130730ED

Page 42179

1 offence or saying something that might provide evidence that you might

2 have committed a criminal offence. However, should you think that an

3 answer might incriminate you and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer

4 the question, I must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to

5 compel you to answer the question. But in that situation, the Tribunal

6 would ensure that your testimony compelled under such circumstances would

7 not be used in any case that might be laid against you for any offence,

8 save and except the offence of giving false testimony.

9 Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

12 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good day, Excellencies. Good day

14 to all.

15 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

16 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Mr. Kljajic. Good day, Mr. Ram.

17 A. Good day.

18 Q. Good morning to you, it's morning over there where you are.

19 Mr. Kljajic, did you give a statement to my Defence team?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 Can Mr. Ram show you a copy of that statement and can you tell us

23 whether that's your statement?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Thank you. Have you read that statement?

Page 42180

1 A. Yes, I've read it.

2 Q. Thank you. Does this statement faithfully reflect what you

3 communicated to my Defence team?

4 A. Except for some minor details, I think that 99 per cent is the

5 way I had put it to the Defence team.

6 Q. Thank you. As for these details, do you feel it is necessary to

7 indicate them and to correct them if they are of significance and if they

8 change the meaning?

9 A. Basically, they're not very significant. It was mentioned here

10 that I worked at the crime prevention service and I actually worked at

11 the department that had to do with the tasks of the police, "milicija."

12 Q. Which paragraph is that? Could you please take a look.

13 A. It's paragraph 2. I think that it's line 6 or 7 where it says

14 that I -- only to return to the post of inspector for crime prevention.

15 Q. And what is it supposed to read, inspector for affairs -- police

16 affairs and tasks?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you. Does the rest of the statement faithfully reflect

19 what you said?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Today if I were to put the same questions to you, would your

22 answers basically be the same?

23 A. They would. The answers would be the same.

24 Q. Thank you. Could you please take a copy from Mr. Ram and could

25 you sign it before him and before us, and could you please put today's

Page 42181

1 date there.

2 A. I'm done.

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

5 tender Mr. Cedomir Kljajic's statement 1D7052, that is the number it

6 bears now, and I would like to have it admitted into evidence.

7 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, do you have any objections?

8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Good afternoon, Your Honours. No objections.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 We'll receive it.

11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D3917, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14 Now I'm going to read out a brief summary in the English language

15 of Mr. Kljajic's statement.

16 [In English] Cedomir Kljajic worked as police inspector in

17 Sarajevo from 1987 to 1991. He was deputy to the assistant minister of

18 police from September until October 1991 to the beginning of the war.

19 When the war broke out, he was assigned to work in Vraca, where he

20 occupied the post of under-secretary for public security. He remained in

21 that position until August or September 1992.

22 Cedo Kljajic was aware that the first party to be founded in BH

23 was the SDA followed by the HDZ and finally SDS. During the SDA

24 foundation assembly the Croatian and Muslim flags were tied together,

25 showing the unity of the two ethnicities. These actions caused fear and

Page 42182

1 concern amongst the Serbian people. Also during this period Cedo Kljajic

2 was aware that the people were being armed and that more than 160.000

3 weapons entered B&H illegally. The overwhelming majority of the weapons

4 were obtained by Muslims and Croats.

5 Following the multi-party elections, a coalition was created

6 between the SDA, SDS, and HDZ and the positions in the MUP were

7 supposedly equally divided. On every level there were hypothetically one

8 Muslim, one Serb, and one Croat. However, the SDA breached this

9 agreement and people from the MUP were replaced by others who were not

10 qualified. Cedo Kljajic discovered that he was not being consulted about

11 changes of personnel in the MUP under his authority as he usually would

12 be, and soon after he raised this issue he himself was replaced. New

13 positions in the MUP were created and Serbian personnel were

14 side-stepped.

15 The Muslims were not only dominant in the top positions in the

16 MUP but they also started to increase their numbers in lower positions.

17 Also, the number of reserve policemen increased. These policemens were

18 almost exclusively Muslims and only served the interests of the SDA.

19 Mr. Cedomir Kljajic was aware that the Muslims were using the MUP

20 to obtain equipment for the SDA. The security situation was getting

21 worse by the day and as a result of all of this there was a need to

22 divide up the BH MUP.

23 The Serbs did not want a conflict. They knew it would result in

24 massive bloodshed and therefore the Serbs embraced the Lisbon Agreement

25 with enthusiasm and relief because they thought that a solution had been

Page 42183

1 found to the problems.

2 When the RS MUP was created, it had numerous problems including

3 the lack of equipment, poor communication, lack of personnel, and the

4 constant shelling of the base in Vrace. Further, some parts of the RS

5 were physically completely inaccessible.

6 In April 1991, Radovan Karadzic told Cedo Kljajic and the two

7 others that the SDS had received certain positions in the MUP and that

8 they could fill them; however, it was not necessary for them to be a

9 member of the SDS. Karadzic asked that they work as the law requires,

10 regardless of the violations of the law by their Muslim colleagues.

11 Radovan Karadzic was adamant that the MUP must operate in accordance with

12 the legal provisions and it was necessary to have a balance in the MUP

13 between the staffs of the SDS and SDA.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Kljajic, perhaps I forgot to ask you something. In your

16 statement perhaps instead of this Sime Djodan, should it have said

17 Dalibor Brozovic, that is paragraph 3. Do you remember, was it Dalibor

18 Brozovic or Sime Djodan?

19 A. I really cannot remember. I thought it was Sime Djodan. It's

20 possible that it was Brozovic though. I know that his statement was very

21 inflammatory. He said that the time came, that there had to be a border

22 on the Drina, that this western bloc would exist again, and we Serbs in

23 principle would not have any place there.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Kljajic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And, Your Excellencies, I don't

Page 42184

1 have any further questions for Mr. Kljajic now.

2 JUDGE KWON: How shall we understand paragraph 3 then?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I understood things correctly,

4 Mr. Kljajic allows for the possibility that it wasn't Sime Djodan, that

5 it was Dalibor Bozovic. He's not sure about the name but he knows it was

6 a high-ranking Croat official who spoke.

7 JUDGE KWON: Very well. I'll leave it at that.

8 Mr. Kljajic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this

9 case has been admitted in writing, that is, through your written

10 statement, in lieu of your oral testimony. And now you'll be

11 cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.

12 Ms. Gustafson.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kljajic.

16 A. Good morning.

17 Q. Now, it's not mentioned anywhere in your Defence statement, but

18 you were interviewed at length by the Prosecution in 2003, and that

19 statement was audio-recorded; correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, I understand from your statement that aside from one break

22 of about five months between April and September of 1991, that you worked

23 full time as a police official, first in the joint Bosnian MUP, then in

24 the RS MUP for about 18 years, from 1974 until September 1992. That's

25 correct, isn't it?

Page 42185

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now I would like to ask you a couple of questions about your

3 position in the RS MUP. You stated that you were under-secretary for the

4 public security service, and that's at paragraph 2 of your statement.

5 And that meant essentially that you were in charge of the public security

6 service of the RS MUP and you were accountable for its operation directly

7 to the minister, Mico Stanisic; correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. And the public security service was responsible for, among other

10 things, threats to state security, the protection of citizens' lives and

11 personal safety, the prevention and detection of criminal offences,

12 tracking down and arresting perpetrators of criminal offences, and

13 maintaining law and order. And that's from Article 15 of the RS Law on

14 Internal Affairs P2964. Can you confirm that those items I listed were

15 among the responsibilities of the public security service and indeed

16 among your responsibilities as under-secretary?

17 A. We had regulations for the interior and we were supposed to take

18 care of preserving law and order and preventing crime and also detecting

19 criminals.

20 Q. Okay. So for what we understand as regular police work,

21 preventing and detecting crime, arresting perpetrators, protecting

22 citizens, you were the number three person in the ministry. The only

23 people above you were the minister and his deputy; right?

24 A. Yes, that's correct.

25 Q. Thank you. Now, at paragraph 4 of your statement you state that

Page 42186

1 in the pre-war period you had information that people were being armed

2 and that according to you the overwhelming majority of weapons were

3 obtained by the Muslims, followed by the Croats, and the Serbs were

4 third. Now, the RS MUP report for the period April to December 1992

5 describes activities of Serbian employees in the joint MUP before the

6 war, activities which include "illegal arming of reliable active

7 personnel and reserve employees." That's P2761, page 7.

8 Now, before the war you were a high-level Serb employee in the

9 MUP, so I take it that you were aware of this illegal arming among Serb

10 police personnel; is that right?

11 A. I think that you're wrong there. What I said, namely, that I

12 knew that before the war about 160.000 fire-arms were illegal is a piece

13 of information that I received from the representatives of the

14 State Security Service. It was Brane Krstic's assistant, I think it was

15 Zoranovic, I think that was his name. And at the end of 1990 we had some

16 joint commission that went out there to the area of Mostar-Capljina

17 because there were some conflicts between the army and the civilian

18 population, and this was a Joint Commission of the Executive Council. In

19 that commission there was a representative of the government, there was

20 this representative of the State Security Service, and I was the third

21 member of the commission. So there was a Muslim, there was a Croat, and

22 a Serb. This representative of the State Security Service who was a

23 Croat stated several times then that the State Security Service had

24 reliable information to the effect that in the territory of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina there were over 160.000 long-barrelled weapons that

Page 42187

1 were in Bosnia-Herzegovina illegally.

2 By the way, by way of a joke sort of, he also pointed out: And

3 these are Muslim weapons, these are the weapons of the Muslims. And by

4 way of a joke, he also said: I'm not sure how much Croats have, but at

5 any rate the Muslims managed to equip themselves well for a war.

6 Q. Well, let me ask you this more specific question. In September

7 1993, Tomo Kovac, who I assume you knew, reported that beginning in early

8 1991 he had been organising intense arming of citizens of Serbian

9 nationality in Ilidza. That's P2308. Did you know about that?

10 A. I did not know about that.

11 Q. Okay. At paragraph 15 of your statement you describe a July 1991

12 meeting of the SDS Deputies Club that you attended along with

13 Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, and Vitomir Zepinic. And in your

14 statement you say that Mico Stanisic praised you and Stanisic and Mandic

15 criticised the work of Vito Zepinic. And you said that Dr. Karadzic

16 reacted forcefully and criticised Zepinic. Now, I'd like to remind you

17 of some additional things you told the OTP in 2003 about this meeting and

18 ask you to confirm them.

19 First you explained that this meeting and the criticism of

20 Zepinic related to the fact that you had been recently demoted, you'd

21 been demoted to the position of commander in charge of escorting trains,

22 a position you rejected. And that's 65 ter 24950 at pages 23 and 24.

23 Can you confirm that that's the context of your attendance at this

24 meeting?

25 A. I don't know on which basis the meeting was called. I know that

Page 42188

1 in the context Mico Stanisic said that we should come to that meeting.

2 There were many people, many SDS members, but I hardly knew anyone except

3 for Mr. Karadzic and that some other people I knew from TV. And some

4 people demanded an explanation because they saw me and some other people.

5 I believe that Slavko Draskovic was there and Kijac too. They saw people

6 they didn't know and they were asking: Who are these people? What are

7 they doing here? And then Mico Stanisic explained that we had come

8 because there were some problems on the MUP, that there had been -- that

9 I had been suddenly replaced, that the Muslims demoted me to a deputy

10 commander after five or six years of being commander of that police

11 station. It was part of their intention to humiliate me and return me to

12 the same police station where I was, but only to the position of deputy

13 commander. That's the lowest position for a person with a university

14 degree.

15 You probably know Sredoje Momic [as interpreted], who was

16 transferred to the Novi Grad police station in Sarajevo. The plan was to

17 humiliate people so that they refuse the position offered to them and as

18 a consequence they'd be left without a job.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I must intervene in the transcript.

