Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 37356

 1                           Thursday, 18 April 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Do you hear me well, Mr. Galic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can hear you perfectly,

 9     Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Before we begin today there seems to be a

11     housekeeping matter from the Registry.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning.  Thank you, Your Honours.  Just a

13     correction for the exhibit list.  65 ter number 1D01473 which was

14     admitted as Exhibit D3402 should in fact be Exhibit D3410.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

16             Are you okay, Mr. Tieger, to begin?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  Thank you for asking.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

20     morning to everyone.

21                           WITNESS:  STANISLAV GALIC [Resumed]

22                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

23                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

24        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General Galic.

25        A.   Good morning.

Page 37357

 1        Q.   I again have to remind both you and I to make pauses, to speak

 2     slowly, and in addition I would kindly ask you to give me as short

 3     answers as possible because I'm going to focus only on the essence so as

 4     we can finish as soon as possible.

 5             General, we were discussing the topic of fire coming from the

 6     city and your responses.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown

 8     1D01530.  That's the document.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, can you please explain one thing to us.  The date is the

11     15th of May, 1993, and in paragraph 1, fourth passage --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

13             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  It looks like the English version is not, in fact,

15     the English version.  What we have in English is the translation of a

16     different document.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, the date is the 12th of May.

18     While we are waiting for the English translation, may I continue with my

19     questions?

20             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure if we have an English translation at

21     all, but ...

22                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, so it seems that we do not have the English

24     translation at the moment.  Shall we collapse the English and let's see

25     how we can deal with this.

Page 37358

 1             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, concerning the 15th of May, you are reporting to the

 5     Main Staff that there was fire open on your positions from Dobrinja 1

 6     and 3, that's in paragraph 3, and then again from Mojmilo --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Given that we do not have English

 8     translation, why don't you ask the witness to read out the relevant

 9     passage.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  I think we might be able to help.  Mr. Reid has

11     just been able to locate a translation which he can print up now and we

12     can put on the ELMO, for example.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, can you please focus on the fourth paragraph which says:

16             "From the area of Bistrik our positions at Bistrik Kula and

17     Vidikovac were targeted and ten 82-millimetre shells fell.  Also hit were

18     the areas of Mrkovici."

19             You said that you did not fire back except in the area of Ilijas

20     where you managed to repel the attack.  As for Bistrik Kula, you say that

21     you neutralised enemy positions in Bistrik with four shells.  Why was

22     that, given that you were targeted by ten shells?

23        A.   If you look at the report relating to this specific date - now I

24     see the second page in the Serbian - but I know what this is about and I

25     understand your question, therefore I can give you an answer regardless

Page 37359

 1     of what page we are looking at.  The point was that they were opening

 2     fire from the area of Bistrik from mortars aiming at our Bistrik Kula and

 3     Vidikovac, and that is correct.  These are the positions that we held.

 4     Nevertheless, we responded with half the strength - let's put it that

 5     way - compared to the number of shells that they fired.  In response to

 6     their eight shells we fired four.  The main reason was because Bistrik

 7     was densely populated and any attempt to neutralise would raise the issue

 8     of proportionality and the use of weapons in such a populated area.

 9             Now, where the exact location of targets in Bistrik were, whether

10     it was in a park or further away from civilians, we can consider that in

11     general terms.  But in short, I would say that that was a selective way

12     of responding and a positive proportionate one carried out with a view to

13     their fire.

14        Q.   Thank you, General.  Item 7 says that there were two wounded and

15     a woman was wounded in Grbavica from a sniper.  Was this something usual

16     or was it something special?

17        A.   If you look at a number of reports, one can say that this was one

18     of the more quiet days in that period.  In the area covered by the

19     Ilijas Brigade there were intensive operations and they were actively

20     involved in them rather than in opening fire.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted

22     into evidence.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3411.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D01534.

Page 37360

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 2             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Good

 3     morning.  Could we please have a copy of the English translation which

 4     has the date of the 15th of May.  Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  No doubt that will be uploaded on e-court very soon.

 6             Could you confirm that, Ms. Edgerton?

 7                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Mr. Reid has already e-mailed it to Defence so

 9     that they can upload it.  And in the interim we have the hard copy that

10     was on the ELMO, and Mr. Piletta-Zanin can certainly have that.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, absolutely.

12             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

13             JUDGE KWON:  You can keep it, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

14             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, we have skipped four days.  Now we are on the

18     19th of May, and under number 1 you said that they violated the truce

19     once again.  Was that the period of truce when you were exposed to this

20     fire?

21        A.   Well, this report shows exactly the locations and times and the

22     weapons used to violate the truce started from Hadzici, Ilijas, Rajlovac,

23     and all other areas covered by the 1st Romanija Brigade.  So this was the

24     time of cease-fire, and I ordered that exact reports be sent to the

25     Main Staff regarding the breaches of the cease-fire so that they can have

Page 37361

 1     information when they go to meet with UNPROFOR or with the mixed

 2     commission that met almost on a regular basis.  And you know very well

 3     that representatives of the VRS attended the meetings of this mixed

 4     committee, mainly those from the Main Staff, also representatives of the

 5     BH Army and their Main Staff, and UNPROFOR commanders for

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up the English

 9     version so that we can see this portion relating to Ilidza where it says

10     that artillery fire came from Mojmilo and rifle grenades.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   And twice you say here that you did not respond.  There was even

13     sniping fire but you still did not respond.  Can you tell me why didn't

14     you respond?

15        A.   Well, it's clear from this report why we did not respond because

16     they had an order not to fire back whenever there was any provocation.

17     It is difficult to say at this moment how justified it was for a person

18     not to respond if his life is threatened.  Nevertheless, there was such

19     an order and all the soldiers and officers abided by this order strictly,

20     although there was some individuals who didn't.

21        Q.   Towards the bottom of the Serbian version --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, we need the next page,

23     page 2 in the Serbian.  Let's see what happens with the English version.

24     Maybe we need to change it as well.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37362

 1        Q.   General, item under 2 you can see what the corps did, that it

 2     improved the defence lines, carried out observations, enhanced

 3     fortifications --

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please slow down when

 5     reading.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters were not able to hear

 7     you in full.  Could you repeat.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I apologise to the

 9     interpreters and everybody else.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Under item 2 you can see the report about what the corps was

12     doing, a number of corps officers went to tour the units in order to

13     monitor how the cease-fire was being observed.  Can you explain what this

14     means?

15        A.   When we issued an order to cease hostilities and fire, the corps

16     command members went on the ground to check the situation and verify

17     whether they were observing and abiding by the order.  The corps command

18     was not a large one, it was not manned to the full, but always a number

19     of officers, including myself, we always went to the ground in order to

20     see how the units were behaving and whether they were abiding by the

21     orders.  This is particularly important because if there was such an

22     extensive enemy activity, both in terms of their actions and fire, it was

23     necessary for us to assess how to proceed because on the spot we were

24     unable to reach a proper and appropriate decision.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Under 7 you see that you lost two soldiers, two

Page 37363

 1     children were seriously wounded, and five were lightly wounded

 2     [as interpreted].  And sub-item (b) says that your prediction is that the

 3     violations of cease-fire will continue in order to provoke conflicts and

 4     with the aim of blaming the VRS.  Can you tell the Chamber how did these

 5     military and civilian casualties affect the status of cease-fire and the

 6     psychological state of soldiers?

 7        A.   Well, any loss of life or any casualties, especially during

 8     cease-fire, causes even great anxiety and some undesirable reactions.  We

 9     can see that in this particular instance there were children who were

10     casualties and this is very upsetting for the soldiers because these are

11     the children of those soldiers who were waging war.  Those were their

12     children, and it is only natural that it had an impact, both on the

13     soldiers and the civilians and the general atmosphere.  Under such

14     circumstances it is very difficult to maintain cease-fire and to achieve

15     peace.  We wanted to achieve peace.  It was ordered for us to achieve

16     peace, but you see that we found ourselves in a situation where it was

17     very difficult to decide what to do.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3412, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please

22     have 1D01539.  Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   On the 28th of May you are reporting in a regular combat report

25     at 1700 hours to the Main Staff that in Hadzici sector a tank fired five

Page 37364

 1     shells on the centre of Hadzici and Ilidza and Nedzarici from rifle

 2     grenades and in Vogosca from the direction of Pretis and the

 3     transportation faculty there was intensive sniper fire.  A bit further

 4     down it says in the Grbavica sector throughout the day civilian targets

 5     were fired on, in particular the green market more than 30, 82-millimetre

 6     shells and on the Slavisa Vajner Cica Barracks they fired by rifle

 7     grenades and sniper fire.  Intensive fire on Sucura houses.

 8             Can you tell us, General, whether there were any military assets

 9     at the market that would justify the firing at the market?

10        A.   When I look at this report in its entirety we can see that in the

11     area there were activities targeting Trebevic as well.  Let us not forget

12     that.  Under item 2, that was why these activities from the area from

13     Miljacka also including fire, so from there to the market in Grbavica

14     were an integral part of the overall operations.  I think that after this

15     incident I went to the green market.  There were no military targets or

16     military forces at the market or any military assets that were situated

17     right there on the market.  It's not a big market but rather a small one,

18     and in practice it could not operate.  Whenever I visited there were few

19     people and they didn't have much produce to sell.  So that the green

20     market could not have been in operation.  I'm not sure if there could

21     have been one or two stalls that were open after that.  Whether there was

22     any reason to target it, in my personal view and from what I personally

23     learned there was no reason whatsoever to target the small green market

24     in Grbavica at that time.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see the following page so that we can see

Page 37365

 1     item 7 and see you had three slightly wounded soldiers, one seriously

 2     wounded, one soldier was killed and one civilian was killed.  Under

 3     item 8 it says that you observed the cease-fire and that you opened fire

 4     only in defence when responding to the enemy fire.  How did you manage to

 5     maintain discipline so that the responses would only be made to respond

 6     to the fire that you received?

 7        A.   Certainly in all the war situations when there are such active

 8     operations and fire, as there was on this particular day, including the

 9     area up towards, as I already said, our central zone, the parts of

10     Grbavica that we held you also visited the area down there.  You know

11     what the situation was like.  You have to descend between Debelo Brdo and

12     Hrasno Brdo in order to reach it, so it's as if you're entering hell;

13     that's how it looked.  Up there, there were some tents that were blocking

14     the area so that it couldn't be targeted by snipers, and holding your

15     position in that Grbavica was really difficult and it was difficult to

16     withstand because we were encircled in a way.  How did we manage to

17     maintain some sort of truce?  Well, we only responded to active fire.

18     Where the forces managed to penetrate and were supported along the axis

19     of their penetration, we had to respond because by that date they

20     threatened the lives in the zone and probably all our positions would

21     later be threatened as well of some brigade units or parts of the

22     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  There were instances when they cut off the road

23     leading from Lukavica towards Pale on Trebevic mountain, and that was

24     practically the only road leading towards Pale and in-depth towards

25     Republika Srpska.  If it were cut off, then Lukavica was encircled.  Up

Page 37366

 1     until around the 14th of August, 1993, after that the situation was

 2     somewhat better.

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see page 2 in English and page 1 of -- 1 in

 6     B/C/S.  Item number 2.  The first part of item number 2 reads as:

 7             "Our forces are at the lines reached.  An enemy attack in

 8     Trebevic area was successfully repulsed, destroying one of" the guns and

 9     et cetera.

10             But the third part of the item 2 says:

11             "No firing by our forces ..."

12             So how do we read this report?  Can I take it that any fires in

13     defensive action would not be recorded as any firing in your report?

14     Could you clarify.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Gladly, Your Honour.  Here is how

16     this is to be understood.  We are covering the entire zone.  The areas

17     where there was no need to respond fire, then we didn't.  Where there

18     were active operations and where they penetrated our lines we had to

19     respond.  That was the situation which is later on explained in the rest

20     of the report.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I'll leave it at that.

22             We'll admit this document.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3413, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 37367

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, on the 1st of June something happened for which I am

 3     charged and I believe so are you; namely, the incident was when two

 4     shells were fired on a group of around 200 people who were watching a

 5     football game on a parking-lot, which was surrounded on three sides by

 6     residential buildings and the fourth side was a road leading to Lukavica,

 7     and so on and so forth.  That was on the 1st of June, 1993.  In your

 8     statement in the chapter entitled "Indictment incidents," you say:

 9             [In English] "I never received an order to open fire at these

10     locations on these dates.  Also, I never issued an order that fire be

11     opened at these locations on these dates and I never informed the

12     superior command that fire was opened at these locations on these dates."

13             [Interpretation] General, do you remember and did you learn later

14     during --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  What statement did you refer to,

16     Mr. Karadzic?

17             THE ACCUSED:  Proofing notes, Your Excellencies.

18             JUDGE KWON:  This proofing note was not admitted as kind of

19     Rule 92 ter.  You should put your question directly to the witness.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, sir, do you remember this incident and do you remember

22     whether on that day you received an order from superior commands or issue

23     an order to subordinated commands to open fire at a football match?

24        A.   Even though the question was 50 per cent in English and

25     50 per cent in Serbian, that was the interpretation I received, I know

Page 37368

 1     what this is about and I know what I'm supposed to answer.  Because

 2     mainly in the corps zone whatever happened I was familiar with it more or

 3     less.  It was the 1st of June, 1993.  We have seen earlier that in this

 4     period there was a sort of cease-fire or truce or cessation of

 5     hostilities.  I cannot say precisely what that was, but more or less that

 6     is what it was.  Now, whether in this period fire was opened from the

 7     area of Dobrinja that was something we reported on earlier about this

 8     fire coming from Dobrinja at our positions.  Nearby, close to the place

 9     where the incident took place, as far as I can remember - as it was

10     20 years ago after all - there was an atomic shelter and the atomic

11     shelter was supposed to be used by civilians; however, it was used to

12     shelter soldiers and materiel from the recoilless guns which were

13     withdrawn towards Mojmilo including the PAMs and other pieces of

14     equipment and troops.  So it was one of the military targets which it was

15     justified and legitimate target at that time.

