130122ED

Page 32408

1 I mean that something you say may amount to an admission of your guilt

2 for a criminal offence or could provide evidence that you have committed

3 an offence. However, even if you think your answer will incriminate you

4 and you do not wish to answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to

5 compel you to answer the question. But in such a case, the Tribunal will

6 make sure that your testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used

7 as evidence in other case against you for any offence other than false

8 testimony.

9 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Indjic.

12 Mr. Karadzic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.

16 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

17 Q. Like all the witnesses who speak Serbian, I have to ask you and

18 also remind myself for the benefit of the interpreters and the transcript

19 that we should pause between question and answer and answer and question.

20 I see you've been promoted in the transcript to colonel, whereas I said

21 lieutenant-colonel, but that's a good omen.

22 A. Well, I would like to thank the court reporter.

23 Q. Have you ever provided a statement to the Defence team?

24 A. Yes, Mr. President.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would now like to call up 1D7030

Page 32409

1 in e-court.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Is this the statement that you gave to my Defence team?

4 A. Yes, this is the beginning of the statement, but I would like to

5 be shown the last page to make sure that the entire statement is

6 included.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see the last page

8 and the signature.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is the statement that I

10 gave to your Defence team.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Thank you. Have you read the statement and does it reflect

13 accurately your words?

14 A. Yes, I've read the entire statement and it reflects my words

15 accurately.

16 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today that

17 were put to you by members of my team, would your answers to the

18 questions in essence be the same?

19 A. My questions to the -- my answers to these questions would be the

20 same in essence, perhaps somewhat longer.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

23 tender this package, but a number of documents will be led live. From

24 pages 49 through the end of the statement, we will lead this viva voce.

25 JUDGE KWON: And you will redact those paragraphs, i.e., para --

Page 32410

1 from para 173 to para 189?

2 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE KWON: With that understanding, we'll receive the statement

4 unless there's an objection from Ms. Edgerton.

5 MS. EDGERTON: No.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2774, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 Now I will read out in English a summary statement of

10 Lieutenant-Colonel Milenko Indjic.

11 [In English] Milenko Indjic was a liaison officer in the

12 Main Staff of the SRK.

13 Milenko Indjic was not familiarised with the strategic objectives

14 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. He considers that the operations were

15 mainly defensive, to maintain the line of separation that had been

16 established when barricades were set up before the war broke out. The

17 blockade of the 1st Corps of the BH army -- the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

18 prevented 40.000 fighters from this 1st Corps from Sarajevo joined other

19 fronts, which would have given the BH army an important military

20 advantage. It was the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps's commitment that a total

21 cessation of hostilities should take place in BH. An agreement was made

22 in June 1992 that the airport should be taken over by the UNPROFOR and

23 used exclusively for humanitarian purposes.

24 Milenko Indjic had never heard of any plan to completely

25 eliminate the Muslim population of Sarajevo nor to deliberately target

Page 32411

1 the civilian population. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps lacked professional

2 servicemen at lower levels. The means of communication between corps

3 command and brigades functioned well. From brigade level to lower units,

4 a person had to be sent to the location to stop the fire from a weapon,

5 which could take half an hour. There were difficulties with the supply

6 of clothing, ammunition, spare parts, food, and fuel, which was often

7 bought from UNPROFOR members.

8 Lieutenant-Colonel Milenko Indjic states that it was clearly

9 specified in the rules when a unit can open fire without the order of

10 superior command; for instance, if the troops or the buildings which they

11 have possession of are under fire, or there is an activity directly

12 threatening to the lives of the troops. However, issues occurred in

13 lower levels of the soldiers because there were not a sufficient number

14 of professional officers. Daily reports of troop activities were

15 submitted to the corps command as part of the regular procedure.

16 There were a number of paramilitary units in BH and efforts were

17 made to prevent the existence of these units and to place them under the

18 control of corps command. In 1993 these units were disbanded and the

19 individuals reassigned to the units with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

20 The Muslims in B&H adopted the same principles as had been seen in

21 Croatia and Slovenia. They carried out blockades of the JNA barracks,

22 the JNA centres, military hospital, school centres, and barracks of the

23 military police unit. Further, they carried out massacres against the

24 JNA.

25 At the beginning of the war, a large number of civilians of

Page 32412

1 various nationalities were leaving Sarajevo, the VRS was allowing all

2 civilians to leave. The Muslim authorities did not allow both Muslims

3 and Serb civilians to leave.

4 As liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Milenko Indjic's main

5 activity was to co-ordinate all activities of the international

6 institutions with the activities of VRS. The group received requests,

7 protests, and petitions from the other side or representatives of the

8 international community for institutions on their side. These requests

9 were processed and forwarded and vice versa. The PTT building where the

10 group worked was situated in the Muslim-controlled area and frequent

11 firing could be heard. The liaison team moved to Lukavica in

12 mid-September when they received direct threats from the Muslim side that

13 they would be killed.

14 In his role as liaison officer, Milenko Indjic could not give

15 approval of movement of UNPROFOR and humanitarian aid convoys. This

16 could only be given exclusively through written documents of the

17 Main Staff of Army of Republika Srpska and the corps command.

18 At corps level, the Serb side insisted that the repair of gas,

19 water, and electricity infrastructure be conducted on both sides. The

20 Serbs from Ilidza supplied half of Sarajevo. On the other hand the

21 Muslims from Mojmilo did not allow for Lukavica to be supplied. Further

22 uninterrupted communication between Lukavica and Pale was impossible due

23 to the constant fire by the Muslim side.

24 As liaison officer Lieutenant-Colonel Milenko Indjic received

25 protests from UNPROFOR, UNMO, and civilians which he confirmed, dealt

Page 32413

1 with quickly, and passed to the appropriate level. However, a number of

2 these came from the other side and were a war time ploy. Protests lodged

3 by the Serbian side were never given any response. Full satisfaction was

4 expressed by all members of the UN with the level of co-operation

5 received from the SRK, and this was declared openly at meetings.

6 During the fighting in Sarajevo, the BH opened artillery fire on

7 a daily basis from the area of the Kosevo Hospital and other civilian

8 objects. Due to the nature of Sarajevo, the entire city of Sarajevo was

9 at the same time a civilian area and a military area. The

10 Patriotic League entered the war in an organised fashion compared to the

11 Serb side which was only formed at the outbreak of the conflict.

12 Lieutenant-Colonel Milenko Indjic did not receive protests from

13 civilians about shelling emanating from SRK forces. Neither he did

14 receive any protests about deliberate or indiscriminate targeting of

15 civilians. A plan never existed of low intensity operations with the aim

16 of terrorising civilians in Sarajevo. An anti-sniper agreement was drawn

17 up, signed by General Galic; however, this was ineffective.

18 The Serb side allowed humanitarian aid use of the blue routes

19 that had previously been agreed; however, the Muslim leadership refused

20 to let the convoys pass as they were preventing the movement of civilians

21 and making leaving Sarajevo impossible. On one occasion a container for

22 the neighbourhood of Butmir or Dobrinja was searched and weapons and

23 ammunition were found concealed inside.

24 That would be a short summary. Now I would like to pose some

25 questions to the witness.

Page 32414

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, two issues. First, I'm not sure if

2 this is a translation issue, but at the end -- at the outset of your

3 summary, although it does not form part of evidence, you introduce

4 Mr. Indjic as a liaison officer in the Main Staff of the SRK. I'm not

5 sure if I understand it correctly. So you clarify with the witness. And

6 secondly, in the case of other military personnel, I would like you to

7 deal with his military career before and after the war as well. Please

8 continue, briefly as possible.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Thank you.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, what did you liaise or who did you liaise

12 between on behalf of the Serbs?

13 A. Well, the institutions and -- the institution and group for

14 co-operation with the international community was specific. It had not

15 existed within the military before that. So physically we were located

16 on the premises of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; however, our work went

17 beyond -- the significance of our work was beyond the

18 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps so that we maintained communication between the

19 Main Staff of the VRS and international organisations and also partly

20 with the political leadership and between the political leadership and

21 international institutions.

22 Q. Thank you. I believe that settles that. Now, could you tell us

23 when you were born and where?

24 A. I was born in Sarajevo on April 1st, 1957.

25 Q. Perhaps you could tell us in the briefest of terms about your

Page 32415

1 educational background.

2 A. I completed my primary education and then I went to the aviation

3 academy with the military, and then the aviation technical academy at

4 Rajlovac. Once I completed my programme there I became an officer and I

5 continued my education through specialised training. I went to a

6 language school. I went to an intelligence training college and I took

7 an exam to become a major, which in military terms is the equivalent of

8 an MA. That would be it as far as my education is concerned.

9 Q. Thank you. How exactly did you move up in terms of your career?

10 What positions did you hold?

11 A. When I first became an officer after completing the military

12 academy, I started serving in Rajlovac as a platoon commander with cadets

13 in the secondary education centre in Rajlovac. I remained in that

14 command position for some years and then I went to the intelligence

15 school. I continued to serve at the academy in Rajlovac as a teacher of

16 intelligence and security and foreign military forces. When the UN

17 mission for the former Yugoslavia was set up, I received orders from the

18 federal secretariat for All People's Defence assigning me as a member of

19 that group for co-operation with the UN headed by General Aksentijevic.

20 When the JNA left Bosnia and Herzegovina, I was reassigned to work in the

21 group for co-operation with international institutions of the VRS. When

22 the war was over I became a member of the 410th Intelligence Centre, and

23 after leaving that institution, I was with the security administration of

24 the General Staff of the VRS until I retired in 2003.

25 Q. Thank you. As for all of these appointments that you held after

Page 32416

1 Dayton, was there any verification or check that was conducted by the

2 international community?

3 A. No, I don't think I was vetted by the international community.

4 The positions that I was appointed to were not subject to any checks by

5 the international community.

6 Q. Thank you. So the war found you working in Sarajevo as a JNA

7 officer; is that what you said?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. When the JNA withdrew to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, what

10 were the avenues open to you at that point?

11 A. I had two or perhaps three options: A, I could relocate with my

12 colleagues from the Rajlovac centre to Belgrade to the academy there and

13 continue my career as a professor; B, I had the option of paying my debt

14 to the Serb people and everybody else in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or

15 rather, Republika Srpska and help defend the Serb people there - and this

16 is what I did; formally, there was also a third possibility which I never

17 even considered, and that was to desert from Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 Q. Thank you. Did you hold any command posts before the war during

19 your career?

20 A. That was only after the academy and before I went to the

21 intelligence school when I was platoon commander in the secondary school

22 training centre in Rajlovac.

23 Q. Thank you very much. Just to go back briefly to something

24 regarding your career, did you receive any awards, commendations, medals,

25 and the like?

Page 32417

1 A. Yes, I received a number of commendations. During the war I

2 received the mercy cross for humanitarian work in the war by your side.

3 Q. When you say "by your side," so you got this medal from

4 Republika Srpska?

5 A. Yes. When I said "by your side," incidentally it was you in

6 person as the then-president that actually signed the decision to award

7 this medal to me.

8 Q. Thank you. Does that mean that you did humanitarian work for the

9 sake of the Serbs alone?

10 A. No, I never saw humanitarian work as something that only pertains

11 to one ethnic group. When it came to humanitarian matters, I always took

12 a broad view.

13 Q. Thank you very much.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I realise the

15 time. Should I go on with my questions or should we perhaps take the

16 break now? I have about 20 documents to go through live.

17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll take a break for half an hour and

18 resume at 11.00.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.27 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, could you please tell us which of the parties

24 involved in the war?

25 A. I have a problem. I'm receiving French interpretation in my

Page 32418

1 headset.

2 Q. Yes, me too. Channel number 6 is the one that you're looking

3 for.

4 JUDGE KWON: Are you hearing me in your language?

5 THE WITNESS: I'm hearing you, but I had translation in French.

6 JUDGE KWON: Probably there's some misconnection. I take it it

7 has been sorted out now?

