Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 45198

 1                           Tuesday, 17 December 2013

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The witness takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, everyone.

 7             Would the witness make the solemn declaration, please.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare I will speak the

 9     truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Beara.  Please be seated and make

11     yourself comfortable.

12                           WITNESS:  LJUBISA BEARA

13                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

14             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Beara.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, good morning.

16             JUDGE KWON:  I seem to have a technical difficulty with my

17     headphones.

18             I think it's okay, yes.  Thank you.

19             Mr. Beara, although you know -- may I know this very well, but I

20     must draw your attention to a certain rule of evidence that we have here

21     at the Tribunal before you commence your evidence.  That is, Rule 90(E).

22     You may object to answering any question under this rule from

23     Mr. Karadzic, the Prosecutor, or even from the Judges if you believe that

24     your answer might incriminate you in a criminal offence.  In this

25     context, "incriminate" means saying something that might amount to an

Page 45199

 1     admission of a criminal offence or saying something that might provide

 2     evidence that you might have committed a criminal offence.  However,

 3     should you think that an answer might incriminate you and as a

 4     consequence you refuse to answer the question, I must let you know that

 5     the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer the question; but in

 6     that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your testimony, compelled

 7     under such circumstances, would not be used in any case that might be

 8     laid against you for any offence, save and except the offence of giving

 9     false testimony.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Beara.

12             Before we go on, I would like to counsel assisting Mr. Beara to

13     introduce himself for the record.

14             MR. OSTOJIC:  Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours.  My name

15     is John Ostojic.  I'm here on behalf of Mr. Ljubisa Beara.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.

17             But, Mr. Robinson, I was informed before I entered the courtroom

18     that Mr. Beara hasn't been informed that cross-examination of -- his

19     cross-examination would be postponed after the recess.

20             MR. ROBINSON:  I see.  Well, I informed his counsel, and I don't

21     know from there what communication they had.  But Mr. Ostojic was

22     informed.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Beara, in order for the Prosecutor to have some

24     time to prepare for their cross-examination of you, the Chamber agreed

25     with the arrangements that were made between the parties so that your

Page 45200

 1     cross-examination will be postponed after the recess.  Do you understand

 2     that?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand that.  I found

 4     out about that this morning.  Mr. Ostojic told me about it this morning.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Yes.

 6             Please proceed, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  Good morning,

 8     Your Excellencies.  Good morning to all.

 9                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

10        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Colonel Beara.

11        A.   Good morning.

12        Q.   I am waiting for the interpretation and I ask you also to pause

13     between question and answer.  Thank you for having come.  We don't want

14     anything to be lost in translation, so I am going to put a few questions

15     to you in the English language, slowly, carefully, and they will be

16     interpreted to you carefully.

17        A.   Very well.

18        Q.   I do apologise for this being in English, but it is going to be

19     interpreted properly.

20             [In English] Can you tell us what positions you held during your

21     military career?

22        A.   I can.

23        Q.   Do, please.

24        A.   I graduated from the military naval academy in 1962, and then

25     first I served on the 11th Split destroyer.  Then I was in Ploce on

Page 45201

 1     minesweepers.  I was a ship commander.  After that unit of minesweepers

 2     was dissolved, I was in Brijuni in the Guards Naval Detachment.  That is

 3     where I was admitted into the security service of the JNA.  Then I served

 4     in Pula, in Split, in the counter-intelligence group, and then in Boka as

 5     chief of the security department of the 9th Naval Sector Kumbor.  Then

 6     again in Split as a desk officer at the security department.  Then

 7     assistant for security and staff affairs and assistant chief of security,

 8     and then assistant chief of security for the military naval sector for

 9     counter-intelligence.  And ultimately, I was chief of the security

10     department of the command of the military naval district.

11             When - how do I put this? - when the tribal war started in

12     Bosnia, I was in Belgrade.  I was there because the military naval

13     district no longer existed, and then they assigned me to the Army of

14     Republika Srpska.  Over there, I was first chief of the security

15     department in the command of the Army of Republika Srpska, the Main Staff

16     of the Army of Republika Srpska.  And then from 1995, I think, or maybe

17     1994, I can no longer remember, I was chief of administration -- well, it

18     was changed, this formation, the establishment was somewhat changed.  And

19     I ended the war as chief of department, and I retired.

20             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We can no longer hear the

21     witness.  Could all other the microphones please be switched off.  Thank

22     you.

23             JUDGE KWON:  The interpreters couldn't follow you.  Could you

24     repeat from where -- from 1994, where you were chief of administration.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So I came to the VRS in

Page 45202

 1     November 1992, 1991.  Again, I don't know.  And then I was chief of the

 2     security department at the security intelligence sector of the Main Staff

 3     of the VRS, the Army of Republika Srpska.  And from 1994 or 1995, the

 4     establishment changed and it wasn't the security department anymore.  It

 5     was the security administration.  Then I was chief of that administration

 6     until I retired.  Or that is to say, until the Main Staff was dissolved

 7     because then the General Staff was established, headed by General Pero

 8     something - I no longer remember his last name - who was in Bijeljina.

 9     Excuse me.  I stayed in Crna Rijeka.  We had built some facilities there,

10     and the idea was that we make a vacation facility there for the wives and

11     children of those who were killed during the war.  And we built a

12     multi-storey building, there was a kitchen, a dining area, and so on and

13     so forth; however, this was not fully carried through.  I actually

14     left -- I retired, and I don't know what happened afterwards.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Karadzic.  The Chamber

16     needs to rise for ten minutes.

17             Court deputy, follow the Judges.

18                           --- Break taken at 9.16 a.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 9.26 a.m.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Mr. Karadzic.  Please continue.

21             THE ACCUSED:  Thank you.

22             MR. KARADZIC:

23        Q.   So please tell us, what was your position in the VRS in

24     July 1995?

25        A.   I think that I said that just now.  I was chief of the security

Page 45203

 1     administration of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever inform me, either orally or in writing,

 3     that prisoners from Srebrenica would be, were being, or had been

 4     executed?

 5        A.   Your Honours, I and my lawyer have received these questions

 6     earlier.  Mr. Ostojic, my lawyer, counselled me that I invoke 90(E) with

 7     regard to this question, if possible.

 8                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Ostojic, would you like to make any observation

10     in this regard?

11             MR. OSTOJIC:  No, Your Honour, just to confirm that, yes, indeed,

12     we've discussed it, and Mr. Beara and both I and he would like to invoke

13     90(E) on this with respect to his testimony in that regard.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

15             Mr. Robinson.

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Thank you, Mr. President.  We would ask that the

17     Trial Chamber compel Colonel Beara to answer this question and afford him

18     the full protections of Rule 90(E), assuring him that testimony compelled

19     in this way would not be used as evidence in a subsequent prosecution

20     against him for any offence other than false testimony.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Would the Prosecution like to make an observation in

22     this regard?

23             MR. TIEGER:  Only to note, Mr. President, that the reference to

24     "subsequent prosecution" seems to ignore what is likely to be the genuine

25     subject of the witness's focus and Mr. Ostojic's focus as well, and that

Page 45204

 1     is the current proceedings and the appeal.  So on the record, it appears

 2     to be a bit misleading and I think that needed to be clarified.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you be more specific, Mr. Tieger.

 4             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. Robinson mentioned, and I'm reading from the

 5     transcript, "the full protections of Rule 90(E), assuring him that

 6     testimony compelled in this way would not be used as evidence in the

 7     subsequent prosecution" or perhaps he meant "any subsequent prosecution,"

 8     I was simply indicating that the use of the word "subsequent" in these

 9     circumstances seemed to ignore what was in fact the object of the

10     witness's and his counsel's concern, and that is the current proceeding.

11             I appreciate that the language is taken verbatim from the rule;

12     nevertheless, the rule may not specifically have contemplated this

13     situation.  In any event, it seemed to create a potential area of

14     misunderstanding and I raised it for that reason.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Would you like to add anything?

16             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  I was quoting directly from

17     the rule, but since the Appeals Chamber has decided in General Tolimir's

18     case that no statements made by the witness would be used in their appeal

19     proceedings, then that would also be applicable here.

20             JUDGE KWON:  And you have nothing to add?

21             MR. TIEGER:  No, Mr. President.  We -- as obviously we weren't

22     the moving force behind calling this witness and given our other

23     responsibilities, we have not undertaken an exhaustive investigation of

24     the issues in law that may pertain to any questions that arise here, so

25     we have nothing beyond the comments I just made at this moment.

Page 45205

 1                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 2                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 3             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will rise for 15 minutes.

 4                           --- Break taken at 9.36 a.m.

 5                           --- On resuming at 10.32 a.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will now rule on the witness's request

 7     to invoke Rule 90(E), not to respond to Mr. Karadzic's question as to the

 8     witness's informing the accused about the execution of prisoners in

 9     Srebrenica.

10             The Chamber has considered the arguments of the parties and has

11     decided to compel the witness to answer the question.  The Chamber

12     reminds the witness of the protection afforded to him by Rule 90(E),

13     which was recently confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in the Tolimir case

14     on the 13th of November, 2013.  This protection means that the witness

15     may be compelled to testify in this case due to the fact that any

16     self-incrimination question elicited in this case -- proceedings cannot

17     be directly or derivatively used against him in his own case.  I said

18     "cannot be directly or derivatively used."  Yes.

19             Mr. Beara, the Chamber is therefore instructing you to answer

20     Mr. Karadzic's question.  The Chamber now invites the parties and the

21     counsel for witness to submit as to whether we should proceed in public

22     or private session.

23             Who shall I hear from first?  Mr. Robinson.

24             MR. ROBINSON:  We would ask to proceed in public session,

25     Mr. President.

Page 45206

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger.

 2             MR. TIEGER:  Mr. President, in light of the language used by the

 3     Chamber in reliance upon the decision of the Appeals Chamber, we think

 4     it's very clear that the matter must proceed in private session in order

 5     to maintain any level of control over the -- of access to those matters

 6     such that the assurance offered the witness can be complied with.  The --

 7     the language of the underlying rule explicitly, 90(E), refers to the use

 8     of evidence in subsequent proceedings.  That presumably means by not only

 9     this institution but others.  If such control is to be maintained and the

10     cautionary language lent meaning, that means that it can't be distributed

11     internationally from the outset for use by anyone.  And that's separate

12     from the issue of the relative meaning of derivative use versus direct

13     use.  So we think it's very clear and we should proceed in private

14     session.

15             Mr. Ostojic.

16             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President, Your Honours.  We take no

17     position with respect to this issue of whether it should be private or

18     public or open session, and we'll defer to Your Honours.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Ostojic.

20                           [Trial Chamber confers]

21             JUDGE KWON:  Having considered the submissions, the Chamber

22     considers it appropriate if we proceed in private session.  The Chamber

23     will go into private session.

24              [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of  Chamber] 

25             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in private session, Your Honours.

Page 45207

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Beara, I take it you followed the proceedings.

 2     Shall I ask Mr. Karadzic to repeat his question?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no need.  I understood it

 4     the first time.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Could you answer the question.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My lawyer and myself asked to be

 7     allowed to invoke 90(E) because we thought that the question was actually

 8     incriminating for myself.  If I say that I didn't report to Mr. Karadzic,

 9     that would mean that I knew but I didn't inform him.  However, if I

10     told -- if I said that I didn't inform him, it would be the same.  In

11     other words, I knew but I kept it a secret from him.

12             In the course of the trial against my group, we found a document

13     where it says clear that Mr. Karadzic should have been informed as to

14     what was going on in Srebrenica and around it.  If necessary, I can give

15     you the name or the number of the document, Your Honours.

16             THE ACCUSED:  Could I pose the question again?  I didn't get the

17     answer, really.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please ask your question again.

19             MR. KARADZIC:

20        Q.   So the question is:  Did you ever inform me either orally or in

21     writing that prisoners from Srebrenica would be, were being, or had been

22     executed?

23        A.   May I answer?

24             JUDGE KWON:  Please.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, the answer is the same.  How

Page 45208

 1     could I inform you.  Pursuant to the rules of subordination, that was not

 2     possible.  If I had known about it and if I didn't inform you, as I have

 3     already told you, why didn't I?  If I had known, I could not have

 4     informed you because pursuant to the rules of subordination, I was not

 5     linked to you in any way.  But you knew it.  Why are you asking me now?

 6        Q.   We'll come to that.  Just to have answers of my five questions

 7     and then we'll go.

 8             Please.  Next question would be:  Did we ever speak during the

 9     war?

10        A.   It was a long time ago.  I know that I did see you from time to

11     time.  Whether we spoke or not, again, we are talking about

12     subordination.  I was far from you and you were even further away from

13     me.  I don't think that we spoke.  I did see you and I don't mean on TV,

14     I saw you in person.  Now, as to whether you saw me or not, I don't know.

15        Q.   Did -- during the war, did you ever author or read any VRS

16     document that indicated that prisoners from Srebrenica would be --

17             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Just a second.  I'm sorry to

18     interrupt you.  But I wonder whether we have to repeat these questions in

19     private session.  Whenever he invokes Rule 90(E), we go into private

20     session.

21             Can I hear from the parties or Mr. Ostojic?

22             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.  We

23     will, just so you know, with respect to question number five, I believe

24     invoke Rule 90(E).  But with respect to the prior question that was

25     asked, we did not and that's why we didn't stand.  The question for

Page 45209

 1     number five has not yet been completed, but I believe from my

 2     understanding with Mr. Beara that we would invoke Rule 90(E) for the

 3     fifth question as well.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 5             Please repeat your question, Mr. Karadzic.

 6             MR. TIEGER:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I don't know if that was

 7     a -- that resolved the Court's concerns, but when the Court raised it, it

 8     seemed to me it was raising a very obvious procedural point.  We would

 9     expect to be in open session for questions to be asked, then -- then the

10     witness invokes or doesn't invoke, and then depending on that

11     circumstance we move into private session.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

13             MR. TIEGER:  Given the emphasis by the Defence in particular on

14     the need for openness, but irrespective of that, just in terms of the way

15     one would normally expect to proceed, I think the Court's suggestion was

16     in keeping with conventional expectations.

17             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  So should we go into open session and repeat

18     with question number four and go on with number five?  Unless there is

19     any objection, we'll go back to open session.

20                           [Open session]

21             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we are now in open session.

23             Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed with your next question.

24             MR. KARADZIC:

25        Q.   Did we ever speak during the war?

Page 45210

 1        A.   As I've already said, we did see each other or, rather, I saw

 2     you, but I don't think that we ever spoke.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  During the war, did you ever author or read any

 4     VRS document that indicated that prisoners from Srebrenica would be, were

 5     being, or had been executed?

 6        A.   Is this a question for 90(E)?  Would that fall under that rule?

 7     Would the same thing apply as for the previous questions?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  The Chamber will go into private

 9     session.

10              [Private session] [Confidentiality lifted by order of  Chamber] 

11             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in private session, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Beara, likewise, the Chamber is compelling you

13     to answer the question with the full protection as provided in the Rules.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.  I understand that.

15             A brief answer would be no.  If any such document had been

16     produced, it would have surfaced by now.  I believe that the Prosecutor

17     has obtained all sorts of papers, documents, orders, plans, and so on and

18     so forth.  Therefore, my answer is this:  I never authored an order of

19     that kind, nor did I ever see such an order in a written form.  It is

20     also true that nobody ever orally ordered me any such thing, nor did I

21     hear anybody order anybody else any such thing.  So this would be my

22     answer.

23             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

24             We'll go back to open session.

25                           [Open session]

Page 45211

 1             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

 2             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you, Colonel.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions,

 5     Your Excellencies.

 6             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  I would like to ask

 7     that the answers of the matters that have been heard in private session

 8     be reclassified as public in light of the witness's answers.  There is

 9     nothing his answers that would remotely incriminate him and therefore

10     subject him to any kind of foreign prosecution, and as a result, I

11     believe that it's in the interest of justice that these proceedings be

12     entirely public.  Thank you.

13             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Tieger or Ms. Pack, do you have any observation?

14             MR. TIEGER:  Well, only to note that -- that Mr. Robinson puts

15     that possible issue before us.  I think given the matters involved, at a

16     minimum, we wouldn't want to jump to the conclusion that no one would be

17     interested in or could possibly use it.  I would think that would be a

18     determination that would only be made by the Chamber with absolute

19     certainty and that would certainly require a much closer scrutiny of the

20     record than we have been able to do thus far.

21             JUDGE MORRISON:  Well, further to that, Mr. Tieger, isn't this a

22     matter to be reconsidered at the conclusion of any cross-examination as

23     to his answers?

24             MR. TIEGER:  That's a very good point, Your Honour.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Ostojic.

Page 45212

 1             MR. OSTOJIC:  Thank you, Mr. President and Your Honours.  We have

 2     nothing to add on the point.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll consider this issue when the

 4     cross-examination will have been over.

 5             But do we have any clue when we'll have the cross-examination of

 6     this witness?

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  We have agreed on the date of

 8     the 22nd of January for the cross-examination if that is suitable to the

 9     Chamber.

10             JUDGE KWON:  22nd.  Very well.  Then we'll continue with the

11     cross-examination of Mr. Beara on the 22nd.

