Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 33081

 1                           Monday, 4 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, sir.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR MILOSEVIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

13                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

14        Q.   Good morning, General.  Can you hear me in a language you

15     understand?

16        A.   Good morning.  I hear you all too well.

17        Q.   General, I want to go back to -- to begin with, I want to go back

18     to the end of your testimony in your examination-in-chief, and that's in

19     regard to your association with the SDS party.  At transcript page 32815,

20     you said that the SDS or its leaders had no influence whatsoever on your

21     work, although you did have certain contacts with them, and at 32904, you

22     said in response to a question from Judge Kwon on another matter, you

23     said, "I was perceived as being a member of the Serbian Democratic

24     Party," but you said that the only party you were a member of was the

25     League of Communists.

Page 33082

 1             So in that regard, I'd like to show you a document and ask you a

 2     question.  It's 65 ter number 06264.  And the document is the transcript

 3     of the 37th session of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Supreme Defence

 4     Council dated, as you see here, 7 June 1995 on the cover page, but if we

 5     go over -- and that should be at e-court -- thank you.  That's the agenda

 6     for the 37th session.

 7             If we go over to page 3 in English.  And to my recollection, it's

 8     the same page in B/C/S.

 9             The meeting was held on 13 June 1995.  Now, the attendees at this

10     meeting with President Lilic, President Milosevic, President Bulatovic,

11     and General Momcilo Perisic who was chief of the VJ General Staff, among

12     others.

13             Now, if we could go over to English page 31 of this document and

14     B/C/S page 22, please.

15             Now, the context of this discussion that you see here is that

16     your army, the VRS, had put forward 12 generals for their promotion to be

17     verified, including some members of the Main Staff, and you were one of

18     them.  And here General Perisic says:

19             "We do not propose Dragomir Milosevic, who is commander of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and who is also an SDS member."

21             So, General, it seems that General Perisic completely contradicts

22     your assertion to Judge Kwon when you say the only party you were a

23     member of was the League of Communists, does he not?

24        A.   I'm afraid I haven't fully understood your question.  However, I

25     hope I understood the gist of it, although there may be grounds for some

Page 33083

 1     additional questions in that regard.

 2             First of all, I cannot deny what Mr. Perisic said, because up

 3     until this moment, I wasn't aware of what he had said.  It is now that I

 4     encounter this indication clearly showing that he was unaware of the

 5     situation.  It is my impression that he tended to use certain arguments

 6     against my promotion, and he could only rely on the fact that I was a SDS

 7     member, which wouldn't -- well, there seems to be a precondition that if

 8     I were a member, I couldn't be promoted, and the other way round.  So he

 9     compared some things that I don't believe to have been useful, and still

10     he had to say something to the council at this session.

11             I can see what it reads, but I deny that.  I was never a member

12     of the SDS, and that is what I can confirm.  As for his words, I dispute

13     them.

14        Q.   So nevertheless, you've acknowledged that you had contacts with

15     the SDS leaders and, in fact, General, in 1996, you wrote to

16     General Mladic, and you said at 65 ter number 09139, in a letter dated 19

17     May that year, you said at page 2 of the English translation:

18              "People from the inner circle of the VRS Main Staff told me that

19     I was an SDS general, a politician's general, and a Chetnik general."

20             At page 4, the second paragraph, you wrote:

21             "All people ever seem to say about me was, 'He's an SDS general,

22     and he's in cahoots with Karadzic.'"

23             So it appears even on the basis of your own correspondence that

24     your links with the SDS were rather pronounced?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I think it would be

Page 33084

 1     only fair if that could be shown to the general and he can have a chance

 2     look at these references before he answers the question.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh I'm sorry, I omitted to give the --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  I omitted to give the B/C/S paragraph and page

 9     reference numbers.  If I can have your indulgence for one second, Your

10     Honour.  If we can go over to the last -- ah, no.  I see the proper

11     reference down at the bottom of the B/C/S page on the screen in front of

12     us, and that's the third paragraph from the bottom.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, while he's reading that, just so

14     that we don't lose track, with respect to 65 ter 06264, is that going to

15     be tendered?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I didn't see a need.  And now perhaps we could go

17     over to the next page in B/C/S for the general.  And there should be the

18     page thereafter.  Apologies.  Your indulgence for a moment.  It seems

19     that we might not have all pages uploaded in B/C/S.

20             I apologise for having misspoken.  We did have the correct page

21     on the screen.  Thank you.

22        Q.   Now, General, having had a chance to look at the pages --

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

24             MS. EDGERTON:

25        Q.   Having had a chance to look at the paragraphs I've referred to,

Page 33085

 1     would you be able to answer my question, which was:  It appears that even

 2     on the basis of your own correspondence that your links with the SDS were

 3     rather pronounced, does it not?

 4        A.   Quite the other way around.  This does not indicate that my ties

 5     with the SDS were such that this would corroborate their existence.  On

 6     the contrary.  Throughout the letter, I was trying to make a statement

 7     opposing such views.

 8             You asked me about it, and yet you assert that I had acknowledged

 9     my contacts with the SDS.  That kind of approach to this matter, which

10     implies that I had conceded to having contact with them, is something

11     that I cannot adopt, and I can't provide answers in that context.  It is

12     only logical and natural that at the time I had to have had contact with

13     people but not with -- well, when it comes to issues such as the

14     activities of the SDS, that was not it.  As you call my acknowledgement,

15     it wasn't an acknowledgement.  It was a mere statement that I was in

16     contact.  I couldn't deny that.  That is what life dictated.  One needed

17     to have contacts with people in order for certain arrangements to be

18     made.  However, that deny -- did not imply getting involved in politics.

19     Such contacts were of different nature.  That was the first thing.

20             Next, I see this conversation with Mladic here.  I would suggest

21     to you -- or, actually, I would propose to answer the following way --

22        Q.   General.  General, let's finish off with the question that I

23     raised with you initially, and that was about your contacts with the SDS.

24     Now, you've just told us that you had contacts and you weren't -- you

25     weren't about to deny that, and did that include general contacts with

Page 33086

 1     Dr. Karadzic?

 2        A.   If you're asking me about Dr. Karadzic, that's a separate issue.

 3     The issue before, however, was of my supposed acknowledgement of contacts

 4     with the SDS.  Dr. Karadzic was not the SDS itself.  My statement that I

 5     did have contacts includes what I have already said, and yet you now want

 6     me to continue discussing my contacts with Mr. Karadzic in the same vein.

 7     However, as regards my contacts with him, I will gladly answer when you

 8     put that question.  I don't read that question in your questions thus

 9     far.  I don't know how you include -- how you are trying to introduce

10     that through the back door.

11        Q.   I take it from the answer that you've given that you did have

12     contact with Dr. Karadzic; correct?

13        A.   Of course I did.

14        Q.   That's fine.  And we'll come to explore that over the course of

15     your cross-examination.  And we'll come back to this document again later

16     in your cross-examination.

17             Now, General, in your testimony in chief at transcript page

18     32815, Dr. Karadzic asked you whether the civil authorities of

19     Republika Srpska interfered in purely military matters, and you said you

20     never experienced that from any person or structure of the government or

21     through activities carried on by the cabinet or the Presidency.

22             "We never had an opportunity to meet, but when we did meet, we

23     never discussed combat activities to be carried out by the

24     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and politics never influenced the military

25     situation."

Page 33087

 1             So as you've just said, you did meet; correct?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   That's a yes or no answer, General.

 4        A.   As regards this variant of providing answers, I reject this

 5     method.  I would much prefer if the method used to arrive at what I have

 6     to say would be a better one.  There is a better way.  I don't want

 7     anyone to draw such conclusions.  See, you had contacts.  Then this

 8     automatically implies certain arrangements about the system of command

 9     and control in the corps.

10             When I said we had contacts, as regards the incident when there

11     was a rift between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic, at the time I went with

12     Mr. Cedo Sladoje because I wanted to establish some kind of contact

13     regarding that rift because it concerned a decision made by the president

14     of the republic to remove Mladic.  If that was the contact discussed

15     here, then I can't deny it.  Of course there were contacts, but in

16     situations when it had nothing to do with managing any combat activities.

17     If I had occasion to visit Mr. Karadzic, it was when Mr. Stanic arrived,

18     when he was dealing with the issue of UNPROFOR and the problems

19     pertaining to them.  Mr. Karadzic ordered that I be there in order to

20     tell Mr. Stanic, "Here is the man who will work with you on dealing with

21     this problem."  I include that in my contacts with him.

22             I was there.  I saw two people, and in my book that's a contact,

23     but not in the light that you are trying to.

24        Q.   We'll get this back on track in a minute, but I just want to

25     follow-up something that you've referred to in your testimony, and you

Page 33088

 1     talk about the occasion when and Cedo Sladoje went to go and see

 2     Dr. Karadzic, referring to a rift between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Mladic.

 3             Now, you talked about that with Judge Kwon during the course of

 4     your testimony in chief, and Judge Kwon asked you some questions about

 5     the nature of the conduct of General Mladic.  He asked you whether or not

 6     General Mladic wanted to be independent and not controlled by a superior

 7     body and whether your answers on that subject meant that General Mladic

 8     was disobedient or defiant to his Supreme Commander.

 9             Now, General, you said on that day that you couldn't say whether

10     he ignored orders or declined orders because you didn't know, and you

11     weren't aware of the details of any conflict between the two people.  You

12     were only discussing your general impression.

13             So are -- if that was your general impression in your testimony

14     in chief, maybe we better get to the bottom of this right now.

15             To be perfectly clear, because you weren't in your testimony in

16     chief, you've not ever seen or heard of Mladic ever disobeying an order

17     from Dr. Karadzic, have you?  Never.  And that, General, is a yes or no

18     question.

19        A.   I am trying to answer the best way possible in my view to obtain

20     the right information.  If I said yes or no, I'm afraid your impression

21     would not be the right one.

22             If I was engaged to the full concerning the situation and combat

23     activities, which included the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the 1st Corps

24     of the army of BH, then that was my main preoccupation.  Being engaged in

25     such a large area, I never had an opportunity to see both of them in the

Page 33089

 1     same area to be able to see what it was that they actually had a conflict

 2     over.  That was one thing.

 3             Another thing, I never attended any Assembly sessions of the

 4     RS Assembly.  I do know that the -- such sessions were held in different

 5     locations, and I do know that basically all of the generals were there.

 6     However, I did not attend a single one.  Whatever misunderstandings there

 7     may have been, whatever discussions there may have been in regard of

 8     command and control could have taken place in such situations, and yet it

 9     could have been in situations where only the two of them were present or

10     some of their associates.  However, I was not there.  I couldn't see

11     that.  I couldn't realise or pinpoint what their misunderstanding or

12     conflict was.  Since I was in no situation to see it, I cannot speculate.

13     Obviously there was a misunderstanding, and I have to be so free as to

14     say that I could see something was wrong.  Now, to what extent that was

15     or who initiated it, that's something I don't know.

16             I think my assertion should be enough for you, which for the time

17     figures as the only one.  I have no other -- I have no other

18     explanations.

19        Q.   Can we just go back to my question then.  It's correct, then,

20     that you've never seen or heard of General Mladic ever disobeying an

21     order from Dr. Karadzic, have you?

22        A.   Of course it's correct.  If I didn't see it, how could I confirm

23     it?  It doesn't mean that I'm saying that there was no recalcitrance, but

24     I'd rather not go into it.

25        Q.   Now, you've just said that you didn't go to Assembly sessions.

Page 33090

 1        A.   Right.

 2        Q.   But I'd like to tell you what General Mladic, your commander,

 3     said about the nature of the army's relationship with the civilian

 4     authorities at the 50th Assembly session of the RS Assembly, and that was

 5     on April 6, 1995, and the transcript of that is P970.  The relevant

 6     page -- actually, what I'll do, General, is I'll start with something

 7     that General Milovanovic, your army's deputy commander and the Chief of

 8     Staff, said at that Assembly session.  I'll start at page 191 in English

 9     and page 162 in B/C/S.  And there General Milovanovic said in response to

10     a speech by Dr. Karadzic:

11             "I don't want to comment on the speech delivered by the

12     Supreme Commander.  I'm not entitled to it.  Yet I can claim again that

13     the Main Staff never had the intention nor does it now to place itself

14     above the state.  No state where the military are in power is long lived,

15     even where a putsch had taken place, where the army did it, it was always

16     with the promise of bringing back a civilian government.  The army, which

17     didn't observe this, lost both the state and army.  It's not up to the

18     army to lead the state but the state to lead the army."

19             And then if we go over to page 344 in English of this document

20     and page 303 in B/C/S, there's a series of discussions that follow the

21     quote I've just read to you.  General Mladic himself speaks in response

22     to and addressing Dr. Karadzic, and he says to Dr. Karadzic:

23              "I wish to tell you, you have no idea how much I understand what

24     a difficult role you, in particular, have, and every other man in a high

25     position has."

Page 33091

 1             And then if we go over to the paragraph that follows, he says to

 2     Dr. Karadzic:

 3             "President, you don't have more competent and more honest people

 4     in Republika Srpska who could give you a better, more honest and more

 5     competent assessment of the army than your officers.  I have nothing to

 6     hide from you.  It's not my army.  It's more yours than mine.  But most

 7     of all, it's the army of the people and the state."

 8             Now, General, based on this, it seems to me that your impression

 9     of what you described as a rift actually reflects your lack of

10     understanding of the situation, doesn't it, because Mladic here in

11     April 1995, before an audience of the members of the Assembly, generals

12     from the Main Staff of your army, Dr. Karadzic himself, and other members

13     of the Supreme Command affirms he's a committed officer dedicated in

14     service to Dr. Karadzic and his people, doesn't he?

15        A.   I don't know what you expect of me.

16        Q.   I expect you to answer my questions, if that's okay.

17        A.   Of course you expect that, but I don't know in what sense.  Why

18     should I try to say something now in terms of see how he put it nicely.

19     As to those statements, issues, and his words in that particular place at

20     that particular time is not something that I'm going to judge.  I'm not

21     going to take the role of a man who will say this is right and this is

22     wrong.  These are issues that I have no contact with, I have no

23     connection to, apart from seeing that these are written on the paper.  I

24     have no other answer but to say that this is not my comment, this is not

25     my opinion, and it shouldn't be expected of me to confirm the veracity of

Page 33092

 1     this or otherwise.  What is written here is apparent, but nobody should

 2     expect of me to confirm other people's ideas, words, utterances, or

 3     variations in their public appearances, and this is something that I

 4     cannot dwell on.

