Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 37881

 1                           Wednesday, 8 May 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Do you hear me well, Mr. Galic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, good morning.  I

 9     hear you well, and I also understand you in my own language.  Thank you.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11                           WITNESS:  STANISLAV GALIC [Resumed]

12                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

15                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:  [Continued]

16        Q.   Good morning, General.  I'd like to --

17        A.   Good morning, Madam Prosecutor.

18        Q.   I'd like to start today by going back to some of the things you

19     said yesterday and asking you a few more questions.  Yesterday, I asked

20     you whether you received information from the Main Staff about shelling

21     and sniping by your forces into Bosnian-held Sarajevo, and you said that

22     this could have been possible via Indjic.  So I'd like to know about your

23     communications now with Dr. Karadzic.  Did Dr. Karadzic ever convey to

24     you any information or reports or protests he'd received about the

25     shelling and sniping of civilians by your forces in Bosnian-held

Page 37882

 1     Sarajevo?

 2        A.   Madam Prosecutor, during the examination-in-chief, I spoke about

 3     that.  I said that President Karadzic and I and the others, Akashi,

 4     et cetera, took part in this conversation when there was this agreement

 5     on the 5th -- or, rather, 18th of February, 1994.  And then I received

 6     that agreement from him, and there was also an accompanying order as to

 7     what should be done in that area.  When I recall the rest, now, there

 8     were questions like whether this or that was done, but not particularly

 9     in terms of carrying out combat tasks and activities, but I remember that

10     he called me when I arrived at the command post.  And when the problem of

11     Markale I was supposed to be resolved, he called me then and I said we

12     had such and such information and that we would check that then.  So that

13     would be it.  Also, I said during the examination-in-chief -- well,

14     possibly with regard to some humanitarian issues.

15        Q.   So apart from the situation you've just discussed related to

16     Markale I, Dr. Karadzic never told you about any reports or protests or

17     information he'd received from whatever source saying that SRK forces had

18     been shelling and sniping into Sarajevo causing civilian casualties.

19        A.   Well, such a conversation or such an order - yes, say order -

20     from the president, I don't remember having received that.  But at

21     different discussions -- well, that was discussed, that there was a

22     disproportionate use of artillery and that it should be decreased.

23             Now, I don't know to what extent, but I also complained about

24     that, and I cannot exactly define it.  It seems to me that it was

25     disproportionate, but I could not regulate that problem.

Page 37883

 1        Q.   So what you're saying now is that there was a discussion in which

 2     Dr. Karadzic told you he'd received information that your forces were

 3     using artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo in a disproportionate

 4     fashion?

 5        A.   Well, it wasn't -- well, how do I put this?  It wasn't that kind

 6     of typical information.  For instance, let me give you an example.  I

 7     would like to portray this for you how this communication developed

 8     between the corps commander and the commander -- rather, the president --

 9     or, rather, the Supreme Command.  When he toured the corps, when he came

10     to the corps command, he talked to officers and to me, too, and all these

11     problems were referred to, and the problem that we're discussing now as

12     well.  He always said that attention should be paid, because before that

13     there were some orders from the government forbidding any kind of firing

14     at town and so on and so forth.  I mean, this order arrived before I came

15     as commander, but it was still in force.  I cannot tell you to what

16     degree.

17             I've already said yesterday these cease-fires and orders,

18     especially cease-fires, they would be in force until they were violated,

19     and then also there were time limits.

20        Q.   Thanks, General, but maybe we need to go back to what you said

21     originally.  You said -- your indulgence.  You said at different

22     discussions it was discussed that there was a disproportionate use of

23     artillery and that it should be decreased.  Was that Dr. Karadzic who

24     told you that?  Yes or no?

25        A.   Yes, but not to me directly.  When he talked to all of us at the

Page 37884

 1     command, it wasn't that he called me and said, "I'm issuing such and such

 2     an order."  No.

 3        Q.   So --

 4             THE ACCUSED:  May I about transcript, please.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] General Galic received

 7     interpretation of lines 3 and 4 that his forces were against the Bosnian

 8     forces in Sarajevo and the transcript says "Bosnian-held Sarajevo."  So

 9     General Galic was satisfied with the question, so he did not refer to

10     what was said there, Bosnian forces.  The Serbian interpretation that he

11     received was:  "Your forces against the Bosnian forces in Sarajevo."  And

12     the transcript says that this is against Sarajevo.  So since he did not

13     get the right interpretation, he could not say anything in reference to

14     that.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Well, Ms. Edgerton asked her question again now, and

16     then I think it's clear from the transcript.

17             MS. EDGERTON:

18        Q.   Now, General, that instance where Dr. Karadzic told all of you at

19     the command that there was a disproportionate use of artillery and that

20     it should be decreased, when was that?

21        A.   Now I spoke about a meeting that was held at the corps command

22     sometime in 1993, but the date I do not recall.  Around that time.  I

23     mean, when I said this, I spoke about that meeting that was attended by

24     President Karadzic together with the corps command.  So we discussed all

25     the problems, all the other problems and - how do I put this? - the

Page 37885

 1     problem of disproportionate use.

 2             I do know that there was pressure from all sides in that domain,

 3     not only from President Karadzic.

 4        Q.   When you say you know that there was pressure from all sides in

 5     that domain, what do you mean?

 6        A.   I mean all the mass media of the world, because I said to my

 7     soldiers and officers that if any shell falls, people know about it

 8     immediately in Washington and they say that we only targeted civilians,

 9     and that the newspapers are writing about that and so on and so forth.

10     There is this Satanisation of the entire Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, thereby

11     the Army of Republika Srpska.  Let me also say that that is why we

12     asked --

13        Q.   General.

14        A.   Yes?  Yes?

15        Q.   How about if we go back then to what President Karadzic said.

16     You said that he told you and your staff this sometime in 1993.  When in

17     1993?

18        A.   Well, I don't remember exactly.  I said that I do not remember,

19     but there was this meeting that I remember that was held at the corps

20     command.  It had to do with something.  Now, whether it was the president

21     going to the airport or something like that -- you're asking me now about

22     something that happened so many years ago.  I really do not recall the

23     date.  But that is true that he did have talks with the command, the

24     corps command.  Not these meetings that are part of protocol and that we

25     discussed at higher levels.  We've already had documents about that.  But

Page 37886

 1     as for this meeting that I'm talking about, there's not a single

 2     document, at least not so far.  It would be a good thing if you had a

 3     document and if we could see it.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Mr. Piletta-Zanin, were you about to

 5     raise this translation issue about Satanisation?  We'll correct it.

 6     Please proceed.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 8        Q.   Now, in your two years of service in the corps command, was that

 9     the only time that Dr. Karadzic raised this issue with you?

10        A.   Well, I've said -- I mean, I've already answered that question.

11     There were other meetings, too, with me and with the other commanders at

12     the level of government, at the level of the Supreme Command.  Different

13     issues were raised, including the question of what could be done in that

14     domain to decrease this disproportionate use.

15        Q.   How often did Dr. Karadzic tell you that your forces were using

16     artillery in a disproportionate fashion against Bosnian-held Sarajevo?

17        A.   Well, at every one of these top-level meetings, and I've already

18     given this example of the corps command.  It's not that he'd call me up

19     every day and talk about that.

20        Q.   How often did every one of these top-level meetings happen?

21             THE ACCUSED:  I think it is already answered.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   Was it once every six months, was it once a year, or something

24     more frequently?  Can you estimate?

25        A.   Well, that topic was present all the time.  Let's be clear on

Page 37887

 1     that.  There was a war going on all the time, and there's always this

 2     evaluation, whether it's proportionate or disproportionate.  There's

 3     fighting every day.  Now, at which level what was discussed and how many

 4     times I discussed this with my officers, with my commands, how many times

 5     this was discussed at the level of the Main Staff or the level of the

 6     Supreme Command.  It is certain that as the level is higher, the dynamics

 7     of raising such issues was greater, of course, because there are other

 8     problems in addition to that.  There's not only Sarajevo.

 9        Q.   So is -- can we understand you to be saying that Dr. Karadzic

10     frequently raised this issue with you?

11        A.   Well, it was raised because it was a burden on all of us, myself

12     and President Karadzic.  Let's be clear on that.  There's no secret about

13     that.  And we were looking for a solution, how to resolve that, what to

14     do.  If you remember, when I said what the 1st Corps of the BH Army was

15     given the opportunity to do and then also there were civilians there,

16     400.000 people.  These are not small problem as far as the area of

17     Sarajevo is concerned, if that's what you're talking about.  So it wasn't

18     only the problem of whether there was excessive use of artillery.  There

19     was a series of other problems that we discussed for five days, ten days,

20     whatever.  I can no longer recall.

21        Q.   And as a result of these discussions, what directives did

22     Dr. Karadzic -- what did Dr. Karadzic tell you to do?

23        A.   In relation to what?

24        Q.   In relation to the information he gave you that SRK forces were

25     using their artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo in a disproportionate

Page 37888

 1     way.  And Dr. Karadzic is quite right.  I mean the city.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  Could this please be stated

 3     very clearly to the General.  Is it the city or is it military

 4     facilities, firing positions?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  What -- I will read the question again for

 6     you.  This is the question:

 7             "In relation to the information he gave you that SRK forces were

 8     using their artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo in a disproportionate

 9     way."

10             And what was the question?

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   What did Dr. Karadzic to -- do in relation to this problem?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in relation to that problem,

15     what we were asking for was quite clear.  All of us, especially

16     President Karadzic, Dr. Karadzic, to reduce this to a minimum related to

17     military necessity and military objectives, that is a simple answer with

18     regard to all these questions.  I'm saying it wasn't every day that the

19     president would call me up.  I've already said there were other problems

20     that had to be resolved, not only that one.  Although this was a major

21     problem for Sarajevo and it's a great problem for the 1st Corps of the

22     BH Army and for me, too, for the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, that is.

23             Well, it's hard to say here when you're talking about only one

24     side and when -- I mean, when you're looking only at what one side did

25     and you're not looking at the other side.  For example, yesterday they

Page 37889

 1     did not allow people to go to Dobrovoljacka even now to pay homage to

 2     those people.  Even now 20 years later they won't let people get in

 3     there, and we know all the things that Republika Srpska allowed.  So

 4     giving a one-sided interpretation is a major problem, whether we ordered

 5     it, whether we did it sufficiently, whether we took measures and so on

 6     and so forth.  We did order.  We took measures that can be taken in

 7     wartime.  Whether we should have done more, whether we had sufficient

 8     information about all of that, we've already discussed that.  So I would

 9     kindly ask you to understand me along those lines.

10             MS. EDGERTON:

11        Q.   Thank you.  Did Dr. Karadzic tell you that the disproportionate

12     use by your forces of artillery into Bosnian-held Sarajevo had caused

13     civilian casualties?

14        A.   He didn't have to tell me that.  I -- I mean, everybody saw that,

15     that there was a war going on and that fire came from both sides.  During

16     the examination-in-chief I spoke about that.  I said that losses were

17     possible and that they did happen.  That's why I'm talking about

18     disproportionate use, not any kind of intentional targeting of civilians,

19     and that is the core of the problem.

20        Q.   Now, you said, General, you took measures.  What measures did you

21     take?  You took measures in response to the issue.  What measures did you

22     take?

23        A.   Well, I've already spoken about these measures yet again.  I

24     mean, I don't understand why you're asking about that again.  I already

25     spoke about it during the examination-in-chief.  I gave an answer to the

Page 37890

 1     Presiding Judge as well.  The Presiding Judge also put a similar

 2     question, measures that were taken by the units of the Sarajevo-Romanija

 3     Corps and by myself as commander.

 4             If you wish I have it written up here on five pages, all the

 5     things that we did.  If you like, I can hand this over to you so that you

 6     can see all the things that were done, all the measures that were taken.

 7     I wanted to give that to the Presiding Judge at the end, because I owe

 8     him part of an answer to one of his questions.  I said that we would deal

 9     with it later.  It was stated later, but not everything has ever been

10     said.  These are two years of problems, two years of things that were

11     being done, and after all, it is hard to put things in a systemic way in

12     order to be as clear as possible.  But basically, let me repeat what the

13     basic things I did were.  Madam Prosecutor, would you agree with that?

14        Q.   I'll ask the question a different way.  Did you stop the

15     disproportionate use, the disproportionate fire of your artillery into

16     Bosnian-held Sarajevo?  Did you stop it?

17        A.   Well, I could stop that only in a situation if I were to stop the

18     war but I, as corps commander, could not have done that.  I consider such

19     questions to be, well, unfair for a corps commander, whether I stopped

20     that.  I could not stop that.  I told you how these casualties happened.

21     This is collateral damage in a war -- or, rather, when there is firing in

22     the Sarajevo area.  And in this area where there is such a group of

23     people, where there are provocations and so on and so forth.  So -- I

24     mean, for you to say, "Did you stop it?"  I couldn't have.  I could only

25     have stopped it if I could stop the war as such.

Page 37891

 1             We suggested that the war be stopped in 1992 already.  I think

 2     that that was when our Assembly passed a resolution on stopping the war.

 3     Maybe I'm making a mistake, but I know that once the National Assembly of

 4     Republika Srpska passed a resolution on ending the war.  I thought that

 5     the war would be over then, and it wasn't over.  In 1994, I left and the

 6     war went on for another year.

 7        Q.   Now, you told us yesterday that you removed two individuals from

 8     duty -- or you recommended two individuals be removed from duty, Dunjic

 9     and Grkovic, for, on the one hand, lack of discipline, excessive use of

10     equipment, and so forth, but in fact, the removal of these two people had

11     absolutely nothing to do with shelling and sniping of civilians in

12     Bosnian-held Sarajevo, did it?

13        A.   Well, you always get involved in the same discussion, that only

14     civilians were shelled and that Sarajevo-Romanija Corps fought against

15     the civilians of Sarajevo and that is incorrect, Madam Prosecutor.  If

16     you just look at the losses that were there, if you look at what

17     Ewa Tabeau said, and you will see what kind of losses the BH Army had.

18     Where are these losses of the soldiers of the BH Army, 2.500 of them at

19     that time point in time.  We forgot to say that.  We point out that there

20     were civilian casualties.  I agree, that should be highlighted first and

21     foremost.  But I've already mentioned that in Sarajevo, out of the total

22     number of casualties in Sarajevo was 36 per cent.  And then at the level

23     of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 600.000 concentration in a small area

24     where there is a war going on each and every day, and at the level of

25     Bosnia there are mountains where there's not a single person, but the

Page 37892

 1     average was 40 per cent, and they even said that 56 per cent was the

 2     figure related to civilian losses.  I also presented some other figures.

 3     So I would kindly ask you not to put questions that way.  Practically to

 4     say that the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps was not entitled to a defence, that

 5     the Serbs in Sarajevo were not entitled to a defence.  I am not going to

 6     accept that no matter for how long I should be convicted.  Well, convict

 7     me for as long as you want.  Have me shot, executed, whatever.

 8        Q.   General, I was asking you only about Dunjic and Grkovic?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  But when you referred to his earlier evidence, let's

10     cite it correctly.  Did he say shelling of civilians or sniping of

11     civilians?  So why don't we show the exact reference?

12             MS. EDGERTON:  Sure.  Transcript pages 37811 to 37812.

13             JUDGE KWON:  What he's challenging is the shelling or sniping of

14     civilians.  So could you reformulate your question?

15             MS. EDGERTON:  I will, and I'll get those pages up and read the

16     General his evidence.

17        Q.   Just before I reformulate, General, what you said in respect to

18     Dunjic and Grkovic at 37810, actually, is that you proposed that the

19     brigade commander be removed from -- a brigade commander and a battalion

20     commander be removed from their positions.

21             "The first commander, the brigade commander, lacked discipline,

22     and he used equipment and assets that were excessive, and as for the

23     second commander, I don't know whether I was right."

24             And with respect to Grkovic, then at the next page, 37811, you

25     went on and said:

Page 37893

 1             "He had to defend and protect Nedzarici.  So any movement by such

 2     large forces that he expected would happen demanded that he engage as

 3     many people as possible to thwart those attacks, and that's why he always

 4     asked from the brigade commanders and his neighbours and he also sought

 5     approval from the corps command to perhaps engage artillery and heavy

 6     artillery assets, possibly in a more unproportionate way."

 7             All right.  That's what you said.  And, General, the reason why

 8     I'm asking this is Dunjic came here to testify, and gave evidence that

 9     his removal was actually as a result of a personal rift between the two

10     of you, and he gave that evidence at transcript page 30486, and he even

11     said that in November and December 1992, he had actually asked the

12     Main Staff if he could be removed from duty on that same page.  And in

13     your own trial at transcript pages 47 and 48, Witness DP-4 said Grkovic

14     was removed from his post in 1993 at the time when the Nedzarici

15     battalion was amalgamated with the unit in Kasindol and the unit in the

16     airport settlement to become one battalion, and another person was placed

17     in command.  And that's why I ask, their removal actually had nothing to

18     do with shelling or sniping attacks on Bosnian civilians or civilians in

19     Bosnian-held Sarajevo, did it?

20             JUDGE KWON:  But General was correct that he didn't say that they

21     were removed because of shelling or sniping of civilians.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Quite so.

23             JUDGE KWON:  But you're saying that attacks on Bosnian -- on

24     civilians, but you reformulated.  Attacks on civilians in Bosnian-held

25     Sarajevo.  Why don't you use his word, "disproportionate" or "excessive"

Page 37894

 1     use of artillery?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  I will do that.