20 In line 14 we see "Sredoje Momic," which is wrong. It should be "Novic."

21 And apart from that, the witness said that he was highly educated and

22 experienced. He was in an executive position in the State Security

23 Service, but he was transferred to a lower position which he refused.

24 As for you, Mr. Kljajic, please speak slowly so that the

25 interpreters don't have too difficult a job.

Page 42189

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kljajic, do you confirm what Mr. Karadzic has

3 said now?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

6 Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

8 Q. And at this meeting, Mr. Kljajic, Dr. Karadzic not only

9 criticised Zepinic, he slammed his hand on the table, yelled at

10 Mr. Zepinic, and told him that if he did not get you re-instated, Zepinic

11 would lose his job; right?

12 A. Probably my memory was fresher then. It's been ten years, after

13 all. I don't remember all the details, but I believe that this is right.

14 If I said it at the time, yeah, I think it was so. Mr. Karadzic must

15 have been very angry with Mr. Zepinic because things were going on at the

16 MUP and things were out of any control by the Serbs. People were

17 replaced daily or removed daily --

18 Q. Mr. Kljajic --

19 A. -- people were sent to police stations in the field --

20 Q. Mr. Kljajic, I'm going to interrupt you there because --

21 A. -- for example --

22 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, but my question was quite specific and

23 you were moving away from it. If we could -- if I could just show you

24 what you said before quickly.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON: It's 65 ter 24950. It's page 25 in the English

Page 42190

1 and page 33 in the B/C/S.

2 Q. And I believe the Registrar has a copy there he can show you. In

3 and the English, it's about a third of the way down the page, it's

4 roughly in the same position in the B/C/S where you described

5 Dr. Karadzic slamming his hand against the table and yelling at

6 Vito Zepinic: What are you doing? And then about two-thirds of the way

7 down the page close to the bottom in the B/C/S you said:

8 "And then Radovan Karadzic said, 'We all demand from you that you

9 do this. You either do this or you'll lose your job.'"

10 Does that remind you of what Dr. Karadzic -- how Dr. Karadzic

11 reacted to Mr. Zepinic at this meeting?

12 A. I think that during the meeting Dr. Karadzic really was angry at

13 Mr. Zepinic and that he insisted that he take steps for the situation at

14 the MUP to stabilise. However, objectively speaking from today's vantage

15 point, Mr. Zepinic really couldn't do much because there was a

16 combination of people at the MUP starting from Alija Delimustafic,

17 Mr. Simovic, Avdo Hebib, Jusuf Pusina, the chief of communication and so

18 on, Hajdar Hodzic who --

19 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you again, but I am trying to ask very

20 specific questions and I would ask you to try to keep your answers

21 focused on those specific questions. Can you just confirm that you told

22 the OTP in 2003 that Dr. Karadzic slammed his hand on the table at this

23 meeting, yelled at Mr. Zepinic, and told him that if he did not get you

24 re-instated that he would lose his job?

25 A. I think that Dr. Karadzic was angry and he probably slammed his

Page 42191

1 hand on the table once. I don't think he -- I said he did it more than

2 once. And I believe that he told Zepinic that he must re-instate me.

3 Q. Okay. At paragraph 8 you talk about the division of the MUP.

4 You said that there was a need to divide the MUP and you said that this

5 was also what the Lisbon agreement provided for. Now, it's correct that

6 whatever the Lisbon Agreement envisioned, it was never finalised. You

7 acknowledged that in 2003 and that's correct, isn't it?

8 A. The truth is that the Lisbon Agreement envisaged a division, and

9 more or less all of us at the ministry started behaving in accordance

10 with it. Although, at some point Mr. Alija Izetbegovic changed his mind

11 and gave up -- walked out from the Lisbon Agreement.

12 Q. Okay. And the other thing about the Lisbon Agreement is that the

13 evidence in this case indicates that the negotiations that culminated in

14 this so-called agreement commenced on 13 February 1992. And that's

15 D2968, paragraph 5. But senior Serb police personnel within the joint

16 MUP, including yourself, were making concrete plans to divide the MUP

17 even before this date. That's right, isn't it?

18 A. It wasn't only senior Serb personnel. Everybody did it. I can

19 mention Alija Delimustafic and there was even mention of a division of

20 buildings. The Muslims would get the building on Bozo Kovacevica Street,

21 the Croats the one on Augusta Cerca [phoen] Street, and I think that two

22 buildings were to go to the Serbs at the school of -- at the MUP school

23 at Vrace.

24 Q. Okay. Could we go to -- sorry.

25 A. And that was agreed at a collegium of the then-Minister of the

Page 42192

1 Interior, Alija Delimustafic.

2 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P1083, please.

3 Q. Mr. Kljajic, these are minutes of a meeting held in Banja Luka on

4 the 11th of February, 1992, and it indicates in the first paragraph your

5 presence. Now, you did attend this meeting of Serb MUP personnel in

6 Banja Luka; right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Okay. Now, I'd like to point you to a few comments that are

9 reflected in the minutes of this meeting, and the first is in the middle

10 of page 1 in the English and near the bottom of the page in the

11 B/C/S - and these are Mico Stanisic's remarks where he says:

12 "Work has to be done by the organisation of the Serbian MUP,

13 starting from the municipal and regional levels up to the Serbian

14 ministry ..."

15 And on the next page in the B/C/S and towards the bottom in the

16 English, Nenad Radovic "notified those present that the Assembly of the

17 Serbian Republic of BH had made a decision on the establishment of the

18 Serbian MUP ..."

19 And then you're the next speaker. And if we go to the next page

20 in the English you state:

21 "I categorically state that the SDA and the SDS cannot work in

22 the same MUP. And if Nenad Radovic's proposal is not implemented within

23 seven days, I will resign."

24 The next speaker Andrija Bjelosevic, and this is on page 3 in the

25 B/C/S, says at the end of his comments:

Page 42193

1 "I also support the decision to establish the Serbian MUP."

2 Goran Zugic, the next speaker, at the end of his comments, says:

3 "The Serbian MUP has to start work as soon as possible ..."

4 Predrag Jesuric, the next speaker, again at the end of his

5 comments says:

6 " ... the Serbian MUP should be established as soon as

7 possible."

8 Krsto Savic says:

9 "We are already forming the Serbian Mostar SJB ..."

10 Now, it's clear, Mr. Kljajic, that the main topic of this meeting

11 or at least one of the topics was the creation of a separate Serb MUP;

12 right?

13 A. I think that the topic was the situation at the MUP. That was

14 the main topic, and one of the other topics was the establishment of the

15 Serbian MUP. And Nenad Radovic said that the Assembly of the Serbian

16 people took that decision, and if it did we had no choice but to start

17 working on it.

18 Q. Okay. And --

19 A. It's another matter that the representatives of all the

20 stations --

21 THE ACCUSED: I would really prefer to let witness finish.

22 JUDGE KWON: I didn't follow the --

23 MS. GUSTAFSON: I had started to speak and then I realised the

24 witness was still speaking --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I continue or should I --

Page 42194

1 MS. GUSTAFSON: -- so I stopped --

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I'll leave it to you.

3 Yes, please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

4 If necessary, the Chamber will intervene. Otherwise, please

5 continue.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON:

7 Q. Mr. Kljajic, if you would like to finish your answer, go ahead,

8 please, briefly.

9 A. I think you interrupted me when I was about to say that at that

10 meeting the situation was analysed and all representatives of public

11 security stations and security services centres exerted great pressure on

12 us and criticised us for not doing anything at the ministry. That we

13 were being inactive and irresponsible on that, we didn't deserve to be in

14 our positions, that we should leave those positions and make room for new

15 people to do the job as it should be done. And I pointed out at the

16 meeting that if in the coming 10 or 15 days we really showed that we

17 weren't determined enough to do anything, that I will resign so that

18 somebody else may be able to do the job better than I. And after some

19 time I did that. I handed in my resignation and retired.

20 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kljajic, if you could concentrate on answering

21 the question. The question put to you this time was whether the topic at

22 the time was a creation of a separate Serbian MUP. What is your answer

23 to that, Mr. Kljajic?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The answer is affirmative. I

25 believe Nenad Radovic phrased it best. He informed us that the Assembly

Page 42195

1 of the Serbian People had taken that decision.

2 MS. GUSTAFSON:

3 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, when you were shown this document in 2003, you

4 agreed that the officials present at this meeting were not implementing

5 something that had been agreed with the Muslims. That's correct, isn't

6 it?

7 A. I don't remember what you're asking me about now. I don't

8 remember that part.

9 Q. Well, if we could then -- I'll just remind you.

10 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page -- to 65 ter 24950, again.

11 This is page 52 of the English and page 70 in the B/C/S.

12 [Microphone not activated]

13 JUDGE KWON: Your microphone.

14 MS. GUSTAFSON:

15 Q. And at the bottom of page 52 in the English and towards the

16 bottom of page 70 in the B/C/S, you're asked:

17 "Mr. Kljajic, is there any reference," and then there's something

18 unintelligible, "agreement with Muslims in respect of division of MUP?"

19 And this is in the context of your discussion of this document,

20 and you say at the top of the next page in English:

21 "No, there is no reference in this document ... this is something

22 that was mentioned and discussed every day."

23 And then in the next page in the B/C/S and skipping down two

24 paragraphs in the English, SM asks you at the end of his question:

25 "Are you saying that all of these officials who got together were

Page 42196

1 doing something that was agreed with the Muslims?"

2 And you answer:

3 "No."

4 And you're asked again:

5 "So, the proposal set out in this document was not agreed with

6 the Muslims?"

7 And you say:

8 "No."

9 Now, that's what you said in 2003, right, that the proposals at

10 this 11 February 1992 meeting were not proposals that had been agreed to

11 with the Muslim side?

12 A. Well, you see, if you're asking me whether we had written down

13 these proposals and given it to the Muslims to work on them, my answer is

14 no. But whether there was previous discussion at the collegium of the

15 minister of the MUP, then the answer is yes. In other words, were these

16 proposals put on paper before we discussed them? No, they weren't. But

17 at any rate, there was discussion about this matter at many collegium

18 meetings at the MUP.

19 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'd like to tender these two pages of the

20 interview, please.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. --

22 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

23 JUDGE KWON: -- Robinson.

24 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive the first page and these two

Page 42197

1 pages. Shall we assign a number for this?

2 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

3 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6468, Your Honours.

4 MS. GUSTAFSON:

5 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, I'd like to ask you now about the barricades in

6 Sarajevo in early March, which you discussed in 2003, and I will ask you

7 to please, if you -- I'm going to put a series of short propositions to

8 you, and if you could please just affirm that it's correct if you agree

9 that it's correct, and if there's anything that you need to add at the

10 end, you can do so.

11 So in 2003 you explained that when the blockade of Sarajevo

12 started with barricades put up by the Serbs, you were called to go

13 urgently to the MUP headquarters. Correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And when you arrived, Momcilo Mandic, then chief of public

16 security, took you on a tour of the barricades and introduced you to the

17 people manning the barricades and told you all of their names; correct?

18 A. Am I supposed to answer merely yes or no?

19 Q. I'd like you to please answer yes or no if possible. Thank you.

20 A. I think I owe you an explanation - although you're insisting that

21 I do so at the end, because I may forget until then. When I came to the

22 MUP, everybody was there, not only Serbs. And this should not be

23 considered to have been that way. Everybody was there, Serbs, Muslims,

24 Croats. At one point we had a meeting for us to be informed of the

25 situation on the ground, and Momcilo Mandic asked me to accompany him, to

Page 42198

1 go to the Holiday Inn. And on our way there we saw those roadblocks and

2 we saw some people at the check-points that he knew.

