Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 32698

 1                           Monday, 28 January 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

 8             Just a second.

 9             Yes, Mr. Bourgon.

10             MR. BOURGON:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Before we begin, I'd

11     like to introduce Ms. Marlene Yahya Haage, who will be assisting me this

12     morning, who is sitting here to my right.  Thank you, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can we turn it up, please.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

16     Good morning to everyone.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             Do you hear me well, General?

19             THE WITNESS:  Yes, yes, okay.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

21                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC [Resumed]

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.  The others have heard

25     me.

Page 32699

 1        A.   Good morning.

 2        Q.   General, last week we discussed the ways of waging war.  Did the

 3     warring parties use ruses, tricks and perfidies and did you witness that,

 4     were you aware of it?

 5        A.   Certainly these things happened.  As for perfidy, I have no

 6     information and I was not able to assess that units of the

 7     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps used that.  And when we talk about certain tricks

 8     and frame-ups, in my case and my reporting that would refer to the

 9     1st Corps of the BH Army.  And I do not include in that certain military

10     cunning that is normal and allowed.

11        Q.   Could you indicate to us the distinction between military ruses

12     that are allowed under international law and those that are not.

13        A.   This is certainly very clear, and when I say "legitimate military

14     ruses," I mean surprise attacks, attempts by the enemy to disguise his

15     axes of movement, mask his intentions and the actions he intends to

16     mount, that is not only allowed, that is necessary.  However, speaking of

17     illegitimate actions, it boils down to illegitimate action against

18     civilians and facilities and installations that have nothing to do with

19     military purposes, not only buildings but also land.  So I believe wilful

20     and disproportionate action to be not allowed, illegitimate, as well as

21     any irregular attitude towards civilian structures.

22        Q.   Last week you mentioned provocations that were meant to elicit

23     our response.  In which category would you place action, such action,

24     from hospitals, from places close to UN forces' bases, et cetera, would

25     you qualify that as legitimate or illegitimate?

Page 32700

 1        A.   The answer is unequivocal and obvious.  To open fire from

 2     hospitals, from rehabilitation centres and similar places, from areas

 3     inhabited by civilian population, hoping that fire would not be returned

 4     would certainly be illegitimate and perfidious, also if it is calculated

 5     to provoke return and very damaging fire by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 6        Q.   As commander and as a military unit, was it your interest to

 7     engage in such provocations yourself and to engage them in combat from

 8     such areas, in political media terms?

 9        A.   The commitment of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and its command and

10     its key commanding officers and the entire military structure of the

11     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was not to provoke or engage in any action, just

12     to portray ourselves as being threatened in an illegitimate way.  The

13     entire structure of the SRK, and especially the command and brigade

14     commanders, were only interested in military solutions on the

15     battle-field between the warring parties.  And we had strictly to adhere

16     to that so that the entire course of military actions and the image it

17     would create -- we had to be, in other words, seen to be doing that in a

18     chivalrous manner.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Muslim side succeed in cashing in in the

20     media and politically speaking on all those incidents when you did return

21     fire?

22        A.   Yes.  I would call it superfluous and going over the top,

23     creating the impression that the Muslim side is threatened.  Of course

24     the civilian population would certainly be threatened as a result of our

25     action, opening fire, carelessness, et cetera.  I think they worked hard

Page 32701

 1     to create that impression with major assistance provided by certain

 2     players, but I don't want to go into that now.  They did a lot to create

 3     the image that they are threatened as a result of our irregular action

 4     and pressure against the people.

 5        Q.   Were you aware of the nature of that conduct, their actions which

 6     were not aimed at making a breakthrough but at provoking return fire?

 7        A.   I stand by what I said, that the corps command and our personnel

 8     were perfectly aware of what was going on and what aims the enemy is

 9     pursuing and what they want to blame the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps for.  In

10     this respect we were united and there was no problem amongst us to agree

11     on that assessment and to adhere to that assessment and to agree on a

12     conduct that would prevent them from creating the wrong impression about

13     us.  Of course that was not easy.  It was not easy to resist that

14     propaganda and their attempts to create an atmosphere in which we would

15     look as if we were engaging in irregular action, irregular conduct, which

16     would not be soldierly.

17        Q.   In such cases, when you put up with fire opened at you from

18     hospitals, civilian buildings, and other facilities that should not be

19     used for military purposes, what did you do?  In what cases did you have

20     to just take it and in what cases did you have to return fire?

21        A.   The position and the assessment I described before to the extent

22     that my command and myself and my subordinated commanders were aware of

23     it, aware of those attempts to set us up, we could not just make that

24     assessment once and for all.  We had to continuously review the situation

25     on a case-by-case basis, based on all the information we had collected.

Page 32702

 1     I have to explain in my own way that within the system of deployment of

 2     forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps we had developed a system of

 3     observation.  That system of observation is something that you absolutely

 4     must have when you are facing the enemy.  We had separate observers for

 5     artillery fire, observers of infantry action, movements and manoeuvre,

 6     and of course there were, generally speaking, observers of air-space but

 7     that was not relevant for us.

 8             This observer structure provided us at each and every moment with

 9     information about what was going on, what was happening, what intentions

10     are beginning to take shape, what is apparently in the offing, et cetera,

11     and that information would reach the commanding officer, who would then

12     make his assessment.  Usually the commanding officer would have to

13     verify, although the observer was a trained observer, the commanding

14     officer would have to make his own assessment whether this information is

15     correct and reliable, whether the area concerned is a clearing with only

16     one combat vehicle opening fire or it is an area that is a populated area

17     where fire would cause damage to civilian situations -- civilian

18     population.

19             There were situations that were perfectly obvious and clear.  If,

20     for instance, we saw a building with lots of sandbags on the balcony and

21     a machine-gun nest between the sandbags, it did not require a lot of

22     assessment to decide whether that was a target that needed to be

23     neutralised or a target that could result in collateral civilian damage.

24     We concluded that if fire is opened from such bunkers on balconies, that

25     had nothing to do with the civilian structure.

Page 32703

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see 1D7503, a regular

 3     combat report containing some of those things you just described related

 4     to anticipation and expectations.  1D7503.  This is a regular combat

 5     report dated 8 December 1993.  Could we look at the last page.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, could you present to us item 8.  What does it refer to?

 8             Could we see the previous page in English, item 8.

 9        A.   Yes, yes.  What do I say on my part, not just pertaining to the

10     document but in general?  These were such attempts to portray us as the

11     side seeking for the right moment to disturb life in Sarajevo in general,

12     especially the work of civilian organs, et cetera.  Forecasts were made.

13     There was a conclusion and appropriate regulation was identified in order

14     to address specific events.  When we believed that there would be an

15     attempt to make a move which would then shift the blame onto our side, we

16     tried to forecast such problems, issue warnings, and our ranks acted in

17     line with our proposals.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we admit this document, please?

20             JUDGE KWON:  What is your proposals, General?  You said "in line

21     with our proposals."  What are they?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Proposals and instructions,

23     Your Honour.  There were specific instructions issued to the units on how

24     to address specific situations.  The first item was that it was to be

25     expected that certain provocations would take place which amounted to

Page 32704

 1     nothing basically and that our reaction to such provocations should not

 2     be provoked.  The proposal was to -- well, I'd say not to get us

 3     involved, to engage in certain actions which would be impermissible,

 4     whereas the incident was merely a provocation.  There were such forecasts

 5     made that similar situations may occur and that we should bear in mind

 6     that our actions should not be provoked as to portray it as illegitimate.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll receive it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2804, Your Honours.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, sir, what does this pertain to?  It says the following:

11             "The decision remains intact or unchanged."

12             We'll see another document --

13        A.   The decision for further action is unchanged.  These had been our

14     previous position.  So we had to make sure that we were not provoked,

15     that such provocations would be avoided in order to avoid creating

16     problems for our side.  All of the regulation positions were in place

17     pertaining to specific situations.  We always strove to avoid acting upon

18     any incidents in cases where it would be impermissible.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we next have 1D1641, please.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   It is your regular combat report as deputy commander dated the

22     9th of January, 1994.  Item 3(a), please.

23             "At around 0900 hours, a 120-millimetre shell fell on the

24     Sarajevo airport.  It occurred as the airplane with Mr. Akashi was being

25     awaited."

Page 32705

 1             And then we have Mr. Akashi's visit to Pale the next day referred

 2     to.

 3             What does this refer to?  It certainly was something that was

 4     expected to take place during Ambassador Akashi's visit?

 5        A.   This clearly shows that there was an attempt to make use of

 6     Mr. Akashi's arrival, to cause an incident which would then be blamed on

 7     the Serbian side to show that the Serbian side did not honour any of its

 8     agreements.  It included international elements and the fact that the

 9     airport had been handed over to the international community.  They were

10     trying to get an indication that our side would seize such opportunities

11     when prominent persons came to engage in action.  We believed that the

12     enemy was prepared to try and impose such scenarios on our side and that

13     we should not be provoked under any circumstances.

14        Q.   Thank you, General.  Can you tell us how successful was the other

15     side in order to tarnish the image of our side?

16        A.   We always tried to show the international community that such

17     things, seeking to provoke us or such UNPROFOR activities which

18     shifted -- which seemed to shift the blame on our side, that it was not

19     the case, especially if the international community was supposed to act

20     as mediator.  We always strove to show that such were not our intentions

21     and our actions.  I'm glad to say that it was never successful on the

22     side of the other party.  I don't think such assessments were finally

23     made on the Serbian side -- about the Serbian side.

24             Perhaps I can use an example.  General Gobillard arrived in my

25     command, claiming that we had destroyed a house at Sedrenik when we used

Page 32706

 1     excessive force allegedly.  I took note of what he said and I simply had

 2     to see it for myself.  My commanders and fighters told me that the house

 3     was full of sandbags and the balcony simply fell through, taking parts of

 4     the wall with it because of the weight.  And then it was reported that

 5     our side brought the building down.  I indeed saw numerous sandbags and

 6     that this was no result of any action on our part.  I conveyed that

 7     information to General Gobillard, but it was my feeling that he didn't

 8     believe me.

 9             We always had to investigate and study, we always had to check

10     whether UNPROFOR information was correct.  And I always tried to

11     influence my men to simply exclude any such possibilities of similar

12     action.  We couldn't get rid of it easily, though, because we were

13     constantly being put in situations whereby we were portrayed as the

14     unfair side.

15        Q.   Thank you.  General, what kind of route did you have to traverse

16     as the corps command from your command post to Sedrenik, to verify

17     General Gobillard's allegations?

18        A.   Your Honours, I understand the question, but the route was not an

19     issue for me, although I understand the thrust of the question.  I'm

20     trying to convey something else, that there were attempts to do away with

21     this sort of anathema that was being imposed on the Sarajevo-Romanija

22     Corps as the side which wages war unfairly.  I will try to answer.  So in

23     short I had to cross over 50 kilometres, but it was an aside for me.

24     There were numerous other occasions when I went to the location where I

25     had to clear things up with UNPROFOR commanders or with the people on my

Page 32707

 1     side who may have engaged in something inappropriate.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  This is a strictly confidential report to the

 3     Main Staff, or rather, to the forward command post.  In item 3(a) it is

 4     stated that the landing of 27 planes is planned for today, four planes

 5     have landed, and Izetbegovic and Franjo Kuharic flew out of Sarajevo.

 6             Did you envisage any alternative in case the Trebevic-Sarajevo

 7     road was closed off for Mr. Akashi to be able to use it?  How could that

 8     take place?

 9        A.   Your Honours, it is a separate issue.  As far as I recall, I have

10     explained some of that already here.  There were several routes which

11     were chosen as a powerful force from Sarajevo to threaten our positions

12     or our axes.  There was the route Sarajevo-Lukavica and Pale via

13     Trebevic.  It was one particular area that they attacked incessantly with

14     all their might, trying to cut it off.  That was the basic axis.  I do

15     realise that additional routes had to be chosen which would take one the

16     roundabout way and it required construction machinery to clear off parts

17     of such routes in order to secure communication between Lukavica and Pale

18     via Trebevic should the original route be closed.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have this admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2805, Your Honours.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D1649, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   We're going to stay with the topic, General.  Could you discuss

Page 32708

 1     item 8 for the benefit of the Chamber and the participants in the

 2     proceedings.

 3        A.   I believe the text speaks for itself in item 8.  It was our

 4     decision that our further action remain unchanged.  We pursued the same

 5     line according to the same principles and regulations, in order to create

 6     conditions, to further honour what had been decided earlier in terms of

 7     principles and regulations to be followed.

 8        Q.   I believe everyone can see from the document that there were no

 9     problems with UNPROFOR and the convoys.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the document admitted?

11     It is of the 23rd of January, 1994.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Correct?  Can we scroll down.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   General, sir, the day before this document, did your forces open

16     artillery or mortar fire Alipasino Polje, and if you recall -- well, on

17     the 22nd of January, one day previously, did your forces open fire on

18     Alipasino Polje from heavy artillery?

19        A.   I really don't recall that.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  That's a leading question.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, I think maybe we need some

24     agreement on what constitutes a leading question.  When you say:  Did

25     your forces open fire on Alipasino Polje from heavy artillery, that can

Page 32709

 1     be equally answered yes or no, it doesn't suggest an answer.  It is my

 2     understanding of a leading question is a question that suggests the

 3     answer, so I don't understand how that question is leading.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to respond, Mr. Tieger, instead of

 5     Ms. Edgerton?

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Well, only because I think this will involve any

 7     number of questions and answers and witnesses over the course of time,

 8     and I think Mr. Robinson is aware that it's context-based.  Information

 9     can be conveyed in the context of a question that's framed yes or no that

10     provides the critical information at issue.  So it depends on the nature

11     of the question.  If where in a particular context fire was or shelling

12     was made and that information is provided, then the leading nature of the

13     question is manifest.  So the answer is not simply going to be the

14     precise way -- whether or not the question is technically framed as a

15     yes-or-no question, but the nature of the information that's being

16     conveyed.  I think that's a fair assessment and I know -- I can try to

17     find it - that in a previous situation Judge Morrison made that precise

18     point to one of the examiners and I don't even remember whether it was a

19     Prosecution or a Defence examination.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Even if it had been a leading question, he didn't

21     succeed.  The witness answered he doesn't know.  I will consult my

22     colleagues.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  The question as formulated in -- and with the

25     specific date included has element of leading question.  Do you follow,

Page 32710

 1     Mr. Karadzic?  Please continue.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency.  I will

 3     reformulate.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   On the 22nd or the 23rd, did you receive a protest from the

 6     United Nations?  And if that was the case, would that have been contained

 7     in your reports?

