Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 43448

 1                           Thursday, 14 November 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Good morning, Mr. Puhalic.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Before we continue, the Chamber will deal with the

10     admission of excerpts of prior testimony and statements of Tomislav Kovac

11     used by the Prosecution during his cross-examination.  The Chamber does

12     not find it necessary to hear any further submissions from the parties on

13     this issue.

14             The Chamber has reviewed the excerpts proposed by the Prosecution

15     as well as the accused's responses to each as provided to the Chamber's

16     legal staff via e-mail on the 4th of November, 2013, and later amended by

17     the parties on the 7th of November, 2013.

18             Of the 19 excerpts of prior testimony and statements put to Kovac

19     during cross-examination, the Chamber is satisfied that 16 of them were

20     fully read out into the record, and thus the Chamber does not consider it

21     necessary to admit these excerpts into evidence.  As agreed upon by the

22     parties, the Chamber considers that the remaining three excerpts were not

23     fully read into the record and therefore would be of assistance to the

24     Chamber.  Therefore, the Chamber will admitted following three documents

25     into evidence:  1, 65 ter number 25514, page 39 in B/C/S, and page 52 in

Page 43449

 1     English; number 2, 65 ter number 22146, pages 90 to 91 in B/C/S, and

 2     pages 383 to 84 in English; and, number 3, 65 ter number 25350, pages 135

 3     to 136 in English.  The Chamber instructs the Prosecution to upload the

 4     specific pages into e-court for these three documents and instructs the

 5     Registry to assign exhibit numbers to them.  Shall we give numbers now?

 6             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.  65 ter 25514 will be

 7     Exhibit P6506; 65 ter 22146 will be Exhibit P6507; and 65 ter 25350 will

 8     be Exhibit P6508.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I just want the record to be clear, Mr. President.

11     Because I did review the previous discussions about this in court and it

12     may be seen as a slight modification of the previous practice, but

13     I understand based on explicit discussions with the accused and based on

14     the Court's ruling, that this decision reflects the fact that when the

15     excerpt is read fully into the record and there is no objection by the

16     Defence, then the portion read out in court serves in lieu of the

17     document and as the equivalent of the document.  That's been the

18     Defence's position on this matter, and I just wanted there to be no

19     mistake about that.  Thank you.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We considered that point as well.  Shall we

21     continue?

22             Yes, please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies.  Good

24     morning to all.

25                           WITNESS:  SLAVKO PUHALIC [Resumed]

Page 43450

 1                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

 2                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 3        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Puhalic.

 4        A.   Good morning to all.

 5        Q.   I would just like us briefly to clarify what you meant by some of

 6     your answers.  Yesterday, on pages 48 and 49, you were asked about

 7     killings and beatings.  Was this done by some of the staff who

 8     administered the beatings?  Who killed these people?  Were these people

 9     killed in the camp?  Were they taken away some place?  What was the

10     attitude of the staff towards that?

11        A.   I know about a few of these cases.  When people first arrived

12     from the outside, I mean, I cannot remember all the details, but I know

13     that there were a few cases when that's exactly what happened.  People

14     were beaten up, and I think that one people -- one person had his or her

15     leg injured.  It was late at night or early in the morning when these

16     people would come.  I know of these few cases when some of these

17     civilians would say that somebody had been injured, and then I'd go and

18     find a doctor or a nurse or someone to help these people.  As for these

19     people, as for the killings, I don't know whether it was two persons that

20     were killed.  Major Kuruzovic or someone, I think it was him, I know that

21     he signed this, but I know that later on some person was held responsible

22     for these killings.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24        A.   And I think that it was in the morning when I arrived there, a

25     lady said that her husband was missing for three days already, and then

Page 43451

 1     again somebody had come from the outside, and then the major told me to

 2     try to find out what happened, so I spent four or five nights right

 3     there - how do I put this? - in that house.  No, it's not a house.  Well,

 4     in that house with that Albanian.  I spent four or five nights there, and

 5     I tried to see who it was that was coming from the outside.  But no one

 6     was hurt, and then after that that stopped and no one came again.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P6051.  We don't have to have it

 9     called up.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   You were asked about that Croatian intercept.  Who was it that

12     could have broken in?  The document bears the date of the 31st of May.

13     Does this shed more light on what this might have meant, if the date was

14     the 31st of May?

15        A.   Well, how should I know?  As I've already told you --

16             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Mr. Karadzic is misstating the evidence.  That

17     intercept actually says to stop a break-out, not people breaking in, but

18     to stop a break-out from the camp.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up the document then

20     for a moment?  P6501 actually.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   While I'm waiting --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not 6502?

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, I'm sorry.  6502.

25             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 43452

 1        Q.   While we are waiting, Mr. Puhalic, you were asked -- or, rather,

 2     it was confirmed that the conditions were bad.  Where did these people

 3     live before the 30th of May?

 4        A.   Probably -- well, at their homes.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Yes, Madam Sutherland is right in terms of the

 6     interpretation of the Croats, by the Croats, but can you tell us what the

 7     situation was on the 31st of May in Prijedor?  What was happening?

 8        A.   Well, let me tell you, after a few killings by the Muslims,

 9     attacks against Prijedor, stopping people going through Kozarac, all

10     these things that happened, so the people who arrived in the camp there,

11     well, there were these extremists, if I can put it that way, who simply

12     took off their uniforms and came to the camp.

13        Q.   Thank you.  But I'm talking about the broader area of Prijedor.

14     What happened on and around the 31st of May?  You mentioned this attack a

15     moment ago.

16        A.   Attack against Prijedor, and before that, there were a few

17     killings in Prijedor committed by the Muslims.

18        Q.   Was there any fighting?

19        A.   Well, of course, if there was an attack against Prijedor, there

20     was fighting.  I've already mentioned that.  This was armed fighting in

21     Prijedor, all day.  And then people probably tried to escape from there

22     and then they arrived in Trnopolje and, yes.

23        Q.   Thank you.  You said that Trnopolje, in your view, was collection

24     centre or reception centre.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 5786.  Could that document

Page 43453

 1     please be shown to the witness.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   While we are waiting, Mr. Puhalic, you confirmed that the

 4     infirmary was not particularly well equipped.  Where did you resolve

 5     matters that could not be resolved at the infirmary in Trnopolje?

 6        A.   Well, I cannot say.  I did not actually deal with that but there

 7     was a doctor who was an ethnic Serb, and he probably tried to take people

 8     to the hospital in Prijedor, things like that.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This is an assessment of the security situation in

10     September 1993.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 3 of this

12     document, both versions.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   At the time -- actually, how long were you in Prijedor, until

15     when?

16        A.   Say September.

17        Q.   Not Trnopolje, Prijedor.

18        A.   Prijedor, yes.

19        Q.   Were there any Muslims in Prijedor who had stayed on in town at

20     their homes?

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   Please let us focus on the first five lines here.  It says that

23     19.000 households had been registered.

24             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Can Mr. Karadzic put a question to the witness

25     before reading text from the document?

Page 43454

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was convinced that I had put a

 3     question.  I was convinced that I had put a question about the Muslims in

 4     town who lived in town, and this document precisely says that there were

 5     6.000 --

 6             JUDGE KWON:  I don't remember you put that question.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 3, Excellency.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  He answered yes.  And then why do you need this

 9     document?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just for him to corroborate that,

11     not only this sentence but others too.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Mr. Puhalic, please look at the penultimate paragraph.  I am

14     going to read it out.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a minute.

16                           [Trial Chamber confers]

17             JUDGE KWON:  For saving time, I will allow you to continue.

18     Please continue.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Since we are going to tender the document, I'm not going to shed

22     any more light on this.  I'm going to read out the penultimate paragraph,

23     and then I'm going to put a question to you:

24             "As a consequence of the armed rebellion, reception centres were

25     established at Omarska and Keraterm.  Prisoners of war and other persons

Page 43455

 1     who had prepared, aided, and organised armed rebellion were placed there,

 2     and the homeless and persons who had left their homes of their own free

 3     will were housed in the reception centre in Trnopolje."

 4             How does this fit into your own knowledge, this bit about

 5     Trnopolje?

 6        A.   With regard to all of this, I would agree with it.

 7        Q.   Thank you.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this document please be

 9     admitted.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will admit the cover page and this page.

11             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4010, Your Honours.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Then I'd just like to ask you this:  You discussed the

14     possibility of people returning home with Madam Prosecutor, for these

15     people to return home.  Can you tell us in relation to this statement

16     that people could not return home, can you tell us whether that was a

17     decision made by the official authorities?  Was that the position of the

18     official authorities?  Or was it impossible for them to return home

19     because of something else?

20        A.   I believe that they could not return home for another reason, but

21     I don't think that the authorities decided on that.  People left their

22     homes, although they could go back home, and as I've already said, with

23     the major's pass, they could return, which was only natural.  People did

24     return because they gave up on any further travel, as far as I know.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 43456

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 5 of this

 2     document.

 3             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Now I would like to draw your attention to the fourth paragraph

 5     and I'm going to read out this sentence:

 6             "During the fighting and later on, many things happened beyond

 7     the official positions that had been taken, property was looted and

 8     destroyed, there was abuse, torching, private property was blown up, as

 9     well as religious facilities."

10             And then the next paragraph says:

11             "Increased presence of armed personnel led to uncontrolled use of

12     firearms, and the consequence of that are a series of killings,

13     suicides," and so on.

14             Can you tell us how this fits into your own experience?  In

15     English it is pages 2 and 3.

16        A.   There were such cases, and that is what happened.

17        Q.   Thank you.

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could this page be admitted too.

19             JUDGE KWON:  We will add that page.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Mr. Puhalic, I have no further questions.  Thank you, and I do

23     apologise that we had to insist that you come and testify.

24        A.   Thank you.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That concludes your evidence,

Page 43457

 1     Mr. Puhalic.  On behalf of the Chamber, I thank you for your coming to

 2     The Hague to give it.  Now you are free to go.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

 4                           [The witness withdrew]

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Sutherland?

 6             MS. SUTHERLAND:  Your Honour, just one matter briefly in relation

 7     to the two video-clips that were admitted yesterday, one from the Defence

 8     and one from the Prosecution.  I would just like to let the Chamber know

 9     that Mr. Robinson and I are in discussions about the admission of those

10     two exhibits and we will get back to the Court on that in a short time.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

12             Next witness is Mr. Kupresanin?

13             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

14                           [The witness entered court]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would the witness make the solemn declaration.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

17     speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

18                           WITNESS:  VOJISLAV KUPRESANIN

19                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Please be seated, Mr. Kupresanin.

21             Before you commence your evidence, Mr. Kupresanin, I must draw

22     your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here at the

23     Tribunal, that is Rule 90(E).  Under this rule, you may object to

24     answering any question from Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecution or even from

25     the Judges if you believe that your answer might incriminate you in a

Page 43458

 1     criminal offence.  In this context, "incriminate" means saying something

 2     that might amount to an admission of guilt for a criminal offence or

 3     saying something that might provide evidence that might -- that you might

 4     have committed a criminal offence.

 5             However, should you think that an answer might incriminate you,

 6     and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you

 7     know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the

 8     question.  But in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your

 9     testimony compelled in such circumstances would not be used in any case

10     that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the

11     offence of giving false testimony.

12             Do you understand that, sir?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Excellently.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

17                           Examination by MR. Karadzic:

18        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kupresanin.

19        A.   God help us, President Karadzic.

20        Q.   Let us remember to make a pause between questions and answers and

21     speak articulately and clearly so we wouldn't have to stop to correct the

22     transcript and waste time.  I know you can do that.

23             Have you given a statement to the Defence team?

24        A.   Yes.

25        Q.   Thank you.

Page 43459

 1             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we call up 1D9198 in e-court,

 2     please.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not very good at this.  I'm

 4     trying.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Can you see your statement on the screen now?  Can you see it?

 7        A.   Yes, I can see it.  I can read it.  I'm trying to read.  Should

 8     I?

 9        Q.   Is this that statement?

10        A.   I've read a part of the statement.  Let me read till the end.  I

11     have reached the part where it says, "Community of municipalities of

12     Bosnian Krajina."  Should I go on?

13        Q.   No need.  Have you read and signed that statement?  Did you do it

14     earlier?

15        A.   Yes.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us show the last page so the

17     witness can identify his signature.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Thank you.  Does this statement faithfully reflect what you have

21     told my Defence team?

22        A.   Yes.

23        Q.   Just leave a short pause before you answer, please.  If I were to

24     ask you the same questions today that they had asked you, would your

25     answers be essentially the same?

Page 43460

 1        A.   Yes.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I tender this

 4     92 ter statement.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Any objection to the admission of this statement,

 6     Mr. Tieger?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive it.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit D4011, Your Honours.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we deal with the associated exhibits?  How

11     many exhibits are you tendering, Mr. Robinson?

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Twenty-five, Mr. President.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Not 26?

14             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, the fourth document down, 1D09274

15     has already been admitted, so --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

17             Any objections, Mr. Tieger?

18             MR. TIEGER:  No.

19             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will deal with item that the Chamber has

20     some problem with.  First, 1D9275, referred to in paragraph 50, the

21     Chamber is of the view that that document is not sufficiently commented

22     upon or contextualised to make it inseparable from the witness statement.

23     So if necessary, the accused should lead live about the document.

24             Second, the document referred to in paragraph 42, i.e.

25     65 ter number 6710, is it not a duplicate of 65 ter 25344, which has been

Page 43461

 1     admitted as Exhibit P6437?

 2             And the documents referred to in paragraph 35, i.e. 65 ter 9201

 3     and 65 ter 17377, and the final one, 18629, the Chamber would like the

 4     accused to lead live as to these three documents.  The Chamber is of the

 5     view witness needs to provide more context for the documents.

 6             And the 65 ter 17367, referred to in paragraph 15, so this seems

 7     to be the identical document to 65 ter 17356, referred to in paragraph 8.

 8     If the parties could check it.

 9             As regards the 65 ter 17516, referred to in paragraph 7, I take

10     it the only three -- first three pages are being tendered.  We will admit

11     those three pages.

12             And 17890, referred to in paragraph 44, the -- it has not been

13     sufficiently commented upon by the witness so it -- if the Defence wants

14     to tender that document, Mr. Karadzic should lead live.

15             And para 4, 65 ter 18630, the Chamber does not need it, will not

16     admit it.

17             And 30061, referred to in paragraph 11, which is an intercept,

18     but this seems to be a wrong intercept.  This is an intercept between

19     Mr. Karadzic, Krajisnik and Jovan Tintor.  But in the statement, witness

20     references a phone conversation between Mr. Karadzic and himself.  So if

21     the parties could check it.

22             Finally, 65 ter 1 -- 310 -- I'm sorry, 31700, an intercept

23     referred to in paragraph 14, because the witness does not sufficiently

24     comment upon this document.  If the Defence is minded to tender this

25     document, it should lead live.

Page 43462

 1             So all the other remaining documents will be admitted into

 2     evidence and be given -- assigned numbers in due course by the Registry.

 3     Yes, thank you.

 4             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I shall now read out in

 6     the English language a short summary of the statement of

 7     Mr. Vojislav Kupresanin.

 8             [In English] Vojislav Kupresanin became engaged in political work

 9     on the eve of the first multi-party elections.  On March the 4th, 1990,

10     he formed the Yugoslav Democratic Party, the homeland front, and on the

11     12th of July, 1992, his party became part of the SDS.  After this, he was

12     a deputy in the Chamber of citizens in B and H parliament and a member of

13     the SDS Main Board.  In the first half of 1992, Mr. Kupresanin was

14     elected president of the assembly of the community of municipalities of

15     Bosanska Krajina and in the second half of the same year, president of

16     the Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, ARK.  After the war, he

17     reactivated the work of the homeland front, and on June the 1st, 1993 --

18     2003 -- 2013, he retired.

19             The ZOBK was established primarily for economic reasons and

20     included 17 municipalities.  After World War II, Banja Luka was

21     economically the second most powerful town first after Sarajevo and the

22     region had several hundred million dollars of commercial surplus, but all

23     this money went to the central bank of Sarajevo.  The ZOBK assembly

24     adopted its own statute and had functioned independently of the SDS and

25     any other political party.  The ZOBR, there were members of the different

Page 43463

 1     parties and everybody worked for the same idea, keeping for the people of

 2     Krajina the natural resources of the area.  With a basic goal of being

 3     able to follow events in the sphere of the economy, politics and culture,

 4     the ZOBK assembly took certain liberties from the BH constitution.

 5             On June the 28th, 1991, the ZOBK assembly adopted a declaration

 6     for the unification of the two Krajinas, RSK and Bosnian Krajina.

 7     Dr. Karadzic clearly expressed that he was against this unification and

 8     advocated the preservation of existing borders.  Dr. Karadzic maintained

 9     that these decisions had never been authorised by the SDS Main Board, and

10     although the ZOBK was aware that SDS Main Board decisions were binding

11     for its own members, the local leadership was convinced that all

12     decisions of interest and importance of the two Krajinas were supposed to

13     be made at a level of the Krajinas themselves.

14             The ZOBK assembly had Muslims and Croats who were delegated by

15     municipalities in which they were deputies for the SDA and HDZ until such

16     a time that they stopped coming to the sessions at the instruction of the

17     SDA and HDZ central offices from Sarajevo.

18             Vojo Kupresanin, in his capacity of president of the ZOBK

19     assembly, expressed his wish for the ZOBK to be joined by various Muslim

20     and Croat municipalities because ZOBK goal was not to create a Serbian

21     community.  Mr. Kupresanin personally contacted several times

22     Mr. Fikret Abdic, the director of Agrokomerc and a prominent Muslim

23     leader of European orientation, because he wanted this food company to be

24     supplied with the raw material from the area.  Unfortunately, Mr. Abdic

25     never replied to these calls.  The goal of the ZOBK was to take control

Page 43464

 1     of the segments of society which were of significance to Krajina, and in

 2     this process, they did not have any co-ordination with the republican

 3     organs.

