130301ED

Page 34543

1 Friday, 1 March 2013

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone. We apologise for the delay,

7 noting it was March we were waiting inside courtroom I.

8 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, please continue.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,

10 everyone.

11 WITNESS: MOMIR BULATOVIC [Resumed]

12 [Witness answered through interpreter]

13 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:[Continued]

14 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bulatovic. Yesterday we spoke -- at the end we

15 spoke about the expulsion of people and I would like to address some

16 occasions where you discussed it in the SDC meetings.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 06244 on the

18 screen.

19 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Bulatovic, these are the shorthand

20 notes of the 8th Session of the SDC of 12th March 1993. Can we please

21 have page 31 in the English and page 25 in the B/C/S.

22 Mr. Bulatovic, I would like to quote what you said on -- and you

23 say here:

24 "We are obliged to help them," referring to Republika Srpska,

25 "but we are also obliged to understand that we can hardly co-operate with

Page 34544

1 someone who, like the Prime Minister of the RS advises us to ethnically

2 cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there."

3 And can we have the next page in the English.

4 And then you also say:

5 "The Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic, he advises us

6 to do it as soon as possible, for Muslims are not to be trusted. They

7 will stab us in the back, they will mine our railroad, and so on."

8 Mr. Bulatovic, that's what you said and that was your

9 information; right?

10 A. I remember this meeting very well. It was being decided how to

11 meet the requests of the Government of Republika Srpska for their

12 military conscripts to be arrested, those who are in the territory of the

13 FRY and how to deliver them by force to the VRS. That decision was not

14 taken and I'm very proud about that. This passage deals with the

15 decision-making process. It is true that this decision was not notified

16 to us in person, but we were just told that in the ranks of the

17 Government of Republika Srpska occasionally there are some extreme views.

18 It turned out that those extreme views were something we could not share,

19 they were not our convictions, and they could not support the making of

20 the decision that was asked of us to make.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 46 in the English and

22 page 37 in the B/C/S.

23 Q. And you say here that is one -- and you speak about the murder of

24 Muslims committed by the Lukic group in this context. You say the

25 following:

Page 34545

1 "That is one of the most important elements of our national

2 strategy, all the more so because the highest leadership of

3 Republika Srpska suggests that we should initiate organised ethnic

4 cleansing and that would be a disaster."

5 That was your position at that time; right?

6 A. I still don't have that text in front of me. If it could be

7 displayed, please.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: [Microphone not activated]

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Prosecution, please.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Sorry. It should be page 37 and -- not

11 page 37, it's page 37 in the e-court.

12 JUDGE KWON: I think we are seeing on this page, upper part, the

13 first big paragraph, last sentence of that paragraph. In English.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In English, but I can't see it now here in

15 the B/C/S. Can we see the previous page. That should be -- sorry, that

16 was a mistake here.

17 Q. You see here how you speak about -- it should be there:

18 "That is one of the most important elements of our national

19 strategy ..."

20 It should be the second paragraph of where you are speaking. No,

21 it's not. It can't be. Can we have the next -- the second-next page.

22 Yes.

23 Here you see it basically in where you speak. It's the third

24 paragraph in which you speak, and that is -- that should be the quote

25 that I had:

Page 34546

1 "That is one of the most important elements of our national

2 strategy, all the more so because the highest leadership of

3 Republika Srpska suggests that we should initiate organised ethnic

4 cleansing and that would be a disaster."

5 That's what you said; right?

6 A. Yes. But look, this was a normal and responsible reaction to an

7 atrocious crime that was committed. This is a discussion about what the

8 paramilitary unit of Mr. Lukic had done. They had killed innocent

9 citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. They were killed on the train only

10 because they were Muslims. You see in the text a strong conviction of

11 that. There is talk about Lukic and he is described as a horrible

12 person. The text also speaks about our efforts to preserve peace and

13 tolerance. Sandzak, for your information, Your Honours, is an area

14 populated mainly by Muslims. That's why I said one of the main elements

15 of our state strategy was to preserve peace and tolerance. And the

16 sentence that comes next is linked to the previous one where we describe

17 an extremist excess by one person from the leadership --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may say ...

19 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure the translation of Mr. Bulatovic's

20 answer has been translated.

21 Yes, we'll hear what you say, Mr. Karadzic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to draw your attention to

23 the fact that Mr. Bulatovic said it was one of the most important

24 elements of our state strategy, all the more so because from the

25 highest -- it originates from the highest places in Republika Srpska,

Page 34547

1 whereas the interpretation refers to the "highest leadership of

2 Republika Srpska." He actually said from the highest places in

3 Republika Srpska. "Highest places" is not legally the same as the

4 "highest leadership."

5 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Bulatovic is kindly asked by interpreters

6 to speak a little more slowly, please.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Bulatovic, for the benefit of the interpreters,

8 could you kindly speak a little more slowly, please.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. Mr. Bulatovic, when you -- I assume that "highest places" is the

11 correct translation as Mr. Karadzic says, and "highest places" means the

12 Bosnian Serb leadership or who would you mean?

13 A. It's clear. This is a continuation from the same session where

14 we strenuously condemn the then-Prime Minister of Republika Srpska,

15 Mr. Lukic.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this document please be admitted,

17 Your Honour? And I assume we do it like with the Defence exhibits, to

18 assume it -- to admit it in full. We do have -- in fact, throughout this

19 session we have references to where they speak about the Republika Srpska

20 and the relationships between the two entities.

21 JUDGE KWON: Why do we need entire transcript which takes place

22 in -- outside Republika Srpska? Yes, I will hear from the Defence.

23 Mr. Robinson.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. We join in the Prosecution's request because

25 these are snippets of the discussion. It's possible we could compact it

Page 34548

1 more if that was preferable to the Chamber and take only those portions

2 relating to Bosnia and excerpt those. But in principle the discussion

3 continues for more than the pages that are referenced here and it would

4 be useful, I think, for the Chamber to have the full discussion.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, if you are not minded to do

6 this, I just wanted to mention that the following pages are about

7 discussions, and that is in addition to those that I just mentioned. It

8 would be 31, 32, 45 to 47, that's where the topic basically comes up.

9 JUDGE KWON: I'm fine with admitting those pages, but why do we

10 have to admit even the irrelevant parts? Are we happy to admit those

11 pages referred to by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, Mr. Robinson?

12 MR. ROBINSON: In principle, Mr. President, but we'd also like to

13 take a look at it to see if there's other portions of the transcript

14 where this topic is discussed. So if you would allow us to do that, we

15 could come back to you with the pages that we would agree could be

16 admitted.

17 JUDGE KWON: I take it you could live with this suggestion by

18 Mr. Robinson?

19 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, of course.

20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Then we'll admit those pages referred to

21 by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff. Shall we give the number?

22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6161, Your Honours.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have 65 ter 07528.

24 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Bulatovic, we have again shorthand

25 notes of a session of the SDC, and it's the 14th Session from

Page 34549

1 11 October 1993. You may remember that there was a session that -- where

2 General Perisic proposed a new scheme of payment of VJ officers serving

3 in the VRS and the SRK. And can we please move to page 26 in both

4 languages and it's the first paragraph in both. And you say here,

5 Mr. Bulatovic:

6 "Let's be completely frank in our close circles. We are facing

7 or shall very soon face the fact that a degree of ideologisation is

8 present in quite an extent both in Republika Srpska and the

9 Republic of Serbian Krajina and their respective armies, but it would be

10 difficult to introduce here that Chetnik ideology present over there."

11 You said that, Mr. Bulatovic; correct?

12 THE ACCUSED: Should it be indicated for the sake of interpreters

13 what part of the text is cited.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: It's the first paragraph, should be the

15 first paragraph in both.

16 JUDGE KWON: In English it starts from the last part of the third

17 sentence -- the third line.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. So --

19 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

21 Q. Mr. Bulatovic, I'd ask you whether you said that and you

22 haven't -- not yet answered that. You said that; right?

23 A. Yes, yes, certainly. I said that. I'm familiar with all these

24 transcripts from the Supreme Defence Council. I believe they are

25 accurate and they faithfully reflect everything that was said there.

Page 34550

1 This was a discussion about how the Army of Yugoslavia was coming into

2 being because the Yugoslav People's Army before that, if you will let me

3 explain why I said this --

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Do I have your permission to explain?

6 Q. I would rather move on to the next page and perhaps it's --

7 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

8 Yes, let's continue. If Mr. Karadzic wishes to take up that

9 issue he will later on. Let's continue for the moment.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

11 Let's move to page 28 in the English and it's also page 28 in the

12 B/C/S, and it's again the first paragraph.

13 Q. And on the same topic you say here:

14 "If someone has spent a long time in Bosnia, it's hard to appoint

15 him to a position in Novi Sad now. We have to bear in mind that people

16 change in war in an atmosphere and in the logic of war and this is a

17 political option which we don't quite accept here but we support it

18 because it's in our interest."

19 Mr. Bulatovic, Novi Sad is a multi-ethnic town with a lot of

20 non-Serb population in Serbia; right?

21 A. Yes, it's true about Novi Sad, but at issue here is Novi Pazar,

22 and Novi Pazar has a 70 per cent Muslim population.

23 Q. It says here in your -- at least in the English it says

24 "Novi Sad." Is that a mistake or -- when you look at the B/C/S it says

25 "Novi Sad."

Page 34551

1 A. No, it's obviously a mistake. You don't have to know the

2 language. Look at the passage in B/C/S. In the original it says "Novi

3 Pazar"; in the translation it says "Novi Sad."

4 Q. You're right. You're right. I now see it. I was looking for

5 that word. Thank you.

6 You said already it's a multi -- it's a Muslim-populated area and

7 those who spent long time in the Republika Srpska would not want to live

8 among non-Serbs; right?

9 A. No, no, the conclusion is completely different. This discussion

10 is about officers, people with combat experience, people who had waged

11 war and who, in my view - as you can see from this document - cannot now

12 be transferred to be commanders in peace time in other environments.

13 Because it says here "war changes people." This is saying that we need

14 to take account of the realities and preserve peace in Serbia and in

15 Montenegro.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can these documents be

17 admitted, and I also mention here that the pages that are concerned with

18 Republika Srpska are pages 24 to 30. That's at least how I saw it, but

19 maybe Mr. Robinson will want to make the same comment as previously.

20 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We have no objection. We'll

21 let you know -- or we'll let the Prosecution know also if we have some

22 additional pages we think should be included.

23 JUDGE KWON: What was the page number that we saw now?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The page number that I was actually

25 discussing with Mr. Bulatovic was 26 and 28, but the entire is 24 to 30.

Page 34552

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit them, pages from 24 to 30.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6162, Your Honours.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If the incorrect bits of the

6 translation are prejudicial to the Defence, I would like to have the

7 accuracy of the translation checked.

8 JUDGE KWON: That is --

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If this is to be admitted.

10 JUDGE KWON: This is being done on an ongoing basis.

11 Let's continue.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 06260 on the

13 screen.

14 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, as again shorthand notes from the SDC and

15 it's the 2nd of November, 1994, and it's the 28th Session. And just

16 so -- to remind you, in this session the rejection of the peace plan by

17 the Bosnian Serbs were -- was discussed, and General Perisic gave a

18 briefing on the military situation in Republika Srpska.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move to page 7 in the English and

20 page 7 in the B/C/S.

21 Q. Let's look at -- Mr. Perisic is speaking and it's the paragraph,

22 the upper paragraph in the B/C/S and the first paragraph also -- the

23 second paragraph in the English. And he says here:

24 "Out of a total number of population of the entire area,

25 20 per cent Serbs hold more than 70 per cent of the territory, which is

Page 34553

1 unsustainable."

2 Mr. -- that's -- Mr. Bulatovic, you were aware that the

3 Bosnian Serb claimed a large percentage of the territory of

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that was a matter of constant debate in the SDC;

5 correct?

6 A. What is true that we have a document before us which is authentic

7 and reflects faithfully the words of General Perisic. What follows from

8 this is not a political acknowledgement of how much territory Serbs

9 should hold. It was not we who discussed that; it was the

10 International Conference on the former Yugoslavia. There were

11 negotiations about this and similar views that resulted in the

12 Dayton Accords. It's true General Perisic said this, but this was said

13 in the context of our efforts to bridge our differences with the

14 leadership of Republika Srpska and to receive a political mandate for the

15 decisions that ultimately resulted in the Dayton Accords.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move on to page 45 in the English and

17 it is page 40 in the B/C/S, and in the B/C/S it's at the bottom.

18 Q. And here we have again General Perisic and he's saying -- in the

19 B/C/S it's at the bottom. He's saying:

20 "Time in running out and what transpired now is pure one-party

21 army of the SDS. We can also pronounce the aforementioned army as

22 Chetnik army or the one that give us hell in the near future. We should

23 bear that in mind."

24 Mr. Bulatovic, that is how it was seen by Perisic at that time;

25 correct?

Page 34554

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is the point? How can

2 President Bulatovic respond to Perisic's communist views?

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, no, I think that's an intervention that

4 is not appropriate. That's a matter that he should raise later in his --

5 JUDGE KWON: But the question as formulated is that you are

6 asking Mr. Perisic's view to Mr. Bulatovic?

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I simply asked him whether that was --

8 JUDGE KWON: What he said --

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- Perisic's view and expressed here.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Bulatovic.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I must admit, Your Honours, that

12 it's very difficult for me to follow the sense. I have confirmed the

13 truthfulness of these documents. It is indisputable on that basis that

14 this is what General Perisic said at that point in time, but I think it's

15 illusory to ask what Momir Bulatovic thinks about that when you have

16 right below that what Momir Bulatovic thinks in that same period. And

17 then as the document goes on when we're to read it in its entirety you

18 could see that this opinion of General Perisic did not win out and it was

19 not the operative opinion. It's very simple to read on and to see what

20 Momir Bulatovic thought and what Slobodan Milosevic said and what was the

21 conclusion of that state body in response to the views of Momcilo

22 Perisic.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I suggest to admit the entire

24 document because it's really only about the situation about

25 Republika Srpska, their stances, and the stances that the participants of

Page 34555

1 the SDC have on this topic. But of course I didn't much time to go into

2 much more details, so that's my proposal.

3 MR. ROBINSON: We agree.

4 JUDGE KWON: So whole of 70 pages is related to matters in

5 Republika Srpska?

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, I would say so, although the gist of

7 this discussion is from page 1 to 46, but it's nevertheless always coming

8 up.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Given the circumstances the Chamber will

11 admit it.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6163, Your Honours.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

14 Q. I would like to discuss one more bit from the transcript of the

15 "Death of Yugoslavia" interview, and can we please have P3060 on the

16 screen.

17 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, did you sort out the question

18 why it was noted as sometime in October 1994?

