130409ED

Page 36830

1 morning to everybody.

2 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.

4 A. Good morning, Mr. Karadzic. I extend my regards to you, the

5 Excellencies and everybody else present in the courtroom.

6 Q. Please state your full name for the record, as well as your

7 father's name and state your date and place of birth.

8 A. Milorad Dodik, born on the 12th of March, 1959, at Banja Luka.

9 My father's name is Bogoljub.

10 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the translation, and I would also

11 like to ask you to wait for the cursor to stop before you start speaking.

12 For the record, please outline briefly your education.

13 A. I graduated from primary school at Aleksandrovac [phoen] where

14 I was born. I graduated from secondary school at Banja Luka, and

15 I obtained my bachelor's degree in political sciences in Belgrade. I'm a

16 politologist by training.

17 Q. What did you do before you engaged in politics, or if you did

18 anything?

19 A. Early on, as a young man I was politically active. I was

20 president of the youth organisation in my birth place, that was at the

21 time of former Yugoslavia. Later, upon graduating from the faculty of

22 political science, I returned to the Laktasi municipality where I still

23 live, and I was elected president of the Executive Board of the

24 municipality. Since that time, I've been in politics.

25 As far as my previous education and training goes, I have

Page 36831

1 already described it.

2 Q. As a member of which political party did you run on the first

3 multi-party elections and then were elected to your position at Laktasi?

4 A. I became a member of the alliance of reformists in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was elected to the highest leadership in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I was president of the regional board of the

7 Bosnian Krajina as it was known then. It comprised some

8 20 municipalities that gravitated to Banja Luka. At the first

9 multi-party elections, I was a bearer of the elder role, and I was

10 elected to the first multi-party assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina before

11 the war.

12 Q. Before that war and after this war?

13 A. Yes, correct.

14 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell the Chamber who was the head of

15 the political party at the level of Yugoslavia and at the level of

16 Bosnia, and what was the party's position in terms of resolving the state

17 crisis. The rest is perhaps not interesting.

18 A. The president of the party at the level of Yugoslavia was the

19 then federal prime minister, Ante Markovic. And the republican

20 organisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was led by Professor Nenad Kecmanovic.

21 The basic approach to the resolution of the crisis was the preservation

22 of Yugoslavia and that it should join the European integrations. The

23 Prime Minister Markovic made great efforts to that effect at the time and

24 many times, in conversation with him, especially after the war, and in

25 particular over the last few years, he kept asserting that the leadership

Page 36832

1 of Slovenia played the greatest role in breaking up Yugoslavia, and he

2 could have prevented the breakup because the Slovenian leadership headed

3 by Milan Kucan insisted on independence and secession of Slovenia.

4 Q. Thank you. And as for democracy and economic issues, perhaps you

5 could tell us just one sentence about the orientation of this political

6 party.

7 A. It had at its heart free democracy and multi-party system, and

8 free market was the hallmark of its attitude towards economy.

9 Q. Thank you. Can you please tell the Trial Chamber how big was the

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in which your party won a certain number of

11 votes, or rather, seats and what was the composition of the assembly?

12 A. The composition was multi-party. This party that I was in won

13 around 10 per cent of the votes at the time. There were a number of

14 parties, the most important being the Party of Democratic Action, which

15 was led by Izetbegovic; the Croatian Democratic Union, which often

16 changed its president but I think that at the moment it was Mr. Kljujic;

17 the SDS, whose president were you; then we had SDP which was led by

18 Nijaz Durakovic; the reformists led by Nenad Kecmanovic; we also had the

19 liberals and the Serbian Renewal Movement and some smaller parties. They

20 all made up the political spectrum of the first multi-party assembly in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first three parties I enlisted, the Party of

22 Democratic Action, the HDZ and the SDS, began talks immediately after the

23 elections and they constituted the authorities at the Bosnia-Herzegovina

24 level while we remained in the opposition.

25 Q. Thank you. Was your party defined as a national party, that is

Page 36833

1 to say an ethnic party or was it multi-ethnic?

2 A. In our party, the members were representatives of all peoples or

3 all ethnicities that was clearly defined and we all knew who belonged to

4 which ethnicity, but it could be conditionally called multi-ethnic

5 because it had the representatives of all ethnicities.

6 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber what was the founder and the

7 president of the party at the level of Yugoslavia by ethnicity. I mean

8 Ante Markovic?

9 A. Ante Markovic was a Croat by ethnicity and he also hailed from

10 Croatia.

11 Q. And he was personnel from the Republic of Croatia; correct?

12 A. Yes. He was the cadre from Republic of Croatia.

13 Q. Thank you. Can you please briefly describe for us how this first

14 multi-party assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina looked, in terms of how it

15 faced the problems that were arising? How did you view the functioning

16 of the assembly in view of the challenges which arose at the time, rather

17 outside of Bosnia than in Bosnia itself. I mean Slovenia and

18 secessionism.

19 A. Well, it was obvious that first of all the

20 Party of Democratic Action which was the first one to be established as a

21 markedly ethnic and ethnically oriented party in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

22 persistently trying to implode the sensitive balance in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina through its activities, and the balance was based on

24 the fact that there were -- and there are three peoples living in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I think the Serbian error and the error of the SDS

Page 36834

1 was that it was trying to defend the break-down of the balance in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina which was caused by the SDA led by Izetbegovic.

3 Throughout this early period it was evident that the SDA insisted on

4 taking over all the jurisdictions and to control all of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the beginning, we believed that it was proof that

6 the right that had been acknowledged even earlier by the communist system

7 should be broken down and that the aim of Izetbegovic was to create a

8 unified Bosnia, a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. Such conduct on his part

9 and the part of his party caused national or ethnic based regrouping even

10 of the people who were in other political parties and in particular it

11 drew distinct borders between the peoples or ethnicities in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, primarily the Croats and the Serbs who opposed this

13 and the Muslims at the time because it was only 1993 that they

14 constituted themselves under the name Bosniaks.

15 It is my conviction that Alija Izetbegovic, in this period,

16 worked hard to promote his Islamic Declaration which had been written

17 earlier on and which requested for introduction of a society that would

18 be based on Sharia law and Islamic values in this territory. He had

19 clearly stated that in his Islamic Declaration earlier on and he was

20 brought to trial in the former Yugoslavia because of that. We were well

21 aware of the text of this declaration and I could see on a daily basis

22 how the political goals stated in Alija Izetbegovic's declaration were

23 being worked out in practice. The declaration clearly said that wherever

24 the Muslims established the authorities, they had to organise an Islamic

25 state and that as long as they were a minority, they should stay calm, be

Page 36835

1 integrated in the society, but once they became the majority they should

2 strive towards this goal without any doubt. So even though the SDS

3 elected me as a political representative of the Serbian people who was

4 supported en masse at the elections I thought that this was a policy of

5 dangerous intentions and that in this sense Izetbegovic lay the

6 foundations for the conflict which followed and which was dramatic in the

7 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The conduct of other political parties,

8 primarily the Croatian Democratic Union at the time, was directed towards

9 giving support to the independence of the Republic of Croatia rather than

10 supporting the Croats within Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was why the

11 Croatian Democratic Union was integrated on the basis of the principles

12 aimed at the break-down of Yugoslavia.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger?

14 MR. TIEGER: The question was: How did you view the functioning

15 of the assembly in view of the challenges which arose rather outside of

16 Bosnia. Then the witness moved into a discussion about, among other

17 things, the Islamic Declaration, not a word of which is mentioned in the

18 65 ter summary that was provided to us. I realise when evidence is being

19 led viva voce it's not entirely controllable, but I think given time

20 concerns and notice concerns, that the accused needs to be a little more

21 careful about assisting the witness in addressing the questions asked.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I leave it to the accused. Could you

23 lead the witness in a proper way.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.

25 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed.

Page 36836

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will, thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. In transcript, on page 6, lines 22 and 23, it is not correctly

4 recorded what the witness said because it turns out that he said that the

5 [In English] SDS elected me as a political representative of the Serbian

6 people [Interpretation] And the witness said that even though I was

7 outside the SDS, which represented the Serbian people and had great

8 support, I could still see and I was involved in the political life.

9 More or less like this. But the substance was that it was not the SDS

10 who elected someone, President Dodik had his own party and he entered the

11 parliament with it.

12 A. Correct. Mr. Tieger, I have sufficient time and I have come here

13 to talk. I have been called to appear before this Court and please do

14 not interrupt me because the context I'm talking about is very important

15 to understand how the assembly operated. Because without being able to

16 understand this --

17 JUDGE KWON: The point was to concentrate on answering the

18 question. Mr. Karadzic will lead you, if necessary. Please continue,

19 Mr. Karadzic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. How did the political parties you mentioned posit themselves in

23 view of unilateral secessions or the Slovenian initiative to break down

24 Yugoslavia?

25 A. My party was against breaking up Yugoslavia, the SDA. The party

Page 36837

1 led by Mr. Izetbegovic wanted an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. It

2 wanted Yugoslavia to break down. The HDZ also wanted a break-up of

3 Yugoslavia and it supported Croatia's unilateral secession both in the

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, whereas the SDA [as interpreted] opposed the

5 break-up of Yugoslavia and was oriented towards seeking a compromise for

6 a continuation of joint life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the

8 Croatian Democratic Union as regards the secession of Bosnia, and what

9 was its position as regards its internal organisation?

10 A. I would like to say that I'm convinced, and the facts point to

11 that, all that happened later, that Izetbegovic's decision that Bosnia

12 should secede was a unilateral secession act. He did not have the power

13 in Bosnia-Herzegovina that would allow him to make such a decision. When

14 Izetbegovic made the decisions that Bosnia should be declared an

15 independent state he did not have any Serbian representatives in the

16 institutions of the government or in the authorities in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, such authorities were not constitutional

18 and were not representative. Therefore, the unilateral secession of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina was something that was very transparent and evident

20 and it was the cause of the later conflict. As for the HDZ, it at first

21 supported unilateral secession of the Republic of Croatia at the time.

22 It is a fact that its president, the president of the

23 Croatian Democratic Union, was also the president of Croatia,

24 Mr. Tudjman, which shows that this organisation had an identical goal,

25 even though it was based in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second goal which

Page 36838

1 was concealed was an alliance with the Muslims, that was the goal of the

2 HDZ, and it had to do with making decisions about the status of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but evidently that was not sincere because several

4 months after that, a war broke out between the Muslims and the

5 Croatian Democratic Union and this war between them lasted more than two

6 and a half years.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you can take a look at the transcript,

9 page 8, previous page, line 23, I take it the "SDA" should read the

10 "SDS."

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

12 Exactly, the witness said that but it hasn't been recorded properly.

13 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. What was the position of the Croatian Democratic Union in view of

16 the internal organisation of such an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and

17 what was the position of the Serbian Democratic Party and also the

18 Serbian deputies from other parties as regards the internal make-up of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

20 A. The Croatian Democratic Union promoted and set up the

21 Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna which in fact established power in its

22 territory. Their main political goal was the dissolution of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and joining the Republic of Croatia which caused armed

24 conflicts between the Muslims and the Croats, as I said earlier. So in

25 the early stage of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, they used the

Page 36839

1 opportunity of the organs of Bosnia-Herzegovina to support the secession

2 of Croatia in the first place, and then later on they organised and

3 implemented the plan to set up the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna so

4 that it could secede the join the Republic of Croatia. As for the

5 Serbian Democratic Party, the SDS at the time, it should be said first of

6 all that the SDS formulated policies which aimed at honouring and

7 observing the political and constitutional system as was extant at the

8 time, and it proposed that it should be expanded in order to recognise

9 and observe the ethnic and people's rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina as the

10 conditions had changed. In this early period of the multi-party system

11 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an initiative to form another Chamber which would

12 be called the Chamber of peoples in the assembly is well known and the

13 role of this Chamber would have been to protect the interests of the

14 three peoples. The leading Muslim political parties and the leading

15 Croatian political parties did not accept this, so the initiative of the

16 Serbian Democratic Party which was launched and which we all supported

17 did not result in any constitutional changes at the time.

18 Q. Thank you. What sort of majority was envisaged for the adoption

19 of constitutional changes or amendments and the change of the status of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia and the internal constitutional

21 issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What majority was needed according to the

22 constitution?

23 A. A two-thirds majority was envisaged and it also included the

24 involvement of legitimate representatives of all peoples and ethnic

25 communities. That was why Izetbegovic himself could not tackle the

Page 36840

1 changing of the constitution because he could not ensure that he would

2 have the necessary majority and he wanted to redefine the constitution as

3 the constitution of a unitary country. Whatever happened later was

4 decided by the violation of this basic principle which meant that first

5 of all everyone had to be involved, that the constitutional provision of

6 a two-thirds majority had to be observed and that what had to be taken

7 into account in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the carefully balanced structure

8 that I will talk -- be talking about a lot today because it is the only

9 basis on which Bosnia-Herzegovina can survive, even today.

10 Q. Now that you have mentioned today's Bosnia, can you say what are

11 the main problems today as opposed to the period between 1990 and 1992?

12 A. Well, it's 20 years later, but the political positions of course

13 are almost identical.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

15 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, let me indicate to the witness it's my

16 responsibility to monitor whether the examination is proceeding along

17 relevant lines. I don't mean to interrupt him at all. So in this case,

18 I wonder about the relevance of this question to the issues in this case.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I agree, Mr. Tieger.

20 Mr. Karadzic, bear that in mind. The situation today --

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I respond to this?

22 Your Excellencies, through this witness who is well-versed and is

23 performing an important function now, I want to see whether the problems

24 between 1990 and 1992 were caused by the appearance of one party or are

25 they part of the nature of our relations in that part of the world?

Page 36841

1 I consider this to be very relevant.

2 JUDGE KWON: The situation today has nothing to do with your

3 case. Please proceed.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Can you please try to remember how many deputies were there in

7 the then assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and how many Serb deputies were

8 there in comparison with the two-thirds majority criterion?