 8        A.   If I had received it, I would have included it.  I can't say

 9     whether I received a protest.  I can't say whether there was anything

10     going on in Alipasino Polje.  This is my answer.  If a protest had been

11     received, we would have checked the situation, and in this case, as I sit

12     here today, I really don't remember any such thing.  I don't remember

13     that that happened.  I know that we did not do anything that was not

14     allowed and that we did not open fire inhabited by the civilian

15     population.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2806, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, sir, during your checks on that time or around that

21     time, did you establish that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had opened fire

22     on Alipasino Polje and caused some unlawful damage?

23        A.   Whatever checks I carried out, whatever attempts I made to

24     establish the truth, i.e., whether fire was opened and how it was opened

25     after the warnings that there were illegalities involved in the fire

Page 32711

 1     opening, I would check that.  I went all the way to the place where the

 2     crews were, those crews and those combatants that were in the sector.  I

 3     wanted to gain accurate information from them relying on the trust that

 4     existed between me and them.  At any given moment they could confide in

 5     me as to what had been done.  I never received an answer to the effect

 6     that they were arrogant in what they were doing, that they opened fire on

 7     the people that they should not have opened fire on.  During my checks I

 8     used several methods.  I talked to the officers.  I talked to the

 9     combatants, to the observers, and I never received any information to the

10     effect that irregularities had happened.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I call up D1515.  This is a

13     Defence exhibit, D1515.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, sir, please look at the bottom where it says --

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we scroll up a little?  Could

17     we go to the bottom of the page.  I believe that in English it should be

18     on the following page, the following page in English.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Could you please read what you did regarding the alleged fire

21     being opened on Dobrinja on the 4th of February, 1994.

22        A.   Yes, yes.  In connection with the allegation, I have to say that

23     whenever information was provided we had to check it.  We received

24     information that an 82-millimetre shell was launched, but we did not want

25     to take that for granted.  In order to verify the information we checked

Page 32712

 1     what had happened.  I didn't do it myself.  That was done by Colonel

 2     Kosovac.  He obtained information that no such fire had been opened,

 3     i.e., that that was refuted in the Republika Srpska media.

 4        Q.   In the last sentence it says:

 5             "The Jewish convoy and activities in this respect are proceeding

 6     according to plan."

 7             Do you remember that convoy?  I had negotiated that in New York.

 8     One of the witnesses put these two events in relation.  Did you notice

 9     that there was a link between these two events?

10        A.   First of all, I'm aware of those events.  Let's be clear on one

11     thing.  I don't know how the decision on the convoy of Jews was arrived

12     at.  I know what happened next, that their request was met, our factors

13     were involved in that, and those people were allowed to leave Sarajevo

14     according to plan and according to their wishes.  However, obviously I --

15     I'm trying to establish a link here.  The idea was to say this:  You

16     agree to something and then we will -- you would manipulate things in

17     order to make the whole thing pointless, i.e., to blame us for hindering

18     the departure of the Jewish community from Sarajevo.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at 1D7513.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, could you please tell us what actions and what

23     preparations you undertook in order to -- you say here that on the

24     4th of February, 1994, you carried out certain activities.  What did the

25     corps do?  Did the corps carry out operations to prepare themselves for

Page 32713

 1     an offensive?

 2        A.   First of all, we did not prepare an offensive.  We were preparing

 3     ourselves for defence.  When you say "offensive," I translate that into

 4     attacks on our part, but that's not the only thing that I want to say.

 5     Furthermore, here I can see bullet point 2, where it says:

 6             "To build and improve the basic defence positions.

 7             "To build the reserve defence positions.

 8             "To build the false defence positions.

 9             "And protect all the shelters ..." and so on and so forth.

10             This is a period during which General Rose made it possible -- or

11     at least that's how I perceived the whole situation.  He was the one who

12     made sure that there was a cease-fire between the two warring parties and

13     I congratulate him on that.  What I'm trying to say here is that during

14     that period of time, a cease-fire was in place and a cease of all

15     hostilities, which means that we did not open any fire at that time.  We

16     were reinforcing our positions.  We did not have any other plans.  We did

17     not open fire.  We did not plan any actions because we did not have to do

18     anything despite their provocations.

19        Q.   Could you please tell us what it says in bullet point 4 where a

20     dead-line is mentioned.

21        A.   The dead-line?  Yes, I can see that.  A dead-line was given for

22     those actions to be completed by the 10th of February, 1994.  Obviously

23     every time there is a decision, there has to be a dead-line.  There was

24     always a struggle with dead-lines and other things as well, but the

25     timing was one of the key factors.  And in this case the dead-line was

Page 32714

 1     the 10th of February, and from then on, we were supposed to monitor the

 2     situation.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps envisage, order, and

 4     carry out the opening of fire by heavy artillery between the

 5     4th of February and 10th February 1994?

 6        A.   My answer is no, it did not.  We did not open fire.  I know I am

 7     a witness, an eye-witness to the developments that took place during that

 8     period of time.  I know how people perceived the whole situation.  They

 9     rejoiced at an opportunity to have a peaceful period.  Nobody was keen on

10     opening fire, on provoking the enemy, or responding to their

11     provocations.  In other words, we did not do anything.  It was a period

12     of relief.  We reinforced our positions and we arranged our own positions

13     in accordance with the circumstances that prevailed at the time.  We

14     didn't do anything.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2807, Your Honours.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D7504.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   This is a regular combat report somebody signed on your behalf,

22     as we will see on the last page.  This was issued on the 1st of July,

23     1994.

24             And now can we go to the last page which is page 2.  Thank you.

25             And now could you please read bullet point 8 for us, conclusions,

Page 32715

 1     forecasts, and decisions for further action.

 2             Can we scroll down in Serbian and can we display bullet point 8

 3     in the English version.

 4             Maybe you can tell us in a nutshell what your forecasts were and

 5     what you decided.

 6        A.   In this case we're talking about 1994 and the period is during

 7     the month of August.  For us that period was when we had obtained

 8     conclusive information that the 1st Corps of the BiH army was increasing

 9     in the number of troops and the number of weaponry.  I believe that I

10     already said that they had started changing the strategy of their use and

11     that strategy of use could be explained by a saying:  You don't open a

12     tin from the inside but from the outside.  And that referred to Sarajevo,

13     obviously.  That practice, that option, was an infernal machine which

14     imposed on us the need to organise ourselves.  Actually, they launched

15     attacks from the outside in the direction of Sarajevo, but nobody

16     reacted.  Nobody said that for that side, for that type of action, the

17     same decision on a cease-fire should be applied.  When it comes to the

18     cease-fire, the only thing that mattered was what was going on in

19     Sarajevo; and as to what was going on outside Sarajevo, that didn't

20     really matter.  They used strong forces to attack from the outside and

21     threaten us in Sarajevo.  And our attempts to match that caused us major

22     problems.

23        Q.   In the following paragraph you say what should be done.  You say

24     that the cease-fire had to be respected and that lines should be held

25     firmly.

Page 32716

 1        A.   Of course, of course.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2808, Your Honours.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, sir, I believe that last week we discussed the types and

 7     manners the 1st Division acted from the city and from outside of the

 8     city.  Could you please tell us what were the effects of the activities

 9     of the 1st Corps of the BiH army and primarily that applies to our troops

10     and the civilians?

11        A.   There are a lot of indicators which were to say that those

12     activities -- and if we're talking about the military side, i.e., about

13     the combatants and units of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, we had a lot of

14     problems because of the threats to the civilian population.  To be more

15     specific, the area and the people who were living in Nedzarici, a soldier

16     knows how to protect himself in a trench or in a building or behind a

17     wall or behind an obstacle and so on and so forth.  Civilians, on the

18     other hand, don't know how to do that, they can't do that.  The following

19     locality of that kind is Lukavica.  It was the workers' quarters or the

20     workers' neighbourhood very close to the Energoinvest building.  We're

21     talking about wooden houses where people could not protect themselves

22     although they were exposed to fire.  Another neighbourhood that we called

23     Trapare because all the families there bore the same family name,

24     Trapare, that was a group of houses and people there were like clay

25     pigeons.  Vogosca was under the constant fire of the artillery of the

Page 32717

 1     12th Division.  Rajlovac as well.  Ilijas was under fire that was like

 2     hell to them.  Every day in Ilijas there were as many as four civilian

 3     casualties up to 12 soldiers who were killed, but they were killed in

 4     combat, whereas the civilians got killed in the street or in their homes.

 5             I don't know whether I am making myself clear enough.  I only

 6     know that those were difficult situations that had is to be borne, that

 7     people had to be protected, that solutions had to be sought in order to

 8     open fire to curb their fire.

 9        Q.   Thank you, General.  Just now you told us about this loss of

10     12 soldiers and daily losses of four civilians in Ilijas.  Could you

11     recall some incidents involving major civilian losses as a result of

12     action by the 1st Division [as interpreted] of the BH army, starting with

13     the neighbourhood of Hadzici, Blazuj, Ilidza, Vojkovici, up to Rajlovac,

14     Vogosca, and Ilijas.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Just for the transcript, Dr. Karadzic said "corps"

16     rather than "division" of the BH army at line 25.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Sorry, but I have to explain.  The

18     14th Division of the 1st Corps was active in Hadzici, and in Ilijas it

19     was the 16th Division, so that the entire corps was firing upon the

20     Serbian part of Sarajevo.  The 12th Division was opening fire from the

21     city itself.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I think we are now entering the region

23     where there is some doubt as to the relevance.  While we understand that

24     it was during the war, please bear in mind you were indicted for specific

25     allegations.  Please continue.

Page 32718

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, thank you.  I

 2     will follow that, but the last sentence by General Milosevic, solutions

 3     had to be sought in order to open fire to curb their fire, that means our

 4     fire is directly linked to their fire and that is why I wanted to get

 5     Mr. Milosevic to recall examples when he was not able to contain anymore

 6     and return fire with consequences that were disastrous to us.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  But your question was a bit much broader than this.

 8     Please continue.  What is your question for the General?

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Do you still remember today some drastic examples of our losses

11     that dictated our responding with fire to their fire?

12        A.   Moments of that kind and that nature were more than one - I

13     cannot enumerate them all now.  And I suppose you want to hear about what

14     was going on in the urban part of Sarajevo, not in Nisici and Trnovo

15     areas because there were other incidents there where we had to look for

16     solutions.  I know very well in the month of May 1995 unit commanders

17     were reporting that they were under heavy fire.  The positions of troops

18     are covered with strong fire and the fire is spreading to civilian areas.

19     My response was to get to the procedure to see whether it was reliably

20     established from where the fire is coming, from which weapons, and to

21     what extent we would be threatening civilians if we responded.  That was

22     time-consuming.

23             The second thing I had to do was to inform UNPROFOR to enable

24     them to see what was going on exactly.  All this required time and in the

25     meantime my subordinate commanders were very unhappy that I was not

Page 32719

 1     giving them permission to respond with fire.

 2             I know and I found it somewhere in the papers later, that the

 3     UNPROFOR observer was observing this and could see how strong the fire

 4     was opened by the 12th Division.  That is one thing.  Second, we also

 5     established that the localities where we could respond with fire would

 6     not hurt anyone but the shooters.  That was the situation in May 1995.

 7     In one of their reports that I saw later, they say that they had engaged

 8     in a three-day action, the commander of the 12th Division is reporting to

 9     his superior that he had used up all the ammunition and he's asking for

10     new ammunition, and those were thousands of destructive projectiles.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 12388.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   One of your reports from 1993, a regular combat report.

14             Page 2 in Serbian.  It's probably page 3 in English.  Item 8.

15             General, sir, could you read out aloud this passage that says:

16             "In view of the frequency ..."

17             You signed this on behalf of General Galic; correct?

18        A.   Yes.

19        Q.   Could you read out loud the entire paragraph that begins with:

20             "Given the frequency ..."

21        A.   "Given the frequency of enemy operations, we foresee that certain

22     units will not be able to tolerate the consequences of enemy fire and

23     consequently will be forced to return fire to protect their personnel.

24     For this reason, a vigorous protest should be made at the fire the enemy

25     is launching from the city.  UNPROFOR should take a firmer stand in

Page 32720

 1     protection of our units and population."

 2             I don't know what kind of comment you expect me to make, but that

 3     was our experience, that the fire was going to be only stronger and

 4     stronger and that we must protect our personnel and population, and we

 5     must also ask for UNPROFOR's assistance, to put pressure on the enemy

 6     side just as they were putting pressure on us to contain all types of

 7     fire.

 8        Q.   You say that the enemy should be prevented from opening fire from

 9     the urban area.  You consider all the other fire to be legitimate;

10     correct?