8 THE WITNESS: I hope so.

9 JUDGE KWON: Do you hear me in Serbian now?

10 THE WITNESS: I -- yes, I can -- yes, yes, that's okay.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Let me see.

13 Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Can you please tell us, Lieutenant-Colonel, which of the warring

16 parties at the beginning of the war and until the month of June was

17 controlling the Sarajevo airport?

18 A. The Serb side had the airport under its control until the

19 Sarajevo airport was handed over to the UN.

20 Q. Thank you. Why exactly was the airport handed over to the UN, if

21 you know?

22 A. When the agreement was signed on the hand-over of the airport by

23 the UN, the airport was handed over to be used for humanitarian purposes

24 only, so for shipment of humanitarian aid in order to avoid a

25 humanitarian disaster and so that the UN soldiers there received all of

Page 32419

1 the necessary supplies.

2 Q. Thank you. What about the confrontation lines, how far were they

3 from the airport itself?

4 A. You might say that the confrontation lines comprised the airport

5 area. They were right next to the airport's perimeter, on both sides as

6 a matter of fact.

7 Q. Thank you. Based on your military knowledge, what were the most

8 dangerous weapons in terms of constituting a threat to airplanes landing

9 and taking off?

10 A. When you talk about airplanes, first and foremost you talk about

11 anti-aircraft weapons because those are the weapons most frequently used

12 to target any incoming airplanes or, indeed, those leaving the airport.

13 Q. Did the Serb side actually have such weapons available to them at

14 the time?

15 A. Yes, the Serb side did have anti-aircraft weapons; nonetheless,

16 this was one of the provisions that was part of the airport agreement,

17 which implied that the airport should be safe. And that meant that the

18 anti-aircraft weapons had to be moved out of that area and out of range

19 so that they couldn't target any aircraft landing or taking off.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06510. Could that document

21 please be brought up in e-court.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. It's a letter that I wrote to the UN. Were you shown this

24 document at any point during proofing and are you familiar with the

25 subject matter?

Page 32420

1 A. The Defence team showed me this document so I am familiar with

2 it. As for the subject matter, yes, I'm absolutely familiar with that.

3 I was personally involved in co-ordinating these activities in terms of

4 pulling out the anti-aircraft weapons, in keeping with this document.

5 Q. Thank you very much.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please go to the next page

7 of the document.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. What was the principal concern of the Serb side in terms of a

10 plane potentially being shot down?

11 A. The principal concern was to prove where the firing came from,

12 where the plane was targeted from. The main thing was to avoid the Serb

13 side being accused of shooting a plane down. That is why everybody was

14 fully ready to remain in keeping with the agreement in terms of pulling

15 out all the anti-aircraft weapons out of range so that no planes could be

16 targeted.

17 Q. Do you remember the incident involving an Italian airplane

18 referred to in this document? How far was this plane from our lines and

19 was an attempt made to pin this on us? Can you please look at A.2.:

20 [In English] "The following forces of the

21 Army of the Republika Srpska are stationed within the 45 kilometre radius

22 of the site where the Italian airplane was downed ..."

23 A. Yes, this shows where exactly the Serb forces were. I have no

24 accurate information regarding that incident, but there was intelligence

25 that was retrieved after the incident and the whole thing was analysed.

Page 32421

1 I think this was an Italian airplane that was shot down somewhere in the

2 Fojnica general area and I think it was targeted by the Croat forces if

3 memory serves.

4 Q. Were the Serbs able at all to shoot down a plane flying over

5 Fojnica?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please. Can you please

9 go to A.3.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Any reference to you there in relation to organising the

12 humanitarian nature of the UNHCR flights?

13 A. Yes, my name is mentioned there, and I can explain that when the

14 airport was over and fully operational, then there were specially

15 appointed liaison officers whose duty it was to monitor those

16 humanitarian flights at Sarajevo airport and elsewhere, abroad, at

17 Frankfurt, for example. So I ceased to be involved in this, but what

18 we're looking at in this specific case, yes, I was involved and that was

19 my role at the time.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Once the Serb side handed the airport over

21 to UNPROFOR, was the airport used for humanitarian purposes alone or was

22 it also put to other kinds of use?

23 A. I assert that the airport was also used for other purposes which

24 we believed to constitute a misuse of the terms. I'm talking about the

25 runway. I'm talking about the area above the runway as well as the area

Page 32422

1 under the runway. The UNPROFOR people knew about the fact that a tunnel

2 was built underneath the airport which the Muslim forces used to regroup.

3 The airport was also used for the transport of Muslim delegations of

4 varying levels for the purposes of their travel across the world and they

5 were lobbying for the Muslim cause. It was also used to bring in persons

6 with assignments that were at the very least suspicious. Neither were

7 they members of diplomatic missions nor indeed were they members of the

8 UN. And the greatest instance of misuse of the airport, the airport was

9 used for the purpose of arming the Muslims. There were several examples

10 of that. The most dramatic example being when ammunition was found

11 hidden in a double-bottomed container that was used to ship humanitarian

12 aid into Butmir airport.

13 Q. I'm waiting for the interpretation and you can also follow on

14 your own screen to make sure interpretation is completed.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

16 document.

17 JUDGE KWON: No objection, Ms. Edgerton?

18 MS. EDGERTON: No.

19 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

20 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2775, Your Honours.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. On the whole, what was the position of the Serb side regarding

23 shipment of humanitarian aid for civilians, not just by air but on the

24 whole? What position did the Serb side take to that issue, civilian

25 supplies for Sarajevo?

Page 32423

1 A. The Serbian approach, generally speaking, was a positive as far

2 as any form of humanitarian aid was concerned, food, clothes, medical

3 supplies, evacuations. But it was always important to underline and

4 point out the fact that Sarajevo was not just the limited extent of

5 Sarajevo under Muslim control but that Sarajevo was a broader area. And

6 the issue of humanitarian aid was something that should apply equally to

7 all, regardless of ethnicity. People were starving everywhere. In

8 Grbavica which was Serb controlled at the time, in Vogosca which was Serb

9 controlled at the time, just the same as people in Muslim-controlled

10 Sarajevo were starving and were short of food.

11 Q. Thank you very much. Was a procedure agreed with UNPROFOR and

12 other international organisations in terms of allowing convoys to pass

13 through and endowing our side with the right to check the convoys coming

14 in?

15 A. There was a war on, so it was necessary to define certain norms

16 and frameworks within which humanitarian convoys were free to move in and

17 out. This had nothing to do with restricting UNPROFOR's freedom of

18 movement because UNPROFOR was there merely to act as an escort for

19 humanitarian convoys. What was the procedure about? Primarily a convoy

20 had to be announced in a timely manner so that we knew exactly when it

21 would be arriving and what route into Sarajevo it would be taking as well

22 as any equipment that they were bringing in. There were two reasons for

23 that, the first being the timely issuance of permits so that the relevant

24 units could receive their orders --

25 Q. Can I please ask you to just slow down a little.

Page 32424

1 A. The first reason being orders could be issued in a timely manner

2 to specific units through whose area of responsibility a convoy would be

3 passing, in order to make sure that all of the convoy personnel were

4 fully safe. Secondly, everything being brought in would be checked in

5 order to make sure there was nothing untoward happening, such as military

6 equipment being brought in, which was not allowed.

7 Q. Were there instances of such abuses?

8 A. Yes, several of them.

9 Q. Now, what -- how did it work? If a convoy appeared at a

10 check-point without previous announcement and without any declaration on

11 what they were carrying, what would happen?

12 A. Well, in those cases the convoy would not be allowed to pass

13 through our zone and they would be turned back until they submitted the

14 requests that were required and followed the rules and procedure that

15 everyone was aware of.

16 Q. Thank you. Now, what would happen if a convoy received a permit

17 for Karakaj and they would show up at Sefik?

18 A. They wouldn't be allowed to pass. It would have to follow the

19 requested route and the route that was already approved. And again I

20 have to say this was primarily because the objective was to ensure the

21 safety of the convoy along the axis where it was moving. And we have to

22 bear in mind that the convoys were moving through war zones. It was war

23 time after all.

24 Q. Thank you. Please take a look at 1D01472, could we pull it up in

25 e-court. 1D01472. Would you please take a look at paragraph 3 which

Page 32425

1 speaks of lack of understanding. Please read it out to yourself and tell

2 us what it deals with.

3 A. Here we see in paragraph 3 that there are several elements. The

4 first element deals with Blazuj and a factory in Blazuj and the Orao

5 aircraft factory where UNPROFOR members tried to enter those facilities.

6 I have to clarify something here. These were by no means isolated

7 incidents. It was clear that some elements of the UN had their own

8 intelligence missions and tasks, including establishing what the

9 situation was at certain facilities and locations. That is quite normal

10 and it was quite understandable; however, it couldn't be handled the way

11 anyone wished them to be handled. There had to be approval and

12 agreement, either with the civilian authorities from the area where that

13 particular facility was located or in agreement with military

14 authorities.

15 Q. Just one question in that respect. The mandate, the UN mandate,

16 that we agreed to, did that include intelligence work without our

17 approval and without our knowledge?

18 A. The UN mandate, as far as I know, was to provide -- to ensure

19 humanitarian missions and oversee them on the ground, and all activities

20 were supposed to be completely transparent and transparency implies

21 exclusion of any intelligence activities.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, the remainder of paragraph 3, just tell us

23 briefly what it deals with.

24 A. The remainder of the paragraph.

25 Q. We have to bear with the interpreters, so please, you should also

Page 32426

1 interfere when I am not on time.

2 A. Now, the problems, here it deals with the regular problems that

3 occurred on a regular basis, the movement of UNPROFOR, for which we

4 always tried to ensure the safest routes. And in this particular

5 instance I -- and this was outside of my authorities as the

6 Chief of Staff admonished me, but I took it upon myself to allow this

7 convoy to pass through the zone where the command was.

8 Q. Thank you. Could we have the next page, please. Now I made the

9 error.

10 A. On this page we can see that incident that I mentioned a few

11 moments ago. I'm aware of this instance where a French humanitarian

12 convoy was stopped, and these problems were especially present and

13 difficult with convoys arriving from France. The reason being that

14 Sarajevo had the greatest number of French forces. There was the

15 French Battalion 2 at the airport, 4 at Skenderija, 5 at Hadzici, I

16 believe, so that the French took advantage of the presence of the French

17 troops there and they felt that they didn't really have to comply with

18 the procedures and that they were sufficient, that they could secure

19 their own contingents.

20 Q. Thank you. Could we have the next page in the Serbian version.

21 The English version is fine. What does the first paragraph deal with

22 here? It says there was a misunderstanding, something to do with some

23 containers, and did they have the right to interfere with the deployment

24 of our forces?

25 A. Well, this problem with a container at the entrance to

Page 32427

1 Kasindolska Street, that's also something that I'm also quite familiar

2 with. Kasindolska Street had the following position: The entrance to

3 the street was open to infantry fire from the Muslim side, from Dobrinja.

4 And for this reason, there was a container placed at that spot that was

5 supposed to serve as - if I may put it that way - an anti-sniper barrier.

6 Now, I'm not quite aware what the reason was for UNPROFOR to feel that

7 this container shouldn't be there because it didn't interfere with the

8 traffic at all and there were numerous such containers in various places

9 of Sarajevo that were under Muslim control and there were even instances

10 where the UNPROFOR themselves placed containers for those purposes. So

11 it was our impression that simply they were trying to provoke our

12 reaction.

13 Q. Thank you. Could you please read the third paragraph, "It is

14 clear that..." Could you please read it out loud.

15 A. "It is clear that the UN are mounting an offensive against us,

16 and the considerable amount of arrogance they are displaying is the kind

17 usually meted out to those who have lost a war."

