Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30142

 1                           Tuesday, 13 November 2012

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Proceedings were delayed

 6     again today due to technical difficulties.

 7             I would like to go back to an issue Mr. Robinson raised yesterday

 8     with respect to the Prosecution's contact with Defence witnesses.  At the

 9     end of your submission, Mr. Robinson, you stated, I quote, it's

10     transcript page 30105, lines from 11 to 14, it reads:

11             "However, I wanted to put it on the record and ask Mr. Tieger to

12     make sure that all members of the Prosecution not only in his team but

13     any other teams that might have any potential need to contact these

14     witnesses to comply with the Trial Chamber's order."

15             So I was wondering what you meant by "any other teams"?  Did you

16     mean to say that, for example, Mladic team should also comply with our

17     Chamber's order?

18             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I did, Mr. President, because the Prosecution

20     is one so they have to comply with disclosure obligations and other

21     things regardless of whether they come into contact in the context of one

22     case or another.  In particular, this matter arose in relation to the

23     Tolimir case because we were advised that the two witnesses who the

24     Prosecution wanted to contact first and one of whom who they had

25     inadvertently already contacted were to be contacted --

Page 30143

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 2                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  This is simply unacceptable.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Maybe we can move to courtroom 2.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we have to just adjourn.  We have to rise.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is also unacceptable that ...

 7             [In English] It appears to be that what Mr. Robinson said is

 8     unacceptable, but I assume that Excellency Kwon said about technical ...

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We'll rise until we are further informed.

10                           --- Recess taken at 9.18 a.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 10.16 a.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, again.  I have to find out which

13     computer is mine.

14             Does it mean that we lost all of the previous transcript for

15     today?

16                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

17             JUDGE KWON:  I have to check until where it has been recorded.

18     So shall we start again?

19             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I think where I left off was

21     that we consider the Prosecution to be one for purposes of contacting our

22     witnesses -- [Microphone not activated].

23             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone, please.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  My microphone is on.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry.  It's my fault.  I inadvertently the

Page 30144

 1     priority switch.  Yes, please continue.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, so Mr. President, it's our position that

 3     since the Prosecution is one, that the Prosecution has to comply with

 4     your order regardless of whether it's a member of the Karadzic team or

 5     the member of another team.  And I had indicated to you that the issue

 6     first arose last week when I was advised by one of the members of the

 7     Prosecution team that people from the Tolimir team wanted to interview

 8     two witnesses who are on our list.  And so they contacted us pursuant to

 9     your order and we contacted the witnesses and now we've advised the

10     Prosecution that they're free to make contact with the witness.  So the

11     system worked well except for the inadvertent contact by the Prosecution,

12     and we believe that that system should continue to be in place for any

13     contacts by members of any Prosecution team.  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just two questions, preliminary questions.  First

15     one is for you, Mr. Robinson.  When you refer to inadvertent contact by

16     the Prosecution team, did you mean the contact of the Tolimir team with

17     Defence witnesses?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, it was an investigator who's working on

19     this case but also working on Tolimir case, and I was advised by the

20     Prosecution that he had made contact with the witness without fully

21     understanding the extent of the Trial Chamber's order.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So it concerned the investigation -- an investigator

23     in the Karadzic OTP team?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Tieger?

Page 30145

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Well, not entirely, Mr. -- technically, yes, that's

 2     true, but it was the same investigator who's been working for the Tolimir

 3     team and this was a contact made for the -- at the behest of the Tolimir

 4     team.  And in fact, this was a matter in which the OTP acted very

 5     efficiently on both fronts, it seems to me, that is, notifying members of

 6     the team and, indeed, members of other teams about this Court's order,

 7     but also this particular investigator in the Tolimir team moving quickly

 8     on the contact.  So when there's -- as Mr. Robinson is well aware,

 9     there's nothing purposefully violative of the Court's order.  Quite the

10     contrary.  Everyone -- the Karadzic team acted as quickly as possible to

11     alert people.  So this was just a matter where the Tolimir team asked

12     this particular investigator to undertake contact before the investigator

13     had been made aware of the terms of the Court's order.  So I -- and I

14     think Mr. Robinson fully appreciates that.  There's no suggestion to the

15     contrary, as far as I'm aware.

16             If I may also --

17             JUDGE KWON:  But, Mr. Tieger, probably this question is not meant

18     for you, but what sounds odd to me is this:  Why does the Tolimir team

19     need to interview witnesses at all, given the stage of its case?

20             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I -- I can't -- I'm not in a position to

21     answer on behalf of the parties who -- of Mr. McCloskey in this case who

22     is the head of the Tolimir team or anyone else who is involved in this

23     particular effort.  But I can think of various reasons why that would be

24     the case.  If these particular witnesses are thought to have information

25     or to be about to bring information to the attention of this

Page 30146

 1     Trial Chamber which somehow implicates some evidence or significant

 2     evidence in the Tolimir case, that might well be something that the

 3     Tolimir team would want to know early rather than late.

 4             The Court is well aware of the fact that, for example,

 5     115 motions are brought well after judgement, so sometimes there can be

 6     reasons to move with alacrity when there's any indication that there is

 7     information that may be in existence that hasn't previously been brought

 8     to the attention of the parties or the Trial Chamber.

 9             In any event, that's one of the possibilities.  I don't want to

10     speak for them, but let me simply say if there's any suggestion that they

11     were acting at the behest of the Karadzic team, that is not at all the

12     case.  So they weren't -- so this was an independent interest on their

13     part.

14             If I could -- as long as I'm up on my feet, if I could add one

15     thing, Mr. President, and that is that we essentially share the -- what I

16     think is the Trial Chamber's puzzlement about the theoretical basis for

17     Mr. Robinson's position.  There are some matters in which the OTP is one,

18     but Trial Chambers have reserved the right to establish procedural

19     standards and rules for how those -- their cases will be run; and

20     therefore, it's very obvious that the OTP is subject to varying rules and

21     standards and guide-lines and practices from case to case.  And we do not

22     consider that the -- this Trial Chamber intended to bind other

23     Trial Chambers in their determination of how the OTP in those cases

24     should make contact with witnesses.  The ultimate absurdity of that

25     argument, it seems to me, is the fact that some of the witnesses on the

Page 30147

 1     Defence witness list are also witnesses, as I understand it, for the

 2     Prosecution in the Mladic case.  So the attempt to blur those

 3     distinctions and act as if there aren't separate Trial Chambers in

 4     existence and separate trials running I think is clearly inappropriate,

 5     as reflected in that example.

 6             Having said that, we don't want there to be unnecessary problems

 7     and problems where they don't need to exist.  And that's why we are

 8     willing to contact other teams and to the extent possible see if we can

 9     ensure that contact is -- that we co-ordinate this and we don't make

10     contact before notifying Mr. Robinson.  So we're happy to be as

11     accommodating as possible and eliminate problems where they don't need to

12     arise, but we reject the notion that we are under any obligation to do

13     so.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I hope this is just a storm in a teacup, but when we

15     order the Prosecution to give notice to the Defence we never meant to

16     include the other OTP teams.  But the crux of the reasoning why the

17     Chamber ordered the Prosecution to give notice to the Defence when they

18     would like to meet with the witnesses whose contact detail they have

19     already is out of courtesy and some practical reasons.  So if the

20     Prosecution is minded to co-operate on a voluntary basis, we would

21     encourage very much that such practice continue in the future as well.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Then unless there's anything to be raised, then

24     we'll bring in the next witness.

25             In the meantime, I think it has been circulated, but to make

Page 30148

 1     sure, we'll sit for the first session till quarter past 11.00 and we'll

 2     have a 15 minutes' break, after which we'll have a second session which

 3     will last until 12.50.  And then we'll have a 40 minutes' lunch break and

 4     we'll sit from 1.30 to 3.00, at which time the Chamber has to rise.

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Your Honour, while the witness is coming in, I'd

 6     just like to suggest that this witness be provided with a caution under

 7     Rule 90(E).  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just out of an abundance of caution, I state this

11     because I'm not sure whether what you stated is recorded or not.

12             Mr. Karadzic, what you said was correct.  What I said

13     "unacceptable" was the technical difficulties but not what Mr. Robinson

14     submitted.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.  Thank you, Excellency.

16                           [The witness entered court]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, sir.

18             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Would you take the solemn declaration, please.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.  I solemnly declare

21     that I will speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22                           WITNESS:  BOZO TOMIC

23                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please take a seat and make yourself

25     comfortable.

Page 30149

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tomic, before you start giving evidence I would

 3     like to draw your attention to a particular rule here at the Tribunal.

 4     Under this rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a question from

 5     the Prosecution, the accused, or from the Judges if you believe that your

 6     answer will incriminate you.  When I say "incriminate," I mean that

 7     something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt for a criminal

 8     offence or could provide evidence that you have committed an offence.

 9     However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you and you do

10     not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the discretion to

11     oblige you to answer the answer.  But in such a case, the Tribunal will

12     make sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used

13     as evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false

14     testimony.  Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understood that fully.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

20        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Tomic.

21        A.   Good morning, Mr. President.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D6087 in

23     e-court.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   While we're waiting for the document to appear on the screen,

Page 30150

 1     Mr. Tomic, I'd like to ask you whether you provided the Defence team with

 2     a statement?

 3        A.   Yes, I did.

 4        Q.   Do you see that statement on the screen before you now?

 5        A.   Yes, I do.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did you sign the statement?

 7        A.   Yes, I did.

 8        Q.   I have to remind myself and I have to ask you to make pauses

 9     between what we're saying for the benefit of the interpreters.

10             Does this statement accurately reflect what you knew and what you

11     stated?

12        A.   Yes, it does fully.

13        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you today in

14     this courtroom, would your answers be more or less the same?

15        A.   My answers would be identical to the answers that I gave for the

16     purpose of this statement.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, may I tender this

19     statement into evidence as well as the 92 ter package to be admitted

20     through Witness Mr. Bozo Tomic.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson, 65 ter list.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, exactly.  We would ask for permission to add

23     the map that the witness marked, which is 1D0034, to our 65 ter list.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             Any objection, Ms. Gustafson?

Page 30151

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No, and there's no objection to the admission of

 2     any of the associated exhibits.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could we upload the second one, the 1D20540, so that

 4     we can take a brief look.  What's the date of this document, Mr. Karadzic

 5     or Mr. Robinson?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 9th of May, 1993.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, English translation says it's 3rd of May, so it

 8     may have to be corrected.  Shall we upload it, 1D20540.

 9             Yes.  Your statement, Mr. Karadzic, that the date is 9th of May

10     seems to be sufficient.  We'll continue on that basis.  So we'll admit

11     the statement as well as four -- five associated exhibits.

12             Shall we give the number.

13             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  65 ter number 1D6087, the

14     statement, will be Exhibit D2418.  65 ter number 1D134 will be

15     Exhibit D2419.  65 ter number 1D20540 will be Exhibit D2420.

16     65 ter number 1D20544 will be Exhibit D2421.  65 ter number 1D20301 will

17     be Exhibit D2422.  And 65 ter number 1D20548 will be Exhibit D2423.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to read a

21     brief summary of Mr. Tomic's statement in English.

22             [In English] Bozo Tomic was a member of the command of the

23     2nd Battalion of the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.  He did his

24     military service in the JNA in 1981 and 1982 in Pula and then on the

25     island of Molat.  He left the JNA with the rank of private first class.

Page 30152

 1             After the events in March 1992, when the Serbian wedding guest

 2     was killed in Bascarsija and barricades were set up in the city, he found

 3     out that many Muslims had been summoned for some military exercises.

 4     Sometime later he was told that there were training camps for Muslim

 5     paramilitary units on Mount Igman.  He lived on Ozrenska Street in a Serb

 6     majority area.  In early April 1992, he and several of his neighbours

 7     agreed on the need to organise themselves to protect their families and

 8     property.  Roughly at the same time, members of the Serbian

 9     Territorial Defence told him and them to organise guards on the streets,

10     to be particularly vigilant at night, and they received signs of

11     recognition to distinguish people outside the neighbourhood and their

12     basic task, as before, was to protect their houses and families.  He was

13     elected squad commander.

14             From the very beginning of the conflict, Muslims opened fire on

15     them from the sector of Sanac and Pero Kosoric Square from multi-storey

16     buildings.  All residential buildings in Pero Kosoric Square and

17     individual houses above and under Tranzit Street, as well as other

18     civilian buildings, were used for military purposes by establishing in

19     them enemy firing positions.  Muslim sniper fire had disastrous

20     consequences on the Serbian side, both soldiers and civilians alike, and

21     not even children were spared.  Because of this, his unit built

22     protection out of tarpaulin, nylon, cardboard, hard material, among

23     others, to conceal movement and hinder reconnaissance and enemy fire.

24     The Muslim forces ranging against them continuously planned and executed

25     offensive combat operations against his unit's line of defence.

Page 30153

 1             They never received any order or instructions referring to the

 2     expulsion of non-Serbs from their houses and apartments.  Around

 3     mid-May 1992, as the war grew in intensity, several Muslim families from

 4     Ozrenska Street moved completely unhindered and without duress to the

 5     part of the town under Muslim control.  They had no -- the Serbs in this

 6     company had no intention of causing civilian casualties, of exercising

 7     psychological influence on civilians under Muslim control, neither did

 8     his superior commands.  They never received any oral or written order

 9     from higher commands or civilian authorities to carry out attacks against

10     civilians under control of the Muslim authorities.  Likewise, he never

11     issued any such orders.  They only carried out defensive actions and

12     never opened fire into the depth of the enemy territory, firing only on

13     the line of disengagement and exclusively on military targets which

14     directly threatened them.

15             Because of the difficulty of the front and the small number of

16     men in Ozrenska Street, they contacted the brigade command asking for

17     reinforcements for the line and the engagement of a work detail to

18     fortify the line.  The work detail was comprised of Muslims who came from

19     Kula penal and correctional facility and were treated properly.  There

20     were no professional soldiers in his unit.  It was a real people's army

21     comprised of the people from Ozrenska Street and the neighbourhood.

22             By the end of the war, about 220 people were killed and several

23     hundreds wounded in the zone of responsibility of the 2nd Battalion.

24             [Interpretation] For the time being, I have no questions for this

25     witness.

Page 30154

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 2             Mr. Tomic, as you have noted that your evidence in chief was

 3     admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you will be

 4     asked by the Prosecution in its cross-examination.

 5             Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 7                           Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

 8        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Tomic.  I'd like to start by asking you a

 9     couple of questions --

10        A.   Good morning.

11        Q.   I'd like to start by asking you a couple of questions about the

12     background to the conflict.  At paragraph 4 of your statement you said:

13             "With the war in Croatia, a different atmosphere began to be felt

14     in Sarajevo.  My experience was that it was loaded with a negative

15     charge, sincere socialising stopped and divisions along ethnic lines were

16     felt.  Speeches of Muslim and Croatian politicians in the Assembly

17     created an atmosphere of mistrust and fear."