 5        Q.   Fine.  We'll move on then.  Let's go back to the situation that I

 6     put to you or the reference in your testimony in chief that I put to you

 7     at the beginning of your cross-examination where you said when you met --

 8     when you said, "I never experienced from any person or structure of the

 9     government, either through any activities carried on by the cabinet or

10     Presidency --" pardon me.  I'll rephrase it.

11             Where you said in respect of the government, the cabinet, or the

12     Presidency that you never had an opportunity to meet, but when you did

13     meet you never discussed combat activities to be carried out by the

14     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and politics didn't interest -- or influence the

15     military situation.  And I want to know you another document.  That's

16     P4925, and it's entitled "Amendment to Directive 6," and it's issued by

17     Dr. Karadzic on 12 December 1993.

18             Now, I think we'll probably for you, General, have to enlarge the

19     copy in your language on the left-hand side.

20        A.   Yes.

21        Q.   And I'm particularly interested in paragraph 2 at the bottom of

22     the page.  Thank you.

23             Now, this is a directive, General, that says -- or a directive to

24     by 21 December, 1993, when Geneva negotiations are resumed, to improve

25     the SRK's tactical position - and if we can go over to the next page,

Page 33093

 1     please - by, among other things, at paragraph 2, 2(a) by among other

 2     things seizing Zuc and Mojmilo features to ensure the most favourable

 3     position for dividing the town of Sarajevo.

 4             So this document, General, is a directive ordering operations

 5     specifically timed to improve your corps' tactical position by the time

 6     political discussions resume.  So isn't this actually a perfect example

 7     of how politics influence and, in fact, dictate the military situation?

 8        A.   First of all, I'm not familiar personally with this directive at

 9     all, and in connection with such ideas or directives, this is something

10     completely new to me apart from being able now to read it.  And this

11     reference concerning improving the situation in the theatre of operations

12     that we discussed so far, the Sarajevo theatre, I cannot assess this in

13     terms of saying that this is not significant.  It is.  It indicates that

14     the organs of government want to create a situation which would be more

15     favourable to them and to make the life of the people living in that area

16     easier, living in the area where there are conflicting parties, because

17     if you have some certain features, if you hold certain features, this is

18     important for the defence of the area and the territory that you'd

19     already seized, that you already have.

20        Q.   So you're saying that you're not familiar with the document or

21     you're not familiar with the operation that it directs?

22        A.   Yes.  Well, this is 1993, isn't it.  As you know very well --

23     yeah.  Yeah.  Well, I was there.  Yes, I'm -- I was made aware of that,

24     of that action being carried out, those activities concerning the feature

25     Zuc, but I did not take part personally in that, because General Galic

Page 33094

 1     commanded the corps at the time.  It was none of my business to monitor

 2     closely at that situation apart from me being at the staff.

 3        Q.   Now, General --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, I'm sorry to interrupt you.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  No problem.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I read the transcript you referred to, i.e.,

 7     transcript page 32815 -- I'm sorry, 32815.  The question asked by

 8     Mr. Karadzic to the witness was related to the influence by the civilian

 9     authorities -- civilian authorities and especially the SDS or its

10     leaders.

11             I don't think that question also related to the president

12     himself, the Supreme Commander, and I don't think the witness ever denied

13     the role of Karadzic, the president, with respect to military affairs.

14             Could you put more directly your question to the witness with --

15     as regards this document.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment while I look again at

17     the transcript, please, Your Honours.

18             Yes.  And perhaps I've come about it in a cumbersome way.  The

19     question relates to, as I read it, the general's assertion that with

20     regard to the government, the cabinet, or the Presidency, that they never

21     had an opportunity to meet, and when they did, they never discussed

22     combat activities to be carried out by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  And

23     I'd like to go directly to that in my questioning.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

25             MS. EDGERTON:

Page 33095

 1        Q.   Now, General, you've just said that you were made aware of this

 2     operation being carried out, and it's true, isn't it, that you were made

 3     aware of this operation because you were part of the high level

 4     discussion in Belgrade on 13 and 14 December 1993, where the operation

 5     was planned, weren't you?

 6        A.   That's correct.  That's correct.  I did attend in my capacity as

 7     a person -- well, I did not command the corps at the time, apart from the

 8     corps commander who wanted me to tag along because of possible better

 9     assessing what was to come going forward, and maybe as his first

10     associate and expert co-worker.  I was there just to attend.  I did not

11     take part in the discussion.  I did not take part in putting forward any

12     proposals, and I did not initiate any matters concerning what was to

13     unfold later.

14        Q.   Now, at that meeting, from the Presidency, from the members of

15     the Presidency of the republic of Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina

16     were Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik; correct?

17        A.   That's correct.

18        Q.   From your army General Mladic, General Milovanovic,

19     General Djukic, General Miletic, General Maric, and Colonel Salapura, in

20     addition to yourself and General Galic; correct?

21        A.   I cannot confirm for certain people, because I cannot recall

22     whether Salapura was there or not, whether Miletic was there or not.  I

23     cannot recall that.

24             As for the others that you mentioned, yes, I do recall, and I

25     know that they were there.  In my previous responses to you, it slipped

Page 33096

 1     my mind to tell you that Mladic was the initiator of all these things.

 2     He particularly tried to go through President Milosevic to create an

 3     impression that there was a need for such a combat action to be carried

 4     out.  I now can see that this is going -- this is interpreted in

 5     hindsight as the President's initiative or his proposal, but I do recall

 6     Mladic's stance at that meeting.  It is true, however, that Milovanovic

 7     held a slightly different position in terms of that he needed more time

 8     for preparations.  He didn't claim that taking such action would be

 9     unnecessary.  And this is as far as I know about these things.

10        Q.   And from the cabinet, the RS cabinet, or the government,

11     Mico Stanisic was also there, wasn't he?

12        A.   I cannot confirm that.  I'm not sure.

13        Q.   Do you remember President Slobodan Milosevic, General Perisic,

14     Jovica Stanisic, and Frenki Simatovic taking part?

15        A.   Of course I do recall President Milosevic and Mr. Perisic.  As

16     for Stanisic, I -- I didn't know that person.  And since there were no

17     introduction at the meeting, he may have been there, but I did not pay

18     any attention to him, because he represented a service which does not

19     want to flaunt its presence around.  I cannot confirm Mr. Simatovic

20     either.  So I cannot confirm that they were there.

21        Q.   That's fine.  Now, in your testimony in chief, you said that when

22     you met, you never discussed combat activities to be carried out by the

23     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, at 32815.  The specific purpose, General, of

24     this meeting was to plan, to discuss and plan, the operation to be

25     carried out in the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps,

Page 33097

 1     wasn't it?

 2        A.   I think that you do not want to hear the right answer, and you're

 3     trying to lead me to give you an answer which is favourable to your

 4     cause.

 5             I wasn't the driver of that meeting, the initiator.  I wasn't

 6     somebody who was meeting President Karadzic pursuant to the need to

 7     resolve those issues concerning combat actions.

 8             When I said I did not meet him on these matters, I mean I did not

 9     meet him separately or meet him in terms of my capacity and my function

10     concerning those activities pertaining to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

11     There was no such separate meeting, or there was no meeting between me

12     and President Karadzic alone.

13             For instance, if there were briefings, military briefings, such

14     briefings would be attended by President Karadzic.  In my eyes, this was

15     not a discussion on how combat activities should be carried out.  Such

16     briefings were used to discuss many matters, and president would receive

17     reports on what was going on within the Republika Srpska Army throughout

18     the territory.  I would not treat that as a meeting concerning the issue

19     that you want me to give you an answer about concerning the Sarajevo

20     area.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In transcript, I don't believe that

22     the "vojna savjetovanja" should not be translated as "military

23     briefings."  Military briefings are daily operational activities, and

24     "vojna savjetovanja" has a different -- completely different meaning.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I can't help that.  Probably you may ask the general

Page 33098

 1     about the meaning or what it was like.

 2             General, I don't remember the term, but if you could assist us.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if it went to

 4     military conferences or military meetings, I presume that this is what I

 5     am supposed to elucidate upon.  Of course, this is not a briefing or a

 6     short meeting that would be for the purposes of exchanging brief

 7     instructions or orders.  Military conferences concerned military matters.

 8     There were -- there were usually annual conferences.  There was no

 9     prescribed frequency, and they would discuss military matters and

10     developments.  This would be a review of the preceding year in terms of

11     military matters and in connection with the aforesaid to take stance on

12     improvements or new solutions or correction of certain deficiencies for

13     the future period.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   So, General, you're referring to the annual -- the briefings on

17     combat readiness which took place at the end of January and the beginning

18     of February every year, aren't you?

19        A.   I'm not discussing that, no.  I said that military conferences or

20     military consultations were places where the Main Staff would find it

21     necessary to invite the president of the republic to make a review of the

22     preceding year.  It doesn't have to be in January, because we're not in

23     peacetime.  We could not plan certain slots for that meeting.

24             It took place when it could, when the circumstances were right,

25     when arrangements for everybody to be present allowed, and of course the

Page 33099

 1     situation along the front line would dictate that such conferences would

 2     take place in a completely different time period.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And now that we've clarified your answers at 32815 of

 4     your testimony, I'd like to move on to a slightly different area but

 5     still keeping this operation from December 1993 in mind.

 6             In your testimony at 32576, you said your corps' objective was to

 7     defend their area of responsibility, and you said that a couple of times.

 8     Now, looking at this order which refers to ensuring the most favourable

 9     position for dividing the town of Sarajevo, would you agree with me if I

10     was to suggest to you it's fair to say that defence of your area of

11     responsibility wasn't your sole objective?  Your objective was to

12     maintain and consolidate and improve positions under control of the

13     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps; correct?

14        A.   What I firmly know in terms of what was the mission of the corps

15     and the task of the corps and what the corps could and wanted to carry

16     out in terms of combat activities is what I already told you, and that is

17     engagement was throughout the area at all points, was focusing on

18     maintaining the territory that was under the control of the

19     Romanija Sarajevo Corps.

20             I know what you're after, because there's mention of division of

21     Sarajevo here.  Well, I can tell you simply when it comes to the division

22     of Sarajevo, irrespective of whether anybody wanted or planned for that

23     to happen, and I know that there was not -- there were no plans for that,

24     division of Sarajevo is rubbish, is bunkum.  Such activity could not be

25     done and there was no need for it to be done.  And it would not be

Page 33100

 1     reasonable to plan for such an activity, because it would entail huge

 2     losses and casualties on both sides, and I refute such claims that we

 3     were trying to enter Sarajevo to that extent that this is nothing to be

 4     discussed, because we neither wanted nor could nor planned to do so.  We

 5     thought it would be -- made no sense and would entail huge sacrifices and

 6     casualties, and this is why we did not want to go into it.

 7             I -- I don't know what a kind of division is being referred to.

 8     You may ask Mr. Karadzic about that.  A division does not have to mean

 9     territorial.  There are other divisions of that.

10        Q.   So despite what looks like the plain wording of this order to SRK

11     forces to set facts in place on the ground that would ensure a divided

12     Sarajevo as part of a negotiated settlement in Geneva, you're now saying

13     that division of the city was not one of the objectives?

14        A.   That is all I can say, and nobody ever issued an order to me in

15     order to carry out certain combat actions for the purpose of dividing

16     Sarajevo.  I did not receive anything to that effect from anyone

17     regardless of the level from which this could have come from.  It could

18     have just come from the commander of the Main Staff.  And so I really

19     couldn't tell you anything other than I remain by what I have said.

20             And may I add, even had anybody ordered anything like that, I

21     would have had to find a way not to accept that and to find another way

22     of opposing that.  It just wasn't realistic.  The forces that we had

23     available could not have made that happen, and we couldn't have embarked

24     upon any kind of adventure in that sense, no.

25        Q.   So you're saying that even though the division of Sarajevo into

Page 33101

 1     Serb and Muslim parts was actually identified as one of the strategic

 2     objectives of the war by the Bosnian Serb leadership, that was not one of

 3     your corps objectives.

 4        A.   Madam Edgerton, I would like to ask you and the Trial Chamber to

 5     accept one of my sentences, a few words where I want to say the

 6     following:  I am here in The Hague in the Detention Unit, and looking at

 7     my indictment when I was preparing for my trial, among other things I

 8     could see that there was some strategic goals being mentioned and so on

 9     and so forth.  Just by chance I happened to find myself in the area where

10     Mr. Krajisnik was as well, so I went.

11             Well, if you can just try to follow me, what I want to try to

12     tell you is something that can come out from my mouth only.  I don't have

13     any other information or assertions.  I said, "Well, let me please see

14     what these strategic goals are."  And he took that down from the

15     computer.  He showed it to me.  And I am telling this Trial Chamber that

16     that was the first time that I specifically heard of those strategic

17     goals, which means that during the events, the combat, throughout the

18     whole period, no one issued anything to me or to General Galic.  Nobody

19     said, "Here are the goals.  Go ahead, implement that."  This was not the

20     case with me or anyone else.

21             We always had a way, a means of securing and protecting the

22     existing area regardless of what the goals exist -- were, if any existed

23     at all, but nobody imposed in practice for us to implement those goals

24     through actions in the field, through combat.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  I'll just wait a second until the general's had a

Page 33102

 1     chance to have a drink.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, could you --

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Could you concentrate on answering the question.

 5     The question was this time whether it was one of the strategic objectives

 6     of the war by the Bosnian Serb leadership to divide Sarajevo into Serb

 7     and Muslim parts.  So --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I -- may I ask to see where it

 9     is stated that these were strategic goals of the war, military strategic

10     goals?  If the question is varied to imply something that is not implied,

11     then it places the witness into a difficult position.  Had this been a

12     military goal, the military would have known it.  This was a political

13     and strategic goal.  Could we please see where it is stated that it was a

14     military strategic goal?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Well, could you put your question again,

16     Ms. Edgerton?

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   The question was whether the general is now saying that the

19     division of Sarajevo, ensuring, ensuring -- and I'll go back to my --

20     I'll go back to my notes and I'll characterize it the way I had

21     initially.