12             Mr. Beara, on behalf of the Chamber, I'd like to thank you for

13     your assistance.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I understand.  Thank

15     you.

16             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber will have a break for about -- is

17     20 minutes sufficient for a break?

18             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 45213

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Let us see how it evolves.  We'll have a break for

 2     20 minutes.

 3                           --- Recess taken at 10.51 a.m.

 4                           [The witness stands down]

 5                           --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.

 6                           [The witness takes the stand]

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Good morning, Mr. Stakic.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Honours.  Good

 9     morning to the Prosecution, to Mr. Karadzic and his Defence team.

10             JUDGE KWON:  And for the record, I note the presence of

11     Mr. Ostojic to assist Mr. Stakic.

12             Although the witness is present, I'd like to deal with three

13     matters.

14             Please bear with us, Mr. Stakic, for a moment.

15             The Chamber will first turn to the accused's "Precautionary

16     Rule 94 bis Notice:  Marko Sladojevic," filed yesterday and on which the

17     Chamber heard oral submissions yesterday.  The Chamber finds it

18     unnecessary to wait till the English translation will be completed.  In

19     conclusion, the Chamber does not agree that Mr. Sladojevic should be

20     compared to Prosecution witnesses Jean-Rene Ruez and Dean Manning who

21     both participated on the ground and in investigations and exhumations and

22     who could testify as fact witnesses as to what they saw at the time and

23     the process through which the Prosecution evidence was collected.  The

24     Chamber also recalls that Mrs. Hanson and Mr. Nielsen testified as expert

25     witnesses, and therefore the comparison with Mr. Sladojevic is

Page 45214

 1     inadequate.  Furthermore, the Chamber is of the view that Mr. Sladojevic,

 2     in his report, seemed to have conducted the kind of analysis which is

 3     typically addressed by parties in their final briefs or closing

 4     arguments.  The Chamber would not be assisted at all by allowing this

 5     type of compilation from a team member of one of the parties to be

 6     admitted on the record.  The Chamber will therefore not allow

 7     Mr. Sladojevic to be heard as a witness in these proceedings and will not

 8     admit his study entitled, and I quote, "Thus Spoke Radovan Karadzic" into

 9     evidence.

10             Second, the Chamber is seized of the accused's request for oral

11     testimony during sentencing case, also filed yesterday.  In this request,

12     the accused asked that the Chamber receive oral testimony during the

13     sentencing phase of his case and that such evidence be heard upon the

14     conclusion of any witnesses called by the Chamber.  The Chamber recalls

15     that during the Status Conference of 3rd of September, 2012, it reminded

16     the Defence that the Defence 65 ter witness list should identify all the

17     witnesses it intended to call, including sentencing witnesses.  In its, I

18     quote, "Decision on Time Allocated to the Accused for the Presentation of

19     his Case," issued on the 19th of September, 2012, the Chamber made it

20     clear that the 300 hours initially granted to him would be for the direct

21     examination and re-examination of all of his witnesses.  This remains the

22     Chamber's position and no additional time will be granted to the accused

23     to present oral evidence related to sentencing.

24             It is for the accused to decide how to spend the remainder of his

25     time, and should he decide to spend all or some of his time on sentencing

Page 45215

 1     matters, the Chamber would not interfere with that decision as long as it

 2     considers the evidence to be of relevance.  However, any such

 3     sentencing-related evidence should be presented before the end of Defence

 4     case and within the 325 hours allocated to the accused.

 5             Third, the Chamber will issue its oral ruling on the "Mladic

 6     Motion for Access to Trial Audio Recordings in Karadzic Case," filed

 7     confidentially by the Mladic Defence on the 16th of December, 2013.  In

 8     this motion, the Mladic Defence requests access to all trial audio

 9     recordings from the Karadzic case, noting that it has already been

10     granted access to closed and private session trial transcript from this

11     case.

12             The Chamber notes that on the 16th of December, 2013, the

13     accused's legal advisor informed the Chamber and the parties via e-mail

14     that he would not be filing a response to this motion.  The Chamber has

15     not heard from the Prosecution or the Registry but is of the view that it

16     can issue this oral decision nevertheless, particularly given the

17     submission in paragraph 6 of the motion in which the Mladic Defence

18     recounts the discussion it has had with the Registry on this issue.

19             As pointed out by the Mladic Defence, the Chamber recalls that,

20     on the 8th of November, 2012, it issued a decision allowing Mladic -

21     pursuant to Rules 54, 70, and 75 - access to all closed and private

22     session transcripts from this case which are not subject to Rule 70 or

23     delayed disclosure and which are produced in the pre-trial and trial

24     proceedings.  Accordingly, given the broad access that Mladic Defence

25     already has to confidential information from this case, the Chamber will

Page 45216

 1     grant the request outlined in the motion pursuant to the same Rules.  The

 2     Chamber reminds the Mladic Defence, the parties in this case, and the

 3     Registry, that those parts of paragraph 20 of the access decision of the

 4     8th of November, 2012, which apply to the transcripts of the proceedings,

 5     shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the audio recordings.

 6             Final, the Chamber notes that the Mladic Defence filed this

 7     motion confidentially.  The Chamber could discern no reason on the face

 8     of the motion for its confidential status.  It therefore orders the

 9     Registry to reclassify it as public.  The Registry is requested to

10     communicate this decision to the Mladic Defence.

11             Having said that, I would like Mr. Karadzic to proceed.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13                           WITNESS:  MILOMIR STAKIC [Resumed]

14                           [Witness answered through interpreter]

15                           Examination by Mr. Karadzic: [Continued]

16        Q.   [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Stakic.

17        A.   Good morning.

18        Q.   What I still need to do is read a short summary of your

19     statement, and then I will probably hand you over to the Prosecutor.

20             [In English] Dr. Milomir Stakic appeared on the SDS list for the

21     first multi-party elections in BH as an independent candidate.  On

22     18th of November, 1990, he was elected deputy in the Prijedor Municipal

23     Assembly, and on the 4th of January, 1991, he was appointed

24     vice-president of the Assembly.  He held the posts of president of the

25     Assembly of the Serbian people in Prijedor municipality, president of the

Page 45217

 1     Prijedor municipality, and president of the Crisis Staff of Prijedor

 2     municipality.

 3             After the multi-party elections of BH in 1990, the authorities in

 4     Prijedor were constituted from members of the SDA, SDS, and HDZ, in

 5     accordance with an agreement on the republican revel.  On

 6     4th of January, 1991, the new multi-party Assembly of the municipality of

 7     Prijedor was constituted.

 8             In September 1991, the Territorial Defence and the

 9     5th Kozara Brigade were mobilised.  This caused a great rift among the

10     peoples because Serbs responded to the mobilisation while the Muslims

11     largely avoided this obligation.  When the SDA started calling on the

12     Muslims not to go into the army, the rift became for more pronounced.

13             A great influx of refugees occurred after the conflict in Croatia

14     started.  These were refugees of Serbian ethnicity.  The influx primarily

15     caused a great economic problem.  In addition, it caused a great

16     commotion among the inhabitants of Prijedor, owing to the events in

17     World War II and the suffering of the Serbian people.

18             As of the autumn of 1991, there was more and more talk about the

19     illegal armament of the Muslims, while the Patriotic League and the

20     Green Berets had already been mentioned earlier.  Throughout the autumn,

21     the SDS maintained contacts with the SDA and HDZ on both the political

22     party level and in the organs in which they worked together.  However,

23     the increasing tension led to the foundation of the Serbian Municipal

24     Assembly of Prijedor and of the Prijedor SDS Crisis Staff on 7th of

25     January, 1992.  The basic task of the Prijedor Crisis Staff was to follow

Page 45218

 1     the situation and events in and around Prijedor which were significant to

 2     the life of the citizens.

 3             On 17th of January, 1992, a decision was reached for Prijedor to

 4     join the Autonomous Region of Krajina since Banja Luka was the centre

 5     towards which Prijedor gravitated economically and politically.  The

 6     municipalities never considered the ARK a creation whose documents should

 7     be binding for the municipal authorities.

 8             On 30th of April, Mr. Stakic learned from Simo Miskovic that

 9     Alija Delimustafic ordered the MUP to commence combat operations.  Given

10     the circumstances, it was decided that control ought to be taken of the

11     town and that should be done by storm in order to avoid bloodshed.

12     Everything was accomplished without a single bullet fired and none of the

13     inhabitants was killed or even wounded.

14             The basic goal of the authorities in Prijedor was to preserve

15     peace and avoid an armed conflict.  However, already in the beginning of

16     May 1992, a Serbian policeman was killed.  Nevertheless, the relatives of

17     the killed policeman opted for revenge and killed four persons of Muslim

18     ethnicity.  This led to the introduction of a curfew and to a request to

19     surrender illegal weapons.  This appeal referred also to the citizens of

20     Serbian ethnicity.

21             The next attack happened in Hambarine on 22nd of May, 1992.  Two

22     days later, on 24th of May, an army column was again attacked on the

23     Banja Luka-Prijedor road, from the direction of Kozarac.  On

24     30th of May, 1992, members of Muslim forces carried out an organised,

25     concentrated, and simultaneous attack against Prijedor, which was

Page 45219

 1     successfully repelled.

 2             During the fighting in Kozarac, a group of civilians turned up,

 3     moving in the direction of the town.  The army let them through.  Due to

 4     the large number of civilians in town, it was decided that they were --

 5     they be directed towards Trnopolje.

 6             The population started moving out from Prijedor already in

 7     February and March 1992.  The main reason for moving out were the

 8     constant clashes, the lack of electric power, water, and basic food

 9     provisions.  Even after the main Muslim forces in the territory of

10     Prijedor had been dispersed, there were many small and large groups

11     remaining which constantly clashed with members of the VRS and the

12     police.  Nevertheless, Muslims and Croats lived in the territory of

13     Prijedor throughout the entire war.  It was never the plan of the

14     municipal authorities of Prijedor to be a single-ethnicity municipality.

15             Dr. Stakic met Dr. Karadzic several times during the war.  He

16     never heard him advocating the deportation of the Muslims and the Croats,

17     or the creation of a mono-ethnic Serbian state.

18             And that's the summary.  And at that moment I do not have

19     questions for Dr. Stakic.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

21             Mr. Stakic, as you have noted, your evidence in chief in this

22     case has been admitted in writing; that is, through your written

23     statement.  Now you'll be cross-examined by the representative of the

24     Office of the Prosecutor.  I take it you understand that?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I understand that.

Page 45220

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honours.  And good morning.

 3                           Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

 4        Q.   And good morning, Dr. Stakic.

 5        A.   Good morning, madam.

 6        Q.   Dr. Stakic, in your statement you acknowledge that you knew at

 7     the time of two major crimes committed by Bosnian Serb police and

 8     military forces against non-Serbs in Prijedor.  The first is the massacre

 9     of dozens of Keraterm detainees by military, and that's at paragraph 24

10     of your statement; and the other one is another massacre of Muslims, this

11     time by police officers, Muslims who were leaving Prijedor in a convoy at

12     Koricanske Stijene, and that's at paragraph 30.

13             And my question, Dr. Stakic, is:  Aside from what you knew then,

14     what you know now, as you sit here today, is that, in fact, the police

15     and the army committed far more crimes against Muslims and Croats in

16     Prijedor in 1992.  They detained thousands of them in horrific conditions

17     where they were subjected to torture and mistreatment, killed hundreds

18     and hundreds of them, and destroyed their property on a massive scale.

19     You know that now as you sit here today; right?

20             THE ACCUSED:  May I just warn that "killed hundreds and hundreds"

21     had been translated "thousands and thousands."

22             JUDGE KWON:  If there's any difference, yes, it's "hundreds and

23     hundreds."  Yes, shall we continue?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer now?

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 45221

 1        Q.   Please.

 2        A.   When I gave a statement to the members of Mr. Karadzic's Defence

 3     team, I stated this on the basis of the knowledge that I had then,

 4     because these two things that happened were terrible.  They are not less

 5     terrible than the others, but all the other citizens of Prijedor heard

 6     about that.  It wasn't only me as president of the Municipal Assembly.

 7     You do know that I was at this trial, and during that trial and over all

 8     those years, although I'm in prison and I don't have much information

 9     from the ground, but during that trial I found out about many other

10     crimes that did happen, unfortunately, in the municipality of Prijedor.

11     And I agree with what is written in the trial judgement and the appeals

12     judgement with regard to these crimes.

13             And may I say straight away, that I personally or my defence

14     during the trial before this court - my trial, that is - we never tried

15     to deny or underestimate these crimes.  Quite simply, we showed that that

16     I was not a big player or the main player.  I also agree with the

17     statement made by the Trial Chamber in paragraph 616 in the trial

18     judgement in my case.  But again, may I say that I do not agree with

19     those parts where it says that I'm the person in charge and that I'm

20     responsible for all these crimes.

21             I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound

22     regret, which I did express during my own trial, for everything that was

23     done to my fellow citizens in that period of time.

24        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Stakic.  That was a helpful but somewhat

25     roundabout answer.  I take it you agree with my summary of events in

Page 45222

 1     Prijedor in 1992, that the police and the army committed mass crime

 2     against Muslims and Croats in Prijedor, detentions, torture,

 3     mistreatment, and killings; is that right?

 4        A.   I think perhaps I was a bit lengthy in my answer, but I did say

 5     that these two crimes are horrible in themselves, but the other ones you

 6     mention are even more horrific, and they really happened.  All I can do

 7     is express my regret, once again, that it happened.  But as I was trying

 8     to say, at that time I did not know of all these crimes that were going

 9     on.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now at paragraph 16 of your statement, you describe

11     the 30th of April, 1992, SDS take-over of Prijedor as a reaction to a fax

12     from Mr. Delimustafic, dated the 29th of April, 1992.  And at

13     paragraph 33, you deny that the take-over was prepared well in advance of

14     the 1st of May, 1992.  And in fact, Dr. Stakic, the Prijedor SDS had been

15     planning the take-over of Prijedor well before the 29th of April and that

16     29th of April telex was simply a trigger which accelerated the timing of

17     the take-over; right?

18        A.   At that moment, I was not aware that the SDS was planning any

19     take-over.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could look at D1830, please.

21        Q.   And as you can see, Dr. Stakic, these are the minutes of the SDS

22     Municipal Board dated the 23rd of April, 1992.  And if you look at

23     point 5, towards the bottom of the page, it states a decision was taken

24     "to immediately start working on the take-over, the co-ordination with

25     the JNA, notwithstanding."

Page 45223

 1             Now that reflects that the SDS was planning to take-over the

 2     municipality well before receiving the 29th of April fax; right?

 3        A.   I can look at that paragraph, but I should like to ask you to

 4     read the whole document.  At the beginning there is a reference to who

 5     took part in the discussion, and the names are listed.  And you don't see

 6     my name there.  I can't say for sure whether I was at that session or

 7     not, because I didn't attend all the sessions.  But from this, you can't

 8     see that I discussed anything.  People were saying all sorts of things,

 9     and when I myself was looking for documents, I found another record, a

10     longer one of that session, where Mr. Drljaca -- it's an extended

11     document, P0041716 is the number.  And 0041719.  Simo Drljaca says:

12             "We and Simo Miskovic were told today at the barracks that we

13     would be arrested."

14             And you see they are coming, and if somebody is threatening them

15     there, I don't see how that can be called co-operation.

16             Anyway, I'm just telling you my personal view.  I had no

17     impression and no knowledge that any take-over is being prepared.  And on

18     that day, 29 April, as I said in paragraph 16, I was in my office doing

19     my usual job as vice president of the Municipal Assembly.  I stayed there

20     until 4.00 p.m. and then went home.

21        Q.   Okay.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could have 65 ter 05787, please.

23        Q.   And while that's coming up, Dr. Stakic, I see you have your

24     statement in front of you and some other documents, and I will be

25     referring to your statement so it's helpful that you have it.  If you'd

Page 45224

 1     like to refer to any other documents besides your statement, if you could

 2     please inform us.  Thank you.

 3        A.   Thank you.

 4        Q.   Now this is a 28th of April, 1994, "Kozarski Vjesnik" article,

 5     which includes an interview with you.  We can see your photo there.

 6        A.   Yes.

 7        Q.   If you could look to the bottom, the last paragraph at the very

 8     bottom left-hand corner of the screen.  If that could be blown up for

 9     you.  So that paragraph at the -- in the bottom left-hand corner, it

10     starts with you stating:

11             "What happened on the 30th of April, 1992, was only the final act

12     of a long-standing, but for the Serbs, perilous plan."

13             Now, this is what you told "Kozarski Vjesnik" about the

14     30th of April take-over, that it was the final act of a long-standing

15     plan; correct?

16        A.   Let me read this.  It says:

17             "What happened on the 30th of April was just the finale of a plan

18     long in the making fatal to the Serbs."

19             So it means "fatal to the Serbs."  I don't know how that was

20     translated into English.  Because it relates to the fax that we received,

21     where they proclaimed the beginning of combat against Serb forces.

22        Q.   And this statement you made reflects, does it not, not only the

23     advanced planning of the take-over but your knowledge of the fact that

24     that take-over was planned in advance; right?

