Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 43150

 1                           Thursday, 7 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, there are a couple of matters I

 7     would like to deal first.  Good morning, everyone, first.

 8             The Chamber will first turn back to the accused's "Motion to

 9     preclude the questioning of Momcilo Krajisnik on statements made in

10     parliament," filed on the 4th of November.  The Chamber notes that,

11     having heard the parties' further oral submissions yesterday, it

12     considers it important to give its position on the motion prior to the

13     start of Mr. Krajisnik's testimony.  The Chamber considers that the

14     accused has failed to demonstrate in the motion and the further oral

15     submissions that while immunities and privileges may protect

16     parliamentary statements in domestic jurisdictions, this applies in

17     international criminal proceedings.  The Chamber, therefore, denies the

18     motion.

19             Second, Mr. Tieger, while -- although Mr. Nicholls is not with

20     us, I raised with the parties as to the admitting or tendering some parts

21     of witness interviews with Mr. Tomo Kovac.  Where are we in terms of that

22     item?

23             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, Mr. Nicholls sent me that

25     afternoon a list of proposed excerpts.  I objected to several of them.  I

Page 43151

 1     copied the Chamber on my e-mail back to him, indicating which ones I

 2     objected to and why, and we haven't had anything since then.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  As the Court impliedly noted, it may be preferable

 5     to have Mr. Nicholls join us for this discussion.  But I was aware that

 6     Mr. Nicholls sent the proposed list to Mr. Robinson virtually

 7     immediately.  I was also aware that Mr. Robinson had raised certain

 8     objections.  I reviewed quickly some of those objections which I

 9     considered to contravene the practice of this Court and the directions

10     insofar as it appeared that -- and I thought they were also factually

11     inaccurate in that he objected supposedly to material that had been read

12     out even though it had not been read out in full.  But more importantly,

13     the practice of this Court to my --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  I'm sorry to interrupt.  Shall we deal

15     with it after the break, first thing after the break?

16             MR. TIEGER:  I think that's fine.  Thank you, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  So I would like to deal with it while our memory is

18     fresh.

19             Yes, Mr. Krajisnik, could you make the solemn declaration.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

21     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

22                           WITNESS:  MOMCILO KRAJISNIK

23                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated and make yourself

25     comfortable.

Page 43152

 1             Mr. Robinson, the Chamber requested your -- granted your request

 2     for Mr. Krajisnik's counsel to be present today.  What happened to that?

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, Mr. Krajisnik was not among the

 4     witnesses for whom we had made that request.  Since he's not detained, he

 5     falls into the category of people that you previously held are not

 6     entitled to have counsel present for their testimony.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  I should stand corrected.

 8             Mr. Krajisnik, before you commence your evidence, I must let you

 9     know about this.  You heard that the Chamber denied the motion to

10     preclude the questioning on the statements made in parliament, and I take

11     it you are well aware of this but I'd like to explain about the rule of

12     evidence that we have here at the Tribunal, that is, Rule 90(E).  Under

13     this rule you may object to answering any question from the accused,

14     Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from us, the Judges, if you believe

15     that your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence.  In this

16     context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an

17     admission of guilt for a criminal offence or saying something that might

18     provide evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.

19     However, should you think that your answer might incriminate you and, as

20     a consequence, you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know

21     that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question.

22     But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony

23     compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any case that

24     might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the offence of

25     giving false testimony.

Page 43153

 1             Do you understand what I have just told you, Mr. Krajisnik?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

 6     Good morning, everyone.

 7                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 8        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.

 9        A.   Good morning.

10        Q.   I cannot avoid these basic initial questions, so please tell us

11     your full name, your father's name, date and place of birth.

12        A.   My name is Momcilo Krajisnik, born 22nd January 1945, in Zabrdje

13     near Sarajevo.  My father's name is Sretko, mother's name Milka, and I

14     lived in Zabrdje until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, after

15     which I lived as a refugee in Pale, which is a small place near Sarajevo.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Could you tell us, equally concisely, about your

17     education and career.

18        A.   I finished primary school, secondary school, and the school of

19     economics, as well as my post-graduate studies in Sarajevo.  After

20     graduating from university in 1968, on the 15th of October that year I

21     found a job in a large company called Energoinvest, and in two sections

22     of that company I worked until the end of 1990 when I was elected MP to

23     the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I was elected Speaker of the

24     Assembly by a majority vote of all parties from all ethnic communities,

25     and stayed in that post until the end.  I was actually not occupying that

Page 43154

 1     post from the beginning of the war.

 2             On the 24th October 1991, I was elected Speaker of the Assembly

 3     of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which later changed its name

 4     to the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, and I remained in that

 5     position until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  After the end

 6     of the war, I was elected member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 7     from Republika Srpska, and in -- my first term was after the signing of

 8     the Dayton Accords.  In 1991, my tenure finished and then I engaged in

 9     private business.  At that time I started my doctoral thesis.

10             However, on the 3rd of April, 2000, I was arrested, sent to the

11     prison in The Hague, where I spent a little more than nine years.  And

12     after the final judgement I was transferred to a jail in the UK.  In

13     February 2013, by decision of the President of this Tribunal, I was

14     released.  But during my stay in prison I worked actively to collect

15     evidence for a review of my judgement, and I'm very grateful to this

16     Chamber as well because they enabled me to get hold of a large number of

17     documents as well as other services, including the OTP, who are my

18     opponent in these proceedings.  They also enabled me to get a large

19     number of documents.

20             Now I live as a refugee and I'm waiting to the great day when I

21     will finally hear the words "not guilty."  I see the best two Prosecutors

22     in this Tribunal in my mind's eye, Mr. Tieger and Mr. Kremer, raise the

23     white flag.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Were you at any point president of the Presidency of

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 43155

 1        A.   I'm sorry, I know I need to leave a pause.  In my two-years'

 2     term, although I was one of the three equal members of the Presidency, I

 3     was never the president because the decision was that the president may

 4     be only a representative of the Muslim people.

 5        Q.   And what is the practice now?

 6        A.   The practice now is rotation in the Presidency; however, during

 7     my term of office this principle did not apply.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell the Trial Chamber briefly since when we

 9     have known each other, how we met, and the course of our friendship until

10     1990 when the Serbian Democratic Party was established?

11        A.   One day, a friend asked me for an explanation as an economist how

12     loans can be obtained and used from banks.  I asked:  Why?  And he said:

13     I have a friend who needs this information because he wants to start a

14     private business.  And he didn't understand my explanation well obviously

15     because he's a poet, so he asked me to find some time and explain it

16     directly to his friend and that friend was Dr. Radovan Karadzic.  That

17     was my first encounter with you, Mr. Karadzic.  And talking to him, I

18     found out that Dr. Karadzic is part of Sarajevo's intellectual elite and

19     I had an interest in these people, but I didn't know them.  And through

20     various private encounters and celebrations of our patron saint's day I

21     got to know many of these people in the elite.

22             I spoke to Mr. Karadzic and those other people about topics that

23     were very interesting at the time.  Everybody in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

24     into politics at that time.  We talked about various topical issues and

25     inter-ethnic relations, et cetera, and we got to know each better.  We

Page 43156

 1     became closer.  Also because in one trial in Bosnia-Herzegovina we were

 2     indicted together and chased out.  After four and a half years we were

 3     acquitted, however.  It was a relapse of one policy in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, whereby political opponents were persecuted and

 5     prosecuted.

 6             When the process began to organise ourselves politically and set

 7     up the authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we split briefly because I

 8     didn't want to engage in politics.  And Dr. Karadzic, too, did not agree

 9     to lead a political party.  My desire was to help as much as I can from

10     the sidelines, so I was not directly involved in those first early days

11     of the Serbian Democratic Party.  I remained an observer.  But later I

12     got involved in a peripheral way and it so happens that I was one of the

13     candidates for a member of the Assembly and later I was elected MP.

14        Q.   How did you first start as a back-up candidate and how did you

15     find your way into the Assembly eventually?

16        A.   The people who knew me believed that, with my approach, I can be

17     of assistance in organising the situation in a rather disorderly

18     municipality where I lived, which is Novi Grad.  And after public

19     appearances on radio and television, I went to the Municipal Board, where

20     human relations were very disturbed.  I managed to reconcile the parties,

21     and the ratio in the government was 30 per cent Serbs and 70 per cent

22     others.  Since I didn't want to be actively involved in politics, I first

23     refused to be a candidate; however, pressure was exerted on me and I

24     found a compromise solution.  I suggested that Professor Unkovic be the

25     first candidate and I was the back-up candidate.

Page 43157

 1             When our ticket was discussed at the personnel committee, they

 2     didn't know him, Professor Unkovic, but they knew me because of some

 3     articles that had appeared in newspapers.  So I was better known, and

 4     eventually I was put on the ticket for the Sarajevo-Romanija region.

 5     Five or six candidates were elected first, and in the early stage I was

 6     not.  Since many parties did not find their way into the parliament, when

 7     the remaining votes were split among other parties, I got one of those

 8     spots in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  How did it come about that you were elected by all

10     parties, by majority votes, Speaker of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament?

11        A.   Well, the answer is very short:  I was elected as Krajisnik, a

12     man from Krajina, from Sarajevo.  Why?  Because one region in

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina is called Krajina, and a candidate of the Serbian

14     Democratic Party, candidate for Speaker, was Milan Trbojevic.  However,

15     people from Krajina demanded Krajisnik and people from Sarajevo wanted it

16     to be a man from Sarajevo, so it had to be one of the two.  And after a

17     very long debate, a solution was still not found, and finally I was

18     elected as a Krajisnik from Sarajevo and that is the only real truth.

19        Q.   Can you explain to the Trial Chamber what your last name means so

20     that we can understand what you just said?

21        A.   My last name, Krajisnik, originally means a soldier defending the

22     border, which in Serbian is also called "kraj," boundary.  At the time of

23     the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, these two great empires kept

24     Serbs on the border who guarded the borders of the empire.  And the Serbs

25     who were manning the border as defenders since they were on the edge of

Page 43158

 1     the empire, again kraj, edge, border, and my family was one of those,

 2     they were named Krajisnik.  And I was accepted, approved, by both those

 3     who wanted it to be a Krajisnik and those who wanted it to be a man from

 4     Sarajevo as a Speaker.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  How did you understand, how did you see, the

 6     strategic options of the Serbian Democratic Party and what were the

 7     strategic options of other parties before the elections, before we came

 8     into power?

 9        A.   All the parties, except those with a communist orientation,

10     wanted a multi-party system in order to introduce democracy in

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Because communism had prevailed for a long time and

12     it had many shortcomings and people wanted change.  The Serbian

13     Democratic Party of which I was a member and the Party of Democratic

14     Action, SDA, which was a Muslim party, wanted Yugoslavia to continue.

15     And they wanted democracy to be introduced.  They wanted a reasonable

16     Federation, and we all worked for Bosnia-Herzegovina to obtain as many

17     privileges and rights as possible because that's where we lived.  The

18     Croatian party was HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, and it was more

19     geared towards the interests of Croats in Croatia than those in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But when it came to our internal inter-party

21     relations, we were rather close to them.

22        Q.   Thank you.  How did the first democratic elections in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina run and who won seats in the parliament?

24        A.   After a long communist rule, the parties were nation-based.  At

25     that time there were no nationalist parties.  Nation-based parties

Page 43159

 1     received maximum support of their ethnic communities.  Roughly speaking,

 2     all three nation-based parties received an overwhelming majority of the

 3     votes from their ethnic bases.

 4        Q.   How was the first democratic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 5     formed?  Who wanted what and who got what in that joint government?

 6        A.   Since the main opponent of all these three nation-based parties

 7     were the communists, these three parties did not differ much in anything,

 8     the HDZ, SDA, and the SDS.  So they decided to create a partnership

 9     between them, with the main objective of politically restoring the entire

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And senior posts were divided between them.  I know

11     when I already became Speaker of the Assembly, the Serbian Democratic

12     Party wanted to achieve an economic revival.  It was my dream and it was

13     our policy that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be Switzerland in the Balkans.

14     And on our side, although I did not participate in the negotiations about

15     the division of senior posts, I know that we were supposed to receive

16     security ministries.  We wanted the economy, finances, and some other

17     areas that would help us achieve our goals.  So we ended up with a

18     parliament which was neutral, whereas executive branches got assigned to

19     the other two parties, the Muslim representative became prime minister --

20     sorry, president of the Presidency; and the Croatian one became prime

21     minister.

22             In the events that followed, we realised it was a great

23     shortcoming that we only got the post of Speaker of the parliament, but

24     we realised that too late.  And eventually it led to a deterioration of

25     the situation.

Page 43160

 1        Q.   Which part of this division of posts do you consider as a

 2     shortcoming, as a failure?

 3        A.   I believe the greatest failure was that the Ministry of the

 4     Interior and similar departments were given to the Muslims, to the Muslim

 5     side.  You have seen, Your Honours, how many intercepts there are,

 6     completely unauthorised.  I could never have imagined that a Speaker of

 7     the Assembly would be kept under surveillance or wire-tapped.  I couldn't

 8     imagine that they would keep tabs on us if we were not doing it to them.

 9     That was the beginning of a conspiracy that began very early on against

10     the Serbian side.

11             Another important department was Territorial Defence and the post

12     of president of the Presidency, although he was primus inter pares, he

13     practically acted as the president of the republic, not one among equals.

14        Q.   Thank you.  After the government was established, were there any

15     changes in terms of the strategic orientation of the leading three

16     parties?

17        A.   What was shocking at the very first parliament session was that

18     the oath was at issue.  Simply, I was the parliament Speaker and there

19     was a president of committee where we decided about this, the Chamber of

20     Citizens, where Professor Konjicija was trying throughout one whole day

21     to harmonise the conditions because, conditionally speaking, the Muslims

22     and the Croatians didn't want "Yugoslavia" to be mentioned anywhere in

23     the oath.  And eventually the Serbian Democratic Party wanted to avoid a

24     rift at the first parliament session and it eased off, and some sort of

25     compromise was achieved.  I can't remember it, but I'm sure that it

Page 43161

 1     wasn't accepted in the form that it should have been and as it had been

 2     originally proposed.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  As for the text of the hymn, was it regulated by

 4     anything, the constitution or the law, and did we violate it -- text of

 5     the anthem, we changed the text of this oath once we changed it against

 6     the procedure?

 7        A.   The insistence on the change of the formulation of the oath was

 8     completely unlawful, and, Your Honours, it can be most easily seen if you

 9     look at the video recording of this very long parliament session when we

10     struggled to find joint solution.

11        Q.   Thank you.  What did it mean and how did it further develop the

12     attitude of those parties towards a joint state?

13        A.   From that moment until the end of the functioning of the

14     parliament before the war, there was continuously a coalition of two

15     against one, so that to be a Speaker of the parliament from the ethnic

16     community against which you had two others was very difficult.  It was

17     very difficult to stand this rift because each new parliament session was

18     an attempt to impose the majority of votes on the Serbian MPs.

19        Q.   Thank you.  After the distribution of positions in the central

20     and peripheral organ, were you in a position as the parliament Speaker to

21     monitor the implementation of inter-party agreements on appointments of

22     people to positions which had been allocated to their respective parties?

23        A.   Certainly so, not just I as the parliament Speaker, but any

24     representative of the authorities, even the lowest ones in municipalities

25     were faced with impossibility to implement the partnership agreement

Page 43162

 1     about the distribution of positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina from the

 2     highest level to the lowest one in entire Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And I can

 3     tell you this from the point of view of the Serbian Democratic Party.

 4     You had the right to appoint your staff somewhere.  There were continuous

 5     obstructions.  And just to recall you can see there how many important

 6     telephone conversations there were in which it was continuously mentioned

 7     how our staff were being obstructed from appointing other staff.  Those

 8     were personnel from the communist times who transformed as turncoats and

 9     they started serving their new masters again.

10             So the SDA accepted them because they would discharge their

11     duties and wouldn't allow such personnel to be removed even though a

12     specific position belonged, according to the agreement, to the

13     Serbian Democratic Party.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Krajisnik, could you speak a bit slower.  Please

15     bear in mind.

16             Yes, please continue.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Can you please tell us what were the main subjects of discussion

20     and the main duties in the parliament, especially taking into account

21     what you just recently said, namely, that at every parliament session

22     there were attempts to out-vote the Serbian people.  What were the issues

23     in which the Serbian people were out-voted and what was the most

24     sensitive issue in the parliament life?

25        A.   By the end of January 1992, the position of the Muslim Party of

Page 43163

 1     Democratic Action and the Serbian side had harmonised their positions,

 2     namely, that both sides advocated Yugoslavia, were in favour of

 3     Yugoslavia.  And if you look at the parliament session held in late

 4     January, the president of the Presidency who was involved in the talks

 5     between the presidents of the republics of the then-Yugoslavia presented

 6     his exposé and he said what we should all be advocating and what was the

 7     position of the Party of Democratic Action.  The Party of Democratic

 8     Action, just like the Serbian Democratic Party then advocated the

 9     preservation of Yugoslavia and a rational, reasonable Federation.

