Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 40077

 1                           Thursday, 20 June 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.  Please continue,

 7     Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good morning to all in

 9     the courtroom.

10                           WITNESS:  BOGDAN SUBOTIC [Resumed]

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:  [Continued]

13        Q.   Good morning, Mr. Subotic.  When we adjourned --

14        A.   Thank you, good morning.

15        Q.   When we adjourned yesterday, we were discussing aspects of

16     Srebrenica in 1995.  I had -- you had mentioned or the issue of

17     directives came up in the context of your statement.  I mentioned that we

18     would be turning to the question of directives, and so I wanted to turn

19     to paragraphs 231 through 233 of your statement, and those paragraphs

20     reflect a discussion about directive for further operations number 7

21     signed by the Supreme Commander in March of 1995 as we see in

22     paragraph 231, and you explain in your statement that you learned about

23     directive number 7 after it had been drafted.  That we see at the

24     beginning of paragraph 232.  You describe that Dr. Karadzic went to the

25     Main Staff, and as you say in paragraph 233, a few days after his return

Page 40078

 1     from the Main Staff I asked the president what was discussed.  He told me

 2     it was about drafting and signing a directive and a large number of other

 3     documents.  The paragraph goes on to describe how you reminded him

 4     that -- of your understanding or agreement that you would be present and

 5     review contents to which he replied, well, General, who am I supposed to

 6     trust if not the generals at the Main Staff, and then you state that the

 7     president would never knowingly put his signature under that disputable

 8     text of directive number 7.  That's found at the last sentence of

 9     paragraph 233.

10             First, General Subotic, what were you referring to when you

11     indicated the "disputable text of directive number 7"?

12        A.   I can tell you that I personally did not see the directive at

13     all.  I did not have it in my hands ever.  However, later on before I

14     testified in 2006, there was a dispute, as far as I understood it, and as

15     I say, I have never seen the directive personally.  As far as I know,

16     there was a dispute about the sentence which allowed some use of force or

17     something of that kind.  To be honest, I would like you to quote from

18     that directive, because I don't know.  I have never learnt about that,

19     which is why I claimed that.  Because we had a system, President Karadzic

20     and myself, according to which all the documents that were of some

21     significance had to be reviewed.  Otherwise, what would have been my role

22     in the office?  I was the expert, especially in terms of the military.

23        Q.   You described that in your statement, and I referred to it just a

24     few minutes ago.  In fact, your statement contains an excerpt or two from

25     the document itself at paragraph 231, there's a reference to the sentence

Page 40079

 1     as follows with reference to the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves "by planned

 2     and well thought-out combat operations create an unbearable situation of

 3     total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the

 4     inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

 5             So as a matter of fact, you yourself refer to portions of that,

 6     and is that one -- is that part of the disputable text that you were

 7     referring to?  In other words, were you -- were you saying in your

 8     statement that this is the kind of thing that you claim Dr. Karadzic

 9     would not knowingly have signed because of the nature of what that says,

10     or are you referring to another part of the document?

11        A.   No, no.  I had in mind that part.  I have not got the translation

12     of paragraph 231 into Serbian, but now you have jogged my memory.

13        Q.   Okay, good.  I would also call up 838, the document itself, and

14     turn to B/C/S page 15 and you can see it.  And that's also found on

15     English page 10 in 838.

16        A.   I still don't have it on the screen.

17        Q.   It's on the screen, sir.  You see under the Drina Corps in the

18     middle of the page?

19        A.   Yes.

20        Q.   You see the end of that first paragraph?

21             "By planned and well thought-out combat operations --"

22        A.   I've found it.

23        Q.   "-- create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no

24     hope of further survival --"

25        A.   [Overlapping speakers]

Page 40080

 1        Q.   "-- or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa."

 2             And, sir, when you were calling it disputable --

 3        A.   Yes.

 4        Q.   -- isn't it the case that what you meant was this is a patently

 5     illegal order to create no hope of further survival or life for the

 6     inhabitants of those enclaves?

 7        A.   Yes, yes, absolutely.  Absolutely.  I accept what you are saying.

 8     This is absolutely what was disputable for me.  Knowing

 9     President Karadzic and what had been done by the two of us up to then, I

10     have a serious doubt that President Karadzic ever read this.  I don't

11     know how things unfolded in the Main Staff.  However, I doubt that he

12     would have accepted this if he had read it.  Moreover, now that I look at

13     it and when I reflect on this, I may not be mistaken if I said that I

14     believed that President Karadzic never read this, and on the other hand,

15     I would not exclude the possibility that that page had been subsequently

16     either altered or tempered with in another way.  Because you see, you

17     legal professionals, all the lawyers in the world initial all the pages

18     of any serious document.  I personally believe, or, rather, I doubt that

19     President Karadzic ever read this.  I don't know whether he read this,

20     whether that was how it was written.  I would not be able to say.  So

21     these are my serious doubts.  However, knowing him --

22        Q.   General, you don't have to make the same point repeatedly.  I

23     understand your position on that.  So it's your position -- let's set

24     aside for the moment your speculation that somehow this was substituted

25     afterwards, it was your position in your statement and as you just stated

Page 40081

 1     here that the Supreme Commander signed a directive that laid out the

 2     course of operations for his military forces after participating in the

 3     drafting of it without bothering to read it.  That's your position.  And

 4     that explains why Dr. Karadzic's signature is on this document that

 5     contains this order; correct?  That's what you're saying?

 6        A.   What confuses me is this:  The principle concerning strategic

 7     documents pertaining to the army was such that a document was prepared by

 8     the Main Staff.  That was the first draft.  The first draft was then

 9     discussed, and then possible corrections were made to that draft.  If I

10     had participated in the drafting of this document, I am giving you a

11     serious guarantee that I would not have allowed this be written in this

12     document.

13        Q.   Right.  And apparently your testimony is that Dr. Karadzic is the

14     kind of guy who when he gets a document that dictates what his forces

15     will be doing doesn't bother to read it but says, Great, here's my

16     signature.  That's it.

17        A.   I cannot say that he did not bother.  I cannot say that.  I

18     wasn't there.  If I had been there, I would have sat down together with

19     Radovan Karadzic, I would have looked at the document together with him,

20     I would have perused it together with him, and then I would alert his

21     attention to a possible irregularities.  I'm telling you this very

22     honestly and I adhere that.

23        Q.   And what prevented you from looking at the document after it had

24     been signed?  Did you consider it to be the equivalent as a nonrefundable

25     plane ticket?

Page 40082

 1        A.   He was not in the office -- or, rather, that document was not in

 2     my office.  I did not have an occasion to see it.  It was signed in

 3     Han Pijesak and that's where he stayed as far as I know.  I personally

 4     never saw it.

 5        Q.   I'm asking you why you didn't ask to see it.  I didn't have to --

 6     why didn't you say to Dr. Karadzic, You know, I didn't a chance to review

 7     it, as you say you had agreed, so let me take a look at it and make sure

 8     there's nothing problematic, disputable, or more realistically illegal

 9     about it?

10        A.   I gave a statement, and I said that I should have seen it.

11     However, I don't know whether he was convinced that that's not how it was

12     written.  I don't know.  What I stated in my statement is correct.  I

13     can't change it now.  I can't speculate.  However, I have my doubts about

14     President Karadzic having allowed this to be said or written.  These are

15     my doubts, and I have to share them with you.  And there's nothing else

16     to it.

17        Q.   Let's move on to a somewhat different aspect of the operation and

18     consequences of the operation --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just one question from me for the witness.  I'm not

20     sure whether the witness could assist us.  Could we see the first page of

21     this document in B/C/S.  And the second page in English.

22             General Subotic, this directive 7 is dated as 8th of March, 1995.

23     Do you see that?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Can we see the second last page in the B/C/S and the

Page 40083

 1     first page in the English.  But the date on which General Milovanovic

 2     sent out this directive to the unit was 17th of March, almost ten days

 3     after the signature date.  Can you tell us why it was so, if you could?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see here that the Main Staff

 5     of the VRS - and this is first time I see the document - sent this to the

 6     command of the 1st Krajina Corps, and I don't know why it was sent to the

 7     1st Krajina Corps.  I wouldn't know that.  Let me just read the two

 8     sentences here.  I don't understand anything.  I don't know why this was

 9     sent to the command of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka in the first

10     place.  I wouldn't know.

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's so natural that if a directive, some document

12     like directive has been signed it should be circulated to the subordinate

13     units, but is it usual to send or circulate this kind of document after

14     almost ten days after the signature?  Would it be usual?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, in general terms,

16     in principle I would not find it commonplace, but I don't know why they

17     did that.  To put it simply, I never saw this document, and I can't say

18     anything concrete about it.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

20             Back to you, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

22        Q.   In paragraph 185 of your statement, General Subotic --

23        A.   185?

24        Q.   185; right.

25        A.   Just bear with me, please.  Very well.

Page 40084

 1        Q.   You describe some issues raised around the beginning of

 2     October 1995 concerning the exchange of prisoners, first talking -- that

 3     is you and Dr. Karadzic, talking to Serbs who were interested in having

 4     prisoners exchanged and presumably therefore having Serbian prisoners

 5     come home, and then a conversation or -- or a discussion that

 6     Dr. Karadzic had apparently following that discussion with the

 7     representatives of the people who had been killed in Vijenac about

 8     exchange, Dr. Karadzic talking to the commission for exchange to try to

 9     arrange an exchange.  So if I understand that correctly, after the

10     conversation with these Serbian civilians who were concerned about the

11     fate of their family members, Dr. Karadzic then contacted the commission

12     for exchange and said get in touch with the Muslims and arrange for

13     exchange.  That's an accurate understanding of what you've -- the

14     information you provided?  That's just the backdrop to the question I

15     want to ask you.  So is that -- do we have an accurate grasp of the

16     situation at that time?  Talk to these people, they wanted an exchange,

17     Dr. Karadzic then talked to the commission to assist those -- those

18     concerns.

19        A.   I can only confirm very precisely and say that things happened as

20     they are described in paragraph 185.  I can't change any of that.  I can

21     read the paragraph for the benefit of the Trial Chamber, but I wouldn't

22     change a single word in this paragraph.  The conversation that happened

23     that night had a huge impact on me.  I'm very familiar with the

24     situation, and I can only confirm that the veracity of what is written in

25     paragraph 185.

Page 40085

 1        Q.   All right.  And then the people he was talking to at the

 2     Commission for Exchange said where are the prisoners from Zepa and

 3     Srebrenica?  And Dr. Karadzic said well, as far as he knew, they had been

 4     exchanged.  That's what you say here; correct?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Now, the fact is, General Subotic, that there had been enormous

 7     pressure that began very shortly after the fall of the enclave for the

 8     Bosnian Serb authorities to identify where the missing Muslim men and

 9     boys were and to -- where they were held or what had happened to them.

10     Isn't that right?  Do you acknowledge that?  The enormous pressure from

11     the international community, and indeed even ultimately pressure from the

12     Serbian community because exchanges weren't -- were -- of Serbs were

13     being held up because of the question of where the men and boys from

14     Srebrenica were?

15        A.   I accept just the last part that you said, and the other thing

16     remains as I said it.  Because what is stated here by those people, by

17     the parents, they are angry at Mladic and at others about why there was

18     no exchange carried out between Zepa, meaning the Muslim prisoners and

19     the Serb prisoners.  What I wrote I cannot change, and I do not accept

20     any other variations.

21        Q.   First of all, is it your testimony that you were unaware of any

22     pressure from the international community, either the international

23     media, or international representatives on the Bosnian Serb authorities,

24     and particularly Dr. Karadzic, to identify where the thousands of missing

25     Muslim men and boys were?

Page 40086

 1        A.   I didn't know that.  No, not at all.  I did not have any

 2     information, nor did I know, and it wasn't my area of responsibility

 3     either.  There are other commissions.  Others were entrusted with that.

 4     That was not something that I was entrusted with.  I stand by this

 5     completely, behind everything that is written in paragraph

 6     170 [as interpreted].

 7        Q.   Well, I thought I understood you in the course of your statement

 8     to make a point about your concerns about the -- what the international

 9     media was saying; in fact, there's a portion in your statement devoted to

10     propaganda and what the international media was saying about the

11     Bosnian Serbs that you considered unfair.  Let me give -- let me just

12     recite for you quickly a little bit of the evidence in this Court about

13     what was being written in the international media in the aftermath of

14     Srebrenica.  So at P4397, on the 17th of July, there was an article in

15     the British publication "The Independent."

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction as to the previous

17     answer of the witness:  It's paragraph 185.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   That discusses a film that was made two days after Srebrenica and

20     what it shows, a reference by a UN official to General Mladic reportedly

21     saying that Serbs had been forced to kill lots of people because they

22     were trying to break out of Srebrenica.  The article says the fate of the

23     menfolk of Srebrenica has been a concern to their families and

24     international human rights since the enclave fell last Tuesday, and first

25     a delegation of the ICRC being prohibited from visiting Bratunac where

Page 40087

 1     many of the captured Muslim men were believed to be held.  Just a few

 2     days later P4398, referring to possibly the biggest mass execution of

 3     Muslim prisoners by the Bosnian Serbs in more than three years of war.

 4     According to residents of the Bosnian Serb controlled town of Bratunac

 5     and Serbs from Serbia who had visited the area, as many as 4.000 captured

 6     Muslim men from Srebrenica have been killed by the Bosnian Serbs.  Two

 7     days after that, 4400, 23 July another article even if -- saying even if

 8     a fraction of the stories emerging from Srebrenica are true, the men of

 9     Zepa have every reason to be afraid of becoming POWs of General Mladic.

10     And again referring to information from residents of the Serb controlled

11     town of Bratunac and Serbs from Serbia about thousands of captured men

12     from Srebrenica who had been summarily executed.  And stories of mass

13     executions of prisoners have started to cross the Drina River, irritating

14     Bosnian Serb authorities because this time the tales are recounted by

15     Serbs.  Or just one more, P4401, two days after that reporting that in

16     the days after Srebrenica fell, residents reported seeing truckloads of

17     men being brought to shallow pits dug on the other side of the river bank

18     and shot by Bosnian Serb soldiers, and stating -- and reporting that

19     thousands of men from Srebrenica were taken prisoner by the Bosnian Serbs

20     after the "liberation" of the Bosnian enclave on 11 July.  Some estimates

21     of prisoners executed are as high as 4.000.

22             Now, is it your testimony, General, that none of this information

23     and none of these allegations and none the concern of the international

24     community reflected in these articles was known to you at the time, that

25     you had no awareness of this whatsoever?

