Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 40911

 1                           Monday, 8 July 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

 9     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10                           WITNESS:  DRAGOMIR KESEROVIC

11                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Pasic.  Please be seated and make

13     yourself comfortable.  Yes, I made a mistake.  Yes, Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, excuse me, Mr. President.  We've had a

15     reshuffling of the witnesses during the weekend and this witness is

16     General Dragomir Keserovic, who will be followed by Radomir Pasic.  We

17     informed the Chamber a few times by e-mail and the order for today will

18     be General Keserovic followed by Mr. Pasic and Mr. Bajagic, and Ceklic

19     will testify tomorrow.

20             JUDGE KWON:  General Keserovic, my apologies.  The Chamber hasn't

21     been informed.  In particular I wasn't informed of the recent change of

22     the order of witnesses.  My apologies again.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please proceed.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

25     morning to everyone.

Page 40912

 1                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 2        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

 3        A.   Good morning.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 5             MR. NICHOLLS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Sorry to interrupt.

 6     I believe we had --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll discuss it in the absence of the witness.

 8     Mr. Keserovic, the Chamber has something to discuss in your absence.  If

 9     you could excuse us for the moment.

10                           [The witness stands down]

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

12             MR. NICHOLLS:  Good morning, Your Honours.  I apologise if I'm

13     wrong, but I believe we had suggested that this witness ought to be

14     advised.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We noted it, but I was wondering why an expert

16     witness needs a Rule 90(E) advisory.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Because part of my cross-examination will very

18     likely focus on his whereabouts and actions in July 1995.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll deal with it when it arises.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  Okay.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE KWON:  That was the understanding of the Chamber.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  All right.  Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Any observation, Mr. Robinson?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Then we'll bring in the witness again.  Thank you.

Page 40913

 1                           [The witness takes the stand]

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Good morning, General.

 6        A.   Good morning.

 7        Q.   In your expert report, we have your CV, but I would kindly ask

 8     you to tell us first where and when you were born and then give us a

 9     brief resume of your career, educational background, and career.

10        A.   I was born on the 8th of June, 1957, in Piskavica near Banja Luka

11     in the then-Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That is where I

12     finished my elementary school, and I finished secondary school in

13     Banja Luka.  I finished the military academy of ground forces in Belgrade

14     in 1981.  I also finished the General Staff Academy in Belgrade in 1997,

15     and the School of National Defence in 1999 in Belgrade.

16             I acquired my Masters Degree and my Ph.D. at the

17     Faculty of Security, and I teach security sciences.  During my military

18     career, I discharged all duties starting from platoon commander, company

19     commander, battalion commander, brigade commander, chief of the corps

20     staff, and in the security service I discharged all duties starting from

21     an operations officer, chief of section, chief of department, chief of

22     administration, chief of the sector for intelligence and security,

23     assistant Chief of the General Staff, and assistant minister for defence.

24             As I said, I currently teach at the University of Security as an

25     associate professor.

Page 40914

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether or not all in the period

 2     after 1992 but throughout your career receive any commendations and any

 3     decorations?

 4        A.   Yes, I did.  On several occasions I received fast-track

 5     promotions and I was decorated as a member of the Yugoslav People's Army,

 6     that is to say before the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and later as

 7     well.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Your terms of reference as an expert was to review

 9     and analyse the expert report provided by the Prosecution witness

10     Ewan Brown relating to the 1st Krajina Corps; is that correct?

11        A.   Yes, that is correct.

12        Q.   We have to wait a little bit for the interpretation to be

13     completed and recorded in the transcript.

14             Let me go briefly through the subjects as put in an order in your

15     expert report.  Can you tell us what did Mr. Brown conclude regarding the

16     connection between the Serbian Democratic Party and the JNA and the

17     5th Corps in particular, and what were your conclusions on that very same

18     subject?

19        A.   In my expert -- in his expert report, Mr. Brown concluded that

20     the Yugoslav People's Army and the Serbian Democratic Party jointly and

21     in co-ordination acted with a view to creating conditions in which Serbs

22     will separate from the other two ethnic communities.  He also concluded

23     that through forcible relocation and ethnic cleansing the number of

24     non-Serbs in that territory would be reduced to a negligible number.

25             I believe that that was a very lightly made statement, because

Page 40915

 1     after reviewing the same documents as Mr. Brown did, I found that the JNA

 2     and the 5th Corps of the JNA and later the 1st Krajina Corps did

 3     everything through a long period of time to calm down the situation, to

 4     keep it under control, to ensure protection for all ethnic communities,

 5     which means both the non-Serbs and Serbs -- and that their attitude

 6     depended solely on the attitude that was displayed towards them whenever

 7     and wherever the JNA that at the time was the only legal and legitimate

 8     armed force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if it was not attacked, if its

 9     soldiers were not being killed or wounded, if they were not put under

10     blockade, they provided equal protection to everyone.  Their only

11     response was in a situation when they needed to defend and protect their

12     troops from attacks.  That's the essential difference between my findings

13     based on the documents compared to Mr. Brown's findings.

14        Q.   Thank you.  As a member of the JNA, was it possible for you to

15     reach a conclusion about the attitude of the JNA towards nationalist

16     political parties?  What was their general view of the so-called

17     ethno-democracy?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Is this witness an expert or a fact witness,

19     Mr. Karadzic?  You are asking the witness based upon his experience as a

20     member of the JNA.  I'm struggling to understand what this witness is

21     testifying about.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry, but I think that on the

23     basis of his review of the documents would be helpful and useful, but I

24     will now stick to the documents solely, and I will rephrase my questions.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please bear in mind that this witness is an

Page 40916

 1     expert witness.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   General, did you come across any documents that were --

 4     corroborate the closeness of views and in particular political views

 5     between the JNA and the SDS, and did you find any evidence in documents

 6     that JNA had some preferences with regard to political parties both

 7     before and during the war?

 8        A.   No, I did not find any such documents that would indicate to

 9     pre-war closeness between any nationalist party and the JNA.  On the

10     contrary, what I found was a lot of documents that spoke in favour of the

11     fact that the JNA was opposed to ethnic polarisation and was advocating a

12     political solution to these differences.  As a result, they called upon

13     everyone to solve the crisis that emerged and the events relating to the

14     disintegration of the former state without a war, that is to say without

15     the use of force.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you come across any documents speaking about the

17     relationship between the SDS and the JNA and how they treated them?  Did

18     you find any fact there was total trust between them?  And I'm talking

19     about period before the war.  What was the attitude of the SDS in general

20     and on the ground vis-a-vis the JNA?

21        A.   The Serbian Democratic Party was not particularly trustful,

22     because that was particularly prominent in its right wing.  As I said,

23     was mistrustful of the Yugoslav People's Army.  They believed them to be

24     the remnant of the previous Communist regime and system, and it could not

25     have anticipated and predicted how the JNA would act in the future.

Page 40917

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If I could intervene, Mr. Karadzic.

 2             In your answer to Mr. Karadzic's previous question, you answered

 3     that you didn't find any -- such document that would indicate to pre-war

 4     closeness between any nationalist party and the JNA.  Do you remember

 5     having said so, General?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, pre-war closeness.  Yes, I

 7     remember that.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  And do you mean that attitude changed during the

 9     war?  Yes.  Do you mean that such attitude changed during the war?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Dr. Karadzic's questions related to

11     the pre-war period, but with time there would come a period when there

12     was more closeness between the SDS and closeness due to the fact that the

13     remaining two ethnic communities would openly attack and practically push

14     them into the SDS who had never been advocating attacks on the soldiers

15     and the barracks even though initially they were not very trustful of the

16     JNA.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   These documents, do they provide sufficient reason to conclude

21     and explain the reasons why the JNA was relocating its resources, its

22     equipment, weapons, and ammunition to predominantly Serb-populated areas?

23        A.   It is important to follow parallel -- two parallel processes.

24     One of them relates to the strategic development and deployment of armed

25     forces that had been established long before the conflict started in the

Page 40918

 1     former Yugoslavia.  The units were mostly deployed in the areas that

 2     actually they recruited conscripts from.  The other process that ran

 3     parallel took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it was based on the

 4     previous experiences of armed conflict, primarily in Croatia but in

 5     Slovenia as well, where the JNA units had been blocked, surrounded,

 6     attacked, where weapons were snatched from them as well as equipment and

 7     soldiers were taken prisoner.

 8             Before the conflict broke out, while the JNA was still in

 9     existence, the General Staff issued an instruction or an order for all

10     the areas where it was not certain that the units may survive and that

11     they would be safe that they should be relocated to safer areas.  This

12     instruction did not specify areas with regard and on the basis on any

13     ethnic majority.  It, rather, dealt with the fact that a situation might

14     occur that as a result of tensions the JNA unit might again become

15     subject of attacks and confiscation of their equipment and the like.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry to interrupt.  No objection.  It's just

18     there have been some questions about before the war and before the

19     conflict, and I just don't know if it might be helpful to know what the

20     date is and if -- and if that means the same thing.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Could you help us General?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There are a number of crucial dates

23     that pertain to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The first relate to

24     the month of March when the armed forces of the neighbouring

25     Republic of Croatia entered the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the

Page 40919

 1     area of Kupres and Posavina, and that is when they started occupying

 2     parts of that area.

 3             The next important dates were when the then-president of the

 4     Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, in early April

 5     and immediately thereafter the commander of the Territorial Defence of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hasan Efendic, in the period up to 10th of April

 7     called upon blockades to be placed on the JNA units and garrison

 8     preventing the movement of the JNA and exposing them to attacks in

 9     general.  Once JNA came under attacks, they responded.  And then these

10     attacks started on the 2nd of May in Skenderija, 3rd of May,

11     Dobrovoljacka Street, 15/16 of May in Tuzla, and so on and so forth.

12             The next important date had to do with the fact that in early

13     May, a decision was adopted for the JNA to leave the area of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina and that this withdrawal should have been completed by

15     the 19th of May.

16             And finally, on the 20th of June, president of the

17     then-Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a document declaring a state

18     of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19             These are the dates that I believe could be taken as benchmark

20     that would define the period, the pre-conflict and during the conflict.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we leave it there, Mr. Nicholls, for the

22     moment?

23             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   General, a war is not declared to an unknown enemy.  As far as

Page 40920

 1     the Muslim and Croatian authorities were concerned, who did they identify

 2     as the enemy?  Against whom was a state of war declared?

 3        A.   A state of war was declared against a third ethnic community,

 4     that is to say the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was preceded with

 5     the war declared on erstwhile joint armed force, that is to say the JNA.

 6     Thank you.

 7        Q.   I'd like to ask you about another topic now from your report.

 8     How did Mr. Brown regard the organisation of the non-Serb forces, that is

 9     to say the armed forces of the Muslims and Croats in the territory of

10     Republika Srpska?  Can you explain to us, please, to what extent did you

11     conclude and on the basis of what that Mr. Brown downplayed that aspect

12     and cited and described certain groups and incidents?

13        A.   Mr. Brown dealt extensively with the military organisation of the

14     Muslims and Croats in what was Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.  He

15     addressed in quite some detail the incidents unfolding in certain areas

16     as well.  It may be important to note on this score that none of the

17     events unfolding in whatever municipality were accidental.  This is not

18     the subject of the analysis but is important to comprehend the events.

19             In early April, as early as that, the first documents issued and

20     the first actions mounted served to the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo to

21     incendiate Sarajevo as well as the Drina valley, Foca, Visegrad, across

22     Zvornik, all the way to Bijeljina, to incense the entire area in order to

23     isolate Bosnia-Herzegovina with respect to Serbia.

24             Next in May and early June it was the Sana valley, Kljuc,

25     Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, all these municipalities followed next.

Page 40921

 1             Mr. Brown referred to many documents in his report that I, too,

 2     reviewed.  He states specifically a text and says an attack was mounted,

 3     seven members of the JNA were killed who were retreating through Kljuc

 4     unarmed.  Or another one, at a check-point fire was opened at a military

 5     police patrol where three MPs were killed, or seven members of the army

 6     were taken prisoner.  He does not suppress or conceal these incidents.

 7     He does not omit to mention them.  However, what was in my view

 8     inappropriate was that he kept using terminology that wanted to downplay

 9     the whole situation, that this was only few people, that these were minor

10     incidents, that only a few people were killed or taken prisoner, and that

11     it all happened sporadically.

12             As I myself analysed these same documents, I can say that these

13     incidents were initial incidents or were triggers which prompted a

14     response first by the JNA and later by the VRS to these very same events.

15     After all, World War I was triggered by the assassination of the heir

16     apparent with the death of two people.  So we cannot say that these were

17     minor incidents, sporadic incidents of little importance which as such

18     prompted such a fierce response.  So I do consider such an analysis on

19     the part of Mr. Brown to be inappropriate.  If you analyse these events

20     you will see that there is a cause-and-effect relationship.

21             Secondly the use of forces, the strength of these forces,

22     reciprocity, all these issues, of course, can be discussed.  However,

23     what I can conclude is that the incidents and later significant events in

24     these municipalities were for the most part initiated, motivated,

25     provoked by these same actions that the Muslims mounted in the various

Page 40922

 1     municipalities and which were for the most part directed against the JNA.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, sorry to intervene once again.

 4             Going back to your career, General, I just took a look into your

 5     CV which is included in your report, but I couldn't find what specific

 6     post that you took during the war.  Could you tell us what you had done

 7     since 1991, specific position in which army?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no.  Well, I was at the

 9     General Staff Academy in Belgrade when the war commenced.  When the war

10     broke out, I interrupted my schooling and became commander of the

11     armoured battalion of the 2nd Mechanised Guard Brigade in Valjevo.  I was

12     part of that brigade when it was deployed in Eastern Slavonija, in

13     Croatia.  When I -- when the area was handed over to UNPROFOR --

14             JUDGE KWON:  That was part of the JNA, your brigade in Valjevo?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes.  Yes, that was part of

16     the JNA.  I joined the VRS on the 17th of June, 1992, when we handed over

17     our area of responsibility to the peace forces, that is to say UNPROFOR.

