130425IT

Page 37742

1 Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

2 Q. Good morning, Excellency Akashi.

3 A. Good morning.

4 Q. I would like to ask you whether you met somebody from the

5 international organisations, particularly UNHCR, on 11th of July, 1995,

6 and whether they informed you about what the population from Srebrenica

7 wanted to be done?

8 A. Let me just consult with my appointment book. My appointment

9 book for July 11th 1995, does not indicate that I met with a

10 representative of UNHCR on that day, but as everybody knows, that was an

11 extremely busy day, and I met with many people. I had to make some

12 crucial phone calls to New York and to the minister of defence of

13 Holland, and the lack of mentioning UNHCR does not mean that I did not

14 have this meeting.

15 Q. Thank you, Excellency.

16 THE ACCUSED: May we have D1039 in the courtroom. Probably it

17 will remind you on your report to Annan and Gharekhan.

18 MS. EDGERTON: If I may ask, would it be possible to, when the

19 document's displayed, slowly scroll down through the document to give the

20 Ambassador an opportunity to look at the document rather than just the

21 header.

22 MR. ROBINSON: We can also give him this in hard copy.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic. Would you like the Ambassador to

24 read through the document?

25 THE ACCUSED: It's not necessary, but I would like him to take a

Page 37743

1 look. So if we can give him a hard copy would be helpful.

2 JUDGE KWON: I think we printed it out.

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much for your attention.

4 MR. KARADZIC:

5 Q. Excellency, may I ask you to see second page, paragraph (b). You

6 may be right, it doesn't mean that it had to be a meeting.

7 A. Yes?

8 Q. Thank you. You have -- you have had some impressions that at the

9 beginning, representatives of the Bosnian government were reluctant to

10 support the evacuation of the civilians. Do you remember that?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 THE ACCUSED: And for the participants, this is in Exhibit P5197.

13 5197.

14 MR. KARADZIC:

15 Q. However, Excellency, it seems that the government finally agreed

16 that the Serbs be solicited to allow all residents who want to leave --

17 who wish to leave enclave. Do you agree, and do you see that in this

18 report of yours?

19 A. I think the question of the safe departure of those residents of

20 Srebrenica who wished to do so was a very hot controversial issue between

21 UNPROFOR and the Bosnian government. Bosnian government was taking the

22 position that those residents should in principle stay in Srebrenica, and

23 UNHCR took the position for humanitarian reasons that those of the

24 residents who wished to leave the enclave should be allowed to do so. So

25 there was a very prolonged difficult negotiations, and, of course,

Page 37744

1 UNPROFOR supported UNHCR in its position.

2 Q. Thank you, Excellency. And if you -- if you wish, you could

3 review the whole document, but ...

4 A. I think for the convenience of all those present here, probably

5 I'd like to ask Dr. Karadzic to draw our attention to any particular

6 passage.

7 THE ACCUSED: May we have number -- page 3, please, next page.

8 MR. KARADZIC:

9 Q. Excellency, do you remember under point 3 you reported to New

10 York what the UNHCR will do? Do you remember that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And was it first provision of emergency, food, and medicine,

13 number:

14 "(ii) safe, rapid, and order early departure from Srebrenica of

15 all those people, including men of military age, for Tuzla, beginning

16 with the evacuation of wounded on an emergency basis."

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you estimated in the next sentence that it will be a massive

19 logistic operation?

20 A. Mm-hmm.

21 Q. How did, according to your memories, Serb side responded

22 concerning rapid -- safe, rapid, and orderly departure from Srebrenica?

23 You envisaged that it was going to commence 13th, but it seemed to me

24 that it was accomplished by 13th in the morning hours.

25 A. What is your question, Dr. Karadzic?

Page 37745

1 Q. Did the UNHCR and UNPROFOR contact Serb side, and was -- what was

2 the response and co-operation of the Serb side?

3 A. It was UNHCR which was talking with the Bosnian Serb side, and I

4 do not specifically recall what was the Serb response to UNHCR proposal.

5 Q. Thank you, Excellency. Did you propose on 12th of July, did you

6 propose to the Security Council content or elements of the resolution on

7 the situation in Srebrenica?

8 A. Would you describe the thrust of this resolution? It's a draft

9 resolution, is it?

10 Q. Yes, Excellency.

11 THE ACCUSED: May we have D03401.

12 MR. KARADZIC:

13 Q. This is your communication to Mr. Annan, Gharekhan, and

14 Stoltenberg on 12th of July - do you remember, Excellency? - and there is

15 your signature.

16 A. I did not recall this cable specifically. I'd like to see a copy

17 of it if possible.

18 Q. We may offer this.

19 JUDGE KWON: We'll print out.

20 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.

21 MR. KARADZIC:

22 Q. I would kindly ask you to take -- to see the three last paragraph

23 on the first page. Before number (1 ), "We understand, not only from

24 your cable ...," and so on. And then paragraph (2) that you suggested

25 for this draft Security Council resolution to comprise the text there:

Page 37746

1 "... according to UNHCR a great majority of the residents of

2 Srebrenica do not wish to remain there. They are already displaced

3 persons from elsewhere and will wish to move on."

4 A. Yes. I think this coincides very much with my impressions with

5 the situation in Srebrenica.

6 Q. Thank you. Yesterday, you mentioned that you noticed the

7 relationship between the military and civilian authorities of the

8 Republika Srpska were unusual or disturbed or so. Did you have a meeting

9 on 17th of July in Belgrade with President Milosevic and General Mladic,

10 and was it unusual for you that President Milosevic wanted to by-pass me

11 and recommend General Mladic as a partner to the international --

12 internationals, and did you report the UN about your observation?