10     Mr. Izetbegovic was then applauded by everyone present.  From my seat of

11     the parliament Speaker, I could not see whether the HDZ, that is to say,

12     the Croatian MPs, applauded him, but the maximum majority supported this,

13     that the parliament should advocate and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should

14     advocate this reasonable Federation.

15             Only a month later, in the very same room, Mr. Izetbegovic, on

16     behalf of the Muslim side, said that the previous time we had not

17     properly understood him and that he believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina, or

18     rather, that Yugoslavia, let's say, conditionally speaking, should be

19     transformed and that Bosnia-Herzegovina should secede from Yugoslavia.

20     And he then said something that was an astonishing statement, namely,

21     that he would sacrifice peace in order to achieve a sovereign state of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But no one understood that in a tragic sense then

23     because there were all kinds of statements going around at the time.

24     There was no reaction of the MPs after that nor did I react because I

25     thought that it was something said in order to make a presentation for

Page 43164

 1     his voters who would understand him in a specific way.  But now from this

 2     point of view, as this happened a hundreds times later, it was very

 3     problematic actually.

 4             Later on, that was a constant topic that was on the parliament's

 5     agenda, namely, the destiny of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Muslim and the

 6     Croatian sides were in favour of a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They

 7     were in favour of Bosnia-Herzegovina seceding from Yugoslavia in an

 8     unconstitutional way.  And on the Serbian side, we advocated honouring

 9     the constitution and finding a compromise, so that each parliament

10     session was a new stress for me.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And putting aside what you know today, did you

12     receive any information or data at the time as to whether those words

13     about sacrificing peace were followed by any practical, organisational

14     moves?

15        A.   I did receive information that I did not believe, that the

16     Patriotic League was being formed, that paramilitary formations were

17     being established, but as an idealist I believed that this was a matter

18     of exaggerations because, honestly speaking, I did not trust the security

19     people.  But later on, reading documents, I could see that precisely at

20     the time when Mr. Izetbegovic stated this, in the book of

21     Mr. Sefer Halilovic, who was at that time the commander of their

22     paramilitary formation, said that at the time he briefed Mr. Izetbegovic

23     and said that he had 200.000 soldiers under arms.  And then

24     Mr. Izetbegovic said:  No problems.  Now I can talk with the Serbian side

25     on an equal footing.  Someone had tricked Mr. Izetbegovic into changing

Page 43165

 1     his position, and I think that those who tricked him are more to blame

 2     than Mr. Izetbegovic himself.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you and, according to what

 4     you knew, whether I also believed that this was really Mr. Izetbegovic's

 5     position.  Initially you just said that someone pushed him or forced him

 6     to change his policy.

 7        A.   Well, Mr. Karadzic, you had a different role than me.  You were a

 8     leader of a party which participated in the power.  You were a leader of

 9     one ethnic group or people, and each time you were reserved and you

10     warned that there could be a transformation, a big change, because it was

11     your duty to warn in this way.  Many information that I received, you

12     received too, and you looked at that as the president of the party which

13     had a duty to warn the people against what could happen.  And eventually

14     it turned out to be correct later on, so I wasn't right, but we played

15     two different roles.  And I understand the role of a leader who had to

16     say something that he wouldn't like to believe would happen, simply as a

17     politician.  Everything seemed to point that the SDA policy would change.

18     I still believed that it wouldn't happen, and that was why until the very

19     beginning of the war I remained in the parliament as the Speaker.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Did it turn out that the information that you

21     received with regard to practical preparations for the war that you

22     didn't believe turned out to be true?

23        A.   Unfortunately, it turned out to be completely true.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please show in e-court

Page 43166

 1     1D49021.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. President, can you remind us, please, from which book does

 4     this page 95 come?

 5        A.   I've read this book.  It's the book of -- the memoirs of

 6     Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.  I remember this article because during the

 7     preparation for my testimony I think I proposed this article as evidence.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  May I then ask you to read out for us the second

 9     paragraph about two brave moves, the second and the third paragraphs out

10     aloud, please.

11        A.   "However, during the summer," I apologise.

12             "However, during the summer of 1991 we made two brave moves.

13     Firstly, the SDA formed the National Defence Council, from which the

14     Patriotic League would later be formed, and from it, during further

15     development, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That was on the 10th June

16     1991, after a rally in the local police centre which was attended by

17     around 400 representatives from all of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Yugoslav

18     army was aware of this rally, but it did not react to it, it did not feel

19     strong enough to react.  Later on, in talks with the head of the

20     counter-intelligence service in March 1992, I learned that they were

21     aware of this.

22             "The other move was our decision not to send the conscripts from

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina to the JNA.  That was in 1991 when the war in Croatia

24     was in full swing.  When I heard the disturbing news that

25     General Nikola Uzelac, the commander of the army corps in Banja Luka,

Page 43167

 1     mobilised our young men and sent them to the front, I requested from the

 2     Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make the decision

 3     that our young men should not respond to the call-ups for mobilisation.

 4     This decision was adopted by a majority of votes (the Serbian members of

 5     the Presidency voted against it)."

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you then tell us whether you concluded that

 7     Mr. Izetbegovic himself was aware that this bravery had to do with the

 8     unlawful and illegal nature of these moves?

 9        A.   That's completely true.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Even though he mentions the 10th of June, 1991, as

11     the date when the Muslims National Defence Council was established, did

12     you learn since when are the years of service counted for the service in

13     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina or membership in the Patriotic League?

14        A.   The document exists.  I cannot be very precise, but I know that

15     it dates from March or April 1991 or thereabouts.

16        Q.   Thank you.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would ask for this page to be

18     admitted into evidence and we will also attach the title page of the

19     book.  Just to be MFI'd until we receive the translation into English.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  I don't have any objection, Mr. President, but let

22     me just note, I was slow to get on my feet, that -- just a caution about

23     leading questions such as:  "Can you tell us whether you concluded

24     that ..."  And then Dr. Karadzic provided an answer to which the witness

25     agreed.

Page 43168

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 2             Mr. Karadzic must have noted it.

 3             We'll mark it for identification, this excerpt, together with its

 4     cover page.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  This document receives MFI number D3996,

 6     Your Honours.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   What were our intentions with regard to the duties of the

10     parliament?  What was the parliament supposed to deal with as its

11     priorities and what did it actually do in fact, in real life, during

12     those first months of 1991, or rather, throughout that year?

13        A.   The Serbian side wanted a democratic transformation of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the introduction of a multi-party system.  The

15     economic situation that existed at the time should be changed as soon as

16     possible because there was social unrest, a difficult situation, and a

17     war-mongering atmosphere which slowed down the normal course of life.  Of

18     course, the Serbian side also wanted for Serbian personnel to participate

19     in power and to assist with improving and changing certain things that

20     were wrong during the communist period, especially that the areas of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina that were rural and economically backward where Serbs

22     lived should be protected in a way and to begin to develop and prosper

23     once again.

24             However, from the very beginning, the parliament, and up until

25     the end of its one-and-a-half-year mandate, only dealt with one problem,

Page 43169

 1     and that was the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that is to say, whether

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina should secede in an unconstitutional manner or should

 3     it remain in Yugoslavia and in what way would the political crisis in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina be resolved.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what you mean when you say "in an

 6     unconstitutional way"?  What about the question of secession?  How is it

 7     regulated in the constitution of Yugoslavia and the constitution of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 9        A.   Both in the constitution of Yugoslavia and in the constitution of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was exactly spelled out how the republics, or

11     rather, the peoples could separate from Yugoslavia and how that could be

12     prevented from happening.  The constitution of Yugoslavia had to be

13     respected and the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In order to

14     protect the peoples - and there were three main ethnic communities, the

15     Serb, Croat, and Muslim communities - then a council for the equality of

16     nations, or something like that, was established and everyone could lodge

17     a complaint with that council.  That could be discussed and then that

18     question could be resolved with a two-third majority, only in that way,

19     in that council, and in parliament.  That is what had to be observed and

20     that is what the Serbian side insisted upon.

21             Also, two-thirds of the voters were not in favour of secession

22     from Yugoslavia, so the other two sides insisted on somehow avoiding the

23     council for national equality of rights because this was an

24     unconstitutional path.  That we were right is demonstrated by the current

25     situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  There is this Chamber of Citizens, if I

Page 43170

 1     can put it that way, and Chamber of Nations, and each constituent people

 2     had the right of "veto," I say that under quotation marks, if they

 3     disagree with a particular matter that threatened the national equality

 4     of rights of the three peoples.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you were aware of the

 6     constitutional provisions and who the president of the constitutional

 7     commission of Bosnia-Herzegovina was?

 8        A.   According to the rules of procedure and according to the practice

 9     that prevailed until then, the president of the parliament, that is to

10     say, I, was the president of the constitutional commission.  And

11     therefore, we had to look into all the unconstitutional ways that were

12     being resorted to to resolve that matter.

13        Q.   Thank you.  You said a moment ago that in parliament they did not

14     have a two-third majority.  What about the Serb side, especially the Serb

15     Democratic Party, and other parties, too, that opposed secession, how

16     many members of parliament did they have in the Assembly of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina out of a total of 240?

18        A.   240 MPs all together in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As

19     for the Assembly of Republika Srpska, 84 separated from that Assembly.

20     So the Serb side had one-third that could dispute anything that was

21     unconstitutional.

22        Q.   Thank you.  We saw here that on the 10th of June, a council for

23     defending Muslims was established.  Could you tell us how this affected

24     parliamentary life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, life in general as well, or

25     rather, the decisions of Slovenia and Croatia on secession, how did that

Page 43171

 1     affect life in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   As soon as secession happened, this automatically spilled over

 3     into Bosnia-Herzegovina and that was a very bad thing for peace in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Some people felt insecure, others felt buoyed by it,

 5     felt that they could take the same path like Slovenia and Croatia.  The

 6     Serbs were worried, and the Muslims and Croats wanted to follow the road

 7     taken by Slovenia and Croatia.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  What about the first attempt in -- made in the

 9     Assembly to adopt a declaration on sovereignty?  When was this attempt

10     made and how did it fare?

11        A.   At the beginning of 1992 -- no, sorry, 1991, after

12     Mr. Izetbegovic's statement that he would sacrifice peace for a sovereign

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was this proposal to adopt the declaration on

14     sovereignty.  It came from the Croatian side, as far as I can remember,

15     and it was supported by the Muslim side, and then there was this lengthy

16     debate where arguments for and against were confronted.  And finally,

17     according to strict procedure, 20 Serb MPs lodged a complaint - and this

18     was a type of veto - and they invoked the council on the equality of

19     rights of nations.  And it was my duty then to conclude the debate and to

20     refer the matter to the council for national equality.

21             Since the sponsors of the bill reacted violently, then I called

22     Avdo Campara, the late Avdo Campara, a Muslim, he spoke and explained

23     this and he said President Krajisnik has the right to do that.  That

24     ended the debate.  The council then dealt with the issue.  We could not

25     agree at the council because they did not want to honour the decision of

Page 43172

 1     the council and, quite simply, because the Muslim side opposed that and

 2     the Croat side, that question never came back to the Assembly, but

 3     procedurally that was necessary, that was a procedural obligation.  It

 4     was supposed to be sent back to us so that we could express our views in

 5     the Assembly and in the council.  So this proposal, this declaration, had

 6     it got a two-third majority, then it would have been valid.  Of course,

 7     the Serb side would have had the right to refer the matter to the

 8     constitutional court, but these activities never took place because,

 9     quite simply, the Muslim side and the Croat side never wanted to go

10     through the constitutional procedure that is envisaged in such cases.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know what the reaction of the Serb side was in

12     terms of their political moves, what were the political moves made and

13     what were the activities of the Serb side in relation to developments in

14     political life and the efforts made by the other two sides?

15             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, sorry.  I was following the question until it

16     broadened out so enormously.  If we're still talking about this

17     time-period in early 1991 and that's what Dr. Karadzic is soliciting

18     information about, fair enough.  But if this is as broad as he may

19     perhaps inadvertently made it, it needs to be narrowed.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you.  I agree.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   The end of June 1991, we're still in that period.  You have

23     kindly presented the main topics involved and the main contentious

24     issues.  Tell us what the main moves of the Serb side were in

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina up until the end of June 1991.  You told us about the

Page 43173

 1     Assembly, but basically, on the ground, you said that they opposed

 2     secession.

 3        A.   The Serb side, and that can be seen from documents, or rather,

 4     the leaders or people who held high office in the municipalities and also

 5     coming from you directly, the Serb side always appealed for pacification

 6     and not to go into conflicts on the ground.  People were worried on the

 7     ground, there were different reactions, especially after a statement that

 8     was made in haste, if you will, by Mr. Izetbegovic.  When the declaration

 9     was refused, then after the agreement reached between and among the

10     presidents of the republics of Yugoslavia he said in Split:  The

11     declaration would be adopted with the Serbs or without the Serbs, it's

12     all the same.

13             There was a tempestuous reaction on the ground; people were

14     alarmed.  Paramilitary formations appeared.  People were saying that the

15     Muslims were preparing an attack on the Serb Krajina and that they would

16     attack Bosnia and Herzegovina.  You will see from the documents - and I

17     remember this - many appeals made by the Main Board and by the president

18     of the party to have the situation calm down and at that time an

19     initiative was launched.  I can't remember whether it was the MBO, the

20     Muslim Bosniak Organisation, or whether it was Mr. Karadzic directly, to

21     reach a historical agreement between the Muslims and the Croats, because

22     these two peoples had a lot more in common than the Croats with the other

23     two peoples.  So then these activities started with regard to the

24     historical agreement.  Then there was a relaxation of tensions.  The

25     newspapers and TV stations were reacting to this favourably.  People were

Page 43174

 1     trying to accommodate each other because they really did want to have

 2     pacification.

 3             During these activities, I had two meetings at Mr. Izetbegovic's

 4     office.  He was not in charge of that action and it wasn't the SDA, and

 5     then there was one meeting in my office.  So I know that this was a major

 6     positive turn and most of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina reacted to

 7     that favourably, irrespective of the ethnic community they belonged to.

 8        Q.   Thank you, Mr. President.  We will go back to that.  I would like

 9     to ask you to tell us -- you said that there were pressures on the

10     ground.  Did the Serb side do anything?  And if you remember the

11     community of municipalities, could you please first explain that to us.

12     Were there communities of municipalities?  How were they regulated?  And

13     how and in which way could they be changed, the composition of the

14     communities of municipalities?

15        A.   Communities of municipalities are a constitutional possibility of

16     bringing together municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  That existed

17     before the war, in the communist times, and since we still had that

18     constitution in force, then municipalities could be joined in a perfectly

19     lawful manner.  Several municipalities could unite several functions at

20     the level of a community of municipalities.  It wasn't only economic,

21     although it was primarily economic, economic requirements, if you will,

22     because in communism, in the former system, nobody thought about war or

23     anything like that or uniting on a national or ethnic level.  So it was

24     economic parameters that were of primary importance.

25        Q.   Thank you.  How did you understand the question of the

Page 43175

 1     establishment of regions?  What was the reason for the regions to be

 2     established?  In the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what was adopted as

 3     a document in relation to these regions?

 4        A.   At the time, unfortunately, everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

 5     politics because everybody was disturbed, old men, old women, children,

 6     women, everybody, this spectacle of our disagreement was all over the

 7     place.  However, the regions were established because traditionally

 8     certain areas had been neglected in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Unfortunately,

 9     since the Serbs had most of the territory, it was these Serb territories

10     that were neglected the most.  We were aware of that problem, and in the

11     former system there was this antagonism between Banja Luka and Sarajevo,

12     there was this antagonism or objections because many ethnic Serb areas

13     were basically being emptied.  So what we wanted was to have this

14     programme, if everything would be normal and nobody gave a thought to

15     war, to have balanced development in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16             In this balanced development, communities and municipalities

17     would play an important role.  So that was the initial reason.  Economic

18     links was the first reason, and secondly, this was possible on the basis

19     of the constitution and everything that was derived from all of that and

20     that perhaps assumed a different connotation later, all of that was a

21     result of efforts made to impose solutions on the Serbian people.

22        Q.   Thank you.  What was the Serb side prepared to do and sacrifice?

23     Do you remember what a concession was on the Serb side in favour of the

24     historic Serb/Muslim agreement?  What did the Muslims want in return in

25     order to have this Muslim/Serb agreement come into being?

Page 43176

 1        A.   The Muslim/Bosniak organisation - it's a smaller political party

 2     and these are high-level intellectuals - they wanted to avoid war at all

 3     costs just like the Serb side, so then there was this compromise.

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain in Yugoslavia, and automatically the Serb

 5     side would give up on regionalisation which made others a bit

 6     apprehensive.  So our maximum concession was to have a decentralisation

 7     of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that there should be nothing that would

 8     resemble Serb homogenisation.  So the concession was for

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina to remain in Yugoslavia but to be a reasonable

10     federation -- a reasonable federation -- rather, Yugoslavia should be a

11     reasonable federation and there should be maximum privileges for

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Serb side would not ask for any kind of

13     regionalisation that would have any kind of political overtones.

