Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 39061

 1                           Friday, 31 May 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Yes, Mr. Gaynor, please continue.

 8             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 9                           WITNESS:  MILE POPARIC [Resumed]

10                           [Witness answered through interpretation]

11                           Cross-examination by Mr. Gaynor: [Continued]

12        Q.   Mr. Poparic, when we broke yesterday we were discussing the

13     measurement of the azimuth of the Markale 2 incident.

14             MR. GAYNOR:  If we call up --

15        A.   I apologise, but I cannot hear well.  Can the volume be raised?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Somebody needs to speak for a test so I'll do it.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Do you hear me -- no?  Let us see.

18             Yes.  Mr. Poparic, do you hear me well?

19             THE WITNESS:  Okay, okay.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

21             MR. GAYNOR:

22        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Poparic.

23        A.   [In English] Good morning.

24        Q.   Now, when we broke yesterday we were discussing the measurement

25     of the azimuth of the Markale 2 incident, and if we can go, please, to

Page 39062

 1     your report D3644 at page 112 in English and that's 113 in B/C/S.  Now if

 2     we could focus, please, on footnote 212.  Yesterday you clarified your

 3     evidence about the measurements by the French UNPROFOR troops and you

 4     accepted that you had made a mistake in footnote 211.  Now in footnote

 5     212 you say:

 6             "It is clear that the French sappers did not measure the azimuth

 7     of 2850 mils and that for unknown reasons they accepted the results of

 8     the measurement of the Sarajevo CSB."

 9             Now, Mr. Poparic, is it correct that you now accept that the

10     French did in fact measure the azimuth themselves?

11        A.   [Interpretation] I will explain.  I accept that they measured the

12     azimuth - and that's the one we can see on the video-clip, that's the

13     azimuth at 2.800, 157.5 degrees is the value - and they rounded up the

14     value to 2.850 which is 165 degrees.  It's interesting that the CSB also

15     measured an azimuth of 2.850, but the units of measure are different.

16     The CSB of Sarajevo has units where the circle is divided into 6.000

17     units, whereas the French divided into 6.400 units.  These two facts make

18     the results appear the same at first sight, but they differ substantially

19     by 10 or 11 degrees.  They did measure 2800 and rounded it up to 2850

20     which matches the other result, but different units were applied and

21     there is a substantial difference in the azimuth --

22        Q.   Let's have a look at the report of CSB Sarajevo.

23             MR. GAYNOR:  Could we look at P1908, page 3, B/C/S, page 2 in

24     English.

25             JUDGE KWON:  We'll not broadcast this.

Page 39063

 1             MR. GAYNOR:  Very well, Mr. President.  Thank you.

 2        Q.   Now in this report it's clear that the CSB Sarajevo have accorded

 3     the azimuth as 170 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees.  It's in paragraph 2.

 4     There's no reference in that report to any measurement by mils.  And also

 5     we can look at it in a minute, P1934 -  perhaps we can look at it now -

 6     which is a report compiled by Emir Turkusic.  And if we look at that at

 7     page 5 in B/C/S and page 4 in English, we see there that Emir Turkusic,

 8     who was also within the RBiH MUP but within the KDZ part of that measured

 9     it as 170 degrees plus or minus 5 degrees.

10             So what is the basis of your assertion that the investigators of

11     the Sarajevo CSB used a compass with a division of 1.600 while they did

12     the calculation and what is the relevance of that assertion to these

13     figures?

14        A.   The CSB Sarajevo investigators worked together with UNMO

15     observers, I believe.  There was a Lieutenant-Colonel Konings.  And in

16     the report of the UNMO observers it is stated that the azimuth was 170

17     degrees or 2850 mils.  In some documents that you showed, the value is

18     expressed in degrees, but in some others it's expressed in mils.  170,

19     according to this division of 1:6.000 is -- equals 2850 mils or actually

20     a little less.  The exact value is 170 point something.

21             Now, in this system of a division of 6.000 --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down and repeat

23     the figures.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Poparic, please speak slowly and repeat from:

25     "The system of division of 6.000 ..."

Page 39064

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If these 170 degrees are expressed

 2     in mils according to the division of the circle into 6.000, we'll get

 3     2850 or -- actually, that's a bit over 170 but that can be neglected.  If

 4     the value of 2850 in the division of 1:6400 is converted into degrees,

 5     then we get 165 degrees.  That's the value the French sappers came up

 6     with.  And the difference is about 10 degrees.  There are documents here,

 7     though, that state the value as 170 degrees or 2850 mils.  So there can

 8     be no error.

 9             MR. GAYNOR:

10        Q.   But you accept that the French UNPROFOR troops recorded the value

11     as 2.850 mils and the CSB recorded the value in degrees as 170 plus or

12     minus 5 degrees; you accept that, don't you?

13        A.   I accept that the French measured the value of 2850.  They put

14     down 2850, but actually I heard that they measured 2800 which is not a

15     significant error.  That was fairly done.  It's -- we're talking about a

16     rounding of 2 degrees.  And there's a police clip where we see that

17     they're using military compasses that has a division into mils.  Now, how

18     they converted the values, I don't know.  Maybe they measured the value

19     in degrees originally and then converted into mils or the other way

20     around, I don't know, but it doesn't really matter.  I accept that this

21     is the result of CSB and UNMO and this result equal -- is equal to an

22     angle of 2850 mils in the 1:6.000 division.  If it were -- we're talking

23     about the 1:6400 division, then the value would be slightly different,

24     about 3.000.  And the difference is obvious and there can be no

25     confusion.

Page 39065

 1        Q.   All right.  We'll move on to another subject.  If we can turn to

 2     the next page in English and B/C/S of your report, which is D3644.

 3     That's page 113 in English and 114 in B/C/S.  We're now going to look at

 4     your assertions concerning the cymbeline radar system.

 5             On that page you say that -- it goes:

 6             "On the condition that the shell had a certain minimum angle of

 7     descent of 67 degrees and considering the conditions for which the radar

 8     had been set up, it was easy to determine the maximum lower incoming

 9     trajectory for each charge ..."

10             And if we turn to the next page in both languages, we see the

11     graph containing a great deal of information about that Cymbeline radar.

12     Now, did you draw this graph yourself?

13        A.   Yes, Mrs. Subotic and I drew it.  These trajectories are -- were

14     calculated using a programme used to make firing tables.  We used it to

15     have a graph with the relevant points, but it seems we failed to point

16     out to which shell this is applied.  It's the M49 shell which corresponds

17     to the Russian 0F-473 model.  We chose it deliberately, although I'm not

18     sure that the VRS had these shells because the UNPROFOR report stating

19     that these shells could not be seen on the radar is based on the firing

20     table for this M49 shell, that's why we calculated the trajectories for

21     this very shell to check what UNPROFOR had stated.  And, by the way, the

22     range of this shell is shorter than that of the other.

23             MR. GAYNOR:  Can we focus, Mr. Registrar, on either one of these

24     images.  They're both exactly the same.

25        Q.   Now, you're confirming that these trajectories are not in fact

Page 39066

 1     for the 120-millimetre mortar projectile; is that right?

 2        A.   No, no.  We misunderstood each other.  It's not 122 but 120.  But

 3     these are the trajectories for a 120-millimetre mortar shell, but it's an

 4     older model that was manufactured under licence from the Russians.  It is

 5     called a heavy shell and the one used now is a light shell.  So this one

 6     is a bit heavier and has a shorter range and carries a bit more explosive

 7     and so on.  That's why I pointed out that we calculated these

 8     trajectories for this very shell because the UNPROFOR in its report

 9     stated the limitations in range and explained why it couldn't be seen on

10     the radar and all that referred to this mine.  So there can be no

11     mistake.  In the report about the shelling, the trajectories for that

12     other shell were stated, which actually corroborates what I'm saying.  We

13     have information for both kinds of shell showing that they couldn't be

14     seen on the radar.

15        Q.   But the trajectories we're looking at on the screen at the moment

16     do not correspond to the trajectories for the MK -- M74, 120-millimetre

17     mortar projectile which is considered to have been the cause of the

18     explosion at Markale; is that right?  That's right, isn't it?

19        A.   I'll explain.  It's that mortar that you mentioned, but it's not

20     the M62 shell but the M48 -- sorry, M49 shell.  It's only a different

21     shell fired from the same mortar because one mortar can fire different

22     types of shell.  These are newer shells.  The M62 shell is the most

23     frequent model and there are other variants, whereas the older model is

24     heavier.  This is the shell for the 120-millimetre shell that was

25     allegedly used to fire a shell on the Markale market.

Page 39067

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 6, lines 5 and 6, due to the

 4     different rules applying to negations in Serbian and English, it was

 5     recorded wrongly.  The witness said that it was impossible that they

 6     could not be seen on the radar.  [In English] It showed that they

 7     couldn't be -- it couldn't be that they hadn't been seen.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think I'm following.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 6, line 5, I'll read out

10     what was recorded.

11             [In English] It showed that they couldn't be seen on the radar.

12     It should be all the way around.  It couldn't happen that they wouldn't

13     be seen on the radar.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Do you see that, Mr. Gaynor?  Line -- it's line 1.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Line 5, line 5.

16             MR. GAYNOR:  It's just slipped off my screen but we can -- I can

17     ask the witness to clarify.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             MR. GAYNOR:

20        Q.   Now, Mr. Poparic, you heard that.  Could you clarify what your

21     words were.

22        A.   I said that we showed that the M49 shell fired from a

23     120-millimetre mortar must have been caught by the radar beam, and we

24     also showed in the other report containing a similar diagram that the M62

25     shell fired from the same mortar also must have been caught by the radar

Page 39068

 1     beam.  All shells irrespective of the model fired from that mortar must

 2     have been caught by the radar beam.  I think it's clear.

 3        Q.   Okay.  Now, in any event your analysis depends to a very great

 4     deal on the location of the centre point of the radar beam and of the

 5     radius of that beam which was in operation on that day.  So I want to

 6     explore that with you.  And a third point which is the location of the

 7     centre point of the radar beam in comparison to the market-place.  So

 8     let's start with the first thing.  Do you see the centre point of the

 9     radar beam which appears to be quite high in the sky above the

10     market-place?  What is the source of your placing the centre point of the

11     radar beam at that point?

12        A.   The centre point you are referring to is irrelevant in this

13     depiction of ours.  The height of 548 metres - or we can round it to

14     550 - this line is important because that's what UNPROFOR stated as a --

15     for which UNPROFOR was a source, above which anything must have been

16     caught, which means that a trajectory 900 metres high would not have been

17     registered, whereas if we were to show the other diagram in the other

18     report, it would be easier to explain.  This height of 550 metres is the

19     height of which UNPROFOR says that anything above that must have been

20     observed.  It was stated by the engineers using the radar.  Maybe the

21     radar beam was wider, but that is not important.  We only made a sketch,

22     an approximate sketch of the front of the radar beam in relation to the

23     trajectory.  It may have been twice as wide or half as wide, but that's

24     not really relevant.  All we care about is the lower limit because the

25     problem is the lower limit and not the centre point.

Page 39069

 1        Q.   Sir, you're suggesting that two things are irrelevant.  One is

 2     the centre point of the radar beam and the second is the radius of the

 3     radar beam; is that right?

 4        A.   That is right.  It is relevant for the one who decides how to

 5     position the radar and how to -- where to point it, but I think they did

 6     a very good job about that because the report states that it was at about

 7     1.050 metres from the separation line.  I don't think that's precise

 8     enough because if we look at the situation on the ground the separation

 9     line was some 2 kilometres away.  They probably had in mind the direction

10     of the radar beam.  Why was it necessary to place the radar there?  It

11     was their task to observe all the projectiles coming from the VRS

12     positions and vice versa.  If we take a look at Sarajevo, how wide the

13     inhabited area is, then we're talking about some 4 to 5 kilometres.  And

14     if we consider the lower or the descending part of the trajectory,

15     then ...

16        Q.   Mr. Poparic --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness repeat the last part of his

18     sentence.

19             MR. GAYNOR:

20        Q.   Could you repeat the last part of your answer.

21        A.   I said that Sarajevo is 4 to 5 kilometres wide there, and if we

22     imagine that the furthest point is targeted or the point nearest to the

23     VRS positions, then the radar must be positioned in such a way that it

24     can catch all these trajectories.  And this position of a thousand metres

25     is roughly at the point where all the trajectories meet, as is the case

Page 39070

 1     here.  They would all be within the beam.  And the technicians who did

 2     that did a very good job about positioning their radar.

 3        Q.   Now, Mr. Poparic, at the bottom of -- just under this graph in

 4     the English language version you say:

 5             "It can be seen in the picture that there was no curve which

 6     could have slipped under the beam ..."

 7             Now, I put it to you surely that depends on exactly where the

 8     centre point of the radar beam was and how large the radius of the radar

 9     beam was on the day in question?

10        A.   Well, I believe that this has been misinterpreted because it says

11     here that it could not go under the beam, which means that they all had

12     to be caught within the beam.  That's the essence.  In principle you are

13     right.  It depends on the central point of the radar beam and its width.

14     However, we did not have that information.  We received a different piece

15     of information.  According to the information that we received, we got

16     the lower limit of the radar beam which was 548 or 550.  That was the

17     most important thing for us.  Everything above that would go beyond the

18     radar beam, you see.  What matters to us is the lower limit, and we

19     received that information from the UNPROFOR report.  And this is official

20     data.

21        Q.   Mr. Poparic, thank you for confirming that you did not have

22     information on the central point of the radar beam and its width.  I'd

23     like you also to confirm that you do not have any information for where

24     precisely the radar was located in relation to the target or in relation

25     to the front line; isn't that correct?

Page 39071

 1        A.   There is some information as to its position, but we don't have

 2     the exact co-ordinates.

 3        Q.   Well --

 4        A.   I repeat once again, we received the official UNPROFOR data from

 5     its report about the height at which the radar could not caught any of

 6     the trajectories, and this is the only relevant information.  The rest is

 7     technical details which matter to the people who placed the radar and

 8     handled the radar, who make sure that the radar beam catches everything.

 9     In our report, it is stated what was the minimum height up to which the

10     trajectories could be caught.  We received that from UNPROFOR.  And let

11     me repeat:  Based on that they concluded that they -- the trajectory

12     slipped under the beam.  We are showing here that UNPROFOR when it claims

13     that the radar beam which caught trajectories up to 550 metres could not

14     catch these trajectories.  However, we demonstrate very clear that it was

15     supposed to all -- to catch all the trajectories, so we have to compare

16     what UNPROFOR claimed and what was the real situation on the ground.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And if you show that part in the

19     shelling report, I can provide some more details as to where UNPROFOR

20     made a cardinal mistake in their analysis and this is the key to the

21     whole problem.

22             MR. GAYNOR:

23        Q.   Well --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             MR. GAYNOR:  Yes.

Page 39072

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 10, line 9 and 10, we again

 3     have a countersense.  It says:

 4             [In English] "... that would go beyond the radar beam, you see."

 5             [Interpretation] The witness said that everything that would go

 6     above 548 would have been registered by the radar because it would have

 7     been caught by the radar beam.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, this is what I said.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

10             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   Mr. Poparic, ultimately you are asking the Trial Chamber to

12     prefer your graph and your conclusions over the conclusions reached by

13     UNPROFOR, which was the organisation which was actually operating the

14     radar on the day of the Markale incident; isn't that right?

15        A.   I'm not asking for anything from the Trial Chamber, I don't have

16     that right.  I'm just telling you what the situation was.  The fact is,

17     however, that UNPROFOR operated the radar and that they claim that the

18     radar was on for 24 hours, that it was in a good working order.  The fact

19     is also that none of the technicians who operated the radar confirmed the

20     findings that the radar could not catch any of the shells.  The

21     conclusion was reached by Lieutenant-Colonel Powers [phoen] together with

22     General Smith.  I don't know whether he is an artillery man or something

23     else.  However, none of the technicians who were in charge of operating

24     the radar didn't -- confirmed the finding that the radar beam was placed

25     in such a way that it could not catch those trajectories.  We claim that

Page 39073

 1     it would have been impossible if we bear in mind that -- the position of

 2     the radar beam.  The key issue here is the height, the lowest level of

 3     the radar beam, of 548 or 550 metres if we round it off.

