Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42429

 1                           Tuesday, 29 October 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everybody.  I hope that everybody has

 6     been re-energised for the proceedings to come.  There are several matters

 7     I'd like to deal with before we begin hearing the witness's evidence.

 8             The Chamber will first issue its oral ruling on Tomislav Kovac's

 9     request for assignment of counsel for the purposes of his testimony in

10     this case filed on the record on 23rd of October, 2013.

11             The Chamber notes that the Prosecution indicated via e-mail that

12     it did not wish to respond to this request and that the accused filed a

13     submission in support thereof on the 28th of October, 2013.  The Chamber

14     has considered Article 5 of the directive on the assignment of counsel,

15     which provides for the assignment of counsel to three categories of

16     individuals:  Suspects, accused persons, and any person detained under

17     the authority of the Tribunal.  Although Kovac does not fall under any of

18     these three categories at the moment, given that he was interviewed by

19     the Prosecution as a suspect on several occasions between 2003 and 2010,

20     and that he was assigned counsel for the purpose of his testimony in the

21     Stanisic and Zupljanin case in 2012, the Chamber orders the Registrar, on

22     an exceptional basis, to assign counsel to Mr. Kovac and allows counsel

23     to be present in the courtroom during his testimony.

24             The Chamber will now turn to the Prosecution motion to exclude in

25     part evidence of Tomislav Kovac filed on the 21st of October, 2013, as

Page 42430

 1     well as the Prosecution's motion for leave to reply to the accused's

 2     response thereto filed on the 28th of October, 2013.

 3             The Prosecution requests that paragraphs 7, 12 through 15, 19 and

 4     20 of the statement of Tomislav Kovac be excluded as they are not

 5     relevant to the charges in the indictment.  The accused in his response,

 6     filed on 28 October 2013, opposes the motion on the grounds that the

 7     Prosecution was allowed to elicit evidence on historical matters.  Also,

 8     on the 28th of October, the accused circulated a revised version of

 9     Kovac's statement.  Having reviewed the submissions and the statement,

10     the Chamber is of the view that paragraphs 7, 12, 14, 15, 19, and 20

11     should be excluded as they pertain to issues not relevant to the

12     indictment.  However, the Chamber is of the view that paragraph 13, as it

13     appears in the revised statement, may remain as it is at least of some

14     relevance to the time frame of the indictment.

15             The Chamber therefore grants the motion in part, orders the

16     exclusion of paragraphs 7, 12, 14, 15, 19 and 20, allows the accused to

17     tender the remainder of Kovac's statement pursuant to Rule 92 ter, and

18     denies the Prosecution's request for leave to reply.

19             The Chamber will now issue an oral ruling on the Prosecution

20     motion to amend Exhibits P4771 and P7 -- strike it, P4772, filed on the

21     25th of September, 2013.

22             In the motion, the Prosecution seeks to amend the expert report

23     of Witness Dusan Janc admitted under seal as P4771, as well as the public

24     redacted version admitted as P4772, by replacing charts included in the

25     report with revised versions.  The Prosecution submits that it discussed

Page 42431

 1     the issue with the Defence on the 18th of September, 2013, and that the

 2     Defence does not object to the replacement of the charts.

 3             The Trial Chamber has reviewed the revised charts and in

 4     accordance with its ruling of the 6th of March, 2012, concerning the

 5     expert report of witness Dusan -- I'm sorry, Dean Manning, the Chamber is

 6     satisfied that the revised charts shall replace the old versions and

 7     instructs the Prosecution to upload them into e-court as such.

 8             Next in relation to the accused's motion to admit documents

 9     previously marked for identification, before a ruling on that motion, the

10     Chamber would like to inquire with the Prosecution regarding its

11     submission on the documents marked for identification as D2518.

12             I forgot the -- to mention the date of filing of the motion but

13     it was on the 5th of September, 2013.

14             The Chamber notes the Prosecution's response to the accused's

15     motion on 13th of September, 2013, wherein in objects to the admission of

16     MFI D2518 based on concerns of authenticity given that the original

17     document in B/C/S is not available.  At this stage, the Chamber would

18     like to receive further submissions from the Prosecution as to its

19     reasons for being concerned about the authenticity of this document.

20             For the remainder of matters, I'd like to go into private

21     session.

22                           [Private session]

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

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20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We are back in open session, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Are there any matters to be discussed?  Then we will

23     bring in the witness.

24             Yes, good morning, Mr. Harvey.

25             MR. HARVEY:  Good morning, Your Honours.  May I, before we start,

Page 42433

 1     then, just introduce Ms. Ellen Naughton who was been with my team since

 2     June of this year.  She is a graduate of Bond University in Australia

 3     with a bachelor of laws and bachelor of international relations.  Thank

 4     you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 6                           [The witness entered court]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, sir.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  If you could take the solemn declaration, please.

10             THE WITNESS:  I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

11     whole truth and nothing but the truth.

12                           WITNESS:  JOHN ZAMETICA

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated and make yourself

14     comfortable.  Mr. Zametica, before you commence your evidence, I must

15     draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at

16     the Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E).  Under this rule, you may object to

17     answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from

18     the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate you in a

19     criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying something

20     that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or

21     saying something that might provide evidence that you might have

22     committed a criminal offence.

23             However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you

24     and, as a consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you

25     know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the

Page 42434

 1     question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your

 2     testimony, compelled under such circumstances, could not be used in any

 3     case that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the

 4     offence of giving false testimony.

 5             Do you understand what I have just told you, sir?

 6             THE WITNESS:  I do.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

 9     Good morning, my learned friends.  Good morning, everyone.  I'm glad that

10     we are in good form, all of us, after the break.

11                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

12        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Zametica.

13        A.   [Interpretation] Good morning.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zametica, I know that you understand both

15     languages but here we -- every word of Mr. Karadzic should be translated

16     so could you put a pause between the question and answer --

17             THE WITNESS:  I will.

18             JUDGE KWON:  -- which is very imperative here.

19             THE WITNESS:  I understand.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please proceed.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22        Q.   As your testimony will be live, I will try to ask you some

23     relevant questions in the briefest form possible, as the answers to those

24     questions could help us to understand the situation and what you had the

25     opportunity to witness and see personally.

Page 42435

 1             Can you tell us, briefly, your first and last name, your father's

 2     name, when and where you were born, and everything else that you consider

 3     important about your background.

 4        A.   I was born in Banja Luka, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1955.  The

 5     name of my father was Muris.  He was a Muslim.  My mother, Olga, was of

 6     mixed Slovak-German descent.  Although I was born in Banja Luka, I didn't

 7     live there very long.  My mother divorced my father when I was still a

 8     baby, and my mother, of course, took me with her when she returned to the

 9     place where she came from, which is a Slovak village north of Belgrade in

10     the -- what was then known as the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.

11     I was given the name Omer, I shall spell that out, O-m-e-r, which was a

12     Muslim name.  Just like Francois is recognisably a French name or Helmut

13     is recognisably a German name, Muslim name Omer was recognisably very

14     Muslim and that was the name I was given at my birth.  But I grew up in

15     this Slovak village called Padina and my mother tongue was Slovak.  It

16     was not Serbian or Serbo-Croat as it was then known.  I grew up in a

17     house where Slovak and German were spoken.  My mother and grandmother

18     conversed exclusively in German.  And I went to elementary school, a

19     Slovak elementary school, so I grew up actually among Slovaks, who were a

20     national minority in Yugoslavia living among many other national

21     minorities in that province of Vojvodina.

22             Subsequently, my mother's career took her to Belgrade and

23     I continued my elementary education in Belgrade where, of course, I had

24     to learn this new language called the Serbo-Croat language.  But we only

25     stayed in Belgrade, I think, for three years because my mother's career

Page 42436

 1     then took her to Ljubljana, the capital of the then Socialist Republic

 2     Slovenia, and I had to learn yet another new language, this time Slovene,

 3     which is quite different from Serbo-Croat.  And I continued my elementary

 4     education in Slovenia, started my secondary education there too.

 5             When I was 18, this was back in 1973, my mother and I moved to

 6     England for family reasons.  My mother decided to remarry and she married

 7     someone who at the time worked and lived in London.  So I had to learn

 8     yet another language, this time English.  When I still lived in

 9     Yugoslavia I used to go and visit my father in Sarajevo, where he lived,

10     quite frequently.  So the -- what that meant was that I actually got to

11     know Yugoslavia quite well, or perhaps better than your average Yugoslav.

12        Q.   [Microphone not activated].

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Could you now please also summarise for

16     us the progression of your education, by just listing the degrees you

17     were awarded, if you can?

18        A.   I received my university, my higher education in England.  I went

19     to several English universities.  I obtained a BA in modern history and

20     politics.  I obtained an MA in 20th century international history, and

21     I also obtained a Ph.D.  I specialised in -- in the area of the Cold War.

22     I was very interested in the initial stages of the Cold War, and I did a

23     Ph.D. on British strategic planning, on British military planning during

24     the early stages of the Cold War, 1945-46-47.  That was my main academic

25     interest, and the Ph.D. had nothing to do with Yugoslavia.  So I did

Page 42437

 1     something in mainstream British history or international history.

 2             In between my MA and my Ph.D., I -- I worked for a while at an

 3     English secondary school, I taught as a teacher, I taught modern British

 4     history and modern European history.  And subsequent to that, I served

 5     during 1980-81 in the Yugoslav People's Army, as it was called.  I did a

 6     stint in the infantry, as an infantryman.  So this was the time just

 7     after Tito had died.  But immediately after completing my military

 8     service, I returned to England to do my Ph.D., which I completed in 1986.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I hope that this answer also included everything that

10     you held in terms of professional positions.  Is there anything that you

11     might add about that?  Before coming into the midst of our crisis, what

12     were the positions that you held?  You worked in some institutes; is that

13     right?

14        A.   That's right.  But before I started working at the International

15     Institute for Strategic Studies in London, which was, I think, back in

16     1990, I had a series of part-time jobs teaching international history,

17     Cold War.  I used to teach at, for example, I used to teach for the open

18     university, I used to teach a course on nuclear weapons.  I used to teach

19     international history for the department of extramural studies at the

20     University of Cambridge.  I taught international history for a while

21     at -- as a tutor, as an external tutor at Wadham College, Oxford.  But

22     those were not permanent appointments.

23             The institute you referred to, the International Institute for

24     Strategic Studies, offered me a post in 1990 at a time when Yugoslavia

25     began to disintegrate, and they needed someone who was an expert on the

Page 42438

 1     Balkans.  Strictly speaking, I was not an expert on the Balkans.  I was

 2     an expert on the Cold War.  And in fact, I had published on the Cold War,

 3     academic pieces, essays and articles, but I had also published an article

 4     on Yugoslavia for "The Times" newspaper and they noticed that.  And as a

 5     result, they wanted to talk to me because they needed someone who was an

 6     expert on the Balkans.  Those were few and far between at the time in

 7     the -- in the UK.  So I was offered this job, and I took it.

 8             After I completed my stint at the International Institute for

 9     Strategic Studies, I worked as a research fellow at the Polytechnic of

10     Central London, which subsequently became the University of Westminster.

11     You may or may not know that all the polytechnics in the U.K. overnight

12     became universities.  So -- but that was my last appointment in the UK

13     before I went to Bosnia.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Before we go further, line 18 on previous page

15     should read "International Institute for Strategic Studies."

16             And, Dr. Zametica, you said a while ago that you did a stint in

17     the JNA.  Could you expand on it?  Was it a compulsory on your part?  And

18     what was your nationality then?

19             THE WITNESS:  The JNA, the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or the

20     Yugoslav People's Army, the system in Yugoslavia at the time was that you

21     had to -- if you were an able-bodied young man over 18 you had to do your

22     stint in the military.  There was an exception, however, and the

23     exception pertained to those people who had residence abroad.  So in my

24     case, I didn't have to serve in the JNA because I had residence abroad.

25     So it wasn't compulsory for me and it would not have been -- I would not

Page 42439

 1     have commited an illegal action had I not joined the army or agreed to go

 2     there.

 3             But in my case, you know, it was a personal decision.  I believed

 4     that it was part of a man's education to do a stint in the army, and

 5     I thought, you know, a man's education is kind of incomplete if he

 6     doesn't have some military experience.  So even though many people

 7     considered it a strange thing to do, for me to leave the UK and go to

 8     Yugoslavia to do a period in the army at a time when there was a great

 9     deal of speculation about the possibility of a Soviet attack on

10     Yugoslavia following Tito's death, I thought that I should nevertheless

11     do it, and I -- I don't regret doing it.  So I hope I have --

12             JUDGE KWON:  And I take it your nationality was then a Yugoslav?

13             THE WITNESS:  Well, my -- as you know in Yugoslavia, you could

14     declare yourself Serb, Croat, Slovene, whatever, but there was a special

15     category which was allowed for those who considered themselves as

16     Yugoslavs.  And in the population censuses which took place when I was

17     still living in Yugoslavia, I would always declare myself a Yugoslav.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Could you just tell us briefly what you

21     knew and to what extent about our crisis in Yugoslavia, in the 1990s,

22     before you came to Bosnia and joined the Bosnian Serb leadership?

23        A.   My job at the International Institute for Strategic Studies was

24     to do -- was to prepare or write what they called an Adelphi paper.

25     Adelphi papers were short studies about 90, 100 pages long, so we are

Page 42440

 1     talking about a booklet, which the institute publishes in relation to

 2     whatever current crises are going on in the world or important

 3     international issues that need to be addressed.  Because Yugoslavia began

 4     to find itself in a crisis in the late 1990s -- late 1980s and the

 5     beginning of 1990s, that should be late 1980s, I was asked to prepare a

 6     paper on the Yugoslav crisis.

 7             So at the time I began my work there was still no war, but

 8     obviously I had to follow the situation very closely.  I was subscribed

 9     to several newspapers from different parts of Yugoslavia.  I went on

10     several visits in Yugoslavia in order to do research for my paper.  I met

11     quite a few actors on the Yugoslav scene at the time, as well as

12     journalists, diplomats, people like that.  So, yes, I -- I had to very

13     closely follow the situation, and be, as it were, at the cutting edge of

14     the research on the subject.  That was expected of me.  So on a daily

15     basis I followed events, yeah.

16        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Could you tell us whether you and I

17     knew each other before this crisis, whether we had any kind of personal

18     relationship?  Actually, you can also tell us when we first met and how

19     our cooperation evolved before you arrived.

20        A.   We certainly did not know each other before the crisis developed.

21     The one person on the Bosnian Serb side that I knew well, at the

22     beginning of the crisis, was the late Nikola Koljevic.  I also met

23     Biljana Plavsic on one of my visits to Yugoslavia, to Sarajevo.  But

24     I did not meet you, I believe, before sometime in 1992, and if I remember

25     correctly, we first met in Villa Bosanka in Belgrade after the war in

Page 42441

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina had already begun, but we did have, I think, telephone

 2     conversations beforehand.  So we knew each other on the telephone, and

 3     you probably gathered information about me from -- from Professor

 4     Koljevic, maybe also from Mrs. Plavsic, I don't know, but we did -- we

 5     certainly did not know each other before the crisis.  And, well, I think

 6     I have answered the question.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  When did you come to Bosnia-Herzegovina, or rather,

 8     Republika Srpska, and what was the position that you came to?  What was

 9     your role, what was your position, in the Bosnian Serb leadership?

10        A.   I arrived in -- in Republika Srpska in, I think, October 1993.

11     When I arrived I still had no position as such, and I was not given one

12     until, I think, February 1994, when you appointed me your advisor.  But

13     my advisory role, as it were, concerned the area of international

14     relations, which is where my expertise lay.  In other words,

15     communicating with the international community.  I was your aide in

16     matters concerning relations with international organisations, the

17     diplomatic effort that Republika Srpska was making.  Of course, in all

18     this, my knowledge of the West and my knowledge of the English language

19     presumably played a role in my appointment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  On the whole, how were you received, by me, by the

21     leadership of the Bosnian Serbs?