11        A.   We need to clarify this.  There is no such thing as legitimate or

12     illegitimate.  You can fire on the enemy as long as it's only the enemy

13     and his weapons.  I did not want to observe any other rules and look at

14     nuances such as whether there would be more damage or less damage.  If

15     fire was opened by a weapon or a group of weapons or by an enemy unit, we

16     can open fire at them.  We could not make any other calculations and take

17     the risk of causing damage to others.  I don't know if you understood

18     what I wanted to say.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this,

20     please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2809, Your Honours.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, while you were still in the 1st Romanija, what kind of

25     orders did you get from the corps command regarding action targeting the

Page 32721

 1     city?  What was the position of the command?  Especially with regard to

 2     larger calibres.

 3        A.   I understand your question perfectly well.  I want to answer as

 4     follows.  General Galic, who was the corps commander, was far more

 5     restrictive and strict than what I am describing.  I take my hat off to

 6     him, and I can say I have learned from him a lot in terms of how strict

 7     you have to be in restricting behaviour that is not legitimate in combat.

 8     In other words, not even his predecessor, Sipcic, had a different

 9     approach.  He was only less demanding.  But Galic constantly issued

10     warnings and orders and really insisted with commanders that they must

11     not engage in such behaviour.  And that was an encouragement to me to

12     continue in the same vein and only our styles differ.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 1D3441.  The

14     English version is all right.  The Serbian is something else.  But it's

15     the same date, 31st October 1992.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can I read this to you in English, General?  It will be

18     interpreted to you.  31st October 1992.

19             [In English] "To:  All SRK units.

20             "Beginning on 1st of November, 1992, until further notice, it is

21     strictly forbidden to use weapons with a calibre greater than

22     12.7-millimetres without the permission of the Corps Commander or his

23     deputy.

24             "Deputy commander ... Marcetic."

25             [Interpretation] Did your brigade receive this order and is this

Page 32722

 1     consistent with your knowledge?

 2        A.   I remember this order, and of course, since I remember it, we

 3     received it and I'm aware of it.  Yes, yes.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the usher give the General a

 5     hard copy in Serbian.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's no problem.  [In English]

 7     Thank you.

 8             [Interpretation] I can only confirm that this is correct and this

 9     was a regulation issued by the corps command, and of course it says that

10     this is a ban on the use of calibres greater than 12.7 millimetres.  It's

11     all types of mortars, artillery, anti-aircraft machine-guns, guns,

12     et cetera.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, can you understand from this document

15     that any shells that were fired from the Serb side and that were greater

16     than 12.7 millimetre in calibre were fired with the permission of the

17     corps commander, if any?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, that is not the

19     position.  The commander made his position known and it was abided by.

20     So irrespective of the fact whether a fighter awaited the commander's

21     approval or not, he had to rely on the clear decision not to engage.  In

22     situations when there was no strict prohibition, the fighter in question

23     had to involve the procedure which I have referred to a number of times

24     here, which means that it required full analysis.  The brigade commanders

25     who, within the system of authority, certain powers were delegated to,

Page 32723

 1     they could act in accordance with certain prearranged decisions if there

 2     was a sufficient degree of threat.  Their decisions were the same as if

 3     they had been received from the corps commander.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             We'll receive this.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2810, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we next have

 9     1D7509.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, sir, we'll see on the next page -- well, perhaps we can

12     go to that page immediately.  It is your document as the Chief of Staff

13     dated the 20th of October, 1993.  Item 2, please, "our defence lines ..."

14             Is this your signature?

15        A.   Yes, it is.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Go back to page 1, please, item 2.

17     We can see it in the English version.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   What is stated there about the defence lines as well as response

20     to enemy fire?

21        A.   The position was as stated here.  The defence lines remained

22     unchanged.  This was a report.  Since there were attempts to attack, our

23     defence stood ground and there were no changes in terms of our forces

24     being pushed back.  However, irrespective of the degree of our

25     protection, the units were still cautioned not to open fire on the

Page 32724

 1     central part of town, on Sarajevo.  There was always a need to be aware

 2     of movements and goings-on in Sarajevo because it was an important issue.

 3     In Sarajevo, international activity took place as well.  That is why

 4     there was an order that no fire should be opened even if we were

 5     threatened directly.

 6        Q.   What does the document say about observation and surveillance?

 7        A.   Well, surveillance is a separate profession, so to say.  It

 8     always had to be in place and all movements had to be observed.  I don't

 9     think it requires any additional explanation, if you understand what I

10     mean.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

13                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

14             JUDGE KWON:  The third page of the B/C/S version is nothing to do

15     with the document, so we'll admit only two pages.  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2811, Your Honours.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just before the break, could we

18     cast a glance on D2567.  It is a short document.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, sir, it is an order to all brigades, regiments, and

21     independent battalions dated the 22nd of May, 1993.  Some consequences

22     are referred to following the activity of the other side, but

23     irrespective of that, General Galic - and it was Sladoje who issued this

24     on his behalf, I presume - prohibited the firing of any weapons larger

25     than 12.7-millimetre calibre and requires that all means of firing be put

Page 32725

 1     under control.

 2             Can you recall what consequences are referred to on the

 3     22nd of May, 1993?

 4        A.   I can't say anything about that.  Unless I'm mistaken, I wasn't

 5     in the corps at the time, in May 1993.  I can confirm, though, that this

 6     is a normal standard request or caution stating what is to be done.  As

 7     far as I know, I was still not with the corps at the time.  This strikes

 8     me as a normal, regular order referring to certain events which had

 9     preceded it.

10        Q.   You were in the brigade.  It is addressed to all the brigades.

11     Does it mean that the 1st Romanija Brigade received it as well?

12        A.   I wasn't in the brigade at that time either.

13        Q.   I apologise, then.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, we can have a

15     break whenever you wish to have it.

16             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at

17     11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  Could

22     we have a Prosecution exhibit, the number is P01641.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, sir, are you familiar with this document?

25             Perhaps we can see the other page too.  Can we have the next

Page 32726

 1     page.

 2        A.   Yes, yes.

 3        Q.   Let's go back to page 1, please.  The first paragraph, can you

 4     explain this proposal for setting artillery aside.  Why did you send this

 5     proposal and what were the reasons that guided you?

 6        A.   It is my proposal and I see it as such.  It was my estimate that

 7     it was up to me to propose this, whereas the decision was to be made by

 8     those whom I addressed, that is to say, the Main Staff.  I'm familiar

 9     with this document.  It was to the effect that a manoeuvre should be made

10     to keep some of the pieces, and I am not trying to hide that.  It is true

11     that I proposed it as such.  It was all based on my experience until then

12     with the way the war was going on and in light of our co-operation with

13     UNPROFOR.

14             When the decision was made to withdraw the weapons, it was my

15     conclusion that all of our weapons were to be withdrawn and its use

16     restricted, whereas the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say, their

17     1st Corps, had such weapons which even when withdrawn had the range and

18     possibility to be used against the area that was supposed to be under

19     prohibition, the area where the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had its lines of

20     defence.  If they had the so-called NORAs, that is to say,

21     155-millimetre howitzers which could reach as far as 32 kilometres, it

22     was all the same to them whether the pieces would be at a permitted

23     location or a location that was not permitted.  They were still within

24     the range where they could open fire.  That is what guided me to propose

25     to my superior command that a contingent of weapons should be retained as

Page 32727

 1     a floodgate, as a means of protection in those circumstances when we were

 2     under threat.  Of course, I am by the same token not saying that it was

 3     the wisest thing to do on my part.

 4        Q.   You mentioned that you proposed this based on your previous

 5     experience.  What was that experience that drove you to proposing this?

 6     What was the nature of that experience?

 7        A.   Yes, this is already 1994 and there was plenty of experience.

 8     There were continuing warnings and assertions that we opened fire,

 9     whereas allegedly the other side did not.  And we all know from practice

10     that they did.  Next, the weapons and measures that were supposed to take

11     place were not to be implemented the way as envisaged by the negotiator

12     or whoever accepted this decision, and we knew it would be like that.

13     They hid their pieces in tunnels or other places of low visibility, and

14     UNPROFOR did not see them.  I know and I believe that UNPROFOR did see

15     those weapons, but there was no pressure or reason enough to indeed have

16     those weapons truly moved out of their range or stop from being active.

17        Q.   How was the cease-fire implemented?  Were there violations of

18     cease-fire before and after this date?

19        A.   The issue of the cease-fire, well, it's something -- but before I

20     answer let me add this:  It was our decision to have a full record of how

21     the cease-fire was honoured by the other side.  We knew what we were

22     doing, of course, and it was our decision not to use those means and not

23     to violate the cease-fire.  The register of violations of the terms is

24     quite long.  I know it's somewhere out there because we created it, and

25     it follows from one day to the next their violations and the

Page 32728

 1     characteristics of their activities.  We used it as an indicator to show

 2     that all agreements and decisions were in vain when they kept being

 3     active from one day to the next and violated the agreement.

 4        Q.   In the agreement of the 18th of February, that is to say, one

 5     week later, was this proposal of yours adopted?  Was it made part of the

 6     agreement or not?

 7        A.   Of course not.  I don't have any regrets.  I know that there were

 8     people who wanted to observe this, those who were in charge of

 9     implementing that decision, and those people did it.  All the assets were

10     moved to Krivoglavci, Poljane [phoen], and so on and so forth, as agreed.

11     I was personally there when those things were happening, the assets were

12     being brought over, and the UNPROFOR deployed Bruno's elements, fenced

13     those assets off, and they could no longer be used.  I was there when

14     General Soubirou was there and I saw in him a firm position that we were

15     supposed to observe because it was well sounded.  The General did not

16     want to greet me.  I did not hold it against him.  I saw that he was an

17     honest man doing an honest job in order to stop the conflict.  My

18     conclusion was that that was his decision; however, once the assets were

19     fenced off, fire was opened from their assets on us - I don't know where

20     they were fenced off, whether they were fenced off at all, who controlled

21     them.

22        Q.   General, sir, you mentioned that after that, or rather, that you

23     kept records on the violations of the cease-fire.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7033.  I

25     am not tendering the previous one because it has already been admitted

Page 32729

 1     into evidence.  1D7033.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is this the record of truce violations starting with the

 4     10th February?  And that date is also the date of your previous document.

 5        A.   Yes, this is the record.  I'm sorry that the letters are a bit

 6     small, but I'm sure you can follow the dates, the places, the times when

 7     those truce violations happened.  You can see when fire was opened as a

 8     result of the fact that the 1st Corps did not observe the cease-fire.  We

 9     monitored those things continuously, not only on those dates, but even

10     later than that.

11        Q.   Can you tell us something about the precision of the record,

12     9.15, 8.45, was that a task?  Does this truly reflect the times when fire

13     was indeed opened?

14        A.   Of course, where there is a will to have certain information,

15     then that information has to be complete, not only as regards the date

16     but also the time.  So we wanted to be perfect in recording those

17     incidents.  I dare say that we were even overzealous, maybe we even

18     over-recorded things.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

21             JUDGE KWON:  If you would like to tender the whole document,

22     could you put some overall foundation as well as some content of it.  The

23     last part of document seems to be of different format.  Probably we need

24     some further explanation.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can go to the last page,

Page 32730

 1     then.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, sir, something has been added by hand, 88 times.  What

 4     is this and why has the structure of the record been altered here?  What

 5     is this about?

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the Serbian version be zoomed

 7     in for the benefit of the General.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, not necessary.  It's big

 9     enough.  I can't say yes.  I don't know -- well, I personally cannot tell

10     you what the difference is between the beginning of the record of truce

11     violations and what I see here now.  The format is changed.  The columns

12     have been changed.  What is missing is the hour when a truce violation

13     happened, but the gist is the same, the number of shells, the time,

14     where, in what area, and what our response was.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Aha.  Did I understand you properly when you said that the format

17     has been changed?

18        A.   Yes, the form, the format has been changed, nothing else.  The

19     only thing that is missing are the hours, for example, that things

20     happened at 9.00 a.m. or 9.00 p.m., but the date remains as well as the

21     type of fire which was opened on that particular day and how we responded

22     to that kind of fire.

23        Q.   And what about the last column, whether it was responded, is that

24     it?

25        A.   Yes, whether it was responded or not, yes, which means that the

Page 32731

 1     words "yes" and "no" provides the answer to everything.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go back to the previous

 4     page.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Can I interrupt you here.  Can we see the B/C/S

 6     page 31, in English page 55.  This is the last page of the first format.

 7     Could you see the date, General?  That's -- I think it's sometime in

 8     April 1994.  Do you agree?  30th of April, 1994.  And shall we see the

 9     next page in the B/C/S while remaining on the same page in English but

10     the bottom of the page.  From April it says it's sometime in November.

11     November in what year?  Would you like to see the previous page again?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand what is missing here

13     is the year, the year.  Probably the record-keeper, the person who

14     collected this information, he probably thought that the year could be

15     only the year when those conflicts were taking place.

16             JUDGE KWON:  So --

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But there is a year.  There must be

18     a date containing the year.  During the night between the 11th and

19     12th November 1999 [as interpreted], the enemy opened fire on all the

20     front lines in the direction of Olovo and Kladanj, for example.

21             JUDGE KWON:  If it was 1994, would it mean that there was no

22     violation of truce between May and October?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that wouldn't mean that.

24     Perhaps no information was collected, perhaps no record was established

25     to that fact.  If the information was not complete, it was not entered.

Page 32732

 1     If the record was not made, if the note was not made on the day when fire

 2     was opened, then it was not registered post festum, after the event,

 3     based on memory.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Now, having seen part of this document, do you know

 5     who produced this document and when?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The document was compiled by the

 7     operative organ of the command of the 4th Corps [as interpreted].  This

 8     means that it was compiled by the operatives who were officers in charge

 9     of receiving information, analysing it, reporting to the commander or the

10     Chief of Staff about the developments, and then came up with the analysis

11     that served as our base for future contacts and work with the UNPROFOR.