18             What particular speeches of Muslim and Croat politicians in the

19     Assembly created, in your view, an atmosphere of mistrust and fear?

20        A.   Well, right this minute I can't remember all the politicians and

21     their speeches, but the president of the Party of Democratic Action,

22     Mr. Izetbegovic, and the president of Herceg-Bosna or the Croatian

23     Democratic Union, Mate Boban, were very unpleasant.  I'm speaking from

24     the point of view of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And

25     you could guess that there was this so-called unprincipled coalition

Page 30155

 1     between the Muslim and Croatian people.  All -- and they saw

 2     Serbs - although it was illogical - as their common enemy.  In any case,

 3     fear and anxiety were rising and particularly in view of their memories

 4     from the Second World War Serbs felt that they had to unite and organise

 5     themselves because they could not feel safe in that country.  The

 6     practice of out-voting one people in the Assembly was another reason for

 7     this rising anxiety and fear.  I had personal experience as well at my

 8     work-place.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10        A.   Muslims and Croats united on one side and --

11        Q.   Thank you.  I'm sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Tomic, but I think

12     we're straying away from the question which was about speeches of

13     politicians in the Assembly.  And I understand from your answer that you

14     can't recall any specific statements, but they were very unpleasant; is

15     that right?

16        A.   Well, Mr. Izetbegovic was always prepared to sacrifice peace for

17     a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We Serbs are not naive and especially

18     with our experience from previous wars, we knew what that meant.  We

19     didn't need anyone to explain to us what it meant when he said that we

20     will sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In that

21     unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina of his vision, Serbs had nothing good to

22     expect.

23        Q.   Okay.  And what about statements of Serb politicians in the

24     Assembly, do you recall any speeches of Serb politicians in the Assembly

25     that added to this atmosphere of mistrust and fear in Sarajevo?

Page 30156

 1        A.   If I remember well, I could say that it was taken out of the

 2     context of the speech of the president of the republic, Mr. Karadzic, is

 3     something that I understood as a warning especially after the

 4     Lisbon Agreement or the Cutileiro Plan as it was known.  I, myself, my

 5     neighbours, and my friends thought that it was a good basis for an

 6     agreement that could spare us from a horrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7     And if I remember correctly, Mr. Izetbegovic even put his initials on

 8     that document; however, upon returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina --

 9        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

10        A.   -- he reneged on it and I believe it was after he was influenced

11     by some other factors, especially foreigns.

12        Q.   Again, I think we're moving away from the topic, but you did

13     allude to a speech of Mr. Karadzic and I assume you're talking about his

14     speech from October of 1991 where he stated that Bosnia was taking the

15     same highway of hell and suffering that Croatia and Slovenia went through

16     and warned of the possible extinction of the Muslim people if it came to

17     war.  Is that the speech you're referring to?

18        A.   Well, yes, that speech.  But I'm saying in Slovenia there were

19     far fewer Serbs as a minority than in the Serbian population of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I understood him as saying that Serbs, of course,

21     would suffer a lot in case of war, but Muslims would suffer the most.  If

22     I had heard something like that from Mr. Izetbegovic, I would - although

23     a Serb - be grateful for such a statement and I would understand it as

24     meaning that all of us should make certain compromises to avoid war.

25     However, I also have to say, as I did in my statement, I played football

Page 30157

 1     every day at the Grbavica stadium and some friends with whom I used to

 2     play without even knowing their ethnicity --

 3        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Tomic --

 4        A.   -- were missing.  You can only imagine how I felt when I

 5     learned --

 6        Q.   Again I interrupted you because we are moving away from the

 7     question.  If you could try to focus as specifically as possible on the

 8     precise question.

 9             Now, notwithstanding your apparent claim that you would be

10     grateful for a statement from Mr. Izetbegovic warning the Serb people of

11     their possible extinction, Mr. Karadzic's warning to the Muslim people of

12     their possible extinction when it came to war added to the atmosphere of

13     mistrust and fear in Sarajevo, didn't it?

14        A.   Muslims probably understood it that way; I did not.  And, you

15     see, I can't answer your questions with a yes or no.  I need to explain

16     certain things.  This is not a mathematical problem where I only have to

17     explain a formula.

18             I have to say one thing.  Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim

19     leadership had already called upon their young people not to join the

20     Yugoslav People's Army.  I and most Serbs saw Yugoslavia as our homeland

21     and that was therefore something unusual, something that was happening

22     for the first time that Muslims were not joining that army, while at the

23     same time making paramilitary units, organising training camps, and I

24     later found out that they had started preparing as early as 1991 --

25        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Tomic.

Page 30158

 1        A.   -- we were not doing that.

 2        Q.   Again, I understand you feel the need to explain, but that really

 3     isn't responsive to the question, which you did answer in the first line

 4     of your answer.  Thank you.

 5             Okay.  I'd like to move on now to April 1992, and you stated that

 6     you lived in Ozrenska Street and in the immediate vicinity of the MUP

 7     school.  So your home and the MUP school, they were in Vraca, in the

 8     municipality of Novo Sarajevo; is that right?

 9        A.   Yes, that's right.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And the clashes of the MUP school that you referred

11     to in paragraph 6, those clashes were in connection with the Bosnian MUP

12     special forces taking over the school in Vraca; is that right?

13        A.   I don't know any details, but I know that members of the special

14     unit whose purpose was to intervene in case of emergencies in the whole

15     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there too Muslims and Croats left and

16     went elsewhere, whereas only Serbs remained.  That night of the 4th

17     April, from the direction of Sanac and from the direction of Pero Kosoric

18     Square and the Tranzit company, fire was opened onto our area.  One Serb,

19     a member of that special unit, was killed and two were wounded.  I myself

20     was not involved.  It was an operation of those so-called special forces,

21     and I did not participate; but I learned that one of them got killed.

22     And it was an internal conflict within a unit --

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   -- of Bosnia and Herzegovina and because of various disagreements

25     and --

Page 30159

 1        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Tomic.  I understand from your answer that,

 2     indeed, the MUP special forces were there and there was an operation

 3     involving them at the time.  I think that's sufficient to answer my

 4     question so I'll move on to the next question.

 5             You said at paragraph 7 of your statement:

 6             "We found out that members of the Serbian TO were in the Pajaco

 7     restaurant at the beginning of Ozrenska Street."

 8             Now, Pajaco, as I understand it, that's also in the immediate

 9     vicinity of your house and the MUP school in Vraca; is that right?

10        A.   It's closer to the MUP school, whereas my house is perhaps

11     300 metres from that restaurant called Pajaco.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And Pajaco, was that the headquarters of the

13     Novo Sarajevo Serbian TO?

14        A.   I don't know whether it was the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO,

15     but I know that when I went there to inquire with my neighbours whether

16     we needed to organise ourselves, we were told that they were members of

17     the TO and we were issued with weapons.  Of course, we were under a lot

18     of pressure and we were very anxious, expecting something to happen, so

19     we wanted to get armed to be able to protect our families and our

20     neighbourhoods, all of us who lived in Ozrenska Street.  Whether that was

21     the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO, I really don't know.  I know that

22     some people were there, and when we were issued with weapons, my comrades

23     selected me to be some sort of squad commander and I was given an

24     automatic rifle.  Every day at dusk we would go there to take certain

25     distinction marks, as is the custom in every army, to be able to tell

Page 30160

 1     that we were from that area, both Muslims and Serbs, only for the purpose

 2     of protecting the local population, all of us who lived there.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could -- just a comment on the

 5     transcript.  The witness said:  In order to be able to protect our

 6     families, all of us who lived there regardless of faith and ethnicity.

 7     And that was not recorded in the transcript.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tomic, do you confirm that?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's what I said.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Just on that point, Mr. Tomic, you stated that this was the -- in

14     your statement that this was the Serbian TO.  Were there Muslims and

15     Croats going to Pajaco restaurant, where - as you state - the Serbian TO

16     was located?

17        A.   I don't know if any Muslims went there.  I went with a group of

18     my neighbours and they didn't even have enough weapons for all of us.

19     They gave us some to be able to have them at guard duty at night and of

20     course that line was not properly organised according to --

21        Q.   Thank you.

22        A.   -- all military regulations.  So I went there with people from my

23     closest circle.  I don't know if there were any Muslims involved.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, Mr. Tomic.  Ms. Gustafson is asking

Page 30161

 1     questions following your statement.  Do you have your statement with you

 2     now?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not this minute.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to have one in hard copy?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It would be a good idea if

 6     possible.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yeah, that will be done.

 8             Yes, please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:

10        Q.   Mr. Tomic, you've stated several times now in your answers that

11     it was at Pajaco that you received -- you and your neighbours received

12     weapons.  Who at Pajaco was distributing weapons to you and your

13     neighbours?

14        A.   I know that Budo Obradovic, Momir Garic were there.  I didn't

15     even know all those people because it's impossible to know them all.  And

16     we were told that our task was - and I said before it was also our

17     desire - to protect our families.  We were expecting that something could

18     happen any time.  We just wanted to prevent war.  I don't know the names

19     of all those people.  And I'm saying again there were not enough weapons

20     for all of my neighbours, so sometimes somebody would have to borrow a

21     weapon and of course --

22        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Tomic.

23        A.   -- there were not enough automatic weapons, not even

24     semi-automatic.

25        Q.   Again, we're straying away from the topic.  I wasn't asking you

Page 30162

 1     about the quantity of weapons.  Now, you mentioned Budo Obradovic and

 2     Momir Garic.  Were Budo Obradovic and Momir Garic distributing weapons

 3     and giving you tasks from Pajaco?

 4        A.   My neighbours and I had heard that there was something at Pajaco.

 5     I don't know if it was the --

 6        Q.   Sorry, Mr. Tomic --

 7        A.   -- headquarters Territorial Defence --

 8        Q.   You're now repeating your earlier answer.  My answer [sic] was

 9     very specific.  It was:

10             "Were Budo Obradovic and Momir Garic distributing weapons and

11     giving you tasks from Pajaco?"

12             If you could answer that with a "yes" or a "no," please.

13        A.   I've already said, let's not exaggerate.  I don't know if Budo or

14     Momo gave me the weapons, but they were there and we were given a

15     specific task.  We wanted to and they advised us to protect our families,

16     to prevent incursions from outsiders, strangers, that's what it was

17     about.  There was no real military organisation yet.  We were just

18     self-organising.  I cannot tell you specifically whether Budo or Momo or

19     Marko or whoever gave me the weapon.  All I know that there was this -- I

20     don't know if it was the headquarters of Novo Sarajevo TO or it was only

21     for the local commune, I really don't know.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And when you said you didn't know if it was Budo or

23     Momo who gave you the weapons, you're referring to Budo Obradovic and

24     Momir Garic; is that right?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 30163

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must say, the witness said in

 2     line 3:  Or somebody else, and that was not recorded.  All that was left

 3     was whether it was Momo or Budo -- or somebody third is what the witness

 4     said.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I think that's the case -- do you confirm that,

 6     Mr. Tomic?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm saying I can't even

 8     remember whether one of the two or both were there on that particular

 9     day.  Perhaps they had been there, but it's pointless for me to claim

10     now, 20 years later, that either of them specifically gave me the weapon.

11             JUDGE KWON:  And it's confirmed by Ms. Gustafson but I'd like to

12     confirm with you once again, Momir Garic's nickname was Momo?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's how I know him, as

14     Momo.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

17        Q.   Now again you've referred both in your statement and several

18     times in your answers so far to Momir Garic and Budo Obradovic at Pajaco.

19     I understand from that that they were either the commanders or the

20     leaders of your TO unit in Novo Sarajevo; is that a correct

21     understanding?

22        A.   I don't know.  I can't speculate.  I don't know what their

23     assignments were.  I just told you the truth about how we went there and

24     received weapons.  There was no military organisation yet.  Only later

25     did the 1st Omladinska Brigade -- sorry, 1st Romanija Brigade came and

Page 30164

 1     towards the end of May the 1st Mechanised Sarajevo Brigade was

 2     established and we joined it - me and my comrades - and remained till the

 3     end part of that 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Well, you said that when you went to Pajaco you were given

 5     a specific task, and that was at lines 3 and 4 of page 20; and also in

 6     your statement you said you were told at Pajaco to organise guards in the

 7     street, et cetera.  Who at Pajaco gave you these tasks?

 8        A.   That was said once.  We didn't need telling twice --

 9        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

10        A.   -- we organised ourselves to go every day and take --

11        Q.   -- whether it was -- whether you were told once or multiple

12     times, that's not the question.  Who told you?  Who gave you these tasks?

13        A.   I'm telling you again, we received tasks, instructions, but we

14     had asked ourselves to be given them.

15        Q.   Yes, and who gave you the tasks?

16        A.   Perhaps one of those two, but I'm telling you we asked ourselves

17     for our own safety and the safety of our families and all the inhabitants

18     of that street in order to feel safe, because at night it happened in

19     some parts of the city that outsiders, perhaps criminals or robbers,

20     would --

21        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Tomic.

22        A.   -- barge in and we had to protect ourselves from looting.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be of assistance?  The

24     interpretation the witness received was in a continuous form of the verb

25     "to give," "who gave you instructions" instead of the one-time form

Page 30165

 1     [In English] "Who used to give us -- to give you," "who used to give

 2     you."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That may be the reason -- but,

 4     Mr. Tomic, could you concentrate on answering the question.

 5             Let's continue, Ms. Gustafson.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

 7             Could we have -- sorry, Exhibit D2419 on the screen.

 8        Q.   Mr. Tomic, the map that you're about to see on the screen is the

 9     map that you marked in connection with your statement where you indicated

10     with a red line the Serbian positions in Ozrenska Street.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could zoom in on the red line which is

12     roughly in the middle of the page and a little bit down.  If we could

13     zoom in a little more.  And maybe one more time so the line is clear.

14     And if we could move the map to the right and up -- sorry, the other way,

15     and down so we can see.  Yeah, great.

16        Q.   Mr. Tomic, can you see the line, the red line, that you drew?

17        A.   That's -- if that's the line going through the football stadium

18     and via Tranzit and this elevation Sanac and along Ozrenska Street, yes,

19     I drew that line.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to mark where you, in particular, were

21     positioned in April 1992 on Ozrenska Street on this map?

22        A.   That's precisely the part going above Tranzit, above that road

23     and the football stadium, going towards this hill, Sanac, and up to

24     Ozrenska Street and further.  Until May 1994, I was a member of the

25     3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Romanija Brigade.  A friend

Page 30166

 1     of mine and I were in command of a platoon of about 60 men.  We had our

 2     area of responsibility within the 3rd Company.  That's precisely the line

 3     I marked on the map that went, as I said, from Tranzit and covered

 4     Tranzit, while a neighbouring platoon was at the beginning of the

 5     stadium, that is to say, closer to the police school and Grbavica.

 6             Just to make one thing clear, the street that goes from Grbavica

 7     towards Miljacka was Djuraskovica Street.  There was company Strojorad

 8     and it goes along the left bank of the Miljacka river and that was the

 9     area of responsibility of the 2nd Battalion whose commander I was from

10     1994 until the end of the war.  So that's the line I also marked that

11     goes down towards Lukavica.  That's one of the longest streets in the

12     city, Ozrenska Street.