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I must admit, I haven't. But I -- I think

20 actually it is correct because when we look at other interviews that were

21 given at that time, I know them from other cases, they are actually in

22 1994. That's what I think. But --

23 JUDGE KWON: But witness testified it was around 2000, didn't he?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, he did but I think he's mistaken.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

Page 34556

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: But we will look into this and inform

2 everyone. But here is the wrong exhibit. I obviously have made a

3 mistake. Can we have 65 ter 24585, so obviously got the P number wrong.

4 JUDGE KWON: P6160.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. And can we move to page 25.

6 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, you speak here of a trip to Pale and you

7 already -- we already discussed it. And you say here:

8 "But it was an interesting and difficult journey because we saw

9 for ourselves what war means. When you saw a signpost on the territory

10 under Serbian control you knew that if the village was destroyed it must

11 have been a Muslim village. Everything was empty and destroyed. A

12 hundred or two hundred metres after that you have a village where

13 everything is normal, children go to school, and you can't even imagine

14 that this is a war zone."

15 And you also speak about Pale being a real city and that there

16 was no sign that a war was raging all around. And you say:

17 "That's when I realised how terrible war is because there were

18 ethnically pure Serb, Muslim, and Croat villages and this insanity must

19 stop."

20 Mr. Bulatovic, that's how you experienced the trip; right?

21 A. Yes, that is how I experienced the entire war in Bosnia, which

22 was tragic, it was equally unfair or unjust towards all, and it should

23 have been stopped as soon as possible. This road was going through Serb

24 territory and it was logical for us to pass through that way. In other

25 areas, unfortunately, it was the other way around, where Serb villages

Page 34557

1 were destroyed, where the Muslims and the Croats were predominantly

2 living. This was just tragic.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this

4 document -- these pages 25 and 26 be admitted. That's the context of the

5 travelling --

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: -- and observation.

8 JUDGE KWON: That will be added to the exhibit.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would like to have now the - I also don't

10 have the D number - 65 ter 06141 on the screen.

11 Q. And, Mr. Bulatovic, you have read this Council for Co-ordination

12 of State Policy notes of the 18th August 1992 meeting and you discussed

13 it with the Defence. And I only want to go to page 19 in the B/C/S and

14 page 18 in the English. And we have Mr. Milan Panic, the

15 then-Prime Minister, say here the following:

16 "This afternoon I received the following information: Ethnic

17 cleansing has begun. 15.000 Muslims from Sanski Most were given eight

18 hours to leave their homes and make 20 kilometres to Jajce in order to

19 reach the Muslims. This information was received from the

20 United Nations."

21 Mr. Bulatovic, this information that Mr. Panic is here providing

22 was true, was it not?

23 A. The only thing that is accurate according to me is the

24 following -- well, we don't know if this information is correct or not,

25 but what is the reaction is that if it is so, that must be prevented.

Page 34558

1 And that, in my opinion, is the only truth.

2 Q. And just to -- in the next page -- we need the next page in the

3 English but the B/C/S is the same. And you -- and Mr. Panic says:

4 "It's important that we discuss here whether it's possible to

5 stop the war and to take an attitude that we don't provide assistance to

6 ethnic cleansing and financing the war of the Serbs in Bosnia."

7 And can we now go to page 75 in the English and 92 in the B/C/S.

8 And Milan Panic asked General Zivota Panic what could be done and how to

9 stop the artillery fire on Sarajevo, the battle in Bihac, the battle in

10 Gorazde? Mr. Panic even says:

11 "We could be better help to them if we would take their weapons

12 from them."

13 And General Panic says:

14 "We cannot take their weapons away because that would be the war

15 between us and them."

16 That was a dilemma that the leadership in Yugoslavia -- Serbia

17 and Montenegro you yourself were in; right?

18 A. Well, I have been placed in an illogical position again to

19 interpret what the dilemma is between Milan Panic and Zivota Panic. The

20 transcripts are accurate, the words are accurate, but I would kindly ask

21 Madam Prosecutor and the Trial Chamber to act as in the previous case.

22 This document can be valid but in its entirety. It is very uncomfortable

23 if you're asking me about certain sentences according to some Richelieu

24 model. I think the entirety of the document is all right, but I cannot

25 comment authoritatively on certain sections of the text.

Page 34559

1 Q. Can we move on. Page 75 in the English at the bottom, I think

2 it's there, and then we have page 93 in the B/C/S and it's also at the

3 bottom. And Mr. Zivota Panic, or General Zivota Panic, states that the

4 Bosnian Muslims planned the attack and they will move forward towards

5 Jajce. They launched a heavy attack against Bihac. And then he refers

6 to information that the Serbs when they came across a Muslim village they

7 killed everybody from children to the elderly.

8 Mr. Bulatovic, doing this, that's ethnic cleansing in its worst

9 form, is it not?

10 A. I'm sorry. I cannot see the text that you have just read out to

11 me.

12 Q. It's page 93 in the B/C/S at the bottom --

13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation].

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yeah, it's actually the last bit here, the

15 last bit of Zivota Panic where he speaks about "Muslimansko selo ...,"

16 so --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask, this is a witness that

18 is too important and too prominent a figure for sentences to be

19 truncated. Can the entire statement by Zivota Panic be read out, please?

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's a matter for the

21 cross-examination -- for the re-direct --

22 JUDGE KWON: But the sentence itself that -- which may not be

23 correct that the witness should have chance to read it.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I don't think it's a matter of --

25 JUDGE KWON: But now he can read it.

Page 34560

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

2 JUDGE KWON: So what is your question, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I actually wanted him just to confirm that

4 this was said and that this is -- I asked him, actually, this is ethnic

5 cleansing in its worst form, killing all inhabitants of a Muslim village.

6 JUDGE KWON: If it had taken place; is that your question?

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, actually. Only whether when it took

8 place that's ethnic cleansing in its worst form.

9 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, and I know Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff is

10 very fair, maybe she doesn't see this portion in the text, but it says:

11 "We obtained some information, which may not be correct ..."

12 And so I think what everyone's point is here is that you can't

13 put something to a witness as if it's a fact when even the speaker said

14 "it may not be correct." And then you also omitted the last sentence

15 which said "they have no control over these forces" which is also an

16 important element. So our point is if you are going to refer to text,

17 you should not be so selective so it distorts the meaning to the witness.

18 JUDGE KWON: My point is that now Mr. Bulatovic has the

19 opportunity to read the entire paragraph so he can answer the question.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21 Q. Yes, can you -- can you -- that information that Zivota Panic is

22 referring to, was that true?

23 A. I would just like to read what Zivota Panic said in this same

24 place before that, just a little bit before on the same page. When

25 Karadzic was talking the other day you heard that he had no control over

Page 34561

1 the individuals who did this but you knew they did it. They launched a

2 grenade on Sarajevo and it seemed as if they launched a thousand

3 grenades. Some of them got drunk, they say, "Let's say launch one. I

4 mean it's very damaging to all of us."

5 Secondly, as to whether this information is accurate or not, we

6 don't know. It's possible here that we have paramilitary formations here

7 against whom we fought quite strictly. This is the greatest crime and

8 savagery which was not motived by any political goals but by looting,

9 theft, and the satisfaction of the lowest impulses. These were not

10 regular units under anyone's control. These were bands or gangs of

11 criminals that we tried to stop in every possible way, but as

12 President Karadzic himself said at the time, you could not have had

13 control over all of these individuals. These, as far as I'm concerned,

14 are the worst war crimes against civilians, but I would not agree that it

15 was part of any systematic plan of ethnic cleansing.

16 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

17 [Trial Chamber confers]

18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, how much more would you need to

19 conclude your cross-examination?

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I would -- I still have three topics. One

21 is the objective of the Bosnian Serbs and it is only one document, then I

22 will address very briefly the paramilitary formations and it's also one

23 document, and if time allows then I would also address one topic in

24 relation to Foca. I would think it's something like 20 minutes if you

25 would allow me that time.

Page 34562

1 JUDGE KWON: Please conclude by ten past 10.00. Yes, please

2 proceed.

3 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

4 Q. Then, Mr. Bulatovic, you mention in paragraph 10 of your

5 statement that you -- to the fact that the peace proposals included some

6 kind of division of Bosnia and allowed the Bosnian Serbs to have a

7 certain level of autonomy, but the Bosnian Serbs as well as the leaders

8 in Croatia -- the Serb leaders in Croatia and in Serbia and Montenegro

9 wanted to live in one state. That was the end goal, so to speak; isn't

10 that right?

11 A. This was the starting position in the Socialist Federal

12 Republic of Yugoslavia. We all lived in one state so that one group of

13 political thought and political representatives of the people wanted to

14 keep the existing situation, to stay in the existing state, while another

15 group wanted to break-up this state and create independent states. So

16 that's when Pandora's Box flew open. The initial position of

17 representatives, political representatives, of the Serbian people

18 wherever they were in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was the

19 survival of the state. It was status quo.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have document 65 ter 06145 on the

21 screen and it is a session of the Council for Co-Ordination of State

22 Policy held on 9 January 1993, so that means we are now in 1993 and can

23 we have both -- page 8 in both languages, please.

24 Q. And we have Mr. Krajisnik basically speaking here and summarising

25 the position of the Bosnian Serbs that there is a prevailing opinion that

Page 34563

1 it is crucial -- is a crucial comment when integration of all territories

2 that want to form an undivided country is possible. I think of territory

3 of Serbia, Montenegro, Serbian Krajina, and Republika Srpska."

4 And that's in 1993. So it continued, this wish to unite the

5 Serbian territories in three republics; right?

6 A. No, no, that is not right. This was the initial position here --

7 Q. Let me interrupt you.

8 A. -- that all of these territories are in one --

9 Q. Let me interrupt you. I was just reading what Mr. Krajisnik was

10 saying on the -- in 1993 on that session and he said that, did he not?

11 A. We are discussing a document here which is called the

12 harmonisation of the state policy.

13 Q. You -- I have to interrupt you.

14 A. Harmonisation makes sense --

15 Q. I have to interrupt you because we have very little time, as you

16 have heard. The answer is either yes or no, he said that. But the

17 transcript is correct, is it not?

18 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, this has no probative

19 value for him to simply say what is being in the transcript. He has to

20 be given the opportunity to give his comment on it, otherwise there's no

21 point in simply showing him something and asking him if the words appear

22 on the page.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please proceed, Mr. Bulatovic.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really don't know how to avoid

25 being interrupted in any way. It's correct. The document exists and

Page 34564

1 it's authentic what is stated here. But this is a document where

2 different opinions are being harmonised, where on the basis of individual

3 opinion, conclusions are drawn for political and state action.

4 Individual opinions here do not have to win out or become a guide-line

5 for the future action of state organs, either those in the

6 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or those in Republika Srpska.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I would like to have this

8 transcript be admitted.

9 JUDGE KWON: What's the status of this document? I think we

10 discussed this in -- during the course of Jovanovic testimony.

11 Yes, Mr. Tieger, do you remember that?

12 MR. TIEGER: I don't believe that particular quote was used.

13 If -- I don't want to enter the fray about the extent of the admission of

14 documents, but these -- the co-ordination council sessions were the

15 subject of discussion between Mr. Robinson and myself about whether or

16 not those were so closely related to the kinds of documents we admitted

17 in their entirety that they should be as well --

18 JUDGE KWON: So my question was it was not formally admitted

19 before?

20 MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers]

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour, I checked that.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. It was discussed.

23 Yes, what pages are you tendering, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: My proposal would actually be to admit the

25 entire document, otherwise I just referred to one particular page, now I

Page 34565

1 can't find which it was.

2 JUDGE KWON: It is a document of 167 pages.

3 Mr. Robinson.

4 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, in principle we favour the

5 admission of the entire document or at least all those portions that

6 relate to the discussion and Bosnia, and if that's too burdensome to you

7 then the Prosecution can identify the pages that they believe are

8 relevant and we would keep the option of adding to that if we think there

9 are other parts that are relevant.

10 JUDGE KWON: When do you think identify the pages?

11 MR. ROBINSON: I think we could do that by Monday.

12 JUDGE KWON: Very well. On that basis, we'll admit it.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. That's very

14 helpful.

15 JUDGE KWON: Exhibit P6164.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17 Q. Mr. -- the next topic I only very briefly want to discuss is

18 volunteers and paramilitaries. And can we please have 65 ter 06242 on

19 the screen, and it's the SDC minutes of 7th August 1992 and it's

20 5th Session of this. And you may recall that in this session you

21 referred to problems of convoys of armed men constantly bussing through

22 Pljevlja in Montenegro and how you wanted to stop it. I think you

23 remember that?

24 A. Yes, I do remember. That was a major problem.

25 Q. And I just want to refer to page 4 in the English and it's also

Page 34566

1 page 4 in the B/C/S and you describe the problem arising, and in

2 paragraph 5 on this page you say that:

3 "The fate and the existence of Muslims could have ended that

4 night."

5 You don't need to go into all these details, but these armed men

6 were a threat to the Muslim population in Montenegro and it would be also

7 to the Muslim population in Bosnia; right?

8 A. This was a criminal paramilitary group that came from Cajnice,

9 the territory of the Republika Srpska, and it was also assisted by the

10 local population and they practically captured the town. They were more

11 numerous and stronger than police and regular military forces and their

12 political goal was to kill all Muslims. The Muslims made up 10 per cent

13 of the Pljevlja local population at the time. I physically came and

14 prevented this, and later we arrested these people. The problem with

15 paramilitary formations, if you permit me, is the fact that you cannot

16 stop them. Imagine a bus of armed people is supposed to be stopped by

17 one policeman on the road. You need to have five times more armed people

18 to stop something like that. The problem of the paramilitary forces was

19 our biggest problem. It was also something that could be -- we could be

20 blamed for the most and we were unable to stop them.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we move to page 5 in the English and

22 page 6 in the B/C/S and it is in the middle of the -- both pages.

23 Q. And you speak here about a self-proclaimed colonel who once was

24 an active-duty officer, and you say the following:

25 "Let's be honest, we needed those paramilitary formations for a

Page 34572

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the 27th of May there was not a single case

2 of repatriation or, that is to say, returning persons who were refugees

3 or who had fled.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, no further questions. Thank

5 you.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, I take it you have some questions?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency. Thank you.

9 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.

11 A. Good morning.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I please call up 65 ter 6145.

13 Perhaps it already has a P number by now. It was displayed a moment ago.

14 That is what Mr. Krajisnik said.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, P6164.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would now like to

17 have page 7 in both English and in Serbian and then we're going to move

18 on to page 8 probably.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. We see here that Mr. Krajisnik started to speak.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And could we now have the next page

22 in both versions, in both languages.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. President, I'd like to draw your attention and the attention

25 of all the other participants to the second paragraph. The speaker of

Page 34573

1 the Assembly, Krajisnik, is presenting our view vis-a-vis the formation

2 and survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you remember that?

