131217ED

Page 45220

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

2 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours. And good morning.

3 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

4 Q. And good morning, Dr. Stakic.

5 A. Good morning, madam.

6 Q. Dr. Stakic, in your statement you acknowledge that you knew at

7 the time of two major crimes committed by Bosnian Serb police and

8 military forces against non-Serbs in Prijedor. The first is the massacre

9 of dozens of Keraterm detainees by military, and that's at paragraph 24

10 of your statement; and the other one is another massacre of Muslims, this

11 time by police officers, Muslims who were leaving Prijedor in a convoy at

12 Koricanske Stijene, and that's at paragraph 30.

13 And my question, Dr. Stakic, is: Aside from what you knew then,

14 what you know now, as you sit here today, is that, in fact, the police

15 and the army committed far more crimes against Muslims and Croats in

16 Prijedor in 1992. They detained thousands of them in horrific conditions

17 where they were subjected to torture and mistreatment, killed hundreds

18 and hundreds of them, and destroyed their property on a massive scale.

19 You know that now as you sit here today; right?

20 THE ACCUSED: May I just warn that "killed hundreds and hundreds"

21 had been translated "thousands and thousands."

22 JUDGE KWON: If there's any difference, yes, it's "hundreds and

23 hundreds." Yes, shall we continue?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer now?

25 MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 45221

1 Q. Please.

2 A. When I gave a statement to the members of Mr. Karadzic's Defence

3 team, I stated this on the basis of the knowledge that I had then,

4 because these two things that happened were terrible. They are not less

5 terrible than the others, but all the other citizens of Prijedor heard

6 about that. It wasn't only me as president of the Municipal Assembly.

7 You do know that I was at this trial, and during that trial and over all

8 those years, although I'm in prison and I don't have much information

9 from the ground, but during that trial I found out about many other

10 crimes that did happen, unfortunately, in the municipality of Prijedor.

11 And I agree with what is written in the trial judgement and the appeals

12 judgement with regard to these crimes.

13 And may I say straight away, that I personally or my defence

14 during the trial before this court - my trial, that is - we never tried

15 to deny or underestimate these crimes. Quite simply, we showed that that

16 I was not a big player or the main player. I also agree with the

17 statement made by the Trial Chamber in paragraph 616 in the trial

18 judgement in my case. But again, may I say that I do not agree with

19 those parts where it says that I'm the person in charge and that I'm

20 responsible for all these crimes.

21 I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound

22 regret, which I did express during my own trial, for everything that was

23 done to my fellow citizens in that period of time.

24 Q. Thank you, Dr. Stakic. That was a helpful but somewhat

25 roundabout answer. I take it you agree with my summary of events in

Page 45222

1 Prijedor in 1992, that the police and the army committed mass crime

2 against Muslims and Croats in Prijedor, detentions, torture,

3 mistreatment, and killings; is that right?

4 A. I think perhaps I was a bit lengthy in my answer, but I did say

5 that these two crimes are horrible in themselves, but the other ones you

6 mention are even more horrific, and they really happened. All I can do

7 is express my regret, once again, that it happened. But as I was trying

8 to say, at that time I did not know of all these crimes that were going

9 on.

10 Q. Thank you. Now at paragraph 16 of your statement, you describe

11 the 30th of April, 1992, SDS take-over of Prijedor as a reaction to a fax

12 from Mr. Delimustafic, dated the 29th of April, 1992. And at

13 paragraph 33, you deny that the take-over was prepared well in advance of

14 the 1st of May, 1992. And in fact, Dr. Stakic, the Prijedor SDS had been

15 planning the take-over of Prijedor well before the 29th of April and that

16 29th of April telex was simply a trigger which accelerated the timing of

17 the take-over; right?

18 A. At that moment, I was not aware that the SDS was planning any

19 take-over.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could look at D1830, please.

21 Q. And as you can see, Dr. Stakic, these are the minutes of the SDS

22 Municipal Board dated the 23rd of April, 1992. And if you look at

23 point 5, towards the bottom of the page, it states a decision was taken

24 "to immediately start working on the take-over, the co-ordination with

25 the JNA, notwithstanding."

Page 45223

1 Now that reflects that the SDS was planning to take-over the

2 municipality well before receiving the 29th of April fax; right?

3 A. I can look at that paragraph, but I should like to ask you to

4 read the whole document. At the beginning there is a reference to who

5 took part in the discussion, and the names are listed. And you don't see

6 my name there. I can't say for sure whether I was at that session or

7 not, because I didn't attend all the sessions. But from this, you can't

8 see that I discussed anything. People were saying all sorts of things,

9 and when I myself was looking for documents, I found another record, a

10 longer one of that session, where Mr. Drljaca -- it's an extended

11 document, P0041716 is the number. And 0041719. Simo Drljaca says:

12 "We and Simo Miskovic were told today at the barracks that we

13 would be arrested."

14 And you see they are coming, and if somebody is threatening them

15 there, I don't see how that can be called co-operation.

16 Anyway, I'm just telling you my personal view. I had no

17 impression and no knowledge that any take-over is being prepared. And on

18 that day, 29 April, as I said in paragraph 16, I was in my office doing

19 my usual job as vice president of the Municipal Assembly. I stayed there

20 until 4.00 p.m. and then went home.

21 Q. Okay.

22 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could have 65 ter 05787, please.

23 Q. And while that's coming up, Dr. Stakic, I see you have your

24 statement in front of you and some other documents, and I will be

25 referring to your statement so it's helpful that you have it. If you'd

Page 45224

1 like to refer to any other documents besides your statement, if you could

2 please inform us. Thank you.

3 A. Thank you.

4 Q. Now this is a 28th of April, 1994, "Kozarski Vjesnik" article,

5 which includes an interview with you. We can see your photo there.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. If you could look to the bottom, the last paragraph at the very

8 bottom left-hand corner of the screen. If that could be blown up for

9 you. So that paragraph at the -- in the bottom left-hand corner, it

10 starts with you stating:

11 "What happened on the 30th of April, 1992, was only the final act

12 of a long-standing, but for the Serbs, perilous plan."

13 Now, this is what you told "Kozarski Vjesnik" about the

14 30th of April take-over, that it was the final act of a long-standing

15 plan; correct?

16 A. Let me read this. It says:

17 "What happened on the 30th of April was just the finale of a plan

18 long in the making fatal to the Serbs."

19 So it means "fatal to the Serbs." I don't know how that was

20 translated into English. Because it relates to the fax that we received,

21 where they proclaimed the beginning of combat against Serb forces.

22 Q. And this statement you made reflects, does it not, not only the

23 advanced planning of the take-over but your knowledge of the fact that

24 that take-over was planned in advance; right?

25 A. I'm sorry. I don't know how this statement of mine was

Page 45225

1 translated into English. I would like the -- to ask the interpreters to

2 interpret it. I said:

3 "What happened on the 30th of April was just the finale of a plan

4 long in the making that was fatal to the Serbs."

5 "A plan," meaning prepared by the HDZ and the SDA and that they

6 revealed in the fax sent by the minister of the interior. I didn't say

7 here that Serbs had been preparing anything for a long time. And I say

8 further that they had been arming themselves secretly, sewing uniforms,

9 et cetera. And later on I got hold of some information seized by the

10 army and the police, documents from which we saw that they had indeed

11 been preparing a long time for that, and later on in the newspapers they

12 tried to deny that fax.

13 Q. Okay.

14 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to the next page in the B/C/S and

15 stay on the same page in the English.

16 Q. And I'd like to direct your attention to the very top left-hand

17 corner in the B/C/S. And here you refer to the Muslims secretly arming

18 themselves, making uniforms with the symbol of the lily, building

19 strongholds in Kozara. Then you say:

20 "But we were not just sitting there idle. When we saw what they

21 were doing, we began to arm ourselves and to tell the party members what

22 they were planning to do to us and what has to be done to prevent 1941

23 happening all over again."

24 Now in your statement you emphasize the arming and organising

25 activities of the Muslim side, but you don't say anything about such

Page 45226

1 activities on the Serb side. But in this article, you acknowledged that

2 the Serbs were indeed arming themselves with your knowledge and support;

3 right?

4 A. A moment ago I was able to see the date of this statement I made

5 to the press. What is the date?

6 Q. This is the 28th of April, 1994.

7 A. You know, I said a moment ago as well that when I was giving this

8 statement, I was trying to describe the knowledge that I had then in that

9 period, from January until October 1992. And this is 1994. During the

10 war, our officers spoke to the radio, to the newspapers, and our police

11 did too. And from the things they said, I learnt that they had also been

12 working to arm Serbian people. But that's something I learned later.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page --

14 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Ms. Gustafson, do you agree that

15 English translation that we have is not correct? First page.

16 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, I understood it to be slightly different,

17 but I didn't --

18 JUDGE KWON: It's not "Serb plan," it's "perilous plan to

19 Serbs" --

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yeah, "for the Serbs."

21 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

22 MS. GUSTAFSON: We will request a revision of this translation.

23 And if we could move to page 2 of the English and move down the

24 page, about two-thirds of the way down the page in the B/C/S, still on

25 the far left-hand side. And this is about a third of the way down in the

Page 45227

1 English.

2 Q. You state here:

3 "We knew they were armed mainly with zoljas, infantry weapons,

4 and wasps, but we had better military potential and our lads were brave

5 and bold."

6 Now, here you acknowledged that the Serb side was better armed

7 than the Muslim side. And that's true as well, isn't it?

8 A. I can repeat once again: This is something I learned later. The

9 commander of the brigade which participated in the fighting gave an

10 interview describing which units took part, with what weapons and

11 equipment. So in 1994, I already knew about these things. But in March,

12 April, May 1992, I did not have that information because nobody owed it

13 to me to inform me, nor was I superior to the army or the police for them

14 to report to me about the equipment and assets they dispose of.

15 Q. Okay.

16 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go back to page 1 of the English

17 and back up to the top of the page in the B/C/S.

18 Q. And this is about six lines down in the B/C/S and two-thirds of

19 the way down in the English. You state:

20 "On the direction of the central office of the SDS, we formed the

21 Serbian Assembly of Prijedor on 7th January 1992, and I became chairman."

22 Now, this is a reflection of the fact that you established the

23 Serbian Assembly in Prijedor pursuant to republic level SDS instructions;

24 in particular, the Variant A and B instructions; correct?

25 A. I said that in my statement. The SDS president convened the

Page 45228

1 session. I believe that was before this 7th of January. I believe it

2 was in December. And at that session, he showed us that document. The

3 document was not copied and distributed to everybody. He just showed it

4 to us and read it out, saying that there are Variants A and B. One of

5 them does not apply to us because we did not have the majority in the

6 Assembly. The other one applies to us, and we should follow that other

7 variant and organise the Serbian Assembly in that municipality.

