121211IT

Page 31160

1 Tuesday, 11 December 2012

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: [French on English channel]

7 MR. ROBINSON: French came over the English channel.

8 JUDGE KWON: Now it should be okay.

9 Yes, Ms. West, please continue.

10 MS. WEST: Good morning, Mr. President. Good morning,

11 Your Honours.

12 WITNESS: SVETOZAR GUZINA [Resumed]

13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 Cross-examination by Ms. West: [Continued]

15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Guzina.

16 A. Good morning.

17 Q. When we finished last Thursday, you had just testified that there

18 were no sniper rifles in your battalion. You said that you had no need

19 for it because the confrontation -- can you hear me in a language --

20 A. Could you speak up a bit, just a bit louder, if possible.

21 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

22 Our usher will assist you in turning up the volume for your

23 headphone.

24 Mr. Guzina --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Fine.

Page 31161

1 JUDGE KWON: -- do you hear me well now?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

4 MS. WEST: Thank you.

5 Q. So when we spoke last on Thursday you had just finished telling

6 us that there were no sniper rifles in your battalion and you had no need

7 for sniper rifles because the confrontation line was so close. And you

8 also said that when you were confronted about snipers by UNPROFOR, you of

9 course denied that you had snipers. Do you remember testifying about

10 this?

11 A. Yes. I said that in that part of Nedzarici I did not have any

12 snipers, but it is a fact that I had M48 rifles with optic sights, and I

13 think that in the 4th Company of my battalion there were three snipers

14 that were pointed in the completely opposite direction, Butmir, the

15 airport, not the locations that you mentioned.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MS. WEST: May we have P01739.

18 Q. So now I see that you say you had M48 rifles with optic sights,

19 and so were those rifles used for sniping?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. You also say that you had -- in the 4th Company of your battalion

22 there were three snipers that were pointed in the completely opposite

23 direction, at the airport, not the locations that you mentioned. I

24 didn't mention any locations. I was talking about snipers generally. So

25 when I asked you last week whether you had snipers, you didn't tell us

Page 31162

1 about these particular snipers, did you?

2 A. Obviously we did not understand each other then. The fact is

3 that in terms of these examples of incidents that had occurred, it all

4 has to do with Nedzarici, so I was thinking along those lines, namely,

5 that in Nedzarici there weren't any snipers and there was no mention of

6 targets in Butmir, I mean that is where the snipers were turned and that

7 is why we were thinking at cross-purposes, if you will.

8 Q. Since you and I spoke on Thursday, have you discussed your

9 testimony with anyone?

10 A. No.

11 MS. WEST: So may we have P01739.

12 Q. This is the map that we looked at last week and you had

13 identified for me that number 7, the red dot number 7, you recognised to

14 be what you understood to be the location of the sniping incident

15 described as F7. And you also said for us last week that number 75 on

16 the left-hand side of the screen you recognised to be the theological

17 institute.

18 Now, in your statement in regard to this scheduled incident, you

19 indicated that the theological institute was about 1.500 metres from F7;

20 is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But the confrontation line between the area of Dobrinja and the

23 area of your responsibility was much closer, wasn't it, it was about 550

24 metres to F7; correct?

25 A. If you say it's that way, then it's probably that way.

Page 31163

1 MS. WEST: May we have P1621, please, e-court page 54. P1621.

2 For the record, this is the Prosecution expert sniping report.

3 Q. Now, I know you - e-court page 54, please - grew up in this area

4 and obviously spent a lot of time in this area. This is a satellite

5 image of the area we just spoke about. To the extreme right where the

6 little blue dot is, that's F7, that's the same -- that's the red dot you

7 just looked at. And as we go to the left you see 550 metres, that would

8 be the confrontation line, and the green area is where the screen is set

9 up. Does this satellite imagery at least look familiar to you? Does

10 this look like the area?

11 JUDGE KWON: Shall we zoom on the upper page only so that we can

12 see a bit better?

13 MS. WEST: Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know about this.

15 MS. WEST:

16 Q. Okay. That's fine.

17 MS. WEST: If we can go to e-court page 53, the page right before

18 it.

19 Q. I want to share with you some of the information the

20 Trial Chamber has received and this regards that particular incident and

21 the opinion of this person. He said the range -- towards the bottom of

22 the page in the English. He said the range of this sniping fire was more

23 than 550 metres, more likely to be more than 700 metres, and a scope will

24 probably have been used --

25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, I take it we have a translation --

Page 31164

1 MS. WEST: Indeed, I see it.

2 Q. So this -- so we have both the English right now. There we go.

3 So on the left-hand side you will see the B/C/S version and towards the

4 bottom it talks about the range. It's the third complete paragraph from

5 the bottom, indicating that it was more than 550 metres, more likely more

6 than 700 metres, and a scope was probably used. And then the next

7 paragraph says:

8 "The round will probably have been a 7.62-millimetre or

9 7.92-millimetre calibre and have been fired from an M76 or M91 sniper

10 rifle."

11 Now, I know you just mentioned that you did have -- I think you

12 said it was an M48. Did you have any M76 rifles in your battalion?

13 A. I don't remember what type of rifle that is. Could you tell me a

14 bit more about that? I'm not a military expert. I'm simply one of the

15 ordinary people who became a commander.

16 Q. Thank you, sir. And we can talk about that a little bit more.

17 But in the meanwhile putting aside the suggestion that the round for F7

18 that this incident came from the theological institute, if I told you the

19 source of fire was more likely to be more than 550 metres beyond the

20 confrontation line, would you then agree with me that more than 550

21 metres means the source of the round was from SRK territory?

22 A. Well, possibly the source of fire was from the area of the

23 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but I claim with full responsibility that there

24 was no sniper activity from the theological faculty, because we had heavy

25 machine-guns there, PAT Brownings. We didn't have snipers up there. And

Page 31165

1 I claim with full responsibility that no one could have fired a sniper

2 bullet within the zone of the 1st Battalion from the faculty of theology.

3 Those are facts. All the rest is false. I could understand if you were

4 speaking about other positions.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 23830, please?

7 Q. So this is a document of the Ilidza Brigade and it's dated

8 October 1993. And you see the B/C/S already on the left and we'll see

9 the English shortly. This is a document to the corps command in which --

10 from the Ilidza Brigade. It says that:

11 "This unit has 30 sniper rifles in total (of which, 15," and I

12 believe it's M "76 and 15 are M48).

13 "We also have one silencer and one passive infrared device.

14 "So far we have deployed 16 soldiers in combat.

15 "We ask you to send us the silencers for all the sniper rifles in

16 our possession."

17 Now you've already said that your battalion had the M48 rifles.

18 What about M76? Does this help you remember a little bit more?

19 A. I said a moment ago that I had M48 and three M76 rifles but

20 pointed at Butmir. That is the area across the airport runway.

21 Q. My apologies. I didn't realise that you said there were M76. So

22 you concede that you had both M48 and M76 sniper rifles?

23 A. That's what I said a moment ago, that we had M48 and M76, but

24 these M76 rifles were in the 4th Company and were pointed at Butmir,

25 opposite the airport, because we had constant sniper activity along

Page 31166

1 Kasindolska Street from the area of Butmir and we exclusively pointed our

2 sniper rifles in that direction and the people who were operating them,

3 but the fact remains that we did not have any trained people.

4 Q. Thank you. And you then, I'm sure, will agree with the

5 proposition that this Trial Chamber heard at transcript 6940 from the

6 expert Prosecution sniping witness that an M76 was a standard sniper

7 rifle; that's true, is it not?

8 A. I think that that's true. If you say that it's that name, then

9 it's probably that name. I'm no expert as far as weapons are concerned.

10 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this document,

11 please.

12 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

13 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll --

14 THE REGISTRAR: This document has already been admitted as P6014.

15 Thank you.

16 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

17 Q. I now want to move to F9 and this is your paragraph 45 of your

18 statement in which you discuss F9. And this was the incident that took

19 place on Djure Jaksica Street. May we have P01803, please. This is the

20 Sarajevo map book and I just want you to take a look at the area. We're

21 looking for map 9, please.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Perhaps that is another document. This document

23 has only one map and this is the one. Thank you.

24 MS. WEST:

25 Q. Maybe it'll be even better to go to your exhibit, which is

Page 31167

1 1D10070, please, and this is your own map and so you'll be familiar with

2 it.

3 MS. WEST: 1D10070, that's the 65 ter number.

4 Q. And this is the map in which you showed the confrontation line

5 around your area so you'll recognise it. Very good.

6 MS. WEST: Now if we could -- Mr. Usher, can you change over the

7 witness's screen so that he can mark on it, please.

8 Q. Now, looking at this map can you identify where the school for

9 the blind is? And you can circle that.

10 A. [Marks]

11 Q. And you also understand from your statement that the event -- the

12 incident of F9 took place on Djure Jaksica Street, but that street's name

13 has now changed, has it not, to Adija Mulabegovica Street; is that

14 correct?

15 A. Probably. I don't go to Sarajevo.

16 Q. Okay. And we see that street where you just drew the circle,

17 it's very close to the right side of the circle, right? You see

18 Adilja Mulabegovica Street, right? Look up at the screen, please.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And the allegation of this sniping incident is that it happened

21 almost at the end so that the distance between the school of the blind

22 and the alleged incident was about 200 metres, was it not?

23 A. Probably.

24 Q. So in your statement at paragraph 5 -- excuse me, 45, where you

25 spoke about this, you said that:

Page 31168

1 "I can say with regard to this that the place of the alleged

2 incident was behind the first line and that it was not logical to assume

3 the presence of civilians in this location."

4 Tell us why it was not logical to assume that civilians would be

5 located there?

6 A. Well, the date itself, the 26th of June, 1994, is very telling;

7 that is to say, all people who lived in Alipasino Polje knew where the

8 separation lines were and it is a fact that they knew that this is the

9 worst line during the conflict between the Serbs and Muslims. That is to

10 say, even the sparrows that were flying in that area knew that that was

11 the worst area. So I don't understand, therefore, why civilians would go

12 out risking their lives.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could other microphones

14 please be switched off when the witness is speaking. Thank you.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So those are the reasons.

16 MS. WEST:

17 Q. In paragraph 39 of your statement you spoke about civilians being

18 on the separation lines as well, and you said in paragraph 39:

19 "There were no civilians on the lines of disengagement or, at

20 least, there should not have been any. Each komandir or komandant was

21 supposed to evacuate the civilians from the zones of combat operations,"

22 or limit their presence in the zones. "It sometimes happened in my zone

23 that civilians" - and here you speak about Serbs - "constantly turned up

24 near the first lines, despite all warnings and prohibitions. The reason

25 for such behaviour was a wish to be in their homes and to take care of

Page 31169

1 their property. This could well have been the case on the other side of

2 the conflict line, and this is why a large number of civilians became

3 casualties."

4 So, sir, in paragraph 45 you said it wasn't logical for them to

5 be there, yet in paragraph 39 you give a good reason why they would be

6 here. But my question is this: Isn't it true that the reason civilians

7 were on the confrontation lines was because front line or not, civilians

8 lived in that area; isn't that right?

9 A. It is possible that civilians lived in that area, or rather, came

10 to that area, if say they had an apartment in that area and if they had

11 lived there before the conflict broke out. But the fact remains,

12 especially with regard to incident F9, the fact remains that in the corps

13 documents it says that on the 25th and the 26th there was fierce fighting

14 in the area. That is to say that there was strong gun-fire there too.

15 And the fact remains when there is gun-fire or shooting going on,

16 everybody is fleeing, trying to stay alive. And if they're in a shelter

17 then they don't go out. So that's it as far as this incident is

18 concerned. Between the 25th and the 26th, there was -- there was

19 shooting.

20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the

21 answer.

22 JUDGE KWON: What did you say between the 25th and the 26th there

23 was what? Interpreters didn't hear you well.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During the night between the 25th

25 and the 26th, in the corps documents, 1D6807, regular combat report of

Page 31170

1 the command, it says that there was constant gun-fire from both sides,

2 that there was a fierce attack of the Muslims, and we were fiercely

3 defending ourselves too, and this continued on the 26th of June, that is

4 to say the fighting that continued in that area, and what happened

5 happened.

6 MS. WEST:

7 Q. Thank you. And we're going to come to that document and we'll go

8 through it in detail, but before we get there I want to discuss with you

9 a little bit more about the subject matter of civilians on the front

10 lines. And on Thursday you had mentioned to the Trial Chamber that you

11 had been interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor in 2003. And when

12 you were interviewed you spoke about this very issue. Do you remember

13 what you said?

14 A. It was a long time ago, 2003. Remind me, please, and then ...

15 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 24281. 65 ter 24281 for the

16 English and the B/C/S has a separate number, Your Honour, and that number

17 for the B/C/S is 24266A, please.

18 Q. So what we see on the English page 6, please, and we'll shortly

19 see the B/C/S translation, and that's 24266A, and it's page 3 of the

20 B/C/S. Thank you. It's the middle paragraph in the B/C/S, and I'm going

21 to read out what you said about this particular subject matter and then

22 I'll ask you a question. As regards to civilians on the front line.

23 It's the paragraph beginning:

24 "We also considered that civilian clothing did not render them

25 unsuitable as a target (the men that is) because we knew from

Page 31171

1 intelligence that only about 30 per cent of Bosnian male forces actually

2 possessed a uniform. I also considered that any man or woman that close

3 to the front line (within range of infantry weapons) was a potential

4 target: After all, what were they doing there if they were not a threat?

5 The Muslims, as I have written, were able to go about their business

6 without venturing near the front lines and within range. They could move

7 freely if they had just used their buildings for cover. We had to assume

8 that they constituted a threat."

9 Was this the only assessment you used in determining whether you

10 could legitimately fire at people on the front line?

11 A. Well, you know yourself, and I've already said that, that a

12 soldier who was at a position was the only person who had the right to

13 decide whether he is under threat or not and whether he is going to fire

14 or not. We told our soldiers that Muslim propaganda was working in all

15 sorts of ways, that they will try to manipulate in different ways, that

16 they will resort to provocations, that they are going to pretend that we

17 are sniping all the time and killing innocent civilians, but I don't

18 think that is true. We did whatever was within our powers.

19 Q. So let's back up for a moment. You don't deny you said this;

20 correct?

21 A. Well, probably if it's written here, but whether it's all been

22 translated correctly I can't be sure.

