Page 37561
1 Tuesday, 23 April 2013
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.11 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Tieger.
8 MR. TIEGER: Good morning, Mr. President and Your Honours.
9 May I raise just one very brief housekeeping matter before we
10 commence, that is the following: In keeping with our customary practice,
11 Mr. Robinson and I agreed upon the limited portions of previous
12 statements that were raised by the -- during the cross-examination of
13 witness Dodik, and we've provided to the Registrar a list of those
14 specific references contained in 65 ter 24921 and 24924.
15 So -- and we would ask that those be admitted with the -- as I
16 say, with the agreement and exchange of information with the Defence and
17 based on our customary practice.
18 JUDGE KWON: Okay. So they are uploaded onto e-court.
19 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will take a brief look and come back to
21 this issue.
22 Mr. Galic and Mr. Piletta-Zanin, with respect to the issues
23 raised by Mr. Galic yesterday, the Chamber is still looking into the
24 matter, particularly Chamber inquired of the Detention Unit as to whether
25 there could be a way in which an observation could be performed without
Page 37562
1 necessarily awakening the detainee, and the Chamber was told by the
2 Detention Unit that the commander will -- commander would consult the
3 medical doctor as to the appropriate interval.
4 We'll come back to this issue very soon.
5 Having said that, let's continue.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Good morning,
8 Your Excellencies, good morning everyone.
9 WITNESS: STANISLAV GALIC [Resumed]
10 [Witness answered through interpreter]
11 Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]
12 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.
13 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
14 Q. Please, even though we are in a hurry and I wish us to finish as
15 soon as possible, I would ask you to make pauses and speak slowly.
16 We are still dealing with your relations with the UNPROFOR so if
17 we could please have 1D06320.
18 Yes, this is your report dated the 19th of January, regular
19 combat report. 1993 is the year.
20 In the first paragraph, about the enemy you say that the enemy
21 fired from all kinds of weapons, especially the sniper fire and wounded a
22 member of UNPROFOR on the Paolina-Hotin [phoen] road.
23 And under 4, unusual incidents, wounding of an UNPROFOR member,
24 commendation to our soldiers from the Vogosca Brigade who managed to pull
25 out the UNPROFOR member who would certainly have died.
Page 37563
1 Can you tell us what that was about.
2 A. Well, quite a lot is already explained in the -- in item 1. And
3 here, in item 4, in a way, the development is described. So there was
4 fire. I think that it was even necessary to pull out one UNPROFOR
5 member, as far as I remember. I'm not sure if this was the situation.
6 In any case, they assisted the UNPROFOR members, and that was why
7 they were commended. And obviously the forces of the BH Army 1st Corps
8 fired at UNPROFOR.
9 So that would be the answer to your question, in brief.
10 Perhaps I still owe you a part of my answer from yesterday when I
11 talked about relations with UNPROFOR when I said that they did not
12 receive the right information, so I was too short and you -- I was
13 interrupted, so if you would allow me to add something now.
14 Q. Yes. But as briefly as you can, please.
15 A. Yes, I have many comments to say, and I wish that I would be
16 given the opportunity to state that before this Tribunal.
17 I started yesterday with sniping incidents and then I continued.
18 But I also wanted to talk the main subjects which are important in order
19 to understand the relations between the UNPROFOR and the Army of
20 Republika Srpska and Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and also my own attitude to
21 UNPROFOR. They did not have sufficient information because if
22 General MacKenzie had had sufficient information, he wouldn't have led
23 the JNA column to the Vrojacka [phoen] Street where they then perished.
24 For sure. That's why I think that they did not have sufficient
25 information. I couldn't say because I would accuse General MacKenzie
Page 37564
1 here if I said that he had sufficient information but still he led the
2 column into the ambush laid by the BH Army.
3 And another example involving the same general, MacKenzie, when
4 there were talks, these were events preceding my arrival but they had an
5 impact on the situation as it developed after my arrival. When the talks
6 about the airport were conducted, General MacKenzie was in charge of
7 negotiating with the Serbian side and he promised that there would be a
8 road next to the airport that would link Ilidza to Lukavica. However,
9 that was never realised and so the section the north western part of the
10 front remained cut off. The operational reasons and problems which the
11 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps faced as a result is something that I wouldn't
12 discuss now. But later on I received information during my trial,
13 General Nambiar said the following. It is true that General MacKenzie
14 had promised the road to the Serbs that would link Lukavica with Ilidza,
15 but he was entitled. He did not have the right to do that. So that was
16 some sort of justification for that. However, I do not believe that
17 MacKenzie wanted to deceive the Serbian side.
18 Another issue that is very important. When we were withdrawing
19 from Bjelasnica and Igman on the 14th of August, 1994, and when UNPROFOR
20 was supposed to take over control of the area, when the agreement was
21 made, they believed that they would really hold those areas. But later
22 on we saw that he couldn't take control of the areas but that it was
23 rather the BH Army which entered there and then committed various crimes
24 from there against the army of Republika Srpska, that is to say the
25 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and civilians as well. I couldn't say that they
Page 37565
1 did that deliberately to cause problems for us.
2 Another thing connected to the airport, if I go back to the time
3 when I was in command, the problem with the airport was that freight
4 traffic was allowed in order to supply humanitarian aid and materiel and
5 technical equipment that the UNPROFOR needed. But then they abused it
6 and there were manoeuvres of the BH Army from Sarajevo towards Igman and
7 backwards, and we know that the tunnel below the airport was also dug at
8 the time.
9 When I regularly asked them throughout 1993 and up until the time
10 when the tunnel began to be operational whether someone was digging the
11 tunneling, they would tell me that the tunnel was not being dug. It is
12 interesting. I don't know if they didn't know, but according to some
13 information that we heard, I don't know if the information was correct,
14 but even the UNPROFOR forces were helping with the digging of the tunnel.
15 It's possible that they did.
16 There was a Military Observer here who testified and who said
17 that to this day he doesn't know that a tunnel had been dug even though
18 there is a museum devoted to the digging of the tunnel in Sarajevo. I
19 don't know, I haven't visited it because I have been in detention all the
20 time but I read that in the paper.
21 Another problem that arose and something that we couldn't accept
22 in any way. You must remember it quite well but let me remind you
23 anyway. It was this. When at some point in spring 1994 General van Baal
24 through Cekrcici or rather from Visoko through Cekrcici centre, these six
25 APCs to block off some pieces of equipment which, judging by the US maps,
Page 37566
1 was within the 20-kilometre zone --
2 JUDGE KWON: General.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I got carried away a
4 little bit. Thank you.
5 That those weapons were within the 20 kilometre zone; that is to
6 say, the exclusion zone. Judging by our map, when measured from the
7 centre of the city, they were outside of the 20-kilometre zone which is
8 something I explained to you earlier. And so on.
9 Before this, we made a phone call and we got in touch with the
10 general. General Rose went to London to be knighted at the time and
11 van Baal as his deputy remained there. He did not communicate with us
12 and our command sufficiently so that we would establish precisely where
13 the weapons were, whether it was within the 20 kilometre zone.
14 Later on the Canadian Battalion with 36 APCs, that was a big
15 provocation, a big and serious provocation because they tied up my
16 soldiers in Cekrcici. That was how they entered. Why did they have to
17 tie them up? They could have -- yes, thank you.
18 Did they tie them up because we were friendly to them? When the
19 UNPROFORs came along with their equipment, my soldiers went out to greet
20 them and they arrested them or tied them up. And in that way, they
21 passed by them. Later movements of those forces were blocked and a
22 serious incident could have happened. We discussed that together in
23 Pale. You, Mr. President, General van Baal and myself.
24 Q. I think that this is sufficient --
25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
Page 37567
1 Yes, I leave it to you, Mr. Karadzic.
2 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
3 MS. EDGERTON: Just one observation. The General referred to
4 General Nambiar's testimony in the Galic trial and General Nambiar never
5 testified in the Galic trial. He must have meant somebody else.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I respond?
7 Mr. President, would you allow me to answer?
8 JUDGE KWON: I will leave it to Mr. Karadzic.
9 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Please tell us. Tell us who did you mean?
12 A. I meant General Nambiar precisely. No one else to mean. Because
13 he was the commander of the UNPROFOR forces in all of Yugoslavia, I
14 think, or something like that. At such a high level. And I said that
15 because his statement was used in my trial. If I need to explain that in
16 more detail, so I'm sure it can be found among the documents.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
19 JUDGE KWON: Shall we mark it for identification?
20 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3463, Your Honours.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 Could we now please have 1D07727.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, can you please have a look at this. The date is the 2nd
25 of April, 1993. And an order is issued on your behalf: Shooting
Page 37568
1 aircraft, taking off or landing from the airport are prohibited most
2 strictly. And then under 2, strictly prohibiting fire against UN forces
3 positioned at the airport. And then it says under 5 that the order also
4 concerns the aircraft carrying humanitarian aid over the SRK zone.
5 Can you tell us how often you issued such orders and why.
6 A. Well, we have seen in one report that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps
7 forces were mentioned as possible attackers of an aircraft which was
8 landing, even though later on it was established that the
9 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps forces had not been responsible. In such
10 situations, when things were critical, to put it that way, then I would
11 issue such orders.
12 I suppose that this order was linked with another order about the
13 so-called parachute operation. I'm not sure whether it was the same
14 period, but let me explain what that was about.
15 Namely, we talked with the general who was representative of the
16 US army. I think his name was Johnson. I believe that was his name, but
17 it could have been different. That was how I understood him at the time
18 and how I remember his name. They then wanted to be -- to supply the
19 Muslim forces or men with humanitarian aid by goods that would be thrown
20 with parachutes from aircraft in Igman and in the area towards Gorazde
21 and Srebrenica. But to have those freight aircraft fly there then, they
22 are slow and they are sensitive to any sort of fire, so I issued an order
23 that this part of the agreement had to be observed as well, meaning the
24 flying over of aircraft carrying humanitarian aid. It was interesting
25 that we had made many efforts but not a single package fell on the side
Page 37569
1 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps or even the Army of Republika Srpska. No
2 aircraft carrying such sort of aid was targeted from the area held by the
3 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. But we had a piece of information about the
4 aircraft that were supplying Igman and the area in the direction of
5 Konjic. I'm not sure where they were throwing the supplies, but it was
6 fired by the BH Army troops. I'm not sure which forces those were. It
7 could have been somebody else not just the BH Army.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3464, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Could we now please
13 have in e-court 1D01568.
14 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. General, please focus on this. The date is the 24th of July,
17 1993, for General Milosevic, your deputy, and the Chief of Staff, signed
18 by somebody else for him. We see it's mentioned what the enemy is doing,
19 where he is firing from, Stupsko Brdo, provocations from snipers and
20 infantry weapons and also mortar shells. Two were fired at Grbavica.
21 Sniper firing, one civilian killed by the Zeljeznica stadium. This is
22 what I'm interested in.
23 Item 2, last sentence:
24 "All subordinated units have been strictly warned to prevent
25 incidents between VRS members and UNPROFOR members."
Page 37570
1 So this is a repetition of the warning and a strict warning at
2 that.
3 Can you tell us what made you to repeat these warnings often to
4 try and maintain good relations and prevent and avoid any incidents?
5 A. The problem was the situation that existed, and we were also
6 implementing the Lukavac 93 operation.
7 In that situation, UNPROFOR wanted a complete picture of the
8 activities of the front line. They wanted more information so they could
9 monitor what was going on. There was a permanent representative at our
10 forward command post. It was a military observer who observed the
11 operation, and that's probably why this warning was required.
12 I apologise.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
14 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3465, Your Honours.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more about this topic.
17 1D06328, please. 1D06328.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Yes, this is the document. It's a cable. We see that it reads:
20 "Prohibition of Conducting Combat Operations Against UNPROFOR and Other
21 International Organisations."
22 In the preamble you say that the Geneva talks are under way and
23 any conflict with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian organisations
24 would be used for a renewed demonisation of the Serbs and could serve as
25 a motive for making moves detrimental to your people.
Page 37571
1 And under item 2 of the order you say that full protection must
2 be secured for all the UNPROFOR convoys, military observers, and convoys
3 of international organisations who got approval to pass the territory
4 controlled by the VRS.
5 What was the interest of the VRS to provide safety and protection
6 to these international factors and to prohibit fire at them?
7 A. If we remind ourselves of the previous conversation, we will see
8 that the Muslim forces sometimes used the command posts on the positions
9 of the international organisations as places from which they fired at our
10 units. In order to avoid any such activity, this first part of the order
11 is about these things. Neither the equipment nor the command posts or
12 positions of the UN were ever targeted by us. The passage of convoys
13 that had a permit, and if I remember what the situation was like at
14 winter time, because all roads of the SRK were blocked from Tarcin and
15 Hadzici to Sarajevo and other directions too. But if you stop such a
16 convoy, nobody else can pass because there was much snow in the area.
17 But there were probably requests made at check-point or something. I
18 remember an instance when you called and said that a convoy must be let
19 through.
20 There were some problems. The situation wasn't ideal. Certainly
21 not. I said what it was like around Hadzici and Blazuj. And even though
22 the convoys only provided supplies to the part of Sarajevo controlled by
23 the BH Army 1st Corps, they regularly -- they were regularly able to
24 pass.
25 And if I may add something?
Page 37572
1 Q. Yes, go ahead.
2 A. The only convoy from Serbia to Sarajevo was led by Fil --
3 Filaret [phoen], an ecclesiastical dignitary. There were various
4 organisations sending humanitarian aid to their people in Sarajevo,
5 including Muslims and Croats. When they moved closer to Dobrinja and the
6 area controlled by the Muslims, they were stopped and fire was opened at
7 them. Three drivers were injured at the time. I learned of it and it
8 all went through UNPROFOR, and then the convoy entered Sarajevo. That's
9 the only such convoy sent by Serbs from Serbia that made it to Sarajevo.
10 Q. On page 12, the transcript didn't record that I probably got
11 information from international organisations when I called you.
12 A. That is my assumption. Because they were known to contact you
13 and asked for assistance in some situations.
14 But I must mention one more problem. When you issue an order,
15 and I have an order from the Main Staff, then I must report to the
16 Main Staff what I'm supposed to do. Because that's how it has to be in
17 the army.
18 Q. This was page 11, line 20.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3466, Your Honours.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, a minute ago you mentioned that our people perceived us
24 as not being treated equally with regard to humanitarian aid. Were there
25 any other reasons, justified or unjustified, to provoke anger in both our
Page 37573
1 soldiers and civilians against international organisations?
2 A. Yes. One thing that made me angry, and the soldiers and the
3 people too, was the fact that we found weapons and ammunition in those
4 convoys. It was also broadcast in the media. I don't know if that
5 content made it to the international media. But we knew that in Sarajevo
6 there were 350.000 people who needed food, so whenever we stopped a
7 convoy, somebody would be hungry. It was hard to say what should be done
8 when weapons have been discovered, and yet the convoy carried valuable
9 supplies.