 4        Q.   We'll move now to the Markale 1 incident which is the next

 5     incident -- actually, it appears at page 116 in the English of your

 6     report.  You have there a graph setting out the possibility of hitting

 7     the target with the first shot.  Now, let's just go through this graph in

 8     some detail.  First of all, the target dimensions of 25.8 metres by 34

 9     metres, that refers to your understanding of the size of the Markale

10     market-place; correct?

11        A.   Yes, that's how large the market is, and you can see it on the

12     land survey map that we had at our disposal.

13        Q.   Very good.  Now, if we can just go to charge 0 plus 5 as an

14     example, we see that the Vd set out is 29 metres and the Vp is 12 metres.

15     Now, if we can translate that into layman's language, that essentially

16     means that if you were to fire a 120-millimetre mortar projectile from a

17     distance of 5.782 metres from the market-place, there is a 50 per cent

18     chance that it would land within an ellipse which is 58 metres by 24

19     metres.  Is that correct?

20        A.   I believe that you are wrong in just one thing.  When you use

21     this Vd and Vp, when we are talking about probable deviations on range

22     and on direction and when we say 50 per cent of the hits will be correct,

23     this concerns a group of projectiles.  If we fired ten of them, we can

24     expect that five will hit the target.  If ten are fired, it may be

25     expected that five will hit the target, and we're talking about a

Page 39074

 1     different thing here.  In the theory of firing, it is also studied and

 2     the calculations are based on that at theory.  We are looking for the

 3     information as to how probable it is for the shell -- the first shell to

 4     be correct because we had only one shell here.  In the theory of firing,

 5     we have a solution to that problem as well.  What is the probability for

 6     the first shell to hit your target?  And this is not the same as when you

 7     have a group of projectiles because the first five may be off target, the

 8     last five may hit the target, so you get your 50 per cent.  Here the

 9     issue is how probable is it for the first projectile to hit the target?

10     And this is a different matter.  So we're talking about a very essential

11     difference in looking at the probability through the Vd and Vp

12     statistical measures because we're talking about a group of projectiles.

13     We're not talking about a sequence of projectiles that will hit the

14     target.  We say if there is ten of them, we have a 50 per cent

15     probability that they will hit the target, which means five will hit the

16     target and five will be off target.  According to the theory of firing,

17     there is also a probability which we have to calculate, and that is how

18     probable is it that the first projectile would hit the target.  The

19     probability is much lower and it is only logical.

20        Q.   Now, can we move to the next page of your report, please, and

21     there we have a sketch which has been prepared, I understand, either by

22     you or Mrs. Subotic of what you understand to be the dimensions of

23     Markale market-place.  And if we can focus in just on the sketch.  First

24     of all, can you confirm as a separate issue that the placement of the

25     stalls in this sketch that you prepared is not, in fact, based on the

Page 39075

 1     contemporaneous video taken in the minutes after the incident?

 2        A.   A few minutes after the incident the stalls were all over the

 3     place.  There is a difference.  This is the placement which differs in

 4     the passage between Marsal Tito Street and Dzenetica Cikma Street.  On

 5     the day of the incident in that area there were more stalls in the --

 6     that passage, approximately up to here, up to the building on 22nd

 7     December.  There are two -- there were two rows of stalls, and there was

 8     an obstacle in the passage from Marsal Tito to Dzenetica Cikma Street

 9     with stalls -- you couldn't go through that passage.  I don't know why.

10             Later on on the clip you can see that they were moving those

11     stalls and then you can see the cars entering that area in order to

12     transport the dead.  On the day of the incident that area was full of

13     stalls for some unknown reason.  But this is an approximate layout, this

14     is a schematic representation of the layout.  But when we are talking

15     about the probability, that probability referred to the entire market.

16     We looked at the probability for the shell to hit the entire area, and if

17     we had looked at the probability of the shell hitting anywhere between

18     any of the stalls, the calculation would be totally different.

19        Q.   Now, I want to take you to --

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 18 and 19, the witness

23     said -- it says:

24             [In English] "A few minutes after the incident the stalls were

25     all over the place."

Page 39076

 1             [Interpretation] The witness said the stalls were upside down.

 2     Everything was [In English] Turned over or turned upside down

 3     [Interpretation] Overturned or turned upside down.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 5             Do you confirm that, Mr. Poparic?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can confirm, but I would like to

 7     also to emphasise that the main difference between the sketch and the

 8     real situation in the market-place lies in the fact that I mentioned a

 9     while ago.  In the passage between Marsal Tito street and

10     Dzenetica Cikma Street there were another longitudinal row of stalls and

11     there were also some stalls that prevented the passage into that street

12     for some unknown reasons and those stalls were perpendicular to the row

13     of longitudinal stalls.

14             JUDGE KWON:  So in the end you agree with Mr. Gaynor that this is

15     not based upon the contemporaneous scene?  That was the crux of the

16     question.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we are looking at the number of

18     the stalls and their layout, Mr. Gaynor is right.  As far as the

19     dimensions of the market-place are concerned, this is correct.  This

20     sketch was transferred from the land survey map.  It is very precise.  We

21     checked that it tallies with the real situation.  The dimension of the

22     market-place correspond to the situation as it was on the day, and as for

23     the layout of the stalls, it may have been different but we did not even

24     take that into consideration when we were calculating our probabilities.

25     All we were looking at was the area, the space of the market-place.

Page 39077

 1             MR. GAYNOR:

 2        Q.   Very well.  Mr. Poparic, we'll take it for the purposes of this

 3     exercise that we accept the dimensions of the market-place itself are

 4     correct, setting aside any difference we might have about the location of

 5     the stalls.  And I'd like the usher to assist you with a pen and I'd like

 6     you to draw an ellipse in whatever direction you prefer of 24 metres by

 7     58 metres around that market-place, please.

 8        A.   It would be correct to start at the centre of the market.  If

 9     somebody were to target it, obviously it would be logical for that person

10     to choose -- I will assume that it is here.  What did we say?  24 --

11        Q.   You say that the market-place was 25.8 metres by 34 metres.  And

12     I'd like you to draw an ellipse of 24 metres by 58 metres.

13        A.   Yes.  The axis or semi-axis should be 24 or -- I didn't

14     understand you.

15        Q.   I would like you to draw around the market-place an ellipse of 24

16     metres by 58 metres.

17        A.   So the entire ellipse should be 24?  Is that what you're asking

18     me to do?

19        Q.   Mr. Poparic, you know exactly what I'm asking you to do.

20        A.   I don't know whether we understood each other properly.

21        Q.   You know what an ellipse is, don't you?

22        A.   I know, yes.  When I draw an ellipse, we usually use semi-axes.

23     Are you referring to the external dimensions of the ellipse?  Okay.  24

24     by 58 -- okay.  I will draw based on what I understood.  This could be it

25     if we understood each other well, that is.

Page 39078

 1        Q.   I think we have.  Now, that marks the area within which 50

 2     per cent of the projectiles would land if you were to fire a

 3     120-millimetre mortar projectile from a distance of 5.782 metres from the

 4     market-place; isn't that right?

 5        A.   That is right, but if we are talking about a group of

 6     projectiles, if several projectiles are fired.  This is only logical.  If

 7     we say that the probability is 50, that means if ten projectiles were

 8     fired it is to be expected that five will land in this area.

 9        Q.   Well, I put it to you that the mortar crew which had fired this

10     projectile in fact stood a pretty good chance of hitting the market-place

11     if they wanted to, especially if they were firing from a mortar which had

12     been in position for many months and they had access to prerecorded

13     target data.

14        A.   This doesn't change anything in the conclusion, what we're

15     talking about.  And these are Vd and Vp.  These are not only

16     characteristics of the mortar.  It also means that we're talking about

17     the characteristics of the shell as well, and it all depends on the crew.

18     They cannot influence the characteristics that a shell has.  It is a

19     projectile which has some shortcomings and there is also a dispersion

20     that you have to take into account.  And it's not up to the crew.  The

21     crew can calculate the elements, it can do its job well, it can position

22     the asset properly, so -- so as to increase the precision.  But the Vd

23     and the Vp that we're talking about are the characteristics of the shell

24     and there -- nobody can influence that.  Every shell will have a

25     dispersion margin that the crew cannot influence.  The crew can perhaps

Page 39079

 1     increase that dispersion if they do not have the firm basis for the asset

 2     and they don't calculate the elements properly.  Every shell has some

 3     shortcomings which reflect in the lack of precision which can be bigger

 4     or smaller.  And this is implied by Vd and Vp.  These are characteristics

 5     of the series of the ammunition.

 6             When you test ammunition, the criteria that is applied is whether

 7     that shell satisfies the criterion of probable dispersion.  This is the

 8     characteristics that are characteristic of ammunition on which a crew

 9     cannot influence.  I heard somebody -- a member of the crew who said:  I

10     can hit a match, which is ridiculous.  No person can influence the

11     characteristics of ammunition.  Vd and Vp are primarily the

12     characteristics of a shell and the crew cannot influence that.

13             You also have to take into account weather conditions, the wind,

14     and everything else, and all that falls under the general category of Vd

15     and Vp.

16        Q.   Could you sign --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

18             Yes, while witness signs this image.

19             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

20             Just a second.  Be careful.  Let's not lose your marking.  Yes.

21             THE WITNESS:  Okay.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now this has been clarified;

23     however, on line 4 there is again a countersense.  The witness sense that

24     this doesn't at all depend on the crew.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.

Page 39080

 1             THE ACCUSED:  Of crew at all, not all depends.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'd like to tender that.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6349, Your Honours.

 6             MR. GAYNOR:  Thank you.

 7             Mr. President, no further questions.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 9             Shall we have a short break, five minutes, to change the setting?

10     We'll continue with Mr. Kecmanovic.  Correct?  Yes.

11             You understand the schedule, Mr. Poparic?  You heard the --

12     there's a change in the witness schedule, so your evidence will be

13     interposed by Mr. Kecmanovic's evidence.  I thank you for your kind

14     understanding, Mr. Poparic.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're welcome.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  And just to be clear, Mr. President, Mr. Poparic

17     is to remain in the building because we expect to resume his evidence

18     later today.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             Five minutes.

21                           --- Break taken at 9.52 a.m.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23                           [The witness takes the stand]

24                           --- On resuming at 10.02 a.m.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration,

Page 39081

 1     please.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 3     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

 4                           WITNESS:  NENAD KECMANOVIC

 5                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Kecmanovic.  Please be seated and

 7     make yourself comfortable.

 8             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

10     Excellencies.  Good morning to everyone.

11                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Professor Kecmanovic.  Did you

13     hear me?

14        A.   Yes, I did.  Good morning.

15        Q.   Tell us, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

16        A.   Yes, I did.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And thank you for making a pause before answering and

18     speaking slowly so that the transcript may be accurate.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up in e-court

20     1D7351.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Do you see on the screen in front of you your statement?

23        A.   Yes, I do.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Did you read and sign this statement?

25        A.   Yes, I did.

Page 39082

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the last page so that

 2     Mr. Kecmanovic may identify his signature.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is my signature.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you said

 6     to my Defence team and is there some sort of confusion concerning an

 7     abbreviation, or rather, does it faithfully reflect what you said and

 8     disregard what I said last because it relates to the English version

 9     only?

10        A.   Yes, it does.

11        Q.   If I were to put the same questions to you today would your

12     answers essentially be the same?

13        A.   Yes, essentially they would.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             Can you tell us, what would be the abbreviation in Serbian for

16     the party that you headed in Bosnia?

17        A.   SRS.

18        Q.   Meaning?  What is the full name?

19        A.   The Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina.

21        Q.   Does the abbreviation in Serbian call to mind some other

22     political parties and are there any connections there?

23        A.   Yes.  The acronym is the same as that for the Serbian Radical

24     Party.  Now, the orientation of my party was pro-Yugoslav.  It was a

25     party in Bosnia-Herzegovina and I was the leader of that party in

Page 39083

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And the then-prime minister Ante Markovic was the

 2     leader of the party at the level of Yugoslavia.  Now, because of our

 3     orientation some members of other political parties would half

 4     jokingly/half seriously say that we were the party of reserve Serbs.  The

 5     reformist orientation was how they referred to us because we were in

 6     favour of remaining in Yugoslavia but that was also the orientation of

 7     the Serbian Democratic Party.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I wish to tender this

10     document into evidence, but I only wish to note that the acronym of SRS

11     in it does not stand - and I mean in the English version - does not stand

12     for the Serbian Radical Party but rather for the Alliance of Reform

13     Forces.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  In the English version it's noted as SRSJ.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, Mr. Karadzic is actually

16     referring to paragraph 8, where there is the "Serbian Radical Party"

17     behind the abbreviation "SRS" and that's wrong.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that it was in the course

19     of translation that this came about.  This was an interpretation on the

20     part of the translator that this was the Serbian Radical Party, and I

21     wish to thank my learned friend for this comment.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Noted.

23             Any objection, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  However, in the view of the Chamber paragraphs 45

Page 39084

 1     and 46 of Mr. Kecmanovic's statement contain a detailed information about

 2     mistreatment of Bosnian Serbs, including the existence of detention

 3     centres.  The Chamber is of the view that this level of detail is not

 4     relevant to the charges against the accused, and accordingly orders the

 5     redaction of these paragraphs.

 6             With that redaction, the Chamber will admit Mr. Kecmanovic's

 7     statement as Defence -- next Defence exhibit.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3645, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will now read

11     Professor Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic's statement in a summary version in

12     English and then I will put some other questions.

13             [In English] Nenad Kecmanovic was president of the Alliance of

14     Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for BH.  Until 1989 he was a member of the

15     Communist Party.  He was nominated as BH representative for a member of

16     the SFRY Presidency.

17             After the elections of 1990, the Assembly of the Bosnia and

18     Herzegovina was accepted positively by the public.  On June the 1st of

19     1992, Professor Kecmanovic joined the BH Presidency.  He proposed a work

20     programme to be established within the BH Presidency.  Alija Izetbegovic

21     was the only one who kept reservations against the platform which was

22     based on the Cutileiro Plan.  Communication with the other parts of BH

23     was not possible for all members of the Presidency except for

24     Alija Izetbegovic.

25             In April 1992, Professor Kecmanovic participated in a meeting

Page 39085

 1     with Mirko Pejanovic, Momcilo Krajisnik, and Radovan Karadzic at Terme

 2     hotel in Ilidza where specific measures to deal with the situation of

 3     conflicts were discussed.  A subsequent meeting with the same purpose was

 4     arranged in May 1992 between Momcilo Krajisnik and Alija Izetbegovic.

 5     Momcilo Krajisnik proposed temporary division of the territory according

 6     to the existing territorial and ethnic distribution and the front line.

 7     Pressure came from the Serbian people because there were victims falling

 8     on both sides.  A copy of this plan was also sent to Pale.

 9             In spring 1992, the status of the BH -- of the JNA in BH was

10     discussed by the Yugoslav President Branko Kostic and Minister of Defence

11     General Adzic.  A proposal for an agreement was accepted and supported by

12     Slobodan Milosevic; however, it was rejected within the BH Presidency.

13     The JNA was supposed to remain in BH to guarantee peace and security and

14     to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts.

15             President Karadzic was fully concerned about what was happening

16     in Sarajevo.  The National Equality Council was developed before the

17     elections in 1990.  Its primary functions were to ensure the protection

18     of vital national interests of each of the three constituent peoples and

19     to preserve the equality of the rights of all ethnic groups.  Out-voting

20     of the Serbian deputies in the BH Assembly was one of the main causes of

21     the war.  Between the end of 1991 and March 1992, the situation in the

22     entire country was especially in Sarajevo very tense and violence kept

23     spreading.  Attacks were mainly carried out against the Serbs, especially

24     against the families of the JNA officers.  The Serbian side launched an

25     initiative to enable citizens of Sarajevo to leave the city if they

Page 39086

 1     wished, supported also by President Karadzic.  Regardless of their

 2     ethnicity, the Serbian side guaranteed everyone safe passage across its

 3     territory.  After May 1992, it was impossible to leave Sarajevo.  The

 4     media espoused war time propaganda:  The Muslim victims were innocent and

 5     crimes were committed only by the Serbian army.