18     That was the unprotected area in east Slavonia.  Then I was appointed

19     chief of security of the 329th or, rather, the 1st Armoured Brigade of

20     the 1st Krajina Corps, and I stayed there until September of 1992, at

21     which point I took up the position of the MP battalion commander of the

22     East Bosnia Corps in Bijeljina.  I stayed in that position until

23     October of 1993.  At the time, I -- or, rather, between October 1993 and

24     February 1995, I was commander of the MP battalion of the 1st

25     Krajina Corps.  Between February and late September 1995, I was chief of

Page 40923

 1     the MP department in the Main Staff of the VRS, and from early October up

 2     until the end of the war I was the commander of the armoured brigade of

 3     the 1st Krajina Corps.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  And when were you promoted to a general?

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 9th of January, 2002.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 7             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Now that we're on this issue, General, in the armies in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, did the continuation of a military career require

11     certification or approval by the international community which ran a

12     background check in terms of the war path of any senior officer?

13        A.   In the VRS -- or, rather, in -- I stayed in the

14     Ministry of Defence up until the 30th of June, 2004.  At a time when the

15     defence system embark on a reform before the creation of what is the

16     system of the armed forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, I stopped working

17     in the Ministry of Defence.

18             Now, a requirement that existed as part of that reform, if this

19     is what the question was about was that no senior officer or wartime

20     commander should remain within that new body of defence forces in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We will come back to that issue of the degree and the

23     significance of the incidents that you discussed previously.

24             In footnote 2, you mention the decision of the Presidency of the

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare a state of war.

Page 40924

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness then please be

 2     shown 65 ter 05867 in e-court.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the document, General, you

 4     said between February and September 1995, you were the chief of military

 5     police department in the Main Staff.  Is that part the one headed by

 6     Colonel Beara?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I was chief of military

 8     police department which was within the security administration of the

 9     security department -- of the security and intelligence department, and

10     Colonel Beara was the head of the administration.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Is this the document published in the Bosnia-Herzegovina

16     Official Gazette which you referred to?

17        A.   Yes.  The 20th of June.  If you scroll the document down, you

18     will see that it's the 20th of June, 1992.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

20     admitted, please?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

22             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection.  I thought it already was in a

23     different form perhaps, but no objection.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3820, Your Honours.

Page 40925

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   In your report, you state that not just the Muslims and Croats

 3     left the ranks of the JNA but also the Serbs who did not hail from

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  You cite one information.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 65 ter 07855 in

 6     e-court.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Is this the document you cite in your document -- in your report?

 9        A.   I think that there must be another document dated the 4th of May,

10     but this document also discusses the need to -- for the JNA to withdraw

11     from Bosnia-Herzegovina and for a decision to be taken to that effect.  I

12     think that this is a decision issued by the BH Presidency which had yet

13     to be brought in line with the federal level.  At any rate, these

14     documents are unique in terms of the subject matter they deal with.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3821, Your Honours.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

19             MR. NICHOLLS:  Just to note there appears to be a typo on the

20     date of the document.

21             JUDGE KWON:  In English translation, yes.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   You also confirmed that this early relocation of properties meant

25     that they -- or, rather, that they were motivated by the fact that they

Page 40926

 1     wanted to be moved to safer areas.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 65 ter 17766 to that

 3     effect.  This is the cover page.  Can we have the next page.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Is this the document you meant?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   Can you tell us what the document says, please?  You don't have

 8     to read, but can you just summarise for us these five points.

 9        A.   This plan of relocation of units from crisis areas in the area of

10     responsibility of the 5th Corps is something that follows the order

11     issued by the 2nd military district which was headquartered in Sarajevo

12     at the time.  This plan was to set out new garrisons for certain units.

13     It was said that the relocation would be directed by the corps and that

14     the plan of relocation as well as the routes to be taken would be defined

15     in a separate plan.  They were supposed to choose those routes where --

16     which were not under threat from any possible attacks.  International

17     observers are called to come and observe the process of relocation of

18     these units.

19             What this meant simply was a reorganisation of the garrisons and

20     areas the units were supposed to be deployed to.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3822, Your Honours.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40927

 1        Q.   Also, you referred to an incident which happened in

 2     Dobrovoljacka Street.  Actually, it was an event in Dobrovoljacka Street

 3     when a JNA soldier was killed by Mr. Izetbegovic's forces.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to call up 01260,

 5     1D01260.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   On the 7th of May, is that a document that you referred to?  What

 8     is that document about?  Can you tell us about the subtitle and bullet

 9     point 1?

10        A.   This is an analytical document which was issued by the 4th Corps.

11     It lists developments or string of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina during a

12     certain period of time.  The document points to the fact that the

13     situation was constantly aggravated, that the situation in

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina was disastrous, that unfortunately some previous

15     predictions had come true, and that is that the intensity of attacks

16     against the JNA would increase and that the leadership of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina did not care about a peaceful solution of the crisis

18     that had occurred.

19             They were inspired by the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by

20     some state members of the international community, and they would try to

21     create a Bosnia and Herzegovina according to their own will and that they

22     would continue to fight for that.  One of the ways of that struggle would

23     be constant attacks against army units.

24             Dobrovoljacka Street and the attack against Skenderija had one

25     thing in common.  Both attacks were carried out, although a peaceful

Page 40928

 1     withdrawal of the troops had been agreed.  This shows that mistrust

 2     spread and continues to spread even further.  If even the things that had

 3     been agreed cannot be implemented there could be no discussion of any

 4     trust in the future.  All of that shows that the situation was becoming

 5     more and more complicated and that the larger scale conflict was

 6     imminent.  This is an overview of events which was done by the command of

 7     the 4th Corps in Sarajevo.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please read the one sentence but last under

 9     bullet point 2 where it says, "Relocated numerous units, lethal and other

10     MTS to secure areas and locations."  Does it say here who would settle

11     those secure areas?  Was that more important to the JNA than security

12     itself?

13        A.   No.  There is no document which says what those areas were and

14     who was to settle those areas.  I didn't find that in any of the

15     documents.

16             What mattered to the JNA was to preserve and protect both people

17     and equipment.

18        Q.   Can you tell the Trial Chamber where was the 4th Corps deployed?

19        A.   The 4th Corps was deployed in Sarajevo.  It was moved from either

20     Croatia or Slovenia and ended up in Sarajevo.  That's where several units

21     were merged.  Some of its units were moved from the areas of previous

22     combat activities.  However, as far as I can remember, the 4th Corps was

23     in Sarajevo.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

Page 40929

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3823, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   When we're talking about the relocation of units, Mr. Brown also

 4     dedicated a lot of room to that.  Can you please tell us, how did he

 5     interpret the relocation of units, for example, to Prijedor, Sanski Most,

 6     Kotor Varos?  He particularly emphasises Bosnian Krajina, because he

 7     dealt with the 1st Krajina Corps.  How did he interpret that relocation,

 8     and what was your conclusion by contrast?

 9        A.   Mr. Brown spent a lot of time on the relocation of units.  His

10     analysis of the relocation of units led to a conclusion that units were

11     relocated to areas where they would be used against non-Serbs, which

12     certainly wasn't correct.  He mentions those units as being the

13     22nd Light Infantry Brigade Skender Vakuf, the 6th Crna Brigade, the

14     17th Kljuc Brigade, the 43rd Motorised Brigade, the 5th Partisan Brigade

15     Prijedor as well.  After they accomplished their mission in

16     Western Slavonia where they were engaged according to the plan of the

17     then-JNA, i.e., the federal state or the former SFRY, they returned to

18     their peacetime garrisons, and Mr. Brown claims that they were relocated

19     to areas where they would be used against non-Serbs.  All those units

20     were mobilised in those very areas and in those garrisons to which they

21     finally returned.  None of them went to a different area.  We're talking

22     about military conscripts, about people who were from those areas, who

23     were mobilised there, who constituted those units and ones that

24     accomplished their missions, they simply returned to the territories of

25     their respective municipalities.  There is nothing here that was planned

Page 40930

 1     in advance.  They did not arrive in those areas in view of some future

 2     tasks that they would carry out.  The fact is that they were not fully

 3     demobilised, because tensions kept on mounting and the situation was

 4     continued to get more complicated in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Where were the base garrisons of those units?

 6        A.   The base garrison of the 43rd and 45 Kozara Brigade were in

 7     Prijedor; the 6th Light Infantry Brigade was headquartered in

 8     Sanski Most; the 22nd was headquartered in Skender Vakuf.

 9        Q.   Thank you.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at

11     65 ter 017811.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat the number, Mr. Karadzic?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 17811.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Could you please tell us about the contents of this document.

16     What is this document about?  18 March 1992, under bullet point 2 you see

17     a reference being made to the changeover of the 122nd?

18        A.   Yes.  This is a combat report of the command of the 5th Corps of

19     the JNA.  Later on that will become the 1st Corps.  That was sent to the

20     superior command, and it speaks about the regular changeover of units

21     that were deployed in Western Slavonia.  One of them was the

22     122nd Light Infantry Brigade which was replaced by another unit, whereas

23     the former brigade was sent to its base in Skender Vakuf.  When we're

24     talking about this brigade, it also had a battalion which was mobilised

25     in the territory of Kotor Varos municipality.  In other words, its troops

Page 40931

 1     were mobilised in two municipalities plus Celinac.  However, its base

 2     garrison was in Skender Vakuf.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3824, Your Honours.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   General, sir, Mr. Brown also speaks and uses the claim about the

 9     take-over of power in the municipalities in Krajina.  Could you please

10     tell us who was in power in the municipalities in Krajina before

11     conflicts broke out?

12        A.   The first multi-party elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

13     resulted in the setting up of power based on the election results.  The

14     election results brought into power three ethnically based parties:  The

15     Serbian Democratic Party, the Croatian Democratic Union, and the Party of

16     Democratic Action.  Where the -- one ethnic group prevailed, that ethnic

17     group had a majority in the assembly, and they set up civilian

18     authorities.  There was such municipalities where coalition agreements

19     were signed so power was shared -- or, rather, participation in power was

20     in reciprocity with the result by the three ethnically based parties, and

21     there was also a fourth option, the alliance of reform force.

22             In Kotor Varos, for example, the president of the municipality

23     was a Croat, the president of the assembly was a Serb, and the rest of

24     the officials belonged to all the other parties.  In any case, power was

25     held by those who won that power in the election.  So we can't talk about

Page 40932

 1     any take-over of power because there were multi-party elections and

 2     powers were given to the parties that won in the elections.

 3        Q.   When it comes to the breakout of conflicts, did the authorities

 4     change or was the authority uninterrupted?

 5        A.   There were attempts at places to rearrange the majority in the

 6     assembly.  However, there was a continuity of power during that period of

 7     time.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And when we're talking about minor incidents --

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at P03662.  It's a

10     Prosecutor's document, 03662.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   What were the daily losses as a result of minor incidents, and

13     how many daily losses are acceptable in a minor incident?  Can there be

14     casualties after such minor incidents?  Would that be acceptable?

15        A.   Obviously it is not acceptable to have an armed conflict or an

16     armed incident.  If we use the term "incident," we can only imply a

17     little argument, a skirmish, a verbal conflict, some minor arguments in

18     any case.  However, the use of weapons which results in a loss of life

19     cannot be seen as a sporadic incident.  Every single human life is too

20     valuable to be seen as the result of a minor incidents, especially if

21     it's not expected.  It is expected that there will be casualties in

22     fighting, in an armed conflict.  However, deep in the depth of the

23     territory which is not affected by armed conflicts incidents with the

24     loss of human life are unacceptable.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at page 7 where it says "Losses."  You

Page 40933

 1     are familiar with the structure of combat reports.  Actually, it's on

 2     page 3, bullet point 7.

 3             "Losses," bullet point 7.  Could you comment upon bullet point 7

 4     which speaks of casualties on the 30th and the 31st of May, 1992.  How

 5     many losses were there?

 6        A.   Those events happened in Prijedor.  At that time, Muslim forces

 7     organised themselves and attacked the town of Prijedor itself and all the

 8     institutions of power.  They attacked the assembly building, the police

 9     station, the garrison.  They entered the very centre of Prijedor and as

10     we can see in this report, the 343rd Motorised Brigade alone had 11

11     members killed and 16 wounded.  As far as I can remember, that was not

12     the final outcome.  The final casualty number was higher.

13             These are major losses.  Therefore, one cannot call this event a

14     sporadic or a minor incident.

15        Q.   A while ago you said that all of this was happening deep into the

16     territory behind the lines which should not have been a war zone.  Can

17     you tell me how far was the front line -- was from the place where these

18     incidents took -- took place?  They were several hundred kilometres to

19     the north or to the south, for example.

20        A.   The initial conflicts and the first actions would create a

21     situation in which certain areas were organised in such a manner that one

22     might say these are the Serb areas, these are the Muslim areas, or as I

23     called them today, Bosniak and these are the Croat ethnic areas.  So in

24     the spring of 1992, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was established an

25     exceptionally long front line of forces positioned along such a line.

Page 40934

 1     Later on it would become a proper front line that would coincide with the

 2     boundaries delineating majority ethnic communities.

 3             Now, as for -- as far as the distance between Prijedor and the

 4     area controlled by the Muslim forces in Cazin Krajina, if you take the

 5     shortest route was between 70 or 80 kilometres.  In other words, those

 6     were the closest Muslim positions to Prijedor.  The next ones would be

 7     the positions facing Livno occupied by the Croatian forces and they were

 8     even further than the previous ones.  So there is no proximity between

 9     the positions where combat activity was taking place and the town of

10     Prijedor itself.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  You also focused your attention on what

12     Mr. Brown said about the relationship between our authorities and

13     military commands or their attitude toward minorities and individuals who

14     committed crimes against minority people.