10 There were units escorting the convoys; mostly Ukrainian units.
11 Q. Did you inform them, did you submit protests to UNPROFOR with
12 regard to these incidents?
13 A. Concerning all these events that were not normal and which we
14 considered as detrimental to our relations and the agreements, the SRK
15 had to implement about a dozen various agreements. Only about
16 cease-fire. Then there were agreements about humanitarian aid. And we
17 wanted to honour all these agreements.
18 There was also the humanitarian commission, the Krajisnik
19 Muratovic commission. Many considered it unimportant, but I thought it
20 was important. I will probably be able to say more about it later.
21 Q. When the other side didn't honour agreement, did you protest to
22 UNPROFOR?
23 A. Whatever was not in accordance with the agreements or the safety
24 of the units of the SRK, I sent warnings or information to UNPROFOR or
25 protested pointing out the problems.
Page 37574
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D01865, please.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While we wait, let me say that we
3 always strove to take care of things through the Main Staff.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. But there were also protests from the corps command level.
6 A. Yes, yes, there were. We saw that yesterday that there were
7 protests from my level, because we had all these commanders coming to us
8 and our relations were more immediate.
9 Q. Please take a look at this protest to UNPROFOR. It's about the
10 behaviour of the enemy during a cease-fire. They are regrouping their
11 forces, seizing territories, inflicting casualties on the civilian
12 population.
13 And toward the end of the first paragraph, it says:
14 "In case they don't stop these actions, the corps will be forced
15 to respond adequately ... it would put in question all efforts," and so
16 on.
17 And the last question:
18 "We ask you to intervene with the [sic] opposing party to stop
19 its actions."
20 Very briefly and if possible just answer yes or no: When the
21 other side violates an agreement, do you have -- do you have a
22 carte blanche to respond immediately?
23 A. In this situation, we don't have carte blanche. We cannot
24 respond to enemy activity immediately. Wherever possible, we warned of
25 such actions, and wherever UNPROFOR was able to do so, they were supposed
Page 37575
1 to stop the enemy attack.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?
4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3467, Your Honours.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see 1D06321.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Here, in this document dated 8 April 1993, we won't go into these
9 shells and the violations of the cease-fire agreement.
10 Instead, I direct your attention to item 9. You inform the
11 Main Staff that this -- the misses, the -- or the shots that missed the
12 runway threatens planes, and so on.
13 Was this a frequent occurrence or what could be done?
14 A. No, this didn't happen often. However, it was rather frequent at
15 the time, and we were -- we didn't understand what was happening,
16 whether -- did they have bad pilots who didn't know how to land or ...
17 But they were all cruising above the SRK. Now it's open to
18 discussion whether that was or was not air-space in which they were
19 allowed to cruise. I am convinced that they did so to observe our
20 territory and take photographs.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I move to admit this document.
22 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
23 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3468, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06322, please.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 37576
1 Q. Your command is informing the Main Staff on the 24th of April,
2 1993, about activities. And toward the end of the first paragraph, they
3 say:
4 "They chose the most favourable moment when a lot of people were
5 in the streets."
6 And in item 5 you speak about an extraordinary event:
7 "An UNPROFOR convoy that had set off from Kiseljak towards
8 Sarajevo but was stopped at Kobiljaca because they didn't allow any
9 inspection. And another convoy ... that had set off for Sarajevo was
10 also stopped there because it hadn't been announced and it didn't allow
11 inspection either.
12 Then it goes on to say that:
13 "Four civilians and one soldier were wounded."
14 And the conclusion is:
15 "UNPROFOR forces are attempting to provoke a conflict with our
16 forces since they don't respect their peace mission and the agreements
17 signed."
18 Can we see the next page in both languages.
19 "Forecast:
20 "It is expected that such provocations will continue."
21 In such cases, serious cases, who protests, you or the
22 Main Staff?
23 A. In such more serious situations, once the front line is reached,
24 because that's where Kobiljaca is, and you see that they don't allow
25 inspection of these convoys, this was April 1993 which was a tumultuous
Page 37577
1 month with lots of combat activity, of course, that will give rise to
2 suspicion. I don't know what kind of inspection is mentioned here but at
3 any rate there shouldn't have been any problems. However, if they refuse
4 to be inspected then that is a problem. In such a situation the Main
5 Staff is informed who had a representative, Mr. Indjic, who was in charge
6 of co-operation with UNPROFOR, and he was also a liaison officer between
7 the SRK and the Main Staff of the VRS.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3469, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. And now can we look at 1D01535?
15 This was issued on the 21st of May, 1995. Under 1, you can see
16 that a tank T-55 was observed in the Sokolje sector. There's a reference
17 to fire against Nedzarici from Stupsko Brdo and Mojmilo.
18 However, under 2 it says:
19 "Our units are observing the cease-fire. UNPROFOR receives our
20 regular protests."
21 What was your experience? Did UNPROFOR have a say with the other
22 side when we -- when it came to cease-fire violations?
23 A. Well, when we see what sort of movements there were -- taking
24 place in the Sokolje sector, we can see that a tank appeared there quite
25 often, so this was nothing new. Our protests were lodged in order to
Page 37578
1 stop the fire that was opened by the 1st Corps of the BiH Army. That is
2 why we sent warnings and protest notes to the UNPROFOR Command, most
3 commonly to the Sarajevo Sector of UNPROFOR.
4 Q. Thank you. Where is Sokolje; can you tell us? Is it on the
5 outer ring of Sarajevo or is it down-town?
6 A. Sokolje is a settlement near Rajlovac. It's a new settlement and
7 its inhabitants are mostly people who had arrived from Sandzak. At least
8 that's what I have been told. I don't know for sure.
9 Q. Thank you.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
11 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Just for
12 the transcript, it should read not 17593 but 17595. Thank you.
13 When I said 175, it's page 17, line 15, and the year is 1993.
14 Thank you.
15 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3470, Your Honours.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I would like to call up
18 1D01547. Thank you.
19 The date is 10 June 1993. I'm interested in page 3, which is the
20 most important page in this document with regard to the topic that we are
21 discussing.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Look at the conclusion. It says here that artillery and mortar
24 fire has been stepped up. The number of projectiles is growing by the
25 day. And then in the middle it says that the enemy - and the word used
Page 37579
1 here is "poturice" - is supplied with ammunition by UNPROFOR. There's no
2 logical explanation as to the number of shells fired.
3 Did they have a -- an ammunition production --
4 JUDGE KWON: Where do -- can we find the passage in English?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's bullet point 8(b). 8(b). The
6 following page.
7 "Predictions: [In English] We belive that the Turks in Sarajevo
8 are being supplied."
9 [Interpretation] That's in the middle of the page.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Supplied with ammunition by
12 UNPROFOR.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Was there any kind of shell production in Sarajevo? If there
15 was, was that production enough to explain such high expenditures?
16 A. According to the information that we had at the time, they could
17 produce shells, rifle grenades, mortar shells. Those that they produced
18 were obviously different from the originals, but their effect was the
19 same. So they did have some production.
20 However, whenever a convoy arrived in Sarajevo - I don't know
21 why - but I claim here those activities were stepped up and it seemed
22 that they have limitless quantities of ammunition at those times. I
23 don't know why. Was it due to the fact that another order was in place,
24 that they were in a different mood, or they had been supplied with
25 ammunition in a different way? I was not in a position to be the judge
Page 37580
1 of that, but one of the explanations is that they received ammunition
2 from UNPROFOR either by means of those convoys that transported
3 humanitarian aid or in some other way I really don't know.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Galic.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
8 JUDGE KWON: It was interpreted in the document as Turks, but
9 what does a "poturice" mean, Mr. Galic?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this is not a term
11 that I would use. My Chief of Staff used that term until the arrival of
12 Milosevic. He used the term "poturice," but it was a derogatory term for
13 Muslims. When you say "poturice" that means that you're referring to a
14 person who started life as a member of another ethnicity and then became
15 Turk. That would be the interpretation. If I did not make myself clear
16 enough, I can go on explaining because there is more to the term than
17 just this.
18 JUDGE KWON: I think that's sufficient.
19 Thank you, Mr. Galic.
20 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3471, Your Honours.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just briefly --
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 37581
1 Q. What would have been the ethnicity of those people who then
2 became Turks and adopted Muslim religion?
3 A. Mr. President, the history of the Balkan peninsula, as you know,
4 is very complex, but you can be a member of any ethnic group in order to
5 become a Turk. But in this particular case, those Turks were supposed to
6 have started their life as Serbs.
7 Q. Thank you. And now I would like us to see whether that term
8 "poturice" referred to the people as a whole or just to the combatants.
9 Was there any difference there?
10 MS. EDGERTON: The general has just said that that is not a word
11 that he uses. It was a word used by his Chief of Staff. So how can he
12 now speculate on what his Chief of Staff might have meant when he used
13 that word?
14 JUDGE KWON: Whether or not the general would be able to answer
15 the question, the Chamber will not be assisted very much. Why don't we
16 move on.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 I would like to call up 65 ter 12397.
19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Were there armed incidents involving UNPROFOR and the
21 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps? How did you react in those cases?
22 A. As far as I can remember, there was just one clash with members
23 of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I wouldn't be able to say that it was
24 actually a clash with the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. The people involved
25 were paramilitaries, members of a paramilitary army. And I had a lot of
Page 37582
1 problems subsequently. I later on resubordinated those people to the
2 Ilijas Brigade and they started behaving. I believe that you are asking
3 me about that.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. I can't remember any other conflicts involving UNPROFOR in any of
6 our zones of responsibilities. Really, we did not have any such problems
7 with UNPROFOR. There were minor things but not such problems.
8 Q. In paragraph 3, it says around at 10.25 they opened fire on our
9 positions. Can we go to the following page.
10 Your memory serves you well, General, sir. It seems that
11 UNPROFOR and [indiscernible], that there was no love lost between them.
12 Under 7 it says that Vasilije Vidovic, Vasko was slightly wounded. Is
13 that the person that you spoke about?
14 A. Yes, I mentioned Vasko and that was at the time.
15 Vasilije Vidovic, also known as Vasko, was a member of the paramilitary
16 in the territory of the Sarajevo Romanija Corps. We had a vojvoda there.
17 Actually, we had three --
18 Q. Besides sending protests, you did not use weapons in response to
19 their activities; right?
20 JUDGE KWON: Well, too fast. Too fast. I'm not sure if your
21 question was correctly translated or reflected in the transcript.
22 Probably we need to hear the answer again.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. General, sir, also -- from the moment when you said also known as
25 Vasko whom you resubordinated to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and that you
Page 37583
1 did not have any conflicts; is that correct?
2 A. No, it's slightly different but in essence it's the same. I
3 resubordinated him to the Ilijas Brigade, not to the
4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, because if I'd done that I would have
5 resubordinated him directly to me. He hailed from Ilijas, from
6 Podogovo [phoen]. He behaved the way he did and that's why we had to
7 resubordinate him to the unit up there.
8 The question was whether we responded or reacted to UNPROFOR
9 activities. We did not. The only thing we did is send protests and
10 whatever misunderstandings we may have had we resolved with UNPROFOR.
11 Actually, there was an incident involving a vehicle. Somebody stole a
12 vehicle, and that's how the problem arose.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3472, Your Honours.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did it arrive that NATO aircraft caused an incident and opened
19 fire against our army?
20 A. We had information to the effect that fire was opened in an area,
21 and later on we could not check whether that was true or not. There were
22 provocations, mostly by NATO aircraft, that patrolled the area of the
23 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. There were up to 150 sorties a day which
24 depended on the situation and on the weather. When they broke the sound
25 barrier, that instilled fear among the troops and the people because it
Page 37584
1 was not a pleasant sound to hear that. And you were just hopeless. You
2 couldn't do anything because you could not open fire on such aircraft.
3 Even if we had had the -- the carte blanche to do it, we did not have the
4 means to do it.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up
6 1D01562.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be reminded that he
8 should speak slowly. Otherwise, his words cannot recorded properly.
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. General Galic, I understand you have a lot of
10 things to -- to let us know, but in doing so, please speak very slowly.
11 Otherwise, your words will not be recorded correctly.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President.
13 I have been in detention for 14 years, so probably you should try
14 and understand me.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Please have a look at bullets 5 and 6. It says at 1500 hours two
17 NATO pact aircraft flew over the positions above Cekrcici very low about
18 150 to 200 metres. Fire was opened but there were no consequences.
19 So what did you do about this? You just lodged a protest with
20 the UNPROFOR; is that right? It says here: "Protest Lodged with
21 UNPROFOR."
22 A. I think that first of all the Chamber needs to be informed about
23 the location of Cekrcici. It's quite a small area. That was where a
24 check-point was from Visoko leading towards Ilijas and our check-point
25 was in operation there. If something happened in that area or if there
Page 37585
1 was firing there, it wasn't so dangerous or did not have such an impact
2 on the disposition of other forces because other forces of our corps were
3 deployed elsewhere. That was why just a protest was lodged.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted.
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3473, Your Honour.
8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Were your protests lodged with UNPROFOR fruitful in any way? Did
10 they result in anything advantage to us. Did UNPROFOR have an influence
11 on the opposing side as it had an influence on you?
12 A. That's a difficult question for me, now -- or, rather, not the
13 question itself but the answer. For me to compare whether they had equal
14 or more or less influence on the other side. But what they presented to
15 us as the measures taken against the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps beginning
16 from the implementation of the agreement that we talked about, that is to
17 say the exclusion zone, without heavy weapons. I know that everyone came
18 to check and monitor that agreement, from Mr. Akashi to the commander
19 from Zagreb. I mean, the UNPROFOR commander. But we know that the
20 agreement was not implemented on the Muslim side and there were not so
21 many checks. That's why we could say that we were not equally treated by
22 the UN representatives in general, not just UNPROFOR.
23 Q. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now please have 1D06330.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 37586
1 Q. The date of this document is the 28th of February, 1994; that is
2 to say, after the Markale I incident. And what the document says is that
3 the enemy continues not to observe the agreed truce.
4 And under item 2:
5 "Our units all observed the signed truce."
6 But can we please see the last page or the second one, rather.
7 It could be the last page in English because the items I'm interested in
8 are 8 and 10.
9 A. In Serbian, please.
10 Q. Yes, thank you. Please look at this number 8.
11 "The Muslims continue to breach the cease-fire with engineering
12 work," and so on.
13 And the last one, conclusions, the measures which the UNPROFOR is
14 taking after our protests have yielded no results so that lodging further
15 protests has no purpose.