 6             Private prisons in Sarajevo exclusively detained Serbian

 7     civilians and abused them under false accusations that they were hiding

 8     weapons or giving light signals to the Serbian artillery.  For example,

 9     they existed in the basement of the Zagreb hotel, those prisons, and

10     Europa hotel.  The police organs, including Minister Delimustafic, had no

11     information about this and could not assist in freeing these people.

12             During meetings with leading representatives of the Serbian

13     leadership in summer of 1992, the shelling of Sarajevo was raised on

14     several occasions.  The shelling was arbitrary and non-selective as

15     presented.  The Muslim artillery was located in the most densely

16     populated parts in the city and Serbian artillery was forced to respond

17     to the fire aiming towards the locations where the fire was coming from.

18             As to how the events were reported through media, news came from

19     two sides:  Radio Sarajevo, which was under Muslim control, and

20     Radio SRNA under Serbian control.  BBC and other global media transmitted

21     information similar to the one provided by the Muslim media.  That had

22     quite a substantial effect on Muslims and Croats, who in the beginning

23     kept the same distance from all three ethnic parties.  Later, they became

24     negatively biased against the SDS, RS, and the Serbs.  President Karadzic

25     emphasised the necessity to find a solution for the conflict in BH

Page 39087

 1     through political negotiations and to avoid or stop the war at any cost.

 2             [Interpretation] That would be the short summary.  I'd like to

 3     put several additional questions to Professor Kecmanovic.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Firstly, not challenging the ruling of the Trial Chamber

 6     concerning paragraphs 55 and 56, your decision to leave Sarajevo, did it

 7     have anything to do with the elements related in these paragraphs?  In

 8     other words, was it what you could or could not do for the citizens of

 9     Sarajevo of other ethnicities something that had an impact on this

10     decision of yours?

11        A.   Of course, yes.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, that's just blatantly leading and

13     not -- and I will stop there.  You could have asked:  What's the reason

14     for your leaving?

15             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, that's actually also the objection and

17     proposal I would have made, but I also want to note that he also in the

18     summary did disregard your decision and has basically exactly told these

19     details that you had just excluded.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, back to you, Mr. Karadzic.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  But it was excluded

22     only today.  Had it been excluded earlier on, I would have left it out of

23     the summary.  But at any rate, the summary is not an exhibit so no

24     prejudice there or no damage there.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

Page 39088

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Professor Kecmanovic, did you have an opportunity to become

 4     familiar with the SDA policy vis-a-vis the multi-ethnic character of

 5     Bosnia and their espousal of a civic state?  What was it that you

 6     observed during your political work and especially during your tenure in

 7     the Presidency?

 8        A.   The political activity of the Party of Democratic Action - at the

 9     time, Muslim; today, Bosniak - consisted of a contradiction, as it were,

10     which emerged sometime in the watershed period when the US Ambassador

11     Zimmerman and Izetbegovic met which was during the Lisbon negotiations

12     under the leadership or chairmanship of Cutileiro.  Up until that point,

13     the Party of Democratic Action mostly operated as a counterpart to the

14     SDS and HDZ.  It had a national agenda and was mono-ethnic by

15     composition.  I think it also had the elements of a religious party.

16     This especially applied to Izetbegovic, the leader of the party, and his

17     closer associates who were put on trial in the so-called Sarajevo trial

18     because of Islamic -- Muslim fundamentalism.

19             And let me say that the SDA was the first one to be set up as a

20     national party, followed by the HDZ and then SDS, within two months of

21     each other.  So from a purely national or religious national party, it

22     underwent a sudden change of turn where it was all of a sudden advocating

23     a civic Bosnian state.  So this was a turnabout which was supposed to

24     camouflage what was a strategic change where Bosnia and Herzegovina would

25     be a state ruled by the three parties that won the elections, but in this

Page 39089

 1     way suddenly it would become a unitary state led by the predominant force

 2     which was at the time the Muslims.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4        A.   I'd like to add and say that the -- had the Bosniak population

 5     wanted this unitary option, they would not have voted for the SDA but

 6     rather for my party, the Party of Reform Forces or the late

 7     Nijaz Durakovic's party.  And there was several more parties who had this

 8     multi-ethnic character because they gathered representatives of all the

 9     three ethnicities.

10        Q.   So can you tell us how many of these multi-ethnic parties were

11     there that you just referred to?

12        A.   Well, there was the party that I headed at the level of

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia

14     for Bosnia-Herzegovina; there was the SDP, which was practically the

15     reformed communist party or the League of Communists as they used to be

16     called; then there was the liberal civic party led by Rasim Kadic; there

17     was also a party of civic orientation, although it was composed primarily

18     of Bosniak Muslims, that's Zulfikarpasic, the party of Adil

19     Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim-Bosniak party as it was called, which unlike the

20     SDA advocated that there -- that an agreement be reached with the Serbs

21     and Croats.  It was in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina remaining within

22     Yugoslavia.  It was a party which had an inner circle of Bosniak elite

23     with a pro-civic orientation.  Adil Zulfikarpasic himself had lived for a

24     long time abroad in Switzerland and returned to Sarajevo shortly before

25     the war.  It seemed to me that he espoused similar ideas and similar

Page 39090

 1     activities shortly before the elections, and I mean political party

 2     activities.  There was a period of time where Zulfikarpasic appeared

 3     together with Izetbegovic; however, it was precisely on the issues that I

 4     mentioned earlier on that they parted ways because Zulfikarpasic thought

 5     that the SDA espoused extremist views.  In some of his books that were

 6     published he even referred to it as a fascist or a pro-fascist party.

 7     That was where his confrontation with Izetbegovic emerged.  And at a

 8     meeting in Tesanj which was one of the main strongholds of the SDA,

 9     because of these positions up there, they were excommunicated from the

10     SDA, and that was when he proceeded to establish this Muslim-Bosniak

11     party of his.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Did Mr. Pejanovic also have a party of his own?  I

13     think you mentioned him somewhere.

14        A.   Yes.  Pejanovic headed the socialist party as it was called, just

15     as the SDP was a transformed League of Communists, Pejanovic headed the

16     socialist party which was a reformed socialist alliance.  For those who

17     are less well-versed with it, before the war in the socialist Yugoslavia

18     this was an organisation akin to a national front.  It was there to

19     gather the broad national masses who favoured socialism but were not

20     communists.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since foreigners find it difficult to tell somebody's

22     ethnicity on the basis of their name, can you tell us out of these five

23     alternative multi-ethnic parties had Muslim leaders and how many had

24     other leaders?

25        A.   Well, Pejanovic was a Serb, just as I am; Zulfikarpasic was

Page 39091

 1     undoubtedly a Muslim, a Bosniak, was - he passed away; as for the Liberal

 2     Civic Party, it was led by Rasim Kadic, who was also a Muslim or a

 3     Bosniak.  Those were the more important parties.  I can't recall others.

 4        Q.   And later Durakovic?

 5        A.   Yes, he was the head of the SDP, the Reformed Communists, also a

 6     Bosniak, Muslim, passed away recently.

 7        Q.   Can you tell us if you were privy to the war strategy of the

 8     Presidency or the Muslim part of it with regard to interventions of a

 9     foreign military force.  Were you able to learn anything about their

10     position on this score?

11        A.   Well, primarily what could be observed and heard in the

12     Presidency in the span of that one month during which I was active there,

13     I believe that the position of the Bosniak part of the Presidency, as

14     well as that of Stjepan Kljuic who represented the HDZ but espoused a

15     pro-Bosniak policy and was less important at the time because by that

16     time the HDZ core members for busy forming Herceg-Bosna, their position

17     was that the matter in Bosnia would be resolved by a NATO intervention,

18     and Izetbegovic spoke frequently at Presidency sessions that by the 15th

19     of August at the latest NATO would intervene and that would have a

20     decisive impact in the context of the resolution of the situation in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And I think that this anticipation had a negative

22     impact on Izetbegovic's readiness to agree to any compromise in his

23     discussions with the other parties.

24             The Presidency was more of a screen for the world in general, and

25     this can be said of the government at the time as well because to all

Page 39092

 1     intents and purposes Izetbegovic pursued his policies basically through

 2     the leadership of the SDA.  By way of illustration, officially the

 3     minister of the interior was Alija Delimustafic; however, Izetbegovic did

 4     these sort of affairs through Bakir Alispahic rather than through

 5     Delimustafic.  He was the head of the town security service and he was a

 6     party loyal and through Hasan Cengic who didn't have any official

 7     positions at the time but he was in charge of military affairs within the

 8     party.

 9             So keep up the appearances of it all functioning in a

10     multi-ethnic way, there were these bodies of the government and the

11     Presidency, but as you went deeper down the real powers were wielded

12     within towns and in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- well, I cannot say it was only

13     the Bosniak and Muslim people, but people from the SDA who wielded power

14     in these positions.

15             I'm sorry if I can say this.  Divjak was often times mentioned as

16     a Serb who was in the military leadership and it's true that he was among

17     the top three men in the BH army, but if you go further down the chain

18     you won't find a single colonel or a lieutenant-colonel, et cetera, who

19     would be occupying an even slightly significant position who wasn't a

20     Muslim.

21        Q.   And when was it that you realised the way the SDA worked and what

22     was the view expressed by it -- by the elite which joined Zulfikarpasic

23     when they broke away from them?

24        A.   I didn't understand your question.

25        Q.   A moment ago you revealed to us what the decision-making

Page 39093

 1     mechanisms were within the SDA and the government in general.  Can you

 2     tell us how did the SDA take decisions and what sort of view was taken of

 3     this by the Bosniak elite that joined Zulfikarpasic and broke away from

 4     them?

 5        A.   Well, you see, the circles that or the circle around

 6     Zulfikarpasic was a very narrow one.  From the more prominent figures

 7     there was a professor of Faculty of Philosophy --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't catch the name.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who joined Zulfikarpasic.  At

10     the time I was in the Presidency, they were critical of Izetbegovic's

11     policies.

12             I had occasion to speak to Muhamed Filipovic, there was Pejanovic

13     there.  Even before Pejanovic and I joined the Presidency I -- we could

14     hear Muhamed Filipovic speaking very critically of Izetbegovic and his

15     views.  We would even have discussions with Izetbegovic, and Filipovic,

16     together with Pejanovic and myself, expressed serious criticism of the

17     way the government was run in Sarajevo.  As you may know, the authorities

18     in Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina -- well, that was one and the same for

19     us.  When you said "authorities in Sarajevo," it meant the authorities of

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina because we did not have much contact with those

21     outside of Sarajevo.

22        Q.   You mentioned Hasan Cengic and Alispahic --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just for record, can you repeat the name of the

24     professor from Faculty of Philosophy who joined Zulfikarpasic.

25     Interpreters didn't catch it.

Page 39094

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The name is Muhamed Filipovic.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can you tell us -- you mentioned Hasan Cengic and then Alispahic.

 5     Can you tell us, what were the main personal factors in

 6     Alija Izetbegovic's circle and what was their political position?

 7        A.   Even then it was known and ever since the war the Bosniak papers

 8     in Sarajevo write about the SDA being led during the war by the convicts

 9     group that comprised other people around Alija Izetbegovic who had also

10     been convicted of Muslim nationalism or pan-Islamism.  Izetbegovic's

11     Islamic Declaration was a sort of foundation or a programme, a platform,

12     if you will, around which they had gathered and which was at the centre

13     of that process.  It was not only a religious or theological work, but

14     also a political platform which would reflect upon Izetbegovic's

15     subsequent behaviour in politics.  Nowadays his son Bakir Izetbegovic,

16     who is a member of the Presidency, in his statement immediately upon

17     being elected to the Presidency, he stated that even today he was keeping

18     the Islamic Declaration on his desk, by which he wanted to say that he

19     still adhered to that text, programatic text.

20             If you were referring to the people in the party leadership,

21     apart from Cengic there was also Omer Behmen, Rusid Prguda,

22     Edhem Bicakcic, Husein Zivalj, the aforementioned Hasan Cengic, and a few

23     people more.  But I must also add that these people or at least some of

24     them never had transparent high positions in the public administration.

25     They remained in the shadow.  Hasan Cengic who was in charge of military

Page 39095

 1     matters and never was in a high position until after the war --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  I think we heard enough.

 3             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour, I actually become a bit

 5     concerned.  We know that the witness is under a considerable time

 6     constraint and I have also two hours of cross-examination and now we hear

 7     a lot of things, including the views of Bakir Izetbegovic, which are

 8     definitely not relevant in this case.  So I think -- I'm getting worried

 9     that here that time is wasted, that I at the end will not have for the

10     cross-examination.  So I think there should be some limitations.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             How much more do you have for your examination-in-chief,

13     Mr. Karadzic?

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just one more question -- actually,

15     one and a half.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Professor Kecmanovic, was it your conclusion or impression or did

18     you have information about the reliability --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please repeat the question.

20     The interpreter didn't understand.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  The interpreters were not able to

22     understand you.  Could you repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I kindly ask that one question to

24     be separated from the half question.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39096

 1        Q.   My first question is:  Did you have information and did you reach

 2     a conclusion about the reliability in implementing what had been agreed

 3     between the Serb and the Muslim side?

 4        A.   In my statement I pointed out this characteristic of the late

 5     Alija Izetbegovic who was known for changing his opinion, and he was a

 6     good man to talk to at leisure, but he was an very unpleasant negotiator

 7     because he would often change positions.  On one occasion he even said

 8     that he had one opinion in the morning and another in the afternoon, and

 9     that was criticised as inconsistency and unreliability.  I cannot say

10     that Izetbegovic had a tendency to slight his partners in talks, but

11     maybe it was a feature of his character.

12             There was an opinion that this was the result of pressure being

13     exerted on Izetbegovic from within his party, various factions in his

14     party.  But some of his closest co-workers did say that he took most

15     decisions himself.

16        Q.   And the Serbian side, what -- or rather, the SDS, how reliable

17     were they?

18        A.   In this respect I think that the SDS and you personally were much

19     more consistent and more direct, to my mind even a bit too much so.

20        Q.   All right.  You will probably get the opportunity to speak about

21     the reasons of your -- of your separation.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I have an intervention about

23     the transcript.  On page 33, line 18, "pan-Islamism" was omitted and

24     "Islamic fundamentalism."  Both should have been recorded, first

25     pan-Islamism and later on Islamic fundamentalism because that's what the

Page 39097

 1     witness said.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Do you confirm that, Mr. Kecmanovic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I confirm.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 5             As you have noted, Mr. Kecmanovic, your evidence in chief in this

 6     case has been admitted in its most part in writing, that is, through your

 7     written statement.  And now you'll be cross-examined by the

 8     representative of the Office of the Prosecutor after a break of half an

 9     hour.

10             We'll resume at quarter past 11.00.

11                           --- Recess taken at 10.44 a.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 11.17 p.m.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

15                           Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

16        Q.   Good morning, Dr. Kecmanovic.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, at the outset of this cross-examination I would

19     like to thank you for attending an interview with the Prosecution on

20     Wednesday and I will come back to some of the facts that you told us

21     during this interview as we go.  And one other remark, as we discussed

22     during this interview we have only very limited time for the

23     cross-examination, and therefore I would kindly ask you to answer my

24     question as short and focused as possible.

25             This morning, Dr. Kecmanovic, you described what your party, the

Page 39098

 1     Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia-Herzegovina was

 2     standing for, and this policy of your party essentially put you into

 3     opposition to the nationalist parties which you referred to this morning

 4     as mono-ethnic parties, and that would include the SDS as well; right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   And you also described this morning that basically the SDA party

 7     was the power centre and not so much the official organs and you

 8     described Izetbegovic being in the power centre as such surrounded by his

 9     other people.  The same would apply to the SDS, would it not?  It was the

10     power centre of the Bosnian Serbs; correct?