15             Based on the same documents, what was your conclusion with regard

16     to the attitude of the 1st Krajina Corps, and were they open to

17     co-operation with international organisations, and did they co-operate in

18     preventing further conflicts?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer, General.  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  The witness may be able to break that down and

21     answer it, but there's a huge amount of concepts in that question.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  It's better to break down your questions.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   How did Mr. Brown characterise the position of the

25     1st Krajina Corps with regard to the perpetrators and crimes committed

Page 40935

 1     against minorities?

 2        A.   In his report, Mr. Brown alleges that the corps was aware or had

 3     reason to be aware that crimes were being committed against non-Serbs in

 4     the area the corps and that it did not do enough to prevent that.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  What was your conclusion?  But before that, sorry,

 6     did Mr. Brown find any proof apart from the passivity that the

 7     1st Krajina Corps issued active orders for crimes to be committed?

 8        A.   He didn't find a single paragraph in a single document that would

 9     speak about corps actively insentivising the commission of crimes against

10     non-Serbs.  What he failed to do, or at least did not include in his

11     report, even though he even made references to this particular paragraph,

12     was that he ignored the efforts and the continuity of orders demanding

13     measures to be taken explicitly for non-Serbs to be afforded protection,

14     their lives and their property.  There is a series of documents that

15     speck in favour of that.  However, one cannot dispute that incidents did

16     happen but an analysis based on the facts show that was not an official

17     policy pursued by the corps command and that the command and the corps

18     made every effort to pre-empt such behaviour and if they happened to

19     punish the -- the offenders.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can would please have 65 ter 024 --

21             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  04201.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Now, what was the effect of the behaviour --

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic please repeat the question.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.

Page 40936

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   While we're waiting for the document to appear, can you tell us

 3     how the existence of armed forces, non-Serb armed forces that even

 4     Mr. Brown recognised in our territory, did they have any effect?  Did

 5     they prove any threat to our population?

 6        A.   Most definitely.  According to the rules of combat engagement of

 7     units, any appearance of hostile armed formations deep behind the lines,

 8     and that is to say behind the bulk of the forces deployed somewhere on a

 9     distant front line requires an action per se.  There is no doubt that

10     this presence instills fear and anxiety among the population, and they're

11     even compelled to move out, to relocate, and, quite simply, to leave.

12             In the theory of warfare, that is qualified as rear combat of the

13     enemy if you speak from the point of view of one side and on the other

14     side perceive -- perceives this as a combat with enemy forces that

15     penetrated their territory deep behind the lines.

16             Now, the policy is to neutralise such forces whether by

17     destroying them or capturing them or forcing them to lay down their arms.

18     At any rate, this is a question that is of the highest priority in terms

19     of findings a solution, because it poses a danger that can entail serious

20     consequences.  It is important to say that there is something that can

21     additionally make the situation more complex, and that is to say that

22     even back in 1991 and in early 1992, JNA units were far away in Croatia

23     while at the same time the Muslim and Croatia forces were establishing

24     their paramilitary formations.  That in itself caused anxiety and

25     uncertainty.  The 400 -- the 243rd Brigade would embark on opening a

Page 40937

 1     corridor which is 200 kilometres from Prijedor, and they will end up at

 2     the Gradacac front line.  Throughout this whole period deep inside the

 3     territory and near their homes, the Muslim formations remained there in

 4     Kozara and elsewhere, and posed constant danger.  And they were involved,

 5     according to Mr. Brown, to minor actions.  Now, this is the whole complex

 6     issue of uncertainty and fear that were caused by the general situation

 7     and atmosphere of what was happening in the Bosnian Krajina.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  This document that you refer to in footnote 22, what

 9     was the order in this document issued by the Main Staff and then

10     forwarded by the corps command?  You don't need to read it all.  Just

11     tell us what it pertains to.

12        A.   This is a report issued by the organ for morale of the 1st Corps

13     and it reiterates the previous documents that were adopted, and they

14     underline again that no revenge should be taken against the population

15     whoever they are, that there must not be any looting or burning.  At the

16     same time, it says that all areas and all events should be given

17     unlimited access to the media outlets, international organisations, and

18     representatives of the international community so that they can have an

19     unhindered insight into what was happening in the area.  There were

20     already UN observers, representatives of UNPROFOR in the area already,

21     and it was emphasised that all of them must have an unhindered access to

22     all the areas and to cover all the events that they wished to do.

23        Q.   What was the importance and significance given to this document

24     by Mr. Brown in his expert report?

25        A.   He did cite this report, but he, in my opinion, did not perceive

Page 40938

 1     it in a proper way.  He said that even though there were efforts through

 2     certain documents to draw attention to the looting and other wrong-doings

 3     targeting non-Serbs, he says that we are not sure that the 1st Corps

 4     followed it to the letter and that their intentions to really prevent

 5     that were not honest and that they were disingenuous in that.  I think

 6     that the document says quite the contrary.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted into evidence.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3825, Your Honours.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Mr. Brown made reference to the case of Vecici, a Muslim

12     settlement of the in Kotor Varos.  Apart from that location, were there

13     any areas where Muslims were concentrated in Kotor Varos?  How were they

14     being treated, and did Mr. Brown take into account the general picture

15     about this municipality?

16        A.   Vecici is an enclave, and that is where conflicts in Kotor Varos

17     happened, because they did not happen in Vecici alone.  We said that

18     Kotor Varos was a municipality where there was power sharing between the

19     three ethnic communities:  For example, the TO commander at the time was

20     a Muslim; I said that a Croat was the president of the municipality; the

21     president of the assembly was Serb, and so on.

22             Kotor Varos municipality was one of the municipalities that was

23     an ethnically mixed municipality, and there were all kinds of ethnically

24     based settlement.

25             In addition to Vecici, another large place was Vrbanjci.  It's a

Page 40939

 1     big place populated by Muslims.  Then we have Hadrovci, then the villages

 2     on the left bank of the Vrbanja River.  There were also Croat villages

 3     there as well like Bilice.  At the very beginning, in June 1992, all

 4     these villages surrendered their weapons by first disarming their

 5     illegally an armed compatriots and they lived in peace with the Serbs

 6     until the end of 1992 when the majority of them decided to the leave the

 7     area.  A typical example were the villages of Siprage and Krusevo Brdo.

 8     Those were the places where several thousand Muslims along with Serbs did

 9     not even turn in their weapons.  They were not confiscated, but they

10     crossed over the Vlasic plateau, which means that they were not under any

11     special measures of observing, and they were not subject to any actions.

12             What is typical of Kotor Varos municipality is that some very

13     unpleasant, rough, and difficult events took place.  When negotiations

14     started about a peaceful resolution for Kotor Varos, the chief of police

15     from the Banja Luka CJB and the chief of security of the 1st Corps were

16     killed on their way back.  These two had almost reached a solution, but

17     they were killed on their way back.

18             Then there was an attack and the killing of Serb civilians in

19     Sardari village.  Then there was the killing of conscripts who were seen

20     off to join the army on the 17th of August.

21             Now, we have a whole series of events that simply caused the army

22     to resolve that.  There was only one problem relating to Vecici, and that

23     was that the people who had weapons ought to surrender them and then

24     leave the area.  Some would stay, some would go of their own accord.

25             Now, they refused to surrender their weapons, and I believe that

Page 40940

 1     the basic security standard would have been to have them disarmed and

 2     that no one could have allowed them to leave and carry their weapons with

 3     them.  Quite simply, disarming is a basic prerequisite for any disarming

 4     and any such actions, and as a result, a lot of conflicts took place in

 5     which many residents of Vecici perished.

 6        Q.   Did Mr. Brown observe that out of all the many Muslim and Croat

 7     villages it was only the village of Vecici that clashed and suffered as

 8     many victims?

 9        A.   Well, I did say that Mr. Brown analysed this particular locality

10     only, and this incident involving Vecici where there were quite a few

11     casualties is presented without an analysis of the run-up to this

12     incident and what were the preceding developments which led to the

13     conflict where they actually perished.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see the time, Excellencies.

15     Would this be the time for the break.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll have a break for 30 minutes and resume

17     at 2 past 11.00.

18                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, can you tell us how did Mr. Brown illustrate the

23     level information that the JNA and later the 1st Krajina Corps had about

24     the pressure put upon the non-Serb civilian population and their

25     expulsion?

Page 40941

 1        A.   In his report, Mr. Brown arrives at the conclusion that the JNA

 2     was informed and was therefore aware of the fact that in the AOR of the

 3     1st Krajina Corps there was forcible expulsion of non-Serb inhabitants in

 4     the area going on.  He states that the 1st Corps and the JNA in general

 5     were aware of these developments within the area of responsibility of the

 6     corps.  He then went on to state that not enough or nothing was done to

 7     prevent this forcible resettlement or displacement of the population.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  What is your conclusion that you arrived at on the

 9     basis of the same documents that Mr. Brown reviewed?

10        A.   In the early months of the spring, that's to say at the start of

11     the year, we have already the first documents and reports from the

12     1st Corps and therefore the army which indicate that tension is on the

13     rise and that people started moving out already due to the fact that

14     these tensions might have led to escalations and this definitely caused a

15     feeling of general insecurity among the people.  Thus the JNA, primarily

16     the 1st Corps, issued instructions in the form of orders, instructions,

17     et cetera, to their troops that they should protect the entire

18     population.  In all the documents without fail they say that protection

19     should be afforded regardless of their ethnic, religious, or any other

20     affiliation, and that efforts should be made to ease the pressure that

21     was brought to bear on the population in terms of their forcible transfer

22     and that their property should be protected.

23             This is the sort of documentation that Mr. Brown had at his

24     disposal and did cite, but his conclusions were of the kind that you

25     described earlier on.

Page 40942

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown

 3     65 ter 08227.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   You took in document into consideration, and you cited it under

 6     footnote 28.  Can you tell us what the 5th Corps command ordered in this

 7     document?

 8        A.   The document addresses the relations with observers, that's to

 9     say the UN mission, as well as with the incidents of possible misuse of

10     UN insignia in the area.  The document goes on to strictly prohibit any

11     sort of abuse or misuse of the sort, as well as to regulate the

12     co-operation between these various bodies with a view to protecting the

13     population from forcible transfers.  It even goes so far as to regulate

14     the exchanges of the fatalities of those killed in combat.  It also

15     precisely defines the facts that the convoys used to this effect can only

16     be stopped for identification checks and for no other reason.  It's a

17     document which orders in no uncertain terms that the population should be

18     treated positively, as well as the international forces, and regulates

19     that the mortal remains of those killed in clashes should be dealt with

20     proper decorum.

21        Q.   It's a JNA document.  4 April is the date.  It was signed by

22     Major-General Momir Talic.  Was this sort of practice changed when the

23     1st Krajina Corps was set up?

24        A.   No.  It did not change.  All the documents that were produced

25     subsequently follow the same lines in regulating the treatment of the

Page 40943

 1     civilian population and units, international units.

 2        Q.   Now, how did Mr. Brown characterise or qualify this document?

 3        A.   This document, as well as most of the other documents that

 4     Mr. Brown reviewed, were cited in his report.  However, they were not

 5     given the necessary significance.  In other words, in his view the corps

 6     and the army units did issue these orders, but he was not fully certain

 7     that they intended them to be fully applied.  He took isolated events and

 8     crimes again the non-Serbs and placed them before the systemic decisions

 9     and orders, according them more importance and concluding that this was

10     essentially insufficient, superficial, and was introduced merely so that

11     it may serve as a screen.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can had been admitted?

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3826, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, sir, what sort of weight did Mr. Brown give to the

17     extremist outbursts that took place in certain circumstances, the

18     extremist positions, and did he go on to analyse whether these extremist

19     views were at all incorporated in the documents issued by the Krajina

20     government as well as the Republika Srpska Assembly?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Before --

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Before you answer the question, General.

24             Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

25             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, no objection.  I just wonder if this

Page 40944

 1     time -- I haven't been asking for cites, but if I could ask for a cite

 2     because I don't know exactly what Mr. Karadzic is referring to in

 3     Mr. Brown's report.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me find it.  It's the portion

 6     where he states that certain individuals made such and such statements.

 7     As soon as I find it, I'll cite it.  I thought that it was clear.  When I

 8     find it, I'll let you know the reference.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Did you observe the attitude that Mr. Brown had vis-a-vis these

11     various statements that could be found in the document?

12        A.   Yes.  When analysing the course of meetings and sessions and

13     reviewing the minutes, Mr. Brown discerns in them the interventions given

14     by individuals which speak from positions which we could characterise as

15     unacceptable or extremist, extremist in their demands.  He translates

16     them into a general position by the Assembly, Presidency, or the

17     government.  He presents it in his report as part and parcel of the

18     official policy and as the official position of the organ in question or

19     the Serbian authorities.

20             Following the course of his argument vis-a-vis these documents, I

21     reviewed them but was unable to find that these extremist positions

22     expressed by individuals were in fact translated into official documents

23     such as decisions, instructions, or any other sort of document.  These

24     positions were expressed, undoubtedly, but they were not something that

25     resulted in an official position taken along that same line.

Page 40945

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

 3             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, again no objection.  Is Mr. Karadzic

 4     referring to the 16th Assembly session?  Is that what we're talking

 5     about?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic?

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That too.  However, Mr. Brown

 8     mentions isolated extremist positions stated by ARK officials.  These

 9     were statements made orally, but he does not go to prove that they were

10     in fact incorporated into the official policy.  Of course, both these

11     statements and the documents are something that we need to take into

12     consideration.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   How did Mr. Brown understand the reasons behind the aspirations

15     on the part of the Muslims and Croats to move out, and were there any

16     cases where Serbs were resettling?