25        A.   I'm sorry.  I don't know how this statement of mine was

Page 45225

 1     translated into English.  I would like the -- to ask the interpreters to

 2     interpret it.  I said:

 3             "What happened on the 30th of April was just the finale of a plan

 4     long in the making that was fatal to the Serbs."

 5             "A plan," meaning prepared by the HDZ and the SDA and that they

 6     revealed in the fax sent by the minister of the interior.  I didn't say

 7     here that Serbs had been preparing anything for a long time.  And I say

 8     further that they had been arming themselves secretly, sewing uniforms,

 9     et cetera.  And later on I got hold of some information seized by the

10     army and the police, documents from which we saw that they had indeed

11     been preparing a long time for that, and later on in the newspapers they

12     tried to deny that fax.

13        Q.   Okay.

14             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to the next page in the B/C/S and

15     stay on the same page in the English.

16        Q.   And I'd like to direct your attention to the very top left-hand

17     corner in the B/C/S.  And here you refer to the Muslims secretly arming

18     themselves, making uniforms with the symbol of the lily, building

19     strongholds in Kozara.  Then you say:

20             "But we were not just sitting there idle.  When we saw what they

21     were doing, we began to arm ourselves and to tell the party members what

22     they were planning to do to us and what has to be done to prevent 1941

23     happening all over again."

24             Now in your statement you emphasize the arming and organising

25     activities of the Muslim side, but you don't say anything about such

Page 45226

 1     activities on the Serb side.  But in this article, you acknowledged that

 2     the Serbs were indeed arming themselves with your knowledge and support;

 3     right?

 4        A.   A moment ago I was able to see the date of this statement I made

 5     to the press.  What is the date?

 6        Q.   This is the 28th of April, 1994.

 7        A.   You know, I said a moment ago as well that when I was giving this

 8     statement, I was trying to describe the knowledge that I had then in that

 9     period, from January until October 1992.  And this is 1994.  During the

10     war, our officers spoke to the radio, to the newspapers, and our police

11     did too.  And from the things they said, I learnt that they had also been

12     working to arm Serbian people.  But that's something I learned later.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to page --

14             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.  Ms. Gustafson, do you agree that

15     English translation that we have is not correct?  First page.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, I understood it to be slightly different,

17     but I didn't --

18             JUDGE KWON:  It's not "Serb plan," it's "perilous plan to

19     Serbs" --

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yeah, "for the Serbs."

21             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  We will request a revision of this translation.

23             And if we could move to page 2 of the English and move down the

24     page, about two-thirds of the way down the page in the B/C/S, still on

25     the far left-hand side.  And this is about a third of the way down in the

Page 45227

 1     English.

 2        Q.   You state here:

 3             "We knew they were armed mainly with zoljas, infantry weapons,

 4     and wasps, but we had better military potential and our lads were brave

 5     and bold."

 6             Now, here you acknowledged that the Serb side was better armed

 7     than the Muslim side.  And that's true as well, isn't it?

 8        A.   I can repeat once again:  This is something I learned later.  The

 9     commander of the brigade which participated in the fighting gave an

10     interview describing which units took part, with what weapons and

11     equipment.  So in 1994, I already knew about these things.  But in March,

12     April, May 1992, I did not have that information because nobody owed it

13     to me to inform me, nor was I superior to the army or the police for them

14     to report to me about the equipment and assets they dispose of.

15        Q.   Okay.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go back to page 1 of the English

17     and back up to the top of the page in the B/C/S.

18        Q.   And this is about six lines down in the B/C/S and two-thirds of

19     the way down in the English.  You state:

20             "On the direction of the central office of the SDS, we formed the

21     Serbian Assembly of Prijedor on 7th January 1992, and I became chairman."

22             Now, this is a reflection of the fact that you established the

23     Serbian Assembly in Prijedor pursuant to republic level SDS instructions;

24     in particular, the Variant A and B instructions; correct?

25        A.   I said that in my statement.  The SDS president convened the

Page 45228

 1     session.  I believe that was before this 7th of January.  I believe it

 2     was in December.  And at that session, he showed us that document.  The

 3     document was not copied and distributed to everybody.  He just showed it

 4     to us and read it out, saying that there are Variants A and B.  One of

 5     them does not apply to us because we did not have the majority in the

 6     Assembly.  The other one applies to us, and we should follow that other

 7     variant and organise the Serbian Assembly in that municipality.

 8        Q.   Thank you.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I tender this article.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President, the first two pages of this

12     would be admitted, but there is another article and the rest of it that

13     probably shouldn't be admitted.

14             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes, that makes sense.  Thank you.

15             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll admit this part of the article.  Yes.

16             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit Number P6581, Your Honours.

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:

18        Q.   Now, Dr. Stakic --

19             JUDGE KWON:  Now, by the way --

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I'm sorry.

21             JUDGE KWON:  -- I take it the parties were informed of the

22     extended sitting schedule that was planned.  Okay.  It was just sent.

23     But you will stick to the three hours allocated to you, Ms. Gustafson?

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, I -- I certainly intend to.  It's always

25     difficult to predict these things with certainty, but I would note that

Page 45229

 1     even with the three hours, it doesn't seem -- seems like it may be very

 2     difficult to finish today.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Please do your best to conclude your cross in three

 4     hours.  And I -- for the Defence, it will have less than 40 or 50 minutes

 5     for the redirect, if we are to conclude Mr. Stakic's evidence today at

 6     all.

 7             MR. ROBINSON:  Between 40 and 50 minutes?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  My calculation, yes.

 9             MR. ROBINSON:  That should be okay.

10             JUDGE KWON:  So we will sit until 4.00 today.

11             Let's continue.

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

13        Q.   Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 18 you describe an attack on a military

14     vehicle carrying five VRS members in Hambarine on the 22nd of May, 1992.

15     And you describe a similar attack on Kozarac -- attacking Kozarac on the

16     24th of May.  And you state: "These attacks were responded to."

17             Now, with respect to events in Hambarine, the Crisis Staff --

18     Prijedor Crisis Staff issued an ultimatum to hand over the alleged

19     perpetrators of this incident, and stated that if this ultimatum was not

20     complied with, the Crisis Staff was no longer willing to guarantee the

21     safety of the population -- the civilian population of the area; correct?

22        A.   I agree with you and what's written in paragraph 18, with all due

23     respect.  As for that other part, I don't know.  To the best of my

24     knowledge, the Crisis Staff met for the first time on the 29th of May.

25     So it couldn't possibly issue this, nor was it within the purview of the

Page 45230

 1     Crisis Staff.  But maybe you have some other document saying the

 2     contrary.  But the fact is the Crisis Staff was established on the

 3     29th of May at a regular Assembly session, and I don't remember that it

 4     was convened specially because of these events.

 5             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to P3485, please.

 6        Q.   And I'd like to direct your attention to the article at the top

 7     right-hand side of this page in the B/C/S.  And this is a 29th of May,

 8     1992, "Kozarski Vjesnik" -- page from "Kozarski Vjesnik" which recites

 9     public statements of the Crisis Staff.  And this one on the top right is

10     a statement dated the 23rd of May, 1992.  And the column -- in the column

11     on the far right-hand side - and in the English this is the last two

12     paragraphs on the first page - it states that:

13             "The Crisis Staff hereby orders the population of Hambarine local

14     commune and other local communes in the area ... to hand over the

15     perpetrators of this crime ... by Saturday, the 23rd of May."

16             And the final paragraph states:

17             "This crime has exhausted all dead-lines and promises and the

18     Crisis Staff no longer can, nor is it willing to, guarantee the security

19     of the population of the above-mentioned villages in this area."

20        A.   I see now this article and it's signed "Crisis Staff."  You know,

21     in the Crisis Staff we also had a press officer or something to that

22     effect who had the right -- not only had the right, but it was his job to

23     meet with the media and issue press releases.  Sometimes he would sign

24     these releases "press officers," sometimes he would sign them

25     "Crisis Staff."  But if you ever saw a decision of the Crisis Staff

Page 45231

 1     itself, it's usually signed "president of the Crisis Staff" and my name

 2     underneath, because I was the president.  So this press release was made

 3     by the press officer, because the army had also spoken to the radio on

 4     the same day, and he made a statement on behalf of the Crisis Staff.

 5             Also, a moment ago mobilisation was mentioned.  The mobilisation

 6     call-ups are signed by the minister of defence, and we at the municipal

 7     level don't have the power to cancel it or prohibit it, but what we could

 8     do is address the press and appeal on the radio to all able-bodied men

 9     over 18 to respond to the call-up.  So this is not a decision or the

10     opinion of the Crisis Staff.  It's the opinion of the press officer.

11        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, when the perpetrators were not handed over by

12     the population of Hambarine, the army attacked the village, shelling the

13     village, attacking the population as a whole, and destroying the homes --

14     destroying homes of the Muslims who lived there; right?

15        A.   I learned and heard that these things happened during those days,

16     but I cannot tell you anything more about the extent and the substance of

17     that operation because they had no obligation to keep me informed about

18     what was really going on on the ground.

19        Q.   Now at paragraph 19 of your statement, you discuss the

20     30th of May attack against Prijedor town by Muslim forces, an attack

21     which you explained was repelled within a matter of hours.  What you

22     don't state anywhere in your statement is that after this attack was

23     repelled, the army virtually destroyed the largely Muslim neighbourhood

24     of Stari Grad in Prijedor town; right?

25        A.   You know what?  As I described it here, that night I was in the

Page 45232

 1     building of the Municipal Assembly when the attack started.  I heard the

 2     shooting.  And at first, I thought it was soldiers shooting in the air,

 3     as they usually do when they are going to the front line or coming back.

 4     But then stronger explosions started, like grenades and even stronger,

 5     around the Assembly building itself.  Then I went into the hallway, and

 6     the shooting was coming from the park, which was only 150 metres away

 7     from the building.  The few of us civilians who were in the building at

 8     that time were not armed, but fortunately, outside the municipality

 9     building there was a check-point manned by two or three soldiers or

10     policemen, I am not sure, who were armed.

11             And I don't know if you know what it looks like.  Next to the

12     municipal building, there is the police station, and they also had

13     reserve policemen there who were armed.  And shooting was heard from that

14     side as well.  It lasted until about 9.00, when I saw a tank, a Serbian

15     tank between the SUP building and our building, and I saw troops coming

16     in, and then they moved towards the park, the new buildings, and the --

17     the buildings and the new hotel where the explosions were coming from.

18     And they started moving towards Stari Grad, the old town.  I wasn't there

19     in the old town but I heard that it was considerably devastated.  I don't

20     know if the army really had to respond that way and use that kind of

21     force.  It's not up to me to judge.  I'm not a soldier.  I'm not

22     qualified.  But at any rate, it was not my purpose to devastate and

23     destroy the town.  There were socially owned buildings there, public

24     buildings, and there were Serb businesses and facilities that were

25     damaged or destroyed as well.

Page 45233

 1        Q.   You said that you "don't know if the army really had to respond

 2     that way and use that kind of force.  It's not up to me to judge.  I'm

 3     not a soldier."  But in fact, you called a military expert in your case,

 4     a US general, General Wilmot, and I'd like to remind you of what he said

 5     in response to questions from your lawyer in your trial.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And this has been uploaded at 65 ter 25618.

 7        Q.   He was asked the question:

 8             "Help me with this:  Also the military at this point, did they

 9     continue to pursue or were they in pursuit of the 'enemy' as a result of

10     the May 30th, 1992, attack upon the city/town of Prijedor?"

11             And he answered:

12             "Yes, they did pursue the attacking forces, but they also stopped

13     in I guess I would describe it as a suburb neighbourhood.  I've never

14     been there so I don't know exactly how to describe it.  Called Stari

15     Grad, is it?  And they decimated that neighbourhood which is contrary to

16     the rules of land warfare and probably criminal action if one would take

17     a look at it, and if certain -- and if authorities would examine what

18     happened there, it was an atrocity, and something that the army should

19     have been brought to account on."

20             Now, that was what your defence military expert said about what

21     the army did in Stari Grad after they repelled this attack; correct?

22        A.   Well, I don't remember exactly what he said, with all due

23     respect.  I trust what you've said, that you're reading it out as he said

24     it.  As you said yourself, he's a military expert.  He can say that.

25     However, I cannot.  I was not at the old town.  I heard that it was

Page 45234

 1     destroyed in that operation.  And I said a moment ago I don't know

 2     whether there was that use of force, this excessive use of force, as this

 3     expert said, or whether it was proportionate.  I really wouldn't want to

 4     go into all of that.

 5             You see, once again, I'm saying:  I'm 50 years old now.  At that

 6     time, I was only 29 years old.  I was just a new, inexperienced doctor,

 7     politically unqualified, naive, not to speak of the military and the

 8     police.  These were not departments that were within my line of work.  I

 9     was not in charge of them on the basis of any documents, and especially

10     in view of my age and lack of experience, I could not have any kind of

11     supervision over the army or could I exert any kind of pressure over

12     them.

13             I just tried here, this paragraph -- I just happened to be there,

14     so I'm speaking as a witness, and I saw what was happening around me.

15     Because later on I did find out, but I really didn't want to go into all

16     of that.  Also, on the under -- on the other side, where the underpass

17     is, there were wounded people.  And then the commander of the military

18     got killed near Kozarski Vjesnik, and also many policemen were killed at

19     the bridge.  Later on I found out that the attackers had come over the

20     Sana because the bridge was guarded by the military and the police, and

21     they came from the direction of the old town.  And apparently, they were

22     withdrawing at that point.  But I'm telling you all of this as a citizen

23     who heard later about what was going on.

24             I don't want underestimate the report of that expert.  Namely,

25     that what happened there did happen.  I'm not trying to diminish it.  I'm

Page 45235

 1     not trying to deny it.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

 3             Ms. Gustafson, can you scroll back to lines 1 of this page,

 4     page 36.  It's part of your reading from that expert's testimony, "called

 5     Stari Grad, is it," and the afterwards, probably because you read too

 6     fast, something is missing, before you referred to criminal action.  I

 7     heard -- I remember something to the effect of that's contrary to warfare

 8     or something?  Could you read it again slowly?

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Certainly.

10             "And they decimated that neighbourhood, which is contrary to the

11     rules of land warfare and probably criminal action ..."

12             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you.

14        Q.   Now, Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 51 of your statement you comment on

15     adjudicated fact 1267, relating to the destruction of non-Serb

16     settlements, and you said that, as far as you were aware, it was not just

17     Muslim homes that were destroyed.  And you gave the example of

18     Mr. Srdjo Srdic [phoen], a Serb, and you state that his house which was

19     in the immediate vicinity of the municipal building was damaged during

20     the combat activities.

21             Now, Mr. Srdic provided evidence about the destruction -- or the

22     damage to his home that the Defence has submitted, and this is what he

23     said about it.

24             "Mine was the only Serb house in Prijedor that was burnt down.

25     They wanted to kill me.  They wanted to liquidate me.  And the proof of

Page 45236

 1     that is that they threw an explosive device on my balcony, and prior to

 2     that they put 'SDA' on it.  But this was not done by a Muslim."

 3             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And that's at D2265, page 24.

 4        Q.   Now it's clear from Mr. Srdic's evidence that his house wasn't

 5     damaged in the course of combat.  He was singled out among Serbs in

 6     Prijedor and his home was specifically targeted for personal reasons;

 7     right?

 8        A.   I don't know about that statement of Mr. Srdic's.  I remember

 9     that he used to come to the Municipal Assembly.  You know, down there at

10     the executive board, there is this department for property-related

11     matters.  First of all, he wanted to prove that it was his house --

12     actually, he lived in another house.  And this is a shop.  It's right in

13     front of the Municipal Assembly building.  It's not even 50 metres away.

14     I mean, I was not watching all the time because I sought shelter behind a

15     wall.  I wasn't looking through the window.  I didn't want to be hit

16     myself.  I don't know whether it was hit by a Muslim tank or a Serb

17     zolja.  I'm not going into all of that.  But during that fighting, the

18     shop was damaged because these are houses that share walls.  These are

19     not stand-alone houses.  They're attached.  You can see that if you go

20     out into the ground.  It's 50 metres from the entrance into the

21     Municipal Assembly.

22             And here my answer pertains to that.  I mean, I'm not denying

23     that -- well, Stari Grad, the old town, as far as I know, had a majority

24     Muslim population, and these houses were destroyed.  I, as a human being,

25     can just express my regret for the fact that these buildings were

Page 45237

 1     destroyed, as I did then.  But Mr. Srdic came to speak to us and he said

 2     that he would be seeking damages.  Also, these people from Kozarac, a

 3     delegation came to see me, and they came to report the damage that had

 4     been sustained by their houses.  Now, what he personally thinks, I really

 5     wouldn't want to go into that.

 6        Q.   Okay, now you're -- I'd like to ask you now about Trnopolje, the

 7     facility you speak about in your statement.  As I understand it, your

 8     evidence is that during and after the attack on Kozarac, the civilians

 9     fled the area, the army allowed them to pass.  They arrived in Prijedor

10     town and then someone directed them to Trnopolje, which you refer to as a

11     holding centre.  And that's paragraphs 18 and 22.