8 Q. Thank you.

9 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this article.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

11 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President, the first two pages of this

12 would be admitted, but there is another article and the rest of it that

13 probably shouldn't be admitted.

14 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, that makes sense. Thank you.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit this part of the article. Yes.

16 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit Number P6581, Your Honours.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON:

18 Q. Now, Dr. Stakic --

19 JUDGE KWON: Now, by the way --

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: I'm sorry.

21 JUDGE KWON: -- I take it the parties were informed of the

22 extended sitting schedule that was planned. Okay. It was just sent.

23 But you will stick to the three hours allocated to you, Ms. Gustafson?

24 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, I -- I certainly intend to. It's always

25 difficult to predict these things with certainty, but I would note that

Page 45229

1 even with the three hours, it doesn't seem -- seems like it may be very

2 difficult to finish today.

3 JUDGE KWON: Please do your best to conclude your cross in three

4 hours. And I -- for the Defence, it will have less than 40 or 50 minutes

5 for the redirect, if we are to conclude Mr. Stakic's evidence today at

6 all.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Between 40 and 50 minutes?

8 JUDGE KWON: My calculation, yes.

9 MR. ROBINSON: That should be okay.

10 JUDGE KWON: So we will sit until 4.00 today.

11 Let's continue.

12 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

13 Q. Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 18 you describe an attack on a military

14 vehicle carrying five VRS members in Hambarine on the 22nd of May, 1992.

15 And you describe a similar attack on Kozarac -- attacking Kozarac on the

16 24th of May. And you state: "These attacks were responded to."

17 Now, with respect to events in Hambarine, the Crisis Staff --

18 Prijedor Crisis Staff issued an ultimatum to hand over the alleged

19 perpetrators of this incident, and stated that if this ultimatum was not

20 complied with, the Crisis Staff was no longer willing to guarantee the

21 safety of the population -- the civilian population of the area; correct?

22 A. I agree with you and what's written in paragraph 18, with all due

23 respect. As for that other part, I don't know. To the best of my

24 knowledge, the Crisis Staff met for the first time on the 29th of May.

25 So it couldn't possibly issue this, nor was it within the purview of the

Page 45230

1 Crisis Staff. But maybe you have some other document saying the

2 contrary. But the fact is the Crisis Staff was established on the

3 29th of May at a regular Assembly session, and I don't remember that it

4 was convened specially because of these events.

5 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to P3485, please.

6 Q. And I'd like to direct your attention to the article at the top

7 right-hand side of this page in the B/C/S. And this is a 29th of May,

8 1992, "Kozarski Vjesnik" -- page from "Kozarski Vjesnik" which recites

9 public statements of the Crisis Staff. And this one on the top right is

10 a statement dated the 23rd of May, 1992. And the column -- in the column

11 on the far right-hand side - and in the English this is the last two

12 paragraphs on the first page - it states that:

13 "The Crisis Staff hereby orders the population of Hambarine local

14 commune and other local communes in the area ... to hand over the

15 perpetrators of this crime ... by Saturday, the 23rd of May."

16 And the final paragraph states:

17 "This crime has exhausted all dead-lines and promises and the

18 Crisis Staff no longer can, nor is it willing to, guarantee the security

19 of the population of the above-mentioned villages in this area."

20 A. I see now this article and it's signed "Crisis Staff." You know,

21 in the Crisis Staff we also had a press officer or something to that

22 effect who had the right -- not only had the right, but it was his job to

23 meet with the media and issue press releases. Sometimes he would sign

24 these releases "press officers," sometimes he would sign them

25 "Crisis Staff." But if you ever saw a decision of the Crisis Staff

Page 45231

1 itself, it's usually signed "president of the Crisis Staff" and my name

2 underneath, because I was the president. So this press release was made

3 by the press officer, because the army had also spoken to the radio on

4 the same day, and he made a statement on behalf of the Crisis Staff.

5 Also, a moment ago mobilisation was mentioned. The mobilisation

6 call-ups are signed by the minister of defence, and we at the municipal

7 level don't have the power to cancel it or prohibit it, but what we could

8 do is address the press and appeal on the radio to all able-bodied men

9 over 18 to respond to the call-up. So this is not a decision or the

10 opinion of the Crisis Staff. It's the opinion of the press officer.

11 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, when the perpetrators were not handed over by

12 the population of Hambarine, the army attacked the village, shelling the

13 village, attacking the population as a whole, and destroying the homes --

14 destroying homes of the Muslims who lived there; right?

15 A. I learned and heard that these things happened during those days,

16 but I cannot tell you anything more about the extent and the substance of

17 that operation because they had no obligation to keep me informed about

18 what was really going on on the ground.

19 Q. Now at paragraph 19 of your statement, you discuss the

20 30th of May attack against Prijedor town by Muslim forces, an attack

21 which you explained was repelled within a matter of hours. What you

22 don't state anywhere in your statement is that after this attack was

23 repelled, the army virtually destroyed the largely Muslim neighbourhood

24 of Stari Grad in Prijedor town; right?

25 A. You know what? As I described it here, that night I was in the

Page 45232

1 building of the Municipal Assembly when the attack started. I heard the

2 shooting. And at first, I thought it was soldiers shooting in the air,

3 as they usually do when they are going to the front line or coming back.

4 But then stronger explosions started, like grenades and even stronger,

5 around the Assembly building itself. Then I went into the hallway, and

6 the shooting was coming from the park, which was only 150 metres away

7 from the building. The few of us civilians who were in the building at

8 that time were not armed, but fortunately, outside the municipality

9 building there was a check-point manned by two or three soldiers or

10 policemen, I am not sure, who were armed.

11 And I don't know if you know what it looks like. Next to the

12 municipal building, there is the police station, and they also had

13 reserve policemen there who were armed. And shooting was heard from that

14 side as well. It lasted until about 9.00, when I saw a tank, a Serbian

15 tank between the SUP building and our building, and I saw troops coming

16 in, and then they moved towards the park, the new buildings, and the --

17 the buildings and the new hotel where the explosions were coming from.

18 And they started moving towards Stari Grad, the old town. I wasn't there

19 in the old town but I heard that it was considerably devastated. I don't

20 know if the army really had to respond that way and use that kind of

21 force. It's not up to me to judge. I'm not a soldier. I'm not

22 qualified. But at any rate, it was not my purpose to devastate and

23 destroy the town. There were socially owned buildings there, public

24 buildings, and there were Serb businesses and facilities that were

25 damaged or destroyed as well.

Page 45233

1 Q. You said that you "don't know if the army really had to respond

2 that way and use that kind of force. It's not up to me to judge. I'm

3 not a soldier." But in fact, you called a military expert in your case,

4 a US general, General Wilmot, and I'd like to remind you of what he said

5 in response to questions from your lawyer in your trial.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: And this has been uploaded at 65 ter 25618.

7 Q. He was asked the question:

8 "Help me with this: Also the military at this point, did they

9 continue to pursue or were they in pursuit of the 'enemy' as a result of

10 the May 30th, 1992, attack upon the city/town of Prijedor?"

11 And he answered:

12 "Yes, they did pursue the attacking forces, but they also stopped

13 in I guess I would describe it as a suburb neighbourhood. I've never

14 been there so I don't know exactly how to describe it. Called Stari

15 Grad, is it? And they decimated that neighbourhood which is contrary to

16 the rules of land warfare and probably criminal action if one would take

17 a look at it, and if certain -- and if authorities would examine what

18 happened there, it was an atrocity, and something that the army should

19 have been brought to account on."

20 Now, that was what your defence military expert said about what

21 the army did in Stari Grad after they repelled this attack; correct?

22 A. Well, I don't remember exactly what he said, with all due

23 respect. I trust what you've said, that you're reading it out as he said

24 it. As you said yourself, he's a military expert. He can say that.

25 However, I cannot. I was not at the old town. I heard that it was

Page 45234

1 destroyed in that operation. And I said a moment ago I don't know

2 whether there was that use of force, this excessive use of force, as this

3 expert said, or whether it was proportionate. I really wouldn't want to

4 go into all of that.

5 You see, once again, I'm saying: I'm 50 years old now. At that

6 time, I was only 29 years old. I was just a new, inexperienced doctor,

7 politically unqualified, naive, not to speak of the military and the

8 police. These were not departments that were within my line of work. I

9 was not in charge of them on the basis of any documents, and especially

10 in view of my age and lack of experience, I could not have any kind of

11 supervision over the army or could I exert any kind of pressure over

12 them.

13 I just tried here, this paragraph -- I just happened to be there,

14 so I'm speaking as a witness, and I saw what was happening around me.

15 Because later on I did find out, but I really didn't want to go into all

16 of that. Also, on the under -- on the other side, where the underpass

17 is, there were wounded people. And then the commander of the military

18 got killed near Kozarski Vjesnik, and also many policemen were killed at

19 the bridge. Later on I found out that the attackers had come over the

20 Sana because the bridge was guarded by the military and the police, and

21 they came from the direction of the old town. And apparently, they were

22 withdrawing at that point. But I'm telling you all of this as a citizen

23 who heard later about what was going on.

24 I don't want underestimate the report of that expert. Namely,

25 that what happened there did happen. I'm not trying to diminish it. I'm

Page 45235

1 not trying to deny it.

2 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

3 Ms. Gustafson, can you scroll back to lines 1 of this page,

4 page 36. It's part of your reading from that expert's testimony, "called

5 Stari Grad, is it," and the afterwards, probably because you read too

6 fast, something is missing, before you referred to criminal action. I

7 heard -- I remember something to the effect of that's contrary to warfare

8 or something? Could you read it again slowly?

9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Certainly.

10 "And they decimated that neighbourhood, which is contrary to the

11 rules of land warfare and probably criminal action ..."

12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you.

14 Q. Now, Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 51 of your statement you comment on

15 adjudicated fact 1267, relating to the destruction of non-Serb

16 settlements, and you said that, as far as you were aware, it was not just

17 Muslim homes that were destroyed. And you gave the example of

18 Mr. Srdjo Srdic [phoen], a Serb, and you state that his house which was

19 in the immediate vicinity of the municipal building was damaged during

20 the combat activities.

21 Now, Mr. Srdic provided evidence about the destruction -- or the

22 damage to his home that the Defence has submitted, and this is what he

23 said about it.

24 "Mine was the only Serb house in Prijedor that was burnt down.

25 They wanted to kill me. They wanted to liquidate me. And the proof of

Page 45236

1 that is that they threw an explosive device on my balcony, and prior to

2 that they put 'SDA' on it. But this was not done by a Muslim."