9 A. This is generally known fact, I suppose. I cannot remember the

10 exact figure right now but I know that there were around 86 or 7 Serbian

11 deputies from all political parties, of which the greatest number was of

12 course from the SDS and then from the alliance of the reform forces which

13 was my party. From the SPO I think there were two deputies and 83

14 deputies from various political parties. Due to the developments in

15 November 1991, an assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina

16 was established in order to show quite clearly the political goals that

17 had to do with the way Bosnia-Herzegovina would be organised once it left

18 Yugoslavia. I also participated in the work of this assembly and also

19 other colleagues from my political party. There were representatives of

20 other political parties as well, and they were not only SDS deputies,

21 which indicates that we all understood the situation at the time and that

22 we rallied around protecting the basic political goals of the Serbian

23 people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regardless of the particular political

24 party to which they belonged.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. The indictment against me states that

Page 36842

1 the time, or rather, the period when I joined the so-called

2 joint criminal enterprise was October 1991 up until the

3 13th of November -- 30th of November, 1995. Can you remember whether the

4 assembly was formed in October or in November? I mean the assembly

5 of the Serbian people.

6 A. Possibly it was October. I cannot say exactly now. There is

7 information about that. It was in the autumn. But what is important is

8 that basically this was a multi-party political assembly, not a

9 mono-party political assembly. As a participant, I did not notice, and

10 it wasn't possible to ascertain that later either, that what they say you

11 are responsible for actually happened. The assembly of the Serb people

12 wanted the Serb people to be protected and organised in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they remain within Bosnia-Herzegovina with

14 clearly defined rights as they should have, and that was legitimate and

15 legal. No actions were referred to at the time, especially not violent

16 ones, in order to ensure these rights. Discussions and agreements were

17 called for, and that is what was pursued with the relevant political

18 factors in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 Q. Thank you. So in that respect the indictment says that from

20 October at the latest Karadzic took part in joint criminal enterprise and

21 that the population of Muslim and Croat ethnicity should be removed on a

22 durable basis from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then various crimes were

23 committed, and the indictment lists them. Let us leave aside the fact

24 that claiming right to certain territory is not a crime. Did you notice,

25 ever, such positions in the SDS as described, especially with regard to

Page 36843

1 the lasting removal -- permanent removal of Croats and Bosniaks?

2 A. I heard about that only later after the war, when indictments

3 were being prepared for responsible people. I never heard at a single

4 assembly or at a single meeting about the promotion of such objectives

5 and you never said that. I never heard you say that, that you asked for

6 something like that, and you were not in the function of issuing orders

7 for anything, let alone anything criminal.

8 Q. Thank you. You said a moment ago that after October, discussions

9 were held and agreements sought. Could you tell the Trial Chamber how

10 the negotiations process evolved. Until the end of March 1992, what kind

11 of attempts were made to find a peaceful solution, from October up until

12 April 1992.

13 A. The very fact that after October and after the assembly of the

14 Serb people was established, the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina continued

15 to function shows that this was not a unilateral act. Rather, this was

16 an act that was supposed to affirm the rights that should have been equal

17 to those enjoyed by the other two peoples. There was also an assembly

18 held in January. I participated in that assembly as well. And then a

19 possible solution was discussed and also the establishment of Bosnia on a

20 new foundation. So the Serb side and my party had certain proposals to

21 the effect that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised as a community

22 that would affirm collective and joint rights of all.

23 Of course, this could not come to fruition because Izetbegovic's

24 idea was that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be a unitary country with a

25 political system of one man-one vote which would mean that Bosniaks would

Page 36844

1 have absolute domination. This could not have been accepted then and it

2 can never be accepted in that area. There were many talks that were held

3 and the most important ones were those within the initiative of the

4 European union led by a Portuguese diplomat, Cutileiro, that resulted in

5 the so-called Lisbon Agreement. That was well known then and that meant

6 that within the Cutileiro Plan Bosnia-Herzegovina should be organised --

7 actually, you heard Cutileiro here, and I hope that you are aware that

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be organised on a new basis. However, when

9 Izetbegovic returned to Sarajevo he withdrew his signature, rejected that

10 plan, and then continued his unilateral policy which shows that he did

11 not want a solution, a political solution.

12 Q. Thank you. As a participant, an active participant and founder

13 of the assembly of Serb people and later on the National Assembly of

14 Republika Srpska, did you take part in the process of accepting this

15 Lisbon Agreement, this Lisbon plan? Did I report to the assembly? And

16 also the acceptance of that plan in that assembly, was it sincere and

17 resolute?

18 A. Yes, of course I remember that. I remember that meeting of ours.

19 I just wish to remind you that you met with a great deal of resistance in

20 your own party, but with your own authority you asked for this plan to be

21 accepted. After that, the assembly as a whole accepted it. However,

22 I must say that from that moment onwards, there were major doubts as to

23 whether the other side would go for it as well.

24 Q. Thank you. Before that, the Serb community, and this assembly as

25 a whole, did they make any concessions in respect of their best

Page 36845

1 objectives and their first original interests and their best interests

2 and did they accept that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be independent and

3 on what condition?

4 A. You said then that this was an unavoidable compromise and that it

5 required giving up on certain objectives, and it was obvious through the

6 debate amongst us, the MPs, this plan was not a full affirmation of all

7 the previously set objectives. It was a compromise. You agreed to it

8 and after that the assembly agreed to it, too, in order to preserve

9 dialogue and the political process which made it possible to find a

10 solution by political means.

11 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Trial Chamber how our acceptance to

12 leave Yugoslavia on the basis of the Lisbon Agreement, how the Serb

13 people as a whole took that and how the assembly took that?

14 A. Of course, the Serb people took that with disbelief, primarily

15 they wished to remain within Yugoslavia and they believed in that. We,

16 the political representatives of that people, believed in the idea of

17 Yugoslavia and that proved to be the best idea for the Balkan region. It

18 is precisely the disintegration of Yugoslavia that led to major

19 destruction in the Balkans and in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

20 The Serb people, that is to say accepted this with certain feeling of

21 disquiet, but they trusted the leadership and they were absolutely

22 prepared to carry out these agreements on the condition of course that

23 peace be preserved primarily in the area.

24 Q. Would the people have accepted to give up on that condition, too,

25 that is to say the existence of our own entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 36846

1 Would the people have accepted a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, and which

2 are the peoples that would have accepted a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina?

3 A. Then, in the past and today, the Serb people reject a unitary

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I think that at the time you, as president,

5 insisted -- I mean had you insisted on that concept then you would not

6 have enjoyed any support because the Serb people needed a guarantee for

7 their status. The Serb people live -- were a relative majority in the

8 former Yugoslavia and they were supposed to be turned into a marginal

9 minority in a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina and they would have been

10 outvoted all the time and this was part of the awareness of each and

11 every individual and that is why the political solution sought by the

12 Serb people were such. You could not have gone any lower than what was

13 accepted in Lisbon. The Serb people would not have gone for that.

14 The HDZ at first pretended, trying to represent themselves as a

15 party that wanted some kind of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, there was a

16 clear objective that the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna secede from

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, the parties of the

18 Bosnian Muslims exclusively existed on a unitary system in Bosnia with a

19 clear organisation, with a central republican power and the

20 municipalities, without any kind of middle level that would have ensured

21 equal national rights in the area. Definitely today I can say that one

22 of Izetbegovic's major mistakes was that he did not take into account the

23 sincere wishes of the other peoples who were supposed to be feeling free

24 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, so his behaviour only led to increased fear in the

25 other two ethnic communities, especially the Serbs and Croats.

Page 36847

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly

2 be asked to speak slower. The pace is too fast for interpretation.

3 Thank you.

4 JUDGE KWON: Could I remind both of you to speak slowly and put a

5 pause between the questions and answers, for the benefit of the

6 interpreters and us. Thank you.

7 Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. President, at the time, and probably today as well, these two

11 communities, did they actually represent the Christian majority there and

12 how is it possible to harbour that kind of ambition to impose a unitary

13 concept upon this Christian majority by the Muslim minority?

14 MR. TIEGER: All right. I will not object to that question,

15 although I think it appears initially to call for speculation, maybe the

16 witness and the accused have discussed where they want to go so that it

17 will be a response that bears on the issues here but I may be objecting

18 to that depending on where it goes.

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the phrase "probably today as well"

20 was unnecessary. We'll see how it evolves. Or could you reformulate

21 your question, Mr. Karadzic?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm going to leave out the

23 "today."

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. At the time these two ethnic communities, did they comprise the

Page 36848

1 Christian majority, and how is it possible to expect that a unitary

2 Bosnia be imposed upon them by the Muslim minority? I beg your pardon.

3 And you established that they did not have two-thirds, but from this

4 point of view could they impose their concept upon the Christian

5 majority?

6 A. According to the census from 1991, which was never formally

7 adopted because it involved a great deal of wrong-doing, but at the time,

8 the Muslims had about 46 per cent of the population, the Serbs 33 per

9 cent, and the Croats 17 per cent. This was preliminary. And perhaps it

10 is close to the actual state of affairs which shows that indeed in the

11 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Christians were a majority. Izetbegovic

12 was, I have to go back to that again, it's a fact, his

13 Islamic Declaration says so clearly, their political struggle for an

14 Islamic state has to be one of perseverance. He didn't want to miss the

15 opportunity of promoting those objectives then either. No matter what

16 this looks like to anyone, you in the Chamber, you in the Prosecution and

17 the public, I did recognise his activities at the time and how he was

18 carrying out his political plan in an operative sense. It has elements

19 of fanaticism, too. Probably there was also a concealed support that we

20 could not see or recognise then, support that he received from elsewhere.

21 That is why he persevered in his efforts, although they were not

22 realistic at the time.

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Now, this persistence in working for

24 these objectives that were against the majority, how did this affect the

25 outbreak of the war and the war option as such? What they wanted to

Page 36849

1 achieve, could that have been achieved through voting and who needed war

2 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for which objectives?

3 A. Izetbegovic did not have a political majority; his political

4 party didn't, his partners didn't. Without a majority that is needed for

5 decisions that were -- involve representatives of the Serbs and Croats --

6 I mean, he simply did not have that kind of majority, and that is what

7 the core of the matter is as far as the outbreak of the war in

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned. Izetbegovic then started falsely

9 identifying himself as the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he tried

10 to rally international support for his project. Of course, this

11 encouraged members of his ethnic community, and it persuaded them that

12 they were right in their political objectives, as they tried to implement

13 that political project. What is well known is that within Izetbegovic's

14 political party, the so-called Patriotic League was established and it

15 started arming the Muslims. This is best attested to by the fact that

16 the first killings in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina were committed

17 on ethnic grounds, motivated by ethnic principles, and it was Serbs who

18 were killed by Bosniaks. The others, especially the Serbs, perceived

19 this as something that led to affirming the necessity of better

20 organisation in pursuing their national interests and objectives.

21 Q. [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE KWON: Could you start over again?

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Let us go back to the Cutileiro Plan or the Lisbon Agreement.

25 You said that the assembly heavy-heartedly but honestly accepted that

Page 36850

1 plan, I mean the Serbian assembly. Did that plan make possible any use

2 of force or eviction of Muslims and Croats from the territories that were

3 to become part of the Serbian entity?

4 A. Absolutely not. There is nothing like that in that plan. It was

5 very difficult for us members of parliament to accept that was because

6 the autonomy under the Cutileiro Plan was such that the territory was not

7 solid, and that gave rise to doubt among us members of parliament. But

8 there is no mention of ethnic cleansing, the eviction of other

9 ethnicities. We certainly wouldn't have opted for that kind of political

10 autonomy of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a protagonist of

11 politics at the time, I refuse any such argument, and consider such

12 allegations to be malicious insinuations.

13 Q. I'm afraid I -- I'm not sure that your words were correctly

14 interpreted. It says solid territory. Did you say that the Serbian

15 entity was to be made up of a territories that were not connected?

16 A. Yes. That was a feature of that plan and that made Serbian MPs

17 uneasy. The Serb autonomy was to be preserved but, still, we accepted

18 that as -- in our will to preserve the peace.

19 Q. The need for continuity, did it impose itself after the war broke

20 out, and what were the six strategic goals in your understanding, the

21 second of which was, I think, a continuous territory? And why was it

22 important as the war broke out, whereas before the war we accepted

23 discontinuity?

24 A. Before the war we accepted it because it meant freedom of

25 movement and communication between the individual parts. Once the war

Page 36851

1 broke out, many areas where the Serbs were the majority, such as mine,

2 were isolated and surrounded. It was logical to strive to achieve

3 continuity because only thus can you make possible political, economic,

4 and of course military life at that time. I believe that to be a

5 legitimate political goal because it was adapted to the new times. At

6 the time, the Banja Luka region was surrounded and totally isolated. We

7 couldn't communicate with other areas, economically, and for months we

8 were unable to come by oil and it wasn't possible to distribute electric

9 energy. We were without electricity for months. But if we made a

10 mistake, well, I hasten to add that even today I would whole-heartedly

11 vote for the decision we took then.

12 Q. When you spoke about your party, you said that you were party

13 chief at the regional level. This area was a centre of about

14 20 municipalities. From which time did associations of municipalities

15 exist and could the individual municipalities choose to belong to one or

16 the other?

17 A. Even before the Second World War, that area was organised

18 administer -- administratively into banovinas. In socialist Yugoslavia,

19 where there were six republics and two autonomous provinces all the

20 republics had certain powers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina there were a number

21 of associations of municipalities. They were free associations and their

22 existence was conditioned by the interests of the municipalities at the

23 time. The most obvious feature of their existence were the Chambers of

24 commerce that existed at that level and the municipalities could freely

25 choose to which association they wanted to belong. So it was up to the

Page 36852

1 decision of the local administration.

2 Q. Thank you. A short while ago you said that the Lisbon Agreement

3 did not envisage or allow violence or violent changes to the ethnic

4 make-up. Do you know any municipalities in the RS, starting from your

5 own, where the Muslim people did not, to a significant extent, leave

6 their homes until the end of the war, and what did that depend upon?

7 A. War certainly is not a normal state of affairs. War is

8 characterised by a lot of violence and chaos, and it's very difficult to

9 control chaos. It was important to prevent chaos but once it came about,

10 those in positions of responsibility had to try to contain it.