12             And so now as I understand it, your position is that this

13     movement of civilians out of Kozarac and to Trnopolje was a movement that

14     happened on their own, they moved on their own, and they moved

15     voluntarily to Trnopolje; is that right?

16        A.   Can I read this once again and see what is written here?  With

17     all due respect, I don't see that I say at any point that these people

18     voluntarily, and so on and so forth, madam.  I'm saying here this

19     information that I received.  I set out in the morning, I left my parents

20     house, and they live in the village of Mariska, and that is where I had

21     moved my wife and my young child.  Why?  Because there was no

22     electricity.  My parents didn't have any electricity either but they live

23     in the country, so they have a well.  They also have a stove that is

24     fired by wood.  I'm sorry for saying all of this right now.  And at the

25     check-point the police said:  No, you cannot pass this way because there

Page 45238

 1     is fighting underway.  And then I took the roundabout way by Rakelici and

 2     Cela.  I arrived in Prijedor.  By the time I got to work it was - I don't

 3     know - about midday.  And --

 4        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt but my time is very limited and I think

 5     you're more or less repeating what's in your statement.  Let me try to

 6     ask it in a clearer way.  I think my question could have been clearer.  I

 7     take it your position is that the Muslims of Kozarac went -- ended up in

 8     Trnopolje and they went there on their own.  Nobody captured them and put

 9     them there; is that right?

10        A.   No, Madam, I do apologise, but that is not written in my

11     statement, that they did this voluntarily.  I'm trying to explain to you

12     how it was that I found out about this.  Because in some statement out

13     there, I mean, in some report that appeared later by the MUP, they claim

14     that the Crisis Staff founded Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm, you know,

15     and they are not referring to any date or the number of that decision or

16     whatever.  I'll telling you how it was that I learned about this.  I'm

17     not saying it was voluntary at all.

18             There were operations going on there.  It's the army then, that

19     there, at the front line, opened a passageway, if that's the right word,

20     and then they let these people get to town, because they had set out

21     towards town from Kozarac.  And then, the people I worked with at the

22     Assembly told me that they had arrived during the night and that they

23     were staying in two buildings in town.  And most of them were called upon

24     to stay with their relatives, friends.  There were people with mixed

25     marriages and so on and so forth.  I don't know who took these people in.

Page 45239

 1     At one point in time, when the police realised that these buildings were

 2     overcrowded, they took buses.

 3             Once again, they asked these people whether anybody had some

 4     private apartment or house to stay at with someone, and then they got

 5     these other people who had fled from Kozarac from the fighting, and then

 6     they channeled them towards Trnopolje.

 7             I never said - and I don't want to say it now, too, and I don't

 8     want this to be put to me - that they went voluntarily.  What happened to

 9     them is really sad and I regret it.  But I'm not saying we did not make

10     any decision about this Trnopolje.  We did not plan this Trnopolje.  At

11     least, I did not take part in that and I'm not aware of any such thing.

12     I'm not saying then and I'm not saying now that they voluntarily left

13     their homes in order to go somewhere, even if you call it a holding

14     centre or whatever.

15        Q.   Okay.  Your position on that is now clear.  Thank you.  Now you

16     said that you never said they went voluntarily, "what happened to them is

17     really sad, and I regret it.  But I'm not saying we did not make any

18     decision about this, Trnopolje.  We did not plan this Trnopolje."

19             And what the Crisis Staff did do, Dr. Stakic, is control the

20     manner in which people could be released from Trnopolje, didn't it?

21        A.   The Crisis Staff to control this?  This Trnopolje was not under

22     the Crisis Staff.  And as far as I know, Mr. Kuruzovic,

23     Slobodan Kuruzovic, was appointed on behalf of the army, and those who

24     appointed him were supposed to receive reports from him in terms of what

25     was going on in the centre.  It's not that I was supposed to receive

Page 45240

 1     reports or the Crisis Staff.  It is a fact that people, but mainly from

 2     the Red Cross, the local Red Cross that was down there, they did address

 3     the Crisis Staff.  But they were asking for assistance in terms of food,

 4     medicine, medical supplies, and later on oil because they also organised

 5     the transportation for these unfortunate people.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P2915, please.

 7        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, you can see that about two-thirds of the way

 8     down the page there it says:  A summary of conclusions, orders, and

 9     decisions adopted by the Crisis Staff from the 29th of May to the

10     24th of July.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to page 3 in both languages.

12        Q.   And near the top in the B/C/S, in your -- towards the bottom in

13     the English, one of the conclusions it refers to is conclusion number

14     01-1-023-45/92 of the 2nd of July, 1992, forbidding the individual

15     release of persons from Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm.

16             A moment ago you referred to the Red Cross coming to the

17     Crisis Staff asking for assistance in terms of food, medicine, and oil.

18     This decision summarised here reflects the Crisis Staff's control over

19     the manner in which people are released from this facility where you

20     acknowledge people were held in a very sad state.  Isn't that right?

21        A.   In this question of yours, there are several assertions, several

22     sub-questions, if you will, but I will try to answer as clear as

23     possible.  First of all, to the best of my knowledge, then and now, as

24     far as Omarska and Keraterm are concerned, it was the police that was in

25     charge.  As for Trnopolje, it was the army who was in charge.  How come,

Page 45241

 1     I do not know.  I cannot explain.

 2             Secondly, the Crisis Staff is a collective body.  There were

 3     11 of us there.  I explained to you a moment ago when I said that I was

 4     not present every time, because we would work one day and then I'd go

 5     home and then I'd come again, and if you look at the decisions of the

 6     Crisis Staff, you will see that only about 30 per cent were signed by me.

 7     So even if I was absent, it was enough to have six members there to pass

 8     a decision, out of the total of 11.  This word "conclusion," that's not

 9     an order.  We could not issue orders to the army or to the police in

10     terms of what they would do there.

11             Now, this is some kind of opinion on my part.  Sometimes, people

12     on the basis of certain interventions -- well, I know of

13     Dr. Beglerbegovic, I didn't even know that he had been arrested and it

14     just says that he released from Omarska because the people got together

15     and signed a petition for him to be released.  And then I know about a

16     former football player from Partizan, they called the chief of SUP and

17     then he was released too.  And so on.

18             To the best of my knowledge, it was the local Red Cross that

19     operated there and then later on the International Red Cross became

20     involved too.  And they turned to us for this kind of logistical support

21     as I said a moment ago.  I don't know what else I could really tell you

22     about this.

23        Q.   Well, Dr. Stakic, you are insisting - and you've done that

24     several times, that you -- these facilities were not operated by the

25     Crisis Staff, Trnopolje was operated by the army, and that you couldn't

Page 45242

 1     issue orders to them.  But this conclusion reflects the understanding of

 2     the Crisis Staff members at the time, that they had the power to forbid

 3     the individual release of persons from Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm;

 4     right?

 5        A.   Throughout all that time, and again I'm telling you that I could

 6     not issue any orders to Mr. Drljaca to release somebody or to keep him

 7     there.  I claim that with full responsibility.  I could have written an

 8     order a day, but none of those orders would have been binding on anybody.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Do Your Honours wish to take the break now?

10             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Given the circumstances, the Chamber is minded

11     to reduce the lunch break to 40 minutes.  We resume at 10 past 1.00.

12                           --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

13                           [The witness stands down]

14                           [The witness takes the stand]

15                           --- On resuming at 1.12 p.m.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honours.

18             And if I could have P2741, please.

19        Q.   Dr. Stakic, this is a 2nd of June, 1992, Prijedor Crisis Staff

20     decision on the release of imprisoned persons.  It orders the release of

21     various categories of persons, such as Serbs who have been imprisoned by

22     mistake, under Article 1; Article 4, all persons older than 60 for whom

23     an investigation has confirmed that they did not commit an offence, and a

24     few other categories.  And in the last article which is on the next page

25     in the English it says that the public security station is in charge

Page 45243

 1     implementing this decision, and the chief of SJB is personally

 2     responsible for it.  Now this -- if we go to the bottom of the page in

 3     the B/C/S, this document is signed by you; correct?

 4        A.   Yes, this is my signature.

 5        Q.   Now, just before the break you said:

 6             "I'm telling you that I could not issue any orders to Drljaca to

 7     release somebody or keep him there."

 8             That was at page 44.  But this document demonstrates you doing

 9     exactly that, you're ordering Drljaca to release certain categories of

10     prisoners; right?

11        A.   Well, if you will allow me, this is what I wanted to say when

12     answering your previous question.  Unfortunately, I was not the one who

13     established the Crisis Staff or the decided on its composition.  However,

14     what I realised during my trial in 2002, the secretary of the

15     Municipal Assembly was not a member of that Crisis Staff.  He was a

16     lawyer.  When I saw that ten years later during my trial and now 20 years

17     later, I can see that some of the things were established without any

18     foundation in the prevalent law and that's how things were drafted.

19     Mr. Drljaca was a lawyer and he worked for the police.  I didn't even

20     know that there were detained Serbs there.  It was only when we received

21     that information from him that I learned it, that some of them were army

22     and police members as is written here, and they had not responded to the

23     mobilisation call.

24             And in keeping with that, our position was that they should not

25     be there.  We wanted to avoid any problems in that centre.  And it's a

Page 45244

 1     fact.  However, this is a decision, not an order.  He could implement it

 2     or not.  As I have already told you, we had other examples of people who

 3     were moving out after having moved into an apartment illegally.  That's

 4     when we sought assistance of the police.  But it was not an order.  It

 5     was just a request on our part to seek the help of the police when it

 6     came to moving those people out.  And when you asked me just a while ago

 7     about certain individuals, it did happen, you know, that individuals

 8     would go to those centres and they would take people away for their own

 9     personal gain in order to extort money from them --

10        Q.   Dr. Stakic --

11        A.   -- and even sadder than that --

12        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you, I'm really not asking you about the

13     reasons why you issued this decision.  Just the fact that it was issued,

14     and if you could really try to focus on my specific questions because of

15     my time limitations.

16             Now, you said in your answer:

17             "It was just a request on our part to seek the help of the

18     police."

19             Now, this decision, as you can see in Article 6, states that the

20     public security station "shall be in charge of the implementation of this

21     decision and the chief of the public security station shall be deemed

22     personally responsible for it ..."

23             This is not phrased as a request, is it?  This is phrased in

24     mandatory terms; right?

25        A.   I'm not a lawyer, Madam, as you know.  But when I look at the

Page 45245

 1     title, it says "a decision," not "an order."  And as far as I knew then

 2     and now, Simo Drljaca was the person who was responsible.  He behaved the

 3     way he did, he reported to his superiors as to what he was doing.  He did

 4     not have to inform us.  There are other decisions of ours and our

 5     requests to which he responded.  Most often he would tell us:  Do your

 6     job.  Don't interfere with mine, gentlemen.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P2637, please.

 8        Q.   Now, as you can see, this is a 1st of July, 1992, SJB document

 9     sent to the Crisis Staff.  And the reference -- it refers to two, what it

10     says "your documents," presumably Crisis Staff documents.  And it states:

11             "In reference to your documents of the above numbers and dates,

12     we hereby inform you that ..."

13             And the first entry states that:

14             "Conclusion number 02-111-108/92, by which the release of

15     prisoners is prohibited is being fully observed."

16             Now this reflects, does it not, Mr. Drljaca's implementation of a

17     Crisis Staff decision prohibiting the release of prisoners and his report

18     back to the Crisis Staff to that effect?

19        A.   I would like to repeat once again -- or, rather, you didn't allow

20     me to finish a minute ago.  When it comes to those individuals, what we

21     meant was that those people, Serbs, if I may call them criminals, they

22     would go to those centres, they would take away individuals from there

23     for their own personal gain.  They would extort cars from them and money.

24     And the saddest thing of all is that they would not return them.  They

25     would kill them.  That was our objection.  It was not that we were

Page 45246

 1     interfering with their work, that they were not allowed to release

 2     prisoners.

 3             And then if you'll allow me, look at the last conclusion with

 4     regard to the establishment of the infamous intervention platoon.

 5     Together with the military police they --

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Stakic is reading too fast.

 7             JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] ...

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me tell you immediately --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Could you repeat.  Together with the --

10             THE ACCUSED:  Next page in English, please.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Yes, if we could go to the next page in the

12     English, to the top of the page.  I think that's what Dr. Stakic is

13     referring to now.

14        Q.   Dr. Stakic, I'm not sure what you're referring to --

15        A.   [Overlapping speakers] ...

16        Q.   I apologise for interrupting.  I am not sure what paper you have

17     now in front of you, but if I could ask you to focus on the document

18     that's on the screen and answer the question -- answer the questions

19     relating to that document.

20        A.   I'm looking at the same document, madam.  In the Serbian version

21     the paragraph is at the bottom of the page, and it's about the order

22     dated 17 June, whereby Mr. Drljaca answers that an integrated

23     intervention platoon was established.  And I claim with full

24     responsibility that I never learnt about its establishment.  I was never

25     informed about that at all.

Page 45247

 1        Q.   Well, Dr. Stakic, this document is directed to the Crisis Staff,

 2     and it states clearly that that intervention platoon was formed and gives

 3     information on what it has been doing.  Are you saying that you never

 4     received this document that was addressed to the Crisis Staff?

 5        A.   No, I never said that I did not receive the document.  I am

 6     saying -- and I have something that you probably have as well.  This is

 7     an order by the Crisis Staff on the establishment of that intervention

 8     platoon.  The number is D2039.  And another P0048598.  This is the

 9     original decision of the Crisis Staff.  I don't know whether you are able

10     to broadcast the document.

11        Q.   I'm not interested in that document at the moment, Dr. Stakic.

12     Let me ask you this:  In your statement at paragraph 21, you said that

13     the Crisis Staff could not give orders either to the army or the police.

14     And at paragraph 24, you said that Drljaca's most frequent answer to you

15     and others in the Crisis Staff was to leave him alone to do his job and

16     that you do yours.  And you've repeated that sentiment today.

17             This document paints a very different picture.  It reflects the

18     SJB reporting directly to the Crisis Staff on the implementation of a

19     number of Crisis Staff decisions, such as the release of prisoners, the

20     intervention platoons, closing catering establishments, prohibitions on

21     shooting.  This document is -- contradicts your position on the

22     Crisis Staff authority over the police, doesn't it?

23        A.   With all due respect, I don't agree with that assertion.  And I

24     am trying to ask you to read this document to see what was asked from

25     Mr. Drljaca, and then you look at his answer and you will see that his

Page 45248

 1     answer is completely different.  Answers to a different question -- or,

 2     rather, his answer is not truthful.  This is what I'm saying.

 3             As MPs in the Assembly and the Crisis Staff was just a -- the

 4     continuation of the Assembly.  It was a small-scale Assembly, if I may

 5     put it that way, and the chief of the public security station once a year

 6     submitted a report to the Assembly about the security situation in the

 7     municipality.  Since the Assembly MPs asked me to ask Simo Drljaca to

 8     write that report, he did it.  But what I'm saying is that what he wrote

 9     was one thing and his actions were different.  It was requested from him

10     to establish a platoon composed of 20 members of the police and

11     20 members of the army.  Look at his report.  He did not establish a

12     mixed platoon.  He claims that he has an intervention platoon which

13     co-operates with the army.  And it's an entirely different thing.  And

14     this is what I'm trying to say to you.

15             Once again, as far as I know, in Bosanska Krupa and in Samac, the

16     military and the police arrested the president of the municipality and

17     president of the Executive Board, and I have no information to the

18     contrary; i.e., that the president of the municipality arrested the chief

19     of the police or the commander of the -- of a unit.  It was absolutely

20     impossible according to our legislation.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Ms. Gustafson, this report from Drljaca about

22     prohibition of releasing prisoners is related to the conclusion we saw

23     earlier on today?

24             MS. GUSTAFSON:  No, I think it's a different conclusion

25     related --

Page 45249

 1             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  Date is --

 2             MS. GUSTAFSON:  -- to the same subject.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Date is different and the number is different.

 4             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Mm-hm.  No, I was just addressing the witness's

 5     claim that he couldn't issue any orders to Drljaca either to release or

 6     detain prisoners, and both of these documents contradict that.  But they

 7     don't relate to the same decision.  No, I agree.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:

10        Q.   Dr. Stakic, I'd like to go back to what you said in relation to

11     the Crisis Staff conclusion prohibiting the release of prisoners that's

12     reflected in this police document, and you said:

13             "When it comes to those individuals, what we meant was that these

14     people, Serbs, if I may call them criminals, they would go to those

15     centres, they would take away individuals from there for their own

16     personal gain.  They would extort them -- or cars from them or money, and

17     the saddest thing of all was that they would not return them.  They would

18     kill them.  That was our objection.  It was not that we were interfering

19     with their work, that they were not allowed to release prisoners."

20             That was at page 48.

21             So I take it that the Crisis Staff -- that you in the

22     Crisis Staff were aware at the time that people were going to centres

23     like Omarska, taking out prisoners, and killing them, yes?

24        A.   We had information to that effect.  And that was our attempt to

25     appeal to those people there to do their job.  If those people -- those

Page 45250

 1     wretched people were detained and if they were being interrogated as they

 2     claimed, they shouldn't allow such things to happen.  I'm sure that you

 3     have a document because I've seen it during my trial.  I had a report

 4     from Simo Drljaca - not me, but the Assembly - in which he claimed that

 5     only two individuals were killed in Omarska; i.e., not killed but died of

 6     natural causes, you know.  And he signed that report.  It was an official

 7     report.