22             General, I'd like to put to you in the context of this document

23     we've been looking at and SRK operations over the course of the war that

24     your corps objective was as follows:  To maintain and improve positions

25     under your corps' control which would set facts in place on the ground to

Page 33103

 1     ensure the achievement of a divided Sarajevo as part of a negotiated

 2     settlement in Geneva or wherever the negotiations were taking place.

 3             So, General, it was your corps' job, wasn't it, to maintain the

 4     area, the existing area, to improve positions of your corps from that

 5     existing area which would set facts in place on the ground that would

 6     ensure the division of Sarajevo at the international negotiating table;

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Well, now it's all clear.  I don't have any problem now to answer

 9     this question.  The basic thing is to maintain the existing situation and

10     to improve it.  As for what would happen at the negotiations, what would

11     be achieved there, that was up to somebody else, not up to the

12     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  In that sense, I can just give the answer that

13     I completely agree with the point that the task was to maintain and

14     improve the position which then makes it possible to, in negotiations,

15     come to something that suits both sides, and for one side to fight for a

16     particular status.  So I would kindly ask you not to seek this as a

17     military task to go into some sort of division.  If the point is to say

18     that the division was supposed to be achieved by military means, this is

19     a task that was not issued by anyone nor was it possible to carry it out

20     or to achieve by combat.

21        Q.   And you were able to carry out your task because the existing

22     area, your existing area, already effectively represented a division of

23     the city, didn't it?

24        A.   The term "division" is something that I'm going to leave out of

25     my answer.  I'm talking about the area that is already.  In my notes I

Page 33104

 1     wrote this already, that at the point in time when I came to the position

 2     of commander, all the issues were already, I would say, crystallised.

 3     There was a balanced ratio of forces, the conflict, and everybody knew

 4     what they wanted more or less and how they should manage their own

 5     forces.

 6             In this case, this picture of events or some sort of indicators

 7     of the territory, which in the initial period and during the first months

 8     of the war in 1992 and 1993 remained the same until the end, so there was

 9     no longer any question of division but it was more of a question of the

10     sides staying wherever they were.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just in regard to your reference to meeting you

12     and Mr. Sladoje, Cedo Sladoje, attended with Dr. Karadzic, and this is

13     jumping forward in time to August of 1995, you said that -- at 32887 to

14     32889 of the transcript, you talked about how you didn't attend the

15     colloquium of generals in Banja Luka because you were in combat, and when

16     you returned to your command, your associates briefed you on what had

17     happened, and you and Colonel Sladoje went to Pale where you went to see

18     Dr. Karadzic.  So could you just confirm in regard to that a couple of

19     things that I think you may have left out.

20             You actually didn't attend the colloquium because Dr. Karadzic

21     told you not to go.  Isn't that the case?

22        A.   First of all, that is not correct.  Secondly, nobody could tell

23     me to attend or not to attend, because they were not in a position to

24     convey information to me that there would be a need to go and see Mladic.

25     So I don't know if I understood you correctly, but I understood correctly

Page 33105

 1     that, if I may repeat that, that Mr. Karadzic told me -- I'm sorry, can

 2     you help me?  What did you say that Mr. Karadzic told me, not to do what?

 3     Can you just, please, just tell me again?

 4        Q.   That he prohibited you from attending the colloquium in

 5     Banja Luka.

 6        A.   No, he did not forbid me.  He didn't have the opportunity to do

 7     that.  I don't know whether this is something that he thought about in

 8     his head, but the actual prohibition did not reach me, and even if it did

 9     reach me, I mean, it's a question of whether anybody can tell me whether

10     to attend or not or to tell me how to conduct myself.

11        Q.   And it's correct, isn't it, that you and Colonel Sladoje didn't

12     go to Pale on your own initiative.  You went because you had been

13     directed to go there with him by Dr. Karadzic?

14        A.   No.  We did not receive any such order.  I explained that when I

15     came from mount Visojevica which is an area close to the most sensitive

16     point, which was the Nisici plain, this is where I had an overview of the

17     situation.  I came quite late in the evening, I would say.  Actually,

18     quite late in the afternoon, around 18- or 1900 hours, and that is when

19     Colonel Sladoje, Colonel -- the security chief came and explained what

20     had happened during the day, that a meeting was scheduled with Mladic and

21     that they were not able to tell me to prepare for the meeting and to go.

22     Nothing else happened or was happening, and there was no other atmosphere

23     being created other than us at that meeting attended by Lugonja and Cedo

24     Sladoje reaching an agreement that the two of us should go to see Mladic,

25     not because anybody ordered it.  We just decided that on our own

Page 33106

 1     initiative.

 2        Q.   Could we have a look, please, at P2683.  And just for the

 3     transcript, at page 25, line 16, it's Nisici with an N, as in November,

 4     as opposed with an M.

 5             So this document that we now see in front of us signed by

 6     Dr. Karadzic, General, is -- looks like it was a telegram dated 5 August,

 7     1995, which was received in the corps at 5.00 p.m., directing you

 8     personally, together with your Chief of Staff who -- and Chief of

 9     Operations who was Colonel Sladoje, to come to the meeting in Pale in the

10     president's office at 9.00.

11             Now, you just said that nobody ordered you to go there.  It seems

12     that that's not the case, looking at this document; correct?

13        A.   Well, that might seem like it to you, and here it looks as if

14     this is something that's being confirmed.  However, Sladoje and Lugonja

15     did not show this document to me.  Therefore, I did not know about the

16     document, but I knew in this form that Mr. Karadzic -- well, this is how

17     I understood it more or less, and it remains for me just to tell you

18     that.  Simultaneously -- and I don't see that from this document, by the

19     way.  So simultaneously as Mladic launched the initiative and summoned

20     the generals to him, I understood from Cedo Sladoje,

21     Colonel Cedo Sladoje, and Lugonja, that the same action, the same request

22     was sent to the generals by President Karadzic, but I did not see this

23     request in this way for me and the Chief of Staff individually.

24             Let me just take a look.  Evidently it states here what it

25     states, but we didn't go pursuant to this, what is written here, because

Page 33107

 1     nobody showed me this.  We agreed to go, to contact Mr. President in

 2     relation to that problem if anything can be amortised and a better

 3     solution found.  So I stand by -- I mean, I'm not denying that this is

 4     something that is written down on the paper.  This is a paper I did not

 5     have in my hand, so in agreement with the officers that I referred to in

 6     my office, there was no mention of going because the president was

 7     requesting it but it was our own decision.  But they probably knew that

 8     this existed, so then we just set off by inertia, but I'm not aware of

 9     this.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the transcript, if it's

11     important, on line 9, page 26, it says president's office, and here

12     actually it says the cabinet of the president of the National Assembly.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  That's -- that's correct.  If we could go --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Milosevic, I find it very difficult to follow

15     you.  The president sent you -- the command sent to the commander of the

16     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps urgently to come to a meeting, and how can -- how

17     could a Chief of Staff or other staff not show this document to their

18     commander?  Could you assist me?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's difficult for me to help

20     you.  I understand what you're saying, because that arrival of mine

21     returned to the office implied a whole situation which in its way was

22     serious, and the question of whether I should get this document or not or

23     should be informed about it was not initiated.  They informed me overall

24     what was going on that day and that General Mladic was summoning people

25     to him and General -- and Mr. Karadzic was summoning people to see him.

Page 33108

 1     So they did not show that in the form that this referred exclusively to

 2     me, but it was understood that President Karadzic was summoning people in

 3     his own way, in his own sense, to have a contact.

 4             I understood from them absolutely then, and that's why I didn't

 5     actually open up that question, that General -- that President Karadzic

 6     was summoning all the generals, but from here you can see that as far as

 7     the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps is concerned, in that case the invitation

 8     referred only to me.  So I don't see.  But they did inform me that it was

 9     a question of parallel invitations.  One was making -- calling people to

10     him and the other one was doing that as well.  So of course it's

11     understood that it cannot be quite clear.  There was no question of to go

12     or not to go.  This all took place at a late point in time, and so

13     perhaps because it was so late, perhaps it was superfluous for them to

14     point out to me that this referred only to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

17        Q.   Just before the break, I'd like to move to another area, and it's

18     about your service -- it refers to your military career, and it's about

19     your service as operations officer with the Drina Corps in the spring of

20     1993.  You mentioned that in your testimony in chief.

21             Now, as the operations officer, you would have been familiar with

22     Operation Udar which took place from February 14th to April 25th that

23     year in the Drina valley; correct?

24        A.   A correction.  I was not the duty operations officer at the

25     corps.  I was the chief of the operations sector in the corps.  So I

Page 33109

 1     wasn't the duty operations officer.  But, okay, this is not important.

 2             If by this name -- I cannot remember now -- well, I was informed

 3     about it.  While I was there, I knew what was going on.  I know that this

 4     code word Udar, you would need to remind me what this Udar referred to.

 5     Then I could tell you how much I knew, but I would like to underline that

 6     while I was at the corps, I didn't know what was going on.

 7        Q.   Well, would you agree --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, in the transcript it

 9     says "I didn't know what was going on," but the witness said that "while

10     I was in the corps, I knew what was going on."  Line 5.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Milosevic?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   Udar was an operation to fortify the central Podrinje area, and

16     it included operations against Cerska, Konjevic Polje, Sasa mine, and

17     Srebrenica.  You remember that now, don't you?

18        A.   Yes.  Yes, I do.

19        Q.   And the outcome of the operation was that it was quite

20     successful, and by mid-March, Drina Corps forces had routed the Army of

21     Bosnia and Herzegovina from all those areas; correct?

22        A.   Yes.  Well, let me just give an answer that would explain the

23     whole thing.  The area that we are discussing now or that I will be

24     discussing is connected to a circumstance where the Army of

25     Republika Srpska had a section of the road from Vlasenica towards Zvornik

Page 33110

 1     in this case that was cut off.  This was in the area of Konjevic Polje,

 2     Pobudje, and towards Srebrenica, and to the north in the sector of

 3     Cerska.  That area was held by the forces of the Bosnia and Herzegovina

 4     army, their 2nd Corps.  I think it was the 83rd Division from Srebrenica,

 5     actually, and it was necessary to embark on active combat in order to

 6     open up a direct route from Vlasenica and, after all, from the inner

 7     areas of Republika Srpska.  So because the road was cut off and the

 8     forces were separated in that area around that Konjevic Polje, then you

 9     would have some enclaves possibly created just like the Srebrenica

10     enclave was created.  So what happened was that a plan was drafted to

11     carry out an operation from Sehovici, from the north, towards the south,

12     and in that way to open up a route through Konjevic Polje so that we

13     could have normal communication, a normal road towards Zvornik.  Of

14     course, the operation took a while.  Mostly it was in early 1993, from

15     March until I'm not sure when.  Perhaps it was over by the end of April.

16     I cannot be certain, but it's around that period.  So the -- we managed

17     to shift their forces and to open up the road.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours you, I see the time.  I wonder if

19     you'd like to take the break at this moment.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will.  We will have a break for half

21     an hour and resume at 3 past 11.00.

22                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes.  Thank you.  Before I continue with the

Page 33111

 1     general, I just want to respond to the intervention by Dr. Karadzic, Your

 2     Honours, where at page 22 he asked to see where it is stated that with

 3     respect to the strategic objectives that these were the strategic goals

 4     of the war, military strategic goals, and he asked where -- to see where

 5     it is stated that it was a military strategic goal, and in that regard I

 6     want to refer Dr. Karadzic to two exhibits that he tendered, Defence

 7     exhibits, the first being the analysis of combat readiness of the VRS in

 8     1992, which is D325.  Because I looked for this over the break, I wasn't

 9     able to identify the corresponding B/C/S pages, but Dr. Karadzic can find

10     this information at e-court page 159 in English, the first full

11     paragraph, where it says:

12             "The strategic objectives of our war which were promptly defined

13     and set before the Main Staff of the army of the RS, the commands and the

14     units, served as a general guideline upon which we planned the actual

15     operations and concerted battles."

16             And Dr. Karadzic can additionally look to another one of his

17     Defence exhibits, D825, which is a copy of a book by VRS Chief of Staff

18     General Milovanovic called "My View of the War in Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina," and at page 13 of the English and 13, in fact, of the

20     B/C/S, refers to this six strategic objectives of the Serbian people as

21     military objectives.

22             So that's just to answer Dr. -- or to respond to Dr. Karadzic's

23     intervention before we move forward.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I took his statement to be asking

25     that -- whether we can see the word strategic goal or military goal in

Page 33112

 1     that document, i.e., P4925, directive number 6.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  I didn't, hence my response to that intervention,

 3     Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I explain what I meant.  The

 7     original document --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  You can take it up in your re-examination.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But it's not a matter for the

10     witness.  It was by way of reply to Mr. -- Ms. Edgerton's response.  I

11     asked about the original document of the 12th of May, 1992.  Where in

12     that document is it stated that these are wartime goals?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   Now, General, to go back to operation Udar, which we were

16     discussing before we had the break, you indicated at page 30 that then

17     you would have some enclaves possibly created as a consequence of the

18     operation just like the Srebrenica enclave was created.  And in fact as a

19     consequence of the operation, that was exactly the case, wasn't it?  The

20     enclave of Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde were created completely

21     separated from each other.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer -- yes.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Inasmuch as this doesn't

25     arise from anything in the direct examination, I'm wondering if this is

Page 33113

 1     for the purpose of credibility or whether this is being offered under

 2     Rule 90(H).

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  This is a matter that goes to the witness's

 5     credibility, Your Honour.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   And frankly, we could even -- General, you don't even need to

 9     answer that question at this moment.  I'll move on still in relation to

10     this operation.

11             General, this Chamber has heard evidence in this trial about what

12     happened in Cerska and Konjevic Polje during the course of this

13     operation, and I'm going to put something additional to you and ask you a

14     question following that, and what I'm going to put to you comes from

15     65 ter number 01219, the periodic report on the situation of human rights

16     in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by the

17     Special Rapporteur of the commission on human rights, and the paragraph

18     I'm going to put to you is at page 18 of the English, paragraph 87, and

19     B/C/S page 19, but I'll read the paragraph to you.  It says with respect

20     to this operation:

21             "Massive and repeated violations of the Geneva Conventions of

22     1949 were perpetrated in recent combat in Eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23     These were carried out by Serb forces in Cerska, Konjevic Polje, and

24     Srebrenica, in attacking and ambushing civilians attempting to flee their

25     encirclement, in attacking the villages themselves, in refusing to allow

Page 33114

 1     humanitarian aid to enter, in refusing to allow the evacuation of the

 2     wounded, in attempting to link the above issues to the independent

 3     question of freedom of movement for Serbs in Tuzla."

