Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 29224

 1                           Tuesday, 23 October 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 6             Before we begin today, the Chamber will issue two oral rulings.

 7     The Chamber will first issue an oral decision on the Prosecution request

 8     in relation to the status of Exhibit P71 filed on the 16th of October,

 9     2012.  In the request, the Prosecution notes that Exhibit P71 is

10     identified on the Registry's exhibit list as confidential and asks that

11     Exhibit P71 remain under seal and that a public redacted version of P71

12     uploaded to e-court under Rule 65 ter number 90047A be admitted into

13     evidence.  On the 17th of October, 2012, the accused's legal adviser

14     informed the Chamber by e-mail that the accused does not oppose the

15     Prosecution's request in the motion.

16             The Chamber notes that P71, a witness statement for

17     Safeta Hamzic, was provisionally admitted into evidence on 10th of

18     November, 2009, pursuant to Rule 92 bis subject to the Prosecution

19     complying with the formal requirements of Rule 92 bis (B).  On the 19th

20     of November, 2010, the Prosecution informed the Chamber that the

21     attestation procedure for the witness statement of Safeta Hamzic had been

22     completed.  On the 10th of December, 2010, the Chamber admitted P71 into

23     evidence as a public exhibit.

24             The Chamber recalls its decisions of 10th of November, 2009, and

25     10th of December, 2010, whereby it admitted P71 publicly and notes that

Page 29225

 1     the Registry's exhibit list is incorrect in that respect.  The Chamber

 2     therefore understands the request to be a motion for reconsideration of

 3     the public status of P71.  Given the Prosecution's submissions in the

 4     request and in accordance with the practice in this case, the Chamber is

 5     not satisfied that it is necessary to reconsider the public status of P71

 6     to prevent injustice.  The Chamber, therefore, denies the Prosecution's

 7     request to place Exhibit P71 under seal and to admit a public redacted

 8     version and requests the Registry to mark P71 as public in e-court.

 9             Next could the Chamber move into private session.

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24                           [Open session]

25             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

Page 29228

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we bring in the next witness.  I take it the

 2     next witness is Mr. Veljovic?

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, a small correction to the

 4     transcript from yesterday.  Page number 29179, line 8, currently the

 5     exhibit number listed there is Exhibit D2334.  Instead it should read

 6     Exhibit D2344.  Thank you.

 7                           [The witness entered court]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could the witness take the solemn declaration.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

10     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11                           WITNESS: STEVAN VELJOVIC

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated and make yourself

14     comfortable.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, good morning.

17     Good morning to everybody.

18                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Veljovic.

20        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6040 in

22     e-court.  There is a Serbian version as well.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, have you read the printed version of your

25     statement?

Page 29229

 1        A.   Yes, fully.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you sign it as well?

 3        A.   Yes, I did.  In English, I signed it in English, however.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I have to ask you and I have to remind myself that we

 5     are speaking the same language and that we should make little pauses

 6     between questions and answers and answers and questions for the benefit

 7     of the interpreters.

 8             Does the statement reflect what you stated?

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   If I were to put the same questions to you today, would your

11     answers be the same?

12        A.   Yes, I would be -- they would be the same.  I would also add to

13     the statement that I completed a reserve officer military school and that

14     in peace time I held different duties starting with platoon commander to

15     battalion commander.

16        Q.   Thank you for the addition.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

18     tender this statement into evidence, the statement provided by

19     Witness Veljovic.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As well as the associated

22     documents, the whole package of course.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I take it that you are tendering only one document

24     as an associated exhibit?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

Page 29230

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  They will be admitted.

 4             Shall we give the numbers.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter number 1D06040 will be

 6     Exhibit D2351, and 65 ter number 1D20286 will be Exhibit D2352.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             I would like to read a short summary of Mr. Veljovic's statement

 9     in English.

10             [In English] Stevan Veljovic was an operative officer in the

11     1st Romanija Brigade during the war.  Long before the outbreak of the

12     conflict, he had learnt about the formation of paramilitary Muslim units

13     and their secret arming, while in late 1990 and during 1991 this was no

14     secret anymore.  At this time they began forming the main bodies of the

15     Patriotic League and the Green Berets.

16             By 1991, inter-ethnic division was pervasive.  In early 1992

17     Muslims who were in the Patriotic League started openly controlling roads

18     in the municipality.  They would stop vehicles and search them as well as

19     the passengers for weapons.

20             Stevan Veljovic was mobilised to the 216th Mountain Brigade on

21     30th of June, 1991, and was the assistant commander for operations and

22     training.  This mobilisation was boycotted by most of the Muslims.  By

23     18th [sic] of May 1992 an agreement had been reached about the pullout of

24     JNA units from BH.  He was tasked to move the unit to the Lukavica

25     barracks.  Before the unit's departure to this location, Muslim and

Page 29231

 1     Croatian officers and soldiers left the unit.

 2             As of September 1992, local battalions whose function was to

 3     protect the Serbian villages around Sarajevo and which were manned

 4     exclusively by local inhabitants were included in the composition of the

 5     brigade.  The brigade was armed with establishment infantry weapons.  The

 6     unit had snipers, but they were insufficiently trained reservists, so

 7     they used sniper rifles like standard weapons rather than sniper rifles.

 8     Training of sniper instructors was organised as late as 1995 on the order

 9     of the commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  His unit had numerous

10     problems with the logistics support.  Supply routes were frequently

11     controlled and covered by enemy fire.  They were constantly short of

12     shells for the support equipment.

13             The combat lines of the 1st Corps of BH army were very close to

14     his unit's defence positions and were often separated by one street.  The

15     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and its soldiers shared the same strategy:  To

16     guard and protect Serbian settlements, their families and property in the

17     zone of defence of the brigade.  This is why offensive operations were

18     never carried out, but merely defensive ones.  They were aware that if

19     the forces of the 1st Corps of BH army broke through any segment of their

20     line of the defence, it would have freed up numerous and serious [sic]

21     enemy forces.  Muslim forces were positioned in various features that

22     were dominant in relation to his unit's line of defence and from which

23     they constantly shelled and inflicted casualties, especially in Grbavica

24     and Nedzarici.

25             Neither the brigade nor any of its organs ordered shelling of

Page 29232

 1     civilians or civilian buildings, only military targets and only when

 2     under artillery and infantry fire from the Muslim side.  Even though they

 3     knew that Muslim units and equipment often used civilian buildings as

 4     shelter.  Muslim forces used important cultural, social, historical,

 5     health, commercial, and civilian facilities or were positioned near UN

 6     monitoring forces, with the strategy of Chetniks being immediately

 7     accused of deliberately destroying those buildings when they did return

 8     fire at such targets.

 9             There had been several orders from the -- all Sarajevo-Romanija

10     Corps command levels that fire was to be opened only if lives were

11     directly threatened, and only at targets endangering the security of the

12     unit.  Neither he nor his unit ever had the intention during combat to

13     cause civilian casualties or to terrorise civilians.  It was prohibited

14     to fire at civilians, civilian facilities, and means of public transport.

15     He never issued orders in that sense nor did his unit receive such

16     orders.

17             Stevan Veljovic stated that his brigade constantly respected all

18     truces, unlike the Muslim forces, which persistently violated them.  UN

19     observers were alongside them at all times and they could see this for

20     themselves.  He drafted numerous regular and interim combat reports for

21     the brigade -- for his brigade that clearly shows that they were

22     constantly attacked and shelled and thus forced to return fire.

23             Regarding humanitarian aid, convoys frequently passed through his

24     unit's zone of responsibility and were never obstructed in any way,

25     unless they were transporting at the same time items intended for

Page 29233

 1     military use.

 2             In early August 1995, Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was recognised --

 3     reorganised and he was appointed commander of the 4th Sarajevo Brigade.

 4     He then detached and intervention platoon and the entire 220- [sic] and

 5     80-millimetre mortar battery was sent to Trebinje front to assist in the

 6     defence of the Herzegovina Corps of the VRS against forces of Republic of

 7     Croatia.  After that, there was no support equipment left in his brigade.

 8     Therefore, in this connection to the Markale II incident, he maintains

 9     that at that time there was not a single 120-millimetre mortar on that

10     direction.

11             Thank you.

12             [Interpretation] At this stage I have no questions for

13     Mr. Veljovic.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, thank you.

16                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

17        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Veljovic.

18        A.   Good morning.

19        Q.   You've testified previously at this Tribunal, haven't you?

20        A.   Yes.  In the month of May in 1997 in the General Milosevic case.

21        Q.   In fact, it wasn't actually 1997, it was 2007, wasn't it?

22        A.   In 2007, yes, I testified in the Milosevic case.  It started in

23     the month of May.  I was here from the 22nd of May to the 1st of June.

24        Q.   And when you say "the Milosevic case," you refer to

25     General Dragomir Milosevic; correct?

Page 29234

 1        A.   General Dragomir Milosevic.  I was an operative in the corps from

 2     1994, from the month of December, up to August 1995.  That's why I

 3     testified in his case.

 4        Q.   So can you confirm then something that wasn't mentioned in your

 5     statement related to this.  General Milosevic was also your commander in

 6     the 216th Mountain Brigade; correct?

 7        A.   Correct.

 8        Q.   And it was under his command that you and other soldiers in the

 9     216th Brigade moved to Sarajevo in May 1992?

10        A.   Correct.  We moved to Sarajevo in 1992 from the Drina river

11     sector.  We were a unit of the JNA and we had to obey orders issued by

12     the JNA.  We were moved to Sarajevo because we had manpower and assets

13     which could help people move from the barracks in Sarajevo.  We could

14     also provide them with fuel.  We arrived in Sarajevo on the 3rd of May,

15     1992.

16        Q.   Who was your operations commander in the 216th Mountain Brigade?

17        A.   That was me at the beginning of the war and before the war it was

18     a Muslim, Nehru Ganic, and then he defected and joined the BiH army and

19     now he is a BiH general.

20        Q.   And in the 1st Romanija Brigade you continued to serve under

21     Dragomir Milosevic; correct?

22        A.   That's correct.  General Milosevic was appointed by the

23     government, i.e., by the ministry of Republika Srpska as the commander of

24     the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade.  And then he selected officers who

25     would compose his brigade.  Many had by then left for Yugoslavia.

Page 29235

 1        Q.   Milosevic moved in February 1993 to serve with the Drina Corps;

 2     correct?

 3        A.   Yes, he went to the Drina Corps for chief of the operations

 4     sector of the Drina Corps, and Colonel --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not catch the name.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- came to replace him as the

 7     commander.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   It was actually Vlado Lizdek that came to replace him; is that

10     correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   And in the 1st Romanija Brigade, who was your operations

13     commander?

14        A.   It was me right until 1994 when on the 19th of December, 1994, I

15     came to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps as an operative officer because

16     Commander Milosevic was already appointed and he called me to become the

17     operations officer of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

18        Q.   So Milosevic called you to become operations officer.  How -- was

19     that a phone call?  Was that an appointment?  How did it happen?

20        A.   He issued an order that I should come for that duty, and so I

21     reported pursuant to this order.  Well, since he knew me from before, he

22     provided me with this opportunity, or rather, this post because I knew

23     how to do this job.

24        Q.   And as operations officer within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps you

25     were part of the staff of the corps; correct?

Page 29236

 1        A.   Yes, as part of the corps staff, and Colonel Cedomir Sladoje was

 2     my superior.

 3        Q.   And what was his position?

 4        A.   He was the deputy commander and Chief of Staff at the same time.

 5        Q.   Maybe since you were in the corps staff I can read you some names

 6     and you could tell me whether the names I give you were also members of

 7     the staff.  How about Marko Lugonja?

 8        A.   Marko Lugonja, he was the assistant commander for intelligence

 9     and security.

10        Q.   And as assistant commander for intelligence and security, he

11     reported, I suppose, directly to the corps commander; correct?

12        A.   Yes, it's correct that he was his assistant but they had separate

13     channels.  The security organ was connected with the Main Staff because

14     the operatives have special powers.

15        Q.   Who in the Main Staff or what organ in the Main Staff was Lugonja

16     then connected to?

17        A.   With General Tolimir who was Mladic's assistant for intelligence

18     and security.

19        Q.   So he reported in two lines:  Directly to the corps commander,

20     General Milosevic, and also to General Tolimir; correct?

21        A.   Yes, but the intelligence staff have a separate thing that they

22     do it like that.  Even though he was Milosevic's assistant, he was

23     tightly connected to Tolimir.  That's how it was in the Serbian army

24     because this is approximately how these rules were adhered to.

25        Q.   Was Luka Dragicevic also a member of the corps staff?

Page 29237

 1        A.   Yes, Luka Dragicevic was in the corps staff.  He was the

 2     assistant commander for morale and legal affairs.