11        A.   Which period are you referring to?

12        Q.   I'm referring to the period before the -- immediately before the

13     war and before the official organs of Republika Srpska were established.

14     So before the outbreak of the war.

15        A.   I can say that it wasn't really the same thing.  In the Serbian

16     Democratic Party the distribution of power, as it were, in the party was

17     greater.  There were some people who were almost on the same footing with

18     Karadzic and they were candidates for some positions.  Likewise, Karadzic

19     at the very beginning was not the first man of the party; that position

20     was vacant.  They had a sort of collective leadership.  As is stated

21     there, I was the one supposed to fill that position, but --

22        Q.   Let me interrupt you.  I was actually referring to the situation

23     before -- immediately before the outbreak of the war, and when you were

24     actually having discussions with Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic, at that

25     point in time Mr. Karadzic was definitely the power centre in the SDS

Page 39099

 1     party and the SDS party was actually the body that counted at that point

 2     in time, was it not?

 3        A.   You mean the time before the leadership of the SDA left this city

 4     and went to Pale --

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  SDS.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me explain so we understand

 7     each other better.  We must distinguish the period until -- including the

 8     co-operation of the three ethnic parties and the period when the SDS

 9     withdrew from the joint bodies and left, which period are you referring

10     to?

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

12        Q.   Actually, I thought I was quite precise.  I was talking about the

13     period when you had the talks - you and Mr. Pejanovic - had the talks

14     with Krajisnik and Karadzic.  That was the period and that was the talk I

15     was referring to.

16        A.   All right.  So it's the period when they had already left the

17     common bodies in Sarajevo, I mean the Serbian representatives.  Obviously

18     there were several people on an equal footing, but Karadzic was number 1

19     nominally.  I communicated with Krajisnik, Koljevic, Karadzic, and that

20     shows that the leadership was more of a collective thing, certainly more

21     so than on the Muslim side.  Karadzic was the number one man in reality

22     and also formally, but you could also speak about a collective

23     leadership.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

25             Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, I take it that you can scroll back the

Page 39100

 1     transcript?

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  At page 37, line 14, was your question about SDA

 4     party or SDS party?

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  37 --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Line 14.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, I actually -- I spoke about the SDS

 8     party -- SDA party being the power centre.  That's what he told us this

 9     morning and I was referring to the SDS being --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Ah, yes, I missed it.  Yes.  Thank you.  The same

11     would apply to the --

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would also like to intervene in

15     the transcript at this juncture.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 38, line 1, Dr. Kecmanovic

18     said -- apart from saying that there were a number of people who were on

19     the same footing with Karadzic and who were candidates, but it was not

20     recorded that Karadzic did not run.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Probably -- do you confirm, Mr. Kecmanovic, what

22     Mr. Karadzic indicated?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             Let's continue, please Uertz-Retzlaff.

Page 39101

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 2        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 5 of your statement you refer to the

 3     criticism that you received after joining the BiH Presidency.  You are

 4     aware that the term "Izetbegovic" or "Alija's own private Serbs" was used

 5     by Mr. Karadzic when referring to you and that participate -- and your

 6     participation in the work of the BiH institutions; correct?

 7        A.   Yes, I know -- or actually, I don't know that it was Karadzic

 8     personally who said that, but I know that people from the RS leadership

 9     spoke about that.  You also had the opposite case, the Muslim side spoke

10     about Karadzic's Serbs --

11        Q.   Sir, I'm not asking about opposite cases.  I just asked you to be

12     precise and answer just the question I asked and not tell a story from

13     the other side.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  So can we please have 65 ter 15 --

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, if I may just for a

16     moment.  I do want us to work efficiently in this cross-examination, but

17     sometimes such digressions are in the function of an explanation what

18     that really means.  It was customary for all three sides for people who

19     were not included in the ethnic movement to consider them traitors or

20     Radovan's people or something.  It was, as I said, usual at the time and

21     was not seen as an insult.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 15896 on the screen,

23     65 ter number.

24        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an announcement by Mr. Karadzic

25     dated the 2nd of June, 1992, in which he refers to you and Mr. Pejanovic

Page 39102

 1     joining the Presidency as somewhat illegal.  If you look at the box in

 2     your language it's this box you find there.  He mentioned that somewhat

 3     illegal and refers to you as private Serbs of Alija Izetbegovic.  And he,

 4     in fact, even compares you with the private Serbs of Ante Pavelic.

 5     Dr. Kecmanovic, he compares you here with the Serbs co-operating with the

 6     Croat leader Pavelic, an ally of the Nazi Germany during the Second World

 7     War; right?

 8        A.   I didn't know about what you have just showed me, and this really

 9     is a serious insult but this is the first time I see this.

10        Q.   And the publication "Nas Glas" is what?  Is it a daily or ... ?

11        A.   I don't know.  This is news to me.  I've never seen this before.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript please.  May I?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Firstly, on page 40 it was not

15     recorded what Dr. Kecmanovic said, that the Muslim side called some Serbs

16     Karadzic's Serbs and the Serbian side Alija's Serbs.  And I kindly ask

17     the witness to be allowed to read this whole article to really see if he

18     was compared to Ante Pavelic as has been suggested.

19             JUDGE KWON:  If necessary, you may take up the issue later on,

20     but I think the witness had opportunity to read this and the question was

21     fair enough.

22             Shall we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  Thank you, Your Honour.

24             Can this exhibit be -- please be admitted.

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Objection, Your Honour, the witness has said that:

Page 39103

 1             "I don't know.  This is news to me.  I've never seen this

 2     before."

 3             So I don't think there's any foundation to admit it through this

 4     witness.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I think --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not related to his statement?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, it's not related to his credibility, so, and

 8     it's a question of foundation, actually, as opposed to relevance.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I was discussing with the

10     witness basically that he was -- that he was called Alija's Serbs and

11     those kind of things and he confirmed this.  And now I showed -- and he

12     said that he didn't know that Karadzic said that.  And I showed him an

13     example.  And the fact that he just didn't see that before doesn't mean

14     that he has not now referred to it and dealt with it, so I think there is

15     a foundation laid.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6350, Your Honours.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

20        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 5 of your statement you also say

21     that such things would be said publicly for propaganda purposes and were

22     not really meant.  Is it your evidence that Dr. Karadzic had in these

23     cases when he would say such things, would he mislead the public?  Is

24     that your evidence?

25        A.   I believe that this was in the function of propaganda.  I can't

Page 39104

 1     believe that he meant that sincerely.  Even if he had meant that, he

 2     would not have advocated for me to lead the SDS.  He personally advocated

 3     that.  Therefore, he could not sincerely think what he said and what he

 4     wrote.  Otherwise, he would not have spoken to me later on on several

 5     occasions.  At the end of the day, he invited me to this Tribunal as a

 6     Defence witness; otherwise, perhaps the Prosecution would have called me

 7     as a Prosecution witness.

 8        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, the purpose of such what you call propaganda

 9     would be to cause outrage against dissidents from the nationalist agenda

10     that the SDS pursued; correct?

11        A.   You see, all the three nationalist parties including the SDS

12     participated in the elections, and one such convincing majorities in the

13     elections that they didn't feel any special need to gather around

14     themselves a relatively small - to my great disappointment - a relatively

15     small number of people who voted for some other parties, including my

16     mine.

17        Q.   And the purpose of such propaganda, calling someone Alija's Serbs

18     comparable to Ante Pavelic's Serbs, that purpose would also be to put

19     pressure on you and others to not express any views outside the

20     ethnocentric policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership and not work in the

21     Bosnian institution; correct?

22        A.   You see, when it comes to the people who may have participated in

23     the institutions on one or the other side, we're not talking about people

24     at large.  We're talking about individuals who do -- do not cave in under

25     such pressures.  They behave autonomously.  I could have joined the SDS

Page 39105

 1     at any moment.  I would have been admitted with open arms before the

 2     elections and after the elections, but even that did not sway me to

 3     change my mind and become a member of the SDS.  I believe that this

 4     applies in general terms to people of my kind who were subjected to the

 5     same kind of pressure and propaganda, as you call it.

 6        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, you resigned from the BiH Presidency in July

 7     1992, and before you did that there was considerable pressure on you from

 8     the Bosnian Serb leadership to do that; correct?

 9        A.   Pressure not to become a member of the Presidency?  Is that what

10     you're asking me?

11        Q.   No, I was asking you -- I was referring to the fact that you

12     resigned in July 1992, and I asked you whether it's right -- correct that

13     before you did it you got pressure from the Bosnian Serb leadership to do

14     so?

15        A.   I was under no pressure.  Nobody put any pressure on me.  All

16     that was my autonomous decision.  If I had caved in to such pressures, I

17     would have probably been the leader of the SDS or I would have joined it

18     later on or something of that kind.  There was no pressure put to bear on

19     me.

20        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, there is evidence before this Trial Chamber --

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honours, I refer here to the 14th

22     Republika Srpska Presidency Session of the 3rd of July, 1992, and it's

23     D438 under point 2 and point 12.

24        Q.   -- and I'm just referring to this here, Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic.

25     They say here in this record that you, Mr. Pejanovic, Mr. Simovic,

Page 39106

 1     Mr. Nikolic, and other Serbs shall be publicly invited to withdraw from

 2     their positions in the official bodies in the -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3     And you are aware of such public invitations, are you not?

 4        A.   I almost don't know about those invitations.  The situation in

 5     Sarajevo was such that I didn't have the time to follow such matters,

 6     especially when I started working in the Presidency.  It -- I was

 7     familiar with that to a certain extent.  Somebody conveyed that to me,

 8     perhaps Simovic or Pejanovic.  But I really did not pay much attention to

 9     that.  I perceived that as an expected reaction.

10        Q.   Equally, this Trial Chamber has evidence in front of it --

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honours, I refer now to D440,

12     that's the 15th RS Presidency Session of 6 July.

13        Q.   -- and there a position was adopted on talks that

14     Messrs. Koljevic and Krajisnik should have with you and Mr. Pejanovic.

15     It states under item 3 in this session that they were appointed to

16     conduct such talks and that the aim of the talks would be to determine

17     conditions for your resignation.  They even formulated demands you should

18     put to Mr. Izetbegovic.  Dr. Kecmanovic, these talks did take place, did

19     they not?

20        A.   The Defence team showed me this document, therefore I'm familiar

21     with it.  I had not seen it before that.  I can give you a very precise

22     answer to your question.  Perhaps the accused Karadzic can help me with

23     that.  I don't doubt that such a decision was adopted.  This is, after

24     all, an official document.  However, when I was in Pale before proceeding

25     towards Belgrade, not for a single moment did any such matter came up, no

Page 39107

 1     such talks were conducted.  I did not sit down with Krajisnik and

 2     Koljevic in any official capacity and nothing of that kind was told me.

 3     The late Professor Koljevic waited for me in Lukavica.  We went to Pale

 4     together.  We were met by Karadzic, Plavsic, and Krajisnik there.  First

 5     we had dinner and we talked over dinner.  Then we had some one-on-one

 6     talks on the following day and on the day after.  Nobody gave me any

 7     conditions to comply with.  The talks never went in that direction at

 8     all.

 9        Q.   Let's move on to another topic.  In your statement you several

10     times refer to the fact that the policies of the SDS and your own party

11     were similar.  Dr. Kecmanovic, that refers basically to the fact that

12     both parties at some point in time wanted that Bosnia-Herzegovina remain

13     part of Yugoslavia; right?  That was where you basically agreed; correct?

14        A.   Correct.

15        Q.   And when the former Yugoslavia was no longer an option in April

16     1992, the Bosnian Serb leadership wanted to have a state of their own in

17     certain territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

18        A.   I wouldn't put it that way.  I believe that it was more about

19     creating a confederal or federal union, some sort of a union or a

20     structure that would be based on the territorial and ethnic

21     concentrations of the population.  As far as my party is concerned, after

22     the changes that you have just mentioned, there were some shifts in the

23     positions.  In my party we supported that concept that was also a concept

24     advocated by the Cutileiro's commission of the European Union.  A new

25     situation had arisen, so it was decided that there would be cantons.

Page 39108

 1     Entities were not mentioned, but rather cantons or semi-cantons.  The

 2     Swiss model came up quite often, the Belgian model.  In any case we

 3     sought for more realistic solutions.  More or less, everybody

 4     participated in that.  I believe the SDP was the only party that kept on

 5     insisting on a centralised and unitarian structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 6     In my party manifesto, the territorial and ethnic issue was not a

 7     priority.  We spoke about the division that would be based on historical

 8     demographic, geographical traffic conditions, and finally on territorial

 9     and ethnic principle, and this is that would end up in the platform of

10     the Presidency --

11        Q.   Let me interrupt you.  I didn't want to hear so many details of

12     the period before when there was still the Cutileiro Plan.  I was

13     actually referring to the fact that after April 1992 when Yugoslavia in

14     the former was not existing anymore, that was the period I was asking for

15     and you did not answer that question.

16             Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 54 of --

17        A.   Please, let's clarify things.  I want to answer rather than skip

18     a question of yours.

19        Q.   But I had asked you a concrete question.  I spoke about the

20     period after April 1992, and then I said the Bosnian Serb leadership

21     wanted a state of their own.  And then you spoke about something

22     completely different.

23        A.   Very well.  Then my short answer would be:  As far as I know,

24     they didn't want a state of their own.  They wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to

25     be transformed into a union, federation, or confederation of territorial

Page 39109

 1     and ethnic units of all the three peoples.  Is that okay for an answer?

 2        Q.   Let's move on.  Dr. Kecmanovic, in paragraph 54 of your statement

 3     you refer to an expert report which you prepared for Prijedor.  And in

 4     the interview on Wednesday you also spoke about this expert report and

 5     you -- that you prepared it for the Kvocka case --

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is case number IT-98-30/1.

 7        Q.   And I'm just -- want to refer you to a passage that is in there

 8     and as you remember this report and you remembered it well during the

 9     interview, I see no reason that we have to pull it up in e-court.  In

10     your Kvocka report --

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And that is 65 ter 25087 for the Defence to

12     know.

13        Q.   -- you have a section:  The Muslim-Croatian war.  You probably

14     remember this, Dr. Kecmanovic, that you have this report and this section

15     or do we have to pull it up?

16        A.   That was a report.  It was not a testimony; right?

17        Q.   No, it was a report.  It was a report that you prepared in the

18     Kvocka case and you had a section in there where you described the

19     Muslim-Croatian war.  And in that section --

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And for the Defence to know, it's on page 34

21     in e-court.

22        Q.   -- you say -- or better, wrote:

23             "Essentially" --

24        A.   I would love to see it in an electronic form, please.

25        Q.   Okay.  Good.  We can do that.

Page 39110

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25087 and we need

 2     the page 34 in e-court.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  And in the B/C/S?

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  There is, unfortunately, Your Honour, there

 5     is no B/C/S --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We have only six pages.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No.  You should have actually the entire

 8     report.  There is a B/C/S only of six pages and that's the Prijedor part,

 9     but I'm referring to the main part of the report and that is -- the

10     English version e-court page 34.

11             JUDGE KWON:  So shall we show from page 31, then, which has the

12     title, the Muslim-Croatian war.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes.  Can we have --

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Would you kindly provide me with a

15     translation, if not in e-court perhaps a hard copy could be provided,

16     please?

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We do not have a hard copy either --

18             JUDGE KWON:  We'll print out from page 31 to page 34 and we'll

19     provide it to you in a moment.

20             Yes, please in the meantime --

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  I'm just -- can we move to the page 34

22     in e-court.  And it's only a small -- yes.  And it's actually at the very

23     top.

24        Q.   It says here on the very top:

25             "Essentially, it was an inevitable war that arose from the very

Page 39111

 1     logic of the Muslim and Croatian movements, which, just like the Serbian,

 2     aspired to create their own ethnic space and establish their own nation

 3     states."