 3        Q.   General, did the removal --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 5             Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 6             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Thank you

 7     for giving me the floor or thank you for having mentioned something

 8     because I was about to get on my feet.  I would like to add that if

 9     General Galic remembers what happened in his trial, however, he knows not

10     much about what happened in this case.  I know how difficult it is to be

11     clear, so if we are referring to testimony that took place in this case,

12     it is important to read the testimony and not just say that on page

13     10800 -- 304.  This is meaningless to the General and one has to provide

14     the content of the previous testimony so that he can reply adequately.

15     Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think Ms. Edgerton faithfully and correctly cited

17     the reference, and the reference page number is for the benefit of the

18     Defence, not for the benefit of the witness, although it may be confusing

19     to the witness.  I think we can safely go on.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   Yes.  And I'm sorry if I've confused you, General, but perhaps we

22     can get back to this and you could tell us whether --

23        A.   I'm not easily confused, Madam Prosecutor.  People have tried to

24     confuse me for 50 years already.

25        Q.   Perhaps you could tell us whether Dunjic or Grkovic were removed

Page 37895

 1     for use of SRK artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo in a

 2     disproportionate fashion.

 3        A.   The last assertion is correct about the two of them, and that's

 4     the words that I used, disproportionate use of firing assets, including

 5     artillery.  I am an artilleryman.  That's -- I meant artillery.  And I

 6     said about Dunjic that he did lack discipline.  And it's only normal when

 7     a war goes on.  He was engaged.  He had his own views as to how to deal

 8     with certain problems.  I did not consider whether he was right or wrong

 9     in his theoretical considerations, but I had a lot of objections to the

10     practical side of his use of assets.  That's why I thought that he

11     would -- should be removed and not to have to deal with the problems that

12     existed in his area of responsibility, and also because he used artillery

13     and firing assets in a disproportionate way.

14             When it comes to Grkovic, I don't know what Dunjic said here and

15     I don't really care, to be honest.  Let's be clear on that.  I don't care

16     what Dunjic said here.  I know why a proposal was tabled for his removal.

17     What he said is his problem.  Everybody has the right to think for

18     himself and to say whatever they want to say.  That's the way he saw the

19     problem, but I was a commander at the time.  I had the right to make

20     decision, and I proposed that he should be removed.  I'm not hiding that.

21     This is nothing new.

22             When it comes to Grkovic and about his removal, I can tell you

23     sincerely that it was not my doing.  It was the organs of the command of

24     the brigade and the authorities in the area that demanded his removal

25     because he had been in a long -- in a bad situation for a long time.

Page 37896

 1     He -- he was stretched psychologically.  I told you already that I went

 2     to Nedzarici on several occasions.  Every time I went during the night

 3     and I would often lose my cap or some other parts of my equipment.  So to

 4     live and to wage a war in Nedzarici was a sheer act of heroism.  I

 5     believe that I mentioned it yesterday when I spoke about his removal that

 6     he did not have reserve positions.  He didn't have anywhere to withdraw.

 7     He had to defend that Serbian area and the population in that area.  It

 8     was a must for him.

 9             I don't know whether after that there was a reshuffling, a

10     reorganisation, what activities ensued after that.  This is neither here

11     nor there.

12        Q.   General, now, both of those men were removed in early 1993.  Were

13     those the only two cases where you removed people from service for

14     disproportionate use of your artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo?

15        A.   You know, when decisions were made on personnel, you have to bear

16     in mind a lot of things.  I said that a lot was done based on my indicia

17     about the disproportionate use of firing assets with regard to the

18     military objectives that we wanted to achieve.  Yes, there were other

19     activities in terms of order and discipline which should have resulted in

20     a more rational use of other firing assets.  In the area of --

21        Q.   Before you go on to that, can you just answer my question?  Those

22     were the only two people you ever removed from service for

23     disproportionate use of your artillery against Bosnian-held Sarajevo;

24     correct?

25        A.   Those were the two commanders which were removed from their

Page 37897

 1     positions because of the disproportionate use of firing assets, and the

 2     reasons why I consider them to be disproportionate, I believe that I have

 3     belaboured the matter quite sufficiently.  If you don't agree, I will go

 4     over the same ground again.

 5        Q.   Did you consider something -- actually, I'll go to something else

 6     that you said yesterday.  Yesterday --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  If you're moving away from this topic.

 8             General, we've been talking about the disproportionate use of

 9     artillery for some time, and you stated that Mr. Karadzic at one point in

10     time about the -- about it, i.e., disproportionate use of artillery, and

11     that it should be decreased.  How did you understand the word

12     "disproportionate," "disproportionate use of artillery" to mean?  Could

13     you give us some examples?

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, an obvious example,

15     Mr. President.  It's very difficult to give you examples, but I shall do

16     it.  For example, what I observed and what prompted me to conclude and

17     arrive at some indicia.  If the enemy side, i.e., the 1st Corps of the

18     BiH Army fired one shell, was it necessary to fire three, five, or six

19     shells from our side?  This is the disproportionateness in terms of

20     achieving a military objective.  If a commander was of the opinion that

21     he had to destroy that firing position, there was no arguing with that

22     because it was up to the commander who was in charge of certain assets or

23     units.  I couldn't tell him, "You should not have destroyed that.  You

24     should have neutralised it."  It was a very difficult thing because I

25     never crossed over to the other side to see what had happened there in

Page 37898

 1     order to make the right decision.  We are talking about the

 2     disproportionate fashion.  If they fired two or three shells on our

 3     positions and we responded with ten in turn, for me it is some sort of

 4     indicia that that was disproportionate, but I cannot prove as the corps

 5     commander that the brigade commander made an illegitimate or illegal - I

 6     don't know what word to use - inappropriate decision in any case.

 7     Whether that attack was legitimate or not, I can't be the judge of that,

 8     i.e., whether the fire opened was proportionate to the objective that

 9     somebody wanted to achieve.  So that will be that.

10             I believe that that was biggest problem, how to suppress all

11     that.  On the examination in chief I said that I had taken measures to

12     control the spending of the artillery ammunition and that the artillery

13     fire use should be approved at a higher level, which means that if fire

14     was opened by a battalion, it would be the brigade commander who would

15     decide on its use, but it was not always possible.  For example, when an

16     enemy had to be stopped and if that wasn't done immediately, the enemy

17     could break through and the whole area would -- fell.  To what extent

18     could we ask for such an order to be carried out?

19             These were all war dilemmas but as for the answer to your

20     question, I would like to say that this was a problem, whether one should

21     respond with a certain number of shells in response to a certain number

22     of shells that were -- that had been fired at us.  In very simple terms,

23     that was up to every commander to decide.

24             THE ACCUSED:  May I just -- about transcript.  In line 11, 12,

25     General said, "We did not have any depth," and it didn't -- hadn't been

Page 37899

 1     recorded.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  You mean on the previous page, page 17?

 3             THE ACCUSED:  No, no, no.  It is this 18.  Talking about "the

 4     enemy could break through."  Prior to that he said, "We didn't have any

 5     depth."

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Do you confirm having said that,

 7     Mr. Galic?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's a well-known thing.  I've

 9     already said that several times.  If you look at the map, the depth of

10     our positions was perhaps 2 or 3 kilometres.  That was all.  The rest was

11     under the control of the 1st Corps of the BiH Army, and I've said that on

12     several occasions, but that was not in the entire area but in some parts

13     of the zone of defence of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   Now, we've been having this discussion with respect to artillery

17     and artillery ammunition, but the same applies to the use of mortars and

18     mortar ammunition by your forces, doesn't it?

19        A.   Well, you think that all of that is shelling, both things.  So

20     when we talk about this part, then we can also include mortar fire under

21     that same category.  In this indictment and in Annex 2 of my indictment -

22     I don't know about this indictment - certain incriminated incidents and

23     activities are mentioned, i.e., shelling, but those were mostly mortar

24     shelling incidents.  All the five incidents.  Whatever I said about

25     artillery also applies to mortars when it comes to the disproportionate

Page 37900

 1     use of those assets.

 2        Q.   General, as we look through some of the documents you dealt with

 3     in your examination-in-chief, I noticed one of them used the words

 4     "active defence," and that's one of your reports, and it struck me that

 5     we've seen that word in other documents from your forces.  Are you in a

 6     position to explain what "active defence" means?

 7        A.   Madam Prosecutor, I'll do that gladly.  I'll tell you what this

 8     is about.

 9             Active defence implies that a certain area is defended, and some

10     of the units are deployed in an area, whereas the other elements or the

11     other units are trying to repair the positions in that area as it were.

12     Active defence also implies situations where an enemy's trying to break

13     through on an axing [as interpreted] and suppresses forces on that axis.

14     The rest of the forces or neighbours will attack those enemy forces and

15     help return lost positions.  Active defence also depends on the focal

16     points of activities.  For example, some parts of the forces are engaged

17     in defence, most of the forces are engaged in the defence, and rest of

18     the forces are engaged in attack.  In that case we're talking about

19     active defence.

20        Q.   And we see in D3452, that's the document that provoked my

21     question, we see this document refer -- uses the words -- the word

22     "persistent defence" as well.  Does that mean the same thing?

23        A.   Persistent?  Is it persistent or continuous?  There is no

24     "continuous defence" or "permanent defence" as a term used by the

25     military.  There is no permanent or continuous defence.

Page 37901

 1        Q.   General -- General --

 2        A.   That was probably used in a different era or in a different

 3     century.

 4        Q.   To avoid any lack of clarity, perhaps we could have a look at the

 5     document so you could see what word was used in your language.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  It's D3452, paragraph 8.

 7        Q.   In English it reads -- it uses the phrase "persistent defence,"

 8     and then in this paragraph I also see a phrase "preventive performance of

 9     offensive actions."  What do they mean, General?

10        A.   Well, this is an entire military theory but I'll try and explain

11     in a nutshell.  Persistent defence means that positions that are being

12     defended must not be abandoned.  They are defended persistently.  An

13     order may even be issued to defend those positions at the cost of a loss

14     of life, a lot of life, and that persistence depends on the objective

15     that was given to the unit in the area.  It may be an operative objective

16     or a strategic objective.

17             It says here "preventive offensive against the enemy."  What is

18     "preventive" or "pre-emptive."  If you think that the enemy will engage

19     you in offensive activities, and we received information from those who

20     crossed over, electronic surveillance, reconnoitering and other forms of

21     security work.  For example, we realised that the enemy will engage in

22     attack.  This is the most sensitive part of military activity.  And

23     before they launch the attack, they need to be attacked because they are

24     focused on a different objective that they want to achieve, and you have

25     an advantage because you can achieve more than in any other situation

Page 37902

 1     because you have an element of surprise on your side.  This is

 2     pre-emptive action.  The enemy doesn't -- actually, that preventive

 3     action does not cover a great depth, but its objective is to prevent the

 4     enemy activity in that area.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, just on this subject of disproportionality that

 6     we were talking about, I want to go to a transcript of an intercepted

 7     conversation between you and General Milovanovic.  And it's P4782, on

 8     20 May 1993, and it is an intercepted conversation that was reported by

 9     the Croatian Defence Ministry.  Actually, it's a summary.  It's a summary

10     of an intercepted conversation.

11             Now, in this conversation, you inform General Milovanovic about

12     clashes your forces appear to be having with the Bosnian Army of -- at

13     Grbavica, and you seem to say a large number of shells fell around the

14     bridge area on 19 May.  Now, General Milovanovic advised you to reply to

15     each attack with a force five times greater, which he said will be

16     justified as active defence.

17             So does --

18             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure whether the General is reading the

19     document.

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, I don't know if he can actually see it.  It's

21     rather faint.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Mr. President.

24     I really was not able to see anything, but now it is all right.  So thank

25     you.

Page 37903

 1             MS. EDGERTON:

 2        Q.   The concept of active defence as you've explained it, General, is

 3     something that General Milovanovic is telling you allows for a

 4     disproportionate response.  So disproportionality is actually ordered by

 5     your military superior in this record of a conversation.

 6        A.   Madam Prosecutor, this is the first time I see such a document,

 7     and I'm thinking about it now.  What can I say when you see something for

 8     the first time 20 years later and you learn and wonder whether its true

 9     or not, to what extent is it true.  And another thing, I asked to be

10     given all the intercepts in my trial, but the Prosecution told me that it

11     had no intercepts at all, not a single one that would contain something

12     accusatory against me.  It was not introduced during my trial.  So this

13     is something new for me.  There were some other intercepts but not

14     involving me.

15             Whether Milovanovic told me this and why, I cannot answer that

16     now, but I cannot even remember that he told me something like this.

17     That's why the selection from which this part of the conversation comes,

18     that I was issued such orders, I don't know.  I don't remember.  I don't

19     remember.  I cannot comment on this, because I don't think that -- this

20     wasn't really Milovanovic's style, even though I could say many things

21     now after everything that has happened, but I would not like to blame

22     anyone, his role or his honour.  I cannot remember that something like

23     this was told.  If I said it was in the sector of the bridge, it means

24     that it was the Bratstvo i Jedinstvo bridge somewhere in the sector of

25     Miljacka.  That was where many shells fell, and he said that we should

Page 37904

 1     step up our activities, intensify them.

 2             I don't know why he said that.  Perhaps he had some information

 3     based on which he told me this.  What if he expected some sort of

 4     counter-attack of the enemy forces and therefore meant that we should

 5     intensify our activities.  There are many conditions on the basis of

 6     which this could be interpreted.  It would be the best if you invited

 7     General Milovanovic, he's your expert witness as he informed my Defence,

 8     and then you can ask him questions about this.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

10             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I know

11     that the Chamber is paying much attention to fairness, but in this

12     document there is no mention about the disproportionate nature.  The

13     question is based on the fact that General would have asked a

14     disproportionate response, but we don't know the situation, and the

15     General clearly said that it depends on the situation.  We -- he can try

16     to achieve an objective, but when it is considered from the answer that

17     this is disproportionate, this is not fair.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure this is the subject you should

19     intervene at the moment.  Let me consult my colleagues.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Rest assured the Chamber will conduct the trial as

22     fairly as possible, and if there's some unfairness in the formulation of

23     question, no doubt the Defence will raise it.  So on that basis we can

24     continue, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

25             Let's continue, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 37905

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Did you, General --

 3        A.   I have not understood.  I apologise, Mr. President.  I have not

 4     understood the -- the interpretation.  What sort of "natruha" or what it

 5     was?  I have not understood the interpretation.  So can you please

 6     interpret this once again.  Mr. President, what -- what Mr. President,

 7     the Presiding Judge said.  You were interpreting it and I haven't

 8     understood interpretation.  The word something like "natruha" or

 9     something.  Did I hear this properly?  So I'm addressing the

10     interpreters.  This is a matter of interpretation.

11             JUDGE KWON:  I can't follow.  Probably Mr. Karadzic can help the

12     witness, or the interpreters.  But what I said is, in a nutshell, that it

13     is notwithstanding Mr. Piletta-Zanin's concern, we can continue with the

14     cross-examination.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, there was one word

16     that was used.  It's possible that it's a Croatian term.  I haven't heard

17     it before in the Serbo-Croatian language.  The interpreter used it, and

18     when the interpreter was interpreting what you said in your response to

19     Mr. Piletta-Zanin.  That was why I asked it to be re-interpreted so that

20     I could understand what you said, because I really haven't understood it.

21     I'm following closely with much care what you said and especially your

22     words.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue?

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25        Q.   Active defence, as you've explained it, is something I want to

Page 37906

 1     stay with for a little while.  Active defence was -- was core to the

 2     military directives your forces received from the Main Staff, wasn't it?

 3     It was fundamental.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just for clarity, could you repeat your question?

 5     I'm not sure if it was translated correctly.  Active defence was --

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   Active defence was fundamental to the directives your corps

 8     received from the VRS Main Staff, wasn't it?

 9        A.   Well, it is not so.  Excuse me, but you asked me whether this is

10     so, so I answered that it's not.  But let me continue just so that we

11     understand each other and that we don't improvise.  The main thing for

12     Sarajevo, only Sarajevo -- I'm talking about Sarajevo because the corps,

13     as I said, had other fronts as well, which it had to have, but for

14     Sarajevo it was always said "persistent defence."  Persistent defence,

15     not -- and in other parts it was active, active operations.  There were

16     periods when we would say "active defence" in some other areas but not so

17     frequently.  The expression "persistent defence" was used more often,

18     prevent the enemy to break through and so on.  If we agree about this.

19     If not, I know what expressions were used and the directives which we

20     received were termed like that in relation to Sarajevo.  Use persistent

21     defence to prevent and so on and so forth, rather than active defence.

22        Q.   So as -- so operations undertaken in persistent defence would not

23     normally be the subject of daily reports because these were effectively

24     operations undertaken under standing orders; correct?

25        A.   You see, the operation is conducted by the entire corps or it can

Page 37907

 1     conduct it, and the other things are combat and battles which are

 2     conducted by smaller units, so as to make the distinction between

 3     operation, battle, combat, and so on.  When we talk about operations,

 4     then the entire corps is supposed to be involved in it or the majority of

 5     the corps forces.  In -- as for whether the defence operation, we can

 6     call it a defence operation in Sarajevo, in the Sarajevo zone, well, the

 7     focus of the forces was to be engaged in such a way that what you stated

 8     could be taken as true and correct.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I'm going to leave that and go back to one small

10     thing that you talked about yesterday, and it's another explanation I

11     want to ask you for, and it relates to the subject of -- it may relate to

12     the subject of disproportionate.  But yesterday you also indicated that

13     sometimes fire was excessive and that's at transcript pages 37208 and

14     37209 [sic].  So you were talking about fire on Sarajevo, Bosnian-held

15     Sarajevo, I take it.

16        A.   The term "fire" implies -- we have -- when we talk about the

17     problems of fire, there is a firing system.  Infantry fire, artillery

18     fire, too, the system of infantry fire, the system of artillery fire, the

19     system of blocking.  We have to take into account these systems.  When we

20     say "firing activities," that implies firing from all sorts of weapons.