16        Q.   Could I just ask you to stop for a moment.  I thought not to call

17     up this document, but perhaps if it will refresh your memory.  D340 is

18     the document that we need.  It's a Defence document, D340, your report

19     dated the 1st of June.

20        A.   It's no problem for me to tell you about the incident, so I

21     accept the situation in which I would answer such questions.

22        Q.   While we're waiting, please continue.

23        A.   We have to realise that the incident happened at the

24     confrontation line, perhaps 150 metres in-depth from the confrontation

25     line at the positions of the BH Army.  So it's not so deep really.  If we

Page 37369

 1     remember the map, the colour map which we called up, when we see the

 2     deployment of forces of, including the Army of BH and the 5th Brigade in

 3     the Dobrinja area, then we will see that in that area forces of the

 4     strength of one battalion were deployed there.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please now focus on the first page where it

 6     says where the enemy fired from in the sector of the

 7     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade with mortars 220- and

 8     80-millimetres [as interpreted], no extraordinary events.  Can we please

 9     see the following page both in the Serbian and the English so that we can

10     see the conclusion.  In the conclusion you say that the forces of the

11     corps fully observed the order with regard to the cease-fire.  We have

12     not responded to enemy provocations, and we expect further intense fire

13     of enemy snipers at civilian targets.  If you had fired a single shell or

14     the two that I talked about, would they be included in this report?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Before the witness answers, can we just go back to

16     what Dr. Karadzic has read in from this document, and it's at lines 3 and

17     4 on page 14.  Dr. Karadzic referred to the document as referring to

18     220-millimetre mortars and 80-millimetre mortars, and the document reads:

19             "The enemy fired 120-millimetre and 82-millimetre mortars on the

20     area of Zlatiste to Osmice and Krtelji in the area of the

21     1st Sarajevo Mechanised Brigade."

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's a matter of

23     interpretation and the transcript.  Thank you for the intervention.  I

24     read it out correctly, but let us continue.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37370

 1        Q.   Can you please tell us, General, about this conclusion that you

 2     did not respond to provocations.  If you had fired a single shell or two

 3     shells or more, would that be included in your report as an obligation?

 4        A.   If we said resolutely where and why we responded, I don't see any

 5     reason, as in this particular situation we did not know what was going on

 6     there.  I didn't know.  I learned about this when I came here to the

 7     Tribunal.  So if we had fired or had been active in that area, I suppose

 8     that it would have to be included in this report.  There is no reason why

 9     it wouldn't be included.

10        Q.   Thank you.  This has been admitted earlier.  Can we now please

11     call up 1D10512.

12             General, you have said that you prohibited civilian gatherings

13     even further away from the line.  How do you see this organisation of a

14     football match with 200 viewers at the confrontation line itself?

15        A.   In our zone, the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in

16     particular --

17             MS. EDGERTON:  I'm sorry, I've been trying to find a translation

18     of this document.  Do we not have one?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that we still have not

20     received the translation.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Then you should properly put foundation about this

22     document.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies, that's

24     precisely what I'm doing.  We have seen in documents and General told us

25     that he prohibited civilians gathering in the zone of the

Page 37371

 1     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Now I'm asking the General how as a soldier he

 2     views this fact that football match was organised at the confrontation

 3     line by the other side.  Was that allowed and how responsible was that?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 5             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  That's not a proper foundational question, with

 7     respect, Your Honours.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  What this document is about, who wrote it, we should

 9     know that in order to understand the document and the evidence.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have not reached the document

11     yet, Your Excellencies.  I asked the General what his attitude was and

12     his orders about civilians gathering or rallying and in -- especially in

13     view of the order on the cease-fire, and then I will move on to the

14     document.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Well, then, Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic, with

17     respect, can take the document away so that the witness is not led to his

18     answer.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we can remove it until the

20     witness answers.  Can we then remove it, please.  I haven't read out

21     anything from the document, not yet.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can you answer, General, what was your attitude to the gathering

24     of civilians, grouping of civilians, and their activities in the zone

25     that was within reach of the enemy artillery?

Page 37372

 1        A.   Very gladly, Mr. President.  I will gladly answer.  I just waited

 2     to see when I could do so, when I would be allowed to do so.  In our

 3     zone, due to the losses which we have seen earlier and due to the general

 4     conditions that we had in the zone of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, we

 5     took a series of measures in order to protect our civilians or civilians

 6     in general, civilians who were in our zone.  One of the measures for sure

 7     was to prohibit a great number of people gathering together.  As for

 8     transportation by public city transportation, we allocated specific

 9     positions that should be sheltered where people could wait because we

10     could see that bus stops were targeted.  And then people would be

11     transported from such designated locations further on, whether they were

12     going from Ilidza or from Hadzici or from the area of Lukavica or

13     Vojkovici and Grbavica.

14             Another thing that we did was remove the civilians who were

15     living right next to the confrontation line, remove them somewhere

16     in-depth as much as possible, because we did not have as many civilian

17     buildings and facilities in our zone as the BH Army did.  But we had

18     quite enough because we should know that in the area of the 1st Corps of

19     the BH Army there were 350.000 civilians living, and on our side perhaps

20     100- or 120.000.  So it was necessary to move them all and to ensure a

21     degree of protection for them.  The buildings housing civilians, we told

22     them to somehow cover the windows facing the front line, that's a normal

23     thing, because I know what we did only at my command, where the seat of

24     the command was, or rather, the forward command post in Lukavica.  We had

25     to place the big metal sheets and other shelters to protect officers,

Page 37373

 1     even though officers were still targeted in the premises where we worked.

 2     We expected that the same thing would be done by the 1st Corps of the

 3     BH Army.  Therefore, I would never have expected that someone would

 4     involve in a football match and say that it was very difficult, that

 5     there was sniper fire and it was impossible to live, and then we would go

 6     out and play football 150 metres from the confrontation line.  For me,

 7     this is something not normal.

 8        Q.   Thank you, General.  On that day did you get an order from the

 9     superior command to shoot?  What -- did you forward it to the lower

10     levels and did you inform the Main Staff of the events?

11        A.   As we can see from the previous report, neither did I get an

12     order to open fire in the area, nor did I order any such thing or receive

13     a report that fire had been opened on that day.  In a word, I couldn't

14     send a report about shooting in that area.

15             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the number.

16             JUDGE KWON:  D34 -- no, could you give the number again.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D10512, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, please tell us the places -- the place names I'm going

20     to read out.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Dr. Karadzic should take the document away if he's

22     not going to address the document.  This is giving the witness a chance

23     to prepare himself for the answer that's -- he's going to be asked to

24     give.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think the document is very clear.

Page 37374

 1     I want to ask the document [as interpreted] where certain places are that

 2     the SRK targeted, whether they are --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We do not -- we cannot read this

 4     document while you can.  So please introduce the document first.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's what I want to do, but let's

 6     have it on the screen.  This is a report -- or perhaps the witness can

 7     introduce the document.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't have it on my screen,

 9     sorry.  I don't see it.

10             JUDGE KWON:  It will be coming, Mr. Galic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Please take a look at this document, tell us what it is, tell us

14     its date, and what does the document say?

15        A.   I have never seen this document before.  Let me take a look at

16     it.  It's a document of the Igman operational group.  They belonged to

17     the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

18        Q.   Dated?

19        A.   1st of June, 1993.

20             THE ACCUSED:  I see Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

22             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to

23     be extremely accurate.  There's something missing, both in the English

24     translation and the French translation.  I don't wish to waste any time.

25     I heard the General saying in his language that it was the first time in

Page 37375

 1     his life that he saw this document; in other words he saw this document

 2     for the first time today.  If I have made a mistake, General Galic will

 3     say so, but that is, at any rate, what I understood.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I heard that as well.  That will be

 5     reflected in the transcript.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  It's actually already reflected on line 14.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You say it's dated the 1st of June, and item 1 says what the

11     Serbs targeted.  Tell us about these places:  Drniste, Crni Vrh, Grebak,

12     Rogoj.  Where are these places in relation to the city of Sarajevo?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't you ask the witness to read out the first

14     paragraph?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Aloud?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Please read the first paragraph out aloud.

19        A.   I'll be glad to:

20             "The Chetniks," obviously they are referring to the

21     Army of Republika Srpska, "during this day shelled the line in the area

22     of responsibility of the 4th," this should read brigade, "the

23     4th Motorised Brigade," I can't see it all too well, "the 81st Mountain

24     Brigade (along the line Drniste-Crni Vrh-Grebak and Rogoj.  The Chetniks

25     are fortified ..."

Page 37376

 1        Q.   You don't have to continue.  Please tell us where these places

 2     are.

 3        A.   Rogoj is towards Kalinovik.  It's not in the Sarajevo area at

 4     all.  From Trnovo to Kalinovik there is a pass by the name of Rogoj.

 5     Grebak is somewhere between Sarajevo and Gorazde.  It's also like a

 6     pass -- actually, it's a plateau.  It was very important for them at the

 7     time because there was a reloading station there.  I can continue to

 8     explain --

 9        Q.   Just tell us how far Grebak is from Sarajevo.

10        A.   Maybe some 20-odd kilometres.  I never really measured.  That's

11     the distance from Sarajevo.

12        Q.   And the last sentence of item II, please read it out.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we just finish the first paragraph before we

14     move on, please, Your Honours.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We can't read it, Mr. Karadzic, otherwise we

16     can't understand it.  So could you --

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no interest to read this out

18     because it's irrelevant.  Once the translation is in, you can read it.  I

19     just want to show what the SRK targeted because the General said that

20     they didn't target the city.  These targets were 20 kilometres from the

21     town --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just in case, how do we know that

23     you omitted something?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] When the translation arrives you

25     will see.  It's irrelevant.  We're just wasting time.

Page 37377

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can confirm, Mr. President, that

 2     nothing important has been skipped here.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  But having heard Ms. Edgerton's request, there's --

 4     I see no difficulty reading out the first paragraph.  Could you read out

 5     the remainder of the first paragraph, starting from the 81st - where is

 6     it?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Can you continue with the part after Grebak and Rogoj.

 9        A.   No problem:

10             "The Chetniks are fortifying the line," does this say Galica,"

11     Galica-Kosuta and the line Katelj-Korijen.  In the Hadzici-Zunovnica

12     area, during the night Chetnik activities were enhanced especially in the

13     form of movement of vehicles between the Zunovnica Barracks and

14     Drozgometva," I think, "no significant movements in the area of the

15     81st Mountain Brigade."

16             That was item I.  I can move on to item II.  If need be, I can

17     read that out too.  I can also tell you where these positions are.

18        Q.   That's not necessary.  In paragraph II they are discussing their

19     own forces?

20        A.   No, this part where they are speaking about the Chetniks

21     referring to our forces.  Gosuta and Katelj are further in the direction

22     of Gorazde, so even further than Grebak.  Korijen, or rather, Hadzici --

23     Zunovnica is a warehouse in the Hadzici area.

24        Q.   Just read out the last sentence of paragraph II, if you will,

25     General.

Page 37378

 1        A.   "A part of the unused units celebrated a Bajram holiday by

 2     engaging in sports competitions and other activities."

 3        Q.   Can we set up a connection between this information and the event

 4     at Dobrinja?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, if we're going to go further into

 6     this document, I'd like to have it read out because based on my pathetic

 7     understanding of the language it looks like this passage that

 8     Dr. Karadzic has just had the witness read out is connected to forces in

 9     the region of -- moving in the direction of Gorazde.  So to avoid any

10     misapprehension or misinterpretation about untranslated documents perhaps

11     we could profit from the witness being here and have him read it.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With all respect, Bajram is on the

13     same day, both on Igman and on Dobrinja.  And the forces going to Igman

14     have to pass through Dobrinja, through the tunnel.

15             JUDGE KWON:  But, first of all, we have to establish this, for

16     example.  I will ask the witness on your behalf, Mr. Karadzic.

17             Could we know from this document when it was written and when it

18     was sent and received?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We can see when it was sent out.

20     It was sent out on the 1st of June, 1993.  The time of reception, I don't

21     see it well.  I can only --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Could you see the top line, it says Sarajevo --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read that?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on the right-hand side it

Page 37379

 1     reads, time of reception 07, then it's not very clear.  I may not have

 2     the right glasses.  24 -- I suppose -- yes.  Oh, on the 07th at 24 hours

 3     and 10 minutes.  I suppose that that's what they wrote.  It says,

 4     07.24.10.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read the first line as well which says

 6     Sarajevo something, 2nd of June.  Does it signify the day of receipt?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Yes.  Sarajevo, the

 8     2nd of June, 1993, number 6680, then file name.  This was probably taken

 9     out of an electronic file DADE260A and so on.  So this is a report of the

10     2nd of June.  It was sent out on the 1st of June.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And let me just add it was sent by

13     the Igman operative group to the command of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Does the area of responsibility of that Igman

15     operation group cover the football field we were discussing?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The zone of responsibility of the

17     Igman operative group does not cover it.  In the operational sense it may

18     but in the combat sense it doesn't cover Dobrinja because Igman covers

19     Mount Igman and the area towards Rogoj and Gorazde.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, did the units of the 1st Corps leave Sarajevo and where

25     did they go?  I mean the Muslim units.

Page 37380

 1        A.   It was a known fact.  Once the VRS in June 1992 surrendered the

 2     airport, then that airport --

 3        Q.   But please be brief.  Did it happen that units left the city

 4     core?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Where did they go?

 7        A.   They left Dobrinja and that part of Sarajevo and went to Igman,

 8     especially in the Butmir area and on toward Hrasnica, and so on.

 9        Q.   And in the reverse direction?

10        A.   Likewise, from Igman to Butmir and through the airport toward

11     Dobrinja.  That was a direction that -- along which they moved for a

12     while without a tunnel.  And later around the 15th of August, 1993, the

13     tunnel was completed and we know that they were digging that tunnel

14     throughout 1993, although the UNPROFOR and others were trying to convince

15     us that nothing was being dug.

16        Q.   Thank you, General.  You must understand that I must try and save

17     some time.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, or rather,

19     marked for identification?