11 Unfortunately, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were many local warlords who

12 tried to interpret the situation in their way and find their own

13 responses to it. And such -- it was the same on all sides. As for your

14 question, in my municipality, there has been a small Muslim community,

15 and nobody bothered them. They didn't have any problems, especially not

16 at the beginning of the war. When their crucial problem was the issue of

17 weapons, whether those communities were armed and ready to enter into

18 conflict with the Serbian people. However, that was not the case, the

19 Muslim settlements were not bothered. And in Srbac municipality, there

20 is a small Muslim community in the village of Kobas where the Muslims

21 stayed throughout the war, and even today the majority of the population

22 there is Bosniak. It's the same with the municipalities of Gradiska,

23 Laktasi, Banja Luka. Where I live, things went the same way, and I was

24 certainly part of political life. I was a member of the War Presidency

25 of the Laktasi municipality, and I can confirm here that the Presidency

Page 36853

1 never got instructions from the republican authorities to harass other

2 ethnic communities in our area. I was an MP then, and member of the

3 Presidency, and I had contact with the Muslim community. I can speak

4 about some individuals from the time. I even gave shelter to some of

5 them in my own house, because they were scared. And I think this shows

6 that efforts were made to preserve peace and stability for all. Not all

7 Serbs interpreted that properly but I never had problems, political

8 problems, due to the fact that I had contacts and provided assistance to

9 members of other ethnicities, that is Muslims and Croats. Where I live,

10 everybody is familiar with that.

11 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. For the parties, transcript page 23,

12 line 6 and 7, Mr. Dodik, you said that "even before the Second World War,

13 this area was organised administratively into banovinas." I don't follow

14 what a "banovina" means. Could you clarify?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The former Yugoslavia was organised

16 based on an agreement that was reached at national level. Banovinas are

17 administrative units established by the then-authorities of Yugoslavia.

18 Banja Luka was the capital of the Vrbas banovina. So even then

19 Banja Luka was a regional centre, to which a number of municipalities

20 gravitated. There were other banovinas in former Yugoslavia, too.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, due to the belated start of today, we

22 are sort of pressed with time, tight with time. So can I ask you how

23 much longer do you need for your examination-in-chief?

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could speak for hours with this

25 valuable witness, but I hope that I'll need half an hour to ask him all

Page 36854

1 the most important questions, and possibly I'll need some more time

2 depending on what will happen in the cross-examination. So my answer is

3 about half an hour.

4 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is minded to take a break for 20 minutes

5 at 11.20 so I would like you to conclude by then.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellencies.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. President, did you -- or, rather, were you criticised by the

9 central bodies, that is the Presidency and so on, the government, for

10 founding your political association at Laktasi?

11 A. No. Never. There were some reactions by ordinary people who

12 weren't politically active but I never -- I was never criticised by

13 political institutions officially.

14 Q. You said that you gave shelter to some people. Can you tell the

15 Chamber why those people were afraid? Did they fear the authorities or

16 somebody else? I mean the Muslims in the Serbian areas.

17 A. They were afraid of chaos, and instability. But it was the same

18 for everybody irrespective of their ethnic affiliation. The very fact

19 that you don't have electricity for years and have to live in darkness

20 creates very strange circumstances and good preconditions for paranoia

21 and fear, and if you add to that combat activity then that really is

22 understandable. Let me mention a concrete incident. A Bosniak family

23 and a Croatian family lived at Gradiska until 1994, when a sabotage unit

24 from Croatia entered the area around Gradiska and the defence lines of

25 the Serbian army and among the Serbian population they committed some

Page 36855

1 crimes. That's when the Bosniaks and Croats became afraid, because some

2 14 Serbs had been killed in that raid. They were afraid from chaotic

3 retaliation or something of that kind. Then I sat in my own private car and

4 drove these families to Laktasi, which is some 30 kilometres or so away, and

5 gave them shelter in my house. They are still alive today and can testify.

6 I can give you their names but I don't think it's relevant for this case.

7 Q. The Defence won't ask you about their names. If necessary, you

8 can say them in closed session.

9 How far is Laktasi from the confrontation line and where did your

10 soldiers fight? Did anyone get killed?

11 A. In our municipality, in the immediate vicinity of Laktasi, there is the

12 Banja Luka airstrip. It's three and a half kilometres away or up to 1 kilometre

13 as the crow flies. In the early days of the war, the Croatian artillery shelled

14 the airstrip and there were a number of people injured and one was killed. I

15 was a member of the police at the airstrip. It was in 1992 when it was shelled

16 from Croatia. Laktasi is some 30 kilometres from the border with Croatia. Like

17 everybody at the time, the people from my municipality too were members of the

18 Serbian army and under the command of the Main Staff they were deployed according

19 to the plans in force at the time. Units from our area mostly defended the corridor

20 which for Laktasi was a matter of life and death economically and socially. And

21 the Laktasi unit was deployed from Doboj to Modrica to preserve the corridor for

22 the functioning of civilian services. Once, a Mujahedin unit composed of the

23 holy warriors of Islam raided them and killed 16 young men from my municipality

24 in a single day. I remember the day when those 16 members of our unit were

25 collectively buried. I must say that when I learned that news, I was with you

Page 36856

1 at Pale – I don’t know if you remember - and we spoke about some peace

2 initiatives. When you heard the news - I certainly remember it very vividly –

3 you said that it was very painful and people were killed in war, but that we

4 must keep a cool head and that there should be no more casualties. Naturally,

5 this was consistent with my own value judgement of such events. Of course,

6 Laktasi was affected by combat activities, and the municipality of Laktasi took

7 part in the struggle for their own economic and social life, in the framework of

8 the operations I mentioned.

9 Q. Thank you. How did the return of the bodies of those killed

10 affect the situation locally, and what did we say who was -- should not

11 come to harm due to such incidents?

12 A. Yes. I remember that. As with anyone including the Bosniaks and

13 the Croats and the Serbs of course, death is a dramatic moment in life,

14 in particular if we are talking about the numbers as high as those

15 I mentioned. I think that general sadness was visible among anyone,

16 whether the people were related to those who had been killed or not.

17 What is important and what I wish to say is that in the conversation

18 between you and me and members of my deputies group, as we were with you

19 at the time, you said that in Laktasi we should pay our respects to those

20 who had been killed but that must not cause a reaction that would

21 threaten the Bosnian Muslim community in Laktasi. That was what we

22 believed and how I understood that at the time. And it was explicitly

23 stated in such a way at the time. And that never happened indeed.

24 Q. So the safety of your Muslims was preserved?

25 A. Yes. They had no problems whatsoever.

Page 36857

1 Q. Thank you. Could you please explain a bit to the Chamber what

2 the political life was like in the assembly of Republika Srpska, whether

3 people were allowed, and did they feel free to speak openly? Were there

4 any consequences? What was it like from the point of view of freedom of

5 speech and democracy in the assembly considering that you were a fierce

6 opposition and opposed anything stupid that ever appeared?

7 A. I think that those who made analyses, and I can confirm that in

8 the assembly of Republika Srpska, from the very beginnings, the right to

9 speak out was promoted and cherished, so whoever was a member of the

10 assembly and even those who were not but were invited as guests by the

11 local officials or some other communities or representatives of various

12 social categories had the right and it was possible for them to speak

13 before the assembly. I spoke often, and my views about how to organise

14 life, especially economic life at the time, were the focus of my

15 activities. In sum, no one had any problems because he or she spoke

16 before the assembly. I want to stress that primarily there were no

17 problems coming from you as the person who was heading Republika Srpska

18 or the prime minister or anyone else. Sometimes we may have had problems

19 at the local level with inarticulate individual who did not quite

20 understand the times but it was not your responsibility. In any case,

21 I had the feeling, and so did my friends, that the assembly was

22 continuously in session, and it was not simple at all to travel at the

23 time from Laktasi to assembly sessions. You had to travel towards

24 Bijeljina along the corridor and then via Zvornik further on to Pale, if

25 it was in Pale, and very often the assembly held its sessions in

Page 36858

1 different places from Banja Luka, Novi Grad, Bileca, Zvornik and many

2 other places where assembly met, in Prijedor as well, where the assembly

3 sessions were held and where as a rule all the deputies attended.

4 Democratic discussion was pronounced especially when we needed to adopt

5 legal regulations. Your role in the assembly was to present the

6 situation to everyone and the freedom of decision making was never

7 threatened. You did not request that certain decisions be taken. It was

8 up to the assessments of the MPs. The assembly sessions lasted for many

9 hours. Sometimes they would end late at night, even before dawn. We

10 always made decisions by compromise. Sometimes it was difficult to

11 achieve those compromises, but that is only normal.

12 Q. Here, the Prosecution sometimes extracts certain sentences which

13 may sound extreme or quite sharp as they were stated by certain MPs at

14 the time. Can you tell us what were the rights that the deputies had --

15 MR. TIEGER: This is an astonishingly leading effort.

16 JUDGE KWON: Please reformulate your question.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Could the deputies freely express even extremist views and did

20 such extremist views or positions adopted in the documents that were

21 produced by the assembly?

22 A. Yes, there were quite opposed views about certain issues which

23 reflected the political life, but the resolution that was adopted was

24 always balanced. There were some extreme requests by deputies.

25 I remember that the assembly should state its mind about certain actions,

Page 36859

1 and so on, but that was never done. And in this respect, none of the

2 deputies never had -- I didn't, as perhaps someone who was the most

3 representative member of this group which held a completely different

4 political positions never had any problems except for what I just said,

5 some local inarticulate individuals who believed that they had certain

6 rights and therefore I was in some conflict with them, but this is not

7 even relevant for what we are talking about now. In any case I am proud

8 that I was a member of this assembly. I'm proud of its internal

9 functioning and precisely of the possibility to express any kind of

10 political views. In discussion with many of my colleagues, they

11 expressed a same belief and conviction. I believe that the assembly took

12 all the most important decisions, and what I could decide by analysing

13 this period ever since there is not a single decision that was made by

14 the assembly or by you as the president which was not in accordance with

15 the decisions made by the assembly.

16 Q. Thank you. Was there a document that was adopted among the

17 documents of the assembly which allowed for the possibility, let alone

18 which ordered that lawlessness should be sanctioned when dealing with

19 anyone, and in particular with minorities? Would the deputies have

20 allowed that, and could anything like have been adopted by the assembly?

21 A. In my archives, I have practically all the most important

22 decisions made at the time. They are available to the Trial Chamber and

23 the public at large. I believe - I'm convinced - that there is not a

24 single decision there that could serve as a basis for crimes, expulsions

25 or anything such. And I believe that the position towards the events is

Page 36860

1 something that is visible through the decision-making process. No one

2 ever stepped up and said, We mustn't make such a decision so that we will

3 not leave such a trace. No one ever said anything like that. We freely

4 made the decisions that were adopted, and of course you as the president

5 expressed your views as well, but I can also confirm that what you

6 advocated in the beginning in some of the sessions was not always

7 accepted in the form as you requested it. It was very often changed

8 during discussion, especially when we talk about the certain laws that

9 were adopted at the time.

10 Q. Thank you. Based on our system, is it the president's obligation

11 to attend the assembly sessions all the time, as I did during the war, or

12 does it depend on the specific occasion?

13 A. Only when requested, the president attends the assembly, and then

14 he has to take the oath. You attended all the assembly sessions, even

15 those that I did not attend though those were few. I believe that that

16 helped to ensure the stability of this institution, and the assembly was

17 definitely, with all due respect to you as the president, the assembly

18 was the most important organ at the time. I believe that it even

19 considered some issues which were the jurisdiction of the government, and

20 that it therefore extended the scope of its activities. But in any case,

21 I definitely believe that the assembly was the most important organ

22 during that period, and that it took all the most important decisions in

23 the relevant time.

24 Q. Thank you. As for the political parties, there were several of

25 those. Did your party or did the SDS order its deputies how to vote and

Page 36861

1 how to act in assembly, or were there no clubs or rather no obligations

2 to one's party during the war? How did these 83 deputies behave in terms

3 of freedom expression and acting in accordance with their own conscience?

4 A. It was known precisely who belonged to which political party.

5 Among ourselves we knew that quite well. And we respected each other

6 completely in that sense. Apart from what is mere political passion,

7 there were no special discussions or conflicts among ourselves which can

8 be seen in some other parliaments. There was nothing that could create

9 animosity or hatred between us outside of the parliament hall. We were

10 united. And on many occasions, you and the leadership of

11 Republika Srpska, not just as assembly but as the deputies as a whole,

12 you would inform us as the very delicate negotiations and talks that you

13 had with various factors from the international community about various

14 contacts and communication you had with various international forums and

15 a variety of contacts you had with other relevant factors in the region.

16 As a proof of the freedom, I might note that in 1994, deputies

17 who were not SDS members, formed an independent deputies group, and

18 formally we acted as an independent deputies group, of which I was the

19 president at the time. I then discussed with you, and you supported such

20 work in the situation, even though there were high officials in

21 Republika Srpska who did not think that it was good at the time and tried

22 to persuade us. But we did not feel any problems. We never faced any

23 problems because we set up this group and organised ourselves in such a

24 way.

25 Q. Thank you. Even though we were not formally in coalition, was

Page 36862

1 any of your members appointed to the first government in

2 Republika Srpska?

3 A. Mr. Kalinic was the president of the deputies club of the

4 alliance of reformist forces, the party that I belonged to, before the

5 war, in the assembly, and later on they became the minister of health in

6 the government of Republika Srpska which testifies to the fact that there

7 were even offers to some members of our party to be members of the

8 government, ministers in the government. For private reasons they

9 declined, but in any case, this example testifies to what that was like.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. You preserved your Muslim community in

11 Laktasi. Did you participate with some -- my representatives, people

12 I authorised, in alleviating the circumstances for the Muslims in some

13 other parts? Do you remember Mevludin Sejmenovic who was a deputy from

14 the joint assembly, and what can you tell us about your involvement and

15 my position to -- with regard to the Muslims in that part of the country,

16 the Krajina?