 3        Q.   Did he also have a separate reporting channel to the VRS

 4     Main Staff?

 5        A.   No, he did not.  He was responsible to General Milosevic but he

 6     also had some links with the assistant.  They would meet from time to

 7     time.  Security is something separate, special, and morale and legal

 8     affairs is not.  This is how the intelligence people do it in order to

 9     gather data.

10        Q.   When you say he also had some links with the assistant and they

11     would meet from time to time, I take it you're referring to

12     General Gvero?

13        A.   Yes, General Gvero.  He was the assistant for morale at the

14     Main Staff.

15        Q.   Aleksa Krsmanovic?

16        A.   Aleksa Krsmanovic was the assistant commander for logistics, for

17     logistical units for provisions.

18             THE ACCUSED:  This is supposed to be answer, not question, on

19     line 13, 14.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   Tadija Manojlovic?

22        A.   Tadija Manojlovic was the chief of artillery at the corps staff.

23        Q.   And who was he linked with in the Main Staff?

24        A.   Of course he was linked with the chief of the artillery at the

25     Main Staff.  There are close links there.  That is how the relations of

Page 29238

 1     subordination are in the army, from top towards the bottom and from the

 2     bottom up, in terms of reporting.

 3        Q.   And who was the artillery chief in the Main Staff?

 4        A.   I don't know.

 5        Q.   Milan Ugresic, who was he?

 6        A.   Milan Ugresic was the chief of anti-aircraft defence, the PVO.

 7        Q.   Milja [phoen] Vlahovic, who was he?

 8        A.   He was the chief of engineering.

 9        Q.   Dusan Josipovic, who was he?

10        A.   Dusan Josipovic was the chief of communications.

11        Q.   And Milivoj Solar, who was he?

12        A.   Milivoj Solar was a Croat.  He was in our corps.  He was the

13     chief of the technical service which was attached to the logistics

14     sector, so Aleksa Krsmanovic was his boss.

15        Q.   What are the technical services?

16        A.   Logistics comprises the technical service, the medical corps, and

17     the quartermasters sections.  That is -- those comprise the logistics

18     section.

19        Q.   Now, we'll come back to that, your time in the corps staff.  But

20     I want to go and look a little bit at your job description, if I can call

21     it that, back down in the brigade level.  And tell me if I'm correct.

22     Part of your job as operations officer within the brigade was to receive

23     and collate reports from the battalions and their subordinate units?

24        A.   An operations officer in the brigade or in the corps is someone

25     who deals with combat issues, works on the war and military skills, makes

Page 29239

 1     and sends reports to the commander, and they can also receive command

 2     assignment.  He can be given two battalions and command them.  They also

 3     draft TKT documents.

 4        Q.   In your job with the Romanija Brigade, did you receive reports

 5     from the battalions and their subordinate units, yes or no?

 6        A.   Yes, every day.

 7        Q.   And if you weren't there for one reason or another, did you have

 8     a duty officer who collected information on your behalf?

 9        A.   Yes.  We had duty officers, but the operations officer was always

10     informed about it and the Chief of Staff.  I'm talking about the

11     battalion reports.

12        Q.   So the reports that you'd receive at brigade level would come in

13     from all the units - am I right? - the companies, the battalions, the

14     platoons, and the squads?

15        A.   No, they would only come from the battalions and the artillery

16     division and the staff units, such as the smaller units, engineers,

17     communications, the staff units --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the last

19     sentence.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   Can you just repeat your last sentence, please, after "staff

22     units."

23        A.   The companies would send reports to battalion commanders or to

24     the batteries, then to the division commander, and then the komandirs of

25     the platoons and the companies, signals, and so on, and then the

Page 29240

 1     communications company commander, which was a staff unit, would send his

 2     reports to the brigade.

 3             THE ACCUSED:  [Previous translation continues]...

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do not overlap while the interpreters

 5     are interpreting.  Yes, we couldn't hear your words, Mr. Karadzic.  What

 6     was it?

 7             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mike.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  In the answer in line

11     23 something has been mixed up.  The witness said that the companies and

12     the batteries in the artillery would send reports to their first

13     superiors, and here it seems as if they were sending it to the battalion

14     commanders or to the batteries.  Perhaps we could ask the witness to

15     speak slowly because he said company or a battery at the same level and

16     then above that it was their superiors.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The brigade command would receive

18     reports from battalion commanders and commanders of batteries and

19     independent staff units, while battalions comprised companies and

20     divisions comprised batteries, and they and the companies are receiving

21     to the division and the companies are receiving to the battalions and the

22     battalion comprises all of that and sends it to the brigades.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

Page 29241

 1        Q.   So the reports that the brigades received, did they come orally

 2     or in writing or both?

 3        A.   It would receive oral reports, but there had to be a written

 4     report in the evening which would be sent to the brigade; and then the

 5     brigade would send it to the corps and this would be an encrypted report.

 6     The corps would send it to the Main Staff and the Main Staff would send

 7     it to the Supreme Command, and that's how it went.

 8        Q.   To do this job the brigade, I take it, had communications with

 9     the operations officers and centres at the subordinate level; correct?

10        A.   The brigade had a system of communications and it had links with

11     the battalions, and then in turn the battalions had links with the

12     companies, and the brigade had links with the corps, the corps had links

13     with the Main Staff, and the Main Staff with the Supreme Command.

14        Q.   Now, these reports that went from the brigade level up to the

15     corps command, who approved them before they were sent?

16        A.   Every report would be signed by the corps commander or by

17     somebody standing in for him on that day if the commander -- if the corps

18     commander was absent.

19        Q.   So I asked you about the brigade level command -- the brigade

20     level reports that went up to the corps command and your answer talked

21     about reports that went from the corps command further up to the

22     Main Staff.  But just to fill this in, who at the brigade level approved

23     the reports before they went to the corps command?

24        A.   90 per cent or 100 per cent the brigade commander; if the brigade

25     commander was not there, the Chief of Staff; if the Chief of Staff was

Page 29242

 1     not there, then the operations officer would sign it.

 2        Q.   You said that these reports would have to go in written form to

 3     the corps command in the evening.  What was the dead-line for sending

 4     that -- those reports in?

 5        A.   By 8.00 in the evening they would be sent, by 2000 hours at the

 6     latest they would be sent.  There were also extraordinary reports if

 7     something happened unforeseen, then the extraordinary report would also

 8     be sent.

 9        Q.   And would you do an updated report in the morning?

10        A.   No, not in the morning.  Only in the evening when the operations

11     officer would write the report, then the commander would update it.  If

12     he didn't like something, if something was not done properly, then he

13     would ask to have that corrected.  It would be corrected and then he

14     would approve it, send it and -- sign it and send it to the superior

15     command.

16        Q.   Thank you.  So you've already given evidence just a few minutes

17     ago that once these reports arrived in the corps operations section,

18     they'd be sent further on to the Main Staff.  What was the dead-line, the

19     daily dead-line, for doing that?

20        A.   The daily dead-line was in the evening, by 9.00 p.m., that's the

21     time by which the Main Staff had to be informed.

22        Q.   And what about the other -- when we're talking about reports sent

23     to the Main Staff, what about the other sections?  Did those daily

24     operations reports contain reports from the other sectors we've just

25     talked about, artillery, security, morale, for example?

Page 29243

 1        A.   Yes, correct.  It all had to be there, artillery, firing, enemy

 2     fire, our fire, everything that was done that day had to be put in the

 3     report.

 4        Q.   And there was a -- you've alluded to a link between some of the

 5     other sectors and the Main Staff.  Did they also -- did those sectors,

 6     security, for example, also generate separate reports for the Main Staff?

 7        A.   Well, since I never did any intelligence work but I was involved

 8     in operations and command, I did not really have much to do with the

 9     intelligence tasks.  I wasn't permitted to do that and I wasn't able to

10     do that, and that wasn't part of my duties either.

11        Q.   I just asked you about reporting.  Did the other sectors also

12     generate separate reports for the Main Staff?

13        A.   No, just one report would be drafted, but the intelligence

14     section had a separate channel.  They would compile data regarding the

15     units.  They did the security and intelligence for the units and that is

16     why they were treated as a special service, intelligence and security.

17        Q.   All right.  Let's move on to another area just to clarify some

18     things from your statement.  I just want to talk about the

19     Romanija Brigade's command.  You said in your statement that it was

20     located in three places, Tilava, the Bob facility --

21        A.   1st Romanija.

22        Q.   Thank you.  The Bob facility and Miljevici.  So until when were

23     you at Miljevici?

24        A.   Every brigade command has its command post and it also has a

25     forward command post.  Miljevici and Bog were a forward command post

Page 29244

 1     where you would have an operations officer or some other duty officers,

 2     and then the main command post would be located in the rear.  There could

 3     also be a number of forward command posts.

 4        Q.   So Tilava was your main command post; is that correct?

 5        A.   Yes, in the beginning, but this actually changed several times.

 6        Q.   Where were you in 1993 -- where was the brigade's command post in

 7     1993?

 8        A.   In 1993 the brigade command post was in Ljubogosta in autumn in a

 9     restaurant or cafe.  This was in the municipality of Pale.

10        Q.   And in 1994 and 1995?

11        A.   In 1995 the 1st Brigade command was at the

12     Nisicka Visoraban [phoen] elevation and there was a command post in

13     Jahorina in 1993.  The command post switched locations frequently because

14     of security.

15        Q.   And depending on the operations; correct?

16        A.   I didn't understand the question.

17        Q.   That's fine.  I'll move on.  So back to the corps again.  As a

18     member of the corps staff you became familiar with how the corps staff

19     worked, didn't you?

20        A.   Yes.  I took part in the planning of the work of the corps for

21     certain periods of time and so on and so forth.

22        Q.   And those -- that planning work was prepared according to

23     directors' directives and orders from your superior command?

24        A.   Exactly.  Every army -- I mean, we're soldiers, we draft plans,

25     we make certain predictions, estimates, we make plans, and it's quite

Page 29245

 1     another thing whether those plans will be implemented or not.  What else

 2     could they do other than draft tactical moves or deal with tactics when

 3     we're talking about one army against another.

 4        Q.   How often in a day did the commander, General Milosevic, meet

 5     with his corps staff?

 6        A.   General Milosevic would have a briefing every morning.  He would

 7     provide certain guide-lines regarding the line of defence of the brigade

 8     in order to have an overview of certain jobs in the field, the correction

 9     of certain tactical positions and so on.  And then in the evening we

10     would report back about what we did and what the staff officers did.

11        Q.   And when you had these daily meetings, were the sector assistants

12     also present?

13        A.   Yes, they were obliged to attend, the sector assistants, yes.

14        Q.   If you needed to get information for these meetings from the

15     subordinate units, how would you do that?

16        A.   The intelligence and security organ provided a lot of information

17     about the enemy, and that was their assignment.  The operations and

18     training organ cannot work unless they have intelligence information from

19     the intelligence and security organ.  They had their scouts, observers,

20     and they reported information so that we could set up the best possible

21     defence in case something was being prepared.  If some actions of theirs

22     were being prepared, then we would be able to respond to that since the

23     entire time we were in the defensive and not in the offensive.

24        Q.   Was the Chief of Staff always present at these meetings?

25        A.   Of course.  The Chief of Staff is the one who leads the staff.

Page 29246

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   I'm afraid you were speaking a little bit too quickly and softly

 4     and the interpreter didn't hear your answer after:

 5             "Of course.  The Chief of Staff is the one who leads the staff."

 6             Could you repeat your answer.

 7        A.   The corps command has the corps commander and his assistants for

 8     security, for logistics, for morale, and the Chief of Staff is in charge

 9     of the services, the artillery, the engineers, the infantry

10     communications, and so on, and so he is their head.  I hope that's clear

11     now.

12        Q.   So Cedo Sladoje was always present at these meetings?

13        A.   Cedo Sladoje, yes.

14        Q.   And if for some reason General Milosevic wasn't present, who led

15     the meetings, Cedo Sladoje?

16        A.   Yes, he was also his deputy at the same time.

17        Q.   So would it be true then that the commander and the Chief of

18     Staff would co-ordinate their actions?

19        A.   Yes, it's correct.  They would meet very often, eyeball to

20     eyeball, and they would discuss certain things in order to make the staff

21     briefings as efficient as possible.

22        Q.   And if for some reason both the commander, General Milosevic and

23     Cedo Sladoje, weren't available, who then led the meetings?

24        A.   One of the assistants, the assistant -- assistant's corps

25     commander or in some cases the operative because the operative was also

Page 29247

 1     the deputy Chief of Staff.  The chief operative was also the deputy Chief

 2     of Staff.