21     This is why we should make a distinction between what we are discussing.

22     Or if we say "fire" or "firing activity," it means fire from all sorts of

23     weapons.  In what degree, what equipment, what weapons, that depends on

24     what is used --

25        Q.   Well --

Page 37908

 1        A.   -- at a single location along a single axis at a single point in

 2     time.

 3        Q.   When you said yesterday that sometimes --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The transcript page you refer to is

 5     part of yesterday's transcript?  Probably the page number is correct or

 6     I -- it must have referred to the earlier dates.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  Sorry, 37208 is the earlier date, and 37809 - and

 8     I'm sorry if I've misspoken the numbers - is yesterday's transcript.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  My apologies.

11        Q.   So when you talked about fire sometimes being excessive, were you

12     referring to infantry fire or artillery fire or mortar fire?  What were

13     you referring to?

14        A.   I don't know, Madam Prosecutor.  In the transcript I'm not sure

15     in the context of what I said that.  I am following, but if we talk about

16     firing activity, I explained prior to this that that implies fire from

17     all sort of weapons.  If I talked about infantry fire, then that only

18     relates to fire from infantry weapons.  If we talked about mortar fire,

19     then I probably meant that.  But if I said only firing activity, then

20     it's universal.  It applies to all weapons.  Whether I have answered

21     you -- I think that that's what it is, if it fits into the context of my

22     answer from yesterday, or if you have more questions, let us be clearer

23     if possible, please.

24        Q.   You were asked at 37809 whether there was any incident in which

25     you answered admitting the SRK's responsibilities?

Page 37909

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It was from me, Mr. Galic.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   It was from His Honour Judge Kwon.  And you said, "I couldn't

 4     admit anything because I didn't have enough information so as to be able

 5     to admit to such an incident," and then you repeated that you didn't have

 6     enough information.  And then later on in your answer to His Honour

 7     Judge Kwon you said:

 8             "Let me tell you, there were situations when I myself says that

 9     those reports that were received on excessive use of fire and firing

10     equipment, that those reports were rather correct, and sometimes fire was

11     excessive."

12             So when you said "sometimes fire was excessive" in that answer,

13     you were referring to mortar and artillery fire, I take it?

14        A.   Well, I meant any fire, but excessive means -- in that context it

15     should be viewed as disproportionate, and that is my term, and that is

16     the exact term based on what it is when we talk about forms of attack and

17     so on.  So there is a term.  What is implied by disproportionate fire.

18     Probably when I was explaining that, I implied under that term a

19     disproportionate use of firing assets.  Ones or the others, I don't

20     remember exactly.

21        Q.   Well, let's just stay with that word that you used, that you

22     actually did use a little bit.  If fire -- if fire -- sometimes fire was

23     excessive, was it excessive because of its effect on the target area?

24        A.   Well, we can try to guess now what, when, and where, but without

25     a specific example I cannot give you a proper answer.  I wouldn't like to

Page 37910

 1     speculate.  I explained what I implied under excessive fire, and what is

 2     otherwise implied in the military lingo when we say "excessive fire."

 3     Excessive is something that is unnecessary, to put it simply.  Too much

 4     fire is surplus fire, to try to rephrase it.  And now how this is

 5     interpreted in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, it would be

 6     disproportionate.

 7        Q.   Was it excessive because it exposed civilians in Bosnian-held

 8     Sarajevo undue risk?

 9        A.   To what risk was the population exposed?  Was it unnecessary or

10     necessary?  Was it collateral damage?  Was it deliberate targeting or was

11     it not deliberate?  We could have discussed each specific incident and

12     then draw such conclusions.  To speak generally about this, it's

13     imprecise in the first place, and it's not good.  You keep insisting, and

14     that was the indictment as well, that was the political view and the view

15     in these trials in general, that we waged war against the civilians in

16     Sarajevo.  Whatever we did, we were carrying out a campaign of sniping

17     and shelling against civilians, and we had no right to do that.  This is

18     why you are leading your questioning and phrasing your questions.  That

19     is why I find it difficult to answer such questions, madam.

20        Q.   Well, I was asking the questions because you used the word, and

21     you used the word on more than one occasion, but --

22        A.   No, madam.  I do not deny that I used it.  I did use it.  No

23     doubt about that.  But in what period, in what context, when, to what

24     question?  We can discuss that, whether the term was used properly or

25     improperly, why it was used, under what conditions, in what situation.

Page 37911

 1     I'm not trying to evade saying that.  Let's us be clear about everything.

 2     I have come here to say the truth so that people would learn something

 3     more about the war in Sarajevo.  I've told you that.  At least what I

 4     know.  What I don't know and if I'm not certain about something, I will

 5     tell you immediately.  I don't know, I'm uncertain, or I have forgotten

 6     and so on.  Thank you.

 7        Q.   Since you, General, find it so difficult to answer the question,

 8     rather than waste time I'll move on to deal with one final area before we

 9     break.  I want to go back to a map that you looked at in your evidence in

10     chief.  That's D --

11        A.   I wouldn't agree that it's difficult for me.  I wouldn't say it's

12     not difficult.  I did answer your question, but the question is whether

13     you have understood me, whether you want to understand me or you don't

14     want to understand me, nothing else.  I did give you an answer to the

15     question, not only now but during the last five, six, or eight days

16     during my testimony.  This is not something new.

17        Q.   As I said, I want to go back to D3383 from your evidence in

18     chief, but what we've actually done is we've made a cutout of that map,

19     which is 65 ter 24954, so that we can see it a little better.  And I want

20     you to help us with some of the symbols on that map.

21             So that's the cutout, General, and we're going to be coming back

22     to that.  I just wanted you to see it quickly to refresh your memory.

23             Now, I wanted to understand what these blue symbols denoted so I

24     found a document, which is 65 ter 24949, and it's an excerpt from a JNA

25     manual explaining various military symbols used on maps.  And I looked at

Page 37912

 1     this manual to see if we could identify some of the symbols on this map.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  So if we could see 24949, please.

 3             If we could go over to page 32, and it's not available in a

 4     translated form yet.  And if we could turn it.

 5        Q.   The second item on page 32, that denotes a machine-gun, doesn't

 6     it?  "Mitraljez."  The second symbol on page 32 is for a machine-gun,

 7     isn't it, General?

 8        A.   Yes, yes.  That's what it says here, that it's a machine-gun.

 9        Q.   And the one --

10        A.   And these are --

11        Q.   The one immediately below that is an anti-air -- the symbol for

12     an anti-aircraft machine-gun, isn't it?  Yes or no?

13        A.   Yes.  When it has these symbols down there, yes, it's

14     anti-aircraft machine-gun, yes, and it says 30/2.  It means that the

15     calibre is 30.

16        Q.   Now --

17        A.   That would be that, yes.

18        Q.   -- the very bottom symbol is a symbol for an 82- or 60-millimetre

19     mortar; correct?

20        A.   Yes, yes.  120, it has one more there, up there, yes.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we go over to page 38, please, of this

22     document.

23        Q.   Now, there's some diamond shapes on this page.  Those denote

24     different kinds of tanks, don't they?

25        A.   Yes, yes.  There are these signs for a light tank, middle-sized

Page 37913

 1     tank, heavy tank --

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3        A.   -- water tank and a tank for clearing --

 4        Q.   Let's go over to page 42.  That -- the symbols on page 42 denote

 5     different kinds of artillery, and the second item is a top field gun, the

 6     third item is an anti-tank gun, and the fourth item is a howitzer;

 7     correct?

 8        A.   Yes, yes, yes.

 9        Q.   Now, if we go over finally to page 45, we see the second item is

10     a symbol, as you mentioned earlier, for a 120-millimetre mortar; correct?

11        A.   Yes, yes.

12        Q.   All right.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Now if we could go back to the map that we just

14     saw, 65 ter number 24954.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] While we are waiting, I will ask

16     you, if you will ask me questions from the map, if we can zoom into one

17     section so that I can see it because I don't see anything.  When we see

18     the whole map I don't see a single symbol.  I just see that there's a

19     little bit of red and a little bit of blue, but I don't see anything

20     else.  So if you could phrase the question in such a way that we zoom in

21     to one section of the map.  Thank you very much.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   No problem.  Let's see if you can deal with my question.  So

24     using those symbols as a guide, General, I applied them to the map, and

25     by my rough count, which is -- and I stipulate rough and conservative, I

Page 37914

 1     see that deployed around Sarajevo on this map you had approximately

 2     40 tanks, 35 anti-aircraft machine-guns, 20 anti-aircraft artillery guns,

 3     30 field artillery guns and howitzers, at least 50 mortars, some

 4     multiple-barrelled rocket launchers, I counted the symbols for 10, and

 5     20 APCs.

 6             So -- now, General, that's your weapons surrounding Sarajevo.  So

 7     you said in your testimony --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  The General wanted to see the zoomed-in map.  Why

 9     don't we do that for him.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Absolutely.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't have a particular question about a

13     particular section, but we could do one section at a time so he could see

14     the zoomed-in map.  Or do half of it.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We can scroll --

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Ah, perfect.  Thank you very much.

17        Q.   So, General, in your testimony, when you looked at this map in

18     your testimony in chief, you said it was pretty accurate as regards the

19     deployment of your forces facing theirs.  So these figures I gave you, as

20     I said accepting that they're only rough, but the figures and the weapons

21     deployment as shown on this map of your forces would also be accurate;

22     correct?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  And so the General can see what I'm talking about,

24     maybe we can zoom in or scroll around on the blue areas or the blue

25     symbols on the map, so the areas outlining Sarajevo.

Page 37915

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I don't see how the

 2     General can really answer that question because it's compound and

 3     includes two aspects:  Does the map accurately represent the position of

 4     their forces; and second, is her calculations correct?  I don't think

 5     that second portion can be answered by the General without studying the

 6     map.  She's gone ahead and added things up and it seems to me that that's

 7     unfair to the General to ask him to accept that part of her question.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Did he not tell us that the map accurately

 9     represents the position of SRK positions during the direct examination?

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  So I think that's about as far as he can

11     take it.

12             JUDGE KWON:  So if --

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no, no, no.  I have an

14     objection to that.  I never spoke about positions of artillery pieces on

15     this map, please.  I talked about the deployment of forces and resources,

16     but I did not speak about the deployment of the artillery pieces of the

17     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  Of course I can provide answers to these

18     questions.  It's no problem for me not to do so, but if we recall

19     correctly, this was a map that was drawn by the BH Army.  I don't know

20     who it was that drew this map, and these are their estimates and

21     assumptions, and it's really the deployment of their forces.  I discussed

22     with President Karadzic then the deployment of their forces and I just

23     mentioned in passing which forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps were

24     there, without going into which artillery pieces were in which positions

25     and when and so on and so forth.

Page 37916

 1             The Prosecutor is putting a general question to me, and I believe

 2     that that is allowed, in terms of what the situation was in the

 3     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, how many tanks, APCs, howitzers, mortars we had

 4     and so forth.  So these are different figures and different estimates and

 5     in different situations we had a different number.  So that is why this

 6     is relative information, the information that you have.  If you say that

 7     you counted the pieces here on this map, and that was my understanding,

 8     judging by what was marked on this map, I mean, I cannot say how many

 9     were marked on this map.  I didn't count it, but if necessary, I can

10     count it, but I don't think that would be necessary.  Thank you.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Did you say this map was drawn by the Bosnian Army?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, maybe.  It may have been

13     drawn by the Army of Republika Srpska, the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, but

14     this kind of map --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Why don't we upload Exhibit D3383.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I think it might be too big to be uploaded on

17     e-court, Your Honour, which is why I made the cutout, but --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let's do it first.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Sure.

20             JUDGE KWON:  In my case it didn't take too much time.

21             Do you remember this map, General?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember this map, and I remember

23     interpreting what this was, the staff and the defence of Sarajevo, the

24     defence of Sarajevo, something like that, and we interpreted it in a

25     way -- I mean, it was my understanding that this was a map from the

Page 37917

 1     BH Army, from a BH Army source, not of the VRS.  I'm sorry if I

 2     misunderstood.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I don't think that

 5     someone in my corps had this kind of schematic.  It would not have been

 6     logical.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Back to you, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 9             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Two

10     points.  If there's the slightest doubt, in light of the map we saw last

11     week, I have the original map.  I've brought it back with me.  If you

12     feel it might be necessary, I can provide you with that, and I can rush

13     back to my hotel and provide you with this original map if you need it.

14     The General said that he remembered something and we have the opposite in

15     the transcript, so there is an element of contradiction here.  Please

16     check tout.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for your kind suggestion.  Let's see

18     whether it's necessary or not.

19             Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

20             MS. EDGERTON:

21        Q.   So leaving aside the figures, taking on board what Mr. Robinson

22     says, and leaving aside the figures, General, you said that this map, in

23     terms of the deployment of your forces, was pretty accurate.  Is this map

24     also accurate then in terms of the deployment of your forces' weapons?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  And maybe we need the zoomed-in one again so he

Page 37918

 1     could see that a little bit better, please.  That was 24954.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  I believe that

 3     there is a bit of confusion here.  Our forces are not marked anywhere

 4     here.  It is only the forces that are in the defence that are numbered.

 5     It's written in the Latin script.  It says that it's the units of

 6     1st Corps.  Our units, our forces are not marked at all.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Could you give the reference where the General

 8     testified that the map was accurate in terms of the deployment of the

 9     SRK.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Transcript page 31789.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Do you remember the date?

12             MS. EDGERTON: [Microphone not activated]

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Leaving that aside, could you answer the

14     question?  If you remember.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first day.  It was on the first

16     day, this discussion about the deployment, and we discussed it on the

17     first day.  I don't know exactly what I said on the first day with regard

18     to this, but I said something similar to what the Prosecutor said just

19     now, but it had to do with the deployment of the Muslim forces and the

20     other forces of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and that is basically

21     correct, and I can repeat that now too.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  And it's 37189 as I inverted the numbers.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this is what you said:

24             "This part of the map which depicts the deployment of our forces

25     facing theirs is pretty accurate, pretty accurate."  Although you "can't

Page 37919

 1     make it out that well, though, on this map."

 2             Shall we continue.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   And my only question before we break is with respect to the

 5     weapons.  With respect to your forces' weapons, then, General, is the

 6     deployment depicted on this map also pretty accurate?

 7        A.   Pretty much, to put it as briefly as possible.  Pretty accurate,

 8     but whether it's exactly that number and exactly in that location, that

 9     could be discussed.  But pretty accurate.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

11             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] This is what I wanted to say:

12     The General said that he could not read the maps that have been shown to

13     me.  He's been asked to provide a blanket statement in view of a series

14     of symbols which he can't really see, and had I been in his shoes, I

15     would have answered exactly the same way.  Thank you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, would you propose that

17     Mr. Piletta-Zanin would kindly bring the original map to provide the

18     witness with this map or you can do without it?

19             MS. EDGERTON:  In the spirit of fairness, we can have an enlarged

20     cutout of what appears on the screen in front of us now made over the

21     break for the witness.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Before we break, could I have 65 ter 24949, the

24     JNA manual with the military symbols admitted as a Prosecution exhibit,

25     please, marked for identification.

Page 37920

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson?

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection, Mr. President.  And probably limited

 3     to those pages which were used.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  That's fine.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll do so.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  And we'll have it translated.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Marked for identification.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI P6301, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break for half an hour and resume at

10     10 past 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.41 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   General, you looked at a lot of documents -- oh, I'm sorry,

16     General.

17        A.   I'm sorry.  I've just received the map now.  Sorry, I got a bit

18     carried away.

19        Q.   You looked at a lot of documents, General, during your testimony

20     in chief which Dr. Karadzic showed you as examples of restraint on your

21     part in the face of violations or attacks, and I want to go to just two

22     of those.  The first one is D3386, and it's dated 26 October 1992.  And

23     we can have a look at it.  And in respect of that document, at transcript

24     pages -- you discussed that document at transcript pages 32716 to 32719

25     [sic], and in that discussion, Dr. Karadzic asked you why you didn't open

Page 37921

 1     fire on Sarajevo, although the document is silent as to action your

 2     forces might have taken, and you said:

 3             "On the whole and in essence our forces for the most part,

 4     irrespective of the existence of an order to cease-fire, as we'll see

 5     later, mostly refrained from firing because whenever we responded and

 6     whenever we did anything, there was a general outcry."

 7             So even though the document is silent, your evidence is that you

 8     didn't open fire on Sarajevo that day; is that correct?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid that this is misleading.

10     It's not correct that it's not written there.  It is stated where this

11     firing took place, and there is no firing at the city, point 2.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you give the transcript page

13     reference again?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  The discussion was -- I've given the range for the

15     discussion.

16             JUDGE KWON:  But I think you said 32716.  I don't think it's

17     correct.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, I'm so sorry, Your Honour.  That would be

19     37216 to 37219.

20        Q.   So, General, to get back to my question, your evidence is your

21     forces didn't open fire on Sarajevo that day.  Is that your evidence?

22        A.   This is the 26th of October, 1992, so let us go back to the year

23     and the time when this situation was there, the one that is presented in

24     this report to the Main Staff.  On that day we noted here where fire was

25     opened and in which areas.  That is stated in paragraph 2.  The forces in

Page 37922

 1     the area of Osmice on the slopes of Mount Igman, attack from the Famos

 2     factory was repelled.  So that's the Famos factory, and so on and so

 3     forth.  So what we wrote here was where we had fired.

 4             These forces that had fired and what was noticed was practically

 5     that they fired at Ilidza, and we see what the losses were down there.

 6        Q.   So, General --

 7        A.   Major losses.  Yes, yes.  I'll get to the answer to your

 8     question.