13        Q.   Okay.  I understand from your answer - and correct me if I'm

14     wrong - that the positions you held in April, basically you continued to

15     hold the same positions when you were a member of a platoon of the SRK

16     and that those -- that position covered the entire length of the line

17     that you've drawn on this map in red.  Do I understand that correctly?

18        A.   Well, as I said, our battalion had within the 3rd Company of the

19     1st Romanija Brigade its area of responsibility.  It was a stretch about

20     several hundred kilometres, and until 1994 I spent all my time there,

21     leaving Sarajevo a few times going towards Trnovo and the Niksic plateau.

22     So there were trips like that in order to reinforce our unit, but most of

23     the time I spent there, on this stretch of several hundred metres.  And

24     the task of our platoon was to hold that defence line.  And during the

25     war, that line did not move.  There were no offensive actions in my unit,

Page 30167

 1     we were not advancing, and as time went by --

 2        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

 3        A.   -- we only fortified it --

 4        Q.   I'm sorry, I really have to ask you to limit your answers to the

 5     specific questions that I ask.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I take it you need more time to finish your cross?

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes, Your Honour, I do.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll take a break now for 15 minutes and resume

 9     at 32 past 11.00.  But I have to note that I forgot to mention that we

10     were sitting for the first session pursuant to 15 bis due to

11     Judge Lattanzi's official function.  She will join us from the next

12     session.

13                           --- Recess taken at 11.16 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.36 a.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Well, this may be the first time for four Judges to

16     be fit into Courtroom 2.

17             Ms. Gustafson, please continue.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

19        Q.   Mr. Tomic, I'd like you now to watch a video and this is P5062.

20     It has no sound so I'd just like you to watch what appears on your screen

21     and we will stop it at 28 seconds and then I'll ask you a question.

22                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, if we could just have a moment.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 30168

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic, in this video you've seen Mr. Karadzic and

 2     General Mladic entering a military position and now we can see the view

 3     from that position.  This is a shot from a position at Ozrenska Street

 4     looking out over Grbavica; is that right?

 5        A.   Well, I'd said from some other position a bit to the right of

 6     Ozrenska.  According to the buildings I can see here, I assume it's some

 7     sort of observation post, that it is from that location that the

 8     positions were observed.

 9        Q.   And when you say "to the right," what do you mean?  Do you mean

10     to the east or to the west?

11        A.   Perhaps a little to the east.

12        Q.   So you believe this is east of Ozrenska Street in Vraca?

13        A.   I would say that it's in Vraca, given the angle of observation

14     and the buildings you can see because there are no such elevations in

15     Ozrenska.  So I would say that it is somewhere to the right.  That is how

16     I would interpret this photograph, this image.

17        Q.   Okay.  But Ozrenska Street is -- runs along a hill and overlooks

18     Sarajevo; right?

19        A.   But I'm just speaking about the angle from which this image was

20     recorded.  I would say that it's an elevation in relation to

21     Ozrenska Street, so to the right or to the east of Ozrenska Street in the

22     direction of Vraca, perhaps in the direction of Trebevic, let's say, but

23     I don't know exactly.

24        Q.   Okay.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could continue playing this video and

Page 30169

 1     that was, for the record, 28 seconds.

 2                           [Video-clip played]

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And we've stopped at 52 seconds.

 4        Q.   Mr. Tomic, can you confirm that this is another view of Grbavica,

 5     and those three high-rises with the white on the edges, that's Soping?

 6        A.   Yes.  In the distance towards the horizon you can see the Hum

 7     hill.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Okay, we're finished with that video.

 9             Mr. Tomic, you have emphasised, both in your statement and in

10     your evidence earlier today, that in April, when you were a member of the

11     Novo Sarajevo TO, that your tasks were solely about protecting your homes

12     and neighbourhoods and that there was no offensive action.  It is the

13     case, is it not, that in April there was a TO offensive towards the north

14     of the positions that you have marked on your map as the line of defence

15     and into -- in particular an offensive in the Grbavica area.  Is that

16     right?

17        A.   In the area of the unit that I was a member of at the time when

18     it entered the 1st May unit there were no defensive or offensive actions,

19     but in second part, yes, in Grbavica at the time because there were a lot

20     of Serbs living there.  People organised themselves down there to protect

21     themselves, their families, and their property, and in order to be safe

22     in that area.

23        Q.   I'm talking about a Novo Sarajevo Serb TO offensive on the

24     21st of April, 1992, in Grbavica.  Was there or was there not such an

25     offensive?

Page 30170

 1        A.   I didn't participate in any such offensive.  I was at the lines

 2     that I have marked, at the positions I marked.  Our task was to hold the

 3     positions there, to protect the area where we lived, my neighbours, my

 4     friends, from the street.  So I did not participate in that offensive.

 5        Q.   So you recall that offensive, the 21st of April offensive, in

 6     Grbavica; is that right?

 7        A.   Well, I can't remember the date, but I know it was towards the

 8     end of April.  I wouldn't say that it's the 21st, but if you say so, it's

 9     quite possible.  However, I did not take part in that offensive.  I

10     wouldn't say that it was an offensive operation.  The people organised

11     themselves and did the same things that we did in Ozrenska Street.

12        Q.   Well, in fact, the TO from Vraca went down to Grbavica and

13     attempted to take territory in Grbavica.  That's an offensive; right?

14        A.   No, there were a lot of Serbs in Grbavica and even the

15     municipality of Novo Sarajevo itself before the war was inhabited by a

16     majority of Serbs.  The municipality covered a large area, and the

17     majority of the inhabitants in Grbavica were Serbs.  They organised

18     themselves as did we.  They were there.  There were no forces from the

19     outside, no members of the Territorial Defence from the outside.  They

20     all had their responsibility in given sectors, in certain areas of the

21     Vraca local commune where they lived because the municipality covered an

22     entire area and Ozrenska Street was part of Vraca local commune, part of

23     the area was part of the Hrasno local commune, I would say.

24        Q.   Sorry, I'm not able to follow your answer.  Do you agree or

25     disagree that members of the TO from Vraca went down to Grbavica to

Page 30171

 1     attempt to take territory?

 2        A.   As I said, I don't agree because I know that in Grbavica there

 3     were a lot of Serbs who lived in the area and they also organised

 4     themselves as did we in Ozrenska Street and in other parts of Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   Okay.  I'd like you to listen to an intercept which is

 6     Exhibit D1202.

 7             And, Mr. Tomic, this is an intercepted telephone conversation

 8     from the 21st of April, 1992, if you could listen to it and then I'll ask

 9     you some questions.

10                           [Intercept played]

11             THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

12             "MG:  Good afternoon.

13             "NN:  Good afternoon.

14             "MG:  May I speak to Danilo?

15             "NN:  Danilo?

16             "MG:  Yes.

17             "NN:  Danilo who?

18             "MG:  Veselinovic.

19             "NN:  Well, you got the wrong number, my son.  Where are you

20     calling from?

21             "MG:  And is Prstojevic there?

22             "NN:  Who are you and where are you calling from?

23             "MG:  I'm calling from Novo Sarajevo.

24             "NN:  And you are?

25             "MG:  Momo.

Page 30172

 1             "NN:  Momo who?

 2             "MG:  Garic.

 3             "NN:  I beg your pardon?

 4             "MG:  Garic.

 5             "NN:  Tell me, Eric.

 6             "Come on Garic, come on --

 7             "MG:  Wait, wait, wait a second.  Garic.  This is Garic.

 8             "NN:  Oh, Garic.  Go ahead.

 9             "MG:  Is Veselinovic there?

10             "NN:  No, Veselinovic is not here, but here is --

11             "MG:  Well, can you just -- how can you help us, please?

12             "NN:  Tell me, speak up.

13             "MG:  The army refuses, those tanks, we are encircled.  Do you

14     have any armour, any manpower?  Please, I'm begging you.

15             "NN:  Garic, Prstojevic is here.

16             "MG:  Let me talk to him.

17             "UMP:  They dumped the armour, three men in 'Palma' --

18             "NP:  Hello.

19             "MG:  Prstojevic?

20             "NP:  Yes.

21             "MG:  This is Garic.

22             "NP:  Good morning.

23             "MG:  What's up?  Listen.

24             "NP:  Nothing special.

25             "MG:  How can you help us as soon as possible?

Page 30173

 1             "NP:  Help who?

 2             "MG:  Us.

 3             "NP:  Who?  Where is that?

 4             "MG:  Novo Sarajevo.

 5             "NP:  Yes, but where?  What is your location?

 6             "MG:  Just a second.  In Vraca.  We need some men in Vraca

 7     urgently, please.

 8             "NP:  But wait a second, where are you in Vraca exactly?  Are you

 9     down near the MUP or up there?

10             "MG:  We are -- somebody will wait for these men at the pass.

11             "NP:  Are you up at the pass and further up on the right side?

12             "MG:  I will wait for the men at the pass.

13             "NP:  Wait a second, Garic.  Are you at the pass and further up

14     on the right side, towards Vraca?

15             "MG:  We went down to the town, all the way to the Miljacka,

16     however, they are too strong there.  They are encircling us and the army

17     refuses to move.

18             "NP:  Wait a second.  Are you fighting there?

19             "MG:  We are fighting fiercely.  We have many casualties.

20             "NP:  Tonight, is that right?

21             "MG:  Well, no, we started this morning here ... forget about it,

22     now we are encircled, as it seems.

23             "NP:  Mm-hmm.

24             "MG:  How can you help us?  I also called Velibor in Nedzarici

25     and he will try to do something, but that is not enough.  That is not

Page 30174

 1     enough.

 2             "NP:  All right.  What are the Special Forces doing?

 3             "MG:  They refuse to leave the barracks.  The Special Forces

 4     refuse to leave the barracks area.  That's it.  The reserve police force

 5     also promised to do everything they can but they went back.

 6             "NP:  Aha.

 7             "MG:  That's it.  What are we going to do?

 8             "NP:  You know, it's day-time and it's the south, and it is

 9     difficult to fight during the day in the south.

10             "MG:  Yes.

11             "NP:  And if they encircle you ... okay, we cannot allow that.

12     First of all, we must not allow the encirclement and second --

13             "MG:  Yes, yes.

14             "NP:  -- one can strike very well during day.

15             "MG:  Yes.

16             "NP:  So you have to organise yourself and get help from people

17     from the nearest surroundings.

18             "MG:  There is nobody closer than you.

19             "NP:  You have Vraca, Petrovici, and that area.

20             "MG:  There is nobody here.  They've all gone down.

21             "NP:  They've all gone down?

22             "MG:  Yes.

23             "NP:  Well, if everybody's gone down, those must be very strong

24     forces.

25             "MG:  Well, them.  We are stretched thin on other sides, Zlatiste

Page 30175

 1     up there.

 2             "NP:  Yes.

 3             "MG:  So that is the problem.  That is the problem.

 4             "NP:  Withdraw.  I don't know now, at this hour, things here are

 5     going --

 6             "MG:  What?

 7             "NP:  I don't know if we can give you any specific help right

 8     now.

 9             "MG:  Yes.

10             "NP:  At this moment.

11             "MG:  All right.  All right.

12             "NP:  Where are you fighting exactly?  Where exactly are you?

13             "MG:  Vrbanja, Grbavica, Ivan Krndelj, and all the way to

14     Elektroprivreda.

15             "NP:  And you went down, is that right?

16             "MG:  Yes, yes.

17             "NP:  Aha.

18             "MG:  Yes.

19             "NP:  Well, if nothing else, withdraw a little bit.  Be

20     resilient, I mean.

21             "MG:  Yes.

22             "NP:  Withdraw and mobilise all those people.

23             "MG:  Yes, yes, everybody has been mobilised.

24             "NP:  Don't forget that it is difficult to send men to fight in

25     an unknown area.

Page 30176

 1             "MG:  Yes, yes, all right.  All right.

 2             "NP:  All right then.

 3             "MG:  All right.  Bye."

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 5        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic, the -- here you heard Momo Garic calling from

 6     Novo Sarajevo and specifically from Vraca.  He's trying to reach

 7     Prstojevic.  He explains that he is encircled.  He describes his

 8     position.  He said:

 9             "We went down to the town all the way to the Miljacka river."

10             He says:

11             "We are fighting fiercely, we have many casualties."

12             He's describing, is he not, a Novo Sarajevo TO operation where TO

13     members from Vraca have gone down to fight in an offensive operation in

14     Grbavica?

15        A.   Well, I don't know.  Perhaps someone from the Territorial Defence

16     participated in it.  But in Grbavica there was a sufficient number of

17     locals, Serbs above all, who organised themselves, and I traced a red

18     line.  You can see how large the area of Vraca is.  The unit I was in

19     wasn't directly above Grbavica.  If we left our positions, the area would

20     have remained empty.  That line would have been penetrated and the entire

21     area of Grbavica would have been encircled from all sides.  So it wasn't

22     possible for us to leave the defence line where we were located because

23     the line was there, from the direction of Hrasno, behind Tranzit.  The

24     line was there and it was gradually fortified for the purpose of

25     security, so we couldn't have participated in those operations.  Our unit

Page 30177

 1     couldn't have done that.  That would have resulted in leaving an area

 2     empty of -- that would have resulted in abandoning an area and the

 3     Muslims could have entered it.  Someone may have assisted them, but I'm

 4     not familiar with that.  I'm telling you that there were a sufficient

 5     number of people there who formed units later on and became part of the

 6     1st Romanija Brigade in 1992.

 7        Q.   Okay.  Well, in this intercept, Prstojevic -- by the way, did you

 8     know Nedjeljko Prstojevic, the commander of the Ilidza Crisis Staff, did

 9     you know him?  I see you nodded, shook your head?

10        A.   No, I didn't.

11        Q.   Okay.  Well, Prstojevic says:  "So you have to organise yourself

12     get help from people from the nearest surroundings."

13             Garic says:  "There is nobody closer than you."

14             Prstojevic says:  "You have Vraca, Petrovici, and that area."

15             Garic responds:  "There is nobody here, they've all gone down."

16             Prstojevic asks:  "They've all gone down?"

17             And Garic says:  "Yes."

18             Here Mr. Garic is clearly describing a TO operation in which

19     everyone from Vraca, Petrovici, and that area have gone down to Grbavica;

20     right?

21        A.   Well, let me repeat what I said, that couldn't have been done.

22     You couldn't leave the left or right flank without any men, just leave.

23     Garic at that time certainly sustained significant casualties and he's a

24     bit panicky, as you could see.  He was asking for assistance.  That's

25     what I understood from the conversation that was intercepted, but it's

Page 30178

 1     not possible for everyone to go to just one part of the defence line.

 2     Then the right and left flank are abandoned and it can be penetrated --

 3        Q.   Okay, Mr. Tomic.

 4        A.   -- the area can be penetrated and what have you achieved then?

 5        Q.   I understand your position is that notwithstanding these

 6     statements, that this was simply not possible.