 3        Q.   So decisions were made at these meetings; correct?

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   And orders were issued at these meetings?

 6        A.   Yes.  And that's true for all the armies of this world; right?

 7        Q.   And notes or minutes were kept of these meetings, weren't they?

 8        A.   Yes.  Minutes were kept at each meeting.  Tasks were issued,

 9     those were recorded by one of the officers who was in charge of keeping

10     the minutes.  It would usually be the chief for morale.  And also it was

11     recorded what was implemented and what was not.  That's why every word

12     was recorded and this helped when it came to monitoring what was achieved

13     and what was not.

14        Q.   So Luka Dragicevic was the one who kept the minutes and notes of

15     these meetings?

16        A.   Luka Dragicevic as well as Milan Ugresic because he kept very

17     good minutes.  But the commander would appoint the person.  If somebody

18     had a bad handwriting, they would obviously not be in charge of keeping

19     the minutes.

20        Q.   And the operations section, your section, sometimes took

21     minutes -- the minutes of those meetings; correct?

22        A.   Well, yes.  He recorded everything that the commander said in

23     order to undertake operative and defensive measures in the unit.  If some

24     other more common things were discussed, such as supplies or assignments,

25     then he would not record that -- those.

Page 29248

 1        Q.   Thank you.  So how often -- or maybe you can confirm this:  The

 2     corps commander would also meet his brigade commanders as a group,

 3     wouldn't he?

 4        A.   Yes.  Very often the corps commander had briefings with the

 5     brigade commanders, but that was not that often.  It was once a week or

 6     once in a fortnight.

 7        Q.   As a brigade operations officers and as corps operations officer,

 8     you would have attended those briefings on both ends, wouldn't you have?

 9        A.   Yes, I attended and I also kept minutes.  I recorded what the

10     brigade commander said, what tasks they were given.  I kept those minutes

11     and I also monitored the implementation of those tasks.

12        Q.   And you would have done that at both the brigade and corps level,

13     wouldn't you have?

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   Those meetings would also have included the regiment commanders;

16     correct?

17        A.   Yes, independent regiments.  There was a mixed artillery

18     regiment, there was a mixed anti-tank regiment, the PVO regiment, the

19     commander of the military police, the staff units at the corps, the chief

20     of engineers, the engineering battalion, they were at the level of the

21     brigade commanders.  Those were the so-called independent units that

22     belonged to the corps.

23        Q.   What about these brigades that you've referred to in your

24     statement, the Trebevic Battalion, the Jahorina Battalion,

25     Podgrab Battalion, those were also independent -- so-called independent

Page 29249

 1     units that belonged to the corps, aren't they?

 2        A.   No, no, they belonged to the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade and

 3     later, after the reorganisation, they were given to the

 4     4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade.  That's who they were assigned to.

 5     They were never independent.  They were always elements of a brigade.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now talking about the brigades, I saw that you

 7     mentioned in your statement that the zone of responsibility of the

 8     1st Romanija Infantry Brigade was Zlatiste on the right and Djukica Potok

 9     on the left, and as far back as Tilava, and Tvrdemici, but this Chamber

10     has already heard evidence that Zlatiste, for example, was in the area of

11     responsibility of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.  Did they assume

12     responsibility for that area after it was held by your brigade?

13        A.   Yes.  They took the responsibility over from us.  At first it was

14     our zone, Zlatiste on the right, Djukica Potok on the left, and Tilava

15     in-depth.  But a zone of responsibility is in-depth and in width.  And

16     then when we were joined by the three battalions, namely,

17     Paljevine [phoen], Jahorina, Podgrab, and Kresani.  Then we -- i.e.,

18     General Lizdek assigned two battalions from Grbavica to the 1st Sarajevo

19     Brigade, and then our zone of responsibility was from Trebinac to -- or

20     Bistica [phoen] brook Vidikovac and to Radovan.  In-depth, the villages

21     of Rakulic [phoen] and Mokra and Romanija.  The zone changed depending on

22     the composition of the brigade.  Sometimes things overlapped and that's

23     why you are puzzled about the fact that at one point our zone of

24     responsibility belonged to the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.  It did

25     happen over time.  The composition of the brigade would change and the

Page 29250

 1     zone would change slightly.

 2        Q.   Who commanded the Novo Sarajevo Brigade of the

 3     Territorial Defence that you referred to in your statement?

 4        A.   The Novo Sarajevo brigade was under the command of a person who

 5     is no longer amongst the living.  His name was Obradovic.  He was killed

 6     during the war.  Pod [phoen] Obradovic was his name.  That was the

 7     Territorial Defence of the Serbian army, i.e., the Serbian guards.  When

 8     the Republika Srpska army arrived, it was ordered that those brigades

 9     should join our brigade as battalions.

10        Q.   And who was Radomir Kojic?

11        A.   Radomir Kojic was a policeman at the beginning of the war.  And

12     then on the 31st of October or thereabouts in 1992 when commander -- the

13     commander of the Trebevic Battalion Milorad Lolovic was killed, he was

14     appointed as the commander of the Trebevic Battalion which was an element

15     of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade.

16        Q.   And did it remain in the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade?

17        A.   It remained in the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade up to the

18     7th August 1995.  And for only two months they belonged to the

19     1st Sarajevo Brigade.  And then the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade

20     was set up, and then that changed because the 1st Romanija Brigade went

21     to Nisici and there was a sort of an interregnum before the new

22     4th Sarajevo Light Infantry Brigade was set up.  In any military there

23     are very frequently changes, very frequent manoeuvres, hence all the

24     subsequent changes.

25        Q.   So -- maybe so we can get this straight in my mind I can have you

Page 29251

 1     look at a map.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have 65 ter number 09390G, please.  Can

 3     we blow that up a bit.  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Now, I wonder if -- because I'd like to see this in -- more

 5     visually laid out, I wonder if you can mark on this map the area of

 6     responsibility of the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade after it absorbed

 7     these independent units, and I accept that we might have lost a bit of

 8     territory on the east side of Sarajevo.  Can you mark that?  Can you

 9     indicate that?

10        A.   I'm really sorry that we're in the courtroom and we're discussing

11     military issues without the original maps of the 1st Corps of the Army of

12     Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  A map is one of

13     the most important elements of the military because the map reflects

14     everything that we did.  You would see the deployment of both forces.

15     When the Milosevic trial was on we saw the map of the 1st Corps map by

16     General Karavelic, we also saw our map, and we could not lie about any of

17     the zones of responsibility.  We knew exactly where the units were and

18     this is a very small scale and I cannot observe, I cannot notice

19     everything.  It's not visible to -- the red line here, usually it is done

20     on a map who -- which -- with a scale of 1:50.000.  I can't see Grbavica

21     here at all.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we make it a little bit smaller for

23     Mr. Veljovic.  And you had previously magnified it one time which looked

24     pretty good.

25        Q.   Does that help you, Mr. Veljovic, or would you like it one

Page 29252

 1     bigger?

 2        A.   Yes, but I can't see anything in the south-east.  You can't see

 3     anything from the Miljacka river.  There are no lines there.  I can see

 4     Trebevic.  I understand the map because a map represents everything that

 5     is on the ground, forests, meadows.  I am sorry that there's no expert in

 6     the courtroom who could correct me if I misspeak.  When it comes to the

 7     1st Romanija Brigade, this is Grbavica to Djukica Potok and across

 8     Trebevic and below the road that leads through the forested part of

 9     Trebevic all the way up to Mrkovici here.  However, I cannot see Mrkovici

10     here at all.

11        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, would you like us to make it -- to magnify it once

12     more for you?  That's no problem.  Because, Mr. Veljovic, you were there,

13     so you would be in the ideal position to indicate your brigade's zone of

14     responsibility.

15        A.   Yes, but -- but I can't see anything here on this map.  This map

16     is not the original map that was drafted by the corps.  Throughout the

17     other trial we had it in the courtroom -- during the Milosevic and

18     Galic's trials you could see both sides, our side and the enemy's side.

19     You could see the deployment of all the units at every observation point,

20     the artillery positions, anti-aircraft positions.  And when you can see

21     that, you know that we cannot lie because that map contained everything.

22     Because whatever the Muslims drew up on their side we copied on our side.

23     I'm sorry that you can't show me that map -- those maps, not this one.

24        Q.   What's your concern with marking this map?  You said just now

25     that we cannot lie with a pre-marked map, referring to one you had seen

Page 29253

 1     in your previous trial.  What's --

 2        A.   I can't see well.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Magnify it, please, one more time and then we'll

 4     see what can happen.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see the Zeljo pitch,

 6     Grbavica, the Jewish cemetery, I can't see all that on this map.  I can't

 7     even see Trebevic.  I don't know where Trebevic is.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  One more time, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The scale is too small.  It's

10     impossible for any operative to use a map of this kind, to work with a

11     map of this kind.  Now I might be able to draw something perhaps.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be provided

13     with a pen.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now this has to be moved, you have

15     to move the map because -- move it to the left, to the left.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll have to have him --

17        Q.   We'll have to have you initial and date this, please,

18     Mr. Veljovic, before we move it to the --

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll ask him to draw again.  We move the map --

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not the zone of

21     responsibility, not all of it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Move to the left, move the map to

24     the left.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We will lose your marking already, but why don't we

Page 29254

 1     do that.  We can lose this.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Fine, Your Honour.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Or we can delete it.  Whatever.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  So at this magnification if we could just move the

 5     map to the left so the witness can see the east side of the city, and

 6     further east, please.  Further east, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Would you wait until assisted by our usher, please.

 8             Is this map okay, Mr. Veljovic?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] More to the left.  More to the

10     left.  More to the left.  More to the left.  More and more to the left.

11     There you go.  That's it.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  If he can be helped with his pen now.  I think

13     Mr. Veljovic can sketch out the area of responsibility of the

14     1st Romanija Brigade after they had absorbed these battalions he referred

15     to in his statement.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But the previous line has been

17     erased so I don't know.  Again you have to move the map so that I can

18     find Radava which is at the top part of the map.  Move the map closer to

19     me.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, this clearly doesn't suit the

21     witness and I think we'll move on and perhaps over the break we can get

22     him a hard copy so he can have a look at this.  I don't want to spend any

23     more time in court on this.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that's the way to go.  Give

25     me a copy on paper and I will draw anything you want me to draw.

Page 29255

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  But I was wondering whether we could not

 2     use the map prepared by the SRK, which we saw earlier on.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Um --

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the way, the -- yes, that's

 6     the map.  That's the map I need and want.  Yes.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll look into it and let Your Honours know after

 8     the next break if that's all right.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  How much longer would you need to conclude your

10     cross-examination, Ms. Edgerton, after the break?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  The next session after that, Your Honour.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break now?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, since we do have another

14     witness here today and we're not scheduled to be in session again until

15     next Tuesday, could the Chamber look into potentially extending the

16     sitting for today's session so that we could complete that witness?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe shorter [In English] Or not

18     to start.  A little longer so to release the witness.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just speaking for myself, I wondered why you would

20     need all that hours to examine such a thing with this witness, but how

21     much would you expect for the next witness, Mr. Tieger?  Is it you that

22     would cross-examine the next witness?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  It's also me, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  And I actually think we would be able to be done

Page 29256

 1     with both of them today.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  I mean -- I'm speaking somewhat optimistically,

 4     but I would make all efforts to be done with both of them today.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             So there's one matter I would like to deal with in private

 7     session in the absence of the witness.

 8             So, Mr. Veljovic, we'll take a break for half an hour, so you may

 9     be excused now.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session.

12                           [Private session]

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 29257

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The Chamber will take a break for half an

17     hour.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, just one question on the subject of reports that I

23     actually omitted to sort of finish off with.  These reports that you said

24     at the corps were prepared to go to the Main Staff, who drafted those?

25     Was it the operations section?

Page 29258

 1        A.   Yes, it was the operations section that on the whole drafted

 2     those reports in 99 per cent of the cases.  The corps commander would

 3     then send them, having read it, and then they would be sent to the

 4     superior command for encoding.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now to go on to another subject that you added to

 6     your statement and you -- in the version that you signed, you added a

 7     paragraph about Faletici saying that in April 1992 members of the

 8     Patriotic League and Green Berets started driving weapons from Faletici

 9     away.  Where did you get that information?

10        A.   Well, that's because the 216th Brigade was part of the JNA at the

11     time.  We received an order to protect that warehouse so that it didn't

12     fall into the hands of the Green Berets; in other words, to prevent them

13     from seizing the weapons.  The 216th Brigade was part of the JNA at the

14     time and we received the -- an order to protect the warehouse, to ensure

15     that weapons of the Territorial Defence for the town of Sarajevo were not

16     seized because there were a lot of rifles and other materiel and

17     technical and military equipment in that warehouse.