 4             In September 1991, the statute of the ARK was adopted.  In this

 5     statute, all nationalities were recognised as equal and municipalities

 6     with a majority of non-Serbian people were enabled to join the ARK.  In

 7     order to protect the Serbian people in Slavonia, in Croatia, who were

 8     exposed to the most heinous crimes, the Serbs in Krajina turned to the

 9     JNA for protection.  After JNA General Uzelac refused to intervene to

10     defend the Serbs, the ARK decided to declare a mobilisation, which is

11     different from a state of war.  Later on, ARK Crisis Staff was

12     established even though the Republika Srpska government ordered the

13     formation of the Crisis Staff per municipalities, not per regions.  The

14     reason for the formation of the ARK Crisis Staff was to -- was the tense

15     and alarming situation in BH, and not the expulsion of the non-Serb

16     population from ARK.

17             The ARK Crisis Staff did not receive instructions from the

18     leadership in Pale.  Individuals in Krajina respected neither

19     Dr. Karadzic, nor SDS, neither before the war nor in the course of the

20     war.  Since neither Dr. Karadzic nor Mr. Kupresanin agreed with the

21     creation of a Krajina state, Mr. Kupresanin managed to prevent the

22     separatist option from being accepted.  Meanwhile, Alija Izetbegovic

23     ordered all municipalities to transfer weapons from the police station to

24     Sarajevo ostensibly for a technical inspection, which was interrupted by

25     the Serbs as an intention to leave the Serbian policemen without

Page 43465

 1     weapons -- interpreted by the Serbs.  For this reason, the regional

 2     security centre was established and local Krajina authorities prevented

 3     the weapons drain from the police stations.  Since in April 1992, Croats

 4     and Muslims attacked various Serbian municipalities, the ARK assembly

 5     made a decision to form a National Defence council of the ARK and a

 6     police department.

 7             Dr. Karadzic charged Mr. Kupresanin with responsibility of

 8     influencing the leadership in Prijedor to close down investigation

 9     centres.  Mr. Kupresanin asked the authorities of Omarska and Keraterm to

10     shut down and to improve the prisoners' living conditions until its

11     disbandment.  After that, Mr. Kupresanin toured to Manjaca prisoner of

12     war camp, in order to check whether the Geneva Conventions were

13     implemented.  Furthermore, Mr. Kupresanin negotiated an end to the

14     fighting in Kotor Varos in agreement with the commander of the VRS

15     operation group and with the chief of the Security Service Centre in

16     Banja Luka.

17             Warring parties and populations surrendered their weapons and the

18     Serbian authorities promised them the creation of conditions for their

19     normal life.  The relationship between Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic

20     was always very tense because Mladic placed himself above the assembly

21     and above Supreme Commander.  Dr. Karadzic did not have practical control

22     over him.

23             And that's the short summary of the statement of Mr. Kupresanin.

24     At that moment, I do not intend to tender those documents that are to be

25     led live.

Page 43466

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 2             Mr. Kupresanin, as you have noted, your evidence-in-chief in this

 3     case has been admitted in writing, that is through your written

 4     statement, instead of your oral testimony.  Now you will be

 5     cross-examined by the representative of the Office of the Prosecutor.  Do

 6     you understand that?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 9             MR. TIEGER:  Just before I commence, Mr. President, just one

10     housekeeping matter, perhaps of several that arise from the Court's

11     observations about the exhibits and the statement.  So, for example,

12     paragraph 11 is a commentary on a document that we haven't seen, that

13     nobody knows anything about because it's not the document referenced in

14     the paragraph.  Barring anything else, I presume that paragraph would

15     then have to come out and that may be true for other sections of the

16     statement in which documents -- well, I think -- certainly wouldn't be

17     the case as far as I can tell for documents that are insufficiently

18     commented on.  That's a different matter.

19                           [Trial Chamber confers]

20             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will bear that in mind in reading the

21     document.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

23                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tieger:

24        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, I understand that although this is the first time

25     you've testified before this Tribunal, that in fact you were interviewed

Page 43467

 1     by representatives of the Tribunal, specifically representatives of the

 2     Prosecutor's office, on the 16th of July 2001; correct?

 3        A.   Correct.

 4        Q.   And am I correct that it's your position that at that time, you

 5     attempted to be as honest and truthful with the -- in giving your answers

 6     as you could be?

 7        A.   I tried to tell the truth.  Things that I was sure were true,

 8     I tried to tell them as I knew them.

 9        Q.   Let me turn to your statement before the Court today, the

10     statement that you gave to the Karadzic team.  Many of the paragraphs in

11     that statement deal with the two successive regional bodies in the

12     Krajina, the ZOBK and then the ARK, the Autonomous Region of Krajina.

13     Now, the purpose of the region, that is the region of Krajina, was to

14     eliminate a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?  That is to destroy what

15     was sometimes referred to as Alija's state; correct?

16        A.   We turned out at the elections of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

17     automatically we recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We chose to live in a

18     democracy and for those three peoples.

19        Q.   Excuse me, let me -- let me lay out some quick ground rules for

20     you.  I'd like you to tend to the question I ask, and I'd like you to

21     only answer the question I asked rather than expound in a manner that you

22     see fit.  So in this case, I'm focusing on the task or purpose of the

23     Autonomous Region of Krajina.

24        A.   Please repeat.

25        Q.   It's correct that the purpose of the region, that is the region

Page 43468

 1     of Krajina, was to destroy what was sometimes referred to as Alija's

 2     state?

 3        A.   That's not true.  The purpose was the economic assertion,

 4     self-assertion of Krajina.

 5        Q.   Well, you say that's not true today, but, in fact, that's

 6     precisely what you told the members of the Bosnian Serb Assembly at the

 7     20th session held on the 14th and 15th of September, 1992.  And we have

 8     that in evidence.  That's D456.  And what you said at English pages 70

 9     and B/C/S page 76 is the following:

10             "Last year, we built up the region and made it strong with the

11     clear purpose and goal, the task of the region of Krajina was to destroy

12     Alija's state."

13             That's what you were saying in 1992, at the time, correct,

14     Mr. Kupresanin?

15        A.   I don't remember that.  But the region, as time went on, acquired

16     political elements when there were turmoil in the assembly of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina and when the declaration of the Muslim and Croat sides

18     was proclaimed, which practically excluded the Serbian people from the

19     assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In that context those words could have

20     been said.

21        Q.   In fact, Mr. Kupresanin, ensuring that a unitary Bosnia and

22     Herzegovina ceased to exist was considered a holy mission, wasn't it?

23        A.   Well, I think that Bosnia and Herzegovina should have never been

24     a unitary state, not that it should have been centralised to such an

25     extent that we Serbs were excluded from that state.  The ordinary people

Page 43469

 1     would never accept such conduct on the part of the assembly of

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3        Q.   And, therefore, Mr. Kupresanin, it was your position that

 4     ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to exist was a holy mission,

 5     wasn't it?

 6        A.   No.  That's not it.  I probably said that Bosnia-Herzegovina

 7     could not exist as a unitary state or a state of Muslims and Croats.

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina must be a state of three constituent peoples.  We were

 9     equal and we were persistent about that.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Yes?

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't like to intervene but the

13     follow-up questions of Mr. Tieger are conditioned by the omissions in the

14     transcript.  In lines 5 and 6, said that the Serbian people were being

15     excluded as or eliminated as a constituent people, excluded from the

16     republic.  Not just as a people.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Do you confirm having said that,

18     Mr. Kupresanin?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember now.  I don't

20     remember.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we continue.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then could you please ask what he

23     said now, not what he said back then?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic, it does not harm the context.  We can

25     continue.

Page 43470

 1             MR. TIEGER:  65 ter 32152, please.  And if we could go to English

 2     page 13 and B/C/S page 9 to see who is speaking first.

 3        Q.   This is an excerpt from the extended session held on the

 4     14th of February, 1992, Mr. Kupresanin, a very large plenary, and this is

 5     a recording of your comments beginning at page 13 in the English, page 9

 6     of the B/C/S, and concluding at page 15 of the English and page 11 of the

 7     B/C/S, where you say:

 8             "I personally propose that you suggest to the president of the

 9     party and to all our Serbian deputies to make sure that the Serbian

10     police are included in the Serbian constitution.  The moment we establish

11     the Serbian police, Bosnia and Herzegovina will cease to exist, and that

12     is our holy mission."

13             JUDGE KWON:  Are we on correct page?

14             MR. TIEGER:  We are still on the first page.  I asked to go to

15     page 15 which is the end.  I didn't realise we hadn't made that

16     transition.  Page 15 of the English, page 13 of the B/C/S -- or page 11

17     of the B/C/S, excuse me.

18        Q.   So that was your position on the 14th of February, 1992,

19     Mr. Kupresanin, that ensuring that Bosnia and Herzegovina ceased to exist

20     was a holy mission; right?

21        A.   The holy mission was that the Serbian people had to be equal in

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  There should be no outvoting of the Serbian people.

23     The Serbian people had to be a constituent people with all the elements

24     and rights which any other people in Europe has in any other democratic

25     country.  Because the Serbian people was having less and less of that in

Page 43471

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina, then we began to form our political positions.  One

 2     of them was to constitute the assembly of Republika Srpska, and then the

 3     government, the constitution, and everything else followed.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Mr. Kupresanin.  Please try to answer the question.

 5     You answered it and then you started to tell us what followed.  I'm

 6     asking you not to make dissertations, just to focus on the question.  In

 7     fact, Mr. Kupresanin, you stated, to applause at that session, that the

 8     goal was to finally live in one country and not have Serb territories

 9     divided.  And that's found on the previous page of both documents, both

10     the English and B/C/S documents.

11        A.   Can you please repeat the question?  Because I haven't

12     understood.  What did I say?

13        Q.   Yeah, you said at 1992 that the holy mission was destroying

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina and the goal was for the Serbian people to finally

15     live in one country; right?

16        A.   Well, any conscious people or an individual within a people has a

17     tendency for the people to live in one country.  Germany caused two world

18     wars, and in spite of 100 million victims, in 1998, the Germans were

19     allowed -- or rather in 1989, the Germans were allowed to live in one

20     country.  And in both world wars we were on the side of the allies.  We

21     are the only people in Europe who is forbidden to live in one state.  So

22     what is bad about that?  I'm thinking to this day, and I tend and wish

23     for my people to live in one Serbian country, and that is my democratic

24     right.  Any tendency of an individual to such a goal is the holy mission

25     of any individual, and this is something I'm not going to deny.  I still

Page 43472

 1     want the Serbian people to have one single Serbian state in the Balkans,

 2     and I think that we deserve this because we participated on the side

 3     of --

 4        Q.   Thank you, sir [Microphone not activated]

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I tender the document, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  We will receive these pages.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, in this case could we receive the

 9     whole document?  He speaks again at the end, and I think it's better to

10     have the whole document in for context.

11             JUDGE KWON:  We will admit these pages and, if necessary, deal

12     with those pages.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Shall we give the number.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  That will be Exhibit P6509.

17             MR. TIEGER:

18        Q.   And, Mr. Kupresanin, you were aware that the Bosnian Serb

19     leadership, the republic level and particularly Mr. Karadzic, backed and

20     were behind regionalisation; correct?

21        A.   In case of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, Radovan Karadzic was

22     not to be found even in traces.  Whatever happened about the region had

23     to do with the MPs who were from the region and municipal deputies.  I'm

24     not aware of Radovan Karadzic having participated in any way.  I know

25     that the constitutive session was held in Celinac.  There were several

Page 43473

 1     people who were candidates.  It never occurred to me that I might be the

 2     president.  Because after a heart attack I had come from a hospital, and

 3     --

 4        Q.   We will get to all that information in a second.  In fact,

 5     Mr. Kupresanin, Mr. Karadzic bragged to you about his role in

 6     regionalisation, didn't he, in telephone conversations with you both

 7     before and after the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Krajina?

 8        A.   I don't remember such bragging.  I don't think it happened.  I

 9     don't remember that at all.  Before Krajina, we never discussed this

10     issue.  After its establishment, I doubt that we did.  I can't remember.

11        Q.   Did you read the documents which are associated with your

12     statement; for example, D1084 cited in paragraph 30, or D424 cited in

13     paragraph 29?  Or were those just appended to the statement by someone

14     else?

15        A.   I didn't read them.  I don't read them here now.  I don't know

16     whether I read them or not.  You asked me a specific question and I gave

17     you a specific answer.  Now, I don't know whether you expect something

18     further from me.

19        Q.   Well, let's take a look at those two documents which are

20     specifically referenced in your statement.  First of all, D1084, which is

21     an intercept, intercepted telephone conversation, between you and

22     Dr. Karadzic on the 23rd of July, 1991.  The transcript says D.  It's

23     P1084.  Now, just to refresh your memory about that, there is a

24     discussion about the possible -- somebody raising the possibility of a

25     referendum about Krajina to which Dr. Karadzic responds, Are they fucking

Page 43474

 1     nuts?  And you say, So, what do you suggest for us to do?  And the

 2     conversation continues.  Dr. Karadzic tells you why that wouldn't be a

 3     good idea, including the fact that it would be a mistake for negotiations

 4     because they have even prepared complete documentation to show

 5     John Major?

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Are we on correct page?

 7             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  That would be page 3 of P1084, in the

 8     English, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  And B/C/S.

10             MR. TIGER:  And B/C/S.

11        Q.   They prepared documentation with all the evidence that the Serbs

12     are creating the Greater Serbia.  And now you are playing right into

13     their hands as if they are paying you.  Fuck, man.  And then he continues

14     at the bottom of that page, and then continues on to the next page, These

15     are some fools who show up making premature steps.  That will happen,

16     Vojo, but they have to be - "they" meaning the Muslims - have to be

17     responsible for that.  They have to make a mistake.  They will definitely

18     make a mistake.  We know that.  And so you ask, Shall I call you

19     tomorrow?

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters into B/C/S did not find the

21     relevant passage and could not quote the original words of the witness.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Okay, it's on page --

23             JUDGE KWON:  With that speed interpreters

24     cannot [overlapping speakers]...

25             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry, Mr. President.  That's page 4 of the B/C/S.

Page 43475

 1     They have to make a mistake.  They will definitely make a mistake.  We

 2     know that.  And then Dr. Karadzic continues in the middle of the page in

 3     English and a little further on in B/C/S, What the fuck else am I

 4     supposed to do?  Who created that fucking regionalisation?  Then he goes

 5     on at the bottom of the page in English to talk about how he views the

 6     appropriate way to be a certain winner by not keeping your plans on your

 7     forehead and playing into other people's hands.

 8        Q.   Now, that's what he told you in July of 1991, Mr. Kupresanin.

 9     Why don't we look at what he said to you in February of 1992, after the

10     formation of the Autonomous Region of Krajina and that's D424, also

11     explicitly referenced in your statement.

12             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, it seems like the witness ought to

13     be given a chance to answer some question, otherwise Mr. Tieger is just

14     making some kind of closing argument.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Well, I am responding to the witness's -- I'm

16     presenting the witness with evidence in response to his assertion that he

17     never discussed regionalisation with the accused before --

18             JUDGE KWON:  Let the witness read the document and then why don't

19     you ask a question.

20             Do you follow the intercept?  Did you read the parts read out to

21     you?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm trying, but it doesn't really

23     seem to work.

24             THE ACCUSED:  Should witness be given the hard copy?

25             JUDGE KWON:  I don't see any difficulty with it.

Page 43476

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What am I supposed to read?

 2             MR. TIEGER:

 3        Q.   I don't care what you read, Mr. Kupresanin.  I recited to you

 4     some of the pertinent portions of this document and certainly sufficient

 5     portions to ask you the question:  Isn't it true that it is -- let me put

 6     it this way:  It is incorrect, it is not true, that you did not discuss

 7     regionalisation with Dr. Karadzic, as you just testified to?

 8        A.   I don't remember that Radovan Karadzic and I discussed the issue

 9     of the regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at any given time.  I just

10     know that all of Europe is divided into regions.  It has 10.000 regions.

11     We wanted to be like Europe.  We wanted to copy Europe.  And all the time

12     we were saying Yugoslavia should join the EuropeEurope is being

13     regionalised.  We wanted to copy that, so where is the sin there?  If we

14     had regions it wouldn't mean that we wanted to topple Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15     They would strengthen it economically in the first place.

16        Q.   Let's stick on the topic.  I'm not asking for your justifications

17     of regionalisation.  I'm asking you about this:  So now that you say you

18     don't remember that you and Dr. Karadzic discussed regionalisation at any

19     given time, can you explain to me how it is that your statement

20     explicitly references this conversation and incorporates it?

21             JUDGE KWON:  Let's do it in this way.

22             Mr. Kupresanin, do you have your statement with you now?  Your

23     statement.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 23rd of July, 1991, how come that

25     it's the 23rd of July when Krajina was formed on the 24th of June?  It's

Page 43477

 1     possible that this conversation took place after the constitution of the

 2     assembly of the autonomous region, because it was on the

 3     24th of April, 1991, that we constituted the assembly of Krajina.  So the

 4     region came into being at certain point, and this conversation was

 5     conducted after it came into being and not before that, as far as I can

 6     notice.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin, do you remember that telephone

 8     conversation with Mr. Karadzic?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, no.  I don't remember at

10     all.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have your statement with you now, witness

12     statement that Mr. Karadzic tendered?  We will print out for you.  We can

13     upload his statement.  Paragraph 13.

14             THE ACCUSED:  If I may, Excellency --

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Do you see the paragraph 13 of your

16     statement?  I will read out for you, "I have been shown document" --

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can see it, I can see it, I can

18     see it, I can see it, and I'm reading it now.  Please don't help me.  I'm

19     going to do it by myself.  I understand this perfectly.

20             JUDGE KWON:  The telephone conversation referred to in this

21     paragraph 13, i.e. P1084, is what you have now with you now.  Just a

22     minute ago you said to us you don't remember that telephone conversation.