18 It is difficult for me to make any comment here because this kind

19 of behaviour or conduct by a large number of members of the UN was

20 predominant throughout the war and this was the -- their conduct towards

21 the Serb side.

22 Q. Thank you. And what about their attitude towards the Muslim

23 side?

24 A. Well, I've never heard that any Muslims complained of that, and

25 there was very frequently the impression that they were just an extended

Page 32428

1 arm of the Muslims.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document

3 into evidence, please.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2776, Your Honours.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. What did you know as a liaison officer about the meetings between

8 the warring parties and UNPROFOR and what did you know about the topics

9 that was discussed there?

10 A. One of the main methods in trying to establish any kind of

11 cease-fire was to hold these meetings of warring parties where UNPROFOR

12 would mediate, and these meetings would be held at all levels, at

13 General Staff levels, corps commands and even at lower levels. Our

14 general position on this was, in view of the fact that our position from

15 the outside was one of peace, so our position was that we should always

16 accept these meetings and be as constructive as possible in seeking

17 arrangements to stop the conflict.

18 Now, in addition to these arrangements that were supposed to lead

19 to an end to conflicts, there were other -- there was a series of

20 meetings at lower levels where daily problems were discussed, such as

21 humanitarian aid, repairs to infrastructure, such as water-supply,

22 electric supply, medical evacuations, exchanges of prisoners of war, and

23 generally the issue of the freedom of movement.

24 Q. Thank you. Did you attend such meetings and did you have any

25 other authority in addition to your liaison function?

Page 32429

1 A. For the most part, I did attend those meetings, or rather, it

2 would be either me or someone else from the group for co-operation with

3 the UN. Our job was most usually the help as liaison officers, so

4 providing help as liaison officers, perhaps providing interpretation,

5 sending reports or submitting reports. And in some rare instances I was

6 empowered by the commander to sign off on an agreement that had been

7 reached.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D06513 in

10 e-court, 1D06513. I'm afraid we don't have a translation of this

11 document.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. And I will ask you to clarify some of the circumstances there.

14 Can you tell us what this document is about and who is submitting this

15 report, because we see that the Serb delegation is referred to as the

16 Chetnik delegation?

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Before the witness answers, Your Honour, I note

19 that there's no translation of this document, so unless one is expected

20 or undertaken to be provided before the cross-examination begins, I don't

21 know how we can effectively use this document at all.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, there were occasions where

23 both sides submitted documents from time to time that hadn't been

24 translated yet, because for us it's also a problem when a document is

25 presented in the English version without a translation. And that is the

Page 32430

1 reason, in fact, why we tried to interpret live these untranslated

2 documents.

3 JUDGE KWON: I don't remember there are many instances the

4 Prosecution used untranslated translation, and I will not comment on your

5 submission that -- regarding the English document.

6 But, Ms. Edgerton, if the Defence is going to use an untranslated

7 document and if the Defence is to introduce the crux of the document,

8 would there be any problem for your preparation? There was such

9 instances before, weren't there?

10 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, Your Honour. And normally I wouldn't rise on

11 something like that if the document was, frankly, rather small. But by

12 my count this document is in excess of ten pages. So if it's something

13 where I thought we could reasonably deal with the crux of the document,

14 by all means, you're absolutely correct. But I think this one which,

15 just by my understanding of some of the citations looks like a transcript

16 of a meeting, is really a bit too big to be able to do that effectively.

17 JUDGE KWON: Let's see whether we can admit this document after

18 his examination on this issue is over.

19 MS. EDGERTON: Of course. Thank you.

20 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see where the source of

22 misunderstanding is because my words were misunderstood. On page 47 I

23 said that the reason why we are offering untranslated documents live,

24 although that is not in keeping with the decision of the Trial Chamber,

25 is that they have not been translated. We don't have them. And I don't

Page 32431

1 know what's happening today, but the interpretation is a disaster. It

2 would be simpler to say that it's the position of the Trial Chamber that

3 whatever has not the been translated has to be led live with the witness.

4 That is my point.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Do you remember, Lieutenant-Colonel, this meeting of the

7 subcommittee held at the airport on the 31st of March, 1993?

8 A. I do remember it. There were various subcommittees established

9 to deal with various issues and this is one such subcommittee that was

10 supposed to deal with the issue of ensuring freedom of movement into and

11 out of Sarajevo. This specific document that I see before me is

12 obviously a document produced by the Muslim side, seeing that the

13 delegation that I was a member of was referred to as the delegation of

14 Chetniks, which was not UNPROFOR terminology.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please go to page 5 of this

17 document.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19 Q. Can you confirm the remark made by Ms. Edgerton, this is some

20 sort of a transcript or minutes of that meeting? You see that there are

21 quotes there.

22 A. Yes, this is a textbook transcript produced by the Muslim side.

23 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us about this bit from Valentin and then

24 down from there? What is that about? What routes are mentioned and who

25 are these routes for? What is the position of the Serbs? What is that

Page 32432

1 of the Croats? And what is that of the Muslims?

2 A. The position of the Serb side in terms of freedom of movement was

3 that freedom of movement had to be ensured unconditionally and had to

4 apply to all. Any restrictions on the freedom of movement in any shape

5 or form would have led to families being torn asunder and to violations

6 of the fundamental human rights of individual persons.

7 Q. Can you tell us what is the position taken by Mr. Pelko, a

8 Muslim?

9 A. Pelko at the time was the Muslim brigade commander. He took the

10 view that men of military age - that means aged between 16 and 60 -

11 should not be subject to this agreement. A state of war had been

12 declared throughout the Muslim-controlled territory and they refused to

13 allow freedom of movement for all. What this implied was that Serbs

14 would not be allowed to enjoy freedom of movement and would therefore be

15 forced to stay as hostages in Sarajevo because they were not assigned to

16 military units as soldiers, so their only purpose would have been to

17 remain there as hostages.

18 Q. Thank you very much. And what was the position taken by the Serb

19 side or, as the document says, the Chetniks, headed by you at this

20 meeting?

21 A. Our position was freedom of movement for all unconditionally, a

22 fundamental human right to choose a place of residence.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please go to the bottom of

24 the page.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32433

1 Q. There is some sort of a compromise there. What was the position

2 taken by the UN, by Valentin?

3 A. Colonel Valentin was obviously not in a mood to clash with the

4 Muslims there; therefore, he threw out our proposal on freedom of

5 movement for all. Our side then attempted to come up with a compromise.

6 There were those groups that the Muslims wished to deny freedom of

7 movement and we wanted to have this allowed for them based on the

8 principle of reciprocity.

9 Q. Can you please read out what you said at the bottom of the page.

10 A. A compromise. Stick with unrestricted freedom of movement but

11 without having a regrouping of military forces, that is, that for men

12 aged between 16 and 60 and for them to enjoy freedom of movement based on

13 the principle of reciprocity.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Please focus on the part about Valentin and Srebrenica. And then

18 what is Pelko saying, what are you saying, and what is Valentin saying

19 there?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we pull up the page, please.

21 Thank you. Thank you. That's fine.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. So after where it says "in Srebrenica" and then on from there.

24 A. It is quite obvious what the position is taken by the UN and the

25 Serb side is the same thing. No separation of families must be allowed,

Page 32434

1 despite which the Muslim side here invokes the fact that they have a

2 state of war in their territory and that men are military conscripts and

3 they refuse to have unconditional freedom of movement as part of this

4 agreement.

5 Q. Can you please read what Pelko says, where he says "we are

6 sticking with," and on from there. Take it easy, please. One quote at a

7 time.

8 A. "Pelko: We are sticking with women, children aged up to 16, and

9 men aged up to 60 under international law. This is a war and military

10 conscripts must stay or men liable to military duty must stay.

11 "Valentin: This is not an international law. This is a rule

12 that we are imposing ourselves. Here are the conclusions based on my

13 proposal because these are humanitarian corridors.

14 "Indjic: We accept the compromise to keep the families together

15 and for the men to be released."

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 8 of this

18 document, please.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Can you please read your own quote, your own contribution, where

21 you say "I cannot understand."

22 A. My quote:

23 "I cannot understand why we can't go for unconditional freedom

24 because we are offering to others the same thing that we are claiming for

25 ourselves."

Page 32435

1 Q. Thank you. Can we please just look at another page, page 3 -- or

2 actually, just a minute, please. We have ERN 084. Page 3 it is.

3 Can you please tell us what this is about. They're talking about

4 collection centres.

5 "Valentin: What would be a good places for a collection centre?"

6 And then what are the Chetniks saying and then all the way up to

7 Pelko's contribution.

8 A. This is about technical issues, where to organise collection

9 points for people and what routes would be used in order to possibly

10 implement this agreement concerning freedom of movement.

11 Q. Thank you very much. And then about Dobrinja, Valentin is asking

12 about Dobrinja. What is Pelko saying in response to that?

13 A. He says that it would not be a good idea to assemble anywhere

14 that close to the front line. In my opinion, this is a paradox. You had

15 front lines all over Sarajevo so there was no place that was safe from a

16 front line.

17 Q. Thank you very much. Unlike this assembling that was announced,

18 how did you view the football matches that were happening close to the

19 collection point in Dobrinja?

20 A. Obviously each of the positions were made to fit respective

21 needs. Whenever there was no need for political or media manipulation,

22 whenever there was no need to avoid a certain agreement, then Dobrinja

23 was no good. But when one had to organise a football match then the

24 exact location of a front line did not matter at all and it proved to be,

25 after all, a perfectly appropriate location.

Page 32436

1 Q. Thank you very much.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please tender this for

3 identification until a complete translation of this document is received.

4 Thank you.

5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton.

6 MS. EDGERTON: I have no problem with it being marked for

7 identification pending translation and further submissions.

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll do that.

9 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2777, Your Honours.

10 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

12 MR. TIEGER: Just to note I think Ms. Edgerton made that note

13 indicating further submissions, but in the past sometimes we've admitted

14 documents MFI simply pending the translation because of a full

15 understanding of what the document was about. In this case and I believe

16 in some of the future matters, the MFI also includes the possibility of

17 examining the document and then determining whether or not further

18 submissions are necessary regarding admissibility.

19 JUDGE KWON: Your point is taken.

20 Before we take away this document, it's not related to any

21 subject matter, but, Mr. Indjic, how shall we spell your last name in

22 Latin? Is it -- I saw here I-n-d-z-i-c, but I was also looking at your

23 statement, which writes -- which reads as I-n-d-j-i-c.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the spelling in this

25 document is inaccurate. It's the other spelling that you mentioned that

Page 32437

1 is actually correct.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D06522

4 brought up in e-court. To see what UNPROFOR had to say about this same

5 meeting.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. This is the same meeting of the joint military working group on

8 the 31st of March, 1993?

9 A. Yes, it is the same meeting.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Can you please read item 2 and tell us whether you believe

13 UNPROFOR understood your position properly?

14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Where it says "Serbs" --

16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, did you say this is an UNPROFOR

17 document? And we have no English version. Is it the case, Mr. Karadzic?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We couldn't track one down, but yes

19 it's an UNPROFOR report. There must be an original, but I was unable to

20 find it.

21 JUDGE KWON: So since you are not giving evidence yourself, I

22 would like to hear the confirmation from the witness. In the future you

23 should ask the question to the witness to confirm your submission. Do

24 you confirm that, Mr. Indjic, this is an UNPROFOR document?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, it's obvious if you look at

Page 32438

1 the header. It's an UNPROFOR document. After each meeting all of the

2 parties involved would receive a translation of the minutes by UNPROFOR

3 to keep for their own files.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic. Just a second.

6 Yes, Mr. Indjic.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just wanted to answer because I

8 heard Mr. Karadzic's question so I might as well answer it. In item 2

9 UNPROFOR reflects the position taken by the Serbs. It reads:

10 "The Serbs will not have any restrictions. Everyone is to be

11 allowed to move about freely."