 7             I'd like to move on now and talk about the time after your unit

 8     was absorbed into the SRK, which I understand from your statement is what

 9     happened.  Now, you said earlier today that you were within the

10     3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion.  The Chamber has heard some evidence

11     that the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion was positioned on

12     Ozrenska Street.  Is it possible that you were a member of the -- that

13     your platoon belonged to the 4th Company or can you otherwise explain --

14     reconcile that?

15        A.   I'd just like to make something clear.  The SRK was in the entire

16     area of Sarajevo and it had a lot of brigades within it.  The brigade

17     that was formed in May 1992 was the 1st Romanija Brigade, and the company

18     that I was a member of was the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the

19     1st Romanija Brigade.  The platoon I was a member of was the 2nd Platoon

20     of that company.  Subsequently, in spring, towards the end of May 1993,

21     the 1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade was established and that

22     3rd Battalion was then the 2nd Infantry Battalion in the 1st Sarajevo

23     Mechanised Brigade, and all those brigades in Sarajevo formed the SRK,

24     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  So my battalion or the company didn't

25     become part of the SRK because you have platoons, company, battalions,

Page 30179

 1     brigade, and then the corps.  That is the hierarchy that is established.

 2     That's how things work --

 3        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

 4        A.   -- in accordance with the establishment.  So I was part of the

 5     3rd Company --

 6        Q.   Thank you.  I understand your evidence now is that you were a

 7     member of the 3rd Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Romanija

 8     Brigade, which later became the 3rd Company of the 2nd Battalion of the

 9     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade.

10             Can you explain where the 4th Company was positioned in relation

11     to the 3rd Company?  Because, as I said earlier, the Chamber's received

12     evidence that the 4th Company was also on Ozrenska Street.

13        A.   That's correct.  The 4th Company was there.  In relation to the

14     3rd Company, it was to the left or to the west if you look at the map and

15     it linked up with the 5th Company, whose area of responsibility was

16     towards Mojmilo and Lukavica, and the 2nd Battalion was there - not in

17     terms of establishment but a battalion from Dobrinja -- it was another

18     battalion from Dobrinja, it wasn't the 2nd Battalion, but they were

19     linked up.  So the 4th Company was also in Ozrenska Street.

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Tomic.  Again, if you could really try to focus on

21     the specific question that I ask.  Now I'd like to ask you about some of

22     the locations where you indicate in your statement you were fired at from

23     and that's at paragraphs 9 and 10 of your statement.  And you included

24     residential buildings and Pero Kosoric Square.  That's a square in

25     Hrasno; right?

Page 30180

 1        A.   That's correct.

 2        Q.   And the Loris building, that's also in Hrasno?

 3        A.   Well, it's in the direction of the Zeljeznicar football stadium.

 4     The red line that you see here shows that it's right next to the

 5     Milutin Djuraskovic Street, perhaps 50 metres from the Zeljeznicar

 6     football stadium in Sarajevo.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And the Plavi Neboder, or the blue skyscraper, where was

 8     that?

 9        A.   Plavi Neboder, there were five of them, they were all on

10     Pero Kosoric Square.  These are all high positions in relation to our

11     positions and sniper fire can cover the entire area of Ozrenska Street

12     from there.  These are skyscrapers that had about 20 floors.

13        Q.   Okay.  So all of these locations were quite close to your

14     positions on Ozrenska Street.  Is that right?  And if so, how close were

15     they approximately?

16        A.   I'm talking about the time that I spent there in 1994, before I

17     became a member of the battalion command.  I spent all of that time in

18     Sanac.  It's within range of ordinary rifles and all large-calibre

19     weapons, of course.  The line of demarcation between us and the Muslim

20     troops -- well, there was a distance of about 20 metres between us in

21     certain areas.  I'm talking about the area of this platoon exclusively,

22     the platoon I was a member of from 1992 up until 1994 up until the end of

23     May.  But I know that in these other areas there was only the Miljacka

24     river that represented the line of disengagement.  So it was in the range

25     of any kind of rifles or infantry weapons and even a house that I lived

Page 30181

 1     in, where my parents also lived, was in range of those infantry weapons

 2     and we spent the entire war time-period in that house.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And the -- I understand then that the units positioned on

 4     this line and generally positioned on Ozrenska Street were exposed to a

 5     great deal of fire and were in a dangerous situation.  Would you describe

 6     it as basically facing constant danger at those positions?

 7        A.   Precisely so.  The line that went along Ozrenska Street, it was

 8     interrupted at places wherever possible due to the configuration of the

 9     terrain.  There is a huge number of houses there and each of the houses

10     was a possible target, a possible place of incursion, or things like

11     that.  Along the entire length of Ozrenska Street, the distance between

12     the two armies was 20 to 50 metres at the most.  So you could even throw

13     a stone -- we could throw stones at each other.  Ozrenska Street had over

14     200 dead, unfortunately a lot of civilians among them died as a result of

15     sniping or mortar fire that came from the other side.

16        Q.   Okay.  And you said also in your statement that:

17             "We never opened fire into the depth."

18             When you say "we" here, are you talking just about your platoon

19     or would you -- would you say that that's the case for all the units on

20     Ozrenska Street?

21        A.   I have to make a distinction here.  Before 1994 I was a member of

22     that unit and I can tell you for a fact that there was no fire opened in

23     depth.  After 1994 I can talk as a member of the battalion command and I

24     can say that there was a strict order not to open fire in depth unless we

25     were attacked; then we could use all means because we would be in full

Page 30182

 1     combat-readiness, we would all be on the line, and we would all be

 2     defending ourselves, so the situation was different then.

 3        Q.   Okay.  So your position is that while you were a member of the

 4     platoon, there was no fire opened in depth.  Do you mean that your --

 5     nobody from your platoon opened fire into the depth?

 6        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 7        Q.   Okay.  You also identified some targets in the depth, that's at

 8     paragraph 19 of your statement and you talked -- you mentioned

 9     specifically schools on the right bank of the Miljacka and artillery

10     pieces that were placed close to residential buildings.  Did the units at

11     Ozrenska Street face incoming fire from any of these positions in the

12     depth that you're talking about?

13        A.   From Grbavica to -- or rather, from Soping, we set temporary

14     observation posts, and since those were skyscrapers with 20 or so floors

15     we could observe the other side.  We could only observe, we couldn't do

16     anything else, otherwise we would reveal our positions.  And we could see

17     all those facilities that I mentioned, and from all of them fire was

18     opened on us.  Later on we learned that they were involved in some dirty

19     dealings.  For example, they would affix a mortar to a little lorry, they

20     would come to a building, fire a few shots, and then that lorry would be

21     hidden behind a school or behind a building.  Our observers saw that.  It

22     was impossible to find them later and it would have been in vain to open

23     fire on those targets which were mobile, as it were.

24        Q.   So you talked, just to follow-up on that, about the mortars on

25     lorries.  When you say it would be in vain to have opened fire on those

Page 30183

 1     targets, was that because by the time you're able to open fire on a

 2     mobile mortar like that it would have moved to another position; is that

 3     right?

 4        A.   The unit, or rather, the platoon at the beginning of the war and

 5     the battalion throughout the war did not have that kind of calibre, did

 6     not have that kind of tools with which it could return fire.  Sometimes

 7     when there were skirmishes when they made attempts to break through our

 8     defence line, and sometimes they managed to do that, we asked for

 9     artillery support on the targets we observed and in places where members

10     of the Muslim army gathered on their side.  In other words, we did not

11     have weapons that we could use against them; on our front line we only

12     had infantry weapons, nothing else.  Our biggest calibre was M84.  We had

13     some machine-guns M53 and 7.62-millimetre weapons.  We didn't have

14     cannons, we didn't have mortars with which we could jeopardise the

15     targets we had observed.

16        Q.   Okay.  When you're saying that we only had -- our biggest calibre

17     was an M84, we had no cannons or mortars, are you talking about your

18     platoon or are you talking there about the battalion?

19        A.   I'm primarily talking about the platoon before 1994.  Later on in

20     the battalion there were some weapons that could be used to provide

21     support in certain positions during fierce combat and during attacks from

22     their side.  Then we indeed could ask for support and we received it.  In

23     companies there was a 60-millimetre mortar, smaller-calibre mortar.  We

24     didn't have bigger-calibre mortars, and in practical terms, it was

25     impossible to use it because of the separation line where the distance

Page 30184

 1     was anything between 20 or 30 metres, not more.  You couldn't ask for

 2     support from a bigger calibre because we would have threatened the lives

 3     of our soldiers because of the closeness between the two armies along the

 4     separation line that separated the two.  Nobody is perfect.  Nobody can

 5     aim so precisely.

 6        Q.   Okay.  So just to be clear, it is your possible that before 1994,

 7     nobody in the battalion had a bigger-calibre weapon than an M84; is that

 8     a correct understanding?

 9        A.   I can't say this for a fact.  I was in one of the units of the

10     battalion.  Perhaps in the battalion somebody had that; as far as I know,

11     they didn't.  But I don't know for a fact because I was not a member of

12     any of the other units.  It was impossible to move.  I didn't know what

13     the other units of the battalion were doing on the rest of the separation

14     line.  When you want to protect yourself from a mortar, there's no

15     perfect way to do that.  But when you moved along secure ways which were

16     marked, where there were no roads, there were warnings to be aware of

17     sniping, and people adhered to that --

18        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

19        A.   -- so in time there were less losses because people became more

20     careful, more cautious.

21        Q.   Sorry, again, I'd like to interrupt you because we're moving away

22     from the question that was asked.  You did say in your statement at

23     paragraph 23 that the UN military observers you dealt with never had any

24     complaints about the firing of your battalion.  And you said:

25             "We in our unit did not even have any artillery weapons, and as

Page 30185

 1     for mortars, we only had 60-millimetre mortars."

 2             Now, I understand from that that you're talking about the

 3     2nd Battalion and that your evidence is that in the entire 2nd Battalion

 4     there were no mortars of a calibre greater than 60 millimetres.  Is that

 5     right?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.  I'd like to now look at 65 ter 24044,

 8     please.

 9        Q.   Mr. Tomic, the document you're about to see is a document from

10     the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion on Ozrenska Street.  So I understand

11     from your earlier evidence this is not your company but it's the company

12     further down the street.  It's a list of weapons in the company dated the

13     22nd of October, 1993, at a time when you were also based on

14     Ozrenska Street.  And you can see that the list includes a PAM

15     anti-aircraft machine-gun; three 60-millimetre mortars; an 82-millimetre

16     mortar; a number of M84 and M53 weapons; three rocket-launchers; some

17     M48s; and a Broving or Browning 12.7-millimetre heavy machine-gun.

18             Now, this document shows not only did the 2nd Battalion have an

19     82-millimetre mortar, but the 4th Company, just down the road from you on

20     Ozrenska Street, had one; right?

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the date for that?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was in 1993.  I was a member

23     of the platoon.  I don't know what the company left my platoon had

24     along -- not along Ozrenska Street but next to it.  If I understand this

25     properly, this was in 1993, and in 1994, at the beginning of June I

Page 30186

 1     became a member of the command of the 3rd Battalion of the

 2     1st Romanija Brigade.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson referred to the date.  Let's continue.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 5        Q.   Mr. --

 6        A.   The year is 1993.  I apologise, Your Excellency.  In 1993 I was

 7     still not a member of the battalion command so I was not in a position to

 8     know whether those things existed in the 4th Company, whose member I was

 9     not at the time.

10        Q.   But, Mr. Tomic, you've said that in 1994 no one in the entire

11     battalion had a mortar greater than 60 millimetres.  And we see from here

12     already in 1993 the 4th Company had an 82-millimetre mortar.

13        A.   I don't know whether you know that in 1994 the United Nations

14     forces put a ban on the possession of weapons on the front line greater

15     than 60 millimetres.  All those weapons were moved in the depth of all

16     the lines and members of UNPROFOR even attended some places from which it

17     was potentially possible to open fire.  So there was a ban on the

18     possession of higher-calibre weapons in those areas.  I don't know when

19     that became effective.  I know that it was in 1994 and the list of the

20     weapons that existed in the 4th Company dates back to 1993.

21        Q.   Okay.  Now, earlier you said that -- you said that the separation

22     line where you were was 20 or 30 metres, not more.  So these weapons on

23     this list, in particular the mortars, those would have been used for

24     firing at targets in the depth, beyond the confrontation line; right?

25        A.   62-millimetre mortar is the only one that can provide support in

Page 30187

 1     fighting along the line which is only 30 metres deep.  You can't use any

 2     greater calibre because shrapnel can fall on both sides.  That's why the

 3     company that I belonged to before 1994, i.e., in that platoon, we did not

 4     have a calibre higher than 60 millimetre.  And we're talking about 1993,

 5     you mentioned the 4th Company, I can see that this is the 4th Company.  I

 6     didn't know that they had an 82-millimetre mortar that you mentioned and

 7     you showed me on this list of the weapons that the 4th Company allegedly

 8     had.

 9        Q.   Right.  Okay.  So the 82-millimetre mortar on this list could

10     only be used for firing at the depth; is that right?

11        A.   I can't speculate.  I don't know whether they used it at all.

12     Maybe they just had it at the ready for defence because there were many

13     attempts at breakthroughs, there were lots of casualties in 1992 and

14     1993.  I don't know whether they opened fire from it or not.  I can't

15     speculate.

16        Q.   Okay.  I'd like to follow-up on that, but just before we leave

17     this document I'd like to confirm a couple more things with you.  An M84

18     automatic weapon, that -- the effective range of that weapon is up to a

19     thousand metres when it's mounted on a tripod; is that right?

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And for an M53, its effective range is 1500 metres when it's on a

22     tripod?

23        A.   Well, yes.  There were such M53s, but they were not -- they were

24     out of order, obsolete, which was made in 1953, it was not even safe to

25     use.  Unfortunately we did not have more M84s, that's why we had M53s,

Page 30188

 1     unfortunately.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And a 12.7-millimetre Browning heavy machine-gun, its

 3     range is about 1800 metres and 1500 metres for a point target; is that

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yes, but I don't understand what your question is.  Nobody will

 6     shoot at random if there is direct fighting.  You use the weapons that

 7     you have on the defence line if you're attacked, but if the range of that

 8     weapon is what it is, why would you shoot arbitrarily and waste

 9     ammunition?  We had a standing order to be careful about the use of

10     ammunition which had to be economical.  Why is the range important here?

11     Why is it important whether this is 1200 or 1800 metres?  I claim with

12     full responsibility that the distance between the two armies along our

13     separation line was 50 metres, 80 at the most at very few places, I'm

14     talking about the battalion in which I spent the entire war.

15        Q.   Okay.  And early -- a few moments ago you said you couldn't

16     speculate on whether the 82-millimetre mortar of the 4th Company was

17     being used.  You said maybe it was just on standby.  So I'd like to look

18     quickly at two more documents.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  The first is 65 ter 24043.