16 A. As you can see here, this is my signature. So no "poturice" are
17 mentioned here but rather just the Muslims. This is why I wanted to go
18 back to the explanation I provided earlier.
19 Whether measures were taken, I'm warning the Main Staff here that
20 they are not taking sufficient measures against the 1st Corps of the
21 BH Army. Perhaps it's a bit severely formulated that there is no purpose
22 to continue lodging protests. I was probably somewhat angry at the time.
23 Something else was going on in the zone of the corps and this was not
24 going well. You keep writing protests and no results. So that was why I
25 wrote it the way I did. Perhaps it was a bit too strong.
Page 37587
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be admitted.
3 JUDGE KWON: What is a MOS violation, General? In point 10.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That stands for Muslim forces.
5 Muslim armed forces, to be precise. The Muslim armed forces, MOS.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll admit it.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3474, Your Honours.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 1D01667 is the one we need to look at now, please.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While we are waiting for it to
11 appear on the screen, the Presiding Judge asked me about the MOS. It is
12 good to see here that these forces, the Muslim air forces
13 [as interpreted], were crossing from Dobrinja towards Igman across the
14 airport where it says MOS.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Thank you. The date of this document is the 1st of March 1993.
17 You are saying where the enemy carried out its activities. Under item 1,
18 fire at Nedzarici. The faculty of transportation. And under item 3, the
19 situation in the territory, you say that a meeting was held between you
20 and General Soubirou and that you protested because the truce agreement
21 was violated by firing sniper fire, regrouping of forces, engineering
22 works carried out by the Muslim army.
23 Were these activities allowed when a truce was in force? Just
24 tell us briefly, yes or no.
25 A. No.
Page 37588
1 Q. Thank you. Can we please see the last page of this document.
2 It -- the manners in which the truce was violated are listed here
3 and you say in particular in the vicinity of the UNPROFOR units which are
4 carrying out checks or monitoring in specific sectors. Last sentence:
5 "Meetings and agreements with the UN commander are not producing
6 the anticipated results, particularly with regard to the -- respecting
7 the cease-fire."
8 So you were not satisfied with what you could achieve by
9 protests; correct?
10 A. Yes, this is all in the context of the agreement which had you
11 signed with Mr. Akashi on the 18th of February, 1994. As far as I can
12 see this is the date, and I had missed it.
13 So this is -- continues all this time that agreement on the
14 cessation of firing in the entire Sarajevo zone was still in force. That
15 covers the entire 20-kilometre zone.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. Can this be admitted.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3475, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D06329 is the one we
20 would need now, please.
21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General, the date is now the 24th of March, 1994. UNPROFOR
23 activities is a separate section. We should have the translation too.
24 We have seen the date. Perhaps we can scroll down. What is described
25 here is a series of measures and counter-measures with regard to
Page 37589
1 disagreements, objections. They are trying to justify what they had
2 omitted to do and once again the problems are listed here.
3 No translation.
4 If you could then please tell us. It says here that all the
5 problems were stressed again. They were the subjects of discussion
6 earlier but they have not been resolved. Can you please read out what is
7 mentioned under item 1 and onwards.
8 A. Well, let me say what the introductory section says. It says
9 that the UNPROFOR refused to transport me across the airport. They
10 wanted to retaliate in a way because we did not meet some of their
11 demands. They wanted to patrol in the Vogosca sector. What was that
12 about? When I needed to go to the north western section of the front,
13 and that was Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas, and that part of the front, if I
14 were to take the Lukavica-Pale-Sumbulovac-Hresa-Vogosca road, from
15 Sumbulovac towards Hresa, that section that was a path for horses, and I
16 didn't want to go there at all I would mean between four and six hours
17 depending on the enemy fire, and if I was transported by UNPROFOR, I
18 would cross the entire way from Lukavica to Ilidza in 10 to 15 minutes.
19 That was why I used that opportunity whenever I had it, whenever they
20 would provide me with their APC and place it at my disposal so that I
21 could do my job.
22 The other issues that we discussed which had not been resolved,
23 first: The return of Muslims to the agreed line on Igman and Bjelasnica.
24 Do I need to provide explanations?
25 Q. I think that the Chamber knows when you acceded those positions.
Page 37590
1 A. Number 2, preventing the Muslim movements below and across the
2 airport.
3 Number 3, monitoring the truce by preventing the movements of
4 Muslim forces, firing, and engineering works.
5 Perhaps it's not clear, those engineering works and what that is.
6 Q. The Chamber is aware of that.
7 A. All right. Violations of agreement with regard to the deployment
8 of the Russian unit in the general Grbavica area. What is meant here is
9 actually Debelo Brdo though it's not written that way.
10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
11 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
12 MS. EDGERTON: I just didn't understand how Dr. Karadzic could
13 say the Chamber is aware of that when none of us are and we can't read
14 the document.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said that the Chamber already
16 knows what engineering works are in the military sense of the word, and I
17 believe that it does. It means digging trenches, bunkers, getting closer
18 to positions, and I believe that the Chamber is aware of this. So we
19 shouldn't waste any time on that.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Number 5, the use of caterpillars
21 and weapons with calibre higher than 12.7-millimetres. That is
22 prohibited.
23 Under 6, continuing flights of UN helicopters above our positions
24 counter to the agreement.
25 Movement of UN vehicles and personnel without announcement and
Page 37591
1 approval. That's under number 7.
2 Number 8, transportation of Muslims in UN vehicles.
3 That's what this page contains. I'm not certain if there's
4 anything on the following page.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Thank you. Can we look at the following page to see what else
7 you objected to.
8 On top of the page you say regardless of the existence of the
9 series of unresolved problems, six military observers persisted in trying
10 to shift the discussion to the issue of patrols along the front line.
11 And below, under item 8, conclusions, expectations, you note that the
12 enemy is continuing to violate the truce. Further provocations are to be
13 expected and so on. Correct?
14 A. Yes. Though it says on top of the page what was emphasised was a
15 major incident when the Canadians violently entered our positions in the
16 general Cekrcici area or sector. That was the incident which I talked
17 about previously and it is now confirmed in this report.
18 Q. Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be MFI'd, please.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
21 THE REGISTRAR: MFI D3476, Your Honours.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06315, please.
23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. There should be a translation. General, do you remember that you
25 also addressed the government with the information you had received about
Page 37592
1 the burial and removal of the bodies of Serb civilians who had been
2 killed in Sarajevo and that you requested that the government block such
3 manipulation with the bodies through UNPROFOR.
4 Do you remember this document?
5 A. It can be seen that I signed this document, and now that I'm
6 reading it, I can remember what that was about in the particular period.
7 The essence was that we had received information from those who had
8 crossed over to our territory and also through our observation and
9 reconnaissance and intelligence that bodies of those who had been killed
10 or wounded were being moved. We did not know who that was, whether these
11 were Serbs' bodies, but most information was that the Serbs' bodies were
12 moved and buried under those who had already been buried at the cemetery
13 under other bodies so that it could not be seen where that was done.
14 Much information with regard to this. And, therefore, I had to send it
15 to the Main Staff for their information.
16 Q. Thank you.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted? And then we
18 could take the break.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3477, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will have a break for a half an hour and
22 resume at 11.00 -- oh, no, I'm sorry. We'll break for an hour and resume
23 at 11.30.
24 Would that be sufficient, Ms. Edgerton.
25 MS. EDGERTON: I hope so, Your Honour. And I thank you very much
Page 37593
1 for that accommodation.
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m.
5 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. General, I would like to move on to another topic, and that's our
9 internal functioning and the co-ordination and compatibility between the
10 civilian and military components of the commands.
11 How did you perceive that command process? Can you explain to
12 the Chamber the difference between the Main Staff and the General Staff?
13 How did -- how did it work? And let us remain at the highest level, the
14 level of the republic, and not go down to the municipal level.
15 A. At the level of the RS, there was the Supreme Command of the
16 armed forces of the Republika Srpska. That command was headed by you.
17 There was also the Main Staff of the VRS, headed by the commander of the
18 Main Staff, and that was General Mladic.
19 It was customary for the Supreme Command to have its own staff,
20 rather than having a separate Main Staff. That's based on the experience
21 from the Second World War in former Yugoslavia. It was necessary at the
22 time because communication lines did not function, and that's when the
23 commanders of the Main Staffs, republic or republic [as interpreted] were
24 appointed, and that was communicated to the forces who had to obey them.
25 I don't know to what extent the RS needed a Main Staff. To my
Page 37594
1 mind, an organisational and formational problem arose due to that because
2 there was the Supreme Command and the Supreme Commander who were to
3 command the armed forces including the army of Republika Srpska, all of
4 it.
5 And now, there was the commander of the Main Staff who was not
6 the commander of the army. He was appointed by the National Assembly of
7 the RS. And his real position was commander of the Main Staff of the
8 Army of Republika Srpska rather than commander of the Army of
9 Republika Srpska. Thus, the problem of the relations with subordinate
10 commands arose. There was a kind of a parallel commanding or dual
11 commanding. In Sarajevo, I had a lot of commands commanding me.
12 I'll give you an example. The supreme commander,
13 President Karadzic commanded me. So did General Mladic as commander of
14 the Main Staff, he also issued orders. Sector commanders also --
15 UNPROFOR sector commanders also commanded. They implemented some
16 Resolutions of the Security Council. They were authorised to control
17 some things and so on. So there were a number of lines of command, and I
18 had to adapt to that.
19 The relationship between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff
20 should have been for the Main Staff to be the staff of the
21 Supreme Command, and it should have done or should have worked the way --
22 in the way that was provided for in the laws and regulations, and the
23 commander of the Main Staff should have only commanded the army to the
24 extent as transferred to him by the Supreme Commander.
25 As far as I know, this authority mostly referred to
Page 37595
1 organisational and formational changes, although the appointment of
2 command was in the remit of the Supreme Commander. The commander of the
3 Main Staff was not able to do it.
4 The Supreme Command could also directly command corps; that is,
5 the corps commanders, but he could also command by way of the Main Staff.
6 Most of the combat activities were only commanded by the
7 Supreme Commander in principle through his directives, whereas it was the
8 Main Staff that drafted the directives to the subordinate command and
9 they were also signed by the commander of the Main Staff.
10 So there was a bit of confusion. Who was it that actually
11 commanded the army? Was it the Supreme Commander or the commander of the
12 Main Staff? This duality was not so -- so much felt at the beginning,
13 because there were lots of other problems to take care of, but it was
14 understandable that the Supreme Command had to transfer some tasks and
15 obligations to the commander of the Main Staff because the Supreme
16 Commander was also president of the republic and party president and he
17 has a lot of work both internally and internationally, so he had to
18 transfer some of his authority to someone to command the army.
19 There was also the minister of the interior who commanded the
20 MUP, and on the other hand there was also the commander the Main Staff
21 who could exercise the authority transferred to him.
22 I could go on speaking about the organisation and commanding at
23 the level of the Supreme Command but that would take hours and hours.
24 Q. Thank you, General. Of the three levels of commanding,
25 strategic, operational, and tactical, to your mind what was still
Page 37596
1 exercised by the Supreme Commander, that is the president of the
2 republic, and what did he transfer to the Main Staff through his decision
3 on formation and organisation dated 15 June 1992?
4 A. I'm not all that familiar with the content of that decision
5 because that -- that's above my level. There was communication between
6 the Supreme Command and the Main Staff. But basically, planning and
7 conduct of combat activity was mostly transferred to the Main Staff so
8 they were supposed to make these plans and the commander of the
9 Main Staff was authorised to sign these. You didn't deal with these
10 things much, but I'm sure that you exercised some sort of control. To
11 what extent, I don't know.
12 There was also the Ministry of Defence, which had its duties with
13 regard to the army, especially when it comes to manning, materiel and
14 technical equipment, ammunition, and so on. All plans about manning,
15 organisation, and formations were, to a great extent, transferred to the
16 Main Staff. I suppose that they briefed you about their solutions to
17 some problems, but basically those powers were transferred to them. They
18 were delegated.
19 I think this is it enough for a corps commander to know.
20 Q. And now, General, sir, when it comes to the operative orders that
21 I sent to you, except for those that arose from my agreements with Akashi
22 or, for example, the agreement that was signed in Geneva with regard to
23 humanitarian work or with regard to some cease-fires, did you ever
24 receive from me an operative order to do one or the other thing, to take
25 one or the other area? Did you ever receive any operative commands or
Page 37597
1 orders from me directly?
2 A. Your question was very good, but my answer was not -- my previous
3 answer was not as good as that.
4 The strategical level of command was at the level of the
5 Supreme Command and the Main Staff. The operative level was at the level
6 of the corps. The tactical level actually was subdivided into two
7 different levels, into basic tactical units and joint tactical units.
8 Basic tactical units were up to the size of a battalion. From battalion
9 upwards, those units were the so-called joint tactical units, though a
10 division was the largest tactical unit, whereas a corps was an operative
11 unit. I believe that I've said enough about that level.
12 And now I would like to answer your last question as to whether I
13 ever received any orders about a direct use of units in combat. While I
14 was in charge, I don't remember any such orders that arrived at the
15 corps. Whether you sent any or not, you should answer that. I don't
16 think so. If you did, then it was -- it was done through the Main Staff.
17 Some orders and directives went through the Main Staff to us, to the
18 corps command.
19 Q. Thank you. And if something like that happened would the
20 Main Staff have evoked my direct order or my agreement with somebody in
21 the preamble? Did you receive information that it was at my request?
22 A. As far as I can remember, we had a document before us in this
23 courtroom where I did evoke an order of the Supreme Command and the
24 Main Staff. Whether they did the same in the Main Staff, whether they
25 referred your document and agreements that you signed, I don't know. But
Page 37598
1 I remember that particular document, and I drew your attention to the
2 fact that the main commander the Supreme Command was cited. They
3 referred you, and I had to evoke the authority of a superior command
4 because sometimes it's very good, especially in war time, to evoke a
5 higher authority.
6 Q. And what authority did you have in mind?
7 A. I mean the authority of the commander of the Main Staff and the
8 Supreme Commander. Because the Supreme Commander had the authority. Of
9 course, he did. There's no dispute about that.
10 Q. Thank you. You said that at first there were no tensions and
11 misunderstandings. How did you perceive those misunderstandings once
12 they arose? Were -- were those misunderstandings result of some crimes
13 or did they have some other conceptual or ideological background?
14 A. When it comes to an ideological background, I don't think that
15 they had any such thing. It's very difficult for me to say anything
16 about the relationship between the Supreme Command and the Main Staff --
17 command. However, as far as I could tell, at a lower level, there were
18 no such misunderstandings.
