Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 33941

 1                           Tuesday, 19 February 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Would the witness make the

 7     solemn declaration, please.

 8             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

 9     whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ambassador.  Please make yourself

11     comfortable.

12                           WITNESS:  JOSE CUTILEIRO

13             JUDGE KWON:  Would the representative of the Portuguese

14     government introduce themselves for the record.

15             MR. DE SERPA SOARES:  Good morning, Your Honour.  I'm

16     Miguel Soares, the Director General of Legal Affairs in the Ministry of

17     Foreign Affairs of Portugal.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, sir.

19             MS. GROBA GOMES:  Good morning, Your Honour.  I'm Mafalda Groba

20     Gomes from the Embassy of Portugal in The Hague.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Today we'll continue to sit pursuant to

22     Rule 15 bis.  Probably we'll do so for the remainder of the week.

23             Unless there's anything to be raised, we'll continue.

24             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.


Page 33942

 1                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, your Excellency, Mr. Cutileiro.

 3     I'd like to thank you for investing this effort to be here.  Did you

 4     provide a statement to my Defence team?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D05532 in e-court,

 8     please.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could all other

10     microphones save for the witness's and the accused's be switched off

11     because of the background noise.  Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D5532.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Is it the statement you provided to my team, the one you see on

15     the screen before you?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Your Excellency, have you read and signed the

18     statement?

19        A.   I did, yes.

20        Q.   Thank you.  The last page, please, in order to be able to

21     identify the signature.

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement accurately reflect what you told

24     my team?  Are your words recorded appropriately?

25        A.   Yes.

Page 33943

 1        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to ask the same questions today in this

 2     courtroom, would your answers be essentially the same as provided in the

 3     statement?

 4        A.   They would indeed.

 5        Q.   Thank you very much.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I seek to tender

 7     this package under 92 ter.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Any objections, Mr. Tieger?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just two matters for clarification.  First as

11     regards 1D604, which was referred to para 24.  However, in the

12     notification, it is referred to as 1D694, which I take it to be a typo.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  And as regards 1D1335, which is being referred to in

15     para 30, it is said to be a letter from Mr. Karadzic to

16     Ambassador Cutileiro, but I think that the case is the other way around.

17     It's a letter -- it seems to be a letter from Ambassador Cutileiro to

18     Mr. Karadzic.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, that's correct, Mr. President.

20             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll admit the Rule 92 ter statement for

21     Ambassador Jose Cutileiro.  Shall we give the number for that.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit D2968, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  And as regards the associated exhibits,

24     they will be admitted and be given numbers in due course by the

25     Registrar.


Page 33944

 1             Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to read

 3     out a brief summary in the English language for the sake of the

 4     interpreters to be acquainted with what is going on.

 5             [In English] Jose Cutileiro served as a diplomat for the

 6     Portuguese Foreign Service since 1974.  In February 1992,

 7     Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the European Commission's Conference on

 8     the former Yugoslavia asked Ambassador Cutileiro to chair talks on future

 9     constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

10             The talks began on 13th and 14th February 1992 at the Villa Konak

11     in Sarajevo.  On 16th to 18th of March, 1992, the fifth round of talks

12     took place in Sarajevo.  At the end of those talks, on March the 18th,

13     1992, the parties agreed to a Statement of Principles.

14             The Statement of Principles provided, inter alia, for a state

15     composed of three constituent units within the existing borders of Bosnia

16     and Herzegovina.  Each constituent unit and the central organs of the BH

17     committed to act with respect for human rights, full religious freedom,

18     and protection of minorities.

19             The Assembly would be composed of two Chambers - a Chamber of

20     Citizens, and a Chamber of Constituent Units.  A four-fifths of majority

21     of the Chamber of Constituent Units would be required for certain

22     decisions.

23             A working group was to be established to define the territory of

24     the constituent units.  A map was annexed to the agreement which showed

25     the relative majority in each municipality and would be the basis for the

Page 33945

 1     working group, subject to apartments.

 2             A referendum would be held to confirm these constitutional

 3     principles.  By agreeing to those principles, Dr. Karadzic and the

 4     Bosnian Serb leaders committed to having religious and ethnic minorities

 5     in the areas covered by the Serb constituent units -- unit and to respect

 6     the rights of those minorities.  The minorities in question were

 7     primarily Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.

 8             On 30th, 31st of March, 1992, the sixth and final round of talks

 9     took place in Brussels.  An annex was added to the Statement of

10     Principles on respect for human and minority rights by the national

11     authorities and those in the constituent units.  A European Community

12     Monitoring Mission would be established to investigate and report on any

13     violations.  Dr. Karadzic agreed to this annex.

14             Shortly after the parties agreed to the Statement of Principles,

15     Ambassador Cutileiro began hearing that President Izetbegovic was

16     disavowing his agreement in public statement he made to the Bosnian news

17     media.  The Bosnian government formally rejected the Statement of

18     Principles in June 1992.

19             During the period after the Statement of Principles was agreed

20     to, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs wanted further negotiations on the

21     unresolved issues while the Bosnian government leaders dragged their

22     feet.

23             Notes of Ambassador Herbert Okun of a meeting on April 18, 1992,

24     in Lisbon in which Ambassador Cutileiro met with Cyrus Vance indicate

25     that Ambassador Cutileiro said that he had grown to distrust Izetbegovic

Page 33946

 1     in spite of his avuncular manner, and that he is tricky and slippery and

 2     he lies.  Alija Izetbegovic says some things in private and another in

 3     public.

 4             The notes also indicate that after that meeting they were joined

 5     by Portuguese Foreign Minister Pinheiro.  During this meeting,

 6     Ambassador Okun's notes indicate that Ambassador Cutileiro said that it

 7     was absurd to blame the situation in Bosnia exclusively on the Serbs.

 8     All sides are to blame.  He repeated that Izetbegovic is very

 9     untrustworthy.  He always goes back on what he agreed to do.

10             Sometimes after the shelling of persons in the bread queue at

11     Vase Miskina Street, Ambassador Cutileiro had the opportunity to speak

12     with the -- a Portuguese army officer, artillery officer, who was

13     stationed in Sarajevo.  The officer told Ambassador Cutileiro that he had

14     participated in the investigation of this shelling and was convinced that

15     the shell had come from the area where the Bosnian government had their

16     positions.

17             Ambassador Cutileiro remained in his role as chair of the Bosnian

18     constitutional agreement negotiations until 14th of August, 1992.

19     Ambassador Cutileiro attended a meeting between Lord Carrington and Cyrus

20     Vance and the Bosnian leaders in London on 26 August 1992.  During the

21     meeting, Dr. Karadzic expressed his willingness to return territory to

22     the Muslims, and Professor Koljevic said that it was clearly in the

23     interests of the Serbs to return land in exchange for full political

24     autonomy.  Dr. Karadzic supported an agreement for the return of all

25     refugees and stated that he had issued instructions to stop his forces

Page 33947

 1     from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign paper indicating they were

 2     willing to leave and that any such paper would have no validity.

 3     Dr. Karadzic also agreed to accept UN monitors at all Serb artillery

 4     positions in and around Sarajevo.

 5             Ambassador Cutileiro believes that it was a real tragedy that

 6     peace was not achieved through the Statement of Principles that he

 7     negotiated in March 1992.  A comparison of the map annexed to the

 8     Statement of Principles of March the 18th, 1992, and the map which is

 9     part of the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 shows that after 3.5 years

10     of war, the result was about the same.  Countless lives could have been

11     saved.

12             On 16th of February, 1993, Ambassador Cutileiro wrote a

13     commentary published in the "International Herald Tribune" which endorsed

14     the Vance-Owen Plan and noted that President Alija Izetbegovic's

15     reluctance to accept that the real Bosnia is utterly different from the

16     Bosnia of his wishful thinking has contributed as much as have the dreams

17     of Greater Serbia and the Croatian hegemony to the continuation of the

18     war.  Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes it

19     to be true now.

20             In a letter to "The Economist" in December 1995,

21     Ambassador Cutileiro wrote:

22             "After several rounds of talks, our principles for future

23     constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina were agreed by all

24     parties - Muslims, Serbs and Croats - in Sarajevo on March 18th, 1992, as

25     basis for future negotiations.  These continued, maps and all, until the


Page 33948

 1     summer when the Muslims reneged on the agreement.  Had they not done so,

 2     the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier with less losses of

 3     mainly Muslim lives and land.  To be fair, President Izetbegovic and his

 4     aides were encouraged to scupper the deal and to fight for a unitary

 5     Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better."

 6             Ambassador Cutileiro believed this to be true then and believes

 7     it to be true now.

 8             [Interpretation] This concludes the brief summary.  At this point

 9     in time, I have no questions for his Excellency.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Ambassador Cutileiro, as you have noted

11     now, your evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing in

12     lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you will be cross-examined by the

13     representative of the Office of the Prosecutor, Mr. Alan Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and good morning,

15     Your Honours, and to everyone in the courtroom.

16                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

17        Q.   And good morning, Ambassador Cutileiro.

18        A.   Good morning.

19        Q.   Ambassador, let me begin with a couple of quick clarifications.

20     First of all, is it correct that nothing you say in your statement is

21     intended in any way to justify or legitimise any of the crimes that took

22     place during the conflict?

23        A.   Not at all.  I mean, I -- I -- the statement is a statement of

24     fact.  I was asked about my position towards several points.  You -- you

25     have listened and you have seen the quotations from Herb Okun's notes.

Page 33949

 1     The quotations also from my articles in the "Herald Tribune" and my

 2     letter in "The Economist," and I -- what I did when I answered both the

 3     counsel for Dr. Karadzic and yourselves from the Prosecution in Brussels,

 4     you asked me about how things had gone and I told you how those things

 5     had gone.

 6        Q.   I understand, Ambassador.  Thank you.  And just to clarify, it

 7     wasn't a suggestion on my part that there was that inference in your

 8     statement.  It is simply that your name has come up in various contexts

 9     during the course of this case as has reference to the negotiations, and

10     on that basis I wanted to clarify what otherwise seemed pretty clear from

11     your statement.  So that's why I asked the question.

12             And I'll ask a similar question for the same reason.  Do I

13     correctly understand that the agreement in principles was not intended to

14     be a trigger or a signal to any of the parties to take control of or

15     seize territory that they considered to be theirs or wanted to be theirs?

16        A.   Not at all.  The idea was to convince, to try to help the three

17     parties to get on with the job of getting an understanding among

18     themselves and prevent a very horrible war to go on.

19        Q.   Understood.  Thank you.  Ambassador, at paragraph 35 of your

20     statement --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Before doing so, Ambassador, do you have your

22     statement with you now?

23             THE WITNESS:  No.  No, I don't.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to have a hard copy of your

25     statement?

Page 33950

 1             THE WITNESS:  I have -- if it is needed here.  If you can show it

 2     to me in the screen.  I have copies of that, but I didn't bring them with

 3     me.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thirty-five, yeah.  I've seen it.

 6             MR. TIEGER:

 7        Q.   You note in that paragraph that had the Muslim side not reneged

 8     on the agreement, "the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier,

 9     with less loss of mainly Muslim life and land."  Now, first of all, this

10     loss of mainly Muslim life and land took place, as you yourself note in

11     the article in "The Economist" that's cited here, after the Bosnian Serbs

12     "went brutally on the offensive."  Correct?

13        A.   I didn't write anywhere that anybody had gone brutally on

14     anything.  You are not quoting me.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Let's call up then very quickly 1D ...

16             JUDGE KWON:  5128?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.  Okay.  That is not

18     the correct cite.  I'll return to that in just a moment.

19        Q.   Let me move on and we'll find that in the citation I had in mind.

20             Secondly, I wanted to note the following, and again this maybe

21     something that's clear from your statement, but I just wanted to clarify

22     that:  The -- there were actually -- there was actually more than one way

23     in which the war could have been averted, I take it.  First of all, as

24     you point out in the article, the Muslim side could have continued to

25     pursue the agreement in principle and the cantonisation of

Page 33951

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That's what you refer to in the article.  And --

 2     that's one way.  And secondly, the other way is that the Bosnian Serb

 3     side could have accepted the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

 4     independent and sovereign state.  That would be the other way in which

 5     war could be averted; correct?

 6        A.   There might even have been other ways.  You didn't mention the

 7     Croats.  For instance, the Croats might have also their ideas about ways

 8     of improving the situation in Bosnia, but we had decided, we the

 9     European -- the European Community's conference, as soon as Croatia got

10     its independence, Lord Carrington was convinced that we would have a

11     problem in Bosnia, because Bosnia had the configuration that you know,

12     with three constituent peoples, the Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats.

13     We thought that the Muslims would want -- the government at that time was

14     a coalition government, if you may remember, made of the people that then

15     went into a negotiation with me into fighting on the ground, and that

16     this -- these people and the situation of the country would probably mean

17     that once was -- Croatia was independent, there might be trouble in

18     Bosnia before Bosnia could get her independence.  Therefore,

19     Lord Carrington asked me to start talks between the three -- all the

20     parties.  I also saw parties from the opposition, but the main parties

21     were those that -- were the coalition government at the time.  And the

22     idea was to find a system that would allow the country to be independent

23     with the agreement of the three constituent nations, which is what the

24     constitutional arrangements of Yugoslavia at the time would require.

25        Q.   Ambassador, let me just say I --

Page 33952

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   I think that was an amplification that was not necessarily fully

 3     contained your statement, and so I appreciate that very much.  As a

 4     general matter, I'm going to ask you to do two things --

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   -- because I have very limited time to speak with you today.

 7     Number one, bear in mind that it's not necessary to repeat information

 8     that you've already provided in the statement that's before the Court.

 9     And number two, try as much as you can to simply focus on the particular

10     question asked and determine from any follow-up questions whether any

11     elaboration is needed.  I really hesitate to interrupt you, but I just

12     want to make sure we can get through the questions I have during the time

13     I've been allotted.

14        A.   What I'm trying to say is that the only way of getting an

15     arrangement to Bosnia was to adhere to the -- what had been agreed in

16     March.  In that way or in some other way.  And if you look at the Dayton

17     Agreement, and if you look at the maps in the Dayton Agreement, you

18     realise, as my letter to "The Economist" shows, that after three years of

19     a lot of tragedies, you didn't move far from what we had foreseen.

20     Bosnia is what it is.  It's not another thing.  And you -- the Serbs

21     ideally would have preferred that Bosnia didn't become independent.  The

22     Croats would have preferred to annex part of Bosnia or to make it some

23     kind of -- and the Muslims, in particular President Izetbegovic and his

24     people, thought that they could have a unitary state.  So the -- if you

25     look at the agreement of March 1992 and you look at the Dayton Agreement

Page 33953

 1     slate, well, I was there and I didn't think that we could go into other

 2     thing -- Martti Ahtisaari who followed me --

 3        Q.   Ambassador, I'm sorry --

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   -- I really have to try to move forward.

 6        A.   Move forward.

 7        Q.   I know you have a wealth of information and ideally we would have

 8     as much time as necessary to hear all of your observations about what

 9     took place, but if you will permit me to please focus on certain areas

10     given the time constraints I have.

11             First of all, we will be looking at the Dayton map and the map

12     affixed to the Statement of Principles.  Before we do, I want to return

13     to what I had asked you before.

14             MR. TIEGER:  And if I could call up 1D5129.

15        Q.   I had asked you whether the loss of Muslim -- mainly Muslim life

16     took place after the Bosnian Serbs "went brutally on the offensive,"

17     quoting an article by you, I think you're correct, I didn't point you to

18     the article reference --

19        A.   Right, right.

20        Q.   -- there.  But in this case I'm pointing to the article by you in

21     the "International Herald Tribune."  And if we could -- I'm just looking

22     at the bottom of the first column that states the Serbs -- it talks about

23     the aftermath of March 18th, and it states:

24             "The Serbs felt confirmed in their paranoid view of history and

25     went brutally on the offensive."

Page 33954

 1        A.   Hmm.  Okay.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Now, Ambassador, you provided us an eloquent

 3     explanation just a moment ago about your role as negotiator and

 4     facilitator rather than someone who was attempting to impose his own

 5     predetermined solution.  Your statement refers to a letter from

 6     Dr. Karadzic, dated the 5th of June.  That's in paragraph 28 of your

 7     statement, and that letter has been admitted into evidence as associated

 8     with your statement.  In addition to the portions of the letter that are

 9     reflected in your statement in paragraph 28, the letter goes on to note

10     that the Serbian people feel cheated.  And in the letter, Dr. Karadzic

11     states to you that:

12             "If you cannot keep your promises publicly announced and

13     confirmed by the EC," that is the European Community, "we have to protect

14     Serbian people on their ethnic territories."

15             Now, there -- you sent a response to that letter.  That was --

16     that is not referenced in the statement.  That's found at P952, and that

17     was on June 12th.  And I'll call it up quickly to remind you of that,

18     Mr. Ambassador.  And in that letter, you state to Dr. Karadzic that the

19     EC has not made any promises to you.  You explain that there were talks

20     on the future constitutional arrangements.  You go on to note the

21     agreement on principles, and you further state:

22             "The validity of that agreement, however, can only be upheld if

23     orders and competencies of the constituent units be defined by negotiated

24     consensus and not by force" --

25        A.   Mm-hmm.

Page 33955

 1        Q.   -- "and if 'ethnically cleansed' territories are -- be restored

 2     to their antebellum ethnical compositions."