23 Q. All right. And --

24 A. It's possible that I said that.

25 Q. And you didn't presume that those people on the front line were

Page 31172

1 civilians in the absence of some specific reason showing they were a

2 threat; right? You didn't make that presumption that people could be

3 civilians?

4 A. The soldier in his position first has to make an assumption of

5 whether his position is under threat or not. The point F9 that you are

6 referring to is a place where a civilian has nothing to do. If you look

7 at the students' hall, it's isolated, there are no houses, there are no

8 shops, no market-place. So why would anybody walk across a military

9 field --

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. -- towards the students' hall where a person would be visible

12 from the home for the blind?

13 Q. So then should we understand that it's your position that any

14 person who walks near the front line is a legitimate target because they

15 have no better reason to be there but be a threat to the SRK?

16 A. Well, if we have noted that from the Muslim side and the Serbian

17 side we both had the obligation to remove civilians from those lines, and

18 whether at a particular moment, whether it was foggy or raining, a

19 soldier would see a target and make his own decision and would do what he

20 did. You have never been in a war and you can't understand that.

21 Q. Let's look at an example of civilians on the front lines. We're

22 going to look at F7 which is what you spoke about in your statement, and

23 this is at paragraph 44. But just to understand the background, you grew

24 up in this area; correct?

25 A. Yes, Ilidza municipality.

Page 31173

1 Q. You owned a restaurant in this area and you were well familiar

2 with everything in the area; correct?

3 A. Yes, the Sokolovic colony and Ilidzajno [phoen]. However,

4 Alipasino Polje and the area of the 1st Battalion, I came there only when

5 I was appointed and when the war broke out because I had lived before in

6 a completely different area.

7 Q. Well, notwithstanding, you were the commander in this particular

8 area so there is no doubt you knew it well. And I'll direct your

9 attention to paragraph 36 where you say the school for the blind and the

10 theology institute were very important facilities in the battalion zone.

11 My predecessor positioned an observation post there and I carried out

12 engineering work to reinforce them.

13 You yourself have been to the school for the blind, have you not?

14 A. Yes, many times, and I said that because we had no better

15 positions because the theology institute and the school for the blind

16 were three-storey buildings. If there had been any taller buildings, we

17 would have probably occupied them.

18 MS. WEST: May we have 65 ter 23970, please. 23970, this is

19 going to be a photo and this photo was taken in 2000. And it's taken

20 from the school of the blind. Mr. President, may I have a moment,

21 please.

22 Mr. Registrar, may we have 24267, please. Thank you, sir.

23 Q. This is a photo that was taken in 2000 and this is one close-up,

24 but we'll go back in a moment --

25 JUDGE KWON: I wonder whether you are being heard by the

Page 31174

1 interpreters.

2 MS. WEST:

3 Q. We'll back up and I'll show you what the view is with the naked

4 eye, but we are looking at the location of this incident and can you

5 confirm for me that in 1994 this little short building we see in the

6 middle of the photo was not there; that was added after the fact.

7 Correct? That little, I think, restaurant or something.

8 A. The fact is from this viewpoint it looks real to me that there

9 are curtains there and windows. Everything was bullet-ridden at that

10 time. It's a nice picture, but I can't believe that that was the school

11 for the blind.

12 Q. No, no, no, and what we'll do in a moment is we will back up and

13 I'll show you a larger view which I think will be more helpful and which

14 you can look from the school of the blind to the location at F9.

15 A. After the war I have never once been in that area so I don't know

16 what it looks like.

17 Q. That's fine, sir. Nonetheless we can still look at the photo.

18 But before we do, you earlier -- you mentioned a document and you said

19 during this period of time there had been ongoing fighting.

20 MS. WEST: May I have 1D01762, please. 1D01762.

21 Q. And this is the document that you mentioned to us earlier in

22 paragraph 45.

23 A. 1D6807. That's what I see in my copy.

24 Q. Okay. And this -- the photo -- excuse me, the document you see

25 on the screen -- look at the document you see on the screen, is that the

Page 31175

1 one you recognise, right? This is the report of June 26th, 1994.

2 A. Yes, I think that's the document I have.

3 Q. Okay. So let's go through this document to see what it says and

4 how it regards the situation at the time. The report was written at 1700

5 hours on June 26. And when we start to read it, it says:

6 In the area of responsibility of the Ilidza brigade on June

7 25th, so the day before, at 2020, so in the evening, the enemy fired one

8 82-millimetre shell on our positions from the directions of

9 Kopici [phoen]. So we're going to stop right there.

10 Sir, are you aware that the incident of which we speak happened

11 on June 26th at about 7.00 or 7.30 in the evening, almost 24 hours later.

12 Are you aware of that information?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Okay. Assuming that that information is true, you would agree

15 with me that the first part of this document, then, does not bear on the

16 firing status almost a day later and is not relevant to what was

17 happening in that particular location almost a day later?

18 A. Repeat the question, please.

19 Q. Let me read the rest of the sentence and this will help you. It

20 then says at -- and at 2215, so this is still June 25th, they fired two

21 grenades from the direction of Glavogodina on our positions. So this

22 entire sentence regards the events of the previous evening, does it not?

23 A. I don't know what it relates to, but I stand behind what I said,

24 that on the night between the 25th and the 26th and on the day of the

25 26th, fighting was going on in the area of the 1st Battalion. I stand by

Page 31176

1 that statement of mine. I found in my notes and my diaries that I kept

2 about day-by-day events in my battalion. This information I did not base

3 myself on the reports of the corps --

4 Q. Okay --

5 A. -- we often did not even send details to the command of the

6 corps.

7 Q. The incident of which we speak happens on the evening of the

8 26th, not the day of the 26th. Were you aware of that?

9 A. I hear that from you now.

10 Q. And assuming that that information is true, then would you agree

11 with me that this document does not support your suggestion that these

12 incident -- this incident can be attributed to what was going on during

13 the normal course of the war events?

14 A. The facts are what I explained to you a moment ago. Whether this

15 document corroborates what I said or not, it does give some details. But

16 the fact is I found in my diaries that on that night and on that day

17 there was combat going on in that area along the whole line and that

18 justifies me saying what I'm saying. I stand by that.

19 Q. And when you say "that night," you mean the night of the 25th;

20 and when you say "that day," you mean the day of the 26th. Correct?

21 A. The night of the 25th, between the 25th and the 26th, and the day

22 of the 26th.

23 Q. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence that according to one of the

24 girls in this incident, they had not -- she said that they had not heard

25 any firing that day nor seen troops in the nearby trench. She also said

Page 31177

1 that she walked that route three to four times a week and had not seen

2 soldiers in that portion of the route. This is adjudicated fact 229 and

3 it's from her Galic testimony. Were you aware of that information that I

4 just said before you attested to paragraph 45?

5 A. No, I did not know about that, but the fact is you believe Muslim

6 reports, not Serb ones. That's up to you. I don't believe this happened

7 that way.

8 Q. We can move on.

9 MS. WEST: Your Honour, I would tender that document, please.

10 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

11 JUDGE KWON: Is it not admitted?

12 MS. WEST: Oh, I'm sorry, it's an associated exhibit --

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, D2554.

14 MS. WEST:

15 Q. Let's move on from June and work into July -- but first, on

16 Thursday when we spoke about sniping incidents, on Thursday as regards to

17 whether when UNPROFOR approached you and made accusations against your

18 battalion for sniping, what you said in response. And this is at 31157.

19 And I said: Did you deny that you were doing that to UNPROFOR? And you

20 said:

21 "Of course I denied it because I know we did not have any sniper

22 rifles in the area of the 1st Battalion."

23 Now, let's -- putting aside your concessions today about sniper

24 rifles in the area of the 1st Battalion, I'd like to talk about some

25 events in July.

Page 31178

1 MS. WEST: And may I have P1600, please. P1600, page 5 of the

2 English; page 6 of the B/C/S. And we're looking at number 2, please.

3 There we go.

4 Q. And this is warring party activity. This is dated July 11th, and

5 it's an UNMO daily sitrep. And under "warring party activity," number 2

6 (b), it says:

7 "UNMOs confirm from the spot as well as hospital visit 1 X

8 Bosnian civilian male (age 17) injured by sniping at BP863578 near the

9 house for blind people at Alipasino Polje area at" and it says July 11th.

10 "It is suspected that the sniping came from," and it gives the same B

11 number -- BP number, "the BSA side. It may be highlighted that this is

12 the third casualty (all civilians) in the same spot in last few days."

13 So this is several days after the incident with the girls and

14 this reports at least one sniping being the third casualty in the same

15 spot in the last few days. Mr. Guzina, how do you account for this? You

16 say that your sniping rifles were pointed at Butmir, but at this point

17 we've now seen at least two sniping incidents from the school of the

18 blind not pointed at Butmir?

19 A. You are trying to say that a military sniper hit that young man,

20 that it was established that the bullet that hit him came from a military

21 sniper. Is that what you're trying to say?

22 Q. No, I want to go back to the document. What the document says is

23 the sniping bullet is coming from the school of the blind and it hit a

24 17-year-old man. This happened on July 11th. Were you aware of this?

25 A. But I'm asking you, has it been established that the bullet that

Page 31179

1 hit that 17-year-old boy came from a military sniper? That's what I want

2 to know because I maintain that professional military snipers were not at

3 that position. There were rifles with optic sights, M48, used by

4 soldiers who happened to be in that position at the time. Has it been

5 established that the round was a real sniper round of the appropriate

6 calibre to the sniper rifle?

7 Q. Well, sir, we're going to look at another document and then I'm

8 going to ask you whether it's been established or not. But let's focus

9 on the fact -- on not so much sniper rifle but actually on individual

10 shooting at particular people, P1601. This is a document from the very

11 next day. P1601.

12 MS. WEST: I'd like to have page 4 in the English, please. And

13 for the B/C/S it's going to be under number 24, paragraph 24 in the

14 B/C/S.

15 Q. And this -- from the very next day, other important incidents.

16 Number (b):

17 "Commander of the 1st Battalion of the BSA Ilidza Brigade

18 admitted the sniping by BSA from BP 859578 (house for the blind people).

19 He promised that there would be no more sniping from that place."

20 Mr. Guzina, you were the commander of the 1st Battalion of the

21 BSA Ilidza Brigade, were you not?

22 A. I'm trying to locate that on the screen. I can't see it.

23 Q. 24(b), at the very bottom, and it probably bleeds over into the

24 next page. But do you see that now?

25 A. Yes, now I see it. Do you mean that the military observer asked

Page 31180

1 me about this?

2 Q. Yes, that's exactly what it says. It says they asked you about

3 it and you did not of course deny it as you told us on Thursday you had

4 done. Instead, you admitted the sniping by BSA positions at the house

5 for the blind, did you not?

6 A. And this is a report by the military observers?

7 Q. My question for you, sir, is: Did you admit that there was

8 sniping from the house for the blind? You can answer that with a yes or

9 no. Please do not answer it with a question.

10 A. Well, I don't see anywhere that I admitted sniping.

11 Q. Sir, I think that's fine we can leave it --

12 JUDGE KWON: No, no, if you are going to put the document, we

13 need to inform the foundation of the document properly.

14 Yes, why don't we show the first page of this document to the

15 witness.

16 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE KWON: So this is the UNMO headquarters daily sitrep. And

18 if you go to paragraph 24 and UNMO Sector Sarajevo reports, inter alia,

19 other important incidents. And in subparagraph (b) it says like this, if

20 you take time to read it. And if you are ready, let us know so that we

21 can go to the next page.

22 So do you agree that commander of the 1st Battalion of the Ilidza

23 Brigade was you at the time?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was commander of the 1st

25 Battalion, but I don't see on what basis you claim that I said that.

Page 31181

1 UNPROFOR was able to write whatever they pleased, and in our talks with

2 UNPROFOR we had a liaison officer from UNPROFOR, liaison officers from

3 the UNPROFOR who understood our position - us on the Serb side - but

4 there were other kinds of liaison officer too and it all depends on who

5 wrote this one.

6 JUDGE KWON: This is not an UNPROFOR report, it's an UNMO report.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, to me it's all the same.

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

9 Yes, Ms. West.

10 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Q. Mr. Guzina, at paragraph 39 of your report you said you never

12 issued an order to fire at civilians, nor am I aware that any of my

13 subordinates or superiors issued such orders. Did you ever issue an

14 order not to fire at civilians?

15 A. Of course I did.

16 Q. Did you ever see an order not to fire at civilians issued by your

17 superiors?

18 A. I think in the early days of the war there was a decree from

19 Mr. Karadzic, the president, to take care about civilians and such

20 things.

21 MS. WEST: May we have 24281, please.

22 Q. This is your interview in 2003. 24281 is the English, page 4.

23 And then the B/C/S is 24266A, and it's page 1.

24 MS. WEST: May we have page 4 in the English.

25 Q. And when asked about this particular subject matter in 2003 --

Page 31182

1 thank you. It's the paragraph third from the bottom beginning with "when

2 the UNMOs." This is what you said. And right in the middle of that

3 paragraph, and the paragraph in B/C/S is at the top, on left side of the

4 screen, you said:

5 "I can't not remember if they (the Corps) sent me a response to

6 the issue of shooting civilians," and you had just said that you told

7 your superiors, "but certainly we did not receive instructions not to do

8 it or amend the terms by which we engaged targets."

9 And then you say:

10 "I will explain this in detail later."

11 So you just told us that you remembered that there was some sort

12 of decree from Mr. Karadzic to take care about civilians, and you just

13 told us this now, but when asked about this in 2003, you said, "Certainly

14 we did not receive instructions not to do it." Do you remember saying

15 that?

16 A. I don't recall saying this, but I can say that they also used

17 word games like you are using here. I don't know what I said at that

18 time, whether the interpreter interpreted it correctly. I don't know.

19 Q. Well, what about the rules of engagement, was that something that

20 you discussed with your subordinates and your superiors?

21 A. Since I did not graduate from any military academies, I was not

22 trained to be an officer, I was not trained to be a commander. I learned

23 things as I went during the war from the beginning of the war.

24 Q. So then I should understand then that you never gave any order

25 explaining the rules of engagement to your subordinates, did you?