3 Q. In 2003 you said:

4 "He invited me to come with him and tour these barricades. We

5 toured the barricades at Vrbanja bridge and Pofalici. I have omitted to

6 mention that when we were touring the barricades he introduced me to the

7 people who were manning these barricades."

8 That's what you said in 2003. Can you confirm that that's

9 correct?

10 A. I think that it's a fact that he told me we were going to the

11 Holiday Inn, and on the way there we also called up those barricades if

12 we want to be fully precise and accurate.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, I'd like to tender what I just read out

14 which is page 20 of the English and page 27 and 28 of the B/C/S and add

15 that to P6468, please.

16 MR. ROBINSON: Well, since it's been read out in its entirety,

17 Mr. President, I don't know that that's necessary.

18 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honour, I think if the witness doesn't

19 accept his prior statement, then the prior statement itself should be

20 admitted as evidence.

21 JUDGE KWON: Better to have them in written evidence. We'll add

22 them to the exhibit.

23 Shall we continue.

24 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

25 Q. And, Mr. Kljajic, you mentioned that Mr. Mandic was taking you to

Page 42199

1 the Holiday Inn, and he indeed took you to the SDS headquarters at the

2 Holiday Inn where you met with a number of people including Rajko Dukic

3 and Nedjo Vlaski who was then a DB official. That's page 21 of the

4 English. That's right, isn't it?

5 A. Yes. I did not meet with him. It was not a meeting. They were

6 doing their job. We came to their office. We simply arrived there, we

7 sat down, and they continued doing what they had been doing before. It

8 was not a formal meeting. It was not like we had arrived in order to

9 attend a meeting that was scheduled before.

10 Q. And what Rajko Dukic was busy doing at the time was talking on

11 two or three telephone lines, and it became clear to you that he was

12 handling everything and was the main organiser. That's page 22. That's

13 correct, isn't it?

14 A. That's correct. I realised that he was the one who was in charge

15 of that activity within the SDS, that he was the most responsible person,

16 the number one person.

17 Q. And you observed that Rajko Dukic was informing Radovan Karadzic,

18 who was abroad at the time, on the latest developments regarding the

19 barricades; correct?

20 A. I believe that he did talk with Mr. Karadzic on the phone and

21 that he put him in the picture, he told him about the situation.

22 Q. Okay. I'd like to ask you some more questions about Mr. Mandic.

23 In 2003 when you were asked about the period before the war, you compared

24 Mr. Mandic and Mr. Zepinic as follows. You described Mr. Mandic as

25 aggressive and unscrupulous, whereas Zepinic was composed, calm, and

Page 42200

1 decent. That's page 19. That's right, isn't it?

2 A. That was how I saw things. It was my free estimate of the

3 things, if you will.

4 Q. And you said that Mandic was very influential and acted as if he

5 were the deputy minister instead of Zepinic. That's page 19. That's

6 right, isn't it?

7 A. That was in keeping with his personality. He liked to behave in

8 that way. I believe that in some cases he appeared to be more important

9 than Mr. Zepinic, that he was the deputy minister and not Mr. Zepinic.

10 Q. And in light of this behaviour of Mr. Mandic, you assessed that

11 he must have had the support of Dr. Karadzic. That's page 20. Can you

12 confirm that?

13 A. At that time, that seemed to be logical, that he enjoyed more

14 support from Mr. Karadzic and the SDS, which is why he behaved in the way

15 he did.

16 Q. Okay. Now, after the war began you told the OTP in 2003 that you

17 arrived at the Vrace school the day after it had been taken over by the

18 special forces, and that from the moment you arrived it was clear to you

19 that Mandic was bent on illegal activities. That's page 33. That's

20 correct, isn't it?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And in particular, you observed that Mandic, with his associates,

23 was taking away everything that he pleased from the Vrace school with a

24 2-tonne freight vehicle, including valuable property, passports, and car

25 registration papers. That's pages 33 to 34. That's right, isn't it?

Page 42201

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And on one occasion Branko Djeric, the prime minister, told you

3 that Mandic had made a gift of nine Golf vehicles to the RS government,

4 but you knew these vehicles were stolen from the Sarajevo airport and you

5 told Mr. Djeric that; right? That's page 37.

6 A. Correct, yes.

7 Q. And Mr. Djeric was taken aback by what you told him and after

8 that it appeared to you that Mr. Djeric wanted to replace Mandic but was

9 not powerful enough; correct?

10 A. Mr. Djeric was taken aback. As a matter of fact, that was my

11 interpretation which was based on the information that I had collected.

12 In the meantime I've read some books and some newspaper articles, and I

13 realised that Mr. Djeric did have an intention to remove Mr. Mandic from

14 his position but he failed in doing that.

15 Q. And you complained to Mico Stanisic about Mandic's activities,

16 and Stanisic told you he couldn't do anything about it because Krajisnik

17 had said Mandic was the best minister in the government. That's page 32

18 and 33. Correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you told the OTP that Mandic and Stanisic were very close,

21 they were connected by the kum relationship, and you believed that that

22 relationship continued throughout 1992, in part because you and others

23 complained to Mr. Stanisic about Mandic's criminality but Stanisic never

24 did anything about it. Pages 35 and 36. Correct?

25 A. I don't know what Mr. Stanisic did, whether he tried to do

Page 42202

1 something. I suppose that I concluded that based on the information that

2 I'd had up to then.

3 Q. Okay. At paragraph 11 of your statement you said that you spent

4 roughly the first month and a half of the war in Vrace, and then you were

5 about 15 days in Pale before you transferred to Bijeljina. So I take it

6 you were in Vrace from roughly early April until roughly mid-May 1992; is

7 that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. And you told the OTP in 2003 that during the time you were

10 in Vrace you went to Belgrade for ten days to visit your family. That's

11 page 34. Can you confirm that; and if so, did you travel back and forth

12 to Belgrade by car?

13 A. I went to Belgrade, but I travelled by helicopter there and back.

14 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, line 16 in your question, you

15 referred to kum relationship between Mandic and Stanisic.

16 MS. GUSTAFSON: I can ask a follow-up question.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yeah.

18 MS. GUSTAFSON:

19 Q. Mr. Kljajic, can you explain to the Trial Chamber what the kum

20 relationship that Mandic and Stanisic had entailed? What does that mean?

21 A. The kum relationship is a form of a friendly relationship. It is

22 not a family relationship. However, a kum is somebody's best man at his

23 wedding. That would be the kum relationship.

24 Q. Thank you. And now you just mentioned travelling to Belgrade by

25 helicopter, and again in 2003 you were played an intercept, which is in

Page 42203

1 evidence as P2227, from the 18th of April, where you were speaking with

2 Mr. Mihajlovic, and in that intercept you said that helicopters were

3 flying every day back and forth from the Pale or Vrace area to Belgrade.

4 Can you confirm that helicopters were going back and forth on a daily

5 basis?

6 A. Well, I can't say that. I doubt that I ever said that they

7 travelled every day, but they did travel from Pale to Belgrade, not from

8 Vrace to Belgrade. And the main purpose of those flights were to

9 transport the wounded. And whenever the wounded were transported, there

10 would be a place left unoccupied. So we made the most of the opportunity

11 and we travelled on those helicopters to Belgrade.

12 Q. Okay.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could have P2227, please.

14 Q. I'd just like to remind you of what you said in that

15 conversation. As you can see this is an intercept of conversation

16 between you and Pero Mihajlovic on the 18th of April. And if we can go

17 to page 2 in the English and page 3 in the B/C/S. And it's towards the

18 bottom of the page in both languages, and you're discussing with

19 Mr. Mihajlovic whether he will come to see you and you say:

20 "There are helicopters flying between Belgrade and here daily."

21 And Mihajlovic says:

22 "I can't reach him, damn it," talking about Mico Davidovic.

23 And you say:

24 "You should ask around. They are operating constantly."

25 Does that remind you of what you said on the 18th of April, 1992,

Page 42204

1 about helicopters operating -- flying between Belgrade and Pale daily or

2 constantly?

3 A. Well, there was just one or perhaps two helicopters that

4 transported the wounded from Pale to the military medical academy in

5 Belgrade, and this is what the conversation is about. I urged him to get

6 on one of those helicopters and return to Pale together with the wounded.

7 That's what I was telling him.

8 Q. Okay. Again, at paragraph 12 of your statement you discuss

9 communication problems in the MUP at the beginning of the war. Now, in

10 2003 it was put to you that by the 20th of April, 1992, the ministry was

11 producing daily bulletins on security-related events based on information

12 received regularly from the CSBs. And you claim that you were not aware

13 that there was communication between the CSBs and the ministry and that

14 you had never seen these daily bulletins. And that's pages 69 and 72.

15 Is that still your claim, Mr. Kljajic, that although you were the number

16 three person in the ministry, you didn't know that there was

17 communication between the CSBs and the ministry or that the ministry

18 produced daily bulletins based on that information?

19 A. Well, I believe that you have to understand my position and my

20 role at the time. I was in Vrace and the Ministry of the Interior was in

21 Pale. The communication between the centres and the ministry at Pale

22 bypassed me. I simply did not have any insight into the type of

23 communication that they may have had, what they were doing.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 42205

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On line 15 the witness said that he

2 was seconded to Vrace. This is missing from the transcript. Vrace was

3 not close to Pale and this is missing from the transcript.

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kljajic, do you confirm that?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON:

8 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, despite your claims that you don't know about

9 communication between the CSBs and the ministry, it's correct that you

10 directly received a report from the Bijeljina CSB in mid-April when you

11 were in Vrace by telephone. Do you remember that?

12 A. I don't remember that.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to D1694, please.

14 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, you can see on page 1 that you introduced

15 yourself. About six lines down, you say:

16 "This is Cedo Kljajic speaking."

17 And the respondent says:

18 "Cedo, this is Jesuric, chief from Bijeljina speaking."

19 That would be Predrag Jesuric, CSB chief in Bijeljina; correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay. Do you remember now receiving a report on the 16th of

22 April from Mr. Jesuric reporting on the situation in the Bijeljina CSB

23 area?

24 A. This is not a report. Do you know what a report should look

25 like? When you look at this conversation and when you put it on paper,

Page 42208

1 "All right."

2 And he says:

3 "15.000 Muslims escaped to Serbia which means that they are not

4 afraid of Serbs and that they have trust from Serbia to Serbia."

5 And you ask:

6 "Escaped to Mali Zvornik, is that right?"

7 And Jesuric says:

8 "Yes."

9 And you say:

10 "To Serbia. Escaped to Serbia. All right."

11 Now, you would agree that a report that 15.000 Muslims have

12 escaped Zvornik. That's a pretty alarming piece of information; right?

13 A. I don't know what you mean when you say this. He shared that

14 with us as a piece of information.

15 Q. And you as under-secretary for public security responsible for

16 protecting lives and safety of citizens, maintaining law and order, and

17 detecting possible criminal offences, you didn't find this piece of

18 information, that 15.000 Muslims had escaped Zvornik, to cause you any

19 concern?

20 A. Look, objectively speaking I believe that this is blown out of

21 proportion, this figure of 15.000 people who fled at one moment. There

22 may have been a couple thousand who fled, and you know that operations

23 were going on there. There was war going on. And it is only normal that

24 under such circumstances people leave, that they flee the war. I don't

25 see anything out of the ordinary here if people decided to cross the

Page 42209

1 river to go to Serbia to save themselves from the war.

2 Q. Well, it doesn't say they decided. It says they escaped. And

3 you said:

4 "It is only normal that under such circumstances," referring to

5 operations, "people leave."

6 But, Mr. Kljajic, you didn't ask Mr. Jesuric what caused these

7 people to leave. You didn't -- you didn't know whether they were leaving

8 due to combat, whether they were being forced out, what had happened to

9 these people, why 15.000 people of only one ethnicity had left the

10 municipality in a short period of time. You didn't ask any of those

11 questions, did you?