3 A. Yes, I remember that and I'm reading the paragraph now, and it

4 clearly reflects Mr. Krajisnik's view.

5 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask you to focus on the next

6 paragraph -- no, not the next one, just skip one. And then look at the

7 paragraph that the learned Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff quoted to you. And can you

8 tell us whose opinion is being presented here by Mr. Krajisnik?

9 A. He is talking about the opinion of the Assembly, if I understand

10 things correctly; because on the previous page he said that after the

11 initial proposal of territorial delineation, or rather, reorganisation of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, this was discussed at the

13 Assembly of Republika Srpska.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. What would you take as his position

15 and what would you -- and how would you characterise this, where it says

16 there was a prevailing opinion or the opinion prevailed that, and so on?

17 A. I will have to ask you to put an additional question to me. What

18 is the distinction?

19 Q. Please look at the second paragraph on this page, the one up

20 there. Whose position is he presenting there and whose position is he

21 presenting this other paragraph that starts with the words "the opinion

22 prevailed that ..." and so on?

23 A. If I remember correctly there were always groups that were called

24 realists and groups that were called idealists. Some thought that this

25 was a favourable moment whereas others thought that this could be

Page 34574

1 achieved in another way and through different means. What is undeniable,

2 I believe, is the wish to continue living within the common state or at

3 least to have special ties between and among all these territories.

4 However, this is a question of politics, who prevails when.

5 Q. Today you mentioned that it should be established whether an

6 opinion prevailed and was reflected in decisions. Is it your position

7 that it would be important to see the decisions, not only the discussion?

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, that's a leading question.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Okay. I shall withdraw it.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. President, it was put to you today that you or somebody else

12 in Yugoslavia as well advocated Serb plans about autonomy in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Did you take part in meetings of leaderships of the

14 Yugoslav republics with Lord Carrington early in June 1991 or throughout

15 1991?

16 A. Yes. Although I was president of Montenegro, I spent most of my

17 term involved in peace negotiations about the reorganisation of

18 Yugoslavia and the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I did a precise

19 calculation. During my four-year term of office as president of

20 Montenegro, I spent 110 days travelling and attending peace conferences

21 and mostly discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. You're talking about your first term?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Thank you. Do you remember what the position was of the

25 conference and particularly of President Izetbegovic with regard to these

Page 34575

1 requests of ours, these demands of ours, maximum ones, to remain within

2 Yugoslavia or, on the other hand, to have some autonomy in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. The crisis Staff in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

5 started when the then-ruling party, the League of Communists,

6 disintegrated, and in the then-Federation that was the only party that

7 existed. There was a long period of political torment and agony. The

8 political organs did not really have the capacity to resolve any one of

9 the issues involved. Because the organs were incapable of doing that, it

10 was agreed upon that we, the six presidents of the Yugoslav republics,

11 would find a political solution regarding the situation and the fate of

12 the country. We did this under a great deal of public pressure and the

13 media expected us to find a solution that would avoid war. The idea of

14 the war was quite present in the media of our country even before the war

15 started. Yugoslavia comes into existence and disappears as a result of

16 major upheavals. It is the result of the First World War, and it was one

17 of the first victims of the fascist aggression during the

18 Second World War, and instinctively people were afraid what would happen

19 when Yugoslavia would fall apart. The six of us, the Yugoslav

20 presidents, travelled and the public called our meetings the travelling

21 circus. As members of this circus, we were under constant pressure of

22 media questions, whether there would be a war. What I particularly

23 remember is that meeting, that was the last one in a series, that we had

24 in Stojcevac near Sarajevo, and where finally we had been asked by the

25 Yugoslav public to tell them whether there would be war, or rather,

Page 34576

1 whether there would be an agreement. At this meeting Slovenia declared

2 its decision to leave the Federation. Croatia personified by

3 President Tudjman said that it would leave the Federation because it

4 could not stay in it if Slovenia was not there. The most tragic person

5 of that meeting was Alija Izetbegovic. There are stenograms that show

6 this. And he said that if there's going to be a disintegration of

7 Yugoslavia, a civil war would flare up in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said, I

8 still remember his words: Armed groups are already gathering in hills.

9 They're stopping people. There's no control over them. A war will break

10 out.

11 And then he asked that this compromise solution be accepted, the

12 one that was submitted by him and the president of Macedonia,

13 Kiro Gligorov. This proposal was not accepted. I remember that

14 particularly because all the participants in the meeting were aware that

15 in this situation when there was no political solution there has to be a

16 war conflict. It wasn't that President Izetbegovic was accusing you,

17 Mr. Karadzic, or any other political personality. He was just

18 desperately struggling for a political solution that would not lead to

19 chaos and chaos did happen when there was no political solution.

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. In paragraph 7 of your statement you

21 mention that meeting so I would like us to see 1D7816 in e-court.

22 1D7816. First of all, let us take a look at the first page. Are these

23 the stenographic notes of that conference? No.

24 A. This is another document.

25 Q. I'm sorry. Again it's a meeting of the peace conference but it's

Page 34577

1 not in June. It's in November -- no, October 1991. Can we now please

2 take a look at page 25 and then 26?

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I just want to know how it

5 arises from the cross-examination because I didn't speak about such early

6 times.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I think thinking about the same.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, during the

9 cross-examination the Prosecution did put a question related to the

10 support of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, and President Bulatovic

11 himself towards the demands of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina for autonomy.

12 And perhaps he was being challenged in that way, or reprimanded, if you

13 will, but now I would like to show what the situation was in the case of

14 others. Was this a demand of Yugoslavia or --

15 JUDGE KWON: No, and I don't think Mr. Bulatovic was ever

16 reprimanded at all, but you are putting the question without knowing the

17 document yourself. Why don't you put your question first and then, if

18 necessary, you can put the document to the witness?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Can you tell us what the position was vis-a-vis our demand? If

22 we were not to stay in Yugoslavia, that we should within

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina have our autonomy? What was the position of

24 Lord Carrington? What was the position, say, of President Izetbegovic

25 himself?

Page 34578

1 A. The then-European Community was actively involved in the entire

2 process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The then so-called troika,

3 headed by Mr. Hans van den Broek, came to Yugoslavia, and they asked

4 Slovenia to postpone their departure from the common state. And they

5 also asked Croatia to postpone the exercise of their state independence

6 precisely in order to reach a solution for Bosnia. And the position of

7 the conference on the former Yugoslavia was a result of that and it was

8 supported by the leading powers of the world that were in the

9 Contact Group, and that included the United States of America.

10 Lord Carrington, in June 1992 --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: October 1992.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- presented a plan and the plan

13 was that those republics who wished to have independent states can do

14 that. Point two was the republics that wish to remain together can do

15 so. Point three said that there was special rights to be enjoyed by the

16 Serb people in Croatia. And point four was resolving the question of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina at a special peace conference. For a simple reason,

18 all of those who are involved in diplomacy and who sincerely wished to

19 preserve peace know that Bosnia will behave just like Yugoslavia because

20 Bosnia is a mini Yugoslavia. European diplomats envisaged a separate

21 conference on Bosnia and this is shown by the fact that in this document

22 that was shown to me, the words of Mr. Izetbegovic are recorded.

23 Mr. Izetbegovic says himself in this text that he does not have the

24 capacity to speak on behalf of all three ethnic communities. According

25 to the then-constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Page 34579

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina was a state, an equitable community of Serbs,

2 Croats, and Muslims. Mr. Izetbegovic held the position of the president

3 of the Presidency and this was based on the key aimed at equal

4 representation. And he said that he had to check all of this with the

5 representatives of the Serbs and Croats because as he himself said he did

6 not have the capacity to pass a decision on behalf of all.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Just briefly --

9 JUDGE KWON: I think it surely goes beyond the scope of

10 cross-examination. What Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff discussed with the witness is

11 what was happening in Republika Srpska rather than the issue whether or

12 not to support from the part of FRY or whatever.

13 We'll have a break now for half an hour.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could finish within ten minutes

15 if it's easier so that we can let President Bulatovic go. Perhaps even

16 less than ten minutes.

17 JUDGE KWON: We'll break for half an hour now and then take that

18 opportunity to prepare yourself for more focused questions.

19 We'll resume at 11.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 10.28 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11 .05 a.m.

22 JUDGE KWON: You already changed your seat, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: That's correct, Your Honour. And before

24 Mr. Karadzic continues, I want to answer your question that you had in

25 relation to the transcript for the "Death of Yugoslavia" interviews. We

Page 34580

1 ourselves received this transcript on the 1st of November, 1995, and we

2 believe that, indeed, the dates on this paper is correct.

3 JUDGE KWON: So would you like another opportunity to put that to

4 Mr. Bulatovic? Having heard Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff's comment, would you like

5 to add anything with respect to the date of your interview?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What was put to me does not have a

7 cover page or the indication of the author or anyone else. I do not

8 contest the contents, but I remember that the BBC was making the

9 "Death of Yugoslavia" series and did an interview with me in the office

10 of my friend in Podgorica, that was the only office where I could talk,

11 and I was no longer in power so I thought it was after 2000. But I don't

12 think it's very important.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll leave it at that.

14 Yes, Mr. Harvey, yes.

15 MR. HARVEY: Your Honour, I was going to get to my feet earlier

16 today, but may I please just take this opportunity to introduce

17 Nemanja Ljubisavljevic, who has been manning our Belgrade office for some

18 time and has been doing terrific work on an analysis of the B/C/S

19 documents in the case.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 MR. HARVEY: I was also going to note that the release date of

22 the film of "Death of Yugoslavia" was, in fact, the 3rd of September,

23 1995.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic. Thank you.

Page 34581

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. President, today on page 2 - in fact, it starts on page 1 and

4 straddles page 2 - a quotation was given to you from what you said on the

5 8th Session of the Supreme Defence Council held on 12th March 1993. I'll

6 read it now in English so it can be interpreted accurately:

7 [In English] "Mr. Bulatovic, I would like to quote that you

8 said -- what you said on -- and you say here:

9 "'We are obliged to help them,' referring to the

10 Republika Srpska, 'but we are also obliged to understand that we can

11 hardly co-operate with someone who like the Prime Minister of the RS

12 advises us to ethnically cleanse Sandzak and kill the Muslims there.'"

13 [Interpretation] And in your answer -- in fact, the question also

14 quotes:

15 [In English] "The prime minister of Republika Srpska, Mr. Lukic,

16 he advises us to do it as soon as possible, for Muslims are not to be

17 trusted. They will stab us in the back. They will mine our railroad and

18 so on."

19 [Interpretation] In the second part of your answer you said this:

20 [In English] "Pasic deals with the decision-making process. It

21 is true that this decision was not notified to us in person, but we

22 just -- we were just told that in the ranks of the

23 Government of Republika Srpska occasionally there are some extreme views.

24 It turned out that those extreme views were not something we could share.

25 They were not our convictions and they could not support the making of

Page 34582

1 the decision that was asked of us to make."

2 [Interpretation] I should like to show you a document. Could we

3 please call up 1D7303. Unfortunately, the translation is not ready yet,

4 but you will be able to see for yourself what it is. It is the inaugural

5 speech of Prime Minister Lukic before this session of the

6 Supreme Defence Council, 19 January 1993. Could we look at page 5, I

7 think. Yes. I will now read slowly what I want to put to you:

8 "No matter how our enemies madly insist on continuing the war, we

9 have to insist on the undertakings that this Assembly assumed by adopting

10 the declaration to establish peace."

11 And then further below it says:

12 "As of today we have to start creating conditions for the

13 citizens who had left their homes due to war operations, the feeling of

14 personal insecurity and danger to their property, return to the territory

15 of Republika Srpska when permanent peace is established. We have to

16 guarantee to the citizens of other ethnicities all their rights according

17 to the constitution and the laws. We made those undertakings and we have

18 to meet them."

19 And now I should like to take a look at the document that follows

20 your session of the Supreme Defence Council, and that would be 1D7304.

21 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if this is a correct way, a proper way

22 of conducting your examination-in-chief or your re-examination. Why

23 don't you put your question first instead of putting the document first?

24 This is a typical way of leading question.

25 MR. ROBINSON: Well, actually, I'll take the blame for that

Page 34583

1 because I advised Dr. Karadzic to do it this way and to ask the witness

2 in light of what Prime Minister Lukic said how that tallies with what he

3 had discussed in that meeting that was brought up by the Prosecution. So

4 I don't think that that is leading, to put something in a neutral way to

5 a witness and ask him how that tallies with the information that he had.

6 JUDGE KWON: Lukic's statement in the Supreme Defence Council was

7 put to the witness by the Prosecution, then he could have asked -- the

8 accused could have asked whether the witness knew Mr. Lukic's position as

9 a whole in general. And then he could put this document. Putting this

10 document first is way of feeding some information to the witness, isn't

11 it?

12 MR. ROBINSON: But you're entitled to do that so long as you ask

13 the witness to comment on that in any way that he feels appropriate, so

14 you're not leading the witness by presenting him with information and

15 asking him for his views on it. It's a little more focused this way than

16 to ask such a broad question and hope for a general answer.

17 JUDGE KWON: Well, let's proceed.

18 Yes.

19 MR. TIEGER: No, I mean, this is a -- we've gone over this ground

20 repeatedly, so I only rose to say this is actually a replication of an

21 exchange we had not too long ago when I rose to say essentially that the

22 formulation -- the last -- the formulation of the question doesn't

23 neutralise the information previously provided to the witness. I

24 referred to something that Judge Morrison had previously said basically

25 to that effect, and there was agreement by the Court that that's the

Page 34584

1 case. So I'm only standing to avoid an erosion of the standards that

2 have been established over a long period of time and consistently

3 maintained about the need to avoid leading questions. So I don't think

4 that was a precisely fair, or at least precisely accurate, recollection

5 by Mr. Robinson of the positions taken by the Trial Chamber on this

6 issue.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson, as you suggested, if Mr. Karadzic is

9 to put -- to be putting something in a neutral way to the witness and ask

10 how that would tally with the information that a witness has, but in

11 the -- and given the past practice he's very much prone to ask leading

12 questions. So that was the point that I made when I told him to put

13 general question first, but we'll see how it evolves.

14 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. President, in light of what His Excellency Judge Kwon said on

18 page 40, lines 20 and 21, about Lukic's statement at the

19 Supreme Defence Council, can you explain, was Lukic present and did he

20 state that at the Supreme Defence Council session?

21 A. No. From the whole context it is obvious that the position of

22 Mr. Lukic was conveyed to us in a hearsay way. We were just referring to

23 a common place that was indirectly passed on to us in the absence of

24 Mr. Lukic.

25 Q. Thank you. In the course of your work, did you encounter similar

Page 34585

1 positions of Mr. Lukic reflected in some reliable documents?