Page 31183

1 A. I did issue orders which were carried out. I issued orders with

2 regard to the defence lines of the 1st Battalion. I told them that at no

3 cost those should be threatened and that we had to do everything to

4 preserve the territory and to preserve the municipality of Ilidza. If

5 the lines of the 1st Battalion fell, all of Ilidza would have been

6 threatened, including our families and children. That's why we were

7 engaged in decisive struggle in that area. I can tell you that two

8 brigades and one battalion were in my zone of responsibility, the 102nd

9 and the 155th Brigades and one part of the 104 Brigade. We were a very

10 important area, therefore, and we were engaged in decisive battle in that

11 area.

12 Q. And when you said I told them at no cost those should be

13 threatened and that we had to do everything to preserve the territory and

14 preserve the municipality of Ilidza, this included shooting at any

15 individual who was on the front line on the Bosnian Muslim side, did it

16 not?

17 A. All this time you are trying to make me say that we opened fire

18 on civilians. We did not, never with an intention to kill civilians.

19 However, I'm not saying that there were no mistakes; however, there was

20 never an intention to kill civilians. We never did that.

21 Q. So on Thursday when we were speaking about the bus incident, I

22 asked you whether -- I asked you about targeting and how -- whether it

23 would be easy to hit a stationary bus. And you said at the time, this is

24 31158:

25 "Well, if this is not a trained sniper shooter, if he were to

Page 31184

1 fire ten bullets at the bus, maybe one or two would hit the target but

2 certainly not all ten."

3 Now, in this particular issue of targeting, you spoke about this

4 as well in your 2003 interview. Do you remember what you said back then?

5 A. Please jog my memory and then I'll try and remember.

6 Q. We are on 24281, the same document we have now. And if we can go

7 to page 5 of the English on the top and for the B/C/S it's page 1 and

8 it's the bottom big paragraph.

9 A. I have not been receiving any interpretation.

10 Q. Can you hear me speak?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. So now looking at this paragraph - and we can scroll

13 down in English so I can see the top, please.

14 "After a few weeks of the war," this is what you said in 2003,

15 "we had all the likely targets registered with a huge degree of accuracy

16 and it was just a case of naming the location and the rounds fell. In

17 the early days until the gunners had their target recorded perfectly,

18 there were instances of rounds landing a small distance off target, but

19 once we had adjusted fire and effectively locked on to target, the

20 gunners were totally accurate. We achieved this accuracy within a few

21 weeks of the start of the war and kept it until the very end. If we

22 wanted a target hitting, we hit it."

23 Do you remember saying that?

24 A. I spoke about that. I don't know whether everything was

25 interpreted accurately. I don't know that. I can see now that even

Page 31185

1 today there have been some mistakes in the interpretation, let alone

2 here, such a long time ago.

3 Q. So could we assume that if you intended to hit a certain location

4 you had the capacity to hit that particular location; correct?

5 A. It depended on the period of the war and on the incident. Can

6 you be more specific?

7 Q. Well, you say it depended on the period of war. Here in this

8 statement you indicated that early on in the war you were targeting quite

9 well, so why would it depend on the period of the war. Would you agree

10 with me that later on in the war your targeting would be even better?

11 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness kindly move away from the

12 microphones. He's too close.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you're right. As the war went

14 on, our targeting got better and better.

15 MS. WEST:

16 Q. There you go. It was just too loud. Sir, can you tell us where

17 Azici is?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. It's close to your area of responsibility, is it not?

20 A. Hadzici were in the zone of the 3rd Battalion of the Ilidza

21 Brigade.

22 Q. And in February of 1993 there were efforts to take Azici;

23 correct?

24 A. We occupied Azici immediately after Otis, within a very short

25 space of time thereafter. And Otis was taken at the beginning of the war

Page 31186

1 in 1992. I'm not sure of the exact date, but I'm sure that you have it

2 in one of your documents. Give me the date and I'll just tell you

3 whether the date that you have is correct or not.

4 MS. WEST: Okay. May we have 65 ter 24280, please. This regards

5 the taking of Hadzici and this is a page that's included in the May 1994

6 report to the Secretary-General regarding the events in Sarajevo. This

7 regards specifically Azici and it includes an interview with you from

8 Reuters dated February 24th, 1993. Would that date remind you of when

9 you took Azici, February 24th, 1992?

10 A. Yes, it is possible that the document is accurate.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Was the interview in February or

12 was the occupation of Azici in February? Can we clarify that, please?

13 MS. WEST: Mr. President, the representation that I make to the

14 Court is that the interview was in February of 1993. I think the witness

15 has also indicated that the taking was at the same time, but perhaps

16 maybe on re-direct that can be looked into further.

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

18 MS. WEST:

19 Q. So if we look at this part and it's paragraph 1 -- it's the

20 second page of the English, please, but you have it right there in the

21 becoming, it's paragraph 1635. And looking at the English we see it

22 says:

23 "Narrative of events:

24 "Serb forces were reported to have captured the key western

25 suburb of Azici. A Reuters television crew went into the suburb on

Page 31187

1 Tuesday and found it 'completely destroyed.' Heavy fighting broke out

2 nearly two weeks ago when the Serbs attacked the western suburbs. There

3 was speculation that with the fall of Azici fighting would be

4 concentrated in Stup, its BiH-held neighbouring suburb. If the Serbs

5 captured Stup the western entrance to Sarajevo would be wide open. Serb

6 attacks on Azici and Stup followed a BiH government push against the

7 Serb-held stronghold of Ilidza. On some days, more than a thousand

8 shells were reported to have fallen in the contested areas. The Serbs

9 said that they captured Azici without a single soldier killed and only a

10 handful wounded."

11 And this is the quote:

12 "'We don't want to lose more soldiers, so we decided on a new

13 tactic: We destroy a place before we occupy it,' said Svetozar Guzina,

14 deputy commander of the Serb forces in the area."

15 So Mr. Guzina, notwithstanding your ability to target effectively

16 and accurately, here on February 1993 you decided to destroy the whole

17 place, civilian objects and all; isn't that right?

18 A. The fact is that that was not my area of responsibility. The

19 fact is that I was a commander on one axis along which Azici was taken.

20 The fact is that we fired a lot of mortar rounds, and the fact is that in

21 that area there were no civilians. I probably said something to the

22 similar effect. I remember that I provided such a statement. I really

23 don't see a problem.

24 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I'd like to tender this.

25 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

Page 31188

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, next Prosecution exhibit.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6038. Thank you.

3 MS. WEST: Mr. President, I think there have been two occasions

4 where I have shown the witness his 2003 interview in which he was not

5 clear that he actually said what the interview said. The last occasion

6 was the targeting and there was one before that. I would ask to tender

7 just those two particular portions of the 2003 interview.

8 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

9 JUDGE KWON: Could you identify the page numbers later on?

10 MS. WEST: I will. Thank you.

11 JUDGE KWON: They will be given next Prosecution exhibit

12 number -- it will be. We will just admit them in one batch.

13 MS. WEST: Thank you.

14 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P6039, so that's a part of 24281.

15 MS. WEST: Thank you, Mr. President.

16 Q. Mr. Guzina, thank you very much. I have no further questions.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. West.

18 Do you have any re-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency. Not many

20 questions, but still I do have some.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,

23 Your Excellencies. Good morning to everybody.

24 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Guzina.

Page 31189

1 A. I did not hear what the President said.

2 Q. I said good morning to everybody including you.

3 A. Good morning.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up P01739.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. May I ask you to mark the school of theology, the theological

8 institute, could you please make a circle around the building and the

9 usher will provide you with a pen.

10 A. I suppose that it would be the facility marked with 75. I have a

11 different map in front of me, I believe it's 75.

12 Q. The usher will help you to circle it and put letters TI next to

13 it.

14 A. [Marks]

15 Q. Thank you. You said that that building has three floors. And

16 when it comes to Bosnian Muslim investigators, how did they conclude that

17 fire was opened from there. Was it the number of floors that was

18 decisive in their conclusion?

19 A. It is possible because the school of theology is behind our lines

20 and it was the only building with three floors, and the others all had

21 only two floors, the roofs were destroyed, so it was a more dominant

22 building than the others that surrounded it.

23 JUDGE KWON: Please refrain from asking leading questions. Your

24 final sentence was so evidently leading.

25 Yes, Ms. West.

Page 31190

1 MS. WEST: In addition to that, Your Honour, he's speaking now

2 about the Bosnian Muslim investigators -- investigation of this incident,

3 which is not something that I spoke about at all. I spoke about the

4 Prosecution's investigation of this incident, so it's beyond the scope.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, Madam West referred to a

6 paragraph in his statement, where it is stated that the Muslim side

7 pin-pointed the school of theology as the source of fire.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Guzina, what was the height of the facilities on the front

10 line? How many floors did they have?

11 A. Yes, we had the old pensioners' home which housed UNPROFOR's

12 bunker for the supervision of the area. We allowed UNPROFOR to set up

13 their bunker there in order to prevent a continuous firing being opened

14 on those lines and for them to finally establish who it was who opened

15 fire.

16 Q. Thank you. Can you see the old pensioners' home in this map?

17 A. The old pensioners' home is somewhere on the front line. I'm not

18 very comfortable with this map; it's different to what I have in front of

19 me. It was some 150 or perhaps 100 metres in front of the theological

20 school, not more than that.

21 Q. Did you have --

22 A. However, it is the highest building in the whole area.

23 Q. Did you have your firing positions in the old pensioners' home?

24 A. No, no, not for a moment throughout the war because the old

25 pensioners' home was inhabited by exclusively elderly people, Muslims,

Page 31191

1 Croats, and Serbs. And I can tell you that on the 6th of June as many as

2 six elderly people died in the course of one day and throughout the war a

3 total of 35 people were killed, and this can be confirmed by UNPROFOR and

4 Milena Mucibabic, who was the lady who was looking after those poor old

5 people.

6 Q. Could you please look at the scale at the bottom of the map which

7 marks kilometres and tell us as an officer how many of these partitions

8 can be placed between the school of theology and the old pensioners'

9 home?

10 A. I don't know exactly, a lot. A lot of these markings can be fit.

11 Q. Would it be approximately 2 kilometres?

12 A. 1500 metres to 2 kilometres. According to our calculations, it

13 was about 1.5 kilometres between the school of theology and number 7.

14 Q. And when we are looking at these houses, is there optical

15 visibility towards number 7?

16 A. No, there's no visibility, optical visibility, because we were

17 not on the roof of the school of theology, we were on the third floor,

18 not on the roof, which means that the visibility was reduced. It was at

19 least 3 metres less than if we had been on the roof, and we could not see

20 a number 7 with a naked eye from the school of theology.

21 THE ACCUSED: In line 22 -- 23, it's not registered that I said:

22 A low, ground floor houses on the first line. Very well.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, lines 22/23, what page?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 31, Your Excellency.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.

Page 31192

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. From those low, ground floor houses on the first line, is there

3 optical visibility of number 7?

4 A. No, not at all. I've just explained that the school of theology

5 was used only for PAT and PAM weapons, which opened fire on Mojmilo Brdo,

6 Alipasino Polje, Dobrinja 2 and 3, and in those grave moments, if I had

7 had any kind of weaponry I would have levelled Dobrinja 5 with the ground

8 if I only could.

9 Q. Were you ever informed about the trajectory of projectiles in the

10 bus about the levels of the entry hole and the trajectory in the bus

11 itself?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Thank you. Did your soldiers open fire on civilians

14 intentionally on any of -- from any of their positions?

15 A. No. I'm sure that they didn't. It -- civilians may have been

16 hit by mistake, but I claim with full responsibility that no Serbian

17 soldier intentionally opened fire on civilians.

18 Q. Was there anything that could have distinguished Muslim civilians

19 from a Serb civilian on their side?

20 A. No, we could not make a distinction in any way, especially during

21 the first year and a half. We all wore civilian clothes. Some people

22 wore Territorial Defence uniforms, but more or less all of us were

23 civilians and we walked about in civilians clothes. That's how we came

24 to the front lines. It was only in 1993, the Ilidza Brigade and my

25 battalion finally had uniforms. All of us were finally clad in uniforms,

Page 31193

1 and that was sometime towards the end of 1993.

2 Q. Thank you. And what was the height of the buildings on the other

3 side, on the side of the BiH army?

4 A. Well, if the Prosecution says that my positions were the school

5 of theology and the school for the blind, those are three-storey

6 buildings, and across the road I had buildings 10- to 12 floors high.

7 You can imagine yourself that they could have thrown stones at us from

8 those high buildings. You can imagine how we fared at our positions. It

9 was a very specific period of war. If anybody had gone back to see for

10 themselves what the situation was like there, they would be -- they would

11 understand our respective situations.

12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Could you both slow down and put a

13 pause. Yes, please carry on, Mr. Karadzic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 65 ter

15 24267.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. It is a photo that Madam West has already shown to you. Before

18 we see that, could you please put today's date and your initials on this

19 map.

20 A. Anywhere?

21 JUDGE KWON: Is it necessary to tender this? All he did is to

22 mark the theology institute, which he identified earlier on by the

23 number. So can we not do without this?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, if that's what you

25 think, I agree, yes, that can be done.

Page 31194

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Madam West has already shown you a photo and suggested that the

3 building in the middle maybe did not exist in 1994.

4 A. I don't have that photo on the screen.

5 Q. Bear with us, please. This building in the middle, is that a

6 building of a recent date which did not exist in 1994?

7 A. I believe that this building did not exist in 1994. I can see

8 another building in the background with bullet-holes.

9 Q. But the low building, is that a new or old building? Is this how

10 new buildings are built these days?

11 A. I wouldn't say that this building is new, that it has been

12 recently built.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this photo been tendered into

15 evidence? If it hasn't been, I would like to tender it.

16 MS. WEST: No objection.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll give the next D number.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And now I would like to

19 ask you --

20 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. What would be the number?

21 THE REGISTRAR: It will be D2560. Thank you.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You were shown P1601, a document which says that you allegedly

24 admitted that fire was opened and that it wouldn't be opened again. When

25 somebody informed you that your men opened fire, what would be the

Page 31195

1 procedure? Would you immediately deny it or admit it or would you carry

2 out a research, an investigation, in your unit as to what had really

3 happened?

4 A. Look, when UNPROFOR came to my command during the war, I did not

5 have to admit anything before them. They simply came. Perhaps they came

6 on the occasion of what had happened. They told me what had happened.