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Thank you very much. Was UNPROFOR's interpretation of the

14 position you took at that meeting correct?

15 A. Yes, it was.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this document, or

17 rather, have it marked for identification, same as the previous one?

18 Thank you.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2778, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE KWON: Do you not have English version in your possession,

22 Ms. Edgerton?

23 MS. EDGERTON: If I'd been aware of one, I would have offered it,

24 Your Honours.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

Page 32439

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, during your liaison activity, did you receive

3 any information about the fighting in 1993, specifically around

4 Srebrenica?

5 A. What I can remember is that I was, I believe, accompanying

6 General Mladic at a meeting with, I believe -- perhaps it was

7 General Milovanovic. It was one of these two, someone from the

8 Main Staff. At this meeting the fighting around Srebrenica at that time

9 was referenced, yes.

10 Q. Were there any meetings that you attended and who were the

11 negotiating parties involved?

12 A. I think it was this mixed or joint military group and there was

13 an attempt being made to have a cease-fire agreed for all of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15 Q. Can you tell us what positions were taken by the opposing

16 parties, or rather, the warring parties on the one hand and the mediators

17 on the other, specifically about Srebrenica and about the cease-fire?

18 A. The position taken by the Serb side, generally speaking, was that

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina in its entirety was affected by war and that it wasn't

20 appropriate to talk about small-scale cease-fires that only applied to

21 certain limited areas. Given the overall situation, war raging across

22 the country. The Muslim side already had, in manner of speaking,

23 Srebrenica in its sights back then and tried to get maximum media

24 exposure for what was going on there so the media were trying to show

25 that everything that was going on there at the time had been planned a

Page 32440

1 long time ahead. As a matter of principle the Croats would never put

2 forward anything at all at any of the meetings. They would always agree

3 with the chairperson but every time a meeting was over, they just

4 continue doing their own thing, promoting their own agenda.

5 Q. Thank you very much. Can you explain to the Trial Chamber why

6 the Serb side deemed it unacceptable or why was it more acceptable to

7 have a cessation of hostilities or a cease-fire throughout all of Bosnia

8 and why did the Muslims, on the other hand, deem it more appropriate or

9 more acceptable to have limited extent of cease-fires in particular areas

10 that they found convenient?

11 A. We're talking about 1993. No state of war had been declared in

12 Republika Srpska. Why? By doing that, we clearly demonstrated our own

13 position. We did not want a war. We did not want cease-fires. We

14 wanted for the war to end and for all hostilities to cease throughout the

15 territory. That would have put an end to the war. As for limited

16 extent, small-scale cease-fires, in our view that would not have

17 contributed to ending the war but rather to drawing the whole thing out

18 and prolonging the situation and that would also help some forces to

19 consolidate.

20 Q. Who exactly?

21 A. Well, those requesting such cease-fires. Specifically we're

22 talking about Srebrenica, in that case we're referring to the Muslim

23 forces there.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have a 1D20177 in

Page 32441

1 e-court, please. There is a translation available.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, please have a look. Were you shown this

4 document during proofing? And can you briefly tell us what the document

5 is about?

6 A. Yes, I was shown this document during proofing. I remember the

7 meeting. It's one of the meetings, high-level meetings, the only such

8 high-level meeting that was held in the presence of delegations from

9 Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The principal purpose of

10 this meeting was to try and find a way to put an end to hostilities

11 throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 2, please.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I want to know about an assertion made there by

16 General Milovanovic. It's line 2, General Milovanovic is quoted as

17 saying:

18 "General Milovanovic told him that the cease-fire is already

19 costing us over 50.000 [as interpreted] dead and that there should be a

20 cease-fire throughout the theatre of war. How come there is a cease-fire

21 on and still so many lives are lost?

22 A. The corps conducted some analysis showing that the greatest

23 losses were suffered -- occurred during cease-fires because people took

24 some agreements at face value, and as a result they would relax. And

25 then the other side violated the cease-fire as a result of which we

Page 32442

1 suffered casualties.

2 Q. What exactly did you know about these cease-fire violations?

3 A. That depended on the level at which cease-fires were agreed and

4 whether there were groups organised to monitor the implementation of

5 cease-fires. So any insight I had into these violations depended on

6 these circumstances. From personal experience I can say that I do not

7 remember a single agreed cease-fire that was fully complied with

8 throughout the agreed time-period.

9 Q. Thank you. And in from -- notice and protests with respect to

10 violations of cease-fires, would they be sent through you as the liaison

11 officer? Or were they sent directly by fax to the addressees?

12 A. Well, here I have to make a distinction. There were different

13 levels and there were two periods. At first, in the first period, the

14 only office of the liaison officer that was active was in Lukavica and

15 most of the correspondence went through that office in Lukavica.

16 However, very soon after that - and I believe that this was in late

17 1993 - UNPROFOR established their own liaison office at Pale so that the

18 communications went from that office, the communications that related to

19 the Main Staff. In other words, they didn't go through the office at

20 Lukavica.

21 Q. Thank you. The violations of cease-fires in Sarajevo, was that

22 something that you had more insight into if they didn't go toward the

23 Main Staff, but rather brigades and corps?

24 A. Well, for the most part yes because it was our duty to take

25 excerpts from daily combat reports that related to cease-fires. We were

Page 32443

1 supposed to reformulate them and inform the UNPROFOR command thereof.

2 Q. What was the response of the UNPROFOR command when we lodged our

3 protests?

4 A. We seldom had any response.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'd like to tender this document,

6 please.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, just related to that document, before

8 we go too far in the transcript, there's a citation at page 59, lines 8

9 and 9, and Dr. Karadzic says at line 2 General Milovanovic is quoted as

10 saying something to the effect of the cease-fire had already cost us over

11 50.000 dead. And I don't see that anywhere in the document or my

12 translation of the document. So I wonder if there should be a transcript

13 correction or what Dr. Karadzic was actually quoting. It could be my

14 oversight, but just to make the inquiry.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 2, toward the top of the

16 page in Serbian I said -- and I read out. Here, we can see it here and I

17 will read it out now:

18 "General Milovanovic told us that so far we've had over 50 dead

19 as a result of this cease-fire ..."

20 And if the transcript does not reflect that, the document does.

21 That's paragraph 3 in the English version.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, but the transcript said "50.000."

23 Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

24 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

25 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit this.

Page 32444

1 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2779, Your Honours.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, can you tell us were there any attempts to

4 demilitarise Sarajevo and what were the positions of the warring parties,

5 especially the Serbian and the Muslim sides on demilitarisation of

6 Sarajevo?

7 A. Well, our general position was that a demilitarisation of

8 Sarajevo would be a great contribution to putting an end to the war in

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially that it would -- that it would

10 provide for a far smaller number of casualties. Now, the

11 demilitarisation of Sarajevo was something that was always mentioned by

12 the Serb side and one of the specific examples, such examples, was the

13 meeting at the Sarajevo airport following a resolution by the UN that --

14 whereby the protected areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde were

15 established, which lasted about 48 hours, the meeting, and at this

16 meeting General Mladic pleaded that Sarajevo be included in that

17 agreement so that the war could be stopped. However, these proposals

18 were never accepted by the Muslim side because it was clear that a

19 possible demilitarisation of Sarajevo would mean an end to the war and

20 that Sarajevo as the martyr town was very important for the Muslims in

21 this war. And whoever it was who decided when the war -- who could

22 decide when the war would end did not allow this issue to be discussed.

23 To me it would have been far more useful to demilitarise Sarajevo rather

24 than Srebrenica.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 32445

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now pull up 1D6520 in

2 e-court. Thank you.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Can you recall this meeting, Lieutenant-Colonel, and could you

5 tell us who attended the meeting on behalf of the VRS? You can see that

6 under "participants."

7 A. I see that this was a meeting of the joint military group. I

8 already explained that this was at the General Staff level and we can see

9 that on the Serb side it was attended by General Gvero, Colonel Tolimir

10 at the time, and myself.

11 Q. What about the Muslim and Croatian sides?

12 A. It was Colonel Divjak on behalf of the Muslims and Mr. Muslimovic

13 and the commander of the 4th Military Group on behalf of the Croatians.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have the next page,

16 please.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Please just take a look at this. We don't have to read this out.

19 Your English is good enough. Can you just tell us what the first and

20 second paragraphs deal with.

21 A. [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Indjic, I'm not sure if we are receiving the

23 translation. Could you kindly repeat your answer.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I've said, we can see from this

25 document that the parties had an interest to declare Sarajevo a safe

Page 32446

1 area. I'm not going to go through the whole document, but I do know what

2 the basic distinction in the approaches of the various parties was. The

3 Muslim party insisted on pulling out artillery outside Sarajevo, whereas

4 they themselves were not prepared to demilitarise their own infantry in

5 Sarajevo. So these were two quite contradictory positions that could not

6 lead, that were not conducive to any kind of solution.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Thank you. Could you please read out the comment here on the

9 Serb interests, the comment by the UN, and is this a -- an accurate

10 reflection of what the Serb side advocated at that meeting? It's toward

11 the centre of the page.

12 A. Yes, I can see that comment and this is a fair assessment of both

13 parties, the positions of both parties.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

16 document, please.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, it will be received.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D2780, Your Honours.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, did you attend meetings or were you aware of

22 any meetings in the course of 1994 where the removal of heavy weapons was

23 discussed, the removal of heavy weapons from the town itself?

24 A. I did attend a number of such meetings.

25 Q. As far as you know, what was in effect the essence of these

Page 32447

1 agreements?

2 A. The essence of the agreement on the grouping of heavy weapons was

3 to provide the basic conditions for long-term cease-fire in the Sarajevo

4 region. An additional protocol to the agreement on the control of

5 weapons implied the cessation of all other combat activities in this

6 period.

7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the --

8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could we kindly ask that the witness move back

10 from the microphone a bit.

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Indjic, could you kindly move back from the

12 microphone a bit.

13 THE WITNESS: Okay.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] I would like to mention the

16 Prosecution document P2120 which is a document dealing with the agreement

17 on the grouping of heavy weaponry.

18 Q. As far as you know, was this grouping of heavy weapons ever

19 implemented as agreed? Were they grouped in these five areas that were

20 mentioned here? We can see that there were five of them mentioned, they

21 were Lukavica, Mokro, Blagovac, Blazuj and Radava?

22 A. Yes, the weapons, artillery weapons, were grouped in these

23 locations.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have Exhibit P1641 for

25 just a brief moment.

Page 32448

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. And I would like to ask you to explain a position there of the

3 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. Please take a look at paragraph 1 that deals

4 with -- actually, it's a proposal to extricate artillery and then there's

5 a proposal to the Main Staff. Could you please just read out the first

6 paragraph. Read it to yourself and then tell us what it deals with.

7 A. I quote:

8 "With the aim of issuing a decision and giving an approval for

9 the procedure of setting aside artillery according to the request of

10 UNPROFOR, we are sending you the proposal that we consider to be a

11 solution and which enables promptness in work. Upon the implementation

12 of this proposal, the SRK forces would not suffer any damages and would

13 not be left without equipment since we would use a diversionary tactic to

14 set aside the equipment that is out of order and for which we do not have

15 sufficient quantities of ammunition."

16 Q. Now, please tell us, what was it that prompted the author of this

17 proposal, General Milosevic, to come up with this kind of proposal. What

18 was the reason for this caution on his part?

19 A. Well, we can see that this is a document from February 1994, so

20 we've already had two years of war behind us. There were numerous

21 violations of various agreements which led to an atmosphere of

22 suspiciousness towards the other party. Now, this proposal, in fact,

23 seeks to avoid a fair implementation of the agreement. And the purpose

24 of that or the objective would be to avoid decreasing the

25 combat-readiness of the VRS in case it was required.

Page 32449

1 Q. Thank you. What date do we see on this document and is it

2 correct that the agreement had been reached on the 16th, or rather,

3 18th of February, 1994? In other words, did this proposal come before

4 the agreement itself?