3 MS. GUSTAFSON: And that's at D2265, page 24.

4 Q. Now it's clear from Mr. Srdic's evidence that his house wasn't

5 damaged in the course of combat. He was singled out among Serbs in

6 Prijedor and his home was specifically targeted for personal reasons;

7 right?

8 A. I don't know about that statement of Mr. Srdic's. I remember

9 that he used to come to the Municipal Assembly. You know, down there at

10 the executive board, there is this department for property-related

11 matters. First of all, he wanted to prove that it was his house --

12 actually, he lived in another house. And this is a shop. It's right in

13 front of the Municipal Assembly building. It's not even 50 metres away.

14 I mean, I was not watching all the time because I sought shelter behind a

15 wall. I wasn't looking through the window. I didn't want to be hit

16 myself. I don't know whether it was hit by a Muslim tank or a Serb

17 zolja. I'm not going into all of that. But during that fighting, the

18 shop was damaged because these are houses that share walls. These are

19 not stand-alone houses. They're attached. You can see that if you go

20 out into the ground. It's 50 metres from the entrance into the

21 Municipal Assembly.

22 And here my answer pertains to that. I mean, I'm not denying

23 that -- well, Stari Grad, the old town, as far as I know, had a majority

24 Muslim population, and these houses were destroyed. I, as a human being,

25 can just express my regret for the fact that these buildings were

Page 45237

1 destroyed, as I did then. But Mr. Srdic came to speak to us and he said

2 that he would be seeking damages. Also, these people from Kozarac, a

3 delegation came to see me, and they came to report the damage that had

4 been sustained by their houses. Now, what he personally thinks, I really

5 wouldn't want to go into that.

6 Q. Okay, now you're -- I'd like to ask you now about Trnopolje, the

7 facility you speak about in your statement. As I understand it, your

8 evidence is that during and after the attack on Kozarac, the civilians

9 fled the area, the army allowed them to pass. They arrived in Prijedor

10 town and then someone directed them to Trnopolje, which you refer to as a

11 holding centre. And that's paragraphs 18 and 22.

12 And so now as I understand it, your position is that this

13 movement of civilians out of Kozarac and to Trnopolje was a movement that

14 happened on their own, they moved on their own, and they moved

15 voluntarily to Trnopolje; is that right?

16 A. Can I read this once again and see what is written here? With

17 all due respect, I don't see that I say at any point that these people

18 voluntarily, and so on and so forth, madam. I'm saying here this

19 information that I received. I set out in the morning, I left my parents

20 house, and they live in the village of Mariska, and that is where I had

21 moved my wife and my young child. Why? Because there was no

22 electricity. My parents didn't have any electricity either but they live

23 in the country, so they have a well. They also have a stove that is

24 fired by wood. I'm sorry for saying all of this right now. And at the

25 check-point the police said: No, you cannot pass this way because there

Page 45238

1 is fighting underway. And then I took the roundabout way by Rakelici and

2 Cela. I arrived in Prijedor. By the time I got to work it was - I don't

3 know - about midday. And --

4 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt but my time is very limited and I think

5 you're more or less repeating what's in your statement. Let me try to

6 ask it in a clearer way. I think my question could have been clearer. I

7 take it your position is that the Muslims of Kozarac went -- ended up in

8 Trnopolje and they went there on their own. Nobody captured them and put

9 them there; is that right?

10 A. No, Madam, I do apologise, but that is not written in my

11 statement, that they did this voluntarily. I'm trying to explain to you

12 how it was that I found out about this. Because in some statement out

13 there, I mean, in some report that appeared later by the MUP, they claim

14 that the Crisis Staff founded Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm, you know,

15 and they are not referring to any date or the number of that decision or

16 whatever. I'll telling you how it was that I learned about this. I'm

17 not saying it was voluntary at all.

18 There were operations going on there. It's the army then, that

19 there, at the front line, opened a passageway, if that's the right word,

20 and then they let these people get to town, because they had set out

21 towards town from Kozarac. And then, the people I worked with at the

22 Assembly told me that they had arrived during the night and that they

23 were staying in two buildings in town. And most of them were called upon

24 to stay with their relatives, friends. There were people with mixed

25 marriages and so on and so forth. I don't know who took these people in.

Page 45239

1 At one point in time, when the police realised that these buildings were

2 overcrowded, they took buses.

3 Once again, they asked these people whether anybody had some

4 private apartment or house to stay at with someone, and then they got

5 these other people who had fled from Kozarac from the fighting, and then

6 they channeled them towards Trnopolje.

7 I never said - and I don't want to say it now, too, and I don't

8 want this to be put to me - that they went voluntarily. What happened to

9 them is really sad and I regret it. But I'm not saying we did not make

10 any decision about this Trnopolje. We did not plan this Trnopolje. At

11 least, I did not take part in that and I'm not aware of any such thing.

12 I'm not saying then and I'm not saying now that they voluntarily left

13 their homes in order to go somewhere, even if you call it a holding

14 centre or whatever.

15 Q. Okay. Your position on that is now clear. Thank you. Now you

16 said that you never said they went voluntarily, "what happened to them is

17 really sad, and I regret it. But I'm not saying we did not make any

18 decision about this, Trnopolje. We did not plan this Trnopolje."

19 And what the Crisis Staff did do, Dr. Stakic, is control the

20 manner in which people could be released from Trnopolje, didn't it?

21 A. The Crisis Staff to control this? This Trnopolje was not under

22 the Crisis Staff. And as far as I know, Mr. Kuruzovic,

23 Slobodan Kuruzovic, was appointed on behalf of the army, and those who

24 appointed him were supposed to receive reports from him in terms of what

25 was going on in the centre. It's not that I was supposed to receive

Page 45240

1 reports or the Crisis Staff. It is a fact that people, but mainly from

2 the Red Cross, the local Red Cross that was down there, they did address

3 the Crisis Staff. But they were asking for assistance in terms of food,

4 medicine, medical supplies, and later on oil because they also organised

5 the transportation for these unfortunate people.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P2915, please.

7 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, you can see that about two-thirds of the way

8 down the page there it says: A summary of conclusions, orders, and

9 decisions adopted by the Crisis Staff from the 29th of May to the

10 24th of July.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page 3 in both languages.

12 Q. And near the top in the B/C/S, in your -- towards the bottom in

13 the English, one of the conclusions it refers to is conclusion number

14 01-1-023-45/92 of the 2nd of July, 1992, forbidding the individual

15 release of persons from Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm.

16 A moment ago you referred to the Red Cross coming to the

17 Crisis Staff asking for assistance in terms of food, medicine, and oil.

18 This decision summarised here reflects the Crisis Staff's control over

19 the manner in which people are released from this facility where you

20 acknowledge people were held in a very sad state. Isn't that right?

21 A. In this question of yours, there are several assertions, several

22 sub-questions, if you will, but I will try to answer as clear as

23 possible. First of all, to the best of my knowledge, then and now, as

24 far as Omarska and Keraterm are concerned, it was the police that was in

25 charge. As for Trnopolje, it was the army who was in charge. How come,

Page 45241

1 I do not know. I cannot explain.

2 Secondly, the Crisis Staff is a collective body. There were

3 11 of us there. I explained to you a moment ago when I said that I was

4 not present every time, because we would work one day and then I'd go

5 home and then I'd come again, and if you look at the decisions of the

6 Crisis Staff, you will see that only about 30 per cent were signed by me.

7 So even if I was absent, it was enough to have six members there to pass

8 a decision, out of the total of 11. This word "conclusion," that's not

9 an order. We could not issue orders to the army or to the police in

10 terms of what they would do there.

11 Now, this is some kind of opinion on my part. Sometimes, people

12 on the basis of certain interventions -- well, I know of

13 Dr. Beglerbegovic, I didn't even know that he had been arrested and it

14 just says that he released from Omarska because the people got together

15 and signed a petition for him to be released. And then I know about a

16 former football player from Partizan, they called the chief of SUP and

17 then he was released too. And so on.

18 To the best of my knowledge, it was the local Red Cross that

19 operated there and then later on the International Red Cross became

20 involved too. And they turned to us for this kind of logistical support

21 as I said a moment ago. I don't know what else I could really tell you

22 about this.

23 Q. Well, Dr. Stakic, you are insisting - and you've done that

24 several times, that you -- these facilities were not operated by the

25 Crisis Staff, Trnopolje was operated by the army, and that you couldn't

Page 45242

1 issue orders to them. But this conclusion reflects the understanding of

2 the Crisis Staff members at the time, that they had the power to forbid

3 the individual release of persons from Trnopolje, Omarska, and Keraterm;

4 right?

5 A. Throughout all that time, and again I'm telling you that I could

6 not issue any orders to Mr. Drljaca to release somebody or to keep him

7 there. I claim that with full responsibility. I could have written an

8 order a day, but none of those orders would have been binding on anybody.

9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Do Your Honours wish to take the break now?

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Given the circumstances, the Chamber is minded

11 to reduce the lunch break to 40 minutes. We resume at 10 past 1.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 12.32 p.m.

13 [The witness stands down]

14 [The witness takes the stand]

15 --- On resuming at 1.12 p.m.

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Please continue, Ms. Gustafson.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours.

18 And if I could have P2741, please.

19 Q. Dr. Stakic, this is a 2nd of June, 1992, Prijedor Crisis Staff

20 decision on the release of imprisoned persons. It orders the release of

21 various categories of persons, such as Serbs who have been imprisoned by

22 mistake, under Article 1; Article 4, all persons older than 60 for whom

23 an investigation has confirmed that they did not commit an offence, and a

24 few other categories. And in the last article which is on the next page

25 in the English it says that the public security station is in charge

Page 45243

1 implementing this decision, and the chief of SJB is personally

2 responsible for it. Now this -- if we go to the bottom of the page in

3 the B/C/S, this document is signed by you; correct?

4 A. Yes, this is my signature.

5 Q. Now, just before the break you said:

6 "I'm telling you that I could not issue any orders to Drljaca to

7 release somebody or keep him there."

8 That was at page 44. But this document demonstrates you doing

9 exactly that, you're ordering Drljaca to release certain categories of

10 prisoners; right?

11 A. Well, if you will allow me, this is what I wanted to say when

12 answering your previous question. Unfortunately, I was not the one who

13 established the Crisis Staff or the decided on its composition. However,

14 what I realised during my trial in 2002, the secretary of the

15 Municipal Assembly was not a member of that Crisis Staff. He was a

16 lawyer. When I saw that ten years later during my trial and now 20 years

17 later, I can see that some of the things were established without any

18 foundation in the prevalent law and that's how things were drafted.

19 Mr. Drljaca was a lawyer and he worked for the police. I didn't even

20 know that there were detained Serbs there. It was only when we received

21 that information from him that I learned it, that some of them were army

22 and police members as is written here, and they had not responded to the

23 mobilisation call.