19 At first, we were referred to as Tito's officers, and then I
20 remember that I was in Ilidza and I said I never sported Tito's kerchief
21 around the neck and you may have. I don't know. But things were done
22 gradually. We sorted out and ironed out our difference gradually. At
23 the level of the plan as to what needed to be done, which also was
24 tantamount to the three strategic and operative plan, it seems to me that
25 if I saw the things well, the first conflict arose while you were in
Page 37599
1 Geneva. An agreement should have been signed and at that time we were
2 involved in an operation, Vukovar [as interpreted] 93. That was in the
3 month of August 1993, namely.
4 Some of the orders that arrived at that time, I don't know
5 whether they were in compliance with what you had regulated and what you
6 had said before the beginning of the operation itself and your departure
7 for Geneva. I think that things were done differently and that they were
8 not in keeping with what you wanted. If my memory serves me well, of
9 course.
10 Q. I would like to make an alteration in the transcript. It was not
11 Vukovar 93 but Lukavac 93. I would like to ask witness to confirm that.
12 A. Vukovar is in Croatia and Lukavac, of course, is in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, yes, I said Lukavac, not Vukovar.
14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
15 Mr. Karadzic asked you about the difference between Main Staff
16 and General Staff. I -- I think you explained, in detail, about the
17 Main Staff, but I don't think we heard about General Staff.
18 If you could.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we did not have a
20 General Staff. I skipped that part. We had only a Main Staff. In all
21 militaries, a General Staff is, indeed, set up, and that staff in war
22 time becomes the staff of the Supreme Command. It has the chief of the
23 then General Staff. It doesn't have a commander. There are many other
24 organisational and establishment differences, but the main difference
25 would lie in that. Those staffs have Chiefs of Staff. They don't have
Page 37600
1 commanders. In all the militaries worldwide, that would be the
2 situation. If you need any more details, I can provide them, but I
3 believe that it -- when it comes to Republika Srpska, no further details
4 are necessary.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Maybe I can ask you to --
7 JUDGE KWON: At one point of time after the war, was the
8 Main Staff transformed into a General Staff?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After the war, it became a
10 General Staff, yes. I don't know when that happened, but, yes, it did
11 become the General Staff of the VRS. It was no longer its Main Staff.
12 I believe that they moved to Bijeljina. It became the
13 General Staff. I was retired already. I was pensioned off in 1994. So
14 I was no longer with the army.
15 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 I'm not sure that the answer given by the witness at the end of
17 page 38, line 25, is completely accurate.
18 Thank you.
19 THE ACCUSED: I suppose so because General Mladic --
20 General Galic said that as far as it is concerned with Republika Srpska,
21 that would be insufficient [sic].
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. That would be sufficient.
24 A. Yes.
25 JUDGE KWON: I think we can understand the context.
Page 37601
1 Let's continue.
2 Thank you, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. General, sir, could you please tell the Trial Chamber something
5 about the difference between the General Staff and the staff of the
6 Supreme Command or rather between the Main Staff and the command of
7 the -- Supreme Command in terms of the influence and activities of the
8 Supreme Commander. Is there any difference? And if there is, what does
9 it consist of?
10 A. When it comes to the organisation and establishment, except for
11 the name there is no other important difference because it is a staff.
12 Both are the staffs that work for the Supreme Command. The Main Staff
13 has a commander who has been authorised by the Supreme Command to do
14 certain things and he can command the staff where there's no other
15 commander. He does staff work. He has a Chief of Staff. He doesn't
16 have a commander, and he directly carries out orders given to me -- to
17 him by the Supreme Commander, i.e., the Supreme Command.
18 Q. I'm afraid you spoke too fast, so it seems here according to the
19 transcript that the Main Staff carries out staff work.
20 A. Both staffs carry out staff tasks. Both the General Staff and
21 the Main Staff. However, General Staff does not have a commander. It
22 has a chief. Certain authorities and obligations can be transferred to
23 that staff by the Supreme Commander as well. However, in the Main Staff
24 we have a commander. As soon as you have a commander, that commander has
25 higher and wider authorities than a chief. He can make decisions, issue
Page 37602
1 orders, in a different way than a chief can.
2 Have I been clear enough?
3 Q. Thank you, General, sir.
4 Can you tell us, to the extent you know about my letters being
5 sent to the corps level, to what extent did those letters concern
6 operations or aborting operations and to what extent they concern
7 humanitarian aid?
8 Can you please tell the Trial Chamber on what occasions did I
9 address certain corps and tackled certain issues with them?
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: He's done it a few times now and I haven't risen,
12 but when Dr. Karadzic -- when Dr. Karadzic asked the question at page 41
13 about the extent what the General knows about particular types of his
14 letters, he was starting to lead the General. And perhaps he should be
15 reminded not to do that.
16 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Karadzic can reformulate his question.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. I thought that we clarified that. The General confirmed that he
20 did not receive any executive orders from me, but I know that I did send
21 letters. I'm asking the General what were those letters about. If those
22 were not executive orders, what were those letters sent to his corps
23 contain?
24 A. Mr. President, as far as I can remember, there were no immediate
25 combat orders. I did receive any such thing from the Supreme Command. I
Page 37603
1 received them from the Main Staff.
2 You addressed us on several occasions with regard to humanitarian
3 issues and with regard to the implementation of some agreements; for
4 example, all those agreements that you helped sign, including the
5 agreement that we have just discussed, TEZ [Realtime transcript read in
6 error "DTEZ"]. I participated at that and with this regard I received an
7 order. But most of the issues concerned humanitarian aid and dealing
8 with situations and issues. There were no any other matters because
9 the -- those matters were resolved by orders and directives by the
10 Main Staff.
11 Q. Thank you. On line 1, the TEZ should stand for the
12 Total Exclusion Zone.
13 Can you please tell the Trial Chamber something about Lukavac 93.
14 What did that operation entail in geographical terms? What crisis do you
15 have in mind when you say -- because Lukavac 93 was a code-name and there
16 was another --
17 JUDGE KWON: Please slow down.
18 "DTEZ" should read the "TEZ," which means Total Exclusion Zone.
19 So line 6 so reflect that as well.
20 Please slow down.
21 Please continue.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. General, sir, instead of Lukavac 93, could you explain the events
24 without using the code-name?
25 A. Gladly. I will gladly explain that part. This was an operation
Page 37604
1 by the Army of Republika Srpska --
2 MS. EDGERTON: I'm sorry. Apologise for interrupting the
3 General, but it's Lukavac, 93, not Lukavica 93.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Lukavac.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. You spoke about that on day one. Is there any other term that
7 could be applied to that event without using the code-name? Where did
8 the operation take place and what was its outcome?
9 A. In the army the code-names are customary. It's nothing new. But
10 it took place in Jahorina, Trnovo, Hojita [phoen], Igman, Bjelasnica.
11 On the other side there were auxiliary axis, Hadzici, Igman,
12 Trsevo [phoen] Brdo, the next auxiliary axis from which the
13 Herzegovina Corps was advancing is the Rogoj pass in the direction of
14 Trnovo.
15 Q. Thank you. And what about the agreement? What did that
16 agreement refer to that was signed after that operation?
17 A. I have never seen that agreement. General Milovanovic came to me
18 together with my operative Cedo Sladoje. They informed me that I had to
19 withdraw from that area, the area of mounts Bjelasnica and Igman, to an
20 area - and that was sometime on the 14th of August, 1993 - to an area
21 where I had been on the 31st of July of that same year.
22 Q. Thank you. Thank you. And what about the area where you were at
23 the time? You withdrew from that area. Who did you leave it to?
24 A. Together with my forces and the other combined forces, because I
25 had been reinforced from forces from the other corps, I withdrew some 27
Page 37605
1 kilometres away from that area that we had reached before then. And that
2 area of Mount Bjelasnica and Mount Igman was taken -- handed over to
3 UNPROFOR. I have already told you about the problems that we encountered
4 during our withdrawal towards Hadzici and the area of Tresno [phoen] Brdo
5 and [indiscernible].
6 Q. Thank you very much. Who did you hand the area over to according
7 to my agreement from Geneva?
8 A. To UNPROFOR.
9 Q. Thank you. You've just told us that I --
10 JUDGE KWON: It's impossible to catch up with the speed. It's
11 simply impossible to catch up with the speed.
12 Please slow down and put a pause.
13 Yes, please continue.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. I'm now asking the General this: We are talking about the
17 relationship between the civilian commands and the military commands and
18 I would like to ask him to be as brief as possible in his answers because
19 I want to finish eventually.
20 You have just mentioned that I addressed the corps with regard to
21 humanitarian issues. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what my position was
22 and what you received from me with regard to letting the convoys through
23 and the flow of humanitarian aid for the city of Sarajevo.
24 A. Mr. President, from you and from the commander of the Main Staff,
25 I received orders according to which I was supposed to comply with
Page 37606
1 everything that had been agreed. The -- the direction of movement of
2 those convoys, who had the right to stop and control them, or they were
3 sometimes even not controlled and they would be allowed to go directly to
4 the area under the control of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army in Sarajevo.
5 If a major problem arose, such was the problem with arms having been
6 found in those convoys, then we reported the incidents to the Main Staff.
7 I don't know and I don't remember whether you issued anything about --
8 with that regard, but I'm sure that you were abreast of the problem.
9 Q. Thank you. Having in mind our command structure, if you received
10 different instructions from me and Mladic, which ones were you supposed
11 to follow?
12 A. Both. But let me tell you this. In terms of subordination and
13 the principle of unity of command, it is something that is part of every
14 military organisation. Only one person is in command. The other
15 principle is that a superior's order must be obeyed. In this situation
16 my immediate superior to me, who issued different orders and who had
17 influence in terms of other aspects was General Mladic.
18 Let me remind you. Perhaps this would not be the best way to
19 formulate it, but when in August 1995 you removed General Mladic, he
20 rallied all of the generals in place at the time who signed a letter
21 declaring their loyalty to him. And, in the end, you had to withdraw
22 that order. That's to my recollection because I had already been retired
23 by the time.
24 I remember us being together in Banski Dvori when civilians were
25 being pulled out of Drvar. I suppose you recall that. At the time, the
Page 37607
1 situation was critical in that part of Krajina because between 14 and 17
2 municipalities were lost. Of course, people were upset with many things
3 as well as with Supreme Commander, Mr. Karadzic. I don't know about the
4 extent but it was not very safe in the area of Krajina.
5 I went to see him in Banski Dvori which also served as part --
6 for the forward command post of the Supreme Command. At the time, he
7 tried to establish contact with the Main Staff, asking for Mladic and
8 others, but was unsuccessful because no one responded for reasons
9 unbeknownst to me. I know the problem at the time was when the civilians
10 would pull out of Drvar and whether our army was there. In that area,
11 the Croatian army had carried out an attack and there was a danger for
12 the civilians facing the fate they were not supposed to.
13 I recall your decision at the time and the hardship you had in
14 terms of reaching an agreement with the municipal president whom I had
15 known from before. You had to agree with him on what would be done and
16 when and in what way civilians would leave Drvar. That is how I could
17 see that something was not quite working right.
18 Q. Thank you. General, sir, how did you see this attempt of mine
19 from August 1995 to have the Main Staff changed to the Supreme Command
20 staff? What were my reasons for that?
21 A. I think it -- it is the Sanski Most meeting, as far as I can
22 recall.
23 By doing that, you wanted to have the Main Staff changed to the
24 General Staff so as to have it directly subordinated to you and so that
25 there would be no question in terms of who was commanding the army. I
Page 37608
1 think that was your focus.
2 Q. Thank you. Can you tell the Chamber about Banski Dvori. Where
3 is it?
4 A. It is in Banja Luka.
5 Q. Thank you. Can we move to another topic which is the issue of
6 supply of Sarajevo, in terms of electricity water and gas.
7 Please tell us where most of the water came to Sarajevo -- where
8 from it came, who was in control of the sources and what it depended on
9 whether the town would have water or not. Was it our army that turned
10 the tap off, or were there other reasons in place due to which the supply
11 of water was made impossible?
12 A. If we look at a map, any geographical map, you will see where the
13 water pipelines are. The sources of water, for the most part, were in
14 the area of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. There were sources of water
15 inside Sarajevo, too, but they were far smaller.
16 The biggest problem regarding that issue was dealt with
17 Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Muratovic. They discussed the supply of gas,
18 electricity, and water. In the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, we always wanted
19 to meet all of their obligations. The supply of water was directly
20 dependant on the supply of electricity. If there was electricity, the
21 pumps could be working in order to achieve pressure. If there was no
22 electricity, the problem was great. We knew that only the natural flow
23 could be used to supply water to Sarajevo. In such circumstance in both
24 parts of Sarajevo, in the area controlled by the 1st Corps of ABiH and
25 the SRK, there were many high-rise buildings in those areas which
Page 37609
1 required greater pressure which could not be achieved without
2 electricity.
3 Q. Thank you very much. Can you tell us about the water supply from
4 Bistrica and Tilava and other mountain sources such as Mostanica, could
5 they reach Sarajevo by free-fall or -- and did you ever prevent that kind
6 of water supply from such sources that did not require electricity?
7 A. As far as I know, there was never a manipulation in terms of
8 water supply. There was never any abuse of water supply in order to have
9 someone sanctioned or punished by doing so. It is impossible to stop the
10 flow of water because one creates a dam which then, in turn, may be very
11 dangerous. On the other hand, the territory and the pipeline system was
12 intertwined. For example, if in the area of Bistrik there was no water,
13 there was no water in Grbavica, and Grbavica was held by the SRK. If
14 I -- I seem to recall that with the aid of UNPROFOR in the area of
15 Bacevac [phoen], which is Ilidza, we built a separate reservoir to supply
16 water to the area controlled by the ABiH 1st Corps. If you were to ask
17 me about the capacity of that tank, I'd say I don't know about it but I
18 know it was constructed.
19 Q. Thank you. Bacevo was in Ilidza. What was the level -- or
20 actually what was the importance of Bacevo and was it also dependant on
21 electricity supply?
22 A. Well, Bacevo is lower down. If we take into account the laws of
23 physics, it did require electricity in order to be able to use the
24 reservoirs in that area.
25 Q. Thank you. General, sir, while you were in command of the corps,
Page 37610
1 the SRK, were there any epidemics in the Muslim-held part?
2 A. Well, that's a very interesting question. Neither in the Muslim
3 nor in the SRK part in Sarajevo there were no epidemics as far as I know.
4 Imagine, even though people already lived under difficult conditions
5 because occasionally there wasn't any water or food, the rate of
6 morbidity was low. Even when there were greater problems. For example,
7 I was at Bjelasnica in winter-time, people did not fall ill. It's a
8 miracle. I have no other explanation. I'm not an expert. But there
9 must have been something that nature took upon itself to take care of the
10 people in such circumstances.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 1D06306.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. It is dated the 10th of November --
15 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: Mr. Karadzic probably meant
16 October.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. -- 1992. You are in command at the time. Can we go to the next
19 page.