Page 40088

 1        A.   I assert that all of this is a lie.  I would not assert that it

 2     was a lie had these gentlemen from England called Serbian journalists so

 3     that together at the actual location they could establish what the

 4     situation was, and then they could write the article together in English

 5     and in Serbian.  Then I would believe them.  I read six books about

 6     Srebrenica which were written after the war with all the details.

 7        Q.   You've mentioned that [overlapping speakers]

 8        A.   And that is why I do not believe, I do not believe at all,

 9     Mr. Tieger, this.  I didn't even know about this, this -- this title,

10     nothing like that.  I don't believe that.  I just simply don't believe

11     it.

12        Q.   I wasn't asking you --

13        A.   Had it been realistic.

14        Q.   I wasn't asking for your opinion about the accuracy of these

15     articles.  We have a lot of information about that, General.  I was

16     asking you if you claim to have been totally unaware that these reports

17     were being made and disseminated internationally.

18        A.   I state that I did not know that at all.  I state that

19     absolutely.  Only after the end of the war I learned some other things.

20     At that time, I didn't know anything.

21        Q.   Were you unaware that on July 24th, 1995, the Special Rapporteur

22     of the commission on human rights sent Dr. Karadzic a letter expressing

23     his deepest - and I'm referring now to P6396 - expressing his deepest

24     concern regarding the recent events in the Srebrenica area which resulted

25     in the forced displacement of some 40.000 individuals and referring to

Page 40089

 1     reports that as a result of these events several thousand individuals are

 2     unaccounted for and there is fear that many have been killed or detained

 3     and calling for a proper investigation and evaluation, and in particular,

 4     calling for access to those who had been detained during the recent

 5     events?  Were you unaware of that?

 6        A.   I did not know.  I absolutely did not know.

 7        Q.   What about a letter sent to Dr. Karadzic by the

 8     Special Representative for the Secretary-General on the 12th of August

 9     also requesting access to investigate these allegations and what happened

10     to the men and boys of Srebrenica, to the thousands of men and boys who

11     were the subject of the international community's concern.  Were you

12     unaware of that too?  Is that your testimony?

13        A.   I did not have the opportunity to see the letter or to know about

14     it.  I didn't have the opportunity.  I don't know.

15        Q.   And you claim this is something Dr. Karadzic didn't mention to

16     his special advisor.  He kept this from you.

17        A.   I would not say that he did not mention it or that he concealed

18     it from me.  I don't know.  Perhaps I wasn't there.  I have no idea.  I

19     am simply not aware of it.  I simply don't know about it.  If there is a

20     letter, this letter in Serbian, perhaps I could refresh my memory, but

21     like this, no, I -- I am not aware of it.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

23             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. -- could we have the exhibit number for

24     that letter?  I couldn't find it in e-court [overlapping speakers] by the

25     date.

Page 40090

 1             JUDGE KWON:  It's in front of us.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  I'm speaking of the 12th of August, letter.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  2288.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 8 of the transcript, the

 6     witness did not say the -- the -- I would not say that he did not mention

 7     it or conceal it.  This "did not mention it" is superfluous.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Let's continue.  Thank you.

 9             MR. TIEGER:

10        Q.   Okay.  This letter has not been translated.  I can read it to

11     you.  Dear -- it's dated the 12th of August, 1995.  It's from the

12     Special Representative the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia,

13     Mr. Akashi.  It states:  Dear, Dr. Karadzic, it refers to the

14     Resolution 1010 of 10 August in which the Security Council expressed its

15     deep concern and reports of grave violations of international

16     humanitarian law in and around Srebrenica and at the fact that many of

17     the former inhabitants of Srebrenica are not accounted for.  I am equally

18     concerned at these reports, especially at the allegation of the existence

19     of a mass grave identified by the government of the

20     United States of America.

21             And he requests as a matter of urgency and in accordance with the

22     directives of the resolution he mentioned, that Dr. Karadzic allow

23     UNPROFOR, and co-operate with UNPROFOR, to investigate the report of the

24     existence of a mass grave and requests immediate access for

25     representatives of UNHCR, the ICRC, and other international agencies to

Page 40091

 1     persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa in areas of

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina under Bosnian Serb control.  Then he asks further

 3     that ICRC representatives be permitted to visit and register any persons

 4     detained against their will, including any members of the forces of the

 5     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 6             So I mention that to you as another reflection of the concern by

 7     the international community and pressures placed on the Bosnian Serb

 8     authorities.  Is that a document again that you profess to be -- to have

 9     been completely unaware of reflecting concerns by the international

10     community and demands by the international community that you also

11     profess to be unaware of at the time?

12        A.   I attended practically all the meetings between Akashi and

13     Mr. Karadzic, and I took notes, kept the minutes, and if any of this was

14     referred to, then I am aware of it.  And I knew that Mr. Akashi and

15     Mr. Karadzic would always and frequently speak in Pale or in some other

16     places, and I was always present, and I knew that.  And this was talked

17     about.  All the questions were talked about.  There was an understanding.

18     There were agreements about these things that were happening, but this

19     specific something that you offered here I did not take part in that, but

20     I know that the president always allowed, as far as the Red Cross is

21     concerned and UNPROFOR and as far as all the international organisations

22     are concerned.  He actually had problem with the army and the commanders,

23     actually, because he always permitted everything that the international

24     community asked to be done.

25        Q.   All right.  So I'm a little confused now.  Are you saying you

Page 40092

 1     were aware of these pressures or you were not aware of these pressures by

 2     the international community to allow to identify where the men and boys

 3     of Srebrenica were and to allow access to them if they were still alive?

 4        A.   Mr. Tieger, the international community was pressuring

 5     Republika Srpska every minute, every moment, and you are asking me now to

 6     split hairs.  I always was under pressure, not just myself but everybody

 7     in Republika Srpska.  How could I have known about every instance of

 8     pressure by the international community?  These pressures were there

 9     every day.  So I will tell you what I know sincerely.  I'm not afraid of

10     anything.  But don't impose any mention of any pressure on me that I'm

11     not aware of it.  There's no reason for that.

12             I am not aware of this.  Therefore, I cannot discuss it.

13        Q.   Let's turn back --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Mr. Subotic, you said you are not

15     aware of this.  You were not aware of this at the time.  But do you agree

16     that Mr. Karadzic received this letter from Mr. Akashi?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that he did.  If you say

18     so, then I believe that he did receive it, because I know that he had

19     contacts very, very frequently and very solidly with Akashi.  I don't

20     have any doubts about it.

21             JUDGE KWON:  If Mr. Karadzic had received this, you would also

22     have received this as well.  So is the thing that you now don't remember

23     this?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I did not receive the letter.

25     I did not have the letter in my hands in the Serbian language.

Page 40093

 1     Therefore, had I had it, I don't know if he had received the letter, I

 2     would believe that he would have taken measures to do what Akashi was

 3     requesting in the letter.  But this was not in my remit to deal with

 4     this.  This was in the remit of other structures in Republika Srpska.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I think you -- this is one part I don't follow among

 6     your answer.  You said:

 7             "I did not receive the letter.  I did not have the letter in my

 8     hands in the Serbian language."

 9             When an international actor like Mr. Akashi, who was in

10     particular the Special Representative for the Secretary-General, when

11     they -- when such international actors sent that letter to Mr. Karadzic,

12     did they send also in Serbian language?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That I don't know.  I know mostly

14     whenever I was at the talks with Mr. Akashi there was interpretation into

15     Serbian.  I would take notes.  Ninety per cent of the conversations then

16     I would note down.  As for this specific case, we did not have, as far as

17     I can remember, talks, because then I would remember it.  I would have it

18     written down somewhere.

19             JUDGE KWON:  You answered that you didn't have the letter in the

20     Serbian language.  It sounded to me that you received the letter in

21     English.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  What I wanted to say was I

23     would have known about it had the letter been in Serb.  I would have

24     known.  Perhaps I didn't express myself properly.  It's logical if I had

25     seen the letter I would not have know what it was about because Karadzic

Page 40094

 1     did not give me the letter or speak to me about the letter.  I don't know

 2     if I was at the office at that time.  I don't recall simply.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:

 5        Q.   Getting back to paragraph 18 --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  There seems to have been an omission

 7     on the part of French translation.  I take it it will be supplemented

 8     later on.  Shall we continue.  Yes.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

10        Q.   So in light of this backdrop, General Subotic, getting back to

11     paragraph 185 where you state that Dr. Karadzic said that as far as he

12     knew the prisoners from Zepa and Srebrenica had been exchanged, I want to

13     ask you what you meant by -- what you understood he meant by "as far as

14     he knew."  So did -- how many prisoners did you understand had been

15     exchanged, prisoners from Srebrenica and Zepa?

16        A.   I don't know.  The number of prisoners was not -- actually, you

17     saw here that these parents were angry.  They were asking where Mladic

18     was and where Tolimir was and why were the prisoners from Zepa not

19     exchanged for their prisoners.  That's how I understood it in that

20     conversation and that is what I noted down.  Therefore, that is

21     disputable.  We didn't know Radovan or I when we spoke with them whether

22     they were actually exchanged or not, but he said, As far as I know, the

23     prisoners were exchanged.  But we were not there.  Other teams were there

24     for the exchange of prisoners, but at that meeting there were just the

25     two of us because the parents came to address us.

Page 40095

 1        Q.   And according to you, what steps did you and Dr. Karadzic take in

 2     the wake of this meeting to find out whether or not prisoners from

 3     Srebrenica and Zepa had been exchanged, how many had been exchanged, and

 4     when that exchange had taken place?

 5        A.   We did not have any information prior to the meeting nor did we

 6     know that they would come.  They came at midnight to the office in

 7     Banja Luka.  At midnight, Mr. Tieger.  We were just caught up, caught out

 8     in the situation, both Radovan and I, and then we asked for the people

 9     who were deal with that, who knew what was happening with the prisoners

10     to come.  The two of us didn't know anything about it.  I mean, simply

11     what I wrote down is what I stand by.  I have nothing else to say

12     regarding that.

13        Q.   Okay.  And your testimony is that by October of 1995, there was

14     no particular reason for you or Dr. Karadzic to have any awareness of

15     where Srebrenica prisoners were or how many there were or whether they

16     had been exchanged; correct?  That's your testimony.  So you were just

17     caught out when this issue came up.

18        A.   Correct.  Correct.

19        Q.   All right.  I want to turn to another subject, and that is

20     something you raised in paragraphs 240 and 241 of your statement, and

21     that's about Blagaj Japra, the Japra Valley, and in those paragraphs --

22     okay.

23        A.   Could I please see the text in the Serbian.

24        Q.   General Subotic, this statement that I'm referring to was

25     prepared by you and the Defence, or at least by -- I mean, I don't know

Page 40096

 1     the extent of your participation in this firsthand, but this is a

 2     document that has your signature on it and to which you attest -- yes.

 3        A.   Yes.  Can I please see the document so I can just remind myself.

 4     I cannot memorise so many pages.

 5        Q.   What's in front of you right now?  I see there's a document in

 6     front of you.  What is it?

 7        A.   What I see before me is in English.  It states "Blagaj Japra,"

 8     240.

 9        Q.   And what's the document --

10        A.   But it's in English.

11        Q.   Mr. Subotic, what is the document that you have on the table in

12     front of you if it's not your statement?

13        A.   I have a document on the table.  Paragraph 240, page 91,

14     Blagaj Japra, but it's in English.

15        Q.   So --

16        A.   241 is also in English, on page 92.

17        Q.   General Subotic, there's only -- there's only --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let me ask the witness.  If you did not understand

19     your statement, how could you sign the document as your statement?  You

20     confirmed that you signed the document.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received a statement in Serbian,

22     but it statement I didn't bring my own.  I was told that I could not

23     bring anything into the courtroom, but this is something that I found on

24     the desk here, the statement, and it's in English.  You have Serbian and

25     English sporadically.  I don't know what that is.

Page 40097

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Could you see the last page.  Last page of the

 2     document.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I signed.  I signed the document,

 4     but I didn't know that in my document -- well, in my document everything

 5     is in the Serbian language, the document that I received from the

 6     Defence, but this one is partially in English and partially in Serbian.

 7     The paragraphs and the pagination are the same.  I don't know why this

 8     happened.  Perhaps it's because of something on your ...

 9             JUDGE KWON:  So I'll read out the passage where Mr. Karadzic

10     asked you questions.  It's yesterday's transcript, page 39984.

11     Dr. Karadzic showed you the statement that you have with you now:

12              "Do you see that statement of yours on the screen?

13              "Yes.

14              "Have you read that statement and have you signed it?

15              "Yes."

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I read it in the Serbian language

17     and I signed it, but this, this, theirs, I mean mine, the one I have in

18     the hotel, all of it is in Serbian.  I didn't even know that there is

19     this mixed thing, Serbian-English.  I don't know why.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we strike out the witness statement?  I think

21     probably Mr. Karadzic or Mr. Robinson need to clarify.

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I believe that the witness is

23     mistaken.  What is in front of him is what he signed, and what he signed

24     is a compilation of his statement as he gave it to Mr. Sladojevic and

25     also the excerpts from his verbatim testimony in the Krajisnik case.  So

Page 40098

 1     that's what the statement consists of.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What is contained in paragraph 24 is part of his

 3     statement which he gave on 20th of May, 2006.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Prosecution.  Prosecution.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Subotic, having heard this clarification, are

 6     you minded to change your answer with regard to paragraph 240?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What do you mean change?  I don't

 8     understand the question now.  If I knew how to read this answer or if

 9     someone would read it out to me, then I could recognise it or not

10     recognise it.  But I don't know how to read it, so I don't know whether I

11     can change it.  I believe that that's it, but it's just written in the

12     English language.

13                           [Trial Chamber confers]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Let me ask one question to Mr. Robinson for

15     clarification.  Take paragraph 240.  That's a part of witness's

16     statement.  I take it there's a Serbian version of his witness statement,

17     isn't it?  Why do we have it English here?

18                           [Defence counsel confer]

19             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, Mr. President, Mr. Sladojevic has told me

20     he's not sure actually what the status is of the portions of the

21     statement that relate to interview by OTP of Mr. Subotic, so he believes

22     that they may also have been in English like the Krajisnik testimony, but

23     he's not sure.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Speaking for myself, I'm concerned whether we need

25     to strike out all the English part from his statement.  If you could

Page 40099

 1     assist us in that regard.

 2             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  First, definitely with respect to the

 3     Krajisnik testimony, this is no different than other 92 ter witnesses who

 4     have listened to their testimony before --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  But we need to satisfy the

 6     requirement that if asked, witness would have answered the same question

 7     here.  That's not satisfied here in this case.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  I believe he would say that if -- that his

 9     testimony he gave in the Krajisnik case was the same.