24 And in keeping with that, our position was that they should not

25 be there. We wanted to avoid any problems in that centre. And it's a

Page 45244

1 fact. However, this is a decision, not an order. He could implement it

2 or not. As I have already told you, we had other examples of people who

3 were moving out after having moved into an apartment illegally. That's

4 when we sought assistance of the police. But it was not an order. It

5 was just a request on our part to seek the help of the police when it

6 came to moving those people out. And when you asked me just a while ago

7 about certain individuals, it did happen, you know, that individuals

8 would go to those centres and they would take people away for their own

9 personal gain in order to extort money from them --

10 Q. Dr. Stakic --

11 A. -- and even sadder than that --

12 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, I'm really not asking you about the

13 reasons why you issued this decision. Just the fact that it was issued,

14 and if you could really try to focus on my specific questions because of

15 my time limitations.

16 Now, you said in your answer:

17 "It was just a request on our part to seek the help of the

18 police."

19 Now, this decision, as you can see in Article 6, states that the

20 public security station "shall be in charge of the implementation of this

21 decision and the chief of the public security station shall be deemed

22 personally responsible for it ..."

23 This is not phrased as a request, is it? This is phrased in

24 mandatory terms; right?

25 A. I'm not a lawyer, Madam, as you know. But when I look at the

Page 45245

1 title, it says "a decision," not "an order." And as far as I knew then

2 and now, Simo Drljaca was the person who was responsible. He behaved the

3 way he did, he reported to his superiors as to what he was doing. He did

4 not have to inform us. There are other decisions of ours and our

5 requests to which he responded. Most often he would tell us: Do your

6 job. Don't interfere with mine, gentlemen.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P2637, please.

8 Q. Now, as you can see, this is a 1st of July, 1992, SJB document

9 sent to the Crisis Staff. And the reference -- it refers to two, what it

10 says "your documents," presumably Crisis Staff documents. And it states:

11 "In reference to your documents of the above numbers and dates,

12 we hereby inform you that ..."

13 And the first entry states that:

14 "Conclusion number 02-111-108/92, by which the release of

15 prisoners is prohibited is being fully observed."

16 Now this reflects, does it not, Mr. Drljaca's implementation of a

17 Crisis Staff decision prohibiting the release of prisoners and his report

18 back to the Crisis Staff to that effect?

19 A. I would like to repeat once again -- or, rather, you didn't allow

20 me to finish a minute ago. When it comes to those individuals, what we

21 meant was that those people, Serbs, if I may call them criminals, they

22 would go to those centres, they would take away individuals from there

23 for their own personal gain. They would extort cars from them and money.

24 And the saddest thing of all is that they would not return them. They

25 would kill them. That was our objection. It was not that we were

Page 45246

1 interfering with their work, that they were not allowed to release

2 prisoners.

3 And then if you'll allow me, look at the last conclusion with

4 regard to the establishment of the infamous intervention platoon.

5 Together with the military police they --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Stakic is reading too fast.

7 JUDGE KWON: [Overlapping speakers] ...

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me tell you immediately --

9 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat. Together with the --

10 THE ACCUSED: Next page in English, please.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, if we could go to the next page in the

12 English, to the top of the page. I think that's what Dr. Stakic is

13 referring to now.

14 Q. Dr. Stakic, I'm not sure what you're referring to --

15 A. [Overlapping speakers] ...

16 Q. I apologise for interrupting. I am not sure what paper you have

17 now in front of you, but if I could ask you to focus on the document

18 that's on the screen and answer the question -- answer the questions

19 relating to that document.

20 A. I'm looking at the same document, madam. In the Serbian version

21 the paragraph is at the bottom of the page, and it's about the order

22 dated 17 June, whereby Mr. Drljaca answers that an integrated

23 intervention platoon was established. And I claim with full

24 responsibility that I never learnt about its establishment. I was never

25 informed about that at all.

Page 45247

1 Q. Well, Dr. Stakic, this document is directed to the Crisis Staff,

2 and it states clearly that that intervention platoon was formed and gives

3 information on what it has been doing. Are you saying that you never

4 received this document that was addressed to the Crisis Staff?

5 A. No, I never said that I did not receive the document. I am

6 saying -- and I have something that you probably have as well. This is

7 an order by the Crisis Staff on the establishment of that intervention

8 platoon. The number is D2039. And another P0048598. This is the

9 original decision of the Crisis Staff. I don't know whether you are able

10 to broadcast the document.

11 Q. I'm not interested in that document at the moment, Dr. Stakic.

12 Let me ask you this: In your statement at paragraph 21, you said that

13 the Crisis Staff could not give orders either to the army or the police.

14 And at paragraph 24, you said that Drljaca's most frequent answer to you

15 and others in the Crisis Staff was to leave him alone to do his job and

16 that you do yours. And you've repeated that sentiment today.

17 This document paints a very different picture. It reflects the

18 SJB reporting directly to the Crisis Staff on the implementation of a

19 number of Crisis Staff decisions, such as the release of prisoners, the

20 intervention platoons, closing catering establishments, prohibitions on

21 shooting. This document is -- contradicts your position on the

22 Crisis Staff authority over the police, doesn't it?

23 A. With all due respect, I don't agree with that assertion. And I

24 am trying to ask you to read this document to see what was asked from

25 Mr. Drljaca, and then you look at his answer and you will see that his

Page 45248

1 answer is completely different. Answers to a different question -- or,

2 rather, his answer is not truthful. This is what I'm saying.

3 As MPs in the Assembly and the Crisis Staff was just a -- the

4 continuation of the Assembly. It was a small-scale Assembly, if I may

5 put it that way, and the chief of the public security station once a year

6 submitted a report to the Assembly about the security situation in the

7 municipality. Since the Assembly MPs asked me to ask Simo Drljaca to

8 write that report, he did it. But what I'm saying is that what he wrote

9 was one thing and his actions were different. It was requested from him

10 to establish a platoon composed of 20 members of the police and

11 20 members of the army. Look at his report. He did not establish a

12 mixed platoon. He claims that he has an intervention platoon which

13 co-operates with the army. And it's an entirely different thing. And

14 this is what I'm trying to say to you.

15 Once again, as far as I know, in Bosanska Krupa and in Samac, the

16 military and the police arrested the president of the municipality and

17 president of the Executive Board, and I have no information to the

18 contrary; i.e., that the president of the municipality arrested the chief

19 of the police or the commander of the -- of a unit. It was absolutely

20 impossible according to our legislation.

21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Gustafson, this report from Drljaca about

22 prohibition of releasing prisoners is related to the conclusion we saw

23 earlier on today?

24 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, I think it's a different conclusion

25 related --

Page 45249

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Date is --

2 MS. GUSTAFSON: -- to the same subject.

3 JUDGE KWON: Date is different and the number is different.

4 MS. GUSTAFSON: Mm-hm. No, I was just addressing the witness's

5 claim that he couldn't issue any orders to Drljaca either to release or

6 detain prisoners, and both of these documents contradict that. But they

7 don't relate to the same decision. No, I agree.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 MS. GUSTAFSON:

10 Q. Dr. Stakic, I'd like to go back to what you said in relation to

11 the Crisis Staff conclusion prohibiting the release of prisoners that's

12 reflected in this police document, and you said:

13 "When it comes to those individuals, what we meant was that these

14 people, Serbs, if I may call them criminals, they would go to those

15 centres, they would take away individuals from there for their own

16 personal gain. They would extort them -- or cars from them or money, and

17 the saddest thing of all was that they would not return them. They would

18 kill them. That was our objection. It was not that we were interfering

19 with their work, that they were not allowed to release prisoners."

20 That was at page 48.

21 So I take it that the Crisis Staff -- that you in the

22 Crisis Staff were aware at the time that people were going to centres

23 like Omarska, taking out prisoners, and killing them, yes?

24 A. We had information to that effect. And that was our attempt to

25 appeal to those people there to do their job. If those people -- those

Page 45250

1 wretched people were detained and if they were being interrogated as they

2 claimed, they shouldn't allow such things to happen. I'm sure that you

3 have a document because I've seen it during my trial. I had a report

4 from Simo Drljaca - not me, but the Assembly - in which he claimed that

5 only two individuals were killed in Omarska; i.e., not killed but died of

6 natural causes, you know. And he signed that report. It was an official

7 report.

8 I wasn't there. I couldn't go there. I -- I did not have the

9 means to carry out my own investigation. What could I do at the moment

10 or what can I do now? I can just express my regret for not having

11 resigned. Eventually I did. I did resign and my resignation was adopted

12 in January 1993. That was one of the ways I expressed my

13 dissatisfaction. Maybe I should have done it earlier when I first

14 realised that there was nothing I could do to prevent all those things

15 from happening.

16 Q. So at paragraph 24 of your witness statement, when you -- where

17 you say that "at the time I knew about two natural deaths that occurred

18 at the Omarska centre but that is the only thing I know with regard to

19 Omarska," that's not really true, is it, because you're saying now that

20 you knew that people were -- Serbs were taking prisoners away and killing

21 them; right?

22 A. I can only repeat word for word what I have just stated. This is

23 what I received. I provided my statement based on what I received from

24 Mr. Drljaca as an official report about how many people died there, but

25 we knew that from Keraterm and Trnopolje - and Trnopolje was the least

Page 45251

1 protected of all - people would be taken away by armed individuals. I

2 don't know how many people were taken away. I don't know who did it.

3 But it did happen and this was our attempt to appeal to the police and to

4 the security over there not to allow those things.

5 Q. Now at paragraph 20 of your statement, you refer to the decision

6 on the organisation and work of Crisis Staff, which is P3536. And

7 Article 2 of that decision says that the Crisis Staff's responsibilities

8 included co-ordinating the protection of safety of people and property.

9 Now that accurately reflects the Crisis Staff's responsibilities towards

10 the safety and security of citizens of Prijedor; right?

11 A. Do you have that document from which you quoted? Can I see it?

12 I don't have any doubts that the way you quoted was correct, but I'd like

13 to see the document.

14 Q. Yes.

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we can go to P3536, please.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What was the article that you

17 mentioned?

18 MS. GUSTAFSON:

19 Q. It's Article 2, which refers to the Crisis Staff's responsibility

20 for, among other things, co-ordinating the protection of safety of people

21 and property. You agree that that was among the Crisis Staff's

22 responsibilities?

23 A. You know what, madam? The Crisis Staff or the presidency -- and

24 the term "presidency" was reinstated. I don't know why the term

25 "Crisis Staff" was introduced in the first place or at least I don't

Page 45252

1 understand that. These are the remains of the communist system. At that

2 time, we couldn't change the documents based on which such bodies were

3 established. And within that system, the entire population was military.