20        Q.   And we can see this is a document from the 8th of June, 1993,

21     from the 4th Company to the battalion command, reporting on the status of

22     ammunition.  And you can see it lists that there are seven

23     60-millimetre -- what's translated as grenades and six 82-millimetre

24     grenades.  That's a reference to mortar shells; right?

25        A.   I suppose so, yes.  I suppose that's that.

Page 30189

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.  And if we could now turn to 65 ter 24045.

 2        Q.   This is a document also from the 4th Company of the 2nd Battalion

 3     about six months later on the 3rd of December, 1993, stating at the top

 4     "ammunition," and it includes one crate of 60-millimetre shells and two

 5     crates of 82-millimetre shells.  And at the bottom it says:

 6             "We have none of the above-mentioned ammunition.  I request that

 7     you deliver this ammunition to me."

 8             Now, these documents show that the 4th Company had ammunition for

 9     82-millimetre mortars and was using it; right?

10        A.   I don't know whether they were using them, but I know that this

11     document was drafted in 1993.  I know that some platoon commanders or

12     company commanders were afraid that they would not have enough and that's

13     why they created reserves.  This was in 1993.  This is not my company but

14     I'm aware of that situation.  Sometimes you have to stock on certain

15     things, for example, when you prepare food for winter you will want to

16     stock up.  This is a digression, but I know that some commanders did that

17     to have what they needed in cases when it was needed.  I don't know

18     whether that was the case, but I suppose it was.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'd like to tender the last three documents that

20     I've used, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just one question, Ms. Gustafson.  I see the name

22     here Dusan Zurovac, is he the next witness?

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I believe so, yes.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, even though the witness hasn't

Page 30190

 1     really confirmed them, we think that under the Chamber's ruling they're

 2     sufficiently related to his testimony that they can be admitted.

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, I would add to that, Your Honour, it's

 4     direct impeachment of the witness's assertion that nobody in the

 5     battalion had an 82-millimetre mortar.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive them, three of them.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  65 ter number 24044 will be

 8     Exhibit P5983; 24043 will be Exhibit P5984; and 65 ter number 24045 will

 9     be Exhibit P5985.

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay.  I'd like to look at one further document,

11     which is 65 ter 1D20334.

12        Q.   Again, Mr. Tomic, this is a report -- daily report from the

13     4th Company of the 2nd Battalion, and it describes a commando raid in the

14     area of the 4th Company position.  It says:

15             "Our commando group successfully took house after house, and so

16     the line of disengagement in this locality was moved some hundred metres

17     into the enemy depth.  The enemy had artillery support, probably from

18     Velesici, as we ascertained later when we analysed the trajectories of

19     the shells that destroyed two civilian structures in the immediate

20     vicinity of the command."

21             And it says:

22             "Our side didn't have any casualties ..."

23             And it says:

24             "Quite a lot of ammunition was expended" including ten mortar

25     shells.

Page 30191

 1             Now, it's my understanding that these shells would not have been

 2     fired at the line of engagement because the commandos were there taking

 3     houses one by one.  Are you able to tell us based on your knowledge of

 4     the situation what these ten mortar shells would have been fired at in

 5     this operation?

 6        A.   Again, I can't speculate.  That happened in 1993.  This is not my

 7     unit.  Maybe there was an attempt to break through from the Muslim side.

 8     Maybe they had to fortify the line or return the line.  This is what I

 9     would say that would have happened in my unit if there was such attempts

10     and if we had to return the line.  I don't know whether they used shells

11     and whether they fired them in the depth of the territory, as you say.

12     All I claim is that it would be ineffective to fire shells in depth if

13     your line was threatened.  Nobody in their right mind would do that,

14     especially not if they had some experience before that.  That was in

15     1993, in June.  What would that person have gained by firing shells in

16     the depth of the territory when their line was threatened?  But again,

17     this was the 4th Company.  I was a member of the platoon in the

18     3rd Company.  That was my area of responsibility, so I believe that it is

19     abundantly clear where I was at the time.  That was very far from me,

20     perhaps even a whole kilometre.  I can't be sure.  Maybe even

21     1500 metres.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'd like to tender that document.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That will be admitted.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P5986, Your Honours.

Page 30192

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 2        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic, I'd like to move on to another topic which is the

 3     departure of non-Serbs from your neighbourhood that you speak about in

 4     your statement.  And at paragraph 13 you said:

 5             "After the start of the conflict, near the MUP school I noticed

 6     that the Muslims from our street had withdrawn to their houses and that

 7     they were moving around much less.  I went to the houses of my Muslim

 8     neighbours Suad Jazic, Senad Sabit, and Ibro Surkovic, and others.  I

 9     wanted to know how they were feeling, if they had any problems, and if

10     they were all right.  All of them were scared and confused."

11             Now, one of the factors contributing to their fear or the fear of

12     non-Serbs in your area was the fact that non-Serbs from Serb-controlled

13     parts of Sarajevo were being expelled; right?

14        A.   I don't know whether there were any expulsion drives at that

15     moment.  I'm sure that they did not feel safe.  They were afraid.  I

16     would have felt the same if I had been on the other side, because my

17     sister with her son and her husband was on the other side and she felt

18     the same until the end of May when she moved to the Serbian side and

19     after that left Bosnia and Herzegovina all together.  I believe that that

20     would have been my motive for departure because I had lived with those

21     people, with Senad Sabit, who were my friends.  That's why I tried to

22     help them as much as I could.  I wanted them to feel safer if at all

23     possible.  I knew two other men, friends of mine, who were Croats.  They

24     left the area - I don't know how, during the night.  Later on they

25     contacted me after having left Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They were both

Page 30193

 1     married.  They are Croats.  They were my very good friends and I wish

 2     them all the happiness like I do mine.  It is absolutely understandable

 3     that people felt -- didn't feel safe.

 4        Q.   There were at this time, were there not, expulsions of non-Serbs

 5     from Serb-held parts of Sarajevo?

 6        A.   I am not aware of that.  I'm talking about the street or the part

 7     of the street where I was and about specific people that I knew with whom

 8     I was very good friends.  Whether it happened elsewhere, I suppose it

 9     did, on both sides.  Everybody wanted to leave that area on the eve of

10     any war.  If you were in Syria now, you would want to flee.  It's a

11     normal human reaction, a normal desire to save yourself and your family.

12     I cannot talk about any other parts of the city.  I'm just talking about

13     my street and the part of the street where I lived.  These things did not

14     happen there.  I said in my statement I might have been on guard duty or

15     elsewhere when my neighbours left the place.  I'm sorry about that.  I

16     know, however - I was told later by friends of mine - that they were all

17     safe and nothing bad happened to them, which is the most important thing

18     in war, to survive.

19             THE ACCUSED:  They were escorted.  [Interpretation] Again

20     something is missing from the transcript:  They were escorted.  The

21     witness said:  They were escorted out so that nothing bad should happen

22     to them.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:

24        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

Page 30194

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 4        Q.   Mr. Tomic, your answer suggested that these people were simply

 5     fleeing a war zone, but they were going from one side of the

 6     confrontation line to the city of Sarajevo, which was hardly escaping a

 7     war situation.  These people, non-Serbs, were leaving your neighbourhood

 8     because of fear of what was happening around them, which was the

 9     expulsion of non-Serbs; right?

10        A.   No.  Emphatically no.  Because I said my own sister was on the

11     other side and in the same way she left voluntarily.  Nobody made her.

12     She was just thinking about her son and his safety and logically she

13     wanted to save him from the war.  My sister was not driven out either,

14     nor were these other people.  But I'm talking about the period when it

15     was possible to cross from one side to another.  It could have been until

16     the end of May.  Later on the city was completely blocked.  Many who

17     wanted to leave -- Serbs, Muslims, and Croats alike wanted to leave but

18     it was no longer possible.  Why?  Because the Muslim leadership did not

19     allow the Serbs to leave --

20        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

21        A.   -- I'm sure that many Muslims would have left Sarajevo even then

22     if it had been possible, but it wasn't.

23        Q.   Once again, we're moving away from the question.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to D92 and specifically page 66 of

25     that exhibit.

Page 30195

 1        Q.   Mr. Tomic, this document is part of a speech that Mr. Prstojevic,

 2     who we -- was referenced in an earlier exhibit speaking with Momo Garic,

 3     was speaking in the Assembly, in the RS Assembly, in July 1992.  And the

 4     B/C/S is not a very good quality so I will read out to you the relevant

 5     part.  He says:

 6             "Namely, when the Serbs started the uprising in Sarajevo and when

 7     they seized control over certain territories, there was no government or

 8     at least it was not known where it was then.  Moreover, we even did not

 9     know if Mr. Karadzic was alive during the first couple of days.  When we

10     learnt that he was alive and when he visited us in Ilidza and encouraged

11     us, the Serbs from Sarajevo retained control over the territory, and even

12     extended their territory in some areas, driving the Muslims out of the

13     territories where they had actually been majority."

14             Now, this in a nutshell is what was happening in the early days

15     of the war in Sarajevo and this is why the people -- the non-Serbs in

16     your neighbourhood were afraid; right?

17        A.   I don't know.  I see this document for the first time.  I really

18     never met Mr. Prstojevic myself, and of course this could be -- of course

19     it is his speech, but what he meant I don't know.  He was at Ilidza, as

20     you say, so I don't know anything about this nor do I know that he spoke

21     before the Assembly.  I must say that I have never been a member of the

22     SDS, but for me he was the leader of the movement because he was

23     concerned about the survival of the Serb people.  Why Mr. Prstojevic said

24     this and spoke about some sort of expansion of the territory, I don't

25     know.  We had no offensive actions and we were just holding this defence

Page 30196

 1     line and the line did not move throughout the war.  I am not aware of

 2     this speech, I'm not familiar with it, never heard it before.

 3        Q.   Okay.  But you did, in particular, at the end of the war or near

 4     the end of the war advocate for the Muslims who had left Grbavica to be

 5     prevented from returning there, didn't you?

 6        A.   I don't know to what passage that relates, but I'm saying no.

 7     How can they return?  The war was still on.  You said "towards the end of

 8     the war," does it mean that the war was still ongoing or the war was

 9     over?

10        Q.   Well, the war was basically over, and just after the

11     Dayton Agreement was signed, which provided for Grbavica to be returned

12     to the Federation side, you advocated for the Muslims to be prevented

13     from returning there; right?

14        A.   No.  I don't know if you have this information.  A large number

15     of Muslims spent the entire war at Grbavica; that is true, that is

16     correct.  At that point when the Dayton Accords have been signed, it's

17     true what you say, Serbs had to leave Sarajevo.  And how would we be in a

18     position to prevent the Muslims from returning?  I can't understand.  How

19     would we be in that position?  How could we prevent them from coming back

20     when the Dayton Accords have been signed, the demarcation lines were

21     drawn, and it was clear which parts of Sarajevo belonged to whom.  We had

22     almost nothing; they had almost everything.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to 65 ter 22851, which I believe

24     is an admitted exhibit and I'll just find the exhibit number now.  If we

25     could go to page 169 in the English and the B/C/S.

Page 30197

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  It's Exhibit P1489, Your Honours.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'm sorry, if we could go to the B/C/S transcript

 3     rather than the original Cyrillic if that's possible.

 4        Q.   Mr. Tomic, this is an extract of General Mladic's military

 5     notebook, and it's -- records a meeting with SRK officers on the

 6     22nd of December, 1995, and this is shortly after the Dayton Agreement

 7     was reached.

 8             And if we could go to the second page -- or sorry, the next page.

 9     And it says:  "Second Lieutenant Bozidar Tomic."  That's you; right?

10        A.   Yes, my name is Bozo, but that's what they called me, Bozidar.

11     They also wrote Aleksandar, Aco, Sasa.  I'm sorry, but I don't really see

12     what's written here.

13        Q.   Can you see it now?  Under your name it says:

14             "People at Grbavica want to stay.

15             "Guarantees that the Muslims and their police and authorities

16     will not come ..."

17             Now, this is a reference to you seeking guarantees that the

18     Muslims would not return to Grbavica; right?

19        A.   No.  At that meeting I was present - that's a fact, that's

20     true - and I sought guarantees that their police would not come to

21     mistreat us because at that moment, all of us, the population of Grbavica

22     and Vraca and I suppose other parts of the city where there were Serbs,

23     Vogosca and Ilijas and such, wanted to remain in their homes, in their

24     city.  And we sought guarantees - maybe this was wrongly recorded, I

25     don't know - not that Muslims would not come back to their homes; it was

Page 30198

 1     their indisputable right.  I have to tell you, for seven years I was

 2     unable to get some of their families out of my own house, but we didn't

 3     want their authorities to come and make arrests among us.  That's

 4     natural.  I didn't mean that Muslims should not come, but that their

 5     police would not come to make searches and arrests.  How could we feel

 6     safe at Grbavica even if we were allowed to stay in our homes?  I suppose

 7     you know and you have that information that in my battalion

 8     Mr. Hrvatcevic, a captain who was deputy battalion commander when I was

 9     assistant commander, went to the international police force to work as an

10     interpreter and he was arrested just a few days after he had started

11     working.  He was arrested, imprisoned, and mistreated, and spent four

12     years in Zenica.  How could we feel safe if their police and army were to

13     arrive and make arrests and search houses --

14        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

15        A.   -- knowing that we were members of the VRS.

16        Q.   -- again, I think we're straying from the question.  I understand

17     your position is that notwithstanding this reference to the Muslims and

18     their and authorities, you were just referring to police and the

19     authorities.

20             I would like to move on now to talk about another topic --

21        A.   Certainly.

22        Q.   In general, your statement suggests that in your view the units

23     that you belonged to and that were around you were familiar with the --

24     or complied with the laws of war.  Were you familiar with the

25     Geneva Conventions?

Page 30199

 1        A.   I had opportunity to read it once, but again, our soldiers were

 2     familiar with that, we were given this to read, and we always received

 3     strict orders.  We in the battalion got orders from higher levels.  It

 4     was strictly prohibited to open fire at civilian targets, against

 5     civilians, women and children in the city.  Those are always the orders

 6     we received from our higher command, and the commander and his deputy

 7     issued such orders to company commanders and down -- further down to

 8     lower levels.

 9        Q.   Okay.  So you would agree that the Geneva Conventions require,

10     among other things, that civilians and prisoners of war be treated

11     humanely and acts of violence and cruel treatment against such persons

12     are prohibited; right?

13        A.   Absolutely agree.

14        Q.   Okay.  And were you aware of any breaches of those conventions by

15     any members of your units or other SRK units?

16        A.   I cannot speak about other units.  I know that in my unit,

17     although I can't claim with any certainty because the battalion had over

18     1.000 troops, it's too much for one establishment battalion, but the

19     length of our line and the configuration of the line, required that

20     number of troops.  With time it varied --

21        Q.   Mr. Tomic --

22        A.   -- and was reduced because of our losses, et cetera --

23        Q.   I'm not asking about the configuration of your line.  Are you

24     aware of any breaches of the Geneva Conventions by any members of the

25     units that you belonged to?