 8             I wasn't there.  I couldn't go there.  I -- I did not have the

 9     means to carry out my own investigation.  What could I do at the moment

10     or what can I do now?  I can just express my regret for not having

11     resigned.  Eventually I did.  I did resign and my resignation was adopted

12     in January 1993.  That was one of the ways I expressed my

13     dissatisfaction.  Maybe I should have done it earlier when I first

14     realised that there was nothing I could do to prevent all those things

15     from happening.

16        Q.   So at paragraph 24 of your witness statement, when you -- where

17     you say that "at the time I knew about two natural deaths that occurred

18     at the Omarska centre but that is the only thing I know with regard to

19     Omarska," that's not really true, is it, because you're saying now that

20     you knew that people were -- Serbs were taking prisoners away and killing

21     them; right?

22        A.   I can only repeat word for word what I have just stated.  This is

23     what I received.  I provided my statement based on what I received from

24     Mr. Drljaca as an official report about how many people died there, but

25     we knew that from Keraterm and Trnopolje - and Trnopolje was the least

Page 45251

 1     protected of all - people would be taken away by armed individuals.  I

 2     don't know how many people were taken away.  I don't know who did it.

 3     But it did happen and this was our attempt to appeal to the police and to

 4     the security over there not to allow those things.

 5        Q.   Now at paragraph 20 of your statement, you refer to the decision

 6     on the organisation and work of Crisis Staff, which is P3536.  And

 7     Article 2 of that decision says that the Crisis Staff's responsibilities

 8     included co-ordinating the protection of safety of people and property.

 9     Now that accurately reflects the Crisis Staff's responsibilities towards

10     the safety and security of citizens of Prijedor; right?

11        A.   Do you have that document from which you quoted?  Can I see it?

12     I don't have any doubts that the way you quoted was correct, but I'd like

13     to see the document.

14        Q.   Yes.

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we can go to P3536, please.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What was the article that you

17     mentioned?

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:

19        Q.   It's Article 2, which refers to the Crisis Staff's responsibility

20     for, among other things, co-ordinating the protection of safety of people

21     and property.  You agree that that was among the Crisis Staff's

22     responsibilities?

23        A.   You know what, madam?  The Crisis Staff or the presidency -- and

24     the term "presidency" was reinstated.  I don't know why the term

25     "Crisis Staff" was introduced in the first place or at least I don't

Page 45252

 1     understand that.  These are the remains of the communist system.  At that

 2     time, we couldn't change the documents based on which such bodies were

 3     established.  And within that system, the entire population was military.

 4     We were all soldiers.  We were all duty-bound to participate in the

 5     country's defence.  We -- and this is why things were drafted the way

 6     they were.  Without any clear instructions to the effect that the

 7     Crisis Staff was subordinate to the police or the army.  The term used

 8     here is "co-ordination," but according to what I know, the Crisis Staff

 9     was not subordinate -- superior to the police forces and certainly not

10     the military forces.

11        Q.   Okay.  At the beginning of your testimony, you stated at page 24:

12             "I also agree with the statement made by the Trial Chamber in

13     paragraph 616 of the trial judgement.

14             And that paragraph states that:

15             "The Trial Chamber does not believe that the conscious object of

16     Dr. Stakic's participation in the creation and maintenance of this

17     environment of impunity was to kill the non-Serb citizens of Prijedor

18     municipality.  However, it is satisfied that Dr. Stakic, in his various

19     positions, acted in the knowledge that the existence of such an

20     environment would in all likelihood result in killings, and that he

21     reconciled himself to and made peace with this probable outcome.  He

22     consequently participated with the requisite dolus eventualis and

23     therefore incurs criminal responsibility for all the killings in

24     paragraphs 44 and 47 of the indictment, which the Trial Chamber has found

25     to be proven."

Page 45253

 1             So I take it from your agreement with this paragraph that you

 2     were aware at the time that the environment in Prijedor was extremely --

 3     an extremely dangerous one for the non-Serb population, an environment

 4     which would in all likelihood result in killings of members of this

 5     population; right?

 6        A.   I'm sorry.  I don't know if it's in the trial transcript, but I

 7     said I agree with the initial sentence, the first sentence.  However,

 8     where the Trial Chamber found that I was not aware that all non-Serbs

 9     were being killed, I agree about that part.  But I don't agree, as I said

10     before, with those passages in the judgement that say that I was a major

11     player and decision maker.

12             As for the knowledge I gained over the past 20 years in France

13     and the US, where I served my sentence, in those places a mayor can

14     appoint the local chief of police.  That's very different from our

15     equivalent of mayor who had no competence over the army or the police.

16             And I also want to add, when I was 29 and had just graduated from

17     medical school, I was politically illiterate and I certainly had no

18     personal authority to achieve something like that; whereas the

19     regulations and the laws certainly didn't allow me to do that.  As for

20     the killings, unfortunately I learned about them later when they had

21     already happened.  And I can only say, once again, that I am sincerely

22     sorry for everything that had happened to my fellow citizens in that

23     period.  And now looking back and thinking what could I have done, the

24     only answer I come up with is that I could have resigned.  I could have

25     done that in July or August when I first found out about these events,

Page 45254

 1     but I don't want to deny --

 2        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you, but your answer is moving away from

 3     the question.  My time is very limited and I would like to ask you to

 4     please focus on my questions.

 5             Earlier today you said:

 6             "We did not plan this Trnopolje.  Trnopolje, at least I did not

 7     take part in that and I'm not aware of any such thing."

 8             That's page 41.  And at paragraph 23 of your statement you said:

 9             "As far as investigation centres Keraterm and Omarska are

10     concerned, the Crisis Staff did not participate in the formation of these

11     centres."

12             But in fact, all three of these centres were formed according to

13     a decision of the civilian authorities in Prijedor; right?

14        A.   I read that in the report by Mr. Drljaca where he claimed that

15     those centres had been established based on decisions of the

16     Crisis Staff.  However, he never says which decisions, which date, which

17     numbers, where he -- whereas he had legal training.  He could have given

18     references.  Therefore, I stand by my earlier response, that I believe

19     the Crisis Staff did not establish these centres.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to 65 ter 40126, please.

21             JUDGE KWON:  While we are waiting for the document, Ms. Gustafson

22     and Mr. Robinson, the document we saw in the -- by the number

23     Exhibit P2915, which is the summary of conclusions taken by the

24     Crisis Staff in the year of 1992, I note that it was admitted only for

25     the -- some limited purpose.  It was admitted for the -- only as a source

Page 45255

 1     document of Ms. Hanson.  I think we can now admit it in full.

 2             Any objection, Mr. Robinson?

 3             MR. ROBINSON:  No, Mr. President.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll do so.

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit P6582, Your Honours -- no.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  No, it will be received, 2915, but it was fully

 7     admitted, not only as a source document.  Yes.  Thank you.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:

 9        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, this is a transcript of a video-recorded

10     interview with you.  And it states -- you state near the beginning that

11     you've been president of the Municipal Assembly for six or seven months,

12     which would put the timing of this interview sometime around late 1992.

13     Now, do you recall giving a video-recorded interview to an

14     English-speaking reporter who had a translator with him around this time,

15     late 1992?

16        A.   There was more than one foreign reporter who came.  I don't

17     remember all of them.  I'm looking at this document now.  It's very

18     possible, especially if it was recorded, that it was my interview.

19        Q.   Okay.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to page 2 in both languages,

21     please.

22        Q.   And if I could direct your attention, Dr. Stakic, to about

23     two-thirds of the way down the page in your language.  This is about

24     halfway down in English, where you're speaking and you state:

25             "These places, such as Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje, were a

Page 45256

 1     necessity in a given moment and were formed according to a decision of

 2     the civilian authorities in Prijedor."

 3             And the reporter asks you:

 4             "So those three camps, or how are they ...?"

 5             And then you interrupt and say:

 6             "Reception centres."

 7             The reporter says:

 8             "... reception centres were formed according to the decision of

 9     your civilian authorities?"

10             And you answer:

11             "Yes, yes."

12             Now, a moment ago when I put to you that you these centres were

13     established by the civilian authorities, you said you read that in

14     Drljaca's report.  And in fact, this is what you stated at the time to

15     the reporter; right?

16        A.   When I mentioned Drljaca's report a moment ago, he claimed that

17     it was the Crisis Staff that established them, not the civilian

18     authorities.  As for this interview, I said there were military

19     authorities and civilian authorities.  The army had its own military

20     police, military courts, military remand prisons; whereas the civilian

21     authorities, apart from the Municipal Assembly and the Executive Board,

22     they had the municipal court, the civilian police.  All these were bodies

23     of civilian authorities, at least as I understand it.

24        Q.   Well, when I asked you the question I said:

25             "These centres were formed according to a decision of the

Page 45257

 1     civilian authorities in Prijedor; right?"

 2             And you didn't say, "Yes, yes," like you said in this interview.

 3     You said, "I read that in a report by Mr. Drljaca," and you went on to

 4     deny the accuracy of that report; right?

 5        A.   What you just said, no, I did not answer that way.  I don't know

 6     how it was interpreted to you.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  So do you agree that those reception centres were

 8     formed according to a decision of the civilian authorities in Prijedor?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I am trying to tell

10     you what I understood, what I understand by "civilian authorities,"

11     because there is a division where we live into military authorities and

12     civilian authorities.  And I'm repeating:  The military has its troops

13     for military intervention, military police, military courts, et cetera;

14     whereas the civilian authorities are the Municipal Assembly, the

15     Executive Board, the municipal court, the civilian prosecutor's office,

16     the civilian public defender, and the civilian police.  And it is the

17     civilian police that opened these centres because the civilian police is

18     a part of the civilian authorities.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to page 5 in the English and

20     page 6 in the B/C/S, please.

21        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, if I could direct your attention to a passage

22     approximately two-thirds of the way down the page, and roughly the same

23     place in the English, in fact.  And this again is you speaking.  You're

24     giving quite a long statement here.  And about in the middle of it you

25     say:

Page 45258

 1             "Those of us who have lived here for centuries, I mean the Serbs

 2     and the other peoples, I also mean the Muslims, who were created

 3     artificially, who were against the Serbs in the previous two wars, while

 4     the Serbs were on the side of the allies both times."

 5             Now, this statement of yours that the Muslims were artificially

 6     created, that's an offensive and discriminatory remark towards Muslims,

 7     isn't it?

 8        A.   I am not a faultless man.  I never said I was.  I am not without

 9     blame, and I'm not looking to wash myself of all that I've done here.

10     But you must take into account that this was wartime.  There was

11     propaganda on both sides, and I probably stated something like this being

12     carried away.  What I meant was that from the Ottoman Empire's time, in

13     our territory, the Muslims used to be Serbs who converted during Ottoman

14     times to the Muslim faith.  I am sorry now for anyone whom I offended

15     with this statement, and nowadays I certainly would not allow myself to

16     say something ugly like that.

17        Q.   So you said it was ugly.  You agree it's discriminatory and

18     offensive; right?

19        A.   Well, if you put it like that, it could be offensive.  But please

20     look at some other passages in this text where I said that our objective

21     is to work for peace and --

22        Q.   Dr. Stakic --

23        A.   -- after the establishing of peace, we will continue to live

24     together.

25        Q.   I am not asking you about other passages.  I'm asking you about

Page 45259

 1     this passage.  You agree that this is offensive and discriminatory

 2     towards Muslims?

 3        A.   Now I really don't know anymore what you want from me.  I told

 4     you it was a mistake that I said this, and I'm really sorry about it and

 5     I agree with you that it sounds offensive.  But please, just in order not

 6     to take it all out of context, you could quote some other things that I

 7     said.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Could we go to page 7 of the English and page 9

 9     of the B/C/S, please.

10        Q.   And this is right at the top of the page in the B/C/S and the

11     middle of the page in the English.  You're being asked about the Muslims

12     who used to live in Kozarac.  And you say:

13             "Well, Trnopolje was mainly filled with Muslims from Kozarac.  A

14     good part of those extremists were from Kozarac and they went to

15     Trnopolje.  The 1500 and some men who were moved with the help of the

16     International Red Cross to Karlovac were mostly from Kozarac."

17             And then a few lines down you say:

18             "The rest, because their family homes had been destroyed, were

19     accommodated either in the territory of Prijedor municipality or went,

20     were transferred to ... some did go to Central Bosnia ... those who

21     expressed this wish.  We organised buses and a train for them, and this

22     was for free, just that they go, so that there should be no casualties,

23     that that genocide that we have already been blamed for in Europe should

24     not occur."

25             Now, when you said you organised buses and trains for Muslims

Page 45260

 1     from Trnopolje to transport them to Central Bosnia, are you referring to

 2     the municipal authorities?  When you say "we organised buses and trains,"

 3     is that something the municipal authorities did?

 4        A.   No, ma'am.  That's not what I meant then and I don't mean it now.

 5     I meant the Red Cross that was there and organised it, and we just

 6     provided assistance at their request in transport and fuel.

 7        Q.   So you provided the buses, the trains, and the fuel, the

 8     municipal authorities?

 9        A.   No.  You must understand one thing:  Under the Law On

10     All People's Defence, the army and the police are entitled to commandeer

11     all means of transport, all the vehicles from all businesses, including

12     bus companies and railway companies.  They have the right to commandeer

13     vehicles or trains or take over one entire enterprise, one entire company

14     under that law.  I'm telling you, it's not us who organised that.  I'm

15     telling you that the Red Cross approached us to provide fuel.  They

16     usually approached the Executive Board or perhaps the Crisis Staff, and

17     we tried to accommodate them because they had already agreed with the

18     ICRC, that's the way they explained it, they had agreed all the routes,

19     et cetera, and we just had to provide assistance in that one aspect.

20             JUDGE KWON:  By the way, have we assigned an exhibit number for

21     this witness's Rule 92 ter statement?

22             MR. ROBINSON:  Yes, Mr. President.  It was done as part of the

23     associated exhibits package that was given to us, and it's D4195.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 45261

 1        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, you said you did this, you organised the

 2     transport so that there should be no casualties and in order to avoid a

 3     genocide.  You are acknowledging here that the non-Serb population risked

 4     their lives by staying in Prijedor, weren't you?

 5        A.   You mentioned genocide and you didn't finish the sentence:

 6             "... genocide for which we have already been blamed in Europe."

 7             I'm telling you again I have information now, from reading

 8     materials during my own trial, showing that certain groups of these

 9     extremists had been captured around Kozara in the hills of Kurevo in 1994

10     and even 1995.  But Serbs, either soldiers or policemen, raided those

11     areas, and on their own initiative, in addition to the regular police and

12     army operations, they searched the houses of those people, looted, took

13     their property --

14        Q.   Dr. Stakic --

15        A.   -- and we had no means of protecting --

16        Q.   I'm sorry to interrupt you, but you're not answering my question.

17     You're talking about events in 1994 and 1995.  This interview was around

18     late 1992, and you're talking about the Muslims from Kozarac.  And you

19     said:

20             "We organised buses and trains for them, just so that they go, so

21     that there should be no casualties, that that genocide that we have

22     already been blamed for in Europe should not occur."

23             Now, those are your words, and by those words you are

24     acknowledging that the non-Serbs who stayed in Prijedor did so at risk of

25     their lives; right?

Page 45262

 1        A.   I can only repeat once again, it's not us who organised it.  It's

 2     the Red Cross.  I agree with you insofar as you say that in that period

 3     it was very risky to live in Prijedor, for all the citizens, and it was

 4     especially risky for Muslims.

 5             I must add that it is regrettable they had to leave.  But from a

 6     humane point of view, I still believe that they were better off, those

 7     who left and had a chance to return, than those who were killed.  I'm not

 8     saying it was a good thing they had to go.  It was a humiliation.  But as

 9     our people say, as long as you live, you have a chance to start anew and

10     rebuild your life.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to page 8 of the English and

12     page 10 of the B/C/S, please.

13        Q.   And this is right near the top of the page in your language.

14     It's near the middle of the page in the English.  And you're being asked

15     to respond to Western press allegations about ethnic cleansing.  And in

16     the course of your answer, you said:

17             "I have already said at the beginning that most of them are

18     leaving now partly for political reasons, but more for economic reasons.

19     Because we are currently all endangered here.  I once had a salary

20     equivalent to 1.000 German marks.  Now, as the mayor, I have 60 marks,

21     and I am a subtenant, and my wife is unemployed, and so on ... so that

22     these ... not only the Muslims are endangered here."

23             Now at this point in time you have acknowledged that you knew

24     that there had been at least two massacres of Muslims in Prijedor, one at

25     Keraterm and one at Koricanske Stijene.  You've acknowledged earlier

Page 45263

 1     today that you knew non-Serbs were being taken out of camps and murdered.

 2     And a moment ago you explained that it was an especially risky

 3     environment for Muslims.  Now comparing the situation of Muslims in

 4     Prijedor to your own, your reduction in salary, your status as a

 5     subtenant, and your wife's employment status, and saying that "we are all

 6     endangered here," that is a deeply misleading and cynical comment of

 7     yours, isn't it?