7 And they said that allegedly the Muslims said that things transpired as

8 purported here. As far as I can remember, they never told me that they

9 ever took part in shedding light on any of those events. It was

10 exclusively what the Muslims told them. They complained against the

11 Serbs. They lodged a complaint against the Serbs, and they were

12 duty-bound to draw our attention to that.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can the witness be shown

15 D314.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. You mentioned a proclamation that I had issued, namely, to

18 protect civilians and so on. Is this what we see before us on our

19 screens right now?

20 A. I think it is. I think that that would be it.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 11180.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. The units of the corps, did they send --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not it. It shouldn't be

Page 31196

1 it. 11280, that would be the 65 ter number.

2 Q. Did I directly address brigades or battalions or was it the corps

3 that was the intermediary and that conveyed by orders?

4 A. It's only natural that the corps would convey your orders to the

5 brigade and then the brigade to the battalion, that is to say to me.

6 Q. Thank you. Would you please identify this. This is the 15th of

7 May, 1993. Can you please take a look at what it says here below, to all

8 units.

9 A. Ensure that all units and complete personnel of the SRK army are

10 made aware of this and respect this order.

11 Q. Just a moment. That's not what I meant. Above the part where I

12 say "I order."

13 A. "On the bases of the directive of the Presidency of

14 Republika Srpska, strictly confidential number 01-87-1/93 of the 14th of

15 May, 1993, order of the Main Staff of VRS, strictly confidential number

16 02/2-420 of the 14th of May, 1993, with a view to consistently observing

17 the cease-fire from our side and consistently implementing the directive,

18 I hereby order ..."

19 Q. Is it clear that they received this as an order from me and then

20 sent it to all units of the SRK?

21 A. Precisely.

22 Q. Could you please focus on paragraph 3. You don't have to read it

23 out loud. Just read it for yourself. Were you aware of this position of

24 the state leadership and of higher commands and was this order being

25 observed?

Page 31197

1 A. Yes, I think that that was conveyed to us in the brigade as well

2 and further on towards the front line.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Shall be assigned Exhibit D2561. Thank you.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if you have further questions, I

8 suggest having a break now.

9 THE ACCUSED: Two short.

10 JUDGE KWON: Please carry on then.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Did you do your military service in the JNA; and if so, did that

13 include education about international humanitarian law?

14 A. I did my military service in the JNA in Bihac, Gospic, in

15 1979/1980. We did have lectures as far as I can remember. It was a very

16 long time ago.

17 Q. Thank you. My last question. You mentioned Azici and also you

18 said that there weren't any civilians there. Can you tell us whether

19 there were any soldiers there, or rather, the area was militarised, and

20 what were the facilities that were used as firing positions and positions

21 for fighting against you?

22 A. The command of the brigade decided only to correct the front line

23 and to link-up our forces with the independent company in Doglodi. The

24 decision was made to reach Azici. In fact, most of this were fields and

25 meadows, but there was this one facility that was called Carapara I think

Page 31198

1 and that was dominant in that area. The Muslim forces were in this area

2 and they were firing at Doglodi and Otis all the time from this Carapara,

3 and the command decided to take that part of the line. We did that

4 efficiently, without any casualties, as stated in this information. I

5 think that we carried out a good operation.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Guzina.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

9 That concludes your evidence, Mr. Guzina. On behalf of the

10 Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it.

11 You are free to go and we'll rise all together.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 JUDGE KWON: We'll have a break for 30 minutes and resume at ten

14 past 11.00.

15 [The witness withdrew]

16 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.

18 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I note that the Prosecution has

19 indicated that it would not respond to the accused's Naser Oric and

20 Ranko Mijic subpoena motions. However, I wonder whether the Prosecution

21 is going to respond to the second motion for subpoena to Eden Garaplija

22 which was filed on 3rd of December, 2012.

23 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, I don't believe so, but if you'll

24 give me a moment to confirm that, that might be the most prudent course.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

Page 31201

1 witness.

2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Good afternoon --

5 JUDGE KWON: Good morning to you.

6 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, good morning. Apologies. I do have some

7 comment with respect to the associated exhibits and a large number of

8 them. I'm in Your Honour's hands as to whether -- if you want to deal

9 with that in the absence of the witness or while the witness is here just

10 because it may take a few moments.

11 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you raise it before we have the witness in

12 the courtroom. Yes, please carry on, Ms. Edgerton.

13 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. There's a large number of proposed

14 associated exhibits with this witness, some of them -- some of which have

15 not been translated, some of which have not been fully translated, one of

16 which has not been uploaded, a number of which the Prosecution's position

17 is -- are actually irrelevant, and a number of which we feel have been

18 mis-characterised by the witness. And I can go through those to make my

19 position clear now, if I may, and I do that by referring to 65 ter number

20 if that makes it clear enough for everyone.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Going through then the associated documents, as I

23 believe they appear in the statement, the Prosecution's position would be

24 with respect to 1D8362, -63, -64, -65, -68, -70, and -73, that those

25 documents which are a number of combat reports are irrelevant to the case

Page 31202

1 at hand. I just want to note quickly that 1D8374 is now D2512. And with

2 respect to 65 ter number 20843, 1D83 - and please tell me if I should

3 slow down at all - 1D8379, 1 -- pardon me, 65 ter number 18384, 1D8385,

4 1D8387, 1D8390, -91, those documents, Your Honour, the Prosecution would

5 be requesting that the evidence of the witness related to those documents

6 be led live for a number of reasons, either because the witness has

7 mis-characterised the documents on their face or, indeed, they're not

8 indispensable parts of the witness's statement. In fact, there's no

9 foundation for their admission --

10 JUDGE KWON: Just --

11 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.

12 JUDGE KWON: -- a bit difficult to follow. Let's take a look by

13 way of an example 1D8385, paragraph 98 I take it.

14 "I have been shown document 1D8385 - this is an example that

15 shows that the SRK strictly respected the cease-fire and co-operated with

16 the UNPROFOR ..." and so on. So "this is an example of truthful

17 informing and the document was compiled for the need of the Corps and not

18 for propaganda purposes."

19 So what is your point?

20 MS. EDGERTON: By way of example with respect to this document,

21 it's not in the witness's document. He doesn't indicate that he's

22 received it or recognises it in any regard, yet he's able to describe it

23 as truthful without any underlying explanation as to why the witness

24 finds it to be truthful.

25 JUDGE KWON: If he finds this paragraph to be truthful, it -- now

Page 31203

1 then it is for you to cross-examine him, isn't it, if he confirms and

2 testifies to the veracity of this paragraph? So what's the point of the

3 Chamber ordering the witness live with respect to this paragraph in more

4 clear terms?

5 MS. EDGERTON: Taking Your Honour's first comment on board and in

6 anticipation of whatever ruling you might make, if you do accept these --

7 the documents in general, these documents and their explanations, while

8 I'm very conscious of the time-limits directed by this Chamber and make

9 every effort to keep within them, that ruling, allowing for these

10 documents to be accepted and so that I would cross-examine them, might

11 mean that I might be in Your Honour's hands for more time.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I can understand that you may need more time to

13 deal with this voluminous batch of documents.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Would I - with respect to the

15 documents that the Prosecution finds irrelevant - be just able to

16 continue down the rest of the list, Your Honour?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.

18 MS. EDGERTON: 1D6442, 1D6443, 1D6444, 1D6478, and 1D6502, and

19 just to conclude I'd note that 1D6407, 1D6408, 1D6505, 1D6414 are not

20 translated. I stand to be corrected, but 1D8153 has not been uploaded.

21 And I believe the translations of 1D6424 and 1D6447 are incomplete.

22 JUDGE KWON: Probably I have a different list. Was 1D8153 ever

23 tendered at all?

24 [Prosecution counsel confer]

25 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Reid informs me that that document is not

Page 31204

1 uploaded, but -- so we're unable to check and see whether or not it has

2 been tendered and that may be the case.

3 JUDGE KWON: The problem is that I don't see that document in the

4 list of associated exhibits. There are many others that you referred to.

5 That also does not appear in the list of associated exhibits, so that's

6 the reason I was confused a bit earlier on.

7 MS. EDGERTON: It's been a difficult list of associated exhibits

8 to work my way through and any misrepresentations I might have made with

9 respect to the numbers are completely inadvertent.

10 JUDGE KWON: But before we come to the specific issues raised,

11 although you didn't raise it, I want to ask Mr. Robinson what's the

12 problem of all these documents in the sense that they were not listed in

13 your -- in the Defence 65 ter document list at all? Mr. Karadzic

14 couldn't meet the witness in advance or we didn't know that witness would

15 mention these documents, et cetera, cannot be a proper reason to continue

16 such practice until the end of the case. That's just -- that kind of

17 explanation just circumvents the raison d'etre or the reason of the

18 65 ter rule at all.

19 Do you have any observation, Mr. Robinson?

20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. First of all, the documents

21 that were not on my Rule 65 ter list were received after this witness was

22 interviewed. This witness was one of the ones that was interviewed

23 rather early, in December of 2011, and so at the time he was interviewed

24 we took the documents that we had identified for him and incorporated

25 them in his statement to the extent that we thought they were important.

Page 31205

1 Afterwards, we received the Rule 66(B) material for him which included

2 these documents. And so it wasn't until before he was interviewed here

3 that we were able to review those documents and find out others --

4 identify others that we wished to use with this particular witness. And

5 that's why those documents weren't on our 65 ter list and that's why they

6 were added more recently. And we did notify the Prosecution that we were

7 going to be using these documents about a week ago.

8 JUDGE KWON: That may be the reason why the Prosecution didn't

9 raise the point of 65 ter list.

10 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11 MS. EDGERTON: That's correct, because we've had them for a week.

12 JUDGE KWON: It takes a lot of time.

13 Let's come to the untranslated documents.

14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, we agree that those -- there

15 are four untranslated documents and we'll lead those live.

16 JUDGE KWON: Let's identify those documents.

17 MR. ROBINSON: 1D46 --

18 JUDGE KWON: Just --

19 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, 1D6407.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MR. ROBINSON: 1D6408.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 MR. ROBINSON: 1D6414.

24 JUDGE KWON: 6414, yes.

25 MR. ROBINSON: And 1D6505. I'm told that 1D8153 is actually

Page 31206

1 P2419.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that was already admitted.

3 And what were your points, Ms. Edgerton, with respect to the

4 first batch of documents?

5 MS. EDGERTON: Well, the first batch of documents that I found to

6 be -- or in my submission are irrelevant, Your Honour, are generally

7 combat reports which either report combat, report a violation of a

8 cease-fire on the part of the ABiH forces, report good relations with

9 UNPROFOR, and -- but for the most part they're characterised by the

10 witness as documents setting out cease-fire violations. And in my view,

11 Your Honours, if -- is that if Dr. Karadzic's case and his defence is

12 that SRK forces under his control only fired back when they were fired

13 at, then these documents showing violations of cease-fires are

14 irrelevant -- or that the witness claims to represent violations of

15 cease-fires are irrelevant.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, before I hear Ms. Edgerton I was also wondering

17 why the accused should tender a series of similar multiple daily combat

18 reports. In any event, would you like to reply -- respond, Mr. Robinson?

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. First of all, these are all

20 reports signed by this witness and they corroborate his testimony, and

21 that's the purpose of associated exhibits is so that you're not left here

22 wondering whether to believe the witness when he says that they were

23 responding to multiple attacks by Muslim forces out -- from the city.

24 And these documents all show the military aims of the Muslim forces and

25 what their activities were, and so it's important for you to understand

Page 31207

1 that this was happening on a daily basis and that they were regularly

2 confronted with attacks from Sarajevo to which they were responding.

3 JUDGE KWON: Can I take a look at 1D6409 which was referred to in

4 paragraph 140. All the witness said is that this is my document, but I

5 do not know how this is related to that paragraph at all. Similar

6 observation may apply to other paras.

7 Do you have any comment?

8 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. If looking at paragraph 140

9 when the witness gives a long explanation about the context of this

10 document, that the Muslims wanted to enable tram transport to transport

11 civilians, et cetera, and it shows -- if you look at the document --

12 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we upload it for the moment. 1D6409.

13 This is it.

14 Yes.

15 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, so the document indicates that UNPROFOR --

16 looking at item 3, "UNPROFOR has been engaged in actions in the Nedzarici

17 sector in the home for the blind and in Stup, which is threatening our

18 safety."

19 So this is what he is referring to when he describes how --

20 JUDGE KWON: Where in that paragraph does the witness refer to

21 that part?

22 MR. ROBINSON: He doesn't refer to that part but the paragraph

23 itself refers to their relations with UNPROFOR and why they had -- why

24 they had to essentially do things that were against what UNPROFOR wanted

25 them to do. And the last sentence:

Page 31208

1 "Despite our warnings, the UNPROFOR attempted to set up

2 containers as covers so that we could not observe or engage the military

3 movements of the BiH army."

4 So this essentially relates to item 3 of the document.

5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE KWON: So the Chamber will proceed in this way. We will

8 order the Defence to lead live with respect to those documents that

9 haven't been translated and other documents will be admitted as part of

10 associated exhibits, but at the same time the Chamber will consider

11 allowing some leeway to the Prosecution in terms of their time for its

12 cross-examination.

13 Let's bring in the witness. But in any event, in para 107 and in

14 para 115 deals with the incident that were not part of the indictment or

15 dropped from the indictment, so I would order the Defence to redact those

16 two paragraphs.

17 MR. ROBINSON: We'll do that.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, sir.

20 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

21 JUDGE KWON: Would you take the solemn declaration, please.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

23 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

24 WITNESS: VLADIMIR RADOJCIC

25 [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 31210

1 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Radojcic.

3 A. Good morning.

4 Q. Were you retired as a colonel?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. Then I will address you as Colonel. Did you give a

7 statement to this Defence team?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I call 1D6900 in e-court,

11 please.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Have you read this statement?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Do you see it before you?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I have to remind myself and you to make a short pause between

18 question and answer for the interpreters.

19 Does this statement contain accurately the answers you've given?

20 A. It does.

21 Q. Have you signed it?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. If I were to ask the same questions today, would your answers be

24 essentially the same?

25 A. Yes.

Page 31211

1 Q. Thank you.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now like to read the

3 summary and then according to the Court's decision I have four

4 documents --

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. We'll give the 92 ter statement the

6 exhibit number first.

7 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter 1D6900 shall be assigned Exhibit D2562.