20             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark it for identification.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3414, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D01551.

23     1D01551.  Oh, here it is.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, this is a regular combat report drafted at 1700 hours.

Page 37381

 1     Four 120-millimetre projectiles were fired at Vojkovici.  Were all the

 2     reports as detailed as this one?  Why didn't they say five projectiles?

 3     Why is it four?

 4        A.   I believe that the reports that we have seen so far show that

 5     these reports were rather precise with regard to the quantity and type of

 6     ammunitions fired, both from our side and on the other side.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell us very briefly what is Vojkovici.

 8        A.   That's a suburb at the foot of Mount Igman in the direction of

 9     Hrasnica.  The Zeljeznica river separates it from the rest of town, so

10     it's at the foot of Mount Igman.

11        Q.   We see that a tank fired at Vogosca.  Now tell us what the

12     connection is between reconnoitring and observation with adequate

13     response to enemy fire?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't see any reference in what we have on the

16     screen to a tank firing at Vogosca.  I don't think that's what the

17     document says.

18             JUDGE KWON:  We see 82-millimetre shells.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             THE ACCUSED:  "At Vraca and Grbavica with a tank and a recoilless

21     gun."

22             JUDGE KWON:  But not at Vogosca?

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, Vogosca was 82-millimetres, 25,

24     82-millimetre shells.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37382

 1        Q.   Can you tell us --

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually, can we have the next page

 3     in English before that.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   -- is there any connection between reconnaissance and observation

 6     and an appropriate response?

 7        A.   Well, without good reconnaissance and observation with regard to

 8     the origin of fire and what kind of fire was used and what the assessment

 9     and the targets were, then a decision is made about what response would

10     be appropriate.  Throughout the week I have been telling you what an

11     appropriate or adequate response would be, and we tried as much as

12     possible to counter it with the identical weapon.  If they used infantry

13     fire, we would respond with infantry fire.  If they used recoilless gun,

14     since we didn't have any we had to use some other weapons such as

15     mortars, et cetera, and so on and so forth.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page I think

18     in the both version -- versions.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Under item 7 you say that you have two fatalities among your

21     soldiers and another seven were wounded and in conclusion you say that

22     the prediction is that they will not observe the cease-fire.  So that

23     means that in this period cease-fire was in force as well?

24        A.   Yes, we can see but it was nearing the end because there were

25     many violations and we assumed, judging by these activities, that the

Page 37383

 1     BH Army was going to continue to breach the cease-fire and that they were

 2     already infiltrating sabotage and terrorist groups in the area of the

 3     corps and they did that quite often.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3415, Your Honours.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Just with the note that --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  -- the witness -- Dr. Karadzic has addressed the

11     questions about this document to the witness as though the document was

12     his own, and just for the record the document does not have his signature

13     on it at all.

14             JUDGE KWON:  I think we heard from the witness, although in

15     respect of other documents, how the documents were signed by his

16     Chief of Staff on his behalf.

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so, just to note that this is a document

18     that is not the witness's document.  It's a document signed by his

19     Chief of Staff so that the record is clear.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

21             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I was referring to the

23     corps command not to the General in person.  Can we now please have

24     1D01555.  This is dated 24th June.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37384

 1        Q.   This is a document issued by your command and we can see your

 2     name at the end.  Let us look at paragraph 1 where it says that they

 3     fired from a distance from artillery weapons at civilian residential

 4     areas and you name them, and then you say that fire was returned and an

 5     enemy gun was hit from a multiple rocket-launcher.  Did you retaliate by

 6     firing on their targets?

 7        A.   If you look at this report dated the 24th of June, 1993, you can

 8     see which targets they selected to fire on.  But we responded only by

 9     firing at the area of Hrasnica which is where the depot was.  This is

10     just below Mount Igman and I don't know if there are any residential

11     areas at all [as interpreted].

12        Q.   Generally speaking, which positions did you select and which

13     targets did you select to fire on?

14        A.   Whenever we were in a position to make a selection and neutralise

15     military targets, we always opened fire at places where there were no

16     residential areas and where the origins of fire were.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3416, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We're going to skip a

22     few weeks again.  Can we now please have 1D01561.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Please look at this report sent at 1700 hours on the

25     5th of July, 1993.  How do you estimate and assess this activity?  We can

Page 37385

 1     see where -- infantry fire, rifle grenades, howitzers, 105 mortars and

 2     their targets.  So the whole item 1, can you please take a look at it and

 3     explain what kind of activities is being described here and what is

 4     UNPROFOR doing across the airport?

 5        A.   If you look only at some of the activities, I don't think it's

 6     necessary to read all of it, you can see that the whole area of the

 7     Sarajevo front there was intense activity on the part of the enemy

 8     targeting Faletici, Mrkovici, Nedzarici, Dobrinja, Kasindolska Street,

 9     and of course there were always snipers firing at Grbavica or other areas

10     and in this instance they were firing from Stupska junction.  So if you

11     want me, I can read everything.  For example, there were five 82-mortar

12     shells fired at Vogosca, and so on and so forth.

13             So the whole front line in the Sarajevo battle-field was covered

14     by this situation and by their activities.  It was interesting to note

15     what it says about what UNPROFOR was doing and I'm going to read it --

16        Q.   We'll come to that later because that's a separate topic.  In the

17     transcript in lines 10 and 11 the witness said that the whole

18     battle-field was on fire.  What did you mean by saying that it was on

19     fire?

20        A.   Well, it was under infantry, artillery, all other kind of fires,

21     and this is a military term to say that it was on fire.  It's a customary

22     word.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what your units were doing which is

24     described under item 2?

25        A.   Our units, I think, were preparing themselves in this period,

Page 37386

 1     that is to say on the Sarajevo front line and in the direction of

 2     Sarajevo.  Our wish was to calm the situation to a certain extent and to

 3     keep it to -- under control.  Our units were not active and were not

 4     targeting Sarajevo.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the next page,

 7     item 7, losses.  We also need the next page in English.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Can you please just tell me what is your opinion about the losses

10     incurred on that day.  Item 7 you have fatalities and wounded.  You don't

11     need to read it.  Just tell us what kind of losses you suffered.

12        A.   You can see that several soldiers were both killed and wounded.

13     I don't see here that there were any casualties among civilians, but when

14     you have this kind of fire and this kind of activities, it is inevitable

15     that civilians also suffer casualties.  But why it didn't happen in this

16     instance?  That is interesting.  I'm going to explain to you.  When we

17     were compiling this report and it was done by another chief of mine,

18     Colonel Milosevic, he must have waited for another day in order to get

19     information and report from the civilian authorities relating to the

20     number of civilian casualties.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted into

23     evidence?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3417, Your Honours.

Page 37387

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   In my indictment, General, there is an incident which allegedly

 3     took place on the 12th of July, 1993.  But before that, can you tell us

 4     at the time when you drafted this previous document was cease-fire in

 5     force?

 6        A.   I think that cease-fire was still in force, but I cannot say for

 7     sure.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether on the 11th, 12th, or

 9     13th of July, 1993, you issued an order to open mortar fire on

10     residential buildings on the streets of --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the names of

12     the streets.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the street name, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Hakija Turajlic Street, formerly

15     the alley of Branko Bulic, and in the residential area of Dobrinja.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   So in those days did you issue an order to this effect or did you

18     receive any order that your forces opened mortar fire at these targets?

19        A.   I have to establish a correlation between this and the situation

20     that prevailed in the corps at the time.

21        Q.   I'm afraid it will take too much time.  Can you tell us briefly:

22     Did you open fire in this specific period, targeting these residential

23     areas?

24        A.   I don't remember this being done with regard to residential areas

25     because at that time I was elsewhere engaged on a different assignment

Page 37388

 1     and we're going to speak about this later.

 2        Q.   Did your subordinate commands inform you about opening fire

 3     without any order of yours?  Did they open fire at all?

 4        A.   As far as I can remember, they did not report any such

 5     activities.  I still see the previous report.

 6        Q.   This is a report which is not relevant.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But can we now have P2665.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   While we wait we can look for another document.

10        A.   I have it on the screen.

11        Q.   I think this is 11th of August.  I made a mistake about the date.

12     Now under item 1, what is being ordered?  Please read it out loud.

13        A.   Item 1, I find it a bit hard to read but I'll do my best:

14             "I order do not open fire against the city of Sarajevo ..."

15             But there's something missing here, "at any cost."  It must read:

16     Do not open fire.

17        Q.   General, if you look at the words "Sarajevo," look how many

18     letters there are.

19        A.   Oh, you are right, Mr. President, your sight is better than mine.

20     It reads:

21             "Do not open fire," whereas here the word "not" is glued to the

22     word "Sarajevo" and I know that no one could have issued any different

23     order.  So it reads:

24             "Do not open fire against the city of Sarajevo at any cost."

25        Q.   The interpreters and the translators understood it properly.  How

Page 37389

 1     often did you issue this kind of orders and what were your instructions

 2     and orders from the Main Staff and the Presidency with regard to opening

 3     fire?

 4        A.   Concerning opening fire on the city, I know that at the time when

 5     I assumed my duties there were already certain orders in place issued by

 6     the civilian authorities.  I don't know if they were issued by you

 7     yourself, but I know that they had come from the civilian authorities and

 8     I know that the Supreme Command also issued said authorities.  And on

 9     various occasions we received such orders from higher commands and we

10     discussed these orders on the very first day when

11     Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali came.  So there was no need to issue this kind

12     of orders every single day because they were orders that were applicable

13     for a longer period of time and were only renewed if the situation

14     changed.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D1564, please.

16     1D1564, please.  Yes, this is what I wanted to call up the first time

17     too.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Can you please tell us --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Is there no translation of this document again?

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was sent for translation quite a

24     long time ago.  Whether we received a translation yet or not I'm not

25     quite sure -- no, not yet.

Page 37390

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Mr. Reid has done his magic again and we have a

 2     hard copy that can go on the ELMO.  So this was previously translated.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, can you please tell us what your units were doing on the

 5     11th of July.  You do not need to read it, but just tell us what they

 6     were doing, what were their activities and along which axes?

 7        A.   Well, generally speaking, in the area of this front in Sarajevo,

 8     if I can put it that way, the enemy mainly stayed on the lines reached

 9     and we prevented him from penetrating in particular towards Igman.  There

10     were manoeuvres of forces towards Igman and the surrounding area in the

11     remaining part of the front at the time Lukavac 93 operation was

12     underway.  It had begun between the 6th and the 7th of June, 1993, and

13     that was why we had other operations along the axis

14     Jahorina-Trnovo-Hojta-Igman-Bjelasnica, and another axis, that is to say

15     on this one where the Main Corps forces in co-ordinated action with the

16     Herzegovina Corps and the Drina Corps, and the other corps axis was along

17     Hadzici-Igman, that is to say Hadzici-Tresnjevo Brdo.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any active operations towards the inner

19     ring?

20        A.   I haven't read all of this but judging by the situation it was

21     no -- it was not necessary to engage in any active operations towards the

22     centre of the city, the inner city, so to speak.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this please be admitted.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 37391

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3418, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Could we now please have 65 ter 23885 so that we can see what

 4     your forces were doing on the day of the incident itself, that is the

 5     12th of July.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have the Serbian

 7     version as well so that the witness can read it.  We do not need the one

 8     dated the 11th of July, but the Serbian version of the document of the

 9     12th of July, that's 23885 under 65 ter.  The English version is the

10     right one and --

11             JUDGE KWON:  It will be coming.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's it.  If we can just

13     zoom in, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Can you tell us what were the preoccupations of the corps command

16     and where did it carry out operations on that day?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Could the witness just be asked the question and

20     not shown the document?  If the question was:  What were the

21     preoccupations of the corps command, the witness is clearly taking an

22     expansive read of the document as displayed in front of him before he

23     answers the question.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But that's --

Page 37392

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Hold on a minute.

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just strictly speaking the Chamber agrees with

 4     Ms. Edgerton, but once we are dealing with war situation in general the

 5     Chamber has no difficulty with putting the report or orders issued by the

 6     witness to the witness.  But however, when we have new areas, I would

 7     like you to put some foundational questions before you put the documents

 8     to the witness.

 9             I think it's -- unless it is inconvenient, we shall take a break

10     now.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If we can just finish this document

12     in a minute and I accept the suggestions and decisions.  But it seems to

13     me that with the previous document General Galic said what follows from

14     this document, mainly along which axes his corps was engaged.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct, Your Honour.  My answer

16     defined precisely what I was now asked, even before the document was

17     called up.  I apologise for saying so, but that's true.  And I would not

18     have answered differently in any way whatsoever than as I already have.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, can you tell us whether in this part "I order," in the

21     end did you order any fire or any activities directed against the city?

22        A.   In that time - and that was the 12th of July - I think that there

23     wasn't so much directed against the city but against Hrasnica, yes, that

24     zone there.  I cannot really see this well, I cannot read it, so I cannot

25     use this document.  But as far as my memory serves me well, I think that

Page 37393

 1     we had reached Trnovo and we were supposed to go there with the majority

 2     of the forces.  I'm not sure if we were there already.

 3        Q.   Can you please try and read it and see whether you ordered

 4     activities directed against Dobrinja.  You see it in the last passage.

 5        A.   I can't see it but I don't have to read it.  I don't think that I

 6     ordered anything like that because there was no reason for that.  No,

 7     that's not it.  If we can please scroll down a little bit, I need the

 8     text.  Yes.

 9             Urgently and at the latest by -- continue the operation.

10     Lukavac 93 is being continued as I ordered.  Free the

11     Trnovo-Kijevo-Sarajevo road.  That's up in the direction of Trnovo and it

12     was part of the Lukavac 93 operation.

13        Q.   And what about Dobrinja?

14        A.   There is no mention of Dobrinja here as far as I can see.

15        Q.   All right.  Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3419, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we take a break?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours, I have finished.

21             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before the

22     break, if you allow me, I would like to say as far as the rest of the

23     proceedings is concerned I'm not quite sure of what the translation says

24     regarding Mr. Galic's testimony.  Line 24 --

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Piletta-Zanin repeat the line and the

Page 37394

 1     page number, please.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Piletta-Zanin, could you kindly repeat the page

 3     and line numbers.