18        Q.   So you were there; is that what you're saying?

19        A.   Yes, the 216th Brigade was at the site, and on that occasion we

20     clashed with the Patriotic League and the Green Berets.

21        Q.   Do you know who Milovan Bjelica is?

22        A.   I know who Milovan Bjelica is.  He's from Sokolac.  He's also a

23     relative of mine because his father and my mother -- brother and sister.

24        Q.   And do you know who Jovan Bartula is?

25        A.   Yes, Jovan Bartula, at the beginning of the war he was in the

Page 29259

 1     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps where he had the duty of a commander of a mixed

 2     anti-armoured regiment.

 3        Q.   So I'd like to go to 65 ter number 12028.  It's a copy of an

 4     interview that Milovan Bjelica gave to Srpsko Oslobodjenje on 27 December

 5     1994.  And I think that the far right-hand column on this first page

 6     is -- I'll just -- your indulgence for a moment.  The far right-hand

 7     column towards the bottom is the one that should be enlarged for

 8     Mr. Veljovic.

 9             Mr. Veljovic, Milovan Bjelica in this interview says that he was

10     also there and said that in answer to the question:

11             "How did you arm the people?"

12             Milovan Bjelica said:

13             "And our greatest success was taking the weapons -- the equipment

14     and weapons from Faletici" --

15             JUDGE KWON:  English page.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me, Your Honours.  English page 3.  My

17     apologies.

18        Q.   He's then asked the question:

19             "You did it right in front of the enemy, under sniper rifle?"

20             And he answers:

21             "We stole it from their hands.  We agreed with the then-minister

22     of defence and with a man from security of the then-Sarajevo Corps."

23             It was:

24             "Gagovic was there as well.  We did it by night in April 1992.

25     We entered with hundred trucks on the first night.  There was a group of

Page 29260

 1     young men, activists of SDS which I was leading, and also a group from

 2     Pale from the party led by Radomir Kojic, then unit of current Colonel

 3     Jovan Bartula, then Ilija Maletic with his people from Stari Grad.  This

 4     depot contained all weapons of the Territorial Defence of the former

 5     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  We raided in there the first night and as soon

 6     as we entered the depot, the Green Berets and special forces of

 7     Dragan Bikic started surrounding the barracks."

 8             And further he says:

 9             "We repelled the attack and started pulling out the weapons.  The

10     first night, we took whole artillery and weapons.  There was about 300

11     artillery tubes from 35- to 50.000 rifles as well as other equipment."

12             And further he says:

13             "We were helped by the unit of Colonel Dragoljub Milosevic, i.e.,

14     the 1st Romanija Brigade ... and we brought all weapons and equipment to

15     the territory of Romanija in three days."

16             So, Mr. Veljovic, it seems that Mr. Bjelica your relative was

17     also there and contradicts your assertion about events in Faletici.

18        A.   I didn't see Mr. Bjelica.  He was there daily or a day later.

19     When the 216th Brigade arrived there, I did not see Milovan Bjelica or

20     Radomir Kojic on that day.  We had between 600 and 700 soldiers.  We

21     helped to protect the warehouse.  We got some of the weapons out and

22     placed them in Mokro, in the barracks.  And I don't know where some of

23     the other weapons went towards Sokolac I think.  These were the weapons

24     of the Territorial Defence staff, not of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but of

25     the town of Sarajevo.  As for this report, or rather, article, it's the

Page 29261

 1     first time I've seen it.

 2        Q.   I take it from your answer you don't dispute what Mr. Bjelica

 3     says happened?

 4        A.   Not a hundred per cent.  But it's true that we got a lot of the

 5     weapons out of the Faletici warehouse and, as I said, we placed them in

 6     the barracks in Mokro in some warehouses in Sokolac because they attacked

 7     the warehouse first and then we protected it.  The Green Berets and the

 8     Patriotic League also took quite a few weapons from the warehouse in

 9     Faletici.  Everyone was trying to grab these weapons.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have this as a Prosecution exhibit,

12     please, Your Honours.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Objection, Mr. President.  This is the statement

14     of a third party and she'll have another opportunity to tender this

15     during later Defence witnesses, particularly KW-38.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The witness confirmed to a certain extent that they

17     took a lot of the weapons out of that Faletici warehouse.  Do we need to

18     admit it separately, Ms. Edgerton?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  No.  Thank you, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Then let's move on.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

22        Q.   Now, just a couple of questions about Dragomir Milosevic.  You've

23     said that you knew him quite well, and in your Dragomir Milosevic

24     testimony you said you toured the combat lines with him; correct?

25        A.   That's correct.  I visited the lines with him.  I was an

Page 29262

 1     operations training officer.

 2        Q.   And, in fact, he was regularly on the front lines.  You told the

 3     Chambers in the Dragomir Milosevic case that he went to every trench

 4     along the front line, not once but several times.

 5        A.   He was a field man and he was continually paying visits to the

 6     troops.

 7        Q.   And when you came here to testify in his defence, you knew what

 8     he was charged with at that time?

 9        A.   Yes, I knew what he had been charged with.

10        Q.   So you knew that just like Dr. Karadzic he was charged with a

11     120-millimetre mortar shelling in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995 that killed

12     43 and injured 75; correct?

13        A.   On the 28th of August, 1995, Milosevic wasn't in command of the

14     corps.  He had been wounded and he was at the military medical academy.

15     And Cedo Sladomir [as interpreted],

16     Colonel Cedo Sladomir [as interpreted] was replacing him, so Milosevic

17     wasn't present when Markale was shelled.  In the judgement you can see

18     that he was liberated.  Karavelic, the commander of the 1st Corps, also

19     confirmed this in his order of the 26th.  He confirmed that the citizens

20     and troops should be protected because Cedo Sladoje would be shelling the

21     town of Sarajevo.

22             But they allowed for the market, but I don't think that a shell

23     can fall on Markale because 120- and 82-millimetre mortar, well, these

24     are weapons that I know very well.  And in order to hit such a

25     location -- well that is simply impossible.  I'd stake my life on that

Page 29263

 1     and I would go as far as standing at that site and being shelled there.

 2     We didn't have any mortars on Trebevic in 1995 because it's covered by

 3     forest.  There aren't very suitable positions for firing positions.  All

 4     the mortars were withdrawn because there was an order from Cedo Sladoje,

 5     according to which some of the SRK forces should be sent to Trebinje.

 6     And my unit in the event of an attack would be supported by --

 7        Q.   Mr. Veljovic --

 8        A.   -- a corps -- by the corps artillery --

 9        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, Mr. Veljovic, I asked you a simple question.  You

10     knew that Dragomir Milosevic was charged with exactly the same incident

11     that Dr. Karadzic is here today; correct?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   And when you came to testify in General Milosevic's Defence, your

14     testimony was specifically related to that incident; correct?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   You offered up an alibi for him?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And in fact in your testimony at those previous -- that previous

19     trial, you actually never denied that the shell had fallen on the

20     market-place on 28 August 1992 [sic], but you're doing it today?

21        A.   Well, I heard about that, since it was conveyed through the

22     media.  We asked for expert reports and we wanted to visit the site

23     because at the time the army wasn't active.  Only one shell was fired

24     then.  It seems it hit Markale, the market, and caused a massacre.  And I

25     said --

Page 29264

 1        Q.   Mr. Veljovic --

 2        A.   -- said that General Milovanovic --

 3        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, when you testified before the Trial Chamber in the

 4     Dragomir Milosevic case, you didn't deny that the incident had happened,

 5     but today you are.  Which testimony are we supposed to rely on?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7             Ms. Edgerton, could you clarify your statement that he didn't

 8     deny that the incident had happened.  Do you mean that he admitted that

 9     it was fired by the Serb Sarajevo-Romanija Corps members?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, his testimony was specifically

11     focused on General Dragomir Milosevic's absence from the theatre at that

12     time, and --

13             JUDGE KWON:  I'm asking you whether by saying that he didn't deny

14     the incident, that he -- did he admit that it was done by Serbs?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  He made no specific admission one way or another,

16     Your Honours.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So could then -- could you reformulate your

18     question.

19             Yes, Mr. Robinson, before I ask -- I give the floor back to

20     Ms. Edgerton, did you have anything to say?

21             MR. ROBINSON:  I did, but you took the words out of my mouth so

22     it's not necessary for me to say anything anymore.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes -- pardon me.  Your indulgence for just a

Page 29265

 1     second, Your Honours.

 2        Q.   In your testimony here at this Tribunal in the Dragomir Milosevic

 3     case, you didn't mention the evidence you've now offered in your signed

 4     statement to the effect that you had 120-millimetre mortar battery on

 5     your command operating on the slopes of Trebevic and it was sent by you

 6     to Trebinje.

 7        A.   Well, we sent the battery to Trebinje before the 28th, around the

 8     23rd, and they returned sometime in mid-September.  We believed in our

 9     opinion we hadn't fired that shell.  It had been planted and activated by

10     a remote control.  That was our opinion.  Our opinion was that the Muslim

11     forces had done this for propaganda purposes in order to ensure that we

12     were bombed.  In the Milosevic case I did not say anything about Markale

13     as far as I know, as far as I can remember.

14        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, you're clearly familiar with the incident.  It's

15     one of the --

16        A.   Yes, yes.  I'm familiar with it but I wasn't questioned about it.

17        Q.   But --

18        A.   In the Milosevic case, when I testified in that case.

19        Q.   Um --

20        A.   Because I wasn't in the corps then.  I was in the 4th Brigade and

21     I wasn't asked about Markale.

22        Q.   Your testimony -- let me try again.  This incident is one of the

23     single-most controversial events in the history of the conflict around

24     Sarajevo, and in the Dragomir Milosevic case you were testifying at what

25     might have been the last opportunity to provide that evidence.  And

Page 29266

 1     you're saying now it didn't even occur to you to bring it up?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I object to -- excuse

 3     me, Mr. Veljovic.  Hold on one second, please.  One second.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  Mr. President, that's a question to which

 6     the answer would have absolutely no probative value.  He's not in control

 7     of what he can give -- what is the subjects of his testimony.  And if the

 8     lawyers for General Milosevic or the Prosecutor chose not to ask him

 9     about that, there's nothing that reflects on his credibility from that.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the witness said, Ms. Edgerton, that he was not

11     asked about that.  Could you start from the actual transcript or

12     reformulate your question, Ms. Edgerton.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   In the transcript in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony you talked

15     specifically about your command of the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry

16     Brigade.  You said it was established on the 7th of August.  You

17     explained how you incorporated the Trebevic Battalion and other brigades.

18     You said I didn't have enough support artillery and I had to rely on the

19     corps artillery.  Do you remember that?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be provided with a

21     reference?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do remember that.  Since the

23     4th Brigade was established late there were only firing groups and we

24     didn't have the possibility of forming a brigade artillery group.  And

25     therefore, I had to rely on the corps artillery group that was to the

Page 29267

 1     east, on the opposite side from Trebevic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11 --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, please wait when interpreters are

 4     continuing to interpret.  Do not overlap, please.

 5             Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought they had finished because

 7     the transcript had come to an end.  Line 17, the witness said that there

 8     were only battalion firing groups in existence, and "battalion" is

 9     missing.  It hasn't been entered in the transcript.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Your indulgence for a moment.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I asked for a reference for the

13     Milosevic testimony that Ms. Edgerton was referring to.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Transcript page 5834, 5835.

15        Q.   You had the opportunity in these proceedings to talk about that

16     mortar battery, and you -- are you asserting now the only reason why you

17     chose not to raise it is because you weren't asked?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, excuse me, Mr. President, that's an unfair

19     question to the witness.  He doesn't have the opportunity to raise

20     issues.  He can only answer what he's asked.  That's -- really, she's

21     making a point that this is omitted from the Milosevic testimony and

22     that's as far as she can go with it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's fair enough.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  It is.  And perhaps we could have, in light of

25     everything, 65 ter number 23851 shown to the witness.  It's a report on

Page 29268

 1     the availability of ammunition and fuel for combat vehicles, and it's

 2     dated 31 August 1992.  And -- pardon me, 1995.  And if you go over to the

 3     second page of the document you see that it's signed by the witness.

 4        Q.   So, Mr. Veljovic, this document lists a number of weapons and

 5     vehicles available to your unit, a T-55 tank, some self-propelled guns,

 6     and a number of mortars, including 120-millimetre mortars.  It seems that

 7     this document dated 31 August 1995 puts in doubt your assertion that your

 8     brigade's mortar battery was out of the Sarajevo theatre.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Could you go back to the first page so that he

10     could see the first page of the document.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there's nothing surprising

12     about this.  I signed this.  This is what I brigade had at its disposal

13     at the time, although they were in Trebinje battle-field I counted them

14     as our men [as interpreted].  That's why I made a list of the equipment

15     that we had in order to be able to issue that equipment to the brigade.