Page 30200

 1        A.   Not that I know of.

 2        Q.   Okay.  And are you aware of any inquiries or investigations for

 3     any of the units that you belonged to of any breaches of the

 4     Geneva Conventions or more generally of the laws of war?

 5        A.   There were no such cases in my unit.  I'm saying again, I don't

 6     know but there were discipline procedures instituted against troops.  The

 7     military police would intervene but that referred to breaches of public

 8     order, robberies, drunkenness, et cetera.  If that happened with a

 9     soldier, then the military police would arrest that soldier.  I don't

10     know about the other things.

11        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I'd like to move on and talk about the -- or

12     ask you some questions about the work detail that you discuss in your

13     statement, and that's at paragraph 15.  You describe a -- you said the --

14     because of the difficulty at the front and the small number of men in

15     Ozrenska Street you contacted the brigade, and a group of Muslim

16     prisoners from Kula came and assisted in a work detail to reinforce a

17     line.

18             Now, how many days or weeks did this work detail spend at your

19     Ozrenska Street positions fortifying the line ?

20        A.   Since that was a period - it was still 1992 - we were unable to

21     do this in any good way, we asked for help and perhaps seven or eight of

22     them came.  And again, I'm talking about the unit where I was in 1992.

23     They were there for ten, maximum 12 days.  I can't remember precisely

24     anymore, but I know they were with us in our midst.  They helped us and

25     we fortified that line at Sanac together, the red line I drew on the map.

Page 30201

 1        Q.   And what exactly did they do in terms of fortifying the line?

 2     Were they digging trenches?  Building bunkers?  What was their task?

 3        A.   Since that was in the immediate vicinity of the Pero Kosoric

 4     Square and the high-rises from which they were able to control the area,

 5     coming to that area was not safe for members of the VRS.  So to just go

 6     there we had to make trenches and communicating trenches on arrival and

 7     we had to set up bunkers for the men whose job was to observe and to

 8     monitor and to scout and keep the line.  Most of those communicating

 9     trenches which were perfectly visible from the high-rises, we had to put

10     a cover over them.  It's pointless to make communicating trenches if they

11     can see you arriving.  And one company commander was killed in that way

12     when coming to inspect the line.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson, we need to take a break now.  We'll

14     break for 40 minutes and resume at 1.30.

15                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.51 p.m.

16                           --- On resuming at 1.32 p.m.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I point to one thing on the

18     record, an imprecision on page 51, line 25.  The witness said he had

19     never been a member of the SDS but he knows that it - the record says

20     "he" - it was a leader.  That cannot be understood from the current

21     LiveNote.  In other words, it does not refer to a person, it refers to

22     the SDS.  And in our language "SDS" would be of the male gender.

23             JUDGE KWON:  So you refer to SDS when he was leader of the

24     movement and concerned about the survival of Serb people, you meant the

25     SDS?

Page 30202

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course.  The SDS had the

 2     force of a movement in the Serbian movement.  It does not refer to anyone

 3     individually, but the SDS as a political party which had the force of a

 4     movement for the Serbian people.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             Let's proceed, Ms. Gustafson.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Mr. Tomic, just before the break I was asking you questions about

 9     the work detail of prisoners from Kula, and I understood from your last

10     answer that this work detail was working on building bunkers and trenches

11     and covering those trenches.  Is that correct?

12        A.   Yes, digging communicating trenches as access to the trenches

13     themselves where there was soldiers whose job it was to observe.  In view

14     of the vicinity of the positions from which fire was opened, these

15     communicating trenches had to be covered from the top so that troops

16     would be safe coming to and leaving the line.

17        Q.   Okay.  And you said in your statement that you knew nothing else

18     about these persons, other than that they were in prison at Kula.  And

19     it's also clear from your statement that you knew they were Muslim.  Did

20     you understand them to be civilians or prisoners of war?

21        A.   I have no precise information that would enable me to give you a

22     precise answer.  I know that we approached the higher command, the

23     brigade command, and to the extent they were able to, they sent us people

24     for perhaps around 15 days until the line was completely fortified and we

25     didn't need it anymore.  I'm talking only about the unit where I was.

Page 30203

 1     There was no more need to engage anyone from the side.  I don't know if

 2     they were prisoners, as you say, or civilians or -- I really don't know.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now you've said that this work was being carried out in

 4     the immediate vicinity of Pero Kosoric Square, from which you've

 5     explained you faced incoming fire and were in constant danger, that this

 6     was between 20 and 50 metres away from the other side, and you've also

 7     said that this work was being carried out specifically because the VRS in

 8     that location was in danger.  So I assume from all of that information

 9     that the Muslim prisoners engaged in this work detail were exposed to

10     great danger of death or injury in carrying out this work; is that right?

11        A.   That's not right.  As soon as they arrived on the site, they

12     started digging, and as soon as they would reach a certain depth we would

13     cover that part.  We did not subject them to great danger or danger of

14     death by putting them there as sitting ducks.  We were concerned about

15     their security and we wanted them to fortify the line as soon as possible

16     for our security and their own.  When you come to a certain locality, you

17     dig deep into the ground, and the earth that was dug out and the trench

18     you dug out are immediately covered from view so that it would not be

19     visible from Pero Kosoric Square or any other positions from which they

20     could open fire on us and on the men working.  So we did take care about

21     their safety.  Of course we told them not to try anything.  We gave them

22     the same food we had, we gave them cigarettes.

23             And in that location, in the unit where I was, I was assistant

24     platoon commander as I said before and the red line you showed on the map

25     was the area of responsibility of that platoon, a length of about 300,

Page 30204

 1     400 metres.  There were really no incidents there.  And from what I heard

 2     from some of those people who came there wanted to go out of wherever

 3     they were, to be in open air, they had better food, they got cigarettes

 4     from us, and we sometimes engaged in informal conversation about everyday

 5     things.  But we never put them in any kind of danger.  They were told

 6     that they were there to do their job.  Nobody abused them in my unit,

 7     nobody mistreated them, and we were concerned about their safety as much

 8     as our own because our objective was to fortify the line as soon as

 9     possible to avoid further losses and we had already suffered losses in

10     coming and going from the line.

11        Q.   Okay.  Well, now you've just said in that location where you were

12     assistant platoon commander, there were really no incidents there;

13     whereas earlier in your testimony when I asked you if you were in

14     constant danger, you said something like particularly so.  You agreed

15     with that proposition wholeheartedly.  Now in addition you've just said

16     that as soon as these prisoners arrived on the site they started digging

17     and "as soon as they would reach a certain depth we would cover that

18     part."  Now, even assuming that these prisoners would be protected once

19     the trench was covered - I would think that would be a -- not a

20     particularly safe assumption - before that trench is covered, when they

21     have started digging, these prisoners were exposed to fire from the front

22     line which was, as you said, 20 to 50 metres away, weren't they?

23        A.   Not from the moment of arrival to the line.  The line of

24     separation was 20 to 50 metres, but in order to reach those trenches the

25     layout of the terrain would show that very clearly.  It's an elevation

Page 30205

 1     and as soon as you reach the top, you are potentially a target of enemy

 2     fire.  To avoid that -- we were actually with them while they were

 3     working.  They could not do those works alone on any part of the line.

 4     There were always our own troops to take care of their safety and to

 5     prevent any untoward action on their part.  They were told to behave when

 6     they arrived.

 7             And when I said there were no incidents, there were no incidents

 8     with the labour platoon.  Nobody physically abused them, mistreated them,

 9     beat them, or threatened them, but they were told in advance just to do

10     their job and everything would be all right, and that's how it was.  The

11     layout of the ground is such that it's an elevation, and when you come to

12     the forward line you have to go there.  It was as dangerous for them as

13     it was for us.  The Serb soldiers from the labour platoon were not any

14     safer and that's the reason why we asked for someone to be sent, why they

15     fortified the lines, and from that moment on, it was not necessary to

16     engage them any longer.  And they no longer came to my unit where I was

17     assistant platoon commander.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Okay if we could have 65 ter 1D02771, please.

19        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic, this is a report from the command of the

20     2nd Battalion, your battalion, to the administration of the Kula prison.

21     And it says that:

22             "Around 12.30 in the morning on the 21st of May, 1993, two Muslim

23     prisoners who had been building bunkers with another nine prisoners

24     escaped to the enemy side from the positions of our 4th Infantry Company

25     in Ozrenska Street."

Page 30206

 1             And if you skip to the third paragraph, it says:

 2             "While they were working, Mitrovic guarded them with another two

 3     soldiers who were at the position there in a trench about 10 metres away

 4     from the prisoners.  According to Mitrovic, the place where the work was

 5     carried out was constantly under infantry and rifle grenade fire from the

 6     enemy, and observation was difficult because it was dusk."

 7             If we can go to the next page in the English.  It says:

 8             "Mitrovic found out about the escape when one of the prisoners

 9     ran to his trench and said to him, 'Zeka and Trifun have run away.'

10     Mitrovic and the two soldiers who were with him immediately opened fire

11     after the prisoners, but they did not prevent the escape."

12             And then in the last paragraph it says:

13             "We add that the work was carried out at night because that place

14     was under constant enemy fire so it was impossible to carry out the work

15     during the day.  In addition, it is in the immediate vicinity of enemy

16     positions."

17             Now, this is a 4th Company report so it's from a position on

18     Ozrenska Street down the street from where you were positioned, but this

19     report explaining that the work of a detail of Muslim prisoners from Kula

20     was being carried out under constant infantry and rifle grenade fire to

21     the point that they were working at night because of the intensity of the

22     fire.  This report basically describes the conditions that Muslim

23     prisoners from Kula faced in work details on Ozrenska Street; right?

24        A.   It says the 4th Infantry Company.  That's not my area of

25     responsibility.  It's about 1500 metres from me, from my line.  Doesn't

Page 30207

 1     this detail, that they were working by night, tell you that somebody was

 2     worried about their safety.  It was too dangerous by the day, and I quite

 3     understand the commander or the assistant company commander to want to

 4     fortify that line because people were killed.  So it was done by night.

 5     People were even buried by night at that time.  You hear about those two,

 6     they escaped.  I was not there but I heard about this incident, this

 7     escape.  But somebody was obviously worried about their safety so they

 8     brought them to work there by night because it was too dangerous by day.

 9     But again, it was not in the area of my unit.  I only know from other

10     people about this escape by people from the labour platoon and I see the

11     signature is the assistant commander for security, lieutenant or

12     lieutenant second class Dragan Maletic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the third line there is a

14     passive form:  People were buried.  Whereas the witness said:  We buried

15     our casualties by night.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Let's continue.

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:

18        Q.   Now, Mr. Tomic, the use of these Muslim prisoners to carry out

19     work such as building bunkers and digging trenches on the front line at

20     Ozrenska Street, not only did it violate basic provisions of the Geneva

21     Conventions requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and

22     civilians; it also violates the prohibition in the Geneva Conventions of

23     using either prisoners of war or civilians in work that is directly

24     related to military activities, doesn't it?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is misleading.  [In English]

Page 30208

 1     This is misleading.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  On what basis?  I assume --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that roads were

 4     accessible, not the forward line, and he never said they were digging the

 5     forward lines and trenches there.  They were digging only for road works.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  That's absolutely false.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I think -- please continue.  You can take up that

 8     issue in your re-examination, but I don't think Ms. Gustafson was

 9     misleading.

10             He can answer the question.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could you please repeat the

12     question.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:

14        Q.   Certainly.  This use of Muslim prisoners to carry out work such

15     as building bunkers and digging trenches on the front line at

16     Ozrenska Street, not only did it violate basic provisions of the

17     Geneva Conventions requiring the humane treatment of prisoners of war and

18     civilians, it also violates the prohibition in the conventions of using

19     either prisoners of war or civilians in work that is directly related to

20     military activities, doesn't it?

21        A.   Our motivation and our desire was primarily to protect personnel.

22     Throughout the war, we had problems filling our ranks due to a great

23     number of casualties and woundings.  We did not have enough people, and

24     that's why we asked for assistance from a higher command to send people

25     in a way that would provide a solution once and for all.  They were

Page 30209

 1     digging access to the line, and of course with the bunkers that we were

 2     fortifying, they were helping it all.  But we used them as we needed to,

 3     to be able to observe a position and open fire from those bunkers if we

 4     were attacked.  So they did not give us conceptual solutions as to how to

 5     do that.  They helped us only in one part.  Their work was completely

 6     safe.  We were as concerned about their safety as we were about ours.

 7     They received the same food as we did, and as soon as they were done they

 8     would leave.  That's how it was arranged in my unit.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we be shown where in the

10     document is it stated that they were digging trenches on the forward

11     line, on the first line?

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, this -- the question wasn't about this

13     specific document, but the document says that these prisoners were

14     building bunkers.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.  I'd like to tender this, please.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be admitted.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P5987, Your Honours.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:

21        Q.   Mr. Tomic, I'd like to move on to another part of your statement

22     where you said at paragraph 23 that UN military observers would come to

23     the battalion command, so this is at a time when you were in the

24     battalion command, to investigate firing incidents, and you said you

25     would take them to the alleged fire positions where they would be assured

Page 30210

 1     that the Serbian side did not commit the alleged fire and they never had

 2     complaints about your unit.

 3             Now if we could go to Exhibit D2421 which is a document you

 4     discuss in your statement at paragraph 26.  And this is an order to --

 5     from the battalion command to the 4th Company which states that foreign

 6     military observers have received permission to monitor the cease-fire in

 7     the battalion's zone of responsibility.  In the second paragraph it

 8     explains when the monitoring will commence and the licence plate numbers

 9     of the vehicles that will be used.  And the substance of the order is in

10     the final paragraph where it says:

11             "Facilitate the movement of the military observers in your zone

12     of responsibility, but prevent their direct access to our positions and

13     their surveillance of the same without permission.  If they should

14     request it, seek the approval of the battalion command.  If they are

15     found at positions without approval, detain them and report to the

16     battalion command."

17             Now, the standing order in this document is to prevent the access

18     and surveillance of the unit's position and sets out the steps to be

19     followed if such access is requested.  Is that a fair reading?

20        A.   Just one correction.  You said a moment ago that I was battalion

21     commander.  At this time, look at the signature, this is deputy battalion

22     commander Mr. Hrvatcevic, while Mr. Petrovic was commander.  I was

23     assistant battalion commander.  It says enable military observers to

24     move.  It even lists vehicles to be given to them, to make everything

25     possible for them.  But if they come directly into the trench, we cannot

Page 30211

 1     be absolutely sure, although they are coming as an unbiased impartial

 2     organisation, we could never be sure whether they could pass on the

 3     information to the other side.  Why am I saying this?  Because this was

 4     the B team of military observers, whereas the A team was in the city in

 5     the PTT engineering building, and a Jordanian man was the boss of both.