 9        Q.   My question was --

10        A.   Yes, yes.

11        Q.   -- did you open fire on Sarajevo that day?

12        A.   I never opened fire on Sarajevo, Madam Prosecutor.  I opened fire

13     not on Sarajevo but on enemy forces.  Let us be clear on that and do not

14     put questions like that to me.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we please have a look at 65 ter number

16     24965.  It's an excerpt from the Commission of Experts report which says

17     at the bottom of page 18 what happened that day.

18             There should be -- if we could go to the bottom of -- e-court

19     page 18.  Thank you.

20        Q.   Now, it's in English, unfortunately, General, so I'll read to you

21     the last paragraph on the bottom of this page with a report on what

22     happened on 26 October 1992.  It says:

23             "Sarajevo was relatively quiet overnight.  However, Serbian

24     forces in the hills unleashed a loud artillery barrage on the Dobrinja

25     apartment complex" - if we could go over to the next page - "near the

Page 37923

 1     airport in the morning.  Heavy shelling rocked Sarajevo's western suburb

 2     of Stup around midday and mortar rounds fell on a district near the

 3     UN headquarters in the city, wounding 5.  The western suburb of Dobrinja

 4     was also a target for heavy fire during the morning.  At least 5 people

 5     were wounded by a single mortar round, 4 of them seriously."

 6             And then further it says:

 7             "UNPROFOR reported that a total of 43 heavy artillery rounds hit

 8     Bosnian-controlled areas around Sarajevo and 7 hit Serb-controlled areas

 9     in the 24-hour period ending at 5.00 p.m. on Monday.

10             "In the 24-hour period that ended at 10.00 am Monday, 4 people

11     were killed in Sarajevo and 47 others were wounded."

12             So your evidence just now was that you opened fire not on

13     Sarajevo but on enemy forces.  Are you saying that this report of events

14     represents your fire on enemy forces?

15        A.   This report is a report of United Nations -- excuse me.  Now, to

16     claim on the basis of that, whether fire had been opened at Sarajevo, to

17     speak about Sarajevo that way, in this wholesale manner, that's a popular

18     thing to do, but these are completely different concepts, opening fire at

19     a city and opening fire at enemy forces, and that's why I'm a bit upset

20     by that.  I cannot interpret here whether fire had been opened at the

21     forces of the 1st Corps of the Army of BH, but if we look at the areas

22     that they refer to and the deployment of forces of the 1st Corps of the

23     BH Army, we cannot say or assert that fire had not been opened at the

24     forces of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

25             On the other hand, this claim in our reports and my statement in

Page 37924

 1     relation to what the report to the Main Staff was, I mean, I stated the

 2     information that I had, or, rather, whoever wrote that report.  So which

 3     are the reports that are correct?  Which are the ones that are doctored?

 4     How was this information received?  I wouldn't want to go into all of

 5     that.  We did look at all of that during my trial, and we saw that these

 6     reports were inaccurate, too, in part, not all of them, because they were

 7     received in different ways.

 8        Q.   All right.  Let's move on, then, General --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I don't think this is a report of

10     United Nations.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Pardon me.  It is not.  It's an excerpt from the

12     Commission of Experts report.

13             JUDGE KWON:  What is that?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  The Commission of Experts was a --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have evidence -- did we hear evidence about

16     that commission and its activity?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  Nothing immediately comes to recollection,

18     Your Honour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  So to put the content of the witness, I think it's

20     fair to introduce what this document is about and it footnotes some press

21     clippings.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, actually that -- I think -- I

23     was going to make that same point.  What this actually is just a

24     compilation of press clippings of newspaper articles.  Whether it was

25     experts or whoever I don't think is that relevant but what actually this

Page 37925

 1     is is some kind of compilation of newspaper articles.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I'm sorry, I'm overlapping.  I couldn't see the

 3     cover page of this document so that's why I asked that question.  Please

 4     continue.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  And again, taking on board what Your Honours and

 6     Mr. Robinson -- taking on board what Your Honours and Mr. Robinson have

 7     said, I'll just move on.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             MS. EDGERTON:

10        Q.   If we could look at another document, General, D3410.  It's a

11     report that Dr. Karadzic showed you, dated 4 February 1993.  And I'll

12     just provide the transcript page cite in one second.

13             And you discuss that document with -- you discussed that document

14     with Dr. Karadzic during the first day of your evidence.  Dr. Karadzic --

15     Dr. Karadzic said to you, in regard to this document, that it reflects

16     the situation at 1800 hours that day.  It says that the attack commenced

17     at 1700 hours with 120-millimetre shells targeting Nedzarici from the

18     direction of Dobrinja and the Olympic village.  That such a combined

19     artillery and infantry attack was still going on, and that your focus was

20     on reconnaissance and observation of enemy activity.  And he asked you:

21             "What does this mean that you're not returning fire yet but you

22     are only observing and reconnoitering?"

23             And you said:

24             "If I go back to that time of 4 February 1993, I'm sure there

25     must have been specific reasons why we did not respond to this sort of

Page 37926

 1     fire and risk to our territory which was exposed.  I suppose that there

 2     was a specific reason why we did not want to return fire at once.  I

 3     suppose that in the meantime a protest was lodged with UNPROFOR that the

 4     BiH Army should desist."

 5             And that was at transcript pages 37335 to 37336.

 6             So, General, my question is:  Is your evidence that you -- your

 7     forces did not shell Bosnian-held Sarajevo that day?

 8        A.   Madam Prosecutor, I can claim that on the basis of what I read

 9     here, because to remember something else in relation to that day compared

10     to what I see from the reports and to the Main Staff, that would be

11     unfair on my part, because I can certainly not interpret it any other way

12     than what is written here.  After all, it was signed by my deputy,

13     Colonel Marcetic, and that means that that is the situation.  They say

14     that they did not respond to enemy fire, although we see down here --

15     actually, there was this question put by President Karadzic.  Wasn't that

16     reason enough?  A child had been wounded.  You know what my answer was in

17     that regard.  It is sad.  Every loss is sad, but particularly the loss of

18     children, but we have to know what the price would be if we were to

19     respond in terms of fire against the BH forces, especially bearing in

20     mind what the objective is with regard to this firing.

21        Q.   So your evidence is that you have no recollection as to whether

22     or not your forces shelled Bosnian-held Sarajevo that day; is that

23     correct?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.  Please, could

25     Madam Edgerton be asked to state precisely what she means by Bosniak

Page 37927

 1     parts of Sarajevo?  The witness already said that these questions were

 2     not correct or fair.  He should say which parts of Sarajevo and what the

 3     objectives are.  In my view these are trick questions, if you will.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  No, I don't agree with you in that regard, but I

 5     would ask Ms. Edgerton to reformulate her question.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:

 7        Q.   Do you have, then, General, any recollection as to whether or not

 8     your forces fired on encircled Bosnian-held Sarajevo that day, on the

 9     4th of February, 1993?

10        A.   We have already spoken with regard to that term "fired on."  I

11     don't want to go over that again.  I know -- I know what you're asking me

12     and I want to repeat my previous answer.  I cannot say anything different

13     than what is written in here.  Twenty years later I cannot remember the

14     day, and I'm not in a position to say anything differently than I see in

15     the report.  I really would like to see a genius of that kind who would

16     be able to do that.  I'm sorry for answering in such simple terms.

17     However, if that is what is in the report, if that was drafted and signed

18     by my deputy, Colonel Marcetic, I can only say that I agree with this

19     report, nothing else, because I don't have any other information.  I

20     didn't it then, I don't have it now.  Obviously you must have a document

21     or a report speaking to the contrary of what I can see in this report.

22     Okay.  Let's discuss that.  Let's discuss your document, because I cannot

23     say, as I sit here, that I remember things in a way different to what is

24     stated and described in the report that is on the screen before me.

25     Thank you.

Page 37928

 1        Q.   General, was that the case with all the daily combat reports you

 2     were shown in your evidence-in-chief, that you actually have no

 3     independent recollection of the events they describe and were drawing

 4     your answer from what you saw on the pages in front of you?

 5        A.   Are you provoking me here?  I believe you are.  I've already

 6     answered you.  If you understood my answer, if you are willing to

 7     understand my answer, perhaps your understanding of people is different.

 8     Maybe you are exaggerating the abilities of a human brain.  I'm saying

 9     that there are events which I remember.  There were such events.  But

10     asking me to remember exactly what happened on a certain day, whether it

11     was foggy, whether it was raining, there had to be an event to jog my

12     memory to that effect.  I can tell you that I went to the Nisic plateau

13     and that it was snowing but I don't remember the date.  And it's not even

14     remember.  Yes, I do remember things but I can't remember everything,

15     madam, and I'm sorry that I have to respond in this way because any other

16     answer would be improper on my part.

17             I told you that I was a sincere and honest man.  I want to arrive

18     at the truth together with you, and if you think that I'm lying here,

19     just tell me so.  You can tell me, "You are a liar," but this is not my

20     intention.  I'm telling you what I know.  What I don't know, I cannot

21     say.

22        Q.   All right.  Then, General, perhaps I can ask you a question about

23     something that, since you mentioned it in your testimony to me yesterday,

24     you might have some knowledge of.  Yesterday you said that Bascarsija was

25     a museum area and shouldn't be targeted, and that's at transcript

Page 37929

 1     pages 37836 to 37837.

 2             So, General, you're familiar with the Old Town of Sarajevo, I

 3     take it.

 4        A.   Madam, we discussed Cengic Vila and the incident at Cengic Vila,

 5     that's when I answered your question in that way.  Cengic Vila is called

 6     Cengic and that name is based on history, and I drew a parallel and I

 7     compared Cengic Vila to Bascarsija.  I will tell you what happened to

 8     me --

 9        Q.   No, General, can you just answer my question.  You're familiar

10     with the Old Town of Sarajevo, yes or no?

11        A.   Well, I want to answer you.  I don't know what you want from me.

12     I want to answer you, and you are not letting me answer you.  This is my

13     style of talking.  We should finally be on the same page after all.  It

14     is true that I said that Bascarsija was spared our attacks and now I'm

15     sure that you want me [as interpreted] to show a document that will prove

16     that Bascarsija was fired on.  I can only guess how to answer your

17     questions so that I do not refute my own words and you would then tell me

18     that I am lying, and I'm not lying.  I can only misunderstand your

19     questions.  Please bear that in mind.  I told you that Bascarsija was

20     spared [Realtime transcript read in error "compared"] because in a

21     certain way it is a symbol of Sarajevo for both Serbs and Muslims as well

22     as for Croats.  Let's be clear on that.  And for myself it was a symbol.

23     It was something that represented Sarajevo in everybody's eyes.

24        Q.   So you're denying that the Old Town of Sarajevo was ever shelled

25     by your forces?

Page 37930

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, just a second.  Yes.

 2             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I must

 3     intervene here because I'm only relying on my memory, but if my memory

 4     serves well, General Galic said earlier on that he was not from Sarajevo,

 5     that he didn't know the city in details.  He said that very precisely,

 6     and I have the impression that he's guided into another way now, saying

 7     something that was different from what he said yesterday.  Thank you.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Than what he said earlier

 9     on.

10             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] And --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

12             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] -- for the Serb translation I

13     didn't say "yesterday" but I said "earlier on."

14             JUDGE KWON:  What I wanted to say to you is that, with due

15     respect, I find this intervention not very helpful.  If the General is

16     not familiar with the geography of the central area of Sarajevo, he will

17     testify so.  So could you kindly refrain from making substantive comment

18     about his testimony.  The Chamber will look to it with utmost care.  By

19     the way -- yes, I'll leave it.  Let's continue.

20             Do you remember the question, General, or shall I ask

21     Ms. Edgerton to repeat it?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I remember the

23     question.  There's no need for the question to be repeated.  I remember

24     as much.  But it's not about my -- the question but the way I'm answering

25     and what kind of answer Madam Edgerton wants me to give.  That's the

Page 37931

 1     problem.  I'm answering in my own way.  She's looking at things from the

 2     legal point of view and I'm looking at things from the military point of

 3     view, but we will arrive at the truth after all.

 4             Let me answer.  I didn't say the old part of the city.  That part

 5     of the city up there, Sedrenik from the centre upwards, that's what it's

 6     called, and it is not that only Bascarsija was the old part of the city

 7     or the municipality in that city.  The municipality was more than just

 8     Bascarsija.  I spoke about Bascarsija as a symbol, as a part of Sarajevo

 9     which is still a symbol of Sarajevo.  It always was and it always will

10     be, and it was spared.  There was no activity in Bascarsija.  I wanted to

11     tell you when I toured the front line and when I checked whether the

12     soldiers knew that they were not supposed to open fire on that area at

13     all costs, they said, "Yes, of course, Bascarsija is protected and should

14     not be fired on."  And that's the answer I got from my soldiers.  You did

15     not allow me to say that.

16        Q.   General, my question --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Before you --

18             MS. EDGERTON: [Microphone not activated] Oh, I'm sorry.

19             JUDGE KWON:  For the record, transcript page 48, line 67,

20     "compared" should read "spared."  "I told you that Bascarsija was spared

21     because in a certain way it is a symbol of Sarajevo," not compared.

22     That's what I heard, and I note nodding by the witness.

23             Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

25        Q.   General, my question was actually about the Old Town.  So my

Page 37932

 1     question is:  Are you denying that the Old Town of Sarajevo was ever

 2     shelled by your forces?

 3        A.   I'm not denying that.  I just told you that Stari Grad is an

 4     entire municipality.  It is a part of Sarajevo.  Take a map of Sarajevo

 5     and you will see the inscription "Old Town" and that includes Bistrik,

 6     Bascarsija, and the entire north-eastern part of Sarajevo or even the

 7     northern part of Sarajevo.  That is Stari Grad or the old city.  That's

 8     the municipality.  You're asking me whether that was spared, i.e.,

 9     whether it was ever shelled.  This is a very wide question and it refers

10     to a wide area.  I am answering you that I don't know when and which part

11     of that municipality came under artillery fire and what enemy forces were

12     fired on in that part of the city.

13        Q.   You said it's a very -- it's a wide area.  Now, tell us what's

14     the radius of that area of the Old Town?  Because you seem to be quite

15     familiar with it from what you've just described.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, I think that comment should be avoided.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   Could you tell us the radius, then, of the Old Town, General?

20        A.   Well, let's take a map of Sarajevo and let's see.  Let's look at

21     a map, let's see where it says "Stari Grad," and let's calculate.

22        Q.   Is your evidence, then, that you don't know the radius of the

23     Old Town and the areas you've described, General?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, I'm not sure if you -- the witness and

25     you are having the same thing in mind when you refer to Old Town.  So

Page 37933

 1     could you clarify with the witness first.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   General, the area that includes Bistrik, Bascarsija, and

 4     Stari Grad that you've just described, I'd like you to tell us how big it

 5     is, the radius, please.

 6        A.   Madam Prosecutor, Bistrik is part of Stari Grad.  Stari Grad is a

 7     municipality.  I'm talking about municipalities.  There is the Centar

 8     municipality, the Novo Sarajevo municipality and the Stari Grad

 9     municipality.  Look at the map and you will see what they encompass.  So

10     when you see the inscription "Stari Grad," it's not just that territory.

11     The municipal territory -- or, rather, the city of Sarajevo had ten

12     municipalities, and the municipality of Stari Grad is somewhat broader

13     and covers more area than you see on the map.  That's why I ask you if

14     you have a map of Sarajevo, let's look at it, and let's define the

15     boundaries of the Stari Grad municipality.  When you mention Stari Grad

16     I'm not talking just about one facility or feature.  I'm talking about

17     the entire territory of the municipality.  Do you understand what a

18     municipality is?  If you do not, let me explain.  And I've told you

19     already what municipalities there existed in the whole area.

20        Q.   General, rather than spend more time on this, you talked about

21     Bistrik, and you talked about Bistrik in your evidence in chief.  You

22     explained to Dr. Karadzic that you shelled Bistrik, and that was at

23     transcript page 37359.  And you also noted that Bistrik was a populated

24     civilian area.  How many times did you shell Bistrik?

25        A.   You drew a lot of assertions about Bistrik and you're asking me

Page 37934

 1     just one thing, and now it is impossible to answer that question, how

 2     many times fire was opened on that area where force -- the forces were

 3     deployed.  And you know that it was the 10th Brigade that was deployed

 4     there.  Later on it was the 105th Brigade.  Originally it was the

 5     10th Brigade, and it constantly attacked the area leading up to Trebevic.

 6     How many times fire was opened on the enemy forces, I don't know.  Fire

 7     was opened, yes, it was.  I base my answer on the report that you have in

 8     front of you that fire was opened on Bistrik.  I agree that there were a

 9     lot of civilians there, a lot of civilian facilities.  I don't know what

10     else you want me to say.

11        Q.   Right.  So now you've just talked about civilians and civilian

12     facilities in Bistrik.  I just want to look at a couple other areas of

13     town.  Alipasino Polje, that's also a civilian area, isn't it?

14        A.   Look, if you put it that way, the entire city of Sarajevo is a

15     civilian area if you look at if that way.  Before the war, Sarajevo was a

16     civilian area, all of it.  Alipasino Polje which is close

17     Goranovo Naselje, Dobrinja, and so on and so forth, and there is a part

18     leading towards the Miljacka, Alipasino Polje is there.  At that time

19     whether Alipasino Polje was a civilian area, look at this map here and

20     you will see what units were deployed in Alipasino Polje, and now you are

21     claiming that this was a civilian area.  Please.

22        Q.   General, Nikola Mijatovic from the Ilidza Brigade came to testify

23     in Dr. Karadzic's defence, and at transcript page 30737, he said

24     Alipasino Polje was a civilian area.

25             I'll ask you about another area.  Ciglane, that's a residential

Page 37935

 1     area, isn't it?