 4             Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic, you are saying here that the Muslims and

 5     the Croats and the Serbians aspired to create their own ethnic space and

 6     establish their own nation states.  That's what you wrote in your report

 7     that was tendered in a case before this Tribunal.  Are you now saying

 8     that's wrong?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Shall we wait until the witness

10     receives the hard copy.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have not received the translation

12     that I asked for.

13             JUDGE KWON:  It's on top of page 32.  We don't have it in your

14     language, unfortunately.  Page 32 in hard copy, but page 34 in e-court.

15     Probably you heard the translation of that sentence.  Yes, can you answer

16     the question?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.  I would like to have

18     the text before me.  It would make things easier, but I can answer

19     anyway.  Could you please repeat your question, please.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

21        Q.   I have asked you before -- I asked you whether the SDS or the

22     Serbian -- Bosnian Serb people wanted to create their own state.  You

23     said no they didn't.  And then I quoted to you what I quoted to you, and

24     then I asked you -- but you are saying it here, right here.

25        A.   Yes.  Well, you see, I'm talking about here not only about Serbs

Page 39112

 1     but also Croats and Muslims.  And that statement seems to be

 2     contradictory to what I stated in the report on the face of it.  However,

 3     we're talking about somewhat broader considerations of the problem.  Just

 4     a while ago I mentioned the term "confederation of unions."  In any case,

 5     those would have been areas where -- which in either the confederal

 6     option or a unionist option would give security to all of the three

 7     peoples who had -- who had very negative historical experiences, and

 8     those experiences accumulated from one generation to the next.  There was

 9     the 1941, 1918, and other historical events that had created

10     uncertainties and concerns that had accumulated through generations.

11     There was hostilities, needs to take revenge, and certain things.  And

12     they may have been suppressed either by the goodwill of the people or

13     under the oppression of the communist regime.  However, deep down it

14     existed, and in the moments of crisis such sentiments surfaced to the

15     ground.  And it seemed that all the three peoples wanted something of

16     that sort.

17        Q.   Yes, thank you.  Dr. Kecmanovic, you speak here in this sentence

18     of inevitable war, and in this context I would like to address paragraph

19     56 in your statement where you express your belief that it was possible

20     to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina territorially and ethnically without any

21     radical or forced changes to the ethnic structure on the ground.  You

22     also say here in that paragraph that the metaphor about the leopard and

23     his spots which apparently faithfully reflects the highly mixed ethnic

24     composition of Bosnia is largely a construct.  Dr. Kecmanovic, you

25     yourself used this very same metaphor in your expert report that we are

Page 39113

 1     looking at here at the moment.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have page 21 in the

 3     e-court, page 21.  Is that page 21?  No.  Can we have page 21.  21 of the

 4     report that we just spoke about.  It's --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  E-court page.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  We speak about 65 ter 25087, e-court page

 7     21.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes, collapse the B/C/S.

 9             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kecmanovic, given that we do not have the

11     translation, providing the English version in hard copy seems to be of no

12     point.  If you could take a look at the monitor, we zoomed in

13     sufficiently or hear the translation which will be read -- relayed to

14     you.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16        Q.   We are looking at the chapter 3, "National Visions of the

17     Break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina."  And if we zoom in on the second

18     paragraph under this chapter, it says:

19             "A fall-back position for all three peoples was that if none of

20     them could take the entire republic in the direction they desired, they

21     could divide it on the basis of their right to national

22     self-determination including secession.  The problem, however, lay in the

23     fact that the territorial and ethnic structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina

24     resembled a leopard's skin.  Large concentrations of a given group

25     outside the larger multi-ethnic towns were not mutually connected.  Party

Page 39114

 1     headquarters on all three sides were feverishly preoccupied with ethnic

 2     maps."

 3             And in the next paragraph it says:

 4             "But in vain, because none of them could combine unconnected,

 5     ethnically homogeneous enclaves into nationally compact cantons and at

 6     the same time avoid massive movements of people, both their own and those

 7     of the two other ethnic groups.  Neither Muslims, Serbs, nor Croats were

 8     prepared to either leave their homes or stay in them as national

 9     minority.  As in an ancient tragedy, each side consistently followed the

10     line of its national interests, which could have been accepted if viewed

11     separately, but which, when they intersected, led inevitably to the

12     catastrophic outcome of civil war."

13             And, Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you wrote in the Kvocka report

14     and was what unfolded after the outbreak of the conflict was, indeed,

15     massive ethnic cleansing, was it not?

16        A.   What was massive ethnic cleansing?

17        Q.   What unfolded in Bosnia-Herzegovina; for instance, in Banja Luka;

18     for instance, in Foca; for instance, in Eastern Bosnia; and around

19     Sarajevo, isn't it?

20        A.   Not around but in Sarajevo.  Do you agree?  I mean, Sarajevo is

21     the most traumatic example of it because the highest number of

22     inhabitants left Sarajevo.  If you compare it to the other figures of

23     inhabitants leaving their native areas, the highest number of departures

24     was in Sarajevo.  Are you aware of that?

25        Q.   We'll come to did your --

Page 39115

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Do you agree then, Mr. Kecmanovic, that

 2     in Banja Luka, Foca, and in Eastern Bosnia ethnic cleansing took place?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would not call it ethnic

 4     cleansing because it has a different connotation at least in the

 5     circumstances of Bosnia-Herzegovina because this is a reference to ethnic

 6     cleansing on one side only, whereas ethnic cleansing took place on all

 7     three sides.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  But you would view as ethnic cleansing what happened

 9     inside the city of Sarajevo?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would simply call all these

11     events with a single term rather than referring to certain events in one

12     part of the country as ethnic cleansing and to other events in other

13     parts of countries as simply resettlement of peoples.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I object to the

15     misrepresentation of what Mr. Kecmanovic said in his report.  He spoke of

16     massive movements rather than ethnic cleansing.  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff

17     translated "massive movements" into "ethnic cleansings."

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, this is an intervention

19     that's --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Inappropriate.

21             Yes, please continue.

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can the two pages be admitted,

23     it's page 19 -- e-court page 21 and e-court page 34.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would, however, kindly ask to be

25     provided with this section of the report in B/C/S in the course of my

Page 39116

 1     testimony.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Unfortunately, we don't have it at the moment.

 3     Probably it might -- somewhere it exists at the Tribunal?

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I actually have discussed it

 5     also with you, Dr. Kecmanovic, and asked you whether you have the B/C/S

 6     version and it was my understanding that you do have the B/C/S version of

 7     this report.  What we do have -- we looked everywhere.  We only had the

 8     translation of these six pages related to Prijedor but Mr. Iain could not

 9     find any B/C/S version.

10             JUDGE KWON:  That's where we are, Mr. Kecmanovic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the situation is such that we

12     simply cannot discuss the matter without the necessary material.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection, Mr. Robinson?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit those two pages as well as the first

16     page of the document, cover page.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6351, Your Honours.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

19        Q.   I would like now to move on to the platform, the platform that

20     you worked on in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and you

21     mentioned this platform in paragraph 11 of your statement and I think you

22     mentioned it also today.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have 65 ter 25060 in

24     e-court.  And we have here both languages again.

25        Q.   And we can see from the second page, from the second page but

Page 39117

 1     maybe we do not have to look at it now, from the second page we can see

 2     it was adopted on the 26th of June, 1992.  When we -- can we look at

 3     point 4.  If we look at point 4, that's this -- the second page in both

 4     languages, we see conditions -- we see conditions for peace negotiations

 5     listed, and among them are:  (a), the secession of hostilities; (b), the

 6     establishment of the political situation before the aggression; (d)

 7     compensation; (c) -- but I read (d), compensation for the war damages and

 8     punishment of the perpetrators.  And at the end of this paragraph it

 9     says:

10             "Bosnia and Herzegovina will not accept negotiations which have

11     as their basis the establishment of ethnically pure territories or a

12     regional division of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a solely ethnic basis.

13     Bosnia and Herzegovina will never accept any kind of territorial or

14     demographic changes and advantages which have resulted from war and

15     violence."

16             Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you together with your colleagues in

17     the Presidency made their goals; right?

18        A.   Yes.  Let me add that certain amendments were made in addition to

19     what the conclusions were not only of the working group but also of the

20     Presidency.  For instance, in the preamble to this paper, mention is made

21     of the aggression on the part of Yugoslavia or the JNA against

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This was not in our version and it was added at a

23     later date by --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't catch the name of the

25     person.

Page 39118

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- at the Presidency, but let's go

 2     back to what you're interested in.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

 4        Q.   Yes.  This -- I actually asked you that this is what you and your

 5     colleagues have agreed about and you actually drafted it.  So --

 6        A.   Yes, yes.  You see, a moment ago I did say that the basis for the

 7     platform was a document adopted by my party, in fact.  I made sure that

 8     it was used and I did say that earlier on after insisting that

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina stay within Yugoslavia we accepted Cutileiro's

10     proposal and the conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina as the basis and

11     that's -- please allow me to finish.  You say --

12        Q.   No, no, wait a minute.  We have very little time, and

13     therefore --

14        A.   Very well.

15        Q.   -- as you -- I understand that you want to tell the whole story,

16     but we do not have time for the whole story and so we have to,

17     unfortunately, restrict ourselves.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this please be admitted, Your Honour?

19             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, a direct answer to your

21     question.  It reads here not on the -- not on a solely ethnic basis.  So

22     ethnicity was not taken as a sole criterion but as one of.  Do you see

23     this?

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

25        Q.   Yes.

Page 39119

 1        A.   There is another place where you quoted something where this

 2     issue is also being relativised.  I don't know if you agree.

 3        Q.   I actually have read it this way.  In English it is the same.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6352, Your Honours.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 23, page 56, it turned out

 9     that this was -- what was said was that this was added at a later stage

10     by Ganic and Ganic was not recorded in the transcript.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13        Q.   Did the -- when you met the Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale, you

14     conveyed these platform goals, did you not?

15        A.   No.  You see, this was a public document and I think that they

16     were aware of this without my playing a part in it.

17        Q.   And when you'd had your talks in Pale, the Bosnian Serb

18     leadership did not agree to these goals and conditions for negotiations;

19     correct?

20        A.   Well, we simply didn't discuss it.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have Exhibit 65 ter 25069A on

22     the screen.

23        Q.   And as it is coming up, and you will see it in a minute, it's an

24     excerpt from the Bosnia-Herzegovina 128th Presidency Session of the 24th

25     of June, where you indeed discuss the platform.  And it's only an excerpt

Page 39120

 1     because it is a lengthy record, but as you mentioned in the interview

 2     that we had you are aware of the Presidency sessions and you indeed

 3     reviewed them in anticipation of your testimony.  Can we please have page

 4     3 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S.  And we have here Mr. Akmadzic.

 5     In the lower part, he says:

 6             "Those prerequisites are:  'Cease war operations, recognition of

 7     the single system of government, and negotiations which have as their

 8     foundation the creation of pure ethnic territories cannot be accepted.'"

 9             That's basically what we also saw in the document.  And you all

10     agreed in the Presidency about this; correct?

11        A.   May I have the entire document?

12        Q.   We are not going into details of the entire document and we are

13     only discussing this page here, and what I just mentioned was how

14     Mr. Akmadzic summarises it and at the very bottom he says the following.

15     He refers to the extreme militant faction within the SDS and that the

16     Presidency had opted not to speak to them.  To whom is Mr. Akmadzic

17     referring when he speaks about the extreme militant faction within the

18     SDS, can you tell us?

19        A.   Truly, I don't know.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have the next page in both

21     languages, and we are again looking at the lower part.

22        Q.   And, in fact, you yourself are speaking here and you make clear

23     that the starting point is the situation as it was before the war and

24     that any kind of changes within the national structure of the populations

25     that were created by war, moving away, et cetera, will not be accepted.

Page 39121

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can we please have page 6 in both

 2     languages, and in the B/C/S we look at the last sentence and in the

 3     English we look at the upper part.

 4        Q.   And in fact you say here, Dr. Kecmanovic, those are territorial

 5     ethnic changes caused by violence, war, genocide, moving away, et cetera.

 6             That refers to what we just some minutes ago spoke about, that

 7     is, the expulsion of population, crimes, and you even refer to genocide,

 8     that activities had taken place, and you wanted this to be reversed;

 9     correct?

10        A.   Of course this is an accurate reflection of what was said.  Of

11     course I was not in favour of acknowledging anything that is the result

12     of violence, genocide, of course, or migrations.  At any rate, it did

13     happen.  And of course it is very difficult to establish what is the

14     result of violence and what the various departures were motivated by.  I

15     can give you examples of persons who did not suffer any violence and yet

16     did move to other areas where members of their ethnicity were present

17     simply because they felt safer and better there.

18        Q.   But during the Presidency sessions, you received information

19     about such violent acts; correct?  Mr. Halilovic reported about it.  You

20     heard others.  That's correct, isn't it?

21        A.   See, I did hear it from Halilovic, whose report I did not trust

22     that much.  I trusted my own eyes and what I observed in Sarajevo, and

23     that was violence that was suffered by the Serbian people.

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this please be admitted, Your Honour?

25             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

Page 39122

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask one thing?  Is the

 2     Serbian side identical to the English?  I'm interested in the first line

 3     where Kecmanovic says that it is inappropriate to name the person by

 4     their first and last names, the persons that you do not want to speak to.

 5     And I don't see this in English.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It's a different page.  It's a different

 7     page.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can that page be received as well,

10     please?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Given that it is only a seven-page document, we'll

12     admit it in its entirety.

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.  I would -- actually, what I have done

14     is I selected the sections where there is a discussion ongoing on a

15     certain topic.  I never just had one page.  I always had a certain

16     section.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Exhibit P6353.

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, in your statement in paragraph 35 you speak about

20     your impression that the leadership in Pale was very concerned about what

21     was happening in Sarajevo and that for them what was happening in the

22     other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina was of secondary importance.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25085 on the

24     screen.

25        Q.   And, Dr. Kecmanovic, as it is coming up it is again just a -- no,

Page 39123

 1     I think we have both languages.  We should actually have both.  No, that

 2     can't be it.  I have this actually it looks different in what I have,

 3     "Seasons in Hell."

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Check the 65 ter number.

 5             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  No, the 65 ter number is correct, but we

 6     have it actually in a different format so that two pages are all on --

 7     oh, I see we have it in this format, but of course it's a bit difficult

 8     to read.  The B/C/S -- let's then see.

 9        Q.   What we have here indeed is an excerpt from Mr. Ed Vulliamy's

10     book "Seasons in Hell."  Mr. -- Dr. Kecmanovic, you know Mr. Vulliamy,

11     the journalist; correct?

12        A.   No.

13        Q.   He -- and if we look at page 1, last paragraph -- can we see

14     the -- can we see the other page, this -- yes, this side?  Can we look

15     at -- no, the previous again, the previous.  In the last paragraph --

16     yes, the last paragraph.  Now I have it.  In the last paragraph

17     Mr. Vulliamy describes a conversation he had with Nikola Koljevic in

18     Belgrade, during which Koljevic admitted to the journalist that Sarajevo

19     was designated the piece of violent theatre which would captivate the

20     world's attention and draw it away from the principal programme.  And if

21     we now move to -- again to the other side, yes.  And he says:

22             "It amazes me that you all took so long to get to the point.

23     Poor Sarajevo!  That was all you could think about.  The crossroads of

24     Europe!  None of you had ever been on holiday in Trnopolje ..."

25             Do you know about this meeting in summer 1992 between

Page 39124

 1     Koljevic/Vulliamy and did you perhaps attend?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   Okay.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Then we move on, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, during the interview we heard you said that you

 6     were not aware of the six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs, and, sir,

 7     there's evidence before this Court that the first strategic goal of the

 8     Bosnian Serb leadership was the separation of the Serbian people from the

 9     other two national communities.  And further on, Dr. Kecmanovic, we have

10     evidence before this Trial Chamber that this strategic goal means, as

11     Mr. Karadzic explains in the 16th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian

12     people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is on the 12th of May, 1992 --

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And, Your Honour, that's 65 ter, or rather,

14     P956, e-court page 9.

15        Q.   -- and he says:

16             "It means separation from those who are our enemies and who have

17     used every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us and who

18     would continue with such practices if we were to continue to stay

19     together in the same state."