2 A. No. Those positions were never officially stated, but the

3 thinking of the Supreme Defence Council was that we did not want to

4 co-operate with Republika Srpska based on extreme views. But since we

5 were co-operating non-stop, in my view it is proof that their views were

6 acceptable to both us and the international community.

7 Q. Thank you. Mr. President, how does what we saw in the previous

8 document fit in with what reached you in that hearsay form?

9 A. The difference is obvious. An official address by

10 Prime Minister Lukic is something that cannot be objected to, whereas the

11 information we received at the Supreme Defence Council was cause for

12 great concern and for that reason was rejected by us.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we see page 6 of this

14 document -- I apologise.

15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Can I just put this to you. This is the 7th Session of the

17 cabinet after that meeting of yours, so on the 19th of May. We have one

18 document from before the session and this one is after the session. I

19 will read carefully the conclusions of the government. First sentence:

20 "The report on the work of the commission for refugees and

21 humanitarian aid for the first quarter of 1993 has been endorsed."

22 And then further below it says:

23 "Of particular importance is to ensure balanced distribution of

24 aid relative to Muslims and Croats and the commission shall pay special

25 attention to this."

Page 34586

1 Mr. President, how do you look at this position of

2 Prime Minister Lukic compared with the hearsay statement which you lent a

3 lot of attention to, regardless of the hearsay aspect?

4 A. These stances expressed here I welcome and I am very glad that we

5 provided assistance in the implementation of these goals.

6 Q. Thank you very much.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I offer both these documents to

8 be MFI'd?

9 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour. But I would like to

11 reserve the right to perhaps at a later stage when we have a full

12 translation of the document, to also request to add pages, if that is

13 only now admitted in parts. But if it is admitted in full, I have no

14 objection.

15 JUDGE KWON: Given the size of the document, we'll admit them

16 both in full.

17 Shall we give the number? We'll mark them for identification.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3060 and D3061 respectively MFI'd,

19 Your Honour.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. President, can you tell us from your experience what was the

23 degree of accuracy of that information, that kind of information that

24 reached you? To what degree did they prove to be wrong or correct?

25 A. It is well-known that the first casualty of every war is the

Page 34587

1 truth. Intelligence and security services that cover and monitor every

2 territory are not always slaves to the truth. They work for their own

3 interests, but most often it is the only source of information. You have

4 to work with that information although you could never swear that they

5 are completely correct or truthful.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have no

8 further questions for Mr. Bulatovic.

9 JUDGE KWON: Well, unless my colleagues have questions for you,

10 Mr. Bulatovic, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber

11 and the Tribunal as a whole, I would like to thank you for your coming to

12 The Hague to give it. Now you're free to go. Have a safe journey back

13 home.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

15 [The witness withdrew]

16 JUDGE KWON: Before the next witness is to be brought in the

17 Chamber will issue an oral decision on the accused's motion to present

18 testimony of General Stanislav Galic pursuant to Rule 92 ter filed on the

19 13th of February, 2013. In the motion the accused requests that the

20 Chamber allows Stanislav Galic to testify pursuant to Rule 92 ter. On

21 the 27th of February, 2013, the Prosecution responded to the motion.

22 The Chamber recalls that on 21st of November, 2012, it found that

23 it was in the interests of justice that Galic be called to testify viva

24 voce. In reaching this decision the Chamber considered that Galic was

25 commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps during the indictment period and

Page 34591

1 WITNESS: NEVENKO SAMOUKOVIC

2 [Witness answered through interpreter]

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please be seated and make yourself

4 comfortable.

5 Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Samoukovic, I must draw

6 your attention to a certain Rule of Procedure and Evidence that we have

7 here at the Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E). Under this Rule, you may

8 object to answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution, or

9 even from the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate

10 you in a criminal offence. In this context "incriminate" means saying

11 something that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal

12 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

13 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an

14 answer might incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer

15 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

16 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal

17 would ensure that your testimony compelled in such circumstances would

18 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,

19 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

20 Do you understand what I have just told you?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

24 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

25 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Samoukovic.

Page 34592

1 A. Good day, Mr. President.

2 Q. Please remember to pause between question and answer and to speak

3 our sentences out slowly so that everything could be recorded in the

4 transcript. Mr. Samoukovic, did you provide a statement to my Defence

5 team?

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at 1D7819 in

9 e-court, please.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Can we please look at the monitor. Do you see your statement on

12 the screen?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And did you read and sign the statement?

15 A. Yes, I did.

16 Q. Please, can you make a longer pause between question and answer.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness the last

18 page so that he can identify his signature.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Is this your signature, sir?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you told

23 the Defence team?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in

Page 34593

1 this courtroom that were put to you then, would your answer in essence be

2 the same as -- the answers in essence be the same as the ones in the

3 statement?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

7 tender this statement. I don't have any associated exhibits. I would

8 like to submit this under Rule 92 ter.

9 JUDGE KWON: Any objection, Ms. McKenna?

10 MS. McKENNA: No, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

12 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3062, Your Honours.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 I'm now going to read a brief summary of Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic's

15 statement in English.

16 [In English] Nevenko Samoukovic was elected president of the

17 Executive Board of the Municipal Assembly of Hadzici municipality.

18 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that the ethnic composition of

19 Hadzici was predominantly Muslim. During the multi-party elections the

20 SDS did not hold any promotional events in order to avoid irritating

21 their Muslim and Croat neighbours, because the Serb population had been

22 irritated by them. At these elections Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic was

23 appointed chairman of the Executive Committee of Hadzici municipality.

24 This committee consisted of six members, three Serbs and three Muslims,

25 and in the beginning the committee functioned normally.

Page 34594

1 Following these elections, the ethnic composition of managers in

2 public and other enterprises did not correspond to the ethnic

3 distribution of votes in the elections. As a consequence, the Muslims in

4 authority tried to correct this; however, they were more concerned with

5 the ethnic background of the person rather than their professional

6 qualifications. This issue was especially acute after the referendum on

7 the secession of BH from Yugoslavia and the declaration of an independent

8 BH against the will of the Serbian people, who did not participate in the

9 referendum.

10 Nevenko Samoukovic considers that those in authority became

11 increasingly unable to agree on various issues, both at the level of the

12 Executive Committee and Municipal Assembly and at the level of the

13 political parties; therefore, the municipal authorities were all but

14 defunct. To compound this problem, the technical Remont company was

15 located in the area of the municipality in addition to military barracks

16 and facilities which housed large quantities of infantry and heavy

17 weapons. Many Serbs were afraid that the Muslims would attack these

18 facilities in order to get hold of the weapons.

19 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that during the period when the

20 SDA and the SDS leaderships were discussing how to ease tensions and

21 prevent chaos, but then the Muslims mounted their first armed attack on

22 Hadzici and the joint authority ceased to function.

23 Nevenko Samoukovic was not aware of the document called Variant A

24 and B. The document was never mentioned at any of the meetings which he

25 attended. When the armed conflict started, a Crisis Staff was created,

Page 34595

1 the armed conflict was considered to be a sufficient extraordinary

2 situation to establish the Crisis Staff. The Crisis Staff did not

3 receive any directions or instructions from anyone, including central

4 government. Further, there was an issue with communication because the

5 telephone lines were down for the most part of the time.

6 Nevenko Samoukovic believes that a large part of the Muslim

7 population residing in Hadzici moved out voluntarily due to the situation

8 and moved to the areas controlled by the Muslims. To his knowledge, no

9 one in the territory of Hadzici made a decision to designate certain

10 facilities as detention camps for Muslims. Certain facilities were used

11 to house the remaining Muslim population to ensure their safety from

12 uncontrolled groups or individuals. Muslim people who lived in Hadzici

13 and were aware what Muslim forces were doing to Serb citizens feared

14 reprisals. Many felt safer in the detention centre -- reception centre.

15 Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that the war strategy for Hadzici was

16 defensive in nature on the Serb side as the front line against the

17 Muslims did not move until the end of the war. The Serbs in the

18 municipality protected themselves and their homes. They did not have an

19 objective to make conquests.

20 Nevenko Samoukovic had not seen or heard Radovan Karadzic issue

21 any kind of order to anyone in the area of the municipality of Hadzici.

22 Nevenko Samoukovic is aware that Radovan Karadzic especially underlined

23 that the authorities had to look after all of their citizens regardless

24 of their nationality and party affiliation. He also emphasised that the

25 authorities had to organise the production of food and other assets and

Page 34596

1 ensure that the population and the army were supplied with the necessary

2 provisions.

3 Mr. Nevenko Samoukovic denies that there were any concentration

4 camps in the territory of Hadzici. There were buildings where Muslims

5 were temporarily placed to protect them from the uncontrolled groups. He

6 was aware that the police station used one of its rooms for the purposes

7 of detention, but only for perpetrators of criminal offences. He had

8 heard that one prison existed and other buildings were used as detention

9 areas as they were in municipal buildings; however, he denies that there

10 were ever any concentration camps in municipality of Hadzici under the

11 Serb control.

12 [Interpretation] This is a brief summary and at this point I

13 don't have any more questions for Mr. Samoukovic.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 Mr. Samoukovic, as you have noted, your evidence in this case

16 was -- evidence in chief in this case has been admitted in writing, i.e.,

17 your -- through your written statement. And now you will be

18 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor,

19 Ms. McKenna.

20 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:

22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Samoukovic.

23 A. Good day.

24 Q. I'd first like to focus briefly on the period prior to the

25 conflict breaking out. Now, during this period you were still the

Page 34597

1 chairman of the Executive Committee of Hadzici. At paragraph 9 of your

2 statement you say that the president of the SDS in the municipality of

3 Hadzici was the late Ratko Radic. And you state that it was largely the

4 political leaders of the party who conduct negotiations all the time

5 about how to ease the tensions in such a chaotic situation arising from a

6 non-functioning Assembly.

7 Now, Mr. Samoukovic, there's evidence before the Trial Chamber

8 that Ratko Radic stated at multi-party meetings in January 1992 that the

9 Serbs didn't want to be in Alija's state and that separation and division

10 was necessary and unavoidable. Now, would you agree that expressing such

11 a view was unlikely to ease the tensions in this situation?

12 A. With a yes and a no. Are you asking me to answer with a yes or a

13 no? Can you please explain to me what you mean by the words "Alija's

14 state"? Bosnia and Herzegovina always in modern history functioned as a

15 state comprising three peoples. The main principle, the basic principle,

16 in the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina during World War II was the

17 second anti-fascist council of Bosnia and Herzegovina session which

18 stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina was not Serb, Croat, or Muslim, but it

19 was Serb and Croat and Muslim. And every child in elementary school that

20 did not know that definition would fail their history class. Ratko Radic

21 said that he did not want to live in Alija's state. I think I understood

22 you correctly that you said he did not want to live in Alija's state,

23 which probably implied that he did not wish to live in a state in which

24 one people would dominate another people. So this is a principle in

25 opposition to the founding principles of the Republic of Bosnia and

Page 34598

1 Herzegovina.

2 Muslims also used to say that they did not want to live in

3 Milosevic's Yugoslavia. So that is how that statement should be taken,

4 meaning that he did not wish to live in a state where one people would

5 dominate the other two people, and the purpose was to say that we have to

6 agree to live in a place where all three peoples would respect each other

7 and where all three peoples would have their own rights, not that one

8 people would dominate another.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic. We'll come onto that further. But in

10 your statement, paragraph 10, you explain that you resigned from your

11 position as chairman of the Executive Committee of the municipality at

12 the beginning of May. And at paragraph 18 you explain that when the

13 conflict began in Hadzici around the 10th of May you were home sick, so

14 not up-to-date with many events that took place at the time. Were you

15 aware that on the 8th of May a group of armed Serbs had entered the

16 Hadzici municipality building, expelling all the workers and taking over

17 the building?

18 A. Yes.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said "no," not "yes."

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

21 MS. McKENNA:

22 Q. And did you attend a multi-party meeting between key municipality

23 members on the afternoon of the 8th of May?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Well, again, Mr. Samoukovic, there is evidence before the

Page 34599

1 Trial Chamber - and that's for the parties' reference at P41,

2 Ramiz Dupovac's evidence - that Radic conducted -- concluded that meeting

3 by threatening that unless a resolution was reached there would be blood

4 deep up to the knees. Again, would you agree that this type of language

5 would be unlikely to ease the heightened tension of this time?

6 A. Sorry, could you please repeat your question. Perhaps the

7 translation is not good. I didn't understand.

8 Q. Certainly. Mr. Radic at a meeting of -- on the 8th of May stated

9 that unless a resolution was reached there would be blood deep up to the

10 knees. Now, my question for you is: This -- using this type of language

11 was unlikely to ease the tensions that were prevailing at this time;

12 isn't that correct?

13 A. Mr. Radic was - let me put it this way - a man who completed

14 craftsman's education. So the way he expressed himself was something

15 that was a consequence of his broadness of mind and education. I don't

16 know what the other side was saying in this instance. Was there some

17 kind of polemic or -- I don't know. I don't have complete insight. I

18 wasn't present at the meeting so I don't know what each of the sides was

19 saying. But in principle, I know that all of those meetings that were

20 held before were quite quarrelsome. They did try, but actually they did

21 not reach any kind of solution at any of the meetings. It wasn't just

22 Mr. Radic, but it was the president of the municipality who usually

23 chaired those meetings. He was an educated man, but he wasn't a

24 politically educated man, in the sense that he was never involved in

25 politics. So he didn't know how to conduct these meetings. He would go

Page 34600

1 straight for the heart of the problem and then there would be a quarrel

2 breaking out right at the start of the meeting so that party

3 representatives would then leave the meetings and they would leave the

4 meeting even after a third of it -- after one-third of it had gone on

5 because they could tell how the meeting would continue.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic. I was just waiting for the end of the

7 translation. I'm going to move on to a different topic and I'll ask you

8 to focus -- to try to give answers that are as concise and precise as

9 possible. Thank you.

10 At paragraph 22 of your statement you say that you have -- you

11 had not heard or seen Radovan Karadzic issue any kind of order to anyone

12 in the area of the municipality of Hadzici. Now, the Assembly of the

13 Serbian people of Hadzici at its session of 11th April 1992 constituted

14 the organs and the bodies of the Assembly of the Serbian people of

15 Hadzici; isn't that correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And at the Assembly you were given a mandate to form the

18 municipal government; correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And also at this Assembly a decision was adopted to establish a

21 Serbian police station; is that correct?

22 A. There are minutes and if it's in the minutes then probably that's

23 so. I don't remember the meeting.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MS. McKENNA: For the parties' reference the minutes to this

Page 34601

1 meeting are D2916 and it is indeed in the minutes.

2 Q. Now, Mr. Samoukovic, just over two weeks previously, on the

3 24th of March, 1992, the Assembly of the Serbian people in

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina held their 12th Session.