 2        A.   Please let's go back to Alipasino Polje for a brief moment.

 3        Q.   General --

 4        A.   Do you know -- do you know -- do you know where the

 5     Kulin Ban Unit was deployed?  If this is the way you want to discuss

 6     things, let's discuss them in that way.  Do you know where the

 7     Kulin Ban Unit was deployed?

 8             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, General, it's not a discussion and I'm

 9     afraid it's not for you to ask the questions.  If necessary, Ms. Edgerton

10     can rephrase her question.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   My question was about Ciglane and whether --

13             JUDGE KWON:  You made a comment about Mr. Mijatovic's statement,

14     I think it's fair for the witness to make any comment about that.  Let's

15     move on.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I?  I can.

18             JUDGE KWON:  You disagreed with what alleged Mijatovic's

19     statement or testimony.  I will leave it to Ms. Edgerton whether she

20     wants to ask more questions.  Otherwise, Mr. Karadzic will take up that

21     issue, if necessary.

22             MS. EDGERTON:

23        Q.   General, do you agree that Ciglane is a residential area?

24        A.   I don't know.  I can't say.  I don't know if Ciglane was

25     residential or not.  I remember a moment in time when the Prosecution

Page 37936

 1     suggested that there was an incident in Ciglane involving artillery fire

 2     and we established that tanks were deployed there, and as soon as that

 3     happened, the Prosecution immediately gave up on that incident.  I don't

 4     know whether my answer was good, whether I made myself clear, I don't

 5     know.  And when it comes to that unit, Kulin Ban, it was deployed in

 6     Alipasino Polje and that is the area where the incident happened --

 7     happened involving children.  And Mr. Piletta-Zanin always liked to ask

 8     questions about Kulin Ban and the deployment of that unit and now I can

 9     answer.

10        Q.   General, Dusan Skrba came to testify here in Dr. Karadzic's

11     defence, and at page 29144, he said that Ciglane was a residential area

12     exclusively.  Would you have any reason to disagree with him?

13        A.   Madam Prosecutor, let me repeat why I don't agree with that.

14     Those are his observations.  Mr. Skrba was an artillery commander.  He

15     was assigned to a brigade.  I was the corps commander and I knew things,

16     and when I say something, I base my words on what I know.  I explained to

17     you how I saw Ciglane at the time.  Whether there was a period of time

18     when there were no troops deployed there, I don't know.  If you can prove

19     that, fine.  I tried to prove to you why you gave up on that incident in

20     my trial, in my proceedings.  If I'm lying, please tell me so; if I'm

21     telling the truth, again, why don't you tell me that I'm telling the

22     truth.

23        Q.   General, would you agree that Velesici is --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I'm not

Page 37937

 1     sure the General said -- and I'm talking about page 54, line 19, and I

 2     hope that this will help the Chamber.  I don't think that he said that

 3     there were no troops deployed there.  I think I heard he said the

 4     opposite.  He said that there were tanks deployed there, et cetera.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue.  Thank you,

 6     Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:

 8        Q.   Would you agree that Velesici is a residential area with family

 9     homes and apartments?

10        A.   Every part of Sarajevo was residential.  There were civilians and

11     soldiers in every part of Sarajevo.  Some were in Velesici.  But let me

12     remind you of a daily report and you will see that fire was opened from

13     Velesici towards Stari Grad.  That was my daily report, if I remember it

14     well.  And if fire was opened from Velesici, that means that there were

15     troops there at that time.  They were deployed in depth towards the

16     centre of Sarajevo and towards the railway station.  That's Velesici.  On

17     the side is Trbaceva Kosa [phoen] and up there is Hum.  Whether there

18     were troops in that area or whether all of the people there were civil --

19     civilians is a matter of discussion.  We can go on discussing that.  I

20     would not agree that everybody was civilian over there.

21        Q.   Can we look at a document now?  It's P1009, and it's a document

22     dated 11 October 1992 from Radislav Cvetkovic, your chief of artillery,

23     to the command of the 4th Mixed Artillery Regiment and Anti-tank

24     Regiment.

25             Now, this document says that -- you see, in respect of points 1

Page 37938

 1     and 2, it's issued further to an order by you.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  And we can scroll down the document so the General

 3     has a chance to see it, and then eventually go over to page 2,

 4     paragraph 3 in both languages, where it refers to the firing tasks of the

 5     artillery.

 6        Q.   Are we okay to go to the next page, General?

 7        A.   Yes, yes, of course.  This document is out of my range.  This was

 8     a document that the chief of artillery was authorised to sign and make an

 9     independent decision on the contents thereof.  If you are seeking my

10     comment on the document, go ahead.

11        Q.   I'll come back to what you've just said, but you see at the top

12     of this page where you see paragraph 3(c), it lists among the artillery

13     tasks to prevent the enemy's attack aimed at lifting the blockade of

14     Sarajevo by opening fire at the areas of Hum, Pofalici, Velesici, and

15     lists a couple of others, Jarcedol, Colina Kapa, Stup, Alipasino Polje,

16     and Mojmilo.  And then at the next paragraph it says:  Support the

17     counter-attack by our forces sending fire into the regions of Trebevic,

18     Colina Kapa, Bistrik, Radava, Pionirska Dolina, and so on.

19             And then from its basic firing position, it says that the corps

20     artillery group supports -- supports by sending fire into the regions of

21     Ciglane, Kobilja Glava and Bistrik, Kozija Cuprija.

22             So first of all, General, can you confirm that this is a firing

23     plan linked to a corps-level operation because it refers to an order you

24     issued planning attacks on regions and areas that -- some of which your

25     subordinates have confirmed are residential.

Page 37939

 1        A.   Madam Prosecutor, you have to make a distinction between several

 2     moments here.  In my order I gave a general task to the artillery.  This

 3     means I'm planning things that they have to carry out in the zones of

 4     their defence.  The chief of artillery here puts forth planning part or

 5     the possible attacks by the enemy and where fire should be opened.  This

 6     doesn't mean that fire was indeed opened but that fire has to be planned

 7     on certain sectors, on certain axes, and in certain situations.  Where it

 8     says, "prevent concentration," "prevent attacks," these are his

 9     assumptions with regard to the axis along which we expect the enemy to

10     try to break through and that's how we planned the fire.  This is the way

11     things are done in artillery.  These are tasks that are given to

12     artillery.  It's only normal.  To go on saying that this area is a

13     civilian area -- and let me tell you, the plan was drafted for the time

14     when BiH Army were deployed there.  If no BiH units were deployed there,

15     there would be no fire.  So let's draw a very clear line between a plan

16     and the actual execution thereof.  I can go on but let's not waste time.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it would help if we

18     were to read all the paragraphs from this (c).  I think that would

19     explain many things and that we would shorten the time, especially this

20     under "neutralise," "neutralise."

21             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, this document was admitted in

22     connection with the evidence of Mr. Philipps and I would ask now that it

23     be admitted for all purposes.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I was trying to locate all the passages we read out.

Page 37940

 1     It's part of firing tasks?  Are they all part of firing tasks?

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Under paragraph 3.  I only have the B/C/S in front

 3     of me at this moment.  Three --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Top of page 3 in English says:

 5             "Neutralise the enemy's artillery by opening fire on the area of

 6     Velesici," et cetera.

 7             Does this mean that there's something military set up in

 8     Velesici?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In that period it could mean so but

10     not necessarily.  That is the axis along which a movement of the

11     BH Army -- of the 1st Corps of the BH Army was expected, along that axis,

12     so the tasks had to be with regard to the axis, because via Velesici, you

13     go on to Zuc and Brijesce Brdo where activities would be carried out.

14     And that was where he expected some forces to come by.  If they were to

15     come by to Velesici, he planned some fire; for example, to concentrate

16     fire in order to prevent the enemy from passing through that zone.

17             Mr. President, was that sufficient?  But please, you wanted to

18     see the axes.  Can you please remember what I said about the areas where

19     we expected active combat and the breakthrough of the 1st Corps of

20     BH Army troops at the positions of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.  If you

21     compare, you will see that these are the axes where we expected increased

22     pressure or breakthrough from the forces of the 1st Corps of the BH Army.

23     This is the best way to understand this plan of the chief of artillery

24     or, rather, the order on the use of artillery.  I think that that's the

25     title but I don't remember precisely.

Page 37941

 1             Mr. President, that would be all unless you have any more

 2     questions.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Exhibit P1009 will be admitted in full.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Could we have a look at P2656, please,

 5     which is dated 26 November 1992.

 6        Q.   And it's another firing plan, General, if you could look at the

 7     screen, from Radislav Cvetkovic again.  And it says, as did the first

 8     document, that items 1 and 2 are the same as in the order by the SRK

 9     commander.  And then in paragraph 3, subsection (c) --

10             MS. EDGERTON:  So we'll have to go down the page in B/C/S, and

11     3(C) is at the bottom of page 1 and then over to page 2 in English.

12        Q.   Paragraph 3, subsection (c), is, General, identical to

13     paragraph 3(c) in the first document.

14             So, General, it looks to me like what we have here are

15     effectively standing orders in terms of firing plans.  The plan of fire

16     hasn't changed from one month to the next.

17        A.   The plan can be changed from one second to the next, but the

18     adaptability of the plan is its greatest value.  It has to be adapted to

19     the given situation or -- which arises.  I have told you that the main

20     characteristic of each plan is such and so is the plan for artillery or

21     its use, because I issued one order and on the basis of that order all

22     other organs are drafting their own orders, depending on what their task

23     is.  Or they make plans, calculations, and all the other staff duties are

24     carried out on the basis of my basic order.  Likewise with this order

25     issued by the chief of artillery.  It can be changed somewhat.  I cannot

Page 37942

 1     compare the two texts now to see whether they're identical.  There would

 2     be no reason to send out two identical texts, but if something is to be

 3     stressed out, the particular commander can refer to his own order such

 4     and such a number, as it was usual for me, and then something new is

 5     added as well.

 6             So this is an order pursuant to which further plans on the use of

 7     artillery would be made.  This is an order setting out the plans only.

 8     It's not realistic that all of this would be achieved, but there has to

 9     be readiness to achieve it if needed, which in turn depends on the

10     activities of the enemy.  In a war, you try to foresee the enemy

11     activities and that's the greatest value of each commander, the ability

12     to do that.

13        Q.   Now, General, can we have a look at 65 ter number 24952, and you

14     talked about an order that you issued within which particular commanders

15     would develop their own orders, and this is an order dated

16     26 November 1992.  So it's the same date as this second artillery plan

17     that we saw.  And if we go over to the very last page, you can see that

18     it's signed by you; correct?  Is this -- is this the operational order,

19     the order for further activities, operation 11/92, that formed the basis

20     for the artillery plan we just saw, the firing plan we just saw?  And if

21     we go over to the first page again, you can have a look at it to

22     familiarise yourself with the document.

23        A.   It's not necessary for me to look at the document for a long

24     time.  I'm familiar with it.  It is my order.  I think it's the first

25     order that I issued in the corps.  Unless I'm mistaken, but I think it's

Page 37943

 1     the first one.  Because when I arrived, there were many things in the

 2     corps that were not well, not even the orders.  They didn't know that

 3     there should be directives by zones, and I wanted to define many things

 4     in one of my order, many obligations of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

 5        Q.   Now, does this order -- does this order relate to the firing plan

 6     we just saw?

 7        A.   But does it include artillery tasks?  There should be an item

 8     with that title "artillery task" -- "artillery tasks."  If it's not

 9     there -- I'm not sure.  It could be a bit more extensive not just this

10     one page.  I think it could have as many as 17 pages.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Can we scroll slowly through this document for the

12     General, because artillery tasks aren't under one specific heading.

13     They're broken up through the document.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me explain, Madam Prosecutor.

15     That is stated through the tasks of brigades so as to see whether the

16     corps artillery would support them or not.  That is why the artillery

17     tasks are repeated several times, but for each brigade, whether they

18     support them on the particular axis, the brigade has to know whether the

19     corps artillery supports it or not and in which situation.  This is the

20     reason why these tasks of this artillery are repeated several times or

21     the 400th MAP.  That's what I meant.  Was I sufficiently clear about

22     this?  But artillery tasks are there.  There must be a separate item that

23     states the artillery tasks.  I don't know if you asked me now.  You can

24     see the date here, but it has to be included.  I don't see it now.  It's

25     not in front of me.

Page 37944

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Could you go to the next page in the document,

 2     please.  And the artillery tasks heading that the General is looking for

 3     is paragraph 6.2, but unfortunately, I can't tell you what page it is in

 4     B/C/S at this moment.  It's page 13 in English.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Page 9 in B/C/S.

 6             THE ACCUSED:  Could it be printed and given to the witness,

 7     please.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let's see whether it's necessary.  I doubt it.

 9     Page 9 in B/C/S.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Great.  Thank you.  Heading 6.2, "Artillery

11     Tasks" --

12             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't we show the top part as well.  It's very

13     short.  Scroll up, yes.  Yes.

14             MS. EDGERTON:

15        Q.   So all I wanted to know is, General, is does this operation order

16     from you relate to the artillery plan we just saw?  Or is the artillery

17     plan a standing order?

18        A.   This order was written, and its value is long-term.  It is valid

19     up until the next order or a supplementary order.  It can be

20     supplementary or a new order with a new operational number, just like

21     with directives.  The procedure is the same.  The general tasks of

22     artillery support are set out here.  I do not specify those details.

23     That was the duty of the chief of artillery and other chiefs who were

24     members of the staff, namely, to specify specific tasks for their

25     specific units.  I just set out what were to be the focal points of

Page 37945

 1     activities of the artillery, and further development and -- of the plans

 2     was up to the chiefs or their deputies depending on the levels.  It can

 3     be the deputy for intelligence and security, but this one was the chief

 4     of artillery because he's a member of the staff and so on.  So these are

 5     long-term tasks.  Up until a moment when the order is issued with the

 6     changed tasks.  On the basis of this, the chief drew up his own order and

 7     probably some plans for the artillery activities, whether he was the one

 8     who made it or not, and that would include also a map and so on and so

 9     forth.

10        Q.   Is your answer then, "Yes"?

11        A.   Well, you phrased the question in such a way that I cannot say

12     just yes.  Yes to what?  I'd like to be able to understand what exactly

13     you are asking me?  So please -- excuse me for asking you once again to

14     ask me.  Yes to what?

15        Q.   Does that artillery plan that we just saw relate to the order,

16     the operations order, that's on the screen in front of you?

17        A.   It's not a plan what we saw.  It's an order on the use of

18     artillery and the plan is something different.  So this order was issued

19     by the chief of artillery, and it is in accordance or it should be in

20     accordance with what I wrote here with regard to artillery and its tasks.

21     If it's not in accordance with this, then it means that the chief of

22     artillery missed the point.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  Could that be a Prosecution exhibit, Your Honour?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

Page 37946

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit that.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6302, Your Honours.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:

 4        Q.   You've repeated in your testimony, General, that your forces only

 5     shelled sources of enemy fire within the front lines, inside the front

 6     lines, when you were fired at, and that's at a number of transcript

 7     pages:  37204, 205, 37239 to 40, and 37335, and 37219.

 8             I would like now, General, to show you a video, and it's a very

 9     short one, and I'm going to ask you some very specific questions after

10     the video.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  And the video for the record is at P1933, and our

12     colleagues in the interpretation booth should have a copy of the

13     transcript.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             "...When they arrived they were told that Vedrana had already

16     been buried half an hour early because the graveyard was being shelled by

17     the Serbs."

18             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could pause.  I'm not hearing any

19     interpretation yet.  Could our interpreter colleagues confirm that

20     they've received copies of the transcript.

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Yes, we have received it.  Should we read out

22     the text which is read out in the video?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, it's in English and I take it -- and I

24     take it it was being translated into French and B/C/S.  That's why you

25     didn't hear that.

Page 37947

 1             Yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin?

 2             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, that's not

 3     the issue.  If you allow me, I have 30 minutes -- seconds.  I would like

 4     to say that this question is a misleading question.  The General stated a

 5     while ago that in certain cases, he could intervene in a pre-emptive way.

 6     So when one says that he only responded to the source of fire, this is

 7     not correct.  He said sometimes a surprise effect was good and it was

 8     good to act in a pre-emptive manner.  One needs to be very concise when

 9     one asks these questions.

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The interpreters in the

11     booth on the other side of the courtroom haven't been provided with a

12     copy of the video.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  General, did you hear the interpretation

14     of this video?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I heard something.

16     I don't think it was fully what was said.  I don't know.  I'm not sure

17     what's necessary.  This is the first time I'm watching it, but I heard

18     that they arrived immediately after the Serb shelling.  That was what I

19     heard in interpretation, and I don't know the rest.  This video could be

20     from a location -- from any location, anywhere.  This is just something

21     that was filmed.  It's not telling me anything.

22             Judging by this, Vedrana, judging by the first and last name,

23     could also be a Serb woman.  She doesn't necessarily have to be a Muslim

24     woman.  She could be a Croatian.  I don't know.  I'm watching it but I

25     would like to reach the appropriate answer.  Thank you.

Page 37948

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  The video's original

 2     soundtrack has been hardly audible so far.  Thank you.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  We'll try to again, Your Honours.

 4                           [Video-clip played]

 5             "When they arrived, they were told that Vedrana had already been

 6     buried half an hour early because the graveyard was being shelled by

 7     Serbs.  That was bad enough, but it got much worse.  More shells started

 8     falling.  One landed as the boys and girls from Vedrana's children's home

 9     arrived with their flowers.  As quickly as they could, they dropped them

10     on the graves of Vedrana and the baby boy the sniper also murdered.  It

11     was time to go.  As the family was leaving, the gunners found their

12     range."