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   That was the letter you sent in --

 5        A.   Yes, indeed.

 6        Q.   -- response to the June 5th letter referenced in your statement?

 7        A.   Yes.

 8        Q.   Now, I think you've referred to this both in your statement and

 9     in your remarks thus far, but it's correct that the agreement in

10     principles, that is the agreement that was reached on March 18, 1992, was

11     essentially a preliminary step toward further negotiations and -- and not

12     a final agreement on the resolution of the --

13        A.   It's written at the end of the agreement.  It says that it's the

14     basis for further negotiations or words to that effect.

15        Q.   Were you aware that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership

16     emphasised to their followers that it was indeed not a final agreement?

17        A.   I suppose they did, yes.  And that was what it was.

18        Q.   So on the very date of the agreement itself, on March 18th, there

19     was a Bosnian -- a session of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the RS Assembly, at which Dr. Karadzic stated:

21             "We have entered into this process with our strategic goals, and

22     we are accomplishing them stage by stage.  We would never have signed

23     this paper as a document, never, never, never."

24             So I just wanted to ask you -- and that's found at D90, at

25     page 43, e-court page 43.  I just want to know if you were aware of the

Page 33956

 1     emphasis that the Bosnian Serb leadership and Dr. Karadzic were placing

 2     on the fact that this was not a final agreement.

 3        A.   No, I was not.  What I was aware of was that during -- at

 4     different stages of our negotiations, Dr. Karadzic told me that he had to

 5     get agreement from his -- what he called his Assemblies, the Serbian

 6     Parliamentary Assembly, to agree or not agree to some points even before

 7     we reached the Statement of Principles.  And -- and then he went, and he

 8     usually got that agreement, and I think -- that's what I know.  That, I

 9     mean, he was representing a group that was the Assembly of the Serbs, and

10     he had to see with them whether what he had proposed to them was accepted

11     by them or not.

12             I suppose it -- all sides would have had their difficulties

13     with -- with their own people, but I was not a member of that Serbian

14     Assembly, as you can imagine, so I don't know exactly what went on there.

15        Q.   Were you aware, Mr. Ambassador, that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian

16     Serb leadership were emphasising their satisfaction with the agreement in

17     principle because it meant the end of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

18        A.   No.

19        Q.   Let me read you a couple of things that were said in that regard

20     by Dr. Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership.  For

21     example, in an interview that we'll have an opportunity to see a bit

22     later, Dr. Karadzic said the map was not acceptable, but for the first

23     time this was about the separation of Bosnia into three pieces.  That's

24     65 ter 45284.

25             At the 39th Assembly session in 1994, Dr. Karadzic said about the

Page 33957

 1     Cutileiro process:

 2             "We pulled them into that at that time when they said we accepted

 3     the division in three and that it would be based on ethnicity.  At that

 4     moment, Bosnia was finished for the international community.  That was a

 5     great achievement.  We were happy when they rejected the maps."

 6             At the 42nd Assembly session -- and that is, for the parties'

 7     reference, P1388.  At the 42nd Assembly session, that's P1394, this is at

 8     pages 81 and 81, Dr. Karadzic said:

 9             "We won it on 18 March thanks to Mr. Krajisnik's skills.  That

10     was the first time that Alija said yes to three Bosnias on ethnic basis

11     and that was fatal for him.  That was the moment when Bosnia collapsed

12     and we were accepted as a party in the conflict.  If they had ignored us,

13     kept silent and acknowledged Bosnia and then afterwards said that some

14     rebels were overthrowing their own state, we would have faced difficult

15     problems.  Nobody would have talked to us."

16             And again Dr. Karadzic, this time at the 37th Assembly session at

17     P1385, pages 114 through 115:

18             "This will be the first time in history that a country is torn

19     apart after the recognition and that the international community accepts

20     it."

21             Ambassador, I take it that you were not aware of these various

22     pronouncements of Dr. Karadzic.

23        A.   No, I was not, and the first of them that you read now is from

24     1994.  I had left -- I stopped dealing directly with Bosnia in the summer

25     of 1992.  I still attended some meetings of the next conference, the

Page 33958

 1     Vance-Owen conference.  But you -- okay.  I just heard what you said.

 2        Q.   And the destruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state was not

 3     consistent with the agreement in principles, was it?

 4        A.   You cannot take bits of political discourse during some kind of

 5     meeting of an Assembly from one side or the other and present them.  When

 6     I see that, I'm not surprised by that.  I think the three sides had a

 7     discourse that was complicated with their own basis, if you want to --

 8        Q.   With respect, Ambassador --

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   -- I asked you earlier to please focus on my questions because of

11     my limited time.

12        A.   Yes.  Hmm.

13        Q.   So I'm simply asking you whether or not the destruction of Bosnia

14     was considered to be part of the agreement in principles?

15        A.   No.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17        A.   The agreement in principle was made to keep -- you see, if I may

18     again disturb you a bit with my going off the point, but it's very short.

19     It's very short.  The Europeans, basically, wanted Bosnia to go on.  We

20     didn't want any change of the internal borders of Yugoslavia.  The Croats

21     and the Serbs were not interested in keeping Bosnia.  The Muslims were,

22     and that was it.  And the agreement, the agreement, was a way of trying

23     to solve that problem.  And if I go back to Dayton, that seems to be the

24     viable agreement.

25        Q.   We're going to be -- as I said to you, we'll be looking at the

Page 33959

 1     map.  Did Dr. Karadzic and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership

 2     tell you that they considered that if they could not get what they wanted

 3     from negotiations, they would go to more traditional approaches such as

 4     the use of force?

 5        A.   The use of force was taking place already with each side blaming

 6     the other at the very beginning, and -- and nobody -- what Dr. Karadzic

 7     told me sometimes is that if we didn't manage to get an agreement, there

 8     would be a terrible war.

 9        Q.   Just citing one remark from the 11th session of the Assembly,

10     again on March 18th, the quote is, and this is by Mr. Krajisnik, a

11     participant in the discussion, and as you are aware, a close confidant of

12     Dr. Karadzic:

13             "Did we not say that nothing was agreed as yet, that this was

14     working material?  Our work is not yet finished, gentlemen.  This is just

15     one phase.  If we cannot achieve our goal and carry out the mandate we've

16     received from this Assembly, then we will do whatever is necessary to

17     protect our interest."

18             That's D90 at e-court page 34.  And I take it that that was

19     consistent with what you just told us you were hearing from Dr. Karadzic

20     and other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership about what would happen

21     if the Bosnian Serbs didn't realise the agreement they were seeking.

22        A.   It was not put to me like that.  It was put to me as if we did

23     not go on negotiating on the basis that we had agreed on in March, things

24     would deteriorate into war.

25        Q.   Now -- now, on February 25th, during the course of the

Page 33960

 1     negotiations, Mr. Krajisnik also said the following.  That's found at

 2     D88.  He said:

 3             "As a participant in the Lisbon talks, I'd like to add a few

 4     remarks."

 5             Then he went on:

 6             "Gentlemen, we have two options, one to fight by political means

 7     to make the most of the present time as a first phase, or to break off

 8     the talks and go for what we have done over the centuries, win our own

 9     territories by force."

10             And then he continued:

11             "We have the opportunity to preserve the Serbian people in a

12     single state, to preserve the entire Serbian people in Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina and have it become part of the Serbian empire."

14             And that's at pages 62 through 63 of D88.

15             Did the agreement in principle, Ambassador, envision that the

16     Bosnian Serb entity would become part of the Serbian empire, that is that

17     the --

18        A.   Look, what Mr. Krajisnik said, it's a lot of rubbish.  I mean, it

19     doesn't make any sense.  Perhaps it did to his public at the time, but

20     that was one of the many nonsenses that we had to cope with.  The idea

21     was to introduce some kind of common-sense rationality into all that

22     business.  That's what the agreement is for.  What they said in their

23     Assembly, I wasn't there.  I didn't hear him.  I'm not surprised, but I'm

24     not shocked either.

25        Q.   The short answer, I take it, Ambassador, is that in fact the

Page 33961

 1     desire to or objective to unify the Bosnian Serb entity with Serbia and

 2     Montenegro was not envisioned by the Statement of Principles?

 3        A.   On the contrary.  It's clear.  I suppose it is said somewhere in

 4     Statement of Principle that they shouldn't try to -- neither Croats nor

 5     Serbs should try to get into either Croatia or Serbia.  I mean ...

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, we've heard reference to the issue of territory,

 7     both in that article in the "International Herald Tribune" we looked to

 8     and in various other references here.  I take it that it was clear at

 9     that time that the issue of what territory would be encompassed by the

10     entities involved was going to be a source of major dispute and major

11     tension; correct?

12        A.   Yes.  More than that, it was going to be the object of the

13     work -- of a working group that would be set with the help of members of

14     the European Community, as we then were, to try to define precisely the

15     borders of these three constituent units which need not be contiguous,

16     and -- but that work was never done, because meanwhile, things started --

17     parties start, particularly I think the Muslims but also the Croats,

18     going, at least in what they told me, against the agreement.  That is --

19     to answer your question, it -- obviously there was a lot of work to be

20     done to get the precise limitations of those three constituent units.

21        Q.   Were you aware that Dr. Karadzic immediately upon the Statement

22     of Principles was stating the following, and that was on -- again at the

23     11th session:

24             "We have achieved the quality.  This is what Europe recognises.

25     Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina exists.  The only remaining question is

Page 33962

 1     one of quantity, and it will happen according to our political will, our

 2     right to self-determination and organisation.  It will happen according

 3     to the actual conditions which are up to you," to the -- to his

 4     followers, "which are up to you to create."

 5        A.   Yes, and so --

 6        Q.   So are you aware at the time of Dr. Karadzic's interest in the

 7     quantity of the land that --

 8        A.   The three of them were interested in the quantity of the land.

 9     It's obvious if you are going to divide land, if you have a plot and

10     divide it with someone, you have to know exactly the quantity you have to

11     have.  This was, of course, one of the complicated things.  The problem

12     was not easy, and at that stage they all looked into that.

13        Q.   And did you consider, as Dr. Karadzic told his followers, that

14     that would be up to the actual conditions which the people on the ground

15     would be able to create?

16        A.   I don't know what he meant by that.

17        Q.   Now, the map that was affixed to the Statement of Principles was

18     a map, as explained in your statement, that reflected the absolute and

19     relative majorities in the municipalities across Bosnia; correct?

20        A.   Mm-hmm.

21        Q.   And during the course of the discussions, as Dr. Karadzic and the

22     other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership explained the kinds of

23     transformation or "transformation" of Bosnia they had in mind, various

24     members of the international community advised them that the map of

25     Bosnia does not speak in favour of that kind of division.  So, for

Page 33963

 1     example, at D1284, those are the notes taken by Dr. Karadzic's

 2     chef de cabinet at the time of the discussions.  Lord Carrington said

 3     specifically at page 3 the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not speak

 4     in favour of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And at page 9 of

 5     those same notes, as the Bosnian Serb leadership continued to press for

 6     ethnic division, Mr. Darwin told them that "I cannot accept that they've

 7     been ethnically clean entities because it is not feasible in the field."

 8        A.   Certainly.  Neither Henry Darwin or myself would have accepted

 9     ethnical cleansing to -- either by Serbs or, for that matter, by Croats

10     or by whoever.  The idea was that this will not be done, and to us in the

11     conference, I think it was Dr. Karadzic himself who agreed that if we

12     came to a final solution of that, there would be -- people would be --

13     that would have been thrown out from their places would come back to

14     those places.

15        Q.   And I'll get --

16        A.   We never foresaw, as you can imagine, ethnical cleansing.

17        Q.   And I'll be talking with you about that portion of your statement

18     in a moment too.

19             I'd like to look now at a couple of clips from an interview by

20     Dr. Karadzic in which he talks about why the Bosnian Serb leadership

21     accepted the statement in principles and some of his objections to the

22     existing map of the absolute and relative majorities.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Those clips are 65 ter 45284A and B.

24                           [Video-clip played]

25             MR. TIEGER:  We're not getting any sound on that.

Page 33964

 1                           [Video-clip played]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I was just about to do that, Mr. President.  Both in

 4     the interest of time and because the -- could we stop that, please.

 5     Let's call up the transcript for 65 ter 45284.

 6        Q.   For both logistical technical reasons, Ambassador, and in the

 7     interests of time, I'm going to show you the transcript of that interview

 8     and direct your attention to certain relevant portions.  On that

 9     occasion, standing before those maps --

10        A.   And that was when?  Can you refresh my ...

11        Q.   We don't have a precise date for it but it would have been after

12     Vance-Owen.  So it appears to have been sometime in probably late 1993,

13     1994, but there's no specific date listed for that.

14             Dr. Karadzic said, as you saw him:

15             "Here before us is the Cutileiro's preliminary map," et cetera.

16             He went on to say:

17             "We accepted the logic of the map and that's why we accepted it

18     because for the first time it was about the separation of Bosnia into

19     three pieces."

20             That's found at page 1, beginning at line 10.

21             And then he goes on --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Let us collapse the B/C/S.

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   And he goes on to make the following references in that first

25     paragraph and in the one that follows that.  He notes that they

Page 33965

 1     acknowledge that there were some Muslims at the foothills of Mount Grmic

 2     and Mount Kozara, but they expected they would trade it for something.

 3     "Like they expected us to trade something."  He indicates down in the

 4     next paragraph, again noting that they didn't accept the map:

 5             "We weren't satisfied with Eastern Bosnia, with Sarajevo 2.  We

 6     weren't satisfied with the Neretva River."

 7             And if we go to page 2, he again refers to a portion of the map

 8     and this time referring, as we see in context here, to north-west Bosnia:

 9             "In that regard you can understand now why a green -- a green

10     stain has appeared here."

11             And he talks about Sanski Most and again about Krupa and again

12     about Mount Grmic and Mount Kozara, which is the in the area of Prijedor.

13             Now, Ambassador, first of all, were you aware of the -- some of

14     the specific objections that Dr. Karadzic and/or other members of the

15     Bosnian Serb leadership had to the map that was the working map for the

16     Statement of Principles?

17        A.   The map for the Statement of Principles was a preliminary map, so

18     much so, as I told you a minute ago, we had decided to create a working

19     group that was never created.  European countries didn't provide on time

20     the people who would help and so on, and it was obvious that the three

21     parties would have objections to bits here or there.  So I -- it's

22     perfectly normal.  But all this that you have shown to me is in 1993 or

23     1994, well after the end.  We're talking of the -- the preliminary map

24     was an attempt to get the very little goodwill that existed among the

25     parties, to put them together and try to build a viable thing out of

Page 33966

 1     that, but any line there was by definition not final, because we had to

 2     negotiate that.

 3        Q.   That's -- that's understood, Ambassador.  I just wanted to

 4     know -- you referred to the objections to bits here and there.  I just

 5     wanted to know if you were aware at the time of Dr. Karadzic's objections

 6     to the bit in Eastern Bosnia?

 7        A.   Not that I recall, but it was 20 years ago.  I -- maybe.

 8        Q.   Do you --

 9             MR. TIEGER:  And I tender 65 ter 45284, Mr. President.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Your only question was about -- his objection to

12     Eastern Bosnia with respect to this clip?

13             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. -- yeah.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I wonder what question did you ask to the Ambassador

15     at all.

16             MR. TIEGER:  The whole -- the whole thrust of these questions was

17     what were the objections to the map.  Then I asked him about specific

18     things, a specific thing that Dr. Karadzic had said about the map.  These

19     are Dr. Karadzic's words regarding that very issue, Mr. President.  I

20     think it goes directly to the question of what -- what specific concerns

21     were held by the Bosnian Serb leadership and about -- and what specific

22     territory they were -- they sought.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Given the position of the Defence,

24     we'll --

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we --

Page 33967

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6134, Your Honours.

 3             MR. TIEGER:

 4        Q.   Ambassador, do you know what steps had been taken prior to the

 5     agreement in principle by the Bosnian Serbs to begin the process of

 6     ethnic separation?  And I include in that such things as the

 7     establishment of the Council of Ministers, meetings to discuss the --

 8     ensuring that Serbian power was felt in certain territories, steps

 9     towards dividing the police, and so on.  Were you aware of that as those

10     discussions were progressing?

11        A.   Not directly at all.  We were -- we had several rounds of

12     conversations with the three parties, what -- each of the parties then

13     with their own.  I was not there and I got only indirect information.

14        Q.   Did you know that on the very date of the Statement of

15     Principles, March 18th, that steps were -- that the Bosnian Serb

16     leadership, that is, at the Bosnian Serb Assembly, immediately suggested

17     that steps be taken toward implementing ethnic division on the ground,

18     that is, toward asserting physical control over the areas sought?

19        A.   No.

20        Q.   Did you know the various ways in which the Bosnian Serb

21     leadership defined what they considered to be Serbian territory?

22        A.   No.

23        Q.   For example, did you know that they considered areas where the

24     Serbs had been a majority before World War II should be Serbian

25     irrespective of which ethnic group was the majority in that area now?

Page 33968

 1        A.   Taken out of context.  All that's affirmations of a very

 2     nonsensical nature, but we were in Bosnia.  The three groups had their

 3     own historical memories that were sometimes were very peculiar to an

 4     outsider, and everybody was trying to scramble to get what he could from

 5     this.  So I wouldn't -- I'm not surprised from -- by what I'm hearing,

 6     but I don't think that if there had been a strong political will from the

 7     top to -- to get this thing through, we might have gotten it through.