12             JUDGE KWON:  General, did you say "4th Corps," "command of the

13     4th Corps"?  I don't follow.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I could not have said the

15     4th Corps.  I only said the corps command and what I meant was the

16     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Page 3 was admitted previously with

21     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.  Shall we admit them in its entirety?

22             Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  I have no problem with it coming in in its

24     entirety now, Your Honour, given the General's explanation.

25             JUDGE KWON:  If the court deputy could remind us of the exhibit

Page 32733

 1     number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour, Exhibit D2803.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.  And now I

 6     would like to call up P2420.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, take a look at the document.  Tell us whether you

 9     remember the document and its contents.  Lieutenant-Colonel Sehovac

10     forwarded, and I mean literally, the contents of a telegram he received

11     from the Main Staff.  Could you please explain?

12        A.   Could I please be shown the signatures.  Okay.  Thank you.  I

13     would have a lot of to say about this document; however, it seems

14     superfluous for me to say anything.

15             This is information that reached General Mladic - I don't know

16     how, in what ways - and then General Mladic issued some sort of a warning

17     not to do what is outlined in the context as something that was being

18     planned.  First of all, without going any further into the details of

19     this issue, because this would be out of my character, I'm wondering how

20     come that General Mladic sent a piece of paper like this to

21     Colonel Sehovac as a brigade commander.  What he wants to forbid or what

22     he wants to warn about, what he wants to prevent, I commend him for that

23     but he should have done it directly with the corps command or the corps

24     commander.  In this case, it seems to me that somebody wanted to invent

25     things and a plot against Mladic wanted him to issue the warning.  I

Page 32734

 1     don't know whether it was a form of self protection, but in any case

 2     there is no action that was ever followed that might prove that any kind

 3     of intention on the part of the corps commander ever existed to that

 4     effect.

 5             It says here that the corps commander held a meeting with

 6     civilian structures.  First of all, I never held any meetings with the

 7     civilian structures.  If I had, then we only talked about bringing units

 8     to strength.  I never discussed combat activities with anybody.  For me

 9     this is incorrect information, this is superfluous information, and this

10     is what I claim.  A meeting of that kind absolutely never took place.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What kind of orders did you issue with regard to fire

12     being opened on town, were they similar to what it says here or not?

13        A.   I don't understand what it says here.  The orders that were

14     issued, the measures that were undertaken, I have already described and

15     explained.  Any kind of new approvals, any kind of changes in the

16     position or conduct or giving permit to anybody to open unlawful fire on

17     the city of Sarajevo and its citizens, I never issued any such orders.

18     No such orders should have been issued at all in the first place.

19        Q.   Here somebody forwarded information to Mladic about that meeting

20     that took place on the 5th of November, 1994.  Can we see what happened a

21     week earlier on the 27th of October.  I'm calling up your document

22     65 ter 20823.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before doing so, General, could you tell us what

24     brigade was Mr. Sehovac commander of?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, he was commander

Page 32735

 1     of the 2nd Sarajevo Brigade, Light Brigade, because it did not have a

 2     large number of personnel.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 20823.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, first of all, could you look at the second paragraph.

 7             "Since our enemy is not abiding by any rules or principles,

 8     although we have tried so far to obey -- to observe all the Geneva

 9     Conventions until now, as well as direct our actions exclusively towards

10     military targets, if the enemy continues in this way, they will force us

11     to respond as of today to every bullet fired at the Serbian settlement by

12     firing at the selected target under the Muslim control in Sarajevo."

13             And then look in the last paragraph.  It says:

14             "Brigade commanders, immediately inform the UN monitors in your

15     area of responsibility about this warning ... never open fire first."

16             And now tell us what you ordered in the last paragraph.

17        A.   "We bear great responsibility for saving the Serbian people from

18     the born-again Islamic fanatics.  In doing that, we should remain

19     energetic and persistent and humane above all.  With that aim, I forbid

20     perfidious killing, wounding, or capturing, and other actions which are

21     not in accordance with the international law of war and the Geneva

22     Conventions."

23             This is just the reiteration of previously stated positions and

24     commitments.  This is not a watershed, this is not a change in our

25     conduct.  I'm saying that regardless of whether their fire is selective

Page 32736

 1     or restricted or not, whether we are in too great a danger, there is no

 2     chance that we will cross the Rubicon and do things against the rules.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I tender this, please?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2812, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   What was the stance of superior commands, that is to say, the

 9     Main Staff, relevant to your orders?

10        A.   I hope this will not sound too frivolous, take this with a

11     certain reservation, I would say that you were really nagging us.  My

12     fighters and I wondered:  Why do you keep cautioning us?  We know that.

13     We have nothing to do with any other structures, apart from military

14     structures, the man wielding a gun and opening fire.  Your warnings and

15     the warnings we received from the politicians and the Main Staff were so

16     persistent that I understood it as keeping pressure on us so that we

17     would never take any action that would threaten the civilian population

18     in Sarajevo.  I respect that.  We received those warnings regularly.

19             We also received certain warnings that I liked.  I liked them as

20     an expression of a humane approach towards events.  We don't want to

21     destroy anyone.  We don't want to carry a victory against anyone.  We

22     don't want to harm anyone.  And whatever is to happen is to happen in a

23     military joust, on the battle-field.  In addition, I can say that my

24     brigade commanders shared this feeling and this commitment that we can

25     only engage in military rivalry.  Anything else would be a pyrrhic

Page 32737

 1     [Realtime transcript read in error "puric"] victory.  That was out of the

 2     question.  We could not carry a victory if we opened fire against

 3     civilians because civilians were not our enemies.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see the Prosecution

 5     Exhibit P5642.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   This is your conversation with General Mladic intercepted by the

 8     other side.

 9             Page 4, please.

10             The date is 16 June 1995.  What were the military circumstances

11     on that day, if you can tell us?

12        A.   In the night between the 15th and the 16th June 1995, I recall

13     everybody who was there and still alive.  I remember that very strong

14     forces moved against the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, both from Sarajevo and

15     the surrounding theatre.  They were advancing towards us and our civilian

16     population.  It was the beginning of an offensive that had been planned

17     by the Supreme Command and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina to, as they called it, lift the blockade of Sarajevo.

19             If -- or, rather, we knew very well what they had planned, what

20     forces they had prepared, in which direction they are moving, et cetera,

21     because they had brought forces earlier on from Fojnica and other places

22     and they wanted to launch this offensive a bit later.  But when they saw

23     the unrest among their troops, even we could hear the exchanges of fire

24     from their areas.  We knew exactly what needed to be done and what needed

25     to be organised.  I made a decision, together with my brigade commanders,

Page 32738

 1     how to deploy our forces and to fortify ourselves to repel that

 2     offensive.

 3             They selected renowned commanders.  Famous General Alagic

 4     commanded the 7th Corps and we felt the full force of their strike.  They

 5     came in waves.  They sent one contingent of forces into an assault, and

 6     when they are repelled, they sent another wave.  They kept trying to

 7     break out through our positions.  They failed.

 8             I reported to the Main Staff, to General Mladic, our command,

 9     what was being prepared in the night between the 15th and the 16th, and

10     he's asking here how things are coming along.  And I tell him:

11     Everything is coming along as I had reported to you earlier, the same

12     scenario.  He was fully informed by that time.  He needed to ask no

13     questions.  He could get his written reports.

14        Q.   Somewhere in the middle he says:

15             "That is the method.  Hold on.  Congratulations.  I hear you've

16     inflicted major losses on them."

17             Is it true that you inflicted major losses on them?

18        A.   I've already said what kind of operations they mounted and how

19     they employed their units.  When one contingent of forces fails to break

20     through, they bring them back and have them rest and then they send

21     another wave.  Why they did that and why they used their personnel in

22     that way, I don't know and I don't want to go into that; but we did

23     inflict losses on them.

24        Q.   Further down below it says Mladic says:

25             "They are moving at all costs."

Page 32739

 1             I'm not sure this is correctly translated.

 2             [In English] "They're fighting tooth and nail and they should be

 3     made to pay for it."

 4             [Interpretation] What does it mean, that they are going forward

 5     at all costs?

 6        A.   I don't see anything unclear here.  He has information that they

 7     are going for a breakthrough at all costs and that's the only thing he

 8     can mean.  Their idea was to solve the situation.  Ratko Mladic must have

 9     meant the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I only meant the area where

10     these forces under the command of Alagic and the other generals were

11     marching towards our front line.  They did, they were going for it at all

12     costs.

13        Q.   And further down he says:

14             "One by one, destroy, attack, only military targets!"

15             You say:

16             "What?"

17             Mladic says:

18             "Only military targets ..."

19             Was this something new?  Was there complete agreement between you

20     and the Main Staff regarding military targets?

21        A.   The agreement was absolute.  I am not aware of any waverings, any

22     vacillation regarding the principal decision how to wage this war.  There

23     was no change of position, no change of approach.  On the contrary, we

24     were completely in agreement - I believe that's clear.  We also agreed

25     that we should target only military targets.

Page 32740

 1        Q.   General, how long did this offensive in the area of the

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps last in June 1995, beginning with June 1995?

 3        A.   It ran its course.  They must have made assessments of what they

 4     have managed to do.  There must have been subsequent decisions to change

 5     axes of attack, change tactics, et cetera.  This offensive lasted the

 6     whole month of June and July, with varying intensity, and they kept

 7     trying to harmonize the action from Sarajevo with the action of the

 8     forces that came from a completely different territory, the forces of the

 9     1st Corps that were outside.  That was a constant problem for them.

10             Now, look, that is the situation, if you allow me, Your Honours,

11     to present this situation to the Chamber.

12             We had come to a conclusion, we made the estimate that in this

13     overall restructuring of axes of attack, they decided, from the area of

14     Sirokaca, which is just under Trebevic, Mount Trebevic, and from the area

15     of Mojmilo hill, to encircle Grbavica and part of Lukavica.  That was

16     felt.  I have to add - and this is intended for everyone, primarily to

17     me - that we could not sit on our hands.  We had to do something to

18     prevent that.  And only thanks to our efforts would the population in

19     Grbavica and other areas be saved.  The population addressed us

20     frequently through their delegations, they made requests, they pled with

21     us to provide them with protection.

22        Q.   You said something about their losses.  What losses did the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps suffer through this sustained offensive and what

24     were the civilian casualties, if any?

25        A.   When the 7th Corps moved towards the forces of the Igman Brigade,

Page 32741

 1     the first losses we had on that axis, that is, the sector and the village

 2     of Vela, the territory of Hadzici municipality, in this first wave of

 3     attack their battalion commander, Captain Bratic, was killed.  And then

 4     at this very difficult moment that was a harbinger of impending

 5     catastrophe, the fighters rose and did not let them succeed in this

 6     breakthrough.

 7             The next day, on the 17th, they were facing a choice.  I don't

 8     know who prepared them and who suggested ways in which they should make

 9     their break out.  That is part of the Russian strategy, actually.  But

10     their way was to choose a narrow axis and then spread their positions

11     further on.  They chose that axis in the neighbourhood of Ilijas which

12     was partly encircled and under attack from all sides, but this area was a

13     hill.  I could not find it on the topographic map, but I found it on

14     another map.  It's a hill called Pijesak where they deployed several

15     artillery weapons and more projectiles landed there than on some major

16     cities in the Second World War.

17             In this fighting, which was very dramatic, I could see that the

18     civilian population, the elderly people were coming from their homes to

19     help carry ammunition, to help the fighting men.  In that situation, the

20     grandson is getting killed, the grandfather is trying to save him and he

21     gets killed himself.  Then the boy's father comes out to save his son and

22     his father and gets killed too.  That was a situation when people were

23     dying like flies but they did not let the front line be broken.

24             Then their forces tried another breakthrough in the area of

25     Nabozici [phoen], but we repelled them again.  My assistance to those

Page 32742

 1     forces was minimal.  I sent only one platoon-strong units to help them

 2     because I had no more to give.  But I was on the spot.

 3             It's very embarrassing for me because I'm getting emotional,

 4     Your Honours.  To that young commander who was 28 years old,

 5     Captain Savic, I came there to help him.  Those were the losses and our

 6     suffering.  On the same day, in Ilijas, 48 civilians got killed.  Let me

 7     not tell you how many people got killed on other axes of attack.  But I

 8     remember this moment, very dramatic moment, that remains etched in my

 9     memory.

10        Q.   One other question regarding that offensive.  What forces, which

11     corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, did engage the SRK?

12        A.   The 1st Corps of the Army of BH with all of their assets, the

13     entire corps, that is, including the divisions in the outer area as well

14     as the 12th Division in Sarajevo itself.  In addition to those units,

15     from the 1st Corps, there was also the MUP brigade.  It was a

16     brigade-strong force amounting to some 7.000 MUP personnel, not in that

17     brigade alone but in total.  The special MUP brigade Bosna as well as

18     other special units were engaged too.  They call them "special," although

19     I'm not sure how special they were.  But we could feel their effect.

20             Next there were also parts of the 2nd Corps of the Army of BH,

21     that is to say, the Tuzla Corps, with the forces that were in contact

22     with us, that is to say, the 101st Olovo Brigade.  There were another

23     2.000 outside the brigade from the 2nd Corps.  So that concludes the

24     2nd Corps.

25             Then the 3rd Corps commanded by General Mahmuljin.  In the corps

Page 32743

 1     there were between 12- and 18.000 people.  There was also a Mujahedin

 2     squad of some 800 fighters.