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Does this seem to you as an

14     original video that was shot during the war?

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   General --

17        A.   And --

18        Q.   General --

19        A.   Tell me.

20        Q.   This video was made by BBC journalist Jeremy Bowen at a funeral

21     in Sarajevo.

22             Now, I have two questions for you from the clip that you've seen.

23     Did you see any outgoing fire from this funeral?

24        A.   Madam, I'm sorry that something like this was -- happened, but it

25     looks to me something that was fabricated later on.  It looks like

Page 37949

 1     something that was rigged.  It's not possible.  It just doesn't happen

 2     this way.  What was made here, whether it's some smokescreen or

 3     something -- there was firing everywhere, perhaps even here too.  I do

 4     not deny that.  That was something that was mentioned in my trial, firing

 5     from Mrakovo and so on.  Then we saw that there was a mortar, an enemy

 6     mortar at the graveyard itself, and now to say here whether some outgoing

 7     fire can be seen here.  You see the person who came there to film it,

 8     these were people who came deliberately to spread propaganda, the

 9     cameraman, and I think that the whole scene is rigged, in my view.  The

10     children coming with flowers, then fleeing.  I don't know if this is

11     really how it all happened.  It's possible that it did.  But it does not

12     seem very realistic, Mr. President.

13        Q.   My question, General, was:  Did you see any outgoing fire while

14     you were watching this video?

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that it is really the time

16     to take into account what the witness says.  He refused to accept that

17     this is authentic, and he expressed his opinion that this was all rigged.

18             JUDGE KWON:  But --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That it was staged.

20             JUDGE KWON:  But he also said it's possible that it happened, but

21     I don't see the point of your question.  If outgoing fire had existed at

22     all, it could have happened before this clip.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Oh, I acknowledge that, Your Honour.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  So shall we move on, Ms. Edgerton.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, that's fine.  I just note it's 12.26,

Page 37950

 1     Your Honour.  I wonder if you would like to take the break now, and then

 2     I would probably be a part of the next session but definitely not the

 3     whole session.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I have a matter that I'd like to deal

 5     with in the absence of the witness, so, Mr. Galic, if you could be

 6     excused.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I won't find that very

 8     difficult.

 9                           [The witness stands down]

10             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Your Honour, while the

11     witness is leaving the courtroom, I would like to thank the Prosecution

12     for having specified this issue.  I'm trying to change my flight for

13     tonight, and if everything could be finished today, that would be

14     wonderful.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  That's a message to Mr. Karadzic.

16             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] That's a clear message to

17     Mr. Karadzic.  Would you like me to leave the courtroom also?  [In

18     English] Do I have to stay?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Oui, s'il vous plait.  I'm going to discuss

20     something confidential to our case, so if you could excuse yourself.

21             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] The question was for the

22     witness.  No problem.  I shall leave the courtroom.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Could the Chamber move into private session

24     briefly.

25                           [Private session]

Page 37951

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             JUDGE KWON:  And before the next witness testifies, I'd like to

16     hear from the parties as to the relevance of paragraphs 42 to 47 of that

17     statement.

18             And there's one minor housekeeping matter.  The Chamber recalls

19     that on the 27th of February, 2013, it instructed the accused to redact

20     part of paragraph 12 as well as paragraphs 27 to 32 of Exhibit D3031,

21     which was the statement, witness statement of Milovan Lelek.  The Chamber

22     now wishes to clarify that instruction and order that the accused redact

23     paragraph 26 to 32, not 27 to 32, as well as part of paragraph 12 of that

24     exhibit.

25             The Chamber also takes this opportunity to remind the accused to

Page 37952

 1     complete any pending exhibit issues as soon as possible, including the

 2     redaction of numerous pending witness statements.

 3             We will have a break for -- yes, Mr. Robinson.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  Just one other housekeeping

 5     matter.  Yesterday we filed a motion for an order to the Deputy Registrar

 6     pertaining to medical records for Milan Babic and we'll withdraw that in

 7     light of the Chamber's oral ruling yesterday.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             We'll take a break for 45 minutes and resume at quarter past

10     1.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.31 p.m.

12                           [The witness takes the stand]

13                           --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

16        Q.   To move on, General, to another area, could we have a look at

17     65 ter number 24959, please.

18             General, this is a document you sent to all SRK units on the

19     9th of February, 1994, regarding the movement of artillery.  And it says

20     that overnight -- it directs the troops to overnight between the 9th and

21     10th of February move defective weapons towards Sarajevo -- can you see

22     it, General, or does it need to be enlarged?

23        A.   Quite frankly, I cannot see it, so if it could be enlarged.

24     Thank you.  Thank you.  This is already better.  Because after all, this

25     text it quite illegible.

Page 37953

 1        Q.   So it's to move defective weapons towards Sarajevo and take up

 2     fire positions, and if the cease-fire is signed, these defective pieces,

 3     it says, are to be moved out in daylight so UNPROFOR could see it, and

 4     that way basic weapon systems remain on vital positions.

 5             And paragraph 4 of this document says:

 6             "In the event of NATO air-strikes, attack, imprison, and hold UN

 7     and all humanitarian organisations until the air-strike ceases."

 8             Now, this is your document, General, and at transcript

 9     page 37448, you said that you complied with the total exclusion zone

10     agreement to the last letter.  If you ever did anything fully and

11     completely, it was this.  Your own document from the time, General, shows

12     that you had no intention of full compliance.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer the question.

14             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.

15     I would like to underline that, as far as I remember, General Galic was

16     never worried nor condemned for adopting behaviours towards NATO staff or

17     UNPROFOR staff, and this issue might involve Mr. Galic's responsibility

18     pursuant to Article 90, if I'm not mistaken.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you for the reminder, but I remember that I

20     gave him the advice pursuant to Rule 90(E), i.e., his right to refuse to

21     give his evidence if the testimony is to be --

22             THE ACCUSED:  But before that --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm trying to remember the word of

24     the Rules, but I'm just carried away.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, Mr. President.  You are not

Page 37954

 1     carried away at all.  I know it off by heart.  Article 90(E).

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  The word I was trying to remember was

 3     "incriminate."  I'm very sorry.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think in our system this

 6     would not have been allowed, that the witness be led through the

 7     question.  This is the 9th of February, and the agreement was signed on

 8     the 18th.  You cannot say on the basis of this that General Galic did not

 9     observe the agreement.  On the 9th there was no agreement yet.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Well, it goes either way.  I don't see any

11     difficulty with the General being capable of answering this kind of

12     question.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  And I specifically referred to an intention to --

14     the General not having an intention to comply.  I'm quite aware that the

15     agreement wasn't signed at that date.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Galic.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would kindly ask you to be able

18     to have a look at the signature at the bottom of this document.  As far

19     as I can see, there is no signature here.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I take it this is a telegram, Mr. Galic.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as far as I can remember, I

22     was not at the corps command then, and that's why I want to see who

23     signed this and why this kind of order was issued.  I'm not deciding yet

24     at the command post who issued this order to them and how, that is

25     something I cannot interpret now, but this is what I would like to say:

Page 37955

 1     At that time, as has already been stated and is well known, I mean, we

 2     said during the examination-in-chief that the agreement was reached only

 3     on the 18th, so your statement, Madam Prosecutor, that I did not intend

 4     to implement the agreement -- well, from this we cannot see that there is

 5     no intention.  I say here that all resources should be prepared.

 6     Preparations are already underway.  But there is this warning down here.

 7     I don't know whether it's good or not.  Well, maybe it's a bit excessive,

 8     that if there were to be NATO air-strikes, then everything would go down

 9     the drain, and then -- well, it has to do with the attitude towards

10     UNPROFOR, not to kill them.  That is stated there.  That is sufficient

11     protection vis-a-vis them.  Although, this process, how it would evolve,

12     to tell you the truth, I don't find that clear.  But if there is bombing,

13     then chaos reigns.  The question is how all of this would be carried out

14     altogether?  Well, perhaps we can say that this is a preparatory order

15     for what would follow on the 18th or, rather, the 19th.  I think that

16     later on our dead-line was the 19th by 2400 hours.  So everything that

17     had not been withdrawn or notified, then there would be bombing.  That's

18     my answer.  I don't know whether it suffices.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The General said if there is

22     bombing, then everything goes down the drain, all the agreements.  All

23     the agreements would no longer be in force, and that was not recorded,

24     that the agreements would no longer be in force.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm having said that, Mr. Galic?

Page 37956

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I confirm that that was said,

 2     Mr. President, because practically that's how it would have been.  I

 3     don't know.  While I was commander I wasn't told -- I mean, well, how it

 4     was later, I don't know.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.  Thank you.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have this document, please, as a

 7     Prosecution exhibit.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit it.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6303, Your Honours.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

12        Q.   Now, General, I'd like to show you another document of yours

13     dated 20 February 1994, and that's D2802.  And it's a regular report from

14     you to the VRS Main Staff on the situation that day.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  And perhaps we could go all the way over to the

16     last page so that the General can see who signed the document, please.

17        Q.   That's your signature, isn't it, General?

18        A.   No doubt.  My signature.

19        Q.   Now, if you go in this document to English page 2, and the

20     reference in your language is on page 1.  The last subparagraph --

21             MS. EDGERTON:  I think it's on page 1 of -- no.  If we could go

22     to the next page, please, in B/C/S.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this page is fine.  You can

24     see the meeting with Akashi.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  I've again written my numbers incorrectly.  It's

Page 37957

 1     the last subparagraph of section 23.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  There is no 23.  Could you please read it, and I

 3     will instruct -- I'll say what is the paragraph.

 4             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Dr. Karadzic, for your help.  And I

 5     apologise for my inability with anything to do with numbers.

 6             "In order to prevent a surprise, parts of units with their

 7     private weapons were kept in full combat readiness with enhanced measures

 8     of surveillance and position maintenance."

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The penultimate and ultimate of

10     page 2.

11             JUDGE KWON: [Microphone not activated] Thank you.  We have that

12     page.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just before -- the paragraph before number 3.

15             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Dr. Karadzic.

16        Q.   Now, General, in commenting on the previous document, you said

17     that that didn't show any lack of intention on your part to comply with

18     the agreement.  And now this document is dated the 20th of February,

19     1994, so after the agreement is signed, and you're telling the VRS

20     Main Staff that you actually haven't complied.  To prevent a surprise,

21     parts of units have kept their weapons in full combat readiness.

22        A.   Madam Prosecutor, you did not understand this right.  I'm going

23     to explain this to you, and then we are going to get a different

24     conclusion from the one that you've drawn just now.

25             Actually, at all these locations where weapons were collected at

Page 37958

 1     that point in time, that they had to be transported, you have to know

 2     that there's lot of snow then, that movements are highly restricted.  It

 3     was total disarray, not to go back to all the bad things that happened

 4     then.  However, these weapons that were supposed to be moved out

 5     20 kilometres away, we moved what could be moved, but what remained was

 6     that that was not in working order, because the agreement did not say

 7     that units have to be disbanded.  That's not what the agreement says.

 8     It's only that weaponry has to be handed over to UNPROFOR for

 9     safeguarding.

10             So roughly, I did go to these weapon collection points.  They had

11     wire around them.  Akashi came and Brosse and all these other generals

12     from Zagreb, et cetera.  So there was this wire fence around it, and

13     there were weapons that had been decommissioned in the middle, and then,

14     of course, if there was to be an attack of the 1st Corps of the BH Army,

15     they should be combat ready.  It's not that they did not hand over their

16     weaponry to UNPROFOR.  However, personnel were not.  They remained under

17     my command.  Let's be clear on that.  So we just had these light weapons

18     from 12.7-millimetre calibre downwards.  That's it.  That's why that kind

19     of order was issued, so that they would be combat ready so -- because I

20     have --

21        Q.   So are you saying that the units with their private weapons were

22     light weapons from 12.7 downwards?  Is that what you're saying?

23        A.   These units that I referred to are these units that handed over

24     these weapons and perhaps part of the unit would have moved 20 kilometres

25     away, however, their area of responsibility remains.  They have to defend

Page 37959

 1     that area because there's no one else who can come there.  It would only

 2     be a case of me leaving it altogether and handing it over to the Muslims

 3     and saying, "Go ahead, take it."  So weapons below 12.7-millimetre

 4     calibre and the area should be protected.  And nothing new was written

 5     here, nothing more than that.

 6             Madam Prosecutor, have I provided a sufficient explanation or do

 7     you have more questions in this regard?

 8        Q.   I think I want to show you another document now, General.

 9     P01294, and it's dated 12 June 1994.  And it's correspondence from

10     General Milovanovic to you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] While we are waiting, if I may be

12     allowed, I think that there is a misunderstanding stemming from the

13     translation "private."  I mean a mortar can be private too.  However,

14     this is light weaponry, sidearms, infantry weapons.  They had not been

15     banned.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think the paragraph that we just saw, I think it

17     speaks for itself.  We can continue.

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   Now, this document, General, says -- and it's marked as urgent,

20     says that the Ilijas Brigade had written the Main Staff requesting that

21     they be issued aerial bombs by Pretis, and General Milovanovic cautions

22     you that the Main Staff decides on the use of aerial bombs and possibly a

23     corps if the Main Staff approves.

24             So my question about this document, General, is:  Are aerial

25     bombs of a size that were banned according to the total exclusion zone

Page 37960

 1     agreement?

 2        A.   It's a hard question for me because we did not look at that.

 3     I'll tell you what, from October 1992, the use of airforce had been

 4     banned.  This was the so-called no-fly operation.  So the use of aerial

 5     bombs in a way had been banned there.  Whereas this document, I don't

 6     know.  It never reached me.  You see that it went directly to -- well,

 7     you asked me, you asked me, so I'm answering.

 8        Q.   So if aerial bombs -- if aerial bombs weren't used because there

 9     was a no-fly operation, why then is General Milovanovic writing you to

10     say that either he or you, the Main Staff or you, decide on their use in

11     1994?

12        A.   This is June 1994.  At that time we did have these aerial bombs

13     in some of our depots.  Now, Josipovic is the commander of the

14     Ilijas Brigade -- no, not the Ilijas Brigade.  Yes, it is the

15     Ilijas Brigade.  And he's asking for these bombs to be taken out, because

16     we were wondering what to do in a situation when heavy weapons were taken

17     away from us, when in the corps zone we have 10.000 and the 1st Corps has

18     45.000 rifles, light weapons.  If they attack us, what are we going to

19     defend ourselves with.  We don't have weapons.  Then somebody gave the

20     following proposal:  That it would be a good thing to prepare this

21     reserve weaponry.  So I did not really take part in these discussions and

22     I cannot tell you about these aerial bombs a lot.  I'm really not

23     familiar enough with that problem.

24             So this is a request just to get it out.  I mean, I know that

25     there was talk about that, like, "What do we do now?  This is the

Page 37961

 1     situation we're in."  That's why we proposed that this anti-sniper

 2     agreement be reached as soon as possible, so that we could stop the

 3     1st Corps of the BH Army if they attack us because we don't have the

 4     forces to attack [as interpreted] them because we, the Sarajevo-Romanija

 5     Corps, are left to our own resources and we don't have that.  I've

 6     already spoken about that.

 7        Q.   You mentioned reserve weaponry.  You're talking about reserve

 8     weaponry that would use these air-bombs, aren't you?

 9        A.   No, no.  We didn't have anything then, no other weapons.  Now,

10     whether there were other weapons or not then, I cannot say whether they

11     constructed something or not.  I saw later that something was used but

12     not in my time.  As far as I can remember, no.

13        Q.   Well --

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.  Transcript, lines 4,

15     5.  It doesn't record it properly.  The General said:  If they attack us,

16     we have nothing to defend ourselves with because we no longer have any

17     advantage.  Our weapons have been taken away.  It's not that we would

18     attack them.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I think it will be checked during the

20     review process today.

21             Yes, but before going further, General, how do you know that this

22     document didn't reach you?  You stated that it didn't reach you.  How do

23     you know that?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't seem to remember it.

25     That's why I say that maybe it hadn't reach know.  I cannot remember now.

Page 37962

 1     Now that I've read it, I see that Milovanovic wrote it.  I cannot

 2     remember that it was in my hands.  Probably the further processing of

 3     that had that taken place.  I don't know.  Well, I didn't remember.  I do

 4     not remember that such a document --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the end of the

 6     sentence.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not trying to say that it

 8     didn't happen.  I'm just saying I could not remember.  That would be my

 9     most sincere answer.  I don't know what else to say, Mr. President.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

11             MS. EDGERTON:

12        Q.   So despite the fact that Milovanovic thought the issue of the use

13     of air-bombs was important enough to write to you urgently, you have no

14     recollection -- your indulgence for a moment.  So if nothing was going on

15     with these air-bombs in June of 1994, why did Milovanovic write to you

16     urgently then, General?

17        A.   Well, you can see in the introduction of this document that the

18     brigade commander asked them directly.  He didn't ask me.  The Main Staff

19     directly.  He asked approval from them.  That is how I understood this

20     document.  If --

21        Q.   So --

22        A.   Directly.  Addressed them directly, the Main Staff of the VRS.

23        Q.   So then Josipovic must have come to you directly, didn't he?

24        A.   The system of any army, I've explained that, is based on

25     singleness of command and subordination.  Without that, there can be no

Page 37963

 1     army in the world.  If it's any different, it's no good.  So I'm

 2     Josipovic's immediate superior as corps commander, and his second

 3     superior is the General Staff or General Mladic, or it's the Supreme

 4     Command.

 5        Q.   So did Josipovic then come to you to ask to use air-bombs?

 6        A.   I'm saying I don't remember.  I don't remember problems with this

 7     regard.  Could you please jog my memory if you can.