16             MS. EDGERTON:

17        Q.   So the note at item number 11 that you had 13, 120-millimetre

18     mortar --

19        A.   Well, I had the Jahorina Battalion, the Podgrab Battalion, but I

20     listed all this -- I listed all this here, all the equipment that

21     belonged to a number of battalions was listed here.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I comment on the transcript?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the 4th Sarajevo Light

24     Brigade, all their weapons:  The Trebevici Battalion is one segment, the

25     Podgrabski Battalion is another segment, the Jahorina Battalion is

Page 29269

 1     another segment, then you have the units attached to HQ.  That's why I

 2     made a list of all the materiel and equipment in order to be sure that I

 3     knew what we had.  From the 31st of August I started making a list and on

 4     the 7th it was necessary for the brigade to be ready for combat, 31st of

 5     August.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on to another topic --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 8 it says "as our men"

10     [In English] "As our own."  [Interpretation] I signed, or rather, I made

11     a list of these weapons which were ours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  I see that.

13             Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15        Q.   Another area that you spoke about in your Dragomir Milosevic

16     testimony but also haven't mentioned here was related to the subject of

17     modified air bombs.  Do you remember that?

18        A.   I do.

19        Q.   So maybe I could put some propositions to you about modified air

20     bombs.  From your Dragomir Milosevic testimony you were quite familiar

21     with them; correct?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   And is it true with respect to modified air bombs that you often

24     heard the commander saying they shouldn't be used because of your safety

25     and because they weren't technically perfected?

Page 29270

 1        A.   Well, yes.  The air bombs with launchers were devised by

 2     craftsmen.  They were not approved, they were not precise, and the

 3     elevation was determined based on the equipment on the lorry and the fuel

 4     that fuelled the air bombs.  And that's -- they could be off target by as

 5     much as 2 kilometres.  That's why we were not supposed to use them in

 6     urban areas.  We were allowed to use them only in wider areas where the

 7     two armies were in contact but there were no civilians, not in urban

 8     areas because there was a risk that we might actually hit our own men or

 9     civilians.

10        Q.   And it's true, isn't it, that air bombs are actually highly

11     destructive?

12        A.   Yes, from 250 to 500 kilogrammes or even up to 1.000 kilogrammes

13     intending to be launched from aircraft; however, that civil war forced

14     people to devise those launchers.  But we were supposed to use those air

15     bombs only in wilderness where there were no human settlements, where

16     there was no habitation, and all they created was panic among the troops.

17        Q.   And that's because, as you described them, they were completely

18     inaccurate; correct?

19        A.   Completely inaccurate.  They were not tested.  Even some crews

20     were killed and the commanders were taken to court because it did happen

21     that those bombs actually exploded there and then when they were

22     activated.  Only some of the brigades had them, not all of them.  Only a

23     few brigades on the strength of the corps had those air bombs, not all of

24     them.

25        Q.   Where were the commanders taken to court?

Page 29271

 1        A.   I know that something happened in Vogosca and some squad

 2     commanders whose crews were killed were handed over to courts.  I don't

 3     know what happened next.  I don't know how many were found guilty.  I

 4     haven't a clue.  But I know that some crews were killed because of those

 5     air bombs that were activated on the spot because those air bombs were

 6     not technically perfected.

 7        Q.   And it's true that their deployment and use was directed by the

 8     corps commander; isn't that right?

 9        A.   That's right.  It would be either the corps commander or brigade

10     commanders, but all that excluded urban settlements.  They could be used

11     only in wilderness, as it were, where there were no urban settlements.

12        Q.   The corps commander or the brigade commander would decide on

13     these air bombs with the approval of the Main Staff; isn't that the case?

14        A.   I really don't know whether it would be on the approval of the

15     Main Staff but that should have been the case because the Main Staff

16     signed the order for them to be removed from Vogosca and they were

17     responsible for air bombs because some sort of a protection was added

18     onto them after they were delivered from the factory or something of the

19     sort.

20        Q.   And, in fact, there was a group within the corps staff who was

21     specifically responsible for monitoring the use and information -- pardon

22     me, implementation of the air bombs; isn't that the case?

23        A.   Well, most probably those were chiefs of artillery, but I am not

24     aware of the existence of such a group.

25        Q.   Now, you've said that you didn't use these bombs on urban areas,

Page 29272

 1     but I want you to have a look at P1297.  It's a document you actually saw

 2     during your previous testimony in the Dragomir Milosevic case.  Pardon

 3     me, I misspoke, P1782.  It's a report from the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

 4     command to the VRS Main Staff dated 7 April 1995.  And on page 2 in both

 5     versions under the heading "Our Forces" you see the notation that:

 6             "In Ilidza one 120-millimetre mine was fired and one 250

 7     kilogramme air bomb was launched in the centre of Hrasnica."

 8             This document appears to -- this document suggests that something

 9     else happened other than what you've said, Mr. Veljovic.

10        A.   It is correct that I testified in the Milosevic case and that

11     this order was shown to me.  However, imagine an aerial bomb weighing 250

12     kilos with such a destructive power.  Its detonation can be heard 60

13     kilometres away.  Hrasnica is close to the airport and UNPROFOR sources

14     would have recorded an event like that and most probably would -- they

15     would have informed the Main Staff in Zagreb.  And since they did not

16     register that -- I saw this order in the Milosevic case and I saw the

17     records from one date to another date, and they never mentioned anything

18     of that kind happening in the territory of the city of Sarajevo, UNPROFOR

19     never did.

20        Q.   Are you then saying that this didn't happen?

21        A.   It didn't happen.  I saw UNPROFOR reports which were shown to me

22     at the Milosevic case.  They sent a report for a certain date.  They said

23     everything was calm in Sarajevo.  Hrasnica is 50 -- 500 metres away from

24     the airport, and you have to know that the detonation of such a bomb

25     could not have been not heard, and they would have heard it, they would

Page 29273

 1     have informed somebody about it.  They never did.  This never happened.

 2        Q.   Well, I'd actually like to show you who did get informed about

 3     it.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we see 65 ter number 16453.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But in that sentence, Mr. Veljovic, it refers to a

 6     Luna rocket.  Do you understand what it is about?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it is the Muslims who

 8     mentioned that.  The Muslim forces mentioned that it was a Luna rocket

 9     which weighs 200 kilogrammes.  Actually, it contains 200 kilogrammes of

10     explosive, but we didn't have that either.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a rocket 6 metres long.  The

13     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not have such rockets at their disposal.  I

14     remember everything that I testified to in that case and what I'm saying

15     now is correct.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Please move on, Ms. Edgerton.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, thank you.  If we could go back to that

19     65 ter number 16453.

20        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, I'd like to show you who did get informed about

21     this.  This is a report from the Main Staff of the VRS to the president

22     dated 7 April 1994 [sic].  And if we could go over to paragraph 3(B) in

23     both documents, please.  I think you just need to go -- thank you.  And

24     in --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Did you say "1994"?  It should be

Page 29274

 1     1995, the same date.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  It should be indeed.  Thank you.  My apologies.

 3     Over to page 5 in the English version of the document.

 4        Q.   Now, this document talks about the situation in the

 5     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and it says under heading 3(B):

 6             "Situation in the Corps:

 7             "The enemy activity was adequately responded to whereby an air

 8     bomb (250 kg) was launched on the centre of Hrasnica."

 9             And then says:

10             "The units have been engaged on additional engineering work on

11     the positions, monitoring of activities being undertaken by the enemy,

12     and prevention of surprises."

13             So this document says not only that Dr. Karadzic was informed and

14     contradicts your assertion that it didn't happen.

15        A.   I don't know what the Main Staff told the Supreme Command.  I

16     didn't know anything about that and that's why referred to the UNPROFOR

17     report covering the four-day period which was relevant and coincided with

18     this event, and for that period they stated that the situation in

19     Sarajevo was calm.

20        Q.   But you've given evidence in the Dragomir Milosevic case that as

21     a brigade operations officer you were completely aware of what was

22     happening in the area of your brigade and as a corps operations officer

23     you knew almost everything going on in your brigade.  You've also given

24     evidence today that the operations sector was involved in drafting these

25     reports that went up to the VRS Main Staff and to the president.  So what

Page 29275

 1     should we rely on, Mr. Veljovic?

 2        A.   I did not draft this report.  I didn't know anything about an

 3     aerial bomb being launched.  Only UNPROFOR could know about that and they

 4     were close by.  If they confirmed that that was the case, then that was

 5     the case.  However, the UNPROFOR did not say anything, that's why I

 6     didn't suffer any consequences when I testified in the Milosevic case.

 7        Q.   So in contrast to what you said in the Milosevic case and what

 8     you've said today, that this bomb wasn't launched, you're now saying you

 9     didn't know anything about it; is that correct?

10        A.   I don't know anything about that.  That's why I'm saying I told

11     you that a detonation would have been heard at a distance of 60

12     kilometres.  The airport was closed.  The UNPROFOR soldiers were there.

13     They would have heard it; however, they didn't hear anything.  They said

14     everything was calm, hence my statement.  And I believe that you will

15     find it on the Internet what I testified to in the Milosevic case, and

16     I'm telling you why I testified the way I did.

17        Q.   Just one more thing then before we leave that point.  I'll just

18     remind you, Mr. Veljovic, of what you said in the Milosevic case.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  And the reference for the record is 5936.

20        Q.   In answer to a question from Judge Mindua you specifically said:

21             "This aerial bomb was not launched, that's for sure."

22             You no longer stand by what you said in the Milosevic case, do

23     you?

24        A.   I still stand by that, because I relied on the UNPROFOR report.

25     I didn't know about that and I thought that the UNPROFOR recorded

Page 29276

 1     everything.  If the UNPROFOR had recorded that I would have agreed.

 2     Since the UNPROFOR never recorded such a launch, based on that I stated

 3     that the launch never took place.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Veljovic, I find it very difficult to follow

 5     what you are saying.  I don't think you drafted any of the UNPROFOR

 6     reports.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.  We saw the documents from

 8     UNPROFOR because I didn't remember that.  Maybe I wasn't there on that

 9     day.  Maybe I was absent.  I'm telling you that the explosion didn't

10     happen.  If it had had -- if it had happened then they would have sent a

11     report to their own staff, and then I would know that it did occur.

12     However, I couldn't confirm because I did not know about it, I did not

13     hear it, I was not informed about it.

14             JUDGE KWON:  It's a separate thing to say that it -- the aerial

15     bomb was not launched at all from saying that you don't know.  But even

16     after having looked at the Sarajevo Corps document as well as the

17     Main Staff document, which are saying to the effect that aerial bomb was

18     launched, you are still saying that that bomb was not launched, which

19     means that these two reports are -- were lying at the time.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they're there

21     or not, but maybe.  That moment I was not there so I was in no position

22     to know that that bomb was launched.  That's why I referred to the

23     UNPROFOR report because they were close, and if the UNPROFOR had

24     confirmed the launch then yes, it happened.  However, if they didn't

25     confirm the launch, then it didn't happen.  I don't know who signed this

Page 29277

 1     on behalf of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I don't know who signed it on

 2     behalf of the Main Staff and who then sent it to President Karadzic.  I

 3     don't know who signed this on behalf of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I

 4     don't know.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  So to be sure, it is your submission that if the

 6     UNPROFOR report does not confirm the content of this document, this is

 7     not true?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because maybe that day I was

 9     in Rogatica and that's why I did not know about that bomb.  Maybe I was

10     at home on furlough, and that's why I wanted to see the UNPROFOR report.

11     I relied on the UNPROFOR report.  If the UNPROFOR report confirmed that

12     there was a launch, then yes; but they said it was calm so there was no

13     launch.  I wanted to see the UNPROFOR report, it was shown to me on the

14     screen, and it stated that Sarajevo and Zepa were calm during that

15     particular period on those days, the document was shown to me on the

16     screen.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

18             THE ACCUSED:  Transcript, please.  Line 5 witness said "I asked

19     to see" not "I wanted to see."  I asked to see.  [Interpretation] "I

20     asked to see."

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Could I have that 65 ter number, I

23     think it was 16453, tendered as a Prosecution exhibit, please,

24     Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 29278

 1             Mr. Robinson, no objections?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that will be admitted as next Prosecution

 4     exhibit.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5943, Your Honours.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  And before it slips my mind completely,

 7     65 ter number 23851, please.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P5944 , Your Honours.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  And I think before we break one last area.