17        A.   Muslims and Croats moved out and Mr. Brown treats this in his

18     findings as forcible departure.  In some paragraph he also refers to that

19     as ethnic cleansing, which was done under the pressure put on them to

20     bear by the Serbian authorities and that that was the key and main reason

21     why the population decided to move out.

22             What is really significant and what I deem to be significant is

23     the fact that the population mostly moved out because of the fact that in

24     the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a conflict had started, a war

25     had started, that there was a state of insecurity that reigned, and

Page 40946

 1     everybody tried to leave the area if they at all could do that, all with

 2     a view for saving their lives and the lives of their families as well as

 3     their property.  The overall conditions were the key reasons for people

 4     moving out.

 5             Why do I consider this to be the fact?  Because a large number of

 6     Serbs move out from the municipalities in Western Krajina.  Militarily

 7     able-bodied men stayed behind because they had been mobilised, and they

 8     were subject to other laws and responsibilities.  However, those who

 9     could and who had somewhere to go moved their families out.  It was not

10     just the non-Serbs who moved out from Krajina.  Everybody moved if they

11     had somewhere to go.

12             The second reason was the economic reason.  For several months,

13     Krajina was completely blocked.  It didn't have electricity, food, or

14     medicines.  Our newborn children were dying in hospitals.  So whoever

15     could leave the area wished to go, wished to leave, and that was the key

16     motive of their departure and not somebody's official policy which put

17     pressure on somebody in order to make them leave the area.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now I would like to call up

20     65 ter 00416.  For Mr. Nicholls and the other participants in these

21     proceedings, in paragraph 20 of this report, paragraph 2139 from

22     Mr. Brown's report is cited, where it says this is compounded by the

23     public appearances of some leaders of Bosnian Krajina who sent messages

24     over the media advocating the departure of non-Serbs, and so on and so

25     forth.

Page 40947

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, sir, could you please tell us why this document or this

 3     instruction is important.

 4        A.   This is a report by the command of the 1st Corps.  We can see

 5     that it bears the day 28 July 1992.  At the time, combat activities were

 6     undergoing, and this shows that at that time, far behind the lines of the

 7     troops on the front line there were organised Muslim and Croat forces

 8     which were either preparing to carry out activities or were already

 9     carrying out activities against the territory behind the lines.  At the

10     same time, groups were infiltrated from some other areas, and those areas

11     were under the control of Muslim and Croat forces.  Those were sabotage

12     and terrorist groups and units.  For example, in the Kotor Varos sector,

13     we had a group that infiltrated from Dobratic in Jajce.  It was a very

14     strong group of fighters which was the first Croatian battalion in

15     Kotor Varos.  Their goal was to reinforce the forces that were already in

16     the area, linking up with them.

17             This clearly demonstrates that the situation was not stable.  It

18     was a neuralgic area where there were still forces very active behind the

19     lines of the main corps forces much deeper into the area behind the lines

20     of combat.

21        Q.   Can you tell us tell us something about paragraph 3?  What did

22     the command observe, and what did they report to the Main Staff about?

23        A.   In addition to the activities of extreme groups it is observed

24     that a number of requests for the resettlement of Muslim and Croatian

25     inhabitants were on the rise.  This is an ongoing process, and again the

Page 40948

 1     main reason were all those activities and the possibility of future

 2     conflicts.  All that motivated the population to leave the area.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation]  Can this be admitted?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3827, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Is this document cited in one of the footnotes of

 8     his report, Mr. Karadzic?

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies.  It is in

10     footnote 32.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If a bar table motion would be

13     acceptable for documents that were used by General Keserovic, it would

14     allow me to finish much sooner.  I don't know what the position of the

15     Chamber would be on that.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I think the Chamber's position is consistent

17     throughout.  Consult with Mr. Robinson.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We consulted about that, but

19     I told him we couldn't be guaranteed that any of these documents would be

20     admitted through the bar table.

21                           [Trial Chamber confers]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to call up

24     65 ter 05074.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40949

 1        Q.   Just a while ago we spoke about the extreme position which were

 2     expressed by the media.  Let us see what you observed, what kind of an

 3     official document you came across.

 4             Can you tell us something about this document?  What is it?  It

 5     was issued on the 29 May 1992.  It was issued by the Crisis Staff of the

 6     AR Krajina.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the document be zoomed in a

 8     little, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a decision -- or, rather, a

10     conclusion issued by the Crisis Staff of the ARK.  The document regulates

11     certain issues which arose from the overall situation.  Some appointments

12     are made, and pecuniary sums are determined.  I believe that the document

13     should be moved, because the second part of the conclusion concerns

14     more --

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Can we go to the following page where we see the conclusions of

17     the 29 May session.  Now we can see it, yes.

18             We missed bullet point 1.  However, can you tell us about the

19     Crisis Staff?

20        A.   Yes.  The position of the Crisis Staff was that people who wanted

21     to move out should be allowed to do so.  In other words, that the

22     resettlement of the population should be allowed.  Those who wanted to

23     leave should be allowed to do so when they express a desire to do that

24     and when creations were created to do that, when they have received an

25     approval by the local communes and when their resettlement was organised.

Page 40950

 1             I believe that under bullet point 1, if that is the document that

 2     I have in mind, the same -- is says that the same should be allowed to

 3     the Serbs who live in the areas under Muslim or Croat control, that there

 4     should be a reciprocity in those matters.

 5        Q.   Yes, you have bullet point 1 before you, and for the participants

 6     in Mr. -- or, rather, in General Keserovic's report on page 38 there is a

 7     translation of this document in e-court.  Unfortunately, we only have the

 8     Serbian version.  On page 38 you will find the English translation of

 9     this document.

10             Yes, this is the bullet point.

11        A.   Yes.  This would be an organised exchange of the population.

12        Q.   How would you call resettlement within the same state or within

13     the same municipality or within the same entity?  Could that be seen as

14     ethnic cleansing?

15        A.   When it happens within the same municipality or within the same

16     entity or within the same state, resettlement can be carried out.  It's

17     even an obligation.  It was an obligation on the previous laws.  The

18     population from war struck --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  I will withdraw it, Your Honour.  I was thinking

21     these legal conclusions that he was making are a bit beyond the scope,

22     but I'll leave it.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Can we go to the following page, paragraph 3.  The Crisis Staff

Page 40951

 1     also decided what?  Paragraph 2.

 2        A.   Yes.  This shows the continuity of official positions of the

 3     authorities to decisively counter the attempts of forcible resettlement

 4     of the population under duress and that this should be prevented by all

 5     means.  This is just one in a series of documents that treats what was a

 6     very crucial and sensitive issue at the time.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  What gained prevalence in Mr. Brown's report, the

 8     official document or the unofficial statements by unknown people?

 9        A.   Those individual statements prevailed over the official act, and

10     they were used as his grounds for conclusion that forcible resettlement

11     was part of the official policy.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll mark it for identification pending

15     English translation.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3828.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  I'm sure it is translated, Your Honour.  I

18     recognise these documents.  I'm looking for the translations with

19     Mr. Reid.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it was translated in the report as well in

21     part.  Thank you.  Shall we continue.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   How did Mr. Brown establish what the position of the

25     1st Krajina Corps was towards extreme behaviours?  Was it lenient?  Did

Page 40952

 1     the 1st Krajina Corps turn a blind eye to the behaviour of extremists or

 2     any kind of extremist behaviour?

 3        A.   Mr. Brown mentions documents issued by the 1st Corps which treat

 4     the issue of the corps' attitude towards crime or criminal activities

 5     against non-Serbs.  However, just like in the rest of his report, he

 6     considers this not to be sufficient enough.  He considered this to be

 7     superficial, and he expresses his doubts about the serious implementation

 8     of such decisions even where there are imperatives, demands referred to

 9     as terms at all costs, in every possible way.  He doesn't find enough

10     reason to deem this to be positive activities on the part of the command

11     of the 1st Corps.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you now comment upon his paragraph 2147 where he

13     says in document dated on the 14th of June that Muslims and Croats are

14     persecuted from Krajina into Central Bosnia but that failed due to

15     difficulties in transportation and the -- and resistance on their part to

16     leave their residence?  How did he understand that resistance when

17     unarmed civilian population could put up resistance?

18        A.   The result of that activity, and that was that the activity

19     failed because the civilian population did not want to leave their places

20     of residence, demonstrates that that was not a forcible activity.  In

21     other words, that they had a choice and that it was up to them to decide

22     whether they wanted to or whether they didn't want to go to

23     Central Bosnia.  If that had been done by force, then the civilian

24     population would not have been in a position to put up any resistance to

25     either the police or the military that wished to expel them.  Therefore,

Page 40953

 1     this points to the fact that some of those cases demonstrated that the

 2     population decided differently and that they were allowed to stay.  As

 3     far as I can remember, it says in these paragraphs that they would still

 4     be guaranteed full protection.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown

 7     65 ter 09415.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   Let us see what the imperative position was of the

10     1st Krajina Corps.  You yourself mentioned those imperatives and those

11     imperative elements in your answer.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid I misspoke.  The number

13     is 09415.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Footnote 37.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.  ERN number 00949869.  Oh, I'm

16     sorry.  But if we cannot have it --

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In that case, can we please have

19     the next, but it says here that attached here with is the order of the

20     commander of the 1st Krajina Corps.

21             Now, can we move to page 3.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Is this a list of all the brigades and subordinate units that

24     received this information, or is any unit missing from the list?

25        A.   I would say that all the units are listed here.

Page 40954

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have page 17.  "Moral and psychological

 2     preparations."  Can you tell us what the first four lines are about?  Was

 3     there any work done with the army?

 4        A.   Yes.  You can see here a list of activities.  Each task and each

 5     activity is accompanied by numerous preparations, be it material,

 6     professional, and also and moral and psychological preparations.  The

 7     troops are being made aware here about the significance of the task,

 8     about all the potential dangers and surprises that might occur.  They are

 9     invited to carry out their tasks in a conscientious manner, and the

10     commanders are asked to control both the units and their respective

11     zones, to monitor the conduct of their troops, and to react to any

12     contact contrary to the regulations and to what is expected and to send

13     regular reports in that respect.  So this is a whole series of

14     preparations, and this kind of psychological preparations always preceded

15     any serious task carried out by the army.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Can we look at the last page which is item 11.  What

17     does item 11 say?

18        A.   Item 11 reiterates in the most stringent way any mistreatment of

19     population and requests the treatment of prisoners in accordance with the

20     spirit of the Geneva Conventions.  This is an official position of the

21     corps commander, and this is one of the documents in which this is being

22     emphasised and ordered for the umpteenth time.

23        Q.   Did Mr. Brown afford proper evaluation and value to this document

24     in his report?

25        A.   Well, the role of the 1st Corps and the 1st Corps command in the

Page 40955

 1     process of providing protection to the civilian population was not

 2     properly evaluated.  It seems to me that all the effort that they made to

 3     provide protection to everybody, all populations regardless of their

 4     ethnicity and were not given a prominent place in Mr. Brown's report.

 5             I repeat that he gave priority to incidents and criminal offences

 6     that undoubtedly did happen, but that was not prevalent conduct and they

 7     had never been encouraged or ordered by anyone, and if they happened,

 8     they always ended up by discovering the perpetrators and prosecuting them

 9     or applying appropriate measures against them.  Nevertheless, he laid

10     emphasis and stress on this kind of incidents even though there was a

11     huge number of documents that clearly show how much effort was made by

12     the corps in their area and during the difficulty time.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3829, Your Honours.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   General, was the army involved in preventing inter-ethnic

17     conflicts, and did that have a negative effect on the combat readiness of

18     the corps and its units?  Was that something that Mr. Brown noticed, that

19     certain elements were allocated to prevent such conflicts?

20        A.   Throughout the whole period and especially 1992, elements of

21     units and even entire units were involved in the activities in the

22     internal area surrounded by front lines.  They established organs and

23     regimens and situations that would provide protection for the population

24     living in the area.  If some of the elements from the operational units

25     were allocated to carry out activities in the rear -- weakened their

Page 40956

 1     combat activity and every other capacity on the front line.  However,

 2     that was a solution that could not have been avoided and it was not

 3     prompted by unjustified reasons or by something beyond that.  The sole

 4     purpose was to make the area more peaceful and safer.  After all, the

 5     people everywhere, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina, felt safer if they

 6     had army units deployed in certain areas.  They would even ask for units

 7     not to be sent to the front line or to have them returned from the front

 8     line due to the general feeling of insecurity, and of course if the units

 9     left certain forces in the rear, that was something that weakened them.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have 65 ter 00335, and it

12     has to do with footnote 46.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

14             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection, but the question wasn't responsive

15     to the second half of Mr. Karadzic's question which was whether that was

16     something that Mr. Brown noticed in this topic, i.e., was it included in

17     his report.  I don't know if Mr. Karadzic wanted an answer to that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Keserovic.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Unless I can have a look, I cannot

20     say for sure that he did notice that certain units remained in the zone,

21     but whether he addressed this issue in terms of whether this was

22     something that weakened the units or not, I wouldn't be able to tell you

23     offhand.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Was this document available to him?

Page 40957

 1        A.   Yes, it was.

 2        Q.   Can you please tell us what this is?  The date is the

 3     16th of July, 1992, an order to carry out combat operations; is that

 4     right?

 5        A.   Yes.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Can we now have page 3.  It's page 5 in e-court,

 7     actually.

 8             Can you please look at the last sentence of the first paragraph.

 9     Can you finish it?  Do you see the last sentence on the first paragraph?

10     The decision, item number 4, which starts, "I decided."  Can you read the

11     last sentence, please.