 4             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, sir.  Page

 5     29, line 4 and following, lines 4 to 8 or 9.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see.  The General did

 7     not say, "I do not know whether there was," but he said, "I don't know

 8     that there was any civilian place of residence there."

 9             [In English] "I didn't know that there were any," not --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We can listen to it.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Galic, I'll read out what you are recorded as

13     having said.  This is a question and answer about the firing at the area

14     of Hrasnica.  So I will -- quote, this is your answer:

15             "If you look at this report dated the 24th of June, 1993, you can

16     see which targets they selected to fire on.  But responded only by firing

17     at the area of Hrasnica which is where the depot was.  This is just below

18     Mount Igman and I don't know if there are any residential areas at all."

19             Do you remember having said so?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's mostly that.  It was

21     so.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just to add something.  It was

24     fired on the facilities of the depot up there, which is practically

25     outside of Hrasnica and below Igman.  This is why I said -- I'm not sure

Page 37395

 1     whether I have made myself sufficiently clear now.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Let me put you again.  Do you know whether there's

 3     any residential area or not below Mount Igman?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there are some residential

 5     areas below Igman.  There is the Hrasnica residential area and other

 6     areas towards the airport, but where the depot was fired on then, towards

 7     Igman, there aren't any.  I don't remember that there are any houses or

 8     buildings there apart from the depot itself.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll have a break for ...

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 35 minutes and resume at

12     quarter past 11.00.

13                           --- Recess taken at 10.40 a.m.

14                           --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, before we get back to business and

17     move on, I just wanted to raise one matter with respect to the documents

18     that we dealt with today which -- where the OTP, Mr. Reid, in fact, was

19     able to find English translations and that's D3411 and D3418.  Now, in

20     respect of D3418, Dr. Karadzic clearly said it was sent for translation

21     quite a long time ago and appeared to be blaming CLSS for there not being

22     a translation available.

23             Now, Your Honours, my understanding of how the document

24     management and translation system works is that these requests go through

25     the ODM, the Office of Document Management, where they're screened for

Page 37396

 1     content and by ERN number to see whether or not a translation exists.

 2     And generally within a few hours, ODM is able to notify the requesting

 3     party as to whether a document has been translated or not.  Now, after

 4     Dr. Karadzic made that remark we were able to see that both translations

 5     for these documents were actually completed in the summer of 2001.  So it

 6     seems to me, Your Honour, if - as Dr. Karadzic said - these had been

 7     requested quite a long time ago they would have received quite a long

 8     time ago the existing translations of these documents.  So in light of

 9     that I would actually like to encourage Dr. Karadzic to be a little bit

10     more careful in choosing his words when he appears to cast blame on

11     somebody when it comes to these untranslated documents.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have anything in response, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just so much, Your Excellencies,

14     that I did not have that specific document in mind but that we send

15     regularly everything that we want to call up to be translated.  I didn't

16     mean this particular document, but the documents that we need in general

17     we send them to be translated.  We do not wait for the last moment to do

18     so.

19             JUDGE KWON:  But I would like you to be precise in making a

20     specific statement in relation to a specific statement.

21             Thank you, Ms. Edgerton.

22             Let's continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   General, now that we dwelt on this incident and in general

25     incidents about which protests were lodged with you or that you were

Page 37397

 1     informed about by the UNPROFOR, what did you do with regard to this?  Did

 2     you respond to them and on the basis of what did you respond if you did?

 3        A.   On the basis of whether the UNPROFOR lodged a protest with the

 4     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, it depended on what that was about, what

 5     incident it was.  They protested some incidents; they didn't protest

 6     others.  As for sniping incidents, I do not remember a single protest

 7     that was lodged just because of a sniping incident.  As for the shelling

 8     or mortar fire, as there is no artillery fire in enclosure 2 of the

 9     indictment, then I think that sometimes, perhaps once or twice, we did

10     receive such information.

11        Q.   And if you learned from the media or from their protest, did you

12     then check that on the basis of what did you state whether that was fire

13     coming from your unit or not?

14        A.   Well, if we learned that an incident did occur in various ways,

15     whether through the media or whether because of a protest note or because

16     we were informed through the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska,

17     we at the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps had a man who was assigned for

18     co-operation with UNPROFOR, that was Mr. Indjic who was representative of

19     the Main Staff and at the same time the representative of the

20     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and he was in charge of co-operation with

21     UNPROFOR in the Sarajevo area and even further afield.  If we received

22     such information, we then checked it in a nutshell.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D43084 is the next document that

25     we would need.

Page 37398

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   And as for your answer, I wanted to say that the shortest answers

 3     are also the best, General.  1D43084.  And we would need the English

 4     version as well, please.

 5             General, can you please focus on this document and tell me

 6     whether you're familiar with it and tell us what was the purpose of this

 7     document.

 8        A.   This document was delivered to all units of the

 9     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and it's basically an order to submit a report on

10     the following:  Who opened fire from artillery and mortars at the town of

11     Sarajevo or from any weapon with a calibre exceeding 12.7 millimetres.

12     The report must contain the following information:  Who ordered the fire

13     and who approved it.  That is similar to what we have already discussed,

14     but this is now more precise.  You remember when I spoke about the use of

15     artillery, this is similar, but this includes all other weapons too.  So

16     who ordered the fire and who approved it.  At what time fire was opened

17     and in which sector?  And here, as usual, I point out that they're

18     duty-bound to act upon this order.

19        Q.   Thank you.  You said a minute ago that you checked.  What has

20     this document to do with the checking of the alleged activity?

21        A.   This document is dated the 11th of June.  All our orders to

22     subordinate units had to be checked in a certain manner to know whether

23     they were being acted upon, to what extent, and so on.  This is a strong

24     order imposing obligations on all units, obligations connected with

25     activity directed against the city of Sarajevo.

Page 37399

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we know who signed the document on the

 5     General's behalf?  It's not the General's document.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, do you know -- do you recognise this signature?

 8        A.   As far as I remember the signatures of authorised persons, I

 9     think that was the operations officer's signature, Mr. Cedo Sladoje.

10        Q.   But based on all other elements, can you tell that this is a

11     document of your command?

12        A.   If we consider all elements, it was processed and delivered by

13     the command of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  I'm not sure who actually

14     signed it, but once such an order is received it must urgently be

15     forwarded to the units.  When I'm not there then somebody else present

16     from the command will sign.  But such an order must be transmitted

17     urgently.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  This is a question for both parties.  When we have

21     an English translation of a B/C/S document, you would usually have the

22     handwritten part translated as well, but this time I'm not sure which is

23     translation of which.  If anybody could assist us in this regard.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll down the original.

25     The upper right-hand part is illegible.

Page 37400

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   But maybe you can help us, General, so we can read the section

 3     under the stamp.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please scroll down to the bottom.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I?

 6             Delivered to the Vogosca Brigade at 9.50, they made a remark of

 7     the fact that it was delivered to the Vogosca Brigade at 9.50.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   But it reads:  Delivered to all units?

10        A.   Yes, we can see that in the heading.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you recognise the signature under this handwritten

12     remark about the Vogosca Brigade?

13        A.   No, I don't recognise it.

14        Q.   Could it be someone from the Vogosca Brigade as proof of

15     reception?

16        A.   Yes, possibly.  But this is actually the processing of the cable

17     so it may have been someone who worked on that, but I don't remember the

18     man.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Just for everyone's information, I'm told that the

21     translation was provided by General Galic's Defence counsel in his first

22     trial.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Given -- and the font I assumed so that English

24     version came from another trial and the Defence was able to locate the

25     original.  Yes, we'll admit it.

Page 37401

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3420, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We'll continue with

 3     July.  Can we please see 1D1567.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Please focus on this report which I'll summarise for us to go

 6     faster.  From Igman there was firing at the Vojkovici neighbourhood and

 7     the Famos factory where 15, 82-millimetre and 120-millimetre mortar

 8     shells were -- fell --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

10             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, Dr. Karadzic doesn't need to

12     summarise the document.  We can see it here in both languages.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   General, can you tell us what this day was like considering

16     losses too and what do you do under paragraph 2?  Your units opened fire

17     at selected targets.  What follows from this document?

18        A.   On the whole, if we look at this document, we see that enemy

19     forces often opened fire on our units in Sarajevo.  Here it is also

20     precisely said from which sectors and at which features they fire.  This

21     is around the 18th of July - I believe a report will also show

22     that - that the main forces of the corps don't launch combat activity in

23     Sarajevo itself but they focus on the implementation of the tasks in the

24     framework of the Lukavica 93 operation which I have already mentioned.

25        Q.   Thank you.  In item 5 you say that better morale is felt overall

Page 37402

 1     after the successful taking of Trnovo and it is also mentioned that this

 2     is part of the Lukavac 93 operation?

 3        A.   Yes, yes.  It's important to understand this correctly.  When we

 4     entered Trnovo on the 18th of July, we must know that the

 5     Herzegovina Corps at the same time linked up with us in that area.  So in

 6     this manner Herzegovina was connected with the remainder of

 7     Republika Srpska because from June 1992 after the beginning of their

 8     operation south 92, Herzegovina to the south of the Kalinovik-Foca axis

 9     was separated from the remainder of Republika Srpska.  That is why this

10     mention about the boost to morale.

11        Q.   We see that the enemy fires six shells at --

12             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the name.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   And two civilians got killed.  I was not careful enough.  You say

15     up there that Vojkovic was fired at and below that you mention six shells

16     fired on Grbavica, Lukavica and Dobrinja.  We see down there that two

17     civilians got killed.  Where could this happen, the death of these two

18     civilians?

19        A.   There's no mention of the place where they got killed, but we

20     know that Vojkovic and Grbavica were targeted so it must have been there.

21     At the level of the Main Staff or even at the corps level, it is

22     important to be informed of the overall civilian casualties, but it is

23     also good to know where these events happened so that measures can be

24     taken.

25        Q.   Good.

Page 37403

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3421, Your Honours.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see 1D01569.  This is still

 5     July.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, please take a look at this and I will briefly summarise.

 8     It seems that from Pofalici and Kovaci they targeted Grbavica with

 9     mortars and recoilless gun as well as machine-guns and infantry weapons

10     and one civilian was killed at Grbavica.  Then from Hrasnica

11     82-millimetre shell were fired and under (b) you say that they broke the

12     cease-fire.  Was this a time of cease-fire?

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Again we have the document on the screen for some

16     period of time, Dr. Karadzic summarising the document before even

17     beginning to put the question to the witness.  I would suggest this is

18     leading the witness and diminishes his responses.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, we have been dealing with the incoming

22     fire and responses, and although Mr. Karadzic used the word to summarise,

23     but I take it to put the crux of the document and hearing from the

24     witness.  So what difficulty are you having with such exercise, if you

25     could be more specific.

Page 37404

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  The difficulty that I have, Your Honour, is that

 2     the witness with the document in front of him which he can read and with

 3     Dr. Karadzic's summarises has - and it's quite obvious because he's

 4     reading the document before he answers - ample time to formulate his

 5     answer based on what he reads in the document rather than from his

 6     recollection or his experience.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Could I hear from you, Mr. Robinson.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, I don't think Dr. Karadzic is putting

 9     anything but the context to the witness so that he can comment on it

10     appropriately.  But I don't see anything wrong with putting a document

11     before a witness and having the witness read the document, whether it

12     refreshes their recollection, whether it evokes a comment.  The point is

13     not to ask a leading question once the document is before the witness but

14     to put a document before a witness on the topic that he's already

15     discussed to make it more precise, there's nothing wrong with him reading

16     that document as it's -- in order to formulate his answer.  That's not

17     leading.  Documents are put to witnesses all the time for them to see --

18     to refresh their recollection or give a comment on without it being

19     considered a practice of leading.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson's

22     observation.  I would allow the accused to continue.

23             JUDGE BAIRD:  But, Dr. Karadzic, may we stress:  Structure the

24     questions in such a way that it isn't leading.  This is the important

25     thing.

Page 37405

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will try my best,

 2     Your Excellency.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   With regard to what was targeted, especially given the presence

 5     of UNPROFOR, how does this match your information about the exchange of

 6     fire and the events mentioned in this report?

 7        A.   We must remind ourselves and remember that an order was given not

 8     to target the city.  Here we see that the enemy is shooting from the

 9     city.  We must also remember that at that time - this is the

10     25th of July - the Lukavac 93 operation is under way along the axes

11     mentioned.  So all enemy activity is focused on weakening the defence

12     lines of the SRK at the Sarajevo front and slow down the attack on

13     Trnovo, Bjelasnica, and Igman.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please tell the Trial Chamber where Bistrik is and

15     where Zetra is, the UNPROFOR headquarters.  How can the fire from Bistrik

16     hill directed at UNPROFOR be interpreted?  Where is Zetra?

17        A.   Zetra is in Skenderija, I think.  I'm not really familiar with

18     all the details in Sarajevo.  Bistrik is also in Sarajevo that is

19     controlled by the BH Army Zetra was and Bistrik also under the control of

20     the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let's see the next page, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Please focus on the conclusion and the -- and the outlook.  It

24     says that the enemy violates the cease-fire and tries to depict the

25     activities as being the opposite of what they were by protesting with

Page 37406

 1     UNPROFOR and targeting UNPROFOR.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the last part

 3     of his question.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Galic.  Just a second.

 5             The interpreters didn't hear the last part of your question,

 6     Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll repeat.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   How does this match your experience with the behaviour of the

10     opponent and what was the purpose of this shelling, that is, their

11     shelling from their territory of UNPROFOR which was also in their

12     territory?  What do they want to achieve?

13        A.   The purpose was to lay the blame on the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3422, Your Honours.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  There's another

19     document from July, it's 1D01570.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, can you please look at item number 1.  Your deputy is

22     providing information here about the intensity of fire targeting your

23     territory by the enemy and that mortar fire was opened on UNPROFOR column

24     from Hum and then under number 2 it says with regard to your units the

25     order to cease-fire is strictly observed especially artillery fire and we

Page 37407

 1     fire back only in extreme necessity.  Can you explain what the term

 2     "extreme necessity" means in this report?