12        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, you said in your statement that with respect to

13     Bascarsija, paragraph I think it was 27, that you could have destroyed

14     that part of the city with artillery but we never even tried to do that

15     although we knew they were military targets and you received strict

16     orders that that part of the city was never to be shelled under any

17     circumstances.

18             Now, that was in the context of a discussion or you dealt with

19     this matter in your Dragomir Milosevic testimony as well in the context

20     of a discussion related to a document exhibited in that case.  And I note

21     that when you were pressed on the issue you said:

22             "I claim," at T5932, "with full responsibility and I am prepared

23     to face the consequences if it proves to be true that Bascarsija was not

24     targeted."

25             And let me just check the cite for a second, Your Honours.  I

Page 29279

 1     need to make sure that I've referred to this properly.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Can you upload that part so we can see that part as

 3     well.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  The 65 ter number for that transcript is 1D26977,

 5     I think.

 6        Q.   And, yes, just to remind you about the context.  On the subject

 7     of shelling Bascarsija you were played a transcript of an intercepted

 8     conversation dated 28 May 1992 between General Ratko Mladic and one

 9     Mirko Vukasinovic and asked the question --

10        A.   Vukasinovic.

11        Q.   -- and asked the question by my former colleague Mr. Waespi:

12             "Mr. Veljovic, General Ratko Mladic, he was interested in the

13     barracks, he was interested in firing at Bascarsija; right?"

14             And your answer was:

15             "You can hear that they should fire at Bascarsija but that did

16     not happen.  I claim with full responsibility and I'm prepared to face

17     the consequences if it proves to be true that Bascarsija was targeted."

18             Is it your assertion then that Bascarsija was never targeted by

19     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces?

20        A.   I claim this with full responsibility.  The Sarajevo-Romanija

21     Corps never did that.  There are even orders issued by General Milosevic

22     that Bascarsija should not be targeted.  Bascarsija is the biggest

23     culture and historical monument that the city of Sarajevo has.  It was

24     built in Turkish times, and if only one 120-millimetre projectile had

25     fallen on that, everything would have burnt because there are no hard

Page 29280

 1     materials there.  That's why I claim with full responsibility and I

 2     invite experts to go there, and if they find that it is not the same as

 3     it was in the 1980s, then you can punish me.  You can do an expert report

 4     on the paints, on the wood, everything the same.  Sometimes people become

 5     euphoric and they issue certain orders, but there is the staff that

 6     alters those orders.  So I can claim - and I do with full

 7     responsibility - that not a single projectile was ever fired on

 8     Bascarsija.

 9        Q.   Now, you've given evidence here today that you know something

10     about mortars, so you must know that mortars are anti-personnel weapons;

11     correct?

12        A.   Yes, if I'm an officer there are certain things that I must know.

13        Q.   So let's have a look at P823.  It's a report dated

14     3 November 1993.  And there should be a translation into B/C/S available.

15     So, Mr. Veljovic, this is a weekly BH political assessment drafted by

16     UNPROFOR and an UNPROFOR civil affairs official on events in the region

17     for the week of November 1993.  And if we could go over to page 7 in the

18     English and page 8 in the B/C/S, the first full paragraph on page 8.  And

19     the second paragraph on -- it's the second paragraph on the B/C/S page.

20     Mr. Veljovic, contrary to what you've just told us, this document reports

21     that Sarajevo and Gorazde have been under heavy bombardment in the past

22     week.  And in response to BH mortar fire, the old town of Sarajevo

23     received almost 500 shells in a one-hour period on 27 October.  And the

24     old town, which has the highest percentage of Muslims in any Sarajevo

25     area, is densely populated.

Page 29281

 1             Now, this contradicts what you've just told us with respect to

 2     shelling of Bascarsija?

 3        A.   I wasn't an operations officer in the SRK in 1993; I was in the

 4     brigade.  But as for 500 shells, if they had fallen on the town they

 5     would have razed it to the ground.  The entire Army of Republika Srpska

 6     didn't have 500 shells.  I think this is grossly untrue.  Five hundred

 7     shells to hit the old part of town, well, do you know what that means?

 8     What sort of inferno would have resulted from that?  How many civilian

 9     casualties would there have been?  The town of Sarajevo was never shelled

10     in this way.  Karadzic and Mladic prohibited this.  But when you saw

11     certain buildings on fire it was in 1992 when barracks were being

12     protected which were in areas that were densely populated by Muslims.

13     But to use 500 shells, well, what did we fire them from since at that

14     time we didn't have that many launchers?  It's quite impossible to

15     understand how a human mind could have imagined such a thing.  Five

16     hundred shells, well, there would have been thousands of dead civilians.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Before going further, Ms. Edgerton, could we clarify

18     whether the old town of Sarajevo and Bascarsija refer to the same place.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Bascarsija is a smaller area.  The

20     old town includes Bistrik and Sedrenik.  It's huge.  It covers a very

21     extensive surface, whereas Bascarsija is only one neighbourhood.  This is

22     really very interesting.  Five hundred aerial bombs, well the Russians

23     didn't drop that many bombs on Berlin.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  If I may, Your Honour, actually Mr. Veljovic is

25     rather correct.  Bascarsija is a local community next to Zajednica within

Page 29282

 1     Stari Grad, the old town.  So it's one of several in that area and

 2     includes indeed some of the areas he's just mentioned, Bistrik, Sedrenik,

 3     and if I give further I might be doing it on the basis of my recollection

 4     and that wouldn't be appropriate.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.  Yes, continue, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a very sorry affair, this

 7     report here.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You talked a little bit in your statement about

10     targeting.  And you said legal military targets were the ones obtained

11     through reconnaissance and intelligence from captured refugees or

12     exchanged persons.

13             So how -- what do you think is a legal military target?

14        A.   A legal military target, well, the demarcation lines or the

15     forward defence line, any firing position regardless of whether it is

16     located in or outside town.  Since the Muslims were defending themselves

17     at the edges of the town of Sarajevo, and according to the military

18     establishment they had the artillery and the depth, we weren't allowed to

19     fire on such targets.  Although we knew about targets in Hrasno and

20     Bascarsija and by the hospital, we didn't fire on these targets to avoid

21     civilian casualties and especially in order to avoid killing children.

22     So we couldn't fire into the depth because we wanted to avoid civilian

23     casualties, although the other side took advantage of this.  You can't

24     put the artillery at the front line.  It has to be positioned in the

25     depth, and since the town was being defended they positioned their

Page 29283

 1     artillery in the depth and we couldn't fire on them.  The only thing that

 2     could happen is if Sarajevo is semi-encircled and then we are assisted by

 3     units, if the gunpowder is wet when we're firing or if the information,

 4     the data, isn't correct, when you fire a shell then the shell doesn't

 5     reach the necessary range and hit the town.  But it was forbidden to fire

 6     buildings in the town.  The Supreme Command had forbidden this, and this

 7     command, this order went down to the lowest-level units.  The command

 8     that the town shouldn't be targeted and that the artillery in urban

 9     neighbourhoods shouldn't be targeted either.

10                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

11             MS. EDGERTON:  I think I don't have anything further,

12     Your Honours.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, a few questions,

16     Your Excellency.

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

19        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Veljovic, could you explain for the benefit

20     of the Chamber whether the Podgrabski Battalion, the Jahorina and

21     Trebevic Battalion, were located which -- this concerns the number of

22     mortars, in fact, that your unit had?

23        A.   The Podgrabski Battalion was facing Gorazde and the Jahorina one

24     was facing Trnovo.  And later, after Lukavica 93, that Jahorina Battalion

25     was sent to the Nisic plateau to become part of the 1st Sarajevo-Romanija

Page 29284

 1     Corps.  The Trebevic Battalion was on Trebevic and facing the town.  It

 2     was in a forested area and it couldn't have opened infantry fire on the

 3     town from that area.  It could have only opened fire on Muslim trenches

 4     which were also located in forested areas.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  On page 48 you were asked who authorised the use of

 6     aerial bombs and it was suggested that the Main Staff as well as the

 7     corps commander authorised this.  You said you didn't know about this but

 8     that it was possible.  Do you have any information according to which the

 9     president of the republic authorised the use of aerial bombs or any other

10     kinds of weapons?

11        A.   I never heard any orders of any kind from the president, from the

12     state, or from the Supreme Command.  I only received orders from the

13     corps command; they were conveyed through the Main Staff of the Army of

14     Republika Srpska.

15        Q.   Thank you.  How many municipalities are there in the old town in

16     Sarajevo and are there any uninhabited areas?

17        A.   The municipality of the old town is very big and there are also

18     rural areas within it as well as urban areas, so it is a very large

19     municipality.  It covers Trebevic which is also part of the old town,

20     then Borci, Sedrenik, Vrace, Vucja Luka, and so on.

21        Q.   Although it's called the old town or Stari Grad it's not an urban

22     area?

23        A.   It is partly urban, yes, and partly rural.

24        Q.   Thank you.  I'd like to ask you the following:  Which -- what

25     sort of fuel did these modified aerial bombs use?

Page 29285

 1        A.   These aerial bombs used some sort of motors with rocket fuel and

 2     they travelled on rails or they were on rails that were on our lorries.

 3     The lorry would then raise its platform or lower the platform and this is

 4     how the device was used.  It wasn't very precise.  The Muslims called

 5     it --

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I'd just like to ask you whether these rocket motors

 7     had tables of their own?

 8        A.   They had --

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours --

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- some kind of tables --

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I think that goes beyond the scope

12     of cross-examination.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The subject matter is precision.

14     It doesn't go beyond the scope.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the witness testified to the inaccuracy of the

16     aerial bomb.

17             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   While you were in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, did you hear or

21     gain any insight into documents that the Main Staff sent to the

22     president?  Did you hear about such documents?

23        A.   Well, when I was in the corps since when the Main Staff sends

24     reports to the Supreme Command, this would be sent down to the corps but

25     not to the brigade.

Page 29286

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did you see this report that was shown to you

 2     according to which an aerial bomb was dropped on Hrasnica?

 3        A.   Perhaps not at that time.  I wasn't in the corps command all the

 4     time.  Sometimes I was on leave.  Sometimes I had certain duties that I

 5     had to perform somewhere.  So it wasn't possible for me to read through

 6     each and every report.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Were you involved in the work that was carried out on

 8     building the modified aerial bombs?

 9        A.   I'm not competent for such things.  I'm an infantry officer.  I

10     don't know anything about rocket motors, metals, and so on and so forth.

11     I did not participate in that.  I'm not an expert on such matters.  I'm

12     not a technical expert by profession.

13        Q.   Thank you.  And you're not a ballistics expert either, are you?

14     Do you have any ballistics training?

15        A.   No, I don't.

16        Q.   Did you hear anything about whether these rockets were tested in

17     the field or on training-grounds in Yugoslavia?  Did you have any such

18     information?

19        A.   There was never any such testing in the Yugoslav People's Army.

20     This was the latest thing in the civil war.  This wasn't part of the

21     weapons of the JNA, the Yugoslav People's Army.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Is there training-ground in Yugoslavia where new

23     weapons are tested?

24        A.   Well, that is probably the case.  There probably is some such

25     training-ground.  I think it must be near the Pasuljanske fields, in

Page 29287

 1     those areas, that's what I know from the media.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see the following

 3     document, 1D8436 in the e-court system.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Did you know about the forces, the military forces, in Hrasnica,

 6     anything about their presence and infrastructure there?

 7        A.   No.  I know that there was a brigade in Hrasnica, or rather, that

 8     in the town of Sarajevo there was the 12th Division under the command of

 9     Fikret Pljevljak and the town of Sarajevo had the most numerous forces.

10     That's where it was possible to mobilise the most men, the largest number

11     of men, and experts who knew about certain technical issues.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Could I ask you to have a look at this analysis of

13     the defence line.  Could you tell the Chamber what period we are talking

14     about and what it has to do, and pay particular attention to item 3, or

15     rather, item 4, and (b) under 4.  Could we zoom in or enlarge this for

16     the benefit of the witness.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Um, Your Honours, um, again I'm not yet sure how

18     this arises from the cross-examination.

19             JUDGE KWON:  You showed the document which refers to the bombing

20     of the centre of Hrasnica.  That's the extent that I understand this line

21     of questions.

22             Yes, let's continue.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's correct, Your Honour --

24     Your Excellency.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 29288

 1        Q.   Mr. Veljovic, please have a look at this proposal, have a look at

 2     item 4.  What is this lieutenant-colonel suggesting with regard to

 3     retaliations because of groups, sabotage groups that are being

 4     infiltrated?  Which military targets are being referred to?

 5        A.   Well, it says the post office in Hrasnica, is that what you have

 6     in mind?