 8             By the way, in Dayton, if I may go back to that, in Dayton with

 9     different perhaps details, certainly many details are different, but

10     we -- we got to that -- the point -- the basic point of this story is:

11     Could we have a unitary Bosnia or did we have to have a tripartite

12     Bosnia?  My conviction in the end, during the time I was there, is that

13     only a tripartite thing would work, and that was also the conviction of

14     Dick Holbrooke in the end.  That's all.

15        Q.   You refer to those as affirmations of a very nonsensical nature.

16     I take it then that --

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   And I'm referring to the position that the Bosnian Serb entity,

19     that Republika Srpska territory should encompass those areas where the

20     Serbs were a majority prior to World War II.  I take it, then, you were

21     not aware that this position was reflected in the declaration of the

22     proclamation of the state on January 9th, 1992, by the Bosnian Serbs, and

23     are not aware that it was actually reflected in the constitution of the

24     Bosnian Serb Republic?

25        A.   It's possible, yeah.

Page 33969

 1        Q.   Ambassador, you referred several times to the map that was

 2     affixed to the Statement of Principles and to the -- and

 3     that's 65 ter 19151, which is attached to P782, and the map which is part

 4     of the Dayton Agreement, which is 1D5129, and you've stated several times

 5     that the result was about the same.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I'd like to call up 65 ter 24616.  This is a map

 7     that combines the two by overlaying the Dayton map on the map affixed to

 8     the Statement of Principles.

 9        Q.   So the black line represents the Dayton line.

10        A.   I have difficulty seeing the black -- oh, yes, I can.

11        Q.   Now, I referred earlier to both Mount Grmic and Mount Kozara.  I

12     told you that Mount Kozara, where that -- where that was, and the

13     reference we saw in Dr. Karadzic's interview to his objections concerning

14     Sanski Most, and in particular we looked at his objections to the

15     Cutileiro map, that is the map affixed to this statement in principles,

16     relating to Eastern Bosnia.

17        A.   Mm-hmm.

18        Q.   And if we look at 65 ter 24616, we see the following

19     municipalities that were once Muslim majority areas and that were

20     identified as such in the map affixed to the Statement of Principles that

21     now fall within the province of the Bosnian Serbs after the -- as a

22     result -- or after the 3.5 years of conflict, and that includes Zvornik,

23     and Bratunac, and Vlasenica, and Srebrenica, and Rogatica, and Visegrad.

24        A.   Mm-hmm.

25        Q.   So those are municipalities whose -- the control of which shifted

Page 33970

 1     after the conflict began and as a result of the conflict; correct?

 2        A.   Probably, yes, I suppose.

 3        Q.   And as this Court is aware, we've seen evidence from the

 4     53rd Assembly by Dr. Karadzic explaining why those areas fell within the

 5     province of the Bosnian Serbs, and he said in a quote by now well-known

 6     by the Chamber --

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we hear the date for the

 8     Ambassador to know to which time this relates?

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah.

10        Q.   This is what Dr. Karadzic said in -- at the 53rd Assembly session

11     in 1995, and essentially Dr. Karadzic said, Don't let this get around,

12     but there were municipalities where the Serbs were the minority.  He

13     referred to the ratios of 30 per cent to 70 per cent.  But that the Serbs

14     had to have them for strategic reasons and no one practically is

15     questioning that now.

16        A.   Well, I wasn't there, so I don't know.

17        Q.   Now, in paragraph 32, as you've explained before, Dr. Karadzic

18     expressed a willingness to return territory to the Muslims.  The quote in

19     your statement is:  During the meeting of August 26, 1992, "Dr. Karadzic

20     expressed his willingness to return territory to the Muslims ..."

21             Now, the fact is, Ambassador, that Dr. Karadzic didn't say he

22     would return all the territory taken, did he?  What he said was -- well,

23     do you remember that?  Do you remember that he didn't -- whether or not

24     he said --

25        A.   I remember exact -- it's in the text.  There is a letter, I

Page 33971

 1     think, in which that is said, and so what are you trying to ask me?  I

 2     don't understand.

 3        Q.   Your statement says he was willing to return territory.

 4        A.   Yes.

 5        Q.   I just want to clarify that he didn't express any commitment to

 6     return all of the territory that was conquered or liberated or taken by

 7     Bosnian Serbs.

 8        A.   He didn't say -- he said "territory."  He didn't say "all the

 9     territory."  He didn't exclude it either.  The way it was said, the

10     implication of that was, I think, that as we would negotiate, we would

11     come to agreements on different points.  But no, he didn't say that he

12     would return all the territory.

13        Q.   He said it was difficult to assess which areas could be handed

14     back and that the precise amount of land that may be returned had not

15     been decided; correct?

16        A.   Probably, if you have it there.

17        Q.   That's found at 1D5127, which I think came in as an associated

18     exhibit.

19             Now, paragraph 32 also states that, and you mentioned this

20     earlier in your testimony, that Dr. Karadzic supported an agreement for

21     the return of all refugees and stated that he had issued instructions to

22     stop his forces from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign papers

23     indicated -- indicating that they were "willing" to leave.

24        A.   Mm-hmm.  I suppose.

25        Q.   Okay.  Now, with respect to the return of people who had fled,

Page 33972

 1     there would essentially be, I take it, two extremes on that end of the

 2     spectrum.  On the one hand, an insistence that everything -- everybody be

 3     returned and everything be returned to the status quo ante, and on the

 4     other hand -- that is everybody has to come back, and on the other hand,

 5     an insistence that the changes resulting from the war, the demographic

 6     changes that resulted would have to remain as is.  Those would

 7     essentially be the two extremes.

 8        A.   I suppose so, yes.

 9        Q.   Well, with that in mind, I'd like to look at some of the

10     positions taken by Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership with

11     respect to that issue and -- and ask if you were aware of those.

12             First of all, let me ask you more generally:  Were you aware that

13     from an early stage, even preceding the conflict to throughout the

14     conflict and toward -- to the conclusion of the conflict, that

15     Dr. Karadzic insisted that the factual situation that could be or had

16     been created would be decisive and would be a point that the Bosnian

17     Serbs would insist on?

18        A.   That was not phrased to me at all like that.

19        Q.   Let me just ask you if you're familiar with any of these quotes

20     and then ask you a question about that, because this Court has received

21     extensive evidence that Dr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership

22     insisted on the enforcement of the factual situation as -- as a means of

23     resolving the conflict and deciding who got what territory.

24             So as early as October 19th --

25        A.   Which year?

Page 33973

 1        Q.   I don't have a correct cite for this.  Just one moment.

 2             Okay.  As early as December 9th, 1991, Dr. Karadzic was stating:

 3             "Europe accepts legality when it does not -- it does not accept

 4     legality but the factual status.  Therefore we have to be wise enough and

 5     prepare both the legality and the factual status."

 6             During the course of the war, as we see from -- and that was -- I

 7     didn't make it -- I'll get the cite for that in the moment.  It's P2554,

 8     page 78, and P1479, at page 22, Dr. Karadzic stated in August of 1992:

 9             "The European Community will accept the factual situation, which

10     is why we must not make any concessions militarily."

11        A.   He said that to whom?

12        Q.   Mladic.

13        A.   To Mladic.

14        Q.   Correct.  In --

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, excuse me, Mr. President.  If this is a

16     question of whether Mr. Cutileiro heard about these things, how would he

17     have heard about something that Dr. Karadzic said to Mladic.  This

18     appears to be an exercise in asking rhetorical questions.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Hardly.  The Defence has proffered this statement

20     for the purpose of advancing certain propositions inferentially and

21     sometimes directly.  I'm now going to juxtapose what Dr. Karadzic was

22     saying to other people throughout the course of the conflict and ask the

23     Ambassador -- and I have throughout this examination juxtaposed the

24     things Dr. Karadzic was saying outside the negotiations and sometimes

25     actually in the negotiations with the positions he took in the

Page 33974

 1     negotiations and represented were commitments he was willing to make at

 2     various times while he was saying other things to his subordinates and

 3     followers.  I think that's entirely fair and illuminating.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Of course while it is fair, but in order to get the

 5     answer correctly, you need to put the quotes in a way so that Ambassador

 6     could understand your question.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. -- Mr. President, I'm sorry if I wasn't clear,

 8     but I thought I indicated I wanted to just identify a few quotes and then

 9     put the general proposition rather than doing them one at a time.  I

10     thought that made more sense since they form a kind of critical mass --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we pause just a second.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Are we still pausing, Mr. President?

13             JUDGE KWON:  French translation has only now been completed.

14     That's the speed we should proceed.

15             Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  If I could just come

18     back to this for one moment.  The question was, "Let me ask you if you're

19     familiar with any of these quotes," and then he asked him, among other

20     things, of -- he quotes the Mladic diary and asks him about something

21     that Dr. Karadzic said to General Mladic.  I don't see how that could be

22     asked in good faith to a witness about what -- was said between Karadzic

23     and Mladic.  So it seems like this is just a pretext for putting before

24     the Chamber, as we would do in a closing submission, material and then

25     bouncing off the witness whatever the answer.  So I don't think that

Page 33975

 1     that's a proper technique, and I think if Mr. Tieger's going to do that,

 2     he should at least break it down so that we know the cite that he's

 3     taking is actually something that the witness might possibly have been

 4     expected to know.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  I'm going to --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a -- I think the point has been made.  Please

 7     proceed.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President, and I'm going to --

 9     Mr. Robinson rises because I think this -- well, I'm not going to rise to

10     his bait.

11        Q.   Ambassador, I'm going to read you one more quote in connection

12     with the insistence on the application of the factual situation and

13     that's in connection with the question of whether or not there was a

14     genuine commitment to refugees returning.  Okay.  At the 46th session

15     Dr. Karadzic said, and that's in 1994:

16             "Our goal is to create a state.  How big it will be, we do not

17     know but it has to be in one piece and in order for the state to exist it

18     has to be in one piece.  We have to maintain -- maintain this reality as

19     long as the world accepts this idea.  We have created new realities."

20             And then he goes on to speak about Zvornik which is won 60/40 in

21     favour of the Muslims but now is populated by Serbs.  And he goes on to

22     say:  We request Zvornik based on the right which comes out of the new

23     reality.  This war had created the new reality."  And he continues and

24     concludes:  If you want to give Zvornik to the Muslims, then you have to

25     wage a new war in which -- in order to expel these Serbs back to Zenica,

Page 33976

 1     we request Zvornik according to this right."

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Kindly slow down when

 3     reading and pause between question and answer.  Thank you.

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   Okay.  Did Dr. Karadzic indicate to you in August of 1992, the

 6     time when you're referring to his position to you on the return of

 7     refugees, that he would be insisting on the implementation and

 8     enforcement of the de facto situation that had been created by the war?

 9        A.   No.

10        Q.   One question about the property relinquishment document, that is

11     the -- you stated that Dr. Karadzic said that he had issued instructions

12     to stop his forces from requiring Muslims and Croats to sign papers

13     indicating that they were willing to leave --

14        A.   Sorry to interrupt.  I think that is in a letter of his attached.

15     It's not part of my statement as such.

16        Q.   It's actually -- it's actually in paragraph 32 of your statement,

17     Ambassador --

18        A.   It says --

19        Q.   -- if you want to look at that.

20        A.   Yeah.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, is the Registry calling up -- thank you.

22        Q.   It's the last sentence on that page, sir.

23        A.   Oh, yes.  Thank you.

24        Q.   I take it that the international community did not itself accept

25     the validity of that kind of document under the circumstances of the war;

Page 33977

 1     correct?

 2        A.   Which document?

 3        Q.   Papers indicating -- papers requiring Muslims and Croats --

 4        A.   Of course not.

 5        Q.   Okay.  Those documents were not worth the paper they were written

 6     on; correct?

 7        A.   They might be in the place where they were written and by the

 8     people passed them between them, but not to us, certainly not.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I have nothing further, Mr. President.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

12             Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps we could let

14     Ambassador Cutileiro go if I am able to finish before the break.  To that

15     end, I'd like to have P05174 in e-court.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Before doing so, yes, Mr. Tieger.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I just note I didn't tender 65 ter 24616, the map.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Overlapping maps.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.  Any

19     objection?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6135, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE KWON:  How long do you expect, Mr. Karadzic?  I'm wondering

24     whether we should take a break now.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Not long.  Until the break, maybe a


Page 33978

 1     minute or two over.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's proceed then.  Is it okay,

 3     Mr. Ambassador?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes, of course.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             THE WITNESS:  It's my first day here, so I'm fresh.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Obrigado.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we have this map,

 9     then, which is P6735.

10                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

11        Q.   [Interpretation] Your Excellency, what is the position of Serb

12     territories vis-a-vis your map and the Dayton map?  I'm trying to say

13     this:  The Muslims were left without some parts of their territory, but

14     the Serbs were left without some too.  Is that true?

15        A.   Yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You said that the political speech in front of the

17     Assembly -- well, do you suppose I had to justify the loss of purely

18     ethnic municipalities such as Drvar, Glamoc, Grahovo -- very well.  I

19     withdraw that.  I withdraw that.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D1754.  D01754.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Your Excellency, you were asked about whether it was true that I

23     said that I had ordered my forces to stop asking for certain paperwork.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we show item 3 to the

25     Ambassador.

Page 33979

 1             THE WITNESS:  "That forced transfer of people and other illegal

 2     measures ..."

 3             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not trying to stop Dr. Karadzic from pursuing

 4     this, but I just want to clarify that cross-examination did not ask

 5     whether it was true that he said it.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the date for the

 7     witness's sake.

 8             THE WITNESS:  19th of August.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Yes.  How is this in keeping with what you stated of me informing

11     you of having issued such an order?

12        A.   Yes, I suppose -- it's here.  At least this is the English

13     translation, so I believe it's an accurate translation.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have D220 next.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

17        Q.   Your Excellency, do you recall a platform of mine I presented on

18     the 22nd of April, 1992, whereby I described my vision of solution to the

19     crisis which I sent to the European Union, the European Community?

20     Please have a look at item 5 where I stipulate our position on what you

21     were asked about during cross-examination.

22        A.   Yes, I read it here.

23        Q.   How is this in keeping with your understanding of my position

24     during the negotiations?

25        A.   It fits.  I mean, what you told me is what is here.

Page 33980

 1        Q.   Thank you, Your Excellency.  The last document, P5745.  [In

 2     English] 5745.

 3             [Interpretation] Your Excellency, this was a private telephone

 4     conversation that was intercepted.  You were not privy to it, but I would

 5     like you to take a look at page 3 to see what it is that I said

 6     privately.  You were read out a quote from my Assembly address, and now

 7     please have a look at my reply, the fifth item from the stop, beginning

 8     with "I, however, accepted."  It is a conversation between myself and a

 9     Krajina official on -- which date?  Please bear with me.

10        A.   Yeah, yeah.  Yeah.

11        Q.   The 25th of February, 1992.  What am I talking about with this

12     official, because he was in charge of explaining our position to the

13     Krajina region.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the quote.

15             MR. KARADZIC:

16        Q.   [In English] "I, however, accepted that in its existing borders,

17     Bosnia cannot be integral, but in its existing borders this means that we

18     won't join a single part to either Serbia or Croatia."

19             [Interpretation] Your Excellency, how do you interpret this?  Is

20     this consistent with the aims of the conference that you were still at

21     the helm of at the time?

22        A.   That is actually touches that one fundamental aspect of the

23     conference itself.  The point of the conference was to give as much

24     autonomy as possible to the Serbs and the Croats in the majority Muslim

25     state without, without, infringing the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 33981

 1     The understanding of that was sometimes difficult, particularly the

 2     understanding of what it meant to be an autonomous part of -- kind of

 3     tripartite arrangement.  But as for the -- the transcription here of your

 4     telephone conversation, yes, that is coherent with -- with what we did at

 5     the conference.  And as I said, in the beginning, it was one of the

 6     points of the conference was to keep the borders.  If we -- if not, it

 7     wouldn't make sense.  It wouldn't even be called -- the thing would not

 8     be called principles for the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   Your Excellency, thank you very much for coming to testify.  I

10     just want to say that even though you were -- even though you were not

11     soft to the Serbs in the least, we did admire your skill and your

12     persistence to preserve peace.  Thank you very much.

13             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

15             MR. TIEGER:  I've been trying to find this document, and -- okay.

16     If you give me just a moment.  It was mis-cited, so I just wanted --

17     before we excuse the Ambassador, I could just take one quick look at the

18     document which I was not able to call up.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I can look -- I mean, it is in evidence.  I can look

21     at it.  I won't hold up the Ambassador or the Court any longer.  Thank

22     you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             That concludes your testimony, Ambassador Cutileiro.  On behalf

25     of the Chamber and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for


Page 33982

 1     your coming to The Hague to give it.

 2             My thanks also go to the representatives of Portugal,

 3     Mr. De Serpa and Ms. Groba.  Now you are free to go.  Please have a safe

 4     journey back home.

 5             We will rise all together.  We will have a break for half an hour

 6     and resume at 11.05.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 8                           [The witness withdrew]

 9                           --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

10                           --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.

11                           [The witness entered court]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness take the solemn declaration,

13     please.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

15     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Stanic.  Please be seated and make

17     yourself comfortable.