17 A. I apologise. I think that we had an assembly session of the

18 Republika Srpska Assembly after St. George's day, sometime in May, and it

19 was then that, together with deputy from your party, I contacted the

20 gentleman you mentioned, a Bosniak or Muslim deputy, and he was a deputy

21 of the SDA, Izetbegovic's political party, and he lived in a Banja Luka

22 suburb or he was staying there with his relatives. I went over to his

23 house and we had a discussion about that with him. He felt some fear

24 about possible further developments. We asked him to join the work of

25 the assembly of Republika Srpska as a Bosniak, which as I felt he had

Page 36863

1 already accepted, but later on he declined. Our position was that you

2 and the parliament speaker, Mr. Krajisnik, should be informed about that

3 in Banja Luka, at the army centre, where the assembly sessions were held.

4 So we sat down together, we talked about that, and you just said

5 that he was welcome and that you had no objections that he should be

6 involved in the work of the assembly. Of course, later on he did not

7 accept this, but other representatives of the authorities in

8 Republika Srpska reacted in a similar way. So unless I'm mistaken, that

9 was around the 10th or the 12th May when the assembly session was held in

10 Banja Luka, in 1992. So the war operations were still not intense and we

11 communicated with these people. As for the Muslim community in the

12 Laktasi municipality, I would like to say that at the very beginning, as

13 I said, I was the head of the police unit at the Laktasi airstrip. In

14 direct contact with us was a Bosniak populated village. There were many

15 people I knew from earlier on, and I have to say that then, as the police

16 commander at the airstrip, I learned that an unofficial group of armed

17 men intended to enter this village and square accounts with the Bosniaks,

18 so I brought my unit there and I prevented them from entering the

19 village. I was supported by all the local representatives of the

20 municipality. That was around mid-1992.

21 All the representatives of the authorities of Laktasi

22 municipality supported me in this, and practically all of them were

23 members of your party, the SDS. They remained there for quite a long

24 time, and at some point just before the war, some people from that

25 community moved out to Sweden. Others stayed. At the moment some people

Page 36864

1 have returned. And there was no violence in that particular area, and

2 I prevented one such potential act.

3 Q. Thank you. Dr. Mirza Mujadzic who was also with you in the joint

4 assembly said during his testimony here that where there were less than

5 50 per cent of them, we did not do anything to them. How --

6 MR. TIEGER: How is that not going to be a leading question?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am quoting what Mujadzic said

8 that where they were less than 50 per cent, that we never did anything to

9 them. I'm asking the witness how this fits in with what he knew.

10 JUDGE KWON: It's in itself leading. Why don't you put your

11 question?

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Mr. President, whether there would be any conflicts, what did

14 that depend on, religious affiliation or something else, say between

15 Serbs and Muslims in that area?

16 A. First of all, I am not retarded in order to need to have anything

17 suggested to me, and it's not that something can have a momentary affect

18 on me so that I could present my position. So speaking of Laktasi, that

19 would confirm the fact that where they were not armed, where they did not

20 support military activities of the Muslims, Muslims were not touched, and

21 there were no elements of conflict or crimes against them. This was not

22 only in Laktasi. It was also in Gradiska and elsewhere. You could go

23 there and see that houses remained intact there from the period before

24 the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But I know Mirza personally. He was

25 one of the more prominent activists of that party on the ground and he

Page 36865

1 organised the rebellion in Kozarac, which later led to certain things

2 that happened there, and crimes as well. At any rate this just confirms

3 what I said earlier on about Alija Izetbegovic and his

4 Islamic Declaration, and in it he says, Where we are a minority we should

5 try to keep quiet but where we are a majority we should try to --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the end.

7 JUDGE KWON: Because of your overlapping, the interpreters were

8 not able to hear the last part of the witness's answer. Could you ask

9 the witness to repeat what the interpreters missed?

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. It seems to me that they got everything: Where we are a minority

12 we should try to keep quiet and where we are a majority we should try to

13 establish our own authority. Our own way of life.

14 Is that what you said?

15 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Dodik?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Please continue.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll finish quickly, Excellency,

19 yes.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Can you tell us the following: What was put to many witnesses

22 was that the high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina disqualified them

23 from public life, from political life. Can you tell us what you know

24 about that, what you know about the activity of the high representative

25 in relation to certain officials and what the nature of that activity

Page 36866

1 was, and what the role of the high representative is in that?

2 A. The high representative of the international community was

3 established on the basis of Annex 10 of the Dayton peace agreement signed

4 by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Republika Srpska, the

5 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and some imaginary Bosnia-Herzegovina

6 that did not even exist, but the international factor at the time

7 accepted that it be represented by Izetbegovic. He did not have the

8 power to sign anything on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The high

9 representative had the role to interpret the Dayton Agreement as a

10 document of international law that was signed in Dayton, and as such, he

11 had powers to take part in the civilian implementation of that agreement.

12 The high representatives, or rather several of them, permanently, in the

13 period since that office was established, violated that agreement.

14 The best example of that is Mr. Holbrooke's assessment, what he

15 wrote in his book about his activity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And he says

16 there:

17 I went to Bosnia with a mandate of breaking up the

18 Dayton Agreement. I had 800 employees at my disposal from the office of

19 the high representative, and 35 million marks, no, dollars, per month, to

20 do that. Everybody helped me with that. My friend Chris Patten, the

21 representative of the European union, who said that the EU was asking for

22 everything I was asking for, and that is how I broke the resistance of

23 the Serbs in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the effort to create a

24 unified state, for which many people lost their lives in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Page 36867

1 I think that I have faithfully quoted him. This speaks the best

2 of the intentions of the high representatives. The mandate of the high

3 representative was supposed to be to implement Dayton, not to break it

4 up. And also in this way the Vienna agreement was violated. The high

5 representative unlawfully imposed many laws. He even intervened in

6 constitutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in this way, he served the

7 purpose of the first objective of Izetbegovic's, the creation of a

8 unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. He invoked the Bonn powers that he gave

9 himself. In the Bonn powers it says that the high representative --

10 JUDGE KWON: Our time is rather limited. The question was about

11 disqualification of certain individuals from public life. Could you deal

12 with that matter?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have time, I have

14 no limit from that point of view, but I think that this is a complex

15 issue and that this kind of introduction that I've been trying to make

16 should be made. I'm trying to say that the high representative massively

17 violated the powers that he had. He intervened in the constitution,

18 changed laws, replaced persons who had been elected, and he didn't have

19 the right to do that. He invoked the Bonn powers but that was not right.

20 The Bonn powers say that the high representative can make decisions from

21 the domain of decision making of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

22 and the council of ministers, but not in the parliament of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Throughout the civilised democratic world, it is the

24 parliament that passes laws. It is only in Bosnia-Herzegovina that the

25 high representative passed laws and dismissed people in this way. Hereby

Page 36868

1 a certain practice was established that leads to problems that Bosnia

2 faces to this day, the Venice commission also rejected this kind of

3 conduct on the part of the high representative. But he declared himself

4 to be beyond the law and above the law, and it is impossible to do

5 anything about this. And this is a good opportunity for me to say that

6 the high representative massively violated the Dayton Agreement to the

7 detriment of the Serb people and the autonomy of Republika Srpska that we

8 obtained on the basis of that agreement.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Just another brief question: During

11 your career, were you commended? Did you receive any decorations? Did

12 you receive any awards?

13 A. From the very beginning, while I was still a student, and while

14 I worked in the former Yugoslavia, I always got top honours. In the army

15 of the former Yugoslavia, where I served, I was commended as the best

16 soldier of that generation, and later on, the highest decorations of

17 Republika Srpska were bestowed upon me. You decorated me, like all other

18 members of the war parliament, and later on I also got top decorations

19 for my work from the representatives of other countries.

20 My political efforts have only been aimed at peace and

21 stabilisation. That's the way it was, as you know full well yourself

22 during the war too, and I must say that I was one of the persons who

23 advocated the acceptance of certain international agreements, although

24 they were not the very best for us. Now I'm glad that that was not

25 accepted because we would not have had this degree of protection of our

Page 36869

1 rights in that respect. I consider this to be quite normal in political

2 activity, that with regard to different questions there are different

3 attitudes.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, at this point in

6 time I have no further questions for President Dodik.

7 JUDGE KWON: We will have a break for 20 minutes. But before

8 that, Mr. Dodik, I was informed indirectly through the Registrar that you

9 should leave around 3.00. Could you confirm that? Tell us how late you

10 can stay at the Tribunal today.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For as long as necessary. Well,

12 before that was the tentative time, but since there is a government plane

13 waiting for me, I can extend that time, no problem whatsoever.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I appreciate it. We'll have a break for

15 20 minutes and resume at 10 to 12.00.

16 --- Recess taken at 11.31 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 11.52 a.m.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

19 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. Good morning,

20 Your Honours.

21 Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

22 Q. Good morning, Mr. Dodik.

23 A. Good morning.

24 Q. Mr. Dodik, first I wanted to simply put on the record what those

25 of us in the courtroom were aware of, but the Trial Chamber would not

Page 36870

1 have known and that is that with the permission of security, you had an

2 opportunity before court began to greet and kiss Mr. Karadzic, that is

3 before the Judges entered the first time.

4 Mr. Dodik, today, as has been our practice, I have the

5 opportunity to ask you certain questions about your evidence, and

6 I expect to focus on very particular issues and the Judges encourage us

7 to cover them as efficiently as possible. And in that connection, let me

8 advise you that we have the benefit of both your previous testimony in

9 the Brdjanin case, and a previous recorded interview you gave to the OTP

10 in 2003 that you also confirmed during the course of the Brdjanin case.

11 So it's my intention to focus, if not exclusively, for the most part on

12 information you've provided before in the hopes of maximising the

13 efficiency -- the efficient use of the time we have. Now I mention that

14 in part because I am -- by simply citing you or referring you to

15 something you said before, that doesn't mean I'm asking you to repeat it

16 or further elaborate on it. I'm trying to focus on very specific issues.

17 And although I don't wish to interrupt you, if we stray beyond the

18 questions raised, I will do so in the interests of maximising the

19 efficient use of our limited time. Fair enough?

20 A. I understand this. However, I reject any possibility of you

21 quoting any of my previous statements. We have already discussed that

22 when I testified in the Brdjanin case. I told you that I have not signed

23 it, that I haven't authorised it, and if you continue to use documents of

24 that kind I'm going to consider it a -- really something that I cannot

25 accept.

Page 36871

1 Q. Mr. Dodik, I tried to be very clear in telling you that I had --

2 I intended to use only information that you provided that had been

3 recorded and transcribed, so that there is no question of your having

4 concern that it wasn't something you said, okay? So that's what I wanted

5 to let you know at the outset. My references will only be to such

6 information.

7 So let's begin.

8 A. All right. I said, and of course I can confirm that we did have

9 a conversation. However I've never signed this, I've never authorised

10 it, and that is why I think you should focus your question on other

11 things and not to refer to that particular report.

12 Q. Mr. Dodik, for the third time I'm saying I don't have the

13 intention of referring to that report.

14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Why don't you start your

15 cross-examination.

16 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. All right.

17 Q. First of all, Mr. Dodik, let me ask you if you accept or deny or

18 claim you don't have any information one way or another that massive

19 crimes were committed by Bosnian Serb forces against Bosnian Muslims and

20 Bosnian Croats during the course of the war and as we will be discussing

21 in 1992?

22 A. We had a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and military forces

23 were organised of both the Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats. All

24 three sides violated the laws of war and committed crimes.

25 Q. All right. Given your political background, let me ask you some

Page 36872

1 questions about the political structures and authorities that were

2 operative in the area of Republika Srpska generally and then -- and more

3 specifically in the area where you resided.

4 First of all, with respect to the SDS generally, which was

5 discussed to some extent during your examination-in-chief today,

6 that's -- you talked about the hierarchy and organisation of the SDS

7 during the course of the Brdjanin case, and do you confirm that you said

8 the following: First, that "this was a firmly organised political party

9 with clear cut hierarchy and superiority"? That, "the SDS was a compact,

10 well structured organisation in which the hierarchy was respected," and

11 that "the party was internally highly homogenised and it functioned in a

12 highly disciplined fashion"?

13 And for benefit of the parties those references are found at

14 transcript pages 20468, 20542 and 20469.

15 A. The SDS was formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the establishment

16 of the Party of Democratic Action. It won the elections. It was one of

17 the winners precisely because it was as you mentioned and as I earlier

18 claimed that it was.

19 Q. Further, the party was controlled from the top, asked that

20 question in Brdjanin, you said, "Yes, absolutely. Mr. Karadzic was

21 president of the party which had its Main Board." That's at 20468. And

22 you also said at 20474, "The top, leadership of SDS headed by Karadzic

23 was at that time the uncontested leadership."

24 Those are also correct propositions; right?

25 A. Well, I am also the uncontested president in my political party.

Page 36873

1 Hierarchy is observed and this is normal for any political party, so I do

2 not see what I need to confirm here. I said that I mentioned this about

3 the pre-election campaigns when I was in one political party and he was

4 in another, and so we fought as opponents of different political parties.

5 They were well organised political party just like the SDA was and the

6 HDZ and the Reformist Party and the party organs were respected and

7 hierarchy was observed, then as it is today.

8 Q. And in that connection, you also testified in the Brdjanin case

9 that if the Main Board issued instructions the municipal boards and the

10 regional boards were obliged to carry out those instructions. That's at

11 20468.

12 A. Once again, I do not understand why you're asking me a question

13 about something that is included in the statute of that political party

14 and in the statutes of all other political parties. Yes, it's quite

15 logical that a political party, a political organisation, with a clear

16 structure -- that the decisions of the highest organs are observed by the

17 lower rank party structure. I don't see how the SDS is different in that

18 from any other political party or structure.

19 Q. Now, you confirmed at page 25 -- 20514 in your Brdjanin testimony

20 that you gave a tape recorded interview to the OTP in July of 2003, and

21 I wanted to ask you about it in addition to some of the things you said

22 there. Because during the course of that discussion, you explained some

23 of the ways in which the SDS hierarchy was effected and among the things

24 you said, when you were asked if you could provide a sense of the

25 hierarchy and -- of the SDS and how it controlled the regions and then

Page 36874

1 the local municipalities, you said:

2 "Well, it's quite clear. They had their own people in the

3 municipalities, that is the municipal board, presidents of the municipal

4 boards and the leadership of these boards, and they were elected with the

5 full approval of Karadzic and the leadership from Pale. Otherwise they

6 couldn't have been elected."