5 MS. McKENNA: If I could have P961, please, which is a stenograph

6 of this meeting. And I'm interested in page 22 of the English and

7 page 39 of the B/C/S. And if I can direct the parties' attention to the

8 fifth paragraph -- the large paragraph in the English version --

9 obviously the large paragraph in both versions. And I'm just going to

10 read an extract from this which is a statement by Dr. Karadzic who says:

11 "We have a legal basis in the Law on Internal Affairs and we also

12 have the insignia and at a desired moment, and this will be very soon, we

13 can form whatever we want. There are reasons why this could happen in

14 two or three days. Such are the forecasts, but I can't tell you the

15 reasons now. At that moment, all the Serbian municipalities, both the

16 old ones and the newly established ones, would literally assume control

17 of the entire territory of the municipality concerned."

18 And then shortly after he continues:

19 "Then at a given moment in the next three or four days, there

20 will be a single method used and you will be able to apply it in the

21 municipalities you represent, including both things that must be done as

22 well as how to do them, how to separate the police force, take the

23 resources that belong to the Serbian people, and take command."

24 Q. Now, Mr. Samoukovic, this statement was made by Dr. Karadzic just

25 over two weeks previously to the Hadzici Assembly, setting up its own

Page 34602

1 bodies and its own police station. So, in fact, the very decision to

2 constitute that Assembly and to separate the police force was taken

3 pursuant to a directive by Mr. Karadzic, wasn't it?

4 A. No.

5 Q. When the Crisis Staff was formed, it took over the work of the

6 Assembly and its organs and services; isn't that correct?

7 A. In principle, yes.

8 Q. And you state at paragraph 14 that the Crisis Staff had around

9 15 to 20 members and was made up of the most influential and most capable

10 people, regardless of their party affiliation. Just to clarify, by this

11 do you mean the most capable and influential Serbs regardless of their

12 affiliation to the SDS?

13 A. By that I mean capable and influential persons, those who wanted

14 to work voluntarily. For example, I'm a member of the Crisis Staff. A

15 moment ago you said that I was elected president of the municipal

16 government, and in the Crisis Staff I did the work for which I was best

17 fitted. Since I'm a civil engineer, I worked in that field.

18 Q. We understand that point. My question is simply just clarifying

19 when you say that it was made up of people regardless of their party

20 affiliation, do you mean it was made up of Serb people regardless of

21 their affiliation to the SDS?

22 A. Of course the party affiliation did not matter at that point at

23 all. All those who expressed the goodwill and wish to help in that

24 situation was welcome. If I tell you that in the Crisis Staff we had an

25 elderly man who was only in charge of funerals, his job was funerals

Page 34603

1 only, nothing else.

2 Q. Let me make my question even simpler. Were there any non-Serbs

3 on the Crisis Staff?

4 A. As far as I can remember, no, at least not from that point in

5 time when I came to the Crisis Staff.

6 Q. And in paragraph 14 you also state that the Crisis Staff did not

7 receive any directions or instructions from anyone, including the central

8 government, and you worked independently. And further at paragraph 22

9 you state that even if you needed to get in touch with someone from the

10 Presidency or the government in Pale, you couldn't do it because the

11 telephone lines were torn. I'd like to look now at some documents

12 regarding communications between the Hadzici authorities and the central

13 government and Presidency. If we could have P2625, please.

14 Now, Mr. Samoukovic, these are minutes of a meeting of the

15 government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the

16 18th of May, 1992. I'd like to turn to pages 2 in the English and

17 Bosnian -- B/C/S versions, please. And at "Ad-2," so at the bottom of

18 the page in English and B/C/S it states that:

19 "It was concluded that aid be given to the Novo Sarajevo and

20 Hadzici Crisis Staffs and that the amount of aid be determined according

21 to the situation in these municipalities."

22 So it's clear from this document, isn't it, that by that stage

23 the government was aware that the Crisis Staff had been set up?

24 A. The document shows that.

25 Q. And the document also suggests that the government was informed

Page 34604

1 of the situation in the Hadzici municipality, doesn't it?

2 A. How they were informed, I don't know, but if it is stated here

3 that we need help - and indeed we did need help - they probably had ways

4 of finding out. But telephones only operated locally, within the

5 municipality, the part that was covered by our telephone exchange because

6 our transmitter went through Sarajevo. So technically it was impossible

7 for us to have some kind of communication. We could communicate with the

8 city, with Sarajevo. We actually had two or three lines via railway

9 telephones with the other side in Sarajevo and certain contacts were made

10 later on with the other side through those telephones regarding

11 population exchanges and so on. However, telephone lines with Pale, we

12 didn't have them. We did in 1993 --

13 Q. Thank you --

14 A. -- when our passive transmitter was turned towards Trebevic.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

16 be asked to speak into the microphone. Thank you.

17 MS. McKENNA:

18 Q. The interprets have asked that you speak a little closer to the

19 microphone.

20 But we're going to continue on this topic of communications

21 between the Hadzici authorities and the republican authorities.

22 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have 65 ter number 1548.

23 Q. Now, you'll see that this is a letter from Republika Srpska

24 government secretary Nedeljko Lakic to Romanija Petrol dated the 28th of

25 May, 1992, and he's asking Romanija Petrol to deliver 50 litres of fuel

Page 34605

1 to the Crisis Staff from Hadzici and to bill it to the Government of

2 the Serbian Republic of BiH. So you'll agree that this shows the

3 government intervening to give material support to the

4 Hadzici Crisis Staff?

5 A. I would not agree. If 50 litres is assistance, well this is

6 probably some individual who was up there in Pale and who introduced

7 himself as having some kind of connections with Hadzici in order to get

8 50 litres of fuel. I mean, what kind of aid is that, 50 litres of fuel?

9 I'm sure that it must be some individual who was up there in Pale, who

10 perhaps went for medical treatment or something, went there with his

11 family, introduced himself as a member of the Crisis Staff, that that

12 would be assistance to the Crisis Staff, 50 litres, no, surely not.

13 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, we'll come on to further assistance to the

14 Crisis Staff very shortly.

15 MS. McKENNA: But I would like to tender this document, please.

16 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6166, Your Honours.

19 MS. McKENNA: Could I please have Exhibit D317.

20 Q. Now, this is a report on combat-readiness of the Serb

21 municipality of Hadzici to the SRK command dated the 29th of May, 1992.

22 And I'd like to focus your discussion -- or focus your attention, rather,

23 on the discussion which is halfway down the page in the English and I

24 believe at the lower end of the page in the B/C/S, if we could scroll

25 down a little -- oh, maybe it's the second page in the B/C/S. But just

Page 34606

1 to explain, this is a discussion of an attack on Zunovica barracks on the

2 25th of May, 1992, and it states:

3 "Combat activities were not favourable for us, so the

4 Crisis Staff of Serb municipality of Hadzici asked assistance from

5 defenders of MRD Hadzici."

6 It continues:

7 "We asked for help from the commander of the HQ of the Serb

8 Republic of BiH himself, who presently sent a fighting group under the

9 command of Lieutenant-Colonel Petrovic Milisav, who after he arrived at

10 the location where the fighting was in progress, organised available men,

11 suspended the attack of Ustasha, and held them on the line that separates

12 two-thirds of Zunovica storage premises."

13 Mr. Samoukovic, do you recall this request for help?

14 A. [No interpretation]

15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We do not hear the

16 witness.

17 MS. McKENNA:

18 Q. Mr. Witness, you will have to move a little closer to the

19 microphone. The interpreters cannot hear you.

20 A. No.

21 Q. You will agree that this document shows the Hadzici Crisis Staff

22 contacting the highest level of republican authorities for help.

23 A. Well, the Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality of Hadzici asked

24 assistance from the maintenance and repair depot in Hadzici -- it's in

25 Hadzici. We didn't ask for assistance in Pale. We asked for assistance

Page 34607

1 in Hadzici.

2 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, the document says:

3 "We asked for help from the commander of the HQ of the Serb

4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina himself."

5 So again I'll ask you: Do you agree that this shows the Hadzici

6 Crisis Staff contacting the republican authorities?

7 A. Who asked for that? It was the maintenance and repair depot.

8 This is a report from someone at that institution and he says here

9 unequivocally that they were the ones who asked for help.

10 Q. I'll move on to a different document, which is P3087. Now, these

11 are minutes from the 26th government meeting of the

12 Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on the 11th of June, 1992.

13 And you'll note that on the first page the agenda item -- I'm sorry, it's

14 on the second page of the B/C/S version. Agenda item number 9 is:

15 "Request for giving loans to municipalities."

16 If we can skip forward to page 4 of the English and B/C/S

17 version, please. It states that, "The Decision regarding" -- I'm sorry,

18 this is at number 9. It states that:

19 "The Decision regarding loans from the reserves of the

20 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been made to the

21 municipality of Vlasenica 2.500.000 and to Hadzici 1.040.000 dinars."

22 So once again here you agree that we see assistance being

23 provided from the government to Hadzici?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And just one final document on this topic, which is P3064. These

Page 34608

1 are minutes of the 8th Session of the Presidency of the

2 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina dated 17th of June, 1992. And

3 you'll see that president -- present, rather, are Dr. Karadzic and the

4 other Presidency members. And if you look at the second paragraph in the

5 document, or rather, the third paragraph it states:

6 "The Presidency was briefed on the situation on the front,

7 particularly in Ilijas and Hadzici where enemy forces viciously attacked

8 our army positions the day before, and once again, as many times before,

9 violated the truce."

10 So again, this shows that -- it shows that

11 Republika Srpska Presidency being well informed of operations in and

12 around Hadzici, doesn't it?

13 A. Well, I think that since this had to do with the 25th of May, the

14 10th of June, the 16th of June, Hadzici was exposed to constant attacks.

15 That was a fact. Those who were involved in military matters knew about

16 that. This is an undeniable fact. This information certainly went up

17 there; that is to say that we were exposed to constant attacks. And

18 probably that assistance that we spoke about a moment ago had to do with

19 these constant attacks and the threats to the population.

20 Q. But it's a fact, isn't it, Mr. Samoukovic, that many

21 communications took place between the republican authorities and the

22 Hadzici municipality -- municipal authorities?

23 A. The municipal authorities, well I'm saying what kind of

24 communication we had. Now, whether the army had their own types of

25 communication, I mean, probably they did. What kind of an army would it

Page 34609

1 be otherwise? And after all that is something different of course. I

2 don't know about that. I'm not that knowledgeable about these technical

3 matters, but I assume they did have something like that, because this

4 also speaks about attacks. This also has to do with military reports.

5 Q. Let's turn then to your specific role as a Crisis Staff member.

6 In paragraph 12 of your statement you describe the various tasks that you

7 had a Crisis Staff member and you explained that you worked on -- one of

8 the tasks was working on the protection of property, taking care of the

9 abandoned apartments, which in the vast majority belonged to Muslims, and

10 making a list of those apartments in order to seal and secure them. Now,

11 you were appointed by Crisis Staff president, Ratko Radic, to -- as a

12 member of a commission to make a list of all abandoned flats and property

13 on the territory of Hadzici municipality; is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 MS. McKENNA: And actually if we may have D1084, please.

16 Q. This is your appointment -- or rather, Mr. Radic's decision to

17 form the commission in which you're appointed. And he states:

18 "The appointed commission is obliged to make a list of all

19 abandoned flats and property on the territory of

20 Hadzici Serb Municipality and also to seal them so they could be

21 registered and placed at the disposal of Hadzici Serb Municipality."

22 Now, by placing them at the disposal of the municipality, this

23 meant that the municipality could allocate those apartments to Serbs,

24 didn't it?

25 A. The question is allocate in which sense? Well, look, this

Page 34610

1 sentence here is be made available to the Serb municipality of Hadzici.

2 I remember that full well. We had this discussion as to why it was

3 included at all. It was put there because a commission had been

4 established to register these apartments, to seal them, and to prevent

5 looting, and that is why this sentence was included, so that it would be

6 well-known that the authorities are standing behind these lists of

7 property and the authorities would not allow those kind of things to

8 happen. And these apartments afterwards, when the refugees arrived from

9 Tarcin, Pazarici, and other places, these apartments were temporarily

10 being given to these refugees for their use.

11 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to look at P739, please.

12 Q. This is on the same topic. It's a letter from Dr. Karadzic dated

13 the 19th of July, 1992, to Sarajevo municipalities, including Hadzici.

14 And Dr. Karadzic says:

15 "In close co-operation with public security stations, you are

16 kindly requested to make an inventory of all housing facilities (summer

17 cottages, houses, and flats) in your municipality that are vacant

18 following the voluntary departure of Muslims."

19 And he states that:

20 "Pursuant to the Presidency's decision ... these facilities will

21 be given for temporary use to Serbs from the Muslim part of Sarajevo."

22 Now, Hadzici authorities received this instruction and acted upon

23 it, didn't they?

24 A. Our activity took place two months before this instruction. Two

25 months before this instruction we immediately registered this property in

Page 34611

1 order to seal it, protect it, et cetera. This instruction is from the

2 month of July and that decision of the Crisis Staff is from May.

3 MS. McKENNA: Could I please have 65 ter number 24665.

4 Q. Mr. Samoukovic, this is a letter dated just over one week later,

5 that's the 27th of July, 1992, from the municipal secretariat for housing

6 and public utilities signed by you as secretary to the commissioners of

7 the Serbian municipality Hadzici. And in it you ask that they inventory

8 all abandoned and vacant buildings that can be lived in and all vacant

9 weekend houses that can be lived in.

10 Now, in requesting this list to be made you were acting on the

11 instructions of Dr. Karadzic, weren't you?

12 A. Number one, I did not sign this. Here it says "on behalf of the

13 secretary," "for the secretary," and down here this is not my signature.

14 So, I mean, this document is unknown to me and you can see that it says

15 here "for." Somebody signed this on my behalf.

16 Q. Well, you will agree that the -- whoever -- whichever

17 representative of the Hadzici authorities who signed it on your behalf

18 was acting on the instructions of Dr. Karadzic?

19 A. Up here, take a look at the heading. It says "Serb municipality

20 of Hadzici, municipal secretariat." There is no more Crisis Staff.

21 There is a municipal government and secretariats that dealt with

22 particular fields. Now, whether this was done in accordance with this --

23 well, it's illogical for someone to come from Sarajevo to Hadzici and for

24 somebody in Hadzici to provide accommodation to people from Sarajevo.

25 That's illogical. That did not happen. There was not a single case of

Page 34612

1 that kind. Organs of government are already functioning here. It is

2 possible that there was some communication where the government did

3 something or -- but I'm not sure.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic.

5 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender this document, please.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, just if I could just offer one reserve. I'm

8 just trying to check with Mr. Reid if this had been disclosed to us

9 earlier, but pending that we don't have any objection at this point.

10 JUDGE KWON: I see that number in the notice, but it is -- --

11 disclosure.