18                           WITNESS:  MILENKO STANIC

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Stanic, do you hear me in the language you

21     understand?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before you start giving evidence, I would like to

24     draw your attention to a particular Rule here at the International

25     Tribunal.  Under this Rule, Rule 90(E), you may object to answering a


Page 33983

 1     question from the accused, the Prosecution, or even from the Judges if

 2     you believe that your answer will incriminate you.  When I say

 3     "incriminate," I mean that something you may say may amount to an

 4     admission of your guilt for a criminal offence or could provide evidence

 5     that you have committed an offence.  However, even if you think your

 6     answer will -- your answer will incriminate you and you do not wish to

 7     answer the question, the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer

 8     the question, but in such a case the Tribunal will make sure that your

 9     testimony compelled in such a way shall not be used as evidence in other

10     case against you for any offence other than false testimony.

11             Do you understand what I have just told you?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I am aware of these

13     procedures.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Stanic.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

16                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

17        Q.   [Interpretation] Good day, Dr. Stanic.

18        A.   Good day.  Good day, Mr. President.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And if I can ask you to pause between my questions

20     and your answers, and can we ask both of us to speak out our sentences

21     slowly so that they can be interpreted to all the parties and so that

22     they can be completely recorded in the transcript.

23             Dr. Stanic, did you provide a statement to my Defence team?

24        A.   Yes, I did.

25        Q.   And can I ask you, please, to look at 1D7232 in e-court, please.

Page 33984

 1     Do you see the statement in front of you on the screen?

 2        A.   Yes, I do.

 3        Q.   We need to make longer breaks.  Did you read the statement, and

 4     did you sign it?

 5        A.   Yes, I did.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness the last

 7     page, please, so that he can identify his signature.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Dr. Stanic, is this your signature?

10        A.   Yes, this is my signature.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And since you read and signed the statement, do you

12     believe that the statement accurately reflects what you told the Defence

13     team?

14        A.   Yes.  This is my statement in its entirety, the way I gave it to

15     the Defence, and it's a statement I signed.

16        Q.   Thank you.  If I were to put the same questions to you in the

17     courtroom that the Defence team put to you then, would your answers in

18     essence be the same as those in this statement?

19        A.   Yes, they would be the same.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

22     tender this bundle pursuant to 92 ter.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, I take it you are tendering only two

24     documents.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.  We're asking for


Page 33985

 1     permission to add them to our 65 ter list as they weren't in our

 2     possession at the time when the list was made.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland, do you have any objections?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, no.  I would only note that 1D25422

 5     is P05399.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, then.  You are tendering only one

 7     document.

 8             Yes, we'll admit them, and let us give the number.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 92 ter statement will be Exhibit

10     D2982, and 65 ter number 1D06050 will be Exhibit D2983.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'm now going to read

13     the summary of Dr. Stanic's statement in English, and then after that, I

14     would ask him about two documents that we received from him.

15             [In English] Dr. Milenko Stanic, born on March the 10th, 1962, in

16     Grabovica village, Vlasenica municipality.  He completed his primary

17     schooling in the area of Vlasenica, his secondary schooling in Vlasenica,

18     and graduated from the Economic Faculty in Brcko.  He completed his

19     masters in Sarajevo and obtained his doctorate in Banja Luka.  He started

20     working in the Vlasenica Boksit mine in 1986 and worked there until the

21     beginning of 1991, when he was elected president of the Vlasenica

22     municipality.

23             At the beginning of 1993, he transferred to the government of the

24     Republika Srpska in the position of Minister of Trade and Tourism.  He

25     left the government to become Director of Customs and was a professional

Page 33986

 1     deputy in the Assembly of Republika Srpska for one year.

 2             Dr. Milenko Stanic did not consider there to be any inter-ethnic

 3     problems in any part of the Vlasenica municipality until the formation of

 4     the multi-party system, which was then the -- which was then the

 5     intolerance began -- which when -- when the intolerance began.  Many

 6     Serbs were against the break-up of Yugoslavia while the Muslims and

 7     Croats were in favour of it, which caused the tensions.  At the

 8     multi-party elections, the SDA and SDS won an equal number of seats in

 9     the Assembly of Vlasenica.

10             In the beginning, the authorities functioned with great

11     difficulty due to the disagreements over key issues.  The Muslim

12     representatives attempted to bring down the established constitutional

13     order, whereas Serbs wished to preserve it.  Milenko Stanic considered

14     that many of the moves made by the Muslims were unconstitutional, and

15     they used the pressure of mass gatherings in their -- of their supporters

16     in order to implement this unconstitutional attitudes.

17             Muslims stopped fulfilling their military service for the JNA,

18     and during this period the SDA Muslim party were also arming the Muslim

19     population and creating paramilitary formations.  Further, Alija

20     Delimustafic, minister of interior, asked police station in Muslim

21     majority municipalities to compile a list of young men who were eligible

22     for military training so that they could be sent to Croatia for training.

23             In the second half of 1991, the SDA gathered and prevented the

24     Tuzla Territorial Defence representatives from requisition --

25     requisitioning military documentation.  The SDA forced its way into the

Page 33987

 1     municipal building and very aggressively prevented the files from being

 2     requisitioned.  A similar incident occurred in -- on 8th of July, 1991,

 3     when a large group of Muslims demanded that Dr. Milenko Stanic provide

 4     buses for them so that they could collect Muslim soldiers who had been

 5     mobilised into the Territorial Defence Vlasenica unit.  When the buses

 6     arrived, the Muslims asked their fellow nationals to abandon the unit and

 7     go home, which almost all of them did, without returning their military

 8     equipment.

 9             Although the Vlasenica municipality did not give its approval for

10     activities regarding the referendum of B and H to be conducted, certain

11     Muslim members inside the municipal government nonetheless became

12     involved.  Once it became clear that the Muslims were seriously engaged

13     in these activities, the Serbs proposed that there should be an official

14     decision that Vlasenica continued to exist within the Socialist Federal

15     Republic of Yugoslavia.

16             Tensions and distrust grew amongst both the Serbs and Muslims.

17     To find a solution, the division of the territory between Serbs and

18     Muslims was initiated.  The agreement between two nations was verified

19     and adopted at the Municipal Assembly on 13th of April, 1992.  Just as

20     the adopted decision on the division of the Vlasenica territory into

21     three municipalities was to be put in practice -- into practice, the

22     Muslim representatives gave up on implementing this decision under

23     pressure from the SDA central leadership.  The fear and distrust amongst

24     the population and many people -- the fear and distrust grew among the

25     population and many people, both Serbs and Muslims, left Srebrenica [sic]

Page 33988

 1     when the armed conflict began in Bijeljina and Zvornik.

 2             Due to the employees -- due to the employees not coming to work

 3     because of the uncertain situation and the mass exodus of people, schools

 4     and companies were no longer functioning.  Representatives were organised

 5     to ask the Muslims to return to Vlasenica.  However, they did not appear

 6     willing to come back.

 7             On 21st of April, 1992, the Territorial Defence in Vlasenica was

 8     mobilised to prevent property from being looted.  No violence was used on

 9     this occasion.  Serbs who had been expelled by the Muslims in Kladanj,

10     Olovo, and Gorazde started arriving in Vlasenica.  Muslims from

11     neighbouring villages also started arriving in the city.  They had asked

12     the municipal authorities to provide them with transport to Kladanj and

13     Olovo.  The municipal authorities tried to accommodate both Serbian and

14     Muslim requests as far as possible.  An issue arose in Vlasenica as the

15     refugees required housing which was not available, so a housing

16     commission was formed to organise temporary accommodation in abandoned

17     Serb and Muslim properties.  A reception centre was also created in

18     Susica and buildings belonging to the JNA were used to house refugees and

19     civilians.  Permits were issued by the police to allow permanent citizens

20     the ability to move around the area and feel more safe.

21             Due to the departure of a large number of Muslim officials,

22     neither the Assembly nor the Executive Board operated and therefore a

23     Crisis Staff was formed with the task to resolve everyday problems.  The

24     Crisis Staff, however, also did not function very well because when the

25     Milici municipality broke away, a number of the Crisis Staff members also


Page 33989

 1     moved.  Therefore, the Executive Board was reactivated to take over the

 2     responsibilities.  These issues were further aggravated because the

 3     municipality was not able to ask the opinion of the leadership in

 4     Sarajevo on many problems because the telephone lines were down and it

 5     was not safe to travel by road.  Dr. Milenko Stanic does not consider it

 6     true that the civilian authorities did not have power and were taken over

 7     by the military.

 8             Dr. Karadzic never issued him or, as far as he knows, any of the

 9     Vlasenica municipality leadership with any order concerning the expulsion

10     of Muslims, the attacks on certain villages, or the carrying out of

11     activities with regard to Muslims.  He remembers a speech of Dr. Karadzic

12     held at the funeral of killed combatants of Rogosija.  He didn't get an

13     impression there was hatred or call for revenge in that speech.

14             [Interpretation] This would be the summary.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Dr. Stanic, you were kind enough to bring two documents with you.

17        A.   If I may just make an intervention on the text that we have

18     heard.  There was an error made in the election results; namely, in the

19     first multi-party elections in Vlasenica in 1990, the Serbian Democratic

20     Party won in Vlasenica.  It had more deputies than the Party for

21     Democratic Action, and you read out that we had the same number of

22     deputies.  Actually, the SDS had 27, and the SDA had 26 deputies.  Our

23     results were better or greater by 600 voters than the results of the SDA.

24     So this is just a correction.

25        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Stanic.  Don't worry, this summary is not an

Page 33990

 1     exhibit.  Your statement would become an exhibit.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So let us look at 1D --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please be asked to repeat

 4     the number.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D07235.  We have to place the

 7     document on the ELMO, unfortunately.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Dr. Stanic, you mentioned in your statement that passes were

10     required for free passage through the territory and at various

11     check-points.  You kindly brought copies of these passes.  Could you

12     please tell us what these passes are.

13        A.   These passes could assist the citizens.  Of course their value

14     was different, but the citizens themselves pressured not only the local

15     authorities but other organs, the public security stations, the military,

16     to be issued with some kind of document, because they felt that with a

17     document they could move more safely.  So in that sense, the local

18     community in Vlasenica issued certain passes at the request of the

19     citizens.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we activate the ELMO, please,

22     because that's where the translation is.  Here we can actually remove one

23     page on one side, because both documents being shown right now on the

24     monitor are identical.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 33991

 1        Q.   And can you tell us what we are seeing, these copies of the

 2     passes.

 3        A.   The passes were issued to all citizens of all ethnic groups, and

 4     I, as the president of the Assembly and later as the minister in the

 5     government, had a certain number of passes.  Here we're in -- have the

 6     opportunity to see a pass issued by the Sekovici military post.  Then

 7     there's a special pass from 1992.  It's in my name.  Then we have two

 8     passes issued by the ministry.  Actually, three passes issued by the

 9     Ministry of Defence, also in my name.  This is the period when I was

10     working in the Government of Republika Srpska.  And then we see a pass

11     from an enterprise or from the Government of Republika Srpska to be able

12     to enter the Famos premises freely, which is where the government was

13     located at the time.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at the translation on

15     the ELMO, please.  I cannot see the ELMO on my monitors.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Dr. Stanic, are you able to explain to us why you needed these

18     passes as the president of the municipality?

19        A.   Because at the time, there were many different check-points held

20     either by the military forces, mostly the police forces.  They acted in

21     different ways while monitoring movement.  So this pass provided the

22     possibility of passing through these checks without any problem.  Some of

23     these passes I used in order to go across the border when I was

24     travelling to the territory of other states.  First of all, the Federal

25     Republic of Yugoslavia.

Page 33992

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

 3     document.  We do have a translation, but we cannot upload it, it seems.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland.

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No objection.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive it.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D2984, Your Honours.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I now ask for

 9     1D07236 in e-court, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Could you explain what this document means?  Unfortunately, we

12     still don't have a translation for this, but you'll be able to explain.

13     It's mostly the names.  Could you just read the title and the first

14     sentence.

15        A.   Yes.  This is a list of persons eligible for the exchange of

16     houses and apartments.  Owners of apartments and houses who wanted to

17     exchange with refugees from Kladanj, Olovo, Sarajevo, Tuzla.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Did they do this under some pressure, and at what

19     time did they arrive at the municipality?

20        A.   The municipal service in charge of issuing passes required all

21     citizens who wanted to travel somewhere to state for what reason they

22     wished to do so.  The municipal service did not have information that

23     anybody was doing this under coercion.

24             In exchanges of residences, there would be involved families,

25     Serb families and Muslim families whose representatives would come to the

Page 33993

 1     municipal service in charge of these affairs.  The service would accept

 2     their applications, record them.  It would run checks at the public

 3     security stations to make sure that these contracts were done properly,

 4     whether they were signed under coercion or some other suspect

 5     circumstances, and after these checks were completed, the municipal

 6     service gave approvals and organised transportation for these citizens

 7     depending on where they wished to go.

 8        Q.   Thank you very much.  Can we see page 2, and then I'll ask you to

 9     read the handwritten portion and explain it.

10        A.   Yes.  This is the second part of the check carried out by the

11     competent public security station.  It says:

12             "On the part of the public security station of Vlasenica, there

13     are no legal obstacles for the exchange of apartments and houses of the

14     aforesaid persons.  The above-said are persons do not feature in the

15     operative records of the Public Security Station Vlasenica.  Signed by

16     authorised officer, Stanisic, L."

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I would like to

18     tender this for identification.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D2985, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I have no further

22     questions for Dr. Stanic at this point.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Probably the number should be MFI D2985.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Correct, Your Honour, D2985.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Stanic, as you have noted, your evidence


Page 33994

 1     in this case -- your evidence in chief has been admitted in most part in

 2     writing in lieu of your oral testimony.  Now you will be cross-examined

 3     by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

 4             Yes, Ms. Sutherland, please.

 5                           Cross-examination by Ms. Sutherland:

 6        Q.   Mr. Stanic, in paragraph --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  My apologies.

 9        Q.   Mr. Stanic, in paragraph 13 of your statement you said that on

10     the 26th of December, 1991, the Serbs in the local parliament proposed

11     that a decision be adopted that Vlasenica join the Birac Autonomous

12     District.  Just to be clear, you mean the Serbian Autonomous District,

13     don't you?

14        A.   No, that's not right.  It's not the Serbian Autonomous District.

15     It was the Autonomous District of Birac.  This term "autonomous district"

16     was accepted at the proposal of Serbian opposition deputies to the

17     Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.  It was the condition for voting in

18     favour of this document and for obtaining the majority for the

19     full-fledged decision of 31 deputies.  It was their condition that it be

20     called Autonomous District of Birac instead of Serbian Autonomous

21     District.  We had a number of Bosniak deputies --

22        Q.   So, Mr. Stanic, this was after the Republika Srpska Assembly

23     passed a decision on the 21st of November, 1991, verifying the declared

24     Serbian autonomous provinces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which included the

25     Serbian Autonomous Region Romanija-Birac, which comprised of the

Page 33995

 1     municipalities of Han Pijesak, Pale, Sokolac, Vlasenica, and Sekovici, as

 2     well as the parts of this region's other municipalities with Serbian

 3     majority.  Is that what you're saying?  It was after this decision?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And that's Exhibit D0083, Your Honours, at

 5     English page 33 and B/C/S pages 33 and 34.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask if Dr. Stanic has his

 7     statement before him and whether he's able to use it?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have my statement here, but I

 9     don't understand the question, the regional districts of Han Sokolac, Han

10     Pijesak.  How is Vlasenica and Sekovici connected with these areas?

11        Q.   Mr. -- Mr. --

12        A.   I would have to see the document.

13        Q.   Mr. Stanic, the -- you said that it was called the autonomous

14     district, and I said to you was that after the Republika Srpska Assembly

15     issued the decision verifying the Serbian autonomous provinces in

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  And then I made reference to the Serbian Autonomous

17     Region Romanija-Birac.  But my question is simply:  Was what you were

18     talking about earlier after this decision?

19        A.   I'm not sure about the date.  I know we adopted this decision

20     towards the end of December, and the exact date is in my statement, the

21     26th of December.  I don't know when the decision was adopted by the

22     National Assembly.

23        Q.   It was on the 21st of November, 1991.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we can have MFI P06112, please.

25        Q.   Mr. Stanic, this is minutes of a -- minutes of the 2nd

Page 33996

 1     Assembly -- 2nd session of the Assembly of the Autonomous District Birac.

 2     We see in English and B/C/S page 2, under point 1, it refers to you as

 3     president of the executive -- the English translation says "Executive

 4     Board," but I think you would agree a better word -- a better translation

 5     is president of the Executive Council of the Autonomous District Birac.

 6     And again if we can look at -- and you explained a proposal there under

 7     point 1.

 8             If I can now take you to page -- English page 5 and B/C/S page 4.

 9     And under point 2 it says the president -- in the English translation it

10     says, "President of the Autonomous District Assembly Milenko Stanic

11     said," and then you go on.  I think you would agree a better translation

12     is president of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Autonomous

13     District.  Do you agree with that?

14        A.   Yes.  The Assembly had its organs including the Assembly, the

15     Executive Council and Assembly commissions.

16        Q.   And you were the president of the Executive Council?

17        A.   Yes.  I was president of the Executive Council.

18        Q.   And you recall saying -- making these two points, 1 and 2?

19        A.   I can't see points 1 and 2.  I don't know what you mean.  I see

20     proposal number 2.

21        Q.   We see point 2 -- you see point 2.  You recall you said to the

22     present parties that you considered that -- that candidates to be

23     proposed to the Executive Council.  Do you remember saying that?