20 A. I'm sorry, it is the 14th of October in my copy.
21 Q. October. Apologies, if I am mistaken.
22 JUDGE KWON: And the date?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The 14th of October, 1992.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The third paragraph from the bottom that has to do with water,
Page 37611
1 electricity, gas, and postal services.
2 We see in item 10 that there was a conversation with
3 General Razek and Magnusson. You discussed water and electricity. So
4 what was concluded? You say here the issue of water, electricity, and
5 gas, we said that our side had done everything to achieve this but that
6 the same should be applied to the other areas of Republika Srpska.
7 Did you ever put in place any conditions, and did they provide
8 the same thing for the Krajina that you did for Sarajevo?
9 A. I did not put any conditions in place --
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic repeatedly leads the
12 witness and, with respect, I would ask that he be firmly cautioned.
13 JUDGE KWON: Well, we discussed this issue of water supply
14 before, but I couldn't find the passage in the document and what -- I
15 don't remember what the point was.
16 Now I understand you are pushing hard to conclude as soon as
17 possible but, to the contrary, it ruins the probative value of the
18 witness.
19 Please take your time in putting the question correctly.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would have to check the
21 translation first --
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. But given the fact that in the report we see that the Serb side
24 was ready to implement everything but, it says, we mentioned --
25 JUDGE KWON: That is leading, that comment of yours. Just put
Page 37612
1 the passage and ask the witness to answer the question.
2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. General, the third or fourth paragraph done deals with water and
4 electricity. Please explain your position with regard to that and do
5 point out whether this was imposing a condition or merely a request to be
6 treated equally.
7 A. Since the representative for civilian affairs was here - I forget
8 his name - for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he agreed, we accepted all
9 demands and stated that we would do whatever necessary to make possible
10 water, electricity, and gas supply. But we also said that this should be
11 done elsewhere as well in other parts of Srpska.
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
13 By "elsewhere," what -- what did you mean?
14 It says in English translation:
15 "The same should be applied to other areas of Republika Srpska."
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This report says that we supported
17 everything that was demanded with regard to water, electricity, and gas
18 supply in Sarajevo, and that this was the way it should be like in all of
19 Republika Srpska.
20 There were some towns in the RS - I don't remember which
21 exactly - that depend on the sources controlled by the BH Army, and those
22 towns had no water supply or electricity supply. But I can't be more
23 precise than that. We didn't put conditions, but what this is about is
24 taking measures to make possible such supply everywhere. I don't think
25 it's a bad thing.
Page 37613
1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be tendered.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.
4 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3478, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. 1D01177, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. General, take a look at the fourth paragraph from the top. The
8 one starting with: "Around 1445 hours..."
9 Why is this important?
10 A. Shells were launched from 120-millimetre mortars of the BH Army
11 and the transformer station in Blazuj somewhere was hit. Here it says
12 that four tonnes of fuel leaked. But it isn't fuel; it's oil.
13 That transformer station at Blazuj was extremely important
14 because it was a switch for Ilidza and Vogosca, as far as I remember.
15 The power lines. I'm sure that experts know better than I.
16 But the transformer station was hit. And then reaction was,
17 well, there is no electricity and there's no water. Of course there
18 isn't. There is no electricity the pumps can't work and there is no
19 public lighting. Of course, not.
20 Q. How did that reflect on the pumps at Bacevo and the water supply
21 in the Muslim-controlled part of Sarajevo?
22 A. Well, I don't really know where exactly the power line ran, but I
23 suppose that it affected that area because one branch went from Jablanica
24 and Konjic descending to Hrasnica, referring to a power line, and
25 possibly it's important for the area you mentioned.
Page 37614
1 Q. Thank you.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
3 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3479, Your Honours.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now get 1D01445, please.
6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. What was the procedure for the repair of electric installations?
8 A. There were joint commissions. As far as I remember, I don't want
9 to read these documents because I know what was done, although I don't
10 know the details.
11 There were commissions that met. They were joint commissions
12 with members from both sides. And then the time and place were agreed
13 on, and what should be done by whom. And the commands would be informed
14 that no fire should be opened at that place as long as the power line or
15 the water-pipe line or whatever it was were repaired. This is it
16 basically.
17 Q. Please take a look at the second sentence in the first paragraph.
18 It says:
19 "The enemy is taking advantage of the suspension fire" --
20 Your fire is meant, right? Read it:
21 "The enemy is taking advantage of the suspension of fire in the
22 area where repairs are being carried out on the power transmission line
23 and is firing on our positions from the immediate vicinity of the area
24 where repairs are being carried out. If enemy fire is neutralised, our
25 side is blamed."
Page 37615
1 Do explain what this is about.
2 A. If an agreement is reached that fire should ceased from both
3 sides, then the enemy takes advantage of that cease-fire and moves in the
4 area where these repairs are carried out.
5 Q. And if you do respond?
6 A. If we do, then the agreement is null and void and no repairs will
7 be carried out on either side. There will be conflict which will again
8 result in a new meeting and a new agreement about repairs.
9 Q. Look at this sentence:
10 "From the immediate vicinity of the area where repairs are being
11 carried out."
12 If you were to respond, then you would have been accused; right?
13 A. We must understand this tactics. I don't know if there was an
14 opportunity for our forces to take advantage of that. I don't think that
15 they ever did because the agreement was that no combat activity should be
16 carried out in a certain area. And then they would move their forces,
17 hiding behind this safe zone. If a decision is taken to respond, then
18 all unwanted consequences would ensue.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3480, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get 1D01552.
24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Can you help us. This is dated the 19th of June, 1993. The
Page 37616
1 second paragraph of item 1 reads:
2 "At 1720 hours and 1740 hours the enemy fired shells and rifle
3 grenades on the cargo gate and power line near Pretis. The latter was
4 damaged and Pretis could not work due to a power outage. Sniping at
5 Vogosca," and so on.
6 Tell us, if the state of affairs with the power line at Vogosca
7 affected Velesici in the Muslim part of Sarajevo?
8 A. It is said here that this part of the power line targeted was
9 damaged. It runs parallel to the front line and enters Vogosca and
10 continues toward the centre of Sarajevo, but I don't have a map to be
11 able to say where exactly those power lines ran. But I'm sure that they
12 go to the centre of the city because one line ran from Hadzici, another
13 from Vogosca, and one part from Pale down to the old city.
14 The power line went through the area of the 1st Corps of the
15 BH Army and only then would it reach the area of the SRK, whereas the
16 lines from Igman and Hrasnica originated at Jablanica and up to July they
17 had a hydroelectric power plant on the Zeljeznica river. These are the
18 lines I know that were used to supply Sarajevo.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3481, Your Honours.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now see 65 ter 15595. The
24 15th of May, 1995.
25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
Page 37617
1 Q. General, on that day you issued an order for the unobstructed
2 passage for humanitarian aid. The order was sent to all units.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems that there's no
4 translation.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Can you help us, General. In the preamble you refer to my
7 directive. It says -- or rather, would you read it aloud.
8 A. "Order:
9 "For the unobstructed passage of humanitarian aid to be sent to
10 all units of the SRK. Based on the directive of the Presidency of
11 Republika Srpska, strictly confidential 01-87-1/93, of 14 May 1993, the
12 order of the Main Staff of the VRS, strictly confidential number" -- this
13 is illegible. I'll skip it.
14 "Also of the 14th of May, 1993. In order to keep the signed
15 truce from -- on our side and the consistent implementation of the
16 directive, I order the following:
17 "Make possible the unobstructed passage and protection of
18 packages, equipment, and personnel that provides aid to the civilian
19 population of the opposing side.
20 "Second, ban the misuse of foodstuffs, crops, water
21 installations, and drinking water supplies for military purposes. This
22 also included dams at hydro power plants."
23 Q. Do continue. This is also important.
24 A. "Third, fully adhere to the Geneva Conventions for the protection
25 of the victims of war of 12 August," I suppose, "1949."
Page 37618
1 Q. Thank you. So General, I issued a directive on the 14th and the
2 Main Staff issued an order on the 14th, and on the 15th you already sent
3 it out. Did it reach all units and did you demand that this be
4 respected?
5 A. It says in the heading "to all units of the Sarajevo-Romanija
6 Corps." And this order was complied with. I don't think that anything
7 was not implemented.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D3482, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. General, let us now deal with the issue of command and control,
15 discipline and so on.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So I'd like to see 1D07524.
17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Immediately after you took over command, you probably made a
19 snap-shot of the situation. And now let's see what the measures were to
20 correct shortcomings.
21 Take a look at this document and tell us what you ordered.
22 Actually, at the first page there's a description of the existing state
23 affairs and what you object to, and on the following page there is your
24 order.
25 JUDGE KWON: Yes Ms. Edgerton.
Page 37619
1 MS. EDGERTON: When Dr. Karadzic tells the witness, Let's see
2 what the measures are to correct shortcomings, he's leading the witness.
3 JUDGE KWON: Absolutely.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But the document is
5 self-explanatory. I thought it was clear. It's a document drafted and
6 signed by General Galic.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Can you introduce this document to us without reading? What
9 prompted you to issue this document a week or two after taking command.
10 A. Well, the font is so small that I can't read anything, so I can
11 only speak from memory to the extent I can remember things now.
12 But basically the situation I found was such that there was
13 neither a corps commander nor a Chief of Staff at the corps.
14 General Sipcic had left the corps about a month before I arrived. Maybe
15 even two months. And they left the command post with part of the Command
16 Staff.
17 At that time the airport was surrendered, and in the north-west
18 of the front line there is a lack of discipline and many unresolved
19 issues, that's the area of Ilidza, Hadzici, Ilijas, Vogosca, and
20 Rajlovac. At the portion where the 1st Sarajevo Brigade and 2nd Sarajevo
21 Brigade were and the corps command toured Kijevo, Kasindol, and Jahorina,
22 when I arrived the front line ran through Jahorina. In this section
23 toward the end of the Jug 92 operation conducted by the BH Army, they cut
24 off Herzegovina from the remainder of the RS. So we were unable to
25 communicate, and they were exerting constant pressure on Lukavica and
Page 37620
1 the -- those forces of the corps that were there.
2 Then the authorities. The situation was such that the JNA had
3 left and TO units were left behind but they had not yet sufficiently been
4 incorporated into the VRS.
5 Q. Thank you, General, sir. This all helps. However, please pay
6 attention to the paragraphs describing what you found looting, lack of
7 discipline. Look at the first page. Look at those paragraphs where all
8 that is described. There's a reference to crime.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Maybe Dr. Karadzic could ask for the B/C/S version
10 to be enlarged so that the General could read it. Because the General
11 said that he can't read it.
12 JUDGE KWON: I think it -- it -- after that moment, the font will
13 enlarge a little bit.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, now the font is
15 good. The letters have been blown up and now I can read the document,
16 whereas I couldn't do it before. I spoke only from memory and you know
17 those things happened 20 years ago.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, sir, please do not read aloud. Just cast a glance at
20 the document and then tell us what you found, what you established, and
21 then we will move onto the following page and we will see what you
22 ordered.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down. This is
24 impossible to interpret.
25 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer, Mr. Galic.
Page 37621
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
2 With this regard, I have encountered different forms of looting,
3 robbery, and all sorts of criminal behaviour, as well as all the other
4 forms of acquisition of material gain.
5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. General, sir, in your own words, rephrase. You don't need to
7 read.
8 A. It says here that there are all sorts of evils that were caused
9 by war and they are all mentioned here: Looting, robbery, acquiring
10 material gain, because we're talking about property that had to be taken
11 over. The authorities were still not in place and they were not doing
12 their job. That's for sure. It says furthermore that many thought that
13 was a period during which they could amass a large wealth, so -- and we
14 know there was a lot of looting everywhere and that was also present in
15 this area.
16 I'm saying here that while some people were waging war, the
17 others are making the most of it -- the situation in order to amass
18 wealth and that caused dissatisfaction among people.
19 Q. Thank you.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to the following page,
21 page 2.
22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. This is the order part of the document.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the English page be displayed
25 for the benefit of the English-speaking participants.
Page 37622
1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Look at the bullet point 3 where you say that -- use all means to
3 prevent looting, thieving, and so on and so forth.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we go to page 3. I'm
5 interested in bullet point 6 of this order. For the benefit of the
6 English-speaking participants in the trial, bullet point 6.
7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Under 6, you say:
9 "I forbid the movement of civilian vehicles in combat areas. I
10 also ban gathering of civilians in organised or unorganized manners."
11 Tell me, please, did the other side, the opposing side honour
12 that and apply that to their civilians? Was that an obligation that
13 should have been complied with on both sides?
14 A. At that time it was my assessment that we had to regulate that
15 part of combat activities about 5 kilometres in depth. That some sort of
16 order had to be established, as it were, in order to prevent unnecessary
17 losses among civilians. One of those measures was to ban people from
18 loitering at bus-stops, that humanitarian aid was not distributed in open
19 area, that if water had to be distributed, it had to be done in shelters
20 or in basements, not in open spaces, that buildings and other facilities
21 had to be protected from the enemy fire. The other side, the opposing
22 side, as far as I know, and when I remember the incidents that we
23 discussed, I realised that they did not take all those measures. In the
24 Additional Protocol number I regulates the obligations of the civilian
25 protection. According to that protocol, the civilian protection should
Page 37623
1 regulate all those issued and it should demand from the civilian
2 population to behave in keeping with the decisions of the command and the
3 civilian protection.
4 I don't know what measures they took. I am not in a position to
5 know. However, in view of the consequences I can tell that they did not
6 do enough. I don't know how much they could do together with UNPROFOR in
7 terms of the protection of the population.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3483, Your Honours.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06324.
13 Could you please remind me when our next break is? I would like
14 to finish before the break.
15 JUDGE KWON: We are going to take a break at 1.00 for half an
16 hour.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We'll do our best to finish.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. General, sir, take a look at the document which was issued on the
20 22 --
21 JUDGE KWON: We are not pressing you. It's for you to decide how
22 to spend your time.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellency, thank you. But I
24 have some precious witnesses that I need to lead live, so I'm wondering
25 whether I'll have enough time left to call all the witnesses that I have
Page 37624
1 planned, so I'm trying to economise, or if you were to give me some
2 additional time, I wouldn't be facing that problem at all. If you gave
3 me an additional couple of hours for --
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, please look at the letter that was sent on the 22nd
6 of May, 1993, to all brigades, regiments, and independent units. You
7 report or, rather, you inform and the document was signed by Sladoje on
8 your behalf, and it was about what happened at the assembly on the 19th
9 of May, 1993. Please -- I'm drawing your attention to some criticism
10 that was addressed at the -- in military with regard to discipline and
11 order.