22        A.   Well, my problem in -- in Republika Srpska was my Muslim

23     background.  I say "my problem."  I didn't have a problem with my Muslim

24     background but I think some people did.  Certainly, Professor Koljevic

25     did not, and certainly you did not.  But I think some others may have had

Page 42442

 1     such a problem, which is, I suppose, understandable.  I think your --

 2     your wife was suspicious of my background.  I think your daughter, too,

 3     didn't like me because of my ethnic background.  But you never exhibited

 4     any feelings that would indicate to me you had a problem with that.  On

 5     the contrary, you -- you were very open about the fact that you knew my

 6     ethnic background but that was absolutely no problem for you.  And I must

 7     say, had I -- had I felt that you in any way disliked me on account of my

 8     ethnicity, I would have left.  I would not have felt comfortable.  But

 9     I never felt uncomfortable with you because of that.  I think some people

10     in the army didn't like me because of it, or thought I was suspect

11     because of it, but I didn't pay much attention to that.  I felt very

12     comfortable working with you.

13             I should perhaps add that within your own family, your wife and

14     your daughter, as I subsequently found out from you, had drawn to your

15     attention the fact that I had a Muslim background and that perhaps I was

16     not the right person to be appointed in the place where I was, but

17     I think you fought against that and I must say this is to your credit.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the army and persons close to me.  In

19     addition to ethnic background, were there other reasons for suspicion, in

20     terms of your British background?

21        A.   [Interpretation] Well, possibly.  Sorry.  [In English] Maybe so

22     but I would not like to speculate on the subject.  I really don't know

23     what was being said behind my back.

24        Q.   Thank you.  But apart from that, on the whole, did you manage to

25     get insight into what was going on?  Were you part of brainstorming

Page 42443

 1     sessions, the process of decision making, especially in terms of contacts

 2     with foreigners, humanitarian issues and so on?

 3        A.   Given the position I held in the Presidency, I was privy to a lot

 4     of information.  I think I was privy to everything that was important.

 5     So you always shared with me information about the international scene

 6     that you had, information about the domestic scene, information about

 7     relationship with Milosevic, information concerning relationships --

 8     relationship with the Army of Republika Srpska.  So everything that was

 9     important and you knew about it, in principle I would also know about it.

10     So, yes, I was -- I was privy to a lot of information.

11             I must say I -- I did not read intelligence reports.  There are

12     two kinds of intelligence reports reaching Presidency, I think, on a

13     daily basis:  Military intelligence and state security intelligence.  But

14     you had your special advisors for those two sectors.  I think they were

15     General Subotic for military matters and Gordan Milinic for state

16     security matters, so they would read those reports.

17             Although I must say I didn't miss much, it would appear, in the

18     sense that you would sometimes share or show me intelligence reports.

19     And I remember one occasion when, I think it was in 1994, when you asked

20     me to come to your office, you asked me to sit down and you handed me a

21     report, and you asked me:  "Read it, please, and tell me what you think

22     about it."  And so I started reading it and it was a military

23     intelligence report signed by General Tolimir, who was the head of the

24     Bosnian Serb military intelligence, and it was quite a long report.  And

25     when I finished reading it, you asked me:  "Well, what do you think about

Page 42444

 1     it?"  And I said:  "President, I've never read so much rubbish in my

 2     life."  And you laughed and said:  "Yes, exactly.  This is what they do.

 3     They just send me lies."  And you said:  "You know what I think General

 4     Tolimir does every morning?  He gets up, drinks his coffee, reads his

 5     newspapers, then takes his scissors, starts cutting the newspapers, makes

 6     a collage, and then starts typing his military intelligence reports which

 7     he then sends to me.  And I'm never again," you said, if I remember

 8     correctly, "I'm never again going to read the rubbish."  And so this is

 9     where it ended.

10             But I mention this episode just to illustrate the fact that what

11     you were receiving from your own people, quote unquote, did not, it would

12     appear, amount to very good intelligence.

13        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  You were asked to appear in public from

14     time to time and present the views of the leadership with regard to

15     particular matters.  Were there ever any misunderstandings?  Did we ever

16     have to issue denials of anything that you presented as our position?  Or

17     was everything always accurate?

18        A.   No.  I cannot remember a single occasion when you or either

19     anyone else from the leadership, civilian leadership or even military

20     leadership of Republika Srpska ever denied anything I said in public.  So

21     I cannot remember a single such occasion.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell the Chamber whether you became aware

23     of my positions on war and peace?  And to the best of your knowledge,

24     what were these positions and what were they like?

25        A.   That's a rather large question you just put to me.  I remember

Page 42445

 1     one occasion when we were talking to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, when you said to

 2     him -- and I cannot remember the exact date, but I do remember that you

 3     said to him:  "Mr. Akashi, I'm not interested in cease-fires.  I'm

 4     interested in a permanent peace settlement."  And I quote this, these

 5     words of yours, in order to illustrate what essentially your approach was

 6     to the questions of war and peace.

 7             Of course, you, before talking about cease-fires or permanent

 8     peace settlement, there was a period when you had to -- when you were

 9     negotiating with the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats about a

10     political settlement in the context when there was still peace, in other

11     words before the hostilities broke out in -- in 1991 -- sorry, in 1992 in

12     Bosnia.  And of course, I was following all of this from my position in

13     London at the International Institute for -- for Strategic Studies, and

14     there were two particular episodes which stand out from that period.  One

15     is -- one is the attempt to reach a political settlement in Bosnia, an

16     attempt associated with the name of Adil Zulfikarpasic.  And the other

17     episode that stands out is the so-called Cutileiro Peace Plan.

18             Now, as far as I know, you did your best to reach a settlement

19     with Mr. Adil Zulfikarpasic, who -- who was co-founder of the Stranka

20     Demokratske Akcije, the SDA, the Muslim party, to call it simply, the

21     Muslim party in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The other founder was, of course,

22     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.  But Mr. Zulfikarpasic, whom I knew personally

23     before the war, Mr. Zulfikarpasic subsequently broke away from the SDA,

24     which he helped found, and founded his own party called the MBO, the

25     Muslimanska Bosnjacka Organizacija, but he will be remembered in history

Page 42446

 1     for his effort to -- to ensure peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina before --

 2     before what he feared, war broke out.  And in order to do that he went to

 3     Mr. Izetbegovic, asking him, you know, are you aware that we have -- this

 4     is summer of 91 -- are you aware, he asked him, that we are about to, you

 5     know, start fighting each other, with the Serbs and the Croats and so on?

 6     And according to Zulfikarpasic's account, Mr. Izetbegovic authorised him

 7     to go and negotiate with the Serb side about a possible -- about a

 8     possible deal, settlement, with the Serbs, within some kind of

 9     Yugoslavia.  Although, of course, hostilities already had broken out in

10     Yugoslavia on 25th of June, 1991, with Slovenia and Croatia declaring

11     independence, but there was still, you know, Serbia, Montenegro,

12     Macedonia, and of course Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13             And Mr. Zulfikarpasic thought he had Mr. Izetbegovic's backing

14     for this so he approached you and your colleagues in the Bosnian Serb

15     leadership, Mr. Koljevic, Mrs. Plavsic, Mr. Krajisnik, and according to

16     his account, there was agreement between you.  And he subsequently went

17     to Belgrade to see Mr. Milosevic, who also agreed with the proposals,

18     which amounted to some kind of rump Yugoslavia containing

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina and possibly Croatia.  But if Croatia didn't want it,

20     it could secede.

21             Now, the interesting thing about that particular peace

22     initiative, as it were, was that it was the only one that did not propose

23     a territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and you had agreed to it,

24     according to Mr. Zulfikarpasic.

25             Now, the whole thing, of course, came to nothing because

Page 42447

 1     subsequently Mr. Izetbegovic, according to Mr. Zulfikarpasic, turned

 2     around and didn't want to have anything to do with the settlement he

 3     initially approved of, and so the whole thing collapsed.  But it was an

 4     interesting attempt to -- to reach peace, not just in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     but -- but in the rest of Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia possibly and

 6     Croatia, which went wrong.  So that's why I mentioned this particular

 7     Zulfikarpasic initiative because I think it's kind of been forgotten and

 8     your own part in it has been forgotten.  And it -- although, you know, it

 9     was -- it was probably going to be difficult to implement it or to

10     completely agree on the package, it was still a better alternative

11     than -- than war.  But as I said, the whole thing collapsed,

12     unfortunately.

13             The other outstanding episode from the peace period, regarding

14     initiatives to reach a settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of course was

15     the Cutileiro Plan which you also backed and which initially

16     Mr. Izetbegovic also agreed to.  I can't remember the exact dates,

17     February 1992, March 1992.  This is the period we are talking about.

18        Q.   Dr. Zametica, may I -- may I just try to save time?  In relation

19     to what you know about Zulfikarpasic, did you actually talk to him about

20     that?  Did you learn certain things from him in personal contacts?

21        A.   Mr. Zulfikarpasic and I mostly talked about antiquarian books

22     because we shared a passion for collecting antiquarian books on the

23     Balkans, written mostly in French, German, English, and we were in fact

24     rivals up to a point as collectors.  But his funds were infinitely

25     greater than mine.  Yes, we also talked about politics.  But, no,

Page 42448

 1     regarding this particular matter, we didn't talk about.  I met him

 2     several times, but prior to this particular initiative which took place,

 3     I think July-August 1991.  Yeah, 1991, yes.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  Since Ambassador Cutileiro testified,

 5     could I ask you to summarise for us what you saw for yourself, what my

 6     position was with regard to peace efforts, peace plans, in which the

 7     international community mediated?  You took part in some of the

 8     decision-making, and you probably spoke about that, presenting our

 9     position to the public.

10        A.   After those two peacetime peace plans, which -- which -- well, it

11     seems that I don't have enough time to talk about the Cutileiro Plan, but

12     if you say that Ambassador Cutileiro has already been a witness here,

13     that must have been already covered.  So I'm not going to waste this

14     Tribunal's time talking about that, especially because I was not

15     personally involved.

16             But regarding your question now, regarding the other peace plans,

17     I think there were -- there were four more during the war, starting with

18     the Vance-Owen Plan, followed by the Owen Stoltenberg Plan, followed by

19     the Contact Group Plan, followed by in the -- in the end by the Dayton

20     Peace Plan which is the conference, the -- that ended the war in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Looking at those four plans, I think from my own

22     experience having been involved in most of them, your attitude was always

23     to gain a political settlement within Bosnia and Herzegovina that would

24     satisfy the Serb side, obviously, and I don't think there is a single

25     plan that you -- of those four that you particularly objected to.

Page 42449

 1     I think in essence you accepted all of them.

 2             You accepted even the Vance-Owen Plan.  I know that because even

 3     though the Bosnian Serbs as such rejected in the end the Vance-Owen Plan,

 4     you personally didn't.  The Serbs did but not you.  You accepted it.  You

 5     informed the members of the Assembly of Republika Srpska at the session

 6     in, I think, Bijeljina before the final rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan,

 7     but did you -- that you actually wanted to accept it.  This is what

 8     I heard from someone who was present then.  And you had in fact signed

 9     the Vance-Owen Plan in Athens, if I remember correctly.  I wasn't

10     personally involved with that, but this is what I understand was the

11     case.

12             Certainly, you accepted the Owen Stoltenberg Plan.  You also, in

13     essence, accepted the Contact Group Plan.  I mean, in the end it was

14     rejected by the Bosnian Serbs, but the Contact Group Plan was really

15     problematic in its semantics rather than in its essence.  And I knew that

16     you were personally in favour of it but couldn't really push it past the

17     opposition from, you know, the -- the -- some -- some, I would say,

18     vested interests on the Bosnian Serb side, maybe the -- some -- some

19     members of the Assembly who did not like the territorial aspect of it.  I

20     don't think the constitution was the problem.

21             And of course, you also accepted the Dayton Peace Plan.  That may

22     sound obvious but it isn't, really, because the delegation you sent to

23     Dayton, and I was a member of that delegation, it was an eight-member

24     delegation.  In Dayton we, in fact, rejected the final peace plan.  This

25     may or may not be well known, I don't know.  I don't think it's

Page 42450

 1     particularly well known in Republika Srpska or in Serbia or in

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina for that matter.

 3             What happened on the last day in Dayton, on the 21st of November,

 4     1995, was that Mr. Milosevic, who had pushed us aside, and so we hardly

 5     participated in the work of the Dayton conference, and of course

 6     Mr. Holbrooke, who was the main actor on the -- on behalf of the

 7     international community, if you like, or on behalf of the United States,

 8     the two are not the same, I should add, although very often they seem to

 9     be, Mr. Holbrooke was also quite happy to ignore us.  So the delegation

10     of Republika Srpska did not know until the last day what had actually

11     been agreed.  And on the last day, Mr. Milosevic came, accompanied by

12     Mr. Bulatovic of Montenegro and by Mr. Milan Milutinovic, the Serbian

13     Foreign Minister, and he showed us this map, and when Mr. Krajisnik, the

14     leader of our delegation in Dayton, saw the map, he went red in the face,

15     and told Mr. Milosevic that history and the Serbian people will never

16     forgive you this.  And we then, the members of the delegation of

17     Republika Srpska, subsequently held a little session where each one of us

18     had to declare himself, as it were, where he stood regarding the peace

19     plan at Dayton, and we all said that we opposed it for this or that

20     reason.

21             And so we left Dayton without signing the Dayton Accords.

22     Milosevic had Mr. Milutinovic sign it on our behalf, as it were, but the

23     Bosnian Serbs did not accept the Dayton settlement.

24             When we arrived in Belgrade, and we travelled in the same plane

25     with Mr. Milosevic and his delegation, we dispersed, we were told that

Page 42451

 1     next day there would be some kind of big conference in Belgrade and we

 2     should hang around in Belgrade, but that night we were all arrested at

 3     different locations in Belgrade.  When I say "arrested," I mean to say

 4     that we were all picked up by the police and sent to or driven to one of

 5     the most luxurious prisons in the world, the former villa of

 6     President Tito at Dobanovci, outside Belgrade.  And so we were in this

 7     luxury arrest place but suddenly, you know, telephone lines went dead and

 8     we could not call anybody.  And of course we were looking at each other

 9     significantly.  Nothing needed to be said.  We knew we were arrested.

10     And we didn't really know whether to fear for our lives, we didn't know

11     what was going on.

12             I personally kicked up a fuss and demanded to be connected to

13     Mr. Jovica Stanisic, the head of Serbian state security, whom I vaguely

14     knew.  This was initially refused, but then I insisted and I even began

15     shouting at the personnel in the villa.  So finally they did connect me

16     to him by telephone and I said to Mr. Stanisic that I demanded to get out

17     because I had not seen my wife for three weeks, and wanted to be rejoined

18     with my wife.  And he laughed and said:  Look, I'm going to let you --

19     I'm going to let you out, but you must promise me that you will, the

20     following morning, turn up at the villa because there is going to be this

21     big meeting and we don't want anyone to be absent.  So I did, and as soon

22     as I got out, I got to a telephone and telephoned you, explaining to you

23     what had happened.  And I think - correct me if I'm wrong - I think

24     I told you that, you know, your life may be in danger because we really

25     didn't know what was going on.

Page 42452

 1             But by the tone of your voice, I -- I gathered -- we spoke in

 2     some kind of semi-coded language.  By the tone of your voice I gathered

 3     that you had, in fact, made up your mind to accept the Dayton peace

 4     settlement, and in fact you did the following morning turn up at

 5     Dobanovci.  We were there.  It was kind of an all-Serb meeting, only the

 6     patriarch was missing, but everybody came.  The president of Montenegro

 7     was there of course, all the -- Milosevic's ministers.  Thankfully his

 8     wife was not there.  But apart from her and the patriarch, everyone else

 9     was.  And I remember Mr. Milosevic pushing you into some kind of small

10     room at one stage and he probably offered you a fountain pen to sign a

11     piece of paper.  Correct me if I'm wrong.

12             Anyway, to cut a long story short, you also accepted the Dayton

13     peace plan at a -- at a -- in a situation where none of your -- none of

14     the members of your delegation had in fact accepted.  We had in fact

15     rejected it.  Whether that was clever or not on our part, I don't know.

16     I have mixed feelings about that.  But we did reject it and you did

17     accept it.