10             JUDGE KWON:  But he wasn't offered that opportunity, because he

11     can't read English at all.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  That's true, but he gave the testimony, and I also

13     believe he listened to the recordings of the testimony from the Krajisnik

14     case.  So he can say that the answers that he gave would be the same,

15     which is what I believe he has said when he was first questioned by

16     Dr. Karadzic.  So those portions that are in English from the Krajisnik

17     case I think fall with the same parameters that we have for other

18     witnesses who have testified in this Tribunal and whose testimony have

19     come under 92 ter.

20             With respect to the statement from the interview, we would have

21     to check on that.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Any observation to make, Mr. Tieger?

23             MR. TIEGER:  Well, just a couple.  I mean, first of all, it is

24     the case that witnesses in the past who cannot read English, instead of

25     being shown a transcript had reviewed the previous testimony or the

Page 40100

 1     previous statement in another form so that they were in a position to

 2     affirm that that was accurate.  So I don't have a problem with the

 3     modality, and I'm not trying to suggest that.  And the -- and I'm not

 4     trying to make this particularly a precise memory game for the witness so

 5     that he has to be able to correlate the paragraph number with information

 6     he previously reviewed for the purpose of making the statement, but

 7     that's -- and, in fact, the -- the -- my point in raising this was not to

 8     challenge that the witness had said what he said - it is reflected in

 9     paragraphs 240 and 241 - but instead to point out what was omitted that

10     he also said but didn't make it into the statement that appears in front

11     of Your Honours.

12             So I wasn't actually challenging the position that he didn't

13     stand by 240 and 241.  He's repeated several times, and I think he

14     would -- whether he recalled what he said in Krajisnik or not, that he

15     doesn't back down from that.  But in this particular instance, it's a

16     question of selective identification of what he previously said.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Whether or not the Prosecution is challenging, I'm

18     concerned about the requirements of Rule 92 ter have been met in this

19     case.

20             Did you try to say something, Mr. Subotic?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, we have two

22     variants.  The first variant is that you allow me within 10 minutes of

23     time to bring my own statement that I have at the hotel and everything

24     will be fine.

25             The second variant is that this be read out to me from English

Page 40101

 1     into Serbian, and I will immediately confirm whether that's it or whether

 2     it's not, and I will say what I know, but precisely --

 3             JUDGE KWON:  So by way of -- by way of example, let me turn to

 4     paragraph 241.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If somebody could read that out to

 6     me in Serbian, then I will answer Mr. Tieger.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I will do that.  This is pat of your testimony in

 8     Krajisnik case.  So Judge Orie asked you:

 9             "Judge Orie:  This Chamber received evidence which suggests that

10     such an event did take place, and that is not just stories, but that

11     includes documentary evidence, that includes some pictures.  So,

12     therefore, if you say, well, hardly could have taken place since we

13     didn't know about such a massive event, I just inform you that of course

14     there was no finding from the Chamber in that respect, but there is quite

15     a bit of evidence."

16             And you answered like this:

17             "I have no reason to doubt what you're saying, but I do have

18     reason to doubt that anybody in Pale was informed.  I can simply not

19     fathom that somebody could have been informed at Pale without raising a

20     campaign on that issue.  That's the only thing I'm saying."

21             And this is my question for you:  Before you signed the statement

22     which is in front of you, did anybody of the Defence team read out that

23     paragraph to you?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They read that part out to me, and

25     they gave it to me in the Serbian language in my copy of the statement.

Page 40102

 1     I don't know.  I didn't go into this.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Subotic.  I would like you to be

 3     precise.  If you don't remember, please say you don't remember.  You said

 4     that the Defence team gave this part in the Serbian language.  Is it

 5     correct?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.  It's not that it was

 7     given to me.  It was read out to me.  But I was told that this would

 8     be -- I mean, in my copy in the Serbian language, all of it, not only

 9     this, but also those other ones.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Be precise, please.  Did you receive this part in

11     Serbian language, or the Defence team only read out the part to you?

12     Which is correct?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- well, they had two copies.  I

14     didn't know that in their copy this was in the English language.  I

15     received a copy in the Serbian language.  All the items, all the

16     paragraphs, all the pages.  I have that copy, but since I was told that

17     I'm not allowed to bring anything into the courtroom, I didn't bring

18     that, but I have a copy of the statement.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Subotic.

20             Yes, Mr. Tieger, please continue.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   Well, His Honour just kindly read out to you what 241 says, and

23     that's the gist of what you convey in your -- the information you provide

24     about events in the Japra Valley and the awareness in Pale and among the

25     Bosnian Serb leadership about what happened; that is, that you have

Page 40103

 1     reason to doubt that anybody in Pale was informed because nobody raised a

 2     campaign on that issue.

 3             Now, that did not reflect the entirety of the discussion that

 4     took place during your testimony in the Krajisnik case, and if we turn to

 5     pages 26470 --

 6        A.   What -- I mean, I don't understand this question sufficiently.

 7     What I said in the Krajisnik case, well, I wasn't asked for anything

 8     precise.  I wasn't asked for anything precise.  I was just -- I mean,

 9     well, the statement I gave is what I knew then.  It's not that I had any

10     precise information and so on, and no one asked me for precise

11     information.  But later when the statement was taken from me, I mean in

12     2012, that was something different because there was information that was

13     accessible to me and that was generally accessible, a lot of information.

14        Q.   And what you said in the Krajisnik case to Judge Orie was that:

15             "You see, Mr. President, this involves," and again this is

16     referring to the Japra Valley operations, "... this involves a huge

17     amount of people, 4.000 people.  It's not a small group.  It's neither 4

18     nor 40.  I believe that there is nor municipal authority or police force

19     in that area that could have kept this from the government or Pale.

20     Since that was never a subject of discussion ever, I simply cannot

21     conceive that something like that could have happened without anybody

22     having been informed whereas the communication lines were working."

23             So what's not contained in paragraphs 240 and 241 is the fact --

24     is your position that there is no way that this event, that any municipal

25     authority or police force from that area could have kept this information

Page 40104

 1     from the republic-level authorities or from Pale; correct?

 2        A.   Correct.  Correct.  I stand by that and that is what is written

 3     in my statement, the one in the Serbian language, likewise what

 4     Mr. Tieger read out just now.  And I stand by that and I cannot claim

 5     anything else.

 6        Q.   Let me turn to another event not involving 4.000 people but

 7     involving a large number of people that was known -- also known to the

 8     authorities in Pale, and that's the events at Koricanske Stijene.  And

 9     that's referred to in your statement at paragraphs 242 through 260.

10             And in those paragraphs, Mr. Subotic, you relate the awareness of

11     Dr. Karadzic about the event, refer to a session of the Presidency or at

12     least the attendance of Presidency members and others at an ad hoc

13     meeting or session, Dr. Karadzic giving you the order - and at this time

14     you were the minister of defence - giving you the order to go to

15     Banja Luka and hold a meeting.  Your participation in a meeting involving

16     prosecutors, judges, chiefs of police stations in the area and others,

17     and passing on verbally the order of the president and the Presidency to

18     take immediate investigative actions and all actions necessary,

19     et cetera.  And then it also provides information in the subsequent

20     paragraphs about some of the -- about what happened afterwards and what

21     transpired.  For example, you were asked the question, it appears in

22     paragraph 244, how many of those policemen who escorted or guarded the

23     convoy were interviewed about what happened to what, as it turned out,

24     were more than 200 Muslim civilians who were massacred.  And you

25     indicated you didn't know, you were not informed about that.

Page 40105

 1             So that's the event in the portion of your testimony that I'm

 2     referring to, Mr. Subotic.

 3             Now, as part of your statement, you indicate that one -- you

 4     suggest there that there were three people responsible for the killings

 5     at Koricanske Stijene, that is three policemen, one of whom was

 6     prosecuted, two of whom were killed, presumably meaning in combat after

 7     they fled, after they went to the army.

 8             First of all, when you refer to one person prosecuted, you're

 9     referring to one person prosecuted many years later by the ICTY and

10     convicted of that crime here; right?  Or do you claim to be aware of

11     somebody else who was prosecuted by Republika Srpska authorities for the

12     murder at Koricanske Stijene?

13        A.   Mr. Tieger, I gave that statement in the Krajisnik case very

14     precisely and in great detail, and in that statement I said all the

15     things that I learned at that meeting in Banja Luka, when this entire

16     team went to the site, to the scene of this crime, where we visually saw

17     this area.  So I gave this statement only on the basis of the notes I

18     took at that meeting.  What I was told by the police, the judges, in

19     order to be able to convey all of that to the state Presidency.  That was

20     my task.  Everything that you repeated just now about those three

21     persons, I noted all of that down at that meeting in Banja Luka.  That is

22     to say I -- actually, that is what I was told.  I was not an

23     investigator.  I was not aware of the case.  Quite simply, I conveyed the

24     information to the Presidency.  I know, I do know, later when the trial

25     took place and so on, that it was, after all, the way you are saying.  It

Page 40106

 1     wasn't only these three, and so on and so forth, but I could not judge

 2     anything, I could not investigate, and that is why my statement -- I

 3     mean, I claim that it's only from that meeting and that event where we

 4     were on that day, nothing else.  And I personally condemned that at that

 5     meeting, personally, as a human being, and I asked absolutely for very

 6     precise investigations, and so on and so forth.  So I have nothing else

 7     to say with regard to that case.

 8        Q.   Mr. Subotic, this is not exactly a major whodunit.  Everybody

 9     there knew that the people who had been killed were part of a convoy that

10     was escorted by a policeman from the Prijedor Police Station; right?

11             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreters note:  We cannot hear the

12     witness.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Subotic, probably you turned off your

14     microphone.  The interpreters did not hear you.  Could you repeat your

15     answer.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm saying -- I mean, I don't know

17     which part I should repeat.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat all over.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, my task was in Banja Luka at

20     the Ministry of the Interior to bring together all relevant persons and

21     institutions that should explain to me what it was that had happened.

22     The president, who entrusted me with this task, or, rather, the member of

23     the Presidency were primarily interested in the following:  Whether the

24     military, the army took part in this.  Immediately at the beginning of

25     the meeting that was eliminated.  The army had nothing to do with that

Page 40107

 1     event.  So it was the police from Prijedor, and all of it was explained

 2     to me.  I wrote all of that down precisely, who said what.  The head of

 3     one centre, the other centre, and everybody else who took part, I

 4     explained all of that when I testified at Mr. Orie's.  I did not know

 5     whether it was true or whether it was not true, whether that is exactly

 6     the way things happened or not.

 7             Later on in the later period I found out because that was made

 8     public.  There were trials, arrests, and so on.  What Mr. Tieger said to

 9     me just now, that was confirmed exactly, but I didn't know about that.  I

10     could not inform the Presidency about that because the information I

11     provided was what I wrote down specifically.  That's it.

12             MR. TIEGER:

13        Q.   General, you said just said that according to you you eliminated

14     from the outset that it was the army and knew that it was the police from

15     Prijedor.  That was the question I had asked you.  So policemen had been

16     sent to escort the convoy, which means that -- that since you had the

17     police chief -- the relevant police chiefs there, everybody knew who

18     those police member were; right?  Right there on the spot, their

19     identities were easy to identify.

20        A.   Mr. Tieger, they just announced three persons to me, I mean as an

21     answer that I could convey to the Presidency.  I don't know anything

22     else.  Whether they did know or whether they did not know, that was their

23     affair.

24        Q.   You're suggesting that this matter was considered so important by

25     the leadership that it sent you out personally to make sure to order that

Page 40108

 1     all appropriate measures were undertaken to solve it.  I'm saying to you

 2     it was crystal clear who was involved.  Do you even know if any of those

 3     people were interviewed, interviewed, by Republika Srpska authorities in

 4     connection with this crime in 1992 or 1993 or 1994?

 5        A.   I don't know about later when I left.  I know that the ministry

 6     took part, the MUP, and the Ministry of Justice.  As I said, there were

 7     judges, and I don't know all the relevant ones, but I didn't take part in

 8     that.  Did I not have an opportunity to learn about this.

 9        Q.   This Trial Chamber has received evidence that the people involved

10     and responsible, directly responsible, hands on, for these killings were

11     not in hiding and had anyone been looking for them they would have been

12     found.  And you can turn to P4257 for that evidence.  And that makes

13     sense, doesn't it, I mean, since their identities were known as

14     policemen, it wouldn't have been so difficult to get ahold of if anyone

15     had wanted to find them; right?

16        A.   If you have that, I believe that's the way it is, but I do not

17     know about that, but, say, logically I can infer that these persons

18     should know that if, as I said, they said that later.  Well -- but I was

19     not in the know.  Had I known about that, I would have conveyed that

20     immediately, and I would have included it in my note.

21        Q.   And so that would further suggest that people involved didn't

22     want to find them.  That also logically follows, doesn't it?

23        A.   According to what you are claiming, this would be a logical

24     conclusion.  However, I cannot claim that because I didn't participate in

25     any of that.  That was not my task.  It was a task that was supposed to

Page 40109

 1     be carried out by investigators, judges, prosecutors.  I don't know who

 2     else, but in any case, professionals.  I was not at the receiving end of

 3     any further information.  I didn't receive any information, and I didn't

 4     really express any interest in receiving further information.

 5        Q.   So according to you, these most elementary aspects, the most

 6     rudimentary aspects of a serious investigation were not undertaken, but

 7     you didn't care, and as far as you know, I take it, Dr. Karadzic didn't

 8     do anything about it or care about it either?

 9        A.   Mr. Tieger, we had zillions of other problems.  We had

10     institutions that were in charge of those matters.  It was not up to the

11     two of us to monitor the work of the police, the formers [as interpreted]

12     of everybody else and their uncle.  You have to understand that we are

13     not computers.  Competent people were tasked with doing that.  Whether

14     they did it or not, I don't know.  I know practically nothing about what

15     they did.  However, that was our system.  So the system had to function,

16     and things had to be done according to that system.

17             I cannot invent things in order to satisfy somebody's needs or

18     requirements.  I don't know.  How was I supposed to know what the police

19     did?  I was not the chief of the police or the minister of police, for

20     that matter.  I knew for a fact that the military did not take part, and

21     that was what mattered to me.  And the rest I did according to the

22     Presidency's instructions.  I submitted my report.  The ministry did

23     their own job.  The prosecutors, the judges did what they were supposed

24     to do, and I don't know what they did.  I did not get involved, therefore

25     I cannot discuss that matter.

Page 40110

 1        Q.   Last question before the break.  Slobodan Avlijas, the deputy

 2     minister of justice or at least a high ranking official in the

 3     Ministry of Justice at that time, participated in the meetings concerning

 4     what to do about Koricanske Stijene.  That is the meeting in Banja Luka

 5     attended by senior officials, including you.  That's T35186.  And he

 6     testified and told this Court that everybody knew what had happened and

 7     that in any properly functioning state, Simo Drljaca would have been

 8     arrested right there.  Do you dispute that?