12        A.   Let me find it first.  In the whole area of operations, prevent

13     at any cost -- throughout the war zone prevent at all cost the creation

14     of new spots and an outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict and prevent

15     genocide of whether it's Serbs or non-Serbs and other people because I

16     can't see it clearly.  It's --

17        Q.   Maybe it's Serb and other population?

18        A.   Yes, Serb and other population.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have page 7 in e-court.

20     Second paragraph from the top.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Be prepared to prevent inter-ethnic

22     conflicts in the territory of Skender Vakuf municipality and genocide

23     between the ethnic groups and the entire population.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Only one part is omitted.  Have a portion of the forces, does

Page 40958

 1     that mean that some elements of the forces would be taken out from combat

 2     with the enemy?

 3        A.   Yes.  Those are the forces that were assigned to preventing

 4     inter-ethnic conflicts.  This is a territorial component which involves

 5     the deployment throughout the whole area in order to preempt any

 6     inter-ethnic components.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have page 7 which is page 13

 8     in e-court.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

10        Q.   Can you please look at item 16 which starts, "After the formation

11     of units."  Can you please read the paragraph up to the mention of

12     Geneva Conventions.

13        A.   "... on forming units quickly start strengthening collective

14     spirit and energetically suppress all forms of defeatism, psychopathy,

15     panicking, and other negative manifestations.  During combat operations

16     do everything you can to suppress looting in the villages.  Before each

17     assignment prepare the troops psychologically for their tasks and while

18     they are carrying out their assignment boost their morale, encourage them

19     and inform them through brave acts of individuals in their own and other

20     units in previous battles.  I most strictly forbid mistreatment of the

21     civilian population and captured soldiers must be treated in accordance

22     with the Geneva Conventions."

23        Q.   Thank you, General.  Was this document properly evaluated by

24     Mr. Brown in his report?

25        A.   Not in my opinion.

Page 40959

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this be admitted.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3830, Your Honours.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. Brown addressed the issue of property ownership, flats,

 6     et cetera.  Can you tell us briefly how did he perceive the issue of

 7     tenancy right, ownership, private ownership, and what were his

 8     conclusions in that respect, and were they correct?

 9        A.   In his findings, Mr. Brown made an error of law in terms of the

10     laws that were in force in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, and he put an

11     equation mark between ownership and tenancy rights, which is not the

12     same, far from it.

13             According to the place of work, people were given certain flats

14     and other residences to use, which made them tenants or the holders of

15     tenancy rights.  These flats, however, had their owners which were, let's

16     say, government organs, the army, the police, companies, work

17     organisations.  They were the ones who built those flats and who were

18     their owners.  In order to satisfy certain living standards of their

19     employees, they gave those flats for use.  Once the contractual relations

20     between the users of and the owners of the flats ceased, this flat was

21     allocated to someone else, which means the previous tenant did not have

22     the right of ownership, which is something that Mr. Brown either

23     overlooked or just thought it was one and the same thing.  As a result,

24     in his report he says that upon departure of the Croats and Muslims,

25     their flats were confiscated and given to be used by someone else.

Page 40960

 1             This was simply something that was stemming from the law in force

 2     in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Was there any evidence that there were some unlawful

 4     changes of ownership of immovable properties as a result of war?

 5        A.   The documents that we were able to review, I wasn't able to find

 6     anywhere that anyone's property had been taken away unlawfully.  The

 7     property was placed at the disposal of a certain community, municipality,

 8     or the owner.  And where housing units were concerned, they were given

 9     for use to other vulnerable elements of the population such as refugees.

10     However, when it comes to the change of title deeds there, I did not come

11     across any unlawful activities.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] can we look at 00733, a 65 ter

13     document.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   We have a list of abandoned flats.  What does "DP Proleter" mean

16     or "Vrbanja"?

17        A.   They were companies owning these flats.  What follows below is a

18     list of holders of tenancy rights.  What follows from this is that among

19     those who are on the list of individuals whose flats are vacant, there

20     are Serbs, Muslims, Croats.  So everyone is listed here.  Everyone

21     abandoned or left these flats behind under these circumstances.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   So how are these flats treated?  Who is able to freely dispose of

25     them?  Who is their owner?  Is there management on the part of the

Page 40961

 1     municipality temporary?  Is that a change of title deeds?

 2        A.   No.  The title deeds remain with the companies or with those who

 3     had them built.  However, they were temporarily placed at the disposal of

 4     municipal authorities in order to provide for the vulnerable elements of

 5     the population that we spoke of.

 6        Q.   Let's see what this is about.  On page 2, item 9,

 7     Bahra Drakulovic, two-room apartment currently inhabited by Zdenko Zakan

 8     with permission of DSPP Vrbanja.  In other words, a Croat moved into a

 9     Muslim flat owned by DSPP Vrbanja and it was the SPP Vrbanja that

10     actually handed the flat over to a new tenant.  And is this in keeping

11     with the law?

12        A.   Yes.

13        Q.   Below it reads DP Rad, Hajrudin Fific [phoen], two-room flat

14     sealed.  What does this mean?

15        A.   It means that at this point in time nobody was granted the right

16     to move into the flat.  In other words, the flat would remain vacant

17     until such time as it is assigned to someone according to a priority plan

18     that would be adopted.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted,

20     please?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I note it was referred to in footnote 56 for

22     the record.  Shall we assigned a number.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3831, Your Honours.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40962

 1        Q.   In paragraph 26, you quote paragraph 2154 of Mr. Brown's report

 2     where he states that according to General Talic's documents, the army

 3     accepted the general policy of separation along ethnic lines and ethnic

 4     transfer of population.  It would criticise the civilian authorities on

 5     occasion for the fact that they failed to fully implement this policy at

 6     times, et cetera.

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes we didn't have the

 8     original.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 04202 which

10     is footnote 58 in General Keserovic's report.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   What was your conclusion of the finding contained in

13     paragraph 5214?  Do you have your report with you?  Perhaps the Chamber

14     will allow you to use it.  It's page 54 in your report.  Footnote 58.

15        A.   This is a situation in an area described here.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in both

17     languages with item 3.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Can you take us through this.

20        A.   Taking in consideration this document as a whole and specifically

21     item 3 which details the situation on the ground, we can see that there

22     are considerable forces here which are still active in the area of

23     Kozarac and on the slopes of Mount Kozara.  These forces continue to be

24     active in the area.

25             In Mr. Brown's analysis, he does not give much importance to

Page 40963

 1     this.  He doesn't attach much importance to this.  Much later after the

 2     resolution of the problems that emerged in Prijedor, Kozarac, and the

 3     surrounding locations there is still a presence of forces that have not

 4     been dealt with fully, that are still active in the rear.  These are no

 5     small groups.  We can see that there's a group of 162 soldiers and that's

 6     a significant force which can in the -- make huge problems in the area of

 7     the municipality and town of Kozarac itself if we take into consideration

 8     that both units normally stationed in Prijedor are deployed far away at

 9     the front line at this time.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did you observe the fact that Mr. Brown identifies

11     the position that I advanced about the rights of civilians, freedom of

12     movement, and freedom of residence?

13        A.   Yes.  He does discuss this, but only sporadically and in several

14     parts of the report that you yourself made public, open statements where

15     you emphasised the freedom of movement, where you underlined equal rights

16     for all, where you asked that the population be provided for and that a

17     political resolution of the situation needed to be awaited, which would

18     ultimately come about.

19             Now, these general efforts expressed in a number of documents and

20     statements where you are addressing those who are being the arbiters of

21     peace, who are looting, putting pressure to bear or engaging in unlawful

22     activities, among all these general efforts he only cites this particular

23     one without attaching enough significance to it or analysing it in

24     sufficient details.  He merely expresses this general situation, some

25     sort of general policy where ethnic cleansing was to be taking place,

Page 40964

 1     where people were to be put pressure upon in order to leave the area,

 2     where their property would be taken away.  So he is expressing this

 3     negative attitude vis-a-vis all your efforts, including yourself

 4     personally, in favour of the civilian population.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In footnote 59 you mention some of the documents, two

 6     of which are admitted, and in item 3 there is mention of a rogue groups

 7     that are actually behaving the way they see fit.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted, please?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3832, Your Honours.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown

12     65 ter 04207.  Paragraph 3, which is in the next page.  In English as

13     well, I believe.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   This is the combat report for 2nd August.  The corps is sending

16     it to the Main Staff, and let's see what sort of reports come from the

17     ground.  The looting in the liberated areas continues.  Civilian

18     authority has not managed to take hold, but there is also mention of the

19     Prijedor region here.  Can you tell us what the document says on that

20     score?

21        A.   It says in the region of Prijedor there is no significant enemy

22     activity or presence.  Pressure demands on the part of Muslim and Croats

23     to move out, and their moving out in organised fashion from a general

24     area of Krajina is evermore present, even though some of the emigrants

25     are returning in an organised fashion and getting involved in enemy

Page 40965

 1     forces.

 2        Q.   What does this mean, are fighters coming back or are families

 3     coming back?

 4        A.   Well, I did not include some of these documents in my report.

 5     However, when they left these areas for other territories under Muslim or

 6     Croat control in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or in certain cases they would go to

 7     Croatia or abroad, able bodies persons would come back and join the ranks

 8     of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or the Croatian Defence Council

 9     depending on their affiliation, and they re-surface as our adversaries on

10     the front.

11             I did not include these other reports, but there is a number of

12     them where we are confronted with these same individuals over and over

13     again.  At one point they would move out of the area, and then at some

14     point we would see them again fighting for the enemy side.  In other

15     words, their families would not be coming back, but they would as

16     soldiers and adversaries.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3833, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 00394,

21     65 ter document.  00394.  That should be a different document.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Meanwhile, let me ask you this, General.  In document P05407,

24     there is report of capture of paramilitary formations, and it is said

25     that there is 7.000 of them.  Two names are mentioned, Zarko and

Page 40966

 1     Anto Stanic.  Can you tell us why these two names are being singled out?

 2     Who are they?

 3        A.   Zarko Tole and Anto Stanic were also members of the former army.

 4     They are commanders and organisers of Croatian units.  Among others, they

 5     were taken prisoner in Central Bosnia in combat.  They were senior

 6     officers.  Zarko Tole was lieutenant-colonel at the time.  He was the

 7     commander of a MP battalion in Sarajevo before the war, and that's how I

 8     know him personally.

 9             The unit that I was in command of was charged with providing

10     security for him until his exchange.  In other words, they are the

11     organisers of Croat units in Central Bosnia.

12        Q.   And are they professional officers, capable officers?

13        A.   Yes.  They are graduates of the military academy.

14        Q.   We admitted the one before, and this is a wrong document, so

15     let's move on.

16             General, in paragraph 31, you address Brown's paragraphs 2163 --

17     or, rather, just that one paragraph, which deals with pressure that was

18     being put and with the meetings that were being differently perceived.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 02268.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Here the 1st Corps command, Vukelic, say that they received

22     provisional regulations from the Presidency that were adopted; right?

23        A.   Yes.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.  The

25     next page, please.  Can we have page 4, please.

Page 40967

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, can you tell us what this reads?  What does this mean

 3     that the provisional regulations will be in force as soon as they are

 4     adopted?  Can we have the next page?

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Can we have page 8, interpreter's correction.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Can you tell us -- can you take us through the document?  What is

 8     it that members of the army are going to be bound by, and what is it that

 9     they will have to adhere to in combat?

10        A.   These professional regulations provide that in combat the members

11     of the army would have to adhere to international laws of -- laws of war,

12     that they will have to treat the wounded and captured humanely and

13     protect the population in the combat zone without, of course, singling

14     out anyone in particular from among the population.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3834, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   And now can we look at 65 ter 1D00254.  This is a regular combat

21     report dated 30 March 1993.  Look at bullet point 3, please.  What is the

22     attitude of the commander -- or, rather, the senior officers towards the

23     Muslim population which is frightened?

24        A.   A series of reports, including this one, shows that the

25     commanders and units report on all the events and phenomena observed in

Page 40968

 1     the territory.  They do not omit to say that some irresponsible

 2     individuals committed crimes against Muslim population in some villages.

 3     They report about that.  And later on we will see that they inform the

 4     superiors, and they keep on going back to the requirement to act and to

 5     exclude irresponsible individuals from their ranks in order to prevent

 6     such events.  So there was no intent to cover up any of those incidents,

 7     on the contrary.  Everybody is kept abreast with a view to preventing

 8     such actions.  This shows that there was a positive attitude towards

 9     acting against those who violate the rules of conduct toward the civilian

10     population, i.e., that the civilian population should not be threatened

11     or put pressure upon.

12        Q.   Can we go to the following page in Serbian and can we stay on the

13     same page in English.

14             The first paragraph where it says --

15        A.   "The command of the 1st Krajina Corps intervened by sending a

16     Military Police Platoon which was supposed to protect the population from

17     irresponsible individuals."

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

20             JUDGE KWON:  Probably we need the full translation, Mr. Nicholls?

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  Yes, I would object to it being admitted in this

22     form.

23             JUDGE KWON:  We shall mark it for identification pending full

24     English translation.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI D3835, Your Honours.

Page 40969

 1             JUDGE KWON:  If it is convenient, shall we take a break,

 2     Mr. Karadzic?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We resume at quarter past 1.00.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 1.17 p.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  I take it Judge Lattanzi got a little bored.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  We are sitting for the remainder of today pursuant

10     to Rule 15 bis with Judge Lattanzi being away due to her official duties.