14        Q.   Thank you.  You said a moment ago that it was welcomed with

15     relief or delight - I cannot remember what you said exactly.  Could you

16     tell us what the reactions were of the Muslim and the Serb sides to this?

17        A.   If you look at the TV footage from the time, and I will remind

18     you of what I know, all citizens could see that on the spot, on the

19     ground, and on television and over the radio too, in companies, in

20     municipalities, there was general delight, celebration, because everybody

21     wanted that to happen, all citizens.

22        Q.   Thank you.  The Party of Democratic Action, when did they

23     withdraw support to that initiative and how was it experienced at that

24     point of view and how did things develop further?

25        A.   I know that, and this was best described by one of the

Page 43177

 1     then-participants, Professor Muhamed Filipovic, who said that

 2     Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Professor Nikola Koljevic, I think, appeared on

 3     television to declare that this historic agreement had been reached.  And

 4     during the TV programme itself, somebody said to Mr. Zulfikarpasic to

 5     come out, and then he was told that the Party of Democratic Action did

 6     not support that and that this was a private affair of

 7     Mr. Zulfikarpasic's and Mr. Radovan Karadzic's, which was completely

 8     incorrect because I took part in these talks at Mr. Izetbegovic's office

 9     and he supported that, he gave it a green light, as I did, to continue

10     negotiations and to have this agreement reached.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I beg the indulgence of the

13     Prosecution because I did not announce this material, but I should like

14     to put on the ELMO this statement made by Mr. Izetbegovic in Split.

15     First, the front page, to see the date, and then the rest of it.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   While we're waiting, Mr. President, did the Assembly impose a ban

18     or adopt another measure concerning these regions?

19        A.   I remember the talks that preceded this enactment by the

20     government, because it was the government that made the decision, and the

21     prime minister, Mr. Pelivan, came to see me with his deputy, Mr. Cengic,

22     and in the talks, they told me they will not impose a ban but they will

23     make a recommendation to defuse the tensions.  So the government proposed

24     that the establishment of regions be put on hold until the spirits calm

25     down.  So they did not say no to the regions, but since the political

Page 43178

 1     situation was getting more complicated, it was put on hold, and of

 2     course, the effect achieved by this government measure was soon

 3     invalidated.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Do we have any problems with the

 5     ELMO?  Can we switch it on?  [In English] So please show the first page

 6     to see the date --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think the ELMO is working at the moment.

 8     Yes, it's now working.

 9             It's up to you, Mr. Karadzic, how to use your time, but are you

10     not spending too much time on this historical background?  Please

11     continue.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, that's year 1991.

13     This is not the historical background.  This is the peak of the events,

14     preparation for war.  [In English] First page, please.  Yeah, okay, okay.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Mr. Krajisnik, can you tell us what is the date and what is the

17     newspaper?

18        A.   It's newspaper "Politika," as far as I can see 30th March 1991, a

19     Saturday.

20        Q.   What is the heading about?  It's a report from where?

21        A.   It's a report from Split.  The heading is:  Press conference held

22     by the presidents of the six Yugoslav republics.  And the subheading is:

23     Great difference but also -- great differences but also a desire to

24     bridge them.

25             THE ACCUSED:  Right corner of the second page.

Page 43179

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   May I ask you to read out Izetbegovic's statement.

 3        A.   [No interpretation]

 4             THE ACCUSED:  That's okay.  That's okay.  Thank you.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I believe that's precisely the

 6     statement I referred to a moment ago.  Alija Izetbegovic says:

 7             "I will immediately answer the second question.  The declaration

 8     on sovereignty is already before the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

 9     will most probably be endorsed.  If it is not endorsed with the consent

10     of the SDS, it will be endorsed without them.  At the end of the day,

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina is a sovereign republic and the declaration is just

12     one document.  Bosnia does not become sovereign by the virtue of this

13     document.  It is a declaration of an already-existing fact."

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Karadzic needs to wait for the

15     interpretation to finish before starting his new question.

16             JUDGE KWON:  You overlapped with the interpretation.  Could you

17     repeat your question.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I apologise.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Were they able to adopt this declaration without the consent of

21     the SDS in terms of the constituent position of the Serbian people and

22     also in terms of the two-third majority rule?

23        A.   They could not adopt this without the participation of the

24     Serbian representatives in the parliament, either in theory or in

25     practice.

Page 43180

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could both pages please be admitted

 3     into evidence pending the translation of this statement?  Or if you

 4     believe that what we have on the record is sufficient ...

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Are you tendering it or not?

 6             THE ACCUSED:  I am tendering, yeah.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Obviously I'm not quite sure what else is on those

 9     pages, but barring -- and what else is proposed to be translated, but --

10     which I presume is the entirety of what he's tendering, though, the page

11     on which the question and the answer appear and the cover page of the

12     document, then I have no objection particularly to those.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's correct.

14             MR. TIEGER:  But, it will be MFI'd, and as is the case with all

15     of these things, given its - as Dr. Karadzic noted - his late notice and

16     the fact that our ability to examine on this is obviously limited, I will

17     obviously reserve any further comment on this until we see the

18     translation.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We'll mark those parts referred to by Mr. Karadzic

20     for identification.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives MFI number D3997, Your Honours.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Mr. President, can you remember, what was the reaction of Serbian

25     authorities at the grass-root level to this cancellation of the

Page 43181

 1     historical -- the historic, rather, Serbian/Muslim agreement, especially

 2     in the Krajina of Banja Luka?

 3        A.   The reaction was fierce.  And the leadership of the Serbian

 4     Democratic Party had huge problems because urgent action was needed to

 5     unify the two Krajinas, the Serbian and the Bosnian Krajina, and there

 6     were major objections voiced to the leadership of the SDS, that their

 7     policies were not realistic because the other side does not wish for

 8     peace.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember when and on what occasion the

10     association of municipalities from the Banja Luka region was proclaimed

11     as the Autonomous Region of Krajina?

12        A.   I don't know when it was proclaimed exactly, but I know that it

13     was only towards the end of the year that we finally verified or approved

14     the creation of the regions, including that one, because new political

15     factors had cropped up by that time.  It was quite clear that there was

16     no consensus, the declaration was passed by a majority vote, and the

17     request for international recognition was submitted to the European

18     community.  So I think it was on the 10th of December that the regions

19     were approved, but even then it was said that if the request for

20     unilateral recognition is not taken back, we would come back to the

21     historic principles, whereby Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within

22     Yugoslavia and the Serbian side would not continue the course towards

23     political regionalisation although it would continue with economic

24     regionalisation.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

Page 43182

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, D3997, that "Politika" article we

 2     looked at, is already in evidence as D00258.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.  And thank you.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  If it is confirmed by the Defence, we'll strike out

 6     the marked for identified part, but shall we continue.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Concerning the failure of the historic Muslim/Serbian agreement

 9     and the tensions on the ground, what did the Assembly that you presided

10     over do in early September?

11        A.   Since the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was being tested to

12     the limit, there were talks within the Assembly.  And then in early

13     September, Mr. Izetbegovic proposed the conclusion at one of the sessions

14     that the future arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina be decided by

15     taking into account all proposals at an equal footing without imposing

16     anything on the others and that the final solution for Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina should be found in a democratic and constitutional way.  And

18     I believe he proposed that conclusion on the 13th or 14th of September.

19        Q.   When you said proposals should be considered on an equal footing,

20     what did that imply?

21        A.   Maybe I misinterpreted it, but I meant to say that all proposals

22     for the solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina should be treated equally.

23     We already knew from our talks that we disagree on many things, even

24     every political party had its own vision for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  So

25     the idea was that all MPs present their proposals in parliamentary

Page 43183

 1     debates, that they all be debated democratically, and that a solution be

 2     found after considering all these proposals and after all these debates

 3     in keeping with democratic principles and the constitution.

 4        Q.   Do you remember when the first ideas appeared about the

 5     transformation of Bosnia along ethnic lines, based on its ethnic

 6     structure, and who voiced these ideas first?

 7        A.   Since we were constantly in contact with representatives of the

 8     other two sides, I myself in the Assembly and others in their

 9     departments, I heard from Mr. Izetbegovic and others that the best

10     solution would be to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However,

11     Bosnia-Herzegovina is a leopard skin when you see it on an ethnic map.

12     So it should be done by creating three parts in which as few Croats would

13     remain in the Serb and Muslim parts, as few Serbs in the Croat and Muslim

14     parts, et cetera.  And Izetbegovic said:  Let's try to make a map wherein

15     as few of us would be on your side and as few of you as possible on our

16     side.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue.  Please try to put a pause as

18     much as possible.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   How did late Mr. Izetbegovic view the possibility of establishing

22     a Serb entity and the possibility that the Serb entity would remain

23     within Yugoslavia and become independent?

24        A.   As you can see from his own book and the book of

25     Mr. Sefer Halilovic and the book of Muhamed Filipovic, Mr. Izetbegovic

Page 43184

 1     was always in favour of creating a new Bosnia and Herzegovina,

 2     transformed, where nobody would impose solutions on others.  That was in

 3     the early days, because he was a pragmatic politician.  If you look at

 4     his book, you will see that he says:  Late Arafat made this suggestion to

 5     me and I fought over this with Sefer Halilovic, and a few years later I

 6     described one declaration where he proposed, and Owen and Stoltenberg

 7     supported it, proposing that the future Republika Srpska would have the

 8     option of organising a referendum within five years to join Serbia.

 9             I remember one discussion in 1993, in Geneva, where Izetbegovic

10     and Silajdzic came to see us and said:  Give us 33 per cent of Bosnia.

11     Let us create three entities and then you are free to go and join Serbia.

12             This entire policy was conducted, and you will see, Your Honours,

13     the transcripts of the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were

14     thinking about dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a way that each

15     nation would have its sovereignty.  That was the policy.  I'm not

16     defending Mr. Izetbegovic, but I believe that that was his sincere,

17     honest, policy.  However, he had too many people around him who had this

18     idea affixed that Bosnia should be unitarian, that, if necessary, it

19     should be achieved by war, et cetera.  And that is the problem.  His

20     early idea expressed in the declaration and many other documents and

21     proposals was travestied.

22             THE ACCUSED:  Excellencies, I see the time.  If you decide for

23     the break.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for half an hour and resume

25     at 11.00.

Page 43185

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, to save time the Chamber is of the view

 4     that it is able to give its ruling without hearing the parties any more

 5     about the interviews of Mr. Kovac.  Would you like to --

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I was going to say that we -- Mr. Nicholls, of

 7     course, was duly suited up and prepared to come down, but it appeared to

 8     us that if we met with Mr. Robinson at the lunch break, we might be able

 9     to narrow the range of disagreement, and thereby reduce the number of

10     issues the Court needed to deal with.  But if the Court has already made

11     its -- taken its position, there's not much I can say.

12             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber was of the view that it tended to agree

13     with Mr. Robinson's observation that those parts that were fully read out

14     and those parts the witness didn't answer are not to be -- were not to be

15     admitted.  And -- but if the parties are minded to have further

16     discussion --

17             MR. TIEGER:  Well, the --

18             JUDGE KWON:  -- the Chamber has no observation.

19             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  Thanks.  I guess the discussion was, yes, to

20     the extent we may -- we may -- that the -- that there is agreement that

21     where a passage is fully read out and the witness affirms it, the

22     practice has been - and we agree with that - then the documentation is

23     superfluous because the witness has adopted it.  On the other hand, where

24     the witness disputes it, then it serves as impeachment; or,

25     alternatively, where the passage is merely paraphrased, then the entirety

Page 43186

 1     of the impeachment should come in.  Now, whether or not the application

 2     of those principles will lead to full agreement by the parties, I won't

 3     know until the lunch break.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I think that can be dealt with after Mr. Karadzic's

 5     examination-in-chief is over.  So I would like to hear from the parties

 6     at that time.

 7             Yes, Mr. Robinson.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  With respect to

 9     Exhibit D3997, we appreciate the Prosecution bringing to our attention

10     that it was admitted under D259.  However, the English version doesn't

11     include the comments by Mr. Izetbegovic, and so if we could submit that

12     for translation and add it to D259, that would be okay.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We'll do so.

14             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   How did these conclusions of the joint Assembly, from the first

18     week or the first third of September 1991, about not imposing a solution

19     accepted by the public and how long did this obligation last, namely,

20     that nothing would be imposed?

21        A.   Just like in any similar situation, the people relaxed.  The

22     tensions subsided and a general positive feeling reigned.  Unfortunately,

23     after only a month another shock followed and a very problematic item was

24     on the agenda, once again a declaration in some other form, and then a

25     rift took place in the parliament.

Page 43187

 1        Q.   Could you please briefly tell the Chamber what was put on the

 2     agenda, how did the session progress in its regular part, and then

 3     afterwards to the end?

 4        A.   On the 10th of October, and then up until the 14th, practically

 5     every day the session was in progress or between the sessions, various

 6     meetings were held in order to resolve the repeated attempt of the Muslim

 7     side to put the declaration on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

 8     an unconstitutional way on the agenda in a different form.  In these

 9     periods between sessions, the positions got closer together in various

10     ways, solutions were adopted, compromises were made, but eventually the

11     situation became the same as it had been in March that same year, that is

12     to say, 1991.

13             After a long and exhausting discussion - and it was exactly the

14     same as when the declaration was rejected - the Serbian deputies from the

15     Serbian Democratic Party and Serbian Renewal Movement once again

16     submitted a request with 20 signatures that this item of the agenda

17     should be delegated to the council for inter-ethnic equality.  And then I

18     ended the session.  The procedure was the same; however, when I declared

19     that the session was finished and when we left, I actually said that we

20     were going on a break and the session was scheduled for the next Monday

21     and also in hope that there would be certain improvements after that.

22             According to the constitution, the session could not continue in

23     any way after that, but the Muslim/Croatian coalition which had already

24     been in existence waited ten minutes and, contrary to the constitution,

25     the deputy Speaker, who did not have the same powers as myself, continued

Page 43188

 1     the session.  They adopted the conclusions, a resolution, adopted the

 2     documents which now had a different title but they were identical to the

 3     declaration for which we had once concluded that it was contrary to the

 4     constitution and that it should be dealt with by the inter-ethnic

 5     equality council.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Here in the indictment and in some documents as well,

 7     it is stated that the Serbian deputies left or walked out of the session

 8     and the Assembly, depending on the document.  Did the Serbian deputies

 9     leave the joint Assembly or the session?

10        A.   No, they didn't leave it or walk out.  I ended the session and

11     after that it could not have been continued.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And did the Serbian deputies leave the joint

13     Assembly?

14        A.   No, they did not join -- they did not leave the joint Assembly or

15     walk out of it.  What followed was an invitation, I even scheduled the

16     continuation of the session, but none of the other sides responded to

17     that.  Then certain political activities began, the invitations of the

18     Serbian side to rescind the unconstitutional decisions which they

19     believed to be valid and the Serbian side didn't.  We wanted to bring our

20     positions closer to one another in order to resolve this difficult

21     political issue.

22        Q.   Thank you.  What was the next move of the Serbian side after

23     these invitations that the unconstitutional decisions be withdrawn?

24        A.   As far as I remember, it was on the 17th or on the

25     19th of October.  The Serbian side sent a public invitation, both to the

Page 43189

 1     population and to the other sides, to rescind the decisions, and unless

 2     they were rescinded, the Serbian side would then pass a decision on

 3     proclaiming the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 4     which would be a substitute for the inter-ethnic equality council which

 5     had not been established because we couldn't find a satisfactory solution

 6     together with the Muslim and Croatian sides.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  What was the following move of the Serbian side, the

 8     Serbian deputies?

 9        A.   On the 24th -- I apologise.  On the 24th of October, the Serbian

10     side proposed or called on the ethnic Serbian deputies from the Assembly.

11     That was actually a general initiative, and the Assembly of the Serbian

12     People in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established.

13        Q.   When you talked about the conclusions from the 19th of --

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The 11th of

15     September.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   -- 1991 that they would not be imposed on anyone, I would like to

18     recall that it was an excerpt from the Official Gazette of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It's already an Exhibit, D265.  The conclusions

20     which eased off the political situation are quoted there.  Thank you.

21             Mr. President, can you tell us if by establishing their Assembly,

22     which as you said had the importance of the chamber of nationalities

23     which was missing by that time, did the Serbian deputies leave their

24     deputies' places in the Assembly or did they continue to work?

25        A.   They did not leave their places.  They did not cease to be

Page 43190

 1     members of the parliament, but they in a way froze their participation.

 2     At the proposal of all the deputies, I myself continued to discharge my

 3     duty as the parliament Speaker in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

 4     order to seek a political solution and in order to overcome the crisis.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what was the next move of the Serbian

 6     Assembly -- actually, the Assembly of the Serbian People in terms of

 7     collecting the opinions and views of the entire Serbian community?

 8        A.   After the attacks in the media to the effect that one political

 9     party, the Serbian Democratic Party, was articulating its own policy

10     rather than the will of all of the Serbian people, the decision was made

11     at the session when we established the council of the Serbian people, the

12     Assembly of the Serbian people, to organise a plebiscite where all the

13     Serbian people could vote because we wanted to have an expression of the

14     will of the Serbian people about this issue, the issue of the future of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

16        Q.   Thank you.  It was said here that we made it possible for Croats

17     and Muslims and everyone else to state their mind, but specifically on a

18     yellow piece of paper.  The suggestion was that we had racially

19     discriminatory attitude toward them.  Can you remember how this

20     progressed and why these specific papers were of yellow colour?