12 A. That meeting was a joint meeting with the government and the
13 Supreme Command as well as the Main Staff, if I'm not mistaken. And on
14 that occasion, the representatives of the government put forth some
15 problems that the Army of Republika Srpska was riddled with. And that
16 included the area of responsibility of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.
17 There was a lot of criticism. And that was an assembly meeting, not just
18 a -- any meeting. It was a meeting of the Assembly of Republika Srpska.
19 There was a lot of criticism about alcoholism, looting, thieving, lack of
20 discipline, failure to respond to call-ups. It was said that both order
21 and discipline had to be stepped up and my order followed that criticism.
22 The way I interpreted things was this: If there was an internal order
23 and discipline, everything else will follow. It will be easy to regulate
24 other things.
25 Q. In paragraph 2 you demand rigorous measures to applied against
Page 37625
1 those who abused weapons, looted, and you demanded that they be punished
2 by court-martial. Under 2 you put a ban on the organisation of any
3 paramilitaries, parapolice units, and parapolitical groups on the part of
4 individuals or group; is that correct?
5 A. When it comes to this part of my work, I can say that a lot was
6 done at the corps level in order to improve the situation.
7 Q. Can we go to the following page, bullet point 2, in English.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The following page, please.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. And in Serbian, the following page, bullet point 3, where it
11 says:
12 "I strictly forbid any involvement by all levels of command and
13 control in the affairs of the local authorities."
14 A. And vice versa. The authorities should not interfere with the
15 issues of army command.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted. Thank you.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3484, Your Honours.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06314, please.
20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. On the 26th of June, 1993, you noticed that there were a lot of
22 informal groups in the zones of responsibility and that those groups
23 instill fear among civilians and they bring uncertainty among the
24 soldiers. And it says these informal groups also use arms, that they
25 don't refrain from that.
Page 37626
1 What civilian population was being disturbed? Was there any
2 special group or did they disturb everybody irrespective of their
3 religious affiliations?
4 A. Those informal group, that was a time when the corps had already
5 dealt with paramilitaries and other informal groups that existed in the
6 zone of responsibility of the corps. First and foremost, those groups
7 disturbed peace among the population irrespective of their religious
8 affiliation. Criminals did not choose their targets along those lines.
9 They exercised their intentions irrespective of the affiliations of their
10 target group.
11 At that time we had a lot of negative occurrences in the north
12 western part of our zone of responsibility, and there were strifes for
13 that area to become independent by way of establishing a Chetnik corps.
14 There was a lack of discipline and excessive use of all sorts of
15 equipment, and that's why I was of the opinion that a commander of the
16 Igman Brigade had to be removed from his position.
17 At that time we disbanded Brna's [phoen] group that was in the
18 orchard. It was another informal group that did not carry out its orders
19 and tasks. It actually bothered both the authorities and civilians in
20 the area. That group was disbanded and its members were attached to
21 various units.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.
24 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3485, Your Honour.
Page 37627
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D06316 is the document that I'm
2 looking for now.
3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And while we're waiting for it, General, sir, Brna's group, which
5 you mentioned, did you recruit into your units those people who had
6 committed crimes and used to belong to that group?
7 A. From that group --
8 MS. EDGERTON: That's another leading question, Your Honours.
9 MR. ROBINSON: I beg to differ, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE KWON: Shall we -- shall he continue or, Ms. Edgerton,
11 could you explain a bit further? Or can I hear from Mr. Robinson first.
12 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. It doesn't suggest an answer.
13 The leading question -- definition of a leading question is a question
14 which suggests an answer. This one doesn't suggest an answer. It could
15 be answered yes or no.
16 MS. EDGERTON: I'll accept that.
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Let us continue.
18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Please answer, General.
20 A. No. We did not recruit individuals who had committed crimes.
21 They were then handed over to courts and prosecutor's offices and
22 military courts.
23 Q. Let's look at the document which was issued on the 31st of May,
24 1994.
25 You reported to the Main Staff that you had informed the brigade
Page 37628
1 commanders about their order, and you said that we have removed three
2 security organs from our units.
3 Can you tell us briefly -- or, rather, can you tell us the Trial
4 Chamber what was it that the Main Staff had ordered and why did you then
5 remove the individuals in question?
6 A. We're talking about security organs who were removed from that
7 position. Those cadres by and large came from the reserve contingent and
8 they were not well trained, and that's why they did things that were not
9 in compliance with the Law on Security.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Admission please. And let's look
12 at the last document.
13 JUDGE KWON: Having looked at this document, I'm not sure whether
14 this is dealing with removal of certain individuals.
15 Yes, General.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We said that three security organs
17 were removed from their position or removed to another position. That's
18 the interpretation I received.
19 Since they were being removed -- actually, since they were being
20 transferred, it means that they were basically removed. That's my
21 understanding. Because they were unsuccessful in his duties. Perhaps if
22 they were good at their job, they would have been promoted.
23 THE ACCUSED: These three security organs have been dismissed,
24 security and intelligence, and probably because of inappropriate
25 attitude.
Page 37629
1 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Galic, could you expand on that sentence, what
2 it meant? As far as you remember, what does "three security organs"
3 mean?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm speaking from memory,
5 Mr. President, because I don't see a single letter of this document, so I
6 cannot comment in any other way, save for what I recall --
7 JUDGE KWON: Could you see the last paragraph.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can make it out
9 now because it has been zoomed in.
10 I do recall that some of the security organs were removed. But
11 not only they, also brigade commanders were removed depending on their
12 respective remits. It reads:
13 "Up until now due to their unprofessional and irresponsible
14 behaviour, three security organs have been removed (security intelligence
15 organs at battalion level)."
16 So the security organ at battalion level acted both as security
17 officer and intelligence officer, so it was a double-hatted duty. What
18 it says is what I've already said: They were removed due to their
19 unprofessional and irresponsible conduct. They were not professional
20 enough to go about that job.
21 JUDGE KWON: So my question is whether you remember what kind of
22 unprofessional and irresponsible behaviour this document referred to?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those organs applied specific work
24 methods that had to do with security and intelligence. They are trained
25 specifically for that. The people who were appointed to these positions,
Page 37630
1 well, the positions had to be filled although the people may have been
2 insufficiently professional. However, they did not meet the threshold of
3 professionalism and moral aptitude, since they did not have sufficient
4 honesty, they did not value other people, they did not respect them, they
5 perhaps acted inappropriately when dealing with captured persons -
6 because they were the ones who processed captured persons, that may have
7 been a problematic area, too - that was clearly identified and they were
8 dismissed and other people appointed.
9 I can tell you that we insisted on fair treatment concerning
10 those who were captured. I recall a problem we had at Grbavica and two
11 policemen were wounded there trying to protect some of the captured
12 persons.
13 So professionalism was required in their work when processing
14 such persons as well as in terms of undertaking measures to gather and
15 process intelligence. If they were not enough professional --
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, thank you.
17 My next question is this. This document does not seem to refer
18 to individuals forming the security organs. Rather, it refers to
19 security organs that have been dismissed themselves.
20 Could you assist us?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They did not dismiss themselves.
22 We say "organ," although it may refer to a person. So a security organ
23 is a person. If that is the chief of the security and intelligence
24 service, then he is the organ, rather than having the whole collective
25 body which requires a system. But in this context, it pertains to a
Page 37631
1 person, if this is helpful ...
2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, indeed. We'll admit it.
3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3486, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Shall we take a break or do you like to continue
5 with your last document?
6 THE ACCUSED: I have one last.
7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 12362.
9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. I wanted to address the term "they removed themselves."
11 It's a reflexive verb in the English language and thus it may
12 have been translated inappropriately or --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: In the Serbian.
14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. General, sir, a moment ago you addressed the protection --
16 MS. EDGERTON: We have gone through a mass of documents and we've
17 got no notification of this one. This was not one of the almost 200
18 documents we received.
19 JUDGE KWON: You're referring to this one we are seeing now.
20 MS. EDGERTON: 12362. It was on the Prosecution's 65 ter list,
21 but I just want to put on the record we've received no notice.
22 JUDGE KWON: Let's continue.
23 Yes, any explanation?
24 MR. ROBINSON: I'm not aware of it, Mr. President. I'll look
25 into it. But in the meantime, we apologise if it has, in fact, not been
Page 37632
1 notified.
2 JUDGE KWON: Given that this is the last document, we can
3 continue. Yes.
4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. General, sir, item 5, please, you say that some people were
6 injured by explosives or with a hand-grenade, a M75. And you say that
7 the cause of the incident was the drunkenness of the soldier and his
8 anger at not having been allowed to physically mistreat Muslim prisoners.
9 A moment ago you said that you removed people for things like
10 this. Can you tell the Chamber briefly what you did in such cases and
11 whether the commands or commanders prevented individuals from mistreating
12 captured Muslims.
13 A. I can certainly reply to that question. When I arrived, the
14 initial prisoners arrived from Otes and they were Juka's fighters, some
15 nine or ten of them had been taken prisoner, and they were treated
16 fairly. Juka did his utmost to have them exchanged. We abided by the
17 standards, stating that the captured soldiers and prisoners have to be
18 kept safe. I recall an exchange which was supposed to take place
19 concerning two captured persons. We had some problems at the brigade
20 command to have them exchanged. They were known to have been criminals
21 in the area of Sarajevo. Perhaps you recall that issue as well because
22 Mr. Krajisnik came at the time to help me in dealing with the issue.
23 So we always sought to exchange all those taken prisoner and we
24 always strove to keep them save.
25 Q. Thank you, General, sir. Perhaps we will have some additional
Page 37633
1 questions after the cross.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But, for the time being, this
3 concludes my examination, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll have a break, as indicated, for
5 half an hour. Let's have 35 -- we'll resume at quarter to 2.00.
6 And we'll admit the last document.
7 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D3487, Your Honours.
8 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.12 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 1.47 p.m.
10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
11 MS. EDGERTON: Mr. Piletta-Zanin is on his feet. I thought I
12 might give him the floor.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
14 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
15 I did not want to interrupt my learned colleague, but I have a
16 few comments to make about the transcript. For the sake of time, I
17 suggest we do it now, but I could also do that later, as you please. It
18 is your procedure.
19 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 I'll have to find my notes, but it can be done very quickly.
22 There are issues related to the French and the English
23 transcripts. I would like to draw your attention to page 36, line 13.
24 General Galic didn't say that it came from the corps but that it went to
25 the corps.
Page 37634
1 Page 37, lines 20, 21, two lines are missing about
2 General Galic's answer.
3 Page 10, line 23, for the French transcript, there was no
4 reference to the Geneva Conventions but the Geneva Talks, "discussion de
5 per Geneve" [phoen] in French.
6 Page 10, line 21, General Galic never talked about people but he
7 talked about assets, and I'm talking about the French transcript.
8 I'm trying to give you the main points, Your Honour.
9 There are other comments on former transcripts, yesterday's
10 transcripts, but I have to review my notes about that.
11 And, finally, I noted down that somewhere there is a declaration
12 about Muslim air force, page 26, lines 21 and 22.
13 And to be fully accurate, page 57, line 17, it's not: "Can you
14 read" but it should be "I can read."
15 Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: So what you did say about Muslim air force,
17 Mr. Piletta-Zanin?
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 MS. EDGERTON: General Galic wants to say something, apparently.
20 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, sorry, Your Honour, I
21 was saying that I saw this on the transcript but maybe it was
22 automatically corrected, and I'm talking about the English transcript.
23 There was a mention about Muslim air force at the page that I indicated,
24 but maybe it has been corrected in the meantime.
25 So I just wanted to ask the Chamber to check if this is accurate
Page 37635
1 or not.
2 Thank you.
3 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I think in light of the -- some of
4 the discrepancies or potential discrepancies, I would ask that the
5 Chamber undertake an exercise where it order the language section to
6 listen to the tape of yesterday's session as a test and compare it with
7 the written English transcript and to make a track-changes version of the
8 English transcript of yesterday, and then we will see from that what the
9 extent of the differences are between what is being said and what is
10 being transcribed. And based on that one day of testimony, we can
11 decide -- or you can decide if there's any further steps that need to be
12 taken to remedy the discrepancies between what's being said and what's
13 being recorded in our record.
14 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if we need it at the moment, but I'll
15 hear from Mr. Galic first.
16 Yes, Mr. Galic. Did you have something to say?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I wanted to say that
18 we did not mention Muslim -- the Muslim air force anywhere. We mentioned
19 the Muslim armed forces. That was the extent of my assistance, in order
20 to have a better formulation.
21 As far as I remember, we did not mention any air force, but the
22 armed forces.
23 Thank you. That would be all.
24 JUDGE KWON: That sounds --
25 JUDGE MORRISON: Sorry. General Galic, correct me if I'm wrong,
Page 37636
1 I didn't think there was such a entity as a Muslim air force?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not use such a term in my
3 presentation. When asked by Mr. President as to what the MOS stood for,
4 I replied by saying that it stood for the Muslim armed forces. If one
5 were to use air forces, of course, it would be incorrect, because such
6 forces did not exist.
7 JUDGE KWON: Muslim air forces were -- were referred to when you
8 were saying about the -- some Muslim people crossing the airport. So I
9 take it that it should have read Muslim air forces, yes -- no, Muslim
10 armed forces, yes.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely. I agree, Mr. President.
12 I agree with the last thing you said. I did not use the term "Muslim" --
13 the Muslim air force anywhere in my testimony.
14 I agree with you that it is actually the Muslim armed forces.
15 That is the correct term.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE KWON: Given that the -- while the court reporter is
18 transcribing the court proceedings at the courtroom, it is on a continual
19 basis, on an ongoing basis it is reviewed on back door until it is
20 produced as a corrected version. The Chamber doesn't see a need at the
21 moment to take a step suggested by Mr. Robinson.
22 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, I -- I appreciate that. But I
23 understand when it's reviewed it's review in English, so the tape is
24 compared to what's been written to see if the court reporter has caught
25 everything that was interpreted in English or said in English.
Page 37637
1 So that doesn't really address the problem of whether what is
2 being interpreted to us in English is accurate. It doesn't seem like a
3 very big step to check by having somebody to listen to the B/C/S for one
4 day. It would just take a few hours of someone's time. So that was my
5 point.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber sees no need to change its position.
8 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.
9 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
10 Just one note for my friend Mr. Robinson. Of course Mr. Reid
11 will be e-mailing our list of cross-examination documents immediately,
12 but to expect additional documents related to the evidence today probably
13 during the day and on Thursday sometime, given that I'm also involved
14 with the next witness.
15 JUDGE KWON: One more comment then.
16 The Muslim air force has been already corrected as Muslim armed
17 forces. And I don't think what we heard during the hearing was Muslim
18 air force. What we heard was, rather, Muslim armed force.