 4             Now, General, you were one of the command team responsible for

 5     directing this operation that Mr. Mazowiecki reported on, weren't you?

 6        A.   In the briefest possible terms and in an attempt to be crystal

 7     clear regarding this issue, I will not comment paragraph 87 and its

 8     wording.  I'll come back to it at a later point.

 9             I joined the Drina Corps on the 4th of February, 1993.  I

10     remember that date since as today as well it is my birthday.  That is why

11     I remember my entry in the corps and engagement there.  It happened then.

12     You won't hold it against me if I say that as old acquaintances, I

13     expected you to congratulate my birthday to me.

14             I mentioned that because this operation, as you call Udar, and

15     indeed that was its name, it had been planned, and the concept had been

16     created for its implementation.  I did not take part in the planning

17     process though.

18             As someone from the corps command, I observed the combat taking

19     place according to the plan created by someone else at an earlier point,

20     the people in question being the corps commander and his Chief of Staff

21     at the time.  The units were commanded by their respective commanders, as

22     is understood, and it was implemented that way.

23             I do know that there was a range of activities undertaken by the

24     Muslim leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina to portray Cerska as an

25     endangered town, extremely endangered as part of that combat, trying to

Page 33115

 1     show that it was standard practice to attack towns in that way.  I also

 2     know that General Morillon wanted to see for himself, to find out what

 3     that town was and what were those impermissible activities known to the

 4     public.  He went to the area of Cerska.

 5        Q.   General, with respect, you actually don't seem to have come even

 6     close to answering my question, which was whether you could confirm that

 7     you were one of the command team responsible for directing this

 8     operation.

 9        A.   I can confirm that, yes.  I followed the activities.

10        Q.   Thank you.  I want to move on now to another area, and it's with

11     respect to Sarajevo.  Now, throughout your testimony, you repeatedly

12     expressly denied that your forces targeted civilians in Bosnian

13     government held Sarajevo.  And that is referred to at transcript pages

14     32582, 32794, and 32833.

15             Is it your evidence, General -- actually, let me ask you this:

16     During the course of your service within the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, so

17     that would be from 1992 through to 1995, is it the case that neither

18     Dr. Karadzic or General Mladic ever mentioned to you any of the concerns

19     expressed by the international community to them over the targeting of

20     civilians by shelling or sniping?

21        A.   Of course that's not what I'm going to say, that no one warned me

22     of measures undertaken and that such activities be not permitted, that is

23     to say that civilians become targets.  I confirm that in entirety.  They

24     warned and asked for, et cetera.  Of course, it was put to them by

25     someone else as if things like that were happening.  They in turn wanted

Page 33116

 1     to issue warnings and to prohibit such activity, that it should not be

 2     allowed.  This fits completely with my assertion, which is that such

 3     activities were not undertaken by the factors in command of the SRK or by

 4     those who monitored and had any influence over the events in the area, in

 5     this case Mr. Mladic and Mr. Karadzic.

 6        Q.   All right.  Then I'd like to tell you about an incident in

 7     Sarajevo that took place on the 11th of July, 1995 [sic], and that was

 8     just five days after you took up office as Chief of Staff, and on that

 9     day Munira Zametica, a civilian, was shot twice from a firing position in

10     the tower -- from the tower of the Serbian Orthodox Church in

11     Velvina [phoen] while she was trying to get water from the Dobrinja River

12     to do her washing.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  And the sources of that are D673 and transcript

14     page 29041 for the following, and the Chamber's heard evidence that that

15     church was in the area of responsibility of your corps, general, and this

16     woman's daughter, the victim's daughter came to testify before another

17     Chamber of this Tribunal, and she told the Chamber in the Galic case that

18     when she died, her mother was 47 years old, and on that day she was

19     wearing a brown skirt, and when she came to find her mother still lying

20     in the riverbed, her mother couldn't be helped or pulled to a safe area,

21     and that was because bullets were continually hitting the water around

22     here fired from the direction of the church.  All right?

23             So this was a victim, a civilian engaged in a civilian activity,

24     shot not once but twice, and whose attacker continued to fire in the

25     water around her to ensure -- which had the effect of ensuring she

Page 33117

 1     couldn't be saved.  Now, would you agree with me, general, that this

 2     evidence shows the victim was deliberately targeted?

 3        A.   Could you please remind me, was this on the 11th of July, 1994?

 4        Q.   Pardon me, 1994, yes.

 5        A.   Okay.  Thank you.  I noted down 1995.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, the transcript should read -- but you said

 7     1995.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  I misspoke.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Before you answer, yes, Mr. Robinson.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  I believe the date is July 11, 1993, according to

11     scheduled incident number F(3).

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I completely misspoke.  Correct.  Thank you,

13     Mr. Robinson.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1993.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   You understood well, General.

17        A.   Very well.  Thank you.

18        Q.   Do you remember my question?  My question was whether you would

19     agree that this evidence shows the victim was deliberately targeted.

20        A.   First of all, no victim, irrespective of the circumstances of his

21     or her killing, if that person was civilian is something I cannot deny.

22             As regards that term or that relationship, it is something I

23     can't reconcile with my presence here.  I can't possibly say that it is

24     untrue.  I won't even go into that.  However, I will discuss the piece of

25     information that simply enough someone simply took the Velvina church,

Page 33118

 1     which is in an valley, and it has an area where the church bells are,

 2     providing some kind of opportunity, and then one can always say, yes,

 3     there is engagement from the church.

 4             I have information that there was no activity from the church.

 5     It doesn't mean that I exclude the possibility of -- of late Munira being

 6     fired at.  In the case of her death, there is nothing that I can assert

 7     other than say it couldn't have been done from the church.  It was not

 8     allowed.  I am positive on this.  It's a definitive piece of information

 9     that I know.  Nobody allowed any soldier to climb up the tower.

10        Q.   General, my question was whether on the evidence that I read to

11     you that the been put before the Galic Chamber as well as this

12     Trial Chamber, you would agree that Ms. Zametica had been deliberately

13     targeted.  And I'll just review it again.  She was a civilian.  She was

14     wearing a brown skirt.  She was in a riverbed pulling water from the

15     river.  She wasn't shot once.  She was shot twice, and she couldn't be

16     rescued because her attacker continued to fire in the water around her.

17     Does that sound like deliberate targeting to you, General?

18        A.   A confirmation whether that was done deliberately or under other

19     circumstances is something I cannot say or give.  I exclude the

20     possibility that things developed that way.  Even if they had, it did not

21     come about as a result of anyone's decision or anyone's issuing of tasks

22     to a marksman to engage civilians.  If under God knows what circumstances

23     it was done by a soldier, he couldn't have been so instructed by his

24     superior or permitted to do so.  That is what I can tell you.

25        Q.   General, you continue to actually not answer my question other

Page 33119

 1     than say a confirmation whether this was done deliberately under other

 2     circumstances is something I cannot say or give, and yet you're able

 3     to -- you offer evidence or information that I would submit is purely

 4     speculative as to what might have gone on with respect to orders or

 5     soldiers' involvement.  My question was simply related to the facts of

 6     what happened to this woman who was shot multiple times.  If that wasn't

 7     direct targeting in the circumstances I've just given to you, what is?

 8        A.   First of all, I wish you didn't assert that I was trying to be

 9     speculative or manipulative.  That is not my task here.  I do not accept

10     that kind of assertion before the Court.  That is why I kindly ask you to

11     refrain from doing so.  That was one thing.

12             Another thing, you cannot ask me to confirm -- well, I confirm

13     that any engagement of civilians is impermissible and that as such cannot

14     be justified.  I can confirm, though, what our policy and practice was --

15        Q.   Now, General, let me stop you there --

16        A.   -- all rules.

17        Q.   -- because you've said you've given evidence about what your

18     policy and practice was over and over again, and we'll move on to another

19     incident that happened the very next day, so 12 July 1993.  And it

20     happened at a well in Dobrinja where the Zametica family actually would

21     most frequently get their drinking water, and that's T 3487 of the

22     victim's daughter's evidence in the Galic case.

23             Now, on 12 July, 13 people were killed and 14 wounded when an

24     82-millimetre mortar shell was fired at a hundred civilians who were

25     waiting in line to get access to this well to get their water, and an

Page 33120

 1     individual, a civilian, Rasim Mahonjic and his wife and two daughters

 2     were waiting in line for water at this well when it happened, and in his

 3     testimony at the Galic case in transcript page 7329 to 7240, he talked

 4     about what happened.  His evidence was that his two daughters went to

 5     join the line at 2.00 a.m. so that they could get to the pump on time,

 6     and he and his wife followed at 10.00 that morning, and they waited

 7     together in line throughout the day until about 4.00 p.m., and

 8     Mr. Mahonjic and his family were second in line to get to the pump.

 9     There was only one family ahead of them when the shell fell, and it

10     killed his wife and his daughters among the other victims.

11             Now, General, people were waiting in line, in the water line in

12     this case, for as much as 14 hours to get to the pump.

13             Now, based on the evidence I've given you, would you agree with

14     me that that's an example of direct targeting of a group of civilians?

15        A.   Ms. Edgerton, you're basically trying to extract answers from me

16     about something I am unaware of.  I simply don't know.  The indicators

17     that I would require would have to be much more specific and detailed

18     save for the fact that people waited for hours on end to get water.  I do

19     not exclude that intention that everything had to do with water,

20     firewood, and burials, but it's a different matter to say that somebody

21     awaited someone else at a certain place in order to do something that

22     would go against acceptable conduct vis-a-vis civilians.  Whatever

23     happened had to have been investigated in order to find out what happened

24     and who was to blame.  That kind of procedure was within General Galic's

25     remit.

Page 33121

 1             Now, to what extent and how well he did so is something I don't

 2     know.  The way you presented this, there's nothing else for me to tell

 3     you other than to repeat that it was unacceptable --

 4        Q.   Well, General --

 5        A.   -- and that there's no other way for me to view it.

 6        Q.   I won't ask you to repeat yourself again, but I thought, General,

 7     as a career officer who's been recognised for your service in the

 8     battle-field, you would have been able to assess the evidence that I'd

 9     given you about these two incidents as to whether or not they sounded

10     like examples of direct targeting.  Is that the case or not?

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm going to object to

12     this question because that's really unfair to a witness.  Civilians are

13     standing in a line and there's a shelling.  Unless you know whether it

14     was deliberate, whether there was an accident, which side it came from,

15     whether there were multiple rounds that were adjusted to attack the

16     civilians, you can't answer that question.  So I don't think there's any

17     probative value to the question ask that you exclude it.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, would you like to respond?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd actually like to move on, Your Honours, if I

21     can.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, a correction in the

24     transcript.  In line 23, page 40, the witness said [in English] "that it

25     was unacceptable if it happened."  "If it happened," this did not find

Page 33122

 1     its way in the transcript.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 4        Q.   Now, General, in your testimony in chief, you also repeatedly

 5     denied that Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces shelled civilian areas, and by

 6     way of reference that's at transcript pages 32582, 83, and 32752.  And in

 7     your testimony you referred not only to areas but also used the words

 8     sectors and neighbourhoods, but just with respect to that first word,

 9     "areas," and when you mean to describe a civilian area, how broad is an

10     area?

11        A.   Madam Edgerton, will you agree with me when I say that I finally

12     and officially -- officially treat Sarajevo in its entirety, the whole

13     town, this whole area, all settlements, as a civilian area?  I am trying

14     to express myself in an original way by saying that the term "area" and

15     "zone," et cetera, whether it's civilian or not, this is something I

16     reject.  For me this whole of Sarajevo is a civilian area.  Why?  Because

17     in that town and throughout that area, civilians resided there.  That's

18     one thing.

19             Another thing, if we make -- may make a distinction between

20     military targets and everything else, a military target is a place where

21     fire is opened from and where groups and forces engage in combat from a

22     certain area.  This is something we can discuss, whether there were

23     targets and could be a target at a certain point in time.

24             In this case, I'm not dealing with the term "area."  I'm not

25     treating it as such whether -- irrespective of whether it's 100 metres,

Page 33123

 1     1.000 metres, if it's a certain locality or not.  If there is a civilian

 2     there, it is deemed a civilian area.  But if fire is opened from that

 3     area, then an assessment will have to be made what to do with that target

 4     which then constituted a military target.  There would be a solution.

 5     There would be a procedure put in place not to put civilians in danger

 6     when it's possible.  If it's not, then an absolute assessment will have

 7     to be made if there would be collateral damage which would outweigh a

 8     military mission to be accomplished, then this is abandoned.  A parallel

 9     is drawn between military advantage and success and the goal -- or target

10     which appears or if there is a situation which may lead to civilians

11     being exposed to an impermissible action if that area.

12        Q.   So when you said at transcript page 32582:

13             "We were not allowed to shell a civilian area nor indeed would we

14     have chosen to shell a civilian area.  The SRK didn't do that.  Wherever

15     there were civilians, that was not a target for us.  We never fired at

16     those areas," your evidence is now that you meant to refer to the city of

17     Sarajevo as a whole; is that correct?

18        A.   I reiterate in the final analysis, wherever there are civilians,

19     that area is a civilian area, and since there were civilians throughout

20     Sarajevo, then my response coincides with this.  But please, through --

21     I've been through this procedure.  My attorney-at-law, my legal counsel,

22     tried to put forward an argument that the -- that Sarajevo was a military

23     area.  I tried to disabuse him of that notion.  I realised that the

24     Trial Chamber kept on asking him about that and that he could put forward

25     no quality answers to that.  Well, even in my utterances you can find

Page 33124

 1     "area" and zone, but this is a legacy of my background.  Now I am giving

 2     you an official explanation and distinction between area, zone, military

 3     target, and civilian area.  I'm sure that this is perfectly clear to

 4     everybody listening.

 5        Q.   Were there any no-fire zones in Sarajevo?

 6        A.   There were.  There were zones, several of them.

 7        Q.   Tell us what those were.

 8        A.   I'm not talking about zones but areas, space, parts of the town.

 9     There were no incidents where fire was opened at civilians.  For

10     instance, in Urijan Bedina Street there were no such incidents.  On

11     Bjeliva [phoen], in Jarcedol, in Bostarici.  Parts of Mejtas.  Not Mejtas

12     in its entirety but parts of it.  There were no combat activities or

13     firing being opened at -- be it on military structures or civilians.