23     So how can you comment on this telephone conversation while you do not

24     remember?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps the telephone conversation

Page 43478

 1     did take place, but I cannot confirm that 100 per cent.  I remember the

 2     topic of this conversation.  I know what it was about, and I know that

 3     Mr. Karadzic, when it comes to this unification of the autonomous regions

 4     of Krajina, Radovan Karadzic did not participate in this process in any

 5     way whatsoever.  It was the result of work of the MPs from the

 6     Autonomous Regions of Krajina.  Actually, he did not want to approve of

 7     this activity of ours, saying that we simply had to apply in practice the

 8     positions of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party, and

 9     sometimes we did something that was not in accordance with it, not all of

10     us, but as far as I can see from this document, the majority.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Back to you, Mr. Tieger.

12             THE ACCUSED:  May I give an explanation?

13             JUDGE KWON:  No.  You can deal with it in your re-examination.

14             THE ACCUSED:  It concerns an inaccuracy of the question.  It's a

15     big confusion.

16             MR. TIEGER:  I'm not hearing any objection to the questions when

17     they are asked and the witness has answered, and to traverse back to the

18     colloquy seems to be counter-productive.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Please discuss it or deal with it in your

20     re-examination, Mr. Karadzic.  In the meantime, we'll continue.

21             MR. TIEGER:

22        Q.   And when it came time for the Autonomous Region of Krajina to be

23     established in September of 1991, you mentioned that establishment in

24     paragraph 16 of your statement, it happened that despite initiatives to

25     do that earlier, those hadn't passed, and then all of a sudden it

Page 43479

 1     happened that it was allowed to establish.  It was allowed to establish

 2     such a region, right, Mr. Kupresanin?

 3        A.   The constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed us to constitute

 4     the region.  Article 4 of the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed

 5     for the regionalisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on various bases, the

 6     economic basis, the closeness of territories, and so on.  The

 7     constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina allowed us to do that.  So there was

 8     no legal vacuum in that respect.  We were not doing anything wrong.  We

 9     were doing this in accordance with the constitution.

10        Q.   Well, that wasn't quite the question.  Let me try it this way,

11     Mr. Kupresanin.  This Trial Chamber has received that on the 6th of

12     September, Dr. Karadzic said to Slobodan Milosevic that the next day he

13     was having a big plenary "with all my officials."  And that's P2544.  And

14     the next day, as we know from P2530, the Pale symposium of municipal,

15     regional and republic SDS organs was held, and that resulted in decisions

16     and conclusions about regional organisation.  And at that meeting, as we

17     know from the words of a Main Board member or in the words of a

18     Main Board member, which is reflected in P2545, "We passed a decision

19     yesterday...," and this was a conversation this Main Board member was

20     having on September 8, so he's referring back to September 7:

21             "We passed a decision yesterday that Bosnia can remain officially

22     but we'll split it into Serbian Bosnia, Croat Bosnia and Muslim Bosnia."

23             So those were the steps taken by the republic level authorities

24     to advance regionalisation, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

25        A.   I don't remember that at all.  I just know that the constitution

Page 43480

 1     of Bosnia-Herzegovina allows for regionalisation, that it was no sin and

 2     it was no conflict with the law or the constitution, that people were

 3     allowed to join a region and establish it.  And as for Radovan Karadzic,

 4     Slobodan Milosevic, instructions, I don't remember that at all, or that

 5     it happened, or that it was some kind of strategy, really, political or

 6     otherwise.  But according to the law, it was possible to establish

 7     regions and why would we hold it against people if they wanted it and

 8     could do it?

 9        Q.   And from your point of view, back in 2001, reflecting back on

10     what happened in 1991 and 1992, all of a sudden it happened that it was

11     allowed for the Krajina officials to establish the region; right?  And

12     you said that in your interview, which is 65 ter 25608, at page 15 of the

13     English and page 20 of the B/C/S.

14        A.   I don't have page 20 here.  I don't see it.  There is page 17 and

15     that's it.

16             MR. TIEGER:  65 ter 25608, page 15 of the English, page 20 of the

17     B/C/S, please.

18        Q.   It's line 20 through 22 for your benefit, sir.  And lines 36

19     through 37 in the English.  That's what you explained some 12 years ago

20     when these events were fresh in your mind; right?

21        A.   This is so vaguely written that I can't understand it.  Nothing

22     is really said here.  What was possible, what was not, what people were

23     allowed to, it was well known what people could do and what was allowed,

24     what we could do and what was allowed we did that.  We did not threaten

25     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  We did not violate the constitution.  So I don't see

Page 43481

 1     what was bad about this and this is very sloppily written.

 2        Q.   It may be sloppily written but it reflects your verbatim words at

 3     the time, sir.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that portion, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you read out from line 20 to

 6     22, your answer.  Could you read out aloud?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "There were earlier initiatives to

 8     organise a region in this area, but it was not upheld.  And suddenly it

 9     so happened that it was allowed to establish a region.  Probably we need

10     the critical mass for such a project like that and probably --

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  We will admit this page.

12             THE REGISTRAR:  As Exhibit P6510, Your Honours.

13             MR. TIEGER:

14        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, you assert in your statement at paragraphs 29,

15     33, 34, that one of the issues that you claim reflected the

16     insubordination or independence of autonomous region of Krajina figures

17     was the push for unification with the Krajina, with the Croatian Krajina,

18     Knin Krajina, and you state that you were the one who prevented that.

19     And again that's found at paragraphs -- the latter assertion is found at

20     paragraphs 33 and 34.

21        A.   No.  I advocated the unification of the two Krajinas.  I did.

22     And the other side, the Serbian Democratic Party and Radovan Karadzic,

23     didn't.  We announced the declaration on the 28th of June, 1991, which

24     said the Republic of Serbian Krajina will join the remaining part of

25     Yugoslavia.  So, for the Serbs, it was somewhat acceptable that the

Page 43482

 1     Republic of Serbian Krajina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia

 2     should be in one state, a smaller state, where Serbs and Muslims would

 3     live together as the two dominant ethnic groups.

 4             That was our political platform, our political will, and this

 5     Grahovo declaration never really took off the ground.  And what happened

 6     happened.  Serbs have been expelled from Croatia and it turns out that

 7     that was better than --

 8        Q.   Okay.  Let's focus on the questions at hand.  So do you -- do

 9     I understand then that you recant the statement that you endorsed no more

10     than a half hour ago, I think, at paragraphs 33 and 34 where you say

11     you -- I managed to prevent the separatist option.  That's 33 and

12     paragraph 34 at the session.  I managed to prevent the option of the

13     Krajina separatists from being accepted.  Because in your statement you

14     take credit for preventing the option that you now say you advocated.

15        A.   Well, I did not sign this decision.  I didn't sign it because the

16     majority, mostly from the Serbian Democratic Party, were against it,

17     including President Karadzic himself, because they were saying the time

18     was not yet ripe for this.  And time passed, we never did it, precisely

19     at the initiative of the President of Republika Srpska and the Main Board

20     of the Serbian Democratic Party.  It was our great wish to unite with the

21     Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina.  They remained a minority.

22     They were victims of genocide in the Second World War and they ought to

23     have been protected at any cost.  I don't think that Radovan Karadzic was

24     the crucial man who dismantled the project.  I think that

25     Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia actually prevented the Republic of Serbian

Page 43483

 1     Krajina from joining the rest of Yugoslavia, and that is a big sin that

 2     the majority of the Serbian people committed towards the Serbs from the

 3     Republic of Serbian Krajina, because that minority of the Serbian people

 4     are the remains of the Serbian people whose throats had been cut in

 5     Croatia.  A million and 900.000 Serbs lived in Croatia before the

 6     Second World War and the Second World War ended in Croatia with 700.000

 7     Serbs left.

 8        Q.   Please, I -- I would ask you, it's not pleasant to have to

 9     interrupt you, and I don't wish to do so, but I hope you can see that

10     you're straying quite far from the precise subject at hand.  Now, what

11     you just said, and I'll -- that the -- the initiative didn't happen

12     because of the intervention of the President of Republika Srpska, because

13     of Dr. Karadzic's opposition, is precisely reflected in what happened at

14     the 8th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on the

15     25th of February, 1992, where you spoke at the assembly and said that you

16     couldn't handle the situation.  Just let me get your exact words, sir:

17     I can't bear the entire burden of that Krajina assembly on my shoulders.

18     And you urged that the president of the party and the president of the

19     assembly come to Banja Luka to make sure that nothing bad happens, and

20     you explained to the Members of Parliament, "I know...," and this is a

21     quote:

22             "I know that Karadzic, as the president of the SDS, is truly the

23     leading figure among the Serbian people and five of his sentences are

24     enough to change the entire course of the session."

25             So contrary to your statement where you take -- you take credit

Page 43484

 1     for preventing the Krajina option from being realised.  At the time you

 2     said you couldn't do it, only Radovan Karadzic could do it, and in fact

 3     he came to Banja Luka on the 29th of February and he prevented that from

 4     happening.  That's what happened; correct?

 5        A.   No.  You've confused your topics and all these theses.  It's not

 6     the uniting of the two Krajinas.  In Bosnian Krajina there was this

 7     project by a number of intellectuals to create Republika Srpska.  In the

 8     area of Banja Luka, and Krajina and these 17 municipalities, a number of

 9     intellectuals advocated that project and they were persistent in that.

10             I asked the President of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, to

11     come to Banja Luka so that we could do something about that.  I myself

12     could not do anything about it.  I couldn't prevent it, I couldn't

13     dispute it, and so on and so forth.  So you confused these topics.  It's

14     not that it's the integration of a state.  This is within one region.

15     There was this idea to create a republic from Grahovo to Derventa.  And

16     the Serb people would not be in an entity.  There would not be a

17     territorial link.  The Serb people should not be forgotten in the

18     Krajina.

19             Sir, I think that you have confused these topics, and you don't

20     seem to know of this other case -- you don't seem to be very

21     knowledgeable on this subject.

22        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, in paragraph 33, you say:  I managed to prevent

23     this separatist option.  And that refers to -- that refers to P938, which

24     is a discussion that took place on the 28th of February, 1992, and it's

25     about the declaration of the Republic of the Krajina; correct?  And at

Page 43485

 1     paragraph 34 you say that there was a session of the ARK assembly the

 2     next day and you managed to prevent the option of the Krajina separatists

 3     from being accepted.  And that's all part of your thesis that

 4     Dr. Karadzic wasn't involved in this whole effort; right?

 5             So you're taking credit for preventing the declaration of the

 6     Republic of Krajina.  That's what you say in your statement.

 7             Is that correct or not?

 8        A.   You said a moment ago, during the establishment of the

 9     Autonomous Region of the Krajina that Radovan Karadzic took part in this

10     project.  I said that Radovan Karadzic did not take part in this project

11     of the creation of the autonomous region in any way.  Now we are moving

12     on to another problem, and that is the creation of a state within a

13     state, a state within a state.  We already have Republika Srpska, and we

14     have an attempt within Republika Srpska to create yet another state which

15     is going to be called the Krajina within the territory of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So we have a state within a state.  That is a

17     different situation.  And of course I asked Radovan Karadzic for his

18     help.  I asked him to help me so that we would prevent the creation of a

19     state within a state.  That is that case.  And it has nothing to do with

20     what you've been saying all along.  And you don't seem to be

21     understanding what I have been saying and that is the truth.  And

22     Radovan Karadzic came --

23        Q.   You did not manage to prevent the separatist option.  You didn't

24     prevent the option, as you say in both those paragraphs.  It was

25     Dr. Karadzic, the man whose five sentences can change the course of an

Page 43486

 1     entire assembly -- session as you said at the Bosnian Serb Assembly on

 2     the 25th of February, 1992.  And you're taking credit for that instead of

 3     giving it to him because you want to remove him from any contact with the

 4     operation of the Krajina; correct?

 5        A.   I've been talking about the state of Krajina here, within

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina that was supposed to be constituted.  I wanted to have

 7     that prevented.  Not to split up the Serb people, not to create yet

 8     another state.  And that's why I called President Karadzic to help us.

 9     He came and he persuaded people that this was nonsense, that this was

10     stupid, and that we should give up on that project.  And I think that he

11     did well.  Quite simply, Radovan's five sentences meant more than who

12     knows how many speeches of mine.

13             So there seems to be this confusion of topics here and I kindly

14     ask you to focus on this creation of the Krajina.  This is in Bosnia.  It

15     has nothing to do with Croatia.

16             MR. TIEGER:  Time for a break, Mr. President.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

18             Mr. Kupresanin, we will have a break for 30 minutes and resume at

19     10 past 11.00, but there is one thing I'd like to deal with in your

20     absence.  Could you excuse yourself first.

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't quite understand.

22                           [The witness stands down]

23             JUDGE KWON:  Could the Chamber move into private session briefly.

24                           [Private session]

25   (redacted)

Page 43487

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14                           [Open session]

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will resume at ten past 11.00.

16                           --- Recess taken at 10.38 a.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 11.12 a.m.

18                           [The witness takes the stand]

19             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

21        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, I want to ask you next about Mr. Brdjanin, the

22     president of the ARK Crisis Staff.  Now, this Trial Chamber has received

23     evidence that, for example, at the anniversary session of the founding of

24     the SDS, which was held on the 12th of July, 1991, that's P6243,

25     Mr. Brdjanin said, I am a man who abides by two principles.  I obey and

Page 43488

 1     respect those who are above me, all those who are under my command must

 2     obey me.

 3             And he went on to explain that's why he supported the central

 4     Sarajevo leadership.

 5             Now, that's in part also how you perceived and understood

 6     Mr. Brdjanin, as a man who, among other things, tried to be as close as

 7     possible to the leadership, to those above him; correct?

 8        A.   Well, you said that Brdjanin was president of the Crisis Staff.

 9     I don't know on whose instructions the Crisis Staff was formed in the

10     Autonomous Region of Krajina.  The Crisis Staff in the Autonomous Region

11     of the Krajina was not initiated by the assembly of the autonomous region

12     and --

13        Q.   Okay.  We may well get into that subject but I thought my

14     question was reasonably clear.  It was about Mr. Brdjanin and not about

15     the establishment of the Crisis Staff of which he was the president.

16        A.   I would like to ask you, if possible, to repeat that as

17     succinctly as you put it a moment ago.

18        Q.   Well, let me try it a slightly different way.  You understood

19     Mr. Brdjanin, based on your contacts with him, as somebody who tried to

20     be close to people -- the people above him, who wanted to push himself

21     forward in politics by doing so, who liked people in high positions, and

22     whose world was basically the people who were on the top; right?

23        A.   Well, how should I know?  He was devoted to this idea that the

24     Serb people should live in freedom.  Now, to what extent he was a person

25     who liked power, I really don't know.  When he and I worked in the

Page 43489

 1     Krajina, he was my vice-president, although at the time he was also a

 2     minister.  We had little contact.  What he stated is his view of the

 3     world.  That is what I can say.

 4        Q.   Well, in 2001, when these events were presumably fresher in your

 5     memory, you also indicated that you didn't have extensive and regular

 6     contact with him but you said that was because he was a guy whose world

 7     was the people on the top.  He was -- he liked and was into the people in

 8     high positions.  And that's your explanation for the limitations on your

 9     contact with him; right?  The fact that he was devoted to the people on

10     the top.

11        A.   Well, I don't think so.  These people were not the classical top,

12     as you would put it.  We are not the same, all of us.  We have different

13     affinities.  I am basically interested in my people.  It's not that

14     I strove to be someone in some position.  I stood in the defence of my

15     homeland and I sought my own happiness in the happiness of my own people,

16     and I sought my own wealth in the wealth of my own people.  Brdjanin

17     perhaps had ambitions that were greater than my own, in terms of power.

18        Q.   Let me --

19             THE ACCUSED:  Transcript, although witness repeated it but it

20     should be in the second line, about ambition.

21             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow, Mr. Karadzic.

22             MR. TIEGER:  If I understand it, what the witness said that's

23     reflected in the last line is apparently something that he said a bit

24     earlier in the answer.  Is that it?  It's apparently contained in the

25     answer.

Page 43490

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  All right.

 3        Q.   Let me ask you then to confirm what you said in 2001.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  First, if we could turn it's 65 ter 25608, and if we

 5     could turn first to English page 15 and B/C/S page 20, lines 28 through

 6     30.

 7        Q.   At the bottom of the page in English, and as I said, on page 20

 8     in the B/C/S, you're explaining the difference between you and Brdjanin

 9     painting yourself as someone who prefers to be independent and retain

10     self initiative in contrast to those:

11             "Who want, who are pushing themselves in politics.  They want to

12     be bigger than they are.  And in order to achieve that, you know, one has

13     to be a poltroon, you know, sort of stuck up too high or people in higher

14     levels."

15        A.   Well, it's not that I think that -- I mean, it's not that I think

16     that Mr. Karadzic liked people who were sort of people who wanted to be

17     lizards, sycophants at all costs.  I admired people for their work, their

18     ideas, their efforts.  I took care of the people.  That was my holy

19     mission.

20        Q.   Okay at page --

21        A.   And Brdjanin --

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Pardon me, could the witness please

23     be shown the top of the next page so that he would have full insight?

24             MR. TIEGER:

25        Q.   You also said at page 28 of the English, lines 8 through 11, and

Page 43491

 1     page 39 of the B/C/S - if we could turn to those - lines 14 through 18,

 2     that Brdjanin:

 3             "Liked people who were in high positions, and I wasn't like that.

 4     We didn't communicate at all, not even on the phone."

 5             So that's another --

 6        A.   I did not telephone or I did not communicate with who?

 7        Q.   This is what you're saying about Brdjanin in 2001; correct?  This

 8     is a taped interview, Mr. Kupresanin.

 9        A.   I did not understand you.  Are you saying that I did not

10     communicate with Radovan Karadzic and the political leadership or that

11     did I not communicate with Brdjanin?

12        Q.   I'm reading to you verbatim from the answers you gave to the

13     representatives of the Prosecutor on July 16th, 2001, about Mr. Brdjanin

14     and you said he liked people who were in high positions and you weren't

15     like that.  That's correct?  That's what you said at the time; right?

16        A.   Well, it's correct that I did not communicate often.  That is

17     correct, that I did not communicate often.  Probably there was no need

18     to, although he was president of the Crisis Staff, because I have my own

19     position regarding the Crisis Staff.