 7        Q.   What does KM stand for?

 8        A.   KM stands for command post.  It's the command post of a given

 9     unit.  I don't know whether it relates to a brigade, a battalion, a

10     corps, or a division.  KM is a military target, command post.

11        Q.   So the KM of the 4th MTBR, MTBR does that stand for motorised

12     brigade?

13        A.   Yes.

14        Q.   And it's in the post office in Hrasnica; is that correct?

15        A.   Yes, the post office KM.  The KM of the 1st Mountain Brigade I

16     suppose, the mountain home Hrasnica.

17        Q.   Thank you.  I won't ask you about these barracks.  Under (b) it

18     says business targets or economic targets?  What does it say?  Can you

19     read it out, please.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we see the next page in English.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Economic facilities, the primary

22     school in Hrasnica, production of shells, the production of shells in

23     Hrasnica, Aleksa Santic primary school in Hrasnica, shell production.

24        Q.   So is this also a legitimate military target?

25        A.   Yes, of course, but it was difficult for us to decide to fire on

Page 29289

 1     such targets because we were afraid of killing civilians.  We only fired

 2     on the demarcation lines, but there was a margin of error, 50 metres.  It

 3     all depended on psychological factors, on the target person, on the

 4     charge, on the calibre of the barrel not being appropriate for the shell.

 5     Then you have to use plastic shells.  The gases aren't appropriate for

 6     expelling the projectile.  Many errors can be made in the artillery.  In

 7     France in the first world war, 10.000 soldiers were killed by their own

 8     artillery.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Chamber when it was determined that

10     there were such targets in the centre of Hrasnica, could you tell us

11     anything about the dates?

12        A.   Well, 0508 of -- the 5th of August, 1994, at the time I wasn't in

13     the corps so I couldn't say anything.  At the time I was in the

14     1st Romanija Infantry Brigade.  I was at the Nisic plateau.  I was in

15     command of two battalions, the Sokolac and the Jahorina battalion.  That

16     was during this period of time.  I wasn't in the corps command.  I was in

17     the corps command as of the 19th of December, 1994, but here I see that

18     it's the 5th of August, 1994.  So I couldn't say anything because that

19     wasn't close to me.

20        Q.   Did you hear that as of that date up to 1995 the centre of

21     Hrasnica was ever targeted, although they were aware of the installations

22     and the legitimate targets there?

23        A.   I don't remember that that was ever targeted.  We always knew

24     that they were making those things, that they placed their command posts

25     in the schools, and we knew that if we targeted them that we would

Page 29290

 1     inflict civilian casualties.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document please be admitted

 4     into evidence.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  And could the witness please be asked to come

 6     closer to the microphones.  Thank you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I take it there's no objection?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That that will be admitted as a Defence exhibit.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2353.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Veljovic, when answering the questions could you

12     speak to the microphone?  For example, I take it that you can come a bit

13     closer to the microphone.  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Can you please tell us to what extent were you familiar with

16     aerial bombs; i.e., those modified aerial bombs?  How familiar were you

17     with them?  What was your participation in all of that?

18        A.   I was not well informed about those aerial bombs.  Several of our

19     brigades had those aerial bombs:  The 1st Romanija didn't have them; the

20     1st Sarajevo didn't have them; the 2nd Sarajevo didn't have them; the

21     Ilidza had them; the Iljas Brigade had them; the Vogosca and the others

22     that had facilities nearby such as the Pretis institute, the maintenance

23     depot, they made them.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did your brigade have them?

25        A.   No.  My brigade, which was the 4th Sarajevo Light Infantry

Page 29291

 1     Brigade, didn't have them, nor did the 1st Romanija Brigade.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you participate in the launch of that bomb?

 3        A.   Only in the Trnovo theatre of war around Treskavica I saw the

 4     bomb being launched, but it is wilderness.  There are no settlements

 5     there.

 6        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Veljovic, for your testimony.  I have no further

 7     questions for you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that concludes your evidence, Mr. Veljovic.  On

 9     behalf of the Chamber I would like to thank you for your coming to

10     The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will take a break so we'll rise all

13     together.  We'll break for 45 minutes and will resume at quarter past

14     1.00.

15                           [The witness withdrew]

16                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.26 p.m.

17                           [The witness entered court]

18                           --- On resuming at 1.16 p.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

21     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22                           WITNESS:  SINISA MAKSIMOVIC

23                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please make yourself comfortable.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 29292

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Maksimovic.

 4        A.   Good afternoon.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6041 in

 6     e-court.  This is Mr. Maksimovic's statement.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Have you read this statement?  Have you reviewed it,

 9     Mr. Maksimovic?

10        A.   Yes, I have.

11        Q.   Did you sign it as well?

12        A.   Yes, I did.

13        Q.   Does it accurately reflect what you stated?

14        A.   Yes, it does.

15        Q.   If I were -- we have to wait for the interpretation.  If I were

16     to put the same questions to you today and offer your answers in lieu of

17     the statement, would your answers be the same as they are in your

18     statement?

19        A.   Yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

21     tender this 92 ter package into evidence.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection, Ms. Edgerton?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  No, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  His Rule 92 ter statement as well as five associated

25     exhibits will be admitted into evidence.

Page 29293

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the statement 65 ter number 1D06041

 2     will be Exhibit D2354.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The other associated exhibits' number will be given

 4     in due course.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to read a

 6     short summary of Mr. Maksimovic's statement.  I'm going to do it in

 7     English.

 8             [In English] In May 1992 Sinisa Maksimovic became a member of the

 9     communications platoon of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps on Tvrdimici, until

10     September 1992 when he was transferred to the Igman's Brigade's

11     4th Infantry Battalion in Blazuj.  In January 1993 he became a member of

12     intervention platoon of the Igman Brigade.

13             In the summer of 1993 he took part in the operation to occupy the

14     hills of Golo Brdo, Obeljak, and Stupnik, all dominant positions from

15     which the Muslim forces fired at and shelled Hadzici.  His conclusion is

16     that in these units there were people who had been convicts.  During this

17     operation his brigade took the position on Brezovaca on Igman.  The

18     Tresnjevo Brdo hill was also taken but his unit withdrew under superior

19     command's order.  They were promised that these positions would be

20     occupied by UNPROFOR and not Muslim forces.  Immediately after withdrawal

21     the Tresnjevo Brdo hill was occupied by Muslim forces, situation that

22     remained unchanged until the end of the war.

23             In June 1994, after having completed his schooling in the first

24     class -- at the first class college for officers and being given the rank

25     of 2nd lieutenant, Sinisa Maksimovic was transferred to the 1st Romanija

Page 29294

 1     Brigade of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  He was accompanied company

 2     commander in Mrkovici in July 1994.  All fire was aimed at the enemy

 3     lines of -- all fire -- devices of this brigade -- company were on the

 4     enemy lines which were very close to theirs, at a distance from 20 to 100

 5     metres.  Almost all soldiers in this company were local men, among whom

 6     the dominant conviction was that the Markale I incident had been

 7     engineered by the enemy.

 8             The units opposed to his were from the 105 Brigade -- Mountain

 9     Brigade of 1st Corps of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Muslim

10     forces possessed sniper weapons.  Muslim special units "Laste" took

11     Spicasta Stijena at least once, in mid-September 1994.

12             In late 1994 he was transferred to the Igman Brigade.  In August

13     1995 a systematic bombing of and artillery assault on Serb positions was

14     initiated by the UN Rapid Reaction Force stationed in the

15     Igman-Bjelasnica sector.  Sinisa Maksimovic watched the UN Rapid Reaction

16     Forces, positioned in Muslim-controlled territory, transport heavy

17     weaponry along the road over Igman.  This assault had air support from a

18     large number of aircrafts.  The Muslim forces also opened fire but dared

19     not launch an infantry assault due to the intensity of the UN artillery

20     and aircraft fire.

21             Regarding incident in Sedrenik area on 17th of April of 1993, the

22     positions of Sinisa Maksimovic's unit remained unchanged even before his

23     arrival as a company commander.  Associated document 1D08572 shows the

24     area where his unit was located in the woods.

25             Regarding incident Sedrenik area on 6th of March, 1995, and to

Page 29295

 1     the best of Sinisa Maksimovic's knowledge, Serb units at that location

 2     did not have trained snipers in their ranks.  The units were comprised of

 3     local people who were not trained for sniper fire.  The alleged positions

 4     from which the sniper attack in Sedrenik was allegedly carried out were

 5     under constant enemy fire.

 6             Regarding incident occurred in the junction of Sedrenik Street

 7     and Redzepa Gorusanovica Street on 22nd November 1994, and beside the

 8     argument put forward in connection to the aforementioned incidents,

 9     Sinisa Maksimovic ask that he never issued any order for civilians to be

10     fired upon, nor did he ever received any information that civilian

11     targets had been fired upon by members of his unit.

12             That would be a short summary and I do not have questions for

13     that witness at this point of time.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             Ms. Edgerton.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

17                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

18        Q.   Good afternoon, Mr. Maksimovic.

19        A.   Good afternoon.

20        Q.   I have a couple of questions about your evidence, the evidence

21     set out in your statement, and they're actually in regard to the

22     incidents you spoke about in paragraphs 7, 8, and 9 of your statement.

23     So in paragraph 7 you were asked some questions about an address at

24     Sedrenik 157.  Do you remember that?

25        A.   Yes, I remember the question that was put to me.  However, I'm

Page 29296

 1     not familiar with the address, Sedrenik 157 --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be

 3     provided with his statement in Serbian.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to have your statement in front of

 5     you, Mr. Maksimovic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have a copy, Mr. Karadzic?

 8             THE ACCUSED:  I'm just --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Or we can print it up thanks to the Registry.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   Great.  Now, if you could just flip over to paragraph 7, there

13     you were asked some questions with respect to an incident at an address

14     at Sedrenik 157.  And when you were asked those questions, were you told

15     that this incident took place on 17 April 1993?

16        A.   I was told that the incident had happened in the month of April

17     and that I was not the company commander in Mrkovici at that time.  I was

18     also told that I should look at the pictures, the photos, the map, and to

19     point at the positions of my units.  To my knowledge, those positions had

20     not changed and did not change after I became the company commander.

21        Q.   Now, in paragraph 8 you were asked some questions about an

22     incident dated 6 March 1995.  You weren't company commander in Mrkovici

23     at that period of time either, were you?

24        A.   I was not company commander at the time.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I assist.  The witness said

Page 29297

 1     that the lines were not changed either before or thereafter, which is why

 2     he was asked to talk about that.  That's on lines 9 and 10.  The witness

 3     said that the lines had not changed before he joined or after he joined.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  He said that and then you can take up that issue in

 5     your re-examination.  Please refrain as far as possible, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Now, the third incident you were asked questions about in

 9     paragraph 9, were you told that Dr. Karadzic is not charged with that

10     incident?

11        A.   No, I wasn't told that.  I didn't have that information.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now in your statement and I think -- and in relation

13     to the situation at Sedrenik generally, you talked about the ABiH holding

14     a position between -- beneath Spicaste Stijene and you've talked about

15     whether or not your unit opens sniper fire from Spicaste Stijene.  Is it

16     your evidence today that SRK units at that area did not shoot from

17     Spicaste Stijene at all?

18        A.   I can't say that.  We did open fire when necessary when we were

19     attacked.  Of course we fired.  However, our activities were aimed at the

20     enemy positions, exclusively at the enemy positions.

21        Q.   Maybe you could answer a question I have then about a document

22     that we've received in evidence here, P1619, please.  It's a report

23     prepared by UNMO Sector Sarajevo on 6 March 1995 and it's been translated

24     into B/C/S.  I'll just wait until we can see the version in your

25     language.  Wonderful.  Thank you.  If we could jump over to English page

Page 29298

 1     3 in both versions -- sorry, English and B/C/S page 3, paragraph 8,

 2     sub a, sub ii and iii.

 3             There we see reports on the wounding of two civilians on 6 March

 4     from Sharpstone.  One is a male aged 48 and the other is a male aged 14.

 5     Now if we could jump back over to page 1, paragraph 3(b), I'd like you to

 6     have a look at that.  Now, paragraph 3(b) says after these incidents that

 7     I've just referred to the UN EgyptBat anti-sniping APC at that location

 8     returned fire onto Bosnian Serb army positions at Sharpstone.  And

 9     following this retaliation, the UNMO Vogosca team received a telephone

10     call from the commander Radava Battalion, Vogosca Brigade, Bosnian Serb

11     army, stating that if the EgyptBat APC in his target practice area

12     (Sedrenik) is not removed within 30 minutes it will be fired upon.  And

13     shortly after this call the sector commander arrived at the APC location.