20             Dr. Kecmanovic, you said you were not aware of this session and

21     what Karadzic said there, but given your interest in participation and

22     participation in politics at that time, you must have been aware that

23     Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership saw the Croats and the

24     Muslims as the enemy of the Serbs.  You were -- you knew that; right?

25        A.   Not a priori as enemies.  That would have been inconceivable, to

Page 39125

 1     consider a whole people as hostile.  I never heard Karadzic say that or

 2     heard that being said about him.  The political leaderships and

 3     leaderships of ethnic parties would discuss these issues and there would

 4     be confrontations in that sense only.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, we'll stop here and we'll have a

 6     break if it is convenient.

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

 9     quarter past 1.00.

10                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 1.16 p.m.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

13             Mr. Robinson, the Chamber will grant your reply -- your request

14     for reply to the Prosecution's response regarding videolink testimony of

15     Nikola Poplasen.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President, we'll be able to file

17     that today.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you, Your Honour.

20        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, you were aware that the Bosnian Serb leadership

21     did not want to live together with the Muslims any longer; correct?

22        A.   You see, that must all be viewed in the context of the fact that

23     the Muslims, together with the Croats, actually made that co-existence

24     impossible because they imposed relations of unequality on us after

25     out-voting the Serbian representatives in the Assembly and the government

Page 39126

 1     and so on.

 2        Q.   So the answer was yes?

 3        A.   I think it wasn't merely the opinion of the leadership of the RS

 4     but also that of the Serbian people since it was put into the position of

 5     being dominated by the other two peoples, that was reactive.  It was

 6     imposed upon them.

 7        Q.   In this regard I just want to quote to you something from the

 8     17th Session of the Republika Srpska Assembly dated 24th and 26th July

 9     1992.  That's D92, page 86.  And Mr. Karadzic is speaking about the

10     Muslims and to be with them -- the impossibility to be with them in a

11     unitary state.  And I quote:

12             "We know very well the fundamentalism -- what the fundamentalism

13     is and that we can't live together.  There is no tolerance.  They

14     quadruple through birth-rate and we Serbs are not up to that.  Not only

15     are the Serbs not up to that, but the Christians in Lebanon are not up to

16     that Oriental mentality stemming from Islam."

17             These kind of arguments made publicly, you are aware of this, the

18     birth-rate and all these kind of things; right?

19        A.   I'm not familiar with this specific statement by Karadzic that

20     you have quoted, but the example of Lebanon is very telling because

21     that's where a prosperous country fell apart, it was called the

22     Switzerland of the Arab world, because the demographic changes that were

23     in favour of the Muslims was such that the Muslim population demanded

24     more power because of their growing share in the structure of the overall

25     population.

Page 39127

 1             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25024 on the

 2     screen.

 3        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is an article that you,

 4     Dr. Kecmanovic, wrote in Nin, a Belgrade daily, on the 20th of January,

 5     1995, with the title:  "Lava Cooling."

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Again, can we please have page 2 in the

 7     English and we look at the last, the very last, paragraph, and then we

 8     move on to the next page as I'm reading.  And in the -- in the B/C/S it's

 9     page 1, also the last paragraph.  And then while I'm reading we go over

10     to the page 2.

11        Q.   What you are saying here, and I quote, you speak about

12     Izetbegovic first and then you say:

13             "At the same time, on the other side, in addition to territorial

14     and ethnic separation from the Muslims ... Pale demand in the form of an

15     ultimatum to also be connected with Serbia as its national mother

16     country.  However, on this side of the Drina River, after the dissolution

17     of the SFRY, there remains tens of thousands of Sandzak Muslims living

18     there without any demarcation.  Moreover, having fled across the river,

19     numerous Bosnian and Herzegovinian Muslims joined them as refugees.

20             "When they meet their countrymen Serbs from Bosnia here in

21     Belgrade, they ask each other why could they not live together on equal

22     terms back home, since they can do ... here as refugees."

23             When it says here, Dr. Kecmanovic, "Pale demand," that would be

24     Mr. Karadzic and the Bosnian Serb leadership; correct?

25        A.   Clearly you are merely -- you have merely read a fragment.  But

Page 39128

 1     we must read the text as a whole.  It was ironically written and in a

 2     humorous tone although the topic is serious.  The Serbs considered the

 3     Muslims to have been Christians originally who embraced Islam, whereas

 4     the Bosniaks consider the Serbs to be original Muslims who converted to

 5     Christianity.  In the subheading of the text we can see that it is

 6     untenable that people of different ethnic or political affiliations must

 7     live together.  After all, today in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina there

 8     are members of all three ethnicities as minorities, and in Banja Luka

 9     there are significant numbers of Muslims and Croats whom I know and I

10     socialise with them as -- just as there are many Serbs who remained in

11     Sarajevo.

12        Q.   But I had actually asked you to deal with this particular

13     paragraph, but in any event you call this the Bosnian paradox and that's

14     a result -- this Bosnian paradox that you here describe is a result of

15     ethnocentric policy of the Bosnian Serb leadership and their claim that

16     there is no life together with the Muslims, is it not?

17        A.   No.  In the whole 65 ter I relativise the question if living

18     together is possible or living separately, and I conclude that these are

19     relative things and that both options are possible.  I also point out

20     that the choice for ethnically homogeneous wholes, these choices were

21     made by all three sides.  And finally there are young people in all three

22     communities, and I also have Bosniak friends in Sarajevo just as I know a

23     number of Bosniaks who were close friends of Dr. Karadzic's.

24        Q.   Let me --

25        A.   And -- just a moment.  What you have mentioned, Pale, you insist

Page 39129

 1     on this, Pale in this the text is a metaphor for a centre of the Serbian

 2     nation, Sarajevo as a metaphor for the Muslims.  West Mostar or Grude a

 3     metaphor for the Croats.  So that's the way to understand it without

 4     anybody specific at Pale in mind.  That was the position of the entire

 5     people, not only of their leadership --

 6        Q.   Let me interrupt you --

 7        A.   -- just a moment --

 8        Q.   No, no, let me interrupt you here --

 9        A.   -- may I interrupt you --

10        Q.   -- I interrupt you --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kecmanovic, I think you answered the question.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

13        Q.   And I only wanted to --

14        A.   If I may --

15        Q.   We have no time --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kecmanovic, if necessary, Mr. Karadzic will take

17     up the issue in his re-examination, rest assured.  The Chamber will

18     monitor that you will be able to speak whatever you wish to and have to.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.  In line 23 it

20     was not recorded what Mr. Kecmanovic said, namely, that he personally

21     knew Karadzic's Muslim friends.  That was not recorded.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

23             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24        Q.   In this -- the next -- the very next paragraph in this article

25     you write the following:

Page 39130

 1             "'For us Serbs, there is no life together with the Muslims!'

 2     That is one of the most frequently used programme slogans of the Serbian

 3     national movement in Bosnia ..."

 4             And, Dr. Kecmanovic, on top of this movement stood the Bosnian

 5     Serb leadership; isn't that right?

 6        A.   I kindly ask the President of the Trial Chamber to caution the

 7     Prosecutor not to interrupt me and constantly mentioning the shortage of

 8     time.  I'm not short of time.  I have time -- I have hours and hours.  I

 9     can stay as much as you want.  The organisational problems that there may

10     exist are no problems of mine.  And now if you --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kecmanovic, we'll make sure that you have the

12     opportunity to answer the question to the extent necessary and relevant.

13     The Chamber will ensure that you speak out when it is relevant and

14     necessary.

15             At the previous time, because I find that you answered already

16     sufficiently, we agreed with Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.  But -- yes, shall we

17     continue?

18             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I just wanted to make now an

19     observation.

20        Q.   That we are hurrying so much through what we wanted to discuss is

21     basically due to the fact that you have indicated through the Victims and

22     Witnesses Unit and the Defence that you cannot continue to stay here.  If

23     that of course would change, we would have more time and we could be much

24     more detailed.  So --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, that is the case.  I confirm.

Page 39131

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know, I've been here since

 2     Sunday, which means five or six full days at the disposal of the team and

 3     this Tribunal and I'm willing to return, but I can't stay longer at a

 4     time than I have already stayed now because of my commitments in Belgrade

 5     and Banja Luka.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue?

 7             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, Your Honour.

 8             Can this document be --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  No, but I don't think we heard the answer from your

10     last question.

11             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Oh, yes.

12        Q.   So I had asked you that:  Mr. Karadzic was on top of the Serbian

13     national movement, was he not?  That was my question.

14        A.   He was at the head of the national movement because the Serbian

15     people elected him to that position.  In other words, he reflected the

16     mood and the opinion of his voters.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this document please be admitted,

18     Your Honour?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6354, Your Honours.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

22        Q.   During the interview we had on Wednesday, you mentioned that

23     given your professional background you are aware of the effect that

24     propaganda has on various audiences; right?

25        A.   Yes.  We spoke about that and your opinion was that propaganda

Page 39132

 1     had a decisive influence, to which I said that it was not the case, that

 2     it did have influence but not a decisive one otherwise we would have been

 3     able to resolve everything through propaganda, which means this would

 4     have been an attack on the principles of democracy, among which there is

 5     the position that people are of age and that they use their head to

 6     think.

 7        Q.   In paragraph 43 and 49 of your statement in which you refer to

 8     the one-sided reporting and propaganda by the Bosnian BiH media

 9     portraying the Muslims as victims and the Serb soldiers as the sole

10     perpetrators, that was the same just reversed for the Serbian propaganda;

11     correct?

12        A.   Yes, and the Croatian too.  When a civil war begins, naturally

13     the media to a great extent are turned into propaganda tools.  That's how

14     it has always been everywhere.  But the problem in this case, and I think

15     I state that somewhere, that the so-called international propaganda

16     almost fully sided with the Muslim side, which confused people about what

17     it's all about.  I even spoke about that to some of my Bosniak friends

18     who were neutral with regard to both sides.  They started to view the

19     Serb side negatively because in our conversations when I was asking them

20     what was happening, why they had changed their minds, they would reply,

21     "But, you see that the whole world is supporting the Muslim side."  They

22     even mentioned the Russian side then that was at the time of Yeltsin and

23     Kozyrev.

24        Q.   Let me interrupt you.  You are going into too many broad details.

25     You confirmed when we talked that propaganda can cause fear; correct?

Page 39133

 1        A.   Yes, I did.

 2        Q.   And it can cause hatred; right?

 3        A.   Now we are really going into details, and given that you're in a

 4     hurry, this -- and this is a very fruitful topic, we could go on for a

 5     very long time.  But yes, it does have a significant influence.

 6        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, do you recall that when the rallies were taking

 7     place in 1990 and 1991 and in the parliaments, reference were made to the

 8     suffering of the Serbs during World War II.  Do you recall that?

 9        A.   I do not, but I know that in talks, even outside of institutions

10     given the inter-ethnic tensions, among Serbs there was a lot of conjuring

11     up of the Second World War when there was Pavelic's state and there

12     was -- there were the same alliances against the Serbs now.  And that

13     1991 the Muslims and Serbs -- the Muslims and Croats --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- joined forces against the Serbs.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

17        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, such kind of references was an important

18     propaganda tool, was it not, because it was meant to remind the Serb

19     audiences of the suffering of the nation and to cause this suffering,

20     namely, the Croats and the Muslims; correct?

21        A.   I don't think that any propaganda was required for that.  I lived

22     in Sarajevo since birth.  No one of my friends and neighbours had such

23     experiences in the previous generation.  I can remind you of Pavelic's

24     Budak's motto that one-third of the Serbs should be converted

25     Catholicism, one-third expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one-third

Page 39134

 1     killed.  That was part of Pavelic's ideology in the NDH.  Children had to

 2     learn that at elementary school.  It was part of the educational

 3     curriculum.  We all knew that, although we were not there during the

 4     Second World War.  But we all had a relative who came to harm in the

 5     Second World War.  We didn't need Karadzic or the SDS to remind us.

 6        Q.   Yes.  In paragraph 13 of your statement you describe that the

 7     Bosnian Presidency was constantly in session and in paragraph 28 you

 8     refer to the minutes of the Presidency.  When you were not present during

 9     sessions you would get the minutes and transcript; correct?

10        A.   No.  This is an opportunity to point out a fact that has to do

11     with the reliability of these minutes.  When it was noted that I was

12     absent from the sessions of the Presidency, even in October although in

13     mid-August I resigned and sent it by fax to the Presidency and also

14     informed the "Tanjug" which was published all over the region, but for

15     September and October it is constantly stated that I wasn't present at

16     Presidency sessions, as if I was still a member of the Presidency --

17        Q.   Let me interrupt you --

18        A.   -- this casts a shadow on --

19        Q.   -- my question was actually answered.  There was no need to

20     digress.

21             While you participated in Presidency session, you did discuss the

22     expulsion of Muslims, did you not?

23        A.   Yes.

24        Q.   Let me first go to 65 ter 25083, and it is the 124th Presidency

25     Session, Bosnian Presidency Session, of 20 June 1992.  And we would need

Page 39135

 1     the second page in the English and in the B/C/S.

 2             Mr. Kecmanovic, I'm aware that you were not present during this

 3     particular session, that is the one where the declaration of war was

 4     adopted.  But I still would like to address one point and that is --

 5     let's look at page 3 in the English and page 4 in the B/C/S and the last

 6     paragraph.  Page 3 in the B/C/S -- in the English and 4 in the B/C/S.

 7     That's not correct.  Page 3 in the English should be -- oh, yeah, I'm

 8     sorry, I'm sorry.  If you look here it says in the last paragraph, there

 9     is a reference to:

10             "The problem of the relocation of Muslims from Banja Luka,

11     underlining that they received threats that they would be killed if they

12     did not leave ..."

13             And Mr. Izetbegovic said that if that would be tolerated, it

14     would create ethnically pure regions and that the country should not

15     succumb to this kind of pressure to establish ethnically pure regions.

16             Dr. Kecmanovic, although you were not present, but this problem

17     with Banja Luka and the expulsion of Muslims from there, that was a topic

18     that you were aware of and you got information about; correct?

19        A.   About these -- Izetbegovic's words, I didn't know anything about

20     them nor did I attend the session.  However, it is indicative that

21     Izetbegovic was very concerned about the situation in Banja Luka, and the

22     fact was that people were fleeing Sarajevo and they were even prevented

23     from leaving Sarajevo.  And that was never a topic at any of the sessions

24     of the Presidency, although I wanted it to be discussed.  Unlike

25     Banja Luka, Sarajevo had an inner circle.  It was encircled from the

Page 39136

 1     inside and the authorities in Sarajevo did not allow the people to leave

 2     the city.  As far as I know about Banja Luka, I can't be a hundred

 3     per cent sure.  People didn't have any problem in Banja Luka to leave it.

 4     As far as I know, I can't testify about something that I did not see with

 5     my own two eyes.

 6             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can this be admitted?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  This page?

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The Presidency session.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  We don't object to the whole thing being admitted.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  It's only three pages.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, it's only three pages.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit it.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6355, Your Honours.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Now I would like to have 65 ter 25071A on

16     the screen.

17        Q.   And it is an excerpt of the Presidency session of 30 June 1992,

18     and you were actually present on that occasion.  And as it is coming up,

19     you received information during Presidency sessions about the detention

20     of non-Serb civilians; correct?

21        A.   About detention of ... ?

22        Q.   Detention of non-Serb civilians in facilities run by Bosnian Serb

23     forces, did you not?

24        A.   Not in any detail.  You mean in the territory outside of

25     Sarajevo?

Page 39137

 1        Q.   Yes, yes.

 2        A.   I did not have any such specific information.  As far as I can

 3     remember, we did not receive such information.  If we received

 4     information, it was rather general.  As a rule, it was not written.