 9        A.   This is not what I noted.  What I noted I conveyed at the trial

10     of with Mr. Orie.  And as for that word, Simo Drljaca was removed from

11     his position, so I don't know.  I suppose that what you're saying is

12     correct.

13        Q.   Simo Drljaca became an assistant minister in the MUP, a higher

14     ranking position, and in fact was given a major award by Dr. Karadzic

15     after this event, isn't that right?

16        A.   I don't know whether he was decorated because of that.

17     Dr. Karadzic did not explain why people were decorated.  It was the

18     chiefs and commanders who were supposed to provide their input as to

19     whether somebody deserved to be decorated or not.  This is how things are

20     done all over the world, in all the states.  That's how people are

21     decorated.  And people can deceive a president, people can deceive a

22     king, because things are not double checked; because if things were

23     checked then no decoration would serve any purpose.  I'm telling you this

24     as an expert as the chief of a body in the Republika Srpska government.

25     But look here, there is a law on decorations, and in the law on

Page 40111

 1     decorations it says that anybody who commits a crime or a big

 2     transgression, any decoration is taken away from them.  I am the author

 3     of that law.  I don't know whether this was really followed through if --

 4     whether Simo Drljaca was decorated and whether the decoration was taken

 5     away from him.  If he was decorated, then the chief of police, his boss,

 6     had to take the decoration from him because the law on decorations is a

 7     public instrument, and I don't know whether that was ever done.

 8        Q.   For the record, decoration is found at P4261.  I see we're

 9     overdue for the break, so that I will resume afterwards.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, I would request that the witness be

11     allowed during the break to go to his hotel which is nearby to bring the

12     version that he has of the statement so he can look at it and we could

13     verify what it is that he has.  I think he could do that within the

14     30 minutes of our break.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I have no difficulty with it.

16             We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at 10 past 11.00.

17     I'm sorry.  We'll resume at quarter past 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.24 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Just a note, Mr. President, before I resume that I

22     understand the witness brought the statement back from the hotel room.  I

23     considered that in the interests of time I might ask to take a look at it

24     before the Court resumed the Bench, but when we began to do so, the

25     witness was very interested in explaining something about it, so we just

Page 40112

 1     said, Stop, wait until the court resumes and anything that needs to be

 2     explained can be handled then.  Mr. Robinson was with me, and I believe a

 3     representative of the Registrar as well.

 4             So that's where we are now.  The witness has that document.  I --

 5     I haven't seen it.  I know the Court inquired about it.  Mr. Robinson

 6     raised it.  It's difficult to know exactly in whose court this

 7     immediately falls, figuratively, but I presume the Bench wants to either

 8     ask about it or see it, and I certainly would like to see it at some

 9     point.

10             JUDGE KWON:  I leave it to the parties.  Let's continue.

11             MR. TIEGER:

12        Q.   Okay.  Mr. Subotic, I understand that you went back to your hotel

13     room, came back with the document, the Serbian version of the statement

14     that you referred to earlier and you have it with you now.  I would ask

15     if with the assistance of the Registrar if I could briefly examine that

16     document.

17        A.   Can I provide a certain explanation for the benefit of the

18     Presiding Judge?  There was some confusion, indeed --

19             JUDGE KWON:  You will have an opportunity to explain that, but at

20     this time could you kindly provide that to Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   Mr. Subotic, I understood you to stay, and I'm referring back to

23     page 25 or 26 of the -- of today's -- of the transcript of today's

24     testimony that you had two -- there were two copies.  You didn't know

25     theirs was in the English language.  You received a copy in the Serbian

Page 40113

 1     language, all the items, all the paragraphs, all the pages.  I have that

 2     copy, but since you were told not to bring anything to the courtroom you

 3     didn't bring it but you have a copy.  Is this document that was just

 4     handed to me the document you were referring to?

 5        A.   Yes.  Yes.  It was my mistake.  I was mistaken.  If I may be

 6     allowed to explain in very simple terms.  Can I explain things to you,

 7     sir?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes, please go ahead.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, so far I have

10     provided three statements to The Hague Tribunal, in 2007, 2008, and in

11     2006.  All the statements have been translated into Serbian.  I have

12     received them, and I have them in Banja Luka, and I have initialed all

13     the pages in those statements, and those statements are in Serbian,

14     exclusively in Serbian.  That's why I was sure that I have a statement in

15     Serbian.  However, when Messers. from the Defence took a statement from

16     me, they were reading sections in English, and they asked me -- at the

17     same time I had my own copies which were translated, and that's why I

18     thought that those were valid statements, and I adhere by that all the

19     time, because I initialed every page, and now that I have arrived here to

20     testify, they showed me all that.  I initialed everything, and this is

21     theirs, their signature as well as mine.  But I believed -- or, rather, I

22     simply forgot.  Otherwise, I would have told you that I had that

23     translation.  In other words, in that sense I suggest that when you're

24     putting questions to me to read everything in Serbian and then I will

25     confirm what I stated.  I can confirm, because everything has been

Page 40114

 1     initialed.  Well, this was my mistake.  I apologise to the Trial Chamber

 2     and to you for having been convinced that I had that in my hotel.  I

 3     don't.  I did not bring of that.  I did not dare take those statements

 4     with me on my travel.  This is what this is all about.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Okay.  And just to make this clear, because I'm not sure that

 7     your explanation was completely clear to the Court, when you said you

 8     were mistaken, this document I have in front of me now that you brought

 9     back from the hotel room is a mixture of English and Serbian; right?  So

10     some paragraphs in English, some paragraphs in Serbian.

11        A.   Only those paragraphs which were taken from my previous evidence

12     given before The Hague Tribunal, only those paragraphs.  I suppose that

13     the Defence did not have them translated into translation, whereas I do

14     have all that translated into Serbian, because after each time I provided

15     evidence I received the translation of the evidence into Serbian.

16        Q.   Mr. Subotic, I am not aware that your -- that the testimony you

17     gave in the Krajisnik case was transcribed into Serbian.

18        A.   Yes.  I have it in Banja Luka.  I received that.

19        Q.   And who do you say transcribed that and provided it to you?

20        A.   I believe that it was the office in Banja Luka.  This was done

21     subsequently.  And as for what happened in Pale, I received that

22     personally in Pale, those two days in Pale.  Since I was in Banja Luka on

23     several occasions in that office, I believe that I received it from them.

24     In any case, I got it from Banja Luka.

25        Q.   And you say you have a copy of your Krajisnik testimony in the

Page 40115

 1     Serbian language in Banja Luka that you can provide us.

 2        A.   Yes.  I can send it to you from Banja Luka.  I don't know how,

 3     but I can.

 4        Q.   We can make arrangements for that.  Meanwhile let me return this

 5     document to you for such use as you may make of it with the -- with any

 6     portions that are in Serbian that may be referred to.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, just to round out this topic, I

 8     would like to just inform the Chamber that we -- I have an e-mail here

 9     where we requested the transcript of -- the portions of the statement

10     that were in English be transcribed -- be translated into Serbian but the

11     language section declined to do that.  So that's why, at least for our

12     side of it, the statement was in both languages.

13             JUDGE KWON:  The version of statement the witness signed was in

14     the B/C/S in most part.

15             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  He signed the version that's uploaded into

16     e-court as the B/C/S original, which contains B/C/S and English.

17             JUDGE KWON:  But his original statement was translated into

18     B/C/S.

19             MR. ROBINSON:  No.  His original statement was taken -- was --

20     his original statement is the one that he has in front of him.  It was

21     then translated into English by the CLSS.

22             JUDGE KWON:  No, no.  I mean his statement of, for example,

23     20th of May, 2006, was it not translated?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  It was not translated.  It was in English that we

25     had, as far as we were working with the English, and so it was contained

Page 40116

 1     in English in the version that we considered to be the original version,

 2     along with the Krajisnik transcript references.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Do you have his statement with you?

 4     Paragraph 240, footnote 250, it refers to 65 ter 20639, witness statement

 5     dated 20th of May, 2006.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, that's correct.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Which is in B/C/S.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  As I understand it, we were working with English

 9     version at the time.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So you could have inserted this part into B/C/S,

11     which was sent to the CLSS.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, apparently that's correct.  There are four

13     statements as Mr. Sladojevic has explained to me.  That's the only one

14     that's in Serbian.  And that could have been done but it wasn't.

15             JUDGE KWON:  So when witness said that he had all the statements

16     in B/C/S version which he initialed every page, I understood in that way

17     that -- so 240 could have been put in B/C/S, but I will leave it at that.

18             Shall we continue.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Just on the heels of Mr. Robinson's comment, just to

20     note that the information that CLSS declined to translate, the Krajisnik

21     testimony is consistent with my understanding that there is no B/C/S

22     version of that testimony, but I'll move on as the Court has suggested.

23        Q.   Mr. Subotic, at paragraphs 219 through 226, you deal with the

24     subject as the header indicates, "Prisoners of war and collection

25     centres."  And on the heels of our discussion before the adjournment

Page 40117

 1     about matters about which the Bosnian Serb authorities in Pale were

 2     informed, I want to talk about the information you provided in the

 3     statement and the information that was available at the time.

 4             Now, first of all, included in that portion of your statement is

 5     a colloquy between Judge Orie and yourself during the Krajisnik testimony

 6     when Judge Orie quoted to you from a record of the government session

 7     held on the 15th of June, 1992, which stated:

 8             "'The government has considered the proposed report.  It has been

 9     concluded that the issue of prisoner exchange is extremely important,

10     complex, and delicate, and that if sufficient attention is not paid to

11     it, it can cause a number of negative consequences for the whole

12     republic.  It has been agreed that a working group consisting of

13     Professor Branko Djeric,'" who was, as we know, the president of the

14     government at the time, the prime minister, "'Milan Trbojevic,'" who was

15     the vice-prime minister, "'Dr. Dragan Kalanic,'" minister of health,

16     "'Mico Stanisic,'" minister of the interior, "'Bogdan Subotic,'" you, the

17     minister of defence, "'and Momcilo Mandic,'" the minister of justice, and

18     it provided they "'should consider all the aspects of the prisoner

19     exchange problem and they should propose systematic and other solutions,

20     taking into account our international regulations.  It is obvious that

21     solving this problem is urgent and that the regulations and concrete

22     measures for solving this issue should be proposed as soon as possible.'"

23             And you indicated to Judge Orie you -- that this was a reference

24     to prisoners who had been taken, you said, on both sides of the

25     municipality.  Prior to that -- although you emphasised that these were

Page 40118

 1     prisoners taken on a local scale and not major battles.

 2             Now, Mr. Subotic, the language that accompanied the establishment

 3     of this working group, referring to the problem as important, complex and

 4     delicate, that's a reflection, is it not, of the awareness at that time

 5     that thousands of Muslims and Muslim civilians in particular had been

 6     taken under detention and if that problem wasn't resolved there would be

 7     significant -- could be or would be significant negative consequences for

 8     the Bosnian Serb Republic?

 9        A.   I did not hear at that session that thousands were mentioned.  I

10     didn't hear anybody mentioning any figure.  And as for the rest, I accept

11     that, but no figures were mentioned at all.

12        Q.   Well, did you -- when -- when you came to understand, as

13     reflected in the report, that the problem was extremely important and

14     complex and required the involvement of the highest officials of the

15     government, including, as mentioned, the prime minister himself, the

16     vice-prime minister, the minister of the interior, and so on, did you

17     make any effort to find out the extent and scope of the problem?

18        A.   For us and for me personally it didn't make any difference

19     whether we were talking about three, five, a hundred, or a thousand.  It

20     was all the same to me.

21             As far as I can remember, and I didn't note any such thing, that

22     any figures were mentioned.  It's different if different places.  This

23     was based on different information.  In any case, that problem was very

24     seriously taken into account, and this is how things were done at the

25     time as far as I know during the first government.

Page 40119

 1        Q.   Now, you had an opportunity during the course of your Krajisnik

 2     case to see a photograph of at least some of the people who had been held

 3     in custody, and you acknowledged, and it's there in your statement in

 4     paragraph 226, that it was "... illegal, to hold people in detention and

 5     treat them in a fashion that resulted in a condition like that" depicted

 6     in the photograph; correct?

 7        A.   It's not quite like that.  You remember very well if you read

 8     everything what I -- you were also present in the courtroom.  You

 9     remember very well that I said things were staged, and I showed how some

10     images, some photographs, were not adequate.  I explained a lot of that

11     to you.  You are aware of that, so I don't see any need to discuss that.

12     I entirely stand by my statement of that day.  I have nothing new to say.

13        Q.   So is that your testimony to this Trial Chamber, that you are not

14     aware of -- or you did not acknowledge in any way that prisoners were

15     held in Bosnian Serb detention facilities in condition that reduced them

16     to an emaciated condition, that were not held in unhygienic [sic]

17     conditions, under -- with -- with inadequate food?  You're denying all

18     that and saying it was staged, is that it?

19        A.   Mr. Tieger, I stand by my statement absolutely, and if you wish,

20     because the Trial Chamber and all the people present here would need to

21     hear my statement and then decide on it.  I stand by my statement, and I

22     have nothing further to add, the one that I provided to Orie.  I cannot,

23     otherwise that is that.  I have no other statement.  But -- and I cannot

24     give you a different answer, because you did not read to the

25     Trial Chamber all that I said in the statement.  I would like the Defence

Page 40120

 1     and the others to find out.

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the last part of

 3     that sentence.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know what it is.  I could read it

 5     out.  If I had a Serbian translation here, I would read it out.  I would

 6     ask the Trial Chamber to allow me to read it out.  I have no other answer

 7     for you other than that.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   No, sir, I'm asking you a question in front of this

10     Trial Chamber, in front of these Judges right here, and I'm asking you if

11     your position is that Muslim -- Muslims were held in Bosnian Serb

12     detention facilities and treated in a fashion that resulted in their near

13     starvation, that -- that they were held in conditions where hygienic

14     facilities were totally lacking.  Basically they were held in brutal and

15     inhumane conditions.  Do you -- do you accept that that was the case, do

16     you deny that that was the case, or do you say that you don't know?  What

17     is it as you're testifying before these Judges now?

18        A.   I am saying that I did not give such a statement the way you are

19     telling it now.  I provided a different statement, and I stand by that

20     statement that I provided to Mr. Orie.  And you are asking me in a

21     suggestive way for me to accuse somebody or defend somebody in a way, and

22     that's something that I cannot do.  What I said in that statement stands

23     before this Court and the court of God, and I have nothing more to add to

24     this.

25        Q.   Well, one of the things you acknowledge in that statement,

Page 40121

 1     Mr. Subotic, is that you were the person responsible for providing -- for

 2     ensuring that soldiers had sufficient food and supplies - that's at

 3     page 26533 - correct?