7 And that's found at --

8 A. Where can that be found?

9 Q. It can be found at page 16 in English and B/C/S of 65 ter 24921.

10 Do you need to see that, Mr. Dodik, or can you confirm it without a --

11 that that's an accurate assessment that you made at the time and that it

12 is what you said?

13 A. Well, I asked you not to use that report because it isn't

14 authorised. I don't -- I cannot back it up and you're suggesting certain

15 answers which you shouldn't do. I did have that conversation, but I did

16 not authorise its authenticity. I think that you're trying to trap me

17 here. As far as the SDS is --

18 JUDGE KWON: Can I advise you that it is for the Prosecution to

19 put their material to you, but you're free to answer in the way you like

20 to answer. You can say that it was true that you said so, or you can

21 say -- you could say otherwise. Do you understand that, Mr. Dodik?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand it quite well,

23 sir. But I don't understand the intention, because a long time back, in

24 2003, and the Brdjanin case, the Prosecutor and I spoke about this topic

25 and we said what I have repeated now, that he should not refer to this

Page 36875

1 conversation, and he replied, Okay, fair enough. I'll try you -- I'll

2 ask you the same question, it's a question with the same content, but

3 without referring to this conversation or interview. The SDS certainly

4 had a strong structure just like all political parties and I'm trying to

5 think what could be so specific. Of course, nobody can become president

6 of a municipal board without my approval. So, yeah, it must have been

7 like that in the SDS, but the only contentious thing here is that report.

8 MR. TIEGER:

9 Q. And I'm going to try once more to clarify this for you,

10 Mr. Dodik, so we don't have an unnecessary problem. First of all,

11 I think the reference that you made to the lawyer saying it was okay to

12 proceed in another way was to something Mr. Ackerman asked you, the

13 Defence attorney. But more importantly, for this purpose, that was a

14 reference to the interview over the course of four days that you did not

15 sign, and that was what you asked not to be asked about, and that's what

16 Mr. Ackerman agreed not to ask you about. But both -- but the taped

17 interview that was conducted shortly before you testified in Brdjanin was

18 indeed the subject of discussion. You confirmed it. Your words are on

19 there. So that's a different matter. That's why I indicated to you

20 today, knowing your sensitivity about the earlier statement which you did

21 not sign, that I did not intend to ask you about that but only about

22 matters that had been -- that you had -- where you had stated something

23 and it had been recorded. Perhaps that assists.

24 A. I didn't even know that it was taped.

25 Q. Well, you -- as I said, at page 20514, you --

Page 36876

1 JUDGE KWON: Shall we upload it?

2 MR. TIEGER: Absolutely.

3 JUDGE KWON: 65 ter number?

4 MR. TIEGER: 65 ter 24921.

5 Q. Why don't we look at the first page, 24921, right. And as we can

6 see from the first page it provides the date of the interview and the

7 persons present and it begins by saying, "Now, Mr. Dodik, are you aware

8 this conversation is being tape recorded?" And you say, "Yes, I am."

9 And you were asked, "And we have your permission?" And you say, "Yes,

10 you do."

11 That's the interview that I'm referring to in addition to your

12 Brdjanin testimony.

13 A. I don't remember.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I can discuss any topic but I see that you insist on this

16 interview. But go ahead, whichever way you think fit. You could have

17 written anything in there.

18 Q. It's all on tape, Mr. Dodik. You want to hear the very beginning

19 to hear your own voice and to hear your agreement that it can be taped?

20 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson? Just a second. Yes,

23 Mr. Robinson.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. I would suggest

25 Mr. Tieger just ask the witnesses the substance of what he wants to know.

Page 36877

1 If it's inconsistent with something that's in that recording he can use

2 it at that time, but we are expending a huge amount of time putting prior

3 statement to a witness. It's only supposed to be put to a witness when

4 there is an inconsistency or a need to refresh his recollection. So if

5 Mr. Tieger can simply put the proposition of the question without

6 reference to any statement or testimony if he doesn't get the answer that

7 he wants he can then go and take that next step. I think we would all

8 benefit from that procedure.

9 MR. TIEGER: Mr. President, that is not --

10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I can assist in finding a

12 solution. There are two interviews, and the witness must be told which

13 one was tape recorded because the Prosecution interviewed President Dodik

14 twice. I have one of these interviews before me, but this is not the one

15 I see.

16 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Tieger was clear about that point but as

17 to the way in which Prosecution put its proposition, it is Defence's

18 position to ask for the references. I think what -- that's what

19 Mr. Tieger was doing, but I'll leave it to Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Let's try to proceed and maybe we had some

21 unnecessary friction and we will have better luck in eliciting

22 information as we proceed.

23 Q. It was also the case with respect to the SDS hierarchy that the

24 SDS had their people posted in the media, in the police, and other

25 structures; correct?

Page 36878

1 A. They were the party that was in power, and it was normal for them

2 to do that. Yes, it is correct.

3 Q. And at one point, there were commissioners appointed to the

4 municipalities who were people from the core leadership or connected to

5 the core leadership, who had the power to give orders to the local

6 authorities and the organs of authority; correct?

7 A. I know that there were commissioners, but the way I understood it

8 they were commissioners for the political party. I said earlier that

9 I was a member of the War Presidency, but I was not in the position to

10 get such orders from these people.

11 Q. It is true that you knew the commissioner for your area, that is

12 Gradiska, Laktasi, and Srbac, and that person had the power to give

13 orders to the local authorities and the organs of authority, isn't that

14 right, because that's what you said at page 16 through 17 of

15 P24921 [sic], the recorded interview.

16 A. Answering to the previous question, I explained how I saw these

17 commissioners. Yes, I know who was there, and the SDS got almost

18 90 per cent of the votes. He worked with the party structure, and knew

19 what the decisions of the executive power would be, but I can repeat that

20 it's a normal thing even today in many countries.

21 Q. Now, with respect to issues of discipline or control, it's

22 correct, is it not, that SDS members who didn't agree with decisions were

23 minimised or rendered passive, and that differing views were not

24 tolerated in the period late 1991 to the fall of 1992, and that those

25 references can be found in the Brdjanin testimony at 20470 and 20542.

Page 36879

1 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just for Mr. Tieger's

2 benefit, it's not necessary to give us the references unless we ask for

3 it. I think that would make things simpler.

4 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Can you answer the question, Mr. Dodik?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. All that time, and

6 even now, I'm a member of another political party. Speaking about

7 another political party must be seen as a political discourse, and not

8 everything that we say about our political opponents is trustworthy. The

9 SDS was and still is a party with a clearly defined structure and party

10 discipline must be abided by. I think it's normal that whoever dissents

11 is marginalised or expelled from the party. It's the same thing in

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia. Wherever there are problems within

13 a political party, the minority must either keep quiet or leave that

14 party. That's normal.

15 MR. TIEGER:

16 Q. And it's also true that in the context of 1991 and then moving

17 into 1992 with the conflict, that the use of the term "traitor" or the

18 power of the term "traitor" was also present in terms of the exercise of

19 party control; right?

20 A. That word was used even more widely in the whole society, and it

21 was used by the Bosniaks, too, and the Croats, and so did we. I don't

22 see what is less than normal there. Yes, I can confirm that, but I don't

23 think it was anything special or abnormal.

24 Q. And one of the consequences of that approach was that those who

25 didn't follow the SDS programme were considered traitors, and there were

Page 36880

1 various ways of ensuring loyalty. For example, if you were not with them

2 then the threat was that you could be immediately mobilised and thrown to

3 the most dangerous part of the front, correct?

4 A. Yes, there were such cases, of course. But it was not the rule.

5 I know of some such cases. But it was more at a local level, possibly as

6 the result of other things, too, not only obedience. But in such a

7 chaotic situation as the war even, there was such cases too, yes.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was not recorded that the

9 witness said the result of animosity.

10 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Dodik, can I ask you again to speak more slowly.

11 Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

12 MR. TIEGER: For the record there is a reference earlier to

13 P24921. It should be 65 ter 24921 so we don't have to make a later

14 correction.

15 Q. Mr. Dodik, let me ask you then about some of the reflections or

16 expressions of these principles or approaches in the context of the area

17 where you resided, that is in the Krajina region. First of all, as you

18 testified to at some length in the Brdjanin case, the -- in the Krajina

19 region there was the Autonomous Region of Krajina and as we will discuss

20 the autonomous region of Krajina Crisis Staff; right?

21 A. There were Crisis Staffs.

22 Q. And the autonomous region of Krajina was a reflection of SDS

23 efforts and interests; correct? It was something that the SDS, that had

24 been present with the SDS for quite some time, even before its formal

25 creation?

Page 36881

1 A. I cannot confirm that, but I've already said that there was a war

2 and a crisis going on, I said that the Krajina was completely isolated,

3 that it had no communication, it did not have enough electricity or oil.

4 It was very hard to keep life going, and of course these questions had to

5 be resolved. The SDS was the leading political party in the area, but

6 today and before I said to you that I was part of that structure in my

7 municipality as a member of the National Assembly. I was duty-bound to

8 take part in the work of these institutions. We dealt with questions

9 that had to do with these economic and social aspects of life.

10 Q. Sorry, sir, but I want to focus on the autonomous region of

11 Krajina for a moment, not the National Assembly. Let me ask the question

12 a different way. The idea of creating certain autonomous regions was

13 very present in the then-governing party that represented the Serbian

14 people, and that was the SDS; right?

15 A. The regions existed earlier on and it was known exactly what

16 Krajina, Semberija, Posavina, Herzegovina were, what the Neretva region

17 was, and so on. So as an idea to establish a new social order, the idea

18 of these regions did not exist as such, but the idea of establishing

19 these regions with a view to the organisation of life, I believe that

20 that was the core of the matter.

21 Q. And you -- and the -- it's the case that the decisions that were

22 brought there, that is of the autonomous region of Krajina Crisis Staff

23 or assembly, were basically discussed and agreed on before that in the

24 SDS, and the SDS had indeed established a very strict party discipline in

25 that regard? That's correct, isn't it?

Page 36882

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. How can the witness

2 know what happened in the party, in another party that was a political

3 adversary? It is speculation that is being asked for.

4 JUDGE KWON: I think --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is to be assumed -- I mean, I'm

6 speaking on the basis of the experience of my own party, political

7 parties, if you will, speak -- function in a similar way before going --

8 before parliament. They have discussions and agree how they are going to

9 position themselves in parliament. I think that that's what we do today

10 and that's what we did before, and that's the way things have been ever

11 since multi-party systems in the world came into being. So why would

12 anyone suggest anything to the deputies club? Before every session of

13 parliament, my political party has a session to see how they are going to

14 position themselves regarding particular issues that are to be discussed.

15 So I assume that that is the case with the SDS. So at these levels from

16 the level of the municipality to the level of the autonomous region of

17 Krajina, I cannot confirm that Mr. Karadzic was ever present and that he

18 took part in the decision-making process of these organs. I don't know

19 about that. Perhaps somebody else knows about that, but I do not know

20 and I cannot say that he was in charge of these organs in that way. As

21 for political parties, from the point of view of regional interest,

22 members of parliament can behave any way they think that they should

23 behave.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the speaker please

25 be asked to speak slower. It is too fast for interpretation for the

Page 36883

1 record.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Dodik, again asked by the interpreters to speak

3 more slowly.

4 Mr. Karadzic, I was about to overrule your objection but the

5 witness has answered the question in any event. I take it Mr. Tieger was

6 putting his -- this question based upon his -- Mr. Dodik's previous

7 statement or testimony, so -- and Mr. Robinson didn't ask for the

8 reference. So that was the reason why I was about to overrule your

9 objection. Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

10 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Q. Mr. Dodik, you seem to be suggesting here, perhaps in response to

12 what Mr. Karadzic said, that what you say about the Autonomous Region of

13 Krajina, its hierarchy and input, was based on assumptions, but that's

14 not what you said in the Brdjanin case when you testified at length about

15 the Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff, for example. So you said

16 at page 20493, as far -- that -- that what you stated was, as far as I

17 knew the situation in relationships there and that's what I inferred on

18 the basis of many conversations with people who then and later confirmed

19 such impressions. Or you said at page 20516 in response to questions

20 from Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Brdjanin's attorney, so can we save a little bit

21 of time he said so can I understand that when you say you have this

22 opinion or impression it's based not only upon your observations at the

23 time but on your conversations with people since that time, am I correct

24 in that? In other words you're not just guessing it's based on something

25 you observed and heard? Now, that's what you said in Brdjanin and you

Page 36884

1 confirmed that that was correct.

2 A. I have a proposal. You have what I said in the Brdjanin case and

3 that's okay. What's the difference between what I said in response to

4 that question before and what you said just now? Of course,

5 I communicated. I was not isolated and it's only logical that I talk to

6 other people about these questions. From this position, I believe that

7 that is quite normal, that a political party, before it makes decisions

8 in the legislation and in government, that they see what their views are

9 going to be and behave accordingly. I see no lack of consistency in that

10 respect and with small modifications, basically the essence is the same.

11 Q. All right. You also mentioned in your earlier response something

12 about whether or not Mr. Karadzic was present or took part in the

13 decision-making process of the ARK Crisis Staff. Mr. Brdjanin was

14 president of the ARK Crisis Staff, and Mr. Brdjanin could not have become

15 president of the ARK Crisis Staff without the blessing and authorisation

16 of Radovan Karadzic; correct?

17 A. We can just make assumptions about that. I don't know what your

18 information is. But I think that Brdjanin was chosen by the

19 Crisis Staff. Whether there were interparty consultations, that is

20 something I can just assume but I cannot confirm that.

21 Q. Mr. Dodik, that is precisely what you said on the

22 17th of July, 2003, in the tape-recorded interview at page 6 of the --

23 excuse me, page 7 in e-court of the B/C/S.

24 JUDGE KWON: It's in front of us. Why don't we see the page? Is

25 this part where the witness said, "I don't think so"?

Page 36885

1 MR. TIEGER: Correct.

2 Q. Now, those were your words at the time. Now, Mr. Dodik --

3 JUDGE KWON: Did you find the passage, Mr. Dodik?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, and I'm not interested. I've

5 already told you that I did not authorise this and I don't stand by this

6 and you use it whichever way you want.