18        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  The details are really interesting but

19     I have to hurry up a little.  You mentioned the opposition, the deputies,

20     and the efforts that I had to make to achieve anything.  However, an

21     expert witness of the Prosecution we've heard here, Dr. Donia - for the

22     parties, it's his expert report in my case - said, for instance, that the

23     Assembly of Republika Srpska heard open debates and one could often hear

24     critique addressed to Karadzic, Mladic and others.  And despite that,

25     I quote:

Page 42453

 1             "The Assembly unanimously, or with just a few votes against,

 2     passed and endorsed all the important measures proposed by the

 3     leadership.  There was only brief debate about proposed measures."

 4             What is your view?  Was it easy for me to deal with that Assembly

 5     consisting of 83 people's representatives?  Was it all that simple for

 6     me?

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Before -- Mr. Zametica, yes.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton?

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  Just if Dr. Karadzic could oblige us with the

 9     65 ter number and the page reference for that quote, it would be of

10     assistance.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately I'm not able to

12     starts up my computer here so I can't tell you that.  But that's the

13     expert report of Dr. Robert Donia, the chapter on institutions, first

14     institutions and then subheading:  "The Assembly of Bosnian Serbs."  It's

15     at the beginning of his report.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Probably you can offer the reference to the

17     Prosecution during the break.  But in the meantime, shall we proceed.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Do I need to repeat the question?

21        A.   No.  There is no need for you to repeat the question.  Whether

22     you had it easy with 83 members of the Assembly, well, the short answer

23     is no.  Not at all.  In fact, my impression about your place in the

24     political universe called Republika Srpska was that even though you held

25     the title of president, in my view you were a weak president, weak in the

Page 42454

 1     sense of your power did not extend very far.  My -- my firm impression,

 2     and I have this impression to this -- I hold on to this view to this --

 3     to this day, is that you had very little power in -- in Republika Srpska.

 4     I felt that there were other, more powerful factors than you.

 5             I felt that, for example, the Army of Republika Srpska was a

 6     power unto itself, pursuing its own policies, domestic as well as foreign

 7     policies, and being regularly insubordinate to you.  I felt that you did

 8     not have the control over the police.  I felt that you did not have the

 9     control over the Assembly members, even though they may have been the

10     members of your own party.  I felt that you did not have control over

11     your own driver.  I felt that you did not have control over your own

12     wife.  And I felt that you certainly didn't have control over your own

13     daughter.  So not that your daughter and your wife were necessarily

14     political factors, but in the case of your daughter, she did prove to be

15     something of a factor in relation to the international media.  So I felt

16     were you a weak president from that point of view.  You had very little

17     control over what was going on in that -- in that chaos called -- called

18     Republika Srpska in the period 1992-95.

19             I also felt that you did not have your own people in the

20     government of Republika Srpska.  Where you did have some kind of

21     autonomy, that was in the field of foreign affairs, and this is where

22     I felt happy working with you because I knew that you could take

23     initiatives there, you could make some impact there, and this is what was

24     important to me.  The idea was to attain a political settlement that

25     would be favourable and fair, and this is the area where -- where you

Page 42455

 1     actually did do a lot, but not elsewhere.

 2             So to go back to your original question, was it easy for you to

 3     deal with those 83 Assembly members, no, it wasn't, because they were all

 4     very individualistic.  They all had their own local interests to defend.

 5     They very often were very arrogant.  They -- you know, one might call

 6     them robust.  But I don't know where Dr. Donia got his information from,

 7     but it's clearly wrong, yeah.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Another expert witness, Mr. Treanor,

 9     Patrick Treanor, in his report before this Court, in the summary,

10     paragraph 15, E15, wrote as follows:

11             "The formal authorisations, the formal powers of the president in

12     extraordinary situations were rather broad and included a considerable

13     degree of control over security forces such as the army and the police,

14     as well as the local regional authorities with the mediation of wartime

15     Presidencies and commissioners.  Thanks to the overwhelming majority of

16     SDS deputies in the Assembly, the Presidency effectively had control over

17     members of the government and, through the SDS, over local and regional

18     authorities as well."

19             How did you see my use of these powers in extraordinary

20     situations?  You mentioned a moment ago local authorities.  How did you

21     see the SDS party?  Was it unanimous?  Was it united?  And how did you

22     view my use of these constitutional powers that were indeed broad?  And

23     how did you see the relationship between central authorities and the

24     local ones?

25        A.   May I ask you whether, when you said Mr. Treanor, are you

Page 42456

 1     referring to Ian Traynor, the "Guardian" journalist?

 2        Q.   No.  Patrick Treanor is an expert for political systems.  He

 3     appeared as an expert witness here for the Prosecution.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Treanor spelling, T-r-e-a-n-o-r.

 5             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  The local factors in Republika Srpska,

 6     that's -- that's a separate and very long story, but I would argue

 7     that -- and this is partly my experience and partly what other people

 8     told me, so partly what I saw with my own eyes and partly talking to

 9     other people, ministers or local officials.  Local power in

10     Republika Srpska was the only one that actually properly functioned.

11     When -- when Bosnia and Herzegovina began disintegrate and when

12     Republika Srpska began to be created, the only thing that actually

13     functioned were the old local authorities.  And the people there, on the

14     Bosnian Serb side, as far as I could tell, were extremely powerful.  They

15     were local chieftains, local masters of life and death.  They would be

16     people who would run their municipalities and not ask many questions

17     about -- they would not ask many questions from you or from Mr. Krajisnik

18     and so on.  They were -- they were very powerful people who decided on

19     practically everything in their municipalities, and they -- they felt

20     that they were the most important people in the world.  They felt that if

21     they -- if their municipality falls to the Muslims, this would be the end

22     of Serbdom.

23             I think you had very little power over these individuals,

24     especially at the beginning of the war, when it was difficult to

25     communicate and everything was in chaos.  I would say that the local

Page 42457

 1     forces, as it were, in Republika Srpska, sometimes worked even against

 2     you.  They always certainly defended their own narrow local interest.

 3     They didn't have the broader vision of the state.  The state was still

 4     being created.  And so we must see that in that particular context.

 5        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Were you aware of the powers held by

 6     municipalities under the previous socialist system and the degree of

 7     their autonomy, especially in the area of defence?  Were you familiar

 8     with these vestiges of socialism and did they continue during the war in

 9     Bosnia?

10        A.   No.  I can't say that I have -- that I had -- I had expert

11     knowledge about the pre-war municipalities' responsibilities, but of

12     course, I -- I seem to remember that they had pretty wide powers,

13     especially in terms of local defence.  There was a system called

14     Teritorijalna Odbrana in the old Yugoslavia, the Territorial Defence.  So

15     I imagine this continued when the war broke out.

16        Q.   Thank you.  You've mentioned the army.  Were you aware to what

17     extent I was involved in the operative and tactical levels of command

18     over the army?

19        A.   I don't think you did anything of the kind.  I mean, in terms of

20     operative and tactical levels of command over the army, I think you --

21     you left that to the army itself.  I think you had responsibilities with

22     regard to -- to any strategic decisions, but with regard to the

23     day-to-day operative and tactical levels, I do not think you -- you were

24     particularly involved.

25             My experience is that -- is that, you know, you and I talked

Page 42458

 1     mostly about the international situation and about the forthcoming peace

 2     conference and 90 per cent of the time we would discuss such matters, and

 3     I can't really remember you going on about, you know, the army should

 4     have done this or that.  I'm not saying you were not interested but you

 5     certainly didn't -- didn't tell me anything about it.  I cannot remember

 6     you as someone who -- who was on a daily basis concerned with what was

 7     going on in terms of a particular military operation.  I remember it was,

 8     you know, a low intensity war and so there weren't many days when, you

 9     know, there was intense fighting somewhere.  There was always some

10     sniping, some shelling, some -- some fighting, but big operations were

11     few and far between.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what my position was vis-à-vis this

13     fighting and the lulls in fighting and the sniper activity and shelling?

14     What were you able to observe as to my attitude to this belligerence and

15     the developments on the ground?

16        A.   As I said, we never talked a great deal about such matters.

17     I remember you saying that sniping on the Bosnian Serb side, sniping from

18     the Bosnian Serbs was stupid, that it didn't get the Serbs any military

19     advantage, and I think you were against it.  The same regards

20     irresponsible shelling or instances when there was some shelling and you

21     had disapproved of it because you just thought it senseless or

22     unnecessary.  But we didn't really talk much about military matters.

23     I think you were more concerned about -- about how to attain a political

24     settlement, and this is what we talked about, rather than, you know, what

25     is going on on the battlefields.  This was not -- this was not something

Page 42459

 1     you and I talked a great deal about.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have an idea about the position held by

 3     Bosnian Serbs and myself on humanitarian issues, regarding civilians,

 4     especially those of the other two warring parties --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  We'll come back to this after the

 6     break.  But Mr. Zametica, you just mentioned that Mr. Karadzic was

 7     against sniping and shelling on the ground that it would not be

 8     advantageous to the Serb side.  In relation to that statement, could you

 9     tell us how you understood the snipings and shellings to be?  What

10     shellings and what snipings did you talk about?

11             THE WITNESS:  I was not referring to anything in particular.

12     I was -- I was talking about sniping and shelling in general, as

13     something disapproved of by Dr. Karadzic.  I'm not sure that I understand

14     your question, when you ask me what snipings did I talk about?  Did you

15     ask me about anything in particular?  Or any particular event or did

16     you -- did you mean to ask me, you know, what was Mr. Karadzic's general

17     position on the subject?

18             JUDGE KWON:  I will quote what you said.  It's from line 13.

19     It's in answer to Mr. Karadzic's question:

20             "I remember you saying that sniping on the Bosnian Serb side,

21     sniping from the Bosnian Serbs was stupid, and that it didn't get the

22     Serbs any military advantage ..."

23             THE WITNESS:  Yes, that's what I said, yes.  Well, I stand by

24     that.  This is what I remember Dr. Karadzic as saying.  Of course you

25     must --

Page 42460

 1             JUDGE KWON:  But my question was whether you knew any sniping

 2     incident, what sniping Dr. Karadzic was referring to at that time?  And

 3     you also continued to say that:

 4             "The same regards irresponsible shelling or instances when there

 5     was some shelling ..."

 6             So what kind of irresponsible shelling you discussed at the time?

 7     Could you expand on that?

 8             THE WITNESS:  No, I cannot expand because I was talking about a

 9     conversation we had in which the subject was mentioned in general, not

10     with particular reference to any particular events of sniping or

11     shelling.

12             JUDGE KWON:  By your answer about quote/unquote irresponsible --

13     I'm sorry, irresponsible shelling, we can take it that Dr. Karadzic had

14     known some irresponsible shelling at least, at the time?

15             THE WITNESS:  Well, I don't know whether he knew about it but he

16     would -- I think he told me that, you know, there was some stupid

17     officers who -- who were irresponsible, but I cannot remember any names

18     or any particular event associated with that.  But he was in general very

19     critical of the army, I would say that.  And you know, I got used to him

20     saying, you know, that this general or this colonel is -- is not -- is

21     not someone who is responsible or -- or general things like that, but I'm

22     not referring to any particular events or any particular names.  I cannot

23     remember.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I note the time.  Shall we continue

25     after a break?  We will resume at 11.00.

Page 42461

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Good morning, Mr. President.  Good morning,

 5     Your Honours.  If I could very briefly raise one housekeeping matter in

 6     connection with the pending resolution of the motions concerning either

 7     safe conduct or subpoena for Mr. Kijac.  I simply wanted to note that

 8     irrespective one way or another of the outcome, that the parties have

 9     agreed that his projected date of appearance would be the first week of

10     December and not the date previously indicated.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Tieger.

12             Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

14        Q.   Dr. Zametica, I think that before the break the question had to

15     do with what you noticed about our and especially my positions about the

16     humanitarian needs of civilians in our territory and especially that of

17     the other two warring parties.  Were you in a position to notice what my

18     position was to their humanitarian needs?

19        A.   I think you were very cooperative regarding the humanitarian

20     needs, the humanitarian convoys, although you often complained about the

21     attitude of the army, you even used rude language to describe their

22     behaviour.  So I think you were every now and again rather frustrated

23     about the fact that the army was perhaps not as cooperative with regard

24     to the passage of humanitarian convoys as you would have liked them to

25     have been.

Page 42462

 1             Of course, in this context, I should also mention the fact that,

 2     to be fair to the Army of Republika Srpska, that they frequently detected

 3     illegal activities concerning those humanitarian convoys such as

 4     smuggling of arms.  And perhaps they had every reason to oppose further

 5     passage of such convoys if they had reason to suspect or if they actually

 6     found that the humanitarian convoys were delivering goods other than

 7     goods meant to cover the humanitarian needs.  I mean weapons.

 8             But, yeah, on the whole, I would say that you were cooperative

 9     with regard to that.  I think the best example of that is the fact

10     that -- I think it was in June 1992 when you agreed to the handing over

11     of Sarajevo airport to the UN and on humanitarian grounds.  Thereby, you

12     gave up a military strategic advantage which the forces of Republika

13     Srpska had in holding the airport, and which perhaps almost cost you the

14     war.  So that's what I would have to say in general on that subject.

15        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica.  Were there any examples of incidents

16     after which certain corridors had to be closed down for commercial

17     traffic?  And what was our attitude to humanitarian convoys as opposed to

18     commercial and other civilian traffic?

19        A.   Well, I remember one occasion in 1995, was it April or May of

20     1995, when you actually ordered a closure of the so-called blue routes,

21     but that was in connection with the fact that, I think, two Serb girls

22     were killed by Muslim snipers and there was much public outrage regarding

23     that.  I personally remember that because I saw it -- I saw the corpses

24     of those two girls shown on TV and there was indeed much outrage about

25     that.  So you did react in that particular connection, I seem to

Page 42463

 1     remember, and ordered the closure of the routes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D25093 in

 4     e-court?

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Please have a look at this announcement of yours in the media, at

 7     the top of the page.  Can you please tell us whether you remember this

 8     and whether this corresponds to what was going on at the time?

 9        A.   Yes.  I have no particular comment to make on that.  That

10     statement -- this statement corresponds to the situation at the time --

11     I don't -- I don't seem to see a date for that particular -- is this

12     June 1994?

13        Q.   [In English] July, July.

14        A.   This is July 1994.

15        Q.   [Interpretation] And do you see this, apart from your words, when

16     they convey what "Borba" reported about, and is that in accordance with

17     information that you had that the civilian traffic was closed rather than

18     humanitarian convoys?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Before he answers the question, let's find out what

20     this is about.  Mr. Zametica, do you read the first line of this

21     document, "Vecernje Novosti," 28th of July, 1994?

22             THE WITNESS:  Yes, I can see it on top of page, yes.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could you tell us what it is?

24             THE WITNESS:  It is a statement that I made regarding allegations

25     by the Muslim side that -- that the Serb side was blockading humanitarian

Page 42464

 1     convoys.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  What is -- what was "Vecernje Novosti"?

 3             THE WITNESS:  "Vecernje Novosti" is a Belgrade mass circulation

 4     paper.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  So I take it this is an excerpt from that

 6     "Vecernje Novosti" written by Markovic.

 7             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Can this document be

10     admitted, please?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Are you going to deal with the next page as well?

12     Or shall we admit only this page?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Only this page, and only the first

14     part, down to the next title.  What Mr. Zametica said and what was

15     reported by the "Borba" daily.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objections, Ms. Edgerton?

17             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  We will admit the first page.

19             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3928, Your Honours.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Zametica, you recently mentioned accusations levelled against

23     the Serbs.  The false accusations for something that they were not in

24     reality doing.  Can you tell us what your experience was with that sort

25     of game, how we were represented in the media, and did this

Page 42465

 1     representation correspond to what you could observe in our conduct?

 2        A.   That is the second very large question you have put to me

 3     regarding the media.  I would say that the international media on the

 4     whole reported the Bosnian war in black and white terms, very -- in a

 5     very partisan way, supporting the Muslim side which was portrayed as the

 6     victim, and portraying the Serb side as the aggressor.  That's what

 7     I would say in general.

 8             Few Western journalists came to Pale, few Western journalists

 9     came to Grbavica which was part of Sarajevo and which was Serb-held

10     throughout the war -- throughout the war, or to Ilidza and other suburbs

11     around Sarajevo that were held by the Bosnian Serb forces.  Why this was

12     so remains partly a mystery.  Why did the Western media report in the way

13     they did without bothering to -- to present a more researched, a more

14     objective picture.