13 A. Excuse me, Dr. Karadzic. Did you mention 17th of July?

14 Q. No. The cable could be 17th of July.

15 A. Yeah. I think you probably meant a meeting at one of the villas

16 of President Milosevic which was held on the 15th of July where

17 General Mladic suddenly appeared.

18 Q. I think you are right, Excellency, but it could have been 16th

19 too.

20 THE ACCUSED: Could we have in e-court 1D25500.

21 THE WITNESS: If my memory serves me, it took place on the 15th,

22 and I was aware of the meeting, and some of the participants I knew

23 rather well. And I remember my impression of General Mladic on that day

24 was that he was -- he was under very tense pressures.

25 THE ACCUSED: Can we have page 2, please.

Page 37747

1 MR. KARADZIC:

2 Q. Excellency, in the first paragraph on this page, sixth line from

3 the top, it says:

4 "We would then play into the hands of Milosevic, who has long

5 wanted us to believe that --"

6 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Let's make sure whether Ambassador

7 is following.

8 THE WITNESS: Page 2 of --

9 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure if you have the hard copy of this

10 document.

11 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I'm wondering whether Dr. Karadzic

12 is referring to a cable which I sent to New York dated 12 July 1995.

13 JUDGE KWON: No, 17th of July.

14 THE WITNESS: 17th of July.

15 JUDGE KWON: Would you like to have it in hard copy as well?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, if I may.

17 JUDGE KWON: It will be forthcoming.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

19 MR. KARADZIC:

20 Q. At first paragraph on front page, Excellency, it said that

21 "yesterday," "called on me yesterday to discuss the situation," or

22 maybe -- yeah.

23 A. What paragraph are you referring to?

24 Q. Now I would like you to see the second page, and first paragraph

25 on that page.

Page 37748

1 A. Is that paragraph 4?

2 JUDGE KWON: I think Mr. Karadzic is referring to paragraph 3,

3 which starts from the first page.

4 THE WITNESS: Yes. Now I have it.

5 MR. KARADZIC:

6 Q. On the first page is says that Portillo seemed intrigued over the

7 fact that the Bosnian Serbs did not mention Karadzic in the talks

8 yesterday. And then it said that:

9 "We would then play into the hands of Milosevic who has long

10 wanted us to believe that this leader is a more co-operative Serb leader

11 than Karadzic ..."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. What was your impression and conclusion, Excellency, about that?

14 JUDGE KWON: But shall we first find out what this single leader

15 or this leader in this paragraph means, who it was?

16 MR. KARADZIC:

17 Q. Excellency, can you help us? Who was the leader that

18 President Milosevic preferred or proposed to you as the one more

19 co-operative with whom you should co-operate further?

20 A. I guess from the context that two people are particularly

21 referred to in this paragraph. One is Dr. Karadzic as a civilian leader,

22 and the other is General Mladic as the military leader.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

24 MR. KARADZIC:

25 Q. And what was the issue that you have noticed as unusual and

Page 37749

1 unpleasant? What President Milosevic preferred?

2 A. I think our discussions with the newly appointed

3 British Secretary of State for Defence in this particular passage is sort

4 of thinking aloud, somewhat speculative on the internal differences in

5 the Bosnian Serb leadership. And I can think of reason why Dr. Karadzic

6 wants us to pay special attention to this paragraph.

7 Q. And did you notice what President Milosevic would like to -- whom

8 President Milosevic would like to be your partner on the Serb side?

9 A. I think here again the discussions at this meeting are somewhat

10 speculative, and I'm referred to as cautioning speculation with regard to

11 something we do not know directly, but I think the absence of

12 Dr. Karadzic from the meeting hosted by President Milosevic at his villa

13 on the 15th of July, absence of Dr. Karadzic, gave rise to some

14 speculations in this regard, but I think we do not -- we did not at that

15 time have any solid proof as to what was taking place. We were

16 speculating.

17 Q. Thank you, Excellency. And did you perceive this as a sensitive

18 to have presence of General Mladic at the meeting of what Karadzic was

19 not -- apparently not informed?

20 A. Could you reiterate your question, please.

21 Q. Maybe I should ask to see P2279, another cable of yours of

22 17th of July.

23 A. May I have a copy of it if I may.

24 THE ACCUSED: This is Serbian version.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 37750

1 THE WITNESS: So, Mr. President, this cable refers to the

2 presence of General Mladic at the meeting at the request of Bildt,

3 meaning Mr. Carl Bildt. So it's not President Milosevic who selected

4 General Mladic, but he was accommodating Carl Bildt's requests or wishes

5 in this matter.

6 THE ACCUSED: Can we see the entire first page, please.

7 MR. KARADZIC:

8 Q. Excellency, I would ask you to see the sentence:

9 "In view of the highly sensitive nature of the presence of Mladic

10 at the meeting, it was agreed by all participants that this fact should

11 not be mentioned at all in public."

12 A. Yes. Yes.

13 Q. And what was sensitive about that, and ...

14 A. I think I surmised that the role played by General Mladic around

15 the situation in Srebrenica gave rise to all kinds of press speculations

16 and that's why I think it was agreed that the presence of Mladic should

17 not be mentioned in public, but this is my guess only.

18 Q. Thank you, Excellency. Due to the lack of time, I skipped many

19 subjects and many of your documents, but I do hope I will have another

20 opportunity to tender it. Thank you very much for coming and testifying.