 5     Sefer Halilovic as the Chief of the General Staff of the Bosniak army,

 6     which was known as the BiH army, during the session or the beginning of

 7     every session he would provide a very general report on the situation on

 8     the ground.  He mostly referred to the victories of the Muslim side,

 9     i.e., the BiH army.  The tone was very optimistic when he spoke.  I

10     believe that I mentioned in my report that one time Izetbegovic lost his

11     nerve and he said that if he had --

12        Q.   Let me --

13        A.   -- if he were trusted the Bosniak army would already have won --

14        Q.   You have again digressed from my question and what you have said

15     is already in your statement, so let's not waste time in this way.  Let

16     us move to page 7 in the English and page 15 in the B/C/S.  We need to

17     look at the upper part of the English and -- it's actually you speaking

18     and in the context of the arrest of the academic Leovac, you say the

19     following:

20             "To be frank, the more cases like this we have" --

21        A.   I don't have that on the screen.

22        Q.   That's -- it should be -- it should be on page 15 in the B/C/S.

23     That's -- you are speaking.  It should be.  It's the -- oh, no, it's the

24     previous -- in the B/C/S it's the previous.  31221.  Yes.  That's where

25     you are speaking in the context of the arrest of academic Leovac.  You

Page 39138

 1     say:

 2             "To be frank, the more cases like this we have, the more we would

 3     indirectly tolerate this, signing up to the anarchy that is happening on

 4     the other side where the crimes are of course incomparably worse,

 5     genocide, et cetera.  However, this does not excuse us anything in

 6     establishing the rule of law in areas we control."

 7             When you speak here of the "other side," that means the Bosnian

 8     Serb forces; right?

 9        A.   That's right.  However, when I say this I only quote what

10     Izetbegovic and other members of the Presidency belonging to the Muslim

11     and Serbian side said about the Serbian side at the Presidency sessions.

12     I warned them when I heard there was that that was also happening on my

13     side before my own two eyes.

14             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we move on to page 10, upper part in the

15     English, and in the B/C/S it should be page 17.

16        Q.   And Mr. Pejanovic is speaking and he says:

17             "I think we are reacting inadequately to the spreading and

18     increase in the number of camps for Muslims in the republic.  We are not

19     doing enough to animate the public either in Bosnia or

20     internationally ..."

21             Dr. Kecmanovic, you got information in the Presidency of the many

22     camps for Muslims run by the Serb forces as Mr. Pejanovic says here, and

23     he's speaking about civilians; right?

24        A.   You should ask Pejanovic that.  As far as I can see, I didn't say

25     anything about camps for Muslims.  He is the one whose words you are

Page 39139

 1     quoting.  We heard about that.  It was constantly mentioned, but that was

 2     propaganda and nobody could be certain of any information that was

 3     launched from the other side including this particular information.

 4             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this please be admitted, Your Honour,

 5     the entire session -- minutes?  This block.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6356, Your Honours.

 8             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25020 on the

 9     screen.

10        Q.   And as it is coming up, it is another Presidency session, the

11     117th of the 12th of June, 1992.  And can we please have page 3 in both

12     languages.  And now we have here under item 1 and 2 we have Dr. Brkic

13     speaking, the assistant minister of national defence, pointing to the

14     great problem regarding the arrested civilians who are being taken to

15     Pale and other camps.  So now it's Mr. Brkic referring to arrested

16     civilians taken to Pale and about other camps.  Dr. Kecmanovic, what is

17     he particular referring to?  Which civilians were taken to Pale, do you

18     know?

19        A.   No, I don't know.  No, no.  I don't know.

20             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can this be admitted, Your Honour?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive it.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6357, Your Honours.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25056A on the

Page 39140

 1     screen, and it is another Presidency session.  It's the 114th Session

 2     from 9 June, 1992.  And page 1 in both languages.

 3        Q.   We have Commander Halilovic speaking right in the beginning about

 4     the military situation and speaking about the artillery fire which was

 5     opened at the city during the last 70 hours and he provides further

 6     details.  As you, yourself, were living in the city, were you in fact a

 7     victim of this artillery fire?  You experienced it?

 8        A.   I was not a victim.  I just testified to that fire, I bore

 9     witness to it.

10        Q.   Yes.  And the citizens in Sarajevo were terrified when that

11     happened, were they not?

12        A.   Including me personally.

13        Q.   And you feared -- you yourself and the other citizens, you feared

14     for their lives; right?

15        A.   Yes.  There is a remark here; however, after very short

16     experience we sought shelter and if we did it in time, if we found

17     shelter in a cellar, in a basement, the danger would be reduced to a

18     minimum because the power of those shells was not so destructive.  They

19     could not pierce the walls of a building.  You were in danger if you

20     found yourself on the street.

21        Q.   And a little bit further down in this session he also speaks in

22     this -- on this page he speaks -- Halilovic speaks about the lack of

23     artillery on the side of the government forces and he speaks about ten

24     weapons against the 150 on the other side.  This lack of weapons on the

25     side of the Bosnian army, that was a concern and a matter of discussion

Page 39141

 1     in various Presidency sessions; correct?

 2        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 3             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  And can this please be admitted,

 4     Your Honour?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I would like to

 7     mention that the ambitions of the BiH army were not to defend the

 8     territories that they held, but rather to liberate every single foot of

 9     the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina according to Halilovic.  That's why

10     they needed so much weaponry because they had VRS on the one side and

11     Croatian troops on the other in the HVO and the HV.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please have 65 ter 25087 again on the

13     screen.

14        Q.   And it's the Kvocka report that we have spoken before.  And I

15     would like to have page -- e-court page 31 on the screen.  And I'm sorry,

16     we don't have the B/C/S, so I read slowly that you can follow.  You refer

17     here -- is this -- yes.  You refer here to the Sarajevo citizens that

18     "became tragic victims of two nationalist extremes ...," you refer to the

19     genocidal and chauvinist hatred.  And then you say:

20             "The superior Serbian artillery laid waste to the central and old

21     part of the city, while the Muslim, which grew stronger with time,

22     responded by targeting the newly built residential areas on the outskirts

23     of the city ..."

24             And at the end of the paragraph you refer to the fact that "the

25     quantities of weapons that started arriving was not enough for the Muslim

Page 39142

 1     army to threatened the Serbian artillery emplacements positioned on the

 2     hills around the edge of the city.

 3             Dr. Kecmanovic, that is how you experienced the situation;

 4     correct?

 5        A.   Yes.  My impression was that there is a disbalance between the

 6     two capacities at the moment when I experienced that.  We're talking

 7     about the period while I was in Sarajevo in practical terms.  It was up

 8     to the 5th of July, I was in Sarajevo until then, and on the 5th of July

 9     I left.

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, can this page also be admitted?

11             JUDGE KWON:  We'll add this page to the Exhibit P6351.

12             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Thank you.

13        Q.   And now I want to put the last document to you, and that's

14     65 ter 25077.  And as it is coming up, it is an interview you gave to

15     "Borba," that's a Belgrade newspaper; right?

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   And it's interview on 29th and 30th August 1992.  Now we have to

18     move a bit around in the various columns here.  On page 1 in the English,

19     the right column, right in the middle, and in the B/C/S, the first page,

20     left column at the end, in relation to the Serbs in Sarajevo you say the

21     following.

22             "The Serbs were in a ...  difficult position.  On one hand, they

23     shared the same ordeals of war time Sarajevo as the Muslims and Croats,

24     and they were equal victims of the constant artillery and infantry

25     clashes.  On the other hand, the situation was made even more difficult

Page 39143

 1     for the Serbs by the fact that the war propaganda imposed on an indirect,

 2     collective feeling of guilt upon them."

 3             And, Dr. Kecmanovic, a few lines further down you also refer to

 4     the fact that the members of the other two peoples gradually started to

 5     see all Serbs as all the same butchers.  What you say here is a fair

 6     assessment of the situation at that time; correct?

 7        A.   What is your question?  Just a while ago I said -- I'll try and

 8     answer.  A few minutes ago in my response I said that I was one of those

 9     who feared the shells that were launched from the Serbian side.  Nobody

10     targeted either Muslims or Croats.  Serbs faced the same threat as the

11     other two peoples.  And then it is stated that the Serbs suffered from

12     the predominantly Muslim authorities and at the hand of Muslim civilians

13     because they treated them as collaborators, as those who stayed behind in

14     order to help the Serbian side.

15        Q.   That's understood.  Thank you.

16             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please move on to page 4 in the

17     English, left column at the bottom, last paragraph, under the header

18     "Everyone to his own Crowd."  And in the B/C/S it's page 2, the left

19     column.

20        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, you refer in this paragraph to destruction and

21     expulsion, and at the end you speak about the practical problem that many

22     houses that have been abandoned and burned and property had been stolen

23     and destroyed and so many people, even if they wanted to return, would

24     not have anywhere or anything to go back to.

25             Dr. Kecmanovic, what you describe here, that's the result of the

Page 39144

 1     policy that is very often referred to as ethnic cleansing; correct?

 2        A.   We are coming back to the ambiguity as regards ethnic cleansing,

 3     and with the help of the President of the Trial Chamber we managed to

 4     establish that that phenomenon which can be termed that way or perhaps in

 5     a more adequate way is less stigmatised.  That's something that happened

 6     on all the three sides.  When you quote my words, when I said about the

 7     looting of houses and other premises, that was something that somebody

 8     from the other side of the front line couldn't do.  That could be done

 9     only by the people in the city itself.  The looting was carried out by

10     the Green Berets, the Patriotic League, and other Muslim paramilitaries,

11     and different structures within the armed forces which -- I apologise,

12     let me finish --

13        Q.   Thank you.

14        A.   -- please let me --

15        Q.   Actually, we have very little time.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Let him finish.

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Okay.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             Which carried out those acts.  In my report I didn't mention that

20     the entire city, all of its shops were looted.  Shop windows were

21     shattered and all that was done by the insiders, the forces who lived

22     inside the city.  They started as the Patriotic League and then they were

23     incorporated into the regular BiH forces.  That was not done by the

24     Serbs, I'm sure.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Can we please move on to the next page in

Page 39145

 1     the English and it's the right column, first paragraph.  And in the B/C/S

 2     we stay with the same page but you have to look at the second column from

 3     the left and a bit below the header "quartermaster support."

 4        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, you state here the following:

 5             "The Muslims really are the most poorly armed and which is

 6     particularly tragic they have suffered the most in the war so far ..."

 7             Dr. Kecmanovic, you're speaking here in April -- in August 1992

 8     and this is what you wrote; correct?

 9        A.   I was a victim of propaganda here.  We received information that

10     during the first several months of war, 300.000 people had been killed in

11     the civil war in Bosnia and that those people were all Muslims.  It was

12     later on a few years later that we learned from an independent

13     international commission headed by a Bosniak, Mr. Tokaca, and that

14     commission that there were only a 100.000 victims throughout the war.

15     When I say "only," I sound cynical but that is not my intention.  And the

16     break-down of the victims, applying a rational criterion:  If you look at

17     it in relative terms with regard to the number of the population, I would

18     say that the number of the victims on all the three sides was

19     proportionally equal.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Do you see -- I can't locate the passage.  Where can

21     I find it?

22             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  The passage is under the header

23     "Quartermaster Support."  It's on --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Could you take a look at the monitor, e-court.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  It was supposed to be page 4 in the

Page 39146

 1     English -- page 5 in the English, the right -- the right column.  Page

 2     5 -- page 3?  Page 3 in the English.  I was just told page 3 in the

 3     English.  There should be a header "Quartermaster Support."  No, it's

 4     actually the next page.  It should be the next page -- no, no, no,

 5     it's -- it's page -- it's page 3, right column, first paragraph, but

 6     it's -- no, it can't be.  It's under the quartermaster support.  Can we

 7     look at the next page --

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I see a passage which says:

 9             "The Muslims really are the most poorly armed" --

10             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

11             JUDGE KWON:  " -- and which is particularly tragic, they have

12     suffered the most in the war so far ..."

13             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, that's the one.  Yes, sorry.

14             JUDGE KWON:  E-court page 4 on the top of the right column.

15             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes, yes.  I'm sorry.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I take it the witness read --

17             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

18             JUDGE KWON:  -- the proper column.

19             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Proper part.  Let's continue.

21             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Yes.

22        Q.   And one last thing, and we remain on the -- the English remains

23     on this page but it has to be a bit lower down.  We have to see the --

24     yes, we have to see this.

25             And for the B/C/S, Dr. Kecmanovic, we have to go back to the

Page 39147

 1     first page and you have to look in this little box at the bottom, and

 2     it's all under the header "aggressors and 'aggressors.'"  The journalist

 3     asks about the Serbs and how can one justify the fact that they have used

 4     weapons to conquer more than two-thirds of the territory in spite of the

 5     fact that they only have one-third of the population in

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And you answer, inter alia:

 7             "Just as in parliamentary competition, that is, in the political

 8     phase, the Muslims and Croats did not shrink from abusing their numerical

 9     superiority to out-vote the Serbian side, the Serbian side did not shrink

10     from using the advantage in heavy weapons in war time ..."

11             And you further state:

12             "Everyone in postelection Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in peace and

13     in war, had ruthlessly exploited their advantages without concern for the

14     weaker side ..."

15             Dr. Kecmanovic, that is what you answered at that time.  Is it

16     your evidence that the out-voting of a minority by the majority in a

17     parliament can be compared to the ruthless use of heavy weapons and

18     military superiority in achieving one's goals?  Do you equal that?

19        A.   No.  They cannot be equalled because the former was the cause and

20     the latter a consequence.  You see, the Muslim side with the assistance

21     of Croatia caused the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by dominating in the

22     common bodies and abusing the majority, and that's what led to the war in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina and to everything else.  Of course in this context the

24     answer would be the one that you would like; however, I think that the

25     former is worse because of the sequence of events and because of the

Page 39148

 1     causality.  Of course, in any other situation it would be different.

 2             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  I would like to tender this exhibit,

 3     Your Honours, and I see my time is up and that was my last question.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6359, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellency.  I will do my

 8     best to be fast, but I do believe that we need to release the other

 9     witness.  We do have only half an hour left, don't we.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Kecmanovic, though, I'd rather address you

14     as "professor," just with the last document we were looking at, can we

15     have the last page.  What were the reasons why you got into the

16     Presidency at a time when Biljana and Nikola withdrew?

17        A.   I personally thought that it was a mistake that Biljana Plavsic

18     and the late Nikola Koljevic left the Presidency.  It was along those

19     lines that I spoke to Momcilo Krajisnik at Lukavica when I asked for a

20     meeting with Pejanovic concerning our membership of the Presidency.  I

21     thought it would have been much better if they had stayed on.  I told

22     them that they should go back to the Presidency, this was still possible,

23     but unless they would do that Pejanovic and I would go into the

24     Presidency because in a way we would be representing the Serbs who were

25     outside of the boundaries of Republika Srpska who were in a way

Page 39149

 1     unprotected and the Serbs in Sarajevo directly asked for that because

 2     they didn't have any deputies, any government members, or Presidency

 3     members who would represent the Serb people.  It was my position or

 4     rather the condition that I expressed was that all the decisions should

 5     be taken by consensus and that there should be the right of veto in the

 6     parliament and that this would be able to counter the developments in

 7     Sarajevo.  I thought that our requests would be agreed to; however, as

 8     you can see in the report that I wrote, none of this in fact happened.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Were you able to bring about the protection of the

10     Serbs in Sarajevo and were you able to have a bearing on the way the

11     decisions were made in the Presidency in a satisfactory manner?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have page 1, please.

13     Paragraph 6.  [In English] "What was controversial."  [Interpretation]

14     "What was controversial."  Can we have the left column enlarged, please,

15     in Serbian.  Can we scroll down, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] How does it start?

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we scroll up, please.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.    "What was controversial."

20        A.   Yes, I can see that.

21        Q.   Can you tell us what is the meaning of the paragraph.  In English

22     it starts with "what was controversial," the second from the bottom,

23     "what was controversial - I do not know how much ...," et cetera.