 3        A.   I don't see the next page, but this was probably drafted by my

 4     Chief of Staff, Milosevic or someone who stood in for him.  The purpose

 5     of this report was to say that they had received an order to observe the

 6     cessation of hostilities and attacks on the city, whereas on the other

 7     hand the enemy forces continued to attack from within the city.  I don't

 8     see here that he wanted UNPROFOR to be informed about this but I think he

 9     should have done so.

10        Q.   Thank you.  But what does it mean to respond only in extreme

11     necessity?  Can you say and explain to the Chamber what an extreme

12     necessity is?

13        A.   An extreme necessity is a very difficult decision for every

14     commander or every human being for that matter, and that means that this

15     is a situation when you have to defend your life.  As far as a military

16     unit is concerned, it means whether they're going to defend their

17     positions or not.  That constitutes an extreme necessity which forces

18     them to respond and to thwart the enemy attack.  When you have enemy

19     artillery fire and if this is repetitive fire, then fire has to be

20     returned in order to neutralise them and to prevent any further losses of

21     own forces or to protect some crucial industrial facility.  And we had

22     many such facilities in the area of the SRK.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 37408

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3423, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D10576.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the number again.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D10576.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Now this is the month of August, General.  The first few bullets

 7     speak about the targets, but I am interested in the period between

 8     12.30 -- 20.30 and 22.00 hours where it says that the enemy was opening

 9     fire from Dobrinja 2 and 3 and constantly firing from Browning at the

10     Lukavica Put [phoen] and Sucuri and also fired through grenades from a --

11     recoilless guns from Dobrinja 2 targeting the Sucuri neighbourhood.

12     General, can you tell us what was the military purpose of firing these

13     two grenades on private houses in Sucuri?

14        A.   Well, speaking about what was happening on the front in general

15     it is difficult to look at one incident in isolation.  This was close to

16     the end of Lukavac 93 operation and these houses in Sucuri and that area

17     in general, as far as I remember there were no positions of ours.  There

18     were, though, some positions above the houses but of minor units.

19        Q.   Thank you.  General, it is stated in the indictment that if we

20     fired one or two shells on the city that was with the purpose of

21     terrorising the civilians.  According to your knowledge, did the

22     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps fire shells at areas, neighbourhoods, without any

23     military purpose whatsoever solely with the intention of terrorising

24     civilians?

25        A.   This kind of attacks aimed at terrorising civilians did not

Page 37409

 1     happen, they were never ordered, and I personally never received an order

 2     to carry out such attacks.  Because terror begets terror.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  We can see the consequences, Milenko Sucur was

 4     wounded and Slobodan Sucur was wounded when he tried to pull him out?

 5        A.   That was another soldier.  I don't know where you see that but I

 6     know that he was wounded while trying to pull out his comrades.

 7        Q.   That is correct, General.  Milenko Sucur was wounded, whereas

 8     Slobodan Sucur tried to pull him out and got wounded himself.  Then it

 9     says there was no response to enemy provocation with the exception of

10     repelling major attacks.  Now, can you look at the sentence which speaks

11     about UNPROFOR convoys which says that enemy opened fire from snipers but

12     without any serious consequences.

13        A.   Can you please scroll up particularly the Serbian version because

14     I don't see what you're talking about.  Thank you.

15        Q.   The last two lines.

16        A.   Yes, yes.  That was, so to speak, a frequent occurrence, to open

17     fire on humanitarian columns and UNPROFOR columns and other convoys of a

18     similar nature so this is nothing unusual.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   If you look at conclusions and predictions, this is consistent

23     with what you said, that the cease-fire was being violated and that

24     UNPROFOR is being shot at with the aim of portraying that as being done

25     by the Army of Republika Srpska and to influence the international public

Page 37410

 1     and cause the intervention of NATO.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the question.

 3     We were still interpreting the previous statement.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters couldn't hear the

 5     last part of your question.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   How often were they successful in these deceptions in creating an

 8     UNPROFOR -- an impression with UNPROFOR that it was the Serbian side

 9     opening fire?

10        A.   From day one we discussed the provocations at length and I said

11     that we used to call such operations - and I don't know whether the

12     Muslims used the same term - but anyhow we used to call it step by step

13     until intervention, which means by way of various provocations to provoke

14     a response from the SRK and the Army of Republika Srpska and then portray

15     the situation as their firing without any reason and need whatsoever.

16     And one of these provocations was an attack on the UNPROFOR convoy, the

17     UNHCR convoy, et cetera.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted into

19     evidence?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3424, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have

23     1D10584.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   A while ago you spoke many times that you were entitled to

Page 37411

 1     respond by using the same type of weapons.  Now, look at item 1,

 2     bullet 2, where it says that from the Srebrenik direction they attacked

 3     by PAT and PAM, an anti-aircraft machine-gun, and anti-aircraft gun; is

 4     that correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Why did you only use PAM instead of PAT as well?

 7        A.   Well, I think that there was cease-fire which came into force

 8     sometime in August, I think on the 11th or the 14th when I withdrew from

 9     Igman.  So that required very precise reporting on the breaches of the

10     cease-fire and that is why you have very precise co-ordinates from the

11     maps.  The point why we used PAM, which is 12.7-millimetre anti-aircraft

12     machine-gun and PAT is 12, the former is a more precise weapon in terms

13     of returning fire, whereas an anti-aircraft machine-gun shell whenever it

14     comes to the first obstacle it becomes fragmented.  We all know how burst

15     of fire is opened at an aircraft and if fire came from Sedrenik we only

16     used a more precise weapon in order to respond.

17        Q.   Now, from the point of view of collateral damage what is the

18     difference between PAM fire and PAT fire?

19        A.   Now, PAM fire should not, if it is precise, cause collateral

20     damage.  It should rather engage and destroy a military target.  However,

21     such losses are always possible.  If the line of vision goes further on

22     over residential area, it can overshoot, whereas in terms of the use of

23     PAT the losses are greater.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

Page 37412

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3425, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have now 1D01598.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, in line 1 you can see that truce was in force but that

 6     the Muslims violated it, and then it says where this was done and so on

 7     and so forth.  And then it says that 1615 hours a shell fell in Vrace and

 8     wounded a 13-year-old boy and a woman was wounded on Ozrenska Street.

 9     Now, what was the point of firing only one shell and what was the point

10     of firing at this woman from a sniper rifle on Ozrenska Street?

11        A.   Well, an 82-millimetre shell which was fired on Vrace -- I have

12     to tell you that in Vrace itself there were no positions or deployment of

13     our troops.  A little bit down there were some forces, though, but in

14     Vrace itself there were no military targets at the time, whether they

15     were aiming at something else I don't know, but as I say there were no

16     military targets in Vrace at the time and that is why the casualty was

17     civilian.

18        Q.   Thank you.  And then under item 2 you say that you did not

19     respond to enemy provocations unless they threatened the positions and

20     lives of your troops.  Now, could this wounding of the young boy and this

21     woman something that could be described as extreme necessity or is an

22     extreme necessity only situation when the lives of your soldiers are at

23     risk?

24        A.   Well, these are heavy casualties, both military and civilian, but

25     they cannot be categorised as an extreme necessity.  If you have in mind

Page 37413

 1     loftier goals and if you take into consideration what are the

 2     repercussions of such a response, both internationally and with regard to

 3     the SRK, if you weigh these two options then it is better to refrain from

 4     opening fire.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence

 7     into evidence?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Leave it at that.  Yes, we'll receive it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3426, Your Honours.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11             Can we now have 1D01610.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Can we go back to this document.

13     Item 2, so:

14             "All units are formally holding positions, are generally not

15     responding to enemy provocation except when the positions and the lives

16     of our troops are in danger."

17             Is it routine explanation what your units were doing or is it a

18     specific explanation what your units did in relation to the fire which we

19     see in the previous document -- passage?  I'm not sure whether there was

20     a return fire or not.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, as far as I

22     can see, we can see from the report - and I cannot remember every single

23     day and what was happening on every single day during two years in that

24     zone.  I also have to look at the report in order to be able to comment

25     because I'm not a computer, I'm just human, and it's been 20 years.  So

Page 37414

 1     we have to be reasonable when you are asking me to answer and when the

 2     questions are formulated.  I would say that something is noted about our

 3     units here, namely, that they are on these positions, they're holding

 4     them, and not responding unless their lives are threatened.  And we have

 5     seen from a report that there was one fatality so that there are lives

 6     which are threatened.  Now, whether there was response in that specific

 7     area, I probably cannot now -- I suppose not because cease-fire was in

 8     force at the time.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

10             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, we are now already in October 1993 and under 1 it is

13     stated here that --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, now we have the document.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Yes, for the 13th of October under item number 1 as usual it is

17     stated what the enemy is doing and at 1630 hours fired two 82-millimetre

18     shells on Banjalucka Street from the direction of the railway station and

19     also two shells on Moravska Street from the direction of the city.  Can

20     you tell us whether you had some military infrastructure targets or

21     troops on Banjalucka and Moravska Streets?

22        A.   I cannot claim that with any certainty right now.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Sniper fire is also included in the report, and so

24     on, and under item 2 in the report says that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps

25     observed the cease-fire but periodically opened fire when the lives and

Page 37415

 1     positions of the soldiers were threatened.  The units are surveying and

 2     so on and so forth.  Compared with the previous report, is this one

 3     clearer or does this report say that there was some fire?

 4        A.   Well, judging by this report we can conclude once again that we

 5     did not fire.

 6        Q.   Can you please look at this, but periodically opened fire when

 7     the lives of the soldiers were threatened and the positions too?

 8        A.   Yes.  But at which section and how much fire was returned, I

 9     cannot claim that they returned fire precisely in this location or in

10     which location.  I'm saying on the whole that we did not return fire

11     except at specific points or sections of the front, as the report says.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And then it says that a group of officers and the

13     Chief of Staff are in the field where they are conducting some controls.

14     And then you say that one soldier was wounded by a sniper shot - that's

15     the following page - one soldier was wounded.  So what sort of a loss is

16     that?  How would you consider that, the loss of one wounded soldier?

17        A.   Well, I would consider it an average loss.  During a day when you

18     have one wounded soldier that's an average loss.  So it's not a major

19     loss, we could not consider it as such, it is a loss but not a major one.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And what do you think was the purpose of firing two

21     shells on Banjalucka and two on Moravska Street from the city?

22        A.   Well, I told you recently that I was not sure whether we had some

23     troops deployed in that area at that specific moment, that point in time.

24     As far as I know, they shouldn't have been there but I cannot claim that

25     with certainty.  I said that earlier so now I am repeating myself again.

Page 37416

 1        Q.   Well, that is honest of you.  Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3427, Your Honours.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Could we now please

 6     have 1D01620.  Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   This is the 26th of October and under item 1, as in all reports,

 9     you inform about the areas that were targeted by shells, rifle grenades,

10     sniper fire, PAM from Mojmilo, Dobrinja, and from the city.  And then in

11     Vogosca there was two mortar shells that were filled with chloride.  How

12     does that fit in with your knowledge and how often did they put -- how

13     often did they put chlorine in the shells?

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  "Chlorine" rather

15     than "chloride."

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember well the reports that --

17     which were sent at the time that there was chlorine and other chemicals

18     that were used to fill those shells, namely.  It was nothing new, as in

19     our army, earlier on the Yugoslav People's Army, I mean, there were

20     instances of preparations of various charges.  So if chlorine was used, I

21     know that they said there was some white trace and that later on fire was

22     caused and so on.  I think that's what it was.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what sort of unrest happened in the

25     city of Sarajevo which resulted in wounding of some people on our side?

Page 37417

 1     Can you remember what was happening in the city of Sarajevo in late

 2     October 1993 among themselves?

 3        A.   Well, many things were going on then.  That was the culmination

 4     of the events that had to do with their paramilitaries and

 5     para-commanders.  That was the 26th of October, the day on which the

 6     commander of the 10th Mountain Brigade Musan Topalovic was killed.  We

 7     know that in his -- his zone included Kazani as well and that that was

 8     where most Serbs perished, in that area.  Later on he turned not only

 9     against the Serbs but also against his own people in his zone.  He became

10     too arrogant and he did not want to obey anyone anymore so they had to

11     liquidate him, just as they took measures against other commanding

12     officers.  We know that immediately after that in 1993 the commander

13     Sefer Halilovic was replaced, that in 1993 at the beginning of the year,

14     or rather, in late 1992 Juka Prazina as someone from the Main Staff and a

15     member of the paramilitaries, so to speak, went out to Igman and in 1993

16     when the conflict between the HVO and the BH Army broke out and later on

17     he was killed somewhere around here in Belgium.  This is squaring of

18     accounts happened in the zone of the BH Army 1st Corps and this was one

19     particular day on which that happened.  It was one of the heavier

20     conflicts in the zone of the BH Army 1st Corps.  I could say much more

21     but I think that what I have said is sufficient.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And how did -- these two Muslims, the prisoners,

23     wounded in Grbavica, in that chaos and unrest, did they continue to shoot

24     in the direction of the Serb-held territories?

25        A.   Well, it's probable that they not only -- they were in panic in

Page 37418

 1     Sarajevo, a general panic, the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  And sometimes

 2     they acted in a confused manner:  Who should they wage war against,

 3     against themselves or against us?  And in such a situation they also

 4     fired on everything that was in front of them.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have the second

 7     page.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Under the conclusions you say in spite of internal unrest and

10     turmoil in the city of Sarajevo the enemy forces are firing from various

11     kinds of weapons on our positions on the confrontation line.  Is this

12     what you just told us that regardless of what was happening in the city

13     they continued to fire at you?