21        A.   The goal and the duty which followed from the objections of the

22     other side was to establish the will of the Serbian people, because the

23     Serbian people, their representatives, had the right to send a question

24     to the council for inter-ethnic equality.  And because it wasn't done,

25     then the objection was that this was not the will of the people but the

Page 43191

 1     will of the party which was represented in the parliament.  So the goal

 2     was to establish the will of one people and we had to know how many Serbs

 3     were in favour or what was their opinion about this issue, and then it

 4     was made possible to the others to do it too because it's not true that

 5     only Serbs were in favour of Yugoslavia.  There were pro-Yugoslav parties

 6     seated in Sarajevo which also wanted to have Yugoslavia preserved and

 7     protected the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their own way, but

 8     that was almost identical to the way that the Serbian Democratic Party

 9     was doing it.  That was why there were different voting papers without

10     any discriminatory intention.  In particular, we tried to make sure that

11     no one would object and compare that to what was happening in

12     World War II, when the Jews, the Serbs, and the Romas were maltreated and

13     discriminated in our part of the world.  So it is completely excluded,

14     this possibility of interpreting it as a wish to discriminate someone.

15     It was just in order to determine how many people from which ethnic group

16     voted.  I don't actually remember which colours were used, but I know

17     that we did take that into account and our commission emphasised that in

18     its report.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What was the situation like in Croatia at the time?

20        A.   Beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, towards Croatia and the

21     west, the war was in full swing so that every minor incident in this area

22     was reflected on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23        Q.   Thank you.  From the position you were in, did you have any

24     insight into the situation with regard to the arming of the ethnic groups

25     in Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Did you have any information about this, and what

Page 43192

 1     was the impact of the war in Croatia on Bosnia-Herzegovina?

 2        A.   Yes.  Very frequently we received various information.  There is

 3     a well-known incident with illegal arming via Hungary.  I think that the

 4     minister of the interior of Yugoslavia was the one who organised it at

 5     the time, and I believe that that was Martin Spegelj.  That was known to

 6     everyone.  We had other information too to the effect that Croatia and

 7     Slovenia were arming themselves, and also individual reports, both

 8     official and unofficial, that the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were

 9     also being armed.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Did you know, did you receive any information, how

11     far the Patriotic League was developed in terms of organisation and

12     obtaining weapons, their military organisation, I mean both the

13     Green Berets and the Patriotic League.  At that moment in mid-October,

14     what did you know about the arming of the Muslim side?

15        A.   There was a lot of information, least of all official, but

16     through various channels there were these reports that paramilitary

17     formations were being formed among the Muslims, in the Muslim community.

18     And as for the Croats, certain things were happening, in particular in

19     western Herzegovina, where the paramilitary formations or perhaps even

20     lawful formations from Croatia, I mean formations belonging to the

21     Croatian state, were present in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So

22     there was a continuous flow of this information that we received to the

23     effect that the preparations for war and for arming were ongoing.

24        Q.   Thank you.  What were the following moves of the Croatian/Muslim

25     part of the authorities and what were the moves of the Serbian side; that

Page 43193

 1     is to say, when was the next parliament session of the Serbian Assembly

 2     held and what were the measures or the counter-measures that were taken

 3     at the time?

 4        A.   The session on the 24th of October.  Our session when we

 5     established the Assembly of the Serbian people did not much concern the

 6     Muslim side.  They continued going along their own way, and we kept

 7     receiving information that their aspiration was to have

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina secede by force and, contrary to the constitution,

 9     from Yugoslavia.  In addition to the invitations to begin negotiations

10     which were never accepted, on the 22nd there was another session of the

11     Serbian Assembly, and then the next one on the 21st of December.  Namely,

12     it was clear that our partners didn't want to have constitutionality back

13     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  They wanted to continue doing what they did

14     previously, which was unconstitutional.  So that on several occasions we

15     insisted on re-establishing constitutionality, on having negotiations,

16     and when that yielded no fruit and it didn't -- because the then-European

17     community called on Bosnia-Herzegovina and other former Yugoslav

18     republics to ask for their independence to be recognised.  When that

19     happened, the government which was not authorised to do this and the

20     Presidency which was not authorised to do this, by out-voting the Serbian

21     members of the Presidency, adopted the conclusion to send this request

22     for the recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  When that

23     happened, I think it was on the 15th of December, we scheduled a session

24     for the 21st of December, at which we clearly said:  Unless you rescind

25     these unlawful decisions and unless you withdraw the request that the

Page 43194

 1     independence be recognised, then the Serbian people and the Serbian

 2     deputies will pass a decision on the proclamation of the republic of the

 3     Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And namely, in the meantime there

 4     were meetings with a number of representatives of the international

 5     community where we were clearly told that negotiations would follow, that

 6     we would discuss the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that if we

 7     accepted this international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina that we

 8     would be entitled to having our constitutive unit within

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10             I did not participate in negotiations with international

11     representatives.  These were Mr. Vance, Mr. Carrington, and others also

12     came.  You were the one who talked with them at the time, Mr. President,

13     and so did the Deputy President, Mr. Koljevic, and I know that this was

14     something that you were the first to learn.  And then I learned that we

15     would have our constitutive unit, an ethnic one.  I received this

16     information around the New Year's Day at a meeting that was held at the

17     invitation of the late Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade.  Wherever --

18     whatever we heard directly later on from Mr. Cutileiro, we heard then

19     first from him.  Our proposal is that you should accept independent and

20     internationally recognised Bosnia and that you would get your ethnic unit

21     within Bosnia, and our policy was corrected a bit in a way.  Publicly we

22     had to stick to our view that we wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, but we

23     accepted and later on confirmed this in the Assembly that we would accept

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina but we wanted to have our own entity within it.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you react to the decisions of the government of

Page 43195

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslim/Croat part of the government of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, you as president of the Assembly, when they asked for

 3     independence?  Do you remember, did you communicate with anyone in that

 4     period of time?

 5        A.   As far as I can remember, I wrote a letter and I sent it to the

 6     representatives of the international community, as far as I can remember,

 7     that is.  The Assembly did react, that is correct, and I on behalf of the

 8     Assembly informed the international community, the European community,

 9     that the decisions of the Presidency and the government were

10     unconstitutional and that they should bear in mind that there is a

11     special situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it's not a sort of normal

12     situation like in other republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because

13     politically there are three different views and they have to be taken

14     into account.  And the proposal that they are receiving, namely, to

15     recognise the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is not in

16     accordance with the constitution and it goes against the will of the Serb

17     people who have the right to challenge that kind of decision because it's

18     unconstitutional.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Again, asking the other side for

20     their understanding, 1D02136, could that document be shown to the

21     witness.  And again, I'm sorry that I haven't notified the other side of

22     that.  There is no Serbian version, so could we please blow up the

23     English version?

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Could you tell us what the document is and could you tell us what

Page 43196

 1     it says in the heading.

 2        A.   That's correct.  This is a document that I signed, although my

 3     signature is not there.  I remember that.  This is the Assembly of the

 4     Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 22nd of December.  That is to

 5     say, a day after this session, this was sent to Lord Carrington and

 6     Henry Wijnaendts, Van den Broek, Christian Braun, then Mr. Janssen, the

 7     UN general-secretary, the UN Security Council, the embassies of 12 in

 8     Belgrade, the embassy of the USSR in Belgrade, the embassy of the USA in

 9     Belgrade.

10        Q.   Thank you.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could you please show us the last

12     page of this document.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   I believe that we can see your signature there.

15        A.   I believe it's only written in the English language.  Somebody

16     wrote that up and I signed it.  That's right.  This is my signature at

17     the bottom of the page, and perhaps that is the first page of this

18     document.

19        Q.   I'm going to read out part of first and second paragraph what it

20     was you wrote to these respectable people.

21             [As read][In English] "By illegal demand for independency of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina, you have once again drastically overthrown the

23     constitutional and law order and endangered peace which relies only on

24     goodwill and sense of our citizens.  With this act you have violated

25     taken oath and disqualified yourselves in front of the present and the

Page 43197

 1     history for further managing affairs of state why people placed trust in

 2     you but with completely different election programmes."

 3             [Interpretation] What did you mean by this?

 4        A.   Precisely what I said a moment ago.  As far as I can remember,

 5     although I cannot see it here, this is a letter that is addressed to the

 6     Presidency of the Bosnia-Herzegovina and the others persons were CC'd,

 7     the persons I mentioned a moment ago.  I said that -- actually, this was

 8     an illegal move, the one that they took, and in this way they betrayed,

 9     actually, the trust of the citizens who voted for them.  And, in fact,

10     they made a turn-around which seriously jeopardises peace.  And peace is

11     actually being maintained just through the goodwill of citizens not

12     through a wise policy conducted by politicians.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you remember Badinter's

14     reaction?  Perhaps he didn't write to you directly, but how did he react

15     in the recommendations for Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Why did

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina not win his approval straight away?  Rather, in

17     opinion number 4, Badinter set some prerequisites.

18        A.   I think, as far as I can remember, maybe I'm wrong, I remember

19     that Mr. Badinter did write to me and it was a similar letter and it can

20     be found in the documents.  A reaction did follow and it was stated that

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina is not an ordinary state, if I can put it that way,

22     and that there are certain specific characteristics involved, and that it

23     is necessary to see the will of the citizens and that these special

24     characteristics have to be borne in mind.  That is the reason why, in

25     this first stage, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not recognised; rather, time was

Page 43198

 1     given to carry out other activities so that these remarks could be

 2     checked in a way and so that a climate could be created that would make

 3     it possible for war to be avoided.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For the participants, this opinion

 5     of Badinter that President Krajisnik is referring to is D1279.  It has

 6     already been admitted, D1279.

 7             Thank you.  Can this document be admitted?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Can I see the title of this page, the upper part of

 9     this page.  This is a warning, to who?  SR B. and H. Presidency.  What is

10     SR?  Is it Socialist Republic or the Serbian Republic?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the Socialist Republic of

12     Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency and the government.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  It's a compilation of several documents

14     which was sent to the Secretary-General and Mr. Carrington?

15             THE ACCUSED:  Yes, Excellency.  [Interpretation] Yes,

16     Mr. Krajisnik is indicating the basis on which he is writing to them, and

17     then he CC'd the others.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection, Mr. Tieger?

19             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President, I didn't have an objection,

20     but you mentioned the word "compilation," maybe I missed that.  I'm just

21     seeing --

22             JUDGE KWON:  If you see first page is the cover page, second page

23     is a letter to the SG of the United Nations, and third page is a letter

24     sent to Carrington which contains several documents.

25             MR. TIEGER:  I don't have any objection in principle.  I'd like

Page 43199

 1     to look at the specific documents.  But let's -- I'll raise -- if I

 2     encounter anything that is worth raising, I will raise it quickly;

 3     otherwise, no objection.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit it.  Shall we use the previous number?

 5     Exhibit D3997.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   Did I hear this wrong or did you skip the session of the Assembly

 9     of the Serb People that was held on the 11th of December?  It is

10     important for me because of a particular document.  Before the

11     21st of December, was another session of the Serb people held on the

12     11th of December?

13        A.   That's correct.  On the 11th of December, a session of the

14     Assembly was held and I did not mention it a moment ago.

15        Q.   Do you remember that a recommendation was adopted then to the

16     effect that where conditions are right Serb municipalities should be

17     established?

18        A.   That is correct.  On the 11th of December a decision was passed.

19     But there's just a small correction there.  To establish Serb Municipal

20     Assemblies, that is to say, bodies like the Assembly of the Serb People.

21        Q.   I do apologise.  So not municipalities but Assemblies of

22     municipalities, parliaments, Serb parliaments in these municipalities; is

23     that correct?

24        A.   Yes, that's right.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Was this obligatory, mandatory, or was this a

Page 43200

 1     recommendation; namely, that if they felt the need to do so, they could

 2     establish that?

 3        A.   The stenographic notes readily show that after a long debate,

 4     yielding to pressure coming from people from the grass roots, this

 5     recommendation was adopted, because we thought that this Assembly that we

 6     established at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina at one point in time would

 7     simply cease to exist.

 8        Q.   In which conditions would these Assemblies, these Serb

 9     parliaments at central level and at local levels, cease to exist?  What

10     would have to happen for them to cease to exist?

11        A.   The first requirement was to go back to constitutionality and to

12     discuss the future set-up in Bosnia-Herzegovina on a constitutional

13     basis.  Once that would happen, the decision on the establishment of the

14     Assembly of the Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina would no longer be in

15     force as well as these Municipal Assemblies; and their task was just to

16     intervene at first, just to intervene at that moment when the

17     constitution would be violated to the detriment of the Serb people at any

18     level.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] D1183, could we please have that in

21     e-court.  In English we first have the preamble and then the rest is

22     probably on the next page.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Do you see the upper right-hand corner, is that that

25     recommendation?

Page 43201

 1        A.   Yes, that is that recommendation.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  Next page in English, please.  [Interpretation]

 3     Thank you.

 4             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   Mr. President, here in the indictment there is a reference to a

 6     certain paper that is called Variant A and Variant B here.  Are you aware

 7     of the existence of such a paper and how does this paper relate to this

 8     recommendation to establish municipalities?

 9        A.   As for Variants A and B, I testified in my own trial so

10     everything I'm going to say now is contained there.  There was no need to

11     pass this document that was called Variant A and B if we had this

12     recommendation that was adopted earlier on.  There is no causal

13     relationship between the recommendation and the subsequently adopted

14     paper entitled:  "Variant A and B."  So on the basis of this

15     recommendation, every municipality, every group of Assemblymen could

16     establish a municipality, a Municipal Assembly, a parliament, and satisfy

17     the things contained in Variants A and B.  I stated that in my own

18     testimony - you can find it there.  I did not know when it was

19     distributed, this document.  Allegedly it was distributed during one

20     session.  Now was it a session of the Main Board or a session of the

21     Assembly at the Holiday Inn, somebody could have distributed that just in

22     passing, by the by, but it's not that I know that it was being

23     distributed.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             As for this recommendation, was it discussed at the Assembly and

Page 43202

 1     was a decision passed?

 2        A.   A moment ago I mentioned this.  If you look at the stenographic

 3     notes from that session, you will see that the initiative came from some

 4     members of parliament at that session and there was a great deal of

 5     hesitation.  We hesitated to make a decision.  And then a compromise was

 6     reached to give a recommendation, that on the ground, on the spot, each

 7     and every municipal parliament, or rather, Serb MPs in municipalities

 8     could decide whether they felt that was necessary or not.  Many did, many

 9     did not.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. President, what does the Assembly produce or what

11     does a Assembly produce?  And if an Assembly produces something, does it

12     first have to be on the agenda?  Does it have to be debated first before

13     being adopted?  Could you tell us what kind of documents are adopted by

14     an Assembly and what has to be on the agenda in the debate and then in

15     the conclusions.

16        A.   In the rules of procedure of the Assembly, it is obligatory to

17     allocate time for presenting documents which would be included in the

18     agenda.  These documents are then discussed, conclusions are made,

19     decisions are made.  In fact, documents are passed which are within the

20     purview of the Assembly, those are decisions, conclusions, laws,

21     declarations, et cetera.  And all these documents that are discussed and

22     that must be presented in advance, all the conclusions made have to be

23     promulgated in the Official Gazette of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Assembly

24     cannot pass anything without promulgating it.  A moment ago you saw one

25     of the conclusions.  There were many conclusions, but conclusions were,

Page 43203

 1     in fact, groundwork for a different document.  Once debate is concluded,

 2     a decision is made, et cetera.

 3             There was a conclusion of 11 September that was so important that

 4     it was promulgated in the Official Gazette too.  Nothing can be passed by

 5     the Assembly without it being published in the Official Gazette, at least

 6     according to the law it shouldn't be.  And because the rules of procedure

 7     prescribed that one had to announce in advance what would be discussed in

 8     the Assembly, the Party of Democratic Action once wanted to interrupt the

 9     session in order to include a new item in the agenda.  I stopped it and

10     the lawyers cautioned all of us that the Assembly may not work in that

11     way.

12        Q.   Here we have some general documents from the Assembly admitted

13     into evidence, transcripts and records of Assembly sessions.  Can you

14     tell us if there is any difference between transcripts and records, is

15     there any essential difference?

16        A.   In the Serbian language, a transcript produced by shorthand is a

17     kind of record produced by shorthand, and if something was missing the

18     audiotape would be checked, whereas a record would include only the main

19     points of the session.  A record is not a verbatim reflection of the

20     session, whereas the transcript shows exactly the course of the debate

21     word for word.

22        Q.   Can the record include something that was not adopted or vice

23     versa?

24        A.   Well, if that happens that can only be by human error, that

25     somebody missed something.  The record reflects the conclusions that were

Page 43204

 1     adopted.