21 I don't have any questions at that moment.

22 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, in this connection, in my booklet I

23 make a short reference to the atmosphere of that meeting and what I

24 perceived to be the psychological mood of General Mladic.

25 JUDGE KWON: Do you have a page number, Mr. Ambassador?

Page 37751

1 THE WITNESS: Please just give me one second.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 In the meantime, Mr. Karadzic, I take it you are tendering

4 1D25500.

5 THE ACCUSED: Yes, Excellency. This is the only one that is not

6 admitted so far this morning.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit D3512, Your Honours.

9 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I'm now able to identify a

10 particular paragraph in my booklet referring to that meeting and the

11 behaviour of General Mladic in addition to the presence of Rupert Smith.

12 That's on page 85, the last paragraph, starting with, "Several days after

13 the Srebrenica massacre."

14 JUDGE KWON: If parties do not oppose, the Chamber is minded to

15 admit this page.

16 Mr. Robinson?

17 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

18 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton?

19 MS. EDGERTON: No.

20 JUDGE KWON: This will be added to the exhibit.

21 Very well. Thank you.

22 Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please proceed.

23 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. And before I begin, Your Honours, I

24 should just tell you, I made my estimate yesterday in rough anticipation

25 of what I thought might transpire today with the examination-in-chief,

Page 37752

1 and hearing what I've just heard in the last hour, I've revised my

2 cross-examination estimate and I think it will be less than I had

3 indicated to Your Honours yesterday.

4 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

5 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

6 Q. Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

7 A. Good morning, madam.

8 Q. Yesterday in your testimony to Dr. Karadzic, at transcript pages

9 37687 to 37688, you roughly outlined some of the findings of the

10 United Nations expert commission that you convened to investigate the

11 marketplace killings in February 1994 in Sarajevo. And just to be sure,

12 can I take it that when you referred to their conclusions you did that

13 actually from a distance, so to speak, not having had an opportunity to

14 review their report before you gave evidence yesterday? A distance, so

15 to speak, of about 18 years?

16 A. Yes, you are right.

17 Q. Thank you. And at that time, in 1994 as well as presently,

18 Mr. Ambassador, can I also take it that you have no knowledge of any

19 local or other investigations that might have been conducted into the

20 incident?

21 A. Is that subsequent to the investigation conducted by our expert

22 commission?

23 Q. Any at all.

24 A. Any at all. I'm not aware of. I'm aware of a lot of

25 speculations prior to and subsequent to the event.

Page 37753

1 Q. Thank you. Now, still on the subject of this incident yesterday

2 at transcript pages 37694, Dr. Karadzic showed you a document. It has

3 the number -- the exhibit number D717. So we could call that up, and I

4 can also give you a hard copy of that document. And for the record, it's

5 an outgoing code cable from you to Mr. Annan, number Z-1256, dated

6 16 August 1994, regarding the weapons collection points in Sarajevo, and

7 it attaches two other documents to it.

8 Now, the first document it attaches is the signed points of

9 agreement between you and Dr. Karadzic, dated 18 February 1994. And

10 again for the record that points of agreement document is also P1654 and

11 P183 -- pardon me, P1820. And the second is this -- an unsigned protocol

12 of understanding with the typewritten date at the bottom being

13 19 February 1994 and typewritten notation --

14 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry. If my friend with the e-court document

15 could go to the points of agreement which is the second attachment to

16 this cable.

17 JUDGE KWON: Page 3.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Page 3. And then the unsigned protocol of

19 understanding is page 4.

20 Q. And at the bottom of the unsigned protocol of understanding has

21 the place written as being Lukavica. And yesterday, Dr. Karadzic asked

22 you if you saw the number 1 in this protocol which he said:

23 "Regulates their right to self-defence in the case of the

24 withdrawal of the UNPROFOR from the interposition areas and in the

25 case --" pardon me, "And in the case --" yes. Page 4, please, in

Page 37754

1 e-court:

2 "And in the case that UNPROFOR is not able either to prevent or

3 stop attack, the Serbs reserve the right to implement adequate measures

4 of self-defence."

5 And you confirmed yesterday that you saw this, and you may recall

6 in moving on to another document I stood and raised a query, and

7 Dr. Karadzic said, "I believe it was not that Excellency Akashi have seen

8 it but that he participated in concluding this." So this is still the

9 preface to the question, and I'd just like to show you before I ask you

10 the question another related document. It's P2188. I have a hard copy

11 for you and it's code cable dated 12 September 1994, from your office to

12 Mr. Annan, forwarding a report and a copy of the letter of UNPROFOR's

13 senior legal advisor.

14 MR. ROBINSON: That's 2118.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Oh, pardon me.

16 Q. And when you've had a chance, Mr. Ambassador, to have a look at

17 this second related document, I'll ask you a question. But as you read,

18 I'll make a couple of points about this second related document, P2118.

19 The second paragraph on page 1 says:

20 "Our review of negotiations has validated the first attachment to

21 our Z-1256, entitled 'points of agreement.' The attached protocol, in

22 contrast, is a Bosnian Serb proposal that was never accepted by us."

23 And then the third paragraph continues that UN records indicate

24 that the Serbs during discussions with you and other UNPROFOR members on

25 the 18th of February express concern for their own security after the

Page 37755

1 withdrawal of regrouping -- and regrouping, pardon me, of heavy weapons.

2 "Rather than entering into any written agreement, UNPROFOR only

3 noted their concerns and gave assurances that UNPROFOR units would be

4 interpositioned between the two sides along confrontation lines. The

5 Bosnian Serb side nevertheless reserved its right to take adequate

6 measures of self-defence in case of attack by the other side. We did not

7 endorse their position."