14        A.   I think that this confirms what I said previously in my previous

15     sentence.  I have nothing to add, nothing else, no comments.  They are

16     unnecessary.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3428, Your Honours.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  And again, for the record, it's a document not

22     signed by the witness and, in fact, it doesn't appear to be signed by his

23     behalf either in type script.  It appears to be signed by

24     Dragomir Milosevic.  I don't know if that's General Milosevic's

25     signature.

Page 37419

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, who was authorised by you to sign the corps documents?

 3        A.   There was a special order and instructions on signing documents,

 4     who was entitled to sign which document.  That's regulated, namely, who

 5     can sign for the commander.  We can see here that my deputy was

 6     appointed, Colonel Dragomir Milosevic, but this is not his signature even

 7     though it does -- says M something, but as far as I remember this wasn't

 8     his signature.  His signature was somewhat different.  I don't know.

 9     Once again I emphasise that this is a report from the corps command and

10     many times we will be in a situation in which the person who is supposed

11     to sign the document, my deputy or the duty operations officer, and the

12     duty officer at the command post is also authorised to sign a report sent

13     to the superior command if the three persons I enumerated are absent.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Please -- you already told us that you were fired at

15     from the vicinity of certain facilities which should not be used for such

16     activities.  Were there any such incidents and where did they mostly

17     occur, or rather, what were the sensitive facilities from the vicinity of

18     which fire was opened at the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

19        A.   Well, the most sensitive buildings and facilities which were

20     abused - if I can call it that way - I can find no better and useful word

21     than that were the premises of protected buildings and these were the

22     premises of hospitals, schools, museums, the premises or areas where

23     observation points of military observers of -- from the United Nations

24     were deployed and where command posts of the UN HQ were also located,

25     whether it was the sector command or the BH command.  Because we know

Page 37420

 1     that the sector remained in Sarajevo practically throughout this time and

 2     the BH command later moved from Kiseljak to Sarajevo to the area that was

 3     within the zone of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  That's the location

 4     close to Holiday Inn.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D01585.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   It's not in chronological order really.  This is from early

 9     September.  Can you please note the first bullet under item 1, that an

10     infantry attack was attempted from the direction of the Jezero hospital

11     which was repelled.  Did you know about this incident and do you know

12     which unit of theirs was deployed at the Jezero hospital?

13        A.   This hospital, Jezero, was not really operational so much at the

14     time.  Whether something was functioning there, whether any services were

15     provided, I'm not sure.  But the premises were protected anyway.  They

16     attacked it upwards in the direction of Mrkovici, I think, more or less.

17     I think that was the axis, and I couldn't provide any more comments about

18     that area, but I could say that it was a protected area, a protected

19     facility in any case, but attacks were launched from that facilities

20     towards our positions in the direction of Mrkovici.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know where the maternity ward was in Sarajevo?

22        A.   Well, it used to be a maternity ward, Jezero, but I'm not sure if

23     anyone was giving birth there at the time.  I didn't have sufficient

24     information to be able to claim that that was still working at the time.

25     I know that there was a maternity ward in that hospital, but I didn't

Page 37421

 1     point it out for what I said earlier, namely, that I didn't know whether

 2     the hospital was operational at the time and whether it provided such

 3     services or not, but I do know that there was a maternity ward precisely

 4     in that hospital, Jezero.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  A little further down it reads that forces are

 6     gathering at the faculty of transportation.  Why was that faculty used

 7     for military purposes?

 8        A.   As far as I understand, it was the students' village.  We called

 9     it that.  It was -- it remained behind after the Olympics 1994 --

10             THE INTERPRETER:  1984, interpreter's correction.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was used to deploy soldiers in

12     that area.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Next page, please.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Please take a look at item 8 where it says that provocations are

21     continuing which leads to the exhaustion of soldiers but they responded

22     in exceptional circumstances.  How long they can restrain themselves.

23     Please explain what this means how this restraint reflected on the morale

24     of the soldiers.

25        A.   With the benefit of hindsight, or rather, in hindsight, it

Page 37422

 1     doesn't look so difficult.  But under the conditions after time when the

 2     SRK waged war, this is easy to understand.  We dealt with the

 3     Ilidza Brigade a lot and we saw that it was almost encircled.  They can't

 4     go to the airport, they only had about 800 metres of length that they

 5     covered, and there was no influx of fresh forces.  There was always the

 6     same people and they had to bear a lot of pressure.  The 4th Corps of the

 7     BH Army - and we saw that was deployed - then we know what exhaustion

 8     means.  Not only the soldiers were exhausted, I was exhausted and our

 9     officers too because it went on day and night.  There is a no pause in

10     combat activities.  If I was able to sleep for two hours without anything

11     happening which required my intervention, I was happy and everybody lived

12     under very similar conditions.  If shells fall around you each and every

13     day and if you must -- if it's susceptible to being hit by sniper

14     anywhere and the rations of food were modest and any kind of supply was

15     modest, sometimes we also ran short of ammunition.  I would like to

16     remind you, although you know better than I do, that the BH Army had

17     under its control the facilities to produce ammunition and weapons,

18     Bugojno and other places.  So we didn't have enough ammunition.  That

19     also contributed to mental fatigue.  When you don't have reserves, be it

20     reserves in manpower or mental reserves, then exhaustion grows.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?  I just have

23     one more document to show before the break.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3429, Your Honours.

Page 37423

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06017, please.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   While we wait, General, please tell us in general what the losses

 4     during cease-fire -- the cease-fire were?

 5        A.   That was a great problem.  During the cease-fires we sustained

 6     heavy losses.  Now the question was how do we react and how do we get

 7     both the soldiers and the civilians to obey, to be patient, and without

 8     excessive response, especially in case of civilian losses.  And this --

 9     those civilians are the relatives of the soldiers at the front line.

10     There were no other soldiers but locals there.

11        Q.   Thank you.  There was a red document on the screen, 1D06017.

12     This is not the one.  A minute ago it was the right document, 1D06017.

13     This is it.

14             General, please tell us what is this list of shells fired by the

15     enemy --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   -- during these two months of cease-fire?

19             JUDGE KWON:  No English translation?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  It's what I'm wondering, Your Honours.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There should be one.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Am I supposed to answer?

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   We're waiting for the translation.

25             JUDGE KWON:  E-court says there's none.

Page 37424

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you try again?  I believe

 2     that it can be uploaded.  But if you prefer to have the break now, then

 3     we can wait.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, can you upload the previous document, last

 5     page.  Exhibit D3429.  Second page, number 8, conclusion.  In English

 6     there are two 6's so number 7 should be number 8.

 7             Here at the end of the conclusion, General, I think it is a

 8     document signed for you by somebody.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is -- this may have been

10     signed by Lugonja.

11             JUDGE KWON:  The last sentence in the first paragraph of point

12     number 8 it says:

13             "...  the question coming increasing to the forefront is how long

14     they can restrain themselves."

15             What does it mean?  What would they do if they can't restrain

16     themselves?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can answer.  Here's what

18     this is about, Mr. President.  We are informing the Main Staff in what

19     military situation the units are and in what situation with regard to

20     morale.  If we continue to restrain ourselves, then there could be

21     unauthorised, random fire from soldiers trying to protect their homes and

22     families and children.  That was to be expected if this fire is continued

23     and if the 1st Corps of the BH Army begins moving its units.  Through the

24     UN, through the Supreme Command, we wanted to communicate that the enemy

25     has to stop his actions and that the cease-fire proclaimed must be

Page 37425

 1     honoured.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  So was this a kind of notice to the Main Staff that

 3     there might be in the future some unrestrained firing from your units?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was a warning to the

 5     Main Staff and we also had information that soldiers and civilians are

 6     becoming increasingly impatient in order to prevent unwanted

 7     consequences.  They had to take military and political measures to

 8     prevent that.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So could you give us the example of military and

10     political measures to prevent that?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, political measures certainly

12     include the crafting of an agreement to see what will happen in Sarajevo

13     for us to have some prospect not just continue dying for nothing.  And

14     the world and everybody should learn about the situation in the areas

15     held by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Our struggle should not be

16     vilified.  We should be allowed to defend ourselves.  As for the military

17     aspect, a new agreement can be reached and the commanders can reach

18     agreement.  I was never present at a meeting with representatives of the

19     BH Army, I was never a member of commissions or delegations that met to

20     take care of such issues.  I therefore have no experience with that, but

21     I know what they should do.  If such incidents happen, I know that under

22     article -- some article of annex 1, what must be done and what reports

23     must be submitted for such actions to be punished, if no measures are

24     taken, what can we expect?  I hope this was enough; if not, please let me

25     know.

Page 37426

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Did you yourself take any measures to prevent such

 2     event unrestrained response, et cetera?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Personally, I did take measures.

 4     You see here in my reporters that the command inspects units and they

 5     speak about the importance of the cessation of such actions.  I tried to

 6     explain the importance of these cease-fire agreements and the cessation

 7     of all negative things happening in a war.  It's not only a problem

 8     whether someone shot at the enemy or at this or that.  The problem is

 9     within the unit to create moral and political conditions for such tasks

10     to be carried out and the obligations connected with that to be honoured.

11     I showed which measures we took, what we did to prevent unwanted

12     consequences, from orders I issued with regard to the honouring of the

13     Geneva Conventions, to the prohibition of targeting civilians, and also

14     here when an order was issued to cease-fire at the town this must be

15     respected.  I think that even today we saw such orders.

16             We also took a number of other measures to create better

17     conditions on both sides.  Mr. President, I believe that this will be

18     discussed later.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             We'll take a break.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only, if I may, on page 69, line 7,

22     of the transcript it was omitted in the witness's reply:  "We did not

23     reply to fire.  We refrained from responding to fire."

24             [In English] It says:

25             "If we continue to restrain ourselves," that should be "from

Page 37427

 1     responding," or, "responding on fire then there could be

 2     unauthorised ..."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Galic, do you confirm that?  You

 4     repeated -- after having said restrain ourselves and refrain from -- I'm

 5     sorry -- and refrain from responding on fire.  I think it's -- it does

 6     not change much and it's the same meaning.  I don't see any problem.

 7     We'll leave it at that.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It can be checked against the tapes

 9     and then we'll know.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at 3.30 -- I'm

13     sorry, 1.30.

14                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.43 p.m.

15                           --- On resuming at 1.33 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   General, the Presiding Judge asked you which measures you had

20     undertaken in order to prevent the exhaustion and the tempting of

21     patience which would be contrary to the order to restrain.  Do you think

22     that your response to the Main Staff constitutes one of the measures, one

23     of the preventive measures?

24        A.   Yes, yes, I understood your question, Mr. President.  Well, the

25     point is and I already said that a whole host of measures and activities

Page 37428

 1     taken by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps in order to resolve the conditions

 2     of war and the conditions in which tasks had to be performed in

 3     conformity with the orders, definitely one of the ways to do that was to

 4     inform the Main Staff so that they could assist us in solving these

 5     problems.  I think it would be worthwhile to mention here that you

 6     yourself were very much interested in many problems faced by the SRK and

 7     how they were being dealt with.

 8        Q.   Apart from informing the Main Staff and issuing orders to

 9     subordinate commands, did you take any other steps or did you communicate

10     with the soldiers in any way in order to incite them to refrain from

11     acting and to abide by the orders?

12        A.   I spoke about the activities that the corps was involved in

13     during my testimony.  One of such activities was touring the units along

14     the front line and having meetings with the local authorities in the area

15     of responsibility of the SRK in order to find solutions to the problems

16     that were affecting both the civilians and soldiers in the area of their

17     municipality.  Then measures were also taken with a view to maintaining

18     the situation that would enable the orders to be carried out to inform

19     all the units up to the last soldier.  Of course I couldn't accomplish

20     that physically, but I did manage to tour some segments of the front line

21     and certain axes.  I think that that was quite sufficient.  I also

22     briefed commands to work with the soldiers and with their subordinate

23     commands.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Within the framework of this latter activity did you

25     issue any declarations to the soldiers?

Page 37429

 1        A.   Well, I communicated with all the soldiers by issuing

 2     declarations and I did that as well with civilians in the zone of

 3     responsibility of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  This declaration that I

 4     sent both to the soldiers of my corps and other soldiers was intended to

 5     motivate them in order to be able to endure all the problems and

 6     difficulties they were facing.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D06331, and I

 8     apologise that there is no translation yet but we are going to highlight

 9     the main points.  So 1D06331.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, can you tell us what this is and we can see that this

12     was drafted by you.

13        A.   This is one of the way of communicating the entire force in the

14     area of the SRK and it was primarily addressed to officers,

15     non-commissioned officers, and ordinary soldiers.  I presume that this

16     type of proclamation reached the government authorities as well and that

17     it prompted them to help us carry out our tasks.  What was the need for

18     such a proclamation?  It was definitely required because we anticipated

19     at the time with regard to the cease-fire that went into force on the

20     10th of June, 1994, that I felt the need to address all members of the

21     corps so that all these relevant tasks can be completed to the full.  I

22     cannot comment now this proclamation from various aspects.

23        Q.   So the second paragraph speaks about the need to abide by the

24     cease-fire of the 10th of June, 1994?

25        A.   This related to refraining for one month.

Page 37430

 1        Q.   And then further below it says:

 2             "Demonstrate restraint at all provocations coming from the

 3     Muslims and respond only if you -- entirely necessarily and if approved

 4     by the Main Staff."

 5             Does this coincide with the way you acted?

 6        A.   This is yet another proof that this was in compliance with the

 7     orders from the Main Staff because I invited all the forces to display

 8     restraint until situation of extreme necessity arose.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, put a pause and please repeat your

10     question.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   The first paragraph -- the first sentence in the last paragraph,

14     what are you asking them to do?

15        A.   I used a kind of colloquial refrain:  Let us give up on alcohol,

16     maybe it's difficult to translate into English, and refrain from

17     alterations and inter party competition and rivalry.  What I wanted to

18     say was that one of the problems that might arise was alcohol, then there

19     were internal rifts and conflicts that were not so numerous but they did

20     occur, nevertheless, in various forms starting from political

21     affiliations all the way to the way in which tasks should be performed.

22     Here I said that this inter party political rifts should be left for some

23     other period.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the very bottom of the

25     page.