 3             The next corps was commanded by the famous General Alagic, the

 4     7th Corps.  He brought his corps to the general area of Visoko and Godusa

 5     and Fojnicka Reka.  His intention was to continue further afield to

 6     Sarajevo and via Igman to Trnovo.

 7             Then the 4th Corps, but only some of its parts.  The 4th Corps

 8     was from Konjic, and they only used a part of their forces that were in

 9     immediate contact with the rest of the 1st Corps which had its forces at

10     Igman, Treskavica, and Bjelasnica, and the general area of Pazaric.

11     Those were the forces which meant to destroy us, I dare say.

12        Q.   When you say the Mujahedin squad of 800, what do you mean by the

13     term "Mujahedin"?

14        A.   I'm not sure exactly.  I know what a Mujahedin is, but I thought

15     it was a matter of common knowledge and understood as such.  They were

16     members of units who were foreign nationals or foreign mercenaries.  In

17     any case, they were not from Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They arrived from

18     certain countries outside Bosnia and Herzegovina and even outside Europe,

19     of course from non-Serb lands.  I didn't try to verify their origin, but

20     I know who they were.  It wasn't so much the matter of who it was, but

21     what kind of sentiment, what kind of fear the population felt when they

22     heard of them being blood-thirsty.  And we had to work on the perception

23     of the population.  In any case, the popular image was that of

24     executioners of people who were ready to do anything.

25        Q.   The 2nd Sarajevo Light Unit you mentioned a moment ago, how

Page 32744

 1     strong was it?

 2        A.   The 2nd Sarajevo Brigade was a small brigade.  In total, they had

 3     around 1200 people who were registered.  In terms of use, one could count

 4     up to a maximum of 800 to 1.000 people from the 2nd Sarajevo Brigade.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  What about the corps as a whole, how many people

 6     could it engage in June 1995?  How many people could be introduced into

 7     combat?

 8        A.   The corps used all of the people it had, that is to say, the

 9     maximum strength or force that existed, including commands,

10     communications personnel, logistics, technical services, et cetera.  In

11     total, it was in the area of 18.000.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Given the fact that you were exposed to attacks

13     from -- units from several different corps, what was the situation like

14     in your neighbouring Serb corps?  Could they lend you assistance?  For

15     example, what was taking place in the Drina Corps area at the time?

16        A.   Do not hold this against me, please.  I don't know exactly what

17     the situation was with those corps, not because I didn't want to know,

18     but you have to understand that I was worried with the situation in my

19     corps.  I did ask for reinforcements, although I knew that the

20     Drina Corps -- well, it's a different matter, something that occurred

21     afterwards.  In any case, it drew the forces of the 2nd Corps of the Army

22     of BH to pull out their forces in that part of the offensive when the

23     situation around Srebrenica arose.  In any case, I do know that the corps

24     had their difficulty, their areas of responsibility, and their problems.

25     I also know that General Talic in a private conversation later told me,

Page 32745

 1     "Yes, General, I do know that the SRK was in a difficult situation at the

 2     time in June, July, and August, but do not forget that we were in the

 3     same kind of difficult situation."  I told him, "Well, I'll take your

 4     word for it, although I don't know what your situation was like."

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at 1D7510 to see

 7     what happened in early August that same year and how the Main Staff sent

 8     this order.  1D7510.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before going further, yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Just a very small matter before we go too much

11     further and it's a transcript matter.  Page 39, line 8, instead of

12     "puric," p-u-r-i-c, I think the word should read "pyrrhic,"

13     p-y-r-r-h-i-c.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   It says the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and there's a handwritten

17     note that the Chief of Staff should draft our order; correct?

18        A.   I can't see the whole page.

19        Q.   The handwritten note.

20        A.   Yes.  I can't read all of it.  This is fine.

21        Q.   As for the part towards the bottom, can you just describe the

22     contents of item 2, what is it that the Main Staff is asking the corps to

23     do?

24        A.   Please bear with me.  I'd like to read it first.  What it says is

25     what we could see in earlier notifications, warnings, or orders.  There's

Page 32746

 1     no particular reason for me to comment upon this.  It pertains to certain

 2     prohibitions, caution, and the process of decision-making that only

 3     military targets could be engaged.

 4        Q.   How about this, we see that observation posts are ordered to be

 5     on duty around-the-clock in order to guide artillery and mortar fire, in

 6     order to achieve as great effects as possible with the least amount of

 7     ammunition.  Fire should not be opened on targets which had not been

 8     observed.

 9        A.   I understand that.  I can only repeat what was stated in the rule

10     that we had put in place and we honoured it without anyone's caution.  It

11     rose out of necessity.  One cannot do anything running blind.  One needs

12     appropriate information.  One couldn't undertake an activity in order to

13     create an impression of strong fire.  One gains nothing by that.  All of

14     my men needed time to understand that our fire amounted to nothing unless

15     the target is hit.  When hitting barriers like a street or something like

16     that, it means nothing unless we hit the target.  Collateral casualties

17     were of no effect and only accurate fire should be opened.

18             I demonstrated to my staff in the following way.

19             When I was in the village of Ostojic at the foot of Treskavica,

20     there was a battery from the 1st Corps.  They had 105-millimetre pieces

21     attacking the village the whole day and I happened to be there and I told

22     the fighters, "See, no effect," after all that had been done, and they

23     didn't know that all their efforts amounted to very little.  We could

24     engage in action only if we wanted to prevent them from having any effect

25     and we could only do that by direct hits.  And the observation system was

Page 32747

 1     in operation around-the-clock and the rules that applied were always in

 2     place.

 3        Q.   In your view, how do you see the allegations from the indictment

 4     that we opened fire at the city randomly and that we used

 5     disproportionate response?

 6        A.   I am aware of that category of interpretation.  Let me address

 7     the issue of proportionality first when opening fire.  In order for the

 8     SRK or anyone else to open fire proportionately on a target, there are

 9     rules in place.  If there is a target that is actually a battery which

10     would amount to a firing squadron in position of defence, then the target

11     needs to be either neutralised or destroyed.  There is a big difference

12     between the two in the amount of ammunition that is to be expended.  No

13     matter how well regulated by the rules, there is no complete destruction.

14     It would be a mere chance to have someone destroy another in totality.

15     Such ambition should not be contemplated unless one had very solid

16     protection.

17             We had our ammunition quantities approved in our combat kits and

18     our units were provided with certain quantities of ammunition that the

19     brigade commanders asked for and I was usually chased about by the

20     brigade commanders because they wanted more ammunition.  I wasn't trying

21     to shun or run away from the responsibility.  I simply had to tell them

22     that we hadn't any more.  Any quantity had to be so limited that they had

23     to come up with different solutions and they realised that.  So you set a

24     limit to his ammunition quantity and then they cannot engage in any

25     excessive fire or minimum fire.  They only fired when they were certain

Page 32748

 1     that they would hit the target.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2813, Your Honours.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, sir, when it comes to neutralisation or destruction,

 8     when are you satisfied?  What is the difference in the level of use?  How

 9     do you know when the target was sufficiently destroyed?

10        A.   Everything can be established.  Everything is well-known.  First

11     of all, it was not inexperienced people who waged the war or amateurs who

12     didn't know what they were doing.  Everything had to be known, everything

13     had to be well ascertained.  If a target was hit, it was also neutralised

14     which did not mean that it was completely destroyed, but it was no longer

15     what had happened to that target.  The most important thing was that the

16     target was hit.  That target could have remained alive because people

17     don't often die from just one bullet.  It takes a lot of bullets

18     sometimes and everybody who participated in the war know that.  They knew

19     what was happening to us.  We knew what was happening to them.  And there

20     is a saying that not every bullet hits the target, but it doesn't really

21     make sense.  What makes more sense is that not every shell hits the

22     target.

23             What else can I tell you about this term of "neutralisation"?

24     The measure of destruction is something that we did not carry out because

25     it was not -- impossible to implement.  Neutralisation means that the

Page 32749

 1     target is rendered quiet by our activity.

 2        Q.   If that is achieved with one or two shells, does the shelling

 3     continue, General, sir?

 4        A.   No, it does not continue.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  A foreign witness, a monitor, I apologise that I

 6     cannot quote the page, to my question which was how he knows what terror

 7     is and what it is not.  He said that one or two shells constitutes

 8     terror.  When there is a large shelling campaign, it's militarily

 9     justified.  What do you have to say?

10        A.   Well, it depends on the target because you can hit a group of

11     people who have nothing to do with fighting with one shell.  If that

12     shell hits them, for them it's more than terror.  I'm not talking about

13     that.  I could not follow that witness's thesis because when it comes to

14     the use of assets, I'm not talking about them in that way.  However, when

15     a target is hit directly, it does not constitute terror.  On the

16     contrary, I have failed to mention that sometime in May when my

17     commanders were exposed to fire and they wanted us to curb their

18     artillery fire, we did not respond to their artillery fire.  We launched

19     some direct hits and CNN recorded us targeting their bunkers, but that

20     was never aired.  Because some people who watched, some viewers, wondered

21     how could you implement such direct hits in order to prevent their fire.

22     We did it because it was a necessity.  Later on, people portrayed it --

23     portrayed those campaigns as our shelling the city.  Let me conclude.

24     When you hit a target, then it's not terror.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 1D7512.

Page 32750

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   You were hospitalised at the time on the 19th of August; however,

 3     your Chief of Staff was there.  I am interested in this as an expression

 4     of the corps' policy and position.  Please look at bullet point 1, where

 5     it says that the system of observation should be improved in platoons and

 6     battalions and so on and so forth.  How does this tally with the policies

 7     and position of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and its tactics?

 8        A.   This fits really well with all that.  I've already said I believe

 9     that warfare cannot be done by blind people.  Every officer and every

10     command as a whole knew how they could organise their defence system, how

11     they could implement their war tactic.  I am glad to see that the

12     continuity is very clear.  I said it very clear that the continuity

13     starts with the corps commander, who was Galic, then it came down to me.

14     We can see that Colonel Sladoje, who remained in charge of the forces,

15     firstly knew very well what to do; and secondly, he applied the same

16     methods, the same practices, and he had the same demands of his unit.

17     There was no discontinuity there.  There were no changes in the policies.

18     There were no changes in conduct.  There was no slacking on anybody's

19     part.

20        Q.   Thank you.  He says here fire has to be planned.  And under 3, it

21     says:

22             "In all units, ensure that fire is opened according to plan and

23     that units, adjacent units, and the population are previously informed so

24     as to avoid unnecessary losses when the enemy returns our fire."

25             Could you please tell us what your obligations were vis-a-vis the

Page 32751

 1     population that resided close to your assets, i.e., what were your

 2     obligations and what was your attitude, i.e., what is implied with bullet

 3     point 3?

 4        A.   I am not going to say here that we did everything perfectly, a

 5     hundred per cent.  However, protection measures for civilians were

 6     implemented, and the basic measure was not to allow the civilians to

 7     remain in the area where there were artillery assets and combat

 8     positions.

 9             Let's understand each other.  The civilians never even tried to

10     find themselves in such areas.  The exceptions were those who were

11     carrying ammunition, who moved with the columns.  This does not apply to

12     the prevention of their presence there.  I am here talking about the

13     exclusion of a civilian population from such areas.  We could not

14     implement that by way of moving people physically from the areas of

15     combat activities.  We could warn them.  And I bear the responsibility

16     for those people in the workers' log cabins near the Energoinvest

17     building and the school of electrical engineering.  There were people

18     there.  There were no artillery assets there, but those people

19     nevertheless got killed.  Men, women, and children got killed by

20     artillery fire particularly during this offensive.  I did not issue any

21     decision to move them out because there were no artillery assets there.

22     To be honest, I didn't do anything because I never expected that they

23     could be targeted.  And, unfortunately, they got killed.

24        Q.   Can we now look at the following page, bullet point 7.  Let's see

25     what Colonel Sladoje ordered.  It says here:

Page 32752

 1             "Inform the population and prepare it to leave and stay in

 2     shelters.  Use the police force to prevent the civilians from moving in

 3     the area of combat activities and completely stop civilian traffic."

 4             Is this in keeping with the commander's obligations towards

 5     civilians?

 6        A.   This is self-explanatory.  This shows clearly what he as

 7     commander did.  There is no ambiguity here.  This is something that he

 8     was duty-bound to do and he did it.  These are facts that demonstrate

 9     that everybody knew what needed to be done to protect people.  This is

10     excellent.  I think that he did very well here.

11        Q.   What were the obligations of the officers of the other side with

12     regard to their own civilians and how did they comply with those

13     obligations?

14        A.   My answer is this:  I'm not going to discuss their obligations.

15     I believe that they are self-explanatory.  They should have known what

16     they were supposed to do.  In the overall constellation of relations, we

17     could not seek justifications.  We could not say they were duty-bound to

18     protect the area from which they opened fire to move the population out.

19     It was our task to establish whether that area was still inhabited by

20     civilians, and if there were civilians, we should not have opened fire on

21     those areas and we did not.  If the area was not cleared, we applied the

22     procedure that I have already mentioned several times.  First of all,

23     there would be observation, information would be provided as to what was

24     observed, what kind of assets were there, and then the officer assess

25     their threat, and after that we either used our assets or we prevented

Page 32753

 1     their use.  It is only normal that they were supposed to protect their

 2     own population.  They should have disallowed them to remain in the

 3     locality where combat activities were taking place.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be admitted?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2814, Your Honours.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   General, sir, you mentioned the profitability of a target and the

10     acceptability of collateral damage.  How were these things guiding you in

11     your actions?  Were those principles your guide-lines?