7 JUDGE KWON: No. It is a tape recorded interview as you saw

8 before. This passage reads like this:

9 "Could Brdjanin have become president of the ARK Crisis Staff

10 without the blessing or authorisation of Radovan Karadzic?"

11 And you answer:

12 "I don't think so."

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There you go. So what did

14 I confirm?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure that this translation

16 is right. He said, "I don't believe so." He did not say, "I don't think

17 so. "

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not make any assertions. If

19 I said I don't think so, it's just an assumption.

20 JUDGE KWON: It is for the Prosecution now to put their

21 questions. So could you listen to the question and try to answer the

22 question. Yes, please continue, Mr. Tieger.

23 MR. TIEGER: All right.

24 Q. As long as we are on the subject of assertions, you also went on

25 to say, as I believe you did in Brdjanin as well, that you considered

Page 36886

1 Dr. Vukic to be, from a practical point of view, a more important person

2 on the ARK Crisis Staff than Mr. Brdjanin because Dr. Vukic was the

3 president of the SDS; correct?

4 A. This is what it says here. I think it is him. That's what you

5 should have said. I think that he is the president of the party then --

6 had a very important role in terms of certain matters, the most important

7 one, that is what is written here. That is what I say, "I think." I'm

8 not saying "I assert" or "I claim."

9 Q. And then you went on to say, he - he meaning Dr. Vukic - had to

10 have full support and absolute support of the approval of Karadzic

11 because without it, he couldn't have been the president which also gave

12 him power at the local level. That's what you said in July 2003;

13 correct?

14 A. Yes, correct. That is written here, and in the context, yes,

15 this would be correct, so I think that's the way it was but I could not

16 know of all the internal relations of the SDS because I was not a member

17 of the SDS, and I had information only based on contacts with people and

18 that's why I said here very precisely that that's what I think. I did

19 not make any assertions though. Now I think that was not the case.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please

21 be asked to speak slower?

22 MR. TIEGER:

23 Q. And it was further your understanding at that time that in 1992,

24 the municipal Crisis Staffs functioned jointly with the regional

25 Crisis Staff and that the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to

Page 36887

1 the local Crisis Staffs were respected; correct? And you can find that

2 at the next few lines as well.

3 A. Well, the organisation we discussed a moment ago, to organise

4 economic and social life, that seems quite normal.

5 Q. Well --

6 A. Can you imagine what it would have been like had everybody done

7 whatever they wanted? Of course, there was some co-ordination. I know

8 of some certain economic matters where there were some joint decisions

9 and that is not being contested.

10 Q. Well, actually I wasn't asking you about your earlier testimony

11 about the Association of Municipalities, but I was asking you about the

12 ARK Crisis Staff and I was asking you specifically about your assertion

13 in July of 2003 that the orders that the regional Crisis Staff gave to

14 the local Crisis Staffs were respected. That's what you said then. That

15 was the case; right?

16 A. I believe that it is so.

17 Q. Now, you also discussed -- let me ask you this: It was also the

18 case that you discussed in your -- you were aware of an article on the

19 27th of February which was brought to your attention, that is an article

20 that was published on the 27th of February, 1992, that was brought to

21 your attention during the course of the Brdjanin case involving issues

22 between Mr. Krajisnik and Brdjanin in that latter part of February 1992.

23 Do you recall that?

24 A. I came here as a witness in Mr. Karadzic's case. I was not

25 preparing for either Brdjanin or Krajisnik. At any rate, well, I don't

Page 36888

1 remember.

2 Q. All right.

3 A. Maybe, but I did not --

4 Q. This is about Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Dodik. And I only mention that

5 to place it in temporal context for you, because it was around that time,

6 wasn't it, that Mr. Karadzic came to Banja Luka to discipline the

7 Banja Luka organisation, and after that the organisation came under the

8 direct control of the top leadership in Pale; correct?

9 A. Karadzic often came to Banja Luka, and I believe that they did

10 have these interparty discussions, but that is a bit different from what

11 you said a moment ago, that there was subordination, so it's either one

12 or the other. I don't know what they did at that meeting but it's only

13 logical that the SDS of Banja Luka and the SDS of -- at republican level

14 have co-ordination and co-operation and hierarchy, and I don't see

15 anything problematic there.

16 Q. Well, there may not be any problematic aspects from your point of

17 view about co-operation and co-ordination, but as you noted and then

18 seemed to dispute, I was asking you about a kind of hierarchical issue.

19 And the reality, Mr. Dodik, is that the portion of what I said that you

20 seemed to dispute was precisely what you testified to in the Brdjanin

21 case, where you said, again as I mentioned before, in the context of a

22 discussion that had began in connection with an interview of 27 -- that

23 is a newspaper interview of 27 February 1992, you said:

24 "Later on, Karadzic came to Banja Luka to discipline the

25 Banja Luka organisation, and after that the organisation came under the

Page 36889

1 direct control of the top leadership in Pale."

2 And you were asked when that was, and you said:

3 "I know it was around those days and months, maybe May 1992."

4 That's at 20544. So those were your words [overlapping speakers]

5 A. Okay. What's the problem? Did I say that I did not read that

6 about Brdjanin? What I said then you really don't have to make the

7 effort. Again, I'm prepared to sign everything that was said in the

8 Brdjanin case, so I'm not denying that. I did not assume at all that you

9 would be using that as the basic document in this examination because

10 I expected us to talk about what I knew about Mr. Karadzic's work.

11 However, in order to resolve the matter, and your efforts to prove my

12 inconsistency, I am telling you that the stenographic notes of my

13 Brdjanin testimony is something that I fully confirm but don't expect me

14 to remember each and every word that I uttered seven or eight years ago.

15 I really don't see anything problematic in that. I have no problem with

16 that. What I said before the Trial Chamber in the Brdjanin case, I stand

17 by that. I really cannot remember every sentence, every event. Don't

18 expect me to do that.

19 Q. I'm not trying to -- it's not a memory quiz, Mr. Dodik.

20 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Robinson is on his feet.

21 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if it would be of any assistance --

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

23 MR. ROBINSON: If it would be of any assistance we would agree

24 that his entire transcript of his testimony in the Brdjanin case can be

25 admitted in this case.

Page 36890

1 JUDGE KWON: Let's proceed.

2 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

3 MR. TIEGER:

4 Q. Mr. Dodik, it's not a memory quiz. I'm not trying to catch you

5 in what you can remember or not, but as you mentioned you wanted to talk

6 about Mr. Karadzic's work and you talked about some aspects of what you

7 consider to be his work. I'm talking about other aspects of his work,

8 which I'm entitled to do.

9 Again, it's also the case that the ARK assembly regulated all

10 segments of life, and decisions were passed and observed by the

11 municipalities that were members of the group; right?

12 A. Is that what the record of my testimony in the Brdjanin case

13 says?

14 Q. Yes, I can read it verbatim.

15 A. Then -- well, it's correct. No, no, no. It's all right.

16 I agree with everything that was said in that case. You can read out the

17 entire transcript. I'll just keep crying out yes. It's not a problem.

18 So whatever was said there I stand by it. Every single word. And I'm

19 not at a quiz. I know that perfectly well. I have come here to do a

20 serious job as a responsible man, to talk about what I know about this,

21 and I'm trying to be consistent in that and not to create confusion. So

22 we have a very simple situation. What I said in the Brdjanin case is

23 something that I stand by. You don't have to prove anything. Everything

24 that the transcript records is correct.

25 Q. Okay. But it's helpful -- thank you for that and I appreciate

Page 36893

1 MR. TIEGER:

2 Q. Thank -- thank you for that clear indication, Mr. Dodik. So with

3 respect to the issue of people posted in the police, it's correct then

4 that the following is true, that the fame and notoriety of Ljuban's group

5 was very strong everywhere in Banja Luka and everyone lived in fear of

6 that group. Now, that was -- they became part of the police, right, as a

7 special unit; correct?

8 A. Yes. Yes. I mean, he -- it wasn't a special group and then

9 became the police. He was the police from the very beginning.

10 Q. And he, that is Ecim, was on the one hand Karadzic's protege in

11 Banja Luka; and on the other hand, he was very close to Arkan and his

12 people. He, meaning Ecim, managed to create the impression that he was

13 Karadzic's person there and that he was untouchable. And that's all

14 correct; isn't it?

15 A. He has said, well, that he managed to create this impression.

16 Now, whether it was so, it's something to be determined. The events

17 indicate that he did have certain contacts with Arkan and that's also a

18 fact.

19 Q. In -- what I just quoted -- what I just stated was, in fact, a

20 quote from your testimony in Brdjanin as we've discussed before, and then

21 you further elaborated on that saying:

22 "Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic, Mandic, Zupljanin and Ecim were

23 part of one small compact team, and they were the most powerful people on

24 their respective levels at the time."

25 And that was correct; right?

Page 36894

1 A. Of course that they were the most powerful people; each one of

2 them in his respective level of responsibility.

3 Q. They were part of one small, compact team. You stated that under

4 oath also in Brdjanin; right?

5 A. Well, if that's what it says there, then I did state that of

6 course.

7 Q. Now, I noted earlier, before asking you about the people that the

8 SDS had posted in the police, which we just discussed to some extent,

9 that you had also confirmed that they had their people posted in the

10 media and I wanted to ask you some quick questions about that. First of

11 all, the -- there was censorship of the media and control of the media,

12 that is there was control up to the level of censorship, by the

13 Ministry of Information, that is Mr. Ostojic, so that only what was

14 suited to the authorities was published; right? And I think you were

15 pretty clear about your position on propaganda in the Brdjanin case.

16 A. Well, if that's recorded in the transcript, I stand by that, too.

17 But now I can understand it from this point in time that it's quite

18 logical that during wartime people act in this way. That was how the

19 Croats acted, too, not just in Bosnia but in Croatia as well. That was

20 how the Bosniaks acted as well. They had an influence on their media.

21 It was also a sort of propaganda. That was what Milosevic was doing,

22 everyone was. Slovenia was doing that, too, when it was preparing its

23 secession from Yugoslavia led by Jelko Kacin, who is now an MP in the

24 European parliament. He was the chief of the propaganda bureau for the

25 violent secession, and today he's a European parliamentarian. So today

Page 36895

1 I understand that this is something quite normal, that in time when you

2 have such authorities and such things are happening, then information is

3 shaped in a specific way, and everyone was doing that.

4 Q. And more specifically, in the area where you were, that is in the

5 Krajina area or the Banja Luka area, there was the newspaper "Glas" and

6 it -- "Glas" was only used for -- as propaganda, that is for propaganda

7 purposes of the Serbian Democratic Party; correct?

8 A. It could be found that about that paper. Is that recorded in the

9 transcript that that's what I said.

10 Q. It is recorded at 65 ter 24921 --

11 A. All right, all right. If it's recorded then it's fine. It's all

12 right. You don't have to ask me. Everything is fine. So if that's what

13 is recorded there, everything is all right, and you don't have to ask me

14 any questions.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please receive

16 complete information about whether he said that in his testimony or if

17 it's from his interview.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, this is the transcript from

19 the Brdjanin case.

20 MR. TIEGER:

21 Q. No, Mr. Dodik, that was the tape recorded transcript which has

22 been transcribed; that is your words in B/C/S were transcribed into B/C/S

23 again. You can see them if you want, but it is -- it's not something

24 that someone thought they heard, it's a tape recorded interview.

25 I wanted to ask you quickly about a particular --

Page 36896

1 A. If you're trying to combine one and the other, I can understand

2 that is your job, but what I'm trying to say here is that what I said in

3 front of this respected Court before is something that I stand by, and

4 also what I talked about with you in various situations is something that

5 I never authorised. I never signed such a statement, and in that respect

6 I cannot accept that this should be a basis for a claim for or against

7 something. And thanks to Mr. Karadzic for his interventions, I have the

8 impression that through these questions you're trying to relay only on

9 what I said in the Brdjanin case. Once again in front of this

10 Honourable Court I want to say that whatever I said in the Brdjanin case

11 and whatever has been recorded here is something that I stand by, and

12 with respect to that, I see no problem at all. Except that I apologise,

13 I did not manage to remember every single detail. But once again

14 I repeat, if that's what is recorded I'll stand by that.

15 Q. I'll be more than happy to bring your attention to the

16 distinction between the two. I understand your position now that simply

17 because you said it can't be necessarily trusted, and then I'll bring to

18 your attention what you stated verbatim and then you can tell us whether

19 you stand by that or not. So is it the case that very often, that the

20 SDS -- is it the case that the SDS presented itself as the protecter of

21 the Serbian people, said that the Serbian people had to be protected from

22 the Ustasha and other massacres, would go back to stories from

23 World War II, but factually and in essence the idea was to gain power and

24 to gain control over the whole area and to rule through the social

25 institutions? Accurate or not?

Page 36897

1 A. Legitimate political struggle, which implies of course legitimate

2 means, assessments of events at the time among the Serbian people, there

3 was tremendous fear from the rehabilitation of the Ustasha traditions

4 because the memories of the Second World War were still quite fresh in

5 the Krajina region. The Serbs had perished in great numbers in the

6 Ustasha camp, Jasenovac, and the fear was more articulated through the

7 people's conviction that it was possible that the crime against the Serbs

8 would be repeated. And the Serbian Democratic Party, as a political

9 party, believed that this fear was relevant, and of course it responded

10 to it.

11 So nothing is incorrect, nothing is anti-democratic about it if

12 political option is trying to represent itself as the protecter of the

13 people's national interests. This is what I'm doing in political

14 practice in my political work nowadays. It is just that the frameworks

15 are different or the moment is different with regard to this.

16 Q. Well, that was said at P -- in P24921, at pages 13 of the --

17 excuse me, at pages 3 of both the English and B/C/S but I wanted to move

18 on very quickly to a specific example of the creation of a special

19 atmosphere. Do you remember the arrival of the SOS in the Banja Luka

20 area in April of 1992?

21 A. Of course I do. I talked about that as the then member of the

22 police, at the Banja Luka airstrip. I was aware that they had arrived in

23 the area.

24 Q. As a back drop to the questions I want to ask you, let's see if

25 we can agree on that, that they came in as an armed group, they blocked

Page 36898

1 the town, that they made certain demands, that a Crisis Staff was formed

2 and acquiesced immediately to their demands; is that all correct so far?