Page 37431

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   It says here Captain Aleksic.  What does it mean?  It's

 3     handwritten.  Does it mean that -- can we please lower the page?

 4        A.   I don't see this note written by Captain Aleksic, but --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Top of the page.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you read the first sentence so that we know who you are

 8     addressing?

 9        A.   Officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, which means

10     the entire force of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

11        Q.   How do you explain this Captain Aleksic?

12        A.   Well, this document was drafted by him [as interpreted] probably

13     he either drafted it or he had it, but it could have been in the hands of

14     any member of the SRK or, for that matter, any member of the BH Army.

15        Q.   There is a mistake in transcript.  Aleksic was not the one who

16     drafted it because the General said that he received it.

17        A.   I drafted it myself.  I know exactly how I drafted it.  You can

18     criticise me if I didn't do a good job, but my intentions were good.

19        Q.   Let us just clarify.  You said that every soldier should have one

20     copy of this and that this probably came from Aleksic?

21        A.   Yes.  Each copy of this proclamation should be held by every

22     soldier.  I don't know the provenance of this proclamation and who wanted

23     to show it, but I say, just as Captain Aleksic had it, it was accessible

24     to every soldier including the soldiers from the BH Army.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 37432

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3440, Your Honours -- I'm sorry, 3430.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 6             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes.  Maybe I didn't hear

 7     properly.  I had the feeling that General Galic was talking about all the

 8     soldiers of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?

10             JUDGE KWON:  I think General had said so and it's reflected as

11     such in the transcript.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm going to repeat, Mr. President,

13     with your permission.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that in that spirit - now

16     it's difficult for me to repeat it word for word - but what I said more

17     or less was that this proclamation was addressed to each soldier,

18     commander, non-commissioned and commissioned officers of the SRK, but I

19     do not rule out the possibility that it could have reached any member of

20     the BH Army in the area of the SRK.  That was my meaning.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I am not sure this is

23     3440.  Anyway, can we have 1D06017, please.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have now the English translation?  Hopefully.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37433

 1        Q.   General, somebody compiled this on your behalf.  This is a review

 2     of what you had to sustain during the two-month period of cease-fire and

 3     it says here in the area of Grbavica 101 shells.  How big is the area of

 4     Grbavica and what was the impact and effects of 101 shells in the area

 5     such as Grbavica?

 6        A.   If you understand that this was only during the two months of

 7     cease-fire, it turns out that some 20 shells were fired on a monthly

 8     basis or one every day or two in October.  If you take that Grbavica is

 9     an area stretch in between Debelo Brdo and Hrasno Brdo all the way down

10     to the Miljacka river, then we can see that this area is not a big one.

11     It is, perhaps, 5 by 5 kilometres approximately, maybe a bit larger.  I

12     never measured it.  But earlier I said that this was a very compact area

13     and it was exposed to the fire from city because one can descend from

14     Vrace towards Miljacka and this road, particularly the main road leading

15     to the Miljacka river, was constantly targeted not only by artillery and

16     mortars but mostly by snipers and other weapons.  So it was a very

17     dangerous road.  Such intensity of fire is tiring for the manpower and it

18     causes losses.  And it also speaks that the 1st Corps of the BH Army

19     failed to observe the cease-fire.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page, please,

21     in both English and Serbian, please.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Here just to shorten it we can see that there was sniper fire,

24     but the total is 1.420 [as interpreted] shells and a lot of infantry

25     ammunition.  And to see what were the casualties, 24 soldiers have been

Page 37434

 1     killed, 37 have been seriously wounded and 25 slightly wounded, so it's

 2     49, 76, and 25, 190, 91 -- no, 101; right?  101.  So you lost 101

 3     soldiers.  They were no longer able to fight.  They were wounded or

 4     killed; correct?

 5        A.   Yes, that was what the calculation showed at the time, but we

 6     lost actually 24 soldiers.  We had 37 seriously wounded.  The slightly

 7     wounded were probably provided with assistance and then returned into

 8     combat.  There was not much time for anyone to recuperate nor was there

 9     anyone who could stand in for them.  So it should be counted that these

10     were the losses from the operations.  If we take into account that a

11     series of measures were taken at the time in order to protect the troops,

12     that they shouldn't fire, that they should keep as much time in dugouts

13     and shelters, then these were still quite big losses for two months.

14        Q.   The two months of truce?

15        A.   Two months of truce rather than two months of combat, yes.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3431, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, do you remember an incident with three mortar shells

23     which fell in Alipasino Polje on the 22nd of January, 1994?

24        A.   January and February 1994, I could not say I don't remember them,

25     but was that precisely the time when the areas you mentioned were

Page 37435

 1     targeted or not?  I'm not sure on the basis of what you are asking me

 2     this question.  What was the exact date?  I would like to know that

 3     because just to say it like this is a bit too general.  I cannot -- I can

 4     answer but my answer will be imprecise.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I will then try to be more specific.  In the

 6     indictment I am charged with the fact that our forces in the area of

 7     Alipasino Polje fired three mortar shells on the 22nd of January, 1994.

 8     The first one in the park behind the residential building in

 9     Geteova Street number 3 that was earlier Cetinska Street, then earlier

10     Klare Cetkin, and a third which fell in front of the buildings where the

11     children were playing.  Four children were killed, five adults were

12     wounded, and according to the indictment, fire was opened from the

13     territory under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska, that is to

14     say the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, approximately from the direction of the

15     west.

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the names of

17     the streets.

18             JUDGE KWON:  The witness [sic] were not able to hear your

19     question.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was probably the interpreter who

21     was unable to hear me.  Let me just see what I did say.  I did present

22     what this was about.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   On that 22nd of January, did you order that three mortar shells

25     be fired on Alipasino Polje and did you receive a report that someone

Page 37436

 1     from your units from the west, the west to Alipasino Polje, fired these

 2     three shells if it was not you who did it?

 3        A.   At the time and in that area, as far as I remember, no order was

 4     issued to fire on Alipasino settlement or Alipasino Polje.  There were

 5     later various conjectures whether somebody else fired rather than the

 6     forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  That was what I heard later

 7     during the war, not now.  This section of Alipasino Polje -- we have to

 8     take into account that it was part of the zone of the BH army's 1st Corps

 9     and that their units were stationed in that area from one which was

10     called Kulin Ban, as far as I remember, and whether that was the reason

11     why fire was opened I'm not -- I don't think so from this point in time

12     because a cease-fire was in force.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please now have D2806, a

15     Defence exhibit.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, this is a regular combat report dated the 23rd.  Let us

18     please focus on the conduct of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  The

19     beginning of item 2 says that units are in full combat-readiness, they

20     have stepped up surveillance and reconnaissance of the enemy, and under

21     item 8 it says a decision for further operations remains unchanged.  It

22     is to be expected that the enemy will continue with provocations against

23     our units with the -- aimed at causing incidents for which they intend to

24     blame the Serbian side.  Can you tell us what was the decision which

25     remains unchanged?

Page 37437

 1        A.   Well, this is the 23rd of January, 1994.  The decision at the

 2     time was that the corps units be engaged to protect the Serbian territory

 3     and defend the Serbian area and Serbian territory together with the

 4     population in the area covered by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Nothing

 5     special was happening at that particular period, as far as I remember.  A

 6     bit earlier we had to fortify our positions up in the area of Zuc, and so

 7     on, but that was before this date.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever receive a report about this incident or

 9     a protest lodged by the UNPROFOR?

10        A.   No, not for this incident.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have D964.

13     D964, please.  It is a Defence exhibit which has been admitted.  Or I can

14     read it out, but the participants should know what I'm reading from.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just bear with me.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We do have the Serbian version now.

17     The English version, just to make sure that it is matching, and then

18     we'll move to the next page, as in the Serbian version it is on the first

19     page.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, this is a document from the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

22     They are reporting the staff about --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.  Can we briefly go

24     into private session.

25                           [Private session]

Page 37438











11  Page 37438 redacted.  Private session.















Page 37439

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             THE REGISTRAR:  We're back in open session, Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, this is a report of the 1st Corps to their

23     Supreme Command Staff about discussion with this UN general.  Please have

24     a look at the last paragraph.  If we could also show the second page in

25     English it says that the deputy commander objected to UNPROFOR's

Page 37440

 1     statement related to a massacre on Alipasino Polje in regards to which

 2     this general replied that they couldn't determine the exact position the

 3     shells came from on the basis of their traces.  According to the

 4     information you had, General, if they could not establish where the

 5     shells had come from, was that the reason why they did not address this

 6     matter with you?

 7        A.   That could be one of the reasons, certainly, because if they did

 8     not establish something there was always a problem with those protests.

 9     I always told them:  If you lodge a protest, please give me a sketch from

10     the on-site investigation so that I can react properly rather than you

11     just come to see me and say this and that happened.  What can I do on the

12     basis of that?  It's a major problem.  How can I respond to such

13     requests?  I suppose that he did not have sufficient elements to address

14     me about the problem and that was why I was not informed about it at the

15     time.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  The last question of yours was very leading, I have

19     to note, albeit belated.  Shall we admit it?  We'll admit it as the next

20     Defence exhibit.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3432, Your Honours.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  And my colleague sitting beside me established

23     that he's fallible and identified where this was previously used in court

24     and indeed your proposal was very well-placed, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 37441

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would just add something else

 2     here with regard to this document and this time.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4   (redacted)

 5        A.   No, no, nothing to do with that, something quite different, what

 6     we did and what is mentioned here.  I think that General Milosevic

 7     probably testified about that too.  At the time we were working on the

 8     anti-sniping agreement and let me just say before this Tribunal and this

 9     Chamber that that idea was an idea of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to

10     conclude that agreement.  It was concluded on the --

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the General please repeat the date.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was concluded by

13     General Milosevic just as I was leaving.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you.  We'll get to that topic.  Can you please tell us,

16     General, how we were portrayed in the Muslim media with regard to various

17     incidents?  And I specifically have in mind the incident which occurred

18     on the 4th of February in the Dobrinja settlement, where, according to

19     the indictment, three mortar shells, 120-millimetre shells, were fired

20     which in Oslobodilaca Sarajeva Street in a line for humanitarian aid

21     caused some casualties.  How did we generally and particularly --

22     portrayed in connection with these incidents in the Sarajevo media?

23        A.   At that time rather many such incidents occurred and they were

24     the basis for accusing the SRK and the VRS in general.  Starting from the

25     incident in January followed by this one on the 4th of February and there

Page 37442

 1     was another on the 5th.  Why was that done?  The one who did it, who

 2     caused these incidents, can only be an enemy of the

 3     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Serbian people.  That is why all the

 4     propaganda of the time directed against the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and

 5     the Army of Republika Srpska and the problems that were happening and

 6     from which side the shell or the -- or another explosive device was

 7     fired, lodged, the very fact that something of this kind can happen in

 8     that situation.  When we withdrew from Igman and Bjelasnica, when we said

 9     nothing significant would happen, why cause such losses?  I see no

10     reasons and no justification no matter who did it.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did you on the 4th of February order fire at the

12     queue of people waiting for humanitarian aid at Dobrinja?

13        A.   No.  And if I may add, I had been informed of this incident and I

14     had taken measures already.

15        Q.   What kind of measures?  What did you find out?

16        A.   As we said about Alipasino Polje, that I wasn't informed, here on

17     the contrary I received some information.  I was not at the corps command

18     at the time, but we got information that the incident had happened and

19     then we demanded subordinate units to report on what had happened and

20     state whether they had opened fire at the time and targeted that area.  I

21     believe that was the essence of what they wanted then.

22        Q.   Thank you.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get D1515.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, this is already an exhibit.  It's a report to the

Page 37443

 1     Main Staff dated the 4th of February.  Somebody signed on your behalf

 2     because I don't think this is your signature.  Let us take a look at the

 3     bottom of the page.  A convoy of Jews and then it further, or rather, in

 4     one bullet point up concerning the alleged targeting of Dobrinja with

 5     82-millimetre shells, what was -- which was published by Muslim TV and

 6     the radio.  The group for co-operation did not receive any protests from

 7     UNPROFOR and it was found out that no fire was opened at the Dobrinja

 8     sector.  Officially now was issued by the Republika Srpska news media

 9     with the approval and according to the instructions of the Main Staff of

10     the VRS.  Do you stand by this today?

11        A.   I must say that I was not at the command post at the time, but I

12     assume full responsibility for this.  I thought that they had received a

13     protest, but this clearly states that they had only gotten the

14     information through the media.  When you get information from the media,

15     there's a risk involved in any checks.  But still, they did check with

16     the units and the units said that they hadn't opened fire.  That's what

17     it says.

18        Q.   Based on your experience, what would your conclusion be?  Why did

19     the UNPROFOR not launch an official protest?

20        A.   I suppose that UNPROFOR at the time did not submit a protest in

21     connection with this incident because it didn't have enough information.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Let's move on to Markale, that is, the

23     5th of February, 1994.  In my indictment and probably yours it is alleged

24     that one 120-millimetre mortar shell hit the open-air market known as

25     Markale in the old city of Sarajevo, a civilian area.  The indictment

Page 37444

 1     reads that the market-place was full of people and 66 people were killed,

 2     whereas more than 140 were wounded.  It is alleged that fire was opened

 3     from positions in the north-east.  Let's go step by step.  And be brief

 4     in your answers, please.

 5             Did you on the 5th of February issue an order for a shell to be

 6     fired at the Markale market?

 7        A.   I would never have ordered to target the market because we

 8     preserved that market for four or five years.  After all that, issuing an

 9     order to fire at it would have been absurd.

10        Q.   Did you get information from subordinate units that a

11     lower-ranked commander ordered this fire?

12        A.   There was no such report.

13        Q.   Did you check the matter and what did you find out?

14        A.   This was -- this is what the situation was like.  General Gvero

15     was at the airport talking to the Muslim side and UNPROFOR, and he

16     demanded that a commission be established to investigate the incident.