15             There were exceptions, of course, but on the whole I think

16     Western journalists were looking for ways in which to present this rather

17     complex conflict, with complex origins, and with very complex goings-on.

18     Remember there was not just one war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were

19     two, three, at times four wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, going on

20     concurrently.  The war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims,

21     the war between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, the war between

22     the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats, the war between Muslims and

23     Muslims in the Western region of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  So I think my

24     impression was that Western journalists wanted to simplify matters.  And

25     in simplifying them and looking at the same time for a sort of good guys,

Page 42466

 1     bad guys, type of story, the Serbs were an easy target in the sense that

 2     for a lot of the time, the Bosnian Serb forces, military forces, held the

 3     military advantage or had the military advantage and the Bosnian Muslims

 4     were seen as the losing side.

 5             It did not help matters that the Bosnian Serbs were seen as an

 6     extended hand of the regime in Belgrade, in Serbia, an extended hand of

 7     Mr. Milosevic.  You, yourself, are being portrayed to this very day, in

 8     many popular accounts, and even academic accounts of the war in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina as the extended hand of Mr. Milosevic, which I find

10     absurd.  I cannot imagine a greater enemy, repeat enemy, of the Bosnian

11     Serbs than Mr. Milosevic himself, together with his wife.

12             So the Western journalists, in portraying the war in Bosnia as a

13     kind of Serb aggression agreed between you and Mr. Milosevic, whose tool

14     you were, according to their accounts, had a good story.  This was

15     swallowed, hook, line and sinker, by many people in the West.  There were

16     those, of course, who remained curious or critical, but on the whole,

17     people relied in the West on what the mainstream media were telling them,

18     and day after day, there were all these horror stories.

19             I remember on quite a few occasions the Muslims were saying that

20     the Bosnian Serb forces were shelling Sarajevo airport.  That's why the

21     humanitarian convoys couldn't get through, because the airport was under

22     fire from the Serbs.  Whereas, in fact, humanitarian convoys were also

23     very good business for the Muslim side.  We have the evidence from

24     Phillip Corwin who served on the civilian side in Sarajevo with the UN,

25     he worked for the UN, who in his diary wrote that he knew the Muslim side

Page 42467

 1     had often shelled, deliberately shelled, Sarajevo airport in order to

 2     stop the flights coming in, in order to make sure that the prices of

 3     goods that they were in the business of selling to the population of

 4     Sarajevo went up.  So -- and the Serbs, Corwin continued, if I remember

 5     correctly, the Serbs were regularly being blamed by the Western media nor

 6     doing something that, in fact, the Muslims were doing in order to gain --

 7     to gain financially from it.

 8             So this is just one illustration of the way in which the Western

 9     media were uncritically reporting events, in this case the shelling of

10     Sarajevo airport, blaming it on the Serbs, whereas in fact, as we have

11     learned from Phillip Corwin, but we knew that any way, but it's good to

12     have someone neutral say that, it was the Muslims who were responsible.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Just to help with the transcript, did you talk about

14     Phillip Corwin?

15        A.   Phillip Corwin, C-o-r-w-i-n.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             JUDGE KWON:  How do you know that what Mr. Corwin wrote in his

18     book was correct?

19             THE WITNESS:  Well, I read his book.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Did you talk to him?

21             THE WITNESS:  I did meet him, I think in 1995, several times in

22     Pale.  So I was in the meetings when he too was present, but of course he

23     subsequently wrote his book, which is a combination of his diary and his

24     subsequent reflections on the events.  But most of it is actually what

25     historians call primary evidence, i.e. diary material.

Page 42468

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Zametica, you mentioned Karadzic and Milosevic as

 4     a context.  In your view, was there some sort of agreement or joint

 5     enterprise or anything joint between these two political views and these

 6     two political tendencies, primarily between myself and

 7     President Milosevic, regardless of how much respect I have for him?

 8        A.   I fail to see why you should feel you have to add regardless of

 9     how much you have respect for him.  I think you should consider yourself

10     lucky to be still alive, because he was going for you.  I think at least

11     since the Vance-Owen Plan, Mr. Milosevic was looking for ways to get rid

12     of you, either politically or even physically.  And together with his

13     wife, who absolutely detested you, they were scheming to replace you with

14     someone more pliable.

15             Milosevic is often portrayed as a -- as the person who was

16     scheming the creation of something called Greater Serbia.  Nothing could

17     be further from the truth.  He was an unreformed communist, and all he

18     was really interested in was to stay in power and consolidate his power.

19     Serbs did not interest him.  Serbs outside Serbia interested him even

20     less.  I would say that in Milosevic you had a very formidable enemy

21     because he was in charge of a state which still had -- despite sanctions

22     still had considerable military and economic potential and ways and

23     means.

24             As you know, following the failure of the Contact Group Plan,

25     Milosevic it was who imposed sanctions on Republika Srpska.  So a state

Page 42469

 1     that was under sanctions itself, Serbia, was imposing sanctions on

 2     Republika Srpska.  We were cut off from the rest of the world.  I think

 3     all that Milosevic was really concerned about was to, as hastily as

 4     possible, sell the Serbs outside Serbia down the river in order to lift

 5     the sanctions and be able to say to his people:  "I have achieved this,

 6     despite all the difficulties.  You can have confidence in me.  We are

 7     going to build a great future together."  He was certainly not interested

 8     in creating something called Greater Serbia.  You were certainly not his

 9     tool.  And I don't see why you should say you still have regard for that

10     man.

11        Q.   Thank you.  If we leave Milosevic aside, did you establish that

12     there was some joint criminal enterprise on my side, that is to say, the

13     side of myself and my associates?

14        A.   I believe the answer to your question is implied in my answer to

15     your previous question.  So the idea --

16        Q.   Thank you.

17        A.   The idea of some kind of joint criminal enterprise between

18     yourself and Mr. Milosevic is absurd.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you say whether you established or whether you

20     observed that, on my part, on the part of the leadership of the Bosnian

21     Serbs, the people I worked with, whether there was any enmity or any kind

22     of inhumane position vis-à-vis Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23     Muslims and Croats as such, not some of them, like a political entity.

24     Muslims and Croats as such.

25        A.   Again, I believe that at least part of the answer to this

Page 42470

 1     particular question is implied in some of my previous answers, when

 2     I talked about your attitude towards me, someone who has a Muslim

 3     background.  I don't think you were a man driven by ethnic hatred.  I

 4     don't think you were a man driven by any dogma of that kind.  That's

 5     simply not you.  People who do not know you may -- people who have

 6     received a wisdom about you from newspapers or popular accounts about the

 7     war probably have a very different view about you, but I knew you very

 8     well, I worked very closely with you, and I don't think you had anything,

 9     even approaching in you that we could call ethnic hatred or feeling of

10     ethnic superiority vis-à-vis the Muslims or the Croats, not at all.  All

11     you were concerned to achieve was a lasting and fair political and

12     territorial settlement regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13        Q.   Thank you.  The very basis of the indictment against me, the very

14     basis of the indictment, without which there would have been no

15     indictment, contains a position to the effect that I wanted to get rid of

16     Muslims and Croats from the territories that we thought we were entitled

17     to, and entitlement to territory is not an incrimination.  Did you notice

18     that I personally or the responsible part of the leadership had the

19     intention to get rid of Muslims and Croats from our areas, to expel them,

20     even going all the way up to genocide?  And would you turn a blind eye to

21     that had you noticed something like that?

22        A.   No.  I certainly think that you had no plans, schemes, in that

23     direction at all.  You were always going to be happy if Muslims and

24     Croats stayed on the territory of Republika Srpska.  You appointed, as

25     far as I know, quite a few people in the judiciary system of

Page 42471

 1     Republika Srpska who were -- who had Muslim or Croat background.  You

 2     appointed me as your principal aide in foreign affairs.  I had a Muslim

 3     background.  You had, I don't want to name him now in an open session, a

 4     person who was in a very sensitive position in Republika Srpska also had

 5     a Muslim background.  Another person I remember who was also close to you

 6     had a Croat ethnic background.  I mean, it doesn't make sense to call you

 7     someone who -- someone who -- who was -- who was driven by ethnic hatred

 8     in the light of what I know and what I experienced with you, what you

 9     were telling me.  You, in fact, considered the Muslims to have been

10     originally Serbs who then chose to become Muslims and you respected that.

11     That was fine by you.

12             What people in the West often failed to pay sufficient attention

13     to is the fact that, in fact, we were fighting a defensive war.  It was

14     the Muslims, together with the Croats, but principally the Muslims who

15     started the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And through a series of illegal

16     actions in late 1991 and early 1992, actions that destroyed the political

17     consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina or I should say the remnants of

18     political consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The culmination of that

19     was the illegal decision to hold the referendum on independence which

20     took place in late -- end of February, beginning of March, 1992.

21             On top of that, I should add that the political group leading the

22     Muslims at the time was not Muslim nationalist.  This was a group that

23     I would call Muslim internationalist, led by Alija Izetbegovic and his

24     clique.  I say he was not a Muslim nationalist rather he was a Muslim

25     internationalist, he was a pan-Islamist and his ideology was Islam.  His

Page 42472

 1     politics were pan-Islamism.  I'm just paraphrasing what he himself wrote

 2     in his book called "The Islamic Declaration," where he also stated that

 3     there can be no peace or co-existence between, on the one hand, Islam and

 4     on the other hand, non-Islamic -- non-Islamic organisations or

 5     non-Islamic society.  And he also stated that the moment the Muslims feel

 6     themselves morally and numerically strong enough, they should overthrow

 7     the existing system and set up an Islamic one.

 8             At the meetings, I remember the meetings, pre-election meetings

 9     in October 1990, during the first free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10     his supporters at the SDA rallies, they had banners, for example, saying,

11     "Long live Saddam Hussein."

12             What I'm trying to say is that the politics of Mr. Izetbegovic

13     who was the legally and legitimately Muslim -- elected Muslim

14     representative, elected by a very large majority of the Muslim

15     population, his politics and his plans were perceived by the Serb side as

16     really threatening and really dangerous.  Even so, you had agreed, as we

17     have already said, to the Zulfikarpasic plan, to the Cutileiro Plan and

18     so on and so forth.  But I mean, I think people in the West often fail to

19     pay enough attention to the threat that this man and his clique and his

20     ideology and his proclaimed aims, the way we perceived them.  And I think

21     we fought a defensive war, I think we fought a just war, and I don't

22     think we have anything to be ashamed of.  Except one episode - I'm sure

23     we'll come to that - and that's Srebrenica.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could you just tell us, as briefly as possible,

25     whether, in addition to becoming familiar with the political papers of

Page 42473

 1     this leadership, did you have personal contacts with this leadership that

 2     followed Mr. Izetbegovic?  I mean, in addition to Mr. Zulfikarpasic, who

 3     left him.

 4        A.   Well, I knew -- I knew Professor Muhamed Filipovic but I'm not

 5     sure whether he was -- he must have been together with Zulfikarpasic,

 6     with Izetbegovic in SDA.  But apart from those two individuals, I didn't

 7     know any other prominent Muslim personalities.  I knew Izetbegovic

 8     himself.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to move on to another topic now.  Do you

10     know, do you remember, what the mandate of UNPROFOR was and what our

11     attitude was towards UNPROFOR and NATO, from the moment when they joined

12     forces and when the bombing took place?  Did you know what our position

13     was, what UNPROFOR could do and what they could not and should not do?

14        A.   In answer to your question, I would like to cite or rather

15     paraphrase, I can't remember exactly, but I would like to cite what

16     Cedric Thornberry - Cedric, S-e-d-r-i-c [sic], Thornberry - said in his

17     centenary lecture held at the London School of Economics in 1995.

18             Cedric Thornberry was involved with the United Nations in

19     Sarajevo in 1992, on the civilian side, a very respected personality.

20     And several years later, as I said in 1995, he held this centenary

21     lecture in which he stated, if my recollection is correct, that one of

22     the main lessons to be drawn from the experience of international

23     peacekeeping is that one must be clear that peacekeeping is peacekeeping,

24     and enforcement is enforcement, and that there can be no hybrid or

25     hybrid, I think he called it monstrous hybrid, in between.  And I think

Page 42474

 1     this is what happened in May 1995, when the United Nations, through NATO,

 2     ceased to be a peacekeeper and became a war maker.

 3             The essence of international peacekeeping is to -- to stay

 4     neutral in a conflict.  The idea is to try and keep peace, secure the

 5     passage of humanitarian convoys and so on.  What happened in May 1995 was

 6     that this was thrown out of the window and the Serbs were bombarded.  So

 7     the line was crossed, the line between peacekeeping and peacemaking had

 8     been crossed.

 9             Our attitude was very clear.  We accepted the presence of UN

10     forces on the ground, in fact we welcomed that, and when the -- when the

11     threat became clear that UN might change its role and become a factor of

12     enforcement, I remember very clearly that on several occasions we

13     informed the representatives of the UN, both military and civilian, that

14     in that event we should treat the UN as our enemy.  I think the position

15     was very clear.

16        Q.   Thank you.  What can you say in connection with our taking

17     prisoner of UN personnel after the bombing started?  What status did they

18     have, in our opinion?  What was communicated to them?  And how were they

19     treated?

20        A.   The taking of UN personnel as prisoners or hostages had been

21     announced in advance, but I personally disagreed with that.  I thought

22     that Republika Srpska, in 1995, was in a -- in a position of

23     international isolation that was deep enough already.  We didn't need

24     further international isolation.  And that any step that would lead to a

25     breakdown of our relationships with the international community or,

Page 42475

 1     rather, with the UN in this particular case, could only worsen our

 2     position.  So I was against it.

 3             At the same time, when the bombardment took place, feelings,

 4     popular feeling, feelings were running very high on the streets, and it

 5     is perhaps understandable that UN personnel on the ground were taken

 6     prisoner.  But I felt this was -- this was an untenable position and, in

 7     fact, I remember writing a memorandum, I seldom used to write memoranda

 8     but I did write a memorandum very soon after the event, which was

 9     sometime after 25th of May, 1995, in which I argued for the immediate

10     release of the UN prisoners.  I think you agreed with me.  I was knocking

11     on an open door there.  And indeed, all the prisoners were released very

12     soon, and no harm was done to them.  So -- well, I hope I have answered

13     your question.  I cannot remember its original phrasing.

14        Q.   Did we consider them to be hostages?  Or were they there in some

15     other capacity?  And what was communicated to them?  What was their

16     position?  Were they hostages or prisoners of war?

17        A.   They were treated as prisoners of war, but I think it was

18     indicated to them that, you know, this is only a very temporary situation

19     where they were going to be released very soon.  I think the intention

20     was never going to -- the intention was never to keep them as prisoners.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Were you in a position to establish the following?

22     When we were asked to allow people to enter Gorazde or some other

23     enclaves, were you in a position to find out what the specialty of these

24     soldiers was?  Were we deceived sometimes?  Did some other people enter

25     those areas, people who were not actually what they said they were?  I

Page 42476

 1     have a statement of yours, a public statement that you made --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  Your Honour, that's a pretty leading question.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  I agree.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, all right.  I will rephrase.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Were you following this when we allowed them to enter, and was it

 8     always what it was declared to be?  Were they just military observers?

 9        A.   I remember a episode from 1994, around Gorazde, when some of

10     those so-called military observers turned out to be FACs, forward air

11     controllers.  They are the people who guide an aircraft up in the air to

12     its target on the ground.  And I remember that particular -- as you say,

13     I think I did give a -- I did make a statement about it but I cannot

14     remember the details.

15        Q.   Thank you.  At the end of May 1995, when these prisoners were

16     taken, can you tell us whether it was envisaged or planned that these

17     prisoners of war be threatened by punishment, by death or wounding?  Do

18     you know what was envisaged and do you know how they were treated

19     actually?

20        A.   That was never said to them, as far as I know.  I mean, no

21     threats were made.  I think -- I think they -- those of them who were

22     subsequently interviewed by the Western media all said that they were

23     well treated.