 6     He co-ordinated both A and B teams.  A was on the Muslim side; B was on

 7     the Serb side.  The order was clear:  Enable their movement.  But please,

 8     to allow them to come into every trench to see how many people we have,

 9     how many weapons we have, I don't know who would have allowed that.  They

10     were told they can come anywhere they like.

11             And on the Muslim side, there were always violations of the

12     cease-fire.  They repaired their fortifications, et cetera.  And when we

13     asked them - we from the battalion command - based on reports from lower

14     units, when we asked them to check on those incidents and violations,

15     they would have to call the A team, and this happened a thousand times,

16     the Muslims would stop their works.  And in their eyes, there was always

17     this impression that we were making things up, until one time when they

18     actually realised it was true.  Their crew went out and found the Muslims

19     doing that.  But it was necessary to get the green light from the

20     Jordanian man for either crew to go out on the site and verify our claims

21     or theirs.

22             Of course, they were allowed to move, but there are certain

23     limits and rules of conduct.  I don't see from this order, although I

24     know about the commander and the deputy commander, perhaps this was a --

25     I came to the command in the beginning of June --

Page 30212

 1        Q.   Okay, Mr. Tomic --

 2        A.   -- this is 26th of May, but I know about this --

 3        Q.   -- I think again we're straying a little far from the question.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P1822.  This is a UN military

 5     observer report.  If we could go to page 2 of the report, this is from

 6     the 11th of August, 1994, and it describes a follow-up investigation

 7     after the shooting of an 11-year-old girl in Sarajevo by a

 8     12.7-millimetre weapon.  And it says:

 9             "UNMO patrols were sent out on both sides of the confrontation

10     line in the Grbavica area."

11             And in paragraph 2 it states that:

12             "The team was able to bearing on a point which coincided with a

13     new 12.7-millimetre position that was known to the team."

14             And in paragraph 3 it says:

15             "The UNMO patrol was sent to the location but was delayed by

16     Bosnian Serb army forces who insisted that the patrol get clearance ...

17     clearance that they had already received."

18             And then it says:

19             "Finally after some time going back and forth ... the patrol was

20     allowed to the site.  By this time the 12.7-millimetre gun had been

21     removed.  The soldiers at the position stated it had been taken away for

22     maintenance."

23             Now, this is clearly in the area of the 2nd Battalion and this

24     document - noting the superfluous clearance demands and the delays that

25     were sufficient that the suspected weapon in question had been

Page 30213

 1     removed - this reflects an effort by forces within your battalion to

 2     obstruct the effective monitoring of the cease-fire; right?

 3        A.   No, that is not correct and I'll explain why.  I was right there.

 4     I think the incident involves two little girls, if that's the same

 5     incident.  There were two girls there.  When I was in the battalion

 6     command we received a report from the company command that two little

 7     girls, perhaps around 10, were hit.  And then I informed the B team of

 8     military observers by courier - the man number one in that team was a

 9     Swedish captain - and they went out.  I can only understand this as an

10     expression of anger of troops who happened to be there.  But I was

11     personally there with the Swedish captain.  We went down there.  We took

12     the girls to the Kasindol hospital and we were all horrified over that.

13     It looked as if somebody took the scalp off these girls.  It's a

14     destructive calibre --

15        Q.   Mr. Tomic, I think you're misunderstanding.  I think you're

16     confusing this -- the incident described here with an incident you

17     describe in your statement about the killing of two Serb girls from the

18     Muslim side, and incident with the Chamber has received evidence occurred

19     on the 11th of March, 1995, and I'd refer to D2294 and P879 as

20     references.

21             This is an incident that's describing the alleged striking of a

22     young girl from the Bosnian Serb side of the confrontation line into

23     the -- so the victim in question was on the Muslim side of the line.

24        A.   In Grbavica?  It says here that the incident happened in

25     Grbavica, if I'm not mistaken.

Page 30214

 1        Q.   I don't think that's right.  It gives a grid reference in

 2     Sarajevo, but the -- and the investigation took place in Grbavica.  So I

 3     understand -- if that's the case, do you not have a recollection of this

 4     incident?

 5        A.   No, I'm not familiar with this.  You're right, I obviously had in

 6     mind another incident.  I'm not familiar with this case.  What happened,

 7     sniper, 12.7 -- I don't even know that such a weapon existed.

 8        Q.   So then you can't comment on the extent to which the Bosnian Serb

 9     army obstructed --

10        A.   No, really --

11        Q.   -- sorry, you can't comment on --

12        A.   No, I can't.  I'm not familiar with this case.  I've never seen

13     this before.

14        Q.   Okay.  And I'd just like that ask you a more general question.

15     You've said -- you've emphasized in your statement and in your evidence

16     today your view that the Bosnian Serb side scrupulously complied with the

17     laws of war.  Did you ever hear anything from any source that the SRK was

18     targeting civilians in Sarajevo, particularly through shelling and

19     sniping?  Did information to that effect ever come to your attention at

20     the time?

21        A.   I personally didn't.

22        Q.   Thank you.  I have no further questions.  Thank you, Mr. Tomic.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Gustafson.

24             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies.  I have to shed

Page 30215

 1     light on some of the things that appeared during cross-examination.  Can

 2     we look at D426.  D426.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] Earlier today you were shown one part of a

 5     document --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D426, D426.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Earlier today you were shown a part of a document in which

 9     Mr. Prstojevic addressed the president.  Let's look at bullet point 3 to

10     see what my position was with regard to the civilian population.  Could

11     you please read bullet point 3 aloud.  Please read it out aloud.

12        A.   You want me to read it out?  Under 3 it says:

13             "To spare the civilians of all attacks."

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             And now I would like to call up D92.

17             This was also shown to you before.

18             Could we get page 87 in Serbian and 86 in English.

19             This was not shown to you.  This is an excerpt from an Assembly

20     session.  Could you please look at line 9 from the top in the Serbian

21     version of the document.  Line 9 from the bottom.  Can we scroll up a

22     little to display that line.

23             It says here:

24             "In that state which we are building, we have to provide them

25     with all the rights that we ourselves have ..."

Page 30216

 1             How does this tally with your notions of our policies, of my

 2     policies, with regard to other ethnic communities and people?  How does

 3     this correspond to what you know about my position with regard to other

 4     ethnic groups?

 5        A.   Mr. President, are you asking me?

 6        Q.   Yes, yes.

 7        A.   I can't see anything here.  Any democratic system in the world

 8     would be happy if something like that were said.  It says here that we

 9     guarantee all rights to everybody unless they harbour hostile intentions.

10     This is an encouragement to all those who want to live in

11     Republika Srpska.  This can only encourage them to stay in their homes

12     and to continue living where they have always lived.

13        Q.   I have just shown you bullet point 3 which was issued before this

14     Assembly session.  This is the Assembly session.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And can we now look at D7154 --

16     D1754.  D1754, please.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Look at bullet point 3, it's not very legible.  I'm going to try

19     and read it.

20             There has to be an English translation because this document has

21     been admitted into evidence already.

22             Bullet point 3, I'm going to read that:

23             "Forced transfer of people and other illegal measures against

24     civilian population must be prevented; certificates on property selling

25     or written statements by refugees that they will not return, if any, are

Page 30217

 1     not legally valid and are out of force."

 2             I believe that this was issued in August, on the 17th of August.

 3     How does this fit with your understanding of our policies?

 4        A.   This is the only correct understanding.  There is no forced

 5     transfer.  I claimed in my statement that no such things ever happened.

 6             Are you talking about the document that was issued on the

 7     13th of June, 1992?  That's a document that I have in front of me.

 8        Q.   It says:

 9             "According to our official act of June 13 ..."

10             That was the first such document and this one was issued on the

11     19th of August.  If we scroll up we will see it.

12        A.   The way I perceive it is as an encouragement and a guarantee to

13     those who decide to stay, who have never harboured any hostile

14     activities, who are not involved in acts of terrorism.  It says here that

15     forced transfer should be banned, that property looting should be banned,

16     and if anybody engaged in such activities they would be duly punished.

17     That's how I perceive this.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You were shown something that concerned my speech in

19     the Assembly.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up D1270.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   You were suggested outside of any context that I had delivered a

23     speech which was war-mongering or intimidating.

24             Let's look at page 116 in Serbian, or rather, in English and in

25     Serbian it's 122.

Page 30218

 1             This was issued on the 14th of October when there was out-voting

 2     and when a declaration on sovereignty was passed.  Do you remember that?

 3        A.   Yes, I do.

 4        Q.   I'm going to read the first paragraph.

 5             "Before any explanation of the proposal is proposed, I don't know

 6     whether I'm going to explain it or somebody else, I have to clarify one

 7     thing which arises from the interpretation of what is being said from

 8     this place.  And this concerns the issue of war or peace.  For the

 9     umpteenth time I have to repeat that Serbs are not threatening to wage a

10     war.  Serbs only declared that they would not be able to accept any

11     decision which is issued by means of out-voting and to their detriment."

12             And one more thing on this page, a little bit further down,

13     somewhere in the middle of the page it says:

14             "Serbs never attacked Muslims nor will they ever attack Muslims.

15     There is no such a feeling towards Muslims; however, the case that could

16     arise from decisions passed by out-voting, the case that could arise that

17     will not be launched by anybody but it will follow its own logic of what

18     we've spoken here.  This is not chaos; order lies in our hands.  Chaos is

19     not in anybody's hands.  The main characteristics of chaos is the fact

20     that nobody generates it.  It follows its own logic and it is

21     self-generating."

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page.

23     It should be 117 in English.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Could I just ask that Mr. Karadzic indicate where

25     in this transcript it says that Serbs never attacked Muslims nor will

Page 30219

 1     they ever attack Muslims.  I couldn't find that part.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Towards the end --

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- spilling over to page 117 in

 6     English.

 7             [In English] Serbs never attacked -- [Interpretation] Last line.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Further on it says, talking about chaos -- can we move to the

10     following page both in Serbian and in English.

11             It says here:  What else could the Serbs offer, although we

12     wholeheartedly accept Mr. Izetbegovic's proposal.  I can see that there

13     are no positions [as interpreted] to that in the Croatian Democratic

14     Union.  Let's think about that.  Let's talk to the world about

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina, about Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.  Let's convey a

16     message that there won't be a war.  Serbs will not be forced to accept

17     one option and Muslims and Croats another one.  We can send the message

18     that there won't be a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We can guarantee that

19     there won't be chaos because order is in our hands.  Chaos is no longer

20     in anybody's hands.  On this occasion I convey warm messages and

21     greetings to Serbs, Muslims, and Croats, to common people who don't even

22     know what sovereignty is, who don't know what the change of a

23     constitutional and legal position is, who are not aware of the projection

24     of things that will be Bosnia in two or four or five years.  My message

25     to them is to support us in our intention for the war not to take place.

Page 30220

 1             I'm conveying warm messages, not war messages, but warm messages,

 2     warm.

 3             Once again let's convey warm messages and greetings to all the

 4     three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Let's tell them that we are

 5     taking all measures to avoid war, to avoid out-voting and so on and so

 6     forth.

 7             In your experience, would you call this war-mongering or would

 8     you call this a message against war?

 9        A.   It would be a message anti-war.  In my statement and during my

10     examination I remember the Lisbon Agreement and we sincerely hoped that

11     war would be avoided.  I suppose that all the members of the other

12     peoples hoped the same.  I really didn't -- never understood why the

13     Muslims had given up on that agreement which was a guarantee of security

14     for everybody, which was a guarantee that war would not take place and

15     everything could have ended up peacefully.

16             War is terrible for everybody.  I no longer live in my own city,

17     a city where I have lived all my life.  This is tragic and it is tragic

18     for everybody who left their homes, especially those who lost somebody in

19     that war.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Earlier today you were shown some of the diary notes

21     by General Mladic, page 53.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 65 ter 7845.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Your answer was that that did not concern Muslims but rather the

25     Muslim police who might jeopardise safety and security.  Please look at

Page 30221

 1     the document.  This is an UNPROFOR report on a visit to Grbavica.  It

 2     says on the 9th of March, 1993 -- [In English] Visit protection officer

 3     to Grbavica on March the 18th, 1993.  [Interpretation] And then bullet

 4     point 4:  Minorities.

 5             [In English] "There are approximately 1.200 Muslims still in

 6     Grbavica.  The males are not drafted, but those of a certain age have to

 7     do work for -- between 100 and 150 Muslims have indicated a willingness

 8     to leave to the other side [Interpretation] And so on and so forth.

 9             Is it true that at that time there were about 1200 Muslims, that

10     you did not mobilise them, but some had work obligation?  And was it only

11     Muslims who had work obligation or was it everybody?

12        A.   I didn't have any precise information.  I know that there were a

13     lot of Muslims and I've already said that today.  I know that a lot of

14     Muslims lived in Grbavica, especially in the part where there were

15     expulsions.  Many people lived there.  I didn't know this

16     information - it's UNPROFOR information.  There was a work obligation for

17     everyone who was not a member of military units.  Although I had nothing

18     to do with this personally, I know that some reported for work.  When

19     humanitarian aid convoys arrived, they would help with the unloading of

20     the goods, they were still receiving them at the time.  Since that was

21     the situation in Sarajevo, there weren't enough goods, people were

22     willing to work on humanitarian products in order to receive some

23     humanitarian aid which they received as did all the other inhabitants.  I

24     didn't know that there were so many of them, but there certainly were a

25     lot of Muslims.

Page 30222

 1        Q.   Here it says that they registered a hundred and 150 of them who

 2     wanted to cross over.  Was this prevented when such wishes were

 3     expressed?

 4        A.   No.  This information is from 1993.  As I said, at the time I was

 5     in my unit's sector.  I know that there was a large group that crossed

 6     over, perhaps 200 people, but I have no idea.  I know that they managed

 7     to cross over.  One part of that group crossed over the Bratstvo i

 8     Jedinstvo Bridge and the other part crossed over a smaller bridge across

 9     the road from Hotel Bristol.  That bridge linked the left bank and the

10     right bank in the vicinity of Hotel Bristol.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And later you were in the battalion.  Did Muslims

12     remain living there - I won't ask you about the number - throughout the

13     war, as well as Croats?  Did they remain in Grbavica, those who didn't

14     want to leave?

15        A.   Yes.  Many of them remained there, especially Muslims.  I don't

16     know how many Croats, though, I don't have any exact numbers, but I know

17     for certain that they continued living there.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be

20     admitted into evidence.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No objection.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24             JUDGE KWON:  How is this related to Mladic -- the part of the

25     Mladic diary that we saw earlier on?  Mladic diary was dated 1995, after

Page 30223

 1     the Dayton, and this is 1993.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.  But there it

 3     said that Mr. Tomic was against the return of Muslims, Muslim civilians,

 4     and in the other place it said the police and the authorities, not

 5     civilians.  So this shows that civilians always lived there throughout

 6     that period.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  This document shows that there were 1200 Muslims in

 8     1993.  In any event, I'll leave it at that.  Let's continue.  We'll admit

 9     this.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2424.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3709.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   If I can draw your attention to the fact this is an order to

14     carry out combat operations in the Grbavica sector.  It was signed by the

15     commander of the 1st Motorised Brigade, the 1st Muslim Motorised Brigade.