4 We were all soldiers. We were all duty-bound to participate in the

5 country's defence. We -- and this is why things were drafted the way

6 they were. Without any clear instructions to the effect that the

7 Crisis Staff was subordinate to the police or the army. The term used

8 here is "co-ordination," but according to what I know, the Crisis Staff

9 was not subordinate -- superior to the police forces and certainly not

10 the military forces.

11 Q. Okay. At the beginning of your testimony, you stated at page 24:

12 "I also agree with the statement made by the Trial Chamber in

13 paragraph 616 of the trial judgement.

14 And that paragraph states that:

15 "The Trial Chamber does not believe that the conscious object of

16 Dr. Stakic's participation in the creation and maintenance of this

17 environment of impunity was to kill the non-Serb citizens of Prijedor

18 municipality. However, it is satisfied that Dr. Stakic, in his various

19 positions, acted in the knowledge that the existence of such an

20 environment would in all likelihood result in killings, and that he

21 reconciled himself to and made peace with this probable outcome. He

22 consequently participated with the requisite dolus eventualis and

23 therefore incurs criminal responsibility for all the killings in

24 paragraphs 44 and 47 of the indictment, which the Trial Chamber has found

25 to be proven."

Page 45253

1 So I take it from your agreement with this paragraph that you

2 were aware at the time that the environment in Prijedor was extremely --

3 an extremely dangerous one for the non-Serb population, an environment

4 which would in all likelihood result in killings of members of this

5 population; right?

6 A. I'm sorry. I don't know if it's in the trial transcript, but I

7 said I agree with the initial sentence, the first sentence. However,

8 where the Trial Chamber found that I was not aware that all non-Serbs

9 were being killed, I agree about that part. But I don't agree, as I said

10 before, with those passages in the judgement that say that I was a major

11 player and decision maker.

12 As for the knowledge I gained over the past 20 years in France

13 and the US, where I served my sentence, in those places a mayor can

14 appoint the local chief of police. That's very different from our

15 equivalent of mayor who had no competence over the army or the police.

16 And I also want to add, when I was 29 and had just graduated from

17 medical school, I was politically illiterate and I certainly had no

18 personal authority to achieve something like that; whereas the

19 regulations and the laws certainly didn't allow me to do that. As for

20 the killings, unfortunately I learned about them later when they had

21 already happened. And I can only say, once again, that I am sincerely

22 sorry for everything that had happened to my fellow citizens in that

23 period. And now looking back and thinking what could I have done, the

24 only answer I come up with is that I could have resigned. I could have

25 done that in July or August when I first found out about these events,

Page 45254

1 but I don't want to deny --

2 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but your answer is moving away from

3 the question. My time is very limited and I would like to ask you to

4 please focus on my questions.

5 Earlier today you said:

6 "We did not plan this Trnopolje. Trnopolje, at least I did not

7 take part in that and I'm not aware of any such thing."

8 That's page 41. And at paragraph 23 of your statement you said:

9 "As far as investigation centres Keraterm and Omarska are

10 concerned, the Crisis Staff did not participate in the formation of these

11 centres."

12 But in fact, all three of these centres were formed according to

13 a decision of the civilian authorities in Prijedor; right?

14 A. I read that in the report by Mr. Drljaca where he claimed that

15 those centres had been established based on decisions of the

16 Crisis Staff. However, he never says which decisions, which date, which

17 numbers, where he -- whereas he had legal training. He could have given

18 references. Therefore, I stand by my earlier response, that I believe

19 the Crisis Staff did not establish these centres.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to 65 ter 40126, please.

21 JUDGE KWON: While we are waiting for the document, Ms. Gustafson

22 and Mr. Robinson, the document we saw in the -- by the number

23 Exhibit P2915, which is the summary of conclusions taken by the

24 Crisis Staff in the year of 1992, I note that it was admitted only for

25 the -- some limited purpose. It was admitted for the -- only as a source

Page 45255

1 document of Ms. Hanson. I think we can now admit it in full.

2 Any objection, Mr. Robinson?

3 MR. ROBINSON: No, Mr. President.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll do so.

5 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6582, Your Honours -- no.

6 JUDGE KWON: No, it will be received, 2915, but it was fully

7 admitted, not only as a source document. Yes. Thank you.

8 MS. GUSTAFSON:

9 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, this is a transcript of a video-recorded

10 interview with you. And it states -- you state near the beginning that

11 you've been president of the Municipal Assembly for six or seven months,

12 which would put the timing of this interview sometime around late 1992.

13 Now, do you recall giving a video-recorded interview to an

14 English-speaking reporter who had a translator with him around this time,

15 late 1992?

16 A. There was more than one foreign reporter who came. I don't

17 remember all of them. I'm looking at this document now. It's very

18 possible, especially if it was recorded, that it was my interview.

19 Q. Okay.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 2 in both languages,

21 please.

22 Q. And if I could direct your attention, Dr. Stakic, to about

23 two-thirds of the way down the page in your language. This is about

24 halfway down in English, where you're speaking and you state:

25 "These places, such as Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje, were a

Page 45256

1 necessity in a given moment and were formed according to a decision of

2 the civilian authorities in Prijedor."

3 And the reporter asks you:

4 "So those three camps, or how are they ...?"

5 And then you interrupt and say:

6 "Reception centres."

7 The reporter says:

8 "... reception centres were formed according to the decision of

9 your civilian authorities?"

10 And you answer:

11 "Yes, yes."

12 Now, a moment ago when I put to you that you these centres were

13 established by the civilian authorities, you said you read that in

14 Drljaca's report. And in fact, this is what you stated at the time to

15 the reporter; right?

16 A. When I mentioned Drljaca's report a moment ago, he claimed that

17 it was the Crisis Staff that established them, not the civilian

18 authorities. As for this interview, I said there were military

19 authorities and civilian authorities. The army had its own military

20 police, military courts, military remand prisons; whereas the civilian

21 authorities, apart from the Municipal Assembly and the Executive Board,

22 they had the municipal court, the civilian police. All these were bodies

23 of civilian authorities, at least as I understand it.

24 Q. Well, when I asked you the question I said:

25 "These centres were formed according to a decision of the

Page 45257

1 civilian authorities in Prijedor; right?"

2 And you didn't say, "Yes, yes," like you said in this interview.

3 You said, "I read that in a report by Mr. Drljaca," and you went on to

4 deny the accuracy of that report; right?

5 A. What you just said, no, I did not answer that way. I don't know

6 how it was interpreted to you.

7 JUDGE KWON: So do you agree that those reception centres were

8 formed according to a decision of the civilian authorities in Prijedor?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I am trying to tell

10 you what I understood, what I understand by "civilian authorities,"

11 because there is a division where we live into military authorities and

12 civilian authorities. And I'm repeating: The military has its troops

13 for military intervention, military police, military courts, et cetera;

14 whereas the civilian authorities are the Municipal Assembly, the

15 Executive Board, the municipal court, the civilian prosecutor's office,

16 the civilian public defender, and the civilian police. And it is the

17 civilian police that opened these centres because the civilian police is

18 a part of the civilian authorities.

19 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page 5 in the English and

20 page 6 in the B/C/S, please.

21 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, if I could direct your attention to a passage

22 approximately two-thirds of the way down the page, and roughly the same

23 place in the English, in fact. And this again is you speaking. You're

24 giving quite a long statement here. And about in the middle of it you

25 say:

Page 45258

1 "Those of us who have lived here for centuries, I mean the Serbs

2 and the other peoples, I also mean the Muslims, who were created

3 artificially, who were against the Serbs in the previous two wars, while

4 the Serbs were on the side of the allies both times."

5 Now, this statement of yours that the Muslims were artificially

6 created, that's an offensive and discriminatory remark towards Muslims,

7 isn't it?

8 A. I am not a faultless man. I never said I was. I am not without

9 blame, and I'm not looking to wash myself of all that I've done here.

10 But you must take into account that this was wartime. There was

11 propaganda on both sides, and I probably stated something like this being

12 carried away. What I meant was that from the Ottoman Empire's time, in

13 our territory, the Muslims used to be Serbs who converted during Ottoman

14 times to the Muslim faith. I am sorry now for anyone whom I offended

15 with this statement, and nowadays I certainly would not allow myself to

16 say something ugly like that.

17 Q. So you said it was ugly. You agree it's discriminatory and

18 offensive; right?

19 A. Well, if you put it like that, it could be offensive. But please

20 look at some other passages in this text where I said that our objective

21 is to work for peace and --

22 Q. Dr. Stakic --

23 A. -- after the establishing of peace, we will continue to live

24 together.

25 Q. I am not asking you about other passages. I'm asking you about

Page 45259

1 this passage. You agree that this is offensive and discriminatory

2 towards Muslims?

3 A. Now I really don't know anymore what you want from me. I told

4 you it was a mistake that I said this, and I'm really sorry about it and

5 I agree with you that it sounds offensive. But please, just in order not

6 to take it all out of context, you could quote some other things that I

7 said.

8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Could we go to page 7 of the English and page 9

9 of the B/C/S, please.

10 Q. And this is right at the top of the page in the B/C/S and the

11 middle of the page in the English. You're being asked about the Muslims

12 who used to live in Kozarac. And you say:

13 "Well, Trnopolje was mainly filled with Muslims from Kozarac. A

14 good part of those extremists were from Kozarac and they went to

15 Trnopolje. The 1500 and some men who were moved with the help of the

16 International Red Cross to Karlovac were mostly from Kozarac."

17 And then a few lines down you say:

18 "The rest, because their family homes had been destroyed, were

19 accommodated either in the territory of Prijedor municipality or went,

20 were transferred to ... some did go to Central Bosnia ... those who

21 expressed this wish. We organised buses and a train for them, and this

22 was for free, just that they go, so that there should be no casualties,

23 that that genocide that we have already been blamed for in Europe should

24 not occur."

25 Now, when you said you organised buses and trains for Muslims

Page 45260

1 from Trnopolje to transport them to Central Bosnia, are you referring to

2 the municipal authorities? When you say "we organised buses and trains,"

3 is that something the municipal authorities did?

4 A. No, ma'am. That's not what I meant then and I don't mean it now.

5 I meant the Red Cross that was there and organised it, and we just

6 provided assistance at their request in transport and fuel.

7 Q. So you provided the buses, the trains, and the fuel, the

8 municipal authorities?

9 A. No. You must understand one thing: Under the Law On

10 All People's Defence, the army and the police are entitled to commandeer

11 all means of transport, all the vehicles from all businesses, including

12 bus companies and railway companies. They have the right to commandeer

13 vehicles or trains or take over one entire enterprise, one entire company

14 under that law. I'm telling you, it's not us who organised that. I'm

15 telling you that the Red Cross approached us to provide fuel. They

16 usually approached the Executive Board or perhaps the Crisis Staff, and

17 we tried to accommodate them because they had already agreed with the

18 ICRC, that's the way they explained it, they had agreed all the routes,

19 et cetera, and we just had to provide assistance in that one aspect.