14     Well, I know that area, but I cannot name it, the name escapes me.  Well,

15     it was Vasin Han.  I'm not sure whether I listed all of them.  I've not,

16     but those were the areas where there were no incidents of shells falling

17     there or rounds.

18        Q.   So let's talk about these military targets you referred to,

19     because you talked about them in different ways in your testimony in

20     chief.

21             First of all, you talked about command posts.  At T2 --

22     transcript page 32553, you said:

23             "The number of command posts within Bosnian-held Sarajevo was

24     275."

25             So my question to you is:  Is it your evidence that that's the

Page 33125

 1     case throughout the war?

 2        A.   Yes.

 3        Q.   And is it your evidence that at those times, from 1992 to 1995,

 4     you observed and identified all 275?

 5        A.   Absolutely that is no longer an assertion whether we located each

 6     and every of them.  We just received intelligence about their location.

 7     We knew at that there were certain command posts that were not visible.

 8        Q.   Is it -- is it your evidence that you shelled them?

 9        A.   Providing you information about the existence of such a military

10     command structure that was effective in that area at the time is

11     something else.  Those were military targets, and they could not -- could

12     be targeted, but it's another matter, and it's not been confirmed, which

13     those -- which targets of those command posts were targeted and which

14     were not.  If there was no danger emanating from those areas even if such

15     targets were legitimate, then we had no need to act against those

16     localities.

17        Q.   Now, you've just said, as I understood you, that with respect to

18     these 275, that was on the basis of intelligence you received about their

19     location and not necessarily on the basis of observation; correct?

20        A.   It's a combined effort.  It's a combined process of getting

21     information.  That information was obtained through intelligence or

22     through observation, and then you put together the pieces of that jigsaw

23     puzzle.  Many localities, many points, were highly visible.  There would

24     be frequent goings-on.  For instance, 12 brigades, command post, it's

25     Dobrovoljacka Street.  You could see it and you could see the frequency

Page 33126

 1     of the comings in and goings out of the commanders, where shifts were

 2     organised, security detail being replaced, companies and special --

 3        Q.   But it --

 4        A.   -- forces being sent from there --

 5        Q.   It stands to reason - and not accepting for a moment your number

 6     of 275 is correct - you're not saying that these command posts were of

 7     equal sophistication by any stretch, are you?

 8        A.   It is irrelevant how sophisticated in terms of equipment they

 9     were because a company commander's command post could not be as equipped

10     as a command post of a corps or brigade commander.  Of course, there are

11     differences in terms of manpower, in terms of security detail and

12     equipment, and in terms of presence of the commander at that particular

13     command post.

14        Q.   And when you refer to these command posts, whether or not you had

15     observations, I take it you're generally referring to buildings, some

16     kind of structures, are you?

17        A.   It doesn't need to be.  Certain command posts could be in

18     shelters, in bunkers, in parts of facilities which allow them to work and

19     provide certain level of security and safety.  But first and foremost,

20     they were located in economic facilities, schools --

21        Q.   Now -- now, General, let's just try and focus on my question.

22     You said you didn't shell all of them.  How many did you shell of these

23     structures?

24        A.   You really cannot get that kind of information.  Really, I don't

25     know.  I don't have the information about that.  I cannot even confirm

Page 33127

 1     whether we shelled either.  We did not shell them.  But any target which

 2     constituted danger, it was targeted, but if it was considered to be a

 3     target in this form, then no action -- if there's no threat, no action

 4     would be put in place against it.

 5        Q.   When you targeted those shelters, bunkers, or other facilities,

 6     you targeted them with mortars; correct?

 7        A.   You know quite well that you fire what you have at your disposal.

 8     I'm not confirming here, neither that we shelled them with mortar nor

 9     with cannon or any other device.  I'm not specifying the type of arms we

10     used.

11             Let me go back to my assertion that command posts mainly were not

12     targeted.  No fire was opened at them.  Why?  Because, for instance, the

13     command post at Sedrenik was located in a coffee house, very famous

14     coffee house where certain circles gathered and spent days and nights

15     there.  That command post could have been targeted by any device

16     available to us, but it never was.

17        Q.   Now, General, could we go back to my question of what you

18     targeted those command structures with.  When you said you fire them with

19     what you have at your disposal, do you mean to say --

20        A.   We could have.

21        Q.   Do you mean to say you targeted them with whatever you had?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  The witness stated

23     that mainly they were not targeted.  He did not say that they targeted

24     them with everything at their disposal.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Will you ask the question again, or --

Page 33128

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   General, those command posts that you targeted, do you mean to

 3     say, based on your answer that you fire with what you had at your

 4     disposal, that you targeted them with whatever you had?

 5        A.   I don't think we are getting anywhere.  We're not making progress

 6     if we continue in the same vein.  If you want me to say that this

 7     happened by using a mortar, then I have to be specific about justifying

 8     reasons to use a mortar.  You cannot use direct fire if you fire a

 9     mortar.  It has a certain curve that the shell follows.  I did say that

10     command posts were not targets.  However, technically how this could have

11     been done is what I tried to explain to you just now.

12             If it's open area, it can be targeted with a device which can

13     fire direct -- directly, not indirectly.

14        Q.   Those that were targeted, what did you target them with?

15        A.   You are -- you are discussing command posts, and I said that we

16     did not use anything to target command posts.

17        Q.   So in your testimony in chief, you went into a long analysis

18     based on a couple of things to come to this figure of 275 command posts.

19     So if you didn't target them, General, what was the point of the

20     analysis?

21        A.   The purpose of that analysis was for you as a person in your

22     capacity to get a picture and to draw a conclusion that the type of

23     charges and assertions against me that shelling was indiscriminate and

24     merciless.  My point was -- is that there were many possible [Realtime

25     transcript read in error "impossible]" targets throughout area, and that

Page 33129

 1     my choice of determining the targets to be shelled was based on the fact

 2     that they were endangering or threatening our defensive positions and if

 3     that target constituted a threat and this was when it became a target.

 4        Q.   I don't want to leave that figure of 275 yet, because it seems to

 5     me, General, and maybe you can confirm this, that it seems to me that you

 6     arrived at that figure of 275 purely on the basis of extrapolations from

 7     military doctrine.  You conducted your own independent doctrinal

 8     analysis; correct?

 9        A.   I don't see a problem in asking the question on how this figure

10     was determined in our analysis about the existence of that number of

11     command posts.  They confirmed themselves the existence of such command

12     posts is implied, because there's no structure or unit at a certain level

13     which would not have its own command.  Nobody can function or use units

14     without their command structure, and since they exposed their materiel

15     and their personnel, it was easy to obtain information about the

16     existence of such structure.  And also, this analysis talks not about the

17     type of targets but the stage of development of command structures and

18     the way that units were being used and combat operations being carried

19     out.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, if I may, intervention

21     about the transcript.  Line 19, page 48, the witness did not say that

22     there were "impossible targets throughout" but "incountless" or

23     "innumerable" targets throughout the area.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             MS. EDGERTON:

Page 33130

 1        Q.   So, General, based on what I understand from what you just said,

 2     it seems that your analysis to the effect that each major unit would have

 3     three command posts is based to some extent on ABiH documents as well as

 4     your own thinking; is that correct?

 5        A.   Not on my thinking but on the hard data.  A division command must

 6     have separate --

 7        Q.   Whose data?  Whose data, General?

 8        A.   What do you mean?  I did not get this.

 9        Q.   You said that analysis is based on hard data.  Where's the data?

10        A.   The data that there is a 12th Division that exists.  You cannot

11     deny that.  If that division exists, it must be structured in such a way

12     so that it has its operational parts which conducts combat activities and

13     logistics or the rear which performs logistics duties.  And of course it

14     has to have its area of operation, because it -- they cannot follow from

15     the Dobrovoljacka Street well what is going on at Zuc if they're

16     interested in what is going on, and this is why they have three command

17     posts.

18        Q.   Well, I wonder where's the data, General?  Where's the documents

19     that you base this on?

20        A.   First of all, the data must be with you.  I don't know which data

21     you're asking me about it, because data that the 12th Division existed or

22     the 5th, I'm taking this as an example.  This is not something that

23     should be re-examined.  If you're questioning whether they existed or

24     not, then that's the path that needs to be taken, how things turned out

25     that way, who is dealing with the command and all of that.

Page 33131

 1        Q.   Well, I'd actually like to examine that a little bit, and maybe

 2     we could have a look at D633.  It's a document dated 25 October 1993, and

 3     it's an ABiH 1st Corps command order for defence.

 4             Now, if we can go over to page 3 of the English, paragraph 5.1,

 5     and B/C/S page 2 in the same paragraph, please.

 6             General, the end of paragraph 5.1 in this document you see in

 7     respect of this operation, you see that for the 1st Motorised Brigade, at

 8     the bottom of paragraph 5.1, only one command post.  If we could scroll

 9     down in English so we see the bottom of paragraph 5.2.  Look, General,

10     only one command post for the 2nd Brigade in the Kras area.

11             Could we go over to the next page, please.  The

12     102nd Motorised Brigade has only one command post in the wire factory

13     area.  The 5th Motorised Brigade has only one command post in the

14     Dobrinja area.  So it seems, General, based on this document that not

15     only are your mathematics off, but you relied on doctrine because it

16     actually inflates the number of command posts; isn't that correct?

17        A.   I'm sure that nothing of this is in dispute, because when issuing

18     an assignment to his troops, subordinate troops, the corps commander is

19     obliged to state where their basic command post is.  The other command

20     post locations is something that he does not have to specify, and he

21     doesn't need to change the location.  So it doesn't have to be in the

22     place where the corps commander says it has to be, but it can stay at the

23     place where the brigade commander located it already.

24        Q.   All right.

25        A.   So the second thing is this is nothing that has to do with

Page 33132

 1     strategy.

 2             Can you please allow me to finish.  You interrupted me.

 3             So this is not being taken out of the context of the rules, the

 4     strategy of combat.  It states here what it states in some of their other

 5     documents.

 6             Secondly, all of these units change their structure, as you are

 7     well aware, in the second half of 1994, whereas here you're talking with

 8     me and asking me about documents from 1993.

 9        Q.   General --

10        A.   My information --

11        Q.   -- let me stop you right there.  You specifically said, and I can

12     find you the transcript reference if you like, you specifically said, I

13     think during the first day of your testimony in chief, that the structure

14     didn't change the areas of responsibility; correct?

15        A.   I want to be quite clear what we're talking about.  I don't know

16     what you're thinking.  It's not true that it didn't change.  If I said

17     that, then I must have thought about something else.  I don't know what.

18     You need to remind me what I was thinking of.

19             The Armija B and H restructuring as a whole occurred in the

20     second half of 1994, as I said.  That was when so-called Caco's brigade

21     was disbanded as well as these other groups and hordes that had a

22     different connotation, and then they tried to place them under military

23     structure properly as things should be.

24        Q.   All right.  So then I've just shown you a document from 1993 that

25     lists the brigades as having one command post, yet you said in your

Page 33133

 1     earlier answers to me that this figure of 275 was a figure that was

 2     constant throughout the war.  This document is evidence to the contrary,

 3     isn't it?

 4        A.   Well, it's contrary in your opinion, because something is

 5     missing.  It was left out from here --

 6        Q.   All right.

 7        A.   -- in the sense of --

 8        Q.   All right.

 9        A.   -- when things are being specified.

10        Q.   Let's look at one of your own documents, P5968, and by "your own"

11     I mean a Sarajevo-Romanija Corps document.  It's an operations order by

12     General Galic, and it's dated 26 January 1994.

13             Now, if we could go over to page 2 in both languages, please.

14     This lists SRK data, hard data, as to the number of command posts per

15     brigade.

16             Look, General, at the bottom of the page.  The

17     1st Motorised Brigade is listed as having one command post.  The 2nd

18     doesn't even have one listed in this document.  The 5th is also listed as

19     having one command post.  The 105th, one command post.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could go over to the next page in English,

21     please.

22        Q.   The 104th, again one command post.  It seems if we're to accept

23     your evidence that something was missing from the document generated by

24     the ABiH, it seems as though General Galic is actually missing something

25     in his operations order as well, or, General, is your math wrong?

Page 33134

 1        A.   I don't know what your conclusion will be or how you're trying to

 2     dispute the number of command posts.  I stand by saying that it's quite

 3     certain that these units had a developed command structure and as such it

 4     had to exist and it had to function regardless of if it was written down

 5     in any paper or not.  You cannot manage with one.  The Sarajevo-Romanija

 6     Corps had its main command post in Lukavica and the rear command posts

 7     in -- post in Pale.  This is a requirement that nobody can leave out, and

 8     you cannot merge these two structures that they would work together.

 9     They have to work separately, each in its own sphere.  So I don't see

10     anything of dispute here.

11             I assume that what concerns you is this number of 275 command

12     posts.  If I had said that just 55 command posts there were for

13     battalions, then does that not indicate something quite significant in

14     terms of numbers?  If we add company commander command posts, then the

15     numbers progress.

16        Q.   Well, to progress --

17        A.   So I wouldn't --

18        Q.   To progress, let's look at D2792.  It's a document from 11 June

19     1995, and you've seen it before.  It's the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

20     1st Corps command's attack order, and you've said a couple of times

21     now -- you've referred a couple of times to the changing structure of the

22     1st Corps in 1995.  So let's have a look at that.

23             After the structure has changed and the corps has gone from

24     brigade to division formation, if you will go over to page 4 of the

25     English translation and page 3 of the B/C/S.  There, starting at

Page 33135

 1     paragraph 5.1 you see the first mention of two command posts, a main in

 2     the Astra sector and a forward command post in Sokolje village.

 3     Paragraph 5.2, again two command posts per brigade.

 4             So, General, in fact it looks likes the documents from both the

 5     ABiH and the SRK show that the scenario you've suggested of every major

 6     formation having three command posts has never actually been the case as

 7     far as the ABiH 1st Corps is concerned.

 8        A.   Quite the contrary, it was always the case, especially as far as

 9     forward command posts are concerned.  Therefore, those commands and the

10     commanding officers cannot do anything or monitor anything from the

11     centre of the city unless they have a forward group of people who would

12     monitor and direct action from a forward command post.  This is a rule

13     that I think we will not really get far if you don't take that rule into

14     account.