20        Q.   And finally, at page 68 of the English, line 41, and page 100 of

21     the B/C/S, line 33, again referring to Mr. Brdjanin, you said:

22             "He had his own world, his people were the top, on the top."

23        A.   That was probably the rule for him.  He had his own ideals, his

24     own idols.  I had my own.  I'm not trying to say that people who were top

25     leaders were not persons of authority for me, but I thought that I was

Page 43492

 1     supposed to work hard, work honourably, work honestly in order to get a

 2     position and to be held in their regard, that I should have certain

 3     merits.

 4        Q.   Okay.  Thank you.

 5             MR. TIEGER:  And I tender those excerpts, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Just the basis to -- of tendering them?  He

 7     confirmed his statement.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  As we indicated, he confirmed portions of those and

 9     portions were sort of edged around.  I think with the clarity being

10     dramatically enhanced if we simply have exactly what he said in 2001, and

11     I mean those are classical documents for admission, I think they would be

12     helpful and render the record more clear.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Robinson.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  This is primarily a matter for the Chamber.  But

15     it implicates the very same issue that we had in the Kovac, if you feel

16     that the portion has been fully read then it's not necessary to admit it,

17     but if you feel there is something that's ambiguous about what was read

18     and what the answer was, then it can be assistance to the Chamber and it

19     can be admitted.  That's my understanding.

20             MR. TIEGER:  And one more point on that, Mr. President, if I may,

21     I --

22             JUDGE KWON:  What's the general position as to the prior

23     consistent statement of the witness?

24             MR. ROBINSON:  Well, a prior consistent statement is not

25     admissible unless it's to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, but

Page 43493

 1     a prior inconsistent statement is admissible either by his oral -- orally

 2     indicating that that's what he said or by the record of what he said

 3     being read to him.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  I'm sorry to intervene

 7     too quickly.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  I'll come back to you unless it is related to this

10     debate.

11             THE ACCUSED:  I just only would like to point out that what

12     Mr. Robinson said was allocated to your Excellency.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Those things do get fixed.  A couple of things,

15     Mr. President.  Number one, the prior consistent statement rule is a rule

16     that arises out of a classical adversarial system for reasons related to

17     the hearsay rule, which have no application here.  The question is the

18     relevance and utility of any statement, not whether or not if facially

19     offends the rule against hearsay and then thus requires a separate

20     exception for its admission.  So citation to that particular rule arising

21     from the jurisdiction that Mr. Robinson and I both hail from, I think, is

22     not applicable here.

23             Number two, the -- I revert back to my earlier point, the -- I --

24     the Kovac decision presumably arises as an exception.  We dealt with

25     those issues before.  This -- in a very similar situation, repeatedly and

Page 43494

 1     I can cite the Court to that.  It's T42198.  The same issue arose.  The

 2     point was made by the Prosecution counsel that it's better and clearer to

 3     actually have the document in, and the Trial Chamber agreed, better to

 4     have them in written evidence.  And I would say that that is the case for

 5     a couple of reasons, because we have -- there are many occasions in which

 6     we present to witnesses for impeachment purposes and recite portions of

 7     evidence which we don't consider to be admissible - Court knows that -

 8     written statements which fall within 92 bis.  So now we're -- rather than

 9     admitting the document and therefore having it clear, we now will have

10     two categories of questions, one of which is to be used in lieu of the

11     underlying document, others of which are not admissible and are only

12     questions.  And unless we make that clear during the time the question is

13     posed, which is not likely to happen and hasn't been happening, we

14     introduce a potential ambiguity into the record.  Far clearer, it seems

15     to me, to simply make the decision at the time.  Of course this is

16     admissible.  It either clarifies, contextualises, or impeaches what the

17     witness says, is of valuable to the Court for that reason, and we have it

18     in evidence and can refer to it, rather than reading the context in which

19     the question is raised to decide it's not one of those questions for

20     which evidential value is or is not to be attributed, but is, instead,

21     one of those that refers to a document that wasn't admissible.

22             In the Kovac case, in this case, we are obviously dealing with

23     documents that are admissible, prior statements.  I think the Kovac

24     ruling was based on the clarity of that particular record and perhaps the

25     number of examples.  But as a general rule, this Court has already taken

Page 43495

 1     the position that it's -- it's better and clearer to have them in written

 2     evidence.  And I continue to think that we'll have a clearer record and

 3     one much easier to work with if we do that.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, I'm not sure the Chamber necessarily

 5     agrees with your observation that the prior consistent statement rule is

 6     not applicable at all.  There are two matters with respect to this

 7     interview, part of this interview.  First, whether this is a -- this part

 8     is inconsistent with this witness's evidence; and number two, whether

 9     the -- there is a need to admit this part separately.  The Chamber will

10     put this under advisement, to make a more informed decision and we will

11     come back to this.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.  I appreciate that, Mr. President.  That's

13     fine.  Let me simply say I tried to get into it in a -- what I consider

14     to be a fair way.  I asked the witness the question first.  We didn't get

15     the direct answer, instead moved away, so I said, Well, fine then, didn't

16     you say this, and we still didn't get quite the adoption that I think

17     would be -- that would completely reflect the statements that were made.

18     Okay.  We'll move on.

19        Q.   Let me ask you next, Mr. Kupresanin, about other aspects of

20     Mr. Brdjanin.  Now, you considered that he was responsible for things for

21     which he should be prosecuted; right?

22        A.   Concerning Mr. Brdjanin I can say that he didn't do anything in

23     practical terms that would harm other people and other nations.

24     Mr. Brdjanin was wont to say things occasionally, but his words are one

25     thing and his acts were something different.  There were verbal excesses,

Page 43496

 1     things he said that I didn't agree with, but in practical life I never

 2     noticed that he harboured any hatred towards other ethnic communities.

 3     He even had a lot of friends and socialised a lot with Muslims from

 4     Celinac, from other places.  I don't think -- I didn't see that he had

 5     any antagonism or hatred towards other ethnic communities.  And he -- in

 6     his discussions in the assembly, I never heard him say anything ugly.

 7     That's how I see Mr. Brdjanin, except that sometimes he would say

 8     something that was over the top.  I don't know if I was clear enough.

 9        Q.   I think you're sufficiently clear about the position you're

10     taking now here in this Court in 2013, so I want to look at what you said

11     in 2001.  First of all, back -- still on 65 ter 25608, at page 68 of the

12     English, page 99 of the B/C/S, English page -- lines 1 through 8 on

13     page 68, and lines 26 through 30 of the B/C/S, you said, "What I put on

14     his soul" -- excuse me.  First of all, you said you consider him

15     responsible for things for which "he should be prosecuted."  See at the

16     top:

17             "And for those things he should be prosecuted.  I think

18     Radoslav Brdjanin is responsible for certain things.  What are those

19     things?  And for things he should be prosecuted."

20             And then you went on to say:

21             "What I put on his soul are statements in -- to which the other

22     people of other nationalities -- nationalities had great problems and

23     probably those statements made them move partly."

24             So you said those two things; right?

25             The B/C/S goes on to the next page, lines 3 to 8.

Page 43497

 1        A.   I never said this.  I never said this.  I have the impression

 2     that something is being foisted on me here.

 3        Q.   This is a transcript of a tape, Mr. Kupresanin.  At page -- again

 4     at page 68 of the English, again page 100 of the B/C/S, lines 21 through

 5     22 of the B/C/S, you said:

 6             "I think that his statements contributed to the great danger

 7     that -- that Croats and Muslims were put into and probably one part of

 8     them moved out because of those things."

 9             You said that as well about Mr. Brdjanin in 2001.

10        A.   I don't think I've said this.  I said a moment ago what I said,

11     that he was wont to make verbal excesses, to say things that were over

12     the top.  So maybe -- maybe there were some problems because of that.

13     I still stand behind my belief that whatever -- whoever did anything

14     against other peoples should be held responsible.  If somebody incited

15     expulsions --

16             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin, could you repeat your answer?  And

18     speak very slowly, please.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't remember this.

20     I said what I've said, and what I've noticed about Brdjanin.  It's

21     possible that I said this but I doubt it.

22             MR. TIEGER:

23        Q.   You heard from Muslims -- excuse me, you heard from Serbs that

24     Brdjanin had said that only a thousand Muslims would remain in

25     Banja Luka, and that's found at page 43 of the English and page 64 of the

Page 43498

 1     B/C/S.  These are at lines 15 through 18 in the B/C/S.  That's correct

 2     also, isn't it?

 3        A.   No, no.  I never heard Brdjanin say that just a thousand Muslims

 4     would live in Banja Luka, only a thousand.  A normal person would never

 5     say that.  I've never heard him say that.

 6        Q.   But that's what you said in 2001.

 7        A.   I never said that Brdjanin had said that only -- it's not true,

 8     Mr. Prosecutor, that I said that he had said --

 9        Q.   Mr. -- Mr. Kupresanin, you said -- as I said before, you said in

10     2001 that Serbs told you that Brdjanin said that -- and that's what you

11     heard from Serbs, that only a thousand Muslims would remain in

12     Banja Luka.

13        A.   Sir, it is such nonsense.  I've never said that.  It would never

14     occur to me.  Nobody told me anything of the kind, nor did I hear

15     Brdjanin ever say that.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness be shown that

17     precise line so that he can read for himself what he had stated at the

18     time?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Or you could read out the entire context.  I'm not

20     sure that we have a correct page on B/C/S.  I will read out the portion.

21     Did you find it?

22             THE ACCUSED:  I think so.  I think we have --

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Under which number?

24             JUDGE KWON:  "Have you heard him on TV saying that only a

25     thousand Muslims would stay in Banja Luka?

Page 43499

 1             "I didn't hear that myself but I heard that he had said that."

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, that's all right.  That's

 3     all right.  No, no.  I heard, when Brdjanin addressed a number of

 4     journalists from the BH television in response to their question how many

 5     Muslims should come back, and he then mentioned a percentage.  I don't

 6     remember which percentage, but it sounded odd to me and it was an

 7     unpleasant surprise.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   You also heard from Muslims that they were afraid of him;

10     correct?  And you said that in 2001 at page 64 of the Serbian, lines 6

11     through 8, and page 43 of the English, line 39.

12        A.   I heard that Brdjanin said at some point that he mentioned

13     cabbage, saying that cabbage should not be pickled.  That's what Muslims

14     told me about what he said on that subject, that they should not expect

15     to eat pickled cabbage, and that's what I heard from the Sarajevo

16     journalists, and this other thing regarding the pickling of cabbage.

17     I took this out of context - maybe he said something in greater detail -

18     and what people told me later, that it's no use pickling cabbage because

19     there would be no time to eat it.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.  Line 20, there is

21     something missing.  The witness said:  The Muslims told me that.  I did

22     not hear it from Brdjanin.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not hear it.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic --

25     Mr. Tieger.

Page 43500

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 2        Q.   And you also stated that Brdjanin was someone who wanted to

 3     impose radical nationalist solutions for the benefit of one national

 4     group against the rights of other national groups; is that correct?  And

 5     I can turn you to the passage that reflects that, if you like.

 6        A.   I would like to see it.  I don't remember saying something like

 7     that.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Page 56, English, please, and page 82, B/C/S.

 9        Q.   You were asked, Would you say that the persons who were the

10     most -- whether Brdjanin was among persons who were the most radical in

11     Krajina at the time.  You said, I don't know what the term radical means,

12     sometimes the term radical it's negative, sometimes it represents

13     fascism, et cetera, sometimes it's positive.  Then it was explained --

14     then you asked, You elaborate.  What do you mean by radical?  And the --

15     your interlocutor stated, When I say radical, I mean radical nationalist,

16     someone who wants to impose solutions, radical nationalist solutions for

17     the benefit of one national group against the rights of other national

18     groups.  And your answer was, I understood.  Well, judging by his

19     appearances and/or his attitude, what he said, Brdjanin had all those

20     elements and more than that.

21             That was your position in 2001, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

22        A.   Well, all right.  Brdjanin had a national bias.  Whether he was

23     nationally aware, I don't know.  I did not see any extremism or

24     chauvinism in his public appearances.  It was more verbal on his part, a

25     populist rather than putting it into practice on the ground.  He was more

Page 43501

 1     into public appearances when he said such things in the assembly.  He did

 2     not speak like that.  I don't believe he was in the -- on the board.  I

 3     know he socialised with Muslims.  He had very close friends among

 4     Muslims.  His entire family and his wife, they even participated in

 5     some --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please repeat what they

 7     participated in.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I don't think he hated other

 9     ethnicities.  But if he thought that would give him a political

10     advantage, then on such occasions that's possible.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.  I'd tender those excerpts, too,

12     Mr. President.  And just to be clear, I'm certainly not urging that where

13     there is a clear-cut, straightforward and unequivocal adoption of a prior

14     statement, that that needs to be admitted in -- in -- in that sense, and

15     we've acknowledged that before.  So if that's what Mr. Robinson meant by

16     previous prior consistent statement, I -- I don't want to argue that we

17     need to have those admitted.  We have take that position clearly before.

18     But in these cases I think we continue to have ambiguity and the record

19     is rendered much clearer by the admission of these excerpts.

20             JUDGE KWON:  What are those pages you refer to?  What pages?

21             MR. TIEGER:  Page -- at the English, page 68.  Page 64 --

22             JUDGE KWON:  I don't think 64 was shown to the witness at all.

23     Please continue.

24             MR. TIEGER:  And page 56 of the English and 82 of the B/C/S.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Sixty-eight, 56, and 64.  I would like you to deal

Page 43502

 1     with -- whenever you -- immediately after you dealt with the document,

 2     I'd like to deal with their admission.

 3             MR. TIEGER:  Each -- each -- each separate is okay, even if it's

 4     the same topic.  We'll do, Mr. President.  Okay.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  We will deal with it all together later on.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

 7        Q.   Now, you -- you mentioned in your previous answer something about

 8     thinking about gaining political advantage.  And, in fact, you stated in

 9     2001, that he probably served a purpose to someone in -- with these

10     extreme positions; correct?  So we turn to page 43 of the English and

11     page 63 of the B/C/S.  And in 63, lines 30 through 31, you said he was

12     forcing himself to be the leader of the Serbs in the Krajina region and

13     he probably served his purpose to someone as being an extreme person,

14     correct, that's what you said in 2001?

15        A.   I see that I've said that and I probably did, but I'll be more

16     precise now.  I believe Mr. Brdjanin was in communication with the army

17     on this subject.  That's my opinion.  And I believe that he did not

18     communicate on that subject at all with Mr. Karadzic.  He adored officers

19     and generals.  I was sometimes in conflict with them but his relationship

20     with them was ideal.

21        Q.   Let me turn to something else you said, and that's at page 68 --

22             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, okay, I think that --

23             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I will -- I will add that page to consider.

24             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

25        Q.   You also said the following, if you turn to transcript page 68 in

Page 43503

 1     the English and 102 through -- 102 in the B/C/S, moving on to 103 as we

 2     continue towards the bottom of the B/C/S at page 102.

 3             So starting at line 40 you said, We didn't socialise.  He had his

 4     own world -- again, we are speaking about Mr. Brdjanin.  He had his own

 5     world.  His people were the top, on the top.  Let me just say something.

 6     All his speeches and all those statements and actions could have been cut

 7     off by somebody and somebody could have shortened his horns.  I wonder

 8     why people who were able to do that didn't do it, because such statements

 9     and such accents -- actions of his only damaged or created damage for the

10     Serb people.  So the president of the country could have done it, the

11     president of the assembly could have, parliament -- I'm sorry, the

12     parliament -- president of the parliament, president of the government,

13     or the prime minister.  Why did they tolerate it?  Maybe they agreed with

14     him, I don't know.  That's what you said in 2001, correct,

15     Mr. Kupresanin?

16        A.   What I know regarding Radovan [as interpreted] Brdjanin and the

17     president of Republika Srpska is this:  I believe they were in constant

18     conflict over Brdjanin's behaviour.  If Brdjanin thought that something

19     he had done was good, then the president would tell him in so many words

20     that it was idiotic, that he had shot himself in the foot with such

21     behaviour, and it very often happened that Radovan criticised him every

22     now and then saying, Why did you do this and why did you do that?  He

23     simply sought explanations from some of his actions.  That's what I know

24     from some people who were there.  Now, what you are saying, perhaps

25     Radovan could have or Momo could have, I don't think he was close in any

Page 43504

 1     way with either Momo or Radovan.  Maybe he had some ambitions of becoming

 2     a minister, but he often made serious slips, blunders, and Radovan could

 3     not understand his actions, he just couldn't understand it.

 4        Q.   It's not what I'm saying, Mr. Kupresanin, it's what you said in

 5     2001.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this excerpt as well, Mr. President.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, it's noted.

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   Now, the statements Mr. Brdjanin made that you said in 2001

10     provoked fear among the Muslims and caused a portion of them to leave

11     were not the only statements by Krajina leaders reflecting issues about

12     the number of Muslims who remained in the ARK region.  For example,

13     Mr. Kupresanin, you were also concerned about the number of Muslims in

14     the territory comprised or anticipated to comprise Republika Srpska;

15     right?

16        A.   Well, I was concerned about Muslims and Croats because of the

17     situation they found themselves in.  They found themselves in a very

18     difficult situation because they had the obligation to serve in our army

19     under the law and wage war against their own, and they tried in every

20     possible way to avoid that obligation, and in that I understood them.

21             Second, we didn't have factories during the war.  In fact, we had

22     factories but they were not operating and people were very hard up.

23     I talked several times with the president of the republic, saying that

24     conditions should be created to enable them to make a living.  Serbs

25     mainly came from villages into towns, but they still had their home farms

Page 43505

 1     from which they could draw sustenance; whereas Muslims were mostly urban

 2     population, and workplaces and factories were for them the only source of

 3     livelihood.

 4        Q.   That's an adequate answer for this purpose.  Your position that

 5     the only expression or the only time you gave expression to concerns

 6     about the number of Muslims in Republika Srpska was for their benefit is

 7     contradicted by any number of things that you said in 1992 through 1995.