24        A.   Yes.  That was standard procedure.  Since the Assembly was made

25     up of deputies from all the Assemblies, it was naturally their demand

Page 33997

 1     that from every municipality there would be one representative in the

 2     Executive Board or the Executive Council.  Otherwise, you could not make

 3     a proper structure.

 4        Q.   And, Mr. Stanic, under point 1, if we can just quickly go back to

 5     page 2 of the B/C/S, you explain the proposal of the operational

 6     programme of the Executive Council.  You remember doing that?  That was

 7     discussed at that meeting.

 8        A.   I think that Assembly session did not adopt a programme --

 9        Q.   No.  You discussed it.  You discussed it.

10        A.   I know we agreed that upon the establishment of the Executive

11     Council, we would in that composition draft a programme and verify it at

12     the next session which, however, was not held.  So at this Assembly

13     session we did not discuss the programme.  It is possible that the

14     introduction which covers proposals by various nominees, we touched upon

15     some issues on which we would work in the future, but the programme was

16     not drafted then, and it was not adopted.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I seek to tender this document, Your Honour,

18     lift the MFI.

19             JUDGE KWON:  The reason for having put this document marked for

20     identification was because of the provenance.  It's an excerpt from some

21     book.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Are you not -- ready to answer the question?

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.  It's an excerpt from

25     Naser Oric's book, and it has been exhibited in two previous trials, and

Page 33998

 1     I actually advised the Chamber of that at the very end of the session

 2     last Friday.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We don't have any objection

 5     to that portion.  We would also appreciate being advised of the

 6     provenance when the Prosecution advises the Chamber, because we hadn't

 7     been advised until hearing it right now.  Thank you.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit it in full.  So it will be

10     recorded as fully admitted.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:

12        Q.   Mr. Stanic, you also chaired a session of the Executive Council

13     of the Birac Serbian Autonomous District held on the 18th of February,

14     1992, didn't you?

15        A.   Right now I can't remember the date unless you show me a

16     document.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have Exhibit P06113.

18        Q.   Now, you say -- see here this is a Cyrillic document, and it

19     states it's the minutes of the 1st session of the Executive Council of

20     the Birac SAO, which stands for Serbian Autonomous District, does it not?

21        A.   That's what it should stand for, but obviously the recording

22     secretary did not pay enough attention to these terms such as "autonomous

23     district."  It's true some other municipalities took different decisions

24     than the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.

25        Q.   You also presented yourself as the president of the Serbian

Page 33999

 1     Autonomous District Birac government to the main Belgrade daily, didn't

 2     you?

 3        A.   I don't remember.

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Could we have 65 ter number 24620.  And I'm

 5     sorry, Your Honour, we don't have a translation at the moment, but -- oh,

 6     yes, we do.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   It's the article in the top right-hand corner.  It's entitled

 8     "Overnight to Serbia," published in "Politika" on the 5th of March, 1992,

 9     page 8 of the newspaper.  It's talking about tensions in Zvornik and

10     Vlasenica, and you're quoted as saying -- you make a statement about the

11     possible proclamation of the independent BiH, and you say:

12             "In case of proclamation of the independent BiH, it is sure that

13     we will not allow any of its laws or regulations to enter in the Serb

14     houses."

15             And you're introduced there as the president or prime minister of

16     the SAO Birac government.  So again we're talking about the Serbian SAO.

17     Do you -- you said that, that you wouldn't allow any laws or regulations

18     to enter into the Serb houses in relation to the independent BiH?

19        A.   Reporters have their own way of reporting.  As for

20     representation, they put such elements into their reports, but as far as

21     my position is concerned, it was a bit different than you are presenting

22     it.  My position was that I repeated several times --

23        Q.   Did you -- did you say what you're quoted as being said in this

24     article?

25        A.   In that context that you are presenting, no, but I did say that

Page 34000

 1     the laws of a sovereign centralised Bosnia-Herzegovina -- or, rather, the

 2     laws of Alija's Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be accepted in Serb houses.

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  So we're admitting only that part.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  That portion, yes, Your Honour.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just in case, do we know who wrote it?

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read the journalist's name at the end of

10     the --

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:

12        Q.   At the bottom of the article, Mr. Stanic, do you see in Cyrillic

13     who the author of the article is?

14        A.   Yes.  Some person named Pejak [phoen].  I don't know that person.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask distinguished

16     Madam Sutherland to clarify whether Dr. Stanic called himself the

17     president of the SAO government or it was the reporter who added that

18     qualification, because the question implies that Dr. Stanic introduced

19     himself as such, and I don't see it from the article.

20             JUDGE KWON:  No, I think -- he answered the question.

21             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I think -- exactly.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6136, Your Honours.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:

25        Q.   Now, Mr. Stanic, the Serbian Autonomous District of Birac was a

Page 34001

 1     functioning body and did issue proclamations and decisions, did it not?

 2     Even as late as late April 1992 it was functioning?

 3        A.   I really don't remember until when it was functioning, but it was

 4     not for long.  We made a proclamation at the first founding Assembly

 5     session in Sekovici, and I believe we did not have more than two sessions

 6     of the Executive Council of the region where we discussed mainly economic

 7     issues, and another topic was setting up a delegation from that area that

 8     would, together with representatives of the Assembly of the Serbian

 9     Republic, put forward suggestions in future talks -- or, rather, talks

10     that were already underway on the internal organisation of

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However --

12        Q.   Okay.  Mr. Stanic, you're basically saying you don't really

13     remember until when it was functioning, but it was not for long.  I want

14     to show you a document now that --

15        A.   Yes, that's correct.

16        Q.   -- that's Exhibit P02615.  Now, this is a document from the,

17     again, Serbian Autonomous District of Birac.  It's issued by the

18     Crisis Staff in Sekovici on the 29th of April, 1992.  And it says:

19             "Pursuant to the decision of the Council for National Security of

20     the Serbian Republic of BH on general mobilisation and on the basis of

21     the estimates of the Crisis Staff of the SAO of Birac on the threat of

22     war, especially in the municipalities of Bratunac and Srebrenica, the

23     Crisis Staff of the SAO Birac hereby brings the following decision," and

24     then proclaiming a state of war.  But it's not just --

25        A.   Absolutely.  This is not an enactment of the Executive Council,

Page 34002

 1     and it's not even signed by the Executive Council.  It's a document from

 2     Sekovici originating from I don't know which organ.  I don't know who

 3     drafted it.  In any case, it's not a document of the Executive Council.

 4        Q.   But it's a document issued by the Serbian Autonomous District of

 5     Birac, is it not?

 6        A.   No.  No.  We did not discuss such issues.  Of course there were

 7     certain members of the Executive Council who tried to abuse their

 8     position, mainly in commerce, especially the representative from

 9     Sekovici, and that is one of the reasons why we terminated our activities

10     very soon.  It's possible that one of these representatives wrote the

11     document.

12        Q.   And we can see the stamp at the top corner.  It's been received

13     by the Bratunac Municipal Assembly.

14        A.   From whom?

15        Q.   Mr. Stanic --

16        A.   The point is -- yes?

17        Q.   Sorry, go on.

18        A.   The point is that the Executive Council did not have its

19     Crisis Staff and could not have produced such a document.  The Executive

20     Council held only two sessions, stopped working shortly afterwards and

21     there was no Crisis Staff at the level of the region.

22        Q.   Okay.  I want to turn now to the Crisis Staff at the municipal

23     level.  You state in paragraph 30 that you don't recall the 4th of April,

24     1992, decision establishing the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, appointing you as

25     president of that body.

Page 34003

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we can quickly look at P06121.

 2        Q.   This is the decision appointing you as the president.  You also

 3     said that -- in paragraph 43 of your statement that you state that you're

 4     not familiar with the contents of the Variant A and B document.  We can

 5     see from the predicate language of this document that the Crisis Staff of

 6     which you're the president is established pursuant to the instructions of

 7     the Main Board of the SDS.  Do you see that?

 8        A.   Yes, I see this document.

 9        Q.   So these instructions of the Main Board were the -- were the

10     Variant A and B -- was the Variant A and B document, wasn't it?

11        A.   Why did I state that I don't remember this document?  Could you

12     scroll down a little so I can see the stamp.  It is evident that this

13     decision was adopted by the Municipal Board, and it was not signed by the

14     president of the Municipal Board, Tomislav Savkic.  Another problem is

15     the stamp is not the stamp of the Serbian Democratic Party.  It is a

16     stamp of a certain secretariat or a service or a department within the

17     Municipal Assembly.  Those were the reasons why I don't remember such

18     document.

19        Q.   You were president of the Vlasenica Crisis Staff, were you not?

20        A.   This Crisis Staff was the Crisis Staff of the SDS.  The Crisis

21     Staff of the Municipal Assembly was established according to different

22     principles based on the statute of the Municipal Assembly and the then

23     laws.  It was basically a continuation of the work of an earlier Council

24     for National Security.  I think that was its name.  That was the name of

25     the municipal body which dealt with extraordinary situations when the

Page 34004

 1     Municipal Assembly was unable to sit.

 2             I do not recall that these ten people ever met as a group in

 3     order to come to certain decisions.  The election of a president is up to

 4     those who are nominated, and the members were supposed to choose the

 5     president amongst themselves.  I was the president of the Crisis Staff of

 6     the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.

 7        Q.   Mr. --

 8        A.   And not of the party Crisis Staff.

 9        Q.   Mr. Stanic, what -- what instructions, Main Board instructions,

10     are being referred to in -- in the predicate paragraph?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Can you show the top part of the document.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "Based on the instruction of the

13     Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding operations under

14     conditions of imminent threat of war, the Municipal Board of the

15     Vlasenica Municipality SDS at a session on 4 April 1992 made the

16     following decision ..."

17             Whoever drafted this document or whoever certified this document

18     invoked some documents which served as the basis.  I am not familiar with

19     the basis of this decision.  I'm simply not aware of this document.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:

21        Q.   You've never seen the instructions from the Main Board.  Is

22     that -- is that your testimony?  The instructions that were issued in

23     late December 1991.  It's your testimony that you've never seen those

24     instructions?

25        A.   What I said is that I do not remember whether I read the

Page 34005

 1     instructions.

 2        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers] --

 3        A.   Yes, that's what it says.  I do not recall whether I was in

 4     attendance --

 5        Q.   Okay, well --

 6        A.   -- at the Assembly session.

 7        Q.   Even if you didn't read the instructions, you knew about the

 8     contents.

 9        A.   Yes.  I heard of those documents, but as for the contents, well,

10     partially perhaps.  I heard people discuss it, and they must have touched

11     upon the contents.

12        Q.   And that was to take over the municipalities?

13        A.   You see, throughout 1992 there were constant problems in

14     communication between --

15        Q.   No, Mr. Stanic, sorry.  I'm talking about --

16        A.   -- the local bodies of authority and --

17        Q.   I'm talking about before the war, before the conflict started.

18     I'm talking about in late 1991, early 1992.  These instructions that

19     you've just told us about that you heard about, that people told you

20     about, and you said that you must have -- it was -- it was -- they --

21     they must have touched upon the contents.  I'm talking about the document

22     that instructed the Serb -- the SDS parties in the municipalities to form

23     Assemblies to take over the municipalities.  That's what I'm referring to

24     when I'm talking about the instructions.  And that's what you're

25     referring to, aren't you, when you say that people talked to you about

Page 34006

 1     the contents of these documents, these instructions?

 2        A.   It wasn't me but the person drafting the document.  At the time I

 3     was very busy in the Municipal Assembly building.  The party was run by a

 4     different leadership.  I didn't have much time for party matters.  There

 5     was enough on my hands in the Municipal Assembly.  Well, I suppose they

 6     invoked a certain document when adopting this decision.

 7        Q.   Mr. Stanic, you were a member of the SDS in -- in 1991 and 1992,

 8     were you -- were you not?

 9        A.   Yes.  I was the first person on the SDS list for the Municipal

10     Assembly in Vlasenica, and I was also the Assembly speaker.  I attended

11     the sessions of the Municipal Board when they sat.  I do not recall this

12     date, the 4th of April, though, and whether I was present then or not and

13     whether that session took place on that date indeed.

14        Q.   And you said that this was -- this Crisis Staff was basically a

15     continuation of the work of an earlier Council for National Security.

16     You said that you thought that was its name.  Well, if that was its name,

17     why didn't it continue with that name and not call itself the Crisis

18     Staff of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica?

19        A.   Yes.  The Council for All People's Defence, and in crisis times

20     it was to be converted into a Crisis Staff.

21        Q.   So this Crisis Staff morphed -- morphed into the Crisis Staff of

22     the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica?

23        A.   Not in entirety.  Some of the members were never in attendance.

24     For example, the person at number 8, I don't remember him ever taking

25     part in the work.  Some of the members were also killed or mobilised at

Page 34007

 1     the beginning of the war.  In terms of composition and the number of

 2     people, there was a difference between the municipal Crisis Staff and the

 3     Council for All People's Defence as compared to the party organs.  There

 4     were similarities, but there were differences as well.

 5        Q.   Okay.  In paragraph 30 you also state that you don't recall the

 6     Crisis Staff meeting before the 21st of April, 1992.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can we have 65 ter 24622, please.

 8        Q.   Now, this is a decision of the Vlasenica municipality Crisis

 9     Staff, issued at its meeting of the 19th of April, 1992, and it's a

10     decision on an imminent threat of war.  And it endorses the decision of

11     the National Security Council of the Assembly of the Serbian BiH, doesn't

12     it?

13        A.   I'd like to say this:  Of course, during proofing I had occasion

14     to see some of the documents shown to me by the Defence.  Generally

15     speaking, I can say that in these decisions there are certain problems in

16     terms of dates.  As I have stated in my statement, I stand by it.  I

17     think the Crisis Staff began sitting on the 22nd of April, that is to

18     say, after the 21st of April.  Quite a few documents produced by the

19     Crisis Staff were drafted in the secretariat department of the Municipal

20     Assembly.  I wasn't in that building where the municipal secretariat was.

21     I was in the administration building of the bauxite mine, which is some

22     200 metres away from the municipal building.  The Executive Board

23     president and I went there after the division of municipality was

24     verified, when the municipality was divided into three parts and the

25     Serbian municipality was established.

Page 34008

 1             Now, why they pre-dated these dates is something I don't know.

 2     We discussed that issue as well, I believe, on the 22nd rather than on

 3     the 19th.  I also noticed that a decision of the 30th of March also has

 4     certain difficulties.

 5        Q.   When were you --

 6        A.   There's another problem here which is the stamp.

 7        Q.   We will get to that decision.  The stamp is the stamp of the

 8     Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica, isn't it?  In the republic of Bosnia --

 9        A.   Yes, but --

10        Q.   -- Herzegovina.  It's the old stamp.

11        A.   It is the old stamp, and I think it was kept in the secretariat

12     of the Municipal Assembly, which is in the old Assembly building, and of

13     course this is not my signature.

14             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, no objection, Mr. President.

16             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have 65 ter 23116, please.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we give the number.

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Oh, I'm sorry, Your Honour.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6137, Your Honours.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:

21        Q.   Again, Mr. Stanic, this is pursuant to a decision of the Crisis

22     Staff at its sitting on the 19th of April, 1992, a decision to disarm the

23     active and reserve forces of the Vlasenica SJB?

24        A.   Yes, this is nonsense.  This is not a document of the Crisis

25     Staff.  The stamp is not that of the Crisis Staff, nor is the signature.

Page 34009

 1     We didn't even discuss this decision.  I believe this document was

 2     planted by some services.

 3              There was no need to adopt such a decision.  On the 21st of

 4     April, in the public security station, there were practically no

 5     policemen.  I know the chief of the station complained, saying that he

 6     would -- he was only able to keep the duty policemen on duty.  There was

 7     no need for this.  There must have been previous calls to have illegal

 8     weapons handed over, but I see no reason why a decision of this kind

 9     would be issued pertaining to the public security station.  The Crisis

10     Staff did not make such decisions.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I would seek this tender this

12     document.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We don't have any objection,

14     although I think there's some question as to the validity of the

15     document, but I think that goes to the weight as opposed to its

16     admissibility, so we don't object.

17             JUDGE KWON:  What is your position about authenticity,

18     Mr. Robinson?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I -- I'm assuming that the OTP

20     located this when conducting its investigations, and so I don't question

21     the fact that they found it somewhere among the offices in

22     Republika Srpska or in its subsidiary bodies.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, this -- this document was provided

24     by the chief of the SJB in Vlasenica.  Provided it the Office of the

25     Prosecutor.

Page 34010

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And in 2009, too.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, you're correct.

 3                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 4             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will receive it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6138, Your Honours.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have Exhibit P03214, please.

 7        Q.   Mr. Stanic, again this is the decision of the Crisis Staff of the

 8     Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, a decision to take over power in the

 9     area over the municipality of Vlasenica, and the signature block is

10     "President of the Crisis Staff, Mr. Milenko Stanic."  So ...

11             JUDGE KWON:  Let's -- let's wait until we see that document.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:

13        Q.   And it also has a stamp.

14        A.   Yes.  And it is significantly different from the previous stamp.

15     This is exactly what I was talking about.  The date is the 19th of April,

16     which is incorrect.  I think it was the 22nd of April.  It is not signed.

17     I do not recall if we issued a document like this, but the date is

18     definitely incorrect.  It must have been after the 21st.