8 Now, if we can go over to page 2 of this document and go down,

9 thank you, to paragraph 4, page 2 being the legal memorandum.

10 Paragraph 4 reads:

11 "From the available information, I have found that the 'Protocol

12 of Understanding' was a draft that had been prepared and submitted by the

13 Bosnian Serb negotiators, but was found unacceptable by the UNPROFOR

14 negotiators and never signed. And accordingly, it cannot be regarded as

15 having any legal standing."

16 Now, if you had a chance to review those documents,

17 Mr. Ambassador, I'd like to ask you just two questions about them, if I

18 may.

19 A. Yes, please.

20 Q. How -- first, can you put the documents in context, and second,

21 how do they relate to one another?

22 A. How ...?

23 Q. Do they relate to one another?

24 A. At this point I fail to understand the relationship.

25 Q. I'll ask you the question in a different way then. Dr. Karadzic

Page 37756

1 in his comments yesterday asserted to you that this additional protocol,

2 which he said provided or allowed the Serbs a right to remove heavy

3 weapons from the weapons collection points in case of attack, was

4 concluded, and that was agreement between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs.

5 These two documents together, Mr. Ambassador, would tend to show that

6 contrary to what Dr. Karadzic observed, this protocol was, in fact, never

7 concluded; isn't that correct?

8 A. Yeah. I think copies of these messages I sent to New York

9 headquarters seemed to endorse what you have concluded from it.

10 Q. And to your mind there was no understanding that the Serbs or the

11 Bosnians, for that matter, had a right to withdraw their weapons from

12 weapon collections points under the terms of the agreement in the case of

13 attack.

14 A. I'm not a military expert, but the fact that the presence of 20

15 to 30 UNPROFOR troops at each weapons collection point seemed to assume

16 that their presence, presence of these UNPROFOR soldiers, was deemed

17 necessary to meet with any eventuality, and I recall that Serbs wanted

18 more weapons collection points and perhaps expected that lesser numbers

19 will be present in case the number of such collection points were more

20 numerous.

21 I ventured a guess that one of the reasons for some disagreements

22 between UNPROFOR Bosnian sector and NATO was due to NATO's misgivings,

23 slight misgivings about the style of negotiation by General Michael Rose,

24 and Michael Rose was a very able, great, very skilled negotiator. He

25 tended to overwhelm his negotiating adversary by mastering impromptu

Page 37757

1 arguments, and so he may have accepted at one point or another about this

2 right of recovery of weapons once collected by the UN, but upon second

3 thought, maybe he felt that UN should not specifically recognise this

4 right. The right of self-defence always can be expanded in the mind of

5 some of the parties concerned. That's why we have to be very cautious

6 about sort of a liberal interpretation of the right of self-defence.

7 So in the process of negotiations, always there are gives and

8 takes, and upon reflection, any party, after consultation with their

9 legal advisors, may alter the position they temporarily took in the

10 course of negotiations and come to the conclusion that final document

11 should not be signed or endorsed. So I could surmise that this incident

12 may have been a product of these fluidities of negotiation.

13 Q. Thank you. Now, I'll go on to another area, and it relates to

14 something that we saw in your booklet, which is 65 ter number 1D29269, at

15 page 80; that would be e-court page 43. And there you said:

16 "Karadzic, as a negotiator, had the tenancy to twist the truth

17 rather nonchalantly," a trait you observed not a few times.

18 Your indulgence for a moment. Yes, it's at the bottom left-hand

19 corner of the image on the screen in front of us.

20 And then you gave two examples of that, both arising in the

21 context of the Gorazde crisis. You said at the time -- at that time,

22 Dr. Karadzic insisted that he had not received a fax from you concerning

23 the UN officers taken hostage by his forces, and while many of them still

24 remained hostage, he insisted that they had all been released, but you

25 easily found out that that was not the case. And at -- if we can go over

Page 37758

1 on the e-court image to the next page, very top:

2 "At one time during Geneva negotiations in Gorazde, Karadzic made

3 a strong statement that the Bosnian Serb forces under his command had

4 withdrawn from a certain area, but on inspection by the UN on the spot,

5 it turned out not true at all."

6 So is this, Mr. Ambassador, what you were referring to yesterday

7 when you spoke of your regret when during the Gorazde crisis Dr. Karadzic

8 told you things his side was doing or hadn't done but on checking with

9 UNPROFOR you found discrepancies in that regard?

10 A. Yes, madam. That's very correct, and in fact, I recall that

11 during the first ipso you referred to in this first paragraph of my

12 booklet, some of my staff who were with me in the negotiation at Pale

13 told me that we should leave the meeting in view of this clear

14 discrepancy between what was told to us by Dr. Karadzic and what we had

15 subsequently confirmed from the ground.

16 I -- I said no. I like to be courteous, and it would be very

17 impolite to withdraw from a meeting which is too dramatic, and I stayed

18 home, hoping in the meantime that more UNPROFOR hostages might be

19 released. So I always wanted to give a benefit of doubt, and I recall

20 Mr. Churkin, the Special Envoy of the Russian government who went with me

21 to Pale. He was very disappointed and upset in the talks, and he decided

22 to leave the meeting, and I stayed on. But I decided not to accept the

23 invitation of my host to stay for dinner.

24 Q. Now, you noted that you had observed this trait of twisting the

25 truth a few times, and I wonder if you could tell us as a consequence of

Page 37759

1 this. What kind of weight did you give to any undertakings,

2 representations, or agreements entered into by Dr. Karadzic?