 4        A.   Which soldiers?  Whose soldiers?

 5        Q.   As minister of defence, were you or were you not responsible for

 6     ensuring that the VRS had adequate supplies, ammunition, food, and so on,

 7     or was that not part of your portfolio?

 8        A.   I was, yes.  I was.  That's true, but it's not the way you are

 9     telling it.  It's different.  Read exactly what I said, exactly what I

10     said, please.  Please do not impose things in a leading way.  I do not

11     accept that.  I did not say it the way you are telling it.

12        Q.   Question at page 26533:

13             "Q.  What was in your domain, Mr. Subotic, according to what you

14     told us, was logistics including such things was food; right?

15             "A.  Yes."

16        A.   No, no.  Just specifically -- all right.  Yes.  Yes.  And it is

17     still a yes.

18        Q.   And who do you claim was responsible for providing food to the

19     prisoners taken and held by the members of the army for whose supply of

20     food you were responsible for?

21        A.   I don't know.  I don't know.  I don't know who was responsible.

22     I don't know who was responsible.  I don't know who that was.  You did

23     not ask me that there, and I did not give an answer to that then.  You're

24     asking me now that now, and I don't know to tell you who it was.  I was

25     not the head of any camp or a quartermaster in order to be able to know

Page 40122

 1     that.

 2        Q.   Well, in fact -- in fact, you said in your testimony it was the

 3     responsibility of whoever set up the camp to ensure that the prisoners

 4     were fed, and that's at page 26523.

 5        A.   Mr. Tieger.  Mr. Tieger, read to me -- read to me word-for-word

 6     what I said.  Then I will give you an answer yes or no.

 7        Q.   Mr. Subotic, when this working group was set up about the complex

 8     and delicate and extremely important problem of prisoners, did you or

 9     anybody else make -- on that working group make an effort to find out how

10     many prisoners there were and how they were being treated?

11        A.   Yes, that was done, but I don't have any indicators now, because

12     I took the least part in that, so I didn't have any numbers or anything.

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please be asked to speak into

14     the microphone.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not see a camp, actually, for

16     myself, with my very own eyes.  I just saw it on television or something

17     like that.  I did not see it in real life.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   Are you denying that there were thousands of Bosnian Muslim and

20     Bosnian Croat prisoners being held at that time, civilian prisoners being

21     held at that time, or do you say that you don't know or that it was true?

22        A.   I don't have any figures at my disposal.  I personally have no

23     figures available, and I'm not able to say anything with any certainty,

24     because that's not something that I knew, and I didn't have any

25     possibility of knowing it.

Page 40123

 1        Q.   You had no possibility of knowing it, Mr. Subotic?  The -- on the

 2     1st of June, 1992, the 1 KK sent a report to the Main Staff, that's

 3     P5398, about the 7.000 prisoners they captured during events around

 4     Prijedor.  On the 17th of July, 1992, a report was sent to Dr. Karadzic

 5     and to Professor Djeric from the Ministry of the Interior stating:

 6             "The army, Crisis Staffs and War Presidencies have requested that

 7     the army round up or capture as many Muslim civilians as possible, and

 8     they leave them -- leave such undefined camps to internal affairs organs.

 9     The conditions in some of these camps are poor.  There is to food.

10     Individuals sometimes do not observe international norms, et cetera."

11             At the 17th Assembly session -- and that by the way was P1096.

12     At the 17th Assembly session held on July 24th to 26th, 1992,

13     Representative Milanovic stood up and said - and that's at page 30

14     through 31 of the English and page 30 of the B/C/s:

15             "We have a huge problem with captured people of other

16     nationalities.  We have hundreds and thousands of these prisoners."

17             On the 2nd of June, 1992, a day after the VRS -- the -- the

18     report from the 1 KK to the Main Staff I referred to earlier,

19     Dr. Karadzic met with Radislav Brdjanin - and that's according to as we

20     see in P1478, at pages 55 through 61 - and Brdjanin talked about the

21     problem of the Krajina with 14.500 Muslims and wanted a position about

22     prisoners from the highest level.

23             Now, in light of that information plus more, do you seriously

24     assert to this Court that you had no possibility of knowing that

25     thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Croat civilians were being held by the

Page 40124

 1     Bosnian Serb authorities?

 2        A.   No.  No, I did not.

 3        Q.   You don't deny that was the case.  You just say you weren't aware

 4     of it; is that it?

 5        A.   I don't know.  I'm not denying anything, not do I know that it

 6     was like that, and I don't -- this report was not something that I had in

 7     front of me.  I'm seeing this for the first time.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter did not hear the end of that

 9     sentence.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat your last sentence, Mr. Subotic.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Should I repeat the last sentence?

12     Is that right?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that I did not know and that

15     I don't know and that I was not aware either of this report or of the

16     figures, and I have nothing else to say.

17             MR. TIEGER:

18        Q.   I've got a limited amount of time left, so I want to move on to

19     just a couple of more topics, Mr. Subotic.  At paragraph 26 of your

20     statement, you say the Serbs made no -- "there was no plan.  Serbs did

21     not make any plans before the war."  Then you go on to say that only the

22     Muslims made plans.

23             Now, this Court has received evidence that Dr. Karadzic talked

24     both before and after about the steps that he had formulated and was

25     prepared to take.  For example, P1387, English pages 74 through 75, B/C/S

Page 40125

 1     pages 57 through 58, at the 38th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,

 2     Dr. Karadzic recalled the earlier days, and he explained how all the

 3     steps were carefully planned to be executed once at a time, and he said:

 4             "Let us use Alija's mistake to increase the price of wine.

 5     Remember how all the SAOs," that's Serbian autonomous regions, "and all

 6     those measures before the war always took place following Alija's

 7     mistakes.  There were nine to ten actions that we carried out.  We

 8     brainstormed them all together.  However, we did not pull all nine moves

 9     straight away, but we carried them out after Alija made a mistake.  It is

10     then we'd make a move and the Muslims would curse his mother afterwards

11     and not ours."

12             And similarly in P2554 at a SFRY Presidency meeting in

13     December 1991, well before the 38th session, Dr. Karadzic again

14     explained:

15             "We made a list of moves, ten moves in the direction that we want

16     that the result be.  But we do not put them into action until

17     Alija Izetbegovic messes something up.  When Alija messes something up,

18     we make move number five and then we wait, and when he messes something

19     else up we make move number six."

20             And said the same thing in P953 --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let's break it down.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

23        Q.   So is it your position that Dr. Karadzic never told you, despite

24     the fact that he told everybody in the Bosnian Serb Assembly and

25     everybody present at the SFRY meeting in December 1991 that he had plans

Page 40126

 1     for what was going to happen in Bosnia?

 2        A.   I did not have such contacts with Mr. Karadzic in 1991.  I didn't

 3     know him, and I didn't even know he existed.  Specifically, in this case,

 4     I have no ideas about that.  This is something that I never -- I'm

 5     hearing of this from you for the first time, so I cannot give any

 6     comments on this.  We can move on.  Let's go to the next question.

 7        Q.   Well, let's talk about one of those very concrete steps that were

 8     taken.  You referred in paragraphs 52 through 55 to Crisis Staffs, and

 9     tried to assert to the Court, did assert to the Court that they were all

10     self-organised and had nothing to do with the Bosnian Serb leadership;

11     right?  That was your position?

12        A.   Yes.  Yes, that is correct.

13        Q.   Well, this Court has heard a lot of evidence about the document

14     commonly known as Variant A and B, which called for the establishment of

15     Crisis Staffs.  For example, P2568.  We heard from a member of the

16     Main Board and Executive Board about his presence at a meeting of SDS

17     functionaries at the Holiday Inn during which Mr. Karadzic distributed

18     numbered copies of the Variant A and B document to municipal

19     representatives and gave a speech about the threat that Serbs were under,

20     and their municipal leaders were called up to take the Variant A and B

21     document.  That's something you didn't know about, Mr. Subotic?

22        A.   Absolutely not.  In 1991, I did not have any information along

23     those lines, and I did not act along those lines.  I was doing some other

24     things in 1991 to prevent the attack of Croatia on Bosnia-Herzegovina,

25     and I have a lot of statements about that.  As for this, I don't know

Page 40127

 1     anything about this.  I'm not aware of it.

 2        Q.   Well, let's move to 1992.  For example, on January 26th 1992, at

 3     the 6th Assembly session of the -- of Bosnian Serb Republic, in front of

 4     the Assembly, during which there was a discussion about the further steps

 5     that the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats had taken toward a sovereign

 6     and independent Bosnia, Mr. Cizmovic stood up and said:  To resolve this

 7     problem I propose that we begin with an urgent operationalisation and a

 8     declaration on the establishment and promulgation of the Serbian Republic

 9     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Tasks set out in the instructions of

10     19 December 1991 should be carried out.

11             And then this Trial Chamber has heard repeated evidence that on

12     the 14th of February, at an extended session of the Main and

13     Executive Boards, including municipal presidents and so on, Dr. Karadzic

14     activated the second level of variant A and B in a speech that referred

15     to that second level four separate times, including saying that's why we

16     called you here today.  You didn't know about that either?

17        A.   I didn't know any of that.  I began to acquire knowledge on the

18     8th of April, 1992, when I came to Pale.  Before that, I never went to

19     Pale, and I did not contact anyone.  So I have no information or any

20     other evidence that I know anything about it.

21        Q.   Well, let me just tell you about -- you refer to one -- two

22     Assembly sessions you were present at where this information was brought

23     to your attention in a very explicit manner.  First the 46th Assembly

24     session, that's P1403, and then we're talk about the 50th which we talked

25     about before.  So at the 46th Assembly section at English pages 347

Page 40128

 1     through 348 and B/C/S 304 --

 2        A.   What is the date of that, please?  Could you please say it?

 3        Q.   I'll get that for you in a second.  I thought I had it.  That was

 4     November 1994, sir.

 5        A.   Could you please tell me which paragraph, what the number is.

 6        Q.   It's not in your statement?

 7        A.   All right.  Very well.

 8        Q.   And I'm also telling you that the transcript of that session,

 9     which is in evidence, also reflects your presence at the session.  But

10     more importantly, here's what Dr. Karadzic said at that session and then

11     said at the 50th:

12             Everything was as clear as day in the municipalities.  He said,

13     Please, remember how we used to work before the war.  Everything was as

14     clear as day in the municipalities where we were majority and in those

15     where we were minority.  Do you remember the instruction A and

16     instruction B?  We had Crisis Staffs, and it was clear they were the

17     authority.  They could make mistakes, but they were still the authority.

18     The people were not left without the authority because they were the

19     Crisis Staffs.

20             And then at the 50th Assembly session to which you've explicitly

21     referred in your statement, Dr. Karadzic said the following - that's P970

22     at English pages 316 to through 317, B/C/S page 278:

23              "At the moment the war began in the municipalities where we were

24     in the majority we had municipal power, held it firmly, controlled

25     everything.  In the municipalities where we were in the minority, we set

Page 40129

 1     up secret government, Municipal Boards, Municipal Assemblies, presidents

 2     of Executive Boards.  You will remember the Variant A and B variants.  In

 3     the B variant where we were in the minority, 20 per cent, 15 per cent, we

 4     had set up a government and a brigade, a unit, no matter what size, but

 5     there was a detachment with a commander.  Distribution of weapons was

 6     carried out thanks to the JNA.  What could be withdrawn was withdrawn and

 7     distributed to the people in the Serbian areas but it was the SDS which

 8     organised the people and created the army.  It was an army.  Together

 9     with the people, those were the armed forces of the Serbian Republic of

10     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They created the space, liberated and created

11     the space."

12             Mr. Subotic, those are words by Dr. Karadzic spoken in your

13     presence that clearly indicated the plans that were set in place and

14     implemented by the Bosnian Serb authorities before the war contrary to

15     your assertion in your statement that there were no plans by the

16     Bosnian Serbs; isn't that correct?

17        A.   Do you have those plans?  Could you provide those plans so that I

18     can see them?  I cannot understand that you can say this from I don't

19     know where.  Do you have the plans of the Bosnian Muslims?  Do you have

20     the plan of the Serbs in order to be able to assert this before the

21     Trial Chamber?  You cannot just be talking off the top of your head.

22     Crisis Staffs existed.  All of that existed, but these were necessary, a

23     necessary evil.  And of course we organised ourselves in some fashion,

24     but you don't have any documents that were not legal.  Show any illegal

25     document on the basis of which Republika Srpska was established and then

Page 40130

 1     we can talk and allow anyone, let anyone, anyone from Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina, give you such a plan, a copy.  We cannot just be talking off

 3     the top of our heads, Mr. Tieger.  These are just leading things.

 4        Q.   I suggest we not talk off the top of our heads.  Look at

 5     paragraph 26 of your statement, please, and tell me if you didn't testify

 6     before this Court in the form of this statement that, "Serbs did not make

 7     any plans before the war"?  Is that your testimony or not?

 8        A.   Let's see.  Let's look at paragraph 26.  It's in the English

 9     language.  Please read it out for me, and then I'll see when I did or did

10     not.  Read it in B/C/S.

11        Q.    "There was no plan.  Serbs did not make any plans before the

12     war."

13             That's a direct quote from the signed statement.

14        A.   Yes.  They did not make any plans.

15        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.  I just have one more topic to cover with you,

16     sir, in the limited time I have, and that's in relation to the document

17     that Dr. Karadzic showed you yesterday.  That's 11274.  During which

18     he -- this is a session of the Bosnian Presidency during which he took

19     your attention -- drew your attention to a portion of that document that

20     referred to the declaration of a state of war, and he asked you:

21             "Did we declare a war on the Muslim-Croat coalition?  Did they

22     declare a war on us?"

23             And then you were shown that document.  Now, I'd like to show you

24     other parts of that document just to identify the context in which that

25     declaration of war was discussed, and if we can call up 11274, please.

Page 40131

 1             If we can look at page 1 of the English translation and page 24

 2     of the B/C/S moving on to 25.

 3             That's a reflection of Mr. Halilovic talking, and he's talking

 4     about indications about agreement of exchange and resettlement, and then

 5     he talks about playing directly into the hands of those whose intention

 6     it is to create some ethnic territories, to move the population, and to

 7     create national units.

 8             Turning to page 2 of the English and page 25 of the Serbian -- or

 9     B/C/S, we see Mr. Abdic talking, who expresses concern about the need to

10     talk more about the fact that UNPROFOR has been put into a situation

11     where ethnic cleansing is being carried out under its supervision.

12             Page 3 of the English, page 28 of the B/C/S, Mr. Izetbegovic

13     says:  If we don't accept the ultimatum, these people really could be

14     hurt.  If we accept it, we're legalising ethnic division, that is the

15     alteration of the demographic picture of Bosnia, the creation of

16     ethnically clean territories, like some precondition for the creation of

17     some kind of a Serbian state in BH.