 8             For example, at the third session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly,

 9     D84, at English pages 26 through 27 and B/C/S 41 through 42, you told the

10     assembly members that in your view, our, that is Bosnian Serb living

11     space, and the territory in which they live was endangered, and that

12     danger has to be averted, and then you talked about shutting off the

13     250- to 300.000 Muslims in Cazin Krajina into a ring.  That was one

14     expression of your concern about the number of Muslims who might be in

15     territories sought by or intended to comprise Republika Srpska, wasn't

16     it, Mr. Kupresanin?

17        A.   I don't know that Muslims from the Cazin Krajina made up or were

18     comprised in Republika Srpska.  They were a separate region.  I don't

19     remember who their main boss was.  And before the war, I had a lot of

20     communication with them about integration and co-operation.  During the

21     war, we had great problems with the Cazin Krajina.  We had to keep a lot

22     of personnel occupied to defend ourselves from them.  But I was talking

23     about the autonomous region of Republika Srpska, not the Cazin Krajina.

24     At that time we were at war.  Why would I be thinking about them?  And of

25     course, we had to narrow down the front line during the war.  We were in

Page 43506

 1     jeopardy, physically, and in economically, and it was --

 2        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, I asked you about something that you said before

 3     the war, at the third session of the Bosnian assembly in 1991, when you

 4     told the delegates that your view was this was a battle for -- this was a

 5     threat to Serbian living space.

 6        A.   I probably meant they were a threat as a military power, as an

 7     armed force.

 8        Q.   It was your position, Mr. Kupresanin, that Bosnian Serb forces

 9     should conquer territories on which the Bosnian Serbs were a minority but

10     on which they were a minority because of the genocide committed in

11     World War II; right?  And you said that in September of 1992.

12        A.   What did I believe?  I believed that we were the left-overs of

13     peoples who -- whose throats were cut during World War II and we would

14     not allow that genocide over the Serbian people to be repeated.  What the

15     Jews in Germany had lived through is the same thing that we lived through

16     in Croatia, in Bosnia, and other parts of Yugoslavia.

17             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness slow down and repeat this

18     sentence.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Could you repeat.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I repeat that I said that the

21     Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the world war,

22     were the remains of a people whose throats had been cut, and we had to

23     mobilise ourselves to the maximum to prevent further crimes against the

24     Serbian people.  And through our activity in the party, we did prevent

25     it, at least temporarily.  And raising the awareness among the people

Page 43507

 1     for -- in my eyes was an obligation.  I repeat to you:  In Croatia before

 2     the Second World War, there was a 1.900.000 Serbs.  When the

 3     Second World War was over, there were 700.000 Serbs in Croatia.

 4     Communists came into power and they were not interested in that story.

 5     Nobody investigated it.  A list of a highly-ranking German officer's -- a

 6     letter from -- high German officer said the Croats had cut the throats of

 7     300.000 Serbs --

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin.  Mr. Kupresanin, I'm not asking you for

10     dissertation on what happened in World War II, please.  You --

11             MR. TIEGER:  And by -- for the Court's benefit and for the

12     benefit of the parties, that was a reference -- the previous question was

13     a reference to D456, pages 24 through 25 in the English and B/C/S, 27

14     through 28.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Just one comment, Mr. Tieger, about the exhibits.

16     In your cross, first part of your cross-examination, we admitted

17     65 ter 32152, some part of pages -- some pages into Exhibit P6509, but

18     I take it that exhibit is part of the associated exhibits which were

19     admitted in its entirety as Defence exhibits.

20             MR. TIEGER:  I believe -- I understand the Court's question.

21             JUDGE KWON:  We will vacate that number.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I was going to say I -- I believe that that --

23     the -- the recording of that session it was comprised of a number of

24     different, separate recordings and P -- I can't remember the exact number

25     for the earlier referenced one may not comprise this particular excerpt

Page 43508

 1     I've referred to.  I can double check on that, of course, but I suspect

 2     that's why I -- I just can't recall specifically.  That's why it was

 3     separately referenced.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Is this the document about which Mr. Robinson rose

 5     to state, to admit in its entirety?

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  I believe so, yes.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I certainly have no objection if the -- in keeping

 8     with our previous practice with regard to similar sessions, if we

 9     aggregated the entirety of the transcripts referring to that particular

10     session and introduced them just as we have introduced whole sessions of

11     assembly sessions.  That would seem consistent to me, so I couldn't

12     object to that.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Given that this is only 20-page document, we will

14     admit it in its entirety.  And, therefore, as such, we will vacate the

15     exhibit number of P6509.

16             Please continue.

17             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

18        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, you also stated in 1994 that you personally think

19     that Bosnia has always been a Serbian land and in that state there could

20     not be three masters; correct?

21        A.   I always stated that Serbs, Orthodox Serbs, Muslim Serbs and

22     Croatian Serbs lived in Bosnia.  That's the way I see it, and that's the

23     way it is.  So if all of them are Serbs of various religious, according

24     to this logic Bosnia is also a Serbian land.  The synonym for a people is

25     not the religion but the language that they speak.  They all speak the

Page 43509

 1     Serbian language.  And that's not what I said 150 or 200 years ago,

 2     Vuk Karadzic said it.  The Muslim Serbs, the Catholic Serbs and the

 3     Orthodox Serbs all speak the Serbian language and the Stokavian dialect.

 4     The other dialects Kajkavian and Chakavian is the Slovenians who speak.

 5     Some Serbs also lived --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please repeat this.

 7             MR. TIEGER:  I think we have strayed away from the question.  So

 8     your explanation is:  You said that and now you've explained that what

 9     you meant was that the -- the Muslims are Muslim Serbs and so there can't

10     be three masters --

11        A.   Yes, I know.

12        Q.   -- that the Serbs must be the masters.  Okay.

13             You also stated in January of 1993 --

14        A.   I didn't say Serbs.  They could be Muslims as Serbs, they are

15     Serbs for me, all other facts do not support that.  Everything else is a

16     lie.  Everything else is a communist division.  There is no fact

17     testifying that the Muslims are not Serbs.  A million facts testify to it

18     that Muslims are Serbs.  Everything else is a lie, if we take facts as

19     facts.  Ninety per cent of the Croats are Serbs, Serbs who were converted

20     to Catholicism, and those who were converted said:  We are not Serbs, we

21     are Croats now.  As Slavs it's logical that we were converted to

22     Christianity from the Byzantium and most of the Bosnian Muslims were

23     converted to Islam from the Turks.  So the majority of the Serbs were

24     converted to Catholicism.  They accepted it, especially during

25     Maria Theresa, the queen.  And now we are discussing who is who in these

Page 43510

 1     areas.  The scientific elite in Europe knows who is who, and so does the

 2     Serbian scientific elite that is not communist.

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please slow down.  He's way too

 4     fast.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, you're purporting now that you don't make any

 7     distinction between Muslims, Croats and Serbs for purposes of this

 8     discussion because to you they are all the same.  But in January of 1993,

 9     after an immense amount of displacement, forcible displacement, killing

10     and ethnic cleansing took place, you said the following, you said at 24th

11     assembly session on the 8th of January, 1993:

12             "We say that the war was not necessary in Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina," referring to what some other people had said.

14             And you said:

15             "The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was necessary.  Right now, if

16     we were to count the population right now, there would be over a million

17     Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Bosnian-Herzegovina would be

18     predominantly a Serb republic."

19             And then to make the point completely clear, you said:

20             "Is war necessary in Serbia?  It's a horrible thing to say that

21     the war would be necessary in Serbia.  If Serbia does not go into the war

22     now, then in three to five years, the Albanians and Muslims will legally

23     overtake the power in Belgrade along with the Serb opposition.  This war

24     was necessary for the Serb people."

25             So there you're making a clear distinction between Muslims and

Page 43511

 1     Serbs and you're asserting that without this war, there be too many

 2     Muslims who would soon be in a demographic position to legally overtake

 3     power; correct?  That was your position in 1993.

 4        A.   I know that I said at rallies always that the Muslims are the

 5     Serbs.  What I told the international representative, Stoltenberg, from

 6     Norway only confirmed my opinion.  I'm saying that Albanians -- all

 7     Albanians are Albanians regardless of their religion because they speak

 8     the Albanian language which means that you have Orthodox Albanians,

 9     Catholic and Muslim Albanians.  Likewise, there are Serbs of various

10     religious.  Only that here, there is this confusion of positions

11     depending on what suits the international community.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please slow down.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin, could you speak very slowly, please?

14     The interpreters have difficulty following you.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.  All right, thank you.

16             MR. TIEGER:  All right.

17        Q.   Let's move on to another portion of your statement,

18     Mr. Kupresanin.  At several points in your statement, you attempt to

19     emphasise alleged ARK power and independence.  At paragraph 40 you said

20     they were independent; at paragraph 42, you said -- that's vis-a-vis the

21     municipalities, by the way.  And let me put that another way so that I --

22     I -- so we don't have any confusion.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please see the

24     statement or, rather, be given the statement in hard copy so that he

25     could follow and check what he has been asked?

Page 43512

 1             MR. TIEGER:

 2        Q.   Okay, paragraph 40 you said the municipal Crisis Staffs were

 3     independent from the Krajina Crisis Staff.  At paragraph -- that's right

 4     in the middle of that page.  And at paragraph 42, you suggested that the

 5     ARK Crisis Staff was more of a Banja Luka-specific Crisis Staff.  So

 6     that's what you say now about the powers of the ARK Crisis Staff

 7     vis-a-vis the municipalities or the role of the Crisis Staff vis-a-vis

 8     the municipalities.  But back in 2001, you said that that was a big

 9     mystery to you, and let me turn your attention to page 33 of the English

10     and page 46 of the B/C/S.  This is --

11        A.   Yes, yes.  I can see it.

12        Q.   Did Brdjanin give orders to presidents of municipalities about

13     what he wanted carried out?  And you said, Well, you see, I -- I ask

14     myself that question.  Certain things happened in Krajina.  I'm

15     interested to what extent was the ARK Crisis Staff connected to the

16     peripheral -- question:  Municipal Crisis Staffs.  And your answer, Yes,

17     yes, that is a great mystery for me.

18             And yet now, a dozen years later, after meeting with the Karadzic

19     Defence, you suddenly claim that that mystery is no mystery at all and

20     you can state that there -- to the contrary, that -- that it had no role

21     with the municipal Crisis Staffs; right?  You changed your position

22     completely, haven't you, sir?

23        A.   Do you expect me to answer?

24        Q.   I don't actually.

25             MR. TIEGER:  And I tender that portion.

Page 43513

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  Objection.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would like to say something.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not aware of a single

 5     institution in Republika Srpska which ordered that Crisis Staffs be

 6     formed by regions.  That Crisis Staff which was established in the region

 7     was not established at the order of the government of Republika Srpska,

 8     so I believed it to be unlawful.  The government of Republika Srpska

 9     ordered the establishment of Crisis Staffs by municipalities.  Banja Luka

10     is a municipality, did not establish a Crisis Staff at the time, nor did

11     it have one.

12             The Crisis Staff of Krajina had no members from Krajina.  All the

13     people in the Krajina Crisis Staff hailed from Banja Luka.  So that for

14     me, the Krajina Crisis Staff was a -- rather a Crisis Staff of

15     Banja Luka.  I also assert that in the communication between the

16     Crisis Staff of Krajina in Banja Luka and the municipality in

17     the Autonomous Region of Krajina, there practically was no communication,

18     as the Crisis Staff had no subordination either vertical or horizontal.

19     The Crisis Staff cannot punish, didn't have its account, and it all means

20     that the Crisis Staff is some sort of a body or institution of a

21     preventive character in a situation when people feel that there could be

22     some kind of danger from a natural disaster to war.  The Crisis Staff has

23     the task to promote and establish a rule of law, if that is possible, in

24     the area where it is situated, so that I can note that each

25     municipality --

Page 43514

 1        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, that's -- this is not -- okay, I need to

 2     interrupt you.  This is not a platform for you to make dissertations on

 3     these subject.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  We will add this page to P6510.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Well, although you said it was a big mystery to you in 2001, the

 7     fact is that contemporaneous documents from the municipalities completely

 8     contradict your assertion here now that there was no level of hierarchy

 9     between the ARK Crisis Staff and the municipalities.  For example -- and

10     let me ask you about Bosanski Novi.  P2632.  This Court has received

11     evidence that the Bosanski Novi Crisis Staff, in reporting on its work,

12     referred to implementing the ARK decision on disarmament, also referred

13     to the ARK decision on general public mobilisation, and stated:

14             "After familiarising themselves with such a decision of the ARK

15     government, the Crisis Staff initiated concrete actions and tasked organs

16     in charge with implementing the decision."

17             So do you claim you're unfamiliar with Novi's position on their

18     relationship to the ARK Crisis Staff?

19        A.   I didn't know anything.  I didn't know anything about these

20     relations and co-ordinations, nor could the Crisis Staff of the ARK

21     Krajina influence the way that the Crisis Staff in Bosanski Novi would

22     act.  It did not have such force.  It did not have such powers.  There

23     was no possibility for the Crisis Staff to do something, nor could it do

24     anything according to the law and nobody was due to obey it.  I'm not

25     aware of this kind of communication.

Page 43515

 1             THE ACCUSED:  If we ask witness to put off headphones or not to

 2     be translated.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Are you going to make some objection?

 4             THE ACCUSED:  I would like to make objections that can't wait for

 5     the redirect.  All things that are cited are selective and wrongly posed

 6     questions that do not fit with the material that is cited.  For example,

 7     on page 53, line 33 --

 8             MR. TIEGER:

 9        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin --

10             THE ACCUSED:  -- and 34 --

11             JUDGE KWON:  No.  I think we can continue.  Yes.  If could you

12     take off your headphone for the moment, please.  Thank you.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But I don't hear anything then.

14             JUDGE KWON:  That's -- yes.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a procedural issue so it's

16     better for you not to hear it.

17             [In English] On 33, line 33:

18             "I'm telling you that the Crisis Staffs in municipalities were

19     Gods, they were a state within a state, and they acted differently in

20     each municipality."

21             And on 26, page 26, line 50, 51, and 52:

22             "Well, I didn't say or I didn't mention something that is very

23     important in all of this, all the most important things of all this.  The

24     Crisis Staffs in the municipalities were states and presidents of

25     municipalities and presidents of the Executive Councils were the leaders,

Page 43516

 1     all communication between civilian and military authorities were through

 2     these people."

 3             So I think that there would be no witness who wouldn't be

 4     confused by this kind of cross-examination.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I don't follow your objections.  Mr. Tieger this

 6     time clearly showed -- cited some part of the prior record.

 7             Where is it from, Mr. Tieger?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  P2632, Mr. President.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Although it was not shown to the witness, I think it

10     was fair enough to cite that part and put to the witness about his

11     observation.

12             Let us continue, Mr. Tieger.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin -- thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED:  Excellencies, I object also that Mr. Tieger

16     testifies and is not interested in response from the witness.

17             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will monitor, but so far we can

18     continue.  But I -- in the future, we would be more benefited if you

19     showed the document to the witness and then ask a comment on that.  Shall

20     we continue.

21             MR. TIEGER:  Let's call up 3497, please.  P3497, English page 1,

22     B/C/S page 2.  Public announcement of the Crisis Staff of the

23     municipality of Kljuc on the 8th of May, 1992, stating among other

24     things:

25             "All decisions shall be made and tasks performed in compliance

Page 43517

 1     with the regulations and decisions of the organs of the

 2     Autonomous Region of Krajina and the Serbian Republic of BiH."

 3        Q.   I take it you were unfamiliar with that position of the

 4     Kljuc Crisis Staff as well?

 5             And the portion I read out is in the second paragraph in B/C/S,

 6     sir.

 7        A.   This Crisis Staff in Krajina, I think that they simply usurped

 8     power.  That's my opinion.  There is a time for a Crisis Staff to exist,

 9     and when the war breaks out, then the War Presidencies should take over

10     the authority, then the Ministry of the Defence, the Ministry of the

11     Interior, they should do their work.  I'm not sure according to what

12     logic the Crisis Staff was doing that after the breakout of the war.  It

13     should do its duties in peacetime, when there is a premonition that war

14     might be coming or if there is a natural disaster.

15             So, for me, this is pure usurpation.  But probably this kind of

16     communication did exist, though I don't see any stamp here.  The

17     Crisis Staff of the Kljuc municipality did not have a stamp.  It doesn't

18     have a stamp, which means that no Crisis Staff had a stamp or a giro

19     account.  It wasn't a legal entity, and it's decisions were not to be

20     taken into account.  Someone who is in war and needs to communicate with

21     the municipalities is the ministry of arm -- of the army or the command

22     of the army.  This is somebody who is infiltrating an empty space and

23     doing some business.  And what I say in the end is that that means

24     usurping power.

25        Q.   And according to you, irrespective of the communication between

Page 43518

 1     the ARK Crisis Staff and the municipal Crisis Staffs, that there was

 2     nevertheless a chain of command running from the municipalities clear up

 3     to Dr. Karadzic, and that's what you said back in 2001; right?

 4        A.   Well, I don't know.  I would exclude the Crisis Staff from any

 5     real operation if the rule of law existed.  There was no Crisis Staff at

 6     the level of Republika Srpska, as far as I know.  That was why a

 7     Crisis Staff is unusual.  It has no subordination or co-ordination from

 8     top to bottom or from bottom to top either.  So someone infiltrates

 9     himself.  During wartime, subordination and co-ordination are different.

10        Q.   Let's set the Crisis Staff aside for the moment.  Your position

11     in 2001 was that there was a chain of command conducted through the

12     presidents of the municipalities through to the president of the state.

13     That is Dr. Karadzic; right?

14        A.   I don't know to what extent the president of the municipality is

15     in communication with the president of the country.  There is some

16     different kind of communication during the war, when war is at issue.  If

17     it's the president of the municipality, he probably tried to co-operate

18     with the political leadership of the republic which is logical, but

19     whether that was the rule, that depends on the situation.