14     The UNMO Vogosca team received another telephone call shortly thereafter

15     from the Radava Battalion commander stating that he would also fire on

16     the UNPROFOR reinforcements with the APC and the APC was then moved to a

17     safer position.

18             And I wonder if that affects your answer in any regard.

19        A.   Well, it doesn't affect it.  Those things happened in 1995 when I

20     was not in the command of the Mirkovic company.  I can't say that the

21     report is not correct, I can't say that.  However, as for what was

22     happening then I can't talk about that because I was not present in the

23     unit at that time.  That was March 1995 and already in December 1994 I

24     was transferred to the Igman Brigade.

25        Q.   Thank you.  We'll move on to the incident you discussed at

Page 29299

 1     paragraph 7 in your statement.  You were shown a photograph and it has

 2     the 65 ter number 1D8572, and you were told that that photograph was

 3     taken from the approximate place where the alleged victim of the incident

 4     was located, and you made some markings on that photograph.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  I wonder if we could call that photograph up.

 6     Thank you.

 7        Q.   Once you've had a look at that, I'd like to show you another

 8     photograph that was taken from the actual incident location, and it's

 9     65 ter number 9563A [sic].

10             MS. EDGERTON:  And maybe we could display those two photographs

11     side by side on the computer monitor.  And, by the way 9536A is a still

12     image taken from the 360-degree image that was admitted through Barry

13     Hogan as P2207.  Page 2 now.  Thank you.

14        Q.   Now, this photo 9536A, page 2, is a photo of the Sharpstone area

15     taken from the actual incident location.  And I wonder if having those

16     two photos side by side that changes your answer and the markings you

17     made in any regard.

18        A.   I would like an explanation of this photo, F2.  I can see two

19     houses there.  I can see some trees.  And in the background I can see one

20     part of a hill but not too well.  I don't know what you want me to say

21     based on the right-hand side photo.  I marked the left-hand side photo.

22     I put a rectangular sign to show where my units were not, whereas the

23     circular sign marks Spicaste Stijene.  I don't recognise any of those

24     things in the other photo, in F2.

25        Q.   Now, this Chamber has received evidence that this photograph was

Page 29300

 1     taken from the actual incident location and the small green triangle,

 2     upside down triangle that you see, the hilltop in the distance, is the

 3     alleged origin of fire.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  And if we can zoom in to that triangle.  Thank

 5     you.

 6        Q.   On 65 ter number 9536A, you see that it displays a different area

 7     than the one that you've marked and the photo was taken from a different

 8     angle than the picture that you've marked in 1D8572.

 9        A.   Again, can I have an explanation with regard to the left-hand

10     side house.  Is that the same house that we can see in the other photo

11     where I marked the position of my unit?

12        Q.   It is.

13        A.   It is, yes, okay.  In that case I can't say anything about the

14     position from which it was allegedly fired because it doesn't seem to

15     belong to the area of responsibility of my company.  It seems to me that

16     that position is a bit further to the right from the end of the zone of

17     responsibility of my company, and if this is the assumed direction from

18     which the bullets arrived, then I can say that this did not belong to the

19     Mokrovici Company.  That bullet must have belonged to another unit that

20     was our neighbour on the left flank.

21        Q.   Thanks for that clarification.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  And since this photograph is already part of an

23     exhibit we're not going to tender it and just move on.

24        Q.   Now, at paragraph 8 of your statement you said -- answering

25     questions about the incident that took place on 6 March 1995 that Serb

Page 29301

 1     positions from the alleged incident locations were more than a thousand

 2     metres away.  I'd like to ask you about that.  Did you get told the

 3     address of the incident location?

 4        A.   No, I didn't know the address.  The address would not have meant

 5     much to me anyway when it came to the positioning of the location or the

 6     way I understood it, the location of the incident, that is.  What I could

 7     see in the photo was something that I assumed must have been very far

 8     from our positions.  I don't know if you understand my answer.

 9        Q.   I think I do.  Your estimate of a thousand metres is an

10     assumption based on a photo you were shown; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes.

12        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  Now for the last question, and also in

13     relation to this incident, you said your units - I imagine referring to

14     the time you were in the Mrkovici company - your units had

15     7.62-millimetre automatic rifles whose efficacy was no less than 800

16     metres in relation to the target; correct?

17        A.   Yes, I said that.  However, it was a bit exaggerated.  Eight

18     hundred metre is a lot for the efficacy of the rifle.  It is most

19     efficient at 3- to 400 metres.  Eight hundred metres would be the

20     ultimate distance for which it can be assumed that that rifle could hit

21     its target.  Eight hundred metres is much too much.  I made a mistake

22     there.  Being familiar with the automatic rifles and automatic weaponry,

23     I would say that its true efficiency range is at some 300 to 400 metres.

24     That's its quality efficiency range.

25        Q.   And you also had 7.9-millimetre weapons and ammunition; correct?

Page 29302

 1        A.   I think that there was an M53 machine-gun in the unit.  I can't

 2     remember which location exactly.  The entire company had about 12 to 13

 3     trenches or fortified positions.  As to where the machine-gun was located

 4     exactly, I could not say.  I can't remember.

 5        Q.   Maybe -- let's maybe have a look at one last document while we're

 6     talking about fire-arms like this.  65 ter number 23826.  And while we're

 7     waiting for that to come up, what's the effective range of an M53

 8     machine-gun?

 9        A.   I assume that it would be between 7- and 800 metres.  An M53

10     machine-gun is extremely unreliable.  It's an unreliable weapon.  Bullets

11     often get jammed.  When you open fire from such a machine-gun the result

12     is very imprecise, in fact.  The machine-gun is used to fire bursts of

13     fire.  I think the enemy is more affected by the bursts of fire than by

14     the results achieved by the machine-gun fire itself.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Just one last document dated 29 October 1993, and

16     it's a document from the 1st Romanija Infantry Brigade to the Sarajevo

17     Corps command responding to a query from the corps commander and

18     indicating that in the brigade they had M76, 7.9-millimetre sniper

19     rifles; M48, 7.9-millimetre sniper rifles; M59/66, 7.62-millimetre sniper

20     rifles.  Are you familiar with the effective ranges of these three types

21     of sniper rifles that I've just described?

22        A.   I think the 7.9, the M76, has a range of 1.000 metres, an

23     effective range of 1.000 metres.  As for the other two sniper rifles, the

24     M48 and 59, the M59/66, I'm not sure about the range of these two

25     weapons.

Page 29303

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we have this as a Prosecution exhibit,

 3     please, Your Honours?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P5945, Your Honours.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   And just one last question and it's relating to the last sentence

 8     in paragraph 10 of your statement.  You referred to the Laste, the

 9     Bosnian special unit, taking Spicaste Stijene in mid-September 1994.

10     That only lasted for a couple of days, didn't it?  Your forces recovered

11     the ridge a couple of days after that; correct?

12        A.   That's correct.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  I have nothing further, Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a few questions,

16     Your Excellency.

17             Could we have a look at P5945 just to see if the title -- to see

18     what it says there.

19                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Maksimovic, could you please just read out

21     the first part --

22        A.   Intensifying sniping activity against Muslim forces to the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, the command of the 1st Romanija Infantry

24     Brigade.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Since you graduated from the college for officers,

Page 29304

 1     could you tell us whether the Muslim forces are legitimate target for

 2     snipers?

 3        A.   The ABiH was a legitimate target.  The Muslim forces were a

 4     legitimate target.  The title is a bit strange.

 5        Q.   On the basis of what we have here, was it possible to target

 6     civilians?  Could snipers target the civilians?

 7        A.   Could I read through all of this?  I don't know what is at stake.

 8     Is this a report?  I'm not sure what the nature of this document is.

 9     It's not quite clear to me.

10        Q.   Read out the first sentence.  I think that's quite sufficient.

11        A.   Yes, it's a report.  Could you please repeat your question.

12        Q.   Does this document allow for snipers to target civilians?  Does

13     it imply that such action could be taken?

14        A.   Of course not because a report is a document that is sent to the

15     superior command and it reports on the situation in the unit, on

16     situation with regard to materiel and technical equipment, and so on and

17     so forth.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now have a look at

20     Prosecution Exhibit P2193.  Could we zoom into the top right-hand corner.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you recognise this map, the map of the town?

23        A.   Yes, it's Sarajevo and its surroundings.

24        Q.   Thank you.  The Defence team showed you a different map that the

25     Prosecution marked this map, it marked the locations of incidents 2, 13,

Page 29305

 1     and 17.  Can you locate Sedrenik, Groblje, Skajca [phoen], Sokak.  Do you

 2     recognise these places and can you tell us how far are the locations

 3     where these incidents occurred were located from your positions?

 4        A.   Quite far.  Incident number 2 I think is about -- or the location

 5     of that incident is at a distance of 800 metres to a kilometre roughly

 6     speaking.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  Just to underscore, as I said earlier, this --

10     with the witness, incident 2 -- pardon me, incident 13 was dropped from

11     the indictment against Karadzic.  He's no longer charged with that.  And

12     I let the paragraph referring to that incident in the witness's statement

13     go in because I thought in context it was the fair thing to do.  But I

14     just wanted to remind Dr. Karadzic, before we go down that road, that he

15     can't have a kick at the can, so to speak, with a dropped incident,

16     particularly since the Prosecution was precluded from referring to

17     dropped incidents in our case in chief.

18             JUDGE KWON:  But you have no difficult with F2 -- 2nd and 17th

19     incident?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  No, none at all.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Mr. Maksimovic, can you see the main street in the Sedrenik

24     neighbourhood here and can you tell us whether it was possible for you to

25     target these locations, location number 2 and location number 17?

Page 29306

 1        A.   I think it is very difficult to provide you with any specific

 2     answers on the basis of this map.  Sedrenik is a densely populated area

 3     and as for the location of the street where incident number 2 occurred, I

 4     believe that could be the main street that led to Mrkovici.  As for

 5     incidents 17 and 13, or rather, incident number 17, if I can see this

 6     clearly I think that it is located beneath Trdonje -- Grdonj.

 7             And it would be difficult to say that it was a visible location

 8     from my positions.  The top of the Grdonj hill was not under our control,

 9     the top of the Grdonj hill.  So incident number 17, as far as that

10     incident is concerned I wouldn't say that it occurred because it was

11     targeted from our positions because it is beneath Grdonj.  As for

12     incident number 2, the location is quite a distance from the line itself.

13     So if such a incident occurred it would be difficult to say that it was a

14     deliberate hit fired from our positions.  It's difficult to say whether

15     fire was opened from our positions in fact.

16        Q.   Thank you.  What's the altitude of the hill of Grdonj in relation

17     to the positions of your company and Sedrenik?

18        A.   It's a dominant position, it's above Sedrenik, and part of the

19     Grdonj hill at the level of Mala Kula, if you have a look at the map it's

20     to the north of the hill, at the level of Mala Kula that is, in fact,

21     where my units were located, or rather, my company and platoons.

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Maksimovic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,

24     Your Excellency.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 29307

 1             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Maksimovic.  On behalf of this

 2     Chamber I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.

 3     Now you are free to go.  Please have a safe journey back home.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 5                           [The witness withdrew]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 29308











11  Page 29308 redacted.  Private session.















Page 29309

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21                           [Open session]

22             THE REGISTRAR:  We're now in open session, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             Is there anything to raise?  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I would just like to put on

Page 29310

 1     the record the fact that the next witness that we had scheduled to

 2     testify who had been designated as KW-341 declined to testify after being

 3     notified that the Chamber had denied our motion for protective measures.

 4     And so he will not be called.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  So who is the next one?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  The witness I am referring to is K --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, who will be testifying?

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  The next witness to be testifying on Tuesday, the

 9     30th of October, is Colonel Steven Joudry and we filed a witness list

10     today for that week.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

12             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I don't want to belabour this point,

14     but I'm not entirely sure why it was necessary to put that on the record,

15     but if it is to be intended to be a suggestion that the Trial Chamber's

16     failure to provide protective measures were somehow -- were a reflection

17     of the nature of the witness's concerns in not testifying, I feel obliged

18     to say the Prosecution doesn't accept that insinuation.  We consider that

19     the witness would have been subjected to cross-examination of a nature

20     that he didn't want exposed to the public and that's the nature of the

21     failure to appear now.  And if we continue this discussion, I'd be more

22     than happy to discuss that evidence in more detail.

23             Secondly, I also wanted to address a comment that was made the

24     other day to the effect that no Prosecution witnesses ever had protective

25     measures sought ultimately denied; that is simply not accurate.

Page 29311

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Well, let us leave it at that.

 2             Unless there are any other things to be raised, the hearing is

 3     now adjourned.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.08 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 30th day of

 6                           October, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.