11             Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document that General Keserovic

13     mentions in footnote 35, which was admitted as 3828, D3828 already has a

14     P number, 3461.  Just for the record so that it's clear that the document

15     has been admitted as a P exhibit, and here we have it admitted as a MFI

16     document.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  That number will be assigned for an

18     upcoming exhibit.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I would like to thank

20     you and the Prosecutor for having informed us about this.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, sir, how did Mr. Brown see the instances of looting and

23     what were your conclusions about that and about the attitude of the army

24     and state organs towards looting?

25        A.   It is true that the looting of property did happen and that it

Page 40970

 1     was a common occurrence during armed conflicts.  One of the key elements

 2     in Mr. Brown's findings was the fact that he looked at the activities of

 3     the 1st Corps and the military and concluded that the corps, the

 4     military, and the authorities in general countered looting.  However,

 5     they approved the looting if it was done on behalf of the corps and its

 6     coffers as he himself points out.

 7             Judging from the documents that we analysed, it is clear that the

 8     corps and the military in general, as well as the authorities,

 9     unreservedly demanded and did everything in their power to prevent

10     looting of anybody's property.  There isn't a single paragraph in a

11     single document which points to the fact that the conduct of individuals

12     who were involved in such actions and activities was condoned.  The

13     accompanying documents, i.e., documents that were issued in respect of

14     individuals and groups that looted and plundered were express in their

15     contents.  They contained demands upon all units to fight to the last

16     even at the cost of the use of arms in order to prevent that type of

17     activity which obviously inflicted a lot of harm on everybody.

18        Q.   Thank you.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can we look at

20     65 ter 17877.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Can you tell us something about the title of this document?  It

23     is an order issued by the commander of the 1st Krajina -- or, rather, the

24     5th Corps on the 14th of May, a week before the withdrawal of the JNA.

25        A.   Yes.  This is just one of the documents, one of the orders that

Page 40971

 1     was sent to all units in order to prevent plunder and other crimes that

 2     might be committed by corps members.  This is a strict order as to how

 3     they should behave and what measures they should take against those, as

 4     you can see under paragraph 2, who are involved in criminal activities.

 5             There is a list of those things that need to be done, and the

 6     last stages would be arresting them and putting them on trial and so on

 7     and so forth.

 8        Q.   Can we go to the following page in the Serbian version whereas

 9     the English version can stay on the screen as it is.

10             Look at the first paragraph on the second page.

11        A.   It says here that the most serious methods have to be used

12     against all those.  So this is a set of conclusions or actions which need

13     to be taken against perpetrators of all sorts of criminal activities.

14     Should these persons offer resistance during their arrest or attempt to

15     escape, the toughest physical methods should be applied against them,

16     including the use of firearms.  This is what it says in this document.

17        Q.   Thank you.  And what about paragraph 2(b)?

18        A.   Under 2(b) we can see that this is about preventative activities,

19     that new privates and officers should be vetted before joining the unit

20     in order to prevent potential criminals and those who already have

21     criminal records from joining our units, and those who show propensity

22     towards all sorts of crime, war crime, and who are already in the units,

23     should be removed from those units.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Brown suggests, however, that the looting of

25     property was acceptable as long as rules were honoured and if the goods

Page 40972

 1     were put in the coffers of the VRS to be used for the purposes of the

 2     military and not for the financial gain of, and so on and so forth.  This

 3     is paragraph 2, bullet point 186 in his findings.

 4             Disregarding individuals, could you please tell us about the

 5     measures that Galic and Talic ordered?  Did Mr. Brown offer and point to

 6     a single document in order to prove that corps units were engaged in the

 7     looting of private property for the benefit of the corps coffers as is

 8     suggested in here?

 9        A.   No.  There are no such documents that would prove his point that

10     the looting of property was allowed to anybody.  What Mr. Brown said here

11     or did here, as it were, is this:  He provided an unacceptable

12     interpretation of things that were done with war booty and confused that

13     with the illegal confiscation or looting of property.  He put all those

14     documents at the same level in a way, so when it came to regulating the

15     collection and use of war booty, he thought that that was looting for the

16     purpose of the state and the military.

17        Q.   Here we heard from the minister of defence as to what could be

18     considered as war booty.  Under what conditions could private property be

19     confiscated and considered legitimate war booty even if the property had

20     a known owner?

21        A.   In principle, private property could not be considered war booty.

22     It could be requisitioned.  It could be taken and mobilised as part of a

23     legal procedure and it could be used in combat by the military.  Some

24     movable goods, primarily could be requisitions or temporarily confiscated

25     and given to use to a particular unit.  However, when it comes to private

Page 40973

 1     property or private assets, those could not be considered war booty, at

 2     least not the kind of war booty envisaged by the law.

 3        Q.   Can you look at paragraph (c), and can you read the fifth line

 4     from the top of that paragraph.

 5        A.   The sentence starts with the following words:

 6             "At these meetings, the most prominent officers of the units

 7     appear to explain to the population, regardless of their ethnic

 8     affiliation, the following things:  First, the goals of our struggle;

 9     second, intentions of the enemy; three, the tasks of our army; four, what

10     is expecting from the people who live in the area in which we are

11     fighting; and five, negative occurrences that do moral damage to our

12     struggle.  Such gatherings should be attend by as many of our soldiers as

13     possible while taking care to ensure the security of the soldiers, units,

14     and population."

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, can this document be

16     admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Could you read out the first sentence again, (c).

18     Can we see the previous page in English.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "At those rallies --"

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   No, number one sentence under (c)?

22        A.   "Every time you pass through or stay in a populating area,

23     contact local people through local authorities at public rallies,

24     meetings, events and so on."

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit this.

Page 40974

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3828, Your Honours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

 3     65 ter 17880.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   In your paragraph 33 you cite his paragraph 2.171 where he says

 6     that on the 17th of May, the corps received yet another order in which it

 7     says that they should collect information about soldiers, officers,

 8     looting, and so on and so forth, and the police units and crimes that

 9     those persons committed.

10             What does it say here in the preamble, and I read, "On the basis

11     of requests from units..."  What is it that is requested from units?

12        A.   At the lowest level requests arrive from privates, from

13     combatants, to counter and fight individuals who plunder in the -- the

14     areas of combat activities.  So far we have seen orders that came from

15     the higher echelons of command, and here in this document we can see that

16     individuals are also aware of the dangers that lie in the instances of

17     looting and the damages inflicted thereby on the military and its

18     struggle.  That is why they demand that all that should be placed under

19     control.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have item 10.  I

22     believe it's on the next page in both versions.  No, I'm sorry, that's

23     not it.  Can this document be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3836, Your Honours.

Page 40975

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   It is suggested in Mr. Brown's findings that officers were

 3     discontent having seen that the looted things were confiscated by private

 4     individuals and that they were not happy to see it go to the army

 5     coffers.

 6             Can you tell us what was to be done with the war booty according

 7     to the law, and was it possible for it to end up in the coffers of the

 8     corps and the army?

 9        A.   No, that was not possible.  War booty was supposed to be disposed

10     of by the state.  That is to say the local municipal government, and it

11     was them who disposed of it.  Army units captured or seized war booty,

12     and thereafter they would hand it over to the local communes in a proper

13     procedure, that is to say to the local civilian authorities.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Apart from these orders and threats, did the army

15     undertake any other measures with respect to prosecution of the looters

16     and those who misused the power of firearms in order to amass personal

17     wealth?

18        A.   Yes, it did.  In addition to the orders issued in all these

19     documents, there were other rules and laws that governed these issues.

20     Military police units had certain organisational parts that were involved

21     in suppressing criminal activities, and all offenders, including war

22     profiteers and other crimes were apprehended by them, processed, and

23     after that handed over either to the military courts or to the civilian

24     courts.  Sometimes they launched such operations in co-operation with the

25     civilian police.  So there were systematically implemented measures

Page 40976

 1     against perpetrators of such crimes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness please be shown

 3     document 17866, 65 ter.  In the report it's under footnote 71.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Can you please tell us what is being ordered by this document.

 6     For example, let's start from the third paragraph from the bottom which

 7     stipulates the duties of the military police and then where criminal

 8     reports should be filed, et cetera.

 9        A.   This is a document entitled "Actions against violence, looting,

10     and other forms of unlawful conduct."

11             Now, going from the Supreme Command and the Main Staff of the

12     army issued an order to this effect, and it is concluded that the police,

13     military police, and security organs have a duty to undertake measures in

14     order to uncover such acts and identify the perpetrators, whereas the

15     confiscated and other property, money, and proceeds acquired shall be

16     confiscated against a receipt.  Criminal reports against the perpetrators

17     are to be filed with relevant military prosecutor offices which in war

18     were attached to the command of corps.

19             As for military prosecutor offices attached to the Main Staff of

20     the army, it involves the Military Court in Banja Luka, and it says that

21     it will start operating.

22             So what you can see here is already a kind of organised approach

23     which is paving the way for criminal reports to be filed against

24     perpetrators with the courts that were in the process of emerging and

25     starting to become operational at that point.

Page 40977

 1        Q.   Thank you.  What you said a minute ago, that it is to be handed

 2     over to the state organs, in the prosecutor's document 502.2, that all

 3     the movable property seized during the war shall be handed over by the

 4     VRS to the relevant municipal or republican organs.  Is that what you had

 5     in mind when you said that?

 6        A.   Yes.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted into

 8     evidence?

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3837, Your Honours.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   In paragraph 2181, Mr. Brown discusses a receipt that is issued

13     according to the instruction, and he explains that:

14             "This receipt is viewed in the context of a decision which limits

15     the amount of money that those leaving the territory could take with

16     them, the handing over of housing to the Serb municipal authorities and

17     the signing of documents of deregistration.  It is clear that an

18     organised and systematic process was adopted by which the non-Serbs would

19     not only be removed from their place of residence and be unable to return

20     but by which their property would be taken from them with the intention

21     of it being placed in the Bosnian Serb coffers for use and the funding of

22     the new Bosnian Serb state."

23             Can you first tell us what was it that you find with regard to

24     the limiting of monies that can be taken out of the territory?  How was

25     it regulated by the law then and now?

Page 40978

 1        A.   The laws, or, rather, the fiscal policy of each state with the

 2     exception of between states who are sort of monetary unions, strictly

 3     defined the amount of cash that an individual can take out of the

 4     country.  At the time, this amount was 300 German marks, that is to say

 5     that each individual was allowed to take from the former Yugoslavia or

 6     from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And by this instruction this was only

 7     emphasised once again.  There was no other reason for imposing a limit in

 8     this sense.

 9             Equally, what Mr. Brown failed to evaluate properly, this is to

10     do only with 300 German marks that cannot be shown the origin of.  This

11     is pocket money of an individual.  Regardless of the amount that exceeds

12     this one, if a person has proper documents confirming that it had been

13     purchased from a bank or that it was the proceeds of the sale of

14     property, this person was allowed to take out this amount of money.  The

15     only limitation referred to the money whose origin was not proven.

16        Q.   What is the current situation now?  What are the rules now?

17        A.   Well, the rules are the same, only the amount has been increased

18     slightly.  A person can take out of Bosnia-Herzegovina 5.000 euros and

19     that's maximum.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 17871.  Page 2,

22     because in paragraph 2181, Mr. Brown speaks about the fact that the

23     seized property was stored in the government coffers, including small

24     pieces of furniture.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Can you tell us how these items

Page 40979

 1     from the list could have arrived at the storehouse for war booty -- or,

 2     rather, the storehouse for unlawfully possessed merchandise?

 3        A.   This kind of merchandise, according to the instruction, was most

 4     probably seized from individuals who had previously misappropriated it in

 5     an unlawful way.  Then when they arrived at check-points and searched,

 6     these items were confiscated from them as unlawfully plundered and was

 7     placed in the depots together with war booty, and that is how these items

 8     happened to be there.

 9             Generally speaking, the army following combat was never involved

10     in collecting these kind of items.  The only items they are interested in

11     collecting is weapons and ammunition.

12        Q.   Now, the smuggled merchandise that was the subject of illegal

13     trade, was that also the subject of confiscation and storing in these

14     warehouses?

15        A.   Most definitely, yes.  That was another source of such goods.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3838, Your Honours.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  How about motor vehicles belonging to the enemy.

21     When they are seized, as well as other mobile property in possession of

22     enemy formations, once they're seized are they also considered legitimate

23     war booty?

24        A.   Yes.  All the assets used by enemy during combat, if they stay

25     behind after combat activities are finished constitute war booty.

Page 40980

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can we see document 17872, and this is under footnote

 2     74 of your report.  This document is dated the 11th of May, 1992, issued

 3     by the 30th Partisan Division.  Can you please tell us what is being

 4     ordered by Colonel Tepsic in respect of motor vehicles and other assets?

 5        A.   This constitutes a hierarchical chain of command, that is to say

 6     the assistant for logistics from the corps conveys an order that the

 7     command of the 30th Division transfer part of the war booty to the corps

 8     depot, and he specifies here what is to be transferred and where.  He is

 9     earmarking certain necessary assets that happened to be in the possession

10     of the division.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And what was the attitude and how much attention was

12     devoted by Mr. Brown to such orders and such items, and how does he

13     explain items such parts of refrigerator, women's jackets and things?

14     Did he ever establish how these items ended up in the war booty

15     storehouse?

16        A.   Some specific items such as mentioned under number 2, women's

17     jackets and alike, what he did was that without any doubt put it into

18     context and established a link with the civilian population, hence he

19     concluded that this unit, the 30th Division, confiscated these items from

20     non-Serb civilians in their zone of responsibility, which is impossible

21     to infer from any document that was available.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit 3839, Your Honours.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 40981

 1        Q.   Let us briefly look at what the commander of the

 2     30th Partisan Division is ordering or, rather, cautioning, if it is

 3     admitted.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can I have D00576 in e-court.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you please tell us who has issued this warning, and what is

 7     the essence of it?