8 Thank you.

9 JUDGE KWON: And among the associated exhibits there's a map I

10 take it which -- whose 65 ter number is 1D8393. So it's very illegible

11 and we need some translations for the legends. So I would like you to

12 deal with that map live as well in addition to those four untranslated

13 documents. Otherwise, all the other associated exhibits tendered will be

14 admitted into evidence and be given numbers in due course by the

15 Registrar. Please carry on, Mr. Karadzic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I

17 should now like to read a brief summary.

18 Colonel Vladimir Radojicic -- before that I'd like to correct a

19 typo. I am pronouncing correctly Radojcic, but the summary is marked

20 Radojicic with an extra i between j and c. It should be deleted.

21 [In English] Vladimir Radojcic worked in Rajlovac as an

22 instructor for defence at the Orao Air Force Institute from April the

23 6th, 1992, to the 15th of May, 1992. He was transferred to Belgrade

24 where he worked at the Military Academy until the end of 1992. He was

25 commander of the 1st Infantry Ilidza Brigade of the SRK from January 1993

Page 31212

1 to the end of the war. After the war, he was appointed chief of infantry

2 at the VRS Main Staff where he remained until his retirement on April the

3 1st, 1998.

4 Colonel Radojcic was aware of the formation of the Green Berets

5 before the war began. The Green Berets were armed with new automatic

6 rifles, pistols, and flak jackets.

7 The 1st Corps of BH army was positioned in the part of the city

8 of Sarajevo under Muslim control in the period between April 1992 and

9 December 1995. The Muslim authorities did not allow the civilians to

10 leave the city and had absolute control over the conditions in the city.

11 His brigade, brigade of Colonel Radojcic, frequently informed the

12 United Nations that the enemy was clearly abusing civilian facilities for

13 military activities. The SRK positions and the civilian population were

14 frequently targeted from the hospital in Dobrinja, for example. No

15 feedback was received and there appeared to be no impact on the forces of

16 the 1st Corps of BH army. The brigade had information that -- and where

17 the units belonging to the 1st Corps of the BH army had command posts,

18 artillery, and positions of -- other fire positions in the depth of their

19 territory.

20 The strategy of the SRK was to protect civilian villages and to

21 prevent a breakthrough of the 1st Corps of BH army which would have had

22 significant impact on other fronts and the course of the war in BH.

23 Vladimir Radojcic's brigade carried out primarily defensive operations.

24 The only offensive operations were carried out to improve tactical

25 positions. His brigade opened fire at the first line of the front and

Page 31213

1 targeted targets in the depth only when they had reliable information

2 that combat elements of the opposed brigade, such as commands, artillery

3 positions, et cetera, were located there.

4 Colonel Vladimir Radojcic received information from superior

5 commands and civilian authorities which was distributed to subordinate

6 units, containing explanations of the provisions of the humanitarian and

7 international law of war. The brigade applied precautionary measures to

8 prevent fire being opened on civilian facilities. Fire was not opened as

9 there was a possibility of civilian casualties, irrespectively of

10 ethnicity. Conversely, the 1st Corps of BH army opened fire at civilians

11 on the territory under the SRK control, especially on the market days,

12 resulting in numerous civilian casualties. This was the case with Muslim

13 sniper fire which was opened on civilians in the city under Serbian

14 control.

15 Neither he nor lower nor superior commands intended to incur

16 civilian victims, terrorise civilians under Muslim control, or exert

17 psychological influence on the civilians. Neither

18 Colonel Vladimir Radojcic nor his brigade were ever ordered by superior

19 commands or civilian authorities, verbally or in writing, to attack

20 civilians or means of the public transport in the city under Muslim

21 control, nor did he issue such orders. Orders from the superior commands

22 were that fire was only to be opened at observed military targets and

23 firing positions. Dr. Karadzic repeatedly pointed out in meetings that

24 any action against civilians or any violation of the international

25 humanitarian law and law of war could have harmful consequences. There

Page 31214

1 was no intention or wish to make civilians' life conditions harder. His

2 brigade's actions were not considered as being part of a systematic or

3 outspread attack on civilians.

4 In Colonel Vladimir Radojcic's brigade there was only one

5 professional serviceman. All the other members of his brigade were local

6 civilians trained mainly for defensive actions which impacted the quality

7 of command and control in the brigade. He also had no professional

8 snipers. The same or similar situation was also in other SRK brigades.

9 Attempts were made to have the paramilitary groups in his zone of

10 responsibility eliminated or disbanded and its members assigned

11 individually to various brigades.

12 The issue of ammunition became increasingly a problem. The

13 orders by the superior commands regarding its use, especially artillery

14 ammunition, were to achieve maximum saving and open fire only when

15 necessary. He had information that modified aerial bombs were used when

16 there was a shortage of ammunition. The bombs were tested and their

17 precision was found to be satisfactory. There were no fuel air

18 explosives in the arsenal of the SRK.

19 Every convoy of humanitarian aid which had been approved by

20 superior commands was allowed to pass and was escorted. In some cases

21 the passage was not approved due to the irregularities, yet even those

22 convoys were also ultimately allowed to pass. He was aware that

23 humanitarian aid was being abused for military purposes of the 1st Corps

24 of BH army or sold in the black market. On one occasion, ammunition was

25 found in the UNPROFOR vehicle destined for the opposing side.

Page 31215

1 President Karadzic decisively forbade any abuse of water, electricity, or

2 gas. Information was received that the Muslim authorities deliberately

3 cut off their supplies when foreign delegations visited.

4 Colonel Radojcic learned that the 1st Corps of BH army used Serbian

5 civilians to dig trenches. Protests were made to international forces.

6 The brigade also had information about the existence of criminal groups

7 within the 1st Corps of BH army.

8 UNPROFOR members were treated correctly and provided with food

9 and correct accommodation and his unit did not consider them hostages but

10 prisoners of war when the conflict between Serbs and UN occur. The

11 conditions were agreed upon through negotiations by all parties.

12 Regarding the incident at the Markale market on 5th of February,

13 1994, a mixed commission was set up to investigate the incident and

14 Colonel Radojcic was supposed to represent the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

15 But this commission was not allowed to carry out its work.

16 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command and the general headquarters and

17 Vladimir Radojcic were certain that the Serbian side was not responsible

18 for it.

19 Regarding shelling incidents in the Klare Cetkin Street and

20 Cetinjska Street on 22nd of January, 1992 [sic], and Safeta Hadzica

21 Street on 26th of June, 1995, and Trg Medjunarodnog Prijateljestva Street

22 on 16th June, 1995, incident of 18 June 1993 - this is out - sniping

23 incident in Djure Jaksica Street on 26th of June, 1994, Colonel Vladimir

24 Radojcic responsibly claims that he never issued orders to open fire at

25 these locations to any units of his brigade nor did he ever receive any

Page 31216

1 feedback information about the alleged attack on these targets.

2 Regarding incident at the junction of Bulevar Avnoja and

3 Nikole Demonje Streets on 25th of May, 1994, Colonel Vladimir Radojcic

4 responsibly claims that he never issued orders to open fire at this

5 location to any units of his brigade, nor did he ever receive any

6 feedback information about the alleged attacks on these target.

7 Moreover, the distance between the two points is beyond the range

8 available in his brigade.

9 Now could I please call into the electronic courtroom 1D06414.

10 [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Colonel, sir, could you please focus on 313 and could you tell us

13 how the civilian authorities functioned, when they were established, how

14 they operated, and how that reflected on the operation of the unit and

15 the defence as such.

16 A. Even before this decision the civilian authorities had clearly

17 defined work that was clearly aimed at establishing organs of government

18 in the territory of the municipality of Ilidza. As for the relationship

19 with the military, it had to do with logistics for our brigade in the

20 rear. So the relationship between the civilian and military authorities

21 were clearly defined. We did not interfere with each other's work. As

22 for this decision that you asked me about, this relationship became even

23 more operative, that is to say, all the most responsible persons from the

24 area of responsibility of the Ilidza Brigade were in a single place,

25 including the civilian and the military authorities. At these meetings,

Page 31217

1 we made highly operational decisions, and I as brigade commander was only

2 assisted by this --

3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- I managed to --

5 JUDGE KWON: -- Mr. Karadzic, unfortunately, not knowing the

6 language, the B/C/S, it's very difficult to follow what this document is

7 about. First introduce what this document is about and put your

8 questions later on.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. These few decisions here on the establishment of War Presidencies

12 and 313 pertains to Ilidza. Is this a decision on the establishment of

13 the War Presidency of the municipality of Ilidza?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Are you familiar --

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, it's a leading question although

17 the Prosecution will not challenge it, but it's -- it reduces the

18 probative value of the witness's evidence.

19 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20 MS. EDGERTON: And it would also be helpful to know the date of

21 the decision.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Could you tell us then please what this document represents.

25 When was it issued and under which circumstances?

Page 31218

1 A. This document was issued on the 20th of June, 1995, at the time

2 of the strongest Muslim offensive that was aimed at deblocking Sarajevo

3 from the external ring.

4 Q. Thank you. Do you know all these 14 members?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Thank you. A moment ago you said that they had all been made

7 available to you for rapid interventions. Do you know what the reason

8 was to establish a War Presidency during this offensive?

9 A. The situation was so critical that decisions had to be made

10 rapidly and carried out as soon as possible. This body made that

11 possible.

12 Q. Thank you. Did these people have any other positions or did they

13 hold any other kind of office?

14 A. Yes. I see that the first person referred to here was the

15 president of the municipality and also the president of the

16 War Presidency. And I see representatives of the civilian police and

17 other civilian authorities. As for the army, I was the only one present.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21 MS. EDGERTON: It has no meaning if we don't know who these

22 people are that he's talking about, Your Honour.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think I -- the first one seems to be

24 Nedeljko Prstojevic.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 31219

1 Q. Well, Colonel, sir, could you tell us then, please, what the

2 positions were of these persons, what their positions were among the

3 authorities?

4 A. Yes, very precisely. Number 1, Prstojevic, president of the

5 municipality; number 2 Velibor Veselinovic, his deputy; then Rade Ristic,

6 also a member of the authorities, but on the other side of Ilidza in the

7 area of Vojkovici and Lukavica; then Mr. Djeklic, he had a post in the

8 municipality, I don't remember exactly which one; the late Mr. Lalovic

9 was the financial organ; then Vladimir Radojcic, that's me, from the

10 brigade; 7 Ljubisa Petricevic, commander, commander of the Igman Brigade;

11 Radomir Kojic, at the time commander of the 2nd Sarajevo Brigade;

12 Obren Zeljaja, representative of the authorities of the municipality of

13 Ilidza from the eastern part; Mr. Tihomir Glavas, chief of the Ministry

14 of the Interior; Vlatko Knezevic, also a top person from the Ministry of

15 the Interior; Goran Sehovac, a person who was in charge of communicating

16 with international institutions on behalf of the municipality;

17 Spaso Muratovic, a man who was in charge of mobilisation activities, that

18 is to say, chief of the defence organ; and Slobodan Marilovic, president

19 of the committee of the Serb municipality of Ilidza.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted now?

22 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

23 THE REGISTRAR: 1D6414 shall be assigned Exhibit D2563, marked

24 for identification pending translation. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D6408, could we have

Page 31220

1 that, please.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. While we're waiting, Colonel, do you know of all the things that

4 we agreed to, what kind of mandate we accepted for the UN forces, for

5 UNPROFOR? Do you know what it was that we had agreed to?

6 A. UNPROFOR had several tasks, both in terms of civilian activity

7 and military activity. As for the military, they supervised the

8 separation lines between my brigade, the 102nd Brigade, the

9 155th Brigade, and the 104th Brigade of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 In addition to this supervision, they toured our positions and they saw

11 for themselves who it was that was violating the agreed cease-fire. We

12 had very specific co-operation with them and the importance I attach to

13 this co-operation is best illustrated by the fact that I appointed a

14 person who had an office at the Serbia hotel and communicated with them

15 on a daily basis. As for their activities in the civilian sector, I am

16 less familiar with them, but I know that they escorted humanitarian

17 convoys that together with other organs of civilian authority they

18 provided humanitarian aid to our population as well as to the population

19 of the Muslim part of Sarajevo, and so on and so forth.

20 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell us whether this is a document of

21 yours and can you tell us what this is about?

22 A. Unfortunately, this is barely legible. I can hardly see

23 anything. Maybe if you can remind me, maybe if you can see it better.

24 Q. Thank you. I'll try. The first paragraph says that in the area

25 of Kasindolska gun-fire was opened from the area of Cenex. Do you know

Page 31221

1 what that is?

2 A. Cenex is a dominant facility that was on the Muslim positions

3 where there was optical visibility in terms of our positions and

4 especially Kasindolska Street.

5 Q. Thank you. Further down it says, or rather, there's a reference

6 to VRS -- oh, no, oh, no. Already a few times and today as well we

7 warned military observers not to tour -- tour without the presence of our

8 officers. Why was that unacceptable?

9 A. That is correct. We had a liaison officer, an UNPROFOR liaison

10 officer, and we had agreed upon the exact procedure as to how our

11 positions would be toured. Now, this was the procedure: They would

12 report to the officer for co-operation with UNPROFOR; they would express

13 their wish as to the position they wished to tour; then the liaison

14 officer would call the commander, the komandant or komandir of that unit,

15 depending on the number of positions they wished to tour; they would say

16 that they wanted to come; and then they would come. However, in this

17 case obviously this member of UNPROFOR did not observe the required

18 procedure. Why did we react? Because the touring of such positions was

19 very risky for a person that was not familiar with the exact location of

20 land-mines that had been placed along those lines. It is for their

21 safety what we insisted upon the presence of a person of ours.

22 Q. Thank you. Colonel, if anything happened to them, what would the

23 consequences be in respect of your own brigade?

24 A. Very fortunately this never happened, and I must say that the

25 attitude of UNPROFOR towards the brigade command and vice versa was

Page 31222

1 exceptional. We never had any conflicts that we could not resolve even

2 in the most difficult situations.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted for

5 identification?

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2564, marked for identification

8 pending translation. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D06407.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Please could you tell us if this is also a report of yours and if

12 you could say what it is that this report says. If necessary, I could

13 help you.

14 A. I would like to ask for your help, please.

15 Q. Thank you. Let's just take a look, it's the 7th of February,

16 1994.