3 A. Well, as I came to know these tendencies, I was of course made

4 more cautious, and I became, as time went on, much more cautious. I

5 remember much later in those years of 1994 and 1995, in fact, yes, I

6 think in conjunction with full-scale NATO air action in the latter part

7 of August and beginning of September 1995, I paid a visit to

8 President Milosevic, and I told him it is my distinct impression that

9 NATO was preparing for full-scale air action. Therefore, it would be

10 important that Serb side should be well aware of this determine --

11 strong, firm, determination by NATO and take that fact into account in

12 their negotiations.

13 Mr. Milosevic told me that he told this to Bosnian Serb

14 leadership, Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic, and he said they laughed at

15 Milosevic for conveying this warning which I had made.

16 So there were misjudgements here and there, and I'd like to refer

17 to my paragraph subsequent -- immediately after what you have quoted, and

18 I quote:

19 "I thought that the word promise or agreement might not carry as

20 much weight on the Balkan Peninsula as in East Asia. According to

21 certain informed sources, this practice goes back to the times of

22 Ottoman Turkish rule, when as soon as the ruled concluded an agreement

23 with the rulers, there is a contrive to live free from the constraints of

24 the agreement."

25 Here I am being theoretical and speculative and I don't mean this

Page 37760

1 as an insult to Balkan culture, but I thought that the complex history of

2 the Balkans might partly explain the weight we give to promises and

3 agreements.

4 Q. Part of the caution you treated his -- Dr. Karadzic's assertions

5 and representations with, I assume, would have involved your checking

6 with your staff and UNPROFOR units on the ground to determine, or be able

7 to, so that you could assess the veracity of what you were being told; is

8 that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. To move on to another area but at the same period of time,

11 yesterday, and that would be April 1994, yesterday --

12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Would you like us to add these pages

13 to the exhibit?

14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you for reminding me. And because I had

15 read portions of them out and Mr. Akashi had read a quote out, I thought

16 initially not, but it would probably be best so that you can have the

17 context of any remarks made to have those pages added.

18 JUDGE KWON: At this point the Chamber is minded to admit the

19 whole chapter, i.e., chapter 4, emotional nationalist, Karadzic and

20 Mladic, pages 77 to 85.

21 Mr. Robinson.

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. We don't have any problem

23 with that, but I think it would even be better if -- this is a booklet,

24 as Mr. Akashi has said, and it's not very long, so we really would

25 appreciate if you could admit the whole thing under these circumstances.

Page 37761

1 There are other chapters dealing with Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and I think

2 it gives the context better if then taking one chapter dealing only with

3 Dr. Karadzic.

4 JUDGE KWON: It is not consistent with our practice. Then to be

5 consistent we will admit only those two pages.

6 MR. ROBINSON: I just note that we have, although that's -- you

7 are correct about our practice. There have been times that we have

8 admitted entire documents such as the Assembly sessions that give a

9 context to the events in general. I think this comes from --

10 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Sorry to interrupt you, but let us

11 visit the issue at the end of his -- Mr. Akashi's evidence.

12 MR. ROBINSON: Very well.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 MS. EDGERTON:

15 Q. So as I said, just to move on to another area but staying at the

16 same time period, April 1994, Dr. Karadzic showed you yesterday at

17 transcript page 37686, a copy of your correspondence with Mr. Annan

18 reporting on your meetings with him on the 7th of April, and that's

19 D3492. And I've just found a copy of it if you'd like to have a look at

20 the whole document, Mr. Ambassador.

21 Now, in the context of the discussion about this document,

22 Dr. Karadzic referred you to 14, which is on the last page of the

23 document, which relates to the question of your visit to -- or which

24 related to in the discussions yesterday the question of your visit to

25 Banja Luka, and I'd like to ask you about that. Your intention to visit

Page 37762

1 the area arose in response to allegations of ethnic cleansing and

2 violations of human rights in Banja Luka, didn't it?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. And yesterday, you said that to your frustration, although you

5 raised the prospect of a visit with Dr. Karadzic a number of times and he

6 said he was doing his best to facilitate it, the visit never happened.

7 Do you remember that?

8 A. Yes. Dr. Karadzic, I think, told us yesterday that he was

9 concerned with my own safety, but -- because I had no means of

10 ascertaining that my life was at risk. I always was accompanied by my

11 bodyguards, and so I thought my being in personal danger is a little bit

12 hard for me to conceive. I was faced with similar dangers a number of

13 times in my life, and that's part of my job.

14 Q. I'd like to show you another document relating to Banja Luka,

15 jumping forward in time from April 1994 to September of that year. Your

16 indulgence for a moment.

17 If we could have a look, please, at P5423, and it's a copy of a

18 letter, a letter that you wrote to Dr. Karadzic on 20 September 1994.

19 And if we could go over to page 2 of the document on the screen. And I

20 have a hard copy, Mr. Ambassador, if you'd like to have a look at it?

21 A. Yes, please.

22 Q. Now, this letter to Dr. Karadzic is a very strongly worded

23 communication from you, conveying your utter dismay to him at the fact

24 that in the past few days alone, over 2.500 Muslim civilians had been

25 forcefully expelled from the area of Bijeljina and Janja. You noted that

Page 37763

1 departures of non-Serb population of the area have been continuing,

2 referring to 700 people arriving in Central Bosnia on 17 September 1994,

3 and you recalled to Dr. Karadzic assurances he gave you on 20 August that

4 such forceful expulsions of non-Serb population are not in accordance

5 with the policies of Bosnian Serb authorities.