 8        A.   The commander of the 30th Division, the then-Colonel Galic, is

 9     warning the commanders of subordinate units at all levels to spare no

10     effort to prevent looting, burning, and small private wars being waged in

11     the area of the division, to provide protection for the refugees and the

12     innocent civilians, and the enemy troops who surrendered ought to be

13     treated in conformity with the international law governing the treatment

14     of prisoners.  All the violators of this order shall be subject to the

15     most stringent legal measures, including physical execution.

16             So basically this is a very radical order that he issued to his

17     own unit.

18        Q.   In Mr. Brown's paragraph 2.182, goes on to say that the corps was

19     being reported to by the 6th Krajina Brigade from Sanski Most, that

20     there -- they were having serious problems with individuals involved in

21     smuggling, robbery, and war profiteering, and that they had utilised a

22     large number of cars and trucks which had been confiscated from the

23     Muslims in the area.  That's his footnote 162 [as interpreted].

24             In your document it is footnote 75.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So can we have in e-court

Page 40982

 1     65 ter 05179.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Can you tell us -- say item 5.

 3     Can we have the next page.  This is dated the 6th of December, 1992, and

 4     page 5 -- or, rather, item 5 is on the next page.  And in English on

 5     page 5.

 6             You mentioned the requisitioning of vehicles a moment ago.  Was

 7     the owner entitled to receiving a receipt and an indemnity in case of his

 8     vehicle being requisitioned?

 9        A.   Yes.  The duty to allow one's property to be requisitioned was an

10     obligation just as conscription was.  Holders of property were obliged,

11     if required, to make their property available to the military forces.  In

12     return, they would receive a certificate to that effect, and in the event

13     of the property getting damaged or destroyed, they were entitled to

14     receiving proper compensation.

15        Q.   Very well.  Let's look at item 5, situation on the ground.  What

16     does paragraph 1 say?

17        A.   "In the territory of Sanski Most municipality, the Muslims and

18     Croats are calm and not creating any problems.  They accept all measures

19     undertaken by the authorities.  However, major problems are groups of

20     armed Serbs on the ground who are terrorising Muslims and Croats, looting

21     everything in their way.  There have also been killings, so that some of

22     these groups have been arrested.  There are a lot of cases involving

23     smuggling, appropriation of vehicles, tractors, and so on."

24        Q.   You don't have to read out anything.  Can you just tell us what

25     item 7 applies to and does it contain the reason why vehicles were being

Page 40983

 1     requisitioned?

 2        A.   What is discussed here is the condition in which these vehicles

 3     were.  They were quite worn out by this time, not really in proper order,

 4     and it would be impossible to implement any assignments unless these were

 5     first repaired.  And this was one of the reasons for requisitioning

 6     vehicles.  This was to be done based on the needs and as they arose.

 7     Whenever their own vehicles would be damaged or be simply unserviceable,

 8     others would have to be requisitioned.

 9        Q.   General, in Serb it says:

10             "Freight vehicles and passenger vehicles were taken over from the

11     Muslims."

12             In English it reads that they were confiscated.  Is there a

13     difference between the term "taken over from" and "confiscated"?

14        A.   Yes, "preuzet iz," "to take over from."  Well, this is the

15     legally provided process of hand-over, whereas "confiscation" means

16     oftentimes "forcibly taken."  That's what the word would mean in Serbian.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3840, Your Honours.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

21             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection.  Page 69, line 4, it identifies this

22     document as Ewan Brown's footnote 162.  That's either a typo or a

23     translation error.  It's actually 612, as well as 554.  612 is the one I

24     think Mr. Karadzic was referring to when he began.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.

Page 40984

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I think that I did say

 2     properly, but perhaps I did not.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   General, in chapter 5, item 39, paragraph 39, you address that

 5     part of Mr. Brown's report which deals with the destruction of religious

 6     facilities and the punishment of these incidents.  In your report you

 7     cite D01979 - so it's a Defence exhibit; right? - as well as D01980.

 8     These are documents wherein the 1st Krajina Corps warns, demands, and

 9     prohibits the destruction of religious and cultural buildings.

10             Have you ever established either on the basis of documents or

11     reports or on the basis of anything else that legitimate military forces,

12     regular military forces, allowed such activities or suppressed the fact

13     that they had been done?

14        A.   Nowhere in these documents can one find that the legal forces

15     were engaged in the destruction of these buildings.  There were instances

16     of religious buildings having been destroyed, some through arbitrary

17     conduct on the part of individuals and groups which cannot be in any way

18     linked up with the regular military forces.  There were also cases of

19     abuse of religious buildings for military purposes, either as positions

20     or sites from which fire was opened.  As a result, such buildings became

21     targets of attack.

22             Nowhere did I find that anyone allowed, ordered, or instigated

23     the destruction of religious properties.  There were many documents,

24     however, which highlighted the obligation to protect these same buildings

25     regardless of their religious denomination.

Page 40985

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Did Republika Srpska consider all these buildings to

 2     be part of its heritage?  Did you ever come across a document of mine

 3     where I forbade or ordered that these religious buildings be protected?

 4        A.   Yes.  There is one document of yours providing for the obligation

 5     to protect religious and cultural heritage.  After all, it amounted to

 6     the heritage of the entire Republika Srpska.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  General, sir, can you tell us what Mr. Brown

 8     concluded about the relationship between the 1st Krajina Corps and the

 9     paramilitaries present in its area?  What did you come to conclude about

10     that?

11        A.   There were several examples such as the Wolves of Vucjak

12     detachment and Veljko Ivanovic, the reconnaissance unit or the unit of

13     scouts of Cigo Radanovic, Macko's unit, and similar.

14             His conclusion was that the units' commands and other higher

15     levels up the chain turned a blind eye or had this very reconciliatory

16     attitude toward their unsoldierly, undisciplined, and at times rogue

17     activity.  Cases were cited such as the arrest of a colonel of the army,

18     attack on a police station, and several other events.

19             At this point Mr. Brown concluded his exploration of these

20     relations and found that they were part and parcel of the Bosnian Serb

21     forces, that they were part of the system, and that it was with the

22     knowledge of the higher levels that they committed these misdeeds.

23     However, what can be seen in the documents available is that in all the

24     incidents cited, the perpetrators thereof were being punished and were

25     punished.  They were arrested, prosecute, and measures were taken against

Page 40986

 1     them.

 2             I do not deny the fact that these things happened, that the

 3     colonel, Chief of Staff of a Tactical Group who was involved in this

 4     event was really arrested by that one unit.  However, measures were taken

 5     to bring him to justice.  The same went for the attack against the

 6     Omarska Police Station and so on.  It never happened that officially the

 7     authorities and army commands tolerated such displays of random

 8     behaviour, unsoldierly behaviour, and insubordination.  This was not the

 9     practice and was not the system according to which the VRS worked.

10        Q.   Thank you.  In his paragraph 265, Mr. Brown says that although

11     Talic prohibited those who were involved in these crimes from joining the

12     corps, he says that certain paramilitary units mentioned by the

13     Main Staff were nevertheless incorporated into the corps.  Do you recall

14     and do you know of our order which was admitted in this case prohibiting

15     paramilitary formations from being set up and from being active and from

16     being resubordinated to the army?

17             Was it therefore to bring a paramilitary group into existence in

18     fact a crime?  They could not have joined the ranks of the regular army.

19        A.   For the most part it involved the misdeeds that the

20     paramilitaries did against their own people, the Serbs primarily, against

21     their own units.  Or it was the case of them engaging in unlawful

22     activities within units.  There are no documents indicating that these

23     units had committed certain war crimes for which they were then pardoned

24     and allowed to resume their activity.  They did display random and rogue

25     behaviour at some point.  However, through the orders of corps, they were

Page 40987

 1     deployed as individuals or groups, and they continued serving within army

 2     units.  However, not a single individual in respect of whom there was a

 3     reason of suspicion that he committed a crime or who had been convicted

 4     or prosecuted could continue serving in the army through a decision

 5     issued by the authorities or the army.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown

 7     65 ter 17792.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Nicholls.

 9             MR. NICHOLLS:  Thank you, Your Honours.  Just two things briefly.

10     If Mr. Karadzic could give me the reference he cited at page 73, line 20,

11     "An order preventing paramilitaries from being resubordinated to the

12     people," it says.  And secondly, at page 73 at the top, the witness

13     answered, "What can be seen in the documents available is that in all the

14     incidents cited, the perpetrators were punished," et cetera.  I don't

15     know if Mr. Karadzic wants to tell us what documents we can find that in,

16     or in each cases, in every incidence there was a prosecution.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that and now we're

18     going to show a document, my document which placed a ban on the setting

19     up and existence and activities of paramilitary formations.  I ordered

20     that they should be resubordinated and that was issued on the 3rd of

21     June, 1992, and adopted on that date.  However, I cannot give you a

22     reference number.  I can't give you the reference number of the exhibit,

23     but I will be able to do that very soon.

24             I would like to call up --

25             JUDGE KWON:  With respect to the part of witness's answer, we may

Page 40988

 1     ask the witness if he could assist us.  Do you remember your answer cited

 2     by Mr. Nicholls, Mr. Keserovic?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  I remember.  In the findings

 4     there is a citation.  I can't give you the exact page because I don't

 5     know the findings by heart, but I'm sure there is a document which

 6     indicates that measures were taken against Milanovic, Radanovic, against

 7     Romanic.  Those were individuals who had ties to paramilitary structures,

 8     and each of the documents states specifically what measures were ordered

 9     against each of the individuals.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope I'll find this.  However,

11     let me just show another document.  Actually, say for the benefit of

12     Mr. Nicholls that there are two documents:  One is D1933, the other is

13     D1993 [as interpreted], both issued on the 13th of June.  One is a letter

14     to Galic as report on the document, and the other document is the

15     document itself placing a ban.  One is D1933, and the other is D93.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can you please tell us, General, sir, if you can pay attention to

18     bullet point 5 -- or paragraph 5, and can you tell us how that paragraph

19     treats the behaviour of Lieutenant Milanovic?  Number 5.

20        A.   Yes.  It says here due to the incident that happened in

21     327th Motorised Brigade and extreme wilfulness and nonmilitary conduct of

22     Lieutenant Milanovic and Captain Milanovic, investigative proceedings

23     have been undertaken.  This is one of the documents to support what I

24     have just recently stated.

25        Q.   Can you tell us whether the nonmilitary conduct and wilfulness

Page 40989

 1     are breaches of discipline or crimes?

 2        A.   They can be breaches of discipline.  However, extreme wilfulness

 3     and nonmilitary conduct are crimes.  So they don't have to be

 4     misdemeanors at all times.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3841, Your Honour.

 9             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   In paragraph 2.70 in Mr. Brown's analysis, Mr. Brown believes

11     that Milanovic could not stay as an officer in the corps.  That's why I

12     asked you what the sentence depends on.  Is there any gradation in that?

13     What does the severity of punishment depend on?

14        A.   When it comes to Mr. Milanovic personally, at that time, apart

15     from what the unit did and then measures were ordered along the command

16     responsibility lines, while he was serving in the army I -- while he

17     participated in the war, he did not commit any acts for which he would

18     have been deprived of his rank and removed from the army, for which he

19     would have been dishonoured.  It's just a matter of analysis whether it

20     was possible to state that there were misdemeanors that had to be

21     punished in that way.  However, up to that time no foundations were found

22     in the law for his dishonouring and from being removed in the military.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted?

25             JUDGE KWON:  We are talking about what document, Mr. Karadzic?

Page 40990

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We are talking about 1772.  It has

 2     been admitted.  I apologise.

 3             For the participants, I would like to say that the issue of Cigo

 4     and Zolja is dealt in P02855 where a distinction is made between them and

 5     the group of robbers known as Suva Rebra and Skenovi [phoen].

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, sir, in chapter 7 you mention something that Mr. Brown

 8     also dealt with, and that is connection between Pale and the

 9     Autonomous Region of Krajina.

10             In your paragraph 43, you cite Mr. Brown's paragraph 1.113.  In

11     that paragraph he says that members of the ARK Crisis Staff were at times

12     also given access to military and other detection facilities.  He

13     describes, based on an article in "Kozarski Vjesnik" a visit by the

14     president of the Assembly, Mr. Vojo Kupresanin and members of the

15     Crisis Staff to Manjaca camp.  Could you please tell us how Mr. Brown

16     treats that subject matter?  What did he conclude, and what were his

17     conclusions based on?

18        A.   Based on a relatively small number of documents of which one is a

19     newspaper article, Mr. Brown ultimately concludes that the leadership,

20     i.e., representatives of -- or individuals, members of the leadership of

21     the ARK, had access but also that they had influence on the conditions

22     and relationships in the camps or collection centres or investigative

23     centres and that they exerted that immediate influence, i.e., that they

24     could appear there as authorities.

25             What various documents say is the fact that on those two

Page 40991

 1     occasions when individuals did appear in those camps, they went there to

 2     set somebody free from one of the camps, and on one occasion they

 3     escorted a commissary Mr. Mazowiecki, who was the representative of the

 4     international community.

 5             Based on that, nobody can draw a conclusion about their clear

 6     control or influence at that they exerted on the functioning of those

 7     places where people were incarcerated.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And now can the witness be shown

10     65 ter 05578.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   General, sir, during the 1.130 days of war, they made just a

13     one-day visit, or perhaps they visited those place on two or three

14     occasions for just one day.  Would you see that as an influence exerted

15     by ARK bodies on the prisons?

16        A.   No, I wouldn't, especially in view of the fact that Manjaca

17     prison camp was set up --

18             JUDGE KWON:  That's very leading.

19             Yes, Mr. --

20             MR. NICHOLLS:  I've been very restrained today, but talking about

21     1.130 days of war when I think we all agree that Manjaca camp was closed

22     in December 1992, when nobody could have visited it after that is a bit

23     misleading.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.  This is the first

25     omission on my part today.  It was leading, but Batkovic existed

Page 40992

 1     throughout the war as a --

 2             MR. NICHOLLS:  Well, talk about --

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- camp accessible -- very well.  I

 4     shall drop that.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Could you now tell us about the contents of this document which

 7     was issued on the 9th of August, 1992.