 8        A.   I am going to try to continue believing that you mean well and

 9     that you are seriously trying to understand the way I saw the situation

10     and that I was not cynical or sarcastic.  Maybe this was inappropriate,

11     this comparison of salaries.  You call me "mayor," although that's not a

12     proper translation.  I was the president of the local Assembly, and I

13     would appreciate it if you would stop interpreting it that way.

14             When I was going to work and coming back, I had to keep a

15     document on me, a document issued by the Secretariat for

16     National Defence, regarding work obligation.  Without that document, any

17     policeman, civilian or military, could have arrested me and sent me

18     directly to the front.  I had no time to say at all in this interview,

19     but I want to tell you that several times I was intercepted by armed

20     members of the Serbian police or army who had bloodshot eyes, maybe from

21     drinking, I don't know, they would put a gun barrel through the windows

22     of my car and say, "You keep driving around town here, having fun, while

23     I have to fight," and it would all end in their trying to wheedle out

24     some drink or cigarettes from me.  I couldn't even report them.  I didn't

25     know their names.  They did not have badges with names.  They did not

Page 45264

 1     have anything on their uniforms.  I could not identified them.  I tried

 2     to report them but that's always the answer I got:  If you don't know

 3     their names, then we can't do anything.  Maybe this reference to my

 4     salary was not a good idea, but I did not ...

 5        Q.   Dr. Stakic, you said in your answer:

 6             "I had no time to say it all in this interview ..."

 7             Are you seriously contending that you failed to mention the fact

 8     that Muslims had been massacred by the police and the army in Prijedor in

 9     1992, that they had been taken out of camps and killed because you didn't

10     have enough time?

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for a reference?  Where

12     was it established that this was done by the army and the police?  The

13     man said nicely that individuals were taking out people.

14             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I was referring to the two massacres in the

15     statements that were committed by the army and the police.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Do you remember the question, Mr. Stakic?  Can you

17     answer the question?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise.  Could the question

19     please be repeated for me now.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:

21        Q.   Certainly.  Dr. Stakic, in your earlier answer you said:

22             "I had no time to say at all in this interview ..."

23             And my question was:  Are you seriously contending that that you

24     failed to mention the fact that Muslims had been massacred by the police

25     and army in Prijedor in 1992 and that they had been taken out of camps

Page 45265

 1     and killed because you didn't have enough time?

 2        A.   Madam, distinguished Prosecutor, I know that you were trained for

 3     this, and I am not an expert so I cannot judge how you're doing your job.

 4     I think you're doing it well.  But you asked me about 60 marks and asked

 5     about the tenants.  And I said here, in response to this journalist's

 6     concrete question, I could not tell him about all the things that I had

 7     experienced.  That I did not feel safe.  My life was not safe either.  It

 8     wasn't only the Muslims.  I'm not saying and I'm not trying to say that

 9     they were not more imperilled, but if you have that in the interview do

10     find it and see what it was that I answered in respect of massacres.  I

11     am not trying to deny that.  I'm not trying to diminish it.  Really.

12     Could you please -- well, I tried to answer the journalist's questions.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I tender this interview, please.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

15             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit Number P6582, Your Honours.

16             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to 65 ter 40633, please.

17        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, this is a transcript of another video-recorded

18     interview of you around the same time, January 1993, with a foreign

19     journalist, where you are being asked primarily about the Geneva plan.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if we could go to page 2 of this document in

21     both languages.  This is at the top of the page.

22        Q.   Where you're speaking, it says MS.  And you're talking about the

23     plan agreed to in Geneva, and you say:

24             "And third, European monitors should come to the field to

25     determine the factual state of affairs, so they don't make maps,

Page 45266

 1     projections, and constitutions based on the propaganda from Vatican and

 2     Tehran.  One needs to come to Prijedor, see who lives here, who works,

 3     what they do, what their activities are, go to Krupa on Una, to Novi, to

 4     Sanski Most.  I am talking about cities that are of interest here.  To

 5     determine, to determine, to see what the situation really is, who lives

 6     here, and what they are doing.  Then they should go away, take a week,

 7     and draw new maps."

 8             Now, here you are promoting the division of territory based on

 9     the factual situation on the ground at the time, based on who is actually

10     living in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, Krupa, and this would, of

11     course, favour the Serbs given the drastic reduction in the Muslim and

12     Croat population in these areas since the start of the war; right?

13        A.   With all due respect, I don't think -- I don't agree with you on

14     this interpretation.  First of all, as you can see, I'm supporting that

15     agreement in Geneva; that is to say, that people accepted to talk in the

16     first place.  Which would mean that the war could be brought to an end by

17     way of talks.  Also, I do not mention in any way that Muslims and Croats

18     should not live there.  And finally, I don't know what year this was,

19     this Geneva Agreement, but finally there was the Dayton Agreement.  And

20     it did bring about this final delineation into two entities.  However, it

21     did not say that only Serbs should live in the Serb entity; rather, the

22     Muslims and Croats and everybody else should live there too.

23        Q.   This is January 1993, and in January 1993, Dr. Stakic, there were

24     very few Muslims and Croats in Prijedor and the other places you mention

25     here, Krupa, Novi, Sanski Most; right?

Page 45267

 1        A.   I don't know how many there were, but I did not say -- it's not

 2     written here anywhere that they should come and take that situation and

 3     that the people who had been expelled from there should not be allowed to

 4     return.  I just welcomed and I wished that that agreement had been signed

 5     in 1993.  As far as I know, the Serb side was in favour of that and not

 6     everybody was satisfied.  To this day, not everybody is satisfied with

 7     the Dayton Agreement, but it is my profound belief that it is better.

 8     Any peace agreement is better than war.

 9             Also, in 1996, I had the opportunity of taking part in its

10     implementation, especially paragraph 7, concerning the return of

11     displaced persons to their properties.  So if there was a delineation,

12     and I said that I agree with the Geneva Agreement, that there should be a

13     delineation, I did not say that a territory should be cleansed of a

14     particular people.

15        Q.   And you keep saying that you're just supporting the agreement in

16     Geneva, but you're taking issue with maps based on propaganda from the

17     Vatican and Tehran and you're asserting that those maps should be drawn

18     on the factual situation based on who was living in these places now;

19     right?  You're making claims about the how the territory should be

20     divided.

21        A.   I don't see that it is written there now on the basis of the

22     factual situation.  Sorry, I really don't see that, at least not in the

23     Serbian version.  I'm saying that I agree that there should be this

24     delineation and that all people should have the right to live at their

25     homes, regardless of whether they are on this or that side of the line.

Page 45268

 1             And now I touched upon propaganda.  It was coming from Belgrade,

 2     Sarajevo, Zagreb.  Perhaps I went a bit too far there.  After all, I was

 3     not in Dayton.  But regarding what I learned, it's been almost 20 years

 4     now since Dayton.  These maps were agreed upon and changed and altered.

 5     And finally when they were established, believe me, not a single side was

 6     fully satisfied with them.  They all have their objections with regard to

 7     Dayton.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to page 4 in both languages,

 9     please.  And this is near the middle of the page in English and about

10     halfway down as well as in the B/C/S.

11        Q.   So again, this is a lengthy passage where you're speaking,

12     Dr. Stakic, and you say in the second line of that long answer you say:

13             "Islam, i.e., jihad has won because a great number of Muslims

14     from this region emigrated and went to Germany, i.e., the whole of

15     Europe.  Why do I mention this?  Because all these Muslims from this

16     region could have chosen to go to Zenica, Sarajevo, Travnik or

17     Western Europe.  They chose Western Europe and they wouldn't leave here.

18     They wouldn't even hear Zenica mentioned or Travnik.  They wouldn't even

19     go to Croatia.  They know they are not welcome there.  On the contrary,

20     they go to Europe, for economic reasons and the reasons preached to them

21     by jihad."

22             Now, again, Dr. Stakic, you knew at this point in time that

23     Muslims had been massacred, that they had been taken out of camps and

24     killed, and that this was an especially risky environment for non-Serbs.

25     But you don't say any of this.  You claim that Muslims left Prijedor

Page 45269

 1     during 1992 for economic reasons and the reasons preached to them by

 2     jihad.  Again, you were trying to mislead this journalist about the real

 3     reasons for the Muslims leaving Prijedor; right?

 4        A.   With all due respect, I do not fully agree with your assertion.

 5     It is a fact that crimes were committed.  It is a fact that they were

 6     expelled from their homes and thereby compelled to leave the area.

 7     However, you can find these documents that I'm aware of.  I didn't bring

 8     them here because I didn't know about that.  During my trial, at one

 9     point, either just when Trnopolje was being closed or after it had been

10     closed, a new wave of civilians, Muslim civilians came to Trnopolje

11     because they saw their chance there of leaving Prijedor.  I agree with

12     that part, that most of them left out of fear and so on and so forth, but

13     what I'm saying here, where they were going and where they wanted to go,

14     of course they wanted to go to Europe where there was no war rather than

15     Croatia and BosniaBosnia, the part under the control of the Croat

16     forces, and they would be drafted into their army and they would have to

17     fight there.  And life was miserable there, too.  And when I say jihad,

18     Islam, that should not be equated.

19             Part of them - how do I put this? - are extremists, like in any

20     nation, and they obviously tried to profit from all of that, too.  And I

21     know from the experience of people who came to see me, and they were

22     asking about -- about what was going on in either places.  And from

23     Bosanski Novi, a group of Muslims left in co-operation with the UNHCR.

24     They were in Croatia at the time, Dvor na Uni - do you know the geography

25     there?  It's on the Una river - and through Croatia they went to Western

Page 45270

 1     Europe.  And then a delegation came to see me, and they asked me how I

 2     could bring them into touch with these representatives of the UNHCR so

 3     that they do not go in the organisation of the Red Cross and others

 4     towards Zenica and Travnik.  I am telling you about all of this from my

 5     very own experience.

 6        Q.   Dr. Stakic, in your answer you said, "It is a fact that they were

 7     expelled from their homes and thereby compelled to leave the area."  And

 8     you said, "I agree with that part that most of them left out of fear and

 9     so on and so forth ..."

10             So when you said at paragraph 26 of your statement that "the main

11     reason for moving out was the constant fighting, the lack of electric

12     power, water, and basic food provisions," that's not true, is it, because

13     you're acknowledging here that most of them left out of fear, that people

14     were expelled and compelled to leave the area; right?

15        A.   I -- even when I talked to the gentlemen from Mr. Karadzic's

16     Defence, you know, we had this extensive discussion and then they would

17     summarise my answer into a few sentences.  I am not saying that they

18     wrote anything that is not true, but they summarised.  You see the next

19     sentence here, "The war was no longer near the municipality.  It was in

20     the territory of the municipality itself."  The very fact that there is a

21     war going on.  You know that.  Who is safe in a war?  Not to mention now

22     what is going on in Syria.  Somebody is rooting for one side and others

23     are rooting for the other side, but it is civilians who are falling

24     victim on both sides and from both sides.  But in addition to that, there

25     were economic reasons, a lack of electricity, water, food, and so on and

Page 45271

 1     so forth.  But as I already mentioned, war was no longer only in the

 2     vicinity, in Krupa, in Croatia, and so on, but it was right there in

 3     Prijedor.

 4             JUDGE MORRISON:  Ms. Gustafson, this is simply my view.  It

 5     occurred to me that if I was a person who had just come into the public

 6     gallery and listened to a good percentage of the questions, one might be

 7     mistaken that Dr. Stakic was the person who was on trial rather than

 8     Dr. Karadzic.  I don't make this as a criticism of you, but I make it as

 9     an observation as to how much of this is really useful to the issues that

10     are before the Trial Chamber.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, Your Honours, I would respond with two

12     points.  Firstly, I think a lot of this goes to credibility.  The second

13     point would be that, in the indictment -- I mean, Dr. Stakic plays a role

14     in the indictment either as a tool or as a member of the JCE.  He's

15     obviously connected to Dr. Karadzic through his position, and I would

16     leave it at that.  I'm about to move on to another topic in any event.

17             JUDGE MORRISON:  It's much easier to observe a cross-examination

18     than it is to do one.  I've been in that position many a time myself in

19     the past.  But it seems to me that the two issues that you raise, that of

20     credibility and joint enterprise, could be dealt with in a much smaller

21     compass.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

23        Q.   Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 14 you said that the Prijedor municipal

24     authorities had no contact or communication with the Pale authorities

25     until the corridor breakthrough.  And I'd like you to clarify when this

Page 45272

 1     communication blockade began according to you.

 2        A.   I cannot say what the date was exactly, but it was sometime in

 3     the month of May, when the joint forces of the Croats and Muslims severed

 4     the road going from Banja Luka to Bijeljina and thereby to the Republic

 5     of Serbia.  I really do apologise.  I cannot tell you what the exact date

 6     would be, but I think it was the month of May.  And then up until the end

 7     of June, the beginning of July, to the best of my knowledge, when the

 8     Army of Republika Srpska managed to liberate the road or the corridor, as

 9     they called it, thereby -- I mean, in my view and to the best of my

10     knowledge, telephone lines were reestablished because we could speak to

11     Belgrade.  And also, the power supply was somewhat improved.  Also,

12     vehicles started moving along and --

13        Q.   Dr. Stakic --

14        A.   -- I said there that we, the municipal authorities, did not have

15     any communication, that I did not have any communication.  Because the

16     paragraph says further on whether the police and the army were able to

17     communicate, I really do not know.

18        Q.   I thank you.  And again, I'd like to ask you to please focus to

19     the precise question I asked.

20             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P3537, please.

21             MR. ROBINSON:  Mr. President, with respect to 65 ter 40633, the

22     interview, is that going to be tendered?

23             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, yes, I do tender that, the first -- the

24     part of the interview that relates to Dr. Stakic.  I think it's the first

25     four pages in both languages.

Page 45273

 1             MR. ROBINSON:  No objection.

 2             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we will receive it.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit P6583, Your Honours.

 4             JUDGE KWON:  The first part, not including Penny Marshall part.

 5             MR. ROBINSON:  That's correct, the first four pages which -- yes.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  What -- are we admitting only -- the only page that

 7     was shown to the witness?  Four pages.

 8             MR. ROBINSON:  I think there were multiple pages shown to the

 9     witness but --

10             JUDGE KWON:  Oh, yes.

11             MR. ROBINSON:  -- there's only four pages in which he's being

12     interviewed and then the next two pages of the English transcript

13     involves someone else's interview.

14             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  As in the previous case, we will admit

15     them all.  Let's continue.

16        Q.   Dr. Stakic, this is in 22nd of May, 1992, Prijedor Crisis Staff

17     decision on mobilisation, and you can see in the preamble it says:

18             "Pursuant to the decision of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

19     Herzegovina about the general public mobilisation of forces and materiel

20     in the republic."

21             And indeed, the Chamber has received in evidence a Presidency

22     mobilisation decision from the 20th of May; that's P3919.  So I take it

23     that whatever communication difficulties you had, you did receive the

24     republic level decision on mobilisation as indicated in this decision;

25     right?  On the -- in May 1992.

Page 45274

 1        A.   Honoured Prosecutor, to the best of my recollection, general

 2     mobilisation -- well, if I'm not talking about the one at the level of

 3     the former Yugoslavia that was in 1991.  General mobilisation was

 4     declared by the Republika Srpska or the Serb Republic of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever it was called, in the month of April, if I'm

 6     not mistaken.  And we are just invoking that decision.  As I said a

 7     moment ago, we could not forbid anything.  We are appealing to the

 8     citizenry to respond to this decision that had already been made at a

 9     higher level and that is compulsory for all citizens, of course.

10             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to P3919, please.

11             JUDGE KWON:  Before we see that document, can we go into private

12     session briefly.  Yes.  We can upload the document in the meantime.

13                           [Private session]

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 45275











11  Page 45275 redacted.  Private session.















Page 45276

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7                           [Open session]

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:

10        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, here you can see the decision issued by

11     Dr. Karadzic as president of the Presidency on general public

12     mobilisation of forces and resources in the republic, dated the

13     20th of May, 1992.  A moment ago, you said that to the best of your

14     recollection, the general mobilisation was declared by the

15     Republika Srpska in the month of April.

16             Now, does this remind you of the general mobilisation decision

17     issued by the Presidency just two days before the Prijedor Crisis Staff

18     issued its mobilisation decision?

19        A.   I don't remember having seen this decision at all.  And there is

20     no reason to have this sent to me, as president of the

21     Municipal Assembly.  I really do not recall having seen this.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Now, if we can go back to P3537.

23        Q.   In your statement at paragraph 39, in discussing adjudicated

24     fact 1029, you state that the Prijedor Crisis Staff met for the first

25     time on the 29th of May, 1992, and you repeated that claim today in your

Page 45277

 1     testimony.