12 A. I did not ask any of those questions because at the time you

13 could hear on the radio and watch on TV that there was combat going on

14 there. It was a logical conclusion that that was the reason. I believe

15 that a certain number of Serbs also escaped; however, that moment he

16 didn't speak about Serbs who had fled the combat area. It is only normal

17 to people to flee from an area of combat operations. I don't know what

18 you think I could do as an under-secretary who was in Vrace to save those

19 people, to provide them with safety in an area of combat operations. Do

20 you really think that one person could do something, especially in view

21 of the fact that I didn't have power in my hands? I was an individual

22 who worked in Vrace. I didn't have a single man under my control or my

23 command. So are you saying that I should have gone there as an

24 individual and that I should have stopped those people? That I should

25 have them: People, stop, you have to stay?

Page 42210

1 Q. So let me get this straight, Mr. Kljajic: As someone with 18

2 years service as a professional police official who was the

3 under-secretary for public security, you get a report from the CSB chief

4 in Bijeljina that 15.000 Muslims have left Zvornik and your professional

5 decision is to assume that they're fleeing due to combat and you see no

6 need as a professional to ask Mr. Jesuric any follow-up questions about

7 these people; is that correct?

8 A. Look, read the report through and you will see that at the end

9 Jesuric tells me that he will send the report to Pale. Whatever the two

10 of us discussed, he would forward to the Ministry of the Interior. And

11 that was just a piece of extra information. And what do you think that I

12 should have done at that moment? I would love you to tell me what I was

13 supposed to do as a professional. The only thing I could do was to

14 acknowledge that. I didn't have any effective power, any possibility to

15 prevent war operations. I could only acknowledge that information as

16 such.

17 Q. Okay. You mentioned that there were operations in Zvornik at

18 this time, and you knew that Arkan was involved, didn't you? You told

19 the OTP in 2003 that it was well-known that Arkan had operations in

20 Bijeljina, Brcko, and Zvornik; and after that, he carried out extensive

21 looting and took as much as he could for himself. That's page 137.

22 That's right, isn't it?

23 A. I received that kind of information. I was not there. I

24 received that information from other people and I interpreted it in the

25 way I did.

Page 42211

1 Q. Okay. At paragraph 16 of your statement you describe a meeting

2 you attended in Belgrade in May of 1992 about a month after the conflict

3 began, attended by the chiefs of CSBs, RS MUP officials, and

4 Dr. Karadzic. Now, in 2003 you told the OTP that you thought

5 Mr. Krajisnik was there as well, that's page 68. That's correct, isn't

6 it?

7 A. Yes, I remember that meeting. I said that I thought that meeting

8 had taken place and that he had been there, but I can't remember that

9 clearly.

10 Q. And I assume that Mr. Stanisic, the minister, was there as well,

11 Mico Stanisic?

12 A. Yes, he was there.

13 Q. Okay. And you said in your statement, Defence statement, that

14 Dr. Karadzic informed those present about the general situation and

15 issues. I take it from that that Dr. Karadzic was better informed than

16 the MUP leadership about the situation; is that right?

17 A. Well, he spoke in general terms, and what he told us is

18 everything that we could see on TV. That information was publicly

19 available. He told us that war operations had started, that there were

20 dead and wounded, that we had to take that into account, and he told us

21 that on our side we had to remain as professional as possible, that we

22 had to implement laws and regulations that applied to the work of the

23 Ministry of the Interior.

24 Q. You said he told you that there were dead and wounded. Did he

25 tell you any more details than that about who was dead and wounded? Did

Page 42212

1 he tell you who, where, or when?

2 A. I really don't remember that he shared any detail with us. He

3 told us that we should comply with the Geneva Conventions, the Law on

4 War, and that the Ministry of the Interior had to act within the

5 framework of the Law on the Interior and our rules and regulations.

6 Q. And did Dr. Karadzic ask Mr. Stanisic or any of the other police

7 officials there for any specific information or reports or ask for any

8 information to be gathered and reported back to him?

9 A. I don't remember that he asked anyone for anything like that.

10 Q. Okay. At paragraph 10 of your statement you said that you never

11 heard from any of your colleagues in the MUP or other members of the

12 civilian and military authorities that Muslims or Croats should be

13 expelled. But you did know at the time that, in the summer of 1992 in

14 particular, that the Republika Srpska authorities were capturing large

15 numbers of Muslims and detaining them in terrible conditions in makeshift

16 camps guarded by MUP officials. You knew that, didn't you?

17 A. Never really did anyone speak about that kind of thing in front

18 of me; I can assert that. No officials within the Ministry of the

19 Interior or political representatives or military representatives, no one

20 ever spoke of any kind of expulsion of Muslims or Croats. As for these

21 camps, I just knew of this one camp, I think it was at Manjaca, the one

22 that Mr. Zupljanin spoke about and he said the conditions were rather bad

23 there and that something would have to be done. So roughly the

24 conclusion was that the best solution was to carry out an exchange of

25 prisoners, Serb and Croat prisoners, all for all.

Page 42213

1 Q. When did Mr. Zupljanin tell you that the conditions in Manjaca

2 were rather bad?

3 A. Well, you see, he just said that there was this camp there that

4 had been established and the conditions were not exactly adequate and

5 that actually this is a burden for the MUP, that he wanted that to be

6 resolved as soon as possible, and that was the conclusion, that this

7 should be resolved by having exchange all for all. So that the Muslims

8 would release all of our prisoners and we would release all of their

9 prisoners, and that would be the only right and rapid solution. They

10 were a problem for us. What to do with these people? There was always

11 the possibility of some abuse on the part of individuals who could have

12 abused these people in some way. So it was really in no one's interests.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could I have D477, please.

14 Q. And while that's coming up, Mr. Kljajic, my question was when

15 Mr. Zupljanin told you about poor conditions in Manjaca. Can you

16 remember that?

17 A. I think that at this meeting he said a few sentences, that the

18 conditions were not good and that this question should be resolved

19 urgently by way of an exchange, all for all. All the prisoners held by

20 the Serbs for all the prisoners held by the Muslims and that that would

21 be the only solution.

22 Q. Sorry, I'm -- I think I misspoke. I think it should be D447. I

23 apologise.

24 THE ACCUSED: But this is nice document, anyway.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 42214

1 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, this is a summary of a meeting of senior MUP

2 officials from the 11th of July, 1992. And if we go to page 2 you can

3 see that it indicates that you, among others, are present. Now, you

4 attended this meeting; right?

5 A. Yes.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page 7 of the English and

7 page 8 in the B/C/S in e-court, and it's actually page 5 in the original

8 numbering of the document in B/C/S for the Registrar's benefit. And it's

9 the second paragraph in B/C/S and it's in the middle in the English.

10 Q. And Mr. Zupljanin is speaking and he says:

11 "The army and Crisis Staffs or War Presidencies are requesting

12 that as many Muslims as possible are gathered and they are leaving these

13 undefined camps up to the internal affairs organs. Conditions in these

14 camps are bad. There is no food. Some individuals do not observe

15 international norms ...," et cetera.

16 And do you remember Mr. Zupljanin describing multiple camps in

17 which as many Muslims as possible were being gathered and detained and

18 these camps were left to be secured by MUP officials?

19 A. I think that Mr. Zupljanin said that in the context of our

20 obligations on the basis of the law and that it was in that context that

21 this discussion took place at that meeting and it was stated that organs

22 of the interior cannot in any way be the ones in charge of camps that

23 were set up by the military. If the military set them up, then they

24 should provide security there too. From the point of view of the Law on

25 the Interior, and that was one of the conclusions, it was unacceptable

Page 42215

1 for us to deal with improvised camps. Because if we are to give our

2 people there to secure these camps, then we would not have enough people

3 for preserving public law and order in the territory that is under the

4 control of the authorities.

5 Q. And that was Mr. Zupljanin's concern, right, that there were too

6 many -- that the police were too busy securing these improvised

7 collection facilities to be -- and they weren't able to carry out their

8 regular police duties; right?

9 A. Well, Mr. Zupljanin made these comments orally. I think that

10 this report or whatever it was that he wrote, he contributed that to the

11 transcript or the minutes and we did not hear all of it perhaps. Truth

12 to tell, he did say there that he thought that that was not the best way,

13 how the organs of the interior should be involved, and he expressed his

14 fear that some members of the police may overstep their authority, abuse

15 these people who are in the camp. And he was afraid of that. He said

16 that he thought that we had to resolve the matter, namely, that the army

17 should take over these camps again and that we should deal with our own

18 work.

19 Q. And earlier you mentioned that Mr. Zupljanin had discussed

20 Manjaca, but it's clear this isn't just about Manjaca, right, he refers

21 to undefined camps being left up to the internal affairs organs and that

22 these collection centres, plural, are not adequate. This isn't just

23 about Manjaca. This is a widespread phenomenon; right?

24 A. Well, I've already said to you that Mr. Zupljanin provided this

25 information in writing too. Here he spoke - it was an oral statement and

Page 42216

1 it was about Manjaca. Now, 21 years ago whether he mentioned some other

2 camps, I cannot remember now.

3 Q. Well, you have expressed quite some recollections about this

4 meeting and these comments in particular by Mr. Zupljanin. Do you

5 remember that in 2003, ten years ago, when you were asked about these

6 comments you said that you didn't remember whether these camps existed or

7 if they were discussed as a problem at this meeting? Do you remember

8 that ten years ago you basically said you had no recollection of these

9 comments?

10 A. It is possible that I said it at that moment. I don't know why I

11 said that. In the meantime I got quite a bit of information through the

12 media, on the internet, read different books. It is possible that in

13 that context, I mean now, I am putting this together, things that I did

14 not remember at that moment.

15 Q. Okay. If we could just go quickly to 65 ter 24950 at page 160 in

16 the English and, in fact, there's no B/C/S transcript for this portion of

17 the interview.

18 MS. GUSTAFSON: And for the benefit of the Registrar in Canada,

19 the page numbers are in the upper right-hand corner, the consecutive page

20 numbers.

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Kljajic, do you understand English and read

22 English?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

24 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

Page 42217

1 Q. Now, Mr. Kljajic, you've said you don't understand English so

2 I'll read the relevant passages to you where you're being asked about

3 this document we just looked at and this comment from Mr. Zupljanin in

4 particular. And you're -- it says -- you're asked:

5 "This meeting took place on the 11th of July 1992. Can you

6 confirm that as ... July 1992 you had knowledge of these camps?"

7 And you say:

8 " ... you have to believe me, I really don't remember. I can't

9 recollect any of these things, it's a long paragraph, you see, I don't

10 remember any of these details."

11 And you're asked:

12 "Do you recall what the Crisis Staffs and the Army ...," and then

13 there's something inaudible, "persons and left them in camps?"

14 And you say:

15 "I cannot remember that, because I was not there, in the field, I

16 was specifically at Vraca and these activities took part on the ground,

17 somewhere in the area of Banja Luka."

18 And you're asked:

19 "Can you confirm that these camps were left under the

20 jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs?"

21 And you say:

22 "I can see that from these minutes, from what I said here in the

23 minutes, but I really don't remember that these camps existed and that we

24 discussed them as some sort of problem."

25 You're asked:

Page 42218

1 "Do you remember that the conditions in the camps were poor?"

2 And you say:

3 "I never toured a single camp and I can't confirm that the

4 conditions were either bad or good."

5 And you're asked:

6 "Did you consider that the involvement of the police in the

7 management of these camps was a serious issue?"

8 And you answer:

9 "I don't remember that."

10 So, Mr. Kljajic, you can that -- can you confirm that in 2003,

11 ten years ago, you stated that you basically had no recollection of these

12 comments at this meeting, in contrast to what you've testified to today?