20        Q.   Well, this is what you said in 2001.

21             MR. TIEGER:  If we could turn to page 27 of the English, lines 9

22     through 15, and page 38 of the Serbian, lines 1 through 7:

23             "They -- then the other kind of communication was then conducted

24     from the --

25             JUDGE KWON:  Could you wait until we have the page?

Page 43519

 1             MR. TIEGER:  Sorry.  I'm sorry.  Did I fail to --

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Actually, here there was a

 3     double command in existence.  The civilian authorities were directed at

 4     the President of Republika Srpska and the military authorities were

 5     focused on the commander, General Mladic.  There was no co-ordination and

 6     subordination, but, rather, double authorities, just like a double stake

 7     is not put into earth.  So that Radovan Karadzic had control.  He had the

 8     state, but he did not have the power; and the army had the power but

 9     didn't have the state.  So the army used us purely for logistics, but we

10     didn't have much influence.  And if crimes happened in certain areas,

11     then civilians were not killing civilians.  It was some army or

12     paramilitary formations that were doing that.  In Republika Srpska we had

13     military courts and military prosecutor's offices.

14             MR. TIEGER:

15        Q.   Let's stick to the subject.  So what you were confirming there

16     was your, quote:  "They -- then the other kind of communication was then

17     conducted from the presidents of the municipalities, through the chain of

18     command, to the president of the state of the country.  And then military

19     people, they have their own chain of command, which also ended, went to

20     the top, to the Supreme Commander, General Mladic."

21             That's what you said in 2001; right?

22        A.   Yes.  I said that it was double command.  The hierarchy in a

23     state is well known.  What if the American president ordered a ship of

24     the sixth US fleet to fire at a town, and if they refused to obey the

25     order, you know what would happen.  In our country, such orders could not

Page 43520

 1     be issued.  There was very often obstruction --

 2        Q.   The question was a simple one.  And in connection with -- before

 3     we break -- with that, one more thing.  When were you asked about

 4     Brdjanin's authority and whether he could order the police or the

 5     military to do certain tasks, you responded in the following way and

 6     let's turn to page 43 of the --

 7             JUDGE KWON:  You're tendering page 27.

 8             MR. TIEGER:  Yes.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  That will be added to P6510.

10             MR. TIEGER:  And page 43 of the English,

11     lines [overlapping speakers].

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something?  May I say

13     what you said, just to confirm or to reject it?  Mr. Brdjanin could not

14     order anything to anyone.  He could only make suggestions but not to

15     order.

16             JUDGE KWON:  A question will be asked after taking a look at the

17     document first.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Page 43 --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just -- may I just clarify?  Who is

20     AC who formulates the question in lines 2 to 5 in the Serbian language?

21             JUDGE KWON:  You can see at the bottom of the page usually.  Let

22     us see whether we have it.  Yes, you should have it.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, I have nothing.  I don't have

24     any AC.  Those are the initials.

25             JUDGE KWON:  I see it under the AC.

Page 43521

 1             MR. TIEGER:  There are -- I -- if we could -- okay.  There are

 2     four people listed:  Mr. Kupresanin, two people from the Office of the

 3     Prosecutor, and an interpreter.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 5             MR. TIEGER:

 6        Q.   Back to what --

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not there in the English

 8     version.  In the English version there is only three, and I have the

 9     English version in front of me.

10             MR. TIEGER:  I think it's safe to say that this was conducted

11     through an interpreter.  And the fact that it's contained in the Serbian

12     version should be adequate, and this is [overlapping speakers]

13             JUDGE KWON:  On this English page there is no AC.  That's why.

14     Shall we continue.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you.

16        Q.   Again page 43 of the English and page 63 of the Serbian, lines 11

17     through 12 in the Serbian, and 11 through 16 in the English, you were

18     asked as -- and you just mentioned something about Brdjanin's authority

19     to order the police or the military to do certain tasks.  Question was:

20             "What was the authority?  Would he order?  Could he order the

21     police or the military to do certain tasks?"

22             You said:

23             "He could have ordered naive policemen and naive army or

24     military.  They were all listening to Radovan's orders."

25             And that's what you said in 2001 about who had the authority over

Page 43522

 1     the military and police and who could order them to conduct tasks;

 2     correct?

 3        A.   Even a layman would know that it was the Ministry of Police that

 4     gave orders to the police and that the Ministry of Defence, through the

 5     Supreme Commander and military commanders, issued orders.  Brdjanin, the

 6     Crisis Staff, could not issue any orders to anyone.  So it's logical that

 7     people should know that the Supreme Commander and the commander of that

 8     army could issue orders and exclude the Crisis Staff from the sphere of

 9     power, some power.  I said naive.  Yes, he could issue orders only to the

10     naive, the Crisis Staff -- many did not obey the Crisis Staff at all.

11             MR. TIEGER:  Okay, I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We will issue -- we will consider this

13     together with the other pages.

14             MR. TIEGER:  And I see it's time for the break.  And again I just

15     emphasise in circumstances where there is a straightforward adoption of

16     the prior statement, I have no problem with that, of course.  And in the

17     sense in which that's a prior consistent statement, we are perfectly in

18     agreement with Mr. Robinson, but where there is equivocation I think

19     these -- the prior statement is -- should -- should be admitted.

20             JUDGE KWON:  We will have a break for 45 minutes and resume at

21     1.20.

22             MR ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  If I could put something

23     on the record with respect to our associated exhibits at the request of

24     the Registrar.  And that is that our document 70, 65 ter 17367 is, in

25     fact, subsumed in 65 ter 17356 and need not be admitted, and then the

Page 43523

 1     intercept which is 30061 which had the wrong participants is not being

 2     tendered and being withdrawn.  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Just a second.  We will come back to

 4     this issue about the associated exhibits.  We will resume at 1.20.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 12.36 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 1.24 p.m.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger, during the break the Chamber has

 8     reviewed all the pages shown to the witness, and the Chamber is of the

 9     view that all those pages were not entirely consistent with the witness's

10     evidence and on that ground we will admit them all.  Those pages will be

11     added to the Exhibit P6510.

12             MR. TIEGER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

13        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, I wanted to turn next to paragraph 22 of your

14     statement.  That deals with a -- the minutes of a session of the ARK

15     assembly in November 1991, and reflects your comments that you insisted

16     on the replacement of directors of companies and institutions and the

17     appointment of SDS staff in their stead but Dr. Karadzic was for harmony

18     and unity and insisted that the old staffs remain in their positions.

19             Now, first of all, as a general matter, it is correct to say that

20     in the ARK, a great many dismissals took place and that task was carried

21     out by the Executive Council of Krajina; correct?

22        A.   Are you asking me to answer?

23        Q.   Yes, sir.

24        A.   The Serb Democratic Party won the elections in Banja Luka that

25     year, and it is to be expected -- and it's to be expected that people

Page 43524

 1     from the Serbian Democratic Party would take key positions in companies,

 2     especially state-owned companies, or, rather, public companies.  That is

 3     logical.  That is to be expected.  Why else did the SDS take part in the

 4     elections?  We took part in the elections because we thought that we were

 5     better than those who were there beforehand, and I don't think there was

 6     anything bad in that.

 7        Q.   Thanks.  And I wasn't trying to make --

 8        A.   I have to finish.  Do allow me to finish.  It is correct that

 9     Mr. Karadzic insisted that we do not dismiss the directors.  He insisted

10     on that many times in order to create some kind of peace, harmony

11     et cetera and I said these are communist directors and they should go,

12     that's it.

13        Q.   Please follow the question.  The first question was not asking

14     you to make a value judgement either way about dismissals or to tell me

15     who instigated those dismissals.  It was just to confirm the fact that it

16     was the case that in the Krajina, a great many dismissals ultimately took

17     place and that the Executive Council of Krajina carried out that task.

18             And do you confirm that?

19        A.   Well, there was a replacement of communist cadres, in part to a

20     large degree.  I'm not saying totally.

21        Q.   Now, let me -- and more specifically, you -- with respect to the

22     ARK Crisis Staff and Mr. Brdjanin, Mr. Brdjanin pushed very hard to have

23     people who were not Serbs dismissed from important positions, in fact,

24     all positions at any higher level in companies, and that, in fact, many

25     -- there were great changes in response to that, and it was the Executive

Page 43525

 1     Council of Krajina that carried out that task?

 2        A.   Well, I don't know that there was this purge, if you will, of

 3     these other peoples in the Krajina.  There were probably replacements

 4     because the SDS won the election and then their people took key

 5     positions.  I keep repeating that.  Like in Sarajevo, where the SDA won

 6     and then the key positions were held by SDA people.  So who prevented

 7     Serbs from being members of the SDA?  They would have then gotten key

 8     positions in Sarajevo just like here.  If the Muslims were in the SDS

 9     then they -- had they joined it, then they could have been in the same

10     position because the statute of the SDS says that the SDS is the party of

11     the Serb people and other peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the witness please

13     be asked to speak slower, thank you.

14             MR. TIEGER:  Let's turn to 65 ter 25608 once again, English

15     page 58, and B/C/S 85.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin, you are advised to speak slow.

17     Please bear that in mind.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   And in July of 2001 you were asked, Brdjanin also pushed very

20     hard to have people who were not Serbs dismissed from important

21     positions, in fact all positions at any higher level in companies; is

22     that correct?  And you said, There were great changes carried out at that

23     time.  I can't say that there were not many great changes.  The

24     Executive Council of Krajina carried out this task.  You have signatures

25     of people who were dismissed.  And then it was said, Yes.  Brdjanin's

Page 43526

 1     signature.  And you said, Very well, everything is clear.

 2             That's what you said in 2001, correct, Mr. Kupresanin?

 3        A.   Possibly.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  In that case I think it's best to tender the

 5     excerpt, Mr. President.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That will be added.

 7             MR. TIEGER:

 8        Q.   Now I'd like to take a closer look at the document you cite in

 9     paragraph 22, that's P551 -- 5551, let's call that up, please.  That's an

10     extract from the minutes of the 9th session of the Assembly of the

11     Autonomous Region of Krajina which was held on the 6th of November, 1991.

12     Looking at item 1, it states that it was established that the presidents

13     of municipalities had failed to fully carry out the conclusions we

14     adopted together at the last session.

15             And it goes on to point out that in some places it was impossible

16     to implement those conclusions because they could only be carried out

17     within the party and notes that Brdjanin should inform Dr. Karadzic about

18     this level of implementation.  Now, the agenda also refers to the

19     implementation -- at the beginning refers to the implementation of

20     conclusions adopted at the session held on the 26th of October 1991.  So

21     those conclusions that had not been fully carried out that were just

22     discussed related back to the 26th of October, 1991.

23             Now, we know from that date that that was the day of the Sarajevo

24     SDS order.  Let's look at 2548, please.  All right.  So this is the

25     document which reflects the order which was brought to light at the

Page 43527

 1     meeting of the presidents of municipalities held on the

 2     26th of October, 1991, in Banja Luka, and which was chaired by

 3     Dr. Karadzic and at which the conclusion were fully accepted by the

 4     Autonomous Region of Krajina.  And if you look down the list, it

 5     includes, in part, to take over power in public firms, post office,

 6     account keeping institution, administration of justice, and especially in

 7     mass communication media.

 8             So, Mr. Kupresanin, in contrast to the suggestion you make in

 9     paragraph 22 about the significance of the document P5551, at that time,

10     Dr. Karadzic, in fact, was urging, indeed ordering, the replacement of

11     the cadres deemed unacceptable to the SDS in particular position -- in

12     important positions in public firms and other important institutions;

13     correct?

14        A.   Well, of course, the SDS should have its own people in public

15     companies.  That is quite logical.  If other people who are suspicious

16     stay on, they could create great problems.  There were some Croats and

17     Muslims in key positions and then the transportation of weapons took

18     place all the time, to Croatia where there was a war between the Serbs

19     and Croats; that is to say, these were not trustworthy people.  We were

20     very sensitive because we knew what was happening and we knew what would

21     happen.  We expected problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  It is quite logical

22     for us to appoints our own people.  What's so sinful about that?  I think

23     it's a good thing that that was done, to put one's own cadres not those

24     of other parties.

25        Q.   Let's look at another reflection of the emphasis on replacing

Page 43528

 1     personnel in important positions in the Bosnian institutions and

 2     especially in mass communication media, and if we could turn to

 3     65 ter 32823, please, this is an intercepted telephone conversation

 4     between Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Vukic around the same time, that is around

 5     the fall of 1991.  This is September 27th, 1991.  And if we turn to the

 6     second page of the document, please, in both languages, and it will

 7     continue in the Serbian.  Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Vukic are talking, and

 8     Dr. Karadzic says, In whose hands is radio Banja Luka?  And Vukic says,

 9     I beg your pardon?  Karadzic, In whose hands is radio Banja Luka?  Vukic:

10     A Muslim is a director.  Karadzic:  What the fuck?  Vukic:  Shall

11     I replace him straight away, let him go to fucking hell?  Karadzic:  Come

12     on replace him immediately.  Appoint a man of yours.  These are war

13     times.  Appoint -- if he is not listening to you, appoint a man of

14     yours -- not listening.  If he is not listening to you and is sabotaging,

15     appoint a man of yours.  Then he goes on to ask who the main editor is

16     and is pointed out that her ethnicity is Serbian and she is a woman.

17             Now, that's another reflection, is it not, Mr. Kupresanin, of the

18     effort by Dr. Karadzic, contrary to your suggestion in paragraph 22, to

19     ensure the replacement of personnel deemed inappropriate with personnel

20     acceptable to the SDS?

21        A.   May I start answering?  The director of radio Banja Luka that

22     belonged to the television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the director was a

23     Muslim.  The director was not a Muslim it was Rajko Vasic.  I remember

24     that very well.  There was this Svetlana who was the editor.  But it is

25     true that there was a man who was a Muslim, and this television -- I

Page 43529

 1     cannot remember his last name now, maybe I will remember.  We replaced

 2     Rajko Vasic.  Not this man who was there, who was of the Muslim faith.

 3     We did not have any problems with him.  We did not attack him at all.  It

 4     was this Rajko Vasic, who was our problem, a Serb.  We did not touch the

 5     Muslim at all.  And this Muslim testified here in The Hague, as far as I

 6     can remember, in relation to what happened during the war and the

 7     Krajina.  So what's bad about that?  It is bad that we replaced people

 8     who were working in television?  In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we had these

 9     televisions that were all anti-Serbs, Yutel, TV Zagreb, and I personally

10     do not mind having people dismissed or replaced.  I was replaced, too, on

11     television, proposal of the SDS, President Karadzic.

12             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that and obviously be -- I shouldn't say

13     obviously, but I assume it would be MFI'd unless there is agreement to

14     the contrary by the Defence.

15             JUDGE KWON:  We will mark it for identification.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  As MFI P6509, Your Honours.

17             MR. TIEGER:

18        Q.   Let me turn your attention, Mr. Kupresanin, to the crimes that

19     took place in the Krajina and particularly during 1992.  Now, there was

20     no mystery about that, was there?  I mean, there were many, many crimes

21     which took place and you were aware of them at the time or shortly after

22     they happened; right?

23        A.   Well, it's been a very long time, for me to find out about a

24     crime.  I mean, the crime committed at Koricanske Stijene, first of all,

25     people started whispering about that and then that went on for months,

Page 43530

 1     and then I finally found out the truth.  So television was probably

 2     concealing that.  Sometimes these media companies who were supposed to

 3     provide information for some reason provided misinformation.  So as for

 4     many crimes, I did not find out about them quickly and no one sent me

 5     information like that.  To be quite frank, I heard about Prijedor too

 6     late.

 7        Q.   Well, Mr. Kupresanin, back in 2001, you explained that many bad

 8     things happened in Krajina and you would find out about those things

 9     about 15 or 20 days after something had happened.  And, indeed, you'd

10     find out from regular people, from Muslims and Croats, and specifically

11     you found out about Omarska about 15 days afterwards, that is after it

12     was formed.  That's all true, right, that's what you said in 2001?

13        A.   No, no.  I found out about Omarska when President Karadzic called

14     me and he asked me to ask people in Prijedor to disband that reception

15     centre.  For me that was a reception centre, not a camp, and that's what

16     I did.  That was the time when I found out about that.  How many days had

17     elapsed, I don't know.

18        Q.   Well, let's look at what you knew or claimed to know in 2001.  If

19     we could turn back to 25608, to English page 22, and B/C/S page 31.  And

20     at lines 32 or 31 you begin to say, As far as I know, many bad things

21     happened in Krajina but I never knew anything about it.  I would find out

22     about it only 15 or 20 days after something happened.  And I would find

23     out about those things from Muslims and Croats and regular people,

24     ordinary people.

25             And then toward the bottom of that -- toward the end of that

Page 43531

 1     answer you say at lines 39 through 41 in the English, For example, there

 2     is camp in Omarska, and 15 days I didn't know what -- for 15 days I

 3     didn't know about it.  I was informed about it by relatives of Muslims or

 4     Croats.  That's what you said in 2001, isn't it, Mr. Kupresanin?

 5        A.   For example, if something happened in the territory of Krajina,

 6     well, specifically concerning Croats, let's say, Bishop Komarica would

 7     immediately come to my office and ask me to participate in inquiring into

 8     that.  And every time he asked, I went to inquire on the spot.  That's

 9     one type of information.  Or, for instance, Emir Pusatlic [phoen], a

10     dentist, when an incident happened, when there was a problem, he would

11     come to my office.  It would be some serious Muslim connection.  He would

12     let me know and see if we could intervene.  So that was this non-Serb

13     connection.  And the Serb connection would be a request from

14     Radovan Karadzic for me to go to Omarska and do that job.  So that would

15     be it.

16        Q.   All right.

17             MR. TIEGER:  I tender this excerpt.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, this will be added too.

19             MR. TIEGER:

20        Q.   Now, you mentioned Bishop Komarica and other people.  Let me --

21     let me ask you about a specific example of crimes that you found out

22     about.  You found out about the mass killing in the village of Bresevo,

23     where the Bosnian Serb army entered the village and killed, according to

24     what you learned, 68 people in July; correct?