 8        Q.   No, that's fine, General.  What we'll do is we'll move on to one

 9     more and last document for the day.  It's 65 ter number 23835.  And it's

10     your report on the state of -- dated May 5th, 1994, your report on the

11     state of combat readiness of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps anti-aircraft

12     defence and rocket units.

13             MS. EDGERTON:  And if you can scroll down to the bottom of this

14     page.  I'd then like us all to go to page 5 in English under the heading

15     "Training of Crews," and the same page is page 3 in B/C/S.  In the middle

16     of the page.

17        Q.   Now, under that heading "Training of Crews," second sentence, we

18     see in your report:  All compositions fired on targets in combat, whereas

19     only sight-setters and operators fired on air targets in the axes sectors

20     of Ilijas, Breza, and Gorazde, SAM-2 missile operator Koprivica having

21     hit a NATO aircraft.

22             Now, General, at transcript page 37461 you said:

23             "As far as I know and according to information I had, we never

24     opened fire on UN planes."

25             When you said that, I take it you weren't including NATO planes

Page 37964

 1     in your answer, then, were you, because you did open fire on NATO planes.

 2        A.   This is a special situation, Madam Prosecutor.  Those forces

 3     which were engaged near Gorazde -- could you please remind me of the

 4     date?  I would like to put things in a context.  What date was that?  The

 5     date.  The date of the document.  Please remind me.

 6        Q.   May 5th, 1994, is the date of the document.  My colleague could

 7     show you -- take you to the first page of the document again, please, so

 8     you can see it.

 9        A.   Yes.  No, no.  I believe you when you say that that was the case.

10     Let's leave it at that, of course.  This is a description of the entire

11     situation and combat readiness.  This is also an assessment of the

12     situation in the corps.  We had some of the troops that were engaged but

13     they were attached to the forces that were attacking in the direction of

14     Gorazde, and that was as far as I can remember.  On the 10th of April,

15     1994, when NATO staged its first strikes on the positions of Republika

16     Srpska, that was not under my command but under the direct command of the

17     Main Staff, but some of the forces were engaged in Jabucko Sedlo.  We had

18     some assault battalions that participated in that part of the operation

19     but not under my command.  They were attached to other units.  It was

20     said at that time, or at least that's what I was said, that somebody shot

21     an aeroplane down from our contingent.  There were other versions.  For

22     example, that that was the Russian needle.  However, a soldier was named

23     that hit a NATO plane and grounded it.  I inquired about that.  I wanted

24     to find out whether that was a soldier that needed to be decorated.

25     However, he was not under my command, so it was not up to me to take any

Page 37965

 1     measures with this regard.

 2             This is my answer to your question whether we shot at NATO, i.e.,

 3     UNPROFOR airforce, because that part of NATO that patrolled with their

 4     aircraft, I consider them to be an integral part of the United Nations

 5     because they could not patrol without an approval by the United Nations.

 6     They were attacking at the time.  That was a situation in which all the

 7     agreements had to be called off.  This was a battle between the Army of

 8     Republika Srpska and NATO in the sector of Gorazde.  This was outside of

 9     my area of responsibility.

10             I don't know whether I made myself clear, Madam Prosecutor.  In

11     other words, that unit was attached to some other contingents, and I

12     believe that they were under the command of a person called Masal [phoen]

13     but I'm not sure.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Could I have this document as a Prosecution

15     exhibit, please.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6304, Your Honours.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  I have nothing further, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  I remember that you -- yesterday you stated that you

21     would come back after checking the B/C/S translation of footnote 711.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  We have done that Your Honours.  The matter has

23     been referred to CLSS and they are dealing with it.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  That was done first thing this morning.

Page 37966

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you, Excellency.

 3                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 4        Q.   [Interpretation] General, sir, I'll try to put simpler questions

 5     than those during my examination-in-chief.  I'm looking for yes and no

 6     answers.  Let's start with the last things first.

 7             Was Gorazde in the total exclusion zone or outside of it?

 8        A.   Outside of it.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You were shown a document, P1294.

10     General Milovanovic warns Colonel Josipovic about his lack of discipline.

11     He is a general now.  On from what side was General Josipovic's unit

12     attacked?

13        A.   At that time, I believe that he was a captain.  All of my

14     officers were promoted.  I was the only one who was demoted.  He was a

15     captain.  He was not the general.  He was the commander of the

16     Ilijas Brigade.  His troops were attacked from Visoko, Vares, and Olovo.

17        Q.   Can you please tell us whether anybody attacked General Josipovic

18     from the total exclusion zone or -- and were those places within the

19     total exclusion zone?

20        A.   There were parts of the Ilijas Brigade that would fall within the

21     20-kilometre zone.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

23             MS. EDGERTON:  The question's been answered.  I'll save it for

24     another occasion.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37967

 1        Q.   When it comes to the area of Visoko, Breza, Vares, and Olovo,

 2     were these places within the total exclusion zone?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   And could they attack --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton?

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  That's outside the cross-examination in my

 8     submission, Your Honour.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Does it not deal with that document, i.e.,

10     Exhibit P1294?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  In my submission, the document does not refer in

12     any regard to Colonel Josipovic being under attack by anyone.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  The subject of the exclusion

15     zone was clearly raised by the Prosecution.  They can't limit it that

16     narrowly, so Dr. Karadzic has the right to rebut that by the question

17     that he's asked.

18                           [Trial Chamber confers]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton, the Chamber agrees with Mr. Robinson,

20     so we will allow the question.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, let's make things simple.  Those zones from which

23     Colonel Josipovic was attacked, Visoko, Breza, Vares, and Olovo, were

24     they part of the total exclusion zone?

25        A.   Those zones were excluded.  However, one part of the zone of that

Page 37968

 1     brigade was within the 20-kilometre zone, looking from the centre of

 2     Sarajevo and Marin Dvor, across Vogosca, and further on towards Ilijas.

 3     So 20-kilometres would fall within that area in the direction of Visoko.

 4     However, Visoko itself was excluded from that area.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Is it true that due to the total exclusion zone, it

 6     was forbidden to the BiH Army to attack the Ilijas Brigade from Visoko,

 7     Breza, and so on and so forth?

 8        A.   Well, you know that much better than I do.  You were the one who

 9     drafted that agreement.  I didn't [as interpreted] attend that, and that

10     did not forbid actions of the BiH Army from those areas.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Was Colonel Josipovic prohibited to open fire towards

12     Visoko and the other places which were not within the total exclusion

13     zone?

14        A.   No, he wasn't, unless there was something -- and I'm talking

15     about a period of time which is very important to emphasise because it is

16     very important whether there was a cease-fire in place, but in general

17     terms, it was not forbidden to open fire in those directions.

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the two speakers be reminded to slow down

19     and make pauses between questions and answers.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Now that both interlocutors are speaking the same

21     time language, please bear in mind that you should put a pause and speak

22     more slowly.

23             Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We apologise to the participants

25     and the Trial Chamber as well as the interpreters.  I will speak slowly

Page 37969

 1     and I will make pauses.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   On line 2, I would like to correct something in the transcript.

 4     You said you did attend the negotiations but that I authored the

 5     agreement.  Is it true that you attended or not?

 6        A.   It was on the 18th of February.  I attended the negotiations, we

 7     repeated that several times, but you sign the agreement.  You were the

 8     Supreme Commander and I wasn't, of course.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  When it comes to Mr. Josipovic - and I don't know

10     what his rank was at the time - did he receive what he requested?

11        A.   As far as I can remember, he didn't get what he asked for.

12        Q.   Thank you.  If he had received the assets, would he have been in

13     a position to use them in the direction of the total exclusion zone?  Who

14     was his southern neighbour?

15        A.   Southern or south-eastern, it was the 3rd Sarajevo or the

16     Vogosca Brigade.  Even if he had received those assets he did not have

17     the means to use them.  How could he have used aerial bombs?

18        Q.   The 3rd Sarajevo Brigade, was that a Serbian brigade, this SRK?

19        A.   The 3rd Sarajevo Brigade was set up somewhat later and then

20     merged the Vogosca and Rajlovac and Kosani [phoen] Brigade.  And yes, it

21     was the SRK.

22        Q.   Thank you.  On page 63 of today's transcript you were shown an

23     order and I'm afraid that we are facing a linguistic problem here.  Can

24     you tell us is there a difference and what the difference is between a

25     planning order and an executive order?  In English it is all translated

Page 37970

 1     as "order."  However, would you say that there is a difference between

 2     various orders?  Can you explain that to the Trial Chamber?

 3        A.   In a nutshell, when it comes to the execution of combat tasks,

 4     the Supreme Command issues directives and lower commands issue combat

 5     orders.  A combat order or an order for combat activities contains all

 6     the elements that concern combat and resistance; whereas orders issued by

 7     the other command organs arise from that order and those are professional

 8     or expert orders, as it were.  They can come from the chief of artillery,

 9     the chief of engineers, the assistant for logistics, and so on and so

10     forth.

11             When it comes to planning or plans, plans are the same everywhere

12     and the name is self-explanatory.  It has to be either a textual or a

13     graphic.  It can be a network planning or -- and I wouldn't go into

14     details because it would take too much time.  A plan is a plan.  It's not

15     an order.  The two things are different.  It can be an annex to either an

16     order or a directive.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Do commands and orders have to be executed?  And what

18     about plans, do they have to be executed?

19        A.   As I've already told you, an army, every army, relies on

20     singleness of command and subordination.  Singleness of command means

21     that there is one superior officer in command, that there couldn't be two

22     or more commanders.  There could be only one and he's responsible.  As

23     soon as somebody else interferes, whoever is in charge has to assume

24     responsibility.  Subordination, on the other hand, says that a

25     subordinate by rank or by position is duty-bound to carry out orders

Page 37971

 1     issued him to by his superior.  This is what subordination means.  And

 2     when it comes to plans and whether they are executed, it depends on

 3     the -- on how realistic it is and how viable it is, to use a peacetime

 4     term.  In wartime, this means that it has to be based on good assessment

 5     and the characteristics and the decision of the commander.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that His Excellency

 8     noticed in P1009 -- and I would like to call up the document.  It is

 9     P1009, page 3.  The title is "Firing Tasks."  Page 3, "Firing Tasks,"

10     please.  This is not the same document.  Not the one that we saw under

11     that number previously.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we see the previous page in B/C/S, while

13     leaving the English as it is.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here it is.  We can see it now.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Yes, it is the document.  Now, please, General, tell us what

17     under this first -- prevent the attack of the enemy from Sarajevo aimed

18     at unblocking Sarajevo, opening fire on the sectors of Humsko Brdo,

19     Pofalici, Velesici, and so on.  You were asked about this, but please

20     tell us about the fourth paragraph -- the third paragraph, support

21     offensive operations by firing along axis Faletici and so on.  Where is

22     that, Faletici, Mrkovici?  That's also outside of Sarajevo; correct?

23        A.   Well, all right.  In this order that's not so important because

24     the order emphasises another problem.  The axis is specified along which

25     a possible enemy attack is to be expected.  Along that axis fire is to be

Page 37972

 1     planned.  This is why the chief of artillery assesses here that it could

 2     be the possible axis of the enemy forces, where they would attack, and

 3     the fire is planned.  It doesn't have to be carried out.  But if the

 4     enemy breaks through, then the firing will indeed take place.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  It's not recorded that these localities are outside

 6     of Sarajevo.

 7             Please look at the fourth one:  Neutralise the enemy artillery by

 8     opening fire on the follow sectors, Velesici, Pofalici, Bistrik, the

 9     tunnel used for transit, Kosevsko Brdo and the Bare cemetery.  Was there

10     any Muslim artillery there that needed to be neutralised?

11        A.   In that period, the chief of artillery had the information about

12     the exact locations of the enemy artillery and he issued a preparatory

13     order to prepare for fire against those sectors, whether it was automatic

14     fire or concentrated fire, but all circumstances that have to be planned

15     were taken into account.  And they had their own artillery reconnaissance

16     which was separate and they would establish the targets.  So I need not

17     necessarily know everything as the corps commander.  He's the commander

18     or the chief, rather, and he would plan what his duties were.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D3394, can we please see that one

20     briefly.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   It was suggested to you that Velesici are a civilian settlement.

23     Please look at item number 1 and the second bullet.  What was the enemy

24     doing?  With combined infantry and artillery fire from the direction of

25     Brek [phoen], Kosevo and Velesici at the Mrkovici village, could the

Page 37973

 1     enemy reach Mrkovici by infantry fire from Velesici or was it rather the

 2     artillery component?

 3        A.   As for Velesici, Mr. President, we already discussed Velesici and

 4     I expressed my opinion in relation to the earlier report.  And this is

 5     another confirmation that there were some forces in Velesici.  There was

 6     a disposition of forces, and it was still expected that there would be

 7     fire from that direction, and this confirms that it did come from the

 8     area of Velesici.

 9             I don't know about the second part of your question.  I may have

10     missed it or I didn't answer it.  I'm getting tired already.

11        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, you have already said that there were

12     civilian settlements in Sarajevo too.  Were there civilian settlements

13     which were completely demilitarised from which fire was not opened at you

14     and that you opened fire at such settlements?

15        A.   Mr. President, there were civilian areas or zones in which, for

16     example, the forces of the BH Army 1st Corps did not enter, but it was

17     difficult to establish that.  We saw from some information that they did

18     not even allow the UNPROFOR to enter and check those areas, let alone

19     that I would go there to see.  There were civilian areas where troops

20     were located and they could have become military targets or they did not

21     become military targets.  It's hard to give a universal answer, but there

22     were civilian zones, civilian areas, protected zones, safety zones, yes,

23     certainly there were some.

24             We never -- as far as I know, all these protected areas, axes,

25     facilities, we never launched any attacks on them.  Yes, we did discuss

Page 37974

 1     the Kosevo Hospital quite a lot and the warning, returning fire, when it

 2     is a military target, when it's not a military target, which part is a

 3     military target.  We could expand it if necessary.  I can do that.

 4        Q.   Thank you, General.  It was suggested also to you that

 5     Cengic Vila was a civilian settlement.  Were there any legitimate

 6     military targets in Cengic Vila or any firing positions from which fire

 7     was opened at your units?

 8        A.   Mr. President, was that where the Jajce barracks was located?

 9        Q.   The Jajce barracks is to the east.  That's where the factory

10     Treska was and so on.  Do you remember how it looked?  We can call up a

11     map.

12        A.   We don't need to call up anything.  I stated here that, in that

13     period, there were some troops moving around Cengic Vila and that some

14     command post was somewhere around there.  Now, whether I've been

15     sufficiently clear about that, I'm not sure.  I think I have been clear.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we have a look at 1D1101,

17     please.  Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   This is a report from the National Security Service of

20     Republika Srpska from Ilidza informing you, informing their minister and

21     others that the Green Berets are located in the elementary school Petar

22     Dokic in Cengic Vila where the headquarters of this formation is located

23     as well.  Do you remember that there was a correspondence between you and

24     the MUP of Republika Srpska and the State Security Service and that they

25     informed you about the information that was available to them?

Page 37975

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Before you answer the question,

 2     General.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Before the General answers, this date's from

 4     25 May 1992, when the General was not in Sarajevo, and he said that

 5     repeatedly in his testimony.  He's talked about his tour of duty.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  And in addition to that query, on what basis do you

 7     say this was sent to the General while I don't see any such notation from

 8     the document.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think that it was

10     personally addressed to the General, Your Excellency, but certainly it

11     was addressed to his security service because such a correspondence was

12     obligatory.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may supplement that.  If you

14     remember, Mr. President, I said that I had some information about the

15     existence of a command post.  I was not aware of this document, to be

16     honest, but somehow I remember that some sort of command post was there

17     and this document confirms that.  Just an observation on my part, nothing

18     else.  In Cengic Vila.

19             JUDGE KWON:  So could you repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   General, you arrived when, two months after this?

22        A.   On the 10th of September.

23        Q.   Did you know, did your service receive or exchange information

24     with the State Security Service?

25        A.   Yes, it did exchange information and informed me about what was

Page 37976

 1     important.  But what is at stake here is that how this is phrased here

 2     and how the disposition of the forces is formulated, they're not changed

 3     on a daily basis.  They remain for longer periods in specific locations,

 4     and I did have some information.  I have no idea, but I told you earlier,

 5     a few days ago, in my testimony, that I had this piece of information

 6     that there was some sort of command post there.  I did not remember any

 7     specific report but this is just a confirmation of what I said then.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can it be admitted?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  No, no objection.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3513, Your Honours.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  1D7388, can we look at

14     that one now, please.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, we can zoom in onto the Serbian version alone.  This is

17     an order from the commander of the 3rd Motorised Brigade of the

18     1st Corps --

19             MS. EDGERTON:  We don't have a translation.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

21             MS. EDGERTON:  The translation of the English is incomplete.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will represent -- I will present

24     the document and the witness can control me.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 37977

 1        Q.   The commander of the 3rd Motorised Brigade orders on the

 2     13th of March 1993 replacement of hand defence grenades, and it says to

 3     collect all bombs without safety levers and send them to the logistical

 4     battalion Valter Peric, location Stup-Azici, and the depot in the

 5     kindergarten at Cengic Vila which has been converted into a depot of the

 6     MES, which means mines and explosives.  That's right.

 7             This kindergarten, does it then become a legitimate military

 8     target, General?

 9        A.   Well, Mr. President, during the direct examination we discussed

10     about what I told UNPROFOR to warn the 1st Corps of the BH Army, namely,

11     not to use schools, kindergartens and similar facilities.  The previous

12     example and this one as well indicates that they did use kindergartens

13     and schools to store mines and explosives there, just like the depot

14     there in Dobrinja.  And then, in such circumstances, it would become a

15     military target, without any doubt.  If there are children inside, then

16     it should be avoided but ...