13 A. Yes. Well, I'm telling you, in order to clarify this thing that

14 you wish to know about, in the meantime I received a lot of information.

15 I looked at a lot of clips on YouTube, I read different books, articles,

16 and probably in the meantime my knowledge about all of that was

17 completed.

18 Q. Okay. Well, you've given evidence about what Mr. Zupljanin said

19 at this meeting and what he meant at this meeting. So is it your

20 testimony that your evidence about what Mr. Zupljanin said and meant at

21 this meeting is influenced by what you've seen on YouTube or read in

22 books and articles?

23 A. Well, look, Mr. Zupljanin at that moment - as I've already

24 said - attached his report and I never had an opportunity of seeing it

25 before it was presented to me in The Hague. I never saw it. We were at

Page 42219

1 that meeting. Mr. Zupljanin spoke briefly and I really do not recall. I

2 really cannot recall all the details of everything he said then.

3 Obviously in that report he wrote about that, as is stated here in this

4 document of yours.

5 Q. Okay.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honours, my time I think is up in the next

7 five minutes. I need to deal with two brief topics, so I would ask, if I

8 could, for an extra 10 to 15 minutes.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Please proceed.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

12 Q. Mr. Kljajic, I'd like to ask you to confirm some information you

13 gave to the OTP about Predrag Jesuric, the Bijeljina CSB chief, that you

14 gained from your time when you were based in Bijeljina. You told the OTP

15 that one of the paramilitary units in Bijeljina, Mauzer's Panthers were

16 essentially operating under Predrag Jesuric. You said that Jesuric was

17 the brains and Mauzer was the executive power behind him. That's page

18 82. That's right, isn't it?

19 A. That is the information that I had. That's true that I stated

20 that. That's the information that I had.

21 Q. Okay. And at one point due to complaints about Jesuric's work,

22 you spoke to Mico Stanisic to try to get Jesuric transferred out of

23 Bijeljina. That's page 138. That's correct; right?

24 A. Well, I asked Mico Stanisic several times to get Jesuric out of

25 Bijeljina because I thought that he was this factor of disruption in

Page 42220

1 Bijeljina, that he disrupted relations in Bijeljina.

2 Q. And you later learned that Jesuric had spoken to Mico Stanisic

3 and had convinced Stanisic to allow Jesuric to remain in Bijeljina and

4 part of that convincing exercise was Jesuric promising to give Stanisic

5 an Audi and a BMW; correct?

6 A. That is the same information that I learned of indirectly,

7 through my co-workers.

8 Q. And then you spoke to Mico Stanisic and he told you that he'd

9 spoken to Jesuric and that Jesuric could stay in Bijeljina, and Stanisic

10 asked you to bring him the two cars that Jesuric had promised him, a

11 request that you refused to carry out. That's page 139. Correct?

12 A. Well, if I stated that then it is certainly correct. Now I no

13 longer remember that, it's been another ten years since then.

14 Q. If we could go to page 139 of the English and page 153 of the

15 B/C/S of your interview. And this is at the top of the page in English

16 and in the middle of the B/C/S, and here you explain that Mr. Pantic, who

17 was the SJB chief, told you that Jesuric had told him that he -- Jesuric

18 had convinced Stanisic that he could remain in Bijeljina and promised to

19 give him the two cars. And then you say that you had a conversation with

20 Mico Stanisic and he told you that he'd talked to Jesuric and that there

21 was no need for Jesuric to go to the MUP headquarters, that everything

22 would be okay in Bijeljina. And you say:

23 " ... and then he asked me to bring to the ministries two cars

24 that were then in Bijeljina and to transport them to the ministry and to

25 give him, the ministry, the keys for the cars which I naturally never

Page 42221

1 carried out."

2 Does that remind you of your conversation with Mr. Stanisic when

3 he asked you to bring him the two cars that Jesuric had promised?

4 A. Well, this has not reminded me, absolutely not, but I believe

5 that what was stated then is true.

6 Q. Okay. I have one last document I'd like to show you and it's

7 not -- there's no hard copy there in Canada, so I'm going to ask the

8 usher to please put it on the ELMO so that you can see it across the

9 videolink --

10 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure whether it's possible because ELMO is

11 being used for the --

12 MS. GUSTAFSON: I spoke to the AV people before court and they

13 told me that it would be so. We can try it out and --

14 JUDGE KWON: We'll sort it out.

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay. Thank you.

16 JUDGE KWON: I will check it out.

17 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

18 JUDGE KWON: I was told that it would be possible but we could

19 not see the witness. Let's proceed.

20 Mr. Kljajic, can you confirm that you can see the document?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

23 MS. GUSTAFSON: Okay.

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 42222

11 Pages 42222-42226 redacted.

Page 42227

1 (redacted)

2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Your Honours, I would like to tender the document

3 I had on the ELMO, although it needs some parts of it to be translated

4 from the B/C/S. So if it could be MFI'd.

5 MR. ROBINSON: No objection, Mr. President.

6 JUDGE KWON: We'll admit it and mark it for identification.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6469 marked for identification,

8 Your Honours.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very briefly. Only a couple of

11 questions, Your Excellency.

12 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

13 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kljajic, you mentioned that you stated

14 something because at that time you had such information. Was such

15 information checked and were -- was it proved true or was it part of a

16 blackening campaign --

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: Before the witness answers, I have no idea what

18 Dr. Karadzic is referring to here. You stated something because at that

19 time you had such information, I think the question needs to be more

20 specific. I can't follow.

21 JUDGE KWON: I think he mentioned he checked something, but could

22 you repeat your question.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll go question by

24 question.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42228

1 Q. Can you tell us the exact position or job title of Mr. Jesuric?

2 A. Mr. Jesuric was chief of the Bijeljina SUP at the beginning of

3 the war.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D1436.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Was he in that position long -- oh, you cannot see this. But

8 then I'll read it out to you. It's a report about an audit or as it says

9 here an inspection conducted on situation found at SJB Bijeljina. And on

10 page 4 -- actually, page 5 it says:

11 "Their demands according to our information have to do with the

12 removal -- unconditional removal of chief Predrag Jesuric ..." and so on.

13 Was he chief of the crime enforcement service at any time?

14 A. When I and Mico Stanisic came to Bijeljina, he was chief of crime

15 enforcement, whereas Aco - I can't remember his last name - was the SUP

16 chief.

17 Q. Is the name Pantic?

18 A. Yes, that's the name, Pantic.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P2881, please.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. I'll read it out because you cannot see it -- or can you? Do you

23 have it there?

24 A. I have a report here. I don't know if this is it. It's dated 26

25 June to 25 July 1992.

Page 42229

1 Q. Yes, that's it. I'll read out the second part of the sentence in

2 paragraph 1.

3 "Certain personnel changes occurred in the department for -- of

4 prevention and detection of crimes ..."

5 And then we'll go to the next page, the third paragraph from the

6 bottom, which mentions Arkan's men. It says here:

7 "89 pistols and three hunting rifles were illegally registered

8 with the Bijeljina SJB with the knowledge of the then-Chief

9 Predrag Jesuric and the general affairs department head ..."

10 Based on all this, was he removed?

11 A. I don't know what the reason for that rotation was. I know that

12 Predrag Jesuric was SUP chief before the war and when Mico Stanisic and I

13 went there, it may have been in May or early June, he was chief of crime

14 enforcement, whereas Aco Pantic, whom he appointed as SUP chief, was SUP

15 chief. There was this rotation, but if he was removed because of that I

16 don't know.

17 Q. Thank you. Today on page 42 of the transcript which you probably

18 cannot see, you mentioned that there were demands for Jesuric to be

19 removed. Was this case involving Jesuric an exception or not and what

20 was the attitude of the MUP toward shortcomings in the work of their own

21 officials?

22 A. I believe that the RS MUP made efforts to function in accordance

23 with the law and the regulations. Whoever did not was basically exposed

24 to disciplinary sanctions, just as in peace time. We didn't replace

25 people ad hoc as if there was a war on. We tried to follow the regular

Page 42230

1 procedure.

2 Q. Thank you. What was the position of the organs, that is, the

3 Serbian authorities, before the war and the authorities of the RS when

4 the war started and it began functioning? Did you receive support from

5 them or were you obstructed?

6 A. No one obstructed us on that. On the contrary, we always enjoyed

7 support. In all contacts with you, you always insisted that we work in

8 accordance with the law and the regulations, nothing else.

9 Q. Thank you. On page 32 of today's transcript you were asked what

10 you as chief of public security whose task it is to preserve law and

11 order, what you did in areas of combat activity, what were you able to do

12 there?

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, that wasn't the question. I mean, that was

14 a total mis-characterisation of what I had said. If he wants to ask the

15 question, I don't have an objection, but without the

16 mis-characterisation.

17 JUDGE KWON: Could you rephrase your question, Mr. Karadzic,

18 based upon the actual transcript.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you. I will.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. You were asked about the number of Muslims who were crossing to

22 Serbia from municipalities along the border. What were you able to do?

23 Did those people go to Serbia because of disruptions in public law and

24 order or for some other reason?

25 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, that's a totally leading way of asking the

Page 42231

1 question. Just ask it in an open-ended way.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

4 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. What was the reason why those people went there and what did your

6 service -- what means of intervention did your service have at its

7 disposal?

8 A. First of all, we must know that at that time communication

9 between us and SJBs out there were very bad, barely existing. All we

10 could do was send Telex messages but the enemy was able to listen in.

11 Whatever we sent out by Telex or received by Telex was also read by the

12 enemy. The same applies to phone lines, and you can see that from

13 intercepts. Everything was eavesdropped. So we could send the

14 information to Sarajevo and Sarajevo could forward that information to

15 them at the same time. There was no direct, dedicated phone line between

16 us and the public security stations. And we were unable to issue any

17 orders to those public security stations, either directly or indirectly,

18 except by sending messages by courier. And of course that took quite

19 some time.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see D4447 [as interpreted]

22 again, page 20 and it's 18 in English.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Please take a look at the page where that starts with the name

25 "Planojevic" or the section that starts with his name. We got the right

Page 42232

1 document although the number is wrong in the transcript.

2 Before your reply, the fourth bullet point from the bottom

3 attributed to Planojevic:

4 " ... take measures to ensure that our members know what awaits

5 them if they commit a crime."

6 What was the position with regard to this? Were efforts made to

7 implement this?

8 A. I insisted several times with Planojevic that all police officers

9 should be informed that we are to honour the law and regulations and you

10 also demanded as much from us always. That was our duty and we acted in

11 the same way in our relations with the CSBs and SJBs. We insisted that

12 they act in accordance with the laws and regulations. If they failed to

13 do so, they would be criminally prosecuted, maybe not right away but at

14 some point certainly.

15 Q. Thank you. Please look at this last-but-one priority and tell us

16 what the position was with regard to the ethnic affiliation of

17 perpetrators of crimes, this part that begins "our priority."

18 A. We always insisted that crime victims are all equal and so are

19 perpetrators of crimes, so that any crime of which we learned must be

20 investigated and, if possible, an investigative magistrate and a

21 prosecutor must be involved, we must do our part of the work and all

22 documentation must be forwarded to the appropriate places so that it

23 might be used later.

24 Q. Thank you. Now please the sentence that you uttered here, is it

25 the only thing you said then or did you say more? Can you see it here?

Page 42233

1 A. Which sentence do you mean?

2 Q. The one under your name, Cedo Kljajic, it's underneath what

3 Planojevic said. It only says:

4 "He stressed the need to document crimes as a matter of priority,

5 so criminal reports can be filed."