3 A. If I said it was so in the Brdjanin case, then it's fine. Now

4 I do not remember any more.

5 Q. Well, the most detailed information on that is available in your

6 tape-recorded interview so I'm not going to suggest that this was -- that

7 I'm relying, in particular, on your Brdjanin testimony, but that's why

8 I asked you about these very broad facts about the arrival and activities

9 of the SOS. You can confirm that much, can't you, that they were armed,

10 they blocked the town, they demanded -- made demands including -- made

11 certain demands, that a Crisis Staff was formed consisting of highly

12 placed Bosnian Serb officials, and they acquiesced virtually immediately

13 to those demands?

14 A. It was quite a long time ago. It's possible that it was like

15 that but I really cannot assert that now because quite a lot of time has

16 passed since, and I cannot confirm any of the details any longer.

17 Q. Okay. Well, if we have more time I could put the specific quotes

18 in front of you as a backdrop to what I'm going to ask you, but we can,

19 keeping with our own practice, have those admitted to the Court. But you

20 also noted in 2003 that these demands by this armed group, the SOS, were

21 "practically the same as the SDS policy"; right?

22 A. I said that much time has elapsed. I would have to be reminded

23 of all facts and then speak about it. It was long ago. I cannot

24 confirm. But I repeat: If it was said in the Brdjanin case then I stand

25 by it, but I can't confirm it off the top of my head.

Page 36899

1 Q. Well, does this refresh your recollection any further? You also

2 said that it was all planned and done within the SDS, through their

3 people in the media, in the police, in the local administration, and when

4 they, meaning the SOS, showed up, it was something they had already

5 known, they would show, already knew they would show up.

6 That's what you said in 2003, at pages 11 and 12.

7 A. The ruling political party, and it was the SDS at the time, of

8 course affected social processes, and it's normal. The country was at

9 war. And during that war those who got the confidence of the people

10 certainly bore the greatest responsibility, and the SDS got the trust of

11 the people. The people to a great extent stood by the SDS's programme.

12 I --

13 Q. [Overlapping speakers] I'm sorry, sir, I'm not talking about the

14 people's reaction to this. I'm -- I -- I asked you specifically about

15 whether the arrival of the SOS was something planned and done within the

16 SDS, so if you don't remember that, we'll --

17 A. I don't remember. I cannot confirm it was a direct instruction

18 of the SDS, but that group was there. That's beyond doubt. However,

19 I was not involved in the decision-making bodies of the SDS. I don't

20 know. I can tell you as what my reasoning is and my political analysis,

21 but I'm their political opponent and was at the time too.

22 Q. Well, from your perspective as someone politically involved in

23 both the republic level assembly and in events in Banja Luka, you also

24 noted that with respect to the arrival of the SDS and these events that

25 we've been discussing, that it happened because at that time:

Page 36900

1 "The SDS was still trying to present its policies as something

2 that could be accepted by the international factors, whereas, on the

3 other hand, along some other lines it prepared all this."

4 So that's what you stated before, that this was a particular

5 technique used to move along different lines on the ground while saying

6 something to the international community; correct? Saying something else

7 to the international community.

8 A. I'm confused by your question. I can positively state that

9 I wasn't present during these events and I didn't see President Karadzic,

10 but the SDS was in power and executed its -- these powers on the ground

11 and they were the political force that took the most far-reaching

12 decisions.

13 Q. And you --

14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tieger, I see the time. If it is convenient,

15 shall we take break?

16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE KWON: After the break can I expect that you could conclude

18 in half an hour?

19 MR. TIEGER: I'll absolutely do my best, Mr. President.

20 JUDGE KWON: Very well. We'll break for 40 minutes and resume at

21 1.45.

22 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.05 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger. Please continue.

25 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 36901

1 Q. Mr. Dodik, before we adjourned for the lunch recess, we had been

2 discussing the events following the arrival of the SOS in Banja Luka, and

3 the nature of those events and who was responsible, and I had asked you

4 about the -- your comments from 2003 about the SDS trying to present its

5 policies as something that could be accepted by the international

6 factors, whereas, on the other hand, preparing things like this on the

7 ground.

8 Now, you also spoke in that context --

9 A. I cannot hear the interpretation.

10 JUDGE KWON: Our usher will assist you.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I can hear it. But I didn't

12 hear it before.

13 JUDGE KWON: Can you hear me well in your language? Thank you.

14 Please repeat, Mr. Tieger.

15 MR. TIEGER: Sure.

16 Q. I was recapping what we had been discussing about the SOS and the

17 SDS efforts to present its policies for the international factor on the

18 one hand and to prepare events like this on the other, and in that

19 context, you spoke about a specially created atmosphere. So I wanted to

20 ask you briefly about that. What you said in 2003 was this was a

21 specially created atmosphere and it was very easy to implement these

22 things in such an atmosphere, and then you went on to talk about some of

23 the things that were easy to implement in that atmosphere, including the

24 dismissal of non-Serbs. Is that correct, that the atmosphere that was

25 created at that time, as we previously discussed, made it easy to

Page 36902

1 implement the dismissal of non-Serbs?

2 A. Of course there was dismissal of non-Serbs, but Serbs were also

3 dismissed in the territories controlled by the Muslims. That was part of

4 the atmosphere created in the entire region, and it was war.

5 I understand the role of Mr. Karadzic, who bears political responsibility

6 for some events. But he stands accused for a joint criminal enterprise,

7 which to my mind is a made-up category. And the things you've mentioned,

8 well, everybody knows that people were dismissed to a greater or a lesser

9 extent on all sides. I could testify about the political conditions in

10 connection with the war in Bosnia, and how the war unfolded. It is very

11 clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a unilateral secession and the

12 international --

13 Q. I'm sorry to -- I indicated I didn't want to interrupt but this

14 is straying quite far from my question and back to the areas you were

15 able to elucidate on at length in the examination-in-chief. Now, this

16 is -- again you referred to the criminal enterprise, and I think you

17 referred to that -- here you say it's a made-up category, earlier I think

18 you said it was a manipulation. But, Mr. Dodik, that's not exactly what

19 you were saying back around 2001, and when you --

20 A. That's possible.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. But such is life. We come to understand some things that may not

23 have been clear to us. And now, if I may speak freely here, all these

24 proceedings are based on the assumption that the Serbs were a factor of

25 disorder and that everybody else was right. And that --

Page 36903

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please repeat.

2 MR. TIEGER: Mr. Dodik, hold on just a second for a couple of

3 reasons. Number 1, I will tell you that's frankly wrong and it's not the

4 position of this institution or the Prosecution. And that -- or the

5 Tribunal. But more importantly, for this -- at this moment, it's not at

6 all what I'm asking you about. We are talking about what you said in

7 2001. You said, "That's possible." And among the things you stated back

8 then, and I'll be happy to show you the newspaper articles in which those

9 comments are reflected, was that you accused the SDS leadership of

10 organising and committing crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

11 Let's turn to P24906. Sorry, 65 ter 24906. My apologies.

12 A. Excuse me, what did you say? Who did I state this to, some

13 media?

14 Q. Yes, I'm going to put this on the screen now. I think you said

15 it to the regional parliament in Banja Luka but this is the media

16 capturing some of those remarks. So this is a report from the BBC, the

17 source of which is Beta news agency from Belgrade, from the

18 12th of January, 2001, noting that you accused the Serb Democratic Party

19 of organising and committing crimes during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

20 saying it must be openly said that the crimes have been committed in this

21 region under the SDS leadership and this must be punished, and noting the

22 expectation that all leading SDS officials at various levels stand before

23 The Hague Tribunal. That's --

24 A. Where does it say The Hague Tribunal?

25 Q. That's in the second paragraph, sir. I think someone has got the

Page 36904

1 cursor there now.

2 A. Yes. That was the political struggle between me and the SDS in

3 2001. It was a time of transition of power. You can consider this as

4 political discourse which need not necessarily be based on facts, but I'm

5 not denying having said this.

6 MR. TIEGER: I tender this article.

7 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6278, Your Honour.

10 MR. ROBINSON: Can I just mention, Mr. President, that the

11 witness doesn't really read or speak English. So when we have only the

12 English translation, it would be good if we went slowly so that he could

13 actually understand the text.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

15 MR. TIEGER: I appreciate that.

16 Q. And I noted also that at the time, you were criticised by

17 Mr. Kalinic for making those remarks, and in the course of that same

18 article in which that's made, Mr. Kalinic spoke about the dire economic

19 situation in the Bosnian Serb Republic with unemployment at the level of

20 40 per cent and many unemployed war veterans, and so on. That was an

21 accurate assessment of Republika Srpska's economic situation post-war;

22 correct?

23 A. We are speaking about 2001. Nowadays it's difficult in Greece

24 and Cyprus, too. Of course, the economic situation after a war is always

25 a challenge. This only confirms what I have said just now. Mr. Kalinic

Page 36905

1 was an SDS member. It is possible that I said this. I'm -- I don't

2 remember everything, but I believe that it has been relayed accurately.

3 By the way, I have so far given 20.000 interviews so I couldn't possibly

4 remember each and every one.

5 Q. Understood. The reason I raise that is because you also alleged,

6 not in 2001 but later, in both -- in 2005 and I believe afterwards, your

7 concerns about and the fact that Mr. Karadzic had taken 36 million

8 German marks from Banja Luka in the spring of 1997.

9 MR. TIEGER: Let's look at 65 ter 24901. And that's available in

10 the B/C/S as well so the witness can see it. That --

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What does B/C/S mean?

12 MR. TIEGER:

13 Q. I'm sorry, that's an acronym we use here for the language

14 Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian, so it all -- the witnesses of all

15 ethnicities can understand the language spoken here.

16 A. In -- where does it say in the law of Bosnia-Herzegovina that

17 there is a Bosnian language? Okay. Never mind. In Bosnia-Herzegovina,

18 there is no consensus about the Bosnian language. There is Serbian,

19 there is Croatian, there is Bosniak, but no Bosnian.

20 Q. Mr. Dodik, you will see in whatever language you choose to

21 characterise it in the left top column, the portion of the article that

22 I wanted to draw your attention to, that there are documents about

23 Radovan Karadzic taking 36 million German marks out of Banja Luka in a

24 bag in spring 1997. First he took bills in the equivalent of 28 million

25 German marks and then another 8 million on another occasion. And you

Page 36906

1 were bringing this conduct by Mr. Karadzic to the attention of your

2 community because you considered it unacceptable, incomprehensible,

3 illegal, and, I presume, deeply unfair to the impoverished war veterans

4 and widows.

5 A. Yes. So what is your question? You want me to confirm?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. Yes, but when I made this statement, I didn't know that this

8 money was used for materiel for the reconstruction of the RS, especially

9 the eastern part. It was used as deposit for roof tiles, bricks, and so

10 on. But when I gave this statement, I didn't know it had been deposited

11 in such a way. Under the conditions when there was -- when the payment

12 system didn't work and all transactions were made in cash. Of course

13 this is a huge amount. But later, when I became prime minister, I was

14 able to see that merchandise worth more than 100 million marks had

15 arrived, mostly for the reconstruction of the eastern part of

16 Republika Srpska, above all the eastern part of Sarajevo. There is

17 nothing contentious about this statement except for the fact that you're

18 using the newspaper "Dnevni Avaz" which is a paper that we don't trust.

19 We think that they are liars. I didn't deny what the BBC says, but the

20 Bosniak newspaper "Dnevni Avaz" has been used for propaganda. It was a

21 case then and it's still the case today.

22 Q. But you confirm that particular article.

23 MR. TIEGER: I tender it.

24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

25 JUDGE KWON: How is this relevant, Mr. Tieger?

Page 36907

1 MR. TIEGER: This goes in -- both to the information that the

2 witness had available about Dr. Karadzic generally before he came and

3 attested to various aspects of his conduct and character, and it also

4 relates to the reasons why he said he made the allegations in the

5 previous article. And it will be tied in with another point I want to

6 make as a general -- the general picture of the information available to

7 this witness about the accused.

8 JUDGE KWON: The timing in which Mr. Karadzic allegedly took this

9 money was 1997.

10 MR. TIEGER: Correct.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, we actually also think this is

12 relevant because it shows that the witness learned things later after

13 making some statements that turned out to be different than they were at

14 the time. This is a good example of that. So we would also urge it be

15 admitted.

16 JUDGE KWON: Very well. The Chamber will receive it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6279, Your Honours.

18 MR. TIEGER:

19 Q. Now, Mr. Dodik, in the previous exhibit, that is 6278, there was

20 reference in your -- in the comments that you made about the crimes that

21 had been committed, also to your position that Mrs. Plavsic was ignored

22 by the leading members of the party. And that, in part, that reflects

23 your - I think what is no secret -- your close relationship with

24 Mrs. Plavsic and your support of her over the years; correct?

25 A. Of course, Mrs. Plavsic is a good and honourable woman.

Page 36908

1 Q. And you were both aware of -- in contact with her and aware of

2 her position in the Bosnian Serb leadership, relations with the members

3 of the Bosnian Serb leadership, both during the war, in the immediate

4 post-Dayton period, and even thereafter; correct?

5 A. No. It's not so. Because I really came to know Ms. Plavsic and

6 to associate with her only after 1998 or from mid-1997 onwards. She was

7 the president and she was a prominent member of the SDS up until 1997

8 when the leadership parted ways and she slated elections as the president

9 of the republic. After elections the government was supposed to be

10 formed, and I accepted to take on this mandate for forming the government

11 in 1997, and then I associated with her. I spent a lot of time with her,

12 and this is why I can say that she is a really good and honourable woman

13 and a great patriot, and so on. As for the events before that time, that

14 is to say before the war, during the war and after the war, I knew

15 Ms. Plavsic, I heard about her, I met her sometimes during the assembly

16 sessions, but we didn't have a close relation. And as for the claims

17 that you expressed, I can only say that that was an opinion but that was

18 not even confirmed within the SDS, such relations between us at an

19 earlier time.

20 Q. Okay. Fair enough about your relations. But you spoke with her

21 subsequently, as I believe you indicated, you testified for her during

22 the course of her sentencing hearing here about, among other things, the

23 difficulties she had with other members of the Bosnian Serb leadership;

24 correct?