 2             Now, if you could look again at the preamble of this

 3     22nd of May Crisis Staff decision, it states that this decision was

 4     reached at the meeting held on the 22nd of May.  So in fact, the

 5     Prijedor Crisis Staff did meet before the 29th of May, didn't it?

 6        A.   Can this be moved a bit up?  It does say the Crisis Staff here,

 7     and the date is 22nd May.  However, earlier I claimed that there were no

 8     sessions before the 29th of May.  Why did I claim that?  If you look at

 9     the minutes of the Assembly sessions that were recorded from July or

10     August 1992, where all the decisions of the Crisis Staff were adopted,

11     and those decisions were made between 22 May and 17 July.  So this may be

12     a mistake.  Maybe it was the Council for National Defence, and maybe it

13     was mistyped as the Crisis Staff.  This is just my assumption.

14             You know that if this was a Crisis Staff meeting, then this

15     decision would have made it to all the collective decisions of the

16     Crisis Staff.  There would have been a document containing all the

17     decisions of the Crisis Staff including this one.

18             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If we could go to 65 ter 10949, please.

19        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, this again is from the 25th of September, 1992,

20     issue of "Kozarski Vjesnik," and the article I'd like to direct you to is

21     the one in the middle and of the top of the page, "Milicija nije vojska,"

22     and the article describes a meeting held on the 18th of September, 1992,

23     with policemen who had returned from Han Pijesak with the municipal

24     authorities, including you.  Now, without getting into the details of

25     that meeting at the moment, do you remember holding this meeting with the

Page 45278

 1     policemen who had returned from Han Pijesak around this time,

 2     mid-September 1992, to address a series of demands that they were making?

 3        A.   I don't remember the date but I do remember the meeting.  It

 4     happened before, soldiers or police members would deflect [as

 5     interpreted] from the front line, but this was a bigger group which is

 6     why I remembered this event.  I don't know if it was an entire unit, but

 7     it was a large group in any case, which is why I remember the event.

 8        Q.   Okay.  And if I could direct your attention to the very bottom of

 9     the left-hand column of this article.  And this is at the very bottom --

10     it starts at the very bottom of the page in the English and moves onto

11     the next page, and it says -- it's referring to the sixth demand of the

12     police members.  It says:

13             "In their sixth demand," and if we could turn the page in the

14     English, "the policemen wanted to know why the prisoners from Keraterm,

15     Omarska and Trnopolje had been released.  Stakic indicated the two key

16     reasons which had motivated the government in Pale to make such a

17     decision:  Pressure from international public opinion and official

18     policy, and the steep cost of maintaining the prisons."

19             Now it's correct, is it not, as this article indicates, that the

20     decision to close down Omarska and Keraterm was made by the government in

21     Pale, yes?

22        A.   I did not see this decision, but I did see and I heard that a

23     decision was made by the Ministry of the Interior to close them down.

24     Simo Drljaca kept on repeating that he couldn't do that and that he

25     received promises from the army that they would open another prison or a

Page 45279

 1     reception centre, as they were called, so a prison was opened in Manjaca.

 2     And as a result of that, there were no longer reasons to keep the other

 3     two open and to keep the people there.  Those who were found to be guilty

 4     of war crimes could be transferred to Manjaca and the others were

 5     released.  This is what I know.  I can't claim that I saw a decision to

 6     that effect.

 7             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If I could tender this article and move on to

 8     65 ter 18416.

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll admit this.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit Number P6584, Your Honours.

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And does the Chamber wish to take a break now?

12             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, we'll have a break for 20 minutes and resume at

13     five past 3.00.

14                           --- Recess taken at 2.46 p.m.

15                           [The witness stands down]

16                           [The witness takes the stand]

17                           --- On resuming at 3.07 p.m.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue.

19             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.  And if I could have

20     65 ter 18416, please.

21        Q.   And, Dr. Stakic, you can see that this is a 22nd of August, 1992,

22     "Srna" press release titled:  "Investigating centre in Omarska

23     abolished."  And it states that:

24             "The government authorities in Prijedor inform that the

25     investigating centre in Omarska had been closed down in the course of the

Page 45280

 1     day, and the open camp in Trnopolje given to the authority of the

 2     Red Cross, according to the decision of the Presidency of

 3     Republika Srpska."

 4             Now, just before the break you said that you had heard that the

 5     minister of the interior made a decision to close down Omarska and

 6     Keraterm.  Does this press release remind you that this was in fact a

 7     Presidency decision?

 8        A.   I can say that this is what I can read here.  I can't, however,

 9     say that this is correct or not.  Whoever drafted this and signed it

10     could perhaps tell you what the news is based on.  I apologise, I can't

11     tell you.  I can read as well as you, but I can't confirm that this is

12     true because I never saw a decision to that effect.

13        Q.   Who informed you that it was the -- that the decision to close

14     down Omarska and Keraterm came from the Pale authorities?  How did you

15     learn that?

16        A.   Mr. Drljaca said that finally a camp was open in Manjaca for

17     prisoners of war.  From the very beginning, he claimed that an

18     institution of that kind should be run by the military, not by the

19     police, and that finally that institution was opened, and that as a

20     result of that, the centres would be closed down, and that the prisoners

21     who, according to them, were guilty of a crime, would be transferred to

22     Manjaca.  I don't know who he received that information from, whether it

23     was from his own minister or from somebody else.  I really wouldn't know.

24        Q.   And this press release says that during the course of that day,

25     which was the 22nd of August, Omarska had been closed down and that

Page 45281

 1     Trnopolje had been handed over to the authority of the Red Cross.  And is

 2     that information consistent with your knowledge at the time?

 3        A.   I can't remember the exact date, with all due respect.  However,

 4     it was about that time in August.

 5        Q.   Thank you.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  I tender this news release.

 7             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.  We'll receive it.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives Exhibit Number P6585, Your Honours.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:

10        Q.   Now, Dr. Stakic, in the course of your meetings with the

11     Karadzic Defence or with your own attorney, did you become aware that

12     Dr. Karadzic has presented evidence in his defence that it was the

13     Prijedor Crisis Staff that was responsible for the mass killings of

14     non-Serbs, the destruction of their homes, and the drastic reduction of

15     the non-Serb population in 1992?

16             And I refer to D2265, page 59, as well as pages 50, 56, and 57.

17             MR. ROBINSON:  Excuse me, Mr. President.  This may be a technical

18     objection but it is of some importance, and that is that I don't believe

19     that any conversations he had with his own attorney is something that

20     should be within the scope of her question as it would be privileged.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Well, I can just ask the question generally.

22        Q.   Did you learn that information, Dr. Stakic, that Dr. Karadzic has

23     presented evidence in his defence that it's the Prijedor Crisis Staff

24     that's responsible for all the crimes against non-Serbs in Prijedor in

25     1992?

Page 45282

 1        A.   No, I didn't hear that.  This is the first time I hear it.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Prosecutor please call up

 3     the document and could she refrain from asking questions without showing

 4     him corroborating documents.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  I think it's for the purpose of reference to the

 6     parties, for the benefit of the parties.

 7             Please continue.

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 9        Q.   Now you agreed at the outset of your testimony that the police

10     and army committed mass crime against Muslims and Croats in Prijedor in

11     1992, detention, torture, killings, et cetera, and that was at page 24.

12     And you made clear your position that you were not a big player or the

13     main player.  And that was also at page 24.

14             Now, you would agree, I take it, that Dr. Karadzic, the president

15     and Supreme Commander, had far greater authority over the police and the

16     army than you, president of the Crisis Staff; right?

17        A.   With all due respect to you and this Tribunal, I don't think that

18     I am the right person to qualify him as the person most responsible for

19     everything.  I'm here as a witness, albeit a Defence witness.  However,

20     I'm here to give the Trial Chamber my own view of the situation at the

21     time in order to help the Trial Chamber shed light on the developments.

22     I believe that Mr. Karadzic has a good Defence team and that they will

23     help him defend himself.  If I mentioned the military and the police

24     here, I meant the local forces.  I know that there was a hierarchy, a

25     vertical hierarchy and that they were duty-bound to report to their

Page 45283

 1     superiors according to that vertical hierarchy.  What reports they sent,

 2     how they sent them, I wouldn't know, but -- because that information

 3     reached me.

 4        Q.   Thank you, Dr. Stakic.  I have nothing further.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Ms. Gustafson.

 6             Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

 7             THE ACCUSED:  I am sorry.  I wanted one page and I forgot.

 8                           Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

 9        Q.   [Interpretation] Dr. Stakic, on page 73 of today's transcript, it

10     was suggested that you were a member of the joint criminal enterprise

11     together with me.  Were you with me in a joint criminal enterprise of any

12     kind --

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, sorry.  That was not a question to the

14     witness.  It's perfectly clear I was responding to a comment from the

15     Bench.

16             JUDGE MORRISON:  Dr. Karadzic, it's perfectly plain that that was

17     an answer from Ms. Gustafson to the query that I raised.  It was not a

18     question to the witness.

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, I apologise.  But the

20     way I see it, the Prosecutor doesn't do anything without a reason.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   On pages 71 and 72, it was suggested that you should accept that

23     Muslims and Croats were expelled and forced to leave from Prijedor

24     municipality.

25             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, again, those were the witness's words.  It

Page 45284

 1     wasn't put to him that he should accept that.  Let's just make sure we're

 2     not mischaracterising his evidence.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Could you reformulate your question.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'll do my best.

 5             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Dr. Stakic, were Muslims and Croats expelled?  Were they forced

 7     to leave?  If that was the case, who did that?  What forced them to

 8     leave?

 9        A.   As I have already stated, both in my statement and earlier today

10     in the course of my testimony, which is recorded on the transcript, as

11     war approached Prijedor and when war operations started in earnest in the

12     municipality of Prijedor, and as I have repeated several times here, as a

13     result of that the rate of crime went up, there was looting, theft, and

14     people started moving out of their houses.  Not all of them but a lot of

15     them did.  Temporarily, they were accommodated in Trnopolje, and then

16     later, with the help of the Red Cross, they went to some other parts of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina and further afield.  Further afield.

18             One more thing that I didn't say here and now it has just

19     occurred to me, I remember that I saw certain documents issued by the

20     Ministry of Health, if I'm not mistaken.  They were signed by

21     Dr. Kalinic, and I don't know what his position was at the time, but I

22     know that together with the Muslim and Croatian representatives he signed

23     a document on the free movement of the civilian population, which meant

24     that they were free to cross from one side of the front line to the other

25     side.  I would like to add that.

Page 45285

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Lines 1, 2, and 3 on page 72.  It says clearly:

 2             [In English] "... that's not true, is it, because you are

 3     acknowledging here that most of them left out of fear, that people were

 4     expelled and compelled to leave the area; right?"

 5             [Interpretation] I'm asking you, Dr. Stakic, did somebody go to

 6     their homes?  Did somebody force them to leave their homes?  Or was it

 7     indeed the case this they were afraid and that's why they fled?  Just

 8     like you told us?  What you said in paragraph 26 --

 9             JUDGE KWON:  Mr. Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic, that's a leading

10     question, very much.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll rephrase.

12             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   Is it true that they were expelled like it was suggested and that

14     they were forced to leave?

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, not only is it leading --

16             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

17             MS. GUSTAFSON:  -- but Dr. Karadzic was reading from my follow-up

18     question, which referred back to the witness's assertion that this is

19     exactly what happened.  So this whole exercise is misleading.

20             JUDGE KWON:  You may refer to his answers.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  I will move on and then

22     I'll see what I'm going to do with this.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   On page 66, it was suggested that you accepted the fact that the

25     police and the army committed massacres.  You were aware that there were

Page 45286

 1     killings and that there was, indeed, a massacre, or rather, a mass

 2     killing in Keraterm and another one at Koricanske Stijene.  Did you

 3     accept the fact that it had been planned by the military and the police;

 4     or if not, did you know who did that?  If you agree that this was a

 5     planned effort by the military and the police, then the answer is yes;

 6     but if not, can you tell us who did it and how?

 7        A.   Can I start answering or should I wait?

 8             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, please.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is true that I answered that I

10     was aware of the fact that massacres indeed took place, but the

11     Prosecutor did not have any follow-up questions.  But now I can answer

12     your question.  When I say the police and the military, I mean that in

13     these two specific cases I had my views or, rather, I had information

14     that was conveyed to me.

15             As for the killings of those wretched people in Keraterm, it was

16     the local battalion and reservists who were responsible for those.

17     Allegedly, they did it because several Serbian soldiers were killed at

18     the front line and in retaliation they burst into Keraterm and killed

19     those innocent people.  Neither then nor now have I heard that it was

20     organised by the command of those troops or somebody else of that kind.

21     I even heard that Mr. Drljaca said, because he was angry and because

22     there were police officers who were supposed to guard those people and

23     those men wanted to take it on the police, so Mr. Drljaca said that he

24     would take it up with the army.  I don't know what happened next because

25     I don't have any information to that effect.

Page 45287

 1             And the next big shame inflicted not only upon me and the Serbs

 2     from Prijedor but the entire Serbian population was the case of

 3     Koricanske Stijene.  I repeat once again, those people from Trnopolje

 4     were allowed to link up with their families.  It was the Red Cross that

 5     enabled them to do that.  And the police and the military were supposed

 6     to make arrangements with this other side to open the passage for the

 7     convoy of buses.  Those policemen, and it is not up to me to be the judge

 8     of them, but I can say that they were not humans because not only did

 9     they rob those poor people but they also executed them.  I condemn that

10     as a human being, as a person.

11             I'd like to say this:  I'm not Mr. Drljaca's advocate.  I don't

12     want to defend him.  We were at odds at times because he had a strong

13     personality.  Sometimes he was harsh in his comport.  But when I learned

14     about that event I called him about a document because, you know, us

15     civilians had to have an approval from the military district and from the

16     police to pass through that corridor.  So I called him and he was in a

17     very bad mood, and he said:  Now you call me when my police officers had

18     done something really, really unprecedentedly stupid.  I'll call you

19     later.

20             So what I'm saying is that I wouldn't say that somebody had a

21     plan to do that.  At least I wasn't aware of any such plan.  This is what

22     I know.

23        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked about investigation centres and a

24     reference was made to Omarska and so on and so forth.  You were asked

25     about the civilian authorities that set it up.  Can you tell me how come

Page 45288

 1     that your police did not carry out investigations in the detention unit

 2     that existed in the public security station?

 3        A.   I am sorry, I did not understand your question.  Why didn't the

 4     police do what?

 5        Q.   This was mis-recorded and this was misinterpreted.  What I wanted

 6     to say is this:  The last document says that Omarska was an investigation

 7     centre.  I'm asking you this:  If Omarska was an investigation centre and

 8     if all the investigations were carried out there, how come that the

 9     police did not detain people in their own existing detention unit which

10     existed in the police station?

11             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand now.

13             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry.  The question assumes that there were no

14     detentions and investigations at the Prijedor police station.  I don't

15     have any -- I don't have the evidence at my fingertips, but I am quite

16     sure that that is not the case.  So the question, I think, should be

17     rephrased or a preliminary question asked.

18             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, I agree that you can reformulate your question.

19     I didn't follow it as well.

20             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   Dr. Stakic, was there a detention unit attached to the MUP in

22     Prijedor?

23        A.   To the best of my knowledge, yes.  But I don't know.  I don't

24     know for how many people, five, six, ten, not more than that, because

25     local criminals and drunkards would be detained there temporarily and

Page 45289

 1     then they would be taken to prison.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3        A.   I do apologise, Dr. Karadzic, and Your Honours, either because of

 4     what I have on my ears and I also hear the spoken word, I heard "your

 5     police" a moment ago.

 6        Q.   The Prijedor police.

 7        A.   Yes.  I assume that that was just a slip of the tongue on your

 8     part, but please, I would like to --

 9        Q.   I do apologise.  The size of this detention unit, does it have

10     anything to do with using Omarska for investigations?

11        A.   Well, you know, I cannot say anything unequivocally here because,

12     as I've already said, that's not my line of work.  But knowing that in

13     Omarska there were many more people -- I saw during the trial that

14     3.000 people went through Omarska.  That figure is telling enough.  And

15     knowing that this detention unit could take only five or six people, on

16     the basis of that, I can conclude -- infer, rather - it's deduction,

17     isn't it? - that it was impossible.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You were asked or, rather, it was established, it was

19     stated that Muslims and Croats lived in a risky environment.  That's on

20     page 55.  Can you tell us when this environment became risky in terms of

21     dates?

22        A.   Well, if you allow me, Your Honours, I remember in my case it was

23     repeated time and again that on the 1st of May different campaigns

24     started, killings, that there was a lack of safety and security and so

25     on.  I would say now that only after Hambarine on the 20th of May,

Page 45290

 1     especially Kozarac, the 24th of May, when the Muslim extremists dared

 2     attack the army, thereby entering a direct conflict with the army, then

 3     there was fighting.  And then after that, this true situation of war and

 4     crisis and fear and everything else started.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In line 3, I believe you said on the 22nd of May

 6     rather than the 20th of May?

 7        A.   The 22nd of May.

 8        Q.   Hambarine.

 9        A.   Yes.  And on the 24th Kozarac.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us why it did not become dangerous

11     already on the 6th of April as it became in Sarajevo?