24             In other words, did you agree that Izetbegovic should promote you

25     to the rank of a representative of all Serbs and not just the Serbs in

Page 39150

 1     Sarajevo?

 2        A.   Yes.  I did not accept that I should represent all the Serbs in

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rather only those who were in that other area

 4     which was under the control of the Presidency of Sarajevo.  Even in my

 5     contacts with official dignitaries such as the visit to Sarajevo of

 6     Lord Carrington and Cutileiro when the Presidency prepared the concept of

 7     the meeting in advance so that members of the Presidency who included

 8     representatives of all the three ethnicities, would, in fact, exclude

 9     from negotiations the leadership of Republika Srpska and perhaps even the

10     Croatian leadership which was represented by Stjepan Kljuic in Sarajevo.

11     My response to that was that this would not work.  I said that I simply

12     did not represent all the Serbs but only the Serbs in that particular

13     area.

14             If they wanted to communicate with the person who based on the

15     elections represented the majority of the Serbs, I told them that they

16     should go to Pale and talk to you, to Dr. Karadzic, who was the president

17     of Republika Srpska and president of the Serb Democratic Party.  Later on

18     at the press conference Lord Carrington did, in fact, say that this was

19     my position and I suppose that you did hear of it at Pale.

20        Q.   Thank you.  This is my next question:  Were you able to assist

21     the Serbs in Sarajevo to the extent that you felt was sufficient and were

22     you able to bring your influence to bear on the Presidency to the extent

23     that you found satisfactory?

24        A.   If I had been able to, I would probably have remained in

25     Sarajevo.  Unfortunately, soon it became all too obvious that nothing

Page 39151

 1     will come out of it.  Izetbegovic and the Bosniak majority in the

 2     Presidency simply had the majority vote and they worked in such a way

 3     that they bypassed the Presidency.  And whenever I expressed my

 4     disagreement with certain issues at the Presidency, they would take it

 5     off the agenda and deal with these issues at certain Presidency meetings

 6     where I wasn't present.  To put it simply, I could not wield any sort of

 7     influence.

 8             As for specific assistance to the Serbs, in a number of cases, I

 9     believe that I was able to provide significant significance by making

10     sure that certain people were released from prisons like

11     Dr. Trifko Guzina [phoen], who was a professor at College of Medicine;

12     and another, Professor Lipovac, who was a professor at the Faculty of

13     Philosophy.  They were members of the Political Council of the SDS but

14     they were not members of the SDS, and they were prominent intellectuals.

15     They were detained, their families intervened with me, and I contacted

16     the minister of the interior --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't catch the name.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- who told me that he was not

19     aware of this whole system of private prisons and paramilitary groups.

20     Truth be told, he did refer me to one of these paramilitary commands or

21     commanders, one of whom was a criminal from before the war who I knew.

22     And it was actually through him that I was able to get my hands on the

23     important information which did not have to do with only these two

24     individuals but also Professor Leovac's wife who was a professor at the

25     University of Technology, a technological university.  They were not the

Page 39152

 1     only cases, but these cases involved well-known figures.  So this was

 2     something that I didn't do as a member of the Presidency or within the

 3     line of hierarchy of the Ministry of the Interior; rather, I relied on my

 4     personal acquaintances and connections with people who I stayed in

 5     contact with after having been in touch with them at a certain point in

 6     my earlier career.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   [No interpretation]

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the accused repeat the reference and his

10     question.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Please repeat your question.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My apologies.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   We were able to see from Exhibit P6355, which is a record of the

15     meeting of the Presidency session held on the 6th of June, 1992, when the

16     war was declared in Montenegro and Serbia that neither you nor

17     Mr. Pejanovic were present.  What was the view that you and Mr. Pejanovic

18     held vis-a-vis the declaration of war?

19        A.   Since this topic came up at one of the earlier sessions or it may

20     have been on the same day that the decision was taken at the morning

21     session, when we heard such a decision announced we expressed our

22     reservations and said that we would veto it.  However, it was precisely

23     because of that that late at night we would normally work until 6.00 or

24     7.00 p.m., late in the evening at around midnight an emergency session

25     was called to which neither Mr. Pejanovic or I were invited where this

Page 39153

 1     decision was taken.  When on the following morning Fikret Abdic announced

 2     at a press conference that the decision had been taken, some of the

 3     journalists who were there knew that we would not support the decision.

 4     They asked Abdic if the decision had been taken unanimously.  He said

 5     that all those present cast their vote and the Serb representatives

 6     weren't there at all in fact.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now call up 19832, 65 ter

 8     document.  19832.  I don't have a Serbian version, although there might

 9     be one in e-court.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   But I will read it out for you and it will be interpreted -- oh,

12     there is, after all, a copy.  We're interested in the beginning.

13             "The latest findings of UNPROFOR about the reasons --

14     [In English] the reasons for and the perpetrators (Muslims) of the

15     monstrous crime in the bread queue in Sarajevo is reason enough that I

16     can no longer remain a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina

17     Nenad Kecmanovic told ..."

18             And the sixth paragraph there you said:

19             "These changes eliminated the minimum conditions under which I

20     entered the Presidency so that now my engagement justifies the simulated

21     civic option behind which Alija Izetbegovic, as one of the national

22     leaders, is trying to impose a unitary solution on less numerous nations,

23     Kecmanovic said."

24             Is that a view you hold today as well?

25        A.   Well, today even more than at the time.  The course of the later

Page 39154

 1     events in Bosnia-Herzegovina through to this day has shown that this is

 2     how things stand.  Everything that happened later proved my view to be

 3     true rather than the other way around.  The Bosniak leadership, despite

 4     the fact that they formally espoused a civic option, although they could

 5     hardly conceal their unitarist pretensions, and this was something that

 6     turned out in the later events as well.  Nowhere where the Bosniaks were

 7     in the majority and wherever they had an opportunity to implement the

 8     principles of civic democracy regardless of the Serbs or the Croats,

 9     nowhere did they do this, not even in the capital.  They had an

10     opportunity to declare it a district based on the proposals from the

11     international community, but they refused to do so and which led to a

12     situation where the Serbs are next to none in Sarajevo.  Some people say

13     that there is even more Chinese than Serbs in Sarajevo.  Also on the

14     issue of the cantons, they didn't achieve this.  Moreover, in the entire

15     Federation you have the same problem occurring with the Croats.  The

16     relations between the Serbs and the Muslims have the same troubles as

17     existed between them and the Serbs because the Croats felt that they are

18     being dominated over and the international community did establish that

19     there was this domination being enforced, that something had to be done,

20     constitutional amendments, a revision of the Dayton Accords, et cetera.

21     So my convictions today are even firmer than they were back in 1992.

22        Q.   I will try to put questions to you now which will allow you to

23     give me a yes or no answer.  You also mention the incident at

24     Vase Miskina Street here as something that was a monstrous crime.  Do you

25     still stand by this position today that this had an impact on you?

Page 39155

 1        A.   Absolutely.  As things stand today, this is clearer than it was

 2     at the time.  I was following the testimony of the lady who is an

 3     explosives expert here before the Tribunal and her expertise was very

 4     compelling.  What made me suspicious of it at the time - and this

 5     involved a house that was a hundred metres away from mine - was that the

 6     Sarajevo TV crew appeared there at an incredible speed.  Even at the

 7     time, suspicions arose of it having been pre-staged, but even later new

 8     evidence emerged that --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stop here?  It goes too far.

10             Please continue.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

12     admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3646, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   On page 76 and I will try to phrase my questions as yes/no

18     questions.  On page 76 in connection with Exhibit 6356, an OTP exhibit,

19     you state that General Halilovic could not be fully trusted when it comes

20     to the representation of the military situation.  Was General Halilovic

21     to be fully trusted when he spoke about the sufferings of the Muslims and

22     other events in Bosnia?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.

24             Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think that's a leading

Page 39156

 1     question.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff suggested that

 4     Dr. Kecmanovic was informed by Halilovic of the sufferings of the

 5     Muslims, and Mr. Kecmanovic said that Halilovic couldn't be trusted

 6     because he lied a lot about the military situation, so I asked him a

 7     question whether he was to be trusted on other things.  That's not

 8     leading.  That's taking up an issue from cross-examination.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I answer?

10                           [Trial Chamber confers]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, it would have been better if

13     he had just asked the second part of the question without making

14     reference to the first, but it's not really a leading question if it's

15     only limited to that.

16             JUDGE BAIRD:  I tend to agree, Mr. Robinson.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Shall we ask the witness to answer

18     or shall we continue?

19             JUDGE BAIRD:  Rephrase, rephrase.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Could you reformulate your question.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Was General Halilovic at Presidency meetings to be fully trusted

24     regarding information about events in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

25     suffering of the people and the victims?

Page 39157

 1        A.   I have mentioned that his almost daily statements at Presidency

 2     meetings were one-sided and biased.  When he spoke about the sufferings

 3     of the -- of Muslim civilians, this is blown out of proportion, and on

 4     the other hand when he spoke about the successes of the army that he led,

 5     he also would exaggerate incredibly.  Even the Muslim and Croatian

 6     members of the Presidency were distrustful and Izetbegovic himself once

 7     pointed out to him not to exaggerate and said, "If you were really so

 8     successful militarily, we would be controlling all of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 9     by now."

10        Q.   Thank you.  On page 66 you were asked what Pale demanded.  Did

11     the Dayton accord grant us special links with Serbia that we had

12     demanded?

13        A.   There is no need to even answer that.  Yes, it did.

14        Q.   It was suggested that the Serb side - or specifically I claimed

15     that we couldn't continue living with the Muslims in one state.  Did that

16     equally refer to the SFRY and the independent Bosnia-Herzegovina?

17        A.   The Serb option - and when I say "Serb," I say it with full

18     consciousness that it wasn't only the position of the SDS but also of my

19     party and it was also the opinion of other Serbs who weren't members of

20     any party - the first option was that Bosnia-Herzegovina should stay part

21     of Yugoslavia.  But everything else was imposed by force because the

22     legitimate and legal Serb option was ignored.  Everything that happened

23     subsequently is merely a consequence of that position of the sides in the

24     conflict which was first political and then also military.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I would like to let you know that the Chamber wishes

Page 39158

 1     to rise at 3.45 sharp today -- 2.45.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I'll try to cut things

 3     short, and I kindly ask for Professor Kecmanovic to answer yes or no

 4     whenever he can, although I'm not allowed to ask leading questions the

 5     way the OTP did.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Did you --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the accused please start over.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Repeat, please.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Did you notice whether in me and the rest of the Serbian

12     leadership and the leadership of the Serbian movement there was a

13     difference in the attitude toward the Muslims we considered

14     fundamentalists and the Muslims we didn't consider fundamentalists?

15        A.   Yes, absolutely, there was a difference.

16        Q.   Thank you.  On page 60 you spoke out against genocide and you

17     said that this didn't refer to any specific side.  The document is P6353.

18     Did you mean a specific perpetrator or one specific side are responsible

19     of committing genocide?

20        A.   No.

21        Q.   Thank you.  When you said "movements of population," that the OTP

22     linked to ethnic cleansing, did you mean forcible removal of

23     population -- forcible resettlement of population or transfer --

24             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, that is leading.

25             JUDGE KWON:  What did you mean?  You can ask -- simply ask in

Page 39159

 1     that way:  What did you mean by "movement of population," "massive

 2     movement of population"?

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Page 53, what did you mean by "massive movement of population"?

 5        A.   "Massive movement of population" is a very broad term.  It is

 6     something that has continued in Bosnia-Herzegovina even after the end of

 7     the war and not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina but in all of former

 8     Yugoslavia.  Movements of population have been present since the Second

 9     World War.  A great percentage of Serbian and Croatian population left

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina in peace time after 1945.  This process is taking

11     place even now, after 1995.  I did not place that in the context of the

12     use of force because in that case it's called something else.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have on one part of the

14     screen P06352 and on the other part D220.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   While we're waiting, Dr. Kecmanovic, did you notice in the Serb

17     leadership or any official Serb factor intentions or inclinations or

18     desires to transfer population or an inclination toward ethnic purity?

19        A.   The people I communicated with - and that's you, Plavsic,

20     Krajisnik, Koljevic - I never observed that.  It seems to me that at one

21     point when there was a discussion about the division of territory and all

22     sides took part in that and all international agreements from Cutileiro's

23     before the war and up until the ones after the war were all about that,

24     and I don't know why this is being stigmatised.  Even the international

25     factors were in favour of such a solution and now it's become something

Page 39160

 1     odious, but I would like to remind of your suggestion, I think, your

 2     proposal that in places where a Muslim or Croatian -- where the Muslims

 3     or the Croats are the majority in that territory, that there should be

 4     sub-autonomies for places in that territory with a definite majority.  I

 5     believe that was applied to something in northern Bosnia.  So there

 6     should be safety for everybody through the system of sub-autonomies.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get page 2 on the right

 8     half.  And on the left side there is the platform that I issued on the

 9     22nd of April, 1992.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Please focus on paragraph 5.  Can you tell us how this tallies

12     with your understanding of our attitude toward the use of force?

13        A.   I think that paragraph 5 is almost identical to what the

14     Prosecutor mentioned from what I had stated at a Presidency meeting in

15     Sarajevo.  In other words, an advantage obtained by force will not be

16     recognised.

17        Q.   On page 2, or rather, on the right-hand side can we see item 4,

18     sub-item (c), if we could just see that.  We can remove this left half of

19     the screen.  Next page, item 4(c).

20             "The recognition of the legal authorities of the state of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina and its institutions in its entire territory."

22             Can you tell us how you understood this and under what conditions

23     these authorities could be legal without the legitimate representatives

24     of the Serbian people?

25             MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:  Your Honour, I think that's leading.

Page 39161

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no way.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Item (c) --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Well, you -- the last part of your question was

 5     leading.  What is your question?  Could you reformulate your question?

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Dr. Kecmanovic, please, how do you understand this?  What is the

 8     Muslim side pleading for?  What legitimate authorities would those be in

 9     all of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10        A.   I understood this to mean some sort of authorities in accordance

11     with what was mentioned at the beginning, that would come about only by

12     all three sides agreeing again, the same way it happened in Dayton.

13     That's the only way for Bosnia to be preserved, and I'm afraid the

14     chronic impossibility to reach such agreement can only result in a

15     separation.  Who was supposed to take part in this?  Maybe you and I

16     together if I had stayed in the Presidency or only the Pale leadership,

17     that's open to speculation.  But it's certain that the Serbian people

18     would have to have its say.  But if this had been like this at the

19     beginning, I'm sure that there would have been no civil war.

20        Q.   And my last question:  Did they, that is the Muslim-Croatian

21     coalition, understand this item (c) the same way as you do regarding the

22     legality of authorities at this moment?

23        A.   The Bosniaks, I'm afraid, no; I'm not sure about the Croats.  I

24     think that they were in favour of that but not the Bosniaks.

25        Q.   Thank you, Professor Kecmanovic.  If there were more time, I

Page 39162

 1     would have more questions but given the time I will finish.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             That concludes your evidence, Mr. Kecmanovic.  On behalf of the

 4     Chamber, I'd like to thank you for your coming to The Hague.  Please have

 5     a safe journey back home.  We'll adjourn but there's one thing.

 6             The Chamber is still considering the motion by Mr. Tolimir

 7     requesting to suspend the subpoena and to allow to appeal on the

 8     decision.  Given the circumstances, it seems prudent to reschedule his

 9     evidence which is scheduled for next week to a further date pending the

10     outcome of the decision -- the request.

11             The hearing is adjourned.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Kecmanovic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I thank you for the good wishes for

15     my return to Belgrade.  I have a request if you would let me say good-bye

16     to the accused.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic must have heard this statement of

18     yours.  It is not consistent with our practice.

19             THE ACCUSED:  But it was approved in Krajisnik case.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Not at this time.  Thank you.

21             The hearing is adjourned.

22                           [The witness withdrew]

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 4th day of

25                           June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.