 2        Q.   What was the fate of some extreme or angry discussions that

 3     happened in the Assembly that we can see in transcripts but we cannot see

 4     them in the records?  How did that happen?

 5        A.   In records you will see almost no reflection of any discussions,

 6     just the conclusions, and that's important.  Deliberations are very

 7     elaborate, very detailed, but the record will reflect only the end

 8     result, the conclusions.  It's important for a journalist or anybody who

 9     wants to read about it, but for me and various services in the Assembly

10     it's also important to have a correct record.

11        Q.   Thank you.  When we were talking about Serbian Assemblies in

12     municipalities, that is to say, Serbian parliaments - and we will discuss

13     it also later in connection with Serb territories - here in my case there

14     is an adjudicated fact number 1932 which is that the SDS was prepared to

15     separate Serbian territories from Bosnia-Herzegovina if that was the only

16     way of keeping them within Yugoslavia.  Is this true according to what

17     you know?  And did we stand firmly by our priority objective of staying

18     within Yugoslavia?

19        A.   As I stated previously, the Serbian side until the end of 1991

20     had a priority task of staying within Yugoslavia; however, we then had

21     talks with various representatives, and I know from talking to

22     Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic as well as with Mr. Vance and

23     Lord Carrington and later Mr. Milosevic as well, we realised that if we

24     wanted to pursue a realistic policy on a global level we had to work

25     towards staying within Bosnia and Herzegovina even if we can't stay

Page 43205

 1     within Yugoslavia.  So this conclusion is not correct.  That territory

 2     was part of Yugoslavia at that time anyway, and all the way up until the

 3     time when the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is resolved, it would remain

 4     within Yugoslavia.

 5        Q.   Another adjudicated fact, 1946, claims that our Assembly of the

 6     Serbian People proclaimed its territory as the territory of the

 7     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in January 1991, including all the

 8     populated areas, municipalities, et cetera, which declared at the

 9     referendum that they wanted to stay as a part of Yugoslavia.  Did we

10     indeed have the intention to proclaim our territory a part of Yugoslavia

11     and did we need anybody's approval or consent for that in November 1991?

12        A.   I don't know the exact wording of that, but the aim of the

13     plebiscite was for the Serbian people to declare their will, whether they

14     were for a united Bosnia-Herzegovina or for staying in Yugoslavia.  So we

15     obtained a map in which certain areas responded differently.  There was

16     no point for us in claiming that these areas are part of Yugoslavia, but

17     we did want to show in which areas the Serbian people declared that they

18     were for Yugoslavia.  It was not our objective to say Yugoslavia is from

19     here and up to here it's not.  As long as the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue

20     was open, that was not the case.  But for the Serbian Democratic Party it

21     was a basis for drawing maps later in negotiations when we were

22     negotiating with the other side.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

24             MR. TIEGER:  If we're going to engage in this exercise,

25     Mr. President, of purporting to recite the witness adjudicated facts and

Page 43206

 1     asking for his -- or trying to elicit a response from him on it, then two

 2     things need to occur.  Number one, the adjudicated fact needs to be

 3     correctly recited.  Here I see the question was:

 4             "Another adjudicated fact ... claims that our Assembly of the

 5     Serbian People proclaimed its territory as the territory ..." et cetera,

 6     et cetera.  The adjudicated fact in fact states:

 7             "On November 21st, 1991, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed as

 8     part of the territory of federal Yugoslavia," et cetera.

 9             So if we start in the proposition that it's difficult to elicit a

10     response of any assistance to the Court, and then secondly, there

11     apparently was no interest on the part of Dr. Karadzic in actually

12     eliciting an answer responsive to that question because the response

13     seemed to address the plebiscite and other aspects rather than the terms

14     of the adjudicated fact itself.

15             I won't intervene in this way in future, but I will make a marker

16     that such questions and answers have no impact on the adjudicated facts

17     whatsoever.

18             JUDGE KWON:  One point, be precise in referring to the

19     adjudicated facts.  It's important to read out correctly.  Shall we

20     continue.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Excellency.  I

22     wanted to save time, but as usual, I end up wasting more time in this

23     way.  I will leave aside the adjudicated facts until I obtain the correct

24     citation.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 43207

 1        Q.   Mr. Speaker, after the 11th of December, which was the next

 2     session of the Assembly of the Serbian People of Bosnia and Herzegovina

 3     and what was the occasion?

 4        A.   The date was 21st December, and the occasion was the unlawful

 5     request of the Muslim and Croat part of the Presidency and the

 6     Muslim/Croat government to apply for international recognition with the

 7     European community.

 8        Q.   Two days before that, on the 19th of December, did you attend the

 9     plenary session of the Serbian Democratic Party?

10        A.   I believe so.

11        Q.   You've already discussed this.  Was there any debate about papers

12     A and B, debate and decision?

13        A.   No.

14        Q.   Thank you.  If a session of a Municipal Assembly would include in

15     its agenda those instructions or recommendations that were adopted at the

16     meeting of the 21st December, would that be party instructions or

17     Assembly instructions?

18        A.   I have to be precise.  When I said it was not discussed at the

19     plenary session, at the same time there was also a club of MPs of the

20     Serbian Assembly, where I dealt with preparations for the 21st December

21     session.  So I did not really participate much in the plenary session.

22     Could you clarify your question?

23        Q.   If in an agenda of a Municipal Assembly we read:  "Consideration

24     of the recommendations adopted by the Assembly of 21st December," would

25     it be a reference to the plenary session of the party or the Assembly

Page 43208

 1     session?

 2        A.   Assemblies, Municipal Assemblies, discussed decisions of state

 3     authorities, state agencies, whereas the party discussed its party

 4     affairs.  So if it was a document of the Assembly of the Serbian People,

 5     then it could be a subject of discussion at the municipal level.  If it

 6     was a party document, then it would be discussed by party organs at the

 7     municipal level.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us something about Crisis Staffs.  When

 9     were they established?  Was there a Crisis Staff at the level of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  Were there any Crisis Staffs in Croatia?  And what

11     is a Crisis Staff in essence?

12        A.   Crisis Staffs were presented before this Court, Your Honours, as

13     an important document.  In the former communist regime, in every

14     situation of natural disaster, any extraordinary circumstances called for

15     the establishment of a Crisis Staff.  There was one Crisis Staff at the

16     level of Bosnia-Herzegovina headed by Ejub Ganic.  The Presidency had its

17     own Crisis Staff.  So it was not a -- something prohibited.  It was

18     something that was triggered by certain circumstances.

19             When I was Speaker of the Assembly, a Crisis Staff was formed at

20     the time of the barricades in Sarajevo, when a member of a wedding party

21     was killed in Sarajevo; a Crisis Staff was formed then.  The leadership

22     was away in Geneva at negotiations and neither Mr. Karadzic nor

23     Mr. Koljevic nor I were there.  It was a one-off Crisis Staff.

24     Crisis Staffs did not exist then on the Serbian side.

25             The first instruction to establish Crisis Staffs came in the

Page 43209

 1     speech of Mr. Karadzic on the 27th March, at the last pre-war Assembly

 2     session, when he said:  Form Crisis Staffs, engage people from your own

 3     territories, and you will see from the records that it was the first

 4     mention of Crisis Staffs on our side.

 5             Whether some people formed Crisis Staffs at municipal level, I

 6     don't know, perhaps they did.  In any case, they were able to because

 7     they didn't need any approval or instruction.  It was quite a normal

 8     thing in the socialist system.  If a river flooded, if there was any

 9     natural disaster or an extraordinary occurrence, Crisis Staffs were

10     formed.

11        Q.   You just spoke about municipal Crisis Staffs.  Was a political

12     party able to form Crisis Staffs without you knowing, considering that a

13     political party is not a state authority?  Were there any party

14     Crisis Staffs before the 27th March?

15        A.   I believe I would have known if the party had done that.

16        Q.   Who, and based on what criterion, became a member of the

17     Crisis Staff?

18        A.   I remember that in your speech of 27 March you said that a

19     leading person in the municipality should be the president of the

20     Crisis Staff.  That was the initial instruction.  I don't know if

21     anything was done about it, but very soon, the government of

22     Republika Srpska issued some sort of instructions along those lines as to

23     who should be on the Crisis Staff, the president of the Executive Board

24     or maybe the chief of police, et cetera.

25        Q.   Did it specify personalities or titles, posts?

Page 43210

 1        A.   Exclusively posts.

 2        Q.   At that Assembly session of the 21st December, did the Assembly

 3     adopt a decision to establish the Serbian Republic of BH and did it set

 4     any conditions?  Was the establishment of the Serbian Republic of BH

 5     inevitable?  What demands were made from the other two sides?

 6        A.   Your Honours, as you will see in the transcript and in the

 7     record, it was said clearly:  You, gentlemen on the other side, withdraw

 8     your unlawful decision, take back your request for international

 9     recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and if you do that -- if you don't do

10     that, by new year we will have established the Serbian republic.  And

11     that was in accordance with the indications given by the international

12     community that we will get our own entity by the Serbian new year, which

13     is the 13th/14th January.  That was the dead-line they had to take back

14     their unlawful decision and their unlawful request for recognition.

15        Q.   Thank you.  And how much time did we give them?  That is to say,

16     when was Republika Srpska proclaimed and did it begin to operate

17     immediately?  When did it begin to operate?

18        A.   I had in my possession some documents, and, Your Honours, you can

19     find them too, this declaration or the proposal of a decision, where we

20     requested that it should be conditional.  Once again, you'll see that it

21     was a proposal and conditional that, on the 9th of January, we would set

22     up Republika Srpska, but if the unlawful decisions were withdrawn, we

23     would withdraw this too because we wanted to give one more chance.  There

24     was much pressure from the deputies, and eventually Mr. Karadzic,

25     Mr. Koljevic, and I, we were in the minority even because the deputies

Page 43211

 1     said:  Here's the interview saying -- showing what Mr. Izetbegovic said a

 2     few days ago, and those from the other side, they will never withdraw it.

 3     They want to go towards independence, and any request of yours is even

 4     comical.  You are knocking at an open door and you know that nothing will

 5     come of this.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now try to remember the events of the

 7     9th of January, the proclamation of Republika Srpska, and whether its

 8     organs began to operate immediately or when did that happen?

 9        A.   The 9th of January was actually a ceremony.  We wanted to

10     announce this so that it would be clear that we didn't agree with the

11     unconstitutional decisions.  We were hoping that the positions would get

12     closer.  You'll see that on the 25th and on the 26th of January, with

13     much insistence from Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic, Mr. Vuka, and myself, we

14     managed to persuade the deputies to attend the joint session of the

15     parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina, hoping that there would be a

16     reconciliation.  And automatically, everything that had been previously

17     formed was annulled.  And then there was a comical situation where

18     Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cengic stood on the platform at the same time.  I

19     tolerated that too just to achieve the reconciliation.

20             So there was no implementation at all because we were hoping that

21     negotiations and a political solution that would be in accordance with

22     the constitution would ensue and would take into account the will of all

23     three ethnic groups.

24        Q.   Thank you.  You now told us what was going on in the joint

25     parliament on the 24th and the 25th of January, 1992.  Could you please

Page 43212

 1     tell the Chamber what was it that Mr. Muhamed Cengic and I agreed on and

 2     kept agreeing for two or three hours?  What was his proposal and what was

 3     my reaction to it?

 4        A.   As we kept insisting on the following - the Serbian side, I

 5     mean - if we wanted Bosnia-Herzegovina to be recognised as an independent

 6     country and for us all to vote at a referendum, then Bosnia-Herzegovina

 7     would need to be transformed, decentralised.  A number of autonomous

 8     areas should be established where our and their and all other requests

 9     would be met at a minimum and no one should rule any other ethnic group.

10     There should be no out-voting.  We had long discussions about this, and

11     at one point we were actually discussing more outside of the parliament

12     session than at it.

13             So when we were in these other rooms, an agreement was reached

14     between Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Cengic was present, so was I,

15     and there were other representatives too from all three ethnic groups.  I

16     have to be honest, the Muslims and the Serbs were there.  As the Croats,

17     they did not want to be involved then for some reason, I don't know what.

18     It was more a conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims.  And

19     Mr. Izetbegovic then agreed.  He said:  I accept.  We should implement a

20     quick regionalisation in a short time and then we would all vote at a

21     referendum.  In late January or in March we would have a referendum.

22     Once we conducted the referendum with our recommendation that Bosnia and

23     Herzegovina should be an independent country, then the tensions would

24     ease off.

25             And Mr. Cengic then entered the main hall and presented to the

Page 43213

 1     parliament what agreement was achieved in the other office.  While he was

 2     speaking, simultaneously Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Cengic were on the

 3     platform.  Cengic had stepped down from the platform and Karadzic

 4     remained on it, and Karadzic said:  I'm happy, and whatever Mr. Cengic

 5     says is correct.  Our positions have become close now.  We should

 6     implement the regionalisation.  And then Cengic came to Karadzic on the

 7     platform, you can see it from the video recording, and then both of them

 8     said:  Look, the situation is relaxed now.  There is no need for tensions

 9     now.  The government will implement the regionalisation quickly and the

10     problem will be solved.  I could see everyone in the hall relax and I was

11     really happy.

12             At that moment there were reactions of some of the deputies to

13     the effect:  Who did you agree with, Mr. Cengic, who entitled you to do

14     that?  And then he said:  Well, here Mr. Izetbegovic agreed to that, and

15     he pointed his finger at Izetbegovic.  Then the president of the

16     Deputies Club from the SDA requested for a break.  They went to the

17     break.  He talked again with Mr. Izetbegovic and he said:  This is not

18     true.  I do not accept this.  And he cancelled what Mr. Izetbegovic had

19     said.  And then there was another chaotic situation, another rift.  Once

20     again we submitted the 20 signatures, once again the decision was

21     adopted, and so everything started going downhill though we were close to

22     find positions that were close to each other.

23        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned that as early as in 1991, Mr. Vance and

24     Lord Carrington and Mr. Wijnaendts came and others that you wrote to.

25     Can you remember when it was that agreement was achieved in principle

Page 43214

 1     that there would be three Bosnias and that the work on harmonisation of

 2     the document began?

 3        A.   I won't be specific.  Whether it was during January or in

 4     February, early February, but immediately after this a meeting was

 5     organised at which it was told to us that we would have our own

 6     constitutive entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina.  So immediately it was

 7     middle -- in the middle of January or late January or early February and

 8     then the negotiations and the conference were continued.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember whether you attended the plenary

10     session of the Serbian Democratic Party held on the 14th of February,

11     1992, when we announced that there would be three Bosnia and

12     Herzegovinas?  And do you remember my recommendations what our leaders

13     should take into account vis-à-vis the Muslims and Croats in the areas

14     where we had the majority population?

15        A.   From this distance in time, I just remember what is positive.  I

16     very often tend to and try to forget what is negative.  You can find that

17     in the transcript; it's easy to establish.  Mr. Karadzic appealed on

18     everyone to protect -- if there is a demarcation line drawn between the

19     three entities, if one of the ethnic groups is a minority in our entity,

20     the Muslims or the Croats, we wanted to have a rule of law, we wanted to

21     have the minorities protected with all rights to be enjoyed.  And if

22     anything like that happened, it could only be by somebody's will if

23     anyone wanted to leave.  Nobody should be forced to leave.

24             Whatever was said then was easing the tensions.  People were

25     relaxed and it was the basis for the next session of the conference where

Page 43215

 1     we would advocate the position taken by the members of the plenary

 2     session, and their position was that now we had to adjust to new goals

 3     which were no longer Yugoslavia but rather Republika Srpska, a Serbian

 4     entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  I do not have your judgement.  Is it true that it

 6     contains the adjudicated fact which is more or less to the effect that on

 7     the 14th of February, Karadzic said that Serbian political leaders should

 8     make sure that there was no exodus from our areas, and that the

 9     conclusion of your Chamber was that at the time I still made sure that

10     the interests of the Muslims and the Croats would be protected?

11        A.   That's true.  It's correct you appealed on everyone to prevent an

12     exodus and that no one had the right to force anyone out.

13        Q.   Thank you.  So that was two weeks before their referendum was

14     held.  Can you please remind us and tell the Chamber, what was our

15     position with regard to this referendum and whether we would vote in it

16     or not, and also what we thought about their right to state their mind?

17        A.   Everything that I'm going to say can be found in documents.  The

18     clear position of the Serbian Democratic Party was that this referendum

19     was, for us, a referendum of the Croatian and Muslim peoples.  The

20     Serbian people had voted at the plebiscite and said what they believed.

21     Those who wanted to vote at the referendum, even Serbs, should not be

22     obstructed.  Everyone was entitled to vote because no one prevented us

23     from holding our plebiscite.

24             It was rather a written document sent out to the field so that

25     people would know that no one had the right to obstruct anyone in the

Page 43216

 1     areas that was solely populated by Serbs if this referendum was to be

 2     organised there, if it was to be slated by the Muslim and Croatian

 3     communities, because it was not like a parliament session, it was slated

 4     in an unlawful manner.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Can you remember, of the 109 municipalities, from how

 6     many municipalities did we have deputies in the Chamber of Citizens, or

 7     rather, in how many municipalities did we have absolute majority?