17 [Defence counsel confer]

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Aha, can you see it now, can you read it now, the 7th of

20 February, 1994, that's what the stamp says here. Do you see the rest?

21 Enemy: What they did?

22 A. I see that. This is one of our daily reports that we sent to our

23 superior command. This daily report shows that Muslims opened fire at

24 Luzani, and I must say that Luzani is an urban part of Ilidza where only

25 civilians lived. To this day I don't understand why they fired mortar

Page 31223

1 shells, 82-millimetre mortar shells, because there was not a single

2 military target there. Also, I see that they fired at other parts of the

3 front line which was basically something that happened every day.

4 Q. Thank you. What about the next one that has to do with snipers?

5 Today snipers are operating in all zones; is that right?

6 A. I mean, on this day, on this day in question, Muslims opened fire

7 at the entire area of responsibility of the brigade, especially with

8 snipers. When I say "snipers," I am claiming that because the distance

9 between their positions and our positions in the zone of defence of my

10 2nd Battalion that was outside the urban area in Igman, that's where

11 snipers were used only. So sniper activity was daily practice as far as

12 their forces were concerned.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted for

15 identification?

16 JUDGE KWON: I'm struggling to understand the relevance of this

17 question. Could you ask the witness to read out the sentence related to

18 snipers.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Could you please read this out. The second paragraph, at 2330 in

21 the neighbourhood of Luzani and then further on up to "the sniper."

22 A. One-third of my copy is illegible. I cannot see it at all. I

23 cannot see the numbers. I cannot read it.

24 Q. This sentence that His Excellency, Judge Kwon, asked for that

25 says "today" --

Page 31224

1 A. Yes, "Today at 1300 hours" --

2 Q. No, no, before that. The previous line?

3 A. "During the previous night...," is that what you mean?

4 Q. No, no, just one line above.

5 A. "Snipers are operating along all front lines."

6 Q. Thank you. What was the target of your snipers, those that you

7 had as optical rifles?

8 A. My brigade specifically had 30 snipers. Out of these 30 snipers,

9 half were M76, that is to say real sniper rifles. When I say "real

10 sniper rifles," I mean a sniper rifle with a sniper sight. The remaining

11 15 were M48 rifles. These were military carbines. And a sight was

12 improvised on these rifles, sights from hunting guns or something like

13 that. So we had a total of 30 snipers. My sniper shooters were mostly

14 deployed in the zone of the 2nd and 3rd Battalion, that is to say outside

15 the built-up areas, for a simple reason, they were more efficient outside

16 built-up areas and using them was more expedient.

17 Q. Thank you. When you say that their snipers were firing at all

18 front lines, does that mean that they had snipers in the areas where you

19 had them?

20 A. They did, for sure. And their activity was particularly

21 pronounced in the neighbourhood of Butmir towards Kasindolska Street,

22 where there was the main intersection of roads, or rather, Kasindolska

23 led between Nedzarici, Ajdonesko [phoen] Naselje and the other parts of

24 Ilidza. So this sniper fire of theirs was the strongest there if you

25 look at the entire war.

Page 31225

1 Q. Thank you. Can you explain why it is that you fired at 10 past

2 1.00 at Cenex using these shells and you said it was dominant. But what

3 is Cenex? Is it a residential building or something different?

4 A. It is a business building made of concrete where their units

5 were. At this point in time they were involved in a shift of their

6 infantry units and my people noticed that and I ordered that mortar fire

7 be opened against them.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all unnecessary

11 microphones please be switched off.

12 JUDGE KWON: This will be marked for identification.

13 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2565, marked for identification

14 pending translation. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I would like to

16 call up 1D06505. Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Could you please take a look at this document. Does its say here

19 that the enemy on that day mostly respected the cease-fire on lines 2 and

20 3?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then you had an incident on their side at 2350 hours -- there

23 was a provocation; right?

24 A. Those were daily occurrences. There were daily provocations.

25 The front line of my brigade was 22 kilometres long and such cease-fire

Page 31226

1 violations were always possible. We just recorded them and we didn't

2 take any special measures.

3 Q. Thank you. And what about the line which relates to the convoy?

4 A. It says that the UNPROFOR convoy was let through without any

5 problems. In most of the cases UNPROFOR honoured the procedure for

6 passage and then UNPROFOR convoys passed without any problems.

7 Q. Why did problems arise? When there were problems, what caused

8 them?

9 A. During the war a system was put in place for the passage of

10 UNPROFOR convoys. It had been agreed with my superior command and the

11 liaison officer. Every evening I would thus receive an announcement for

12 UNPROFOR convoys for the following day. In that notification it was

13 specified when the convoy was supposed to pass, the number of vehicles,

14 and the contents of the cargo in the vehicles. And if that was honoured

15 by UNPROFOR and if things were done in that way, there were no problems

16 as far as I can remember. The number of incidents, or rather, the number

17 of problems that we had with UNPROFOR can be counted on the fingers of

18 one hand. Problems arose when things were not honoured, when the

19 agreement was not honoured.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2566 pending translation. Thank you.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up the map

Page 31227

1 under 8393.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Could you assist us with the map, please. And tell us what it

4 depicts.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Just for the record this is 65 ter number 1D8393.

6 Thank you.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D, yes. Can we zoom in on the

8 map.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Who issued the map? What does it say?

11 A. The map was issued by the chief of artillery of the 1st Corps.

12 Q. Of which army?

13 A. Of the BiH army.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we zoom in on the circle, and

16 that circle depicts Sarajevo itself. Thank you.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Colonel, sir, did you make any annotations on the map?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Could you please tell us what your annotations represent?

21 A. I drew up the zone of responsibility of my brigade.

22 Q. In what colour?

23 A. Red.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

Page 31228

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. This map is obviously linked to --

3 JUDGE KWON: How about just admitting 1D8393A, which is a

4 zoomed-up version. I don't think you need this one, given the

5 legibility.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that would be better.

7 Thank you.

8 JUDGE KWON: Please carry on. I said we would admit the

9 zoomed-up one, then you don't need to cover this if you are not tendering

10 the previous one. Please continue.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. This does not need to

12 be signed. It can be admitted as is; right?

13 JUDGE KWON: It's part of associated exhibit. Numbers will be

14 given in due course or has been already.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you. And now I

16 would kindly ask for some flexibility. We did not announce the following

17 document, but it ties well with paragraph --

18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second --

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- with paragraph 136. I would

20 like to call up 1D6919 --

21 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber needs to rise right now. We have a

22 meeting in some context -- some other context.

23 We'll have a break for 45 minutes, Mr. Radojcic. We'll resume at

24 quarter past 1.00.

25 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

Page 31229

1 --- On resuming at resume 1.18 p.m.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

3 MR. TIEGER: Just getting back to the Court concerning the

4 inquiry about the Garaplija request, and we thought we had sent an e-mail

5 indicating that we were not taking a position, but in any event the Court

6 is correct, the same position as the previous motions applies.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

8 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

9 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. On the subject of motions for

10 subpoena, it would be helpful if the Trial Chamber could decide the

11 motion concerning Mr. Cutileiro as we are trying to bring him at the

12 beginning of February and making some plans. So if you could turn your

13 attention to that at some point before the recess, we would be greatly

14 appreciative.

15 JUDGE KWON: We'll consider your submission, Mr. Robinson.

16 Yes, let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Colonel, sir, in paragraph 136 of your statement you speak about

20 two routes that UNPROFOR could take to get to Sarajevo, one is

21 Sarajevo-Ilidza-Hadzici and the other one is across Mount Igman mountain.

22 What are the differences between these two routes, please?

23 A. The Sarajevo-Ilidza-Blazuj-Hadzici road is an asphalt road which

24 all vehicles use as they go towards Igman and further on towards

25 Bjelasnica. However, Muslims also made a road that went from Igman

Page 31230

1 towards Hrasnica. That road pre-existed, the one that the Muslims made,

2 but it was enlarged and it was ready to accommodate bigger vehicles. We

3 called that road a logistics road because that's how the Muslims got

4 their supplies from the Igman sector to Sarajevo. Obviously 90 per cent

5 of the transports that used that route were military transports. On

6 several occasions, in contact with UNPROFOR, we insisted that UNPROFOR

7 did not use that road, especially not during the night, because we could

8 not control whether the vehicles belonged to UNPROFOR or to the Muslim

9 forces. On several occasions we saw that UNPROFOR vehicles were used as

10 decoy by Muslims who supplied all sorts of things to Sarajevo. That's

11 why we asked UNPROFOR not to use that road during the night and by and

12 large they adhered to that.

13 Q. And in terms of the distance, which road is better?

14 A. The road leading from Sarajevo via Ilidza, Blazuj, and Hadzici is

15 much shorter.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at 1D6119. I

17 apologise. 6919. 1D6919. Thank you. Can we just have one copy and can

18 it be blown up to the maximum. And can some more light be shed on the

19 image, please.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Colonel, sir, do you recognise what is depicted in the photo?

22 A. This photo depicts Mount Igman in the background and closer to me

23 I notice Hrasnica and Sokolovic Kolonija.

24 Q. Thank you. Could the usher help the Colonel with the marking and

25 what can you see on Igman?

Page 31231

1 A. I can discern that logistics road coming down from Igman.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask the usher to help the

4 witness with the electronic pen.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What do you want me to mark?

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. First of all, could you please encircle Sokolovic Kolonija and

8 can you put letters SK next to that circle.

9 A. [Marks]

10 Q. Thank you. And now can you mark Hrasnica for us.

11 A. [Marks]

12 Q. Thank you. You did it in the Cyrillic script. And could you now

13 use the blue pen and mark the contact point between your forces and their

14 forces.

15 A. [Marks]

16 Q. So this is the longer line. And what about the line to the

17 right -- [In English] To brush -- to delete this one. No, no, no, the

18 other one. [Interpretation] Can you repeat the one that was erased by

19 mistake and extend it all the way up to the hill, make it a full line?

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you are not giving evidence yourself.

21 Ask the witness to do it. Yes, please continue.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So that was the separation line; right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. Did you see and did you hear the transports on the

Page 31232

1 Igman road?

2 A. During the night it was particularly well discernible. Lights

3 were dimmed but war lights were on and we could hear the motor vehicles

4 on because they travelled in convoys.

5 Q. Was fire opened on your area of responsibility from Mount Igman,

6 from which parts? Can you see them, can you mark them?

7 A. Artillery fire was opened on Ilidza from Igman because one part

8 of the artillery group of the 1st Corps of the BiH army was there and

9 from the Igman sector they opened fire, unfortunately, most commonly on

10 civilian targets. Those were 122-millimetre, 155-millimetre, and

11 130-millimetre howitzers and guns which were especially destructive --

12 THE INTERPRETER: And could the witness please be asked to slow

13 down.

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Radojcic, you are speaking a bit too fast for

15 the interpreters to keep up. Could you slow down and could -- if you

16 could repeat from -- when you mentioned the 122-millimetre howitzers,

17 could you start from there again.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Igman mountain range dominates

19 the Sarajevo valley and there Muslims deployed elements of their corps

20 artillery. I was talking about 122-millimetre howitzers, 155-millimetre

21 howitzers, and 130-millimetre cannon. The last cannon, 130-millimetre

22 cannon, is especially destructive. Its action is very destructive and

23 its non-selective use inflicted huge losses on our forces. On the slopes

24 of Igman Muslim forces were deployed there and they opened machine-gun

25 fire and anti-aircraft fire on the urban parts of Ilidza.

Page 31233

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Thank you. And can you now please mark the Igman road by putting

3 letters IP next to it and please could you do it in the Latinic script in

4 order not to confuse the participants in these proceedings.

5 A. [Marks]

6 Q. Thank you. Can you put the letters IP next to it.

7 A. [Marks]

8 Q. And now can I ask you to put a date, today's date, and your

9 signature in the right-hand side corner of this photo.

10 A. [Marks]

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

14 THE REGISTRAR: 65 ter document 1D6919 as marked by the witness

15 shall be assigned Exhibit D2618. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies. I have

17 nothing further.

18 JUDGE KWON: Just one thing. Could we upload and see 1D6411

19 briefly, both English and B/C/S.

20 MS. EDGERTON: It doesn't look in my pathetic understanding of

21 the language like a translation of the B/C/S document --

22 JUDGE KWON: In my e-court -- that's what I heard, but in my

23 e-court I can see a B/C/S document with the date of 16th of July, 1994,

24 and the format of the document seems to be identical to the English

25 version. But I don't know why it happens. My B/C/S version bears the

Page 31234

1 number Y0006670, but this one is different. So let's leave it there and

2 then we'll come back if necessary.

3 Very well, Mr. Radojcic, as you have noted, most part of your

4 evidence in chief in Mr. Karadzic's case was admitted in a written form

5 in lieu of your oral testimony. Now you'll be cross-examined by the

6 representative of the Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. Edgerton.

7 Please proceed, Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

9 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

10 Q. Good afternoon, Colonel.

11 A. Good afternoon.

12 Q. You can hear me in a language you understand?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Perfect. Thank you. You just left off with Dr. Karadzic talking

15 about a couple of things, and one of them was the Igman road and the

16 other was about weapons held by the ABiH. And I'd like to start off on

17 one of those points and that's about weapons held by your brigade. In

18 addition to the 30 sniper rifles you spoke about with Dr. Karadzic,

19 perhaps you could just confirm the following: Your brigade also had

20 three T-55 tanks?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And those had 100-millimetre guns?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. 12.7-millimetre Brownings?

25 A. Yes.

Page 31235

1 Q. Do you recall how many this far ahead in the future?

2 A. I can't remember the exact number.

3 Q. 12.7-millimetre, and I have to use the abbreviation,

4 12.7-millimetre DShK, which I believe stands for Degtyaryov-Shpagin large

5 calibre machine-gun?

6 A. Yes, it was a machine-gun which was part of the standard-issue of

7 the T-55 tanks. It's a 12.7 anti-aircraft machine-gun. But this does

8 not exclude the possibility to use it even more efficiently on ground

9 targets.

10 Q. You had two 105-millimetre howitzers, at least?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. You also had 122-millimetre D30 howitzers?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. 122-millimetre howitzers?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. 155-millimetre howitzers?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And these guns, these last, those had a range of about 15

19 kilometres. Would you agree?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And the 105-millimetre howitzers had a range of over 10

22 kilometres; is that correct?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. You had a ZIS 76-millimetre gun?