15             As for the operational part of the command --

16        Q.   Well --

17        A.   -- and the rear command --

18        Q.   -- General --

19        A.   -- right at the beginning, this is something that is separate.

20        Q.   You asked -- you indicated -- when I asked you for the hard data,

21     you indicated that we probably had it, and I've now shown you the hard

22     data about the number of command posts for the different military

23     formations within Sarajevo, and the hard data shows that even up until

24     1995, the major formations never had more than two command posts.  So

25     you're contradicted by the hard data, aren't you, General?

Page 33136

 1        A.   I don't agree with that, but ultimately I can say that even that

 2     is no longer an issue, whether they had three or two.  Don't forget,

 3     Ms. Edgerton, that they had to have had more locations and axes, because

 4     I as corps commander had to have one forward command post at Nisici, one

 5     forward command post at Trnovo, and one main basic command post in

 6     Lukavica.

 7        Q.   Well --

 8        A.   The need --

 9        Q.   We'll move on, because -- without spending any more time on the

10     numbers, recalling what you said, your assertion earlier that you didn't

11     target most of these in any case.  But still on the subject of targeting,

12     you talked about -- at 32581, you talked about ABiH forces using civilian

13     facilities including the Kosevo Hospital, schools, nurseries, commercial

14     buildings, shops, and private homes for military purposes, and at 32700,

15     referred to essentially the same thing.  So my question about that is did

16     you fire at those facilities?  And let's go through one by one.  Did you

17     fire at the Kosevo Hospital?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Did you fire at schools?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Did you fire at nurseries?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   Commercial buildings?

24        A.   No.

25        Q.   So hearing that, I want to ask you then would you agree that the

Page 33137

 1     reason you didn't fire at those facilities is because of the risk to

 2     civilians?

 3        A.   Choice of targets is a completely different action.  When you

 4     choose a target, then you establish everything, and I think I mentioned

 5     this several times already, you mention the degree of threat, the level

 6     of fire from it, the area around it, how many civilian -- of the civilian

 7     population are there around it, how much of a threat the target is to our

 8     positions.  I think that you understand that very well.  All the things

 9     that we had to note in order to make an assessment whether one was

10     permitted to fire at the target or not.  And mostly this indicates that

11     these schools from where somebody was in command, we didn't fire at them,

12     but if there was a school where on the roof of the school there was a

13     device with sandbags, meaning that there was fire over the heads of one's

14     own units, then that fire was that much of a threat that we had to

15     neutralise it by our own fire.

16             You asked here about command posts.  They were mostly not fired

17     at, but perhaps we can differentiate a little bit from -- between general

18     targets, fire targets, and command posts.  Then no, no, no, no, means no

19     at a school if officers are having a meeting there.  But if there is

20     coming -- fire coming from there, that is a completely different

21     circumstance and it's a different type of target.  It's not the same kind

22     of fire.

23        Q.   So I asked you whether or not you fired -- I specifically asked

24     you whether or not you fired at schools and you said no, but your answer

25     now is yes.  So my question is:  How would you respond to mortars being

Page 33138

 1     fired from a school?

 2        A.   First of all, you cannot fire from a school.  A mortar cannot be

 3     fired from a building.  It's a question -- doesn't take it wrongly, but

 4     it's not a professionally put question.  You cannot place a mortar in a

 5     school and fire it from a school.  It can be near a school, behind a

 6     school, and so on and so forth.  And then the situation is different in

 7     terms of that mortar than when we're talking about a building.

 8        Q.   How would you respond to mortars being fired within, as you said

 9     in your testimony in chief, 100 metres from a school?

10        A.   Again, I would like to suggest that we cannot really proceed this

11     way, but this is your methodology, and I respect that.

12             If I said 100 metres, I am trying now to ask you to forget those

13     100 metres.  It's possible that I wasn't precise enough.  However, it all

14     comes down to, I repeat, and I don't know if it's rational to keep

15     repeating that one studies a target to see what sort of a danger it poses

16     and what is around it.  The main factor in adopting a position is that

17     there are no civilians near the target which could be the object of fire

18     when one fires at the target.  So this is something that is avoided

19     unless we're talking about -- well, it all comes down to one mortar here.

20     That one mortar was never the issue, but it was a mortar battery

21     numbering four to six weapons when you would get quite heavy fire from

22     there.  And then one would evaluate such targets and see when and how one

23     would fire at such target.  But even in such a case, it was absolutely a

24     thing to avoid having civilian casualties by firing in the vicinity of

25     civilians.

Page 33139

 1        Q.   So is your answer that you would -- you would respond to mortars

 2     being fired from within 100 metres of a school with mortars?

 3        A.   I don't know where you get that I would respond by mortar fire or

 4     that I said that the choice of weaponry would be a matter of what

 5     weaponry was available at the given moment.  I did not say that we would

 6     respond to mortar fire with mortar fire from our side.  It's something

 7     that I didn't say nor can this be exercised in the field nor should it be

 8     done in this way.  It doesn't have to be.

 9        Q.   Are you excluding by your answer that you responded to mortar

10     fire with mortars?

11        A.   No.  No, I'm not ruling that out.  It just means that you

12     shouldn't hold me to these 100 metres.  I understand what you're trying

13     to say by using the 100 metres and then if you miss then you hit a

14     different target.  This is not what I'm talking about.  I'm talking about

15     the type of fire that we would respond to their fire.  This is up to the

16     commander who is endangered and up to the weapons that he had at that

17     time.  I mean, we didn't have enough weaponry to be able to choose we're

18     going to use that or something else.  They can be also hit by

19     anti-aircraft weaponry operating from the ground if there was a firing

20     line and a situation where he could silence that mortar.  But these

21     things are not necessarily connected.

22        Q.   If you don't want us to hold you to the 100 metres, let me ask

23     you this:  How near a civilian or a civilian object would you fire?

24        A.   I hope that you're not expecting an answer.  I don't have a

25     different answer.  Choice of target cannot be such that the civilian

Page 33140

 1     structure suffers from our fire.  That decision cannot be made.

 2             I'm not ruling out at all the possibility of it happening for

 3     different reasons, but in making the decision and issuing the task to

 4     open fire, that action could not happen by saying, well, let's hope it

 5     won't happen and taking a certain risk.  One would aim to hit a target as

 6     a result of which the population would not suffer.  Innocent civilians

 7     would not suffer.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I'm just looking at the time.  I'm

 9     wondering if -- this is time for the break.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll resume at 17 past 1.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.33 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15        Q.   General, when we left off before the break, we left off before

16     the break with you giving evidence of your efforts to avoid civilian

17     casualties in Bosnian-held Sarajevo and the scrupulous proportionality

18     assessments you made in that regard when it came to shelling.  And you

19     said that the choice of target cannot be such that the civilian structure

20     suffers from our fire.  And, General, with respect, the weight of

21     evidence the Chambers of this Tribunal have heard is completely to the

22     contrary, and I'm going to put some of that to your recollection and I'm

23     going to ask you a question.

24             They have heard with respect to Bosnian-held Sarajevo that the

25     whole city was peppered with damage from shelling or gunfire.  Almost no

Page 33141

 1     building had windows, many of the larger buildings had holes in them, and

 2     they were splashed from shrapnel from mortar rounds.  Areas of the city

 3     that had not been militarily contested were often scattered with

 4     pockmarks from shelling or gunfire.  They have received evidence that

 5     throughout the war, forces, SRK forces, made no distinction --

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me, and the source for the first quote is

 7     P820, paragraph 27.

 8        Q.   They've received evidence that throughout the war SRK forces made

 9     no distinction between military and civilian targets.  Anything that

10     moved, including civilian pedestrians, came under fire.  Hospitals,

11     schools, and historical buildings received direct artillery, tank and

12     mortar fire on a regular basis, while houses, apartments, and gathering

13     places such as markets and waterlines would be shelled without seeming

14     pattern.  Nobody knew when and where a shell would hit, so every place

15     was dangerous.  And that's transcript page 8170 in this trial,

16     General Brigadier General Fraser.

17             They have heard, the Judges in this Tribunal have heard the

18     testimony of individuals who saw random and indiscriminate spelling by

19     your forces throughout Bosnian-held Sarajevo.  One witness, a Dutch

20     military officer, said:

21             "It's the fact that I saw that we, my team, I myself and my

22     people, we witnessed falling rounds, especially mortar rounds, throughout

23     the city in a random pattern, not in a way that you combat military

24     targets with."

25             And further on he continues:

Page 33142

 1             "It is what I witnessed during those periods.  I don't know why

 2     the Serb commanders did it.  I don't know what orders they had, but the

 3     fact is what I saw is that they were random firing with single rounds or

 4     a few rounds on areas where there were no military targets whatsoever."

 5             And that's transcript page 9345 to 46 in this trial, the evidence

 6     of Lieutenant-Colonel Konings.

 7             And similarly, Major Pyers Tucker saw artillery under the control

 8     of your forces being used on one hand in support of attacks by your

 9     infantry but also saw it being used to fire all over the city at targets

10     that had nothing to do with the actual attack.  The impression he gained

11     was that the purpose of this shelling was in order to intimidate the

12     population of the city in general and the government in power and to

13     break their will to resist, and that's P4203.

14             Another witness described the most common form of shelling he

15     experienced during his time in Sarajevo as shelling that was constant but

16     a relatively low bombardment by your forces with no identifiable military

17     purpose.  It seemed intended to keep the civilian population of Sarajevo

18     locked down, vulnerable, fearful, and isolated.  It wasn't entirely

19     random.  Sometimes targeting certain neighbourhoods from one day to the

20     next but otherwise there was --

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wonder -- I wonder, your

22     Excellencies, how one can answer a question as complex as this.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The Chamber was discussing this.  So shall we

24     stop there and hear from the witness or will you put a question.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Can I ask a question?

Page 33143

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  If the general is able to answer the question.

 2     Yes, what is your question, Ms. Edgerton?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   General, the weight of the evidence before this Tribunal as to

 5     the shelling by your forces and targeting of civilians in Sarajevo is

 6     massively contrary to the evidence you've given today, isn't it?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  That's absolutely an

 8     impossible question.  First of all, to spend two pages of transcript to

 9     ask a question is absolutely unacceptable and unheard-of, but then to

10     finally ask a question about the weight of evidence in this trial.  He

11     has not been sitting through this trial.  He has no way to answer that

12     question.  We've just wasted about 10 minutes, and I hope you'll consider

13     that if they ask for additional time.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  May I rephrase?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

16             MS. EDGERTON:

17        Q.   General, this evidence shows that your forces were doing exactly

18     what you said they weren't; correct?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Again, Mr. President, I don't think he can comment

20     on evidence he hasn't heard in total.  I don't think it's appropriate for

21     him to be asked to comment on it.  There's a more direct way to ask these

22     questions.  I think you should instruct the Prosecutor to do that.

23             JUDGE MORRISON:  Ms. Edgerton, to simply read out the transcript

24     and turn it into effectively an enormous compound question, it's very

25     difficult because you then asked a question at the end which in a sense

Page 33144

 1     demands a yes or no answer, Does it contradict that which I've said.

 2     It's putting the witness into an extremely difficult position.  It might

 3     be better to formulate it something like this:

 4             General, bearing in mind the thrust of the evidence that's been

 5     read out to you, if the Chamber found it was accurate evidence, wouldn't

 6     that contradict your statement that there was no indiscriminate fire?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  That was the question from the Prosecution.

 8             Could you answer the question then, Mr. Milosevic.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with all due respect

10     to the people who testified, and the questions or assertions put forth by

11     Ms. Edgerton, my answer would be that I was hoping for this situation to

12     arise so that I can address the issue.

13             Neither Ms. Edgerton nor the esteemed gentlemen who came to

14     testify had an opportunity to view the entire situation in its full

15     complexity and the way both sides had to assess it, on the one side the

16     SRK and the other the 1st Corps of the army of BH.  I think I will be

17     sufficiently precise if I said that if things had taken place indeed the

18     way it was portrayed here, that events unfolded without measure, Sarajevo

19     would have been razed to the ground.  The area itself could not sustain

20     it if this were proven to be true.  It was not.  Such engagement did not

21     come about.  And it does not fall within the concept of what our position

22     or policy was.

23             What I know only is that we did not allow such activity, such

24     behaviour.  For the most part, without interpreting things in any other

25     way as regards my period between 1992 and 1995 --

Page 33145

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  1994 and 1995.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When engaging targets, that is

 3     something I want to discuss here to confirm and whether we actually

 4     engaged in such conduct.  There is nothing to hide.  We didn't behave

 5     this way, and things did not develop this way.  No atmosphere was created

 6     to the extent that people were being driven crazy there.  One cannot put

 7     such assertions that our activity, our engagement went along those lines.

 8     Such a procedure, such conduct did not take place, and it cannot be

 9     accepted that every part of town was targeted like that every day and

10     that the procedure was something that went on day after day.

11             It was all portrayed in such a way as to show that we enacted a

12     campaign of terror against the population while setting aside all the

13     other aspects such as standing ground and opposing the other side, their

14     1st Corps.  This kind of position, this kind of thesis cannot be

15     sustained, and I am ready to address it from a number of viewpoints.

16     However, if one wants to create an anathema as regards the military

17     conduct of the SRK, such as that it was a bestial organisation, it's

18     certainly not a good way to try and prove anything.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The last line, actually line 3,

20     should be "bestial," and just above that I believe he mentioned terrible,

21     a terrible situation, a terrible atmosphere which did not make its way

22     into the transcript I'm afraid.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24        Q.   Now, General, I'd like to show you a document you drafted.  It's

25     P2668.  And, General, you've just said in answer to this question that it

Page 33146

 1     cannot be accepted that every part of town was targeted like that every

 2     day and procedure, the procedure we were discussing, was something that

 3     went on day after day.

 4             Now, this document was issued by you on the 19th of July, 1995,

 5     and it relates to the rational expenditure of ammunition.  If you go to

 6     page -- paragraph 2 of this document, about halfway through the paragraph

 7     it says:

 8             "That is why we very often fire at inhabited settlements and

 9     specific buildings when there are no combat actions whatsoever spending

10     vast quantities of ammunition without paying attention to the fact that

11     we will not have anything to stop the enemy when it comes to mounting a

12     decisive defence."