 8        A.   I could not say what the percentage was, but I know that in many

 9     of the municipalities the Serbs had absolute or relative majority.  And

10     why?  Because the Serbs possessed land in big areas, and where

11     municipalities were centred in urban environments, there the Muslims and

12     the Croats had the majority, so that in a great number of municipalities

13     the Serbs were dominant.  I think, but whatever I say will be

14     speculation.  But I know that it was a huge number of municipalities.

15        Q.   Is it correct that in the Chamber of Municipalities we had more

16     than a simple majority, that is to say, 37 deputies?  And who was the

17     president of the Chamber of Municipalities?

18        A.   That's correct.  In the Chamber of Municipalities we had the

19     majority because -- and that was why we also had the position of the

20     president.  A Serb, Mr. Petko Cancar was the president of the Chamber of

21     Municipalities.

22        Q.   Thank you.  In view of the fact that you were the parliament

23     Speaker and also the president of the constitutional commission, can you

24     tell me whether this referendum of theirs would be considered successful

25     if in the 37 municipalities we prevented its -- prevented it from being

Page 43217

 1     held?

 2        A.   All decisions are made autonomously in one and the other chamber,

 3     and if we were to look at municipalities separately, first the decision

 4     will have to be made in the Chamber of Municipalities, then in the

 5     Chamber of Citizens, and then such a decision would be passed at the

 6     level of the parliament as a whole.  The Muslim/Croatian coalition could

 7     not even in theory secure for itself a two-thirds majority if all the

 8     Serbian deputies were to vote in the Chamber of Municipalities.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Perhaps I was not precise enough.  This legality of

10     the referendum, what it would look like if in the 37 municipalities and

11     in -- I don't know which percentage of the territory, the Serbian side

12     prevented the referendum from being held where it was capable of

13     preventing it?  Would the referendum then be considered successful?

14        A.   For the international community which expected to get the results

15     of the referendum, it certainly wouldn't be acceptable and legal because

16     there would be more than 51 per cent of the territory where the results

17     of the referendum would not exist because the citizens would not be able

18     to vote.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Immediately after the completion of the referendum,

20     as you noted, one member of the Serbian wedding party was killed in

21     Bascarsija.  This was followed by unrest and the barricades were put up.

22     Where were the two of us at the time?  I believe that you mentioned that

23     we were in Brussels; however, it seems to me that we were at the

24     preparations for Brussels in Belgrade.  Do you remember this?

25        A.   As far as I remember, we were at a session in Brussels or in

Page 43218

 1     Geneva, and on the way back from that meeting to Belgrade, we heard about

 2     the barricades being put up and the murder of this member of the wedding

 3     party.  We may have been in Belgrade, I don't know, but when this was

 4     happening we were in Belgrade in any case.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  That was the beginning of March.  Can you tell us how

 6     did the conference develop and who presided?

 7        A.   In March, Mr. Cutileiro was very active and very busy.  He was

 8     the Portuguese ambassador who at the time, I believe, was in charge of

 9     the European community.  At the time, Portugal was the presiding country.

10     And March is the month of the finalisation of negotiations when we were

11     about to achieve some results.  Unless I'm mistaken, we had two meetings

12     and we reached an agreement on the principles in accordance with which

13     the final agreement about peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be based.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you remember what was the first map of

15     Ambassador Cutileiro where he established who had the majority where?

16        A.   I remember that well.  All three sides in the negotiations with

17     Mr. Cutileiro mainly kept asking this question, but the map, the map, the

18     map, and the map, because territorial issues were the most important for

19     reaching an agreement because three constitutive units were to be set up.

20     And then the late Mr. Darwin drew a map where he identified certain areas

21     with relative or absolute majority of -- for one ethnic group.  So, to

22     give an example, you have a bigger enclave --

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please have 1D03931 called

24     up because it will be easier for the witness to present this for us,

25     1D03931.  Thank you.

Page 43219

 1             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Can you recognise this?  Is this the map you spoke about?  Can

 3     you tell us what it depicts?

 4        A.   During my trial, I tendered this map to the Prosecutor present

 5     here and he tendered a different map to me.  This map was after the

 6     meeting on the 31st of March or around that date.  As far as I can

 7     remember, after Brussels.  That was the first time that the border was

 8     marked on the Una, which was the basis for our six strategic objectives.

 9        Q.   I beg your pardon.  Could you please show the Una River to the

10     Trial Chamber here?

11        A.   I'll try.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could he please be assisted with an

13     electronic pen.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think I can manage.

15             This is the border on the Una --

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   You can mark it, yes.

18        A.   I beg your pardon.  That is the border on the Una.  The green is

19     Muslim territory and the blue is Serb territory.  You see this here --

20        Q.   I'm sorry.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could that please be erased.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could you precisely mark the Una River using that pen.

24        A.   [Marks]

25        Q.   Now could you please mark the Una River very precisely all along.

Page 43220

 1        A.   This is the Una River.  Sorry, yet again -- I haven't really

 2     managed.  Sorry about that.  I do apologise.  I'm not very precise.

 3             The border between the green and the blue is the Una River.  The

 4     Una River flows this way, as far as I can remember.  This is the first

 5     time within Bosnia-Herzegovina that a demarcation was set between the

 6     Muslim - this is the Muslim area - and the Serb area.

 7        Q.   I'm sorry.  The Cyrillic S.

 8        A.   Sorry.

 9        Q.   It looks like Croatian.

10        A.   Sorry.

11        Q.   Sorry.  Can you go all the way down the Una to its confluence to

12     the Sava.

13        A.   This is the Sava, this.  This is the Sava up here, and the Una

14     flows into the Sava, you see.

15        Q.   Thank you.  In anticipation of the six strategic objectives, who

16     was here on the Una River, on the right bank of the Una and the right

17     bank of the Sava?

18        A.   What is marked here in blue --

19             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

21             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  I have refrained from repeated

22     objections to leading questions, but I'm going to be more rigorous now.

23     In anticipation of the -- I mean, this is a clear leading question and

24     building in commentary as well.  Dr. Karadzic has to refrain from that

25     and just keep his questions open-ended to this witness, please.

Page 43221

 1             JUDGE KWON:  What is your question, Mr. Karadzic?

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Let me not mention the objectives.  Can you tell me -- actually,

 4     can you extend the border along the Sava, and could you tell us who is on

 5     the right bank of the Una River and on the right bank of the Sava River

 6     on the basis of what was established by the team of the

 7     European Commission?

 8        A.   I'm going to start from here, when the Una enters

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, that's this here.  So the Una flows --

10        Q.   You've already said that.  Could you place number 1 there.

11        A.   It is this here.  From there, from that place, the Una flows

12     towards the Sava.  On the right-hand side --

13        Q.   Sorry, number 2, could you mark the confluence with a number 2.

14        A.   That is number 2.

15             On the right bank of the Una River, this is the Serbs, S, Serb

16     ethnic area marked in blue.  And on the left side, the green colour,

17     that's where the Muslims are.  This here is an enclave, if I can call it

18     that, right here.  One-third is brown or red and two-thirds are green.

19     Croats are where it is brown.  So this is where the Croats are.  And

20     these are the Muslims here.  So I'm going to place number 3 there and the

21     Muslims will be 4.

22             The representative of the European community envisaged the

23     following.  Within a larger ethnic area, there can be enclaves of the

24     other ethnic community.  Of course, if you look at the principles, what

25     is envisaged is even exchanges of territory, if I can put it that way, in

Page 43222

 1     order to satisfy a particular geographic or economic entity.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Could you mark the Drina River for us now, where it

 3     flows into the Sava River, so that you don't have to deal with all of it.

 4        A.   Here, right here.  Sorry about that.  Number 5, that's what I'm

 5     going to put there now.

 6        Q.   Could you extend it a bit, the Drina, so that we see where the

 7     Drina is there?

 8        A.   I'll try yet again.  This is where the Drina flows.  The Drina

 9     flows here.  I think -- well, I don't know exactly.  I think it's like

10     this.  Now I don't know if I'm being very precise, but I think it's

11     something like that.  Actually, I beg your pardon, it does enter

12     Montenegro, the Tara and the Piva rivers.

13        Q.   Thank you.  Number 6 for the Drina.

14        A.   I will place number 6 there.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Can you mark the Neretva River approximately?

16        A.   The Neretva should be here roughly.  I think that it's something

17     like this.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you --

19        A.   Sorry, this is number 7.

20             JUDGE KWON:  What is number 5?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Number 5 is where the Drina flows

22     into the Sava.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Please could you initial this or sign this and place the date

Page 43223

 1     there.

 2        A.   Only if I knew what the date was today.

 3        Q.   The 7th of November.

 4        A.   [Marks]

 5        Q.   Before the break, bearing the break in mind and for as long as we

 6     still have the map there, could you tell us whether the paper called "Six

 7     Strategic Objectives" has anything to do with these boundaries of the

 8     Serb ethnic area?

 9        A.   This map is a basis for rounding off or for creating the six

10     strategic objectives.

11        Q.   Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this into

13     evidence.  Actually, another question.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   We see here close to Banja Luka there should be a canton, or

16     rather, an enclave Muslim/Croat.  What about the Drina valley, Podrinje,

17     who is there?

18        A.   If you look at Podrinje, the Drina River valley, it is this

19     entire eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The green colour are the

20     Muslims here.  These are the Muslims and these are the Serbs.  So maybe I

21     should put some numbers there.  I don't think it's necessary.  Then green

22     is a rather large area in the Drina valley and it was supposed to be

23     divided between the Muslims and the Serbs.  The Muslims would have these

24     enclaves, so to speak, and the Serbs would have these areas that can sort

25     of visually be linked, Semberija, Romanija, and Herzegovina.

Page 43224

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can this be admitted and can we

 3     take the break then?

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We'll receive it.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Exhibit Number D3998, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  We'll have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

 7     25 past 1.00.

 8                           --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.37 p.m.

 9                           --- On resuming at 1.28 p.m.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Excellency.

12             Once again could we have the map, please, 1D03931.  This time an

13     unmarked one.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Mr. President, we saw the decision, or rather, the recommendation

16     of the Serb Assembly, the Assembly of the Serb People, to establish Serb

17     municipalities.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be

19     assisted with the electronic pen.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Can you tell us whether these ethnic boundaries, the boundaries

22     of these ethnic areas coincide with the municipalities of the -- with the

23     borders of municipalities or is there a difference?

24        A.   These ethnic areas do not coincide with the borders of

25     municipalities in the areas where the two colours, if you will, of ethnic

Page 43225

 1     areas - how do I put this? - where they meet.  I can give you an example.

 2     Right here --

 3        Q.   Please do draw what I'm going to ask you to draw.  Do you see the

 4     municipality of Bihac?

 5        A.   I see it, it's right here.

 6        Q.   Could you please draw all the areas that are encompassed by the

 7     Bihac municipality.

 8        A.   I hope that I will do this right.  This is the municipality of

 9     Bihac.

10        Q.   Thank you.  If a Serb municipality of Bihac is established, what

11     does it include?

12        A.   If a Serb municipality of Bihac were to be established, it could

13     include -- well, I'll try now, this area that is blue.  Right here,

14     that's one.

15        Q.   What about a Muslim municipality of Bihac, what would that

16     include?

17        A.   This area.  Muslim municipalities.  So what is marked in green

18     and that is within the boundaries of the overall municipality of Bihac.

19        Q.   Thank you.  What about the southern part that is left out, is

20     that the municipality of Bihac as well, to the south?

21        A.   Well, possibly.  I'm not very precise, am I?  Maybe this part is

22     included by Bihac too?  I was not precise.

23        Q.   Green, green.

24        A.   Possibly.  Possibly.  All of this might be Bihac, that is to say,

25     this area, green, that's Bihac, just like the blue one over there.  But

Page 43226

 1     of course, the blue denotes the area populated by Serbs, whereas the

 2     green denotes areas where the majority population is Muslim, so not the

 3     entire population, the majority population is Muslim.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Could you mark the boundaries of Bosanska Krupa now.

 5     What does it include?

 6        A.   Now, Bosanska Krupa, I think that this is Bosanska Krupa.

 7     Actually, could it be blown up a bit, this map.  I'm so sorry.

 8        Q.   No, Mr. President.  We lose the drawing.  However, perhaps no

 9     harm done in blowing it up and having the drawing repeated so that it

10     could be more precise.

11        A.   Maybe I could take the liberty of saying -- well, sorry.  Maybe

12     this could be Bosanska Krupa, maybe this, so this part here, if my

13     drawing is right.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Was Bosanska Krupa on the left bank of the Una as

15     well?

16        A.   Certainly.  Well, this is a free drawing because I'm not precise,

17     but it was on the left side too.  Maybe I can do this free drawing and

18     then there is part on the right bank of the Una too.  One were Serb areas

19     and the other Muslim areas, and the Una went through the municipality of

20     Bihac and the municipality of Krupa.

21        Q.   Thank you.  If Serbs establish a Serb municipality of Krupa and

22     if Deputy Vjesnica [phoen], after the beginning of the war, says:  In the

23     Serb municipality of Krupa there is not a single Muslim and I hope that

24     there never will be one for as long as the fighting is going on, which

25     part of Krupa is he referring to?

Page 43227

 1        A.   He is referring to the Serb part of Krupa, which is predominantly

 2     populated by Serbs, or rather, Serbs are an absolute majority.  So in

 3     that part of the municipality where the Serbs are a majority.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now, please, this Muslim enclave, do take a look at

 5     it.  Does it include Kljuc, Sanski Most, and part of Prijedor?  Which

 6     municipalities are we sharing with the Muslims and Croats in the

 7     Sana River valley?  Could you please mark this in blue -- no, red, red.

 8     Could you mark the Sana River from Novi Grad to Prijedor to the south.

 9        A.   I think here, because you cannot really see it so well, I assume

10     that the Sana River, Novi Grad, that Sana is here.

11        Q.   Mr. President, it has to pass through Prijedor, so can you please

12     take a look at that.

13        A.   Well, I can't see it.  Yes, it does flow through Prijedor and

14     then enters Novi Grad -- ah, excuse me, Sana is here from what I can see.

15     I think that's it.  It passes through Prijedor.  This is Prijedor here;

16     isn't that right?

17        Q.   And were these municipalities ethnically homogenous or have

18     ethnically homogenous parts and were thus divided between the Serbs and

19     the Muslims?

20        A.   This image shows that there was a division of these

21     municipalities between the Muslims and the Croats, Krupa, Prijedor, and

22     Bihac, these ones that we mentioned.

23        Q.   And the Croats?

24        A.   Yes, the Croats.  It's just this part.  This area marked in brown

25     is Croatian, this brown area here.

Page 43228

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can I now please ask you to draw in the outlines of

 2     the Zvornik municipality and to tell us what made up the municipality of

 3     Zvornik.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, Mr. Krajisnik.

 5             I'm not sure whether -- if we would be assisted if we look at

 6     this marked map later on.  Why don't we re-draw it.  Just zoom in on the

 7     western part and then let's draw these three drawings again.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  And --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  And let's do it separately with Zvornik.

10             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, and as long as the Court has stopped this for a

11     moment to ask about its utility, may I ask what precisely is the

12     underlying utility of having this witness guess at municipal boundaries

13     which can be identified on a number of much more reliable documents that

14     we have.

15             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think that this is -- the purpose of this

16     exercise is not to find out exact border of municipality, but -- let's

17     zoom in it first on the western part.  We can ...

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

19        Q.   His Excellency, Judge Kwon, is right.  We can just sketch it.  It

20     doesn't have to be precise.  All I'm interested in --

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let's zoom it one further.  Further.  Upper part.

22             Yes.  First, could you draw the border-line of Bihac first.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.  Now this is

24     much more easy to see.  This is Bihac.  I will try to indicate that.  I

25     think this too.  This is Bihac.

Page 43229

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Number 1 for Serbian part.

 2             THE WITNESS:  Number 1, yes.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Number 2 for Muslim part.

 4             THE WITNESS:  Yes.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  And now with black pen, could you mark the

 6     Bosanska Krupa.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Krupa from what I can see,

 8     this is Krupa.  I don't know whether it's that part at the top, but from

 9     what I can see, Krupa is this part here.  Probably it's like this as

10     well.  This is Krupa, 3 is the Muslim area, and 4 is the Serbian area.

11             JUDGE KWON:  And what did you ask, Mr. Karadzic, to

12     Mr. Krajisnik, Sana River?  What did you ask next?

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked him to mark the Una River,

14     but you can see it exactly.  It's where these two lines or these two

15     colours meet.

16             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   Can you please draw that line between that -- the Sana and then

18     going through the Prijedor enclave.  Perhaps you can draw that line as

19     well.

20        A.   Well, I think this is the Sana.  The Sana flows through

21     Novi Grad, it passes through Prijedor.

22        Q.   Does it pass through Sanski Most and close to Kljuc?

23        A.   It passes through Sanski Most.  This is Sanski Most.  And it

24     passes through Kljuc, yes, it passes through Kljuc.  Yes, this is Kljuc.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And now can you please mark in blue, let's say,

Page 43230

 1     Sanski Most, the municipality of Sanski Most, its borders, because it's

 2     already partly marked.