24        Q.   Thank you.  A moment ago you mentioned Gorazde and you talked

25     about exaggerations at one point and misrepresentations of consequences

Page 42477

 1     and victims.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could we have a look at 1D25089

 3     in e-court?  Could it be zoomed in, please?  And then we would like to

 4     have page 2.  This is April 1994.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Do you remember this statement of yours about this exaggeration,

 7     misrepresentation --

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Actually could we zoom in seriously

 9     on the first part?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You mentioned today as well that there were false reports,

12     especially about Gorazde.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Ms. Edgerton?

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Could Dr. Karadzic please just keep an eye on how

15     he phrases the question because at no point in today's transcript did

16     this witness mention the word "exaggerations" and misrepresentation of

17     consequences.  That makes this a leading question.  All Dr. Karadzic

18     needs to do is show the witness the document.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we continue?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do apologise if it was leading.

21     Could we please see the lower part first?

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Can you tell us whether you remember this statement of yours?

24     And can you tell us what it refers to and how it fits into your overall

25     experience?

Page 42478

 1        A.   Well, I vaguely remember this statement I made but, I mean, you

 2     don't have to take my word for it, you can read the memoirs of

 3     General Sir Michael Rose who says essentially the same thing.  He was the

 4     UN military commander at that time.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we now look at the upper part

 6     so that we can see that?

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Dr. Zametica, can you tell us whether this was an exception, and

 9     how often or how rarely did this kind of thing happen, namely that a

10     false picture was portrayed to the public?

11        A.   I think this matter must have been clarified in this Tribunal

12     many times over already.  I mean, you only have to remind yourself of the

13     statements made by, I think he was then the Foreign Minister of Bosnia

14     and Herzegovina, Mr. Haris Silajdzic, who at the beginning of the

15     conflict -- I was still in London admittedly, but I very closely followed

16     the events.  At the beginning of the conflict he was claiming

17     200.000 Muslim dead.  This was, you know, after two months of conflict.

18     In the end, the total number of casualties on all sides was somewhere

19     like 100.000.  So these exaggerations on the part of the Muslims about

20     the number of their dead or wounded, such exaggerations were commonplace.

21        Q.   Thank you.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this document be admitted?

23             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit pages 1 and 2.  Any objection before

24     that, Ms. Edgerton?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  No.

Page 42479

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, pages 1 and 2.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3929, Your Honours.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Dr. Zametica, can you tell us about this exaggeration,

 6     misrepresentation, how it affected our confidence in what we heard, what

 7     was bandied about in public?  Could we believe such allegations?

 8        A.   I'm afraid I don't understand your question.  So you have to

 9     rephrase it or -- I'm not -- I'm not sure what you're trying to -- to

10     say.

11        Q.   Can you tell us whether this affected our lack of confidence in

12     sources and allegations of this kind?  Could we continue to blindly trust

13     everything that the media reported?

14        A.   Well, of course not, but you were a politician, I was your

15     presidential aide.  I mean, we could not blindly trust everything that

16     the media reported in any case.  And particularly not in this case.

17     I mean such exaggerations, if this is what you're trying to say, such

18     exaggerations did nothing to boost our confidence in the -- in the

19     objectivity of the media, yeah.

20        Q.   After I went into hiding, did we correspond occasionally?  In

21     other words, were you able to receive my messages or perhaps a letter or

22     send me a letter?  Especially regarding the adoption of the Law on

23     Cooperation with the Tribunal, especially until that time?  Were there

24     any obstacles in that period?

25        A.   Yes.  We -- we did have a correspondence whilst you were a

Page 42480

 1     fugitive.  As far as I can remember, a lot of that correspondence

 2     pertained to private matters concerning my family or things like that.

 3     There was some political content to that, regarding the situation in

 4     Republika Srpska, the wider Balkan situation.  But nothing very memorable

 5     about that correspondence, as far as I can remember.

 6        Q.   Thank you.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please call up

 8     65 ter 21578 in e-court?  [Microphone not activated].

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We need page 2 in Serbian, 3 in

11     English.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   I would like to draw your attention to the second paragraph and

14     in English it begins with the words:  "You know very well what we were

15     going through."  Here, in this paragraph, the subject is the same as what

16     you just said, the allegations in the media.

17             Do you remember this passage in my letter where I considered,

18     together with you, what had happened in Srebrenica?  In 2001, did we know

19     more than we had in 1995?  And what were our speculations, what did we

20     know exactly at that time?

21        A.   You mean to ask what we knew about Srebrenica in 1995?

22        Q.   First of all, what did we know about it in 2001, when I wrote

23     this letter?  Did you know more than I did?  And does this reflect what I

24     knew and what I thought at that time?

25        A.   You always respected me.  You never lied to me.  I never felt

Page 42481

 1     that you -- you were being even economical with the truth regarding

 2     anything.  You completely trusted me, and I completely trusted you.  In

 3     this kind of private correspondence, you would be as sincere with me as

 4     you would be in our normal course of -- in the normal course of events.

 5     So if in 2001, if this is 2001, you wrote this about Srebrenica, I have

 6     no reason to believe that you were not sincere in saying that.  So in

 7     2001, we didn't know much more about Srebrenica than we knew in 1995.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  I just -- probably it's only me, but I didn't follow

 9     the relation between this paragraph and Srebrenica.  If you could

10     clarify, Mr. Karadzic?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, in this letter,

12     I wrote to Mr. Zametica my thoughts, my speculations, my attempts to

13     reconstruct the events on the basis of all that I had learned up to 2001.

14     That is the importance of the letter and a good part of the letter refers

15     to Srebrenica 1995.  I am thinking aloud what exactly might have happened

16     and who stands behind it.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, more specifically the second

18     sentence in that paragraph is what [overlapping speakers] --

19             JUDGE KWON:  How does it read?

20             MR. ROBINSON:  It reads that:

21             "When you add to all this the information on the arrest of the

22     Spider Group and the role of the French intelligence service in the

23     events in Srebrenica, then it becomes crystal clear that we had nothing

24     to do with it."

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Let's continue.

Page 42482

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  May I tender this whole

 2     letter?

 3             JUDGE KWON:  This includes two letters from you?  Before that,

 4     yes, do you have any observation or do you object, Ms. Edgerton?

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Although I don't agree with Dr. Karadzic's

 6     characterisation of the contents of the letter, I have no objection to

 7     the whole 17 pages, two letters, being tendered.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So are you tendering it in its entirety,

 9     Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED:  It could be.  I have here from one to five but it

11     could be all 17.

12             JUDGE KWON:  In light of the Prosecution position, we will admit

13     it in its entirety.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D3930, Your Honours.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Now we come to this point.  Looking at the agendas kept by my

18     secretaries, I see that we had encounters between 10 and 14 July, on

19     several occasions, and these meetings were also attended by

20     Dr. Trifkovic, et cetera.  Do you remember coming to my office on certain

21     dates in July 1995, that you met me at my office?

22        A.   For God's sake we had daily contact in those -- I mean, frequent

23     daily contact during those days.  I was -- I left Pale, I think, on the

24     19th of July because I had to be present at my own wedding.  But until

25     that date, we were in frequent daily contact.  Yes, of course I remember.

Page 42483

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell the Chamber what did we know at that

 2     point in time about events around Srebrenica, especially after the

 3     takeover of Srebrenica?  What information did we have at our disposal?

 4        A.   We knew that a military operation had been successfully

 5     completed, the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica as a

 6     military stronghold from which the Muslims were frequently staging

 7     attacks.  Not only on our forces but also on our civilians.  That much we

 8     knew.  If you are asking me did we know something about a massacre that

 9     took place in Srebrenica during roughly that period, then my answer is we

10     knew nothing about that.  By "we," I mean the civilian side.  I mean you,

11     I mean myself, I mean our close colleagues in the Presidency.  We knew

12     nothing about it.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Can we pause here?  Just going back to the previous

14     document, which we admitted as D3930, Ms. Edgerton, is it your intention

15     to use the other part of the letter?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I haven't decided yet, Your Honour, to be

17     perfectly honest.

18             JUDGE KWON:  That being the case, we are going to admit only the

19     page which was shown to the witness.  Yes.

20             And, Mr. Robinson, if you could remind me, remind us whether we

21     heard ever the evidence about or in relation to Pauk or Spider Group?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  I don't know if that term has been used for sure.

23     It's possible that it has been but I don't recall exactly.  I think that

24     that was a designation of the 10th Sabotage Detachment, but I don't know

25     whether or not that has ever been actually testified to by a witness or

Page 42484

 1     is contained in a document.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

 3             MS. EDGERTON:  With respect, I don't think that's correct.  But

 4     I'm not able to give Your Honours any further information about it.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Then I have to ask Mr. Zametica whether he remembers

 6     anything about -- anything related to the arrest of Pauk or Spider Group.

 7     Can you assist us, Mr. Zametica?

 8             THE WITNESS:  I can remember, Your Honour, I can remember reading

 9     about it in the press, in the media.  It was a big story.  I didn't

10     follow it very closely so I'm afraid I cannot assist you in any

11     significant way.  But it -- at the time I remember it was quite a big

12     story.  So maybe Mr. Karadzic can elaborate on that, but I don't have the

13     details.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I will leave it at that.  Shall we

15     continue, Mr. Karadzic.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Your Excellency, if

17     it's of any assistance, I can say that we have evidence here that the

18     10th Sabotage Detachment members were taken by the French to Africa to

19     fight, and later they were involved in attempts to kill Milosevic.  But

20     the connection is that these people were members of the

21     10th Sabotage Detachment.  And then, after our war, they were taken to

22     Africa to fight, and then they were -- they reappeared as the Pauk,

23     Spider Group, and arrested by the Serbian intelligence service, and

24     caught in the attempt to kill Milosevic.  Some gold was involved and some

25     foreign party, foreign intelligence service.

Page 42485

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue?  We'll leave it at that.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Dr. Zametica, as opposed to what we knew, how was all this

 5     portrayed in the media?  Did we have reason to trust media reports?  Did

 6     we run our own checks?  What were we able to establish during those days

 7     regarding the rumours surrounding Srebrenica?  Were they true or not?

 8             I mean, before you left to attend your wedding, while you were

 9     there, did we check allegations published in the media and what did we

10     conclude?  First of all, was there any talk at that time about execution

11     of prisoners or did it concern civilians?

12        A.   I'm not sure I understand the last bit of your question.  There

13     was certainly no talk about executions of prisoners.  I mean -- or

14     anybody else for that matter, so, you know, I -- I can certainly say that

15     much.  But I'm not sure what -- what exactly you were asking there.

16        Q.   At that time, did you make a public statement or a press release

17     regarding these allegations?

18        A.   Oh, yes.  I -- I -- I made a statement, I believe on the

19     17th of July, 1995, with regard to the media allegations that there had

20     been mistreatment of prisoners.  So, yes, I -- I denied that, and

21     I denied that on the basis of the knowledge accessible to me, and to you

22     by the way, at the time, and also on the basis of a declaration signed by

23     the representative of Muslim civil authorities in Srebrenica - I cannot

24     remember his exact name, someone called Nesim Mandzic or something like

25     that - who, on that same day, 17 July, if I remember correctly, signed a

Page 42486

 1     declaration to the effect that the Muslim civilians from the area of

 2     Srebrenica had been well treated and had been evacuated, I believe he

 3     said, under the supervision of United Nations forces.  There was no

 4     maltreatment of them and everything had been done in accordance with an

 5     agreement or -- yeah, it was an agreement of, I think, the 12th of July,

 6     which the Srebrenica authorities had signed with the representatives of

 7     the Bosnian Serb forces.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we pull up 65 ter 25314 in

10     e-court, please?

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   This is a report by AFP on your communique.  Please look at it.

13     It says that allegations of torture, murder, rape, and deportation of

14     Muslim civilians are made repeatedly without any independent

15     verification, and then you mentioned this document signed on the

16     17th by the Muslims and the UNPROFOR.  Is this what you just talked

17     about?  And how does this refutation upon verification fit in with the

18     whole story of passing off misinformation?

19        A.   Well, yes.  That is the statement I made.  I remember it.  I can

20     only repeat that I made that statement on the basis of information

21     available to us at the time.  I have nothing further to add.

22        Q.   Please answer the second part of my question.  How does this

23     reverified and reconfirmed exaggeration about the deportation and -- of

24     civilians fit in with the context of what you just said?  To what extent

25     were the media to be believed?

Page 42487

 1        A.   Yes.  The -- it certainly was part of my experience that the

 2     Muslim side, as we have discussed already, would tend to exaggerate

 3     matters regarding their casualties.

 4             I remember already, at the beginning of the military operation

 5     Srebrenica, Muslim media, Haris Silajdzic, I seem to remember him

 6     particularly, listening to the Muslim radio, was shouting murder, was

 7     shouting rape.  You know, the operation was still going on.  He could not

 8     have known anything about what was happening.  And in typical fashion, he

 9     had already decided that there had been horrible things going on at the

10     time.

11             So, yes, to answer your question, it was part of my experience

12     that they would, as a matter of policy, exaggerate.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Let's go back to Mr. Karadzic's question.  He said,

14     I quote, "reverified and reconfirmed exaggeration about the deportation."

15             Do you agree that you, the Bosnian Serbs, at the time, reverified

16     or reconfirmed the Muslim argument or the statement at the time?  And if

17     yes, then how?

18             THE WITNESS:  I think, Your Honour, Dr. Karadzic was asking me

19     whether it was part of my daily experience that, to hear, to listen to

20     the Muslim side exaggerating about their casualties.  I think he meant

21     that.  I think the way in which this particular question put by

22     Dr. Karadzic was phrased is not -- not particularly clear, to me at

23     least.  So I would need -- I would need -- I would have to ask

24     Dr. Karadzic to rephrase this question.

25             I mean, there was no question that we thought anything horrible

Page 42488

 1     was going on.  We thought everything was being done in accordance with

 2     all the conventions.  I remember the late Professor Koljevic telling me

 3     at some stage during Operation Srebrenica, that General Mladic had told

 4     him he had let in the International Red Cross into the Srebrenica area.

 5     And I remember this particular episode precisely because at the time,

 6     Professor Koljevic was very angry with General Mladic because he thought

 7     General Mladic was taking away his job from him.  Professor Koljevic was

 8     in charge of the International Red Cross and such organisations.  So

 9     that's why I remember that particular episode.  But it just illustrates

10     that if I knew and if Dr. Karadzic knew that General Mladic had let in

11     the International Red Cross into the Srebrenica area, plus this statement

12     signed by what's his name, the Muslim civilian representative in

13     Srebrenica, all of that formed a picture in our minds that everything

14     was, you know --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Let's leave it there.  But my question was

16     whether there is any process of reconfirmation or reverification of what

17     happened in Srebrenica.  But let's leave it to Mr. Karadzic.  Shall we

18     continue?

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Zametica?

21             THE WITNESS:  Can I please have some water?  Thanks.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Do you remember, Dr. Zametica, who sent us this document and at

24     whose request?  How did we receive it?  How did we receive this document

25     confirming that all of this was regular?

Page 42489

 1        A.   No, I cannot say that I do remember the exact circumstances about

 2     the receipt of this document.  You have to remind me.

 3        Q.   Do you remember the name Deronjic and the man's position?  Was it

 4     at my request that this response came or would it have been sent by the

 5     Muslim authorities even if I had not requested it?  Perhaps you don't

 6     know the details, but do you remember that there was the Bosnian Serb

 7     signature and the Muslim signature and the UNPROFOR's as well?

 8        A.   Oh, yes.  The document dated 17 -- the Srebrenica document dated

 9     the 17th of July was signed by all three sides, by the Muslim side, by

10     the Serb side, and by the UN.  And the name Deronjic, I don't think I

11     ever met the man, but I remember him, I remember that name, because

12     I think he was the man you appointed at some stage during the Srebrenica

13     military operation, possibly towards the end, as -- as the Serb civilian

14     representative there.

15        Q.   Thank you.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I should like to have this document

17     admitted.  My point, Your Excellencies, was that this was a response to

18     our verifications.  Dr. Zametica did not have to know that we had asked

19     Deronjic about the media reports and whether they were true.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit this.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D --

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Dr. Zametica, thank you very much that you came to testify

24     although you are a very busy man and thank you for your long years of

25     cooperation.