6 A. Well, you see, those minutes were often made by people who did

7 not record everything that was said and that was relevant. I'm sure that

8 this applies to these minutes as well. I can't have said one single

9 sentence. I must have said a lot more. This is just a -- one of the

10 conclusions, but the minute-taker summarised it this way.

11 Q. Did you get this document for you to authorise what you said?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Thank you.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we get page 5 of the same

15 document up now.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Can you say what this means, summarise -- summary of discussions,

18 and can we rely on this summary as being comprehensive, complete? It

19 says "page 2," although it's page 5 of the document. It's 5 in e-court

20 and 2 in the hard copy.

21 A. You know what? In principle I can't say how accurate and

22 comprehensive this is and how much it reflects what was said at the

23 meeting. The person who took minutes, it all depended on who he was, how

24 professional, how fast he was, and how quickly he could take notes to

25 interpret those notes later. It was his own free will to interpret the

Page 42234

1 words and produce the final minutes. The minutes usually did not reflect

2 what was actually said at the meeting.

3 Q. Thank you. Were meetings sometimes recorded and then

4 transcribed?

5 A. I don't know that any of the meetings that I participated in were

6 recorded and then transcribed.

7 Q. Thank you. On page 17 you stated that you suffered pressure from

8 the local police before the war broke out. What was it that intimidated

9 people? What caused dissatisfaction among the local police before the

10 war broke out?

11 A. Before the war broke out, they had a lot of objections about the

12 work of the Ministry of the Interior and a lot of complaints. They filed

13 applications for filling up a position with certain people. If the

14 conditions had been normal and if the Muslim side had not obstructed

15 matters, those people would have been appointed within seven to 15 days

16 pursuant to their proposals. However, those people could not be deployed

17 for months given the way the Ministry of the Interior worked. It

18 happened that people were removed and new people were not appointed,

19 vacancies lasted for a long time, and this primarily applied to the

20 Serbs. They were removed from their positions and the Muslims performed

21 duties according to what they had been said by the SDA, not according to

22 the letter of the law.

23 Q. Thank you. On page 13 you were interrupted. You started saying

24 that the ministry could not do much because there was a combination of

25 people and you mentioned Delimustafic and you were interrupted. Can you

Page 42235

1 finish that sentence?

2 A. In the Ministry of the Interior there was a group of people who

3 really played like a good team. They had received instructions from the

4 SDA. They obstructed everything that would arrive from the Serbian side.

5 For example, if we were asked to intervene and to complete any of the

6 processes with regard to the appointment of a commander, we would go to

7 the personnel and then they would refer us to the administration for the

8 police; from there, they would refer us to the minister of the police.

9 Actually, we were running in circles. They made us run in circles.

10 After a certain while and after we went from one manager to the next, we

11 realised that it was to no avail because we could not exercise our rights

12 and you could not make sure that things were done by the book.

13 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kljajic, could you please tell us something about

14 the ethnic distribution of positions in the MUP and other bodies before

15 the multi-party elections. What was the purpose of such a distribution?

16 A. Before the multi-party elections, one could say that the Serbian

17 cadre had a slight percentage more personnel in the Ministry of the

18 Interior with regard to the ethnic structure in the Republic of Bosnia

19 and Herzegovina. However, the reason for such a representation was

20 primarily the fact that the Serbs were loyal to the Ministry of the

21 Interior. Whenever there was a job opening, for example, for a

22 policeman, a dozen of Serbs would apply, whereas there would be only five

23 Muslims and one or none Croat. This means that they were simply not

24 interested and this is why the Serbs had a slight prevalence, if I can

25 put it that way, they had a slight majority.

Page 42236

1 Q. What I meant, Mr. Kljajic, is what you were saying about

2 managerial positions, one Serb, one Croat, one Muslim. Did such a

3 situation exist even before the multi-party elections? What was the

4 person of such a distribution? Why was that taken into account among the

5 managers?

6 A. Before the war, i.e., before the multi-party elections there was

7 a lot attention paid to the balance among the managers in view of the

8 ethnic structure of those managers. It had to be one Serb, one Muslim,

9 one Croat, and that applied to the minister, his deputy,

10 under-secretaries, and down the scale. The same applied to the

11 assistants. For example, if the assistant minister was a Muslim, his

12 deputy would have been a Serb or a Croat and so on and so forth. A lot

13 of attention was paid to the ethnic composition.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I note the time.

15 I will finish within the next few minutes before the break.

16 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Kljajic, in that sense could one control the other so as to

18 prevent illegal deals along ethnic lines?

19 A. Of course. But there was also a lot of trust because before the

20 multi-party elections all the personnel was duty-bound to comply with the

21 laws and regulations. After the multi-party elections, when the Muslims

22 took over the Ministry of the Interior, there wouldn't have been any

23 problems if they had continued working in the same way in compliance with

24 the law. Problems arose when they started disobeying the law, when they

25 started disobey being the rules and regulations of the service.

Page 42237

1 Q. Thank you. Mr. Kljajic, did the Serbian Democratic Party or did

2 I impose people at any level in the police, people who had not been

3 members of the police before that and who were not professional in

4 discharging their duties?

5 A. I believe that the SDS paid most attention to appointing people

6 who were professional and who were career police officers. The SDA

7 appointed people who came from other services, from other bodies, who

8 absolutely had nothing whatsoever to do with the police and still they

9 became highly appointed officers.

10 Q. My last question: Among the Serbian cadre in the MUP, who was

11 supposed to look after the good representation and distribution of

12 positions and appointments to those positions?

13 A. By virtue of his position, this should have been the deputy

14 minister of the interior. He was the one who should have been tasked

15 with that.

16 Q. What's his name?

17 A. Vitomir Zepinic.

18 Q. Did you ever hear from me or from my closest associates anything

19 unfavourable about Muslims or Croats, especially that they should be

20 expelled or discriminated against?

21 A. I can claim with full responsibility that I have not heard a

22 single negative word, either from you or from your associates. Nobody

23 uttered any such thing in front of me.

24 Q. Did any of your acquaintances or associates in the MUP inform you

25 that they heard something of the kind?

Page 42247

1 prisoners of war who had surrendered in that area after the fall of

2 Srebrenica. Major Malinic and his men registered those prisoners during

3 the afternoon of the 13th of July.

4 General Savcic has reviewed a telegram bearing his name dated

5 13th of July, 1995, transmitting proposals by General Tolimir for the

6 handling of prisoners. Although he does not specifically recall this

7 telegram, General Savcic states that the procedures set forth in this

8 telegram, such as preventing journalists from having contact with

9 prisoners and preventing prisoners from being seen from the air, were

10 standard procedures for the handling of prisoners.

11 General Savcic states that he had no information that prisoners

12 from Srebrenica would be executed and that there is nothing from this

13 telegram that led him to believe that any prisoners would be killed.

14 That's all and I would give up this document that is not

15 translated. I will not lead it live. Thank you. I do not have

16 questions -- further questions at that moment.

17 JUDGE KWON: As you are aware, Mr. Savcic, your evidence in chief

18 in this case has been admitted in writing and you'll be cross-examined by

19 Mr. Nicholls.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: One quick correction to the summary. The

21 statement does not say that Major Malinic and his men registered those

22 prisoners. The statement says at paragraph 55 Major Malinic started

23 making a list of the prisoners.

24 Cross-examination by Mr. Nicholls:

25 Q. You're Karadzic's chief investigator in this case?

Page 42248

1 A. In a way, yes, although there is no rank of chief investigator in

2 formal terms.

3 Q. Well, that's what they call you in their motions, in the motion

4 for the subpoena of Zivanovic, 26th of March, 2013, in para 5; and the

5 motion for the subpoena for Andric, 26 April, 2013, at para 4. They

6 refer to you as the chief investigator. So whether that's a formal

7 position, that's the way the Defence views you, since they're filing that

8 with the Court. Right?

9 A. Well, basically that's it since I do the work of other

10 investigators too, one may conclude that I have that role in the team.

11 Q. All right. On 13th of July, 1995, as we just heard in the

12 summary, at that point you're commander of the 65th Motorised Protection

13 Regiment; right?

14 A. Yes, the 65th Protection Regiment Motorised --

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a minor point. In line 21

16 there is something missing: "I do organise the work," et cetera.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.

19 MR. NICHOLLS:

20 Q. And is that correct, that you organise the work of the other

21 investigators, as Mr. Karadzic just said? We missed that in the

22 transcript.

23 A. Yes, that is correct.

24 Q. Okay. So I'll ask it again. 13 July 1995, your position at that

25 time in the VRS is commander of the 65th Motorised Protection Regiment;

Page 42249

1 right?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. And Zoran Malinic, whose name we heard in the summary, is

4 commander of the regiment's military police platoon; correct?

5 A. The interpretation I received is completely incorrect.

6 Zoran Malinic was commander of the battalion of the military police, not

7 commander of a platoon of the military police.

8 Q. That may have been my error. Thank you. Battalion.

9 And you are his commander, Zoran Malinic's commander?

10 A. I was not his commander. I was commander of the protection

11 regiment.

12 Q. He was your direct subordinate?

13 A. Yes, as commander of the battalion of the military police, he was

14 directly subordinated to me.

15 Q. Okay. And on the 13th of July, 1995, as we've heard, he was in

16 Nova Kasaba, Zoran Malinic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. You were in Borike on that day, 13 July 1995?

19 A. In the broader area of Borike. I could not say that I was

20 exactly in Borike. I think I was in the village of Sjeversko, that's

21 what it's called, but this entire area is called Borike.

22 Q. That's what I meant, you were in the Borike area. And so was

23 General Tolimir on that day, 13 July 1995?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Now, again as we heard in the summary, the unit, the battalion

Page 42250

1 Zoran Malinic commands, took a large number of Muslim prisoners that day,

2 13 July 1995; right?

3 A. That is partly correct. Now, what is it that is not correct? I

4 would like to stress once again that every time one speaks in front of

5 this Court about that unit one always speaks of the battalion of the

6 military police. At that point in time, on the 13th of July, in

7 Nova Kasaba there were up to 20 men there, that is to say the

8 quartermasters of the military police and the duty service of the

9 military police --

10 Q. Let me -- let --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all other

12 microphones please be switched off when the witness is speaking. Thank

13 you.

14 MR. NICHOLLS:

15 Q. Let me stop you right there. I didn't ask you how many men

16 Zoran Malinic had at his disposal then, okay. On 13 July 1995,

17 Zoran Malinic and the men he commanded, however many of them there were,

18 took a large number of Muslim prisoners; correct?

19 A. But in your question you said "battalion of the military

20 police" --

21 Q. [Overlapping speakers]

22 A. -- which is a force to be reckoned with.

23 Q. Okay. I did not say complete battalion. Were the men he

24 commanded at Nova Kasaba on 13 July 1995, however many of them there

25 were, members of the military police battalion?

Page 42251

1 A. That's right. That is correct.

2 Q. He and those men took a large number of prisoners that day;

3 right?

4 A. That's correct too. However, I could not say whether all of them

5 had been taken prisoner or whether they had perhaps surrendered on their

6 own, but both did happen.

7 Q. Now, you spoke with Zoran Malinic about those prisoners on that

8 day by telephone?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. And you told him, this is from your statement at paragraph 53, to

11 secure the prisoners and to treat them in accordance with the Rules of

12 Service; correct?

13 A. Since it had to do with that subject matter, today I cannot

14 recall exactly what I said to him. But I assume that the conversation

15 had to be related to that and that I drew his attention to the personal

16 safety of his men and the people that had surrendered to him and the

17 people that he had taken prisoner.

18 Q. All right. Let me read you paragraph 53 of your statement that

19 you just swore to and said you would answer the questions the same way,

20 and you can look at your copy.

21 "I told him to call the regiment command and that a company of

22 about 30 men who were engaged on increased security of the KM

23 General Staff should be sent to the Nova Kasaba sector. I again told him

24 that he should secure the prisoners and to treat them according to Rules

25 of Service."