6 The letter also shows that you had a telephone conversation with

7 him on 6 September, and you informed -- he informed you that he had taken

8 measures to identify, arrest, and prosecute those responsible for

9 inhumane -- the inhumane and criminal expulsions of non-Serb civilians.

10 You also reminded him that he gave the same assurance to

11 Mr. Vieira de Mello, one of your staff, earlier that month, and you

12 conclude in the last paragraph by telling Dr. Karadzic that you failed to

13 understand how such a deplorable situation can continue and accelerate

14 despite all the commitments he had made to you to stop the forceful

15 expulsions and to improve conditions for the non-Serb population. And

16 you notified him that those responsible for such acts would, of course,

17 be subject to investigation and prosecution by this Tribunal.

18 Mr. Akashi, would you like to comment on this document?

19 A. I think this letter requires no additional explanation. This was

20 a product of my utter dismay with the practice in -- in the area of

21 Banja Luka, and I had no other alternative than writing this kind of

22 straightforward letter from time to time to Dr. Karadzic. But I was

23 accused, I remind you, of being over polite to Dr. Karadzic, and the

24 well-known representative of a certain big power got hold of a copy of

25 one of those polite letters which I sent to Dr. Karadzic and accused me

Page 37764

1 of unduly polite and courteous. But I tried to be -- to do my best to

2 maintain a trustful relationship with all my negotiating partners in

3 three different parties.

4 Q. It must have taken enormous energy as well as obvious commitment

5 and dedication. I'd like to ask you some more questions about some of

6 your assertions to Dr. Karadzic in this document.

7 Is it at all feasible in your view that such large-scale

8 population movements, 2.500 on the one hand, and 700 on the other hand,

9 could take place, actually such large-scale and protracted population

10 movements, because we have here incidents in September and you recall

11 that yesterday you discussed your concerns over forced expulsions in

12 Banja Luka in April. So is it at all feasible that movements of this

13 type over such a protracted period could take place without, in your

14 view, government knowledge and acquiescence?

15 A. What do you mean by "government"?

16 Q. State authorities.

17 A. You mean state authorities of the government of

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19 Q. Of Republika Srpska.

20 A. I think it is most unlikely that this could take place without

21 the knowledge of whichever local or autonomous authority in a country.

22 Q. And once an area is emptied of all other ethnic groups --

23 actually, this kind of exercise, these expulsions, would you agree with

24 me that they effectively by emptying the area of all its other ethnic

25 groups create facts on the ground that would be very hard to reverse in a

Page 37765

1 political negotiated settlement?

2 A. Hard to reverse, yes, but if it is totally unjust and

3 unforgiveable to bring about such population movement should not lead us

4 to conclude that since reversal would be unrealistic, we have to accept

5 the new situation which has been created as a result of whatever unlawful

6 action.

7 So I think difficulty with implementation is a different matter

8 from whether it is lawful or rightful.

9 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, it's 10.29. Would this be a good

10 time to pause?

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for half an hour and resume

12 at 11.00.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 11.05 a.m.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Robinson.

16 MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. President. We're joined by

17 Milos Bacic of Republika Srpska, who is also serving as an intern with

18 our team. Thank you.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

20 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

21 Q. Mr. Ambassador, yesterday Dr. Karadzic showed you a document that

22 now has the number D3495, and if we could have that on the screen. It's

23 a copy of a response he made to you on your protest over an attack on a

24 humanitarian convoy, and it's on the screen in front of you now. If we

25 could go to page -- page 2 of this document, you'll see his response.

Page 37766

1 Now, in this response, Dr. Karadzic writes:

2 "I assure you that what took place cannot in any way be construed

3 as representing the policy of the Republika Srpska, nor is the manner --

4 nor is this the manner in which the Army of the Republika Srpska

5 behaves."

6 Now, that was just to refresh your memory as to what you were

7 shown yesterday. I'd like you now to have a look at P1686, and it's a

8 letter of -- copy of a letter of protest from you to Dr. Karadzic on the

9 30th of July, 1994. Now, if we could just scroll down the page a little

10 bit. The type script isn't the best, but in summary, this letter of

11 yours to Dr. Karadzic refers to a report by the UNHCR chief of mission

12 for Bosnia to Professor Koljevic, made on the 17th of July, of an

13 incident on 18 June where sleeping bags and glue were confiscated at a

14 Bosnian Serb check-point at Dobrun and another incident on 14 July where

15 500 bags of wheat flour were damaged. Beans were -- there was another

16 incident on the 3rd of July when slashing of sacks of wheat flour again

17 and beans caused damage, and then on 20 July the UNHCR Russian convoy

18 reported that flour bags were again ripped and tins of meat were opened.

19 Now, you pointed out to Dr. Karadzic that, "... all our convoys

20 for Gorazde originate in Belgrade and travel exclusively through

21 Serb-controlled areas ...," so you couldn't accept explanations for this

22 loss of humanitarian goods as being necessary for security reasons.

23 Now, it seems to me that the protest you made in this document

24 and the behaviour that you brought to Dr. Karadzic's attention is

25 exactly -- reflects behaviour that's contrary to Dr. Karadzic's

Page 37767

1 assurances to you in his letter of March 24th as to how the

2 Army of the Republika Srpska behaves. Isn't that the case?

3 A. I think this is an instance of the lack of discipline in the

4 armed forces of the Republika Srpska.

5 Q. Now, in your book, your booklet, you referred at page 26, which

6 is e-court page 16, and still on the subject of humanitarian aid, you

7 said at -- on page 26, the penultimate paragraph, you said:

8 "From the view point of the parties in war, humanitarian

9 assistance was not a disinterested moral action but an instrument to

10 either weaken the position of their opponents or strengthen their own

11 party, civilian as well as military."