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can it be MFI'd, please.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI'd D3514, Your Honours.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested to you that at Ciglane were a

23     civilian settlement and you said that in Ciglane there were also some

24     tanks which were stationed there and also other pieces of equipment.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D193 is a document that I would

Page 37978

 1     like us to look at.  D193.  So it's a Defence document, 193.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, in paragraph 2 we see that in the tunnel in Velesici a

 4     tank was stationed, and in front of the building of the so-called TO BiH

 5     in Ciglane, a tank and an APC were stationed.  Was that also at the time

 6     when you took over the corps command?

 7        A.   I will again refer to the examination-in-chief when I discussed

 8     Ciglane and the surrounding area and when I mentioned the armoured

 9     battalion which was deployed in the area, and that a manoeuvre was

10     conducted there.  Whether they were going up towards Zuc, when there was

11     a mechanised brigade -- the 1st Mechanised Brigade which was deployed

12     somewhere, and whether this battalion was part of its composition, but in

13     any case they were moving along this area in my time too.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2

16     briefly.  Gornji Velesici are mentioned here on page 1.  If we can please

17     look at page 2 now.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   In the second paragraph, artillery weapons located on Hum below

20     the relay and also at the firing range in Velesici.  Did you know that

21     there was a firing range there and that they were firing from there?

22        A.   Mr. President, Mr. President, I -- excuse me, excuse me.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, what did you want to say, Mr. Galic?

24        A.   Mr. President, I wanted to answer the question.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 37979

 1             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honours, with respect, this is now redirect

 2     and I think Dr. Karadzic is really leading with the document.  The

 3     untranslated document was an exception because Dr. Karadzic was putting

 4     that on the record for all of us, but he's really leading with the

 5     document and that should be discouraged, I think.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Do you follow, Mr. Karadzic?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   I can ask General whether he knows what was located in Hum below

10     the relay and whether he is aware that there was a firing range in

11     Velesici and whether there were any military targets there.

12        A.   On the first day, when I stated the disposition of the forces and

13     so on, I said that the artillery of the BH Army 1st Corps was located at

14     the foot of Hum.  It can be checked but it's certainly true.  As for

15     Velesici, I did not mention the information then, whether that was any

16     presence any or not, I don't remember that was very important, but I know

17     that there was some sort of firing range in that area.  What else was

18     located there?  Well, it's listed here.  I cannot interpret it because I

19     was not so well informed about this disposition, Mr. President.

20        Q.   Thank you.  What did you know about the use of private houses as

21     military facilities by the 1st Corps of the BH Army?

22        A.   Well, Mr. President, both sides, not just the BH Army.  We all

23     used, mainly in Sarajevo, privately owned houses, buildings, residential

24     buildings, and all the other infrastructure that had been built.  There

25     was no time to make special military facilities except along

Page 37980

 1     confrontation lines.  Some field facilities were built there such as

 2     roads, bunkers, communicating trenches, and so on.  So in other words,

 3     such facilities were used, private homes and houses, certainly.  Even

 4     when the residents were still there.  In particular in the

 5     Muslim-populated area in the zone of the BH Army's 1st Corps.  If the

 6     Serbs had lived in those houses, they were kicked out and the army would

 7     then move in and use such facilities.  We remember that there were some

 8     attempts on our side in Grbavica, when Budo Obradovic, the president of

 9     the Executive Council, perished because he did not allocate a Muslim

10     house to a soldier.  So there were such attempts on our side as well.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please see the next page.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   The last line of the first paragraph says that in Muslim houses

14     around the airport, members of the BH Army are located, and then in the

15     atomic shelter in Dobrinja 3 and also in the Sipad furniture store.  You

16     told us about houses.  How about the furniture store and atomic shelter

17     in Dobrinja?  How does that fit in your experience and what you knew

18     about the militarisation in Dobrinja?

19        A.   Dobrinja, as we have seen here, through the indictment and

20     through my evidence and through Madam Prosecutor's questions, was very

21     important during the war, during my case, and during your case.  It has

22     always been the focus of attention.  I did mention the atomic shelter and

23     I said it was used not for the accommodation of civilians but for

24     billeting soldiers and accommodating cannons and other equipment.  So

25     this only confirms what I've already said.  Thank you very much.

Page 37981

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, in my submission that's not only

 3     leading with the document further but it's a leading question suggesting

 4     Dobrinja was militarised.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Militarisation or the nature of civilian settlement

 7     was raised during the cross, and after setting -- introducing some

 8     foundational question, putting some individual documents, the Chamber

 9     does not -- does not have any difficulty with it.  So I will -- the

10     Chamber will allow the Defence to continue.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.

12             And now I'd like to look at 65 ter 14731.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   You said that you were aware of a staff in the vicinity of Cengic

15     Vila.  We saw a document to that effect.  And now can we look at the

16     document that I've just called up?  I'm interested in page 3.  Can we

17     first look at page 1 to see who drafted the document.  This is English.

18     However, in Serbian it says Major Per Brennskag, military observer, on

19     the 16th of March, 1995.  Who --

20             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't think it's English.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  I don't think the document we see is in English.

23     It's in a Scandinavian language.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There must be an English version

25     somewhere, I'm sure.

Page 37982

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we have.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 3, please.  Page 18 in the

 3     document.  Page 3 in what I have.  Page 18 in the document.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Look at the beginning where it says that there's the 111th

 6     Brigade and 112th Brigade, and then line 2, paragraph 2, where it says

 7     the King Tvrtko Brigade with its staff in the vicinity of Cengic Vila.

 8     Did you know of the King Tvrtko Brigade?  Whose unit was that?

 9        A.   Can this be zoomed in?  I can't see very well.  Maybe it is not

10     even important because I can answer your question anyway.

11             Mr. President, what date is this?  I apologise it's very

12     important for me to know the date.  I can't see it in the document.  Do

13     you have it?  Can you be of assistance?

14        Q.   The date is 16th March 1995.  However, he gives an overview of

15     the information that he has.

16        A.   This is excellent.  This is excellent.  I needed the date to be

17     able to provide you with a complete answer.  I spoke about the brigade

18     Kralj Tvrtko, or King Tvrtko, which is an HVO brigade.  Before 1993 when

19     it was disbanded, it was deployed around Stupsko Brdo, Stupsko Petlja and

20     thereabouts, and when once it was disbanded -- I don't know whether it

21     kept the name or not, I believe that they even changed the name.  We can

22     see that it was deployed in the vicinity of Cengic Vila, which is in the

23     area that we already discussed.  I don't know whether it has anything to

24     do with the information that I shared with you earlier, however, this is

25     a confirmation that the were indeed troops there.  The Kralj Tvrtko

Page 37983

 1     Brigade, or the King Tvrtko Brigade, is an HVO brigade.  They were mixed

 2     the Croats and Muslims at the time, the command staff was changed, and so

 3     on and so forth.  It's really not important so I don't want to go into

 4     more details.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  And what about the 1st Glorious Olovo Brigade?  Where

 6     is its staff?  Where is Buca Potok?  We will show you a map later on.

 7        A.   Well, there are two Potoks or two brooks, but in any case this in

 8     Sarajevo.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

10             MS. EDGERTON:  But the General said he didn't even need to see

11     the document to answer Dr. Karadzic's question, so I don't think he's

12     actually said anything about the document.

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I think that he's indicated that

14     this confirms information that he has.  I think that pages 16 and 17 of

15     the English should be admitted.  It's not necessary to admit the whole

16     document.  I note that it pertains to the summer of 1995, so you can

17     consider that, but nevertheless, I think the witness indicated that it

18     was consistent or confirmed information that he believed during his tour.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to add anything, Ms. Edgerton?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  No, Your Honour.  If the document -- if

21     Your Honours are inclined to admit the document, then I would simply ask

22     that the whole thing come in.

23                           [Trial Chamber confers]

24             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit those two pages shown to the witness.

25     We do not see the need to admit it in its entirety.  Shall we give the

Page 37984

 1     number.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3515, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Does Mr. Piletta-Zanin have to change his flight,

 4     Mr. Karadzic?

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, he has to.  There

 6     were a lot of ambiguous questions which have created an impression that

 7     has to be elaborated and light shed on it.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Yes, please continue.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   General, sir, it was suggested to you that you were quick to

12     refute protests and objections by UNPROFOR with regard to some incidents.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at D2586?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   If an incident happened and if there were casualties, did you

16     need deny that without checking or did you perhaps check first?  Before

17     you read the document could you please answer.  Is it correct that you

18     were quick to refute things without checking first as the Prosecutor

19     alleged?

20        A.   I provided an answer.  I can repeat the same answer again without

21     referring to the document, Mr. President.  Whenever there was an

22     objection or a protest, I would check first with my subordinated units.

23     Under the circumstances that prevailed at -- that allowed me to check as

24     much as I could, and I also took measures which were contingent on the

25     conditions.  That was my answer then and I'm repeating it now.  I agree

Page 37985

 1     that that was an assertion by the Prosecutor.  However, I had something

 2     to say with this regard and my opinion has been known from the beginning

 3     of my evidence.

 4        Q.   Could you please look at the document.  Do you remember that the

 5     command of the Ilidza Brigade was ordered to set up a commission?  How

 6     does that tally with what you said?  Was that an exception or what?  How

 7     did that tally with your general position?

 8        A.   Well, if you're asking me whether I remember this particular

 9     document, this particular order, I don't.  However, now that I read it, I

10     can say that this was drafted by Milosevic because this is his signature.

11     I believe he was my deputy, of course, and there's no dilemma here

12     whatsoever.  This is exactly how things transpired.  Milosevic would not

13     let things go lightly.  None of my chiefs did.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to call up D3390.

16     D3390.  Defence 3390.

17             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   This is your answer to Colonel Daveau [phoen].  We'll go to the

19     next page to see that this was indeed your telegram.  You answer that you

20     did not have any troops at Colina Kapa.  As for Borije and Hadzic Ravne,

21     we have our own troops so it would not be logical for us to open fire on

22     them.  Under 5 it says that you have strict adhere to the order of the

23     commander of the Main Staff.  And under 6 you say when it comes to the

24     fire that was opened on Hrid and Logavina Street, we did not establish

25     responsibility because of the absence of the soldiers who were in charge

Page 37986

 1     of the combat assets in question.  Why did you not refute the allegations

 2     lightly?  As you see in bullet point 6, does it mean that you checked

 3     everything else?

 4        A.   This speaks about my character and the character of all my

 5     troops.  We checked what we did, and if we didn't, we said why we didn't,

 6     and that we were not in a position to provide an appropriate answer.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we go to the

 8     following page.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Bullet point 8, you say here that -- or you admit that, by

11     mistake, a shell was fired -- there is no translation but I'm going to

12     read.  Lukavicka Street, Muhameda Dzudze Street and Djure Jaksica Street

13     were not shelled.  There was just one shell that fell on Lukavicka road

14     when the mortar asset was being repaired without due caution.

15        A.   You can see from bullet point 8 that we said that this was --

16     that this was our shell which was fired from my position by mistake

17     because of careless handling of weapons.  It is not a sin to admit a

18     mistake.  Not admitting a mistake creates other problems, but it is also

19     not good if mistakes are repeated.  That's why we opened up to that

20     mistake because we also at the same time sought ways to avoid a

21     repetition of that mistake.

22        Q.   Thank you, General, sir.  You also received various situations

23     with regard to civilian settlements.  I would like to look at a document.

24     However, you responded that the Serbian civilian settlements were also

25     shelled.  D346 is the following document I would like to see, and let's

Page 37987

 1     see what you implied when you said that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, this is it.  Can we zoom in

 3     for the benefit of the General.  I hope that the other participants can

 4     see the English version.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   General, sir, this is a Muslim document sent by the 1st Corps on

 7     the 20th of March, 1993.  In the first paragraph where it says

 8     information about the enemy, which is the Serbs obviously --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes we can't see the English

10     translation.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Can you tell us briefly where is Rogoj with regard to the centre

13     of town?

14        A.   Rogoj is a pass leading towards Kalinovik and Foca and it is some

15     30 kilometres away from Sarajevo, or thereabouts.  This is a pass from

16     the Foca valley in Herzegovina towards Sarajevo.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And now can we scroll up to look at bullet point 2

18     where it says:  Information about our own forces, i.e., the forces of the

19     1st Corps.  It says that they opened fire from 130-millimetre cannons

20     with two shells; a 105-millimetre howitzer, four shells; and a

21     152-millimetre howitzer top with 22 shells on the requested targets of

22     the command of 1st Corps.  Chetniks responded to -- on the sectors of our

23     weapons by firing four projectiles.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, bear it in mind when you don't show

25     the English page on the monitor, the interpreters do not have access to

Page 37988

 1     the English, so please read slow, very slow.

 2             Yes, what is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, sir, it says here that you responded by opening fire --

 5     or, rather, launching four shells on their sector where their assets were

 6     deployed.  Why did you do that?  Why didn't you open fire on another

 7     sector?

 8        A.   When we look at the Operative Group Igman we can see what assets

 9     that they had at their disposal.  There is a 130-millimetre cannon, a

10     105-millimetre howitzer, and a howitzer cannon, 152-millimetres.  They

11     launched 25 shells and so on and so forth.  Let me stop there.  Those are

12     heavy pieces.  The heaviest that we had on our strength.  They launched

13     25 shells, as they put it themselves, and later on they said they didn't

14     have weapons, they didn't have assets, they didn't have anything to

15     defend themselves, and they didn't have anything to respond to our fire.

16     And when we responded we only launched four projectiles.  I don't know

17     whether they were shells or what.  I don't know what we responded with.

18     Those targets were mostly in that area of the Igman Operative Group, from

19     Igman towards Rogoj.  I suppose we didn't have more projectiles, but we

20     were in a situation when we didn't have enough of that type of

21     ammunition.

22             I've already told you that from the very beginning we didn't have

23     enough ammunition.  That's why I would like to go back to

24     Madam Prosecutor's allegations that we had the VBRs, yes, we did, but we

25     didn't have any ammunition.  We could not launch a single projectile when

Page 37989

 1     I arrived because we didn't have any reserves.  We did not have any

 2     supplies.  While I was there, the VBR or multi-rocket launcher, we did

 3     not use it once.  We did have them but we didn't have ammunition.  I also

 4     said that we did not have any ammunition for the 72-millimetre recoilless

 5     cannons.  We didn't have a single shell.  And we can see here and as I

 6     already told you, the armed forces of the BiH Army had shells and assets.

 7     That would be my answer to you, Mr. President.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  As for the 82-millimetres recoilless gun, I want to

 9     correct that, and please look at these two lines where it says that they

10     fired five shells against Vojkovici village and the forestry school.  Was

11     the Vojkovici village a civilian settlement?

12        A.   Vojkovici village, we said where it was before.  It's on the

13     slopes of Igman.  To the right of it is Hrasnica.  So it was a civilian

14     settlement.  There were no military facilities in the village itself that

15     could be targeted.  And the forestry school was in the area of Ilidza, as

16     far as I remember, Mr. President.  That was next to Stojcevac, up towards

17     Stojcevac, that's the area where the forestry school was and it was there

18     on its own.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I see what the

20     time is and I think that you announced that you would need some minutes,

21     so perhaps if it's the time to stop, I could stop now and continue

22     tomorrow.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure I said that I would need some minutes.

24     I don't think I said that, but I remember General said that he was tired.

25     It's time to adjourn for today.  We'll continue tomorrow.  But before

Page 37990

 1     that, yes, Mr. Piletta-Zanin.

 2             MR. PILETTA-ZANIN: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Since we

 3     still have a few minutes and in order to facilitate everybody's work

 4     including the Registry, would it be possible to have some forecast for

 5     tomorrow's hearing so that I can plan my flight back?  And I would also

 6     like to have more information about whether the General would have to

 7     return by plane or by car.  You had some reservations about that.  Thank

 8     you very much.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I will come -- I will ask Mr. Karadzic how much he

10     would need tomorrow, but as to the way in which the General is to be

11     escorted back to the third country, it goes beyond the purview of the

12     Tribunal as a whole, so I don't think we have a say with respect to that,

13     but once it was raised, I think -- I hope it would be solved in a way

14     that all the parties are happy with.  That's all I can say at the moment.

15             But, Mr. Karadzic, how long would you need tomorrow?

16             THE ACCUSED:  I will finish certainly before the end of first

17     session.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED:  But if not now, I may ask you tomorrow, too, that I

20     be allowed to see witnesses that accomplish their own testimony and that

21     are in the Detention Unit with me.

22             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think I followed.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  I think that Dr. Karadzic is ask that you modify

24     your order concerning the separation of General Galic from him at the

25     Detention Unit so that the Detention Unit is authorised to allow them to

Page 37991

 1     meet after his testimony is concluded.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I think we have -- we had similar experience with

 3     the previous witness.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  It was mentioned, but it was too late.  By

 5     the time we had contact with the Detention Unit, the witness had already

 6     been gone, but they seem to indicate that they believe that unless your

 7     order is modified, since it does, you know, create a separation regime,

 8     that they would be unable to accommodate any visits between Dr. Karadzic

 9     and the detainee.

10             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will consider the issue.

11             Before we adjourn, Mr. Tieger, in relation to the Prosecution

12     motion to exclude certain parts of Mr. Trivic's statement, the Defence

13     responded that it had no objection to the deletion of pages 12 to 20,

14     but -- although it stated that it would add some parts later on.  In

15     light of the response, are you ready to withdraw your motion?

16             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.  We may be dealing with the

17     subject further, but you're quite right in respect of events thus far.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  The hearing is adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.52 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day

21                           of May, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.