12 MR. ROBINSON: There was an earlier disclosure obligation, but it

13 may very well have been disclosed to us. I didn't have time to check

14 myself and I asked Mr. Reid who is very quick at that. So I'll get that

15 information soon, but in the meantime we can admit it. If there's a

16 problem I'll raise it with the Chamber.

17 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

18 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6167, Your Honours.

19 JUDGE KWON: Are you coming to a conclusion, Ms. McKenna?

20 MS. McKENNA: Your Honour, I have one additional topic.

21 JUDGE KWON: How long would it take?

22 MS. McKENNA: May I just -- your indulgence while I check how

23 much time I have left.

24 [Prosecution counsel confer]

25 MS. McKENNA: I can finish in five minutes, Your Honour.

Page 34613

1 JUDGE KWON: Please do so, yes, Ms. McKenna.

2 MS. McKENNA:

3 Q. Turning a totally different topic, Mr. Samoukovic, you explained

4 in your statement that there were no concentration camps in the territory

5 of Hadzici, but rather areas where Muslims were temporarily placed to

6 protect them. And you state that Muslim people would go to the reception

7 centre willingly and seek opportunities to leave their territory. Now,

8 there is evidence before the Trial Chamber from witnesses who were

9 unwillingly taken to Hadzici sports centre - and that's P161, P2403, for

10 the parties' reference - including a witness who was under house arrest

11 until 16th May 1992 when he was taken to the sports centre and

12 witnesses -- a witness who testified that between 25th of May and June --

13 22nd of June, there were 282 people detained in the sports hall. Now,

14 these people didn't actually express a wish to be held in the sports

15 centre, did they?

16 A. Well, I cannot answer whether they did or did not express their

17 wishes because none of them approached me nor did I have any

18 conversations with any of them, so I cannot answer that question. As far

19 as I know --

20 Q. Well, SJB commander, Glavas, who was a fellow member of the

21 Crisis Staff testified that people were taken from their houses by the TO

22 and the police. Were you aware of this occurring?

23 A. I knew that the police brought in some people and took them from

24 their houses. I heard about that. The police had their reasons why they

25 do things. They probably had some operative intelligence. And in the

Page 34614

1 police, like in every profession, there are incompetent people who are

2 not professionals, those who abuse their position and powers. But the

3 fact is some of them have already been prosecuted for that.

4 Q. Well, it was Mr. Glavas' evidence that the decision was made by

5 the Crisis Staff that all Bosniak men of military age were to be arrested

6 and detained from areas such as Binjezevo, Zunovica and Kucice. Now,

7 you've already stated that you weren't around at that period, but do you

8 agree that it's correct that only the Crisis Staff had the authority to

9 make this decision?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we get a reference and an

11 exact quotation?

12 MS. McKENNA: My apologies. That was an exact quotation and it's

13 from P2296, paragraph 26.

14 Q. Shall I repeat my question, Mr. Samoukovic? Do you agree -- or

15 Mr. Glavas testified that a decision was made by the Crisis Staff to

16 arrest Bosniak men of military age and detain them. Do you agree that --

17 A. No.

18 Q. Do you --

19 A. No. In my own statement I said as far as I know the Crisis Staff

20 never made such a decision.

21 Q. They never made such a decision to your knowledge, but you agree

22 that the Crisis Staff were the authority in the area?

23 A. The Crisis Staff was a body responsible for the situation on the

24 ground to the extent the Crisis Staff was able to work.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic.

Page 34615

1 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I have no further questions.

2 JUDGE KWON: Given the time, we'll have a break for 45 minutes

3 and resume at 20 past 1.00.

4 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.35 p.m.

5 --- On resuming at 1.26 p.m.

6 JUDGE KWON: Before we continue, given the pace of hearing today,

7 I take it there would be no point of holding General Vasiljevic in the

8 waiting room anymore?

9 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. We'd appreciate that.

10 MS. McKENNA: I think that's right, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. That will be done.

12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Please continue.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

15 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Samoukovic, you were asked when the Serbian

16 municipality of Hadzici was formed. Are you able to tell us what

17 comprised the Serbian municipality of Hadzici?

18 A. The Serbian -- in what sense when was it formed?

19 Q. On page 58 you were asked if it was formed on the 12th, or

20 whichever, April. I'm not asking you when it was formed. I'm just

21 asking you what that area comprised, what made up that municipality?

22 A. The Hadzici Serbian municipality didn't have any territory. It

23 was a political formulation.

24 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, what did the Serbian

25 authorities control of the Serbian municipality of Hadzici?

Page 34616

1 A. A few days after the combat erupted, when the lines of defence

2 were established, we controlled perhaps some 15 to 20 per cent of the

3 territory of the municipality.

4 Q. And what was the majority population on the territory under your

5 control?

6 A. [No interpretation]

7 Q. Thank you. And was there a Muslim municipality also in the

8 territory of the Hadzici municipality?

9 A. [No interpretation]

10 Q. Did they have a Crisis Staff and later the organs of the

11 municipality?

12 A. Well, it was more or less the same.

13 Q. You were asked if there were any Muslims in the Serbian

14 Crisis Staff. Were there any Serbs in the Muslim Crisis Staff?

15 A. I said that as far as I knew there were no Muslims in our staff

16 and as far as I know there were no --

17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch what the witness

18 said.

19 JUDGE KWON: What did you say after as far as you know there

20 were ...?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were none.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. There were no Muslim in ours. What about Serbs in theirs?

24 A. The same.

25 Q. There were none?

Page 34617

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Thank you. Did the Crisis Staff or the unit plan and execute

3 offensive actions with the intention of capturing this Muslim part of the

4 municipality?

5 A. No. The lines of separation that were established in the course

6 of May and June held until the end of the war practically.

7 [Defence counsel confer]

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Thank you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D13021.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Can you see whether this is a document confirming that the

13 Muslims had their own Crisis Staff?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And did you know the president of the Crisis Staff,

16 Mustafa Dzelilovic?

17 A. Yes. He was the president of the municipality and I was the

18 president of the Executive Board before the war time events.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 MS. McKENNA: I'd just like to interject here that the

21 Muslim Crisis Staff was not the focus of the cross-examination.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I was wondering myself how it did arise from

23 the cross-examination, Mr. Karadzic?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, Madam McKenna created

25 the impression that there was no division of power in the municipality so

Page 34618

1 that one would expect that there were Muslims in the Serbian Crisis Staff

2 and that the Muslims did not have their own authority or their

3 Crisis Staff. Page 60 of today's transcript, line 12, is where it is

4 stated: Why didn't you have any Muslims? As if the Muslims were

5 stripped of all of their rights.

6 [Trial Chamber confers]

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. McKenna.

8 MS. McKENNA: If I may, I believe Mr. Karadzic is referring to

9 the line of questioning which was simply to clarify the witness's

10 assertion in his statement that the Crisis Staff was comprised of people

11 regardless of party affiliation. I am simply clarifying what he meant by

12 that.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, she didn't deal with the division of Hadzici at

14 all. Why don't you move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellency, it was implied that

16 this was in terms of ethnic belonging, but the witness was talking about

17 party affiliation and the question was that the Muslims were not included

18 in the Serbian Crisis Staff but, however, they had their own.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, witness testified that so you don't need

20 further evidence. Why don't you move on?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I just wanted to

22 corroborate.

23 Are you going to admit the document?

24 JUDGE KWON: No. Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 34619

1 Q. On page 56 you were told that Ramiz Dupovac testified here and in

2 his testimony he conveyed the words of Ratko Radic. I did not

3 cross-examine Dupovac because the statement was submitted under a

4 different Rule. Did you know Ramiz Dupovac?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Are you able to tell us what he is, what is he like and what did

7 he do?

8 A. He was the commander of the Territorial Defence staff.

9 Q. Thank you. Did he take part in the war afterwards?

10 A. Well, I really couldn't say.

11 Q. Thank you. You were asked about the communications between the

12 government and the central organs. Are you saying that you were

13 completely isolated or that your daily communications were reduced?

14 A. Our daily communications were reduced. Let me explain. The

15 communication towards Pale was a physical one. So if somebody was daring

16 enough, could go through some forests and in areas hard to pass to

17 communicate and those people were shot at. I dared to go on that trip

18 with my sister and her husband, and her husband was left without a leg

19 and we were forced to take him to Belgrade after that.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at D1072, please. It's

22 a Defence exhibit, D1072. This is a report on the work of the defence

23 ministry Hadzici office. Can we look at page 5 now, please -- 4, it's

24 page 4 in the English and it's page 5 in the Serbian. At the end of --

25 at the bottom of the page in the English -- actually, we also need page 5

Page 34620

1 in the Serbian. [Microphone not activated] Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I would now like to present a paragraph to you. In English I

4 think it beginnings with the words "we tried to establish necessary

5 co-operation ...":

6 I'm going to read it in Serbian:

7 "Co-operation by means of various letters, requests, orders, and

8 even visits to the Presidency of the republic and the General Staff of

9 the army but without success. In mid-September, however, we managed to

10 break through the barrier and establish co-operation which is today at an

11 enviable level."

12 How does this tally with your experiences and knowledge about the

13 defence department's problems and what they state are their problems?

14 A. Well, it's just as I told you earlier.

15 Q. Thank you. Text was quoted to you from Mr. Glavas' statement and

16 I would like to give you a more complete citation from that in the

17 Serbian, and they can translate it:

18 [In English] "Document undated report on the work of the Assembly

19 of the Serb municipality of Hadzici in 1992. It has been ERN of

20 0228-7570 to 7571.

21 "I can say that I have never seen this report before; however, I

22 can see mention of December of 1992 the municipality is being organised

23 and various organs are functioning. It says in this document the

24 Crisis Staff took over complete supervision of the Assembly and its

25 organs and services."

Page 34621

1 [Interpretation] Are you able to tell us when the

2 Municipal Assembly and the Assembly board and the Crisis Staff worked

3 together at any point in time? Did the Crisis Staff take over control

4 over the Municipal Assembly at the parliament session?

5 A. At the beginning of the war, the Crisis Staff did all the

6 functions. The Assembly never convened. It was only in July, I think we

7 saw it from the documents that the Madam Prosecutor showed and at the

8 heading they're talking about the secretariats, meaning when the

9 Executive Board was formed, the secretariats after that, then the

10 Assembly began its work.

11 Q. And did the Crisis Staff continue to function?

12 A. No. With the cessation of the operation of the Assembly, then

13 the war time organs began to work such as the municipal Executive Board

14 and the Assembly.

15 Q. Thank you. With the cessation of the work of the Crisis Staff or

16 the municipality? We just want to clarify a possible error?

17 A. With the cessation of the operation of the Crisis Staff.

18 Q. What continued?

19 A. Then the organs of authority, such as the Executive Board and the

20 Assembly, were established. And as far as I can remember, this was in

21 the month of July.

22 Q. Thank you. On page 70, 71, you were asked about concentration

23 camps - moving on to a completely different topic - and how you said that

24 they came to the reception centre of their own free will in order to seek

25 shelter until they left for their territory. And then it was said

Page 34622

1 that -- what was said about Glavas. The question the way it was put --

2 I'm going to read it out so it can be properly translated:

3 [In English] "Q. Well, SJB commander, Glavas, who was a fellow

4 member of the Crisis Staff testified that people were taken from their

5 houses by the Territorial Defence and the police. Were you aware of this

6 occurring?"

7 [No interpretation]

8 "A. I knew that the police brought in some people and took them

9 from their houses. I heard about that. The police had their reasons why

10 they do things. They probably had some operative intelligence. And in

11 the police, like in every profession, there are incompetent people who

12 are not professionals, those are abuse their positions, position of

13 power. But the fact is some of them have already been prosecuted for

14 that."

15 [Interpretation] Now I would like to show you what the commander

16 of the public security station, Mr. Glavas, was writing at that time.

17 Can we look at D1074. And while we're waiting, are you able to tell us

18 where those who were in police detention at the police building were

19 going, what was the outcome? What could have happened to them after

20 their interrogation?

21 A. Probably prison or reception centre, some probably home also.

22 Q. Thank you. I'm now going to read a report to the security centre

23 dated the 9th of August, 1992. It states:

24 "Upon the establishment of the Serbian police station of Hadzici,

25 i.e., in the phase of its formation as well as over the next 40 or so

Page 34623

1 days, the activities of certain small groups so-called 'free shooters'

2 was noted ..."

3 And then a little bit lower it says:

4 "This police station, among other things, the execution of tasks

5 and assignments was approached with due seriousness, primarily security,

6 protection of the legal and property, safety of the citizens, maintaining

7 of law and order, as well as the prevention and uncovering of crimes and

8 their perpetrators."

9 How does this fit in with your understanding of the work of the

10 police at that time?

11 A. I think that it corresponds to my answer, but I do want to say

12 that the police -- there were few of them and they really could not

13 manage to cover and carry out all of their duties and assignments.

14 Q. Can we look at the last page of the document? It's the

15 one-page-but-last in the English.

16 I'm also going to read a part of paragraph (d):

17 "As regards the procedure and jurisdiction in connection with the

18 treatment and guarding of prisoners, it can be noted that we had a large

19 number of detained persons who, once they were interviewed and after

20 other relevant information had been gathered, were taken to state prison

21 in Kula or were released. A small number of people brought in (currently

22 11 persons) are in prison in Hadzici and they are being treated properly

23 and in accordance with the law.

24 "We would also like to know that in the area of the Hadzici

25 municipality we do not have collection camps used by the army to bring in

Page 34624

1 the Muslim population without documents on the reasons for their

2 detention."

3 How does this fit in with your knowledge and experience about the

4 legality of the operation of the police?

5 A. As I said, the Crisis Staff as far as I know, I probably would

6 have heard of it or seen it, never adopted any decisions on the formation

7 of --

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not make out the rest of

9 the sentence of the witness.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Samoukovic, for answering my questions and thank

12 you for behaving professionally during the war and everything --

13 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters didn't catch your

14 last answer. If you remember, could you repeat it? What we have at the

15 moment is --

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything that is stated in this

17 report is in accordance and is not in collision with what I said.

18 JUDGE KWON: What did you say? The Crisis Staff never adopted

19 any decision on the formation of what?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As it is written somewhere here --

21 please help me, Mr. Karadzic.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. In the statement.

24 A. Camps are mentioned somewhere.

25 Q. In this report, (d), point (d), the last page and then the second

Page 34625

1 photograph:

2 "We also emphasise that in the area of Hadzici municipality there

3 are no collection camps where the army is bringing Muslim population

4 without any documents on the reason why they are brought in."

5 Can you then explain what you said about the Crisis Staff.

6 A. What I've already stated, that the Crisis Staff never made such a

7 decision and that this report of Mr. Glavas is consistent with my

8 statement.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That then concludes your evidence,

11 Mr. Samoukovic. Thank you for your coming to The Hague to give it. Now

12 you are free to go.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 [The witness withdrew]

15 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will now issue an oral ruling in

16 relation to the testimony of Obren Markovic and Tomislav Puhalac.