12 And you spoke in your book about statements made by the Bosnian

13 authorities in that regard. But my question to you is: Isn't it the

14 case, Mr. Ambassador, that you saw Dr. Karadzic and his military forces

15 also interfere, particularly over the course of 1994 and 1995, with the

16 distribution of humanitarian aid, using it as an instrument to weaken

17 their opponents?

18 A. Yes. Unfortunately, it was a practice that both sides in this

19 conflict, the Bosnian government as well as the Bosnian Serb forces,

20 looked at humanitarian assistance as potentially aiding their side, or

21 oppositely, as a means to strengthen their side. So they looked at what

22 we considered to be purely a humanitarian act or action as something very

23 political and militarily significant matter. We tried our best to

24 dissuade parties to be concerned exclusively with their military balance,

25 but often times it was our frustration that they continued to look at

Page 37768

1 humanitarian activity from their own narrow partisan perspective.

2 Q. Thank you. If we could -- thank you. If we could just have a

3 look at --

4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ambassador, looking at this

5 paragraph, it seems that this paragraph refers to the Bosnian government

6 side, not the Bosnian Serb side. Am I correct in so understanding?

7 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President. The first sentence refers to

8 the Bosnian government, but please look at the third sentence, "From the

9 view point of the parties in war ..." So all the parties, without

10 exception, unfortunately, looked at humanitarian assistance as interested

11 assistance rather than disinterested assistance. That's very bad and

12 unacceptable from a UN viewpoint.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ambassador.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have, please, in e-court -- and perhaps

15 before I go further I could ask for e-court page 16 of the Ambassador's

16 book to be admitted. That's pages 26 and 27.

17 JUDGE KWON: Did we look any passage on page 27, Ms. Edgerton?

18 MS. EDGERTON: We didn't. I only asked -- suggested page 27

19 because I actually don't know how to --

20 JUDGE KWON: In e-court that is on the same page. Yes. We'll

21 add this page to the exhibit.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. 65 ter 01291, please.

23 Q. If we could, 65 ter number 01291, Mr. Ambassador, is dated

24 3 September 1994, and this is the cover page to your letter to

25 Dr. Karadzic of that date. If we could go to the second page, please.

Page 37769

1 It's a very smaller, so I think we can deal with it on the screen, but if

2 you could enlarge that.

3 Now, this letter that you wrote to Dr. Karadzic is -- expresses

4 your concern about remarks you understand he made during a speech to his

5 Assembly on the 1st of September, 1994, referring to economic sanctions

6 imposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and said -- and he said

7 that, "Now we have the full right to introduce such sanctions against

8 Muslims so that even a bird will not fly through to them." And you urged

9 him to refrain from taking any such action.

10 Mr. Ambassador, is this reflective to your mind, the statements

11 by Dr. Karadzic, reflective of the tendency of the parties to use

12 humanitarian assistance perhaps as a lever rather than as disinterested

13 assistance?

14 A. I think you're right.

15 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you. Could we have that as a Prosecution

16 exhibit, please.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6293, Your Honours.

19 MS. EDGERTON:

20 Q. Now, one final question and one final issue, and it takes us back

21 to your booklet, Mr. Ambassador, and so that's 65 ter number 1D29269, and

22 it's at page 31 of the booklet, e-court pages 18 and 19, where you refer

23 to the detention of UN personnel following the NATO air strikes in

24 May of 1995. And I'd like to know whether you agree with me that UN

25 personnel who were taken hostage on that occasion were used, actually, as

Page 37770

1 human shields in order to compel NATO forces to stop the air strikes.

2 A. I think the term "human shield" is frequently used by journalism,

3 but in this particular case, I think if we construe Bosnian Serb action

4 of taking UNPROFOR personnel as a -- as hostage, if this act is construed

5 as taking hostages and making them as human shield is certainly not an

6 exaggeration, journalistic exaggeration.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, I have

8 nothing further.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

10 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

11 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

12 THE ACCUSED: No, Excellency, except to thank Excellency Akashi

13 for his effort to come and testify. No additional questions.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

15 That concludes your evidence --

16 THE ACCUSED: Excellency.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

18 THE ACCUSED: Since there are many pages after your first ruling,

19 I wonder whether there is now new -- new justification to tender and

20 admit the whole book.

21 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has considered the issue and decided to

22 leave it as it is.

23 Unless my colleagues have a question for you, Ambassador Akashi,

24 that concludes your evidence. On behalf of the Chamber and the Tribunal

25 as a whole, I would like to thank you for your coming to The Hague to

Page 37772

1 The Chamber is seized of the accused's request for postponement

2 of testimony of subpoenaed witness Slavko Puhalic filed on 24th of April,

3 2014 -- I'm sorry, 2013. The accused requests that the date of

4 Mr. Puhalic's testimony be postponed from 7th of May, 2013, to 30th of

5 August, 2013, based on scheduling issues and to place his testimony at

6 the same time as other witnesses from the north-western municipalities.

7 So in this regard, the Chamber would like to ask the Prosecution if it is

8 minded to respond to this request.

9 Mr. Tieger.

10 MR. TIEGER: No, Mr. President.

11 JUDGE KWON: Well, then the Chamber will issue its ruling on the

12 request now.