5 A. I cannot answer that with certainty. I have to see that

6 document -- I have to see the agreement and the date on it. I see that

7 the date on this document is 10 February, but I cannot really recall on

8 what day the agreement itself was reached.

9 Q. Thank you. While we still have this document here, can I ask you

10 was this proposal by General Milosevic accepted and implemented?

11 A. I know that it wasn't.

12 Q. Were his concerns founded and what -- on what were they founded?

13 What was the basis for them?

14 A. As I've --

15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Just a second.

16 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps the question could be rephrased because I

18 don't see how, based on this, the witness is able to read

19 General Milosevic's mind.

20 JUDGE KWON: Probably -- is the objection related to the last

21 part of the question what are the -- what was the basis for them?

22 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I can rephrase it.

24 JUDGE KWON: My understanding was Mr. Milosevic -- Mr. Karadzic

25 was asking the reason for the refusal. Probably you can rephrase your

Page 32450

1 question.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. First I asked whether and on

3 the basis of what, or rather, what the reasons were for the caution on

4 the part of General Milovanovic and whether life actually showed that

5 this was founded, that his concern was founded.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can answer. As I've

7 already said, these were conditions where there was general lack of

8 confidence. That's number one. Number two, the balance of forces in the

9 Sarajevo theatre was maintained because the VRS, or the

10 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, had an advantage in artillery, whereas the

11 Muslim side had an advantage in infantry. Now, placing the

12 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps under control would bring us into a weaker

13 position vis-à-vis the Muslim side. Now that this concern was justified,

14 we can see from the fact that the war continued long after this date.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Thank you. P2120 says the 16th of February and I believe that

17 the agreement was only signed on the 17th or the 18th.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

19 MS. EDGERTON: I don't know if we're moving on to another

20 document now, Your Honours, but I just feel I should put on the record

21 that this document which we're discussing, P1641, wasn't even a belatedly

22 notified document. That's a brand new document that has been brought up

23 in the examination-in-chief.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document has been admitted.

Page 32451

1 However, I failed to notify the Prosecution, but this has been admitted

2 as one of their documents.

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the fact that the document was

4 admitted earlier on has nothing to do with your obligation to notify the

5 Prosecution of your usage.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise, but believe me the

7 pace is frantic and it's difficult to keep up with everything, as you can

8 see. Is it sufficient for everyone else involved for me to say that

9 P2120 dated the 16th, so 16 days after this proposal, although the

10 agreement was signed on the 17th or possibly 18th of February. That is

11 for the purposes of orientation.

12 JUDGE KWON: We can move on. It's ...

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, are you familiar with --

15 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

16 JUDGE MORRISON: Sorry to interrupt, Dr. Karadzic. There's just

17 one thing I wanted to clarify with the witness.

18 Colonel, you said earlier that the Muslims had an advantage in

19 infantry. By that do you mean a numerical advantage or an advantage

20 by -- for other means, such as better weaponry? Better training? Or was

21 it a mixture of both?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Numerical advantage.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I press on?

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, were you familiar with the progress of the

Page 32452

1 negotiations and how all these things were being implemented regarding

2 the exclusion area, the total exclusion area within a radius of

3 20 kilometres surrounding the city for heavy weapons and artillery?

4 A. Yes. I was a member of the delegation doing the negotiations and

5 was personally in charge of co-ordinating activities regarding the

6 grouping of these weapons.

7 Q. Thank you. Were the Muslims too under an obligation to comply

8 with this 20-kilometre radius surrounding the city itself and therefore

9 to pull out all of their heavy weaponry from that area?

10 A. Yes, the other side was also under an obligation to comply with

11 that. Nonetheless, we must keep in mind Sarajevo's peculiar

12 configuration. The lie of the land there means that in the built-up

13 parts of Sarajevo they had no place that they could leave those weapons

14 and still remain in keeping with the parameter, the radius. So they had

15 to take those heavy weapons to Butmir and Hrasnica.

16 Q. You're talking about the grouping of weapons. And what about

17 weapons being removed from the 20-kilometre radius, was that also a

18 commitment that they undertook under the terms of that particular

19 agreement?

20 A. Yes, that also applied to the commitment they undertook to pull

21 out the heavy weapons. If we're talking about a 20-kilometre radius that

22 means there are no heavy weapons left in Sarajevo itself.

23 Q. Thank you. Was the Muslim side acting in keeping with this

24 agreement?

25 A. Everything that happened in the war later on and the use of

Page 32453

1 artillery at a later stage in the conflict by the Muslim side clearly

2 demonstrates that they failed to comply with the terms of that agreement.

3 Q. And what about any violations of that agreement that was reached

4 by the Muslims? How did the Serb side respond? What could they do by

5 way of response?

6 A. I do apologise, sir. I don't think I understand your question.

7 Q. Did you have occasion to see for yourself that the Muslims indeed

8 were violating this agreement and what did the Serbs do by way of

9 response?

10 A. We could raise objections with the UNPROFOR command because of

11 this non-compliance, but our own artillery weapons had been pulled out

12 and we couldn't reply in kind, so to speak. Nevertheless, we used what

13 was available to fire back.

14 Q. How did UNPROFOR respond to these violations and to your own

15 objections?

16 A. In my personal view, UNPROFOR had very few resources that they

17 could actually use and, indeed, very little authority to impose in order

18 to keep these violations from occurring. So their role basically boiled

19 down to conveying our information to the other side in terms of simple

20 feedback. That was the extent of it.

21 Q. And what was the position taken by the Main Staff of the VRS and

22 the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in terms of our relations with

23 UNPROFOR and in terms of incidents occurring between our soldiers and

24 UNPROFOR?

25 A. I have to say, we were not too happy to have UNPROFOR there. Our

Page 32454

1 impression from the outset was that they were siding with the other

2 party. Nevertheless, we undertook a professional commitment to build up

3 relations with UNPROFOR at all levels that were nothing but fair and

4 proper. Our foremost priority was to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR. If

5 there were any incidents that left UNPROFOR soldiers at risk, such

6 incidents would invariably be immediately investigated and any

7 perpetrators were punished.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06518, please --

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, if it is convenient, shall we take a

10 break now?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll take no more

12 than two minutes to deal with this document. Perhaps it might be a good

13 idea to do that before the break.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, very well.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06518, please.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Could you briefly tell us about this document, what is it about

18 and tell us in your own words. One look should be sufficient for you to

19 see what it is about.

20 A. This is a daily combat report. When there are combat operations

21 going on there would be several such reports submitted each day. We see

22 that this is exactly such a period. There were several such daily

23 reports because, you see, that reflected in the heading their situation

24 at 1700 hours. So one of the elements included in these reports was

25 about the situation on the ground and one of the mandatory features would

Page 32455

1 be a description of UNPROFOR activities. So based on this we see that

2 the military observers are still outside the technical repair centre in

3 Hadzici. So this is not what I was alluding to at the beginning of my

4 evidence today. It's not -- what I mean when I was talking about the

5 intelligence activities pursued by certain UNPROFOR members, or indeed

6 their attempts to gain entry to certain facilities that had not been

7 previously agreed. And then if you go to paragraph 2 you see a

8 description of -- a communication between General Soubirou and myself.

9 Unfortunately I have to say that this was a highly unpleasant situation

10 because I was treated in an exceptionally unprofessional manner by a

11 French general who hated me because I had shown him up for what he was in

12 terms of his role in the tunnel being dug underneath the Sarajevo

13 airport.

14 Q. Page 2, please, there was something exceptional that happened at

15 about 1725. That's paragraph 2.

16 A. This paragraph reflects -- is an incident that occurred involving

17 a soldier who for unknown reasons activated a grenade in the physical

18 proximity to UNPROFOR soldiers. So this person was now being brought in

19 and questioned. That is the soldier who put the lives of UNPROFOR

20 members at risk.

21 Q. Can you give us a brief assessment. You talked about how

22 General Soubirou treated you. How would you generally assess his

23 treatment of the Serb side and do you think his impartiality was

24 affected?

25 A. What I'm offering here is my private opinion based, however, on

Page 32456

1 my knowledge of his actions at the time. I think the things he did were

2 unprofessional. I think he was not neutral and had a definite bias in

3 favour of the Muslims.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please go to the last page

5 of this document.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. If you can just tell us what this is about where it says

8 cease-fire related duties.

9 A. I do have to give you a breakdown of this for -- on this for you

10 to understand. It's about engineering work. The greatest problem that

11 we faced during cease-fires was the fact that the Muslim forces used

12 these reprieves to take territory by means of engineering work. They

13 would simply gain ground on us by using their engineering people, and

14 because a cease-fire was on we couldn't prevent them from doing that by

15 opening fire. We kept raising this with UNPROFOR, pleading with them to

16 put a stop to that kind of activity; however, to no avail. UNPROFOR did

17 nothing about that.

18 Q. Thank you very much.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I would like to

20 tender this document for admission and then we must take our break.

21 Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE REGISTRAR: D2781, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, before we break, I have a brief

25 question for you which is about the accused's motion for safe conduct for

Page 32457

1 General Vasiljevic. The motion does not provide the witness's country of

2 residence. I wonder whether you can inform the Chamber of the country

3 where he currently resides in public session.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. It's Serbia.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

6 We'll have a break for half an hour -- no, I'm sorry, for

7 three-quarters of an hour and resume at 20 past 1.00.

8 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, did you know anything about sniping and the

14 charges for sniping of civilians? What was the position of the Serb side

15 in that respect?

16 A. For clarification I need to say - and that is also in the

17 statement that was admitted into evidence, in my statement - now, if all

18 of those cases of sniping deaths were taken as being true, then there

19 wouldn't have been any other casualties in Sarajevo other than casualties

20 of sniping. So first of all, as a professional, military professional, I

21 have to say that one can state that had there been sniping and had

22 someone been hit by a sniper rifle bullet, there would have to be a

23 medical examination in order to establish whether the bullet was actually

24 a sniper bullet or not because that kind of bullet is different in weight

25 to the regular bullet. Now, I mention this because all infantry fire was

Page 32458

1 referred to as sniping. Now, accepting -- even if we were to accept the

2 misunderstanding and the misconceptions about sniping, the Serb side was

3 always -- always expressed its readiness to come to any agreement that

4 would lead to a cease-fire, including an agreement on sniping that would

5 actually make sniping impossible by either side.

6 Q. Thank you. Were there any attempts to limit or confine sniping

7 activities outside of this general agreement on a cease-fire?

8 A. There were requests and calls for a separate agreement on

9 sniping, irrespective of a cessation of hostilities or cease-fire

10 agreements, a special agreement that would totally exclude sniping

11 because sniping in key locations was the greatest threat to the civilian

12 population on either side and this is the reason why many anti-sniping

13 obstacles were placed.

14 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the Serb side on such

15 agreements? Was it in favour or against and was it in favour of

16 compliance with such agreements?

17 A. Our position was clear. We were absolutely in favour of such

18 agreements, primarily because that would have worked in our favour,

19 because sniping was, and this is certain, primarily used by the Muslim

20 side and abused as well. When I say "abused," I can clarify the role of

21 the Seva [phoen] group and the killings of UNPROFOR members as well as

22 one's own people.

23 Q. When you say for the most part used by the Muslim side, could you

24 please explain that because there is a perception here that the Serbs

25 were on the hills and the Muslims were in a subordinate position. So how

Page 32459

1 did that work in terms of sniping activities?