20 JUDGE KWON: By the way, have we assigned an exhibit number for

21 this witness's Rule 92 ter statement?

22 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. It was done as part of the

23 associated exhibits package that was given to us, and it's D4195.

24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON:

Page 45261

1 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, you said you did this, you organised the

2 transport so that there should be no casualties and in order to avoid a

3 genocide. You are acknowledging here that the non-Serb population risked

4 their lives by staying in Prijedor, weren't you?

5 A. You mentioned genocide and you didn't finish the sentence:

6 "... genocide for which we have already been blamed in Europe."

7 I'm telling you again I have information now, from reading

8 materials during my own trial, showing that certain groups of these

9 extremists had been captured around Kozara in the hills of Kurevo in 1994

10 and even 1995. But Serbs, either soldiers or policemen, raided those

11 areas, and on their own initiative, in addition to the regular police and

12 army operations, they searched the houses of those people, looted, took

13 their property --

14 Q. Dr. Stakic --

15 A. -- and we had no means of protecting --

16 Q. I'm sorry to interrupt you, but you're not answering my question.

17 You're talking about events in 1994 and 1995. This interview was around

18 late 1992, and you're talking about the Muslims from Kozarac. And you

19 said:

20 "We organised buses and trains for them, just so that they go, so

21 that there should be no casualties, that that genocide that we have

22 already been blamed for in Europe should not occur."

23 Now, those are your words, and by those words you are

24 acknowledging that the non-Serbs who stayed in Prijedor did so at risk of

25 their lives; right?

Page 45262

1 A. I can only repeat once again, it's not us who organised it. It's

2 the Red Cross. I agree with you insofar as you say that in that period

3 it was very risky to live in Prijedor, for all the citizens, and it was

4 especially risky for Muslims.

5 I must add that it is regrettable they had to leave. But from a

6 humane point of view, I still believe that they were better off, those

7 who left and had a chance to return, than those who were killed. I'm not

8 saying it was a good thing they had to go. It was a humiliation. But as

9 our people say, as long as you live, you have a chance to start anew and

10 rebuild your life.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 8 of the English and

12 page 10 of the B/C/S, please.

13 Q. And this is right near the top of the page in your language.

14 It's near the middle of the page in the English. And you're being asked

15 to respond to Western press allegations about ethnic cleansing. And in

16 the course of your answer, you said:

17 "I have already said at the beginning that most of them are

18 leaving now partly for political reasons, but more for economic reasons.

19 Because we are currently all endangered here. I once had a salary

20 equivalent to 1.000 German marks. Now, as the mayor, I have 60 marks,

21 and I am a subtenant, and my wife is unemployed, and so on ... so that

22 these ... not only the Muslims are endangered here."

23 Now at this point in time you have acknowledged that you knew

24 that there had been at least two massacres of Muslims in Prijedor, one at

25 Keraterm and one at Koricanske Stijene. You've acknowledged earlier

Page 45263

1 today that you knew non-Serbs were being taken out of camps and murdered.

2 And a moment ago you explained that it was an especially risky

3 environment for Muslims. Now comparing the situation of Muslims in

4 Prijedor to your own, your reduction in salary, your status as a

5 subtenant, and your wife's employment status, and saying that "we are all

6 endangered here," that is a deeply misleading and cynical comment of

7 yours, isn't it?

8 A. I am going to try to continue believing that you mean well and

9 that you are seriously trying to understand the way I saw the situation

10 and that I was not cynical or sarcastic. Maybe this was inappropriate,

11 this comparison of salaries. You call me "mayor," although that's not a

12 proper translation. I was the president of the local Assembly, and I

13 would appreciate it if you would stop interpreting it that way.

14 When I was going to work and coming back, I had to keep a

15 document on me, a document issued by the Secretariat for

16 National Defence, regarding work obligation. Without that document, any

17 policeman, civilian or military, could have arrested me and sent me

18 directly to the front. I had no time to say at all in this interview,

19 but I want to tell you that several times I was intercepted by armed

20 members of the Serbian police or army who had bloodshot eyes, maybe from

21 drinking, I don't know, they would put a gun barrel through the windows

22 of my car and say, "You keep driving around town here, having fun, while

23 I have to fight," and it would all end in their trying to wheedle out

24 some drink or cigarettes from me. I couldn't even report them. I didn't

25 know their names. They did not have badges with names. They did not

Page 45264

1 have anything on their uniforms. I could not identified them. I tried

2 to report them but that's always the answer I got: If you don't know

3 their names, then we can't do anything. Maybe this reference to my

4 salary was not a good idea, but I did not ...

5 Q. Dr. Stakic, you said in your answer:

6 "I had no time to say it all in this interview ..."

7 Are you seriously contending that you failed to mention the fact

8 that Muslims had been massacred by the police and the army in Prijedor in

9 1992, that they had been taken out of camps and killed because you didn't

10 have enough time?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for a reference? Where

12 was it established that this was done by the army and the police? The

13 man said nicely that individuals were taking out people.

14 MS. GUSTAFSON: I was referring to the two massacres in the

15 statements that were committed by the army and the police.

16 JUDGE KWON: Do you remember the question, Mr. Stakic? Can you

17 answer the question?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise. Could the question

19 please be repeated for me now.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON:

21 Q. Certainly. Dr. Stakic, in your earlier answer you said:

22 "I had no time to say at all in this interview ..."

23 And my question was: Are you seriously contending that that you

24 failed to mention the fact that Muslims had been massacred by the police

25 and army in Prijedor in 1992 and that they had been taken out of camps

Page 45265

1 and killed because you didn't have enough time?

2 A. Madam, distinguished Prosecutor, I know that you were trained for

3 this, and I am not an expert so I cannot judge how you're doing your job.

4 I think you're doing it well. But you asked me about 60 marks and asked

5 about the tenants. And I said here, in response to this journalist's

6 concrete question, I could not tell him about all the things that I had

7 experienced. That I did not feel safe. My life was not safe either. It

8 wasn't only the Muslims. I'm not saying and I'm not trying to say that

9 they were not more imperilled, but if you have that in the interview do

10 find it and see what it was that I answered in respect of massacres. I

11 am not trying to deny that. I'm not trying to diminish it. Really.

12 Could you please -- well, I tried to answer the journalist's questions.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this interview, please.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll receive it.

15 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit Number P6582, Your Honours.

16 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to 65 ter 40633, please.

17 Q. And, Dr. Stakic, this is a transcript of another video-recorded

18 interview of you around the same time, January 1993, with a foreign

19 journalist, where you are being asked primarily about the Geneva plan.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could go to page 2 of this document in

21 both languages. This is at the top of the page.

22 Q. Where you're speaking, it says MS. And you're talking about the

23 plan agreed to in Geneva, and you say:

24 "And third, European monitors should come to the field to

25 determine the factual state of affairs, so they don't make maps,

Page 45266

1 projections, and constitutions based on the propaganda from Vatican and

2 Tehran. One needs to come to Prijedor, see who lives here, who works,

3 what they do, what their activities are, go to Krupa on Una, to Novi, to

4 Sanski Most. I am talking about cities that are of interest here. To

5 determine, to determine, to see what the situation really is, who lives

6 here, and what they are doing. Then they should go away, take a week,

7 and draw new maps."

8 Now, here you are promoting the division of territory based on

9 the factual situation on the ground at the time, based on who is actually

10 living in Prijedor, Sanski Most, Bosanski Novi, Krupa, and this would, of

11 course, favour the Serbs given the drastic reduction in the Muslim and

12 Croat population in these areas since the start of the war; right?

13 A. With all due respect, I don't think -- I don't agree with you on

14 this interpretation. First of all, as you can see, I'm supporting that

15 agreement in Geneva; that is to say, that people accepted to talk in the

16 first place. Which would mean that the war could be brought to an end by

17 way of talks. Also, I do not mention in any way that Muslims and Croats

18 should not live there. And finally, I don't know what year this was,

19 this Geneva Agreement, but finally there was the Dayton Agreement. And

20 it did bring about this final delineation into two entities. However, it

21 did not say that only Serbs should live in the Serb entity; rather, the

22 Muslims and Croats and everybody else should live there too.

23 Q. This is January 1993, and in January 1993, Dr. Stakic, there were

24 very few Muslims and Croats in Prijedor and the other places you mention

25 here, Krupa, Novi, Sanski Most; right?

Page 45267

1 A. I don't know how many there were, but I did not say -- it's not

2 written here anywhere that they should come and take that situation and

3 that the people who had been expelled from there should not be allowed to

4 return. I just welcomed and I wished that that agreement had been signed

5 in 1993. As far as I know, the Serb side was in favour of that and not

6 everybody was satisfied. To this day, not everybody is satisfied with

7 the Dayton Agreement, but it is my profound belief that it is better.

8 Any peace agreement is better than war.

9 Also, in 1996, I had the opportunity of taking part in its

10 implementation, especially paragraph 7, concerning the return of

11 displaced persons to their properties. So if there was a delineation,

12 and I said that I agree with the Geneva Agreement, that there should be a

13 delineation, I did not say that a territory should be cleansed of a

14 particular people.

15 Q. And you keep saying that you're just supporting the agreement in

16 Geneva, but you're taking issue with maps based on propaganda from the

17 Vatican and Tehran and you're asserting that those maps should be drawn

18 on the factual situation based on who was living in these places now;

19 right? You're making claims about the how the territory should be

20 divided.

21 A. I don't see that it is written there now on the basis of the

22 factual situation. Sorry, I really don't see that, at least not in the

23 Serbian version. I'm saying that I agree that there should be this

24 delineation and that all people should have the right to live at their

25 homes, regardless of whether they are on this or that side of the line.

Page 45268

1 And now I touched upon propaganda. It was coming from Belgrade,

2 Sarajevo, Zagreb. Perhaps I went a bit too far there. After all, I was

3 not in Dayton. But regarding what I learned, it's been almost 20 years

4 now since Dayton. These maps were agreed upon and changed and altered.

5 And finally when they were established, believe me, not a single side was

6 fully satisfied with them. They all have their objections with regard to

7 Dayton.

8 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to page 4 in both languages,

9 please. And this is near the middle of the page in English and about

10 halfway down as well as in the B/C/S.