18             Page 4 of the English and page 28 through 29 of the Serbian,

19     Mr. Izetbegovic continues noting that:  Wherever they surrendered their

20     weapons, et cetera, they ended up getting hurt.  He's talking about, I

21     think, they later simply point their cannons and kill all those people.

22             That's the context in which the Bosnian Muslim authorities

23     declared or discussed the declaration of a state of war, isn't it?

24        A.   Bosnian Muslims declared war from our side.  Everything was done

25     to prevent a war, everything.  And the only guilty party for starting the

Page 40132

 1     war is the Bosnian Muslims or, rather, Alija Izetbegovic and the

 2     international community.  Had that -- had they not done what they had

 3     done, there would have been no war.  We Serbs asked for just one thing,

 4     to have the right in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Serb community to have

 5     its rights like in other countries all over the world that have mixed

 6     communities.  So my conscience is clear there, and I have no dilemma in

 7     terms of who is guilty of starting the war.  So the international

 8     community assisted Alija Izetbegovic and had that not happened, there

 9     would have been no war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As regards this part.  If

10     you have some more, because you intimated that there would be another

11     question in this regard, but I did not hear that right.

12        Q.   There will be.

13             MR. TIEGER:  But let me tender those -- tender those pages along

14     with what was tendered during the examination-in-chief.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll receive them.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  [Microphone not activated]

17             JUDGE KWON:  Microphone.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be added to Exhibit D3716.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   And, Mr. Subotic, the reason -- first of all, Dr. Karadzic asked

21     you whether or not the Bosnian Serbs had declared a state of war, and the

22     reason that the Bosnian Serb authorities refrained from introducing a

23     state of war is because of their position that if something is done by

24     the civilian authorities without a state of war, such as settlement and

25     resettlement, but that is much better and it is not discarded after the

Page 40133

 1     war.  In other words, that all the demographic redistribution that was

 2     taking place at the time that was referred to in the excerpts I talked to

 3     you about earlier, that was reflected in the Bosnian Muslims and

 4     Bosnia Croats by the thousands in the camps, that that democratic

 5     redistribution wouldn't be discarded after the war or was less likely to

 6     be discarded if a state of war was not declared.  And that was the

 7     reason, wasn't it?

 8        A.   Where is that written?

 9        Q.   Well, I'm glad you asked that question because apparently you

10     demand that.  Let's turn to D00456 --

11        A.   Where is that written?

12        Q.   -- D00456, English page 57, B/C/S page 61 through 62.  That's the

13     20th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and we'll see Radovan Karadzic

14     speaking.

15        A.   Please read it out to me so that I can hear what it is.  I cannot

16     remember that.

17        Q.   In English it states the following:  "We have refrained --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Let's find the passage.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   "We --"

21             JUDGE KWON:  Where is it?

22             MR. TIEGER:  It's about the -- in English it's about the fourth

23     line down, and --

24        Q.   Are you able to find it, sir, "We have refrained from introducing

25     a state of war"?

Page 40134

 1        A.   I don't have it in Serbian on my screen.  Could somebody please

 2     react?

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Can we scroll down until we can see -- we can see

 4     more.  Or scroll up until we can find a point of reference.  Another

 5     point of reference would be the reference to Presidency and government.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  It's not on this page.  I do

 7     not see it on this page.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  Let's turn to -- is this -- B/C/S

 9     page -- it should be the Serbian page 61, going on into 62.  I -- I can't

10     see if this is the --

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have page 59 here on the screen.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Sometimes the electronic versions don't conform to

13     the hard copy notations.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Microphone, please.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Microphone not activated]

16             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, turn on your microphone.

18             THE ACCUSED:  I couldn't before Mr. Tieger turned off.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.

20             THE ACCUSED:  Now I see, but it is not at beginning of sentence.

21     [Interpretation] Until now, "we have refrained," [In English] This is

22     sort of 15th line from the bottom.  [Interpretation] It's actually around

23     the 15th line from the bottom of the page and the sentence does not start

24     with those words, "We have refrained."  I'll tell you how the sentence

25     actually starts, "I don't know what else we'll be doing tonight."  So

Page 40135

 1     that is the lower third of the page, "I don't know what we will be doing

 2     tonight.  Please, if we are to continue tonight, could somebody else us

 3     from a legal point of view whether we have to change it."

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have it.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Okay.  It starts on the second line in English.

 6     Shall we start from there, "I don't know what else we will do tonight."

 7             MR. TIEGER:

 8        Q.   Okay.  And the quote is as follows in the translation:

 9              "We have refrained from introducing a state of war because it is

10     much more important, more founded and feasible if something is done by

11     the civilian authorities without a state of war under regular

12     circumstances such as settlement and resettlement.  When the civilian

13     authorities do this, it is much better.  It is not discarded after the

14     war."

15             And that's the reason or at least one of the reasons,

16     Mr. Subotic, why a state of war was not declared by the Bosnian Serb

17     authorities; correct?  At least according to Dr. Karadzic.

18        A.   Yes, but what is negative there?  I would like to know in terms

19     of your question what is negative here.

20        Q.   I have one more matter to -- I ask you the questions, sir.  I

21     have one more matter to raise with you and then we'll adjourn and I'll be

22     finished, and I'd like to call up P1483, page 155 in both versions.  And

23     it's in May of 1993, Mr. Subotic -- excuse me a second.

24                           [Prosecution counsel confer]

25             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  And I'd like both the English and the B/C/S

Page 40136

 1     called up of 1483, at page 155.

 2             On the 27th of May, 1993, Colonel Bogojevic met with

 3     General Mladic, as reflected in his notebook, and he related that four to

 4     five days ago Simo Drljaca had arrived, sent by the minister of the

 5     interior, and Drljaca came about the Tomasica mine, the mine near

 6     Prijedor where earlier they had buried around 5.000 Muslim bodies.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me one second, Mr. Tieger.  Mr. President,

 8     this appears not to have been notified to us as being an exhibit which

 9     will be used in cross-examination.  If I'm mistaken about that.  I'm

10     looking at the two e-mails, and I don't see this one, but -- so I would

11     object to it being brought to the witness unless there's some explanation

12     for why we weren't notified.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I regret the omission.  If so, that would be

14     the first time that I recall that ever happening in a long period of

15     time.  I'm not quite sure what difference it would make, if they need

16     in -- in those terms.  I'm not quite sure why the Defence doesn't want

17     the witness confronted with this, but I -- I -- I -- given the kinds of

18     notification we normally receive from the Defence on matters of this sort

19     and the accommodation we have provided, I find this to be a fairly

20     extraordinary objection, and I'm not -- I don't think it's well founded.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Shall I take it as a word of apology for your

22     omission?

23             MR. TIEGER:  I regret the omission, but I --

24             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Let's continue.

25             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'll

Page 40137

 1     continue.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  But let us find the passage.  Probably in English it

 3     starts from the previous page.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  It does but where I was reading from is -- we are

 5     now on -- on the correct page.  We can go to the previous page to see

 6     the -- but this is -- this is the passage I was reading from.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Probably.  We need to start from the previous

 8     page in both versions so that witness can follow.  Yes.  In B/C/S as

 9     well, shall we go back to the previous page?

10             MR. TIEGER:

11        Q.   All right.  This page reflects what I had just mentioned to you

12     earlier, the meeting of Colonel Bogojevic who related Drljaca's arrival,

13     having been sent by the minister of the interior about the Tomasica mine.

14     And if we continue to the next page in both languages, please.  That's

15     the mine near Prijedor where earlier they had buried around 5.000 Muslim

16     bodies.  And then General Bogojevic said:

17             "I'm sure the world knows about this from the released prisoners.

18     Drljaca came to leave this with us and they want to get rid of it by

19     burning, grinding, or some other way.  There are all kinds of bodies, and

20     they have involved Subotic in this.  The team includes Drljaca.  He was

21     in charge even while this was being done.  At the meeting where General

22     Subotic, Arsic, Drljaca, me, and Mile Matijevic from the Banja Luka SUP."

23             He asked for the position.  The position was "They killed them,

24     so they should get rid of them.  And an investigation must be launched in

25     connection with this case and information retained to prevent it from

Page 40138

 1     getting into the hands of unauthorised people."

 2        A.   What it's date?  I cannot see the date here.

 3        Q.   May 27th 1993.

 4        A.   The 27th of May, 1993.  This is the first time I see this and

 5     hear of it, but I know what this is about.  So it is well known that the

 6     first conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in Prijedor, the first one

 7     as far as the Bosnian Krajina is concerned.  I wouldn't dare speak about

 8     Herzegovina and the rest down there, because I'm not familiar with that.

 9             This conflict occurred already in the beginning of May in

10     Prijedor, and during that time I was minister in the Government of

11     Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is to say I came on the

12     5th -- on the 8th of April.  After that I assumed my duty, and, I don't

13     know, for more than a month, I think, I did not move from Pale at all.

14     Since communications were very bad at the time, we had not even

15     established a government yet in full.  There were five or six of us.  So

16     that is to say that the formation of the government was underway.

17             Some information was coming in about clashes between Serbs and

18     Muslims, ethnic groups in the town of Prijedor itself.  Now, what

19     happened there and is to what extent, we did not know.  We were not in a

20     position, we from the government, not at all.  We hadn't even been

21     established yet as such for -- for us to get any meaningful information.

22     Time elapsed.  Sometime in 1993, in the month of May, Haris Silajdzic, in

23     a public statement on the radio said that in Prijedor, in the beginning

24     of May 1992, 5- to 7.000 Muslims were killed.  Around the 12th of May -

25     I'm not sure.  I don't remember correctly - in 2003, among other things,

Page 40139

 1     I became the chief inspector of the army.  I personally heard this

 2     information in Pale.  And that was the first time I heard of anything

 3     like that.  Then I decided, because that was my task, to check because I

 4     knew it wasn't the army.  In Prijedor, in May, there was the JNA, a

 5     military unit, but it was in Slavonia.  As far as I remember, it was

 6     precisely in Slavonia.

 7             So in this conflict with the Muslim population or fighters or

 8     whatever, I don't know how it was that they clashed, it was the

 9     Territorial Defence that took part.  It only could have been the

10     Territorial Defence, possibly the police.  That is why I, around the

11     22nd or 23rd of May, I cannot remember exactly, I went to Banja Luka.  I

12     asked for information as to what it was that happened in Prijedor in May,

13     what Haris Silajdzic had stated in the media.  It turned out that no one

14     could tell me anything specific, and I addressed precisely this

15     Colonel Bogojevic who was head of security in the 1st Krajina Corps, and

16     I asked him and he said, We don't know all of it either, but the Prijedor

17     police would have to know and the Territorial Defence.  They were the

18     ones who took part in this.  I asked the colonel that we go there and

19     see.  We found Colonel Arsic there who was commander of the JNA unit who

20     maybe could have or should have had some information about that.  I,

21     Bogojevic, and Arsic went together to the police to see Drljaca, who was

22     chief of police at the time.  I don't know exactly what his exact title

23     was.  I first put this question:  Did the army take part in this?  The

24     explanation I was given was that this military unit, I think it was

25     called the 27th or some brigade, that was a JNA unit, that it was

Page 40140

 1     somewhere in Okucani or towards Papuk, but that that was this clash

 2     between the opposing parties, that is to say the Muslims and the

 3     Territorial Defence in Prijedor.

 4             Simo Drljaca, well, I asked where were these people who were

 5     killed buried, and he said at the mine of Tomasica.  I asked that we all

 6     go there together to see whether anything can be seen there or something

 7     like that, because according to military regulations in a state of war,

 8     and so on, which had already been regulated, well, not exactly in May but

 9     by the end of June I as minister of defence issued these regulations.

10     This was regulating how this should be done, how people should be buried,

11     one's own soldiers, enemy soldiers, and so on and so forth.  I asked that

12     we take a look, and when we arrived there, so that is about a year after

13     this massacre, I asked Mr. Drljaca.  He said that it was the materials

14     that took part in this and part of the police.  I asked how many were

15     there, because I said Haris Silajdzic -- well, this is what initiated my

16     interest in it.  When I asked the question how many people, fighters, or

17     whoever they were, civilians, were buried there, he said up to 500, up to

18     500.

19             I could not make any decision then.  For me it was important that

20     the army didn't do it, and that was confirmed by Colonel Arsic and

21     Drljaca.  When actually after that Krajisnik and I went to see the

22     president of the municipality we talked a bit about that, but he said

23     that's how they were buried.  That's how it was.  No one touched

24     anything.  The location and time are well known.  When I returned to

25     Pale, I notified the minister of justice, it was Mr. Jovo Rosic, and I

Page 40141

 1     asked him, I mean I explained this to him, what it was that I found out,

 2     and I asked him to start an investigation about this case.

 3             What happened after that I don't know.  That is what I know about

 4     this case.

 5        Q.   One follow-up question.  So your testimony is that before the

 6     attack on Kozarac on May 24th, 1992, before the confinement of thousands

 7     of Muslims and Croats in Omarska and Keraterm, before the room 3 massacre

 8     where 150 people were killed, before the attack on the Brdo in

 9     July of 1992, before the killing of over 150 people from the Brdo and

10     Omarska and so on, that already at least 500 and according to Bogojevic,

11     5.000 Muslims had been killed before that in Prijedor?  That's your

12     testimony?

13        A.   That's what we were told by Drljaca to me, Bogojevic and Arsic.

14     I didn't know anything about that, to be honest, although there were

15     rumours.  There was information that we received in Pale that there had

16     been conflicts between Muslims and Serbs in the territory of Prijedor.

17     There was nothing strange about that.  The war had already started,

18     therefore there was nothing specific.  And as for Kozarac and the rest, I

19     really at that time -- I did not have a possibility or time to deal with

20     that problem at all throughout the entire first war -- year of the war I

21     didn't have the time, or at least up to June I didn't.  Perhaps two or

22     three times I turned up in Banja Luka and once I was there with

23     Krajisnik.  When we went to visit the president of the municipality, I

24     know that Krajisnik asked him about the situation with the population in

25     Prijedor, and that was sometime around the 12th or the 13th of May.  He

Page 40142

 1     said we have about 5.000 Muslims, about 5- to 6.000 Croats in terms of

 2     the other population.  That's what I know.  I remember that very well.

 3             After that case, in 1993 I remember that, and then I wondered how

 4     come that there were 5.000 Muslims and that they were killed by the

 5     Territorial Defence at the beginning of the war since the

 6     Territorial Defence perhaps had one company.  I don't know how many.  I

 7     didn't know how many men they had at their disposal.  So who was it who

 8     was capable of killing that many people?  I didn't find any of that

 9     logical.  But listen, see, according to Haris Silajdzic there were 5- to

10     7.000 and so on and so forth.  In any war the figures get exaggerated,

11     and that was also true of Srebrenica and so on and so forth.  This is

12     what I know about that case.