17 First, having reviewed the proposed Rule 92 ter statement for

18 Obren Markovic, the Chamber finds that the following portions contain

19 detailed information not relevant to the crimes in the indictment. These

20 are paragraphs 6, the last sentence of paragraph 21, paragraphs 27 from

21 "I know during these bombardments," and paragraph 32 from "an example of

22 such crimes" until "I am saying this because after the crime."

23 Next, having also reviewed the proposed Rule 92 ter statement for

24 Tomislav Puhalac, the Chamber finds that paragraph 19 contains detailed

25 information not relevant to the crimes in the indictment.

Page 34631

1 the political leadership in Pale municipality as the police had neither

2 the time nor the ability to contact anyone. The telephone lines were

3 down more often than they worked. Further, Hadzici municipality was

4 physically cut off from Pale as the Muslims had cut off the roads.

5 And that is the summary, and I think I made mistake that Muslim

6 reserves were drafted. I think it was Serbian reservists were drafted to

7 fill these gaps in the army. No questions for this witness for the

8 moment.

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tolj, as you have noted, your evidence in chief

10 in this case has been admitted in writing in lieu of your oral testimony.

11 Now you will be cross-examined by the representative of the

12 Office of the Prosecutor, Ms. McKenna.

13 MS. McKENNA: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examination by Ms. McKenna:

15 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Tolj.

16 A. Good afternoon.

17 Q. At paragraph 15 of your statement you state that you were

18 appointed commander of the Hadzici police station at some point during

19 autumn 1992. I'd like to show you 65 ter 24575, please. So in this

20 document which is dated 17th August, 1992, the Hadzici municipality

21 Executive Council recommends to the Ministry of the Interior in Pale that

22 you be appointed commander of SJB Hadzici. So you were appointed by the

23 Ministry of the Interior following this recommendation; is that correct?

24 A. Correct.

25 MS. McKENNA: I'd like to tender this document, Your Honours.

Page 34632

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6168, Your Honours.

3 MS. McKENNA:

4 Q. Now, at paragraph 13 of your statement you mention a number of

5 detention centres and you also describe how all the people detained were

6 registered with the appropriate records in your statement. Now, under

7 the criminal code in force at the time, it's correct, isn't it, that the

8 police were authorised to issue a detention on custody that could last up

9 to three days.

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. And the code of criminal procedure also stipulated that at the

12 end of that three-day period police forces had an obligation to bring the

13 detainee before an investigative judge, who would then issue a decision

14 on continued custody or release; is that correct?

15 A. Right.

16 Q. Now, I'd first like to focus on the detention centre in the

17 garage in the municipality building. Non-Serbs were arrested and brought

18 in to be interviewed by the police in the municipality building premises;

19 is that correct?

20 A. The Muslim population was brought in not only by the police but

21 also by army units from combat. They were not only rounded up in houses.

22 They were brought in also from combat zones.

23 Q. And that included the people captured in the attack by your

24 police force on the village of Musici, didn't it?

25 A. I could not give you a specific answer regarding Musici village

Page 34633

1 because I was not at the police station at the time. I was on the lines

2 in position on one of the lines. I believe it was done by a combined

3 unit consisting of police officers and military police officers; they

4 carried out that attack.

5 Q. But the Trial Chamber has heard evidence that 40 men from Musici

6 were brought to the municipality building garage after the attack. Do

7 you accept that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And while they were detained in the garage, you and other members

10 of the police interrogated them in the office upstairs; isn't that

11 correct?

12 A. Not all of them. Some, yes.

13 Q. You frequently worked together with Zoran Gasevic, didn't you?

14 A. We were sent on missions together quite often.

15 Q. Now, you agree that the garage in which the detainees were held

16 was a small concrete garage?

17 A. That was a garage in the ownership of the Municipal Assembly of

18 Hadzici, where a number of vehicles were kept as well as archives that

19 were kept in one part of the garage, and there was also plumbing inside.

20 Q. But at one time around 50 people were held there; isn't that

21 correct?

22 A. I cannot confirm the number because it fluctuated. Some people

23 were transferred to the gym usually when there was fighting. If some

24 people were captured in the fighting, they would be brought to the

25 garage.

Page 34634

1 Q. Well, in the garage on occasion men and women were held together;

2 isn't that correct?

3 A. I believe there were one or two such cases, as far as I know.

4 Q. The detainees had no means of cleaning themselves, did they?

5 A. For hygiene they had the same facilities as everybody else

6 because in Hadzici we did not have either water or electricity for a

7 while because the Muslim side had cut off the supply. It was a huge

8 problem for the entire population of Hadzici.

9 Q. Well, let's talk about your obligations in relation to those

10 detainees. You've agreed that the police were permitted to detain people

11 for three-day period, and after which they were required to bring the

12 detainee before an investigative judge. So that should have been what

13 you did in respect of those detained in the Hadzici municipality

14 building, shouldn't it?

15 A. In the building of Hadzici municipality, Ilidza, Ilijas,

16 et cetera, there was no courthouse, so there was no possibility for these

17 people to be turned over to the proper authorities for further procedure.

18 Communications towards Pale, Lukavica, and other places were cut off.

19 You could reach them only taking tracks through woods and that was

20 dangerous because every now and then there were raids by various groups

21 and even some of our policemen got killed or injured in that way when

22 they were intercepted by Muslim army units on those roads.

23 Q. Mr. Tolj, I'd like to focus on the issue of the detainees

24 under -- in your custody in the municipality building. Now, the

25 Trial Chamber has heard evidence - and that's at P2403 at paragraphs 48

Page 34635

1 and 51 - that men from Musici were held there for six days. It's also

2 heard evidence that people were held there for weeks, including one group

3 for as long as 33 days, and that's at paragraph 66 of P2403. Now, this

4 is detention far beyond permissible detention under the law in force at

5 the time; isn't that correct?

6 A. I agree, but if you understood my previous answer I said that

7 there were war operations engulfing the whole area. It was not possible

8 to transport people into proper premises before the competent organs that

9 would take charge from then on.

10 Q. Well, these people never received a decision on detention by any

11 authority in accordance with the law in force at the time, did they?

12 A. I believe so because - and I think I've said this before - the

13 police station was based on the premises in the offices of a construction

14 company. So we came in without any equipment, without any communications

15 equipment, without any amenities or proper facilities for police work.

16 We had no proper premises or equipment, and most policemen, sometimes

17 100 per cent of them, were engaged to hold the lines and had no time to

18 do their job, which was police work.

19 Q. Mr. Tolj, I'll ask you to listen carefully to the question that

20 I'm asking and to respond as accurately and as concisely as possible. We

21 have very little time. Let's come back to the interviews of the

22 detainees. Now, after the interviews some of the people who you had

23 determined didn't pose a threat would be transferred to the sports

24 centre?

25 A. Roughly that's right. People on whom no weapons were found were

Page 34636

1 taken to the sports centre because that was the safest place for them

2 because of various raids by groups out of control, people who were under

3 nobody's command, people who were not within the police or the army

4 system.

5 Q. Well, let's then focus on the sports centre now. At paragraph 9

6 of your statement you say that a part of the Muslim population who had

7 expressed such a wish were put up in arrangement with them at the gym of

8 the secondary school centre so they would be protected. And you

9 continue -- you also state that after a while the Muslims who so wanted

10 were transported by buses to the side under the control of their people,

11 that is to say Kiseljak.

12 Now, the Trial Chamber has heard -- well, you've just accepted

13 that people who were taken to the sports centre from the municipality

14 building garages following their interviews -- is it your evidence that

15 these people asked to be taken to the sports centre from the municipal

16 garage?

17 A. Could you please repeat the ending because I'm not sure I

18 understood the question.

19 Q. Mr. Tolj, in paragraph 9 of your statement you suggest that the

20 people were taken -- or people went to the sports centre voluntarily.

21 I'm asking you whether it is your position that the people who were taken

22 to the sports centre after their interviews by your police in the

23 municipality building garage -- or in the municipality building, did

24 those people go to the sports centre voluntarily?

25 A. Very few went voluntarily. Most were brought there and kept

Page 34637

1 there with the best of intentions because that's where it was the safest

2 for them. There were cases when people were allowed to go home because

3 that was their wish. They would spend even less than 24 hours at home

4 and an incident would occur. They would be attacked and then they would

5 reappear, or rather, there would be these people who did whatever they

6 wanted as they roamed about, so then these people would return to the

7 centre because they felt safest there.

8 Q. Now, it was the public security centre who was responsible for

9 the organisation and security of the sports centre, wasn't it?

10 A. Not the public security centre. It was the army, or rather,

11 mobilisation. And it was the military authorities that provided security

12 for the entire centre.

13 THE ACCUSED: Transcript. [Interpretation] In line 10 of the

14 transcript it doesn't say that yet again these people who freely roamed

15 about and would mistreat other people, it wasn't recorded in line 10.

16 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

17 Let's continue.

18 MS. McKENNA:

19 Q. Now, at paragraph 10 of your statement you describe how after

20 Serbs broke into the gym and mistreated the people there, the political

21 and military leadership made the decision to transport part of the

22 Muslims at their own request from the gym to the Muslim-controlled side

23 at Kiseljak while the remainder was transported to the Kula prison, that

24 is, those who had violated the law. Now, it was Mr. Glavas's evidence,

25 your predecessor as SJB commander, that the Crisis Staff president

Page 34638

1 Ratko Radic gave the order to transfer 180 to 200 detainees to the Kula

2 prison on the 22nd of June, 1992. For the parties' reference that's

3 P2296, paragraph 50, and T11785 to 6.

4 Mr. Tolj, is it your position that all 200 of these people being

5 transferred to Kula prison had violated the law?

6 A. I am not of the view that all of them had violated the law.

7 Quite simply, the order was that they could no longer be held in

8 detention on the premises where they had been until then. They had to be

9 transferred to institutions, prisons, that were envisaged for that, and

10 then of course that the procedure was continue over there and everything

11 else. And as far as I know, immediately after being transferred to the

12 Kula prison some people were immediately released and they went to the

13 city of Sarajevo.

14 Q. Well, the Trial Chamber has heard evidence from people who were

15 part of that transfer, Witnesses Mehmet Music and Adem Balic, who were

16 transferred from the sports centre to Kula prison and held there until

17 they were transferred to further detention centres. So rather than being

18 voluntarily bussed to Kiseljak, as your statement suggests, these

19 detainees were being transferred from detention centre to detention

20 centre; isn't that correct?

21 A. I really don't know of the fate of individual persons who were

22 transferred to Kula prison and how they were then transferred from there,

23 how many were released, how many were transferred to other prisoners.

24 That was very hard for us to control, or rather, to have information.

25 The road we used from Lukavica to Hadzici was over 100 kilometres long,

Page 34639

1 round about, over the hills. Telephone lines weren't working either so

2 communication was very poor.

3 Q. Well, let's talk about those people who were being held in the

4 sports centre during the period in which you were SJB commander. It's

5 correct, isn't it, Mr. Tolj, that non-Serbs were held in the sports

6 centre right up until October 1992?

7 A. Well, in that period I was appointed commander and that's where I

8 found them. Perhaps there were about then persons there.

9 MS. McKENNA: Could we please have P1607 and page 2 in the

10 English and B/C/S, please.

11 Q. Mr. Tolj, this is a report on the situation in prisons and

12 collection camps for prisoners of war from the Republika Srpska Ministry

13 of Justice and administration representative, Slobodan Avlijas. I'd like

14 to turn to section 10 on Hadzici, that's English page 6 to 7 and B/C/S

15 page 5. And I should have noted, Mr. Tolj, that the date of this

16 document is 22nd October 1992. Now, on the topic of Hadzici it states:

17 "Ninety prisoners of war are accommodated in the Hadzici sports

18 centre. Organisation and security is provided by the

19 Hadzici Public Security Station."

20 So firstly, you accept that this document contradicts your

21 testimony that the Hadzici public security station was not involved in

22 the organisation of the sports centre?

23 A. In the organisation of the sports centre, I said at the very

24 outset how it was. And after that a certain number of policemen together

25 with members of the military provided security there. At first all

Page 34640

1 members of the police were involved in repelling attacks at the front

2 line. Once the situation was consolidated, at least a bit, then the

3 police started doing their own work too. I think this has to do with a

4 number of people who were not prisoners but rather victims of a failed

5 exchange at the level of state commissions.

6 Q. Let's speak about the exchange. Mr. Avlijas states that he

7 suggested that people be transferred to a section of KPD Butmir but did

8 not encounter understanding regarding the transfer because it depended on

9 the exchange of prisoners of war of Serbian nationality held in the

10 Tarcin Silos and in Pazaric.

11 It's correct, isn't it, that people were held in the sports

12 centre for the purposes of exchange?

13 A. A large-scale exchange had been agreed upon at the level of state

14 organs between the Muslim and Serb sides. On the Muslim side it was led

15 by Mr. Amor Masevic [phoen]. All the people were asked about leaving

16 Hadzici and also those who were in Pazarici and Tarcin who wanted to

17 leave Muslim-controlled territory. How do I put this? People were

18 polled. They were asked where they wanted to go and whether they wanted

19 to be exchanged, and then they were told that on such and such a date an

20 exchange would be carried out, buses were provided, and it was supposed

21 to happen at the separation line between the municipalities of -- at the

22 location called Kobiljaca.

23 Q. Can I direct your attention to the final paragraph in this

24 section - and I believe it's the next page in the B/C/S - and it states:

25 "In the cases of Zvornik, Hadzici, and Ilidza, we see that the

Page 34641

1 Public Security Stations keep people in custody without any authorisation

2 or justification in law because they have the authority to keep people in

3 custody for no longer than three days."

4 The people who are the subject of these -- of this document are

5 not people who are part of any sort of organised exchange, are they?

6 They are people who are being kept under illegal detention; isn't that

7 correct?

8 A. Really, I cannot answer. As far as I know, these were people who

9 were prepared, I mean to have these exchanges take place from both sides.

10 And there was a lot of pressure from families on our side and on the

11 Muslim side and state commissions were working. However, these exchanges

12 failed day after day and practically people stayed on for a long time

13 without any need for them to stay on such premises.

14 Q. Let's move to page 28 of the English of this document and page 27

15 of the B/C/S. And this is a letter of the same date from minister for

16 justice Momcilo Mandic to the Serbian municipalities of Hadzici and

17 Ilidza. And he states:

18 "Having carried out the control of this ministry, we have

19 established that there are 90 persons of Muslim ethnicity imprisoned on

20 the territory of your municipality ..."

21 Now -- sorry, "... on the territory of your municipality at the

22 premises of the sports centre in Hadzici ..."