11 Q. So again, this is a lengthy passage where you're speaking,

12 Dr. Stakic, and you say in the second line of that long answer you say:

13 "Islam, i.e., jihad has won because a great number of Muslims

14 from this region emigrated and went to Germany, i.e., the whole of

15 Europe. Why do I mention this? Because all these Muslims from this

16 region could have chosen to go to Zenica, Sarajevo, Travnik or

17 Western Europe. They chose Western Europe and they wouldn't leave here.

18 They wouldn't even hear Zenica mentioned or Travnik. They wouldn't even

19 go to Croatia. They know they are not welcome there. On the contrary,

20 they go to Europe, for economic reasons and the reasons preached to them

21 by jihad."

22 Now, again, Dr. Stakic, you knew at this point in time that

23 Muslims had been massacred, that they had been taken out of camps and

24 killed, and that this was an especially risky environment for non-Serbs.

25 But you don't say any of this. You claim that Muslims left Prijedor

Page 45269

1 during 1992 for economic reasons and the reasons preached to them by

2 jihad. Again, you were trying to mislead this journalist about the real

3 reasons for the Muslims leaving Prijedor; right?

4 A. With all due respect, I do not fully agree with your assertion.

5 It is a fact that crimes were committed. It is a fact that they were

6 expelled from their homes and thereby compelled to leave the area.

7 However, you can find these documents that I'm aware of. I didn't bring

8 them here because I didn't know about that. During my trial, at one

9 point, either just when Trnopolje was being closed or after it had been

10 closed, a new wave of civilians, Muslim civilians came to Trnopolje

11 because they saw their chance there of leaving Prijedor. I agree with

12 that part, that most of them left out of fear and so on and so forth, but

13 what I'm saying here, where they were going and where they wanted to go,

14 of course they wanted to go to Europe where there was no war rather than

15 Croatia and Bosnia. Bosnia, the part under the control of the Croat

16 forces, and they would be drafted into their army and they would have to

17 fight there. And life was miserable there, too. And when I say jihad,

18 Islam, that should not be equated.

19 Part of them - how do I put this? - are extremists, like in any

20 nation, and they obviously tried to profit from all of that, too. And I

21 know from the experience of people who came to see me, and they were

22 asking about -- about what was going on in either places. And from

23 Bosanski Novi, a group of Muslims left in co-operation with the UNHCR.

24 They were in Croatia at the time, Dvor na Uni - do you know the geography

25 there? It's on the Una river - and through Croatia they went to Western

Page 45270

1 Europe. And then a delegation came to see me, and they asked me how I

2 could bring them into touch with these representatives of the UNHCR so

3 that they do not go in the organisation of the Red Cross and others

4 towards Zenica and Travnik. I am telling you about all of this from my

5 very own experience.

6 Q. Dr. Stakic, in your answer you said, "It is a fact that they were

7 expelled from their homes and thereby compelled to leave the area." And

8 you said, "I agree with that part that most of them left out of fear and

9 so on and so forth ..."

10 So when you said at paragraph 26 of your statement that "the main

11 reason for moving out was the constant fighting, the lack of electric

12 power, water, and basic food provisions," that's not true, is it, because

13 you're acknowledging here that most of them left out of fear, that people

14 were expelled and compelled to leave the area; right?

15 A. I -- even when I talked to the gentlemen from Mr. Karadzic's

16 Defence, you know, we had this extensive discussion and then they would

17 summarise my answer into a few sentences. I am not saying that they

18 wrote anything that is not true, but they summarised. You see the next

19 sentence here, "The war was no longer near the municipality. It was in

20 the territory of the municipality itself." The very fact that there is a

21 war going on. You know that. Who is safe in a war? Not to mention now

22 what is going on in Syria. Somebody is rooting for one side and others

23 are rooting for the other side, but it is civilians who are falling

24 victim on both sides and from both sides. But in addition to that, there

25 were economic reasons, a lack of electricity, water, food, and so on and

Page 45271

1 so forth. But as I already mentioned, war was no longer only in the

2 vicinity, in Krupa, in Croatia, and so on, but it was right there in

3 Prijedor.

4 JUDGE MORRISON: Ms. Gustafson, this is simply my view. It

5 occurred to me that if I was a person who had just come into the public

6 gallery and listened to a good percentage of the questions, one might be

7 mistaken that Dr. Stakic was the person who was on trial rather than

8 Dr. Karadzic. I don't make this as a criticism of you, but I make it as

9 an observation as to how much of this is really useful to the issues that

10 are before the Trial Chamber.

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Well, Your Honours, I would respond with two

12 points. Firstly, I think a lot of this goes to credibility. The second

13 point would be that, in the indictment -- I mean, Dr. Stakic plays a role

14 in the indictment either as a tool or as a member of the JCE. He's

15 obviously connected to Dr. Karadzic through his position, and I would

16 leave it at that. I'm about to move on to another topic in any event.

17 JUDGE MORRISON: It's much easier to observe a cross-examination

18 than it is to do one. I've been in that position many a time myself in

19 the past. But it seems to me that the two issues that you raise, that of

20 credibility and joint enterprise, could be dealt with in a much smaller

21 compass.

22 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Dr. Stakic, at paragraph 14 you said that the Prijedor municipal

24 authorities had no contact or communication with the Pale authorities

25 until the corridor breakthrough. And I'd like you to clarify when this

Page 45272

1 communication blockade began according to you.

2 A. I cannot say what the date was exactly, but it was sometime in

3 the month of May, when the joint forces of the Croats and Muslims severed

4 the road going from Banja Luka to Bijeljina and thereby to the Republic

5 of Serbia. I really do apologise. I cannot tell you what the exact date

6 would be, but I think it was the month of May. And then up until the end

7 of June, the beginning of July, to the best of my knowledge, when the

8 Army of Republika Srpska managed to liberate the road or the corridor, as

9 they called it, thereby -- I mean, in my view and to the best of my

10 knowledge, telephone lines were reestablished because we could speak to

11 Belgrade. And also, the power supply was somewhat improved. Also,

12 vehicles started moving along and --

13 Q. Dr. Stakic --

14 A. -- I said there that we, the municipal authorities, did not have

15 any communication, that I did not have any communication. Because the

16 paragraph says further on whether the police and the army were able to

17 communicate, I really do not know.

18 Q. I thank you. And again, I'd like to ask you to please focus to

19 the precise question I asked.

20 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could go to P3537, please.

21 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, with respect to 65 ter 40633, the

22 interview, is that going to be tendered?

23 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, yes, I do tender that, the first -- the

24 part of the interview that relates to Dr. Stakic. I think it's the first

25 four pages in both languages.

Page 45273

1 MR. ROBINSON: No objection.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will receive it.

3 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6583, Your Honours.

4 JUDGE KWON: The first part, not including Penny Marshall part.

5 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct, the first four pages which -- yes.

6 JUDGE KWON: What -- are we admitting only -- the only page that

7 was shown to the witness? Four pages.

8 MR. ROBINSON: I think there were multiple pages shown to the

9 witness but --

10 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.

11 MR. ROBINSON: -- there's only four pages in which he's being

12 interviewed and then the next two pages of the English transcript

13 involves someone else's interview.

14 JUDGE KWON: Very well. As in the previous case, we will admit

15 them all. Let's continue.

16 Q. Dr. Stakic, this is in 22nd of May, 1992, Prijedor Crisis Staff

17 decision on mobilisation, and you can see in the preamble it says:

18 "Pursuant to the decision of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina about the general public mobilisation of forces and materiel

20 in the republic."

21 And indeed, the Chamber has received in evidence a Presidency

22 mobilisation decision from the 20th of May; that's P3919. So I take it

23 that whatever communication difficulties you had, you did receive the

24 republic level decision on mobilisation as indicated in this decision;

25 right? On the -- in May 1992.

Page 45283

1 superiors according to that vertical hierarchy. What reports they sent,

2 how they sent them, I wouldn't know, but -- because that information

3 reached me.

4 Q. Thank you, Dr. Stakic. I have nothing further.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Gustafson.

6 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

7 THE ACCUSED: I am sorry. I wanted one page and I forgot.

8 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

9 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Stakic, on page 73 of today's transcript, it

10 was suggested that you were a member of the joint criminal enterprise

11 together with me. Were you with me in a joint criminal enterprise of any

12 kind --

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, sorry. That was not a question to the

14 witness. It's perfectly clear I was responding to a comment from the

15 Bench.

16 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, it's perfectly plain that that was

17 an answer from Ms. Gustafson to the query that I raised. It was not a

18 question to the witness.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, I apologise. But the

20 way I see it, the Prosecutor doesn't do anything without a reason.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. On pages 71 and 72, it was suggested that you should accept that

23 Muslims and Croats were expelled and forced to leave from Prijedor

24 municipality.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, again, those were the witness's words. It

Page 45284

1 wasn't put to him that he should accept that. Let's just make sure we're

2 not mischaracterising his evidence.

3 JUDGE KWON: Could you reformulate your question.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I'll do my best.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Dr. Stakic, were Muslims and Croats expelled? Were they forced

7 to leave? If that was the case, who did that? What forced them to

8 leave?

9 A. As I have already stated, both in my statement and earlier today

10 in the course of my testimony, which is recorded on the transcript, as

11 war approached Prijedor and when war operations started in earnest in the

12 municipality of Prijedor, and as I have repeated several times here, as a

13 result of that the rate of crime went up, there was looting, theft, and

14 people started moving out of their houses. Not all of them but a lot of

15 them did. Temporarily, they were accommodated in Trnopolje, and then

16 later, with the help of the Red Cross, they went to some other parts of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and further afield. Further afield.

18 One more thing that I didn't say here and now it has just

19 occurred to me, I remember that I saw certain documents issued by the

20 Ministry of Health, if I'm not mistaken. They were signed by

21 Dr. Kalinic, and I don't know what his position was at the time, but I

22 know that together with the Muslim and Croatian representatives he signed

23 a document on the free movement of the civilian population, which meant

24 that they were free to cross from one side of the front line to the other

25 side. I would like to add that.

Page 45285

1 Q. Thank you. Lines 1, 2, and 3 on page 72. It says clearly:

2 [In English] "... that's not true, is it, because you are

3 acknowledging here that most of them left out of fear, that people were

4 expelled and compelled to leave the area; right?"

5 [Interpretation] I'm asking you, Dr. Stakic, did somebody go to

6 their homes? Did somebody force them to leave their homes? Or was it

7 indeed the case this they were afraid and that's why they fled? Just

8 like you told us? What you said in paragraph 26 --

9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic -- Mr. Karadzic, that's a leading

10 question, very much.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll rephrase.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Is it true that they were expelled like it was suggested and that

14 they were forced to leave?

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, not only is it leading --

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 MS. GUSTAFSON: -- but Dr. Karadzic was reading from my follow-up

18 question, which referred back to the witness's assertion that this is

19 exactly what happened. So this whole exercise is misleading.