Page 42490

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, 65 ter number 21578 will be

 2     Exhibit D3931.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will have a break for 45 minutes,

 4     after which we will hear the cross-examination by the Prosecution.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 1.19 p.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

 8             But before we continue, please bear in mind, Mr. Zametica,

 9     although Ms. Edgerton and you will speak the same language, please put a

10     pause for the benefit of Mr. Karadzic, who will hear in Serbo-Croat.

11             Yes, there is one matter.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  Just for the record, the

13     correct 65 ter number for Exhibit D3931 is 25314.  Thank you.

14             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, thank you, Your Honours.

15                           Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton:

16        Q.   Mr. Zametica, I would like to start your cross-examination today

17     by showing you 65 ter number 25545, page 1.  And, Mr. Zametica, this is a

18     copy of the e-mail that you wrote to Mr. Robinson on 28 June of this

19     year, and that e-mail was appendixed to the public motion Dr. Karadzic

20     filed on July 2nd for a subpoena for you to testify in his defence.  And

21     I just want to draw your attention to paragraph 2 of this e-mail.  And in

22     paragraph 2, you write that earlier that day, you were listing through a

23     pile of documents which an intern had brought you after you signed your

24     statement.  And you say one of those documents flatly contradicts a

25     central claim you make in your statement, one that you sincerely believed

Page 42491

 1     to be true when you wrote the statement, and the Prosecution would have

 2     no problem ripping apart this claim.

 3             So I'd like you, Mr. Zametica, to tell me the central claim you

 4     made in your signed statement that you now say was flatly contradicted by

 5     the document.  And if you want, actually, we can have a look -- rather

 6     than have you look at notes, we can have a look at your signed statement

 7     in e-court.

 8             MS. EDGERTON:  It's 1D09616.  And you can collapse the e-mail so

 9     that Mr. Zametica can see his statement at greater magnification.

10        Q.   We can go through this and you can identify for us the central

11     claim that was contradicted by the document.  Can we do that?  Can you

12     identify for us what it is?

13        A.   Yes, I can.  If we go down to relations with the UN, I think

14     that's how I entitled --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Do we have a hard copy?  It's a 17-page document,

16     I take it.  Shall we print it?  Oh, you have it, yes.  Unless the Defence

17     has problem with it, we'll hand it over to the witness.

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  If you go to page 13 of my statement,

19     paragraph 27, near the bottom, so it's the --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm afraid, we have different

21     version.  But paragraph 27 --

22             THE WITNESS:  Paragraph 27, fifth line from the bottom, sentence

23     reads:

24             "But there had been no policy decision to that effect."  This is

25     what I wrote.  "But there had been no policy decision to that effect."

Page 42492

 1             Meaning -- I meant to say, and I think it's clear from the

 2     context if you read the whole paragraph, that there had been no decision

 3     by the leadership of Republika Srpska to take UN personnel prisoners.

 4     All right?

 5             So on returning from -- as you know, I was here already in June,

 6     but some other witness's testimony took much longer than expected and

 7     I never testified in June.  In the meantime, I was handed a small pile of

 8     documents which were made available to the Defence by the Prosecution,

 9     and at home, having returned from The Hague, I had a closer look at those

10     documents.  One of those documents, which I don't have, unfortunately,

11     with me today, but you have it because you made it available to the

12     Defence, relates to an intercepted telephone conversation dated, I

13     believe, the 30th -- the night of 30th to 31st May 1995.  It is clear

14     from that conversation, which was -- which involved several people, the

15     call was made by Todor -- Mr. Todor Dutina, who was the Republika Srpska

16     representative in Moscow.  The call had been made either to Mr. Krajisnik

17     or to Dr. Karadzic, I'm not sure which, and it's not, I think, clear from

18     that document.  But in that document, Mr. Krajisnik at one point says, in

19     reply to Mr. Dutina's assertion that the international community is

20     monitoring everything that the leadership of Republika Srpska is doing,

21     and knows every single move that the Republika Srpska leadership is

22     making or is about to make, in response to that assertion by Mr. Dutina,

23     Mr. Krajisnik says:  "How come, then, they didn't know we were going to

24     do this?"  From the context, it is clear, how come they didn't know we

25     are going to do this, how come, in other words, they didn't know that we

Page 42493

 1     were going to take UN personnel prisoners?

 2             Any reasonably capable Prosecution could conclude that there was,

 3     in fact, a policy decision to the effect that UN personnel would be taken

 4     prisoner, in case of aerial attacks.  I didn't know about that telephone

 5     conversation, but in the intercepted document, Dr. Karadzic mentions me

 6     twice because he too was -- I think they put on the speakerphone so they

 7     could all talk, mentions me two times, saying that "Zametica is speaking

 8     on my behalf or in my name," words to that effect.

 9             Now, what does all this mean?  Any Prosecution could establish

10     that, in fact, either Zametica is lying or he's a fool being fooled by

11     the Republika Srpska leadership, or in any case, I turn out very badly

12     from this, and that is why I objected.  It's the business and duty of the

13     Defence team to notify me of such evidence of which I was not aware when

14     I wrote this statement.  I wrote it in all sincerity, and I believed that

15     there had been no decision, policy decision, to take UN personnel

16     prisoner.  So I objected and protested because I thought, for God's sake,

17     this sort of thing is being discussed in court all the time, presumably,

18     and the Defence should have let me know, having read my statement, they

19     didn't write it on my behalf, I wrote it.  Had they read it carefully

20     they would have come across this sentence, "but there had been no policy

21     decision to that effect," and said to me, look, this is wrong, there had

22     been a policy decision to that effect.

23             So I thought, as I wrote subsequently in this paragraph, my

24     understanding is that a group of Russian volunteers, fighting on our side

25     and stationed in Pale, had taken the initiative to start taking -- that

Page 42494

 1     is the reason why I wrote that -- what I wrote.

 2        Q.   So this line, which doesn't say, "I believe there had been no

 3     policy decision to that effect" but says, "There had been no policy

 4     decision to that effect," is not true?

 5        A.   What is truth?  I don't think Dr. Karadzic deliberately misled

 6     me.  I simply wasn't there.  This was at night time.  I was up in my

 7     hotel on -- ten kilometres away on Mount Jahorina.  There clearly,

 8     according to Mr. Krajisnik, had been some kind of decision to that

 9     effect.  I hadn't been notified of that, but this was a fast-moving

10     situation.  I -- I would normally have been notified of such things, but

11     I was sincerely unaware of that particular decision, in whatever form it

12     was taken.  Whether it was spontaneously immediately after the first

13     bombs fell or whether it was subsequently, I certainly was not privy to

14     that decision and I didn't know about it.

15        Q.   But the very next sentence -- now you've just said you weren't

16     there, you didn't know about it, but your very next sentence reads:

17             "Karadzic had not issued any order about taking UN personnel

18     prisoners."

19             Is that also untrue?

20        A.   As far as I knew it, yes -- as far as I knew it, it was -- it was

21     true.  I thought that Karadzic had not issued such orders.

22        Q.   But, again, Mr. Zametica, you wrote this in absolutes.  You said:

23             "Karadzic had not issued any order ..."

24        A.   I just --

25        Q.   And now you're qualifying what you wrote in your signed statement

Page 42495

 1     in June.

 2        A.   I'm not --

 3        Q.   Right?

 4        A.   No, it's not right.  I'm not qualifying anything.  I just gave

 5     you a very long explanation or I gave this Tribunal a very long

 6     explanation of the context in which I wrote what I wrote in my statement.

 7     And I repeat, at the time, I thought that there had been no policy

 8     decision to that effect.

 9             Having said that, and I think I mentioned this during the time

10     when Dr. Karadzic earlier today questioned me, there had been warnings,

11     so it did -- you know, this does not come as a surprise to me, that

12     intercepted document, not as a huge surprise, because there had been

13     warnings to the UN, if you bomb, there will be consequences, we will

14     treat you as an enemy.  Of course, taking UN personnel prisoner would

15     have been a consequence of that.

16        Q.   Now, what about this next sentence, which says your understanding

17     is that a group of Russian volunteers fighting on your side had taken the

18     initiative to start taking hostages.  So is your understanding that four

19     military corps, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the 1st Krajina Corps, the

20     East Bosnia Corps, the Drina Corps - oh, actually five - and the

21     2nd Krajina Corps were all separately prompted to take UN personnel

22     hostages and place them at military targets and VRS military facilities

23     right across the areas of responsibilities of all five of them because of

24     something a group of Russian volunteers did?

25        A.   That was my understanding.  I was given this information about a

Page 42496

 1     group of Russian volunteers by the then Minister of Information,

 2     Mr. Miroslav Toholj.  And my understanding was that when this initial

 3     action of Russians taking UN personnel prisoner started in Pale, there

 4     was an avalanche effect.  That was my understanding.

 5             MS. EDGERTON:  Let's have a look at D2149 next, please.  This is

 6     a Defence Exhibit, not yet, a Defence Exhibit D2149 tendered by

 7     Dr. Karadzic and it was offered by General Milovanovic relating to his

 8     meetings with Dr. Karadzic, between May 1992 and December 1995.  And I'd

 9     like us to go over to page 56 in the English and page 38 in the B/C/S

10     original.

11             THE WITNESS:  I would --

12             MS. EDGERTON:  And I'd like to --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, just a second.  Yes, Mr. Zametica?

14             THE WITNESS:  I would kindly request if the English version can

15     be enlarged because I can hardly read it.

16             MS. EDGERTON:

17        Q.   Do you mind, then, if we collapse the Cyrillic version so you can

18     just read at least one of them clearly --

19        A.   Well, for the time being I don't mind, but I certainly cannot

20     read the small letters there.

21        Q.   And if at any time you want to see the Cyrillic of a --

22        A.   Thank you.

23        Q.   -- document or the other version, just say.

24             So here, on the entry in this diary for May 25th, 1995, on the

25     very last line, General Milovanovic says:

Page 42497

 1             "While informing Karadzic about the start of bombardment, he,"

 2     and if we go over to the next page, "he ordered me to activate last

 3     year's decision of the Supreme Command on the VRS arresting everything

 4     foreign in RS territory."

 5             So not only was there a policy decision taken by the

 6     RS leadership, your understanding of Dr. Karadzic's role in the operation

 7     is actually incorrect.  Dr. Karadzic ordered it, didn't he?

 8        A.   It is possible, yes.  I cannot confirm that or deny that.

 9     I think it is possible, yes.

10        Q.   Well, how about if we go over to - your indulgence for a moment -

11     P2137, which is a VRS Main Staff order to the commands of the 1st and

12     2nd Krajina Corps, the air force, the anti-aircraft defence, the

13     Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the East Bosnia Corps, all the corps, signed by

14     General Milovanovic.

15             Now, have a look at this document, Mr. Zametica.  It says in

16     paragraphs 1 and 2, that the corps commands and the air force and

17     anti-aircraft defence shall, in agreement with the commanders of the

18     logistics bases, place the captured UNPROFOR staff as well as the staff

19     of other international humanitarian organisations in their AORs in the

20     areas of command posts, firing positions, and other potential targets

21     that may come under air strike.

22             And then, if you go over in the English translation to page 2,

23     paragraph 8, and also find the second-to-last paragraph in the original

24     B/C/S, you see, Mr. Zametica, that this order of the VRS Main Staff about

25     the deployment of UNPROFOR has been approved by the president of the

Page 42498

 1     Republika Srpska.

 2             Mr. Zametica, not only is it possible, that's what the evidence

 3     shows.  Isn't that the case?

 4        A.   That is what General Milovanovic says, yes.

 5        Q.   That's what this order shows.  Isn't that the case?

 6        A.   No.  I'm not trying to say this is impossible.  All I'm saying,

 7     this is what General Milovanovic was saying.  There is no direct

 8     connection between his document and Dr. Karadzic saying these people

 9     should be tied up to, I don't know, posts and the like.  It is possible.

10     I -- I have no knowledge of that and I cannot comment on it.  But all I'm

11     saying is that you do not actually prove a direct connection here.  This

12     is what Milovanovic says.

13        Q.   So evidence that the specific order deploying UNPROFOR personnel

14     to military locations that could be the subject of NATO air strikes has

15     been approved by the president of the Republika Srpska doesn't in your

16     mind represent a direct connection?

17        A.   No, it does not because -- because the army would do very often

18     things on its own regardless of Dr. Karadzic's wishes or orders or

19     instructions.  As I said earlier, the army was very much on its own,

20     pursuing its own policy.  I'm not saying this is impossible.  All I'm

21     saying, it proves nothing.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  If we could have a look at another document,

23     please.  It's D1055.

24        Q.   And when you call that up, if we could go over to page 5, which

25     is a statement given by you on 26 May 1995, at midnight, actually,

Page 42499

 1     26 May 1995, in response to the air strikes.  And you said there,

 2     Mr. Zametica:

 3             "I believe that we have demonstrated" -- you can read it halfway

 4     down the page.  "We have demonstrated our determination and firmness

 5     through today's response," and you describe it as a restrained response,

 6     and that the international community will understand that.

 7             You also say:

 8             "However, if that's not understood and the attacks continue, we

 9     shall go further.  If the international community continues with the use

10     of force, we shall respond in the same manner.  We are defending

11     ourselves in our traditional territories and we will respond adequately

12     to the use of force."

13             And just to put things in context, the first air strike took

14     place at 4.20 on 25 May 1995.  All the safe areas were shelled except for

15     Zepa, and the source for that is P6275 --

16        A.   No, no, I'm --

17        Q.   -- and -- and here you are, using language that speaks expressly

18     of unity of purpose and unity of action, Mr. Zametica.  How is the army

19     doing something on their own?

20        A.   If you go further up in this document, which is my statement

21     dated 26th of May, you will see that I'm sending here a signal to the

22     international community which is as follows.  I'm reading now.

23        Q.   We can see the document, Mr. Zametica --

24             JUDGE KWON:  Let him continue.

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Apologies.

Page 42500

 1             THE WITNESS:  I say that:

 2             "The international community has so far demonstrated a total lack

 3     of understanding.  We are defending ourselves in our traditional

 4     territories," and I continue further down.  "We are prepared to negotiate

 5     today or tomorrow, but only on the basis which would assure equal

 6     treatment to us as to the other parties to this conflict."

 7             So my message there -- of course, I said all these things.  I'm

 8     not denying it for a second.  And it was a strong statement, and you must

 9     understand the context in which it was made.  Feelings were running very

10     high.  But the most important part of this document is the one where I'm

11     sending a signal to the international community, hey, we are prepared to

12     negotiate.

13        Q.   My question was about the language you used.  You said, referring

14     to the -- what you described as a restrained response, you said, "We, we,

15     we," over and over.  Are you saying that this was the army doing

16     something on their own?

17        A.   I'm not saying that.  All I'm saying is that you -- you cannot

18     demonstrate what you call unity of purpose here.  There was no unity of

19     purpose.  There may have been a coincidence of purpose but never

20     something as grand as what you have termed the unity of purpose.  Didn't

21     exist.

22        Q.   So are you saying now that it's a coincidence that all the safe

23     areas were shelled within hours of the first air strike?  It's only a

24     coincidence?

25        A.   Your question doesn't follow from my answer.  I don't see the

Page 42501

 1     logical connection.

 2        Q.   Maybe you could answer my question.  Are you saying it's a

 3     coincidence that all NATO safe areas were -- pardon me, all safe areas

 4     were shelled within hours of the first NATO air strikes?

 5        A.   The question of coincidence does not arise here at all.  I fail

 6     to follow your logic.

 7        Q.   Was the army doing something off their own bat?

 8        A.   Very often that was the case.  I don't know what the army was

 9     doing in this particular instance.

10        Q.   Then why do you use the words "we" all the way through your

11     response that's carried across the world?

12        A.   Because it is logical that I say "we."  What other term in the

13     English language would you have recommended me to use?

14        Q.   I'll move on.  The next day, after all the safe areas were

15     shelled, and you issue this threat that "we" will go further, you up the

16     ante and that -- on the 26th of May, within one hour from the second air

17     strike, you were shelling Sarajevo with 250-kilo air bombs, you blocked

18     land access to Sarajevo, you cut the water and electricity supplies off,

19     and you reacted by taking human shields.  The order that Dr. Karadzic

20     gave to General Milovanovic was implemented all across the country.