19 MR. ROBINSON: I completely agree with you. But I think there's
20 a dozen examples that Mr. Piletta-Zanin has raised over the course of
21 General Galic's testimony where what's recorded in the transcript and
22 what we heard is different than what was said.
23 But I think our team will undertake this exercise, and if it's
24 productive, we'll get back to you.
25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.
Page 37638
1 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:
2 Q. General Galic, I'm going to be cross-examining you for the next
3 few days, it looks like, but unlike Dr. Karadzic, I'm going to encourage
4 you to answer my questions and answer them succinctly, and unlike your
5 soldiers, I'm going to be interrupting you if I feel that we've gone off
6 topic, and I just need to you know that before we begin.
7 Is that all right? Do you understand?
8 A. I think that's fine. We'll see when we start working if there
9 are any problems. We are here to reach agreement to say what is
10 important. What is important is to present the truth, and we have to
11 arrive at it together.
12 Q. Now all these -- Dr. Karadzic over the course of your
13 examination-in-chief discussed a lot of shelling and sniping incidents
14 with you.
15 And those were -- and you were convicted of all these incidents
16 on the basis of having command and control over the units responsible for
17 the shootings; correct?
18 A. Well --
19 Q. The question is -- the question is: You were convicted of all
20 those incidents on the basis of command and control; is that correct or
21 is it not?
22 A. I don't know which incidents you mean, the ones I was accused of
23 or the ones President Karadzic was accused of because there were
24 incidents in my judgement that are not part of the indictment in the
25 Karadzic case. That's why my question to you is: Are you trying to
Page 37639
1 elicit a response to what refers to Mr. Karadzic or what refers to me,
2 for which I was convicted?
3 Q. You were convicted of every single shelling and sniping incident,
4 scheduled shelling and sniping incident that Dr. Karadzic read out to you
5 from his indictment; yes or no.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And you were convicted on the basis of having command and control
8 over the units responsible for those shootings of civilians; yes or no?
9 A. It's very difficult to provide answers to such complicated
10 questions. I really ask to be allowed to comment because it's very
11 difficult to give a yes or a no answer, because I can answer but then we
12 won't understand each other later.
13 Q. We'll get back to that later then and I'll help you understand.
14 So where I'd like to begin from there is to go to the subject of
15 protests and something that you said in your evidence in-chief to
16 Dr. Karadzic.
17 You said, as far as sniping incidents go, I do not remember a
18 single protest that was lodged just because of a sniping incident. And
19 that's at transcript page 37397.
20 And in regard to shelling, you said, at page 37210:
21 "As far as I remember," talking about the observers, UN
22 observers, "As far as I remember, they never alerted me to the fact that
23 the artillery forces of the SRK were acting in a way that would not have
24 been legitimate."
25 You said:
Page 37640
1 "I didn't ever -- or receive ever information to that effect."
2 So I want to talk a bit about that and ask you a couple of
3 questions.
4 You referred today in your evidence to Major Indjic.
5 Major Indjic was part of the group for co-operation with UNPROFOR, wasn't
6 he?
7 A. That is correct. He was the representative of the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the Main Staff for co-operation with
9 UNPROFOR. Or the UN forces, which includes the UNMO.
10 Q. And he had his office in your command. That's where he was
11 headquartered, wasn't it?
12 A. Yes, yes. He had an office at the corps command, yes.
13 Q. And so it's correct, isn't it, that any communication from
14 UNPROFOR went through him?
15 A. Well, all -- all communication -- he was representative for the
16 co-operation with UNPROFOR. Mostly all communication went through him
17 but not all through -- not all talks went through him.
18 Q. Protests went through him --
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Protests went through him.
21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 4, it was not recorded that
23 he was the representative of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and the
24 Main Staff. The Main Staff was not recorded. This can affect the
25 subsequent examination.
Page 37641
1 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. It's the
2 same type of issue. I do not remember if the French transcript is still
3 interesting for anyone but me, but if it's the case, in Serb,
4 General Galic said, page 78, that all written communications went through
5 him, and I under lined the word "written," and you can't find this in the
6 English transcript. I don't know if anyone is following the French
7 transcript and can confirm this, but there are huge discrepancies because
8 afterwards he might be asked or -- or be told, You said all
9 communications, and General Galic will not understand that because he
10 only talked about all written communications.
11 So we should be very careful about this.
12 Thank you.
13 JUDGE KWON: This time, Mr. Karadzic, you -- do you see a
14 phonetic mark after Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and, although the -- court
15 reporter missed this time, it will be reviewed and corrected in the
16 course of review process. Rest assured, it will be corrected.
17 Just a second.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm just ...
19 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Bear with me.
20 Yes, let us continue.
21 MS. EDGERTON:
22 Q. Maybe we can get to the point this way. General, Major Indjic
23 came to testify here and gave evidence in this case on behalf of
24 Dr. Karadzic, and he explained how his office worked.
25 Regarding protests he said - and that's at D2774 - it all went
Page 37642
1 through the office of the liaison officers any communication from
2 UNPROFOR, including protests. So it wasn't possible for such protests to
3 be sent to someone in the corps command another way. It wasn't possible
4 to bypass the office of the liaison officers.
5 That's correct, isn't it? That's how Indjic's office operated?
6 A. That is correct. Yes, it's correct. Because I didn't speak
7 English, so I couldn't communicate directly. Somebody had to translate
8 it and Indjic was the only one who could do so. There were some other
9 people at the command who spoke some English but not enough to be able to
10 translate documents coming in or going out of the command. That's why
11 this statement is correct. But I added before, if you remember, that at
12 any other meetings with UN representatives, and I'm calling them that for
13 you to understand fully, that he wasn't always present.
14 Q. Now, Major Indjic also told us, and it's at paragraph 85 of his
15 written evidence, as I said before, D2774, he also told us that
16 95 per cent of the protests were in verbal form. That directly
17 contradicts what you've just told us, or what Mr. Piletta-Zanin has said
18 you've just told us.
19 A. That is Mr. Indjic's interpretation, not mine. We must
20 understand each other. He communicated orally with them. He received
21 their protests and I received written protests, and I said here that I
22 replied to each and every one. We discussed here to the extent possible.
23 Oral protests could be stated in a conversation but they were not
24 official protests. More generally speaking, all these protests --
25 there's a problem with all these protests, content-wise.
Page 37643
1 Q. Well, let's just stay on topic to talk about the system.
2 Protests would come orally to the SRK because they were urgent; isn't
3 that the case?
4 A. No. Oral protests were lodged with Indjic's office, I suppose.
5 So it was his office, but for someone to call me up directly to -- to --
6 to launch an oral protest is something I don't remember at all.
7 There were situations, if I may explain further, when there were
8 meetings and talks about some problems, and then it was pointed out that
9 this or that had happened, if you want to consider that an oral protest.
10 Q. You don't? You don't consider that an oral protest?
11 A. I don't know what exactly you mean.
12 Q. You've just told us that:
13 "...there were meetings and talks about some problems, and then
14 it was pointed that this or that had happened, if you want to consider
15 that an oral protest."
16 Don't you consider it an oral protest, General?
17 A. Well, I think that's more of a warning and a discussion of
18 problems, not a protest. A protest must have a certain form.
19 Q. What form must a protest have for you to have taken action on it?
20 A. I have my own view of protests and what form they should have.
21 If there's a protest about any sort of problem or incident, it
22 should contain a basic textual part with all information about the
23 incident in question.
24 Then if a commission worked on it and dealt with the incident,
25 there should be such information as well because without such
Page 37644
1 information, if we're discussing at a general level, such as your forces
2 fired at Brijesce Brdo, then three sides [as interpreted] should
3 investigate, and in the situation that existed there was not much time to
4 deal with such things. If I had received information of the kind that I
5 think it should be, then I would have been duty-bound to take specific
6 measures and measures to prevent any subsequent occurrences.
7 Q. So what you're telling us is that if any protest that you might
8 have received is not put to you writing, if it's not delegated to some
9 kind of a commission, you took no action in regard to that protest; is
10 that correct?
11 A. That is not correct. I put forward my view of this matter during
12 the examination-in-chief. If I received information, and we've discussed
13 such information protests here, I verified each such information with the
14 subordinate commands to see what had been said or what had been written
15 to me was, indeed, true.
16 Q. General --
17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
18 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm doing my
19 best to follow what General Galic is saying, and I think that I heard in
20 the French transcript the opposite of what was said in the English
21 transcript. It -- in French it says "c'est exact," it is correct, and in
22 English it was the opposite. I do not want to break the rhythm and the
23 pace of my colleague, but we should find a solution for that.
24 JUDGE KWON: Well, Mr. Galic, did you say that it was correct or
25 it was not correct?
Page 37645
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it is difficult for
2 me to answer your question. Whether what was correct or incorrect? So
3 if you could repeat the question, then I would be able to answer.
4 JUDGE KWON: I will leave it to Ms. Edgerton.
5 But before proceeding further, discussing this issue in vacuum
6 does not help us much. I like to clarify what Mr. Galic meant when he
7 said -- I will quote you're saying Mr. Galic. It's about protest.
8 It's at the beginning of your answer:
9 "There was situations, if I may explain further, when there were
10 meetings and talks about some problems, and then it was pointed that this
11 or that had happened, if you want to consider that an oral protest."
12 What kind of problems did you mean, and what kind of conversation
13 do you have in mind when you said pointing what had happened on the
14 ground?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. President, we have seen
16 from the documents shown here that there have been many instances of
17 talks with UNPROFOR or UN representatives where many open issues were
18 dealt with, not only incidents. It included matters such as supply, the
19 passage of UNPROFOR, the exchange of prisoners of war, the passage of
20 humanitarian convoys, and so on. There were other problems we dealt with
21 and not only incidents. That's what I meant when I mentioned the talks.
22 But when our attention was directed to an incident that happened, then I
23 contacted subordinate units and had them check what it was about.
24 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.
Page 37646
1 I believe it is important. Page 81, line 23, records
2 General Galic as saying:
3 "If somebody tells me in general that somebody shoots -- shot at
4 Brijesce Brdo, then I must investigate three brigades," and it was
5 recorded here "three sides."
6 JUDGE KWON: Do you also recognise a phonetic mark there? Yes.
7 Please continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that is for Brijesce Brdo.
9 But it should be "three brigades" rather than "three sides."
10 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
11 MS. EDGERTON: If I could just have your indulgence to find my
12 path again, please, Your Honours.
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] In the meantime, if I may, I
14 would like to say that it is perfectly correct, because if I remember
15 well, General Galic said, "for example," and it's recorded in none of the
16 transcripts.
17 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.
18 MS. EDGERTON:
19 Q. All right. So maybe we can go back a little bit more towards the
20 beginning, General, and you can confirm the following: Your corps
21 received verbal protests; correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Your corps received written protests; correct?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. And your evidence is that whenever - and I'll find your words to
Page 37647
1 Judge Kwon - you said, in answer to a question from His Honour
2 Judge Kwon, I think, or you said in your evidence:
3 [As read] "If you received information, and we've discussed
4 such information protests here, I verified each such information with
5 subordinate commands to see what had been said or what had -- whether
6 what had been said or what had been written to me was true."
7 Correct?
8 A. You are mixing different things so it's hard to say with whether
9 it is correct. But essentially it is.
10 Q. You told Judge Kwon that in talks with UNPROFOR or UN
11 representatives you discussed matters like supply, the passage of
12 UNPROFOR, the passage of convoys, and so on.
13 So, in addition to information about protests for shelling and
14 sniping, issues were raised with you with respect to freedom of movement;
15 correct?
16 A. I don't know what you mean. To what extent?
17 Q. Let's get back on track. General Galic, you said in your
18 testimony in chief:
19 "As for sniping incidents, I do not remember a single protest
20 that was lodged just because of a sniping incident."
21 And you said the same thing about shelling incidents. You were
22 never alerted to the fact that artillery forces of the SRK were acting
23 illegitimately.
24 Are you saying now that you did receive protests about shelling
25 and sniping and you acted upon them?
Page 37648
1 A. You have forgotten a very important detail here. I said during
2 the examination-in-chief that there were individual sniping incidents and
3 I never received protests about them. Neither verbal nor written.
4 Nobody had ever told me that somebody was killed by individual sniping.
5 There was some general protests. We said that during the
6 examination-in-chief. I don't want the picture to be distorted. That's
7 what I said. I adhere by that. There were general protests.
8 As far as artillery fire is concerned, I said in the
9 examination-in-chief that in documents there is no reference to artillery
10 fire, only mortar shelling, and I said about every incident that was
11 discussed here whether I was alerted to such an incident or not.
12 Q. You spoke in your --
13 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I refrain from
14 standing up, but I have no technical means to find that part again, but I
15 know that General Galic was very precise, and he said:
16 "I'm going to explain to you the difference between artillery
17 fire and other types of fire."
18 And if questions are asked about artillery in general without
19 making reference to what General Galic said, this is not fair.
20 And then my learned colleague has the means to do that. She
21 should quote the exact sentence. General Galic, when he talked about
22 that, talked about artillery fire from a technical point of view, and he
23 said that artillery was considered to be above a certain calibre, and I
24 think that my colleague knows that, and that's why I stood up.
25 Thank you.
Page 37649
1 [Trial Chamber confers]
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Piletta-Zanin, thank you for your intervention,
3 but in this case we can continue. I think we can follow the context.
4 Please carry on, Ms. Edgerton.
5 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you, Your Honours.
6 Q. So you received protests about shelling; is that correct?
7 A. Protests about shellings themselves, there were such protests.
8 We discussed those during the examination-in-chief.
9 Q. All right. You've now clarified these assertions in your
10 examination-in-chief to -- to the effect that you didn't receive
11 protests.
12 Now, let's talk about these two types of protests. You said
13 there were general protests and there were specific protests; correct?
14 A. Well, correct. There were protests worded in general terms about
15 sniping in a certain area. Or your artillery opened fire in a certain
16 place. Or one or the other thing happened. Those were protests in very
17 general terms, not backed by commission reports. And I said that it
18 would have been good if all the protests had been backed up by reports,
19 schematics, sketches, and only then would I have been able to undertake
20 a -- specific measures.
21 When it comes to mortar shelling, I told you, and you know
22 exactly when I was informed, how I was informed, and in what specific
23 terms was I informed about them.
24 Q. Why? What difference would a commission report have made to a
25 protest that UNPROFOR laid across your desk? Why did you need a
Page 37650
1 commission report to do anything about it?
2 A. Because -- do you have any protest in regard to any of the
3 incidents in the indictment against Dr. Karadzic? Is there any such
4 protest lodged with the command of my corps? I received a protest about
5 the incident that happened on the 4th of February. I was not there. I
6 received it through communication means, and I made checks based on that.