2 A. Well, perhaps the easiest way to understand this is to provide

3 you some examples. I will give you the example of the crossing at the

4 Mis store on Grbavica 1 -- in Grbavica 1 settlement. I can say that at

5 least 20 civilians were hit at that crossing by a sniper that was from a

6 building on the Muslim side of the town. The second example is the

7 killing of civilians near the national museum, near the

8 Holiday Inn hotel, where a container for -- as a protection against

9 sniping was placed. This example was so obvious because the soldier had

10 been hit from -- laterally, in other words, from the side that was under

11 the control of the Muslims. But nevertheless, the Serb side was

12 automatically accused of this incident as well.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, this or other sniping activities against

14 UNPROFOR members, were they ever investigated and was it ever established

15 and clarified who the culprit was?

16 A. Well, unfortunately there is a dual situation, as it were, here.

17 After certain incidents thanks to our preparedness and readiness to allow

18 an inspection of our positions, for instance, in the situation where this

19 French soldier was killed, there were two UNPROFOR commissions that came

20 and I went to this infamous red building at Grbavica together with them

21 on two occasions, and we went through every room of the building and we

22 tried to establish where the firing could have come from in respect of or

23 in relation to the direction where the killing occurred. We looked at

24 all the holes from which the firing could have been, and it was

25 established by both these commissions that it couldn't -- that the fire

Page 32460

1 could not have come from the Serb side, but then three days later the

2 Serbs were accused of that action.

3 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the Serb side on

4 investigations to be conducted by UNPROFOR or the other party and also on

5 the request that the Serb part also participate in investigations that

6 were in the area under the control of the BiH?

7 A. Well, aware of the fact that we were declared the bad guys from

8 the very start, our position was that we should co-operate to the best of

9 our abilities and to allow investigations whenever there was a request

10 for an investigation. Now, as for major disasters, I can't call them

11 incidents, but the major disasters, such as Markale I and Markale II, the

12 Serb side was immediately ready to have Joint Commissions established in

13 order to determine what exactly had happened. And generally our requests

14 in that respect were refused, declined, because they claimed that they

15 could not guarantee for the safety of the members of that commission --

16 those commissions, but in fact the true reason was that they did not want

17 the truth to come out.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please pull up in

20 e-court 65 ter 09658. 65 ter 09658.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Do you see your name here and are you aware of this document?

23 A. Yes, I see this. This is a document relating to continued

24 implementation of the measures arising from the anti-sniping agreement

25 that had been signed, and it implied that there should be a liaison group

Page 32461

1 established that would include the so-called BH army, the VRS, and the

2 UNPROFOR, that could then respond to any sniping activities quickly. But

3 as far as I can recall, such a group was never established.

4 Q. Do you know anything, Lieutenant-Colonel, about why this never

5 materialised, which side was blocking it?

6 A. I believe that the Muslim side was not ready to send its own

7 representative.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

10 document, please.

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2782, Your Honours.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, do you remember our withdrawal from

15 Bjelasnica and Igman that had been captured previously and do you know

16 what the regime that was put in place at Igman and Bjelasnica was after

17 that?

18 A. Unfortunately, I remember that very well. I participated in the

19 negotiations at the Sarajevo airport personally and General Milovanovic

20 headed our delegation and signed the agreement on the demilitarisation of

21 the areas of Igman and Bjelasnica, Mounts Igman and Bjelasnica. Now,

22 this agreement was, in fact, provoked by the Muslim side because they

23 wanted to prevent their total collapse because the

24 Army of Republika Srpska was some 100 metres away from the point where

25 the link-up forces from Hadzici and Krupa would be. However, this

Page 32462

1 agreement was not implemented or complied with by the Muslims. In other

2 words, the area was not demilitarised. The French battalion that was at

3 the airport was responsible for the control of that area and they were

4 supposed to oversee the implementation of the agreement; however, that

5 had never happened. And thanks to the fact that there was no

6 demilitarisation, one of the greatest crimes by the Muslim side was

7 committed because they used this unprotected, undemilitarised area to

8 attack a position of the VRS where -- and they killed on that occasion 20

9 VRS soldiers, of whom four were unarmed nurses. All these people were

10 killed in their sleep.

11 Q. Thank you. When was the demilitarisation and when did this crime

12 occur?

13 A. Well, it's hard for me to recall this as I sit here, the exact

14 date, but it's quite certain that this crime occurred after the period

15 when the demilitarisation was supposed to happen.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D06521, please,

18 in e-court.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Do you know this document? Did you see it at the time or have

21 you seen it perhaps during proofing and what does it deal with?

22 A. I was shown this document during proofing and -- but I'm aware of

23 the events described there. The chronology here speaks of our

24 communications between the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the

25 French Battalion, Battalion 5, who were controlling the Igman and

Page 32463

1 Bjelasnica areas for the purpose of the final demilitarisation of that

2 area. It is clear from this document that members of the French

3 battalion -- battalions are being warned that Muslim forces are carrying

4 out combat operations from the zone that was supposed to be

5 demilitarised.

6 Q. Thank you. At 9.40 here we see that the liaison officer reports

7 that there is several casualties. And then can we see your name in the

8 first couple of paragraphs?

9 A. Well, yes. The entire communication, actually, is a reference to

10 my actions.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the next page, please.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can you please look at the penultimate paragraph, 1435, what does

15 it say there?

16 A. Well, it says here that the Chief of Staff confirms that there

17 are 20 bodies and that some of them were mutilated.

18 Q. Mutilated?

19 A. Yes, mutilated.

20 Q. Does that mean that UNPROFOR actually checked your reports and is

21 this what they found?

22 A. Well, yes. This is the Chief of Staff of the UNPROFOR command

23 and this is what they have -- after they have verified our reports. And

24 there is also, I believe, a video-clip entitled Catlaj [phoen], some 20

25 minutes long, which shows the bodies.

Page 32464

1 Q. Does it say further or could you tell us how these people were

2 killed and by what?

3 A. Well, most of them had their throats slit or were killed with

4 some other cold weapon such as an axe or so.

5 Q. Thank you. What did UNPROFOR do after they verified that this

6 crime had actually been committed?

7 A. Personally, I don't know that any measures were taken against the

8 Muslim side by UNPROFOR.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

11 document.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2783, Your Honours.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, can you tell us how our withdrawal and the

16 abuse of that withdrawal reflected on the situation among our people and

17 specifically within the ranks of our army?

18 A. There was a pronounced lack of trust and the war was dragging on.

19 For that reason, our withdrawal was seen by most people as a form of

20 defeat. People failed to accept this for what it was. Nonetheless,

21 there was certain agreements that were signed. It was no matter for any

22 of us to personally agree or disagree. These simply had to be complied

23 with.

24 Q. Thank you very much. What about the Muslim side, did they ever

25 all together leave the area which they were never supposed to take in the

Page 32465

1 first place once it was handed over to UNPROFOR?

2 A. According to my intelligence, the Bjelasnica and Igman areas were

3 never fully demilitarised by the end of the war, which means that the

4 agreement had not been complied with.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D060515. 1D06515.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Can you please tell the Chamber who produced this document and

8 what is this about?

9 A. The header shows that this is a BH army document, specifically

10 the 1st Corps command, minutes from a meeting held at the airport, a

11 meeting with the Serb side which they refer to here as the Chetniks, so

12 obviously it's not the Croats that we're looking at here. Attending the

13 meeting were Cedo Sladoje, chief of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, Chief of

14 Staff, and myself. It was about the implementation of the

15 demilitarisation agreement of the Igman and Bjelasnica areas. The

16 document clearly shows that the demilitarisation process was not fully

17 implemented by this time.

18 Q. We're talking about January 1995; right?

19 A. Yes, specifically the 5th of January, 1995.

20 Q. Thank you very much. May this please be admitted?

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2784, Your Honours.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Did you know about the position taken by the president of the

Page 32466

1 republic, that means me at the time, regarding the passage of

2 humanitarian convoys en route for Sarajevo?

3 A. The position taken was perfectly clear if you consider everything

4 that was going on across the area. I never personally heard anything

5 from you on that count, but it was perfectly clear. There was always the

6 demand that nobody should try and stand in the way of humanitarian aid

7 being shipped to civilians. One had to make sure it got there. So we

8 had a whole number of these organisations, Merhamet, Caritas,

9 Dobritor [phoen]. These were humanitarian organisations and they were

10 assisted in every way in their efforts to deliver aid to civilians.

11 There was even the need for co-ordination, obviously, so a special

12 headquarters was set up to help these civilians with regard to the

13 humanitarian situation.

14 Q. Thank you. Do you know who on my behalf or on behalf of the

15 Presidency dealt with the issue of humanitarian convoys and co-operation

16 with these humanitarian institutions ensuring safe passage for the

17 convoys?

18 A. I think if memory serves it was the late Nikola Koljevic.

19 Q. Thank you. Given the fact that convoys would sometimes pass

20 through several times unhampered, what was the role played by the

21 Main Staff of the VRS in terms of approving these convoys?

22 A. As I said earlier on, the role played by the Main Staff was quite

23 significant because there were procedures in place when approval was

24 granted for each of the convoys and when appropriate checks were made

25 because these convoys were passing through the theatre of war, where

Page 32467

1 combat operations were underway. I explained all these procedures in one

2 of my previous replies.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06516, please. In e-court.

4 Thank you. 1D06516. Unfortunately, the translation of this document has

5 not been completed yet.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Who produced this document?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please scroll down to the

9 bottom of the page in order to see that.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It bears my signature. Having

11 received a request for a convoy to be allowed through, I submitted this

12 request to the Main Staff for approval, proposing also that the convoy

13 should be allowed to pass and that approval should be granted for the

14 15th of November, 1994. And what follows is your own reply. At my

15 level, I didn't have the authority to approve this or, indeed, to ban

16 this convoy from passing through.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Okay. Let's go back to paragraph 1. Who submitted or who had

19 sent the request that you asked for the Main Staff to approve?

20 A. In the first paragraph you see that the request came from you,

21 and then based on an agreement that was reached by you and Mr. Akashi,

22 approval was to be granted for general supplies convoy to be approved for

23 Kakanj, specifically the Catholic school there and the canteen. It was

24 about furniture being shipped to that area.

25 Q. Thank you very much.

Page 32468

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be MFI'd, please. Thank

2 you.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D2785, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

6 MS. EDGERTON: If my colleague Mr. Reid can release 65 ter number

7 24459, that's a document that I was fortunately able to have translated

8 overnight, as I wasn't able to read it. And I would have risen earlier,

9 Your Honours, and my apologies. I wasn't able to locate that in my

10 e-mails until this moment.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Then would you agree that this document

12 would be admitted in full?

13 MS. EDGERTON: Yes.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That will be done. Thank you,

15 Ms. Edgerton.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you on behalf of the Defence

17 team.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, given your post, were you in a position to

20 follow the cease-fire negotiations? Were there any cease-fire agreements

21 reached between the Serbs and the Muslims?

22 A. Cease-fire agreements were frequently signed. Essentially one of

23 the responsibilities included going through the liaison officers HQ in

24 order to analyse these cease-fire agreements and forward the results of

25 our analysis to both UNPROFOR and the other side in the conflict.

Page 32469

1 Q. What was the fate of such agreements? Did they ever take effect

2 and how long were they complied with?

3 A. Based on my recollection, which is what I said earlier on, none

4 of these agreements were actually complied with by the dead-line set out

5 in the document itself.

6 Q. Thank you very much. 65 ter 15433 in e-court, please. Thank

7 you.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Did you personally play a role in the -- any of the follow-ups to

10 these agreements and the implementation of these agreements?

11 A. I see a document by the Main Staff of the VRS on the screen,

12 ordering a total cease-fire, a cessation of all hostilities, pursuant to

13 an agreement reached on the 31st of December, 1994. As far as I

14 remember, our responsibility was to produce daily reports to show whether

15 agreements were complied with and to what extent exactly.

16 Q. Thank you very much.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Paragraph 3, the first sentence, what does it say there? What is

20 being ordered there?

21 A. "Ensure that all provisions in the agreement are fully and

22 consistently adhered to with regard to the Muslim forces and not

23 implement or observe the agreement on the cessation of firing activities

24 in the part of the front where we have a border with the armed forces of

25 the NDH and the HR HB until the territories occupied by the joint forces

Page 32470

1 of the NDH and HR HB are liberated."