Page 42252

1 Now, do you assume you said that or is your statement true, that

2 that is what you said?

3 A. It's impossible to remember after all this time each and every

4 word that I said, but it's certain that we didn't discuss other topics

5 but the one - the one - that had cropped up that morning and that is

6 prisoners of war. So what I wrote in this paragraph is probably what I

7 said. Now, whether it was in this form, that is another matter.

8 Q. Please listen to my questions and little more carefully. I'm

9 asking you verbatim. Let's make this very simple. Is paragraph 53 of

10 your statement correct?

11 A. Paragraph 53 of my statement is correct.

12 Q. So in that case you did tell him to secure the prisoners and

13 treat them in accordance with the Rules of Service, right, as it says in

14 paragraph 53?

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. And by 17th of July, 1995, four days later, virtually all of

17 those prisoners who had been in the custody of your direct subordinate,

18 who you had spoken to about how to treat them, had been murdered; right?

19 A. What does that have to do with me and Zoran Malinic?

20 Q. Can you answer the question, please?

21 A. I am answering your question right now.

22 Q. Well, they're in your custody and they're murdered four days

23 later. I'm asking you if you accept that, that by the 17th of July the

24 vast amount of those men who were in the custody of your direct

25 subordinate were dead?

Page 42253

1 A. Mr. Prosecutor, I accept that on that 13th of July we handed over

2 all of those men, as we were ordered by the commander of the Main Staff,

3 to Bratunac. And I don't accept any more than that. On the 17th of

4 July, neither Zoran Malinic nor I nor any soldier from the

5 65th Motorised Protection Regiment had nothing to do with that. And it's

6 not only on the 17th, it's from the 13th in the evening. That is true.

7 Q. I didn't ask you after the 13th what they had to do with it. My

8 question is: Do you accept that by the 17th virtually all of those men

9 had been murdered or do you not accept that?

10 A. On the 17th of July and for many years after that, I did not know

11 that. And don't ask me now whether I know what happened on the 17th of

12 July and in some indirect way you are shifting responsibility for the

13 fate of these men to my men.

14 JUDGE KWON: No --

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I really have nothing to do

16 with that and you know that full well.

17 JUDGE KWON: No, Mr. Savcic, your answer is not acceptable.

18 Mr. Nicholls' question is whether you accept now that those, the

19 prisoners, whatever you call them, had been murdered at the time. Do you

20 know now or do you accept it?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I know that and now I accept

22 that.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, that was the question.

24 Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

25 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you.

Page 42254

1 Q. So in July 1995, over a thousand men who were held by

2 Zoran Malinic, your subordinate, ended up dead in a matter of days. When

3 did you learn that? You accepted it just now. When did you learn that,

4 that these men had been killed? I shouldn't say "killed," "murdered."

5 A. After a great many years I will tell you that on the 27th of July

6 I was sent from the area of Han Pijesak to the area of Drvar, that is

7 over 500 kilometres away from that area. For several months I was

8 involved in heavy fighting on a daily basis with the Croatian army and

9 the 5th and 7th Muslim Corps. I stayed there all the way up until the

10 end of 1995. In 1996 I was sent for training to the General Staff school

11 of the Army of Yugoslavia in Belgrade.

12 And the first information and intimations of these events I

13 started learning after the statement of General Krstic that was disclosed

14 in certain media in the BH. However, I wish to note there as well that

15 in the statement of General Krstic's the role of the protection regiment

16 in these events was presented in a completely wrong and erroneous manner,

17 so even then I did not know the real truth about these events. And

18 practically, it was only later when I entered this procedure of giving a

19 statement I had the opportunity of seeing certain documents and of

20 finding out the truth.

21 I wish to say one more sentence here, I hope that you won't mind

22 because of the time, and it has to do with the following. Two persons

23 were tried before this court who are friends of mine - otherwise, of

24 course they were not tried because of that, they were tried because of

25 their possible responsibility - it is Mr. Vinko Pandurevic and

Page 42255

1 Mr. Ljubisa Borovcanin. With these men I spent over three years with

2 them every day. We saw each other every day. We had coffee together,

3 read the newspapers together, played cards together, talked. I did not

4 hear a single word of -- from them that had to do with Srebrenica, and if

5 we are going to call this the full truth or it depends to what degree it

6 has been discovered, I practically learned of that when I started giving

7 my own statement and when I had an opportunity of seeing certain

8 documents. That is the truth concerning my knowledge about what happened

9 in Srebrenica.

10 Q. Okay. So the 1200-odd men or more under Malinic's control on

11 13 July, you didn't learn their fate until sometime after General Krstic

12 had been indicted; right? I'm talking about the people who were under

13 the -- in the custody of your subordinate.

14 A. If I understood your question correctly, it's much like your

15 previous one. These people were under the control of the military police

16 battalion of the 65th Protection Motorised Regiment for a very short

17 time. These -- the people were addressed at Nova Kasaba by the commander

18 of the Main Staff who said that they were going to be exchanged. So how

19 could I have known what later on would happen to them?

20 Q. You were -- let me move on. You were interviewed by the OTP in

21 2005, in October, by Mr. Peter McCloskey. Do you remember that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Did you tell the truth in that interview to the best of your

24 ability?

25 A. Absolutely, to the extent I was able to remember the answers to

Page 42256

1 the questions put to me, I gave those answers.

2 Q. And you've testified in this Tribunal before twice in the Popovic

3 and Tolimir cases; right?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. You testified truthfully then?

6 A. Absolutely truthfully.

7 Q. All right. We already went over that you were commander of the

8 65th Motorised Protection Regiment in July and that at that time your

9 deputy was Jovo Jazic; right?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. And speaking again of Zoran Malinic, his nickname at the time --

12 well, all the time probably is Zoka; right?

13 A. Well, basically whoever's name is Zoran is called Zoka where I'm

14 from. So we can say -- so I can answer yes, although I don't know if

15 many people called him that.

16 Q. Okay. That's a slightly strange answer. Is his nickname Zoka or

17 not?

18 A. I'm telling you, most people by the name of Zoran are called Zoka

19 by others, but that depends on the relationship between them. I didn't

20 call him Zoka. I called him major captain, you know.

21 Q. Okay. I'm not asking what most people named Zoran are named. In

22 your interview with Mr. McCloskey at page 6 you said:

23 "Commander of the military police battalion was Major

24 Zoran Malinic."

25 Question from Mr. Peter McCloskey:

Page 42257

1 "And his nickname?"

2 Answer from you:

3 "Zoka."

4 That was not really a nickname, Zoka. Everybody called him Zoka,

5 didn't they? Zoka, Zoran. So people called Zoran Malinic Zoka in July

6 1995, didn't they?

7 A. [No interpretation]

8 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your answer. We didn't hear the

9 interpretation, please.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I was not focused

11 on -- what was your question?

12 MR. NICHOLLS:

13 Q. I just read out your answer from your interview in 2005 where you

14 confirmed that Zoran Malinic's nickname was Zoka. I don't think it

15 should be that complicated of a question. Is his nickname Zoka or not?

16 A. Well, probably many people called him Zoka. I did not.

17 Q. Not probably. Did people call him Zoka? I don't want you to

18 speculate. If your answer's different now than from your interview, let

19 me know now you don't remember what his nickname was.

20 A. Well, there can be no other nickname given his first name. A

21 nickname is either derived from one's first name or -- well, his first

22 name was Zoran and I don't remember anyone calling him Malina, so it must

23 have been Zoka if that's relevant or not.

24 Q. Let me ask you this, don't worry about what's relevant and what

25 isn't: Have you ever heard someone call Zoran Malinic Zoka or refer to

Page 42258

1 him as Zoka ever?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. And Zoran Malinic's deputy was named

4 Aleksandar Lucic; correct?

5 A. You mean -- are you referring to July 1995?

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. I think so, but I was absent from the unit due to a injury almost

8 a year, but I think so.

9 THE ACCUSED: Absent. [Interpretation] Transcript line 14, it

10 should be "absent."

11 MR. NICHOLLS:

12 Q. Just to help you remember and keep this clear, let me try to

13 refresh your recollection from your testimony in the Popovic case at

14 T15236.

15 "Are you familiar with someone by the name of Aleksandar Lucic?"

16 Your answer:

17 "Yes. At that time he was lieutenant or captain. I can't

18 remember exactly, and his duty was deputy commander of the military

19 police battalion."

20 So he was Malinic's deputy; right?

21 A. Well, I told you I underwent medical treatment for almost a year.

22 Before my last injury he was company commander. I now cannot remember

23 that he was -- that he became battalion commander in the meantime. But

24 if I said so, it must be true. However, off the top of my head right

25 now, I can't say whether he was company commander or anything else.

Page 42259

1 Q. He was the deputy of the military police battalion; right? Not

2 the -- he was the deputy. That's what you said in 2007 in the Popovic

3 case.

4 A. Sir, he can be deputy even if he's commander of company 1. If --

5 in the establishment he has no deputy or if there is no deputy due to --

6 in the establishment. In an infantry battalion or a mountain battalion

7 or -- and similar unit, the commander of Company 1 can be deputy

8 battalion commander. So I cannot state it with any certainty, but you

9 are free to choose the variant that suits you best.

10 JUDGE KWON: I'm not following, Mr. Savcic. Does it mean that

11 your testimony in Popovic case was incorrect?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I could see that statement in

13 Serbian -- because even now, Mr. President, I'm not stating anything to

14 the contrary. Aleksandar Lucic was an officer in the military police

15 battalion. Before I was wounded, he was commander of the Company 1 of

16 that military police battalion. And automatically, that same person is

17 deputy battalion commander, if there is no deputy in the establishment.

18 If after a year when I returned he was really appointed deputy commander,

19 I don't know. But I can accept both possibilities.

20 MR. NICHOLLS:

21 Q. Okay. I'm not asking you to accept anything. I'm asking you to

22 answer a question. What you said in Popovic was about Aleksandar Lucic:

23 "His duty was deputy commander of the military police battalion."

24 I'm asking you if that's correct. Not what his rank was, not if

25 was also a company commander. Was his duty deputy commander as you

Page 42260

1 testified to here last -- the first time here under oath?

2 A. I'm under oath even now and I don't deny that Aleksandar Lucic

3 was a member of the military police battalion. Maybe the question put to

4 me then was different. But I repeat, the commander of Company 1 can at

5 the same time be deputy commander. Now, don't make me say that he had

6 been appointed by a written order and what have you. But you can say

7 that he was performing the duty of a deputy battalion commander.

8 Q. He was performing the duty of a deputy battalion commander;

9 right? That's what you just said.

10 A. Well, Mr. Prosecutor, we agree.

11 Q. Okay. Now, in July 1995 - and I'm not saying only then - but in

12 July and in 1995, the regiment, your regiment, was highly disciplined;

13 correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Could I have 65 ter 25457, please.

16 Q. You may remember this.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Could we go to the last page so that

18 General Savcic can see who signed it.

19 Q. And just so you know, if you didn't see the first page, this is

20 just an assessment of order and discipline in the 65th Motorised

21 Protection Regiment, that's what this is. Is that your signature?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Is it for you? Is there a "za" there? I don't see a "za." Or

24 maybe it is "za."

25 A. No, it doesn't say "za."

Page 42261

1 Q. So who signed that?

2 A. Vojislav Sarovic signed it.

3 Q. Okay. And who is he?

4 A. Vojislav Sarovic is chief of the training and operations organ of

5 the regiment.

6 Q. All right.

7 MR. NICHOLLS: Let's go to the first page, please, in both

8 languages.

9 Q. And if you'll see that sentence up there that ends with a 4 it

10 says:

11 "The final grade for order and discipline for the year 1995 is

12 very good (4)."