21     That's what happened, isn't it, Mr. Zametica?

22        A.   That is what you said happened.  I'm not so sure.

23        Q.   Well, you were there.  Tell us.

24        A.   How many human shields, if I may ask, were there out of, I don't

25     know, 300 prisoners?  Because I mean -- sorry, I just need to continue.

Page 42502

 1     What you said sounded as if, if someone didn't know about it, as if all

 2     prisoners were human shields.  In fact, a very small proportion of

 3     prisoners were human shields.  Not that I approved of it.  I made my

 4     opposition to the whole idea very clear earlier on.  But I just wonder

 5     why you are using language which suggests that all prisoners, all UN

 6     prisoners, were human shields, which was demonstrably not the case.

 7        Q.   Mr. Zametica, I gave you the context and the sequence of events

 8     and you said that you weren't so sure this is what happened.  So if I'm

 9     wrong, I'd like you to tell me what happened.  You were there.

10        A.   The fact that I was there doesn't mean that I knew everything

11     that was happening.  So whatever happened there, and my knowledge about

12     those events, I have related in my statement and I have nothing further

13     to add to that.

14        Q.   Well, Mr. Zametica, let's look at something else you said on

15     26 May 1995.

16             MS. EDGERTON:  Let's go to 65 ter number 25339.

17        Q.   It's your press statement carried by Reuters.

18             MS. EDGERTON:  And perhaps we could enlarge it a little bit.

19        Q.   And I'd like you to go down to the second-to-last sentence.  It

20     says:

21             "Zametica said that the Serbs have positioned UN troops and

22     unarmed military observers around potential targets that NATO might hit."

23             Well, Mr. Zametica, based on what you say at the time, not only

24     were you there, you knew these military observers had been deprived of

25     their weapons, deprived of their protective gear, dispersed throughout

Page 42503

 1     Serb-held territory to compel NATO forces to stop the air strikes.  And

 2     In fact, you say -- if you go up and look at the second paragraph on that

 3     page, you say:

 4             "If it wishes to proceed, the international community as a whole

 5     will have to pay a very, very heavy price."

 6             And further, you say:

 7             "It will not stop at that.  The Serbs are determined to make a

 8     point to the entire world."

 9             And very -- at the very bottom of the page, you say:

10             "If the NATO alliance wishes to continue with air strikes, then

11     it will have to kill the UN troops here on the ground."

12             You were there, you knew exactly what was going on, Mr. Zametica.

13     Isn't that right?

14        A.   No, that is not correct.  I think I made my views on the subject

15     very clear earlier on.  I personally opposed the whole policy of taking

16     UN personnel prisoner.  The Reuters report which you have presented me

17     with sounds very much like -- like a made-up statement, in part at any

18     rate.  It sound to me like some kind of briefing I may have given to some

19     journalists, there were plenty of journalists there at the time, but off

20     the record.  I never would use terms like:  "It will have to kill the UN

21     troops here on the ground."

22             I was very aware -- but that in particular sounds to me like a

23     made-up story.  I was very much aware of the importance of communicating

24     with the Western media, with the Western world.  I was very careful in my

25     choice of words and I would never have used words to that effect or the

Page 42504

 1     words that are stated here.  So, yes, I was there, I'm not denying that

 2     I was there, but I didn't know everything that was taking place.

 3             Fast-developing situation, plenty of emotion.  War, you see, is

 4     not a set of rational moves and countermoves.  Emotion comes into it.

 5     Fear comes into it.  And so on.  So this was one of those situations.

 6     But I, despite the statement which we saw earlier on, which I'm not

 7     denying I'm the author of, this sounds to me like an off-the-record

 8     briefing with an additional content thrown in, of which I'm not the

 9     author.  I would never have used things -- terms like:  "It will have to

10     kill the UN troops."  That would have been a completely wrong message to

11     send to the international community.

12             I drew your attention just earlier on now to the most important

13     part of my statement of, I think, 26th of May, where I said that

14     Republika Srpska is prepared to negotiate.  Do you think that I was

15     unaware of the very situation -- very serious situation in which we were

16     finding ourselves?  I mean, our only hope was through negotiations.  Our

17     only hope was, you know, given the combined forces arranged against us,

18     which were enormous, from the international community to the Western

19     media, to Mr. Milosevic and his wife in Belgrade, to the insubordinate

20     army, to -- our only hope was to have a peace settlement as fast as

21     possible.  So -- so this statement which you have presented -- this

22     press -- Reuters press report completely goes against my thinking at the

23     time.

24        Q.   You've just once again described the army as insubordinate, but,

25     Mr. Zametica, we've looked at a series of documents now, including

Page 42505

 1     military documents, that show exactly the contrary, that show the army is

 2     implementing a directive, an order, in fact, from Dr. Karadzic.  On what

 3     basis, in respect of this operation, are you claiming the army is

 4     insubordinate now?

 5        A.   Can you show me that order by Dr. Karadzic?  Not Milovanovic's

 6     document, Dr. Karadzic's document.  Is there one?

 7        Q.   We have seen the evidence from General Milovanovic's diary.  If

 8     you'd like, I can call it back up for you.

 9        A.   No.  I have seen it.  I asked you to give to me, to demonstrate

10     to this Tribunal Dr. Karadzic's order.  Where is it?

11        Q.   Mr. Zametica, I've just told you, you've already seen the

12     evidence.  Now you can answer my question.  On what basis, in respect of

13     this operation, are you now claiming the army is insubordinate?

14        A.   The army was insubordinate all the time.  It was preparing a

15     military putsch in August 1995.

16        Q.   I asked you --

17        A.   I can go -- I can go into detail.  I mean, an army that is

18     preparing a putsch --

19        Q.   Mr. Zametica, stop.  I'm not asking you about August.

20     I specifically asked you about this operation.

21        A.   Well, what makes you think that during this operation, the army

22     was acting as, all of a sudden, an instrument of the political leadership

23     of Republika Srpska and had become less independent than it normally was?

24        Q.   Mr. Zametica, you're not answering my question, so --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Let me put this.  What is your evidence,

Page 42506

 1     Mr. Zametica:  Number 1, Dr. Karadzic never ordered the taking prisoners

 2     of UN soldiers or, number 2, you did not know whether he issued such

 3     orders or not?

 4             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour, it's number 2.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Edgerton, please continue.

 6             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.  Your indulgence for a moment, and I'll

 7     go on to another area.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Perhaps we could admit this exhibit,

 9     Mr. President.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  Of course.  That would make understanding

11     Mr. Zametica's answers much easier.  If that could be a Prosecution

12     exhibit, please.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

14             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit P6474, Your Honours.

15             MS. EDGERTON:

16        Q.   You've mentioned a couple of times today, both to Dr. Karadzic

17     and to your answers to me, about the memorandum you wrote advocating the

18     release of the hostages and that was because you thought there was a risk

19     of additional international isolation.  Fair?

20        A.   Fair enough, but that's not the whole story.  I felt that taking

21     prisoner -- taking UN personnel prisoner was also morally unsustainable.

22        Q.   Now, it looks like -- your indulgence for a moment.

23             Now, Dr. Koljevic, who you referred to in your signed statement a

24     couple of times, wrote about your memo in his diary actually, and

25     I assume you've read his diary.  Have you?

Page 42507

 1        A.   I have read parts of his diary.  It is a diary which has been

 2     published, in two very large tomes.  I would not like to claim that I

 3     have read it from page 1 to the last page.  I have read bits of it, yes.

 4        Q.   All right.  Then you knew that Dr. Koljevic had written about

 5     your memo in his diary.  Right?

 6        A.   I cannot remember now but it's very possible, yes.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  I'd like to call up 65 ter number 25569.

 8        Q.   Which is an excerpt from his diary, or the excerpt from his diary

 9     which talks about your memo.  And in the B/C/S original it's at pages 152

10     and 153.

11             And you can just tell us, Mr. Zametica, which you'd like to have

12     on the screen in front of you, the English or the B/C/S.  I'd like you to

13     direct your attention to the paragraph that reads:  "On that same day,

14     29 May," because that's the part that relates to your memorandum.  And if

15     you can skim through that, I'm going to take you over to the next page

16     and then I'm going to ask you a question.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we collapse the B/C/S?

18             MS. EDGERTON:

19        Q.   Is that all right with you, Mr. Zametica?  Shall we collapse the

20     B/C/S?

21        A.   Yes, please do.

22        Q.   Can you tell us when we can go to the next page, Mr. Zametica?

23        A.   Yes, go ahead.

24        Q.   And there is going to be part of a third page after that.  So let

25     us know when you've come to the bottom of this page.

Page 42508

 1        A.   Yes, please go on.

 2        Q.   When you talked about your memo --

 3        A.   Sorry, I haven't finished reading.

 4        Q.   Let me ask the question and you can continue reading after I ask

 5     the question.  When you talked about your memo, Mr. Zametica, you didn't

 6     mention this next bit that Dr. Koljevic has written about in his book,

 7     and it was about a proposal, your proposal, as regards the eastern

 8     enclaves.  Now have a read.

 9        A.   Yes.

10        Q.   Mr. Zametica, what you didn't mention is that you also made a

11     proposal for an immediate fierce offensive attack against the eastern

12     enclaves at the same time as UNPROFOR members were released selectively,

13     and you pointed out that that would be the only move that would bring us

14     back to the negotiating table to ensure a complete victory in

15     Eastern Bosnia.

16             Now, you relied on Dr. Koljevic's diary on more than one occasion

17     in your signed statement.  Can we also rely on Dr. Koljevic's diary in

18     his rendering of your proposal to the Bosnian Serb leadership?

19        A.   To a large extent, yes.

20        Q.   Great.  Then I want to ask you a little bit about this fierce

21     offensive against the eastern enclaves that you recommended at the end of

22     May 1995.  And what I'd like to know, Mr. Zametica, and it actually

23     relates to something you said earlier today.  You told Dr. Karadzic in

24     your examination-in-chief that you didn't read the intelligence reports

25     because he had advisors who did that, and you identified them.  Now, do

Page 42509

 1     you agree, then, with the security advisor that did read those reports,

 2     that the killings in Srebrenica are a myth?  In fact, he used the words,

 3     "a big farce."  Is that your position?

 4        A.   Before I say what my position is, I would like to have

 5     additional -- I would like to have clarification on who you're referring

 6     to and what is the -- what is the citation -- who are you attributing

 7     this citation to about the myth?

 8        Q.   I'm attributing it to Ambassador Milinic who was one of the two

 9     advisors to Dr. Karadzic and he said this when he came to testify in

10     Dr. Karadzic's Defence at this Tribunal at transcript pages 39769 to 70,

11     and 39793.

12        A.   I'm not responsible for what Gordan Milinic was saying, so I'm

13     not clear what you're trying to ask me.  I mean, are you asking me to

14     comment on what Mr. Milinic said in his testimony?  Is that what you're

15     trying to ask me?

16        Q.   I'm asking you -- you said you didn't read any intelligence

17     reports and Dr. Karadzic had advisors who did.  Well, one of the people

18     who read those said the killings at Srebrenica are a myth, a farce.  Is

19     that your position as well?

20        A.   No, it is not my position.

21        Q.   Well, then, Mr. Zametica, when you talk about the crimes at

22     Srebrenica, as you did with Dr. Karadzic, you're talking about the mass

23     executions of thousands of Bosnian men and boys by the armed forces of

24     the Republika Srpska.  Right?

25        A.   Can you please repeat your question?  I'm not following you.

Page 42510

 1        Q.   All right.  So since that's not your position, I want to ask you

 2     if we can agree on this.  When you talk, as you did in your

 3     examination-in-chief and in your written statement, actually, your signed

 4     statement, about the crimes at Srebrenica, you're talking about the mass

 5     execution of thousands of Bosnian men and boys by the armed forces of the

 6     Republika Srpska.  Right?

 7        A.   I'm sorry, Your Honour, I'm just taking a little bit more time to

 8     come to the -- to the Srebrenica section, to see what exactly I wrote.

 9     I actually wrote - this is page 16, paragraph 35 - to this day, I do not

10     know who perpetrated or ordered the crimes of -- the crimes in

11     Srebrenica, but it is certain that whoever it was did a great disservice

12     to Republika Srpska.  That's what I wrote.

13        Q.   All right.  When you talk about the crimes at Srebrenica, it's

14     correct that you're referring to the mass executions of thousands of

15     Bosnian Muslim men and boys by forces of the Republika Srpska.  Right?

16        A.   No.  First of all --

17        Q.   Tell us what you're referring to, then.

18        A.   I'm referring to a massacre that took place in Srebrenica during

19     that period.  That's what I'm referring to.  More than that, I cannot

20     refer to because I was not there.

21        Q.   Mr. Zametica, there has been -- and you would know this because

22     you seem to have been following the trials at this Tribunal rather

23     closely.  There has been several trials now into the allegations related

24     to Srebrenica and there has been several findings about these executions

25     and those findings are -- are to this effect:  Those findings refer to

Page 42511

 1     7.000 -- pardon me, those findings refer to almost 7.000 Bosnian Muslim

 2     men and boys executed by the armed forces of the Republika Srpska, the

 3     VRS and the MUP.  Is it your evidence that you're not prepared to accept

 4     that as true?

 5        A.   No, no, I'm not saying that.  Incidentally, I wonder on what

 6     basis you say that I have been closely following the trial -- the trial

 7     here.  I don't think this follows from anything I said.  But as regards

 8     the massacre that took place in Srebrenica during that period that we are

 9     talking about, I can only repeat what I said in my statement in

10     paragraph 35, and I shall read it to you again because you do not seem to

11     have understood my -- so if you require additional explanations, I

12     shall -- I shall be happy to try and provide them.  But I repeat this

13     first sentence in paragraph 35, which is as follows:  To this day I do

14     not know -- so to this day, and this was dated, I suppose in June -- to

15     this day I do not know who, repeat who, perpetrated or ordered the crimes

16     in Srebrenica, but it is certain that whoever it was did a great

17     disservice to Republika Srpska.  I have nothing to add to that.

18        Q.   So can we take from what you're saying that you're not prepared

19     to accept that almost 7.000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were executed by

20     the armed forces of the Republika Srpska?

21        A.   Once again, I repeat because you do not -- I don't know in which

22     language I should be talking to you, but it seems to me that either you

23     have chosen to misunderstand my English or ignore it, or perhaps if

24     I offer additional explanations -- but I think the -- the phrasing of

25     this sentence, first sentence in paragraph 35, is as clear as it can be

Page 42512

 1     in the English language.  So all I can say is that I was not in

 2     Srebrenica at the time.  My knowledge at the time was that nothing in

 3     terms of crimes had been done in Srebrenica.  That was also what I

 4     believe to this day was Dr. Karadzic's information.  So I was not there,

 5     I do not know who, repeat who, perpetrated or ordered the crimes in

 6     Srebrenica.  I'm sure this Tribunal has been looking into the matter very

 7     carefully and it will, I'm sure, establish the facts of the matter.

 8        Q.   Because you're not answering my question, I'll ask you one more

 9     thing in a slightly different way and then we'll move on.

10             You refer repeatedly now, because you keep repeating something

11     you wrote in your statement, to a massacre at Srebrenica.  How many

12     victims, to your knowledge, and do you believe, resulted from those

13     executions?

14        A.   I have no knowledge of the subject.  Let me just add, because

15     I see what you're driving at, let me repeat, I was not there on the spot.

16     I have no idea what happened there except that it is by now clear

17     something awful did happen.  I don't know who perpetrated the crime.  I

18     don't know how many people were executed.  So I'm not trying to run away

19     from this subject.  I'm just trying to be as clear as I can be in the

20     English language, to tell you that I have no specific knowledge of the

21     matter.  I don't know how many people were executed.  Even if only one

22     was executed, that would have been wrong.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Now, you also said today that as regards the massacre

24     at Srebrenica, and you said this at temporary transcript page 50, that we

25     didn't know any more in 2001, at the time you and Dr. Karadzic were

Page 42513

 1     having some private correspondence while he was a fugitive from justice,

 2     you didn't know any more in 2001 than was known in 1995.