13             And if you go over to the next page in both languages, I think

14     paragraph 4 on page 2, this reads:

15             "In order to achieve a surprise effect and inflict the highest

16     enemy losses, produce strong, planned, concentrated fire from several

17     weapons from different directions at a specific time instead of firing

18     one or two weapons for an hour at the same target.

19             So, General, this document represents -- is actually an

20     acknowledgement that your forces were indeed targeting the city in the

21     way you've just said they weren't.

22        A.   I see that there is no map.  It is my conclusion that you lost

23     sight intentionally or unintentionally because, of course, it is your

24     goal to lead me into providing a wrong answer.

25             The SRK covered a specific area that these warnings referred to,

Page 33147

 1     and they also referred to such areas where there were no settlements or

 2     where there were very small abandoned settlements which housed only their

 3     forces, that is, when we are discussing some rural areas just outside

 4     Sarajevo.

 5             You are now putting all of this in the context of Sarajevo and

 6     its residential buildings, but it definitely doesn't mean that.

 7             If you would kindly return the first item on the screen.  I think

 8     I was cautioning them not to do it unnecessarily.  Well, whoever is

 9     receiving an order needs to be told clearly that they should not open

10     fire unnecessarily, that it may be detrimental if one even ponders

11     opening fire in the context that doesn't require it.  That is why I said

12     that there should be no pointless targeting of inhabited areas.

13             One could only conclude the following, that we didn't need to and

14     that we had to in order to achieve success, as my people would do it, as

15     if we were just beating around the bush to act pointlessly.  For such

16     kind of activity, while we didn't have that much ammunition and we didn't

17     act that way because, as it says here, that conditions needed to be

18     created for a specific moment in time which may pose a much greater

19     threat in terms of enemy breakthrough.

20             So all of our instructions and all of our enforcing of regulation

21     revolved around the concept of proper conduct in the right manner, in the

22     right spirit.  That's what I was trying to say.

23        Q.   General, this --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that that's what

25     the document is trying to show and that it wasn't the witness who was

Page 33148

 1     trying to say it.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  The document was authored by the

 3     general.  Let's continue.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:

 5        Q.   General, with respect, as much as the warning cautions your

 6     forces against spending vast quantities of ammunition as if they had it

 7     in abundance, if you look, if you go back over to page 1 in both

 8     languages, if you look at paragraph 2, it refers -- it specifically says:

 9             "That is why we very often fire at inhabited settlements and

10     specific buildings when there are no combat actions whatsoever."

11             On its face, General, the document doesn't lend itself to any

12     other interpretation than inhabited settlements were being targeted when

13     there was no combat action underway; correct?

14        A.   Incorrect.  If I may, I'd like to present my approach to this.

15     When issuing orders to my units, I have to warn them in such a way which

16     would put them in the right situation, because they don't know whether it

17     referred to their specific activity or the activity of a unit that is

18     adjacent to it in terms of the SRK.  And they should receive their own

19     information or caution that if a specific person or a unit should try to

20     engage targets in that way, that it simply cannot be done randomly or

21     blindly, if I may put it that way.  It may appear to be that way to you,

22     but I do know that those units had to be cautioned and provided with

23     instruction in different ways so as not to find themselves in a situation

24     where they would behave like that and not to make it a practice.

25     Actually, they always had to bear in mind that it was simply not allowed.

Page 33149

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for just a moment.

 2                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   We'll just move on to another area, General, and it's an area you

 5     spent a lot of time dealing with in your examination-in-chief, and it's

 6     about air-bombs and the air-bomb shelling you ordered on 6 April 1995.

 7             Now, General, you clearly know something about these air-bombs,

 8     don't you, and how they operate, because as a commander ordering their

 9     use you would be required to be familiar with these assets.  Isn't that

10     the case?

11        A.   Yes, I know them.

12        Q.   These air-bombs are really area assets, aren't they?  Area

13     weapons.

14        A.   Both from the air and from the ground, yes.

15        Q.   They're -- let me rephrase.  These air-bombs, like -- not unlike

16     mortars, are meant as area weapons; correct?

17        A.   It doesn't have to be that way.  If you're targeting a specific

18     target which is stronger and profitable target with large number of

19     people, we are not discussing area here.

20        Q.   Now, with respect to the air-bombs incident on Dositejeva Street,

21     you said, and it was at transcript page 32780, that if it had indeed

22     fallen there, it would have caused much greater destruction than it did.

23     So maybe given that, you can tell us exactly with a kind of destructive

24     power these bombs had.

25        A.   This is an asset containing a large quantity of explosive, and

Page 33150

 1     its effect covers a larger area, and it produces more effects than

 2     mortars or other pieces of artillery.

 3        Q.   And what kind of quantity of explosive does it contain?  How

 4     much?

 5        A.   There are two types of such bombs.  100 kilograms one and 250

 6     kilogrammes the other.  That quantity does not refer to the quantity of

 7     explosives but the total mass of the asset.  I could not confirm here

 8     whether 250 kilogrammes or 100 kilogrammes would be 100 kilogrammes or

 9     250 kilogrammes of explosive.  These are technical specifications.  What

10     I know are the types of air-bombs.  What I don't know is what precisely

11     they contain.

12        Q.   All right.  And you obviously know a little bit about their

13     accuracy, because in your evidence in chief at transcript page 32773,

14     when Dr. Karadzic asked you where the bombs were fired from, you said

15     they were fired from your corps area of responsibility behind the lines

16     of the units in the trenches, and if there were residential areas on the

17     axis, these bombs would go across those areas, but those situations were

18     mostly avoided and your forces chose localities where such aerial bombs

19     would have to overfly only your units and those were circumstances, you

20     said, that required caution, and it had to be made sure that there was a

21     high degree of precision, otherwise the bomb may have landed on your

22     forces.

23             So clearly based on your evidence, you were aware of a certain

24     measure of risk with regard to the launching and landing of that

25     air-bomb, a risk to your forces and Serb-held areas; correct?

Page 33151

 1        A.   I don't know why you misunderstood that utterance.  If it is said

 2     that one of the reasons why accuracy has to be achieved and high level of

 3     precision, it is that very reason.  If there's no accuracy and precision,

 4     they could fall on our forces, on our territory.  This is not in

 5     contravention, neither does it change the situation which shows that we

 6     were working on upgrading those air-bombs, introducing electronics and

 7     expertise of experts, calculating the tables so that they may be turned

 8     into a reliable assets when used.

 9        Q.   I don't think there was any misunderstanding, General.  You were

10     clear in your evidence that situations where the bombs might fly across

11     residential areas were mostly avoided.  That's because the bomb might

12     have landed on them, isn't?

13        A.   Yes.  Naturally I know what you're after.

14        Q.   Now, we also talked -- or you also discussed in your evidence in

15     chief at 32776 and 32777 some of the other air-bombs incidents apart from

16     the incident on 7 April 1995.  In particular, you talked about the one on

17     Majdanska Street on 24 May.  At transcript page 32778, you said that the

18     distance in this case, the Majdanska Street incident, 130 or 140 metres

19     to the residential building was far enough to be safe.  It couldn't be

20     damaged by your action.  People would be unhappy about it, but there were

21     no casualties.  So 130 to 140 metres is your acceptable safe radius for

22     the use of these bombs.  Is that what you're saying?

23        A.   For me it is acceptable that whoever finds himself 100 or more

24     metres, that that person would not be in danger.  One hundred metres from

25     the place of detonation.  There's no doubt about that.  But let's not

Page 33152

 1     lose sight of the fact that I was in the vicinity of detonation sites

 2     when NATO air-bombs fell, and I survived without a scratch.  I know what

 3     those air-bombs effect was when they tried to destroy certain facilities,

 4     in this particular case military facilities.  Without a direct hit, their

 5     effect is just to -- to dig a crater.  I'm not trying to belittle the

 6     effect of those air-bombs, but these are not assets that would have

 7     unlimited destructive power.

 8             I ventured into those craters of eight NATO air-bombs at Hadzici

 9     and Jahorinski Potok and at bridges, et cetera, et cetera.  For instance,

10     they could not destroy those bridges using those air-bombs, for instance.

11        Q.   We'll get to your presence at Sarajevo around the time of the

12     NATO bombing a little bit later, but I want to stay for the time being a

13     little bit earlier in 1995 at the time of -- around the time of these

14     incidents.

15             I actually on the subject of the safe radius would like to show

16     you a document.  It's P1299, and it's dated 26 April, 1995.  And it will

17     be two quick documents in succession.

18             So this is an extremely urgent piece of correspondence to you

19     from General Mladic asking for an explanation, saying you're to inform

20     him -- saying he's in possession of information that you are planning to

21     use two air-bombs against enemy targets and settlements in the area of

22     Sarajevo in the evening of 26 April, and directing you to inform him

23     whether this information is correct, who ordered it, why, the planned use

24     of the weapons, and the beginning of the operations in Sarajevo.

25             Now, once you've had a chance to look through that document, I'd

Page 33153

 1     like to go to another one related to this.  And do you see actually,

 2     General, on the top right-hand corner of the document handwritten there's

 3     a notation that Colonel Tadija gave a partial reply?  That would be

 4     Colonel Tadija Manojlovic your chief of artillery, wouldn't it?

 5        A.   Yes, yes.  Yes.

 6        Q.   Just let us know when you've had a chance to look at this

 7     document, General, and we'll go on to the next one.  And General, if you

 8     ever need to have this enlarged, all you need to do is say, because our

 9     colleagues here can enlarge the image on the screen in front of you so

10     that you can see it more clearly.

11        A.   That's all right.  I understood.  But no further enlargement is

12     necessary.  This is sufficient.

13        Q.   All right.  Let's go now to Colonel Manojlovic's partial reply.

14     It's P1310, also dated 26 April, 1995.

15        A.   Could you please enlarge a bit.

16        Q.   Now, Colonel Manojlovic in his response to General Mladic's query

17     says that he abandoned the planned firing of the modified air-bomb

18     because through measuring with instruments they established that two

19     UNPROFOR points are at most 200 metres away while your own defence line

20     was 500 metres away, and the risk to both should the weapon be fired was

21     too great.  So your own -- the safe radius of your own head of artillery

22     is actually almost five times what you said was acceptable in your

23     comments with regard to the Majdanska Street incident, isn't it?

24        A.   What chief of artillery assessed as an expert is a measure.  It

25     is something which constitutes an additional consideration to absolutely

Page 33154

 1     make sure that safety is achieved.  Had UNPROFOR position been even

 2     further away, because of their relative vicinity, it was not justified

 3     nor would it be wise to use an air-bomb against the target being

 4     discussed here, and the target was the area of Donji Kotorac.  Therefore,

 5     this is not an error, neither is it any action which would run contrary

 6     to my assertion.  I maintain my efforts to explain to you that if an

 7     air-bomb exploded and somebody would be 100 metres away from the

 8     detonation site, that person would not be affected or threatened.  It

 9     wouldn't be -- become a casualty, wouldn't be destroyed.

10             It doesn't mean that this assessment was so strict if somebody

11     would be 100 metres away we would no longer observe that.  We took into

12     consideration whether the same degree of threat would be the same for

13     that person and for -- for the target, and this would not be a

14     counter-argument that we should expand that radius to 200 to 850 -- 500

15     metres.  The degree of caution expressed by this artillery expert is

16     justified, and I acknowledge his assessment because he's the expert.

17     There were no other intentions behind this decision except for safety.

18        Q.   And just to go back to what you said in the earlier part of your

19     answer, you said had the UNPROFOR position had been even further away, so

20     even further than 200 metres, because of their relative vicinity, the use

21     of the air-bomb would not be justified.

22             So the question I want to ask is do you have any idea, General,

23     how far UN Sector Sarajevo headquarters was from the impact site of the

24     air-bomb on Majdanska Street?

25        A.   Of course.  It was distant enough not to be threatened.  This

Page 33155

 1     case we are consisting which required a different approach and Majdanska

 2     are two separate matters.  When it comes to Majdanska, the target needed

 3     to be fired upon because of our general jeopardy of -- the general danger

 4     that we were exposed to.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your indulgence for a moment.

 6                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   Now, let's go over to -- more specifically to the situation in

 9     Hrasnica and the air-bomb shelling of 7 April.  You said at T 32791, you

10     talked about the size of Hrasnica and said it was covered in totality by

11     forces that were deployed or that opened fire from within or were on

12     furlough or there were reservists who were on standby, and you also said

13     that the locality itself, the territory of the neighbourhood, was

14     encumbered by the military factor and artillery assets, i.e., mortars,

15     120-millimetres which opened fire from that area.  So when you refer to

16     mortars which opened fire from that area, do you mean to refer to mortars

17     in the town proper?

18        A.   Mortars not in the town.  It wasn't a town.  It was a settlement,

19     an open ground close to certain buildings, in parks, in public parks and

20     such areas.

21        Q.   All right.  Just in that regard, maybe we could have a look at

22     another -- at an order drafted by you.  It's D779.  It was drafted by you

23     on 27 March 1995, for an operation called Lukavac 1995.  So this is about

24     11 days before this incident.  And if we go over to the bottom of page 3

25     of the document in English - and with your indulgence, I'll just try and

Page 33156

 1     find the B/C/S page reference.  I think the corresponding page is the

 2     second page in B/C/S, but at the bottom of page 3 of the English, we see

 3     information that you have about the deployment of the armaments of the

 4     4th Motorised Brigade.  You see 120-millimetre mortar platoon in the zone

 5     of Vrhovi.  Now, that's not in the settlement of Hrasnica, is it?

 6        A.   No, it's not, no.

 7        Q.   And on the next page in English, same page in B/C/S, you see

 8     reference to a 105-millimetre howitzer in zone of Radeljevaca.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   An [as interpreted] 82-millimetre mortar in the zone of Vrhovi,

11     an 82-millimetre mortar in Bijela Kosa, and a mixed mortar platoon in

12     Kotarni Cari [phoen].  Now, none of these weapons placements are --

13     reflect -- or are locations in the settlement of Hrasnica at all, are

14     they?  They're actually above and behind Hrasnica centre.

15        A.   Yes.  Well, could you please return to the page where the date of

16     the Lukavac document is listed.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Intervention into the transcript.

18     In line 19, it says "an 82-millimetre mortar."  It wasn't a single piece

19     of mortar.  It was a platoon of mortars.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's okay.  I've seen the

21     date.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   All right.  Now, this document also doesn't mention any

24     facilities for weapons manufacture as being in the town or in the

25     settlement, does it?