2 Therefore, this is clearly in reference to the two parts. The

3 agreement concerning the clashes against the Muslim forces with a total

4 cessation of hostilities being ordered here and the other part of the

5 conflict in the Krajina regarding clashes with the regular units of the

6 Croatian army and the HVO.

7 Q. Were there any agreements signed with those parties on possible

8 cease-fires or anything like that?

9 A. No, because representatives of the Croatian army - mind you, I'm

10 not talking about the HVO here, I'm talking about the

11 Army of the Republic of Croatia - being actively involved in the fighting

12 in the Krajina area and those municipalities over there. They were no

13 parties to any of the agreements that were actually signed.

14 Q. Paragraph 4, what is being forbidden in the strictest of terms

15 there?

16 A. "I strictly forbid opening fire and carrying out offensive

17 operations in the front line towards the Muslims ..." I think it's

18 probably an error here in spelling, "which would violate the agreement

19 reached. Respond to their possible fire if absolutely necessary and if

20 the lives of combatants and civilians are at peril or if there is a

21 danger of destruction or seizure of combat equipment."

22 So this is a very clear-cut order. Strict compliance with this

23 agreement is demanded here.

24 Q. Thank you very much. In relation to this document can you tell

25 us more about what the committees these are that are mentioned here and

Page 32471

1 were you a member of any of these?

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the Serbian text

3 pulled up a little and it's also the next page in the English.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To make sure this agreement was

5 actually acted upon and to make sure it wasn't dead in the water since it

6 was signed at the highest level. In each of the corps committees were

7 set up whose duty it was to monitor the implementation of these

8 agreements and implementation consistency as well. I myself was a member

9 of this committee for the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. You talked about the Croatian army being involved in the

12 occupation of the western municipalities. Were UNPROFOR aware of this

13 and was there anything they did about that in terms of preventing a

14 foreign army from occupying Bosnian territory, or rather,

15 Republika Srpska?

16 A. This was a fact that was definitely well-known to everyone there.

17 I don't know personally whether anything at all was done to prevent this

18 from happening.

19 Q. Thank you very much.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May this be admitted, please?

21 Thank you.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2786, Your Honours.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32472

1 Q. Lieutenant-Colonel, in your official capacity, did you ever come

2 across issues related to supplies, water and electricity, for Sarajevo

3 specifically regarding both sides? Did you take part in negotiations

4 regarding that, so restoring the supply of electricity and water to

5 Sarajevo?

6 A. Yes, quite frequently as a matter of fact. During the first

7 stage after the outbreak of war, the electricity and water facilities

8 were destroyed. As soon as conditions were in place to have those

9 repaired and rebuilt, we demanded that steps be taken in that direction.

10 Each time a formal request was submitted, this would normally go through

11 the liaison officer, the simple reason being most of the damage that had

12 occurred was in the area that was between the confrontation lines. It

13 was necessary, therefore, to use the existing chain of command to order a

14 cease-fire so that the workers could actually go out and get the work

15 done, get the necessary repairs done.

16 Q. Did UNPROFOR understand which of the parties was actually

17 sabotaging the repair works?

18 A. As far as I know, the UNPROFOR engineers, so the people who were

19 actually in charge, understood very clearly that the lack of co-operation

20 was to be blamed on the Muslim side for the most part. We were talking

21 about infrastructure facilities here and that was a vital issue also from

22 a media perspective when trying to construe an image of yourself as a

23 victim.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D6523 in e-court, please.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32473

1 Q. Could you please tell us what this telegram is about, what it

2 means and what it talks about.

3 A. This is a report on a meeting with General Tolimir at Sokolac. I

4 attended this meeting. And aside from other issues, we discussed the

5 possibility of getting on with infrastructure renewal and repair work in

6 and around Sarajevo.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to paragraph 3, please.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Could you please tell us what Tolimir discusses here.

10 A. Tolimir says that it's absurd to talk about restoring utilities

11 before a cease-fire is accomplished because whatever is repaired on one

12 day on the next day would be destroyed again because the electric lines

13 were -- ran along the confrontation line right next to it, so it was

14 impossible to work on them.

15 Q. Thank you. Did the infrastructure system or the infrastructure

16 facilities, were they connected and were there shortages also on the

17 Serbian side, in the Serbian part of Sarajevo?

18 A. Well, Sarajevo was a large whole before the war, it was one

19 whole, so that the system of infrastructure automatic -- was one whole

20 and automatically a breakdown in one would automatically cause a

21 breakdown in the entire system.

22 Q. Thank you. A moment ago you said that the Muslim party had some

23 political benefits or reaped some political advantage from the fact of

24 this breakdown in supply of water and electricity and what was the Serb

25 response to this in the international media?

Page 32474

1 A. Well, unfortunately the media were not really very much

2 interested in trying to establish the situation, what the situation was

3 like in the Serbian side and to report that there were similar problems

4 on the Serb side. For instance, when I moved to Banja Luka I learned

5 that at the time when the media reported on the major difficulties in

6 Sarajevo because the power lines were down and there was no electricity,

7 at that same time Banja Luka had been into a full year almost without any

8 electric power and there were no reports on that.

9 Q. Thank you. Lieutenant-Colonel, did you have any impression on

10 the number of flights and the number of convoys that arrived at the

11 airport in Sarajevo on a daily basis without any difficulties?

12 A. Well, we had a very clear picture of the number of flights and

13 convoys arriving. Even if we were not reported on each and every flight,

14 we did -- we were informed of the convoys. But we also had observers who

15 would count the flights arriving at or landing at the Sarajevo airport.

16 So we had that information as well. Now, as for the convoys that moved

17 in Sarajevo but that did not -- that had not come from the crossing the

18 territory of Republika Srpska, we had no information on them for obvious

19 reasons and we were not responsible for them.

20 Q. Do you recall how many humanitarian flights and landings at the

21 Sarajevo airport there were on a daily basis?

22 A. Well, it's hard to give you a figure, but I believe that

23 generally speaking we could say that there were anywhere between five and

24 ten flights a day.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 32475

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

2 document, please.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D2787, Your Honours.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions for

6 Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. I thank you for your understanding and for your patience.

9 JUDGE KWON: Very well, Mr. Karadzic.

10 Mr. Indjic, although some part of your evidence was led live but

11 most of the evidence in chief has been admitted into writing. Now you'll

12 be cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,

13 but given the circumstances your cross-examination will be deferred till

14 probably Thursday. Do you understand that?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

16 JUDGE KWON: I apologise for your inconvenience, but can I advise

17 you not to discuss with anybody else about your testimony.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, I wonder whether

20 the Prosecution might be ready to start their cross tomorrow because I'm

21 a bit concerned about the witness because he's having some difficulties

22 because of his long stay here. If that's not possible, let's leave it as

23 it is, but if at all possible for the Prosecution perhaps it would be

24 more convenient for the witness.

25 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, just in fairness to Ms. Edgerton,

Page 32480

1 just told you, sir?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do. Everything is all

3 right.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

5 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

6 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.

8 A. Good afternoon.

9 Q. Please feel free to remind me when the pause that I make after

10 your answer is too brief to ensure that every word spoken here will make

11 it into the transcript. Now, if you look at the screen you can see that

12 once my question is complete, there will be a letter A appearing below

13 it.

14 Now, could you please tell us your first and last name and your

15 father's name?

16 A. Yes. My name is Dragomir Milosevic. My father's name is

17 Milorad.

18 Q. Thank you. Where were you born and when?

19 A. I was born in Ub municipality -- my apology, I started earlier.

20 So I was born in Ub municipality in the village of Murgas, the Republic

21 of Serbia, on the 4th of February, 1942.

22 Q. Thank you. Could you tell us something about your background and

23 your education? Could you tell us what schools and where you attended

24 and completed?

25 A. I began my schooling in elementary school in the place where I

Page 32481

1 was born, of course. I'm talking about the elementary education,

2 elementary school. Then I attended the high school or the secondary

3 school, military secondary school, in Sarajevo. This was in 1958 to be

4 more precise. After completing the secondary military school for a

5 while, or rather, for two years I served in Banja Luka as a

6 non-commissioned officer. At -- in those days, certain cadres could be

7 sent further on to the military academy for further education. I was

8 offered and given this possibility because I met all the conditions. I

9 accepted and I signed up or enrolled at the military academy in Belgrade,

10 which lasted four years. Out of those four years, one, the final year,

11 the senior year, was in Sarajevo. And this was by way of completing a

12 specialised course. Once I graduated from the military academy, I was

13 assigned to the garrison in Ljubljana. Would this be sufficient or would

14 you like me to tell you something about my various appointments?

15 Q. Well, could you please tell us what your various appointments

16 were and where you served.

17 A. Very well. When I arrived in Ljubljana, I was a platoon

18 commander for a while.

19 And soon thereafter I became a company commander. I stayed at

20 the Ljubljana garrison in Sentilj two years, after which I was selected

21 or perhaps there was a decision made - I don't know exactly what the

22 wording was - but I was reassigned to the school for reserve officers in

23 Bileca. I assumed that it was observed that I had certain talents to

24 work with -- to work training personnel. I spent two years in Bileca,

25 where I was platoon commander and company commander. And I spent an

Page 32482

1 entire period of five years there. Following this, I moved to Sarajevo,

2 where I became a member of a military police battalion that was

3 established as a unit that was to serve the needs of the 7th Army, the

4 then-Yugoslav People's Army. I remained there, or rather, I was first

5 appointed deputy commander of the military police battalion and

6 subsequently, after a number -- some time, I can't recall exactly how

7 much time, I became the military police battalion commander. In other

8 words, this was a battalion of the 7th Army.

9 After that, someone decided that I was now at a point where I had

10 met all these other conditions. And then I was transferred to Lukavica

11 near Sarajevo to act as the Chief of Staff in the 49th Regiment. Let me

12 just confirm about all these other things too. In the meantime I had

13 undergone additional training at Belgrade for a two-year duration. It's

14 called the higher military academy. So it was a military political

15 school. After serving with the 49th Motorised Regiment at Lukavica, I

16 was transferred to the Han Pijesak garrison to serve there as commander

17 of the 216th Mountain Brigade. I believe this was back in 1988, and then

18 on from that point in time until the war in Sarajevo broke out.

19 Q. Thank you very much. Did I understand you correctly, you arrived

20 in Sarajevo when you were 16. And apart from the time you spent in

21 Ljubljana and apart from your training in Belgrade, all your posts were

22 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as Banja Luka and Han Pijesak. Can you

23 confirm that?

24 A. Yes, that is entirely right. All the other posts were in Bosnia

25 and Herzegovina. I spent more time in Bosnia and Herzegovina than

Page 32483

1 anywhere else as a matter of fact, apart from the time that I have spent

2 in The Hague by now of course.

3 Q. General, sir, on the 20th of May, 1992, the JNA was withdrawing

4 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. What was the choice that you faced at the

5 time?

6 A. It's not really that I had much of a choice. It was about me

7 taking a decision, but I know what you mean. People serving in the JNA

8 at the time had certain rights and people who were from one of the

9 republics were free to go back to their own home republic and continue

10 their service there. But members from Bosnia and Herzegovina obviously

11 were also allowed to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So I'm not entirely

12 clear about this. How should I interpret the fact that I stayed in

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina? But I don't think that really is the

14 deal-breaker here. I don't think it's that important for me to explain

15 really. It's just a decision that I took. I was constantly hoping that

16 at some point I would be transferred to Belgrade, though.