19        Q.   Mr. Stanic --

20        A.   You see what the problem is --

21        Q.   The problem is this document is before the take-over.  You -- the

22     take-over occurred on the 20th, 21st of April, 1992, and this document

23     deciding to take over the power precedes the take-over, does it not?  So

24     it would be a bit silly to issue a decision after the take-over on the

25     22nd of April, as you say, when the take-over occurred before.  Do you

Page 34011

 1     agree?

 2        A.   I said already.  After the army came into the town itself on the

 3     21st, we started with our first session around the 22nd.  Now, why we see

 4     decisions dated the 19th --

 5        Q.   Mr. Stanic, can I just interrupt you.  It says -- under point

 6     number 1 it says:

 7             "The Vlasenica municipality Crisis Staff hereby adopts the

 8     decision to take over power ..." not as you're saying if -- if this had

 9     occurred on the 22nd of April, it would have said the Vlasenica

10     municipality Crisis Staff power has been taken over already.  This is

11     prior to the take-over.

12        A.   I see no reason for adopting such a decision.  We were the

13     elected authority immediately after the Serb municipality of Vlasenica

14     was established on the 30th [as interpreted] of April when the joint

15     session was held.  The Serb deputies remained and elected their people to

16     the bodies and organs.  We started setting up our own organs on the

17     13th of April, but the Crisis Staff was only established after the

18     take-over and, for some reasons of their own, the date was pre-dated by

19     some municipal services.

20        Q.   But, Mr. Stanic --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  The accused overlapped.  Could he please repeat

22     his question.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Please do not overlap.  Just a

24     second.  Let me check that.

25             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 34012

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 16, it seemed that the

 2     witness said the 30th, whereas he said the 13th of April.  It is very

 3     similar the way it sounds in our language.  Could that be checked?

 4             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 5        Q.   You did say the 13th, didn't you, Mr. Stanic, the 13th of April?

 6     But --

 7        A.   Yes --

 8        Q.   -- but in fact -- but in fact --

 9        A.   -- after the joint session of the Assembly.

10        Q.   Yes --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland.  Ms. Sutherland, do you hear in

12     English or in B/C/S?

13             MS. SUTHERLAND:  In English, Your Honour.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please do not overlap with the interpretation.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm sorry.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:

18        Q.   Mr. Stanic, but that's not right, is it, because on -- you didn't

19     set up the Serbian Assembly on the 13th of April, did you?  That was set

20     up earlier than that.  It was actually set up on the 30th of March,

21     wasn't it?

22        A.   I said during the introductory part that I had insight into some

23     of the documents given by Defence.  Some documents bear the date of the

24     19th of April, which was the session of the Crisis Staff which didn't

25     take place, and the 30th of March when the Assembly did not sit.  A

Page 34013

 1     session of the Serbian Assembly was held immediately after the joint

 2     session on the 14th of April, when we adopted a decision on the division

 3     of the municipality into three new municipalities --

 4        Q.   Okay.

 5        A.   -- the Serbian deputies remained in the Assembly and adopted

 6     certain decisions on the appointment of officials.  So that date, too, is

 7     incorrect.

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can we have 65 ter number 24621, please.  Now,

 9     Your Honour, we may not have a translation for this at the moment.  It's

10     being -- it's being done as we speak.  Oh, here it is.  No.

11        Q.   Mr. Stanic, here it says during the session of the Serbian

12     municipality of Vlasenica on the 30th of March, 1992, a decision to

13     appoint you as president, and it's signed by Cedo Vrzina.

14        A.   No, no, no.  Cedo Vrzina.  He was the Municipal Assembly

15     secretary, and he was not supposed to sign such documents.  The

16     appointment of the municipal president is signed by the speaker Assembly

17     himself, and he was not in that position.

18             In his department is where the documents were created with the

19     wrong dates.  I am certain after 22 years that on the 13th of April, the

20     1st session of the Serb Municipality of Vlasenica Assembly was held

21     following the joint session.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I would seek to tender this

23     document.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

Page 34014

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI P6139, Your Honours.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Stanic, you -- the Serbian authorities did then take

 4     over power in the days following the 19th of April, 1992, and it was

 5     taken over by the --

 6        A.   The 21st of April.

 7        Q.   The forces of the JNA and the formed unit co-ordinated by the SDS

 8     Crisis Staff.  And this is contained in a report of the 1st Vlasenica

 9     Light Infantry Brigade commanded by Mile Kosoric.  Now --

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The date, please.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at the document.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, sorry, P02636.  If we can bring

13     that up quickly.

14        Q.   Now, this is dated the 19th of December, 1994, with reference

15     back to what occurred on the 20th of April, 1992.

16             Now, I note in paragraph 23 of your statement that you say "he

17     claimed," I presume the person you're talking about by "he" is

18     Mile Kosoric, and you are in fact referring to this document, were you

19     not, in paragraph 23 of your statement?

20        A.   I did not invoke this document.  I wasn't even aware of it.  I

21     can't invoke fake documents.  You say paragraph 23?  Let me have a look.

22             As regards the document, it is true that it was signed for

23     Mile Kosoric.  I have to say that this person throughout 1992 was in the

24     theatre of war in Croatia.  So he was not in Vlasenica until I joined the

25     government, which was on the 1st of February, 1993.  I think it was in

Page 34015

 1     late 1993 that Mile Kosoric came to the Vlasenica brigade command.

 2             Now, how can a person who was in Croatia could write about

 3     Vlasenica events is something that I'm not clear about.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see -- well, I don't have

 5     that in paragraph 23, any of what was said, in the 23rd paragraph of the

 6     statement.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm sorry, it says --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Does it not start with "he claimed that" --

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  "He claimed that on the 21st of April, 1992, the

10     Serbs in Vlasenica carried out an armed attack on Vlasenica and captured

11     the town."

12        Q.   So whose document are you talking about there?  Where you say "he

13     claimed," are you talking about Kosoric or are you talking about someone

14     else?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In any case, in my original there's

16     none of it, or in the English translation.  Whose statement is it then?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Let us upload witness's statement,

18     para 23, both in B/C/S and in English.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:

20        Q.   This was a paragraph that was added to your statement on -- to

21     your previous draft statement, so it must have been something that you

22     said when you signed your statement the other day, on the

23     16th of February, 2013.  So, what document were you referring to in this

24     paragraph?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Do you see the passage "he claimed that"?  I don't

Page 34016

 1     see it here.

 2             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No, Your Honour.  This -- this doesn't appear to

 3     be the final version of the witness statement.  The document that I

 4     received on -- after the 16th had a number of track changes, words added,

 5     and this entire paragraph has been added.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  In my hard copy I see the passage, but I don't

 7     see it here.  Let's check how it happened.

 8             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, what time were you minded to break

 9     for lunch?

10             JUDGE KWON:  So we'll break now, then.  Let's sort it in the

11     meantime, sort it out.

12                           [Trial Chamber confers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  This is the problem of -- of having a lot of revised

14     statements.  Judge Lattanzi's version is different from mine in hard

15     copy, so we'll -- let's sort it out.

16             We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at 17 past 1.00.

17                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

18                           --- On resuming at 1.20 p.m.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson, I wonder if the matter has been sorted

20     out.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, it has been sorted out.  What

22     happened was that Ms. Sutherland was looking at the track changes version

23     and it was highlighted, and so she believed that it was still included in

24     the statement but, in fact, that was a deletion from the original

25     statement.  So that's the problem.  But in e-court and what was e-mailed

Page 34017

 1     to the parties over the weekend is the final revised statement that

 2     everyone should have.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  When was the last notification filed?

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  The notification itself was filed on Monday.  The

 5     statement was e-mailed on Saturday evening.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Well, we'll leave it then.  Among the Judges, it is

 7     only Judge Lattanzi that had the correct latest version.  Thanks to her

 8     efficient, diligent and committed assistant.  Well, let's continue then.

 9     Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I can discuss this with the Defence further, but we

11     also identified a submitted statement that had track changes but did not

12     identify all the deletions.  I raise that because I've discussed it with

13     Mr. Robinson, but it occurred to me that we hadn't advised the Court, so

14     perhaps that's something we need to do as well and I can take an

15     opportunity when it presents itself to do so.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Please bear in this mind and please do your utmost.

17             Yes.  Let's continue, Ms. Sutherland.

18             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19        Q.   Mr. Stanic, the document that we had on the screen just before we

20     broke for lunch, P02636, the letter from the commander of the

21     1st Vlasenica Light Infantry Brigade, talked about the take-over by JNA

22     forces and the unit co-ordinated by the SDS Crisis Staff liberating the

23     town of Vlasenica.  Do you recall seeing that?

24        A.   I have seen the document now.  I can analyse it as such.  It's

25     full of important facts.  We can go over the document so that I can tell

Page 34018

 1     you what is false about it.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the purposes of the transcript,

 3     the witness did not say "lazne ne golazne" [phoen], meaning not

 4     important, but "false" matters.  I understand the interpreter, but I just

 5     want to make the correction.  [No interpretation].  [In English] Full of

 6     "lazne," false facts.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Do you confirm that, Mr. Stanic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  It's a completely false

 9     document.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  May we have 65 ter -- sorry, Exhibit P02636 on

12     the screen, please.

13        Q.   Mr. Stanic, it says in this document that in accordance with the

14     decision of the Crisis Staff, mobilisation of the former TO was carried

15     out.  And it also says in paragraph 4 that:

16             "The SDS Crisis Staff commanded and controlled detachments in the

17     field through their established staff command and control of these units

18     until 28 June 1992, when all the units became part of the 1st Bircani

19     Brigade."

20             Now, this is consistent with a decision issued by the Vlasenica

21     Serb Crisis Staff on the 19th of April, is it not?

22        A.   I understand your intention, and I understand what the grounds

23     were to draft [Realtime transcript read in error "demographic"] those

24     ordered documents of the 19th of April.  Precisely this letter which is a

25     document written in 1994, as I already said, by a person who came to

Page 34019

 1     Vlasenica in late 1993.  The Crisis Staff never interfered in military

 2     operations.  We adhered wholly to the positions of the Government of

 3     Republika Srpska of the 26th of April, or, rather, the instructions to

 4     the Crisis Staffs which in paragraph 4 state that it was -- the question

 5     of command of the armed forces and the police is exclusively in the

 6     domain of the professionals in those areas and that Crisis Staffs must

 7     not interfere in such affairs.  So it is evident here that the document

 8     is false in respect of the date as well, indicating that the Crisis

 9     Staffs existed on the 26th of April.  I think you have a decision on the

10     forming of the commissioner's office for Vlasenica, and I think that was

11     on the 15th of June.

12             In late May --

13        Q.   Mr. Stanic, sorry to interrupt --

14        A.   -- May, the Crisis Staffs ceased to exist --

15        Q.   I'm talking about a decision.  We'll bring it up now.

16             MS. SUTHERLAND:  65 ter 23117, please.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I say something about the

18     transcript.  Line 12, page 76, Dr. Stanic did not say "demographic those

19     documents," he said "the ordered documents," meaning that they were

20     deliberately fabricated.  The way it is now, it makes no sense.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Stanic?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Absolutely.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:

24        Q.   So, Mr. Stanic, we see in front of us this document issued by the

25     Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, the decision on the establishment of

Page 34020

 1     the Territorial Defence headquarters.  And under point 2, the staff's

 2     task is to name and establish territorial units and to manage them.

 3        A.   This also is one of those false documents made to order.  It was

 4     not signed by me.  It's not a Crisis Staff stamp.  We didn't have any

 5     need for a decision like this.  The Vlasenica TO staff was formed on the

 6     15th of April by an order of the TO commander, Ferid Hodzic, who,

 7     pursuant to instructions of the BiH Presidency, carried out a division of

 8     the TO staff and the TO armed forces into a Serb and Muslim component;

 9     namely, a Serbian TO staff and a Muslim TO staff.  I spoke about that in

10     my statement in this annex or addition under number 43.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, I seek to tender this document.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Do you recognise whose -- whose signature this is?

14     Can we zoom in, collapsing the B/C/S -- the English.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I cannot tell.  I think

16     somebody tried to sign my own signature.  There's no name.  This is not

17     my signature.  I don't know who it was who tried to sign my name.

18     Probably one of those people who were providing these documents pursuant

19     to requests, a request from someone, so that this false story would

20     receive verification in some way.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Sutherland, in the English translation we see a

22     passage about handwritten part on the next page.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Can you see it in B/C/S?

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  It should be on the next page, Your Honour

Page 34021

 1     06393730.  It appears at the top of the page, yes.  And in fact, I see on

 2     the English translation it says "MA."  It should in fact be "MD."  We

 3     will have that revised.  The person that provided us with the document,

 4     the person I referred to earlier that gave us the other document.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6140, Your Honours.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 8        Q.   Mr. Stanic, the -- the -- there was a combat unit of a couple

 9     of -- several hundred people strong which were armed by the SDS and

10     trained by the SDS party, wasn't there?

11        A.   As far as I know, the SDS did not have officers who could train a

12     party army.  A party army did not exist.

13        Q.   In late 1991, the SDS party armed this combat unit and it was

14     actually stationed at Milici, was it not?

15        A.   I am aware that that unit existed, and I think I talked or

16     addressed a gathering on the occasion of the establishment of that unit,

17     but the position of the Serbian Democratic Party is known.  We wholly

18     supported the Yugoslav People's Army, and we did not form party units.

19     But in any event, we did give our support that the Yugoslav People's Army

20     remains as the common component, and they tried to preserve Yugoslavia.

21     That unit was under the control of the Yugoslav People's Army wholly and

22     not under the control of the Serbian Democratic Party.

23        Q.   I want to move on to another topic.  I will leave that there.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I'm just wondering

25     if -- it seems to me that the time of the Prosecution had expired a while

Page 34022

 1     ago.  Maybe I'm not calculating that correctly.  It was one hour for this

 2     witness; correct?

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  One and a half.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think we allotted one and a half hours.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  Okay.  My mistake then.  Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Something for the transcript before

 7     a new question, if possible.  Page 79, line 1.  The witness said that he

 8     knew that one unit existed, not that unit.  [In English] "I am aware that

 9     that unit existed" should be "I'm aware that a unit existed."

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Stanic --

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  A unit, one unit.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. SUTHERLAND:

14        Q.   Mr. Stanic --

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can we have Exhibit P03240.

16        Q.   While that's coming up, the Serbian Autonomous District Birac was

17     also involved in the moving out of the non-Serb population, wasn't it?

18        A.   No.  No, it was not.  That's not correct.

19        Q.   So this document here where Major Svetozar Andric says that:

20             "Pursuant to the decision of the Birac SAR government, which

21     regulates the moving out of the Muslim population from the territory of

22     Birac SAR, I hereby order," and then he says, "setting up a camp in

23     Vlasenica, forbidding the passing of any arbitrary decision on the

24     physical liquidation of prisoners, the security organ of the detained

25     shall conduct operative interviews and the president," I think the

Page 34023

 1     English translation says "prime minister" but I think a better

 2     translation is "the president of Birac SAR is to establish contact

 3     urgently regarding negotiations on the exchange of prisoners."

 4             Now, firstly, you're the president of the Birac SAR, are you not?

 5        A.   That organ doesn't exist.  What do you mean a government?  We

 6     talked about an Executive Council or an Executive Board half an hour ago.

 7     The government did not exist.  The Executive Board or, rather, the

 8     Executive Council existed.

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the last part of

10     the sentence.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was no decision of this kind.

12     I've already said that we held two meetings.  We discussed some

13     questions, not these questions, and you can see in item 4 of this

14     decision that I am being ordered to, but how can anybody order me as the

15     president of the municipality to do something?

16             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the rest what the

17     witness said.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you were too fast.  The interpreters

19     couldn't hear the last part of your answer.

20             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Paragraph 4 of this order saying

23     that the president of the government of Birac should immediately

24     contact -- so any -- nobody can order a representative of a civilian

25     government what to do.  So this indicates that this decision has a lot of

Page 34024

 1     errors.  Nobody from our board reviewed these questions according to the

 2     statute or the regulations that we were supposed to review, did not -- it

 3     was not provided for that we review these questions, that we deal with

 4     them in any way.

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:

 6        Q.   So you're talking about the board that you say doesn't exist

 7     didn't have to review these --

 8        A.   The government did not exist.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can I have Exhibit P06030, please.

10        Q.   This is a "Javnost" article of the 6th of June, 1992.  So when

11     they make reference to the decision made by the government of the Serbian

12     Autonomous Region of Birac, that didn't -- you're saying that this

13     newspaper must be wrong as well?

14        A.   I am seeing this document for the first time.  I would need to

15     review it in detail.  "Javnost" is – whose magazine is that,

16     what is the source of this information?  If we have time, I can...

17        Q.   It's a very short article, Mr. Stanic.

18        A.   Let me look at it, please.  Only the first part could be

19     accepted, that we discussed a delegation which, with the president of the

20     National Assembly, would establish the positions in future negotiations

21     about the structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These other articles

22     relating to safe moving in and moving out, this is probably the position

23     of the journalist who reported on the events in his own way.

24        Q.   I will leave that there and move on to another topic given the

25     time.