Page 33157

 1        A.   First of all, let's be on the same page.  This document was

 2     drafted in a completely different time when it was foreseen that we will

 3     have to engage our forces to carry out Operation Lukavac.  However,

 4     certain changes occurred which put this document out of force, both the

 5     decision and the order and further plans of ours to carry out this

 6     activity concerning the area of Igman and the area of Treskavica.  I'm

 7     familiar with this area.  And when it stated where mortars are

 8     positioned, the reference is made to the region of Vrhovi, well, this is

 9     the first indication that they did not have at their disposal just one

10     platoon of mortars and that they placed them and deployed them at Vrhovi.

11     They had artillery pieces both at Vrhovi and within Hrasnica itself.

12             Furthermore, these dates do not match.  The change of firing

13     position is such a simple activity and that is carried out by units, in

14     this case our enemy.  It was easy to do.  Even if it weren't for the same

15     mortars which was not the case because they had sufficient mortars to

16     cover both Vrhovi location and Hrasnica itself.  This is what I can tell

17     you.  Those two documents cannot be connected in terms of they were there

18     and we thought they were in Hrasnica.  This was not so.

19        Q.   Now, same question on this as I asked you with respect to the

20     number of command posts.  You've referred to a change in firing

21     positions.  Where's the hard data for that, General?  Where's the

22     document?  Because this is your own document dated only ten days

23     beforehand.

24        A.   I didn't understand you, what you meant when you said where is

25     the data.  Which data?  What sort of data do you mean?

Page 33158

 1        Q.   Well, you referred in your evidence in chief to documents you had

 2     in your possession.  Do you have a document that establishes firing

 3     positions other than what you set out in your order of 27 May 1995

 4     existed or that firing positions were changed from what you set out in

 5     your order of 27 May -- pardon me, 27 March.

 6        A.   In Hrasnica?

 7        Q.   Yeah.

 8        A.   I still didn't understand, because I don't need any other

 9     document.  This is an assessment, an evaluation that we had about the

10     deployment of the enemy in order to plan the Lukavac operation.  If it

11     was planned as such and executed or was supposed to be executed, then the

12     data was gathered and this is what we had at our disposal when we needed

13     it.  I don't know how I can add to that or to confirm the data in this

14     situation except for what is already written there.

15        Q.   All right.  Now, you said that between 27 March 1995 and the date

16     of the incident on the 7th of April, Bosnian firing positions changed and

17     moved to the town centre of Hrasnica.  So let's look at another document,

18     and it's a document dated 7 --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, please.  Can we have the

20     information when this was stated?  Quite the contrary.  The witness said

21     that they did have enough to have that at the same time in Hrasnica and

22     in the hill.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  I think Dr. Karadzic is actually correct.  I think

25     I might have misunderstood the witness who said:

Page 33159

 1             "The change of firing position is such a simple activity and

 2     that's carried out by units, in this case our enemy.  Even if it weren't

 3     for the same mortars which was not the case because they had sufficient

 4     mortars to cover both Vrhovi location and Hrasnica itself."

 5             So, yes, I apologise.  My misunderstanding of the witness.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Nevertheless, I'd still like to go to the document

 8     dated 7 April 1995, and it's P5943, and it's a VRS Main Staff report to

 9     Dr. Karadzic.

10        A.   Could we please zoom in on the document.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Maybe one more magnification for the general,

12     please.

13        Q.   Now, if you go over in this document and the numbering is

14     difficult in the B/C/S.  Let me just see if I can scan it.  I want to go

15     over to paragraph 6, and its kind of jammed together on the B/C/S.

16        A.   I don't see that paragraph, the number 6, anywhere.  Could you

17     perhaps tell me how the text begins?

18        Q.   It's on --

19        A.   [In English] Mm-hmm, okay.  [Interpretation] I see.

20        Q.   It's on B/C/S page 3 and it's paragraph 3 I'm after.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies.  And English page 4.

23        Q.   Now, this paragraph says at 6.00 a.m. that morning, the enemy

24     opened up heavy fire from Gradina, Igman, and Lasica.  So would you --

25        A.   Yes.

Page 33160

 1        Q.   -- agree with me that all these locations are up in the hills or

 2     in the case of Lasica that's right next to the confrontation line by the

 3     Famos factory?

 4        A.   Correct.  Correct, yes.  Lasica is in the town, in the

 5     settlement.

 6        Q.   Now, this document says that -- pardon me.  So then the origin of

 7     fire for the launching or in response to which this 250 kilo air-bomb was

 8     launched, and that's at sub-heading B, under paragraph 3, actually was

 9     outside of the settlement centre, whereas the bomb was launched in the

10     town centre, General.  The fire, according to this report that the bomb

11     responded to actually had nothing to do with ABiH activity from Hrasnica

12     centre at all.  Isn't that the case?

13        A.   No.  No, that wasn't like that.  You didn't give me an

14     opportunity to say what the circumstances were and what the situation was

15     in Hrasnica.  I must give an explanation that the commander of the

16     Ilidza Brigade had for a long time insisted that a solution be found how

17     to prevent the mortar and artillery fire from the Hrasnica section.  The

18     Ilidza area and the entire part from Stojcevci across the basins, the

19     pools, the institute, the spas, and the villas were threatened by this

20     fire coming from Hrasnica.  He didn't start to show it to me and to look

21     for a solution.  For example, if there was fire on the 7th, he didn't ask

22     for it on the 5th, but it would be a few days before.

23             I had to be in the situation, because from where I was, I

24     couldn't see Hrasnica from Ilidza.  So in order to have confirmation of

25     what was actually happening there and whether that corresponded to what

Page 33161

 1     the commander was saying.  There was an area called Siljak.  It was above

 2     Ilidza, and these are already the slopes of Mount Igman.  That is

 3     where -- from where we could see the force that was inside and the

 4     assets, how they were deployed.  The basic thing is that there were

 5     mortars and firing positions there deployed in the same way as they were

 6     at Vrhovi.  Let me add this as well:  The image and noting the indicators

 7     was at the same time when there was firing.  It just happened by chance.

 8     They weren't aware that somebody was monitoring what they were doing in

 9     that particular time.  So I ascertained that there was fire in that area,

10     and I could then see how much under threat the commander and his sector

11     was by that fire.  And on the basis of that, I had to agree with him to

12     neutralise that fire.

13             I can tell you later or I can tell you right now how things went

14     on from there.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 5 in the transcript, the

16     witness was misunderstood.  He didn't say that it would be a few days

17     before.  He said "even," it would be even more than a few days earlier.

18     That's what he said.

19             MS. EDGERTON:

20        Q.   So the timing of the fire was not in -- the timing of the fire of

21     the air-bomb was not in any way proximate in time to the mortar fire

22     you've referred to.

23        A.   I don't know why that would be so and where the misunderstanding

24     comes from.  I gave an explanation as to what was seen at another time,

25     but this fire continued, and somehow now we cannot come to the conclusion

Page 33162

 1     that you would like to draw that since it happened on the 7th that would

 2     be when actually nobody was firing at all.  There would not have been any

 3     fire on the 7th either -- or, rather, on the 6th, is that right?  If

 4     there had been no fire before that at some point, this is what happened

 5     then, that at some point the air-bomb was used.

 6             I hope that you understood that nothing was left to chance

 7     because that Hrasnica was too active and it's forces as well, that we

 8     were firing whenever we felt like it.  We had a lot of patience as well

 9     as attempted to thwart it in a different way than it would be done, but

10     in this case they weren't pardoning themselves at all, never mind us.

11        Q.   So your evidence is this air-bomb was fired to neutralise a

12     mortar; correct?

13        A.   Not mortar but mortars.  Artillery weapons.  Actually, in this

14     case there were four of them.  I mean, it wasn't a question of one

15     mortar.  You wouldn't retaliate for one mortar.

16        Q.   Now, still on the subject of this incident, you also in your

17     evidence at 32796 said that the Aleksa Santic school was a place where

18     they made hand grenades and rifle grenades in Hrasnica.  Did you know

19     that a Serb resident of Hrasnica actually came to testify in

20     Dr. Karadzic's defence and specifically said that there was no production

21     going on in the school and the only thing going on was melting in the gym

22     and the manufacturing process took place somewhere else?  And he said

23     that at transcript page 32087.

24        A.   What I said was based on data that I was given by certain people.

25     That connection, movements, contacts, they were not so exclusive so that

Page 33163

 1     somebody from Hrasnica would not be able to come to provide information

 2     about what was going on in Ilidza and that this data could then be

 3     offered up.

 4             I do acknowledge the testimony of that witness, but as far as

 5     he's concerned, if he had better information at disposal, then -- our

 6     information also was grounded.

 7        Q.   Well, if it was, where were the mortars positioned?

 8        A.   I said that the mortars were located in open areas, in areas that

 9     could be described as parks or locations where there were no buildings.

10     They were next to buildings, in the vicinity of buildings.

11        Q.   Let's just -- and did you receive information that the mortars

12     had been neutralised?

13        A.   Well, let's understand the following first:  When the decision

14     was given to use the air-bomb, the order was sent to the hands of

15     Colonel Radovcic [phoen], and in the order it stated, which usually is

16     there, it's a rule that has to be applied, that the air-bomb or some

17     other asset, but the air-bomb in this case has to be prepared.  It has to

18     be ready to act.  Once it's prepared, when the information is confirmed

19     that the asset is prepared, the information would reach me, then there

20     would be a couple of checks so that we make sure that it's no longer

21     technical preparedness but that we would need to check what the situation

22     was in the location where the asset is supposed to be fired, and then the

23     information was that the target was still visible, the target was still

24     active, and that the asset can be fired, and all of that would then stop

25     at this check and making sure that everything was as it is, and then we

Page 33164

 1     would wait for my order for the fire to go ahead.

 2             As for some more immediate indicators, then I would perhaps

 3     receive further such information or data about the situation as it was.

 4        Q.   Well, General, with respect, the evidence that we've discussed

 5     today suggest that it would be impossible to pinpoint a target with these

 6     air-bombs.  You've said that the air-bombs weren't fired over Serb

 7     residential areas because they might land on them.  Your chief of

 8     artillery wouldn't fire air-bombs on a target within 500 metres of your

 9     own forces because of the risk that the bomb might land on them, and I

10     would suggest to you, General, that whether or not the target was

11     visible, it was impossible to pinpoint something like that with this

12     weapon without risk of civilian casualties.

13        A.   Well, the assessment isn't made in the way as to guarantee that

14     there would be absolutely no civilian casualties.  The risk is calculated

15     on the basis of an estimation of possible collateral damage compared to

16     the option of halting these assets that were endangering us.  I don't

17     know if you can see in view of the locality the area.  Those same assets

18     are so easily fired at Vojkovici without any restraint at Grlica and at

19     parts over there around the Famos factory, and in the same way they fired

20     at Ilidza.  These are not two opposite sides.  So it was simple to direct

21     fire.

22             These assets, these weapons from Hrasnica were not threatening

23     just a sector of the front but a broad sweep of the area for manoeuvring

24     an action.  So the calculations had to take into account what had to be

25     done so that the civilian population would not suffer if the target was

Page 33165

 1     engaged.  Calculations were made so that the target would be destroyed

 2     without destroying a large number of people.

 3        Q.   General, your own orders explicitly refer to the probability of a

 4     miss when you used these air-bombs.  Let's have a look at P1309.  It's

 5     your order dated 21 April, 1995, for the operation called Talas.  Talas

 6     1, in fact.  And in both languages, we can go over to page 2, paragraph

 7     2.

 8             This orders -- this is your order.  It says:

 9             "Proceed forthwith to prepare launchers to make sure that four to

10     six aerial bombs can be launched simultaneously against the designated

11     target, the condition being that they must hit the target, which means

12     that the provisions have to be made for more bombs so that in the event

13     of a miss, the next projectile lands on the target."

14             General, you actually had an expectation that these bombs

15     wouldn't hit the target as evidenced by this order and you still fired

16     them against Hrasnica and other areas of Sarajevo where civilians were

17     found?

18        A.   Excellent question, and you will get my answer.  It's not a

19     question here of firing.  It's -- it's -- we're talking about firing at a

20     target here.  It's a question of terminology.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  In the B/C/S, interpreter's note.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it's not an artillery battery

23     but a launcher.  So immediately prepare a launcher and ensure that the

24     selected target is hit by four to six air-bombs on condition that they

25     hit the target.  It cannot be permitted that the crew -- well, not the

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 1     crew but the commanding officer controlling the assets prepares to such

 2     an extent and makes such a calculation that they -- the target would be

 3     hit.  This is one thing.

 4             Secondly, the commander -- and here I officially note that the

 5     commander cannot know everything, and my people who understand this much

 6     better said to me immediately that you cannot fire more than one air-bomb

 7     at a time because the firing is followed by preparation, namely once one

 8     is fired and it does not hit the target, then a lot of time is required,

 9     and I think they told me that it's about two hours, to prepare a new one.

10     The two hours would imply completely revealing the asset, which is quite

11     large, and it would be out of the question to keep it where it was,

12     because then it would be exposed to enemy fire.  So in essence, we did

13     not change the contents of the regulations, but we nuanced and detailed

14     so that everything would come down to the use of one air-bomb calculated

15     in such a manner that it's to the target.  Contrary to that, the

16     professional controlling the fire and overseeing the precision of fire

17     would not even proceed to firing point unless he could rely on this

18     precision.  So he tried to stick to what was there as closely as possible

19     without changing the rules and the text of the content.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, I see it's 2.45.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll continue tomorrow, but before we

22     adjourn, I briefly have two matters, Mr. Tieger.

23             Would you like to respond to the Defence motion for a request

24     Mr. Krstic's lawyer to be present in the courtroom?

25             MR. TIEGER:  I think an e-mail was just sent on that,

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 1     Mr. President, and I won't pre-empt the contents, but I believe we don't

 2     have a problem with that.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And do you have any observation about the Defence

 4     motion to -- Defence response to your motion to exclude the evidence of

 5     Snezana Kovac in which the Defence wants to tender those remaining

 6     relevant paragraphs pursuant to Rule 92 bis?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  On that one I think I'm behind the curve and I'll

 8     have to check.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So if we could hear your response as soon as

10     possible.

11             MR. TIEGER:  As soon as possible, of course, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is now adjourned.  We will begin --

13     we'll resume tomorrow at 9.00.

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 5th day

16                           of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.