12        A.   It was very important for any shelling campaign if it was

13     considered that there would be a lot of casualties on our side, the only

14     thing that we did was to carry out the necessary assessment in order to

15     obtain some information.  Even if there was a possibility for people to

16     get killed although they were not direct participants in fighting, in

17     order to minimise the collateral damage and to be different than the

18     damage we suffered from their fire, if there were to be losses due to

19     heavy fire from that area, that locality was targeted only if there was

20     minimal collateral damage among civilians and that amounted to one or two

21     people.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D8012.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   You just told us that the number of shells does not have anything

Page 32754

 1     to do with the number of victims.  Which shell is the most dangerous in

 2     order?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, if I may, I wonder -- I've just been

 5     listening to a couple of different channels of interpretation.  I wonder

 6     if Dr. Karadzic and General Milosevic could be encouraged just to measure

 7     their pace in their questions and answers a little bit so that our

 8     colleagues can keep up with the speed of the evidence.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   We have to make pauses, but I wanted to accomplish as much before

12     our lunch break.  You mentioned the fact that the number of casualties

13     does not depend on the number of shells.  What happens after the first or

14     the second shell?  Which shell is the most dangerous for manpower in

15     their sequence of being fired?

16        A.   Let us agree on one thing.  When I say that the number of shells

17     is not the right measure, I'm talking about our military positions.  I am

18     not saying that one, two, or a hundred are perilous if none of them have

19     hit the target.  I don't know whether I am making myself clear.  I know

20     what I'm trying to say.  I'm trying to say that not every shell kills.

21     Shells don't kill people who are protected.  This was my intention.  I

22     wanted to convey that message to my artillery men.  I didn't want them to

23     think that when they launch a great number of shells that they are

24     effective.  They're only effective if they hit the target.  That's the

25     rule and that's what I tried to convey as a message to my artillerymen.

Page 32755

 1             And when we're talking about shells missing targets, nobody knows

 2     what the collateral damage will be and nobody knows which one in the

 3     sequence will be the most dangerous.  The first one is the warning one

 4     and every next shell is dangerous.  But the first one is the most

 5     dangerous because after the first one, everybody tries to find shelter

 6     and it is especially dangerous and perilous if it hits the target.

 7        Q.   Can you please look at what your Chief of Staff wrote on the

 8     30th of August while you were still on sick leave.  What he said happened

 9     after the alleged Serbian massacre of civilians at Markale.  He says that

10     an air-strike started, and in the third paragraph he says that several

11     thousands of projectiles fell, that there was civilian damage in Hadzici,

12     Ilidza, and in the general sector of Lukavica.  When you returned from

13     your sick leave, did you get informed about the consequences of that

14     shelling campaign?

15        A.   30th August, yes.  I returned to the corps on the 9th or the

16     10th September, which means ten days later than the events described in

17     the document.  Of course they told me what had been going on.  Among

18     other things, the corps command had to relocate.  It was no longer in the

19     same place where I left it because it was exposed to direct fire, but I

20     would say very sophisticated and very precise fire by rapid action forces

21     from the Mount Igman.  Let me not tell you now about this Rapid Action

22     Force.  Of course they reported to me and they told me about the aviation

23     attacks, but I also saw some of that action when the bombs fell on an

24     area overlooking Lukavica.  And I know why they landed there.  There used

25     to be a base for the 247th Self-propelled Rocket Regiment which had moved

Page 32756

 1     out of there as early as 1992 and moved to Novi Sad.  But their

 2     installations remained there and people used that for cover.  And the

 3     NATO aviation dropped a lot of its load in that area.  I was -- I got

 4     there early enough to see some of that action.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stop here?  What's the relevance of this

 6     part?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I need two minutes,

 8     Your Excellency.  Because you will see from further questions that it is

 9     relevant.

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Two minutes, yes.  Please continue.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   General, did you ask your associates to report to you about the

14     events of the 28th of August and what kind of information did you get

15     about the origin of the shell?

16        A.   I did not ask for that and I have to say clearly here I was not

17     aware of the incident.  Because I was not aware, I couldn't ask for the

18     information.  But they did tell me of their own accord what happened at

19     Markale on the 28th of August.  Quite naturally, people told me.  They

20     told me that an anathema fell on the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps because

21     people said it was their mortar who fired their shell.  However, on that

22     day, no such fire was opened, no such shell was used.  That is what I

23     heard from Cedo Sladojevic, Colonel Lugonja, and some other officers from

24     the inner circle of the brigade.

25        Q.   Then in item 4 it says:

Page 32757

 1             "Continue to refrain from opening fire on the city with artillery

 2     weapons and do not fire on UNPROFOR personnel and assets."

 3        A.   Yes, that was our continuing position the way we had agreed to

 4     proceed.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I tender this, please?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2815, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll have a break for 45 minutes and

 9     resume at 22 past 1.00.

10                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.37 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.22 p.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, you mentioned decision-making procedures.  Can you tell

16     me, what was the process of making the decision whether larger calibres

17     will be used?  What was the input from the ground and who made the

18     decision ultimately?

19        A.   The first requirement that had to be met was to find out whether

20     the target is detected.  It was not enough for fire to be observed from

21     that area.  It was necessary to narrow down the area, to identify the

22     target, its surroundings, that is to say, its immediate locality.  The

23     second thing that needed to be established was the type of weapon, the

24     type of fire, and the number of weapons, whether it's one, two, three, or

25     five guns, and of which calibre.

Page 32758

 1        Q.   Excuse me, whose weapons are you talking about when you say type

 2     of weapon and number of weapons?

 3        A.   I thought that was implied.  If we are considering and discussing

 4     targets, then I'm talking about fire opened by the 1st Corps by their

 5     guns, their assets, and the military targets they represented.

 6        Q.   I just wanted it to be crystal clear to the participants.

 7        A.   These decisions had to be taken very quickly because action is

 8     sometimes pointless if it comes too late.  And of course we were not

 9     computers.  We were not machines to analyse this data very quickly.  So

10     the next thing to be considered was the damage that could be inflicted on

11     things other than the target, the surrounding people, buildings,

12     installations, et cetera.  We needed information about that from our

13     sources.  The commanding officer on the ground had to verify all that and

14     to check if the initial report is really accurate.  Sometimes even a

15     trained observer is not always qualified to represent the situation

16     accurately.

17             If we had a target who posed a danger to the forces of the SRK,

18     then we would open fire with the most profitable weapon, such as mortars,

19     or stronger weapons that would enable us to neutralise that target and

20     prevent it from opening fire against us again.

21             Or are you asking me who makes the decision?  The brigade

22     commander or even I if I'm there on the spot.  If I'm not, then the

23     person whose units are in danger will make that decision.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 8, next to the word

25     "danger," I should like to add the word "great" because the General said

Page 32759

 1     if there is a "great danger" then the fire would be opened.  We could

 2     hear it on the tapes if necessary.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Milosevic?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Of course, I understand that you could make that decision as the

 8     highest commander, but what is the lowest level for such decision-making?

 9        A.   It could not be anyone lower than brigade commander.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11        A.   Excuse me, may I add this?  We are not talking about the urban

12     area.  This whole discussion is about the urban area.  In other areas I

13     believe it is perfectly clear that our problems were not just in the

14     narrow area of Sarajevo, but the whole broader region.  If we are talking

15     about areas outside the city, about clearings, then this decision to open

16     fire could be made by a company commander as well.

17        Q.   But speaking of the decision to use heavy weapons, what resources

18     did brigades have and what resources did battalions have and what were

19     your orders in that respect?

20        A.   I hope it is perfectly clear and that detailed explanation is

21     perhaps superfluous, but I'll try.  The basic assets used on the targets

22     we discussed before were the assets at the disposal of the brigade

23     command.  It could be howitzers, 100-, 105-millimetres mortars,

24     120-millimetres, and those were the heavy weapons they had.  They didn't

25     have any other heavy weapons.  The corps artillery had more powerful

Page 32760

 1     weapons that were not in use, such as howitzers 155.  They were

 2     eliminated from use in 1994 when they were withdrawn and placed under the

 3     supervision of UNPROFOR.

 4        Q.   Artillery groups, how are they grouped?  There were some on the

 5     level of brigade, some on battalion level, some on the corps level.

 6     Companies did not have them; right?

 7        A.   No, companies could only have 60- and 82-millimetre mortars, but

 8     not all companies had them because they had to be scattered over such a

 9     large area and not every company commander could have his own artillery

10     support.

11        Q.   And how about the outside forward line of defence facing the

12     2nd and 7th Corps and the 14th and 16th Division, how did the line run

13     through populated areas and did you have any restrictions imposed on the

14     use of artillery there?

15        A.   Those areas were mostly clear, unpopulated -- mostly unpopulated.

16     However, specifically in the area where the Ilijas Brigade was fighting

17     parts of the 16th Division near Breza and Visoko, they were also in

18     contact with the urban area.  It's good that you reminded me about this.

19     There was never a problem if a shell landed in Visoko, but when a shell

20     landed in Sarajevo, then whole world saw it as artillery rampage.  They

21     did not respond to action in higher ground.  There was always this

22     tendency to concentrate on Sarajevo as a city in danger, and Visoko is

23     also a town just like Sarajevo.

24        Q.   How many Muslim shells landed in Ilijas, an urban area in

25     Sarajevo, on average during the war?  Did you have any sort of records,

Page 32761

 1     even rough?

 2        A.   I did not keep that kind of record.  I would take the liberty now

 3     of saying that there was too much fire of that kind, but we did not count

 4     the shells.  That's why I cannot give you a precise number.  But I can

 5     tell you that Ilijas was under fire, not only artillery fire but also

 6     under 12.7-millimetre fire because it was such a compact area.  Ilijas

 7     was a place that was -- whose surroundings were crawling by all sorts of

 8     forces and it was constantly under mortar fire.

 9        Q.   Were neighbourhoods like Visoko, Breza, Zupca, a large Muslim

10     concentration, in the range of SRK artillery?  Did you target them and

11     did you raze them to the ground?

12        A.   It was not impossible to reach.  It was not impossible to fire

13     there.  I'm talking about Visoko.  As for Breza, that locality was far

14     enough to be out of our range.

15        Q.   What about Zupca, it wasn't far, was it?

16        A.   It's actually Zupca.  As far as I remember, that's a village.  It

17     was not too far but it was not under fire.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you remind us, what kind of relationship did

19     Republika Srpska have with Yugoslavia in 1995 at the time of this

20     offensive that three or four corps launched against the Sarajevo-Romanija

21     Corps?  I don't mean the political relationship.  I mean trade.

22        A.   I understand.  I understand.  Concerning these specifics, I know

23     there was a decision to impose an embargo on import of assets.  This

24     embargo was imposed by Serbia and they banned all deliveries to

25     Republika Srpska of equipment, food, fuel, all sorts of supplies.  And

Page 32762

 1     I'm trying to tell you and you, Your Honours, I am only aware of this.

 2     I've read about it but I did not deal with that directly.

 3        Q.   And where did we produce shells in your area of responsibility?

 4        A.   This production was at the Pretis factory in Vogosca.

 5        Q.   Where did we get steel for these shells?

 6        A.   Somebody else might know that.  The situation was like this:  The

 7     director of that factory was complaining to me that he had no imports,

 8     nothing to produce anything with.  So by coincidence I went to Ilijas to

 9     deal with something else and I saw there the ironworks, the former

10     factory of Ilijas, and I saw behind the factory a huge heap of steel.

11     And I asked if they don't need it to give it to Pretis, but they said

12     it's not the type of steel they need.  So I was actually so ignorant

13     about these things that I could not distinguish between what is good for

14     military production and what's not.  I was simply barking up the wrong

15     tree.

16        Q.   I'm trying to avoid leading questions, but tell us about this

17     embargo imposed by Yugoslavia in 1994.  Did it also apply to the steel

18     from Niksic in Montenegro?

19        A.   Yes, yes, I know that.  That was the key product.  Looking in

20     hindsight, I realise now that we needed it more than food.

21        Q.   Let us move on to air bombs and that is why I asked about the

22     situation with logistics in the SRK at the time.  Do you know whether the

23     Muslim side had or used air bombs?

24        A.   My knowledge and in this case my assertion is that they did have

25     air bombs.  To be more precise, around the 18th or perhaps the 22nd of

Page 32763

 1     April, 1992, the special forces of MUP commanded by Dragan Vikic entered

 2     the Pretis factory and started taking away certain quantities of

 3     ammunition and they even took the stock of air bombs that there were in

 4     the warehouses.  There was a skirmish, a conflict, between those who

 5     protected the factory and those forces.  And once it was over, some of

 6     those assets were taken away.  It only confirms that they had a certain

 7     amount of air bombs at their disposal.

 8             Secondly, I do know, although I'm unaware as to how extensively

 9     they used it, they did have an arsenal of anti-aircraft weapons -- I'm

10     sorry, I'm sorry, air lethal assets.  The main depot was in Busovaca,

11     which is in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It was Croatian

12     territory, to tell you the truth, but how they divided the loot from

13     Busovaca is something I don't know.  But they did certainly have

14     preconditions to receive supplies of air bombs.  In this particular case,

15     in addition to other lethal assets, air bombs were there as well.  And I

16     do know that because I used to command a military police battalion and,

17     as such, I was aware of the situation in each and every warehouse and

18     what was being held where back then in the time of the JNA and in peace

19     time.  I stand by my assertion that potentially they did have it at their

20     disposal, but I don't know how diligent they were in keeping matters

21     up-to-date.

22             What I also know is that in the location of the national park at

23     Vrace, there are certain monuments there as well, there were three air

24     bombs that were dropped there but went unexploded.  Colonel Cedo Sladoje

25     called me because he was astonished and he wanted to show it to me.  He

Page 32764

 1     wanted me to see something that on one hand was a dangerous asset for us

 2     and, on the other, we were happy that they did not explode.  One landed

 3     in a civilian's garden and the other two landed in the park itself.  We

 4     were very happy that they went unexploded.  This tells you a lot about

 5     whether they did have it or not.  If they managed to drop it on our

 6     heads, they must have had some.