Page 34025

 1             In paragraph 27 of your statement, you said that when the

 2     military operations started in the villages around Vlasenica, a large

 3     number of Muslims poured into Vlasenica from these villages.  And you

 4     said that the majority of them were housed in the "holding centre" in

 5     Susica.  By "holding centre," do you mean where Muslims were detained?

 6        A.   I'm talking about military operations here.  These were areas

 7     where conflicts broke out between the warring parties.  These are --

 8        Q.   Mr. Stanic if I can --

 9        A.   -- suburban neighbourhoods of Vlasenica --

10        Q.   If I can interrupt you.  If -- in relation to the words "holding

11     centre," did you mean the place where the Muslims were detained?  Yes or

12     no?

13        A.   I cannot answer in the way that you seek.  I would have to

14     explain the situation so that the Chamber could understand it and you

15     also --

16        Q.   In paragraph 27 --

17        A.   -- so when we're talking about --

18        Q.   Excuse me, Mr. Stanic.  In paragraph 27 you say a large number of

19     Muslims poured into Vlasenica, and then you said that the majority of

20     them, i.e., the Muslims, were housed in the holding centre.  And I asked

21     you, simply, does the "holding centre" mean where these Muslims were

22     detained in -- in Susica?  In Susica camp.

23        A.   Yes.  The correct name of that paragraph is that a part of this

24     population who had property in the town, houses and apartments, were

25     accommodated in their own houses and apartments, and that other part from

Page 34026

 1     the rural area, they were placed in the collection centre by the

 2     military.

 3        Q.   And why -- why do you refer to them then as prisoners?

 4        A.   Who's talking about prisoners?

 5        Q.   I'll show you a document in a moment where you refer to them as

 6     prisoners.  Why do you refer to them as prisoners if they were in a

 7     holding centre or collection centre?

 8             Okay, let me -- let me -- let me ask you another question.  You

 9     said that you didn't know about what was going on in this TO building in

10     Susica -- Susica, where persons were being housed, but you're being

11     economical with that statement, aren't you, because you did know about

12     these people, and you did know about the number of people that were being

13     held there.

14        A.   I do have a paragraph here which I clarify that situation.  I

15     said what I knew, how the collection centre was formed and why we knew it

16     was a collection centre, but it was under the control.  These were

17     military facilities, so I cannot talk about some things that I don't

18     know.  I cannot accept whatever anything says and create false documents

19     here.

20        Q.   In paragraph 33 of your statement --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just for the record, the paragraph you referred to

22     seems to be to para 26, not 27, in the latest version.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, that would be right, Your Honour, if this

24     other paragraph is -- that didn't have the strike-through is deleted,

25     yes.  You're correct.

Page 34027

 1        Q.   Mr. Stanic, in paragraph of what is now 32, you said that -- or

 2     in the paragraph that you talk about in your statement where you say that

 3     after the war commissioners were appointed on the 16th of June, 1992, and

 4     that's actually an exhibit in our case, P05399, which was a document

 5     signed by you, your function was basically to co-operate with the

 6     War Commission and municipality Assembly deputies who were not militarily

 7     engaged, and you said that this work bore mostly a humanitarian

 8     character.

 9             You say that, Mr. Stanic, but in reality you were involved in

10     matters relating to the army as well, and after the commissioners had

11     been appointed you met with high-level personnel from the military and

12     the police about issues relating to soldiers and detention facilities,

13     didn't you?  Yes or no?  You met with high-level personnel from the

14     military and police about issues relating to soldiers and detention

15     facilities?

16             Mr. Stanic, did you --

17        A.   The question is not clear to me.  When you say "high-ranking

18     officers," you need to tell me specifically what you're referring to in

19     order for me to be able to answer.

20        Q.   Okay.  I'll show you -- I will show you General Ratko Mladic's

21     notebook.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have P01478.  If we could go to the

23     entry for the 25th of June, 1992, which is e-court page 227 and in the

24     B/C/S it's 226.  Just so that we can see the date of the 25th of June,

25     1992.  It must be -- we see here -- on the English we see the

Page 34028

 1     25th of June.  If we could perhaps go one more in the B/C/S.

 2        Q.   Mr. Stanic, you spoke at this meeting --

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can we go one more page further of the B/C/S,

 4     please.  Okay.  We will go to where Mr. Stanic is talking.  It's -- it's

 5     on page 232 of e-court and page 231 in B/C/S.  Okay.  It must be -- it

 6     must be page 232 of the actual document, so if we can go forward

 7     six pages, please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  English e-court page number 232.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Do you see on the screen at the moment,

10     Your Honour, it's got 226 at the very top.  That's the actual page of

11     the -- the -- of the notebook.  So I think if we go to page 232 --

12             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, I see 229 with it, but e-court page 232.

13     I'm seeing president of the SAO Milenko Stanic.

14             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, Your Honour.  So whatever page -- I'm

15     sorry, what page is that?

16             JUDGE KWON:  232 --

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  232.

18             JUDGE KWON:  -- in English.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes, and it's 231 in B/C/S.

20        Q.   Mr. Stanic --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we upload English page 23 -- yes, and I

24     think two pages before in B/C/S.

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:

Page 34029

 1        Q.   Now, it states here --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you very much.

 4        Q.   It states here, Mr. Stanic, at this meeting which was held on the

 5     25th of June with representatives of the Vlasenica civilian police and

 6     military authorities, that you stated here a large number said they

 7     wanted to move away.  Over 800 prisoners, 200 of whom are women and

 8     children who were brought last night pose a problem.  And then you're

 9     also talking about the number of soldiers who have been mobilised.  Now,

10     this is what I'm talking about, a high-level meeting that you attended?

11        A.   Yes, it is one of General Mladic's notebooks.  I think that many

12     of these things -- well, I didn't have such information.  I couldn't

13     discuss such facts, especially the number of mobilised soldiers and

14     pieces of weapons.

15             As regards prisoners, we did stress the problem of the high

16     school centre, and we addressed the Main Staff with it because the school

17     had been closed down.  The principal of the high school asked that

18     classrooms be provided for him to get them ready for the next school

19     year, and we kept asking the Main Staff to provide appropriate facilities

20     so that we could ensure the functioning of the high school centre in

21     Vlasenica.  And we can only discuss this issue within that framework.

22             I suppose that this note was made by someone from the Secretariat

23     of Defence or of the TO.  I don't know if the General himself signed

24     underneath these entries.

25        Q.   Mr. Stanic --

Page 34030

 1             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could go to the next page, 230 in the

 2     English.  We see that Major Slobodan Pajic talks about a battalion was

 3     formed.  Can we please go to the next page.  Down the bottom it says

 4     Major Slobodan Pajic, and over onto the following page, the manpower was

 5     earlier armed through parties and they were approximately 600 men in

 6     territorial based units.  So -- and then lists the number of weapons that

 7     they have.

 8             Then we also have over on page 232, so the following page, we

 9     have the chairman of the Municipal Assembly Bozo Milic, who talks about

10     we have 270 empty apartments and 250 houses.  So all this is being

11     discussed at a high level with General Mladic.

12        Q.   And that's not the only the meeting that you attended, is it,

13     Mr. Stanic?  You also attended a meeting on the 30th of June, 1992, at

14     Zvornik with Karadzic, Mladic, Captain Dragan, and around 20 civilian and

15     military officials from East Bosnia municipalities.  Do you remember

16     attending that meeting?

17        A.   As I said in my statement, in 1992 I met with Dr. Karadzic twice,

18     and I also had in mind this particular meeting in Zvornik, and we greeted

19     each other when he addressed those who attended the funeral of those who

20     were killed in Rogosija.

21        Q.   You -- and the meeting in -- for Zvornik is in this same Exhibit

22     P01478, and you were speaking, you were the second person to brief

23     Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic.  And that's at e-court page 248 of the

24     English and 246, 247 of the B/C/S.  And one of the topics discussed at

25     that meeting was the expulsion of Muslims.

Page 34031

 1             Mr. Stanic, you were -- on another topic, if I can direct your

 2     attention now to the sale of war booty.  You were aware of that

 3     occurring, weren't you?

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I think that the

 5     witness ought to be given an opportunity to comment on what's in e-court

 6     recorded at that meeting or else the Prosecution shouldn't even be

 7     referring to it.  It's not proper to refer to something and then just

 8     move on without giving the witness a chance to comment.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Fair enough.  Let's show him the document.

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  We can --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Stanic, do you know what this document is about?

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No, Your Honour, we're still on the Mladic

13     diary.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I'm asking him.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Sorry.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I attended the meeting in Zvornik.

17     Now, what the General wrote into his notebook concerning that meeting is

18     something I am unaware of.  I can have a look certainly.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's proceed.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:  May we go to page -- sorry, Your Honour.  I've

21     been advised I'm officially out of time, so --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please proceed.

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you, Your Honour.

24             If we can go to page 248 of the English translation, another two

25     pages on, please.  Perhaps we can try page -- it's -- I'm sorry, 245 of

Page 34032

 1     the notebook.  So where we have -- so we need to go back three pages.

 2     I'm sorry, it's actually e-court page 248.  Okay.

 3        Q.   Do you see down the bottom:

 4             "Mr. Stanic, President of Vlasenica Municipal Assembly.

 5             "We have defined the western boundaries in the area of the Birac

 6     region."

 7             And it's in --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No, we haven't yet had the proper page in --

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm trying to -- I'm trying to find -- there it

10     is, Your Honour.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, here.

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:

13        Q.   Do you see down the bottom?

14        A.   Yes, I can see it now.

15        Q.   So we're actually on the -- on the meeting in Zvornik on the

16     30th of June, 1992.  But I'll take you to the page where the matter of

17     expelling of the Muslims and that was Marko Pavlovic speaking at page 250

18     of the notebook, which is in e-court page 251, 252.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And if we go over the page, please.  And again.

20        Q.   So down the bottom of this page 250:  "We were most active in

21     evicting the Muslims."  We had -- and over the page -- "we had brought

22     peace to Sepak, Divic and Kozluk.  Some of them wanted to move out while

23     we demanded it.  We had to evict some of the people also for the sake of

24     our 'heroes' who fled from Kovacevici."

25             So that was the reference that I was referring to when I said

Page 34033

 1     that expulsions of Muslims were discussed at this meeting that you

 2     attended.

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Now, Your Honour, do I have time to show the

 4     witness two more documents?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question with respect to this diary at

 6     all?

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, my -- my -- I was -- I took

 8     Mr. Stanic to the entries of the earlier meeting and then I also said:

 9     "That wasn't the only meeting you attended.  You also attended a meeting

10     on the 30th of June, 1992, where the topic of the meeting -- one of the

11     topics at the meeting was the expulsion of Muslims."  Mr. Robinson then

12     asked for those pages to be shown to the witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  And what was the witness's answer?  I don't

14     remember.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  That he did attend the meeting.  He does recall

16     attending this meeting.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know what the central issue was

18     at that meeting that I put forward.  As for the issue of Zvornik, I am

19     not familiar with it.  Marko Pavlovic discussed the situation in Zvornik.

20     The greatest problems for the municipalities of Vlasenica, Bratunac, and

21     Milici at the time was the issue of road travel from Vlasenica to

22     Konjevic Polje to Zvornik.  We asked the army to put conditions in place

23     so as to enable unhindered economic activity along that road.  I heard

24     that the General wrote down that mopping up was required.  It is a

25     military term.  In civilian authorities we do not use such parlance.  We

Page 34034

 1     asked that the armed formations in the area should be used to secure the

 2     road, since a number of killings had occurred along it, and later on it

 3     was completely cut off.  So that was our main problem.

 4             As regards any other issues, I don't recall having them

 5     discussed.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Sutherland.

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you, Your Honour.  I have two very, very

10     brief areas.

11        Q.   Mr. Stanic, I said to you a moment ago that I wanted to turn to

12     the topic of war booty and that you were aware of the sale of this,

13     weren't you?  When you were the RS minister of commerce and supplies.

14        A.   Yes, there was a decree which regulated that issue as well.

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could have 65 ter number 24625, please.

16        Q.   This is a document dated the 23rd of June, 1993, and it's a

17     request by -- by you about the public sale of valuables acquired through

18     the war, and that you as minister of trade are seeking to regulate the

19     sale of war booty, noting that such sales as recently held by Executive

20     Boards of Prijedor and Kotor Varos are -- are of massive proportions and

21     with the implementation of the government conclusion of the 20th of

22     March, 1993, on -- that is on placing state war booty under control you

23     can expect a great influx of -- of objects.  So what -- what did you mean

24     by massive proportions?  Such sales as recently held by the Executive

25     Boards of Prijedor and Kotor Varos.

Page 34035

 1        A.   Yes.  The problem was that there were significant assets left

 2     behind in certain local communes and companies.  The government of the

 3     RS -- or, rather, of the Serbian Republic issued a decree regulating the

 4     issue of war booty.  It was such property belonging to companies which

 5     was found in the territory of Republika Srpska.  Some local communes or

 6     communities used that property to finance their own needs.

 7             Before my arrival at the helm of the ministry of trade, there had

 8     been a decree regulating the issue.  It was stated that all war booty was

 9     to go to the state reserves of the commodity reserves of the RS.  It was

10     a separate entity within the ministry of trade.  All requests of the

11     commodity reserves to the government went through the ministry that I was

12     heading at that time.  Since there were problems and wilful activities in

13     the field that went against that decree, I asked that the government

14     issue their position regarding the issue.

15        Q.   And this war booty, isn't this property which is -- which was

16     owned by non-Serbs and which they had to voluntarily, quote/unquote, sign

17     over to the municipal authorities in order to leave?

18        A.   If you are familiar with our system as it existed before the war,

19     you know that all companies were public, owned by the state.  Physical

20     persons did not have important assets.  It was up to the government to

21     deal with property.

22             As for the companies left in those areas, for example, I know

23     that there was -- there was significant quantities of aluminum that was

24     taken out as the JNA units were pulling out and taken to Nevesinje in RS,

25     and that issue had to be regulated.  In Sarajevo, too, there were several

Page 34036

 1     large depots containing oil and oil derivatives, and that issue, too,

 2     fell under the decree.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4        A.   The government did not deal with personal property.

 5        Q.   Mr. Stanic, I want to move on to the -- to -- in paragraph 38 you

 6     said, "I didn't have any contact -- I did not have any occasion to

 7     contact Mr. Karadzic until I went into the Republika Srpska government,"

 8     and that was in August 1995, wasn't it?

 9             Mr. Stanic, I need you to be very brief.  Did you go into the

10     government in 1995?  Were you a member of the -- were you a member of the

11     Assembly in 1995?

12        A.   Not in 1995.  I was a member of the Assembly, but I was in the

13     government from the 1st February 1993, and I was an MP from 1995 or even

14     1996.  I'm not sure.  As for meeting with President Karadzic, I said

15     that --

16        Q.   [Previous translation continues] ... [overlapping speakers] ...

17        A.   -- I had seen him in 1992 at a funeral.

18        Q.   And you also -- and you also saw him at the Zvornik meeting on

19     the 30th of June, 1992.

20        A.   In Zvornik, right.  That is true.  When I said we didn't meet, I

21     meant we never talked one-on-one about any issues.  We did not have any

22     meetings in 1992, and even during my term of office at the Municipal

23     Assembly, President Karadzic never stopped by the Municipal Assembly of

24     Vlasenica.

25        Q.   So then what did you mean in the following paragraph where you

Page 34037

 1     say, "I know that he would emphasise at every meeting that our soldiers

 2     must not be allowed to commit crimes"?  Which meetings are you talking

 3     about?  Are you talking about meetings when you were minister of trade?

 4     Why would you be discussing soldiers not being allowed to commit crimes

 5     in trade meetings?

 6        A.   I'm talking about two orders we received in the month of

 7     June 1992.

 8        Q.   I'm sorry, Mr. Stanic, if I can --

 9        A.   One was addressed to --

10        Q.   -- if I can stop you there.  I'm talking about -- you say in your

11     statement:  "He would emphasise at every meeting that our soldiers must

12     not be allowed to commit crimes."  We just established that.

13        A.   I mean this meeting in Zvornik and a series of meetings I had

14     later at the Government of Republika Srpska in the course of 1993 and

15     1994, and also the orders we received in June 1992.

16        Q.   And in 1993 and 1994, you were minister for trade?

17        A.   Yes.

18        Q.   Very last point.  You were aware of the SDS leadership objective

19     to eradicate the borders with the Serbian states, weren't you?

20        A.   I know it was the objective and the wish of our people to remain

21     part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  That was the basic demand of

22     our people, our leadership, our government, and we aspired towards that

23     aim.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If I could have 65 ter number 24624, please.

25        Q.   Mr. Stanic, this is a "Drinski" article, which is the VRS

Page 34038

 1     Drina Corps monthly bulletin, dated November 1995, and it's an interview

 2     with you.  And this is an excerpt within this interview where you're

 3     talking about the upcoming elections rather than a retrospective on the

 4     war, but you hope that a result of the ongoing negotiations will be a

 5     monetary and trade union with Yugoslavia that Serbs will be able to have

 6     citizens of RS and FRY.  And that Serbs will finally be connected to

 7     their mother state.  You are now in charge of the customs service of

 8     Zvornik, and the policy of the SDS is that the customs borders with FRY

 9     will disappear and be moved to the border with the Muslim-Croat

10     federation.

11             MS. SUTHERLAND:  If we could go to the second page of the B/C/S,

12     please, so the witness can see that page.

13        Q.   Do you recall saying that in November 1995, Mr. Stanic, to the

14     "Drinski" bulletin?  We can see just above your photograph, the sentence

15     in the second paragraph -- second column, sorry, going down under your

16     photograph, and then also in the top of column 4.  Do you recall saying

17     that the policy of the SDS was as I just told you a moment ago?