13 The Chamber recalls the subpoena it issued on the

14 20th of March, 2013, ordering Mr. Puhalic to appear before this Chamber

15 to testify on the 7th of May, 2013, or another date and time to be

16 notified. In light of the accused's submission and the Prosecution's

17 response, the Chamber considers that the postponement of Mr. Puhalic's

18 testimony is warranted. The Chamber thus grants the accused's request

19 and orders that Mr. Puhalic shall testify in this case on the

20 30th of August, 2013. The Chamber instruction the Registry to

21 communicate the change of date of his testimony to Mr. Puhalic and to

22 take any further necessary steps to implement the Chamber's decision.

23 Now the Chamber wishes to return to the matter of the motion for

24 the temporary transfer of detained witness Franc Kos filed on the

25 4th of April, 2013. The Chamber recalls that on the 18th of April, 2013,

Page 37773

1 in response to a Chamber inquiry regarding the motion, Mr. Robinson

2 stated that the Defence was unable to make any definitive representation

3 regarding the Rule 90 bis requirements because, in his submission,

4 Bosnian authorities generally do not respond to the Defence absent a

5 request from the Chamber. In his submission, it is for this reason that

6 the Defence requested that the Chamber issue an invitation to the BiH

7 authorities verifying that the Rule 90 bis requirements have been

8 satisfied. The Chamber recalls, however, multiple instances where the

9 Defence has successfully liaised with the BiH authorities and,

10 furthermore, considers that it is incumbent upon the parties to show that

11 the Rule 90 bis requirements have been satisfied. The Chamber thus

12 instructs the Defence to make an inquiry to the BiH directly and keep the

13 Chamber apprised of any response or lack thereof from the BiH. Finally,

14 the Chamber notes that the Defence may be assisted by filing its letter

15 to BiH on the record as it has done on previous occasions.

16 MR. ROBINSON: We'll do that, Mr. President.

17 JUDGE KWON: And now the Chamber refers to the Prosecution's

18 submission with respect to the portions of Milorad Dodik's interview and

19 testimony in the Brdjanin case which were referred to during his

20 cross-examination and which are now being tendered.

21 The Chamber has reviewed the excerpts which have been uploaded as

22 65 ter 24921 and 24924. The Chamber is not convinced that these extracts

23 need to be admitted into order to understand the testimony of

24 Milorad Dodik or in order to assess his credibility. The relevant

25 portions from both his testimony and interview were quoted or referred to

Page 37774

1 in a way that the Chamber can understand the essence of the witness's

2 evidence and the points raised on cross-examination. The witness also

3 repeatedly confirmed the content of what he said during his testimony in

4 the Brdjanin case. The Chamber also notes that 51 pages of Mr. Dodik's

5 testimony from the Brdjanin case are being tendered, but the number of

6 specific pages referred to during cross-examination was far fewer.

7 Accordingly, the Chamber will not admit 65 ter 24921 or 24924 at this

8 stage.

9 Just a second.

10 Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11 MR. TIEGER: Well, there may be some kind of upload problem,

12 Mr. President. If the Chamber was presented with 51 pages of testimony

13 from the Brdjanin case, my recollection was that the total number of

14 pages that we intended to provide to the Chamber in conformity with the

15 previous practice was far fewer; in fact, less than half. So there seems

16 to be some problem that may have misled the Chamber. We really did try

17 to limit the submission to matters that were addressed, so maybe we can

18 just start over, and I'm sorry for the confusion. I would have checked

19 that personally but we've never had that problem in the past. So maybe

20 if we can commence again, and I indeed can mention to the Court where the

21 references were made if that's helpful, but I apologise for what appears

22 to be a logistical misstep. But as I mentioned to Mr. Robinson before,

23 the number of pages we were submitting was far fewer. I think he is

24 aware of that so there seems to be a problem.

25 JUDGE KWON: Thank you for the information, Mr. Tieger, but the

Page 37775

1 main reason for the Chamber's ruling was stated in the previous part and

2 that that situation does not make a cause for the Chamber to change its

3 position. Thank you.

4 Finally, the Chamber will issue an oral ruling on the admission

5 of 65 ter 24232, which was tendered by the Prosecution on

6 10th of April, 2013, during the cross-examination of

7 Witness Soniboje Skiljevic.

8 The Chamber notes that the document in question is a 129-pages

9 "Verdict of the Appellate Panel" of the BiH court in the case against

10 Radoje Lalovic and Soniboje Skiljevic dated 11th of July, 2011, which is

11 referred to in paragraph 17 of the Soniboje Skiljevic's witness statement

12 which was admitted in this case as Exhibit D3331. The Chamber notes that

13 the parties seek the admission of the document in full.

14 The Chamber is satisfied that -- I'm sorry. Having reviewed the

15 parties' submissions in relation to the verdict, as well as the document

16 itself, the Chamber finds that only the first 13 pages of the English

17 version of the verdict, as well as paragraphs 71, 80, 98 to 101, 104,

18 105, 108 to 111, 118, 129, 151, 158, 174, 205, 216, 225, 226, and 262

19 should be admitted into evidence.

20 The Chamber is satisfied that these paragraphs cover the

21 questions raised in court during the cross-examination of the witness and

22 show the outcome of the verdict, as well as the reasoning of the

23 appellate panel in reaching such outcome.

24 The Chamber hereby instructs the Prosecution to upload onto

25 e-court the first 13 pages of the verdict as well as the 22 paragraphs

Page 37776

1 just referred to.

2 The Chamber further instructs the Registry to assign this

3 redacted version of 65 ter 24232 an exhibit number.

4 THE REGISTRAR: That be Exhibit P6294, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE KWON: Well, unless there's anything to be raised, the

6 hearing is adjourned. The next hearing will be on 7th of May.

7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 11.36 a.m.

8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 7th day

9 of May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.