 7        Q.   Can you remember how they launched them, how were they able to

 8     reach Vrace?

 9        A.   I don't know how they launched them.  There's nothing else I can

10     say.  We all know how they could have launched them, the same way we did.

11     They asserted that alleged bombs came from our side which fell into the

12     Miljacka, and they said they extracted them, used powder for their rifle

13     grenades.  But what I actually fear is that they dropped the bombs which

14     they had extracted that way to attack us with them.

15             There was another thing that I wanted to share with the Court.  I

16     had information that the person who created those assets to be launched

17     from their side was Mr. Berko Zecevic, who had worked at Pretis, and he

18     had advocated the use of such assets even before.  I'm simply sharing the

19     information I had at the time although I'm not claiming anything.  I know

20     that he tried to produce such assets even back when he had worked at

21     Pretis.  He was competent and intelligent enough to design such an asset

22     which was of significant force, significant power.

23             Also, one needed a level of technical education to have them

24     launched as well.

25        Q.   We'll get to that, General.  Let me ask you another thing about

Page 32765

 1     this topic.  Were there any classical-type JNA weapons that the SRK or

 2     VRS had that the Army of BH did not?

 3        A.   It was the other way around, depending on the type of weapon.  I

 4     am not discussing the VRS as a whole.  I'm only discussing the SRK now.

 5     We did not have the NORA howitzers, whereas the 1st Corps of the Army of

 6     BH did and the 1st Corps did as a matter of norm, standard.  They

 7     produced it in the Bratstvo factory and they kept developing them during

 8     the war.  We did not have that kind of asset.  As for the rest we had,

 9     they had it too.  All of that had come from the same armed force.  Both

10     forces were created out of the same basis and we had the same assets.

11        Q.   In addition to the NORA howitzers, did they have 133-millimetre

12     cannons called Sultan?  Did they have such cannons at Igman?

13        A.   Yes.  Actually, it was a 130-millimetre gun.  It has a long

14     barrel and the calibre was 130.  It wasn't as large as you said because I

15     don't think they would have been able to manage such large calibres.  As

16     a professional, I'm not even aware of that calibre.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have 1D7031, please.  This

19     is the audio recording of the 10th of August, 1995, session of the

20     Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Could we have

21     page 7 in the English and we'll move on to page 8, whereas in the Serbian

22     we need page 10.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, did you suffer the consequences of the attacks of such

25     air bombs even before the 10th of April?

Page 32766

 1        A.   I told you we suffered no consequences.  I simply realised that

 2     they had them.  Our problem was the dynamics of activities that were

 3     underway.  It was reported to me literally that some kind of contraption

 4     landed in Nedzarici, apparently having large destructive power.  To tell

 5     you the truth, I had no time to verify at all because combat was of such

 6     intensity that we could only establish whether there was any resulting

 7     damage to Nedzarici so as to enable a breakthrough on their part; and if

 8     that was negative, we no longer bothered.  It seems that some kind of

 9     contraptions also landed at Ilijas.  At times of their aggressive action,

10     we simply did not have time to carry out on-site investigations and keep

11     records.  We just moved on.  If we could protect ourselves in spite of

12     such danger, we simply continued fighting.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In line 13 one reads, as you said, that "we were

14     aware that we had them," whereas you say that "we were aware that they

15     had it."  Were you aware of the Muslim side having air bombs?

16        A.   Yes, that's what I said basically.  That's what I meant.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Let me read out Silajdzic's reply, the last sentence

18     before the president.  He says:

19             "There is some talk of some 26 airplanes that arrived in the last

20     few days.  If this refers to about 10.000 multiple rocket-launcher

21     rockets and 10.000 ARPDZ and 800 aerial bombs, et cetera, then I can say

22     if this is about this and this was among other things ..."

23             And then the president says:

24             "This has not arrived yet.  We are waiting."

25             And then Silajdzic says:

Page 32767

 1             "When I mentioned the four flights, they had already gone by

 2     then, which means that stuff was being brought in.  If that's what it's

 3     about, I can tell you that my sister, our ambassador to Pakistan,

 4     procured it.  However, she resigned but I took care of the money.  So it

 5     was paid to them via Malaysia."

 6             Did you know that they were buying assets in these far away

 7     countries?

 8        A.   I knew about the rockets mentioned here, that they were used

 9     against the units of the SRK.  The kind of procedure they had concerning

10     procurement and their connections, that is something I was not aware of.

11     It wasn't within my remit to know.  What was much more important for me

12     was that I could feel the impact of such weapons after a wave of

13     additional reinforcement which occurred as of the second half of 1994 and

14     in early 1995.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that the page in English

16     does not correspond to the one in Serbian.

17             Can we have this admitted, Your Excellencies?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let me check whether we have correct English.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Pages 7 and 8 in English.  So the

20     previous page -- the bottom of the previous page in the English.  Yes, we

21     see there where it says "800 aerial bombs."  And the rest is at the top

22     of page 8.

23             Your Excellency, I seek to tender the entire transcript because

24     we also admitted all other similar Assembly transcripts en bloc, as a

25     whole, a package.

Page 32768

 1             JUDGE KWON:  That's the case of Serbian sessions.  I'm not sure

 2     if we need to admit them all.  We'll admit English pages 7 and 8.  I

 3     think that's sufficient.

 4             Ms. Edgerton.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, actually, having read the whole document, I

 6     think Your Honours would be better able to understand the context within

 7     which the remarks at pages 7 and 8 are placed if you had the whole

 8     document.  I'm not normally --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary you may --

10             MS. EDGERTON:  -- out to burden the record --

11             JUDGE KWON:  But you may tender it if necessary.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  That's fine.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D2816, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I ask -- thank you.

16             May I ask whether the documents of Muslim authorities should be

17     treated as Serbian documents and admitted as a whole so that we could all

18     rely on them during our closing arguments and submissions?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did we have aerial bombs?  Why did we have them and how did we

23     use them?

24        A.   Yes, we did have aerial bombs.  As an asset which proved itself

25     useful.  It was something we needed.  We were put in a situation where we

Page 32769

 1     needed to have more destructive or stronger weapons which would address

 2     the situations and circumstances which could not have otherwise been

 3     resolved if we wanted to use smaller types of weapon.

 4        Q.   Did you have these smaller types of weapon in sufficient

 5     quantities, such as shells of different calibre that were being produced

 6     in the Pretis factory?

 7        A.   The Pretis factory was one thing, whereas the VRS is a much

 8     larger entity than the SRK alone.  We received some of it from the Pretis

 9     company but not enough.  It confirms what I said before.  The Pretis

10     factory could not produce sufficient quantities because they did not have

11     enough raw materials.  We did not have sufficient assets to conduct our

12     defence adequately.

13        Q.   Thank you.  When the Prosecutor calls those bombs "modified air

14     bombs" in its documents, can you tell us, is it the bomb itself that was

15     modified or is it the way it was launched modified?  What was it that was

16     actually modified?

17        A.   There was no modifications done to the air bomb in terms of its

18     power, the way it exploded, and so on and so forth.  It remains a

19     classical bomb, just as it used to be, and that's as far as the air bomb

20     is concerned.  The modification in question and the term that was used

21     had to do with the way it was launched.  It was not us who called it a

22     modified aerial bomb.  We just called it an aerial bomb.  What was

23     modified was the way it was launched.  It was no longer thrown from the

24     air.  It was launched from the ground from a launcher.

25        Q.   How was it launched?  What was its fuel?  What powered it?

Page 32770

 1        A.   First of all, if I may be allowed to say something.  I went

 2     through all of those stages in my case and what arose was a statement

 3     that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps actually invented that kind of bomb,

 4     that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps used it first, ever.  My information is

 5     different so I'm going to give you a totally different story.

 6             As early as in 1981 or in 1982, I was a battalion commander.  I

 7     attended a training course after Strela 1, a type of anti-aircraft

 8     weapon, was launched.  That training took place in Slovenia and we were

 9     trained to launch that type of weapon.  And then I saw a launcher and a

10     model of an aerial bomb launched from it.  The crew was thus trained to

11     use that Strela anti-aircraft weapon.  I paid good attention to that

12     Strela weapon and to what we were being told.  Unfortunately, I did not

13     pay as much attention to the launcher and the way that asset was fired.

14     It was only later that it occurred to me that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

15     could not have been a creator of that aerial bomb because that had

16     already been done and tested in other places.  And the change consists in

17     the way that bomb was launched, not from the air but from the ground, and

18     it was not our product.

19        Q.   What about the fuel?  What about the way those bombs were fired?

20     What was their nature?  How precise they were?

21        A.   I can tell you everything and I can explain.  At the corps

22     command we designated Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Ugresic and we engaged him

23     to be that link.  But before that, before that, I have to tell you that

24     the Sarajevo region and the factories in Sarajevo, such as Pretis, Orao,

25     and so on and so forth, they all had purpose production.  In that area

Page 32771

 1     there was a host of engineers, a host of experts in weapons.  They always

 2     offered us to improve things or to create things for us.  We could not

 3     rely on the know-how of those people because they maybe harboured other

 4     ideas.  That's why the Lieutenant Ugresic was the link between those

 5     creative factors, those who were engaged in manufacturing the launcher

 6     and mounting the engines to fuel the aerial bomb.  A person who was an

 7     expert, who was very moderate, very conscientious and diligent, he was

 8     vigilant.  He monitored their work in order to tell us whether what they

 9     were doing could be used or not.  He was personally in the testing ground

10     where those assets were tested until they ended up with something that

11     could be used in combat, if you people understand what I'm saying.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the name of that Lieutenant-Colonel,

13     Milan.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ugresic, Ugresic.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Which rockets, which engines were used to be attached to the air

19     bomb?  Did you know?  Do you have that technical data?

20        A.   I already told you who was in charge of that, who was designated

21     to monitor that and to inform us.  I cannot repeat the details and the

22     description of those engines that he gave me, their construction and use.

23     As far as I know, those engines were taken from the -- from

24     multi-barrelled rocket-launchers.  They were rocket engines.  I don't

25     know the details.

Page 32772

 1        Q.   Thank you.  KDZ3083 [as interpreted] was a witness here and he

 2     testified to the fact that before that aerial bomb was used, it was

 3     tested at Zuc.  Did you know anything about the testings of that aerial

 4     bomb before they finally were used in combat?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, before going further, yes,

 6     Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I think on this one I'd like to ask Dr. Karadzic

 8     for a citation, Your Honour.  I think that's a misstatement of the

 9     evidence and it's a very leading question.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  And it -- what's the witness number again?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Something that I think doesn't exist.  The

12     translation or the transcript says "3083."  That's also what I heard from

13     Dr. Karadzic.

14             JUDGE KWON:  That's why I'm asking.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said "383."  I did not mention

16     any 0s.  I don't think that he was protected, but I don't want to take

17     any chances with that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see that number.  Can we get the name,

19     Ms. Edgerton, if he's not protected.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Let me just ask, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, do you have the number?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm not exactly -- I have someone in mind, but I'm

23     not exactly sure if it's the same one in Dr. Karadzic's, so I'm not --

24     perhaps we can rely on the Prosecution for this.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can say.  Milomir Soja.  I don't

Page 32773

 1     think he was protected.  If he was, then we need to redact this.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  No, he was not protected.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  And he was number 383.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, thank you.

 5             And did you, in the meantime, check the -- check your reference

 6     as regards Ms. Edgerton's objection?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Sladojevic is looking for it

 8     and he will tell us.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   But even without that, General sir, did you know anything about

11     the accuracy of these assets and the ways the accuracy of those assets

12     was established?

13        A.   Yes.  Ugresic claimed that the experts who worked on those assets

14     practically perfected the weapon to the point at which it could be

15     considered precise.  If the target was visible, if the calculations were

16     properly made, that weapon could hit the target.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript 7217, lines from 16

19     through 20, Witness Soja.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Did he inform you where those testings had taken place?

22        A.   At Kalinovik, at a testing ground which is an open space in the

23     direction of Mount Zelengora.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Where were those bombs fired from?  How significant

25     was their precision for your forces?

Page 32774

 1        A.   Those assets were fired from the area of responsibility of the

 2     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  That area or that zone is behind the lines of

 3     the units which were in their trenches, and if there were residential

 4     areas on the axis, those bombs would go across those areas.  But those

 5     situations were mostly avoided and they chose such localities where such

 6     aerial bombs would have to overfly only our units.  Those were the

 7     circumstances which required caution and it had to be made sure that

 8     there was a high degree of precision, otherwise the bomb may have landed

 9     on our forces.

10             And let us be clear on one thing.  I know that when we're talking

11     about Soja, Soja reported, or rather, I apologise, he testified about

12     some sort of testing and that that aerial bomb fell on a hangar in the

13     territory that was under the control of the VRS.  I don't know anything

14     about that period.  When it fell over there, all further work was

15     abandoned until conditions were put in place for the electronics to be

16     perfected.

17        Q.   Thank you.  How many aerial bombs were used in the forward part

18     of defence in the outer ring and how many in the city of Sarajevo itself?

19        A.   When dealing with aerial bombs, I perceive that question as

20     having its specificities in the following sense and let me tell you what

21     they are.  We used two aerial bombs, one in Nisici and the other in

22     Trnovo, in the direction of Treskavica.  That was at the time when their

23     offensives were already in full swing.  They did not react.  They did not

24     say that they had been hit by something, but they were stopped in their

25     advancement.  Neither was anybody else interested in the bomb being used

Page 32775

 1     in those localities.  It was construed as the aerial bombs were something

 2     good and not dangerous, and later on, it became the biggest bogeyman for

 3     the urban territory.  They were used in both areas but not with the same

 4     significance.  All of a sudden it occurred to somebody to say that that

 5     bomb was the biggest bogeyman for the mass murder of the population.