 3        A.   This is Sanski Most.  This is Sanski Most.  Sanski Most.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please mark the Serbian part with the number

 5     5 and the Muslim part with the number 6.

 6        A.   Well, perhaps we could mark Prijedor first because I marked that

 7     as well.  Well, all right, 5 is the Serbian part and 6 is the Muslim part

 8     of Sanski Most, that is.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please indicate the boundaries of the

10     municipality of Prijedor and mark that.

11        A.   Sanski Most --

12        Q.   And Prijedor.

13        A.   Ah, Prijedor.  Well, from what I can see, I think this is like

14     this -- no, no, excuse me.  This is Prijedor.  I don't know if I'm

15     precise enough.  Perhaps I went too far a bit this way, but more or less,

16     this is the area of Prijedor.

17        Q.   Could you mark the Croatian part with a number 7, with the number

18     8 the Muslim part, and with the number 9 the Serbian part of Prijedor.

19        A.   7 is the Croat part, 8 is the Muslim part, and 9, 9 is the

20     Serbian part.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Since we're unable to zoom in and out, could you

22     please date and sign this map.  And could you please tell us if there was

23     a recommendation or the possibility -- it's not 2011, I'm sorry, it's

24     2013.

25        A.   I apologise.

Page 43231

 1        Q.   If there was a recommendation to form two municipalities, could

 2     you please tell us what one of them would consist of and what the other

 3     would consist of.  Could you use Bihac, Krupa, Prijedor, Sanski Most, and

 4     Kljuc as examples, please.

 5        A.   According to this map, those who would be forming the Bihac

 6     municipality would go out and make the boundaries out in the field, but

 7     the normal thing would be that this part marked in green, that part would

 8     be a Muslim municipality of Bihac.  This part marked in blue should be

 9     the Serbian part of this municipality.  Since Una flows through Bihac,

10     then it would be normal for the right bank settlements -- the area to the

11     right of the Una belonged to the Serbs and the area to the left of the

12     Una would belong to the Muslims.

13        Q.   All right.  Thank you.  And what would remain as common territory

14     at the level of the town of Bihac; i.e., how many of our towns are parts

15     of different municipalities and how many of them are just in one

16     municipality?

17        A.   Well, I could say that a large number of municipalities could be

18     formed like this.  There are examples, though, where it was just the area

19     of one municipality where the authorities, the power would remain in

20     power because it was made up of representatives of citizens who are

21     inhabiting that area.  Here everybody would have their own territory but

22     there would be joint functions as well.  The best example would be Bihac

23     where the joint power or municipal structure could remain intact, but

24     also it could be separate, it could be divided, if that is what they

25     agreed.

Page 43232

 1        Q.   If one were to say or make a recommendation that Serbs, Croats,

 2     and Muslims in Prijedor formed their own municipalities within that

 3     single town, what would be part of one, the second, and the third

 4     municipality?

 5        A.   Well, this is the Prijedor area, if I was precise enough.  So

 6     that area, let's say, of the Prijedor municipality could be that area

 7     coloured in brown.  And number 7 could be used to form the Croatian

 8     municipality.  This area marked in the colour green would be the area

 9     where a Muslim municipality would be formed.  The area in blue is where a

10     Serbian municipality could be formed.  As you can see here, at the edges

11     of this brown-coloured and the blue-coloured territory we can see

12     Prijedor.  Therefore, it's possible that the boundaries of the

13     municipalities would be in the town itself.  There would be no walls or

14     anything like that, but on one side of the street would be one

15     municipality and another on the other.  But there would be no formal

16     boundaries.  So each of the sides could establish power in that area

17     inhabited by members of one ethnic community.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us, after the war how the

19     Dayton Agreements resolved the territorial issues in the municipality of

20     Kljuc?

21        A.   The municipality of Kljuc is a small part of the municipality --

22     actually, a small part of the municipality was assigned to the Serbs,

23     that is, Ribnik, a smaller area.  The bulk of the municipality, including

24     the town itself, was assigned to the Muslims or to the Federation of

25     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The boundary was drawn quite imprecisely.  There

Page 43233

 1     are some areas that were assigned to one or the other entity, but that's

 2     how the border was drawn, whereby municipality of Kljuc was divided into

 3     two municipalities.

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move the image a little bit

 6     towards the east, please.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We'll admit this image as Exhibit D3999.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             And can we now have the same map but can we look at the eastern

10     part of it around the Drina River.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   While we're waiting, Mr. President, are you able to tell us

13     whether it was unusual to have several municipalities in one town or not.

14     How many municipalities are there in Sarajevo before the war?

15        A.   It's quite usual.  All towns, especially large towns, have a

16     number of municipalities.  The town of Sarajevo itself had ten

17     municipalities before the war, and today on the Serb side there are seven

18     or eight and also more or less the same number on the Muslim side.

19        Q.   Thank you.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we move towards the east,

21     please, towards the right.  This is fine.  I think we can stop here.

22             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   Could you please look at the municipality of Brcko, please, and

24     tell us the territories that comprise that municipality, the municipality

25     of Brcko.  And could you please tell us how many municipalities were

Page 43234

 1     formed during the war and after the war in the district of Brcko, that's

 2     what it's called today?

 3        A.   Well, there's a problem here because there are no municipal

 4     boundaries shown here, but I will do my best.  All right.  I'm going to

 5     try to do this now.  I think that Brcko is here, the town of Brcko, and I

 6     think that the municipality -- there are no boundaries.  Tuzla is towards

 7     the south.  I think that it was like this, but this is just a very

 8     roughly drawn map.  There were three municipalities:  A Croat one, a

 9     Muslim one, and a Serb one.

10        Q.   Thank you.  And was this something that was proposed even before

11     the war or did this just turn out like that and was formed like this

12     during the war?

13        A.   There were proposals for that before the war, but during the war

14     it was actually implemented in practice, if I can put it that way.

15        Q.   Thank you.  Do we see the entire municipality of Zvornik here so

16     that we don't have to move the map?  Can you roughly indicate the

17     territory of the municipality of Zvornik?

18        A.   The town of Zvornik is here, and now I'm going to just make an

19     estimate.  I can roughly indicate that it was like this even though it's

20     a rough estimate.  I think this is how the boundaries of the former

21     municipality of Zvornik lay.

22        Q.   And which territories comprised that municipality?

23        A.   This municipality comprised Muslim and Serb inhabitants.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And who controlled these green areas of the Zvornik

25     municipality during the war, to the west of the town?

Page 43235

 1        A.   I think that almost at the very boundary or at the outskirts of

 2     the city, more or less here, was where the border was.  A part was

 3     controlled by the Muslims and the other part was controlled by the Serbs.

 4     So this was controlled by the Serbs and this other part by the Muslims.

 5     This is the area controlled by the Serbs.  I'm going to mark this.  This

 6     would be the area controlled by the Serbs, this would be the area

 7     controlled by the Muslims, this would be the area controlled by the

 8     Serbs, and then this would be the area controlled by the Muslims.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Since we don't want to move the map so that we don't

10     lose the markings, I would just ask you to sign and date this map,

11     please.

12        A.   [Marks]

13        Q.   And what was the name of this area around Bijeljina before the

14     war and during the war?

15        A.   This area here, this entire area, I can mark it, is called

16     Semberija.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we tender this document,

19     please, this is document 4000, a landmark.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Yes, we'll admit it, Exhibit D4000.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22             Can we now scroll up so that we could see the mid-Drina area and

23     the boundaries of the municipalities' ethnic areas.  A little bit more,

24     please.  Very well.  This is good.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 43236

 1        Q.   The Serbian territories are not clearly indicated in Bratunac so

 2     we won't dwell on that, but could you please look at the municipalities

 3     of, let's say, Visegrad, Gorazde.  Perhaps you could look at the

 4     municipality of Visegrad and that area, then Rogatica, Gorazde, and

 5     Srbinje or Foca.

 6        A.   Yes, I can see it well.  Do I need to mark anything?

 7        Q.   Yes, please.  Mark both territories.

 8        A.   Visegrad municipality, if I can see this well, should be here.

 9     The border, the boundary is not marked here, but since this is Rogatica,

10     then the boundary should run this way.  It's not very precise, but that's

11     roughly it because this is Visegrad -- I think this is a bit imprecise.

12     Rogatica should be -- and I apologise for my imprecision again.  This

13     could be -- I'm not sure.  I think this could be Rogatica, this.

14        Q.   What about Gorazde?

15        A.   Gorazde could be like this.  Maybe it's even here on the other

16     side.  So this is Gorazde.

17        Q.   I beg your pardon, just a moment.  Does Gorazde cross over to the

18     Serbian part?

19        A.   Yes, I'm sorry, maybe.  This is Cajnice.  I'm saying this with a

20     grain of salt because I'm not entirely sure.  Gorazde is on both sides of

21     the Drina River, the Drina River being here.

22        Q.   And tell us what territory's covered by Srbinje, or rather, the

23     name before and the name now is Foca?

24        A.   This is Srbinje.  I think the boundary runs like this.  This is

25     Srbinje.  So this is not Gorazde, after all, this is Srbinje.  I can't

Page 43237

 1     see the boundaries clearly.

 2        Q.   Mr. Speaker, in these municipalities on the Drina, were the

 3     conditions in place for establishing two municipalities?

 4        A.   In all of these municipalities, all of the prerequisites were

 5     there for forming both Muslim and Serb municipalities.

 6        Q.   How did the Dayton Accords deal with the Gorazde municipality?

 7        A.   We can see very easily that Gorazde is a place where part of the

 8     territory went to the Serb entity and another part to the Federation of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  A part of other municipalities was attached to

10     Gorazde, actually, to create a corridor to Sarajevo, to create a bypass.

11        Q.   Srbinje municipality, or rather, Foca, did part of Foca remain

12     within the Federation?  Was it divided like Gorazde?

13        A.   Yes.  It too was divided, and to this day there is a Muslim

14     municipality of Foca, although the town of Foca went to the Serb entity.

15        Q.   And what was envisaged before the war?  Without a war, how much

16     would Muslims and Serbs hold respectively in Foca itself?

17        A.   The municipality would be divided into two --

18             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  It's not -- I mean, it's a little too -- what was

21     envisaged before the war?  By whom?  By what?  This is kind of a

22     free-floating abstract concept that can be lifted and applied anywhere.

23     So more specificity is going to be necessary for this to be meaningful in

24     any way.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I'm wondering what is the point of this exercise.

Page 43238

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will rephrase.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Mr. Speaker, before the war, were there any negotiations about

 4     transforming these municipalities into two municipalities each and what

 5     did these negotiations have in mind for Foca?

 6        A.   There was several representatives from both ethnic communities in

 7     the Assembly, and I have information that they conducted negotiations

 8     between them about dividing the municipality into two municipalities,

 9     wherein the Serbian territories would go to the Serb municipality and the

10     Muslim neighbourhoods to the Muslim municipality.

11        Q.   To what extent did Dayton Accords verify that?  Did Ribnik really

12     go to the Serbs?  Did Sanski Most go to the Muslims?  Did part of Zvornik

13     remain in the Muslim municipality?  And what about a part of Pale?  Can

14     you give us municipalities which the Dayton Accords sanctioned as

15     transformed?

16        A.   Looking at the map we can see that very easily.  Most of the

17     municipalities were divided along ethnic lines.  I'll give you a graphic

18     example.  Before coming here to testify, I was departing from the

19     Sarajevo airport.  I was passing through the part of Serbian Sarajevo,

20     and the taxi-driver told me:  This is the ethnic boundary, and that's one

21     street.  On one side of the street is one ethnic community and the other

22     ethnic community has the other side of the street.  And I said:  How

23     come?  And he said:  Nobody really thinks twice about having it divided

24     along one street.  That's one example, but you have examples of another

25     kind, like in Zvornik.  Similar examples can be found in Kljuc, in parts

Page 43239

 1     of --

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I'm really at a loss where we are

 3     heading.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Your Excellencies, I have

 5     been charged by this indictment that I wanted municipalities to be

 6     divided, that is, charged against me as a crime, that I proposed or that

 7     it was effected by the war that Muslims were divided, as had been

 8     suggested before the war.  I am looking into how the United Nations dealt

 9     with this same problem in Dayton, when they didn't have to shoot and all

10     they held in their hands were pencils --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, I don't think you were charged for

12     wanting municipalities to be divided, but I'll leave it to you.  It's up

13     to you how to use your time.  Please continue.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  But as part of the

15     joint criminal enterprise, one reason, although it's a contradiction, one

16     part of the JCE for the removal of Muslims and Croats is the division of

17     municipalities.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   May I ask you, Mr. Speaker, to put a date and signature here.

20     You don't need to put in numbers because it's obvious from the colour of

21     different areas.

22        A.   [Marks]

23             JUDGE KWON:  This will be next Defence exhibit.

24             THE REGISTRAR:  D4001, Your Honours.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

Page 43240

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   I shall now cite several adjudicated facts from your trial, from

 4     your trial judgement.  Adjudicated fact 1915:

 5             [In English] "However, among the functions" --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Adjudicated facts in our case cited

 7     from Mr. Krajisnik's case?  Very well.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the Krajisnik trial judgement,

 9     paragraph 49:

10             [In English] "However, among the functions, the SDS assigned to

11     the Bosnian Krajina community of municipalities was the organisation of

12     its defence in times of war or imminent threat of war."

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Did the Serbian Democratic Party have any possibility or the

15     right to grant this competence to the municipality of the Bosnian

16     Krajina?  Is this adjudicated fact accurate?

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

18             MR. TIEGER:  All right.  I considered whether or not to object to

19     presenting the witness with the adjudicated fact rather than the basic

20     issue and having him provide information about that in a non-leading

21     fashion but decided, okay, we'll let the adjudicated fact be presented.

22     But then I don't think the accused should start answering the question

23     for the witness in the course of the alleged question proposed by

24     suggesting reasons why, in his view, the adjudicated fact can be attacked

25     by the witness.  Let's try to keep it if -- I mean, it's already

Page 43241

 1     problematic under the circumstances, but to lead the witness in this

 2     fashion is unacceptable.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  This adjudicated fact says SDS assigned certain

 4     tasks to Bosnian Krajina communities of municipalities, and he questioned

 5     whether SDS has any possibility of the right --

 6             MR. TIEGER: [Overlapping speakers] --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  -- to the municipality.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Right.  I mean, the question is not asking the

 9     witness to comment on that one way or another; it's focusing -- directing

10     his attention to particular alleged aspects of the situation that the

11     accused thinks can bear on the accuracy of the adjudicated fact.  Given

12     the fact that we're already presenting him with a fact rather than

13     eliciting -- we're already presenting a witness who, for various reasons

14     we know, identifies with the accused.  Now we're presenting him with a

15     fact that the accused -- it's basically telling him:  I would like you to

16     attack, if possible, and on top -- which I let go by, and now he's

17     essentially telling him how to do that.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And then, in your view, how should the question have

19     been formulated?

20             MR. TIEGER:  He can always say something to the effect of:  Can

21     you shed any light on this adjudicated fact?  He could have started from

22     the proposition:  Can you tell us about the nature of the Bosnian Krajina

23     community of municipalities and what its organisational components were,

24     et cetera.  I mean, there are various ways to do it.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Now I see your point, yes.

Page 43242

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I could do that, but I'm only

 2     interested in the defence function of Krajina.  Did it derive from powers

 3     granted it by the SDS as stated in the judgement?  In fact, is this

 4     adjudicated fact accurate --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  But -- that's correct, but --

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- however, the issue is much

 7     broader and I'll come to the other part as well.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  -- by putting your previous overture, it may be

 9     viewed as if you are feeding the answer to the witness.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll put it simply.

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Is this adjudicated fact correct or not?  And in either case,

13     explain why.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Because he did not have the adjudicated facts before

15     him, could you read it again.  I will read it for you.

16             "... among the functions of the SDS assigned to the Bosnian

17     Krajina community of municipalities was the organisation of its defence

18     in times of war or imminent threat of war."

19             Is this not correct?

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm afraid it was not interpreted

21     correctly and it's not correct in the transcript either.  It's not "among

22     the functions of the SDS," it should be -- [In English] "Among the

23     functions that" -- it doesn't say "that," but "among the functions the

24     SDS assigned to the Bosnian" --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I'm sorry.

Page 43243

 1             "... among the functions the SDS assigned to the Bosnian Krajina

 2     community of municipalities was the organisation of its defence in times

 3     of war or imminent threat of war."

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judges, this adjudicated fact is

 5     not correct and I will explain why it is not.  The Law on All People's

 6     Defence stipulated precisely that all municipalities are entitled to

 7     organise All People's Defence.  The municipalities having that power --

 8     another law which stipulates that they may associate, or rather, join

 9     into associations, by virtue of that law all the powers that one

10     municipality has can be conjoined at the level of the association of

11     municipalities.  Now, in our case several municipalities decided to join

12     the association of the Krajina municipalities, and you can see exactly

13     from these laws why this adjudicated is not correct.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

15             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   I asked you about the associations of municipalities.  Based on

17     whose will they were formed and were they established once and for all or

18     were they subject to modification?