18        A.   I said our wish and the wish of the people was to stay part of

19     the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and to have good relations with --

20     with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  Nowadays we have special

21     relationship with Serbia, and you also know that the issue of borders and

22     customs within all of Europe is radically different.  There are no

23     borders and customs between 27 states, and there are also tax and customs

24     policies that stand in the way of normal trade.  I expected that.  I

25     suggested that, and we see it happening.  Customs services have less and

Page 34039

 1     less work, and we hope that in the period to follow they will be

 2     abolished completely.  They have been abolished already in the European

 3     Union.  Why wouldn't they not be abolished between Republika Srpska and

 4     Serbia?

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Thank you, Mr. Stanic.

 6             Your Honours, I have no further questions.  And I seek to tender

 7     that document, please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  What document?

 9             MS. SUTHERLAND:  The document we have on the screen.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Are you also tendering the previous document?

11     Public auction or sale of --

12             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Yes -- yes, Your Honour.  The war booty, that

13     was 24625.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit them all.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibits P6141 and 6142, respectively,

18     Your Honour.

19             MS. SUTHERLAND:  And, Your Honour, I've been advised that P06139

20     now has a translation and can be admitted and I seek for it to be

21     admitted in full.  And P06140, the translation has been rectified.

22             JUDGE KWON:  61 --

23             MS. SUTHERLAND:  6139 now has a translation.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Very well.  We'll do so.

25             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.


Page 34040

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  Let me

 2     just ask are we free to have translated the rest of this document?  Has

 3     only the portion that has been translated been admitted into evidence or

 4     the whole text?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  It has been our practice to only admit those

 6     portions shown to the witness.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no time now.  I can only

 8     accept the witness if he accepts the entire interview as his own.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Why would I accept it if I haven't

10     read it?  I can see the portion that is excerpted, and I agree that it be

11     admitted into evidence.  I did advocate the open borders with Yugoslavia,

12     but there may be other portions that do not accurately reflect what I

13     said.  I have no time now to read the entire text.

14                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15        Q.   [Interpretation] All right.  Then, we won't go any further.

16             Dr. Stanic, you insisted and we it as a leitmotif in documents

17     beginning with page 55 and onwards, that the region of Birac was the

18     Autonomous Region Birac without the prefix Serbian.  Was there any other

19     region that was not Serbian Autonomous Region, but only Autonomous

20     Region?

21        A.   I believe there were others.  I can't remember any specifically

22     now, but I believe there were such districts in other areas.  I believe

23     the Semberija region was also called autonomous district, and there was

24     another in Krajina that was not called Serbian, only autonomous.

25        Q.   Thank you.  How far did you come in organising the organs of

Page 34041

 1     authority of the Autonomous Region of Birac?  Which authorities were in

 2     place to issue executive orders?

 3        A.   Not a single body or agency succeeded in fully assuming its

 4     responsibility.  It was only our attempt to stop the break-up of

 5     Yugoslavia and to show Muslims that we would not accept a unitarian

 6     centralised Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And when we were establishing these

 7     bodies, it was not even our intention to put them into operation because

 8     we simply did not have the funds to finance so many bodies.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about Variants A and B.  Did anybody

10     from the central authorities send you any queries or controlled in any

11     way whether you adhered to the provisions of documents A and B?

12        A.   Absolutely not.  There was a strong grassroot initiative at the

13     time.  There was an empty space.  The leadership was in a difficult

14     situation after having to leave Sarajevo, and a lot of initiatives came

15     from the local level.  We simply could not expect support or assistance

16     from the central level.  We made do consulting with other municipalities

17     and looking at our own particular situation.  Every municipality was

18     facing different problems.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Several things are mentioned here.  It is said the

20     Crisis Staff of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica.  What does it

21     mean, Serbian municipality of Vlasenica?  What is understood by that

22     term?

23        A.   That's a municipality established through joint negotiations

24     between representatives of two peoples.  There is a document signed by

25     both parties.  It was approved also by representatives of the Muslim

Page 34042

 1     people, and it was adopted by an overwhelming majority by the Municipal

 2     Assembly.  That majority did not mean that only Serbs were meant to live

 3     in that area.  It implied, of course, that the Muslims living in the area

 4     created by these negotiations should remain there or perhaps later decide

 5     according to their own wishes to move.  There was no mention of

 6     ethnically pure municipalities at any point, and I believe there is one

 7     of the conclusions that defines this relationship.

 8        Q.   When it is said that you were appointed president of the

 9     municipality or the president of the Crisis Staff of the Serbian

10     municipality of Vlasenica, does it mean that you took over that position

11     in the Muslim municipality of Vlasenica too?

12        A.   No.  We had serious intentions and goodwill to start implementing

13     that agreement.  However, the local representatives of the Muslim people

14     obviously coached by the leadership in Sarajevo and following their

15     instructions abandoned that agreement.  We had discussed all these issues

16     in an atmosphere of mutual co-operation, and I believe that agreement had

17     given us a chance to avoid war spreading to Vlasenica.

18        Q.   Who was in power in Vlasenica throughout 1991?

19        A.   In 1991, the authorities were formed by a joint agreement between

20     the SDA and the Serbian majority in the local parliament.

21        Q.   And who was in power in the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica in

22     1992?

23        A.   I believe the officials who worked in joint authorities continued

24     to work in the Serbian authorities, including myself as president of the

25     joint Assembly and later president of the Assembly of the Serbian

Page 34043

 1     municipality of Vlasenica.

 2        Q.   I have a list of the population here.  Which of Vlasenica's

 3     municipalities did Cerska belong to?

 4        A.   Cerska was --

 5             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, excuse me.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Sutherland.

 7             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm just wondering how this arises out of

 8     cross-examination.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, this is how the indictment --

11     actually, the cross-examination today suggests that the Serbs took over

12     power in Vlasenica.  However, they continue to be in power, but only in

13     the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica, and here we have a list of

14     settlements in the Muslim municipality of Vlasenica where the Serbs did

15     not take power.  The charge of the take-over of power appears in the

16     indictment as one of the gravest charges, even though there was a

17     division of the administration and even though the Muslims who

18     transferred to the Muslim police station is being treated as our

19     dismissal of those Muslims.  So what's being suggested is that the Serbs

20     took over power in Vlasenica.

21             What I'm trying to clarify is the -- the circumstances in which

22     there was a changeover of power and did it occur in that sense.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure I follow in terms of how it arises from

24     the cross-examination.

25             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour --

Page 34044

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think Ms. Sutherland dealt with any issue

 2     relating to Cerska.

 3             MS. SUTHERLAND:  No.  And, Your Honour, if -- if Mr. Karadzic

 4     wanted to get this information from the witness, he could have done it in

 5     his -- in his examination-in-chief.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, it was said

 7     take-over of power, and what was shown was Exhibit P03214.  From page 68

 8     onwards of the transcript we are dealing with the take-over of power by

 9     the Serbs, even though it says in all of those documents that it's the

10     government of the Serbian municipality of Vlasenica.  So I want to find

11     out from a witness who was in that government what it meant before the

12     war and during the war, what it means, the term "Serbian municipality."

13     When and how did they take over power?

14             JUDGE KWON:  I'm fine with you putting questions with respect to

15     that decision to take over power, i.e., Exhibit P3214, but you seem to be

16     asking some question about Cerska.  So what is your question,

17     Mr. Karadzic?

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Dr. Stanic, was Cerska an integral part of the municipality of

20     Vlasenica?

21        A.   Yes, it was.

22        Q.   Did you take over power in Cerska?

23        A.   Until the end of the war, the area of the old municipality of

24     Vlasenica had a functioning Muslim municipality of Vlasenica.  It

25     functioned on a half of the territory.  Its headquarters were first

Page 34045

 1     located in the Gru [phoen] neighbourhood of Vlasenica.  Later it was

 2     moved to Cerska itself, and it remained there up until the operations

 3     relating to Srebrenica.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm just going to read a few things.  I'm going

 5     to put the question to you.  Did you take over power in Cerska, Djurici,

 6     Dzemat, Djile, Kerovi [phoen], Gradina, and generally in that half,

 7     Puljancici, Macesi, and so on and so forth, Nova Kasaba?  At the

 8     beginning, did you take over power in Nova Kasaba?

 9        A.   I said until the end of the war, until operations in Srebrenica,

10     these areas were under the control of the authorities of the Muslim

11     municipality of Vlasenica and by their armed forces.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us who was in the majority in these

13     neighbourhoods that I have just mentioned?

14        A.   Of course it was a Muslim-majority population.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look -- well, today we saw a series of

16     documents produced on the 19th of April.  Same typewriter, same manner.

17     It was a very productive day.  Are you able to tell us -- well, you

18     expressed your doubts about these documents.  Are you able to tell us who

19     and for what reason would produce these documents that you did not see or

20     sign?

21        A.   Well, it would definitely be somebody who had reasons to prevent

22     the truth from coming out and from being heard, and that is why I am

23     here, to deny such lies.  So far there are been many lies that we have

24     heard in the court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  I testified there, and now

25     I have the opportunity to state the truth before the International

Page 34046

 1     Tribunal.

 2             Certain forces which I assume have something to do with

 3     corruption and those kind of problems and who are probably in cahoots

 4     with the Prosecution are producing these false documents.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D25422.  This

 7     is an associated document.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Could you expand a bit more about the reason for

 9     making up these false documents?  So what's the point of those?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, I can, because today I

11     could understand what the essence is of the intention of the Prosecution.

12     The false document from 1994 signed by Mile Kosoric, an officer of the

13     JNA who only came to Vlasenica at the end of 1993 and who wrote that

14     military detachments were formed under the control of the civilian

15     authorities and the Crisis Staff, this is absolutely not true, and that

16     person could not have known what was going on in Vlasenica at that point

17     in time.  And the earlier documents then tie into this document, because

18     on the 21st of April the army entered Vlasenica and the Crisis Staff

19     began to function on the 22nd.  It was necessary to show that the

20     civilian authority was the one who organised the army's coming, arrival,

21     and that it was the civilian authorities who were in command of the

22     military forces even though we had an order which we respected in its

23     entirety not to interfere in military operations by the military or by

24     the police, and that is really how it was.  That is the truth.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Well, I'll leave it at that.  Please continue,

Page 34047

 1     Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we're on this topic, can we

 3     look at D407, please.  It's a Defence exhibit, D007.  This is the

 4     previous document.  Well, we can leave this document.  It's all right.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Sir, are you familiar with this document, and can you please look

 7     at item 4, and could you please read it out loud.

 8        A.   Yes.  I'm speaking about this document.  It was the basis of all

 9     of our actions and conduct.  Paragraph 4 states:

10             "TO, Territorial Defence, and police forces are under the

11     exclusive command of professional staff, and therefore it is necessary to

12     prevent any interfering in the command of the TO or use of the police

13     forces."

14             That is the instruction coming from the Government of

15     Republika Srpska, dated the 26th of April, I think.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D25422 now.

18     This document was looked at earlier.  It's an associated document.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Dr. Stanic, please, could you please look at this document and

21     tell us whether this document is legal.  Is there a protocol?  Is there a

22     heading, a signature, a stamp?

23        A.   Yes, it does have a protocol, a signature, a stamp.

24        Q.   And is this authentic?

25        A.   Yes, I think that it is.

Page 34048

 1        Q.   And what is it that makes this document a legal document?

 2        A.   Its preamble.

 3        Q.   I asked about the signature.  You said that they were authentic.

 4     Is this your signature, and the other one is Djukanovic's?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  The documents that we saw that don't have a protocol

 7     number or a signature, how would you evaluate their legitimacy?

 8        A.   It's clear that those are mostly disputable documents that bear a

 9     different stamp from this one.  This is one element.  A number of them

10     does not have my signature, and there is a problem also with the

11     corrected dates.  It's true that, in May, all the municipal services,

12     including the economic sector and the financial services sector and the

13     municipal secretariat had stamps like this, and they had all stamps of

14     the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica, and a number of documents were

15     issued by those services so that we were not in the municipal building in

16     the course of the month of May, so we could not control that process.

17     And that is the reason why probably a whole series of documents was

18     created that we did not have access to, that were not reviewed at the

19     organs of the Municipal Assembly of Vlasenica.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And did you have the Vlasenica Brigade, regardless of

21     what its names were at particular periods of time, and what was your role

22     in supplying that brigade?  I'm thinking of the Vlasenica municipality.

23        A.   The Vlasenica Brigade was formed a little bit later.  I think

24     that I was already in the Government of Republika Srpska when the

25     Vlasenica Brigade was formed.  Earlier I think there was the

Page 34049

 1     Vlasenica Battalion which was part of the Sekovici Brigade.

 2             The question of supply of the Vlasenica Brigade, primarily food

 3     and financing, securing salaries for the army, was mostly entrusted to

 4     the Executive Board which we had activated quite early on.  That was one

 5     of our local initiatives.  Some municipalities did not have an active

 6     Executive Board, and these activities were carried out by the

 7     commissioners' offices and then before that by the Crisis Staffs.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Dr. Stanic, the Birac zone, the Vlasenica

 9     municipality and the neighbouring municipalities, Nova Kasaba, Vlasenica,

10     Konjevic Polje, and so on, Cerska, at that time were these areas areas

11     where there was combat?  Were they theatres of war?

12        A.   Yes, it is clear that they were combat zones, and sometime from

13     early May 1992, even though there were tensions before that, all the way

14     until 1995, June 1995, these were combat areas.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And you as the president of the municipality, were

16     you also by virtue of your office the president of the council for

17     defence?

18        A.   Yes.  From the time the municipality was founded, from the

19     multi-party elections in 1990 and practically until the 20th of April,

20     when I tried for the last time to convene the National Defence Council.

21     However, the TO commander whom I invited to that meeting, and that was

22     the last time that I spoke with him, he promised to come and he didn't

23     appear, and the other Muslim officials left Vlasenica earlier than that,

24     so that we simply did not have any other officials, Muslim officials, who

25     would be prepared to take part in the work of the Council for National

Page 34050

 1     Defence.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  As the president of the Council for National Defence,

 3     were you familiar with our obligations towards the civilians.  According

 4     to international law, did we have any obligations towards them?

 5        A.   This was something that was regulated by the federal law for the

 6     defence which provided the precise duties in extraordinary conditions,

 7     what the duties and authority of this Council for National Defence was.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's look at one more document.

10     This is D1603.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Were you aware that we -- did you know that -- did you know that

13     we were in contact with the Red Cross and the commissioner for refugees

14     regarding the rights of civilians, the wounded, and so on?

15             MS. SUTHERLAND:  I'm wondering where this is going as a result of

16     cross-examination, but if Mr. Karadzic can be asked not to lead the

17     witness, it would be appreciated.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it arises from the showing of

19     Exhibit 03240, and it relates to actions towards civilians.  Well, I

20     would like to rephrase the question then.

21             JUDGE KWON:  But the witness denied the existence of the

22     government at the time, but let's continue.  Is this your last question,

23     Mr. Karadzic?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency, the last

25     question.

Page 34051

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   I'm not trying to change the fact that the government did not

 3     exist, but let us see what our attitude or position or conduct towards

 4     civilians was.  Paragraph 7 of this document.  Let's first say what

 5     meeting this was exactly.

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND: [Microphone not activated] Your Honour, is it

 7     possible Mr. Karadzic can lay a foundation question before he --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic --

10             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can Mr. Karadzic lay a foundation question

11     before he gets the document read?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked if Mr. Stanic was familiar

13     with the duties of the warring parties and our duties towards civilians

14     in that zone, regardless of the document but generally, because during

15     the cross-examination the question of the fate of civilians was asked,

16     especially transfers, expulsions, and so on and so forth.  And --

17             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour --

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked Dr. Stanic whether this was

19     a combat zone and now you're going to see why.

20             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour -- I'm sorry, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Mr. Karadzic's question was:  "Well, let us see

23     what our attitude or position or conduct towards civilians was."  He's

24     basically just wanting to bring this document up and to show this to the

25     witness.  He hasn't laid, in my view, a question -- a foundation


Page 34052

 1     question.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let's conclude your cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

 3     This has been already admitted into evidence.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 10 so -- 7 so

 5     that we can see day -- the date and then page 10, just so that we can

 6     read one sentence.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  No.  I told you to stop here.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought that you said that I

 9     could complete my question and complete my examination.  But in any

10     event, thank you.

11             Dr. Stanic, thank you for coming to testify.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  I thank

13     the Trial Chamber, and I thank the Prosecution.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just before we adjourn today, Mr. Tieger, just

15     before the winter recess last year, the Chamber received from the accused

16     his Notice of Special Defence as to count 11, i.e., reprisals, dated 14th

17     of December, 2012.  I'm wondering if the Prosecution intends to respond

18     to any procedural or substantive issues arising from that Defence notice.

19             MR. TIEGER:  We now take on board the fact that any -- that the

20     Chamber would appreciate any potential response within a reasonable time

21     period from this inquiry and we will do so accordingly.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Stanic, that concludes your evidence.  Only

23     behalf of this Trial Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to

24     The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And thank you for making it

Page 34053

 1     possible for me to speak the truth before the International Criminal

 2     Tribunal.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The hearing is adjourned.

 4                           [The witness withdrew]

 5                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,

 6                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 20th day

 7                           of February, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.