25 A. Yes. That's correct. And that was why they parted ways. I just

Page 36909

1 said that in mid-1997, when Karadzic was no longer actively involved in

2 politics, there was a rift in the leadership of the SDS and Ms. Plavsic

3 continued to perform her office, and if things were not so dramatic there

4 would not have been a rift. And they parted ways because they had parted

5 ways politically about certain issues, and that is true.

6 Q. And you became aware specifically, did you not, of her continuing

7 conflict with Momcilo Mandic, among others?

8 A. Yes. That conflict was generally known throughout the time while

9 it lasted.

10 Q. And specifically what Mrs. Plavsic has made no secret about

11 whatsoever, and I therefore presume that you had opportunities to discuss

12 it with her, was the onset of that conflict which began in 1992, as she

13 related in her book, "I testify" when she brought to the attention of the

14 Bosnian Serb leadership the activities of Batko in Grbavica. And she

15 described in detail how she went to a meeting involving Mr. Karadzic,

16 Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Mandic and Mr. Stanisic, told them what she had

17 learned about Batko, was stunned that Mandic simply smirked about it and

18 that she realised that both Mandic and Stanisic knew about him and his

19 activities and indeed were his protecters and order-givers, and then

20 explained since then - and believed it would surely be like to the end of

21 her life - Mandic had been harassing and threatening her. You were aware

22 of all that; right?

23 A. Years later, I learned the actual substance you're talking about

24 but I did not attend the meeting that you mentioned and I cannot confirm

25 that I know that. I did hear that a meeting was held. I'm not sure

Page 36910

1 whether this one, Batko, was mentioned then or not. But I do know, and

2 one could feel when we attended the assembly session, it was known among

3 the MPs that the relations between Ms. Plavsic and Mr. Mandic were not at

4 the level that was expected between members of the Presidency of

5 Republika Srpska and the minister in the Republika Srpska government. So

6 this was felt and known. And later on, Ms. Plavsic herself told me about

7 some of these things, this meeting and some problems that she had, but

8 this is more or less everything I can say about that.

9 Q. Okay. And -- give me just one moment.

10 [Prosecution counsel confer]

11 MR. TIEGER:

12 Q. You spoke earlier today about Mr. Sejmenovic, and the story you

13 described as I see it here now --

14 A. What?

15 Q. You remember Mr. Sejmenovic? Because you testified about him

16 earlier today.

17 A. Yes. I think it's the man with that last name but it's easy to

18 check. He was in the assembly and I met him in Banja Luka under

19 circumstances I described.

20 Q. Well, the circumstances you describe to this Trial Chamber today

21 was that in the early part of May, around the 10th or 12th of May, you

22 went to see Mr. Sejmenovic where he was living, went over to his house,

23 to have a discussion with him. He was concerned about or had some fear

24 about possible developments so you invited him to work with the assembly

25 or in the assembly of Republika Srpska, thought he had accepted but he

Page 36911

1 later declined and that this was the -- you related that to him, that

2 this was something that Mr. Karadzic had approved. Mr. Dodik, the fact

3 is that this was not a benevolent invitation to suggest to somebody that

4 he might want to consider joining the Bosnian Serb assembly under

5 conditions where he could freely choose whether or not to do so. The

6 fact is that this man -- this was not early May. But this man had just

7 been taken out of Omarska; correct? And that's what you testified to in

8 the Brdjanin case.

9 A. Several things. Yes, he did come from Omarska. He arrived in

10 Banja Luka. We talked. I was not myself free. Under such uncertain

11 conditions, nobody was free. We discussed, we believed that by his

12 engagement he could eliminate the fear that existed in a significant

13 degree and that was the subject of our discussion. I didn't say earlier

14 that Mr. Karadzic accepted this in advance, but we said that we discussed

15 that later. Mr. Karadzic didn't even know that we were discussing about

16 this. I believe that for reasons that we were colleagues, I should talk

17 with him, and I did it not just alone but with Vojo Kupresanin, who was

18 also an SDS MP in the assembly at the time. So we talked about the issue

19 and I don't see anything wrong there. These were the first months -- he

20 had no more or less freedom than I had to decide what and how to do at

21 that time.

22 Q. This man was scared to death; right? He was very frightened and

23 he bore the physical effects of his time in Omarska. You could see it;

24 isn't that right?

25 A. No, no. I didn't see any consequences. One could see a degree

Page 36912

1 of exhaustion. I was very surprised. I do not scare anyone to death.

2 And when I was there, I did not notice that he was scared to death of

3 that conversation. After that, as far as I could follow, nothing

4 happened to that man later. I couldn't follow everything, though, but in

5 the first few weeks after that event, I think that he did not have any

6 problems whatsoever.

7 Q. All right. Just so we don't get caught up in semantics, let's

8 set aside "scared to death" and whatever that means to you. Are you

9 saying you couldn't tell this man was very frightened?

10 A. Well, I just said that I saw that there was some fear, but I did

11 not see any physical marks of violence. I didn't see. Perhaps that was

12 under his clothes, but I didn't see that.

13 MR. TIEGER: One moment, Mr. President.

14 [Prosecution counsel confer]

15 MR. TIEGER: All right. I think I'm at my half hour,

16 Mr. President, and that concludes the examination, thank you.

17 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

18 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very few questions, Your Honours,

20 very few.

21 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

22 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. President, something that you stated was

23 quoted to you as recorded in "Dnevni Avaz." Were your statements given

24 as part of your political struggle conveyed precisely in the media?

25 A. Of course not always, depending on the leanings of each medium,

Page 36913

1 it depended on that because they are not really responsible in terms of

2 the media freedom, as we can see in the west. This is why their articles

3 do not always stick to the facts. And most often this is the case with,

4 for example, "Dnevni Avaz" which is a well known paper of the Bosniak

5 people which was formed during the war and performed its propaganda role

6 practically throughout this time. And even to this day, in some of its

7 elements, as well as "Glasovski [phoen]" which was active in our part of

8 Bosnia and about which Mr. Prosecutor also asked me it preferred such

9 contents that was in accordance not just with the official policy but the

10 general atmosphere of the specific moment.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 JUDGE KWON: Pause. Pause, please. Yes.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Would you repeat such statements under oath, such as you accepted

16 everything that you had said under oath in the Brdjanin case? Would you

17 likewise repeat everything that was said in the media under oath?

18 A. Certainly not. Not under oath. But as for this specific issue,

19 I think that I explained everything that I said, and I did say that under

20 oath.

21 Q. Thank you. Could we just briefly see P6278, just to clarify

22 something semantically. This is your statement given to the BBC. And

23 could we please zoom in a bit? Mr. President, I'm going to read this out

24 slowly in the English language so that it would be interpreted:

25 [In English] "It must be openly said that crimes have been

Page 36914

1 committed in this region under the SDS leadership."

2 [Interpretation] Was it the region that was under the SDS

3 leadership or did SDS lead in the crimes?

4 A. No. The SDS did not lead in this. The SDS was the leading

5 political party and that was the context in which this was given.

6 Q. Thank you. I am accused here not because a party was formed and

7 structured and was successful in elections. Rather, I'm accused for

8 being involved in the commission of crimes. From what you know, what can

9 you say about my possible involvement in crimes?

10 A. With full responsibility and under oath, I can say here that

11 I never had the occasion at any meeting or when I met personally with

12 Mr. Karadzic, most often during assembly sessions that were held during

13 the war, I never heard the request being made to anyone to commit any

14 crime. Rather, I can repeat that Mr. Karadzic resolutely tried to find a

15 way to resolve the conflicts peacefully and that the responsibility for

16 crimes which were committed by certain paramilitaries in the territory of

17 Republika Srpska, that they needed to be taken to responsibility for

18 that. Of course it was a situation that is not normal. It was war. And

19 as I say here, I absolutely assert that Mr. Karadzic never insisted on

20 the commission of any crimes, nor did I witness that he was involved in

21 anything like that. What I believe needs to be said are the

22 circumstances under which that happened. At the very beginning of the

23 war, I did say something about that previously. But the key issue

24 remains, and these are the relations among the ethnicities,

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have the consensus for unilateral secession.

Page 36915

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be --

2 MR. TIEGER: I have to object. This is -- the witness is

3 straying into further elucidation of a favourite theme that is not

4 related to the question asked, calls for an objection as being

5 non-responsive.

6 JUDGE KWON: I think the witness has answered the question

7 already. Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. We will return to something you did not finish. I would like to

11 ask you the following: Were you a member of the War Presidency in your

12 municipality?

13 A. Yes. Laktasi municipality. As a deputy, I was supposed to be

14 involved in this. The SDS had the majority in this municipality. That

15 is to say that the municipal officials came from the SDS. And I was also

16 a member of this War Presidency as a member of another political party.

17 Q. So you were that officially, by nature of your position?

18 A. Yes, by the nature of my position, yes.

19 Q. Ex officio, yes, fine. In the Presidency did you receive any

20 orders from the Crisis Staff of the ARK, which you then had to implement?

21 A. I don't remember such a situation at all. We regularly

22 corresponded with them, but I don't remember any specific orders about

23 anything, so I cannot confirm that that happened.

24 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell the Chamber whether the

25 Crisis Staffs, the Presidencies, and some other ad hoc bodies in which

Page 36916

1 people held their positions ex officio were unlawful or illegal according

2 to our laws?

3 A. In all extraordinary situations and war is certainly an

4 extraordinary situation, this was considered something normal, and when

5 there are major floodings in the municipal area, then a Crisis Staff is

6 normally set up. Under the conditions that I talked about, that is to

7 say the isolation and social depravity, it was to be expected that such a

8 body would be formed. I also wish to say that throughout the time while

9 I was a member of the War Presidency of the Laktasi municipality, the

10 Municipal Assembly was also operational, and the War Presidency at least

11 in that municipality did not substitute the work of the Municipal

12 Assembly.

13 Q. Thank you. Mr. President I will read out to you, and this is P6,

14 a Prosecution document, it says, pursuant to Article 12 of the Law on All

15 People's Defence, and the Official Gazette of Republika Srpska, the

16 Executive Council of the Autonomous Region of Krajina at its meeting of

17 the 5th of May, 1992, adopted the following decision to form the

18 Crisis Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina. So here they refer to

19 Article 12 of the Law on National Defence. From what you know about

20 municipalities, what role did the president of the municipality, or the

21 president of any socio-political community have in the national defence

22 of his own area, if he had any such role?

23 A. Up until the first multi-party elections held in 1990, I had been

24 a municipal official. I was in charge of the executive power in Laktasi

25 municipality, and together with the municipal president I undoubtedly had

Page 36917

1 the obligation to follow all plans and to introduce innovations with

2 regard to the security situation in the territory of the municipality

3 that I belonged to. With regard to this, the president of the

4 municipality was the leader in charge of all the war plans which

5 according to the law at the time all municipalities had to have, so he

6 was in charge. He managed those plans as the president of the

7 municipality and in accordance with the Law on All People's Defence of

8 the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9 JUDGE KWON: Please speak much slower, please.

10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. President, you were asked about the structure of parties and

13 so on. Please tell us if, in your party, decisions are taken in a

14 democratic fashion?

15 A. Of course they are. The respective body sits, there is

16 discussion about the matter in question, a common position is

17 articulated, and then the executive bodies or me as the president, are

18 then called upon to execute this decision.

19 Q. In my party or any party, who has the power to change a

20 democratically taken decision in the -- at the implementation stage?

21 A. If given explicit powers in line with the statute the party

22 president can do so, but he must consult the party bodies to get

23 approval.

24 Q. And if during the implementation stage you demand discipline and

25 in the implementation of democratically taken decisions, would you call

Page 36918

1 that autocratic ruling?

2 A. No, that's a democratic system of responsibility, with which all

3 party members must abide by. Whoever does not is infringing upon party

4 discipline and must bear the consequences in line with the party

5 standards.

6 Q. Thank you. Under conditions where everybody can found a party,

7 would it be allowed and honourable to implement the programme of one

8 party in another party?

9 A. Of course not. There is absolute liberty where we are from, and

10 we are one of the few countries where there is a huge number of political

11 parties. If they disagree with the articulated policy of one party,

12 they -- people are free to found their own, and I don't see why I would

13 carry out anybody's instructions if I'm a member of a different party.

14 Q. Today on page 44, it is recorded that you said that I was the

15 uncontested leader of the SDS. Was this leadership achieved by

16 undemocratic means, or did I have any means of coercion before the war or

17 during the war to force the members of the SDS to have me as their

18 uncontested leader?

19 A. You certainly are an uncontested leader. The people saw you as

20 such. And by virtue of that your statements and your conduct had the

21 support of the whole people. As far as I know, and that can be confirmed

22 by any serious assessment, the SDS was a movement that included everybody

23 who wanted to join it and be members of that political party. I cannot

24 confirm because I don't know. I was not witness to any instance of

25 undemocratic membership or your exerting coercion against any member of

Page 36919

1 your party.

2 Q. Thank you. On page 43, it was quoted to you what the Serbian

3 forces were doing. Can you, as a high official of the assembly now also

4 of the republic and previously of the executive power at municipal level,

5 say which armed group or individuals you would consider Serbian forces,

6 for which the authorities are responsible and were there any whom you

7 would not consider Serbian forces?

8 A. Only the army of the police of the Republika Srpska are

9 legitimate structures, and there were groups who -- which at the local

10 level abusing the impossibility to communicate, and also by using

11 elements of violence, there were some paramilitary groups that were not

12 under the control of the authorities and even exercised repression

13 against local authorities of the RS at certain periods. And these

14 paramilitary or militant organisations and individuals absolutely were

15 not under the influence of the local structures of power in the RS. I

16 can say, having been in contact with General Talic, who was a commander

17 of the 1st Krajina Corps, that he made efforts to place -- or, even to

18 place under control or even disarm these paramilitary formations in his

19 area of responsibility.

20 Q. Thank you. And when you spoke about the protection of the Muslim

21 community at Laktasi during the examination-in-chief, let me now repeat

22 the question because I didn't receive a complete answer. What was the

23 source of jeopardy for these Muslims? Was it the authorities?

24 A. No. They wanted to be protected by the authorities, and they got

25 that protection. I was a representative of the authorities and I've