19        A.   In the times of socialism, communism, associations of

20     municipalities were formed by virtue of directives and many

21     municipalities were unhappy with the choice of association to which they

22     were assigned.  And their interests were not necessarily best served by

23     that particular association.  And generally speaking, there was always a

24     desire to make associations based on economic interest.  And even before

25     the war, all these legal possibilities were used for political purposes.

Page 43244

 1     And had there been no war, these associations would never have acquired

 2     another dimension that can be misinterpreted and abused.

 3        Q.   Adjudicated fact 1913:

 4             [In English] "During the first months of 1991, the SDS began to

 5     organise Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina into

 6     communities of municipalities, in some cases severing ties with

 7     pre-existing communities of municipalities."

 8             [Interpretation] Was this taken to be a sin of yours?  Was this

 9     lawful?  Were we allowed to do that?  Could the municipality change the

10     community it belonged to?

11        A.   Less than a minute ago I said that many municipalities wished to

12     join either one community or the other.  This was certainly always a wish

13     that was being expressed, but not a single municipality could leave a

14     community and join another one without the consent of the

15     Municipal Assembly.  So everything that happened had to be based on a

16     decision by the Municipal Assembly of a particular municipality.  So this

17     certainly cannot be ascribed to the SDS, that the SDS initiated that.  It

18     was people from that municipality, members of parliament, assemblymen,

19     citizens, they could articulate their requests in a certain way.  That

20     was quite permissible, but there was a procedure involved for leaving one

21     municipality -- one community of municipalities and joining another one.

22        Q.   [No interpretation]

23             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We did not hear the

24     question.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 43245

 1        Q.   "SDS party leaders justified the associations" of municipalities

 2     "in terms of economic necessity."

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  I'm not sure --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm not sure --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I'm not sure Mr. Krajisnik heard the question.

 6             But before we come to 1914 adjudicated fact, what was wrong with

 7     the previous adjudicated fact?  The adjudicated fact did not deal with

 8     legality of that forming communities of municipalities.  You said -- I'm

 9     asking Mr. Krajisnik.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I beg your pardon.  Could you

11     please repeat your question.  How did you understand this?  Maybe I've

12     made a mistake.

13             JUDGE KWON:  I'll read the adjudicated fact, and then you tell us

14     what was wrong with it.

15             Adjudicated fact 1913 from your trial judgement, paragraph 48:

16             "During the first months of 1991, the SDS began to organise

17     Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina into communities of

18     municipalities, in some cases severing ties with pre-existing communities

19     of municipalities."

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Certainly these former communities

21     of municipalities were being severed, but it was because of the will of

22     the citizens on the ground.  They couldn't have done that without a

23     decision taken by a Municipal Assembly.  If there was will to do that on

24     the ground, then they could do that.  It could be severed as is stated,

25     or actually they could cut through one community.  They could join

Page 43246

 1     another one.  How do I put this?  At first the entire municipality would

 2     have to move on to another community if there is a decision to that

 3     effect taken by the Municipal Assembly.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  I still do not understand what was wrong with this

 5     adjudicated fact as I read it to you.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, it wasn't a

 7     municipality that was being split, or rather, it wasn't a community that

 8     was being split.  One municipality could separate from one community and

 9     join another community.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   What about the SDS --

12             JUDGE KWON:  This adjudicated fact does not mention a split at

13     all or separation.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, maybe then the translation is

15     not good.  It says here "split."

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The severing of ties.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, severing ties.  Oh, yes.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   That's one.  And the other thing I'm interested in is whether it

20     was the SDS that started this and ordered that and organised that.

21        A.   It is very easy to establish who it was that did that.  The SDS

22     could not have done that, although that was a party that articulated Serb

23     interests.  It was people on the ground who decided depending on their

24     situation right there where they lived.  Different parties, different

25     provenances.

Page 43247

 1        Q.   Thank you.  From a legal point of view, how do things stand if

 2     there is a republican law and a federal law which is applied if they are

 3     not harmonised?  Which one has priority?

 4        A.   Federal law had priority.

 5        Q.   Now I would like to draw your attention to adjudicated fact 1918.

 6     I don't need to read out all of it.  I can recount what it says.  At any

 7     rate, municipal authorities were supposed to make sure that only Yugoslav

 8     laws were being applied, suspending the implementation of republican

 9     regulations, thus creating legal foundations for communication,

10     co-operation, and the like between these municipalities and the

11     Federation and its organs, like the Socialist Federative Republic of

12     Yugoslavia -- actually, the Assembly of that Yugoslavia and the Federal

13     Executive Council and so on and so forth.

14             So can you tell us what our legal system had envisaged and

15     whether this was impermissible.

16        A.   In the former system, republican and federal laws were

17     harmonised.  Federal law could not be suspended by applying only

18     republican laws.  That would have been unconstitutional, so federal law

19     had to be abided by.  It could only be changed at federal level.  It

20     could not be suspended by the republican Assembly or republican organs.

21        Q.   Thank you.  A while ago I already asked you whether we could

22     declare territories, Serb ethnic territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be

23     an integral part of Yugoslavia.  That is adjudicated fact 1946.  Could we

24     or were we supposed to declare that to be Yugoslavia?  You said that that

25     already had been Yugoslavia and was Yugoslavia.

Page 43248

 1        A.   At that moment, in 1991, Yugoslavia did exist and all of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina was within Yugoslavia.  We did not have any need to

 3     say:  This is Yugoslavia now and the others who have not expressed their

 4     views are not Yugoslavia.  Perhaps this has been misinterpreted.  Perhaps

 5     this has been written erroneously.  In this area where the plebiscite was

 6     carried out, these people have voted in favour of Yugoslavia and actually

 7     that was the basis to show where the citizens had voted for a political

 8     solution within which Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain within Yugoslavia.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Our solutions and our proposals, did they imply that

10     what we were asking for ourselves --

11             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me --

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   -- was something that we were denying others --

14             MR. TIEGER:  Objection.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

16             MR. TIEGER:  I mean, again we're heading towards a leading

17     answer.  I mean, if he wants to know what the implication was of a

18     particular solution and proposal, he can ask that and find out what the

19     witness has to say instead of continually suggesting to the witness the

20     answer he wants.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, sustained.

22             Could you reformulate your question, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   One adjudicated fact, and I'm going to read it out to you,

Page 43249

 1     suggests that we were denying others what we had envisaged for

 2     ourselves --

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, excuse me, that's a very transparently

 4     backdoor way of doing the same thing that I just objected to and that was

 5     sustained.  So now he's interpreting the adjudicated fact for the benefit

 6     of the witness.  Anyway, you can see what's going on.  I object again.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  What adjudicated fact are you referring to?

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1947.  It would be best if I were

 9     to read it out.  I wanted to link it up to the municipalities.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Did we deny them the right to establish a municipality of their

12     own in places where we established our Serb municipalities?

13        A.   We did not deny that.  And there are so many statements of mine

14     and of other top people from the Serb leadership who said at the time

15     everything that we are proposing, suggesting, actually we are allowing

16     the others the right to do that.  We are not imposing anything on others.

17     You can check my statements and you will see that that was our policy.

18        Q.   If the Trial Chamber allows me to do so, I'm going to read out

19     verbatim adjudicated fact 1947 which speaks to the contrary.  It will be

20     interpreted.

21             JUDGE KWON:  "Which speaks to the contrary" was leading.  But

22     please read out verbatim adjudicated fact 1947.

23             THE ACCUSED:  "If the majority in one municipality had voted to

24     remain within Yugoslavia, the whole of that municipality would remain.

25     Municipalities where the majority of the people had not participated in

Page 43250

 1     the plebiscite (and were, thus, presumably, non-Serb-majority

 2     municipalities), the SDS proposed to look at single communes or

 3     settlements; if local communes voted to remain, then only that community

 4     would be considered part of Yugoslavia, while the rest of the territory

 5     of the municipality would be allowed to join an independent Bosnia and

 6     Herzegovina."

 7             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   So let me explain.  What they are saying, this adjudicated fact

 9     suggests --

10             MR. TIEGER:  Wait --

11             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation].

12        Q.   -- that we would not have allowed a local --

13             MR. TIEGER:  Objection.  I'm sorry, I shouldn't say "wait."

14     That's astonishing --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Yes, I will intervene.  It's your

16     trial judgement, paragraph 74.  I don't think you need explanation from

17     Mr. Karadzic.  Can you tell us whether that part of adjudicated fact is

18     correct or not.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judges, that is not correct and I

20     can explain why it is that it's not correct.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please go on.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Two things are being confused here.

23     One is stating one's views during a plebiscite, that is to say, the

24     number of citizens from municipalities -- from a municipality that voted

25     for remaining in Yugoslavia.  This was not viewed in a territorial way

Page 43251

 1     because in one municipality, say, 60 per cent of the citizens can vote in

 2     favour and all of them can be within the city itself, whereas the other

 3     areas may have voted in favour of having a Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Later on,

 4     like this map, that was a basis where you could see exactly where certain

 5     citizens lived, Serbs and Muslims.  That was a basis for - how do I put

 6     this? - demarcation within Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Out of 1.300.000,

 7     700.000, how many were there, Serbs, together with Yugoslavs, the

 8     plebiscite just showed what the will of the Serb people was, how willing

 9     they were to stay in Yugoslavia.

10             Now, what is creating confusion here and which perhaps - how do I

11     put this? - contributed to this confusion was that subsequent activities

12     in a way caught up with the plebiscite.  Now, what are these activities?

13     We know that 60 per cent from one municipality voted in favour of

14     remaining in Yugoslavia, and then what is being spelled out in very

15     precise terms is where the Serbs live, where the Muslims live, and

16     independently of the vote a demarcation is made.  So this fact actually

17     sublimated two activities that have nothing to do with one another.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please continue.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Speaker.  Do you remember that in peace time,

21     before the war, some minority local communes voted in favour of joining a

22     neighbouring municipality and that we always approved of that?

23        A.   That did happen.  I know, for example, in Skender Vakuf there was

24     that kind of example.  One local commune said:  I don't want to be in one

25     municipality, I want to be in another municipality.  And these two

Page 43252

 1     municipalities actually agreed on that.  This Dobratic, the one that

 2     would -- they would leave and the other one where they would go.  For

 3     example, in Bijeljina also, Janja and Bijeljina, there would be two

 4     municipalities, if that's what we can call this initiative which was in

 5     the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  However, it was not carried through.

 6        Q.   Now I'm going to stop with the adjudicated facts because that

 7     subject matter was already dealt with during the negotiations.

 8             Now, could you please tell us about this 18th of March, when part

 9     of the Lisbon Agreement was being discussed between the three parties?

10        A.   Between the 17th and 18th of March, three delegations, the Serb,

11     Croat, and Muslim delegations, had a meeting at a residence called Konak

12     in Sarajevo.  Then under the chairmanship of Mr. Cutileiro they agreed on

13     the principles for resolving the crisis.  Let me paraphrase by saying

14     that, the crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We agreed on the basis of these

15     principles that we transform Bosnia-Herzegovina, that Bosnia and

16     Herzegovina be reorganised into three entities on the basis of the

17     census.  There was a proposal for 1981 and for 1991, when other

18     principles would be involved, geography, transportation and some other

19     criterion that would supplement this first basic ethnic criterion.  Then

20     all three parties accommodated their views, and immediately on the next

21     day, the 18th, we went before the Assembly and we asked our members of

22     parliament to agree to the consent expressed by our delegation in view of

23     these principles.

24        Q.   Can you tell us what was accepted at that Assembly and what

25     remained outstanding?

Page 43253

 1        A.   The principles were accepted and what remained was to work on the

 2     maps, and on specifying the authority exercised at central level and

 3     local levels.  So the principals say that these principles and that map

 4     are the basis for further talks in order to reach a final solution.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now I'm going to put to you 2004, another adjudicated

 6     fact, from paragraph 124 of your trial judgement.  I'm going to read it

 7     out verbatim.

 8             [In English] "In response to an invitation from Jose Cutileiro,

 9     international mediator, to continue the multi-party negotiations, the

10     Bosnian-Serb Assembly unanimously rejected a draft of the constitutional

11     arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

12             [Interpretation] Is that correct?

13        A.   That's not correct.  It's a very well-known fact.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us, in both our indictments it is

15     alleged that you, on the 18th of March, said:  Now we are going in -- now

16     go into the field - and maybe it's I who said it - now go into the field

17     to put into practice what we had agreed.  Tell me, what had we agreed?

18     What was it about?

19        A.   That's a reference to an agreement made the day before and no

20     conspiracy is involved.  I'll explain very briefly because that's a basis

21     for my involvement in the JCE.  I am collecting new evidence to prove

22     that I was not a member of the JCE and that my participation was not

23     substantial, and I found that evidence.  It's video footage from that

24     session where there is a difference between the transcript and what I

25     actually said.  I hired an agency that made an expertise, providing an

Page 43254

 1     expert report, establishing that I was talking about a previous meeting

 2     and not some underhand play.  The word used was "fortify," and the

 3     Chamber concluded that I was calling people to arms to fortify our

 4     territories, whereas in our language "fortify" can also mean

 5     "consolidate," "determine," "establish."  I was talking about

 6     consolidating an agreement, not calling people to arms to fortify our

 7     territories.  And experts in the area determined that this was absolutely

 8     not a reference to what was concluded it was a reference to in my

 9     judgement, and I will be able to provide that evidence.

10        Q.   So who made an agreement about what before our 18th of March

11     session?  Did Serbs agree on anything amongst themselves?

12        A.   Three delegations, Muslims, Serbs, and Croat, and the

13     representative of the international community had agreed about principles

14     on the basis of which they would make a future agreement.  There was no

15     separate agreement of ours on any issue.  I was referring to the

16     agreement made the previous day with Mr. Cutileiro.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Mr. Speaker, you told us what remained to be agreed.

18     Was it necessary to reconsider the already agreed things, such as

19     constitutional principles, the principle of transforming Bosnia into

20     three entities and such?  Could we apply that on the ground or did that

21     have to wait as well?

22        A.   What had been agreed at that meeting was agreed, and the

23     principles were not subject to change.  We could see that, you know,

24     people can always go against an agreement but they were not supposed to

25     be changed.  We were supposed to continue work at grass-root level to see

Page 43255

 1     which peripheral areas would end up in which entity.  The map that you

 2     will see in the transcript I referred to was based on the proposal of the

 3     Muslim representative who said that it's better to go into the field to

 4     see which territory belongs to whom rather than do that in an office.  So

 5     establishing territories -- identifying, perhaps is the best word,

 6     identifying territories on the ground.  Finding an arrangement that would

 7     enable Serbs to end up in the Serb entity and Muslims to go to the Muslim

 8     entity.  It was allowed to make adjustments for villages in peripheral

 9     areas to join one entity rather than another.

10        Q.   Now it was interpreted as "establishing territories," not

11     "fortifying."

12             Do you remember what Lord Carrington used to say very often:

13     Stick to the principles.  And he said it very often whenever somebody

14     showed a willingness to go back on the principles.

15        A.   My English is not that good, but I know that he meant if

16     something has been agreed, you can't start discussions from scratch.  We

17     can only continue from the point where we left off.

18        Q.   Thank you.  At that session of the Assembly, the words "take

19     power" were also uttered.  Do you distinguish in our language between the

20     words "take over power" and "take power"?

21             MR. TIEGER:  Wait, wait -- what --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

23             MR. TIEGER:  Continually leading questions, and an obvious

24     reflection of the fact that this -- the accused can't trust this

25     witness -- even this witness to provide him with the answers he wants,

Page 43256

 1     but has to tell him those in advance here in court.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Absolutely not.  I want to point

 3     out some linguistic problems because what was said there was "take

 4     power," whereas the indictment says "the Serbs took over power."  I just

 5     want to ask the witness what was understood by "take power."

 6             JUDGE KWON:  You could simply ask the witness what's the meaning

 7     of "to take power" in the transcript.

 8             But before we go there, in relation to the previous question

 9     about the 18th of March session, was it referred to in the indictment?

10             THE ACCUSED:  Many times.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  I think he's speaking of Mr. Krajisnik's

12     indictment.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Not -- but he -- Mr. Karadzic also referred to his

14     indictment, both of our indictments.  I couldn't find it.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Many Serb -- [Interpretation] I am often admonished

16     that I recommended the take over of power at that Assembly session and

17     that the Serbs later took over power in these municipalities --

18             JUDGE KWON:  No, no, no.  I was simply asking whether it appears

19     in the indictment, 18th of March session, or the agreement the day

20     before.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think it is stated in the

22     pre-trial brief that I --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes --

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- asked or demanded that our

25     people take over power on the ground.

Page 43257

 1             JUDGE KWON:  No, I thought you were referring to the indictment.

 2             Shall we take a break or shall we adjourn for today.

 3             Mr. Krajisnik, we'll continue next week.  As you know well,

 4     please do not discuss about your testimony with anybody else.  Is it

 5     Tuesday or Monday?  Yes, Tuesday.  We'll resume on Tuesday morning at

 6     9.00.

 7             The hearing is adjourned.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.46 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of

10                           November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.