23 Now, contrary to what you say at paragraph 9 of your statement,

24 the sports centre wasn't a space for temporary accommodation, but these

25 people were, in fact, imprisoned there; isn't that correct?

Page 34642

1 A. Temporary accommodation and prison in war time -- I mean, I don't

2 know how I would make a distinction --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not understand the

4 end of the sentence.

5 MS. McKENNA:

6 Q. Could you please repeat that sentence, as the interpreters did

7 not catch your evidence.

8 A. The reception centre, if I can call it that, in war time at times

9 when war is waged or this detention or these premises for keeping people,

10 practically all of this boiled down to the same thing terminologically.

11 Q. Well, let's talk about some evidence before the Trial Chamber of

12 one of the witnesses who was part of a failed exchange who

13 testified - and this is Zihad Okic whose testimony is at -- evidence is

14 at P124 and 125 - and Mr. Okic was under house arrest from the 11th of

15 May until the 7th of September, 1992. And on the 7th of September, your

16 colleague Zoran Gasevic came to his house and told him, his wife and his

17 children, that they had half an hour to go to a meeting point where they

18 would be bussed to an exchange at Kobiljaca. And Mr. Okic recounted that

19 about 200 Muslims were picked up from around the villages and travelled

20 to Kobiljaca where an exchange -- the anticipated exchange didn't, in

21 fact, take place. And so they were then returned to the sports centre,

22 around 500 people in total, where they were held, some of whom were held

23 until - and this is Witness Misic's evidence - for 12 days; and that's

24 P2403, paragraphs 113 to 117. Now, only on the 18th of September were

25 the women and children released to go home, so that out of 500 detainees

Page 34643

1 only 84 remained.

2 So I'd just like to clarify what your evidence is on this. These

3 witnesses -- these detainees were not, in fact, being voluntarily

4 accommodated, were they?

5 A. Well, just a moment ago I explained that a large-scale exchange

6 had been agreed upon, all for all. And among other things, people were

7 told: Pack, get on the buses, and we're going to Kobiljaca for an

8 exchange. On the other side there will be buses too and numbers would

9 not be looked at at all, how many people. So as many people on one side

10 and as many people on the other side, but then what happened? On the

11 Muslim side they obstructed this. They did not bring people. Their

12 state commission went together with our state commission and they

13 negotiated and they stayed until late at night and then Amor Masevic, the

14 then-president of the state commission said that they did not want that

15 but that talks would continue on the next day, and then on the next day

16 these activities should continue in view of the fact that people had

17 already packed their things, the bare necessities, things that they could

18 take by bus. There was no point in taking them back to their homes. It

19 was suggested - I don't know who it was from the state commission that

20 suggested this - that they spend the night at the sports hall and that

21 the buses would be prepared for the following day if this was ensured.

22 However, how did this happen? Unfortunately, at Kobiljaca there was

23 this -- actually all these buses actually left from both sides and

24 Mr. Masevic and his driver and we took them to the police station in

25 Hadzici and then he spent the night with -- at the house of the person

Page 34644

1 who was then the chief and then he went on to Sarajevo to continue these

2 activities and these activities because of the obstruction of the other

3 side --

4 Q. Mr. Tolj, once again I'll just ask you to keep your question --

5 your answers as concise as possible. My question is simply: Do you

6 agree that people, including people who were being held for the purposes

7 of exchange, were being held against their will at Hadzici sports centre?

8 A. I really cannot say that that was against their will. It was

9 with their agreement because people had been told: You will wait here

10 for the commissions to reach agreement and then we're going to have the

11 exchanges effected. Now, the fact that this took some time and that

12 practically this was undermined and this activity failed all together, so

13 it turned out that these people were in captivity for longer than normal.

14 Q. Well, let's speak then about some of the people who remained in

15 captivity up until the 22nd of October which is the document that we've

16 looked at. The Trial Chamber has heard evidence from Mehmet Music, who

17 was, for your information, one of the people who was taken to the

18 garage -- municipality building garage from Musici and subsequently

19 brought to the sports centre. So therefore, the police had determined

20 that he was not a threat to them under your own account. And on the

21 23rd of October, Witness Music was transferred by the police, by the

22 Hadzici police, together with 70 detainees to -- from the Hadzici sports

23 centre to Planjo's house in Svrake, in Vogosca, and that's at P2403,

24 paragraph 123. So this was a transfer that occurred during the period in

25 which you were commander. Do you recall this transfer?

Page 34645

1 A. Well, that was done on orders that arrived from the ministry to

2 transfer. The first time when I spoke the capacities at the Kula prison

3 were overextended. We did not know where the capacities were being

4 extended and where else they could be kept. So the orders we received

5 were for them to be transferred to Bajina Kula. That's what we did.

6 Q. So, in fact, individuals who your own police force had

7 ascertained were no threat to you were transferred first to Kula prison,

8 then to Lukavica, then back to Kula prison, back to the Hadzici sports

9 centre and now to Planjo's house in Svrake. So, in fact, these civilians

10 were not -- they didn't elect to be held at the sports centre; rather,

11 they were transferred from detention centre to detention centre as the

12 Hadzici authorities pleased. Isn't that correct?

13 A. Well, it's not that the police of Hadzici liked that or were

14 pleased. The police in Hadzici didn't do that. There were exchanges

15 that had been agreed upon. There were people who were brought for

16 exchanges primarily. Also, there were private and individual ones,

17 individual exchanges and exchanges at state levels, so some people were

18 transferred from prison to Hadzici because these exchanges usually took

19 place at Kobiljaca, at the separation line.

20 Q. Let me just clarify your evidence on this point. You say it's

21 not that the police of Hadzici liked that or were pleased. And then the

22 transcript reads:

23 "The police in Hadzici didn't do that."

24 Are you denying that the police in Hadzici were involved in

25 moving detainees from detention centre to detention centre in Hadzici

Page 34646

1 municipality and the surrounding municipalities?

2 A. If they were given an assignment, then they would carry it out,

3 that is to say they would effect the transfer.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Tolj.

5 MS. McKENNA: Your Honours, I have no further questions.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. McKenna.

7 With the indulgence of the interpreters and reporter, we decided

8 to go until 3.00, so if you could conclude by then, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency. I will

10 try.

11 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Tolj, could you please give me answers that

13 are as short as possible so that we can finish by 3.00. When did you

14 leave Sarajevo and when did you get to Hadzici?

15 A. Well, it was the beginning, April 1992.

16 Q. Thank you. Do you know what the reason was for the fighting

17 around the village of Musici?

18 A. Well, information was coming in to the effect that there was an

19 armed group in Musici and that there was sporadic gun-fire from that

20 area. This is a village with mixed population, Serb and Muslim. People

21 felt unsafe, and an order was passed to cleanse the terrain and to

22 collect the weapons there.

23 Q. Thank you. You were asked, or rather, it was suggested that in

24 the detention unit in the municipality only Muslims were being detained.

25 Was anybody else being detained?

Page 34647

1 A. There were Serbs too because in part these premises were used for

2 police detention.

3 Q. Thank you. Today you said in line 89 -- on page 89 of today's

4 transcript that it wasn't only the police that was detaining people who

5 had violated the law, but also the army brought in those who were

6 captured in fighting. Here it was said "combat" and "in combat zone"

7 elsewhere. That is what was stated. Who was it the army brought into

8 the detention unit?

9 A. The army brought in those who were taken prisoner during combat

10 activities or if they found them with weapons, and so on, or if they

11 intercepted various groups. There were things like that too.

12 Q. Thank you. You said that as for civilians who had violated the

13 law there was an obligation of three days of detention and then they

14 would be brought before a judge. What about prisoners of war? Did they

15 have to appear before an investigating judge within three days?

16 A. It wasn't possible to organise that, to take them before an

17 investigating judge because there wasn't an investigating judge in our

18 area. We had not organised a court.

19 Q. Thank you. And on the whole, for prisoners of war was there this

20 obligation to keep them in detention for up to three days and to bring

21 them before an investigating judge?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. All right. Did you know this Mehmet Music and Adem Balic?

24 A. I knew Adem Balic. As for Mehmet Music, I know he was a

25 journalist.

Page 34648

1 Q. Thank you. You were asked about people's departures and

2 exchanges. Did any lists exist of people who were supposed to cross over

3 to the Muslim side and how were those lists made?

4 A. Lists were made by going from person to person and asking them

5 whether they wanted to cross over to have some sort of record.

6 Q. Thank you. Who polled the Muslims in the Serbian territory of

7 Hadzici municipality?

8 A. In the Serb territory of Hadzici municipality, civilian

9 commissioners existed by street, by neighbourhood, they dealt with

10 distribution of food, and they also had lists of all inhabitants in their

11 area, and they went from door to door and made those lists.

12 Q. Did Masovici and the Muslim side know how many Muslim civilians

13 wanted to cross over?

14 A. Yes, because they could see with their own eyes, they could talk

15 with those people while they were waiting on buses, and it was evident

16 that that was no forced deportation; that it was of their own free will

17 that they wanted to go.

18 Q. In your experience, how long would a person's name be on the list

19 before being informed that a bus would be available within one or two

20 hours?

21 A. That was very difficult because once we got information that

22 something like that would be organised, that there would be a movement of

23 population, that there is will on both sides, then we would approach

24 people immediately, poll them, and based on that we made lists. So there

25 were no precise time-frames.

Page 34649

1 Q. On page 99 it was quoted to you that somebody came and told them:

2 You have 30 minutes to get ready. Were you able to see that it was

3 something forced or were they just given information when they would be

4 able to leave?

5 A. Those people knew they would be leaving, they knew that in

6 advance, and then they were told: The time has come. Get ready within

7 half an hour.

8 Q. Thank you. Were there any Muslims who didn't put their names on

9 those lists and stayed to live in Hadzici?

10 A. Yes, there were Muslims like that but I don't know how many. I

11 don't remember.

12 Q. There was some ambiguity here about the role of the Serb police

13 in guarding the school centre. First of all, tell us, how far was the

14 combat zone from Hadzici?

15 A. All of Hadzici was a combat zone. That belt was constantly

16 shelled, shot at, perhaps there was a little part of Hadzici facing

17 Ilidza close to the bridge that was a little spared from the shelling,

18 but mainly shells would land almost every day on Hadzici except for brief

19 periods of cease-fire if they were respected.

20 Q. What about the number of casualties, how many were wounded and

21 injured every day or at least in peak days of Crisis Staff?

22 A. In the early days four policemen were killed, five were wounded.

23 In attacks on the 10th and 25th a large number of soldiers were killed,

24 many were wounded.

25 Q. Did Muslim soldiers take our soldiers prisoners and did our army

Page 34650

1 keep Muslim prisoners?

2 A. Yes, there were prisoners taken on both sides.

3 Q. Could we see D1074. It's a report by Mr. Glavas. This is

4 related to transcript page 97. The question was:

5 [In English] Do you accept that this document contradicts your

6 testimony that the Hadzici public security station was not involved in

7 the organisation of the sports centre?

8 Your answer was:

9 "In the organisation of the sports centre I said at the very

10 outset how it was, and after that a certain number of policemen together

11 with members of the military provided security there. At first, all

12 members of the police were involved in repelling attacks at the front

13 line. Once the situation was consolidated at least a bit then the police

14 started doing their own work."

15 [Interpretation] Could we now see the second page, please, in

16 both versions. Item (b) says:

17 "In the period April and July 1992 police officers of this

18 station were involved in all combat operations and that was necessary at

19 the time, indispensable, whereas beginning with 1 August 1992 most of the

20 policemen had returned from the front lines and were again involved in

21 the activities of the Ministry of the Interior. In April not a single

22 policeman was involved in regular work and there were 105 in combat. In

23 May, none in regular activities, 120 in combat. In June and July only 3

24 and 5 respectively were in regular activities.

25 How is this consistent with your knowledge?

Page 34651

1 A. I too have confirmed that in the first two months policemen were

2 non-stop on the front lines, and later on to the extent of our ability we

3 got some of them to come back and do regular police work.

4 Q. And my last document, on page 91 , lines 8 through 12, you were

5 asked -- I'll read it in English:

6 [In English] "Q. The detainees had no means of cleaning

7 themselves, did they?

8 "A. For hygiene they had the same facilities as everybody else."

9 [Interpretation] Then you added: The police, army, and the

10 population, none of that made it into the record. Did you mean police,

11 army, and all the other population?

12 A. I meant everybody, the police, the army, and all the citizens.

13 There was no water. The water was cut off.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now show 65 ter 24666.

15 65 ter 24666, page 3. Let's first see the cover page and then page 3.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. This is a report on the work until December. Could you read the

18 first three lines dealing with water-supply, or I can read it:

19 "Water-supply.

20 "After the war broke out there was a breakdown in water supply to

21 the Serb municipality of Hadzici, so we were forced to make an improvised

22 pipeline to re-route the well located at the Hadzici maintenance and

23 repairs depot ..." et cetera.

24 How does this fit with your knowledge about the availability of

25 water?

Page 34652

1 A. I could provide a broader explanation if there is time, but I

2 know until 1994 there was no water in Hadzici. The local sources were

3 reconnected using pumps and only closer parts of the town, wherever

4 possible, received water, and the rest we provided through water tanks

5 and distributed to the population.

6 Q. You also said there was no power, no electricity. Could we see

7 the next page.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, is that your last question?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'm done with the documents.

10 This is the last one. There will only be a brief question afterwards.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Can I read this to you:

13 "As a result of war operations, electric power supply has been

14 completely discontinued."

15 How does that fit with your statement?

16 A. It's true that the transmission line of 35 kilowatts was brought

17 down and the breakdown was in such a place that we needed to secure the

18 site first and we even tried through the UNPROFOR to provide joint works

19 to repair it and that would last for a day or two and then it would break

20 down again. So there were many days in Hadzici without water or

21 electricity and there was just a little gas.

22 Q. On page 102 it was suggested to you in the question that those

23 people who were taken from Hadzici to Kula then to Planjo's house were

24 civilians. Did you consider those who were taken prisoner in combat or

25 disarmed through some -- in some operations as civilians?

Page 34653

1 A. Of course they were not civilians. They were captured in combat.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I have completed

4 my examination. May I tender this document.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

6 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3064, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, if you have any comment on the Defence

8 motion for modification of segregation regime for certain witness, you

9 will be heard first thing on Monday.

10 Mr. Tolj, that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the

11 Chamber, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to give

12 it. You are now free to go. We'll rise all together and resume --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 JUDGE KWON: -- on Monday at 9.00.

15 THE ACCUSED: If I may, if I may ask whether Prosecution was

16 segregated from their own witnesses during their own case.

17 JUDGE KWON: I think he's not on the list of next week's

18 witnesses list?

19 MR. ROBINSON: No, he won't be testifying next week.

20 [The witness withdrew]

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.04 p.m.,

22 to be reconvened on Monday, the 4th day of

23 March, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.