13             I don't know where this has come from, where this information has

14     come from.  From Bogojevic?  I haven't a clue really.  I really don't --

15     am surprised.  What did he say?  Let me see.  Just bear with me for a

16     moment.  That Subotic got involved.  What does that mean?  What does it

17     mean when he says that I got involved?  What was I involved in?  Maybe he

18     thought that I as the main inspector of the army and I came to check the

19     situation.  I don't know what I was involved in.  As a minister, what was

20     I supposed to be involved in during the first days of the war.  I was in

21     Pale.  I didn't know whether I was coming or going, what was I supposed

22     to do, how I was supposed to set up my ministry from the 12th of May

23     onwards?  I really don't understand.  He should explain his own words to

24     you, I guess.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. Subotic.

Page 40143

 1             Thank you, Mr. President.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, in light of the time for redirect

 4     which will probably be somewhat extensive, I'm proposing that we excuse

 5     Colonel Salapura for today so that he can start his testimony in the

 6     morning.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 8             Mr. Subotic, before Mr. Karadzic starts his re-examination, I

 9     will put some questions to you, and I ask you to be very precise, because

10     depending upon your answer, the Chamber may order redaction of some part

11     of your statement.

12             So you have your statement, signed statement with you right now.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14             JUDGE KWON:  And some parts of the paragraphs are written in

15     English as we saw before.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

17             JUDGE KWON:  It is my understanding that there are three kinds of

18     paragraphs that were written in English, so shall we go to paragraph 236.

19     Or we shall go to paragraph 240 first which we saw earlier today.  Could

20     we upload it.  Next page.  Yes, 240.  Under the subtitle of Blagaj Japra.

21             This is written in English, but this is a quotation from your

22     witness statement you gave on the 20th of May, 2006, which --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Which was also written in the B/C/S on which you

25     signed and initialed every page.  Do you remember?

Page 40144

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I remember that, yes.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  So you were confident this is true because you

 3     signed the original B/C/S version at the time when the witness statement

 4     was made.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  All right.  Then let us move to next paragraph,

 7     paragraph 241.  It's a question from Judge Orie and your answer, and

 8     there's another question from Judge Hanoteau and your answer.  This is a

 9     transcript from the Krajisnik case.  When you gave testimony at the time,

10     the transcript was made only in English and no -- and it is my

11     understanding and I am confident --

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

13             JUDGE KWON:  -- that no Serbian translation was made at the time.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, there wasn't, but I did provide

15     the statement.  I signed it, and only later did I receive its

16     translation.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I don't understand your answer, Mr. Subotic.  What

18     we are talking about is your testimony in the Krajisnik case.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  Yes, yes, yes.  I did

20     provide that statement.  I remember that very well.

21             JUDGE KWON:  What do you mean by the statement, providing that

22     statement?

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I uttered those words.  When

24     Mr. Orie asked me questions, I answered, yes.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I'm coming to that.  So when Defence produced

Page 40145

 1     this part of statement, i.e., that is paragraph 241, how did you find

 2     that the paragraph 241 was correct?  Did the Defence read out this

 3     paragraph to you?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.  The Defence read

 5     out that paragraph to me when they took a statement from me.  Whenever

 6     they took statements from me, they read those statements to me first from

 7     English, and the statements that I provided in the Krajisnik case, and I

 8     confirmed their correctness because I knew that there were no alterations

 9     to them made.

10             JUDGE KWON:  And shall we go back to paragraph 236.

11             Mr. Tieger, who was JR?

12             THE ACCUSED:  Maybe Jean-Rene Ruez.

13             JUDGE KWON:  So --

14             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President.  Which footnote are we

15     referring to?

16             JUDGE KWON:  236.

17             MR. TIEGER:  That's the problem.  I believe that was

18     John Ralston.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Do you see paragraph 236?  This is an

20     interview you gave at the -- at the Prosecution --

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see that, yes.

22             JUDGE KWON:  So you were asked by the representative of the

23     Office of the Prosecutor, John Ralston, and you gave your answer.  You

24     see the initial BS?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

Page 40146

 1             JUDGE KWON:  How did you confirm that this part was also correct?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Sladojevic interpreted

 3     that to me when he was taking my statement.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure the Chamber understand you when you

 7     said Mr. Sladojevic interpreted that to you.  What did exactly he do?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He told me that he would also

 9     include some statements from my previous testimony which in essence

10     correspond with what I know.  He -- he told me that those statements

11     would be included verbatim from your previous evidence because in essence

12     they correspond with my entire statement; i.e., I repeat them in one way

13     or another almost verbatim in the same vein, and I accepted that that

14     could be exclusively done in the way I testified before Mr. Orie.  I

15     accepted that voluntarily.  Therefore, there's no reason for things to be

16     repeated.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I understand that, Mr. Sladojevic told you

18     that those parts would be included -- included verbatim from your

19     previous evidence, but my question is whether Mr. Sladojevic or any other

20     person, including interpreter, read out your statement in its entirety

21     that is to be included in your statement.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  What is now before me was

23     read out to me, both the parts in English as well as the parts in

24     Serbian.  We spent an entire day during proofing on that.

25                           [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 40147

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We'll an a break for 45 minutes and

 2     resume at 1.45.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 1.01 p.m.

 4                           --- On resuming at 1.51 p.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  If I could just quickly note one matter unrelated to

 7     this witness that I've already mentioned to Mr. Robinson, that is that in

 8     light of the timing and nature of Mr. Zametica's proposed 92 ter

 9     statement, the Prosecution will be asking at an appropriate moment that

10     his testimony be led live, so I wanted to let the Chamber know in case it

11     had anything in mind by way of arguments for timing just before the

12     witness testifies or any time before.

13             JUDGE KWON:  To be led live in its entirety.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Correct.  Well, in light of the fact that there is

15     apparently no way of segregating the new portions from the previously --

16     the previous draft, that is correct.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we're against that but if the

19     Chamber were minded to do that we would prefer to postpone his testimony

20     until the 3rd of July, which would be after the 14 days would have

21     expired from the receipt of the more recent statement, so if you could

22     let us know, but we are unlikely to make much progress with his testimony

23     tomorrow in any event, so if it's determined that there was not enough

24     notice to allow him to testify under Rule 92 ter at this time, we would

25     simply prefer that he be recalled at a time when there is sufficient

Page 40148

 1     notice.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  We can't decide in vacuum.  We'll hear from the

 3     parties sometime today or tomorrow.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellencies; good

 6     afternoon to everybody.

 7                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 8        Q.   [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General, sir.

 9        A.   Good afternoon.

10        Q.   I'll start with last things first, and I will base my questions

11     on what we heard from you yesterday.  Could you please tell us, General,

12     sir, how you understood the situation which resulted in casualties that

13     were buried in the mine in Prijedor.

14        A.   Those casualties were result of a conflict as Drljaca confirmed,

15     and that conflict involved the Territorial Defence and police forces

16     during May in Prijedor.  I have nothing else to say because I didn't hear

17     anything different.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Were there any signs, were there any rumours that

19     they were the result of a crime, that they were killed?  Did Bogojevic

20     specify the way casualties came by?

21        A.   To be honest, I didn't ask any questions since he said that they

22     were killed during clashes in the town of Prijedor, I did not ask any

23     questions.  I didn't have any reason to doubt those words because it was

24     publicly known that there was fighting going on in Prijedor.  I was in

25     Pale, so I did not have precise possibilities to know more than I did.

Page 40149

 1        Q.   When it comes to that burial and sanitization, did that happen

 2     before or after you issued your instructions?

 3        A.   They were buried immediately after.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  This is the second time Dr. Karadzic is

 6     introducing terms of art that have particular connotations that were not

 7     either -- they're not contained in the document, for example.  Now we

 8     have sanitization.  Previously we had casualties.  It's clear what he's

 9     intending to convey with his use of the words, and I want to urge

10     open-ended questions that don't direct the witness to particular

11     formulations of events.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

14        Q.   General, sir, what instructions did you give in the month of June

15     after the army started functioning properly?

16        A.   I prescribed everything in terms of documents concerning warfare,

17     the burial of casualties, and so on and so forth.  Therefore, I didn't do

18     anything else.

19        Q.   Thank you.  That provision concerning burials, what does it set

20     out?  Which casualties is the army supposed to bury?

21        A.   I know from some parts, for example, in Zvornik where I was

22     present when General Stankovic, who is a pathologist, dealt with some

23     casualties in Zvornik that were buried at the cemetery, and they were

24     Muslims.  Pathologists did their bit that they were supposed to do.  They

25     had documents.  The graves were marked with numbers.  I saw that, and

Page 40150

 1     that was in accordance with the military regulations that prevailed in

 2     the JNA and in all the other militaries in the world.  I had an occasion

 3     to see that.  That was prescribed by our rules and regulations.  People

 4     could not be buried in any way.  Their graves had to be marked.  Their

 5     names had to be known, and so on and so forth.  And later on the mortal

 6     remains could be transferred to other places depending on requirements

 7     and some other thing.  I don't know what.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Was every killed enemy soldier buried in the place

 9     where they were found?  What procedure was followed?

10        A.   Listen, it depended on the conditions.  For example; I don't know

11     why those people in Prijedor did it the way they did.  In Prijedor there

12     are Muslim cemeteries and so on and so forth, so they could bury them in

13     Muslim cemeteries, which would have only been fair, and so on and so

14     forth.  They should have marked those graves.  However, maybe the

15     conditions were not in place.  Maybe it was not possible due to fighting

16     and conflicts.  I don't know.  I never investigated the circumstances.

17     My information dated from one year after the conflict and after the

18     burial.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, after the war or at any time, were those

20     bodies exhumed when that burial site was discovered?  Did anybody mention

21     the number of bodies that were found there?

22        A.   I know from the media, from the press, and from TV that that

23     burial site in the Omarska mine was exhumed.  To be honest, I was never

24     in those mines, so I don't know what the name refers to.  However, that

25     information did not contain the number of casualties, but that was done

Page 40151

 1     after the war.  I know that.  In peacetime I don't know when, in what

 2     year, but that can be checked in the territory of Banja Luka.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked whether you denied that Omarska,

 4     Keraterm were camps where the civilians and fighters were detained and

 5     other people.  Can you tell us how many people were released from Omarska

 6     and Keraterm and how many were found as guilty of having participated in

 7     fighting?

 8        A.   According to the information that I had even before the end of

 9     the war, 60 per cent of the people who were detained there were released.

10     I don't know what happened to the remaining 40 per cent.  I don't know.

11     I'm not privy to that information, but I know for a fact that I came

12     across information according to which 60 per cent were released.

13        Q.   Who was it who was in charge of the investigations and triages

14     that happened there?  Who was it who decided that some should be released

15     and that some should be kept?  Do you know that?

16        A.   Yes, I did know that, because --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  More of the same and I'm going to keep rising when

19     this keeps happening.  You can scour the transcript.  There is no mention

20     of triage up to now.  This is part of a continuing pattern by

21     Dr. Karadzic trying to indicate to witnesses where he wants them to go

22     and what assumptions he wants them to build into their answers.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Actually, Mr. President, I don't agree with that.

25     This is not a leading question and the witness is free to give any answer

Page 40152

 1     he wants.  I don't think that Dr. Karadzic is asking an improper question

 2     at all in this way.  I don't really understand the basis for an objection

 3     that Dr. Karadzic is creating some kind of suggestion to the witness.

 4     The question is open-ended.  He can answer it in any way he wishes.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  How about the word "triage"?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Nevertheless, that's not suggested.  It's up to --

 7     if that's how Dr. Karadzic characterises and the witness understands what

 8     the import of the question is that's not suggestive simply charactering

 9     of something one way or the other.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

11             MR. TIEGER:  In my system, as Mr. Robinson well knows -- first of

12     all, we should be arguing this outside the presence of the witness, but

13     never mind.  This assumes facts not in evidence.  So Dr. Karadzic wants

14     to ask the witness about something that the witness has not testified to,

15     that was not raised in the examination, that is now presented as a fact

16     and ask him who was in charge of that fact that the witness hasn't

17     testified about and that wasn't part of any earlier answer.  That is the

18     existence of triage.  Now, and -- and as I said before, this is another

19     reflection of the same pattern that exists of providing the witness with

20     something as a fact and then having the witness automatically build it

21     into his answers.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase the question.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40153

 1        Q.   General, sir, these 60 per cent, were they released --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Bear that in mind.  The Chamber

 3     agrees with Mr. Tieger's observation.  Please continue.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, sir, according to what you heard and found out these

 6     60 per cent, were they just released indiscriminately, and what about

 7     these other per cent and what is this the result of?  Did others decide

 8     about that?

 9        A.   Others were aware of that.  I didn't know about it, but nobody

10     asked me about it.  Mr. Orie didn't ask me about that.  I was responding

11     only to Mr. Orie's questions.  I didn't know who would be asking me what.

12     So this means that the investigative organs interviewed individuals.

13     This was publicly shown by the organs of power.  It's not a secret.  All

14     those who were not -- who were not -- who did not participate in the

15     fighting, and so on and so forth, who did not, they were released.  I

16     know that for sure.  There's nothing else to it.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to move to page 54 of today's

18     transcript where the declaration of war was discussed.  First, I'm asking

19     you this:  It was read how I said that the municipalities had their own

20     units.  Are you able to tell us whether the municipality has the right to

21     any armed formations and to which ones?

22        A.   According to the law on the national defence of the

23     Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

24     the municipality had all the powers in that sense at the municipal level.

25     This is particularly interesting until the formation of

Page 40154

 1     Republika Srpska -- or, rather, for the beginning of the war, until we

 2     formed our own organs, laws, and so on and so forth.  So we copied

 3     certain things from those laws.  We did not change the laws of

 4     Yugoslavia.  Therefore, the municipalities did have such powers at the

 5     municipal level.  They had their own Municipal Staffs.  They had their

 6     own weaponry.  They had -- all of this existed on one side and the other

 7     side, the Muslim side, the Serb side, and the Croat side.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked or actually what was disputed was your

 9     assertion in the testimony in the Krajisnik case that Serbs did not have

10     any preparations.  What sort of preparations did you mean when you said

11     that you did not have any preparations?

12        A.   Serbs had no preparations at all for armed fighting.  They simply

13     had -- Serbs had political preparations, preparations through which they

14     attempted, and it wasn't just the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in

15     Croatia, Slovenia, and so on and so forth.  They were trying to convince

16     people not to go into war, not to embark on war, that if we needed to

17     split up then we should split up.  So that was it.  No Serb was willing

18     to participate in the war.  Not a single Serb.  Believe me, we loved

19     Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia was a wonderful country.  Therefore there were no

20     military preparations that were carried out until the beginning of the

21     war.  As one says only with the entrance of the army to Sarajevo, they

22     were escaping in front of the enemy, they were getting killed in

23     Sarajevo.  It was then that people understood what it was all about, how

24     things were proceeding and then they began something at their own level,

25     they made some attempts.