25 A. Yes.

Page 31236

1 Q. 120-millimetre mortars?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And your battalions also had 60- and 82-millimetre mortars

4 available to them?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. 20- [sic] and 88-millimetre anti-aircraft guns?

7 A. We did not have that calibre anti-armour gun.

8 Q. Anti-aircraft gun was actually the word I used.

9 A. Yes, we did have that calibre anti-aircraft gun.

10 Q. A modified air bomb launcher?

11 A. Yes, in the last stage of the war. When I say "the last stage of

12 the war," I mean 1994.

13 Q. And 1995 as well?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And you had also modified aerial bombs in your arsenal; correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And one last question before we go over to the other area we left

18 off, from your statement it's not exactly clear: Did you or did you not

19 have 120-millimetre mortar positions in Nedzarici?

20 A. The battalion fire group in Nedzarici was composed of mortars,

21 60-millimetre, 82-millimetre, primarily. And due to the complexity and

22 the unfavourable tactical position from the brigade artillery group we

23 attached to them two 120-millimetre mortars in order to be resubordinated

24 to the commander of the 1st Battalion.

25 Q. Thank you. Now, just to go back to the subject of the Igman

Page 31237

1 road, you spoke to Dr. Karadzic about the differences between the Igman

2 road into Sarajevo and the Sarajevo-Ilidza-Blazuj-Hadzici road, although

3 I think Hadzici comes before Blazuj. And the differences you articulated

4 to Dr. Karadzic, I think, aren't the only differences in those routes.

5 In fact, on the Igman road the difference is that UNPROFOR didn't require

6 your consent or agreement before it entered Sarajevo; correct?

7 A. Practical reasons forced us to agree between ourselves on how the

8 road would be used. If the enemy army used that road during the night

9 hours, it was only normal to expect that the commander of the unit took

10 all the necessary measures for that road not to be misused or abused. In

11 order to avoid conflicts with UNPROFOR, we agreed with them that they

12 would be using that road only in daylight. I had to tell you that we had

13 at our disposal information that the 104th Brigade painted its two APCs

14 white and used them also in daylight --

15 Q. Um --

16 A. -- in the military terminology --

17 Q. Now, let me stop you there actually, with respect, Colonel,

18 because you haven't answered my question. And my question was: Is it

19 correct that UNPROFOR using the Igman road didn't require your consent to

20 enter Sarajevo?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Thank you. And the circumstances that drove UNPROFOR to use that

23 road included the fact that all land routes, all other land routes into

24 Sarajevo had been closed; correct?

25 A. No.

Page 31238

1 Q. Well, perhaps we could look at a document. I think P888 would be

2 appropriate. It's a Sector Sarajevo weekly situation report dated 3 June

3 1995, and there's no translation so we can collapse one side of it. And

4 I'd like to take us to page 3, second paragraph.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please could we show the witness

6 the date in order to give him the context of the whole situation. Can we

7 go back to page 1, in other words.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Noting that I have actually put the date on the

9 record.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 MS. EDGERTON: But with respect to Colonel Radojcic, could we go

12 back, please, to page 3, second paragraph.

13 Q. Now, this document says of the situation in Sarajevo in the

14 second paragraph:

15 "The food situation is steadily deteriorating. The UNHCR

16 contingency stock is nearly exhausted while there have been no land

17 convoys because of the closure of the land routes. The airport remains

18 closed, as the humanitarian air-lift has been suspended for 56 days."

19 Now, do you agree or dispute the assertion in this document or

20 the report in this document about the situation? It notes not only that

21 the land routes have been closed but the air-lift has been suspended for

22 almost two months.

23 A. The very fact that air-lifts of food to Sarajevo were suspended

24 indicates that it was decided at a much higher level than brigade

25 commander. As far as I'm concerned, any movement of the UNPROFOR was not

Page 31239

1 for me to allow or to stop. I could not restrict their use of the road;

2 that was their sovereign right.

3 Q. So actually now seeing this, you don't disagree that all the land

4 routes into Sarajevo had been blocked and the air-lift had been closed?

5 A. I agree that it must have been agreed at a higher level that they

6 should not move and that supplies should be stopped, but it was not

7 within my purview to prevent it or to prohibit it, I couldn't.

8 Q. The land routes into Sarajevo, Colonel, were blocked by VRS

9 forces; correct?

10 A. If we look at the map we will see that my neighbour was the Igman

11 Brigade and their neighbour was the Croatian Defence Council. They did

12 not come to our border and I'm telling you I don't know why they didn't.

13 Q. With respect, that actually doesn't answer my question. It was

14 VRS forces who in April 1995 blocked all land routes into Sarajevo;

15 correct?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see where it's written that

17 it was in April?

18 JUDGE KWON: I think Ms. Edgerton is just simply putting her

19 question.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Moving on -- yes, correct. Thank you, Your

21 Honour.

22 JUDGE KWON: Can you answer the question, Colonel?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot because I don't remember

24 that the road was blocked in the territory of my brigade.

25 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, at this moment can I interrupt you a

Page 31242

1 THE REGISTRAR: It was already assigned Exhibit D2594 marked for

2 identification expending translation. Thank you.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

4 I apologise for your confusion, Colonel Radojcic, we had to go

5 back to the Defence examination-in-chief because I found that one

6 document hasn't been translated.

7 Now back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

9 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

10 Q. You had indicated you actually didn't know whether all land

11 routes into Sarajevo were closed and I'd like you to have a look at

12 another UN document. It's P822. It's a Sector Sarajevo weekly situation

13 report dated 8 July 1995, and unfortunately again it's not translated but

14 I'll read it to you. The second -- third bullet point on the first page

15 says:

16 "Denied any freedom of movement by the Serbs, UNPROFOR and UNHCR

17 continue to use the Igman road; UNPROFOR and the Bosnians are making

18 joint plans to protect exposed parts of the road with physical barriers.

19 The Serbs seem anxious, and are making some concessions."

20 And if you go over to the top of page 3, please, the first

21 paragraph at the top of page 3 says:

22 "As before, Serb gunners are targeting UN convoys using the Igman

23 road. Every night convoys targeting the road are attacked with

24 machine-guns, cannons, mortars and light field artillery. Very early on

25 Tuesday morning (4 July), two UNPROFOR personnel were injured by shrapnel

Page 31243

1 when bringing humanitarian aid into the city."

2 And if we could go down the page a little bit under the heading:

3 "Igman road used extensively; plans to protect it; Serb concerns," it

4 reads:

5 "Denied any freedom of movement by the Serbs, UNPROFOR and UNHCR

6 have been using the Igman road extensively in the past week.

7 "Two more aid convoys entered the city over Igman during the

8 week, the first on the night of Monday/Tuesday (3/4 July), the second on

9 Wednesday/Thursday (6/7 July). The first was attacked by the Serbs, two

10 drivers were injured and two trucks were damaged. The second convoy came

11 through without incident."

12 Now, this is second document I've shown you which confirms that

13 freedom of movement into the city was denied by the Serbs and as a result

14 UNPROFOR and UNHCR resorted to using the Igman road. Do you still

15 maintain you didn't know that all the land routes into the city had been

16 blocked by Serb forces?

17 A. From what you've read out to me I see that all the incidents that

18 occurred, occurred in the night hours. I must say that we were, after

19 all, at war with the enemy and by night we cannot distinguish whether

20 it's an UNPROFOR vehicle or the Bosnian army vehicle, whether it's a

21 humanitarian aid convoy or the logistical convoy of the BH army. If it

22 were by daylight we could have perhaps made the distinction, but by night

23 we couldn't.

24 JUDGE KWON: It's fair enough for you to comment upon the Serbs

25 targeting UN convoys, but the question was whether you were aware at --

Page 31244

1 that all the land routes to Sarajevo were closed or not.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nobody informed me of that. I

3 repeat, it's possible that it was done at a higher level so that I didn't

4 know. Convoys did not cross the border of Herceg-Bosna. Whether the

5 road was cut off by Herceg-Bosna or the agreement was reached at some

6 different level, I don't know.

7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

8 Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

10 Q. Now, in paragraph 87 of your statement, you referred to a

11 document that's D252 and it's a daily combat report from your -- it's an

12 SRK daily combat report on their artillery attack on an unannounced

13 convoy. So just relating that to what you've said, should we understand

14 your evidence -- let me rephrase. Just relating that to the situation

15 you've described, can you tell us what exactly was visible from the 3

16 kilometres' distance that you fired as reported in this document?

17 MS. EDGERTON: And we could bring up the document to show the

18 Colonel so he has a chance to see it. It's D2512.

19 Q. So now your statement says when fire was opened the UNPROFOR

20 vehicle didn't have its light on and the distance from our positions was

21 over 3 kilometres. When we opened fire we didn't know that it was an

22 UNPROFOR vehicle --

23 JUDGE KWON: Just a moment, Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour. Is it only us who are

25 hearing some B/C/S or French? The -- there seems to be a problem. I'm

Page 31245

1 still hearing the --

2 MR. TIEGER: And same over here, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE KWON: Oops, if you could give it a try, Ms. Edgerton --

4 no, I'm still hearing the -- now I know it's B/C/S.

5 MS. EDGERTON: I'm in Your Honour's hands. I'll do whatever I

6 can to accommodate.

7 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

8 JUDGE KWON: Possible reason was, Mr. Radojcic, you are too close

9 to the microphone so the sounds from your headphones may be heard by us.

10 Shall we try again.

11 Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

12 MS. EDGERTON: All right.

13 Q. Colonel, what exactly was visible from 3 kilometres' distance?

14 A. With the naked eye at 3 kilometres, obviously you couldn't see

15 much. But if you used binoculars, then of course we could see better.

16 Q. So should we understand your evidence about this use of the Igman

17 road and the targeting of UNPROFOR that its acceptable to fire on a

18 convoy if you can't see it with the naked eye and you don't know it's UN?

19 A. From my report you can see there were two UNPROFOR vehicles and

20 between them there were 12 other motor vehicles. It is therefore evident

21 that it was not just an UNPROFOR convoy, not a purely UNPROFOR convoy,

22 but some combined convoy between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian side. We can

23 see that this is true from the fact that after we opened fire the corps

24 artillery of the 1st Corps opened fire at us from the mountains. Their

25 fire was a response to our fire on the Igman road. I don't think they

Page 31246

1 would have fired if we had only attacked the UNPROFOR.

2 Q. Well, with respect, that's an inference, isn't it, Colonel. So

3 why is it acceptable to fire on a convoy if you don't know that it's the

4 UN?

5 A. Because that road was used to transport logistical supplies to

6 the 1st Corps, and the Muslim side very frequently used illicit means.

7 Under international law it's called perfidy. When you abuse the

8 Red Cross and the UNPROFOR, it is a prohibited military ruse that is what

9 happened here.

10 Q. So in terms of the precautions that you spoke about in your

11 statement several times that you indicated you took to prevent civilian

12 casualties, your evidence then is that in these circumstances those don't

13 apply?

14 A. On what basis am I to know that this is a civilian vehicle and

15 the casualties are civilians?

16 Q. Doesn't it stand to reason, Colonel, that if you can't see what

17 you're shooting at, you can't determine whether it's the United Nations,

18 you're required to take precautions before opening fire at an object that

19 might risk civilian casualties?

20 A. My communication with the UNPROFOR commander was permanent. I

21 said this at the beginning, we had a liaison officer for the UNPROFOR at

22 the Serbia Hotel in Ilidza. It was always possible to announce that at

23 such and such a time on such and such a day an UNPROFOR convoy would be

24 travelling. This was not done in this case. And you can see that also

25 from the fact that the next day a French colonel from the

Page 31247

1 2nd Parachute Regiment came to see me and never raised this issue. I

2 remember this very clearly.

3 Q. It was not done - to go back to my point initially - it was not

4 done in this case because land routes were closed. UNPROFOR was

5 effectively a prisoner inside Sarajevo; isn't that correct, Colonel?

6 A. At that time, if I remember well, UNPROFOR was not our prisoner

7 and all incidents would have been avoided if the liaison officer had been

8 notified. It was in the middle of a war. You don't have many options

9 there. You can allow them or not allow them. If you do allow them,

10 maybe you will pay for it the next day because they would have supplied

11 military equipment; you don't allow it and then you have different

12 problems. Those were situations where you had to make a decision in a

13 second. I always tried, especially in relation to UNPROFOR, to

14 co-operate with them constantly, to deal with all problems through

15 agreement, and most of the time I succeeded. This incident regrettably

16 happened - and I'm saying "regrettably" because it was not inevitable and

17 it wouldn't have happened if we had been notified in time.

18 Q. Let's move on. You talk now again of the liaison officer. Is

19 that Colonel Indjic?

20 A. Colonel Indjic was the liaison officer for the Sarajevo-Romanija

21 Corps. The one with me was Captain Novak Prodanovic, a polyglot who was

22 appointed to that position because of his knowledge of languages and his

23 general culture as an officer. But he was a reserve officer.

24 Q. Now, protests to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps from the UN for

25 allegations of shelling and sniping against civilians in Sarajevo would

Page 31248

1 go through Colonel Indjic or Colonel Prodanovic?

2 A. If they were from the area of activity of my brigade, protests

3 came from both sides. Prodanovic, or rather, the UNPROFOR liaison

4 officer knew both Prodanovic and Indjic. I don't know which incident you

5 are now referring to, but we never sniped at civilians.

6 Q. So Indjic not only had something to do with receiving protests

7 from UNPROFOR, he had something to do - it seems from your answers to

8 Dr. Karadzic - with freedom of movement as well because you described a

9 procedure that UNPROFOR had to follow for visiting your positions?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. Thank you. Now we'll move on to another area and that's about

12 the modified air bombs that you spoke about at the beginning of your

13 cross-examination.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.

15 Q. Now, you would agree with me that air bombs per se are aerial

16 weapons that are designed to engage area targets, not small targets at

17 all; correct?

18 A. I was lucky enough in my military career to spend some time in

19 the air force, so I know a bit more than an average infantry officer.

20 The air force had several types of weaponry including air bombs. There

21 was several types of air bombs depending on the target. This one was a

22 type of air bomb that was designed for destroying personnel and equipment

23 in closed spaces and buildings, contact fuse air bombs.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.