13 And that's correct; right?

14 A. Well, that's a subjective assessment. It's an analysis of an

15 order. The elements underlying this assessment are not mentioned here,

16 only the final grade is stated --

17 Q. You seem to have incredibly --

18 A. -- I can confirm it --

19 Q. I don't want to stop you from -- you can confirm it. Okay.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: Can we go to page 2 in both languages.

21 Q. And it's written here at the top of the page in the English - it

22 should be at the top in your language as well I believe:

23 "Even when the situation was the most difficult and people's

24 lives were in danger, nothing was done without issuing a command, which

25 is proof of exceptional training and exceptional discipline."

Page 42262

1 Right?

2 A. Oh, you cannot have top-notch -- a top-notch training level after

3 two months of training. In peace time the training lasts three times

4 longer, but we did whatever we could to train the soldiers as well as

5 possible to prepare them to carry out the basic military duties in a

6 unit.

7 Q. Okay --

8 A. I repeat that this is a subjective assessment of that officer. I

9 was much stricter in this respect.

10 Q. Right. Do you agree with that statement that I just read out to

11 you? You already told me it was a highly disciplined unit.

12 A. I agree with that. There is no doubt about that. This is the

13 only unit that absolutely carried out all tasks without complaining.

14 That's why we stayed so long on the front line. In principle, the answer

15 is yes; however, there could be individual incidents that were not in

16 keeping with this.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: May I tender the document, Your Honours?

18 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit P6470, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE KWON: While we are dealing with the admission,

22 Mr. Robinson, we admitted the 65 ter 2529 which is referred to in paras

23 57 and 61, but I take it that you are tendering only those parts, not the

24 entire JNA rules?

25 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct.

Page 42263

1 JUDGE KWON: If you could identify those pages and liaise with

2 the Registrar. And also 1D9178 which was referred to in para 8, I'm not

3 sure if that has been translated.

4 MR. ROBINSON: I know we do have a translation for that. Whether

5 that is uploaded or not -- whether you can see it or not, I don't know,

6 but we do have that.

7 JUDGE KWON: Could you see to it that that would be uploaded as

8 well.

9 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 In line 19, the -- it was not recorded that the General said

12 that's why we stayed longer on the front line up until -- up to a year

13 while other units were on shifts of one month. That was omitted.

14 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Savcic?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's exactly what I said.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

17 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Okay. Let's go back to 13 July and when you spoke with

19 Zoran Malinic on the phone from the field in the Borike area. You said

20 in your interview that you were using an RRU1 phone from the field;

21 right?

22 A. Yes, RRU1, that's a telephone for wireless calls.

23 Q. Thank you. Now, let's talk about the second call with Malinic

24 that day. That's at para 50 of your statement. It says:

25 "He told me that some UNPROFOR members asked for his help because

Page 42264

1 they did not consider it was safe for them to return to their base in

2 Potocari in view of the combat activities in Srebrenica."

3 Right, that's what it says?

4 A. What's your question?

5 Q. The question is that's the full truth, as far as you're

6 concerned, about why -- the interaction between DutchBat and

7 Zoran Malinic and the military police battalion on 13 July. DutchBat

8 came and said to -- to Zoran Malinic and said: We don't think it's safe

9 for us to go back to Potocari. Can you help us? Is that your truthful

10 testimony about what happened that day between DutchBat and the military

11 police battalion at Nova Kasaba?

12 A. I was informed in that way and I later learned that there were

13 three vehicles of the DutchBat with crews and that one vehicle was taken

14 away from them at Nova Kasaba and that was a signal that they should not

15 continue towards Srebrenica. They contacted the first military unit and

16 asked for help. That's what Major Malinic told me.

17 Q. Okay. Well, you're the chief investigator on this case. Have

18 you looked over the -- you know, in learning about the case, have you

19 looked over the DutchBat statements and testimony at all?

20 A. Well, not only their statements. This is a large trial, I cannot

21 read all statements, but I was even able to listen to some of their

22 testimonies.

23 Q. Okay. Well, if you listened to the testimony, which was 92 bis

24 in this case, of Witness Egbers, which is P00331, you would know that

25 what is in your statement is not correct according to Egbers. Mr. Egbers

Page 42265

1 testified at T2757 that what happened at Nova Kasaba is that they were

2 stopped, he and his DutchBat fellows, by soldiers pointing guns at them,

3 that they took his car and drove away with all the equipment, and that he

4 had to sit along the road with 10 or 12 others, DutchBat members, and

5 that these other 10 or 12 members had not succeeded to go past

6 Nova Kasaba and their cars had been taken. And he said again --

7 MR. NICHOLLS: This is for friends P00331 at e-court page 35.

8 Q. -- that he was brought to a school nearby Nova Kasaba where they

9 were stopped and that's where he met Major Zoran. And he says:

10 "I always called him by his first name. His last name was

11 Malinic."

12 And that he asked to be able to leave and Malinic said to him:

13 "Well, okay, you can go if you want to."

14 So he ordered three UN vehicles to be prepared with peacekeepers

15 and ordered them to try to leave the school and go nearby Nova Kasaba and

16 go back to Bratunac. And then this is what he said happened:

17 "But, unfortunately, one car was coming back, two others were

18 stolen by Bosnian Serbs, and they all walked back 500 metres with just

19 one car. So it wasn't possible for us to leave the site of the school by

20 our own means and we were not free to go."

21 And then he was asked:

22 "So what did you then decide to do?"

23 And Mr. Egbers responded -- answered:

24 "So I complained about that as well to this major and he told me

25 he had to contact Colonel Beara about this, and as soon as he is there at

Page 42266

1 the school he would try to arrange a safe return for us to Potocari."

2 So did you know that, that the DutchBat did not go to the 65th --

3 to the military police battalion of the 65th Protection Regiment and ask

4 for help, that they were halted there, their equipment was stolen, and

5 they weren't free to leave?

6 A. Prosecutor, even now from what you have read out, I'm not

7 convinced that this was done by members of the military police battalion.

8 You read out the statement of a Dutch officer. The information I

9 received was different, namely, that they were stopped near the school at

10 Nova Kasaba but not by military police battalion members. That was the

11 Drina Corps zone of responsibility. Many units were moving here or there

12 executing their tasks. I told you a short while ago what I heard, and I

13 know that many years later Zoran Malinic spoke to me about the details,

14 that they were never stopped by force, that they had the possibility to

15 communicate with their higher command. And only on the following day,

16 when the situation calmed down somewhat, they left, two Mercedes vehicles

17 were left at Nova Kasaba with Major Malinic. A protocol was made about

18 that and nobody ever claimed those vehicles.

19 Soon after IFOR forces arrived and they knew that those were

20 their vehicles. If they had had a report that anything had been stolen,

21 they would have done something about it. I believe that one of those

22 vehicles, a Mercedes or Puch, was salvaged or had to retire together with

23 the VRS. I don't believe that this was an accurate statement and these

24 people were not stopped by military police members but some -- with other

25 units of the VRS.

Page 42267

1 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, I see the time, but I could have one

2 question maybe.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

4 MR. NICHOLLS: Okay.

5 Q. So you knew that these DutchBat soldiers were stopped by, as you

6 say, another unit of the VRS and that some of their vehicles were taken;

7 right?

8 A. Upon first arriving at the school, they were in three vehicles.

9 They wanted to stay for a short while and continue towards Srebrenica --

10 Q. You're not answering my question. Were they stopped by another

11 unit of the VRS and not being allowed to continue?

12 A. I am answering your question. They were convinced that they

13 could continue. As soon as they were on the road again - and I believe

14 the Trial Chamber was there to see what it's like, the road is only a

15 hundred metres away from the school - they returned to the school again,

16 to Malinic. Why did they return if he was confiscating their property or

17 anything else? That's the information that I got.

18 Q. Were they stopped by another VRS unit and stopped from

19 continuing? You just said it was another unit that stopped them. Did

20 you know before you sat down today that they were stopped by another VRS

21 unit?

22 A. According to my information, yes, another unit from the command

23 of the Drina Corps.

24 Q. All right. So when we look at your statement which says on

25 paragraph 50:

Page 42268

1 "The second time that day when we spoke, he told me that some

2 UNPROFOR members asked for his help because they did not consider it was

3 safe for them to return to their base in Potocari, in view of the combat

4 activities in Srebrenica."

5 You think that is a fair and accurate way to present the evidence

6 to this Trial Chamber when you know they were stopped by a VRS unit from

7 continuing?

8 MR. ROBINSON: Excuse me, Mr. President, that's not a very fair

9 question since that paragraph describes his conversation with

10 Major Malinic on that day, not what he knows today.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: Well, if you only described the conversation, the

12 clear implication is that's what happened from reading this. If we're

13 supposed to take everything he says with a grain of -- a huge grain of

14 salt that it may be completely inaccurate, that explanation of why it's

15 not accurate is left out of the statement, that's another thing.

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber does not consider the question to be

18 unfair at all. Please continue, Mr. Nicholls.

19 MR. NICHOLLS:

20 Q. Can you answer the question, please.

21 A. I don't understand why you're getting upset while you're asking

22 questions, and I really fail to understand what you're -- what you're

23 claiming I knew or did not know.

24 Q. Listen carefully. I'm not getting upset. Listen carefully.

25 I'll read the question again.

Page 42269

1 JUDGE KWON: Do you have your statement, Mr. Savcic, with you?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President.

3 JUDGE KWON: It's paragraph 50.

4 Yes, if you could put your question again, Mr. Nicholls.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. All right. So when we look at your statement which says on

7 paragraph 50:

8 "The second time that day when we spoke he told me that some

9 UNPROFOR members asked for his help because they did not consider it was

10 safe for them to return to their base in Potocari, in view of the combat

11 activities in Srebrenica."

12 You think that's a fair and accurate way to present the evidence

13 to this Trial Chamber when you know that these DutchBat personnel were

14 stopped by the VRS unit from continuing?

15 A. Yes. But after they first called at the school and tried to

16 leave, but that has nothing to do with the military police battalion but

17 some other unit and they returned to the school and stayed until the 14th

18 or whenever. They spent the night there.

19 Q. You don't find that misleading in any way?

20 A. I don't understand you. What do you mean "misleading"? How

21 misleading ?

22 THE ACCUSED: Transcript.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't want to interrupt, but on

25 page 88, line 23, General Savcic said, "I trust my major more than a

Page 42270

1 lieutenant who gave unprecise testimony, unprecise evidence," after the

2 VRS part.

3 JUDGE KWON: Let me help you understand Mr. Nicholls' point.

4 Take a look at paragraph 50. In your statement you said that

5 DutchBat members couldn't go to the Srebrenica area because they

6 considered that it was not safe for them in view of the combat activities

7 in Srebrenica, but you didn't tell here about the VRS another unit, be it

8 DK or whatever else, stopping the DutchBat soldiers at the time. So

9 Mr. Nicholls said that that was misleading. Do you agree?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree that I omitted to state

11 that fact; however, I did not wish to mislead anybody and I believe that

12 the way we treated UNPROFOR members is something that the protection

13 regiment can be very proud of.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll adjourn for today and continue tomorrow

15 at 9.00.

16 THE ACCUSED: I would like to -- this correction of transcript to

17 be confirmed.

18 JUDGE KWON: What, Mr. Karadzic?

19 THE ACCUSED: What I said about 88 page, 23 -- line 23.

20 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes, I didn't ask the witness.

21 But I take it you confirm what Mr. Karadzic said, Mr. Savcic?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As regards my opinion, or rather,

23 my position that I trust my major more than I do a lieutenant who didn't

24 convey a message properly, yes.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

Page 42271

1 The hearing is adjourned.

2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.10 p.m.,

3 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 31st day of

4 July, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.