 3             Mr. Zametica, Radislav Krstic, the deputy commander of the

 4     Drina Corps, was convicted here, at the ICTY, after a trial in the first

 5     instance in August 2001 of aiding and abetting in the genocide, murder,

 6     extermination, and persecutions in respect of the killing of thousands of

 7     Bosnian Muslim men and boys.  So how can you say we didn't know any more

 8     in 2001 than we did in 1995?

 9        A.   If the Tribunal convicted General Krstic, did you say?  It must

10     have investigated the matter very carefully, and I cannot comment on

11     that.  I think what you're referring to -- this is the private letter

12     that Dr. Karadzic wrote to me in 2001.  You will be aware that the

13     subject of Srebrenica is still a subject of considerable controversy, and

14     presumably what Dr. Karadzic meant to say in that letter is that

15     basically we don't know now, in 2001, much more than we knew in 1995.

16     Presumably that's what he meant but I cannot -- I cannot comment more

17     than that.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Your indulgence for a moment.  Now, you said in

19     response to a question by Dr. Karadzic earlier today as to what

20     information we, referring to, I presume, you, he and other people, had at

21     your disposal, your response was:

22             "We knew that a military operation had been successfully

23     completed, the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica as a

24     military stronghold."

25             Mr. Zametica, this was an operation ordered by Dr. Karadzic,

Page 42514

 1     wasn't it?

 2        A.   I believe it was, yes.  However, I have something to add to that.

 3     I think when we are talking about Srebrenica, it is important to realise

 4     that there are two separate aspects to Srebrenica which most people seem

 5     to be unable to distinguish between.  The first aspect of Srebrenica is

 6     military operation Srebrenica.  The neutralising of a military

 7     stronghold, Srebrenica, bristling with armed people who are jumping out

 8     of it all the time, something that was commented upon by UN

 9     Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in contravention to the

10     demilitarisation agreement on Srebrenica.  So the taking out of this

11     military threat, Srebrenica, is aspect number 1 of the subject of

12     Srebrenica.

13             Aspect number 2 of Srebrenica is the massacre in or at

14     Srebrenica.  They are two very separate matters.  Whoever did the crime,

15     it was done on the ground, repeat, on the ground, and not as a result of

16     some joint criminal enterprise.  If it was, as you said, the Army of

17     Republika Srpska that did it, then it was an army out of Dr. Karadzic's

18     control.  Repeat, out of Dr. Karadzic's control.  I'm sure that

19     Dr. Karadzic would have sanctioned aspect 1 of Srebrenica, which is the

20     military operation.  I'm equally convinced, however, that he would never

21     have sanctioned any crimes that subsequently took place in or around

22     Srebrenica.

23        Q.   Let's look at another document.  Now, you said, when I asked you,

24     that you believe that the military operation of neutralising Srebrenica

25     was ordered by Dr. Karadzic.  Now, I'd like you to have a look at P4484.

Page 42515

 1     And it's going to take us some steps to go through this.  This is an

 2     excerpt from a dictaphone tape containing a number of recorded

 3     conversations and I want you to look at a conversation between

 4     Dr. Karadzic and the Drina Corps commander, General Zivanovic about the

 5     attack on Srebrenica.  And it's dated on or around July 1995 --

 6        A.   Sorry, can you repeat the date?

 7        Q.   8 July, on or around 8 July 1995.  Let's have a look at the

 8     conversation.  A third of the way down the page, Dr. Karadzic asks:

 9             "Are the tits ours?"

10        A.   Sorry, what does he ask?

11        Q.   The English translation is:  "Are the tits ours?"  Referring to a

12     feature.  General Zivanovic responds:

13             "They are.  They're there for the first time" --

14        A.   Excuse me, excuse me, can you please stop for a second?  Which

15     line is this roughly in the document?

16        Q.   One-third of the way down the page.

17        A.   "Are the tits ours?"

18        Q.   Line 15, approximately.

19        A.   Sorry, can you please give me some time to read the whole

20     document?

21        Q.   Absolutely.

22        A.   Thank you.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Could we have the correct page in B/C/S,

24     please?

25             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you to my colleague, Mr. Registrar.

Page 42516

 1        Q.   By the way, just regarding the translation, the English word

 2     being "tits," that refers to when it says in the B/C/S - and apologies

 3     for my translation --

 4        A.   You don't need to --

 5        Q.   -- it's the Tri Sise mountains.

 6        A.   The what mountains -- oh, the [indiscernible].

 7        Q.   Tri Sise, if I pronounce it correctly and I probably don't.

 8        A.   Actually we might need that translation because I did not

 9     understand your rendering of the Serbian language there.  So I'd kindly

10     request the translation.  I've read this page.

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Could we go over to the next page in English,

12     please?

13        Q.   Mr. Zametica, Dr. Karadzic, in this conversation with his

14     military commander, General Zivanovic, is getting an earful of

15     information and it's a very tactical discussion.  They talk about

16     elevations being reached, prisoners being taken, and Dr. Karadzic gives

17     an order.  He gives an order to attack.  You would have seen in the

18     second page, two-thirds of the way down, Dr. Karadzic tell

19     General Zivanovic:

20             "All right, General, full speed ahead.  Tell Krstic order to go

21     full steam."

22             Now, you said earlier this morning, or earlier today, that as far

23     as you knew, Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in operational, tactical

24     command over the army, and that's contradicted by this, and I called it

25     an intercept, I apologise, this dictaphone tape recording, isn't it?

Page 42517

 1        A.   No, it's not.  I didn't say that.  Please don't put words into my

 2     mouth.  I said by and large, or words that that effect, he did not -- he

 3     did not have a great interest in tactical operational matters.  That's

 4     what I said.  I think I was very clear earlier today.  I think it can be

 5     checked in the record.

 6        Q.   What you said was:

 7             "In terms of operative and tactical levels of command over the

 8     army, I think you left that to the army itself."

 9        A.   So I said "I think."

10        Q.   "I think you had responsibilities with regard to strategic

11     decisions, but with regard to day-to-day operative and tactical levels, I

12     don't think you were particularly involved."

13        A.   Precisely.  He was not particularly involved.  So what you said

14     earlier on just now, that this document currently on display contradicts

15     or contravenes my earlier statement, is simply untrue.

16        Q.   It fits -- you're saying it fits, then, within the statement

17     you've given that I just read back to you?

18        A.   It fits in within your imagination, perhaps, but it doesn't fit

19     with my statement.

20        Q.   We'll move on to another document, D2090.  This is a document

21     dated -- oh, pardon me.

22             JUDGE KWON:  We are hearing B/C/S in English channel.  I think it

23     has been corrected.  Please continue.

24             MS. EDGERTON:  And I said the wrong 65 ter number, it's 2080.

25             JUDGE KWON:  And has your question about Sise been resolved?

Page 42518

 1             THE WITNESS:  I don't think so.  I think it's been ignored.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  It just referred to the three hilltops nearby

 3     Srebrenica.

 4             THE WITNESS:  I see.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  "Sise," I take it, was "tits" in B/C/S.

 6             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  My mispronunciation, I'm told it's not a sh sound.

 8             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9        Q.   So, Mr. Zametica, this is a document dated the next day,

10     9th of July, 1995, from General Krstic to the VRS --

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me, can we establish for

12     sure whether that date, the date of the first document, was indeed the

13     8th or not?  If we are going to continue claiming that this was on the

14     next day?

15             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Edgerton?

16             MS. EDGERTON:  I said on or around the 8th.

17             JUDGE KWON:  We do not have document -- I do not have date on

18     that document.

19             MS. EDGERTON:  Not on that document, but I can -- tomorrow

20     morning, I can direct Dr. Karadzic to the evidence regarding the date of

21     this conversation.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Shall we continue, then?

23             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you.

24        Q.   So this is a document from General Krstic to the VRS Main Staff

25     with an assessment of the situation in Srebrenica on the 9th of July --

Page 42519

 1        A.   You mean 9th of -- I see two separate dates.  I'm sorry to be

 2     interrupting you, but I see two separate -- 9th of July and 9th of May,

 3     1995.

 4        Q.   Yes.

 5        A.   So I'm confused.

 6        Q.   There is nothing confusing about this document.  This document is

 7     dated in the top left-hand corner, the 9th of July, 1995.  And in the

 8     second paragraph, General Krstic relates the fierce attack that his units

 9     have carried out along the axes of Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica-Pribojevici

10     village and so forth, and indicates that they've created conditions for

11     extending the attack toward Srebrenica.  In paragraph 3, he --

12        A.   Sorry to interrupt you, Madam Prosecutor.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zametica was referring to handwritten date on

14     top right corner.

15             THE WITNESS:  Correct.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Why don't ignore it for the moment.  She may come

17     back later on if --

18             THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Your Honour, but I wish to comment also

19     on the translation of paragraph 2.  It just goes to show that sometimes

20     things can be lost in translation.  In paragraph 2, there is no talk

21     about a fierce attack.  There is talk about "u snaznom naletu" which

22     means a "strong push."  It's not a fierce push but -- okay, it's a minor

23     detail.  I'm just drawing the attention of your fine self and the

24     Tribunal that we have to be very careful regarding the language.

25     I happened accidently to stumble against the Serbian version of the

Page 42520

 1     document, but please carry on, yes.

 2             MS. EDGERTON:

 3        Q.   Now, paragraph 3 sets out his decision for further actions, where

 4     he writes:

 5             "Taking advantage of the success achieved, regroup the forces and

 6     carry out a vigorous and decisive attack towards Srebrenica."

 7             MS. EDGERTON:  And if we scroll down to the bottom of the page,

 8     in both languages, please.  Sorry, you'll have to go over to the second

 9     page in English for the date stamp.

10             THE WITNESS:  Well, I -- sorry, I haven't even digested the first

11     page.  You're already pushing me on to the second page.  I think this is

12     slightly unfair.

13             MS. EDGERTON:

14        Q.   That's fine, Mr. Zametica.  We can go back to the first page.

15        A.   Thank you.  Thank you so much.  Just a quick comment on

16     paragraph 1, he talks about the enemy firing all their available weapons.

17        Q.   Mr. Zametica, I'll give you an opportunity to comment when I ask

18     a question.  I would just like to invite to you finish reading the

19     document, as you'd requested.

20        A.   Thank you.  Yes?

21        Q.   All right.

22             MS. EDGERTON:  Now, if we can go over in English to the date

23     stamp, we see that it's received on the 9th of July at 2330.  If we can

24     go back over to the English page -- the first page of the English.

25     Pardon me, 2320.  All right.

Page 42521

 1        Q.   Now, Mr. Zametica, General Krstic is sending this interim combat

 2     report exactly where he is supposed to, up to the VRS Main Staff.  So I'd

 3     like us to go to another document --

 4        A.   Excuse me, when you say General Krstic is sending this report

 5     where it should be going to, the VRS Main Staff, and the Drina Corps,

 6     what exactly is the meaning of your words?

 7        Q.   It's a lead-up to the next question --

 8        A.   Oh, I see, sorry, yes.

 9        Q.   -- in the next document.

10             MS. EDGERTON:  P2276, please.

11        Q.   The very same evening that you, in your written statement, have

12     your conversation with Dr. Karadzic, General Tolimir issues an order

13     which is copied to Dr. Karadzic for information and it's delivered to the

14     Drina Corps command post, Generals Gvero and Krstic, personally.

15             Now, it relates to the conduct of combat operations around

16     Srebrenica, and it says, in paragraph 1, paragraph 2, paragraph 3, and

17     paragraph 4, that the president of the republic has been informed of the

18     combat operations, the president of the republic is satisfied with the

19     results of the combat operations, he's ordered that follow-up combat

20     operations take place, and in accordance with the order of the

21     president --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please be more precise?

23     Where does it say that I ordered it in -- as opposed to given my

24     approval?  Or consent?  If the meaning is important, then let us take

25     proper care of this meaning.

Page 42522

 1             JUDGE KWON:  We have the document.  So what -- please let us know

 2     when you have done the reading, Mr. Zametica.

 3             Just a second.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I'm sorry, but

 5     I received a different interpretation than the translation.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Ignore the previous question.  I think Mr. Zametica

 7     read the document.  What is your question, Ms. Edgerton?

 8             THE WITNESS:  Well, I think it is clear --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  No, just a minute.  What is your question,

10     Ms. Edgerton?

11             MS. EDGERTON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

12        Q.   Now, Mr. Zametica, I want to go back again to your assertion that

13     Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in operational tactical command of the army,

14     and here --

15        A.   Can we -- can we just pause for a second?  I mean, this is the

16     second time I'm going to say this.  I never said that.  You say that

17     I asserted that Dr. Karadzic was never involved in operation and tactical

18     conduct of warfare.  I never said anything of the kind and I repeat it

19     now.  It will be on the record.  I repeat it now.  He was largely

20     uninterested.  So I never asserted that he had not been involved in

21     operational and tactical at any time whatsoever.  I never said words to

22     that effect.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Zametica, you've described the army as

24     insubordinate.  This is an example of General Krstic sending a report

25     right up to where it's supposed to go, to the VRS Main Staff.  If you

Page 42523

 1     look at this document, it's clear that the order we just looked at, D2 --

 2     or the report we just looked at, D2080, went to Karadzic.  45 minutes

 3     later, and you can see by the time stamp on this document, the answer

 4     comes back from Dr. Karadzic.

 5             This is an example, Mr. Zametica, of the chain of command in

 6     the -- the chain of command working perfectly smoothly and contradicts

 7     your assertion that the army was out of control.

 8        A.   No.  I think this is a very good example of how a clever lawyer

 9     like yourself puts two and two together and makes ten.  And I shall

10     elaborate on that.  In this document currently on the monitor, you said

11     Karadzic ordered this and that.  In paragraph 1, in paragraph 2, you

12     said, and in paragraph 3.  In fact, if you actually bother to read the

13     document, he doesn't order anything in paragraph 1.  He simply informed.

14     I shall read it:

15             "The President of Republika Srpska has been informed of

16     successful combat operations," blah, blah, blah.

17             Second paragraph:

18             "The president of the republic is satisfied ..."

19             So being satisfied doesn't mean he's ordering anything.  Being

20     informed doesn't mean he's ordering anything.

21             The only thing, in fact, he is ordering is to be found in

22     paragraph 3, and I shall read it out for you:

23             "The President of Republika Srpska ordered," repeat ordered,

24     "that in the follow-up combat operations, full protection be ensured,"

25     repeat, full protection be ensured, "to UNPROFOR members and the Muslim

Page 42524

 1     civilian population and that they be guaranteed safety in the event of

 2     their crossover to the territory of Republika Srpska."

 3             And that's the only thing he ordered.

 4        Q.   So you agree with me, then, the chain of command is working

 5     perfectly?

 6        A.   No, I do not.  I wish that were true, but it -- it unfortunately

 7     didn't work like that.  Earlier today, I tried to make the point about

 8     the Army of Republika Srpska being basically a force unto itself.  I

 9     don't know what better way of describing the state of affairs that

10     existed at the time.  The chain of command that you talk about did not

11     really exist.  It existed only when the Army of Republika Srpska, when it

12     suited it to obey some order or instruction by Dr. Karadzic, then it did

13     work.  But otherwise, they did what they -- what they liked.  They very

14     much behaved like a force unto itself.  So you're trying to establish the

15     existence of a certain chain of command which was demonstrably not there.

16     Only two -- three weeks, sorry, after this date, which is 9th of July

17     here, the army is staging a silent coup d'état.  What sort of chain of

18     command are you talking about?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we stop here?

20             MS. EDGERTON:  Yes, I was about to say.  I've gone over time and

21     I apologise, Your Honour.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Zametica, have you ever testified before a

23     court?

24             THE WITNESS:  Yes, in a civil case regarding tenants once in

25     Cambridge, many years ago.

Page 42525

 1             JUDGE KWON:  I'd like to advise you not to discuss with anybody

 2     else about your testimony while you're testifying here.

 3             THE WITNESS:  I understand, Your Honour.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.00.  The

 5     hearing is adjourned.

 6                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,

 7                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 30th day of

 8                           October, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.