25        A.   I heard about it from Bishop Komarica.  I didn't hear it from a

Page 43532

 1     different source.  He asked me to go to the scene and find out how much

 2     of it is true.  So we went.  There were two military men with us.  They

 3     drove us.  And we entered Brisevo village.  It's not Bresevo, it's

 4     Brisevo.  We came to a different village which had a little Catholic

 5     church.  And when we came, there were some women there.  Komarica held a

 6     mass service.  These women were moaning and asking us to enable them, if

 7     we possibly can, to leave that village.  We tried to tell them

 8     different -- suggested different options, but they wouldn't listen.  Now,

 9     how many people were killed, I don't know.  I don't know your figure is

10     correct.  In one variant is 88, another variant is 63, and there are

11     different figures.

12             I was very willing to help, together with Bishop Komarica, and

13     Mr. Karadzic never held it against me that I made these efforts and he

14     always encouraged me, on the contrary, and told me that I need to look

15     after other ethnic communities.  Usually, the president of the SDS,

16     Krzic, came; president of the HDZ, Gabelic; Catholic priests; hodzas;

17     Muslim intellectuals, came to my office, came to speak to me as if there

18     were no war going on.  And I tried to help them all, and I did all

19     I could with the encouragement and approval of President Karadzic.

20        Q.   When you learned about this terrible crime in Brisevo?  Did you

21     keep it to yourself or did you tell someone in the republic-level

22     authorities?

23        A.   I found out from Mr. Komarica the first time.  Now, whether

24     I informed anyone, we had two military persons who kept a record and of

25     course they were supposed to submit a report to the military authorities

Page 43533

 1     because the perpetrator was the army.  I know that I discussed this with

 2     several people and I'm sure that I discussed it with a member of the

 3     Presidency, Biljana Plavsic.  I was much closer to her than to other

 4     people.  Ideologically we were close.  The others looked to me a bit like

 5     communists, left of centre, or leftist.

 6        Q.   You also told Mr. Karadzic and you also told --

 7             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The witness also

 8     said whereas the two of us were monarchists.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not sure I said Krajisnik.

10     I discussed it in detail with Biljana Plavsic, as a member of the

11     Presidency, not Karadzic.  That's the one thing that I'm sure about.  I'm

12     not sure about the rest.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Line 6 should say "Krajisnik" instead of "Karadzic."

15             MR. TIEGER:  I believe that's right.  That's certainly -- yeah,

16     that's correct, Mr. President.

17        Q.   Let's turn back to what you said in 2001 when these events were

18     fresher in your mind.  And if we could turn to page 62 of 65 ter 25608,

19     and page 92 of the B/C/S.  Question, this begins at page -- line 39 of

20     the English:

21             "Okay, Mr. Kupresanin, my question is:  When people informed you

22     about the crimes that were committed on them, what was your response to

23     those crimes, the killings and the destruction of their property?"

24             You said:

25             "Well, what I heard there I told the others.  It didn't stay with

Page 43534

 1     me or --

 2             "Q.  Who did you inform, who did you inform?"

 3             And you said:

 4             "For example, Momo Krajisnik, maybe a certain number of

 5     ministers, all deputies from here."

 6             Then it continues on to the next page in English, and same page

 7     in Serbian, and you discuss how quickly according to the victims this

 8     occurred, which brigade may have been involved, and then later we see you

 9     say, No, I informed -- you didn't inform General Talic but no, I informed

10     ministers, minister of the army.  It was Nikolic, I don't know, or it was

11     Subotic.

12             And the question was:

13             "So you're saying whoever was the minister of defence at that

14     time, the RS minister for defence, you brought this information to his

15     knowledge?"

16             And the answer is, That was the schedule.  That was how you do

17     things.

18             So, in fact, that's who you recalled were among the people to

19     whom you reported this crime after you learned about it?

20        A.   Well, okay, I was informed and I probably informed some other

21     people.  I don't remember.  I don't think that was within my competence.

22     I think it was within the competence of military courts and military

23     prosecutor's offices that were in operation at the time in Republika

24     Srpska.  I had only two military men around me and on all my travels and

25     contacts with other ethnic communities and priests and hodzas, those

Page 43535

 1     militaries were present, for the most part, and it was logical for them

 2     to inform their commands, Talic and the others.  That was not my job.

 3     But because the crime had happened, I told people.  That I know

 4     100 per cent that I had spoken to Biljana Plavsic.  About the others, I'm

 5     not sure.  It's possible that I spoke to the minister of the army as

 6     well.

 7        Q.   You also said - and that's found at page 63 of the English, again

 8     same page in Serbian - many people, even if they heard that, they didn't

 9     want to hear about it.  That was your experience in attempting to report

10     these things, wasn't it, Mr. Kupresanin?

11        A.   Well, there were many situations when specifically the government

12     was not willing to do its job and they were not interested.  I had

13     problems, and when I informed them they don't want to get involved.  They

14     don't want to share in it.  We know exactly who was in charge.  Who

15     perpetrated the murders.  We know exactly who perpetrated the crime.

16     It's quite sure that within one hour all the perpetrators could have been

17     identified, and later prosecuted and held responsible.  I was a deputy.

18     It was not my job.  But it is human to react as much as I could within my

19     limitations.

20        Q.   And despite those efforts, those people who were known were not

21     arrested and prosecuted at that time; right?

22        A.   I know that it's not fair.

23        Q.   And --

24        A.   They didn't do their job.

25        Q.   I wanted to turn next to paragraph 60, in which you assert that

Page 43536

 1     there were no organised expulsions.  So that's the position that you take

 2     in your statement.  But back in 2001, your position was a bit different.

 3     Then, you were asked about ways of making the Muslims and Croats leave

 4     the area, and you indicated that you knew the municipalities did that and

 5     said it was on their own initiative but then went on to say, Well, maybe

 6     that's not the case.  Maybe there was someone who co-ordinated it.  Does

 7     that refresh your recollection about the occurrence of organised efforts

 8     to expel Muslims and the fact that you were not prepared to say at that

 9     time -- first of all, you thought the municipality -- you were -- you

10     knew that the municipalities did it and you considered that maybe there

11     was someone who co-ordinated it?

12        A.   Well, I was a deputy in the assembly of Republika Srpska.  There

13     was never any activity in that direction or was such a project of

14     expulsion ever advocated.  I was a member of the board and never was

15     there any activity in that direction.  But I have to be frank and honest,

16     municipalities in Republika Srpska were states unto themselves and there

17     was no co-ordination whatsoever.  For instance I was in Krajina.  I

18     didn't know what was going on in Prijedor.  I -- I didn't know what was

19     going on in Brisevo.  I didn't know what was going on in

20     Koricanske Stijene.

21             I cannot say I ever encountered an incident wherein people would

22     be expelled at gunpoint.  I know that people left so as to avoid military

23     service and because of poverty and deprivation.  Nobody prohibited it,

24     and there is a Geneva Convention on the freedom of movement and it allows

25     people to move out and go wherever they like.  There was Sarajevo where

Page 43537

 1     people could not leave.  So all of them lived in a ghetto, just to prove

 2     the democracy of Alija Izetbegovic, and we all know how they fared.

 3        Q.   Let's go back to paragraph 60.  So if I understand you correctly

 4     you are not in a position to assert -- that you cannot assert that it is

 5     not true that there was an active and systematic repression and expulsion

 6     of Muslims.  You can only say at this point that you don't know

 7     everything that was going on, that's the most you can say, you're willing

 8     to say now.  But, in fact, in 2001 you said you knew that the

 9     municipalities were doing that.

10        A.   Well, I can say about the municipalities where I physically moved

11     around, I am from the Banja Luka municipality and I know that nobody was

12     expelled there, from Laktasi either.  I was in Prnjavor, in some Muslim

13     villages in 1995.  And in that municipality, in those villages,

14     specifically Muslim villages, I worked as a teacher and I went there to

15     visit my Muslim friends.  I found them, they had never moved anywhere,

16     and they told me, The Serb authorities are treating us quite well.  So in

17     1995, in August, I was there.  In August 1995, the Muslims were there.

18     And there were charges against --

19             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter didn't hear against whom.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the expulsions of Muslims from

21     Prijedor.  In other municipalities, I was not physically present, and I

22     could not make anyone send me daily reports.  So I maintain that the

23     political leadership was not doing that.  It was not the political

24     position of the top leadership or the assembly.  But it's possible that

25     some municipalities did it.  And it's very viable.  It can be checked.

Page 43538

 1     It's not a problem.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 2, page 85, the interpreters

 5     didn't hear properly.  The witness said I was deputy to the Main Board of

 6     the party, and at the beginning of page 85, the witness enumerated

 7     municipalities, Srbac, where he comes from, Laktasi, Banja Luka, Prnjavor

 8     and Gradiska.  These are municipalities where he knows nobody was

 9     expelled from.  Maybe there are some more municipalities that he

10     mentioned, but these did not find their way into the transcript.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I would have noticed the buses, the

12     people being expelled, the police.  I didn't see that.  I only saw buses

13     carrying prisoners from Manjaca.  There was an organised convoy of buses

14     headed by police cars and I saw that they were escorting someone.  And

15     I asked who and they told me prisoners from Manjaca.  But in those

16     municipalities where I was able to move around and visit, nobody was

17     expelled.

18             MR. TIEGER:

19        Q.   Let's just as a final -- focus on this topic, let's turn to

20     page 36 of your 2001 interview, in the English, and page 52 at the bottom

21     and 53 at the very top of the Serbian.  And at the bottom of the page in

22     English, beginning at line 41, you're asked, Did the Crisis Staff, again

23     referring to the ARK Crisis Staff, discuss ways of making the Muslims and

24     Croats leave this area of the Krajina?  Your answer, I don't think so.  I

25     know that municipalities did that on their own initiative but maybe

Page 43539

 1     it's -- maybe that's not the case.  Maybe there was someone who

 2     co-ordinated it.  That's what you said in 2001; right, Mr. Kupresanin?

 3        A.   I said "maybe, maybe" everywhere.  I told you roughly the truth

 4     about the areas where I moved around.  I told you that the top leadership

 5     of Republika Srpska, the political leadership, never pursued that, never

 6     pursued any activity wherein people would be physically expelled and we

 7     would remain alone in these areas.  As to what happened in

 8     municipalities, I don't know what happened in some other municipalities

 9     such as Novi.  I know that Pasic had certain problems.  I know that much.

10     I know they had problems.  But who else?  I don't know.  I know about

11     Kotor Varos.  There were problems.  I participated in Kotor Varos on

12     another project.

13             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  This will be added.

15             MR. TIEGER:

16        Q.   You mentioned Kotor Varos.  Very quickly, what you said when you

17     went there was -- you were told the presidents of the local communes that

18     the Serb army has tanks and guns, and that you don't have the right to

19     sacrifice your children.  So let's try to find some solution; right?

20        A.   Right.  I received on a daily basis information from the ground,

21     from the municipality of Kotor Varos, where heinous crimes occurred.

22     People were impaled, they were murdered, some people were even roasted on

23     a spit, if you can imagine that.  I don't know in whose minds this idea

24     was born, but this was done by the Muslims and the Serbs were killed in

25     various ways.  And then Bishop Komarica came to see me, I told him

Page 43540

 1     horrible things are happening in Kotor Varos, let's do something about

 2     it, and he said, Vojo, I'm at your disposal.  Then I contacted two

 3     Catholic priests in Kotor Varos and one hodza.

 4        Q.   I'm not so much interested at the moment in the details of your

 5     activities in Kotor Varos at that time.  I wanted to focus on your

 6     position regarding the relative military weaponry available and your

 7     comment that it was the Serb army that had tanks and guns.  So I wanted

 8     to ask you if it was not the case that you were always adamant, from the

 9     beginning of the war to the end, that the Serbs were vastly superior

10     militarily to the Muslims and, in particular, in 1992?

11        A.   Well, it was true, we had weapons.  It was true we were able to

12     commit crimes.  Now, combatting the Muslim and Croat army was not a

13     crime.  However, there were hundreds of children there who were innocent.

14     I made an appeal.  I told them, You don't have the right to kill your

15     children.  I am at your disposal.  I offered this, this, this and this.

16     But it's true they were -- they had tanks, they had webers, they he had

17     howitzers, they were able to do the job, and a lot of Muslims and Serbs

18     eventually were killed in that operation.  But the purpose was to save

19     lives, but primarily the children.  So we -- we carried out that project,

20     Mr. Komarica and I.  Sometimes policy is stronger than all the howitzers

21     in the world.

22        Q.   I have limited amount of time left so I wanted to turn to

23     paragraph 46 of your statement, Mr. Kupresanin, where you state that the

24     local -- you discuss among other things Omarska and Keraterm and you

25     state that the authorities, local authorities in Prijedor, acted on their

Page 43541

 1     own initiative there.  Now, that's not consistent with what you said back

 2     in 2001.

 3             In 2001, you said, in fact, you were interested to know who

 4     ordered the establishing of the camp in Omarska.  If you turn to page 37

 5     of the English of the 2001 interview and page 53 of the B/C/S, and then

 6     in a related excerpt at page 62 -- page 42 of the English and page 62 of

 7     the B/C/S, there you're referring to, at the beginning, your effort to

 8     get Mevludin Sejmenovic out of Omarska, which you say you did on your own

 9     initiative, but then you say:  I want to say that Radovan Karadzic told

10     me personally that he had nothing to do with that, but my feeling is -

11     what I have is - that the order about the camp, about the camps to be

12     established, didn't come from Brdjanin but somewhere, someone on the top,

13     but I don't know who from.

14             So back in 2001, Mr. Kupresanin, it was your position that you

15     thought that the Omarska camp, that you didn't -- first of all, you said

16     you didn't -- you were interested to know who ordered it, and that you

17     thought the order had come from somewhere on the top but you didn't know.

18     So your statement in -- in paragraph 46 that it was a local initiative is

19     belied by what you said in 2001 when these events were fresher in your

20     memory; right?

21        A.   I can say, at the time when you were interviewing me, I did not

22     have the real picture.  Now, after all this time that has passed, I gave

23     it a lot of thought.  What actually happened in Prijedor?  Two or three

24     days before the conflict in Prijedor, people from Prijedor and people

25     from Omarska came.  They asked the president of the Executive Board, that

Page 43542

 1     is to say the prime minister of Krajina, to enable them and find a way --

 2        Q.   Mr. Kupresanin, just -- okay.  First of all, just so we get a --

 3     are you relating now what you knew at the time or what you've learned

 4     since?

 5        A.   I'm telling you the real truth and please hear me out.  So two or

 6     three days before this clash in Prijedor, people came from Omarska and

 7     from Prijedor.  Omarska is a place in the Prijedor municipality.  The

 8     delegation from Omarska asked that the municipality be divided into two

 9     municipalities, Prijedor and Omarska.  Why?  Because of the Ljubija mine.

10     Ljubija is a mine that yielded huge money.  And people from Omarska were

11     thinking that Prijedor is stealing from them, so they came to see the

12     president of the Executive Board to talk to him about how to go about it,

13     and he invited me to assist, to attend the meeting.  So they asked me,

14     too, What should we do to achieve this division?  I didn't know the

15     answer.  Nikola didn't know the answer.

16             So the conclusion is, two or three days before the conflict in

17     Prijedor, the political leadership didn't know it would happen.  That's

18     my opinion.  I believe the army knew but the political leadership of

19     Republika Srpska did not know.  And, again, I maintain that sometimes

20     municipalities acted on their own.  And in this case, the political

21     leadership of Prijedor did not organise any conflicts or any clashes, and

22     in the end it was the Muslims who attacked the municipality of Prijedor,

23     not the political leadership of the municipality.

24             I exclude the political leadership of the municipality and the

25     republic but the army knew.  The municipality was attacked.  Some

Page 43543

 1     villages were attacked but it was all done by Muslim forces.  They were

 2     the first to attack.  So many people got killed in Prijedor.

 3        Q.   You -- we have to finish up pretty quick.  Do you know how many

 4     Muslims and Croats were in Omarska or Keraterm by the time of the attack

 5     on Prijedor town on the 31st of May, 1992?  Do you know how many Muslims

 6     and Croats had already been rounded up from their homes and placed in one

 7     or either of these camps?

 8        A.   I don't know about Keraterm.  I visited Omarska and I saw

 9     hundreds of people.  A huge number of people were there.  All these

10     people were leaning against the fence or were sitting down on the

11     asphalt.  That was what I saw.  I stood by these people, I spoke a few

12     words with them, because I know that I got the task to have the camp

13     disbanded and I came to do that.  How many people were there?  There were

14     many, perhaps 1.000 or 800.  I don't know.  I think people kept arriving

15     even after that.

16        Q.   Well, there were --

17        A.   There were many people there.  I don't know anything about

18     Keraterm.

19        Q.   All right.  Two more quick points about Omarska:  First of all,

20     you say, and you repeated it here a few minutes ago, that Dr. Karadzic

21     called you and suggested you use your authority and ask the local

22     authorities to close down Omarska.  In fact, in 2001 you explained that

23     Dr. Karadzic called you to visit the municipal authorities and tell them

24     to dismiss the camp that day, and that day meant immediately after it had

25     been discovered by the international community and been highly

Page 43544

 1     publicised.  That's correct, isn't it?

 2        A.   No, that's not correct at all.  I didn't say immediately.  I said

 3     that President Karadzic said that it should be dismissed and that on the

 4     second day, when it was disbanded and when I went to Manjaca I entered

 5     the buildings and I gave to speech to these people.  I told them that

 6     they would come to no harm and that only those who were guilty would be

 7     held to account.  And I saw the facilities, and the facilities could not

 8     be put in order and adjusted for the needs.  At least a month was

 9     necessary.  These were huge buildings, so probably the camp had been

10     prepared for 20 days or a month in order to be functional so that it

11     could be used.  That was my estimate.  And no one ever said a single word

12     that it had to be on the following day.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, I didn't tender the previous excerpts

14     referred to which were pages 62 and 63 of the English and 92 and 93 of

15     the B/C/S.