Page 40155

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And then my learned friend Mr. Tieger said as I --

 2     that I said that we had a series of pre-planned moves.  When

 3     Mr. Izetbegovic made one move, we made another move.  So this political

 4     counter game, did that lead to war?  Did it have a military nature?

 5        A.   No, no.  It was just precisely that political game that tried by

 6     all means.  This is generally known.  Everybody knows this.  Muslims in

 7     Sarajevo know this, and many Muslims would confirm that, and -- and they

 8     could testify to it.  Thus no one was in favour of war.  Quite the

 9     contrary.  We accepted that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be Bosnia and

10     Herzegovina.  It should be one state, because Yugoslavia was dismembered.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MR. TIEGER:  I'm sorry, but I'm going to keep objecting to this.

14     So this is another example so Dr. Karadzic says to the witness about this

15     matter.  So did these political counter moves and so on.  What the

16     witness actually said when he was presented with that information was, I

17     didn't have any contacts with Mr. Karadzic in 1991.  I didn't know him.

18     I didn't know he existed, specifically in this case.  I have no ideas

19     about that.  Well, now Mr. Karadzic gave him some ideas and it comes out

20     in his testimony and that's what's happening over and over.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I also agree, and also it reduces the probative

22     value of the witness's answer.  While the Chamber is able to recognise

23     such -- such the probative value of such questioning, but please refrain

24     from putting a leading nature in your -- in your questions.  Please

25     proceed.

Page 40156

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I just wanted to respond

 2     briefly to Mr. Tieger.  This was a consequence of the fact that

 3     Mr. Tieger presented our political measures to the witness as military,

 4     war measures, and that brought him into the situation of having to say

 5     that he didn't know anything about it.  Had he read which measures we had

 6     taken, then ...

 7             JUDGE KWON:  It is you that inserted the term political

 8     counter-gain and it's not appropriate when you conduct re-examination.

 9     Please proceed.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, your Excellency, but in

11     that case I would ask that the witness be shown the measures to which

12     Mr. Tieger alluded so that we can see.  He presented them as part of

13     preparations for war, but they were not of a military nature, so he

14     confused the witness.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Please proceed.  It's up to you how to conduct your

16     re-examination, Mr. Karadzic.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, just give me a little time to

18     collect myself and I will come back to that.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   General, sir, you were shown the transcript of the

21     20th of June, 1992, where the Muslim side -- or, rather, the Presidency

22     declares war and proclaims a state of war.  Was this the first time that

23     they undertook and adopted some aggressive warmongering actions in

24     relation to the Serbs?

25        A.   No, no.  They already from the attack by Croatia to -- and

Page 40157

 1     preparations for the attack on.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Is this the first time that they

 3     adopted some aggressive warmongering actions in relation to the Serbs?

 4     Please reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, very well.  I apologise.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Was that the first time that any law was being referred to or

 8     mentioned which would direct towards fighting against the Serbs?

 9        A.   No, it was not.  Already from the beginning, after the formation

10     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the referendum, this already started to

11     be prepared and so on and so forth.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at D332 in e-court, please.  General,

13     sir, please, could you read the date and the first sentence and then

14     could you read paragraph 4.

15        A.   The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ministry of

16     National Defence, Territorial Defence Staff, Sarajevo, number such and

17     such.  The date, 20 -- I don't know if this is 20 -- 20th or the 27th -

18     I'm not sure - of April, 1992.  Order on the implementation of decision

19     number such and such of the RBiH Presidency pursuant to the decision of

20     the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Could you read item four now?

22        A.   Four:  Hurriedly plan and begin combat operations in the whole

23     territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and co-ordinate them

24     with the Territorial Defence staffs of regions, districts, and the

25     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In planning combat operations, plan

Page 40158

 1     extensive measures of protection of the civilian population and property

 2     of the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 3     Commander Colonel Efendic.  Hasan.  I'm missing some letters, but last

 4     name is Efendic.  This is the person who replaced Vukosavljevic,

 5     General Vukosavljevic.

 6        Q.   General, sir, against whom should combat actions be planned and

 7     commenced on the territory of the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 8        A.   Well, it's not against angels or anyone.  It's against Serbs and

 9     probably Croats at that time.  Possibly.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Please remember, Mr. Subotic, to put a pause before

12     you start answering the question.

13             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well.  Very well.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   The Serb side at that time or at any point later did it make a

17     plan and issue a similar directive for offensives on the entire territory

18     of Bosnia and Herzegovina or in territories which were majority Muslim or

19     Croat?

20        A.   Absolutely not ever until perhaps the end of 1992 when there were

21     orders by the army for certain operations like that, but otherwise before

22     that this was not definitely the case, no.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now see 1D44050 in e-court, please.  There is

24     no translation, but I'm briefly just going to read five or six lines.

25     First of all, let's identify the document though.

Page 40159

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  We're about to see a document that doesn't have an

 3     English translation, so I won't be able to tell why it's being raised at

 4     this point to this witness, but -- so I'm a little bit lost as to the

 5     manner in which this arises from the cross-examination and what is

 6     intended by putting this particular document in front of the witness

 7     rather than seeking whatever information he might have that's relevant to

 8     redirect examination.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, there was a

11     question as to the declaration of war and the conduct and actions of the

12     Muslim army and possible preparations on the Serb side.  The topic is the

13     same as the one dealt with with the previous document, and the author is

14     the same, General Hasan Efendic.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  That's not justification for leading the witness,

17     which is apparently what this is an effort to do.  Meanwhile this

18     document is in front of the witness and he's reading it.  So

19     Dr. Karadzic, as has been his custom, one way or another continues to try

20     to lead witnesses.

21             JUDGE KWON:  He put a question, albeit very brief, on the

22     previous page.  Very well.  Now that the witness has read the document,

23     what is your question?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, he didn't read the part that

25     I'm interested in.  It's on a different ...

Page 40160

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Is this directive correct, General, sir, is this how they acted

 3     based on this directive from the 29th of April?

 4        A.   I am familiar with that situation.  First of all, I would like to

 5     tell the Trial Chamber that in Bosnia and Herzegovina this post was

 6     health by General Vukosavljevic, and he was replaced because he is a Serb

 7     by ethnicity even though he was married to a Muslim woman from Sarajevo.

 8     Therefore, he was not suitable for the preparations, because he wouldn't

 9     do that.  He was lieutenant-general by rank.  He was a very serious man.

10     I knew him personally.  We all knew him, because he was the commander of

11     the Territorial Defence for the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina for a

12     number of years.  So he was deliberately replaced so that Hasan Efendic

13     could subordinate himself to Alija Izetbegovic and then --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- he could be acting according to

16     the wishes of Alija Izetbegovic.

17             JUDGE KWON:  In order to put a document to the witness, first you

18     should put a foundational question and lead the witness to tell us what

19     this document is about, and you may then proceed to ask some content of

20     the document.  I don't see from the document what this directive is about

21     at all, and I don't know what this document is about.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, the directive has

23     been taken down.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something?

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No.  Just wait.  The directive has

Page 40161

 1     been taken down.  I already put questions on it, then it was adopted.

 2     This is D332 it was earlier on the screen.  This is a review by the same

 3     man about the development of the military --

 4             JUDGE KWON:  You're not giving evidence.  Put a question to the

 5     witness.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   All right.  General, do you see this document?  Can you tell us

 8     what the document deals with?

 9        A.   He is justifying the declaration of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10     rather, Alija's declaration of war, and he is trying in some way to

11     explain that, the reasons for declaring war.  That is the essence.

12        Q.   Can we see page 4.  What is written there?  Can you read out the

13     heading for the Trial Chamber.

14        A.   Well, now I have page 3.

15        Q.   Can we please have the first page yet again and could you read it

16     out.

17        A.   "Development and growth of defensive liberation forces."  Please,

18     this is clear.  Defensive liberation forces.  These are forces that were

19     attacked, not those that are defending themselves.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Subotic, what you were asked about is to read

21     out the title.  Please concentrate on answering the question.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I agree with the Court's guidance, and I also

25     think it's clear that what's happening is that in lieu of asking this

Page 40162

 1     witness focused questions that might elicit information that he has in a

 2     non-leading way that arise from the cross-examination, instead he's being

 3     turned to documents that Dr. Karadzic wants information to be elicited

 4     about and being asked to read it out and affirm -- it's classical

 5     leading.  It's also very peripheral to the cross-examination which dealt

 6     with the matter that Dr. Karadzic raised in a very specific way and now

 7     he's returning using that subject as a broad platform from which to

 8     discuss everything about Muslim preparations for war.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll withdraw that, Excellency.

10     I'm going to abandon this topic altogether and I'm going to go back to --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Speaking for myself, and I take it my colleagues

12     would agree with me but I tend to agree with Mr. Tieger's observation.

13     So, Mr. Robinson, if you could have a word with Mr. Karadzic how to

14     conduct his re-examination in the future.

15             Shall we adjourn for today with the witness -- with this witness

16     and I will hear from the parties about Zametica's evidence.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I was informed that we can -- Mr. Salapura's

19     evidence has not been concluded which he will continue tomorrow for about

20     half an hour or an hour.

21             Yes.  Mr. Subotic, you may be excused.  We'll continue tomorrow

22     morning at 9.00.

23                           [The witness stands down]

24                           [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

25             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President, I think I can shortcut

Page 40163

 1     this discussion just by doing some math here.  I don't think we'll reach

 2     Mr. Zametica tomorrow, so instead I think we'll reschedule his testimony

 3     for the 3rd of July and that will obviate any problems.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  I certainly haven't thought through the impact --

 6     what I understand Mr. Robinson to be saying is that the circumstances are

 7     such that he's in a position to reformulate the schedule in a manner that

 8     doesn't implicate any loss of time to the Court or any impact on the

 9     Prosecution.  I actually haven't thought it through from that respect,

10     but if his point is he can do something unilaterally that doesn't have

11     any implications to the Prosecution's schedule, I suppose that's a way of

12     saying it doesn't really matter what the Prosecution says in response.  I

13     haven't thought it through fully from that point of view and to see what

14     impact it has, so my position was predicated upon the impact of dealing

15     with that statement under the circumstances that we expected to occur,

16     and you'd have to give me just about at least two minutes to consider the

17     implications of what Mr. Robinson just suggested.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, Mr. Tieger.  So we'll deal with it when

19     it will arise as a matter of fact.  So we'll deal with it immediately

20     before Mr. Zametica is due to testify.

21             There's one matter.

22                           [Trial Chamber confers]

23             JUDGE KWON:  So I'd like to ask the parties whether -- or how

24     they view this:  Mr. Salapura is going to testify in the Mladic case

25     tomorrow morning for some time, after which he's due to come to this

Page 40164

 1     courtroom and to give testimony, this time as a Defence witness.  In

 2     terms of perception or appearance, whether there's any problem or

 3     whatever, can I hear from the parties.

 4             MR. ROBINSON:  We don't see any problem.  Maybe I'm missing

 5     something that is not blatantly obvious to me, but in reality, the

 6     Prosecution is interested in proving the events in Srebrenica and some of

 7     the things that occurred there, and they're using Colonel Salapura to do

 8     that in the Mladic case.  We're interested in showing that Dr. Karadzic

 9     didn't have any knowledge of those events, and we're using

10     Colonel Salapura in our case for that purpose.  So I don't see any

11     inconsistency, but if I'm missing something about the perception, maybe

12     you can let me know.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Yeah, I'm also happy to focus on particular concerns

15     the Court might have, but my initial reaction is that this is a

16     reflection of an aspect of witness testimony that we see reflected in

17     various ways when insider witnesses are called, and that is in part that

18     parties may call witnesses in respect of particular information and ask

19     the Court to consider the witness's testimony in light of the totality of

20     evidence and the extent to which that witness's testimony about certain

21     matters is convincing and credible and corroborated by the totality of

22     the evidence and disregard other aspects of the witness's testimony that

23     may be, for whatever reason, whether it's -- well, for various reasons,

24     not considered reliable by the Court.  So I -- given the position that

25     certainly has been taken in respect of insider testimony in other

Page 40165

 1     instances, I think it would not be necessarily surprising that a

 2     witness's evidence is of interest in some respects to either party,

 3     although all of the evidence that that witness may provide may not be

 4     accepted or indeed may be challenged by the party that calls the witness,

 5     and I say that completely in the abstract, because I haven't conducted

 6     myself the particular analysis of what evidence I think the Defence

 7     specifically intends to rely on, what evidence I think is likely to be

 8     adduced from this witness in the Mladic case, but I think that broad

 9     principle is -- is one that we're familiar with in the institution.

10             Given the fact that people close to the events are also people

11     close to the -- very often to the accused and are other parties of

12     interest, there is often a viewed need to elicit information from those

13     people, understanding the possibility that not all information elicited

14     will -- can be assessed in and given precisely the same weight.

15             JUDGE KWON:  In conclusion, you do not see it problematic?

16             MR. TIEGER:  I can say this, Mr. President, when you raise it, it

17     makes me rethink it and -- and consider the possibility of -- of giving

18     it further thought, but the -- the answer to your question at this moment

19     is no, it is not something that we had intended to raise with the Court

20     in the manner you just asked about.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Maybe there's some English custom that Mr. Tieger

22     and I are missing, but we're going under the principle that the witness

23     is not the property of either party and therefore it could be okay.

24             JUDGE MORRISON:  I don't think you're missing any English

25     customs.

Page 40166

 1             JUDGE BAIRD:  You're not, you're not.

 2             JUDGE MORRISON:  I think the Chamber's just acting out of an

 3     abundance of caution.  But I speak purely for myself, if neither party

 4     sees any difficulty, then so be it.

 5             JUDGE BAIRD:  This is the point.  I mean, if both sides agree,

 6     then the matter comes to an end, but from the standpoint of perception, I

 7     thought that instinctively it might not have been the best course of

 8     action and possibly a day to interpose himself between the two bodies of

 9     testimony, but if both sides agree, then, you know, so be it.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  I think especially under the circumstances

11     where we wouldn't have any other witnesses tomorrow if we did have this

12     problem, a gap, so I think it's better to go ahead.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll do so.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes?

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Indeed, I have exercised restraint,

17     but this is not the first time that Mr. Tieger is mentioning that

18     witnesses are close to me.  Mr. Tieger called all the witnesses who are

19     not close to me.  And none of these witnesses that are called by the

20     Defence are particularly close to me.  Simply they are not Prosecution

21     witnesses.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  The hearing is adjourned.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.40 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 21st day

25                           of June, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.