7 Q. You're not answering my question. My question is: What
8 difference would a commission report have made to a protest?
9 A. I don't know -- you know what? In the international law or,
10 rather, when I used to deal with the international regulations, you know,
11 it is defined what a protest is and what it needs to contain. It is
12 defined in Protocol I what a report should contain. If -- it is supposed
13 to contain a schematic for me to see, and based on that schematic I would
14 know from which shell had come, either -- it would contain all the
15 ballistic data, then I would be able to say: Okay, I have that
16 information. This refers to that brigade and I'm sending a commission to
17 investigate. Or if we were allowed, which we were not, to go to the spot
18 to be part of a mixed commission and that commission had been set up. I
19 gave you an example when we went to the airport to investigate and I told
20 you what we established. Without that, madam, everything else is pure
21 speculation.
22 Q. So are you saying that absent a commission report, protests to
23 you from the United Nations were pure speculation?
24 A. Well, from my answer, you could see that -- my answer to UNPROFOR
25 that some of those protests were speculations. They were not accurate.
Page 37651
1 And let me add also this: That if you receive a protest in this way,
2 in -- worded in general terms, that you know based on some information
3 from which directions fire could come and which units could have opened
4 fire, that means that all that time we would have to investigate all the
5 time. What would -- would we have been able to establish without
6 documents? It would be difficult. At Markale there were a few
7 commissions and what did they establish at the end of the day? At the
8 end of the day, they established that nothing could be ascertained. That
9 nothing could be established.
10 Q. We'll get to Markale. But now --
11 A. No, no. It was just a figure of speech, you know.
12 Q. You've just said in your answer that some of those protests were
13 speculations and they were not accurate.
14 Which ones, General, were not accurate? You should be able to
15 give us some examples if you're making that assertion.
16 A. Madam, to try and remember all of that after 20 years, all of the
17 allegations, and to tell you, I have nothing in front of me. You have a
18 book. I have nothing.
19 However, can you try and remember when I answered UNPROFOR
20 protests? I said that during the examination-in-chief it was said that
21 we had opened fire on Colina Kapa, and I answered that at that time there
22 were no Muslim forces at Colina Kapa. That was my answer. That was my
23 reply. So I could have considered that speculation because after that
24 there's my sentence, if you remember that, where I say that they didn't
25 want to deceive us - I'm talking about UNPROFOR - they were just badly
Page 37652
1 informed or they were not informed properly.
2 Q. Well, General, you know, there was another general who testified
3 in your case, General Abdel-Razek who was in a command position in
4 UNPROFOR, and he came here during Dr. Karadzic's case. Now he said in
5 P1258, his written evidence, that he took his complaints regarding the
6 shelling directly to you. That's at page 15 of P1258. These points, he
7 said, were the Serb shelling of UN headquarters and civilian centres.
8 And I quote:
9 [As read] "General Galic denied that the Serb shelled those
10 areas. He said that the Bosnian side did the shelling. I recall that I
11 told Galic, Listen, we're all military men. I tell you that we know
12 where the shelling came from, it came from the Serb side. I have
13 experience in these matters, and my staff and I have the means by which I
14 can say where the shelling came from."
15 Now, it seems like General Abdel-Razek coming from the
16 United Nations, protesting to you about the shelling of, among other
17 things, the UN headquarters, is not ill-informed at all, is he, General?
18 A. During the examination-in-chief, I said something about
19 General Razek. I said that he was not honest in our co-operation and
20 that he misrepresented himself. You have to take with a grain of salt
21 all of those allegations of his. I can't say what he claimed. I was not
22 here so I don't know. I don't know whether what he said was accurate.
23 However, a commission was sent to the airport to establish who
24 had shelled the UNPROFOR command post and it was established that that
25 was done by BiH Army, and the commission went out after his allegations.
Page 37653
1 After that our commission was not allowed to attend any onsite
2 investigation in the area of responsibility of the 1st Corps of the
3 BiH Army. If he had told --
4 Q. Before you go on further --
5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.
6 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Thank you for giving me the floor.
9 I know what my role is here, and if I am to carry out my duty in
10 full honesty, I should be able to check assertions made by the Prosecutor
11 as it was the case with the Defence earlier on. I haven't received any
12 copy of the documents used. Maybe it's a typo, maybe my colleague
13 misspoke, but I should be able to check with a written document what the
14 general exactly said, General Abdel-Razek.
15 Thank you.
16 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure ... at the moment, it is left to the
17 Defence to check the veracity of the previous witness's testimony as
18 cited. And I -- I don't think you have access to the e-court. I'm --
19 why don't we continue at the moment. But I think witness has sufficient
20 answers as to General Razek's credibility.
21 Let's continue.
22 MS. EDGERTON:
23 Q. And, yes, General, because you speak at speed, I interrupted you
24 before we went on too far because I wanted to know about this commission
25 you have just spoken about. And who was on that commission? I want the
Page 37654
1 names of who was on the commission.
2 A. I don't know the names of all of the people. They were
3 representatives of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, our representatives, and
4 that representative testified here at this Tribunal. There was also a
5 representative of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army and a representative of
6 the Sarajevo Sector. That was the commission that worked at that time.
7 There was Lieutenant-Colonel Ugljesic on behalf of the
8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. I don't know about the other two side. He
9 testified here. In the meantime, he has died, but you have his testimony
10 on record.
11 Q. So -- so you're saying that General -- if that's his rank,
12 Ugljesic is one of the people who was on this commission to deal with
13 General Abdel-Razek's specific complaint of Serb shelling of UN
14 headquarters; is that correct?
15 A. It is not correct. I shall speak slowly so nothing is omitted
16 because it is very important.
17 That was a mixed commission. Its name was a lower-ranking mixed
18 military commission. On its composition there was a representative
19 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, a representative of the 1st Corps of the BiH
20 Army, a representative of the UNPROFOR Sector Sarajevo. The
21 representative of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, in that commission, was
22 lieutenant-colonel - not general, we're not all generals -- or perhaps we
23 are - but he was Lieutenant-Colonel Ugljesic. He testified here at this
24 Tribunal. His testimony is on record. If you look at it, you will see
25 that he testified that UNPROFOR forces were shelled at the airport and
Page 37655
1 that the BiH army was responsible. And it was not the command of
2 UNPROFOR that was shelled. It was the forces and assets of UNPROFOR that
3 were shelled at the airport, not its command.
4 And that's as far as I can remember.
5 Q. We'll leave that so I don't waste any more time.
6 Now, you talked about the accuracy, if I can put it that way, of
7 General Abdel-Razek about allegations that Serb forces had shelled the
8 UN. And by the way, he said that they shelled civilian areas as well.
9 I'm going to -- I wonder what you say about another individual who
10 testified at your trial, and that was Major Bergeron.
11 Now, Major Bergeron spoke about sniping, and at pages 11268 to
12 11270, he discussed his meetings with you on the issue of snipers. He
13 said:
14 [As read] "On several occasions where we would meet with
15 General Galic or people or members of his organisation, we would often
16 mention the fact that there were snipers and the fact that the snipers
17 would kill civilians, be it women, children, and elderly people, for
18 apparently no other reason than to terrorise the population than to
19 demoralise the population."
20 Is there anything inaccurate about Major Bergeron's evidence
21 during your trial.
22 A. I think that it is all inaccurate. Everything is inaccurate.
23 It was his arbitrary observation without any specific evidence.
24 As far as opening fire on civilian targets is concerned, what do you
25 consider a civilian area in Sarajevo? Were there any such areas in
Page 37656
1 Sarajevo; civilian areas, that is?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript. The sentence: Do we
3 have civilian areas is not on the record. Not "what do you consider
4 civilian areas." [In English] Before -- before is "what do you consider
5 a civilian area," there was a part of answer that is: "Do we have
6 civilian areas in Sarajevo?"
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that was my question to your
8 question. I was answering your question with a question, but I can
9 answer it in answer as well.
10 JUDGE KWON: I think we have that answer already, to a certain
11 extent.
12 Let's continue.
13 MS. EDGERTON:
14 Q. So what action -- pardon me.
15 So because he didn't have any specific evidence, you took no
16 action in response to Major Bergeron's assertions; correct?
17 A. You spoke about his evidence here and what he said as a witness,
18 as far as I can remember. And his allegations during evidence are
19 controversial and contrary to what actually happened during the war.
20 This is what I stated and what he said to me at the time. You know, when
21 one comes here it's easy to talk about everything else, but did that
22 major bring a document to show you and to tell you, This is what I handed
23 over to General Galic. Maybe we could have then discussed that document
24 to see whether he did hand it to me, to me personally, or somebody
25 representing me. And now, based on his evidence on -- based on what he
Page 37657
1 said that before the Trial Chamber, and you're inviting me to comment
2 upon that, it's really difficult, and in my view it would not lead to a
3 proper solution. As much as he can claim that something is true and
4 accurate, to that same extent, I can claim that it is not correct and it
5 is not accurate, unless he has proper evidence to corroborate his words.
6 Q. What happens, General, when --
7 JUDGE KWON: I'm sorry to interrupt you because you seem to move
8 away.
9 Mr. Galic, your answer or, rather, your question was a bit
10 confusing to me. What you did mean by asking whether do we have a
11 civilian area in Sarajevo? Did you mean to say that there's no civilian
12 area at all in Sarajevo?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, that part of the
14 question was from the question that was put to me. The aim was to
15 provide a more precise answer as to whether such areas were targeted.
16 And as for civilian areas in Sarajevo, on both sides, and whether there
17 were any such areas and what civilians areas there were, if any, I'm sure
18 that we will come back to that later and that we will discuss that issue.
19 JUDGE KWON: Your question sounded to me as if you were saying
20 that every part of Sarajevo was militarised, so shelling any part of
21 Sarajevo was legitimate.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it's an erroneous
23 opinion. I never said that. I never thought that. It never occurred to
24 me to think that.
25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
Page 37658
1 Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.
2 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. And apologies. I'm having trouble
3 keeping my stride this afternoon. Your indulgence for a moment.
4 Q. Just based on your answer about Colonel Bergeron. I wanted to
5 ask you, you said that - and I don't think you quite finished your
6 sentence - that his evidence was not accurate and unless he had proper
7 evidence to corroborate his words, and -- and you were referring to, I
8 gather, his assertions regarding sniping.
9 So I wanted to ask you, General, what happens when a
10 military observer, one of the UNMOs, or somebody else from UNPROFOR calls
11 your office and says, There's shelling in a given area and we know it's
12 coming from your forces, what do you do? How do you respond? And how
13 did you respond?
14 A. I don't recall anybody calling me directly, but they must have
15 called Indjic and his Office for co-operation with UNPROFOR if anything
16 like that happened.
17 First, it had to be established where it was happening and what
18 problems arose. I believe that then, if it had been established that the
19 target was not legitimate, that fire ceased. That would have been
20 justified.
21 The duty officer was entitled to initiate that, not necessarily
22 the commander, because the commander wasn't always at the command post.
23 Q. What kind of investigations were undertaken to establish where it
24 was happening? Wasn't the word of UNPROFOR about where it was happening
25 good enough for you?
Page 37659
1 A. I said what would have been good enough to make a targeted
2 investigation. We needed information about which side it came from, but
3 there was no possibility of a commission investigating it. Then we had
4 to know whether it was legitimate or not to shoot, whether there were
5 forces there, whether there were civilians. I never entered that zone
6 with my forces. I can show you where the forces were on that map. That
7 was part of the deployment. And if you say that there was shelling from
8 guns or mortars, anywhere in the zone, all I can do is trust you without
9 evidence and then check with my subordinate units.
10 Q. Okay. Just before we go on too far, I don't think you've quite
11 answered my question. Wasn't the word of UNPROFOR about where it
12 happened good enough for you?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe it has been asked and
14 answered.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I answered what was required to
16 make it good enough.
17 MS. EDGERTON:
18 Q. So unless UNPROFOR gave you specific information about which side
19 it came from, unless you had a commission investigating it, unless you
20 had information as to whether it was legitimate or whether there were
21 civilians at that location, you didn't do anything?
22 A. I don't understand your question. What kind of answer do you
23 want from me?
24 Q. I want to know why the word and the protests of UNPROFOR, general
25 protests - if you want to call them that - weren't good enough for you to
Page 37660
1 take action.
2 A. I think I gave you an answer but I can repeat. We must put
3 ourselves in a realistic situation. Every day there's combat activity.
4 There is conflict. There's fire from both sides. In such a situation,
5 you get a report about somebody firing at a certain zone. And then from
6 the side of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, what kind of information would
7 you be satisfied with to take measures in the corps? What kind of
8 measures was I in a position to take then?
9 I'll tell you: Unless I have the information that I mentioned,
10 no commission, no this, no that, how do I find out from where, who, what?
11 Because we're talking about 10.000 men. It's not easy to investigate who
12 fired a shot at a window or who launched a mortar shell because that's
13 the kind of information I need to launch a specific investigation.
14 But, anyway, in the commands we would inquire over the phone, Did
15 you open fire from this or that kind of weapon on this or that zone? And
16 then we got either oral or written replies, because I can't know what's
17 happening in Sarajevo if I'm in The Hague. It was the same then.
18 Because I couldn't know everything that was happening at any given point
19 in Sarajevo. We're talking about a large area with about 400.000 people,
20 almost. Only in the area held by the 1st Corps of the BH Army.
21 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, I would like to be able
22 to adjourn now because I also have a proofing with the next witness that
23 needs to commence on time.
24 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, sorry. I apologise. I didn't notice the
25 time.
Page 37661
1 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President just for, I think General Galic
2 already knows this, but tomorrow we'll be hearing the evidence
3 Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and he will not be brought back to the Tribunal, and
4 we expect to have him brought back on Thursday.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.
7 MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if this may
8 help, I would very much appreciate to get from the Prosecution a copy of
9 the documents it is going to show, and anybody can make a mistake and
10 that we have seen in the transcripts. So if I could receive a courtesy
11 copy from Ms. Edgerton, I would be extremely grateful. Thank you.
12 JUDGE KWON: Without determining the issue, whether it's
13 necessary or not, I'll leave it to the Prosecution.
14 MS. EDGERTON: With respect, Your Honours, I would suggest that
15 Mr. Piletta-Zanin contact Mr. Robinson, because Mr. Robinson has been
16 notified of the documents. Because the length of time it would take to
17 put together that collection of documents would adversely affect our
18 preparation for the continued cross-examination.
19 JUDGE KWON: I tend to agree with you, Ms. Edgerton. And I would
20 recommend you to leave it to the Defence, as far as the correctness of
21 citation is concerned.
22 Given the time, shall we adjourn for today and discuss it
23 further, if necessary, on Thursday?
24 Hearing is adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.03 p.m.,
Page 37662
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of
2 April, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.
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