17 If I may just add one thing, since the question you asked was

18 quite specific. I was a brigade commander. The 216th Brigade stationed

19 at Han Pijesak was subject to a decision taken by the superior command

20 and there was to be mobilisation there back in 1991. So that was a whole

21 year before the clashes in Sarajevo ever broke out, Sarajevo and the rest

22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. So the brigade was mobilised. So it

23 was in a state of semi-combat readiness, so to say, pursuant to this

24 order from our superior command, needless to say. So during this time I

25 was working with these people, I was training them, I was looking after

Page 32484

1 them, and they were working with me as well. So having said and

2 considered all of that, it would have been perhaps immoral of me to have

3 gone through all of this with these men and as soon as certain things

4 happened for me to simply be gone, to up sticks and leave the area,

5 because these people placed an enormous amount of trust in me, and I did

6 not want to let them down and make it seem as though I was leaving them

7 in the lurch.

8 Q. Thank you very much, General. We'll get back to some questions

9 regarding the war itself. Were you commended for your work? Did you

10 receive any medals or awards?

11 A. Yes. I can't give you the whole list, to be perfectly frank. I

12 don't think I'd be able to think back and remember each and every one,

13 you know, like the specific type of medal that I was awarded or, indeed,

14 the names of these medals and commendations. But I got everything that

15 was due me given my rank and my professional stature at each stage of my

16 career. My professional assessments were always exceptionally

17 favourable. It was always outstanding or even particularly outstanding

18 at one point in time. Sometimes perhaps it would have been wiser to not

19 receive this rating of particularly outstanding because my life might

20 have taken a different course, but I'm just telling you what exactly

21 happened and we can't change the facts. So that of all these medals and

22 commendations being awarded also during the war in Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina, during the armed conflict there, I remember two specific

24 decorations, the Karadjordje Star, which is a first-grade or second-grade

25 decoration, and also the Milos Obilic medal. I remember those two.

Page 32485

1 Q. One is for exercising command, for setting an example; and the

2 other is for courage. Right?

3 A. Yes, command and courage, that's true.

4 Q. General, I see you have some documents in front of you or what is

5 that, a note pad? Let's see what that is and whether perhaps you'd be

6 allowed to use it.

7 A. This is just a blank note pad. There is nothing in it. But yes,

8 I do have some documents here in a folder which I've put together for

9 myself, just in case I get into a situation where I need to interpret

10 some things, perhaps make assertions or perhaps demonstrate certain

11 things.

12 Q. Thank you very much. Did you put these together yourself or was

13 there someone who gave you a hand with that?

14 A. I put them together myself, needless to say, on my own. You need

15 to keep in mind the fact that I am in prison and the people there were

16 not able to help me with this because they know nothing about this, so I

17 was left to my own devices. I came up with a plan and I put together

18 everything that I believed might come in handy.

19 Q. Thank you very much. Did you perhaps jog your memory with

20 respect to the specific documents that you used when you were producing

21 these notes?

22 A. Let us try and clarify this. There were all these documents that

23 were used at my trial. I have a memory of all these documents,

24 obviously, but when I was preparing for possibly giving evidence I did

25 not exactly have any of these documents physically available to me. So I

Page 32486

1 wasn't using physical documents. I was trying to think back and remember

2 and not really tie myself down to a specific detail but to think more in

3 general terms.

4 Q. Well, as you know, written evidence under 92 ter is also admitted

5 by this Tribunal. Did you perhaps produce a written statement

6 specifically for your evidence here in this trial and what about that

7 document right in front of you, is that perhaps the statement that you

8 put together?

9 A. Well, let me be specific about this. I'm not saying that I'm

10 familiar with all these Rules, 96 bis I think you mentioned or something

11 like that, but it doesn't really matter. I'm in a position to confirm

12 that generally I understand the Rules. But I wanted to come up with some

13 sort of a framework for myself and it didn't matter to me very much

14 whether it was pursuant to this rule or that. I tried to put together a

15 number of things that I could use as reminders just to make sure I

16 remained within the right context. So as far as I understand, you're

17 asking me if this is a statement, a written statement. No, it's just all

18 these things that I was going through while preparing for my own private

19 needs, my notes that would help me find my feet in any situation that I

20 might encounter.

21 Q. Thank you very much. General, did anyone specifically ask you to

22 prepare these?

23 A. No, no one asked me to do this. No one proposed that I do this.

24 No one imposed this on me. No one cautioned me about this. No one even

25 advised me to do it, so the answer is no.

Page 32487

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, may

2 General Milosevic please be allowed to use his notes during his evidence

3 before this Trial Chamber as he goes about answering my questions? As

4 far as I understand, the notes were disclosed to the OTP last Sunday.

5 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, do you have any observation to make?

6 MS. EDGERTON: Based on Dr. Karadzic's answer, we did receive a

7 copy of these and a draft translation on the 21st, so no, no objection.

8 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber sees no problem with it either as long

9 as you can -- you consult with your handwritten notes under the control

10 of the Chamber. There should be no problem. Please proceed.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, sir, I asked my advisors and assistants to get in touch

14 with you and to ask you whether you were prepared to appear as a Defence

15 witness in this trial. They got back to me in no time at all to inform

16 me that you willingly accepted this request. Can you tell me why?

17 A. It is true that I welcomed the request. No additional

18 information was required for me to agreed to appear in this trial as a

19 Defence witness. As far as my decision to testify here in this trial,

20 well I have quite a number of reasons. As I said, my reasons are

21 numerous and I will only mention here the two principal reasons. I

22 thought about it, I made my assessment, and I arrived at some

23 conclusions. My own trial and the circumstances under which a conviction

24 was imposed --

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not understand the witness.

Page 32488

1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters didn't understand

2 your last sentence. Could you start repeat from your own trial and the

3 circumstances.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. My trial happened and then it

5 was completed. My experience and my conclusion is that certain

6 conclusions were reached at that trial and the conviction was reached

7 that does not conform with what was supposed to be demonstrated and

8 proven beyond reasonable doubt during that trial. Essentially what was

9 missing all together was a faithful depiction of the armed conflict: Who

10 were the clashing parties, what was the progress of the clashes, what

11 were the respective forces involved, and who was involved in the

12 fighting. So a context was concocted, if I can put it that way,

13 suggesting that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps used all of its fire-power to

14 target the civilian population and the civilian infrastructure.

15 I don't think we ever reached a point in that trial where

16 everything that was going on became clear and obvious for all. Because

17 everything that was happening there at the time was against the

18 background of two armed forces clashing. On the one hand the 1st Corps

19 of the BH army and the remaining forces, the police forces and the rest;

20 and on the other the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. These are the two clashing

21 elements or two clashing forces that were engaged in war, in fighting.

22 The issue of civilians belongs to a different context, not that one. So

23 that is what I need in order to be able to be here and offer evidence in

24 this trial.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 32489

1 Q. Thank you very much. Did you have a chance to contribute to the

2 creation of a more faithful depiction of historical events during your

3 own trial?

4 A. Well, that is my problem, isn't it? And that is what I'm trying

5 to confirm. My defence - and I'm not necessarily saying that they did

6 not desire to do so or perhaps they weren't able to achieve that, but my

7 Defence failed to produce evidence really showing and demonstrated what

8 happened there at the time. The option they decided to take was to have

9 an opportunity to challenge those incidents at trial without producing

10 key evidence, key evidence showing who was clashing with whom, to what

11 extent, what exactly was the fierceness of the armed combat involved,

12 what were the intentions of the parties involved, who was sending their

13 forces in which direction, and what were the objectives that they were

14 trying to achieve. We did not arrive at a complete description of what

15 actually happened. So sometimes there was manipulation. Sometimes some

16 things were being staged and offensives were being launched. And it's

17 also about the seriousness of this conflict. Because what actually

18 happened from our perspective was not two forces clashing on equal

19 footing. The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had to cover a very extensive area

20 and there was an element of overstretch. We were more than fully

21 stretched, which led to a certain -- to a certain evolution, and that

22 evolution led to different conclusions.

23 Q. I'm not sure if my understanding is correct. Is this something

24 that you understood during the actual trial or was it only after the

25 trial that you arrived at these conclusions?

Page 32490

1 A. First of all, I did not know at the beginning what was going on

2 there. It was during the actual clashes that I understood and I'm sure

3 the enemy understood as well what they were doing and what their

4 intentions were as well as who they were dealing with and the ratio in

5 terms of power between the respective forces involved in the fighting,

6 not to mention the trial itself. I made an enormous effort to make sure

7 my Defence and my Defence team understood what they were meant to do.

8 They were supposed to develop certain method of using documents, taking

9 into account everything that happened in order to portray the situation

10 as it was, as a faithful reflection of our goals, our intentions, our

11 desires, and the decisions that we took at the time.

12 Q. Did you have a chance to appear as a witness in your own trial;

13 and if not, why?

14 A. It's difficult to get something done if you don't enjoy support,

15 if you have no support coming from anywhere and no one to help you -- or

16 rather, allow me to clarify. It's not just about whether I was actually

17 willing to testify or not. What I wanted to do was to tell the

18 Prosecution about this whole situation and tell them what it was like,

19 but they were trying to throw me off track, as it were. Okay. So I

20 would like to own up to something and then, you know, it's totally

21 different. So I didn't want this process to involve any confessions or

22 anything like that, any steps like that being taken, but I wanted to have

23 someone who would hear me out so that I could tell them what actually

24 happened. And then they could take that information and press on in any

25 direction they liked regarding me or, indeed, anything else, no matter

Page 32491

1 whether they would actually believe me or not. So my lawyer tried to

2 talk me out of that. He discouraged me by telling me that this would be

3 no use at all and that it would be an error for me to take that course of

4 action. I didn't understand at the time what exactly that meant, to

5 appear as a witness in your own trial. How far would anyone be willing

6 to trust my words, trust my evidence? Perhaps I would have been

7 construed as trying to lead biased evidence in my favour, but that was

8 all I was trying to achieve. Nothing else mattered. It wasn't like I

9 was trying to take a distance from anything that I did at the time.

10 Q. Last question today. General, sir, let's leave theory aside and

11 probably no good lawyer would advise you to trust the Prosecutor, but

12 could it perhaps have been the case that there were documents for you to

13 use that perhaps you might have used during your own evidence in your own

14 trial and yet those documents were never actually produced during the

15 trial?

16 A. Documents are something special, something important, something

17 big. My Defence team told me at one point that they had collected a

18 total of 5.000 documents from the defence ministry in Sarajevo. I was

19 overjoyed. 5.000 documents. And now it was time for me to study these

20 documents, to go through them, and to make certain suggestions in line

21 with that to my Defence team, but I didn't get that chance. So it was

22 all about the plan hatched up by the person in charge of my Defence. He

23 wanted to take the shortest route in order to keep us from wasting time

24 because all this needs translating and so on and so forth. So he came up

25 with a selection of documents and then I went through those documents and

Page 32492

1 then told him what I thought he should do. But when I continued to make

2 suggestions, they simply paid no heed. He had his own plan. He wasn't

3 interested in my plan, in my ideas. Every time I would propose that he

4 seek out someone, an expert or a person to talk to, I always got the same

5 reply. Invariably, he would tell me that those were people who came to

6 him for advice because he was the cleverest guy around and it wasn't his

7 job to go around asking other people for advice. So I didn't have all

8 these documents available to me apart from the ones that he was actually

9 tendering, but I'd normally first set eyes on those in the courtroom and

10 not before. So how could I use any of those as evidence?

11 Q. Thank you very much, General, sir. I believe this is all the

12 time that we've got for today.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are we pressing on until 3.00,

14 Your Excellency, or is it quarter to 3.00?

15 JUDGE KWON: We'll adjourn for today.

16 Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to advise you once you started giving

17 evidence you're not supposed to discuss with anybody else about your

18 testimony. Do you understand that, sir?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly, Your Honour, I

20 understand.

21 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00. The

22 hearing ...

23 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

24 JUDGE KWON: Of course that excludes your counsel.

25 MR. BOURGON: Mr. President, I intend to visit the witness at the