16             JUDGE KWON:  English page numbers again?

17             MR. TIEGER:  Sixty-two and 63.

18             JUDGE KWON:  And not this one?  Oh.

19             MR. TIEGER:  I haven't put that to -- I asked a general question.

20     I haven't -- with respect to the answer the witness just gave, there is

21     not a --

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well, they will be added as well.

23             MR. TIEGER:

24        Q.   If we could turn quickly to page 37 in the English, page 54 in

25     the B/C/S, and the lines -- relevant lines are 27 through 29 in the

Page 43545

 1     English, 8 through 10 in the B/C/S, where you relate to -- you see that

 2     there, Mr. Kupresanin?  The line begins, I asked -- I asked one day

 3     Radovan Karadzic, and then it continues, And he asked me as a deputy to

 4     visit the Municipal Assembly in Prijedor and to tell them to dismiss the

 5     camp during that day.  And you've also said that you and Dr. Karadzic got

 6     into a big argument about the camp on the phone.  You see that excerpt,

 7     sir?  B/C/S is 8 through -- look at line 8 through 10 toward the top of

 8     the page.  That's what you said in 2001, that Dr. Karadzic asked you --

 9        A.   All right.  I know that Dr. Karadzic asked me to do this but he

10     did not impose any deadlines.  He didn't say I had to do it immediately.

11     First of all, it's impossible to do it at once.  He said see what the

12     situation is like there and, please, as this was a camp through which

13     inmates kept moving, ask the army to create the conditions so that people

14     could live normally in the camp.  But I don't remember that he said

15     I should do it immediately.  I came to Prijedor and found a great number

16     of journalists there from various international agencies, such as

17     Reuters, the BBC, and so on, and I believe that they were at the camp.

18     They visited it at that day, and also visited the president of the

19     municipality.  There were so many journalists there.  I found them in the

20     municipal building.

21        Q.   All right.

22             MR. TIEGER:  I tender that excerpt, Mr. President.

23             JUDGE KWON:  I think we saw that page before as well.  We will

24     add that page.

25             MR. TIEGER:  Okay.

Page 43546

 1        Q.   And finally, Mr. Kupresanin, I simply want you to confirm that

 2     while you were at Omarska, you spoke to Dr. Karadzic on the phone and

 3     that was in the presence of Mr. Sejmenovic, who you took out of the camp.

 4        A.   What have I heard?  What am I supposed to say?  What do you

 5     expect from me?  I hear you real well.

 6        Q.   I notice in discussing what happened in Omarska your statement

 7     doesn't mention anything about Mr. Sejmenovic, anything about a telephone

 8     call to Dr. Karadzic in the presence of Mr. Sejmenovic, which was

 9     something that [overlapping speakers] --

10        A.   [Overlapping speakers]

11        Q.   Dr. Karadzic told Mr. Sejmenovic didn't happen.  In fact, it did

12     happen.  You did speak to Dr. Karadzic on the phone from Omarska in the

13     general presence of Sejmenovic and then you took him out of the camp;

14     correct?

15        A.   No.  That's not correct.  I did not call anyone on the phone from

16     Omarska.  I came from Omarska, then I informed Radovan, and Sejmenovic

17     was in my office at the time.  Mr. Sejmenovic.  I ordered half a litre of

18     coffee as the Muslims drink a lot of coffee and I gave him two boxes of

19     cigarettes.  And I told Radovan, Mr. President, what is going on there?

20     And he told me, Vojo, those fools and idiots, no one obeys me.  It was to

21     that effect.  And it turned out that he had some idea about that, so

22     perhaps I did not put this nicely, and perhaps he was even more rude when

23     he said -- he said, Those guys there, those idiots, that was -- he said,

24     which means my conclusion from the conversation with him was that Radovan

25     had nothing do with it.  But my conclusion was also that the political

Page 43547

 1     leadership of the Prijedor municipality also had nothing to do with it.

 2     My final conclusion was that the army oversaw all this.

 3             How would the political leadership of one municipality allow the

 4     Muslims to enter and kill so many Serbs, if they had been preparing

 5     anything, the Serbs were killed first and then all the other things

 6     developed as they did.

 7        Q.   So there was no problem with the telephone lines and the man you

 8     spoke to from your office, from -- was Dr. Karadzic; right?

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I informed him what I had done.  And

10     throughout this time, Mevludin Sejmenovic sat next to me and he listened

11     to what I was talking about.  Only that this Mevludin, whom I treated as

12     my own brother, was here at a trial in 1994 for the first time and he

13     said the absolute truth about everything that he had seen, and it was

14     absolute truth, and then he corrected his positions.  He kept changing

15     them, probably because he was persuaded by the political party that he's

16     a member of, so that I am somewhat angry or rather quite angry at him

17     because he was not fair and he was not correct.

18             MR. TIEGER:  Nothing further, Mr. President.  Thank you.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  So the Muslim you talked about is

20     Mevludin Sejmenovic who testified in this case?

21             MR. TIEGER:  Yes, Mr. President.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Sejmenovic, S-e-j-m-e-n-o-v-i-c.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

25                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

Page 43548

 1        Q.   [Interpretation] First of all, a general question,

 2     Mr. Kupresanin.  Do you remember whether you read the transcript of this

 3     interview dating from 2001?  Did you read it then?  Was it given to you

 4     to read it over and did you sign it?

 5        A.   I don't understand you.  Please, can you explain.  What

 6     transcript, whose transcript?  With regard to whom and what?

 7        Q.   The interview which Mr. Tieger showed and cited many pages.  When

 8     this interview was conducted, did you receive it for inspection and for

 9     reading it?

10        A.   No.  He took the statute of the autonomous region from me,

11     I signed each page, and whatever I had with regard to your abolitions of

12     Muslims and Croats.  Any documents I had they seized it from me.  I had

13     no copies so I was left without it and without the statute of Krajina.

14     I delivered everything over to ICTY.

15        Q.   Thank you.  But the interview itself was audio-taped.  Did you

16     receive it later on to read it and to sign it?

17        A.   No.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Could you now please show page 39?  You said a little

19     while ago that you called me from your office and Mr. Tieger suggested

20     that it was from Omarska.  Let's see what you said about that in 2001.

21        A.   I think I said that I called you from my office.

22        Q.   Here, please, have a look at 39 in English and I'm not sure which

23     page of the Serbian version.  The page in English is 39.  I'm going to

24     read it out.

25        A.   Please read out.

Page 43549

 1        Q.   From line 4, question:

 2             [In English] "When you were in the Omarska camp did you talk to

 3     Karadzic from the camp by telephone?"

 4        A.   No, no.

 5        Q.   Serbian 55, [Interpretation] 56 in Serbian.  Let me just read it

 6     out.  I will read out your answer and you will get it on the screen as

 7     well.  But this is your answer in English:

 8             [In English] "When I returned to the office, that's when I had

 9     this verbal conflict with him, and during that verbal argument, this

10     deputy was present and he heard everything.  I forget that I was -- there

11     were -- there were other people around.  I mean there were somebody else

12     with me."

13             [Interpretation] So, did you also say in 2001 that the

14     conversation was held from your office?

15        A.   Yes, because I think that there was no phone anywhere else except

16     at the office.  That was where I talked to you from.  I wondered somewhat

17     and I had a heated discussion with you to a certain degree.  I asked you

18     what was going on and you told me something to the effect that, Those

19     idiots used to do that, Vojo, without my knowledge.  That was that, and

20     it was a heated conversation.  And it's true that I called you from the

21     office because I never saw another telephone on that day.  I could have

22     called you from Prijedor as well also, but that wouldn't even have

23     occurred to me; because I thought that they had done all this by your

24     instructions, and then you said it had nothing to do with you and that

25     those were the idiots who had done all that, to that effect.  Perhaps you

Page 43550

 1     had in mind Stakic, or whether you had in mind the army.  From this point

 2     in time I think that it was the army, but all right.  The Muslims had

 3     attacked Prijedor.  It wasn't the Serbs who launched the attack.  Is

 4     there anything that I haven't said?

 5        Q.   No.  It's fine, thank you.  I just wanted to ask you this, now

 6     that you said attacked, you listed a number of municipalities in which

 7     Muslims lived but had no problems:  Are you aware of a municipality in

 8     Krajina in which the Patriotic League and the Green Berets did not begin

 9     the fighting and the Serbian army and police attacked and killed

10     somebody?

11        A.   No.  They were -- I have the feeling that this part of the Muslim

12     people were very impatient, so to speak.  I think they -- they openly

13     paraded with uniforms and weapons, and so on, in all municipalities, most

14     often the municipalities where the Muslims were the relative majority or

15     the Serb were the relative majority.  I'm not aware of the Serbian army

16     attacking first anywhere.  In Kljuc and in Sanski Most, it was the

17     Muslims who attacked first.  In Prijedor, it was the Muslims who attacked

18     first.  Actually, we in Krajina didn't have any war.  What happened in

19     May and June, that was that.  And after that there was no fighting, no

20     conflicts or combat.  Those who wanted to leave did so.  I was in a room

21     in Banja Luka somewhere close to the bridge, I got there on business and

22     I saw a number of men and women, and I asked, What are these people doing

23     here?  And they told me, They are going abroad.  What are they doing

24     here?  They said, They are getting some documents issued.  And then

25     I thought they are going abroad, well, that's not bad, better to go

Page 43551

 1     abroad than to be in the war.  And why couldn't the Serbs from Sarajevo

 2     leave and go abroad?  That was what I thought privately.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I have to rush and it will be interesting to read

 4     your experiences that have been written down.  Today, you were asked as

 5     for the relations between Brdjanin and the leadership in Pale, and you

 6     were suggested that he was in close contact with the leadership, that he

 7     maintained such contacts.  You said that he had a wish to maintain close

 8     contacts.  And did you have any direct knowledge as to whether Brdjanin

 9     visited Pale in the leadership at the time and how frequently?

10        A.   Very rarely.  That's my opinion.  He became a minister of town

11     planning, if I'm not mistaken, and he was satisfied with that.  I think

12     he paid few visits and I know that on many occasions you attacked him

13     because of his conduct and his irregularities.  And very often it was

14     asked, Why are you doing this, giving a goal to yourself, Brdjo?

15     I didn't see or hear that but people reported it to me.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please add this page 3956 in

17     Serbian and call up page 16 in English and 21 in Serbian?

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  Could the speakers please

19     slow down a little?

20             JUDGE KWON:  If you both could slow down.

21             Yes, Mr. Tieger.

22             MR. TIEGER:  Just remind the accused that the use of prior

23     statements as we learned, perhaps at painful length today, is about --

24     arises in the impeachment process.  So I think it's not unacceptable, of

25     course, to use these things in redirect or direct, but they shouldn't be

Page 43552

 1     a first port of call for any aspects of the examination.  But if

 2     Dr. Karadzic is proposing to go through various parts of the prior

 3     statement, he will have to -- I don't think that's a matter of leading

 4     and he'll have to ask questions that give rise to the appropriate method

 5     of doing so.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Do you have any objection to the adding to -- adding

 7     of this page, page 39?

 8             MR. TIEGER:  No.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Bear that in mind, Mr. Karadzic.  We will add that

10     page, 39.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Now I'm a bit confused.  I just want to note that this document

14     was used selectively by the OTP.  Isn't it that it isn't as one may gain

15     the impression.  Here, from line 4 onwards, you were asked about that,

16     whether you were aware of these visits, and you said that you really

17     didn't know.  Do you remember that you said so and do you stand by that?

18        A.   What?  Under which number?  Four, was it?  Are you aware --

19        Q.   It has to do with Brdjanin.  Do you know this?

20        A.   I don't know how frequently he went there but I don't think that

21     you were on a close terms with Brdjanin.  I don't think that he was

22     somebody who had much in common with the political leadership, some other

23     people did but not him.

24        Q.   Thank you.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would ask for this page to be

Page 43553

 1     added and to be admitted as well.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Is it not a bit tenuous?  He already confirmed that

 3     he rarely knows.  But in any event, Mr. Tieger, do you have any

 4     objection?

 5             MR. TIEGER:  Well, on this one, I agree with the Court.  I mean

 6     he asked him if he knew, he said he didn't.  He asked him again if he

 7     didn't know, and then he pointed out -- it's reflected here.  I -- you

 8     know, I -- I don't think that's an appropriate use of the document under

 9     these circumstances.  I accept that there are uses to which it can be

10     made in redirect, and I have no problem with that, but this doesn't seem

11     like one.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We may give up on it.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Shall we then proceed?

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   During the cross-examination, it was also suggested to you that

16     the municipalities, without your maybe, had a direct contact with the

17     president of the republic.  Did the municipalities from Krajina during

18     1992 depend in their work on the leadership at Pale or were they

19     independent from it?  And what was the physical link up until the end of

20     July or August, when the corridor was established?

21        A.   I think that there was no connection with Pale; that is to say

22     the municipalities had no contacts with Pale.  I stand by that.  It was

23     physically impossible for them to establish links with Pale because the

24     territory was cut off in Posavina and we were surrounded.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have any direct knowledge of any example of

Page 43554

 1     municipal leaderships during the existence of the AR Krajina that it sent

 2     reports to or received instruction from the president of the republic?

 3        A.   No, I'm not aware of any such instances.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Back to the relation of the president of

 5     municipalities, Mr. Karadzic.  What did you mean by saying that by chain

 6     of command?  You said there was a chain of command running from the

 7     municipalities to Karadzic.  What did you mean by that chain of command?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in 1992, the year of war and

 9     war conflict, it was impossible physically to establish any sort of

10     contact with the president of the republic or any other institutions at

11     the republic level.  We were surrounded, so how could it have been

12     possible to do something like that?  We were left to our own devices.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

14             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   It was suggested to you today that the telephone lines were in

16     operation, nevertheless.  Can you tell us whether they worked all the

17     time and was it always easy for us to communicate on the telephone?

18        A.   No.  They were not always functional.  Sometimes they did,

19     sometimes not.  The power was down for months and the phone lines were

20     down for months.  That is my opinion.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Did I ask you to go to some municipalities to do

22     something?  You did mention that and you spoke about that.  Were you

23     acting as a representative of the state, of the government, apart from

24     the fact that you had your own goodwill, personally?

25        A.   Yes, I did.  I was doing that sort of work as if I was a kind of

Page 43555

 1     mini-statesman.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  When the authorities were unable to help the Muslim

 3     and Croatian civilians, did you then address international organisations

 4     so that they would help the Muslim civilians who had set out?

 5        A.   Very frequently.  For example, Mr. Schweizer was the president of

 6     the ICRC, and in all sorts of situations he would try to help us with

 7     regard to the Muslims and the Croats.  With regard to the Croats, Caritas

 8     existed.  It helped both to the Croats and the Serbs and the Muslims.

 9     And then there was a humanitarian association among the Muslims, what was

10     it called, renewal or something like that, but they did not give a lot

11     when Caritas did, and they had helped both the Muslims and the Croats.

12        Q.   Thank you.

13             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show for a moment

14     P3820.  This has been admitted already.  Can we please show the

15     6th of June, 1992.  No, we need the next page, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't see this well, if you can

17     please read it out or something.

18             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   Yes, yes.  I will read it out to you, and could we please show

20     the English version.  You are slightly promoted here.  If you have a

21     look, it says on the 1st of June, 1992, the mayor of Banja Luka,

22     Mr. Kupresanin, called a civil affairs office in Sector North.  He

23     conveyed some information concerning the Muslim refugees' flow that might

24     originate from his area towards Croatia, passing through the crossing

25     points in Dvor and Karlovac, and so on.  The mayor's information can be

Page 43556

 1     summarised as follows.  And now you say that you are in contact with the

 2     presidents of municipalities in order to resolve the situation in which

 3     the Muslim population is, that this population is in fear, there is a

 4     shortage of food and medicine, that there is a lack of trust on part of

 5     the Muslim civilians with regard to the local authorities, that they had

 6     tried to go to Travnik which is under Croatian control, and so on.

 7             Do you remember and how often did you request from international

 8     humanitarian organisations to help you with your fellow citizens of a

 9     different religion?

10             THE INTERPRETER:  Can the witness please restart with his answer?

11             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Kupresanin, could you restart your answer?

12     Could you repeat it from the beginning?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said very often, especially the

14     International Red Cross.  In the case of Kotor Varos, there were two

15     jeeps involved.  We followed the column, the people, women, children.

16     They always wanted to help is.

17             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I see the time.

18     Excellencies, shall we continue tomorrow?

19             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

20             Mr. Kupresanin, we will adjourn for today and continue tomorrow

21     morning at 9.00.  I'd like to advise you not to discuss --

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  -- not to discuss with anybody else about your

24     testimony while you are giving testimony here.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, thank you, thank you.

Page 43557

 1             JUDGE KWON:  There is one matter I'd like to adjourn -- I'd like

 2     to raise before we adjourn.  It's related to the associated exhibits.

 3     The Chamber often -- as today, the Chamber often identifies the document

 4     being tendered as associated exhibits which are not indispensable and

 5     inseparable with the underlying statement, and invites the accused to

 6     lead these documents live, if he seeks to have them admitted, to provide

 7     more context.  The accused -- the accused often decides not to seek to

 8     tender these documents, which suggests that those documents are not of

 9     such significance to the Defence case.  The Chamber invites the accused,

10     in consultation with Mr. Robinson and his team, to be more carefully --

11     in only tendering associated exhibits which form an indispensable and

12     inseparable part of the witness's statement and which are of significance

13     to his case.

14             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, we will do that, but I also

15     would just like to indicate that we discussed this very point

16     specifically after you have given us 25 hours of the 100 that we asked

17     for in additional hours.  And we decided for the remainder of this case

18     we are going to give up on most of the associated exhibits that you don't

19     admit, simply because we don't have enough time, even though we do think

20     often that they are important.  But we will try to do a better job of

21     incorporating them into the statement, but you can expect in the future

22     we will often not have enough time to lead live documents that are

23     attempted to be associated exhibits.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please be more vigilant and take more robust care in

25     tendering the exhibits.

Page 43558

 1             The hearing is adjourned.

 2                           [The witness stands down]

 3                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.48 p.m.,

 4                           to be reconvened on Friday, the 15th day of

 5                           November, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.