 8        A.   This is a regular combat report which speaks about the

 9     infiltration from the territory of the Republic of Croatia of a sabotage

10     terrorist group into the area around Bosanska Gradiska.  It also speaks

11     about activities to fight that group and about the capturing of the group

12     members.  The document shows how the group was recruited and how they

13     were sent across the Sava River in order to fight behind the Serbian

14     lines.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Brown mentions this document in his footnote 186.

16     In paragraph 3 there is a reference to Manjaca.  Can we go to the

17     following page where a reference is made to Mazowiecki's visit, and I

18     suppose Mr. Kupresanin was also there at the time.  It's on the following

19     page.  It says on the previous page that the president of the Assembly of

20     ARK.  Who was the president of the ARK Assembly?

21        A.   It was Mr. Vojo Kupresanin.

22        Q.   It says here that he gave some promises which were not founded.

23     Did you know that Mr. -- okay.  Let me not leading.  On behalf of whom or

24     what did Mr. Kupresanin visit these places and make promises?

25        A.   Mr. Kupresanin at that time could and most often did give

Page 40993

 1     statements on his own behalf if he had power of authority to do that.

 2     However, since Manjaca was under the control of the military, I believe

 3     that he could not do anything serious on his own.  The only thing that I

 4     came across was his link with the central authorities, i.e., the

 5     authorities of Republika Srpska, whereby on one occasion he was

 6     authorised to visit the camp and to order -- or, rather, to convey some

 7     measures with regard to some of the detainees there.

 8        Q.   Do you remember what detainee was in question and what measures

 9     were ordered?

10        A.   I believe that it was your decision that one of the MPs from the

11     assembly from the ranks of the Muslim people had to be released with

12     immediate effect.

13        Q.   Thank you.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

15             MR. NICHOLLS:  Sorry, at page 79, line 25, where Mr. Keserovic --

16     General Keserovic states, "Mr. Kupresanin at that time could and most

17     often did give statements on his own behalf if he had the power of

18     authority to do that."  I just wondered is that from documents or

19     personal observation, because I didn't see it in the documents.  I

20     apologise if I missed it.  In other words, was that as a fact witness?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  The question was on behalf of whom or what did

22     Mr. Kupresanin visit these places and make promises?  What is your basis

23     for your answer, Mr. Keserovic?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the screen we see a document

25     which is a report, and according to that report he was a manager and gave

Page 40994

 1     some statements which were not founded.  I did not come across any

 2     documents on which his authority could be founded, i.e., that he could

 3     give some statements of those kind -- of that kind.  So there is no

 4     document that authorised him to do that.  He could only provide

 5     statements on his own behalf.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D9273.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   I believe that you had access to this document.  Can you tell us

 9     what is this document, and how does it relate to Mr. Kupresanin?

10        A.   This is a record of 26 August, stipulating that an individual

11     called Nedim Biscevic is released from the POW camp Manjaca and he was

12     personally to be taken over by Mr. Vojo Kupresanin.  So this is a

13     document certifying that a person is being released from the prisoner of

14     war camp.  This was preceded by an order of the security chief of the

15     1st Krajina Corps, and I was one of its members at the time and we went

16     there, made this arrangement and this person was eventually released from

17     the camp.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] aS well as the previous.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  65 ter number 05 -- 05578 will be Exhibit D3842,

23     and 1D9273 will be Exhibit D3843.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can we now have

25     65 ter 00406.

Page 40995

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you tell us something about this document?  Take a look at

 3     item 4.  If we can scroll it up a bit, the Serbian version, so that we

 4     can see item 4.  Can you tell us what this is all about?

 5        A.   This is a combat report produced by the 1st Krajina Corps

 6     command.  Under item 4 it is stated that in the area of the AR Krajina

 7     the --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in

 9     Serbian, and we remain on the same page.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Several leaders and members of

11     several parties in the AR of Krajina are clashing more and more with the

12     official government of the SR BH.  A boycott of deputies from the region

13     attending the SR BH Assembly has been announced.  And it has been

14     demanded as an imperative that only Banja Luka can be the seat of the SR

15     BH government."

16             This document as well as some other reports that particularly

17     dealt with the issue of morale demonstrates that at one point the army

18     felt that there was disagreement between the leadership of the ARK and

19     the authorities at the level of the republic.  Given that everything that

20     happens in politics, both good and bad things, reflects on the corps

21     command, they decided to report this to the Main Staff.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Has Mr. Brown noticed this, and did he pay any

23     attention to this?

24        A.   These disagreements were not the subject of Mr. Brown's attention

25     in the sufficient measure.  Now, speaking about relations between the ARK

Page 40996

 1     and the republican authorities, there were some objective circumstances

 2     that caused the communications to be almost completely severed, but there

 3     were also some subjective reasons as well which caused this rift as

 4     stated in the document.  For almost two months the Krajina was cut off

 5     from the remaining part of Republika Srpska, i.e., the authorities in

 6     Pale, including telephone lines, and there was no corridor as well.  So

 7     it was difficult to communicate with them.  Similarly, the leadership of

 8     the ARK had their own vision, had their own ideas, but they not always

 9     coincided with the ideas of the central authorities and what the

10     leadership in Pale thought.

11             I cannot give you any specific details because this has to do

12     with political conduct and not so much with military aspects, but I know

13     that all of this stopped once the ARK ceased to exist in September 1992.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

15     admitted.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Mr. Nicholls.

17             MR. NICHOLLS:  No objection just because the answer wasn't

18     completely clear about whether Mr. Brown had noticed this.  It's his

19     footnote 198 in Mr. Brown's report.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3844, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now have 65 ter 484.  If I

23     could kindly ask for a extra five minutes and then we shall finish

24     everything.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

Page 40997

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   General, in paragraph are 1124, Mr. Brown emphasises that there

 3     were examples which demonstrate that even when there was interference by

 4     the civilian bodies in military matters the corps would often assist

 5     these bodies and so on.  And then he goes on to say that General Talic

 6     was aware in early May that there were extremists in Kljuc and that also

 7     the president of the Kljuc municipality was -- attempted to command the

 8     units, hence he's asking the government of Krajina to intervene.  And

 9     this is in his footnote 211.

10             Can you tell us what that document is about?

11        A.   This document speaks about these extremely delicate relations

12     between the civilian authorities and the military, particularly during

13     the period while institutionally speaking all the mechanisms were not in

14     place.  There was still no transition from the properly ordered system in

15     which the previous army existed and the new system that would be in force

16     in this emerging state, and it was involved in parallel processes of

17     setting up the army, the state, the government bodies, and is attempted

18     to institutionalise all those processes.  As I said, in conditions when

19     the 4th Corps remained surrounded strategically was the reason why

20     General Talic appealed to the political leadership that he had access to,

21     that is to say the leadership of the ARK and not for reasons of

22     disrespect for the central authorities.

23             Now, as for the attempts in Kljuc on the part of the municipal

24     leadership who tried to influence the commanding of the units was very

25     ferociously stopped by General Talic and it was stopped, and they

Page 40998

 1     continued further on to carry out the orders issued by the corps command.

 2        Q.   Can we have the next page item 3 in English, and we need the next

 3     page in Serbian, which speaks about murder committed by a person who was

 4     intoxicated, and it says that General Talic was aware of that.

 5             Can you tell us if General Talic undertook appropriate measures?

 6        A.   A whole host of events took place in Kljuc that preceded an

 7     ultimate decision by the corps to place this area under their control.

 8     They first took over the relay, then JNA column was attacked and seven

 9     conscripts were killed in the attack, then there was an attack on another

10     unit, there was an attack on a police patrol resulting in the death of

11     one policeman, and all of this contributed to increasing the tension, and

12     the corps was fully aware of that.  Perhaps their response was somewhat

13     belated because too many events of that nature happened before they

14     decided to react.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, can this be admitted.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3845, Your Honours.

18             MR. KARADZIC:  [Interpretation] Thank you.

19        Q.   The last two documents, General.  In chapter 8 you deal with the

20     issue of paragraph 1132 in which he suggests that Mladic changed his

21     opinion about the participation of non-Serbs in the army, police,

22     government, company management, et cetera.

23             You are challenging a document that I issued instead of the

24     assembly, and in that regard can we have document 17873 under 65 ter.

25             While waiting, General, can you tell me whether there were any

Page 40999

 1     Muslims and Croats in our army occupying high-ranking positions from the

 2     beginning of the war and whether there were any Muslim units that were

 3     fighting for Republika Srpska?

 4        A.   Yes, there were.  There were both individuals.  I personally know

 5     that in the 1st Corps that we are analysing here there were not only

 6     Muslims and Croats, there were Slovenes and other ethnicities.  We had

 7     one entire unit made up of Muslims called the independent unit Meso

 8     Selimovic, which was part of the 307th [as interpreted] Brigade from

 9     Derventa, and this unit was engaged throughout the war.  In Eastern

10     Bosnia Corps in the Semberija brigades we also had a unit composed of

11     Muslims and also individual posts were held by both Muslims and Croats.

12        Q.   I think you said 327th, not 307th.

13        A.   Yes, 327th.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page in both

15     versions.  Item 2, page 7 in e-court.  Page 7 in e-court.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can you look at paragraph 2 at the top of the page.

18        A.   "Any sectarian attitude towards other ethnic groups should be

19     eliminated if they accept our policy as stated above.  They can be

20     assigned work and other obligations to contribute to the development and

21     advancement of the Serbian Republic.  Everything else must be treated as

22     treason and resistance to the Serbian people."

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this be admitted?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit D3846, Your Honours.

Page 41000

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at 1D04591.

 2     1D04591.  Yes.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Can you tell us what is this official note about?

 5        A.   This originated from the POW camp Manjaca, proposal to engage

 6     prisoners of war in war units, prisoners of war who had expressed desire

 7     to join units of the Army of Republika Srpska and to take part in its

 8     defence.

 9        Q.   As I can see this, there are five Serb captives who want to

10     fight.

11        A.   Well, prisoners of war are everybody who found themselves to be

12     on the opposite side, and that's how it happened that these Serbs were

13     taken prisoner too.

14        Q.   Can you tell us something about the proposal in the last passage

15     regarding this sergeant, Radinovic?

16        A.   It is proposed here with regard to Mesa Selimovic battalion that

17     should they face problems by merging with other units to be --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the speakers please pause between

19     questions and answers.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat, Mr. Karadzic.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Could you please tell the Chamber who Mesa Selimovic was and what

23     kind of unit it was that these Muslim volunteers were dispatched to?

24        A.   If my understanding is correct, it has to do with the unit itself

25     and not with the Mehmed Mesa Selimovic.  Mehmed Mesa Selimovic was a

Page 41001

 1     prominent writer who said for himself that a Serb of Muslim confession.

 2             Now, the unit came into the being in the following way:  The

 3     Derventa, Srbac, and Brod villages which were populated mostly by the

 4     Muslims, they expressed their loyalty to the Serb authorities and

 5     accepted what was reality at the time, and that was the partition of

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In return, their request was, and it was ultimately

 7     accepted, that they should be organised in a separate unit which was

 8     named Mesa Selimovic at their request.  And they were part of, as I said,

 9     327th Brigade, and they were listed within that brigade as an independent

10     unit, and the unit was active within the brigade until the end of the

11     war.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted and I would

14     like to refer the parties to D479.  This is my response to the Main Staff

15     in relation to the wishes expressed by the Muslims and Croats - well, in

16     this instance, the Muslims - to fight in our ranks, where I similarly

17     said that they should be treated properly and fairly, that they should be

18     assigned to available units and that they should not --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Unnecessary.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- against the enemy.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Unnecessary, Mr. Karadzic.  It's already noted in

22     his footnote.  We'll admit this.

23             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3847, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Are you through your examination-in-chief,

25     Mr. Karadzic?

Page 41002

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.

 2             General, sir, thank you.  I apologise for keeping you here for

 3     long.

 4             I offer this report into evidence.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I take it, General Keserovic, that it has been

 6     explained to you that the cross-examination by the Prosecution will take

 7     place next week.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the first time I'm hearing

 9     of it for the next week.

10             JUDGE KWON:  My understanding is 9.00 on Tuesday morning.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, we've schedule it actually for the

12     23rd of July.  Unfortunately, and I apologise, members of our team failed

13     to inform General Keserovic of this as they were instructed to do.  So we

14     apologise for that, and we have scheduled his cross-examination for

15     Tuesday, the 23rd of July, and his arrival on the 22nd of July.  We hope

16     that that will work for him.

17             JUDGE KWON:  23rd.

18             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

19             JUDGE KWON:  So he will go back and return.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes.  As I understood, he was not going to be

21     cross-examined this week at all, and so he would have had to go back in

22     any event.  Since next week is full of witnesses, instead of rescheduling

23     one of them, we decided it would be better if he came back the following

24     week.

25             JUDGE KWON: [Interpretation] Does it suit you, General Keserovic?

Page 41003

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the 23rd would definitely

 2     suit me more.  However, I cannot possibly travel on the 21st, but I can

 3     on the 22nd.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  There should be no problem with it.  We will adjourn

 5     very shortly, but shall we discuss the scheduling.  We have three

 6     witnesses for this week.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it those three witnesses will be

 9     concluded by Wednesday.

10             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, sometime during the day on Wednesday we will

11     finish with those three.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Which means that we may not have a hearing at all on

13     Thursday.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Thank you.  The hearing is adjourned.

16                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.01 p.m.,

17                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day

18                           of July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.