 6        Q.   And what was its precision in Nisici and in Trnovo?  Can you tell

 7     the Trial Chamber how far are the two locations from the city and in what

 8     directions?

 9        A.   Yes, yes.  The locality of Nisici and all the sectors around it

10     are some 40 to 42 kilometres from the city or thereabouts.  The same

11     applies, it may be somewhat shorter, towards Trnovo and Treskavica, when

12     the bombs were fired from Trnovo to Treskavica.  I can't speak about

13     precision, save for the fact that their attacks were stopped which means

14     that our aerial bomb achieved its goal.

15        Q.   When did the use of those bombs start in the city of Sarajevo

16     itself?

17        A.   We assessed periods in order to see what kind of combat

18     operations lie ahead of us.  We arrived at the assessments that I have

19     mentioned on several occasions.  We decide to opt for a new strategy and

20     for reinforcement.  We saw that they opened fire from out of the city

21     because they had concluded that they were less successful in trying to

22     break through from the city.  And that's why we started coming up with

23     reinforcement in order to stop their onslaught from those axes.

24             The situation was well assessed; however, what happened next was

25     not based only on those assessments.  When they got reinforcement and --

Page 32776

 1     during the offensives, they became very efficient and they could break

 2     out from the city of Sarajevo.  The 12th Division had grown to such

 3     proportions in terms of manpower and equipment that we realised that we

 4     needed to open fire on those forces that were breaking through from those

 5     areas.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  In my indictment I am charged with an incident which

 7     happened on the 24th of May, 1995, in Safeta Zajke Street.  Allegedly

 8     100 -- a bomb fell 100 metres away from the industrial compound, i.e.,

 9     from the wire.  It is said that two people were killed.  Do you recall

10     the circumstances of that date, 24 May, and the incident in the

11     Safet Zajke Street, I believe it used to be called Drinska.

12        A.   There is nothing that I don't remember if it has to do with

13     military operations and developments in that period and especially in

14     that locality.  When we'd get information that they concentrated certain

15     weapons and especially 120-millimetre mortars, because in this case we

16     are discussing they were attempting to cut off our road from Lukavica to

17     Pale through Trebevic in a place called Zlatiste, near that feature.

18     They did it in such a co-ordinated way that they were attacking on one

19     axis with weapons and in another area they were preparing a breakthrough

20     towards Nedzarici.

21             Now, concerning this incident in - what's the name of that

22     street? - Safet Zajke.

23        Q.   Yes.

24        A.   Yes.  That's where they had six 120-millimetre mortars covering

25     Nedzarici and part of Ilidza with strong artillery fire, and they brought

Page 32777

 1     their forces close to the Stupsko Brdo area so that after that artillery

 2     attack, their infantry could move in.  With the air bomb we stopped them

 3     at Safet Zajke Street and neutralised those six mortars, to the best of

 4     my recollection.

 5        Q.   What kind of their operations do you recall on the 24th of May,

 6     1995?

 7        A.   Before that they were trying to mount these offensives, but it

 8     turned out that these operations of theirs - I cannot now find a good

 9     word for it to explain - but that made it clear to us that they were

10     trying to change the whole course of the war.  Our response to this

11     fierce attack was again seen as us endangering Sarajevo and very soon

12     afterwards NATO air-strikes began.

13        Q.   You're talking about the 25th of May, right, not August?

14        A.   Yes, May.  We're not discussing August now.

15        Q.   In the same indictment concerning the same day, 24th of May, I am

16     charged with the incident in Majdanska Street, where allegedly an air

17     bomb flew into a residential area killing two and wounding six.  Can you

18     tell us, was that street also engulfed in the offensive and what were the

19     circumstances?

20        A.   All this is the same locality, parts of Novo Sarajevo, from which

21     they launched their operations with the proviso that this area,

22     Majdanska Street, territorially belongs to the 101st Mountain Brigade.

23     And their forces attempting a breakthrough went through the well-known

24     Ozrenska Street, that's the street which leads to Majdanska, and their

25     forces were trying to cut off that Ozrenska Street.  And this

Page 32778

 1     Ozrenska Street is like a knife's edge.  Whoever manages to get to the

 2     south side has made it; we no longer have a chance to stop them.  So they

 3     were attacking with mortars from that locality.  I know that their air

 4     bomb landed in a certain place killing nobody.  I know from their

 5     reports.  The indictment says otherwise, that it killed people.  That's

 6     all I know.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, G-11 in the indictment only refers to

 8     a missile projectile.  Is it your or Prosecution's case that the bomb

 9     landed in this Safeta Zajke on the 24th of May was indeed a modified

10     aerial bomb?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  It is.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, I was not clear enough before.  This one in

16     Majdanska Street hit a transformer station.  The closest residential

17     building was a hundred metres away.  Do you believe that it was a

18     legitimate hit, in view of the precision of air bombs?

19        A.   I don't want to assert anything because I don't know how the

20     Court will understand whatever I say.  I know that we were targeting a

21     position that posed a danger to us, and that is how I see it and that's

22     why I estimate that it was justified to neutralise that fire.  As for the

23     distance, 130 metres or 140 metres to the residential building, I still

24     believe that it was far enough to be safe.  It cannot be damaged by our

25     action.  Of course people will be unhappy about it, but there are no

Page 32779

 1     casualties.

 2        Q.   On the 26th of May, the indictment states that in Safeta Hadzica

 3     Street a bomb landed, two people were killed and 12 were -- sorry, two

 4     people were seriously wounded and 12 lightly injured.  What was the

 5     purpose of firing that projectile?  Was it still during the Muslim army

 6     offensive?

 7        A.   I'll first answer about the offensive.  It's impossible that we

 8     would have fired if everything was quiet and nobody was attacking us.  In

 9     that incident, what I know and what I recollect and what the reports that

10     reached me said, fresh forces had been brought in to attempt a

11     breakthrough.  They were trying and they had the firm intention to link

12     up with 104th Brigade through Nedzarici and that reinforcement they had

13     brought was about battalion strength and they were in the expecting

14     sector.  And it was clear their intention was to bring in that

15     reinforcement for attack in the sector, in the expecting sector, of the

16     brought-in battalion which had about 600 men.

17        Q.   Thank you, General.  Concerning the 16th of June, what was the

18     situation in the Sarajevo theatre on that day, 16 June 1995?

19        A.   We have already discussed this date, going through the intercept

20     with General Mladic.  I provided information and explanation that the

21     well-known Tehber offensive had commenced.  It was a situation from which

22     we had to find a way out.  Now, the 16th of June -- I know all these

23     situations here, but speaking about the 16th of June, the air bomb that

24     is said to have been fired at Dositejeva Street in the centre of

25     Sarajevo, I know that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not do that and it

Page 32780

 1     was not its air bomb, if it had been fired at all.  The same applies to

 2     the street, although it doesn't feature in your case, called Cobanija,

 3     formerly Masarykova Street.  They claim that one of our air bombs fell

 4     there, damaging, hitting, part of a boiler room.

 5             Now, as for the Dositejeva Street, it destroyed a toilet.  And

 6     they claimed it destroyed five businesses.  How can anyone claim that

 7     because it's the heart of Sarajevo?  There could not have been five small

 8     shops there.  Anyway, I assert that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps did not

 9     fire these bombs.

10        Q.   Did you know of any military target in Dositejeva Street,

11     regardless of whether it was the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps that fired or

12     not or whether there had been a bomb all?  Were there any military

13     targets there?

14        A.   I did say before that I knew everything, but, of course, there

15     may have been things I didn't know.  I knew about Dositejeva Street that

16     the 1st Corps command is headquartered in the vicinity.  I knew that

17     there were people -- the crew of chopper squadron, I received a report

18     about that, that they had their residence there, but I did not go there

19     to check.

20        Q.   The indictment alleges that three people were lightly injured.

21     What kind of damage would you expect if that place had really been hit by

22     an air bomb?

23        A.   That is why I'm saying, if it had indeed fallen there, it must

24     have caused much greater destruction.  And if it caused no destruction at

25     all, then I wonder what this is all about.  This incident was mentioned

Page 32781

 1     in my trial too.  Not a single witness was brought to testify about that

 2     incident, to say yes or nay.  Mr. Berko Zecevic spoke about this.

 3             One of the first allegations of the investigative organs was that

 4     the air bomb was fired from the area of Pionirska Dolina, and if you

 5     fired anything from that place, you would hit several high-rises before

 6     getting to Dositejeva.  But then Berko Zecevic comes and says:  No, it

 7     was fired from the Pretis factory.  So there are different versions.  In

 8     my mind it was neither.

 9        Q.   On the 16th of June the indictment states that our air bomb hit

10     the Square of International Friendship - you will tell me which brigade's

11     area that was - lightly injuring seven people.  Part of what military

12     operations was this and whose area was this Square of International

13     Friendship?

14        A.   I'm certain that it was the area of responsibility of the

15     102nd Mountain Brigade which had direct contact and was jointly attacked

16     with this battalion of ours and was attacking --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- our battalion in Nedzarici and

19     again this was an attempt to stop their attack.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   I understand you have reservations about the number of casualties

22     in one incident.  Even the indictment says that the total number of

23     casualties, the total number of people killed by this air bomb was five.

24     How do you see that and what does it look like to you from the viewpoint

25     of international law of warfare?  Even if we had done all that, even if

Page 32782

 1     we were responsible, what do you say about five people being the total of

 2     casualties?

 3        A.   In terms of law, I'm not saying that five people killed is

 4     nothing.  That's a lot.  That's one thing.  Two, if they were portraying

 5     this image of a hugely destructive weapon, then this number would seem to

 6     indicate that it isn't.  But with a good selection of target and

 7     precision of fire, it is possible to avoid civilian casualties if you

 8     target only militaries.

 9        Q.   Is it the case that a major offensive was underway at the time of

10     these incidents?

11        A.   Yes.  Very clearly, the enemy was engaging a huge force in order

12     to solve their problem and their problem was to how to create this space

13     for linking up, for further integration and unification of Bosnia as they

14     saw it under their control.  I didn't want to go into whether their plans

15     were realistic or nonrealistic.  But in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

16     everyone to -- down to the last man was determined to protect their own

17     homes and their areas.  In the end, of course, they had to leave or they

18     were driven out, but still they were happy that they were not militarily

19     defeated.

20             JUDGE KWON:  What's the schedule number that happened on 16th of

21     June at the Square of International Friendship?  Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  That's G-15, and of course the number of victims

23     is seven lightly injured and not five.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Does it talk about any killed persons?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

Page 32783

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I did not count

 2     the wounded, but there were five killed people in all of the incidents

 3     put together.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Now I understood, yes.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Finally, at first instance of use of an aerial bomb in the area

 7     of responsibility of the SRK and in the town itself took place on the

 8     7th of April, 1995.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For that -- to that end, let's look

10     at P01201.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, I wonder if Dr. Karadzic can

12     rephrase that question, which --

13             JUDGE KWON:  You're not giving evidence, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was interpreting the indictment,

15     Your Excellency.  In my indictment, the incident is referred to under

16     that date, so I am pursuing the allegations in my line of questioning.

17     But if you wish, we may well continue this tomorrow.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Can you take a look, what paragraph is this?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  G-10, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Would you like to ask the last question for

21     today?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Well, only this:  Do you recognise this document and can you tell

24     us why you issued the order?  What were the circumstances?  What were the

25     circumstances of issuing the order?

Page 32784

 1        A.   I think I have explained in my prior testimony what kind of

 2     events, activities, and actions there were in the area of Hrasnica,

 3     Sokolovic Kolonija, and Butmir.  The Ilidza Brigade, in the area they

 4     defended, were constantly under fire from the forces at Hrasnica.  They

 5     were under threat of extermination of all soldiers and civilians.  The

 6     area defended by the 2nd Sarajevo Unit at Grlica, Vojkovici, and the area

 7     towards Lukavica was attacked even more fiercely.  If need be, I am ready

 8     to show how active they were in the area.  All of the weapons that were

 9     supposed to enter Sarajevo were held there.  The weapons arrived across

10     Igman where there was a selection made and then they kept much of the

11     good pieces.  The 104th Motorised Brigade, for instance, it was the

12     ringleader, I would say, and dealt unfairly even vis-a-vis its superiors.

13     They didn't care about anyone.  They were more extremist and they were

14     busy with that rather than trying to make a breakthrough.  They usually

15     took it out on our civilian population.  That was one thing.

16             Another thing, weapons were arriving through that area, units

17     were leaving, deploying themselves in Niksici and Trnovo, it was a

18     military space boiling with a number of soldiers, activity, attacks on

19     the engine factory, et cetera.  When my subordinates told me that it

20     became unbearable to sustain any further fire from certain locations at

21     Hrasnica - there was mortar fire and ZIS cannons of 76 millimetres - they

22     suggested that we should use an aerial bomb.  I decided so.  I used it.

23     But first I asked them to pin-point a target, which would make sure that

24     their attacks ceased or were reduced.

25        Q.   That's what the first paragraph refers to.  There seems to have

Page 32785

 1     been an attack underway for three days in the Famos factory area.

 2        A.   Yes, yes.  The text speaks for itself.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, this has already

 5     been admitted as a P exhibit and we may conclude for the day.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             We'll continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  The hearing is now

 8     adjourned.

 9                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,

10                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 29th day of

11                           January, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.