25 [Prosecution counsel confer]

Page 31249

1 MS. EDGERTON:

2 Q. So you're referring to the different kinds of air bombs now in

3 possession of the JNA?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, is it your evidence that 100 -- the 100- and 250-kilo air

6 bombs were designed for destroying personnel and equipment in closed

7 spaces and buildings?

8 A. Contact fuse bombs, yes.

9 Q. What kind of destructive -- actually, the destructive power of

10 these bombs, 100- and 250-kilos is massive; correct?

11 A. When we say contact fuse aerial bombs weighing 100 kilos, we have

12 to know that the explosive charge accounts for 40 per cent of the total

13 weight of the bomb. The rest is the body of the aerial bomb and that

14 after the explosion during which the bomb is fragmented, of course this

15 is massive. Yes, it's a powerful bomb.

16 Q. As a professional military officer, you were - and since you know

17 something about air bombs - you must know that weapons testing in the

18 arms industry in the former Yugoslavia was very demanding and required

19 the firing of a significant number of missiles to produce firing tables?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In fact, sometimes hundreds of firings before the firing tables

22 are produced and the weapons finally approved.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So when you said in your statement that both the missile engines

25 and the whole kit were tested, you mean they were tested by firing?

Page 31250

1 A. Yes, but it was not fired on personnel. It was done at the

2 Kalinovik testing ground which is an old artillery testing ground. Only

3 after those testings were we allowed to use such bombs.

4 Q. How many times was it fired?

5 A. If you mean in the area of responsibility of my brigade --

6 Q. No. In testing. How many times was it fired?

7 A. Unfortunately, I can't tell you that. However, if we received

8 the so-called temporary firing tables, that means that those who

9 delivered the firing tables to us had some relevant information based on

10 which he was of the opinion that launching the bombs from launchers was

11 okay.

12 Q. So you have no information as to any testing that was done to the

13 same exigencies as would have been the case in the normal arms industry

14 of the former Yugoslavia? You don't know? Or to the same exigencies,

15 pardon me.

16 A. Unfortunately, I can't answer your question because I don't know.

17 Q. And you said the deviation range was 10 metres by 1.000. Do you

18 actually have a firing table that supports that?

19 A. No, I don't have that firing table. It was the chief of

20 artillery who had it. Based on those firing tables, they calculated

21 targeting elements. You could not just place a rocket on the -- on a

22 launcher, turn it towards the target, and do things approximately. It

23 had to be done by means of firing tables and -- but those firing tables

24 were only temporary.

25 Q. All right. Two questions. Just to go back to something you said

Page 31251

1 earlier, you talked about testing at the Kalinovik testing ground. Do

2 you know that because you attended the testing of the air bombs there?

3 A. I wasn't there. I was a brigade commander and that was within

4 the purview of the centre who dealt with that. I was not there but I

5 know based on the fact that we received those tables that testing and

6 test firings should have been done and that a number of bombs had to be

7 fired first before the tables could be compiled. I myself was not there

8 at the testing ground.

9 Q. So who's the chief of artillery who had them, the firing tables?

10 A. The chief of artillery of the Ilidza Brigade was Predrag Bosicic,

11 that was his name. And the artillery battalion commander was

12 Bosko Radijgljac.

13 Q. So he had the firing tables but you haven't got them?

14 A. I was the brigade commander. In order to make my work easier,

15 according to our establishment, the brigade commander had at his disposal

16 chief of artillery, communications, and other branches. They were those

17 professionals that assisted a commander in arriving at the right

18 decision. In other words, this was a professional issue that was within

19 the purview of the chief of artillery, and I as the brigade commander did

20 not have to deal with that at all and I didn't.

21 Q. So you didn't deal with that but you know something about these

22 modified air bombs. You know, for example, that they were powered by

23 rockets?

24 A. Yes, as far as I can remember. We used rockets that were used by

25 the Plamen multi-rocket launcher. They were used as the fuelling agent.

Page 31252

1 Q. In fact, would you agree that there were different numbers and

2 different types of rockets actually used with the air bombs?

3 A. I can't answer your question precisely because this is beyond the

4 scope of my knowledge and my authority on aerial bombs.

5 Q. So -- but when you talk about the deviation of the bombs and say

6 that it's similar to mortars, well, I'd like to explore that, actually.

7 I want to talk about the emission of the rockets, for example. So if a

8 rocket -- if a bomb is using more than one rocket and a rocket ignites --

9 one of those rockets ignites even tenths of a second after the other

10 rockets, you would agree that that would cause a deviation in the course

11 of the modified air bomb, wouldn't it?

12 A. I don't know whether a deviation is possible in the timing of

13 igniting of various bombs, but I don't think it is possible. Those bombs

14 were precise, deviations were minimal. But as any projectile which has

15 an in-flying trajectory, we're talking about possible deviations. We can

16 talk about them primarily due to meteorological conditions such as wind,

17 humidity, and so on and so forth, but all those are conditions which have

18 already been taken into account and can be found as being incorporated in

19 firing tables.

20 Q. So you just said you don't know anything about whether a

21 deviation is possible in the timing of igniting, but you don't think so,

22 but you said deviations were minimal. So let me put this to you: What

23 if actually two rockets ignite at two different times, that's going to

24 create another and maybe even a greater deviation, won't it?

25 A. I said that I thought it was technically impossible for those

Page 31253

1 rockets to be ignited one by one because there's needle that would ignite

2 all four rockets or two -- it depended on how many a launcher can take.

3 Please bear in mind that I'm an infantry officer. This is not my area of

4 expertise.

5 Q. And if a rocket is launched or in the launching a rocket deviates

6 somewhat, you would agree that the longer the flight the potential for

7 greater deviation, wouldn't you?

8 JUDGE MORRISON: Ms. Sutherland [sic], this -- I mean, this is

9 all really self-evident stuff, isn't it? I mean if something goes wrong

10 with a rocket and it doesn't fly a true course, it will deviate. The

11 question really is: Did that happen? Sorry, I called you

12 Ms. Sutherland. That wasn't rocket science.

13 MS. EDGERTON: It's not a problem, Your Honour. And taking your

14 words into account, could I just have a couple of moments to look back at

15 the transcript and one of the colonel's answers.

16 Q. You've said deviations were minimal. Does that mean -- do you

17 say that on the basis of the reports you received on the rocket

18 explosions?

19 A. For those rockets that were launched and of which I was aware,

20 yes.

21 [Prosecution counsel confer]

22 MS. EDGERTON: I'm going to return to this but I need to -- I'm

23 going to return to this in a different way and I just need to consult my

24 notes for a moment.

25 Q. Talking about some of the incidents you discussed in your

Page 31254

1 statement, you talked about an incident you wrote, actually, about an

2 incident on 26th June 1995 that occurred in Safeta Hadzica Street and

3 said that it occurred in the midst of a fierce offensive and that you

4 never received any feedback about the attack. Now, I suggest to you that

5 you never received feedback because the incident actually took place on

6 26 May 1995.

7 A. I don't recall that.

8 Q. Fine. We can move on further. At a couple of points in your

9 statement you highlighted that your brigade members local civilians who

10 needed training, they were -- your officers and command staff were

11 untrained for performing their duties and that had a significant impact,

12 you said, on command and control. Do you remember that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In that regard let's have a look at an order that you -- an order

15 of General Milosevic's that you commented on in your statement. It's

16 P1201 and it's dated 6 April 1995. This is an order to your brigade to

17 thwart the enemy and give them a warning so they're forced to accept a

18 truce and ordering your brigade to prepare a launcher with an aerial bomb

19 and select the highest-yielding target in Hrasnica or Sokolovic Kolonija

20 where there will be the greatest human and material losses.

21 So my question to you is: Even though you insisted in your

22 statement that the order that civilians should not be attacked was so

23 important that it was constantly repeated, it's not repeated here.

24 Doesn't this reflect an assumption that the people who implemented the

25 order knew exactly what they were going to do?

Page 31255

1 A. In military terminology, when you want to open fire on enemy

2 personnel, you use that term, live personnel. When a general orders me

3 to open fire on personnel, on soldiers, the way I understand that order

4 is to open fire on the enemy soldiers, exclusively on the enemy --

5 Q. With respect --

6 A. -- soldiers.

7 Q. -- Colonel, that's an order for bodies. It doesn't say anything

8 about military targets.

9 A. The system of command was such that in an ops room there was a

10 map belonging to the chief of artillery. It was a working map. And on

11 that map there were markings for all those targets that our artillery was

12 supposed to fire upon. There were numbers and different other markings.

13 So when General Milosevic told me: Open fire on a target which will

14 inflict the biggest number of casualties among the personnel, the way I

15 understood it was to open fire on the place where at that moment there

16 was the highest number of personnel. In this specific case it was their

17 command.

18 Q. So that order -- your evidence is that that order leaves you free

19 to point the air bomb wherever you want to ?

20 A. Yes -- well, yes --

21 Q. Now, Colonel, given that, given --

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be allowed to

23 finish his answer? I was not allowed to interrupt him mid-sentence.

24 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough.

25 Let's hear him out.

Page 31256

1 Do you have anything further to add, Colonel?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I expected that there will be an

3 even more precise question when I was interrupted, which is why I

4 actually stopped myself continuing my answer.

5 MS. EDGERTON:

6 Q. So, Colonel, given that you've already said that your brigade is

7 local civilians, untrained, your officers were untrained, the lack of

8 training had a significant impact on the quality of command in your

9 brigade, we can't have any confidence that the people who implemented

10 this order knew exactly what to do?

11 A. When I described how my brigade was set up and who its members

12 were, this is precisely what I said. My men were locals and there were

13 very few professional career officers in that brigade. I was the only

14 one in addition to the chief of the anti-aircraft artillery. I was the

15 only active-duty officer, which doesn't mean that my chief of artillery

16 and battalion commander who completed reserve military schools for

17 artillery were not trained to carry out the duties that were assigned to

18 them.

19 Q. What I'd like to put to you is that General Milosevic could have

20 no confidence, especially given that the order to pay special attention

21 to civilians was not repeated here, he could have no confidence that the

22 order -- this order - which you've already characterised as

23 incomprehensible to anyone but a professional officer - no confidence

24 that a target could be properly engaged, giving due consideration to the

25 civilians who might be in the area?

Page 31257

1 A. I must tell you that according to the international law of war,

2 unit commanders during combat in a built-up area are duty-bound to move

3 out civilians from combat areas. In the first part of this order it says

4 that for three days Muslim forces had been attacking the

5 2nd Sarajevo Brigade, which means that a commander of the Muslims

6 4th Brigade, Fikret Prevljak, had been attacking a Serbian brigade for

7 three days. He was duty-bound to move out civilians according to the

8 international law of war.

9 Q. Failure to act according to IHL, Colonel, doesn't excuse the

10 other party for failing to do the same; correct?

11 A. The number of casualties, does it not speak volumes that I did to

12 the best of my abilities, just like you think that I should have, after

13 the launching of that aerial bomb.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to offer a better

15 interpretation. Instead of he was "forced," I would use the word "he was

16 obliged to move the civilians out of the combat area."

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

18 Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.

19 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, just one more document for today,

20 Your Honours, and that's 1D8436, which is dated 5 August 1994.

21 Q. Which you also referred to in your statement in reference to the

22 document we've just been discussing. And it's a document by your fellow

23 brigade commander suggesting economic and military targets to the SRK

24 command in retaliation for an incursion into SRK territory. And your

25 fellow brigade commander is Mr. Sehovac. Now, is this your target list,

Page 31258

1 Colonel?

2 A. As far as I can tell, the target of my brigade was only the

3 command post of the 4th and later on the 104th Motorised Muslim Brigade.

4 The command post which was in the Hrasnica school.

5 Q. Is your evidence that your target is then based on a document

6 that's dated a full eight months before the incident we're discussing?

7 A. Throughout the war the post office in Hrasnica was the

8 communications centre and the main command post for the 4th and later on

9 104th Brigade of the BiH army brigade. Next to it, the Aleksa Santic

10 school which is mentioned in here was the facility where special units of

11 the 1st Corps were trained. It was also the place where ammunition was

12 being manufactured for a little while during the war. We managed to

13 learn that -- I apologise.

14 THE ACCUSED: May we see next page in English.

15 MS. EDGERTON:

16 Q. So this document which referred to in reference to

17 General Milosevic's document P1201 actually has no reference to P1201

18 eight months later at all, does it?

19 A. I did not understand your question. I don't know what document

20 you're talking about.

21 Q. We were discussing --

22 A. Could you please --

23 Q. Sure. We were discussing the document issued by -- the order

24 issued by Dragomir Milosevic on 6 April 1995 to launch an air bomb at the

25 most profitable target in Hrasnica or Sokolovic Kolonija. And this

Page 31259

1 document which you referred to in your evidence actually has no relation

2 to any target selection you might have done eight months later, does it?

3 A. All our targets in Hrasnica were more or less permanent targets.

4 Throughout the war they were always there. So nothing had changed in

5 those eight months. In order to exclude the possibility of making an

6 error, I could always resort to intelligence work and learn from those

7 who defected about any even minor changes to the targets that were marked

8 on the map of the chief of artillery. All that simply excluded any

9 possibility of a mistake.

10 Q. But there was a mistake that happened on the 6th of April, 1995,

11 because you didn't hit the targets, did you? You hit a private house.

12 A. Which target?

13 Q. You didn't hit the post office building in Hrasnica, you didn't

14 hit the Aleksa Santic primary school in Hrasnica; on the 6th of April,

15 1995, you hit a private house?

16 A. I apologise about that imprecision of 20 metres. That house was

17 20 to 30 metres away from the facility which was our target. It was not

18 a civilian house. It may have been during -- before the war, but during

19 the war this was where their guards were billeted, those who provided

20 security for the command. According to information that I received from

21 UNPROFOR, only one soldier was hit. He told me that he had seen with his

22 own eyes that the man wore a uniform, so after all you will have to admit

23 that we were precise.

24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, I see the time.

25 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, and it would be a very good time to break. I

Page 31260

1 estimate that tomorrow I would probably be half an hour further and no

2 longer.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 Mr. Radojcic, we will adjourn for today. I'd like to advise you

5 about the rule here at the Tribunal, that you are not supposed to discuss

6 about your testimony with anybody else. Do you understand that, sir?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

9 We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00. The hearing is adjourned.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of

12 December, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.