12        A.   We still had a joint Assembly that was established on the basis

13     of the interparty agreement at the republican level reached between the

14     HDZ and the SDS.  It was violated, to the best of my knowledge, in

15     autumn 1991 when the SDA and HDZ MPs outvoted the SDS and they left the

16     Assembly.  We continued to work together on local levels.  Because you

17     know what it's like, the houses are mixed.  There were hardly any hamlets

18     that were purely Muslim or purely Serb, and especially the population in

19     town itself.  And you can see that from the transcripts of the joint

20     Assembly.  We tried to keep it together.  We didn't succeed, but we

21     called upon Muslim assemblymen from the SDA, saying that we should reach

22     an agreement at local level in order to share power, all with a view to

23     preserving the peace.

24             Although -- well, you mentioned Sarajevo, but I would like to

25     mention municipalities that are closer to Prijedor.  It already started

Page 45291

 1     in Bosanska Krupa and Sanski Most, in April, also, to the best of my

 2     recollection.  And in Prijedor there was no war.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Also you were asked and you gave an answer.  You said

 4     the Muslims could go to Central Bosnia and that they could go to Germany.

 5     Did the Muslims have an opportunity to stay on in Prijedor itself?  Were

 6     there agreements about the transformation of Prijedor where they would

 7     exercise authority over themselves?

 8             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry, if we could just specify the time-period

 9     with this question?

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   Before the conflict broke out, was it only Central Bosnia and

12     Germany or did they have a third option, Prijedor itself?

13        A.   They could stay in Prijedor and a number of them did stay on

14     throughout the war.  Truth to tell we are dealing with 1992 here, but I

15     would like to say something.  A large number, I don't know exactly how

16     many, Muslims left in 1995 when -- how do I put this?  When there was

17     this major influx of Serbs, the Serb population from the Krajina that was

18     flooding in.  Also, they could establish their own municipality and

19     declare their own territory, and then also even after the take-over of

20     power on the 1st of May, and that can be seen from documents.  There was

21     a mixed police force as well, and they were told they could take part in

22     this local commune.  And in Kozarac the entire police stayed on.  And

23     there were no problems whatsoever all the way up until the 24th of May.

24     That is to say, I agree they did have that option.  In those areas where

25     they were the majority population, they could stay on.

Page 45292

 1        Q.   The transcript does not say Ljubija and that's the location.  You

 2     mentioned it together with Kozarac; right?

 3        A.   Yes, Ljubija, Kozarac, that's what I mentioned, two enclaves.

 4     And they're not small, between 10- and 12.000 inhabitants.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  It was suggested to you that you spoke about the life

 6     of Muslims in Prijedor and that already by the end of 1992 there were

 7     very few Muslims left.  Can you tell us how come this happened then, that

 8     I was pressured in the autumn of 1994 to release 80 trucks full of

 9     Muslims per day and that they stayed on, and how come there were

10     thousands of Muslims left in 1994, and by the end of 1995 there were

11     several thousand --

12             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Sorry --

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   -- Muslims in Prijedor?

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  -- this is all leading.  It hasn't been

16     established that the witness knows anything about these assertions about

17     trucks and thousands of Muslims in 1994.  Those foundational questions

18     have to be asked before these ones.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Could you rephrase your question?  Otherwise, we

20     need to go back to the page where he spoke about this.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I'm sorry.  I'm going to

22     rephrase.

23             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   It was suggested to you that you spoke to journalists about the

25     life of Muslims in Prijedor, although you knew that then, at the end of

Page 45293

 1     1992, there were very few Muslims left in Prijedor.  Is that correct,

 2     that at the end of 1992 there were very few Muslims left in Prijedor?

 3        A.   I think that I said to the Prosecutor that there was no official

 4     census at the time, but I would like to repeat what I said a moment ago;

 5     that is that when the Dayton Agreement was signed - that is to say, in

 6     December 1995 - there were still some Muslims in Prijedor.  And I

 7     mentioned a moment ago as well that when tens of thousands and hundreds

 8     of thousands, Serb refugees, came to Prijedor and went through Prijedor,

 9     quite a few Muslims also left Prijedor.  That's the period of August and

10     September 1995.  And I still claim that a number of them stayed on.  I

11     cannot say exactly what the numbers involved are or the percentage, but I

12     do know some people who lived there, worked there, I saw them in the

13     building and they were in town.  The population was mixed.  Cela,

14     Donji Jakupovici, those were Muslims neighbourhoods.  And these

15     enclaves -- people from these enclaves did not move out at all.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Were there Muslims and Croats on our police force?

17        A.   To the best of my knowledge, yes.  As for exact numbers, I

18     wouldn't know, but there were some.  That can be checked, too.  In the

19     veterans organisation.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Tell me, generally speaking, what did this depend on;

21     namely, that some Muslims could stay and others felt threatened or were

22     detained or interrogated or were just leaving Prijedor?  What was

23     decisive in that respect?  Your will, the will of your local authorities

24     and the army and the police to group Muslims or --

25             JUDGE KWON:  You're just losing your time.

Page 45294

 1             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And not stopping with a non-leading question and

 2     having to add -- add to the question that makes it leading, it's

 3     inappropriate.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, as briefly as possible:  How

 5     come some of them could stay on and others could not?  If the systemic

 6     approach was that the Muslims should disappear, how come some can stay

 7     and others do not stay.  It is a perfectly legitimate question.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  No.  Let's go back to the part which was dealt with

 9     and start from there.

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the beginning is there.  The

11     Prosecutor suggested that Dr. Stakic deceived the journalist, speaking

12     about the life of Muslims in Prijedor although he knew --

13             JUDGE KWON:  Then upload that document and ask your question

14     based upon the cross-examination.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know what the document is

16     now, but I know that it's in the transcript, that it was put to him that

17     I intentionally misled or deceived the journalist.  But I'm going to

18     abandon the topic in order to save time.

19             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   Dr. Stakic, on page 51, yet again it was discussed whether you

21     could issue orders to the army or the police.  Even if you did send an

22     order to the army or the police, what would happen to that kind of order?

23        A.   Well, now that you've put that question, I'll answer by telling

24     you about something that I experienced in 1993 when I was no longer

25     president and when I was replaced by another gentleman, and I did have

Page 45295

 1     some objections.  The local committee of the party was objecting,

 2     actually.  They said that I am not influencing the army and the police

 3     sufficiently.  They actually wanted to have all assemblymen and all

 4     members of the SDS freed of military obligation and military duty, and I

 5     said we cannot do that.  We can pass an Assembly decision, but they don't

 6     have to observe that.

 7             Now I'm going back to what I was saying, when this new president

 8     came from that stream, that is to say, these people who thought that they

 9     could -- or, rather, that I as president could have issued orders.  I and

10     the late Dr. Kovacevic were sitting there.  We had a colleague from

11     Belgrade who had come to perform some operations on some children so that

12     we wouldn't have to take them there.  So it so happened that

13     Mr. Pero Colic, commander of the Prijedor Brigade, entered that

14     restaurant and said, "Look at the document that I got a few days ago from

15     the president of the municipality, where he says, 'I, president of the

16     municipality, hereby order Pero Colic ..." and so on and so forth," and

17     this man says I was wondering whether I should send the military police

18     to arrest him and take him to the front.  But what prevailed was that we

19     shouldn't heighten tensions any further, so I gave up.  Who does this man

20     think he is?  Well, so much for that.  That's what it would have meant,

21     if I even did write an order to him.  I hope I was clear.

22        Q.   Thank you.  On page 42 it was suggested to you that the

23     Crisis Staff decided who would be released but not the way in which they

24     would be released.  Could you tell us you did not allow these group

25     releases?  What's the distinction between individual releases and group

Page 45296

 1     releases?

 2        A.   I tried to explain that but I'll try to once again.  The police

 3     were assuring us, at least, and perhaps you'll see that, too.  They got

 4     all these lawyers busy, 40, 60 lawyers from their services, from the

 5     court and I don't know from what other places.  And they were

 6     interrogating these detained persons, and they decided who was guilty and

 7     who was not guilty, who would be sent to Trnopolje and who would be

 8     released.  Now, what was it that made us try to intervene?  Precisely

 9     that, that Serb criminals decided to enter these centres.  And I don't

10     know how they did it there.  Were they in cahoots with the guards or did

11     they deceive them, but they took people out.  It wasn't groups.  They

12     would go there and ask for particular individuals by name and surname,

13     and they said that they would return them, that they just needed to reach

14     some kind of agreement.  Usually it had to do with extortion, to get

15     money from them or immovable property, if they had any.  And the most

16     regrettable thing was that afterwards they would kill these people.

17             After this kind of knowledge, after we heard about this, we tried

18     to appeal to the police to prevent that kind of thing from happening and

19     not allowing such individuals to enter such centres in the first place.

20        Q.   It was also suggested to you on page 33 or perhaps 34 that the

21     Muslim population in "celina" was attacked, and mention was also made of

22     Stari Grad.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

24     65 ter 20209.  And the reference for what I said about the journalist is

25     page 17, lines 13 through 18.

Page 45297

 1             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  Page 70, seventy.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One of the texts has been

 3     translated.  Can we get the English translation.  This is dealing with

 4     the consequences of the attack or removing the consequences of attack.

 5     Yes.  This is it.  Everybody can see it.

 6             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   But I'm asking you to look at the very short text in the upper

 8     right-hand side corner.  Apologies, this is on the 5th of June, 1995 [as

 9     interpreted].  What does it say on the upper right-hand corner?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you zoom in on that part?

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Attackers came from Stari Grad.  Do

12     you me to read just this or should I continue?

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Maybe you could give us your own summary.

15        A.   At 4.30 this morning, members of Muslim paramilitary formations

16     carried out an attack from various directions and from various areas, and

17     in particular from the direction of Stari Grad, Pecani, and Tukova --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And they attacked the facilities of

20     the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor, the police station, Prijedor hotel,

21     the city bridge on the Sana.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second.

23             Yes, continue, please.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   Could you please tell us whether you accepted the Prosecutor's

Page 45298

 1     suggestion that the population in "celina" in Stari Grad was attacked?

 2        A.   No, I would not describe it that way.  I tried to answer the

 3     Prosecutor's question by answering why they hadn't crossed the bridge on

 4     the Sana, because there is only one bridge on the Sana that was opened at

 5     the moment because it was secure.  There was a police and military

 6     check-point there.  And as for the Prijedor hotel, where one part of that

 7     unit was billeted, they didn't go from there.  They went down the stream

 8     of the Sana and they arrived in the centre.  When they were withdrawing,

 9     they took the same route, whereas the troops followed them.

10        Q.   Thank you.  A few interventions --

11             JUDGE KWON:  It's purely my personal observation, but I find it

12     strange that you base your questions in your re-examination on the

13     question put by the Prosecutor during her cross-examination, not on the

14     answers given by the witness.

15             MS. GUSTAFSON:  And if I could just add, Your Honour, that the

16     question was "whether you accepted the Prosecutor's suggestion that the

17     population in 'celina' in Stari Grad was attacked."  What I put to him

18     was that after the attacking force was repelled, the army destroyed the

19     neighbourhood.

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MS. GUSTAFSON:  So it's also not an accurate characterisation.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, the witnesses are

24     used to our system, and they cannot be mindful of the tricks in the

25     questions, and I cannot intervene during the cross-examination and that's

Page 45299

 1     why I'm asking.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Celina" is not a place.  "Celina"

 3     is the word for entire population.  It's not a place.  It's not a

 4     location.  So when a witness confirms something without this --

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Please, please.

 6             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness did say you're very

 7     skillful in what you do because he sensed that the questions were tricky.

 8             Okay.  Very well, then.

 9             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Totally inappropriate.

10             JUDGE KWON:  Let's move on.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is inappropriate is the fact

12     that we are being tried in such a system.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Can we now see the removal of consequences through a glance and

15     tell us whether this is corresponds to what you knew about the situation

16     at the time.  This document or, rather, this text.

17        A.   Do you want me to read it aloud?

18        Q.   No, no, just look at it.  Could we look at the very short

19     paragraph:  At the meeting of the Crisis Staff, problems of the

20     temporarily resettled population was considered after they took refuge in

21     some of the camps in order to save [indiscernible] from war operations?

22     What camp did the author have in mind?

23        A.   I suppose that he had in mind Trnopolje because Keraterm and

24     Omarska were places where people were put to be investigated after having

25     been arrested during combat.  And as for Trnopolje, as I've already told

Page 45300

 1     you, people would go there to seek shelter.  And then when the Red Cross

 2     started organising their departure, it was allowed for the people to join

 3     their families up there.

 4        Q.   What is the meaning of the term "those who moved out

 5     temporarily"?

 6        A.   I've already answered a question to that effect.  The document

 7     was signed by all the three parties, and in that document there was a

 8     reference to temporarily moving out during the war while the population

 9     was in danger as a result of war operations, and I personally accepted

10     that.  And I thought once some day when peace was restored, that all

11     those who wanted to return would be able to return to their homes.  And

12     this is indeed what is happening, what is still happening, in accordance

13     with the Dayton Accords, as far as I know.

14             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

15     tender this document but we would also request the part on Stari Grad to

16     be translated, the part that Dr. Stakic started reading out.

17             JUDGE KWON:  I am not sure which part you made Mr. Stakic read

18     out in addition to those that have been already translated.  Shall we

19     mark it for identification, pending English translation?

20             THE REGISTRAR:  It receives MFI D4203, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE KWON:  Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  Just to put on the record now that I'm not sure

23     exactly what Dr. Karadzic is referring to.  I may have objections when

24     this is translated because at this point I just can't.

25             JUDGE KWON:  Very well.  That's the purpose of marking for

Page 45301

 1     identification.

 2             Do you have more questions, Mr. Karadzic?

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish on time, your

 4     Excellencies.  I have a few short questions.  Can this entire document be

 5     tendered?  We would like to have all the text because they could be of

 6     much help to the Trial Chamber if Dr. Stakic confirms that that is what

 7     indeed happened at the time and that "Kozarski Vjesnik" accurately

 8     conveyed news of the situation.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect, we did not

10     meddle with the editorial policy of "Kozarski Vjesnik," and now you have

11     not given me an opportunity to read all that.  However, the parts that I

12     read, I can agree with them.

13             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14        Q.   Thank you.  You said that at first there was no communication but

15     you still managed to receive certain instructions.

16             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to remind the

17     participants of the fact that P02716 on page 22 says that during the

18     first 45 days, we did not have any contacts, and this is from a meeting

19     with the leadership of Prijedor.  We can call it up if you wish --

20             JUDGE KWON:  Yes.

21             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Do you --

22             MS. GUSTAFSON:  If he wants to call up a document, that's fine.

23     But this preliminary exposition on what the document says is

24     inappropriate.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document has been admitted.

Page 45302

 1     I'm just asking the doctor whether it is true whether there were to

 2     contacts and whether that corresponds to what he experienced.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said to the -- I apologise to

 4     everybody and to the interpreters.  Can I be allowed to answer?

 5             JUDGE KWON:  What?  I don't remember what the question was.

 6             MS. GUSTAFSON:  The question appears to have been based on P2716,

 7     so I think as an initial step that should be called up.

 8             JUDGE KWON:  So before we see the document, what is your

 9     question, Mr. Karadzic?

10             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked Dr. Stakic, since during

11     cross-examination his contention that there had been no contacts was

12     challenged and some instructions were shown, I am now asking Dr. Stakic,

13     considering that at that first meeting we had noted that there had been

14     no meetings, that was page 2716 -- that was P2716, page 22.  I am asking

15     him now if that's consistent with what he knows.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree with you.  I answered the

17     same to the lady from the Prosecution.  Although, I didn't have the exact

18     number of days that we hadn't seen each other.  I don't know exactly how

19     soon the corridor was closed.  But I know that I had no contact with you,

20     personally.  Nor did the others, I believe, because we in Bosnian Krajina

21     were not able to reach anyone outside by phone.  And I also added that I

22     don't know whether the army or the police had some communications of

23     their own.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25        Q.   And my last question.  Evidence was led in the form of evidence

Page 45303

 1     of Witness Srdjo Srdic in 2002 that it was the Crisis Staff that

 2     organised it all --

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the last part of his

 4     question.

 5             JUDGE KWON:  Just a second, just a second.  Could you repeat your

 6     last sentence again for the benefit of the interpreters.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask Dr. Stakic -- I

 8     cannot show this document of three or four passages that the Prosecution

 9     cited.

10             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11        Q.   I'm just asking how old he was, Srdjo Srdic, in 2002?

12        A.   I think over 70.

13        Q.   Thank you.  I cannot clear that up now because we have no time.

14     Thank you, Dr. Stakic, for coming here and for your evidence.  I have no

15     further questions.

16             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Stakic.  That concludes your

17     evidence.  On behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your

18     coming to The Hague to give it.  You are free to go.

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I thank

20     the ladies and gentlemen of the Prosecution and Mr. Karadzic and his

21     Defence team.  I hope that I managed to give some contribution at least

22     to your efforts to shed light on the events of 1992.  It's up to you, of

23     course.  Thank you and goodbye.

24             JUDGE KWON:  Our thanks also go to Mr. Ostojic for your

25     assistance.  Thank you very much.  I appreciate it.  And I also

Page 45304

 1     appreciate the kind indulgence of the staff and the interpreters and

 2     everybody involved.

 3             Hearing is adjourned.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.07 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the

 6                           18th day of December, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.