16     It was authorised by the commander of the 1st Corps, Mustafa

17     Hajrulahovic, Talijan.  The 2nd of January, 1993, is the date.

18             Now I would like to remind you of your testimony according to

19     which you weren't afraid of civilians returning, you were afraid of armed

20     forces returning, armed forces, the police and the Muslim authorities.

21             Could we now see the next page.  In the English version too.

22             Please, let's have a look at the part in a box that says:

23     "Task."  The 31st of December, it's just before the new year,

24     New Year's Eve, and it says:

25             "Task.  Take the the sector to the right, Tranzit to the left,

Page 30224

 1     the bridge by Elektroprivreda, carry out an attack on the following axis:

 2     11 Plavi, the southern part of the state in Grbavica, Palma, the Soping

 3     and Strojorad, four large skyscrapers, with the objective of routing the

 4     enemy on these axes and taking control of important features."

 5             Can we see the following page, please.  And could we see the

 6     following page in the English version.

 7             JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues]...

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We only have this part translated

 9     in English.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Have a look at item number 6, paragraph number 6, fire support.

12     The artillery shall provide fire support in the enemy's depth at the

13     command post, post where the reserves are deployed, in accordance with

14     the requests from the battalion commander.  Can we see the following

15     page, it's the same page in the English version?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, before you continue with this

17     question, can you explain what this document is about and then can you

18     also explain why the format of the document looks like this?  It seems

19     like you cut and pasted this document from somewhere else.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this is an IDS

21     document.  It's a Muslim order for an offensive on Grbavica.  We only

22     have this part translated --

23             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, Mr. Karadzic --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- the most salient part --

25             JUDGE KWON:  You didn't explain -- answer my question, my

Page 30225

 1     question why the fonts per paragraph look -- differs.  Para 3, para 4,

 2     and para 6, they all look different.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, it's -- it was

 4     typed on a Muslim machine.  They added things to it.  It took a while to

 5     compile the order.  It wasn't all done in one go, but the original is

 6     theirs.  It's signed on the first page so it's their document.  The

 7     question is when they added certain elements and to which parts of the

 8     order.  You also have a stamp at the end of the document, at the bottom

 9     of the document, and it also bears a signature.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I also see the ERN number.  Is it from the

11     Prosecution?

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  It certainly appears to be the case from the ERN

13     number.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at the next

16     page, please, in the Serbian version, the same page in the English

17     version.  Could we have a look at the last paragraph just above

18     "logistics support," could we scroll up a bit.  I'll read it out.

19             "Since taking such a fortified settlement is impossible without

20     destroying and torching features which are strong fortifications at the

21     same time everything has to be destroyed and torched.  To carry out the

22     operation in -- safely because of the brazenness, the lack of principles,

23     one shouldn't trust a single captive and especially not captives bearing

24     weapons of any kind."

25             I'm waiting for the interpretation.

Page 30226

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Mr. Tomic, is such an approach of the ABiH towards captives,

 3     settlements, and features, did such an approach have an influence on you

 4     and on the inhabitants of Grbavica when it came to waiting for the Muslim

 5     police and authorities after the Dayton --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7             Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'm not sure a sufficient foundation for that

 9     question has been asked.  I mean, it is -- the question assumes -- first

10     of all, this witness's knowledge of this specific attack; secondly, that

11     it was effectively carried out.  I mean, we know nothing about that at

12     this point.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             Would you like to respond to Ms. Gustafson's observation or would

15     you like to reformulate your question?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll rephrase my question.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   During this period of time were you in Grbavica, the 2nd of

19     January, 1993?

20        A.   Throughout the war-time period, as I have already said, until I

21     went to the battalion command I was in a unit sector above the Tranzit

22     and the stadium in Sansa [phoen] sector.  I was in the command battalion

23     from June 1994.  I never saw this document, but there were a lot of Serbs

24     who fled at lines in our area of responsibility.  And we obtained a lot

25     of information from them about this.  So it wasn't even necessary for me

Page 30227

 1     to see such a document.

 2             Naturally I was concerned about my safety and the safety of my

 3     family and of my friends.  So I don't know who had a diary.  We didn't

 4     sign things.  I didn't sign things like my statement -- well, I stand

 5     behind everything I said at Mr. Mladic's meeting.  I didn't receive the

 6     minutes, I didn't sign anything.  I didn't say the Muslims could not

 7     return, but in January 1996 if we remain there, if their police or

 8     military arrived -- well, what would have happened?  No one would have

 9     been safe and especially not those who were members of the VRS.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Were there such attacks and how many such attacks

11     were there on Grbavica and on your area, Novo Sarajevo?

12        A.   Well, I couldn't say, I couldn't give you a precise number, but

13     there were many attacks on all the lines.  Sometimes this was simulated,

14     but most of the attacks would be carried out against some other line, but

15     we kept increasing the level of combat-readiness, we were often at full

16     combat-readiness, so people were very tired, exhausted, because there

17     were constant attacks.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And was there such destruction of buildings, such

19     torching of buildings and features?

20        A.   Where you have this -- these special types of ammunition,

21     whenever possible they would torch things.  When I was visiting a command

22     line I entered the nearest -- the building that was nearest to the

23     Strojorad, the skyscraper nearest to it.  This was at the end of 1994.  A

24     soldier of ours who was living there and remained there, his family had

25     been settled in the inner part of Grbavica, he told me that only that

Page 30228

 1     skyscraper was on fire 44 times.  This is close to the Miljacka river, to

 2     Strojorad.  That is where a line of disengagement was, in fact.  It was

 3     about 30 or 50 metres from the bank of the Miljacka.  So they used these

 4     flares, as I said, this type of ammunition.

 5        Q.   How do you understand this advice, don't trust a single POW?

 6        A.   I don't know how the interpreter will translate this, interpret

 7     this.  I'm trying to be as precise as possible.  The proverb is:

 8     Gestures are sufficient for a clever person.  How can I draw any other

 9     conclusion from this?  It concerns people who have weapons with them.  I

10     don't know where -- what the rules are, but that is how I interpreted

11     this.  It means:  Eliminate everyone.

12        Q.   Thank you.  I think in Latin one says "sapienti sat," what you

13     just said.  Thank you.

14             Can we see the last page, the signature.  To be frank,

15     Zlatko Lagumdzija isn't the politician, is he?  This is a commander.  It

16     says:  Commander Zlatko Lagumdzija.  It's not the politician

17     Zlatko Lagumdzija; is that correct?

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just want us to be frank.  It

19     wouldn't be fair if we suggested in public that this was the name of the

20     politician because there is a well-known politician whose name is

21     Zlatko Lagumdzija.

22             Could this document be admitted into evidence, please.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson.

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I don't think the witness was really able to

25     confirm that anything like what is described in this document took place

Page 30229

 1     and it would certainly be news to the Court that there was, in fact, a

 2     major offensive in Grbavica at the date that this document states.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, the witness has indicated

 4     that this is consistent with his observations and concerns about police

 5     coming into Serb areas, and I think that on that basis - since he's

 6     indicated it's consistent with his understanding - that it's admissible.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it that the Prosecution is not

 9     challenging the authenticity about this document?

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, Your Honours, we -- we have to look into

11     it.  I agree with Your Honour's observations that it's an odd-looking

12     document, but I simply can't comment at the moment.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The special type of

14     ammunition the witness referred to earlier was, in fact, armour-piercing

15     incendiary bullets, not flares.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             In terms of relevance, the Chamber tends to agree with

18     Mr. Robinson, but given the authenticity issue as well as the English

19     translation, simply it is lacking.  So we mark it for identification.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2425, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  And now I would like to

22     call up 1D500.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   This is my last question about your concern and the concern of

25     Serbs in Grbavica with regard to those who may be allowed to return.

Page 30230

 1     Unfortunately, this is yet another untranslated document.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that on-site translations

 3     in the courtroom cannot be taken as official translations.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This bulletin of the staff of the

 5     Supreme Command of armed forces which was issued on the 11th of October,

 6     1993.  Can we please look at page 3 in e-court.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Could you please read the part of the document which is in a

 9     frame.

10        A.   "Among the combatants of the 101st Motorised Brigade who are

11     mostly not satisfied with the work of the command of this unit, there has

12     been a rumour going on recently that the command in the locality in the

13     zone of responsibility of this battalion should be taken over by

14     Musan Topalovic - Caco.  The commander of the 1st [as interpreted]

15     Motorised Battalion, Enis Srna, who, according to some unverified

16     sources, is in cahoots with Caco, commented upon this rumour with the

17     following words:  'In tactical terms it is better for one person to be in

18     charge of Grbavica so that it could be cleansed.'"

19        Q.   Did you ever hear of the people who are mentioned in here?

20        A.   I did hear about Musan Topalovic, Caco.  I did not hear about

21     Enis Srna.  That name doesn't ring bell.

22        Q.   Who they cleanse Grbavica from [as interpreted], what does this

23     imply?

24        A.   I believe that it is more than clear.  This is a threat addressed

25     at the Serbian population, at us.

Page 30231

 1        Q.   Could you please tell the Trial Chamber who was Musan Topalovic,

 2     Caco, what was his reputation?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes -- no, just a second, Mr. Tomic.

 4             Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  This doesn't seem to relate to the

 6     cross-examination.  I'm not sure what the connection is supposed to be.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 8             Mr. Karadzic, could you explain that?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question is whether there

10     was any reason for the Serbs in Grbavica to be afraid of Musan Topalovic,

11     Caco -- [No interpretation].

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not understand the

13     question.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This arises from contesting that

16     the Serbian population in Grbavica was afraid of the arrival of the

17     Muslim police and the army, i.e., the authorities.  Now I'm asking the

18     witness whether he knows Musan Topalovic, Caco, and whether his

19     reputation gave enough reason for fear among the Serbian population.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Whether or not the Serbian population in Grbavica

21     was afraid or not was not an issue that was raised in cross-examination.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will allow the question.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can you please answer or should I repeat?

Page 30232

 1        A.   You don't have to repeat.  I never met Musan Topalovic, Caco,

 2     personally, but everybody in Sarajevo was aware of his reputation and, of

 3     course, our fear was justified.  We were afraid if something like that

 4     should happen, we knew what would have happened to us, especially us who

 5     were members of the Army of Republika Srpska.  So the fear was justified,

 6     it was present and justified.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be marked for

 8     identification pending translation.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Any observation, Ms. Gustafson?

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, Your Honours, I -- since Your Honour's

11     allowed the question I won't object to the marking of the document.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

13             We'll mark it for identification pending English translation.

14             THE REGISTRAR: [Microphone not activated]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  MFI D2426.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours.  Can I

19     have a five-minute break to go to the bathroom if at all possible.  I

20     need three minutes -- a couple of minutes.

21             JUDGE KWON:  You have further questions, Mr. Karadzic?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Three or four short questions, but

23     I think that the witness should be allowed to go to the toilet.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Five minutes.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.

Page 30233

 1                           --- Break taken at 2.45 p.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 2.49 p.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, I thought that was the last

 4     question from you, but please continue.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let it then be my last

 6     question.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Mr. Tomic, you were asked about M84 and M53 Brownings and so on

 9     and so forth and about their ranges.  When it comes to these weapons,

10     were they used in the Ozrenska zone of the entire battalion, could they

11     be used for sniper fire and killing civilians in Sarajevo?

12        A.   Those weapons were used only in support in case of attack, to

13     allow us to defend ourselves, because M84 is a good weapon, a well-tested

14     weapon.  In my statement I already stated that M53 is not a reliable

15     machine-gun.  From those weapons you couldn't open sniper fire.  They

16     don't have optical sights.  For example, M53 doesn't have that.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you for coming to testify.  I have no further

18     questions.  I would have a lot more questions but they're not that

19     pertinent, I suppose.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Witness has answered the question already, but

21     please refrain from asking leading questions, Mr. Karadzic.

22             Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, I have to add that that was -- the issue

24     of sniping was never raised either in direct or in cross-examination and

25     it's totally unfair to put that as the last question.

Page 30234

 1                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, the subject was raised, Mr. Witness, but

 3     if the line of separation was only 50 to 80 yards, you wouldn't need

 4     optical sights, would you, because a competent rifle shooter over 50 or

 5     80 metres would be able to shoot with his eye on the sights without an

 6     optical enhancement.  Do you agree with that?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I be heard?  May I respond?

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  No, this is to the witness.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to Madam Gustafson's

10     objection?  This is what I would like to respond to.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure you followed.  Judge Morrison was

12     asking a question to the witness.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But -- but, no, no, not to

14     Judge Morrison, no, not to Judge Morrison.  I would like to respond to

15     Madam Gustafson.  In cross-examination Madam Gustafson laid a foundation

16     for the incident that happened in Krndelja Street and so on and so forth.

17     Those were sniping incidents.  I wanted to establish what that was about

18     because that was about precision and range.

19             JUDGE KWON:  It's moot already now, so I'll leave it at that.

20             So, Mr. Tomic, do you remember Judge Morrison's question?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I remember the question

22     properly, His Excellency Judge Morrison stated, as a matter of fact, that

23     at such short distances you don't need optical sights and I fully agree

24     with that.  However, I was answering Mr. Karadzic's questions and I said

25     that one could not open in -- fire a single shot from those weapons.  You

Page 30235

 1     could only fire bursts of fire, and those weapons were not used to open

 2     fire in depth.  They were only used in cases of attack and in cases when

 3     you wanted to repel an attack.  M53 and M84 weapons were not used because

 4     they opened bursts of fire and they're not as precise as the types of

 5     weapons which fire single shots.  Although His Excellency,

 6     Judge Morrison, is absolutely right.  At such short distances we did not

 7     use optical sights because they were not needed.  There is a good line of

 8     visibility at distances of 50 to 80 yards as Mr. Morrison said.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Well, that seems to conclude your evidence,

10     Mr. Tomic.  On behalf of the Chamber I would like to thank you for your

11     coming to The Hague to give it.  Now you're free to go.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to thank you, and on

13     my behalf I would like to commend the services that have looked after my

14     arrival and stay here in The Hague and everything else.  Once again,

15     thank you very much.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll rise all together.

17             I was informed by the Registry that the -- due to technical

18     difficulties, Courtroom 1 will be closed down for renovation in terms of

19     a switchboard.  So tomorrow we'll be sitting in the afternoon in

20     Courtroom 3 after Mladic trial, i.e., from 2.15 to 7.00.  On Thursday,

21     we'll sit in the morning from 9.00 to quarter to 2.00 in Courtroom 3.  So

22     I appreciate the Registry's endeavour to get the proceedings to go on.

23             Given the time and given that the Chamber needs to rise at 3.00

24     sharp, so we'll adjourn for the day.

25                           [The witness withdrew]

Page 30236

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.57 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 14th day of

 3                           November, 2012, at 2.15 p.m.