17     This was said at my trial too.  But the Muslim side and UNPROFOR refused,

18     as usual, because they said they could not guarantee the safety of the

19     commission if the members of the SRK, that is, Serbs, were part of that

20     commission.  So that nobody from our side took part in the work of that

21     commission.  Ten commissions investigated the Markale incident, which is

22     what I learned only later, but they were unable to officially establish

23     where the shell had come from.  With that I want to say if ten

24     commissions are unable to determine exactly what happened, how should we,

25     if we were not even present - and this applies to some other incidents as

Page 37445

 1     well -- I think you asked me what we did later, what else we did.  From

 2     the reports that I read after returning to the corps command, I learned

 3     that a commission or some body was established to inspect the units and

 4     even go there and I remember a remark that they find out in the area of

 5     Mrkovici where there was some waters and it was snowing at the time.  The

 6     hood or the tarp which is placed on the mouth of the mortar was covered

 7     with snow.  So it was impossible for a shell to be fired from there.

 8     This is what we were able to find out, although we were not allowed to

 9     take part in the work of those commissions.

10        Q.   General, did you accept the allegation that over 200 people were

11     hit by one shell and that there were even more people at the market-place

12     on a winter afternoon?  What was your conclusion from these facts?

13        A.   I cannot say how many people there were, 200 or 50 or whatever,

14     but it was winter-time and there should probably have been fewer people

15     there.  That's my assumption.  And for one 120-millimetre mine to inflict

16     such casualties, well that would make it a unique shell in the whole

17     world.  According to our estimates of the losses caused by one single

18     120-millimetre shell, these losses are certainly deplorable, that's all

19     what I can say.

20        Q.   Thank you.  But do you think it was possible that there was so

21     many people and that so many got killed by one shell, so many people

22     among stalls and other obstacles?

23        A.   This information was put forward at the trial and elsewhere

24     later, but it's difficult to accept as accurate and that really

25     everything happened as described.  I'm especially interested in a detail

Page 37446

 1     because I would like this incident to be investigated so as to show who's

 2     responsible.  Where are the fragments of the shell?  We saw the tail of

 3     the shell, but these can be found anywhere.  But there are no fragments

 4     to be found anywhere.  They were only shown in pictures, but the

 5     fragments themselves are nowhere to be found.  And there are other

 6     elements of a technical nature and of a general nature, including the

 7     overall situation that make this quite abnormal.

 8        Q.   Was any agreement struck after the incident with regard to the

 9     positioning of large-calibre weapons in the Sarajevo zone?

10        A.   That's the only agreement where I was involved in the talks

11     together with you.  I remember it still.  On the 18th we worked with

12     Akashi, Rose, and all the others, and somehow we got some information.  I

13     arrived around the 11th.  And the information was that this part of the

14     incident was caused by the BH Army and in a way General Rose also

15     admitted as much when he made his statement.  However, he said --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat his last

17     sentence about the two persons he mentioned.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Mr. Galic, the interpreters couldn't

19     hear your last sentence, "However ..."

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   You didn't finish.  What did Rose say?

22        A.   Can I repeat now?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Rose

25     said that he first stated that the BH Army was to blame for the incident,

Page 37447

 1     but later he explained that in the following fashion that he only said as

 2     much to pressure Alija into talks because Alija constantly refused talks,

 3     as you know.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can you briefly tell the Bench what the essence of the agreement

 6     reached on the 18th of February was and whether the

 7     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps honoured the agreement?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes -- just a second.  Just a second.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:  It's just a small thing, but the witness -- the

10     witness hasn't said anything about the date that Dr. Karadzic put some

11     words in his mouth.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I did say the 18th

13     that the president and I were together with General Rose and the others

14     at that meeting, and that was the first time I was present when an

15     agreement was reached.  I said that earlier.  You can check the

16     transcript.  I'm positive that I said it.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 95, line 15, or rather,

18     page 90, line 15 "the 18th" was omitted but the witness certainly did say

19     it.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember that I said it but I

21     didn't check whether it was noted or not.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   So what was the essence and did the corps, commanded by you,

24     implement the agreement?

25        A.   The essence of the agreement was for all heavy weapons from

Page 37448

 1     calibre 12.7 millimetres up be pulled out to at least 20 kilometres from

 2     the centre of Sarajevo, which applied to both sides, the

 3     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the BH Army.  The assets which could not be

 4     pulled out because they were damaged or because the dead-line was too

 5     short, I believe the dead-line was by midnight on the 19th.  I don't have

 6     it before me to be sure, but the order was that everything that hadn't

 7     been pulled out or reported would be targeted by NATO planes.  The

 8     purpose of the agreement was to reduce losses on both sides and probably

 9     to create better conditions for a peaceful resolution in the Sarajevo

10     area.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps honour the agreement

12     and did the BH Army 1st Corps honour it?

13        A.   As far as I know, the BH Army 1st Corps did not honour it, and I

14     protested a number of times to General Soubirou.  They reported to me

15     that they had implemented it, but I'm sure that they didn't.  The

16     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps honoured the agreement to the last letter.  If we

17     ever did anything fully and completely, then it was the implementation of

18     your agreement with Akashi that was reached on the

19     18th of February, 1994.  That's the so-called TEZ agreement.

20        Q.   TEZ?

21        A.   Yes, TEZ.

22        Q.   General, how was all this received by the soldiers and officers

23     of the SRK?  And I'm talking about the obligation that we undertook to

24     deprive ourselves of heavy weaponry.

25        A.   Well, the reaction was that both you and I were labelled as

Page 37449

 1     traitors.  Why?  And I have to tell you because these are very serious

 2     words that I'm uttering today, both for you and for me.  The reason was

 3     very clear.  After so many years of fighting they knew what advantages

 4     the BH Army 1st Corps had over the SRK, how many more troops they had.

 5     If you compared 350.000, 220.000 Serbs.  And what was waiting us in terms

 6     of the fire coming from the weaponry with the calibre of less than

 7     12.7-millimetres should the 1st Corps of the BH Army decide to use it

 8     against the SRK, it would be very difficult for us to counter that.  The

 9     only advantage that we had had was taken from us.  That is why, although

10     the soldiers understood the essence of the agreement and the need to

11     implement it, the majority of them were nonetheless dissatisfied and

12     unhappy about it.

13        Q.   Can you tell us if the 1st Corps of the BH Army implemented this

14     agreement and to what extent?

15        A.   The Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, as I said, regardless of all the

16     pressures --

17        Q.   I'm talking -- I'm asking you about the 1st Corps.

18        A.   I'll come to that.  So regardless of that we managed to realise

19     that, but according to the information that I have and judging by the

20     activity and the operations that they conducted, most definitely did not

21     implement it because on many occasions when we got this protected area I

22     asked UNPROFOR whether it pertained to the entire Sarajevo and they said:

23     No, no, no, it relates only to the 1st Corps of the BH Army.  I don't

24     know what pertained to others, but as for them they did not abide by it.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now please have 1D01686.

Page 37450

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, in this report, regular combat report, of the

 3     31st of March, 1994, sent to the Main Staff you said at 1735 hours

 4     movement of the enemy's self-propelled gun was observed on the

 5     Franje Rackog Street near the national museum in Sarajevo.  Now,

 6     according to the agreement was this self-propelled gun something that was

 7     allowed to be within the 20-kilometre exclusion zone?

 8        A.   Well, I already said that all calibres in excess of

 9     20.7 [as interpreted] millimetres were excluded, and this one should not

10     have been there or if it was there it should have been under strict

11     control of UNPROFOR and incapacitated in such a manner that it could not

12     be moved elsewhere.

13        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 1 it says that from the direction of the

14     mechanical engineering faculty there was a burst of fire from small arms

15     and that your forces did not respond.  What did you know about the

16     mechanical engineering faculty and the deployment of forces of the

17     1st Corps across the Miljacka river?

18        A.   Yes.  Well, this faculty and this area crossed the Miljacka is an

19     area where there is -- there are quite a few high-rise buildings, there

20     is also the parliament there and other buildings.  Now, speaking only

21     about the mechanical engineering faculty would be unjustifiable because

22     that was an area where the sniper units of the 1st Corps were most

23     extensively deployed and were active targeting Grbavica.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

Page 37451

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3433, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 1D01717.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   This is dated the 5th of May, 1994, and this is all happening

 6     after the agreement had been concluded; correct?

 7        A.   Correct.

 8        Q.   Can we now have page 2 and then we'll come back to page 1.

 9     Page 2 in both versions, please.  Maybe even page 3 in the English

10     because we need item 8.  One more page forward in the English.  Under

11     item 8 you are reporting, or rather, Cedomir Sladoje informing on your

12     behalf that the enemy is firing from snipers, hand-held launchers,

13     rifle-launched grenades, et cetera, in order to provoke our forces to

14     open fire and provoke a conflict.  Can you tell us these hand-held

15     launchers and rifle-launched grenades, what calibres are these weapons

16     and were they permitted under the terms of the agreement?

17        A.   Well, the rifle grenade is part of a rifle and it is attached to

18     the rifle.  Therefore, one might say that it could be tolerated under the

19     agreement, not permitted but it could be tolerated because it is an

20     integral part of a rifle.  As for the hand-held launcher, its calibre is

21     larger than 12.7 and it was impermissible to use it to fire.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now go back to page 1.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You remember why the position was

24     taken to decide that the calibre should be in excess of 12.7-millimetre.

25     I provided one explanation but the explanation given by the Main Staff

Page 37452

 1     was the one that was accepted which means that every weapon in excess of

 2     12.7-millimetres is classified as having weaponry although it does not

 3     coincide with the military classification.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   In line 1 it says that enemy fired on UNPROFOR helicopters and

 6     then under item 3 it says the Muslims opened fire at UN helicopters from

 7     the Sokolje sector.  The helicopter was flying over our positions.  What

 8     can you tell us about this and what was the purpose of firing on a

 9     helicopter while it was flying over our territory?

10        A.   I would just like to explain in more detail the position of

11     Sokolje.  It is above Rajlovac and it is overlooking Rajlovac.  Our

12     forces were in Rajlovac whereas Sokolje was held by BH Army.  The

13     helicopter was flying -- I suppose it was following the stream of the

14     river Bosna.  I don't know where it was coming from - and then it was

15     fired on from Sokolje.  It seems to me after you've read this that I

16     actually remember this incident, so from that area and from Vogosca and

17     Zuc was where the fire came targeting the helicopter.  Later it was

18     established that it actually came from Sokolje.

19        Q.   Now, what was their objective?

20        A.   The usual one, to create a provocation and to blame the

21     Army of Republika Srpska.  If anything transpired in terms of shooting

22     down the helicopter, we would have to prove that it wasn't our fault but

23     I don't think that we would have had enough time to do that.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence?

Page 37453

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3434, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And shall we stop here?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have one more document, but we

 5     can deal with it on the Monday.  It's up to you.  I'm in your hands.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll adjourn here.

 7             Mr. Galic, we'll adjourn for today and continue Monday next week

 8     at 9.00.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  This will be

10     very good for my bad back.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, thank you very

13     much.  In order for me not to be suspected of illegal activities, I think

14     that I now have understood that on page 62, line 14, or from line 14, I

15     have the feeling that the transcript is not very clear as opposed to what

16     General Galic has said.  I'm just making a note of it in case there might

17     be later on questions about it.  This is what I wanted to say.  Thank

18     you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  I will leave it either to Mr. Karadzic or

20     Ms. Edgerton to take up if there's any need.

21             Mr. Galic and Mr. Piletta-Zanin could you excuse yourselves.  We

22     have to deal with one matter in private session.  Have a nice weekend.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you so much.  Have a nice

24     weekend.  You too.

25             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN:  Thank you very much.

Page 37454

 1                           [The witness stands down]

 2             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in order not to

 3     waste too much time I will come back to the room later on to get my bags.

 4     Thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, shall we go into private session?

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 7                           [Private session]

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 37455

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8                           [Open session]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just one matter, Mr. Robinson.  The Chamber is

10     seized of the motion for the temporary transfer of detained

11     Witness Franc Kos filed on the 4th of April this year in which the

12     accused moves for the transfer of the detained witness from

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina to the UNDU for purposes of testimony in this -- in

14     the Defence case.  The Chamber notes that in the motion the accused

15     submits that the two requirements for transfer pursuant to Rule 90 bis

16     are met, namely, that the presence of the detained witness is not

17     required for any criminal proceedings in progress in BiH and that the

18     transfer of the witness does not extend the period of detention.

19     However, the Chamber also notes that the accused requests the Chamber to

20     issue an invitation to the BiH authorities to confirm these two

21     assertions.  So this is the question, whether you can clarify why the

22     Defence team itself could not have made these inquiries prior to filing

23     the motion and how you can affirm that requirements for Rule 90 bis are

24     met.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  That statement that was made

Page 37456

 1     in our motion was based upon our review of the calendar of -- or at least

 2     a review of the proceedings from the web site of the court of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina where it is seen that he was convicted, sentenced to

 4     40 years in prison.  So we know that the first problem is not going to be

 5     met that his sentence would be expired by the time he came here.  And

 6     then we saw that there were no -- currently no appeal proceedings

 7     scheduled.  So based on our review of those -- of that information, that

 8     was the basis of the representations that we made in our motion, but we

 9     thought that it was better if the Chamber wanted to satisfy itself for

10     sure that the information be received from the Bosnian authorities.

11     However, as I think you know, when we communicate with the Bosnian

12     authorities absent a request from the Chamber they do not respond to us

13     and they only act upon requests that are passed through the Chamber.  So

14     that's why we didn't contact them directly but asked the Chamber to do

15     it.

16             JUDGE KWON:  But you didn't contact the BiH authorities at all?

17             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.  And I think you'll -- you'll

18     remember you've urged them on several occasions in the past to

19     co-operate.  They have taken the position -- they have been very

20     co-operative, actually, with us but only when the information is passed

21     through the Chamber.  So that's been their position and we didn't contact

22     them directly because we assumed that they would tell us that we would

23     have to go through the Chamber for that.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll continue on Monday morning.  The

25     hearing is adjourned.

Page 37457

 1                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.50 p.m.,

 2                           to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day of

 3                           April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.