20 JUDGE KWON: You may refer to his answers.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will move on and then

22 I'll see what I'm going to do with this.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. On page 66, it was suggested that you accepted the fact that the

25 police and the army committed massacres. You were aware that there were

Page 45286

1 killings and that there was, indeed, a massacre, or rather, a mass

2 killing in Keraterm and another one at Koricanske Stijene. Did you

3 accept the fact that it had been planned by the military and the police;

4 or if not, did you know who did that? If you agree that this was a

5 planned effort by the military and the police, then the answer is yes;

6 but if not, can you tell us who did it and how?

7 A. Can I start answering or should I wait?

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is true that I answered that I

10 was aware of the fact that massacres indeed took place, but the

11 Prosecutor did not have any follow-up questions. But now I can answer

12 your question. When I say the police and the military, I mean that in

13 these two specific cases I had my views or, rather, I had information

14 that was conveyed to me.

15 As for the killings of those wretched people in Keraterm, it was

16 the local battalion and reservists who were responsible for those.

17 Allegedly, they did it because several Serbian soldiers were killed at

18 the front line and in retaliation they burst into Keraterm and killed

19 those innocent people. Neither then nor now have I heard that it was

20 organised by the command of those troops or somebody else of that kind.

21 I even heard that Mr. Drljaca said, because he was angry and because

22 there were police officers who were supposed to guard those people and

23 those men wanted to take it on the police, so Mr. Drljaca said that he

24 would take it up with the army. I don't know what happened next because

25 I don't have any information to that effect.

Page 45287

1 And the next big shame inflicted not only upon me and the Serbs

2 from Prijedor but the entire Serbian population was the case of

3 Koricanske Stijene. I repeat once again, those people from Trnopolje

4 were allowed to link up with their families. It was the Red Cross that

5 enabled them to do that. And the police and the military were supposed

6 to make arrangements with this other side to open the passage for the

7 convoy of buses. Those policemen, and it is not up to me to be the judge

8 of them, but I can say that they were not humans because not only did

9 they rob those poor people but they also executed them. I condemn that

10 as a human being, as a person.

11 I'd like to say this: I'm not Mr. Drljaca's advocate. I don't

12 want to defend him. We were at odds at times because he had a strong

13 personality. Sometimes he was harsh in his comport. But when I learned

14 about that event I called him about a document because, you know, us

15 civilians had to have an approval from the military district and from the

16 police to pass through that corridor. So I called him and he was in a

17 very bad mood, and he said: Now you call me when my police officers had

18 done something really, really unprecedentedly stupid. I'll call you

19 later.

20 So what I'm saying is that I wouldn't say that somebody had a

21 plan to do that. At least I wasn't aware of any such plan. This is what

22 I know.

23 Q. Thank you. You were asked about investigation centres and a

24 reference was made to Omarska and so on and so forth. You were asked

25 about the civilian authorities that set it up. Can you tell me how come

Page 45288

1 that your police did not carry out investigations in the detention unit

2 that existed in the public security station?

3 A. I am sorry, I did not understand your question. Why didn't the

4 police do what?

5 Q. This was mis-recorded and this was misinterpreted. What I wanted

6 to say is this: The last document says that Omarska was an investigation

7 centre. I'm asking you this: If Omarska was an investigation centre and

8 if all the investigations were carried out there, how come that the

9 police did not detain people in their own existing detention unit which

10 existed in the police station?

11 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand now.

13 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry. The question assumes that there were no

14 detentions and investigations at the Prijedor police station. I don't

15 have any -- I don't have the evidence at my fingertips, but I am quite

16 sure that that is not the case. So the question, I think, should be

17 rephrased or a preliminary question asked.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, I agree that you can reformulate your question.

19 I didn't follow it as well.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Dr. Stakic, was there a detention unit attached to the MUP in

22 Prijedor?

23 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. But I don't know. I don't

24 know for how many people, five, six, ten, not more than that, because

25 local criminals and drunkards would be detained there temporarily and

Page 45289

1 then they would be taken to prison.

2 Q. Thank you.

3 A. I do apologise, Dr. Karadzic, and Your Honours, either because of

4 what I have on my ears and I also hear the spoken word, I heard "your

5 police" a moment ago.

6 Q. The Prijedor police.

7 A. Yes. I assume that that was just a slip of the tongue on your

8 part, but please, I would like to --

9 Q. I do apologise. The size of this detention unit, does it have

10 anything to do with using Omarska for investigations?

11 A. Well, you know, I cannot say anything unequivocally here because,

12 as I've already said, that's not my line of work. But knowing that in

13 Omarska there were many more people -- I saw during the trial that

14 3.000 people went through Omarska. That figure is telling enough. And

15 knowing that this detention unit could take only five or six people, on

16 the basis of that, I can conclude -- infer, rather - it's deduction,

17 isn't it? - that it was impossible.

18 Q. Thank you. You were asked or, rather, it was established, it was

19 stated that Muslims and Croats lived in a risky environment. That's on

20 page 55. Can you tell us when this environment became risky in terms of

21 dates?

22 A. Well, if you allow me, Your Honours, I remember in my case it was

23 repeated time and again that on the 1st of May different campaigns

24 started, killings, that there was a lack of safety and security and so

25 on. I would say now that only after Hambarine on the 20th of May,

Page 45290

1 especially Kozarac, the 24th of May, when the Muslim extremists dared

2 attack the army, thereby entering a direct conflict with the army, then

3 there was fighting. And then after that, this true situation of war and

4 crisis and fear and everything else started.

5 Q. Thank you. In line 3, I believe you said on the 22nd of May

6 rather than the 20th of May?

7 A. The 22nd of May.

8 Q. Hambarine.

9 A. Yes. And on the 24th Kozarac.

10 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us why it did not become dangerous

11 already on the 6th of April as it became in Sarajevo?

12 A. We still had a joint Assembly that was established on the basis

13 of the interparty agreement at the republican level reached between the

14 HDZ and the SDS. It was violated, to the best of my knowledge, in

15 autumn 1991 when the SDA and HDZ MPs outvoted the SDS and they left the

16 Assembly. We continued to work together on local levels. Because you

17 know what it's like, the houses are mixed. There were hardly any hamlets

18 that were purely Muslim or purely Serb, and especially the population in

19 town itself. And you can see that from the transcripts of the joint

20 Assembly. We tried to keep it together. We didn't succeed, but we

21 called upon Muslim assemblymen from the SDA, saying that we should reach

22 an agreement at local level in order to share power, all with a view to

23 preserving the peace.

24 Although -- well, you mentioned Sarajevo, but I would like to

25 mention municipalities that are closer to Prijedor. It already started

Page 45291

1 in Bosanska Krupa and Sanski Most, in April, also, to the best of my

2 recollection. And in Prijedor there was no war.

3 Q. Thank you. Also you were asked and you gave an answer. You said

4 the Muslims could go to Central Bosnia and that they could go to Germany.

5 Did the Muslims have an opportunity to stay on in Prijedor itself? Were

6 there agreements about the transformation of Prijedor where they would

7 exercise authority over themselves?

8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry, if we could just specify the time-period

9 with this question?

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Before the conflict broke out, was it only Central Bosnia and

12 Germany or did they have a third option, Prijedor itself?

13 A. They could stay in Prijedor and a number of them did stay on

14 throughout the war. Truth to tell we are dealing with 1992 here, but I

15 would like to say something. A large number, I don't know exactly how

16 many, Muslims left in 1995 when -- how do I put this? When there was

17 this major influx of Serbs, the Serb population from the Krajina that was

18 flooding in. Also, they could establish their own municipality and

19 declare their own territory, and then also even after the take-over of

20 power on the 1st of May, and that can be seen from documents. There was

21 a mixed police force as well, and they were told they could take part in

22 this local commune. And in Kozarac the entire police stayed on. And

23 there were no problems whatsoever all the way up until the 24th of May.

24 That is to say, I agree they did have that option. In those areas where

25 they were the majority population, they could stay on.

Page 45292

1 Q. The transcript does not say Ljubija and that's the location. You

2 mentioned it together with Kozarac; right?

3 A. Yes, Ljubija, Kozarac, that's what I mentioned, two enclaves.

4 And they're not small, between 10- and 12.000 inhabitants.

5 Q. Thank you. It was suggested to you that you spoke about the life

6 of Muslims in Prijedor and that already by the end of 1992 there were

7 very few Muslims left. Can you tell us how come this happened then, that

8 I was pressured in the autumn of 1994 to release 80 trucks full of

9 Muslims per day and that they stayed on, and how come there were

10 thousands of Muslims left in 1994, and by the end of 1995 there were

11 several thousand --

12 MS. GUSTAFSON: Sorry --

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. -- Muslims in Prijedor?

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: -- this is all leading. It hasn't been

16 established that the witness knows anything about these assertions about

17 trucks and thousands of Muslims in 1994. Those foundational questions

18 have to be asked before these ones.

19 JUDGE KWON: Could you rephrase your question? Otherwise, we

20 need to go back to the page where he spoke about this.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. I'm sorry. I'm going to

22 rephrase.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. It was suggested to you that you spoke to journalists about the

25 life of Muslims in Prijedor, although you knew that then, at the end of

Page 45293

1 1992, there were very few Muslims left in Prijedor. Is that correct,

2 that at the end of 1992 there were very few Muslims left in Prijedor?

3 A. I think that I said to the Prosecutor that there was no official

4 census at the time, but I would like to repeat what I said a moment ago;

5 that is that when the Dayton Agreement was signed - that is to say, in

6 December 1995 - there were still some Muslims in Prijedor. And I

7 mentioned a moment ago as well that when tens of thousands and hundreds

8 of thousands, Serb refugees, came to Prijedor and went through Prijedor,

9 quite a few Muslims also left Prijedor. That's the period of August and

10 September 1995. And I still claim that a number of them stayed on. I

11 cannot say exactly what the numbers involved are or the percentage, but I

12 do know some people who lived there, worked there, I saw them in the

13 building and they were in town. The population was mixed. Cela,

14 Donji Jakupovici, those were Muslims neighbourhoods. And these

15 enclaves -- people from these enclaves did not move out at all.

16 Q. Thank you. Were there Muslims and Croats on our police force?

17 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes. As for exact numbers, I

18 wouldn't know, but there were some. That can be checked, too. In the

19 veterans organisation.

20 Q. Thank you. Tell me, generally speaking, what did this depend on;

21 namely, that some Muslims could stay and others felt threatened or were

22 detained or interrogated or were just leaving Prijedor? What was

23 decisive in that respect? Your will, the will of your local authorities

24 and the army and the police to group Muslims or --

25 JUDGE KWON: You're just losing your time.

Page 45294

1 MS. GUSTAFSON: And not stopping with a non-leading question and

2 having to add -- add to the question that makes it leading, it's

3 inappropriate.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, as briefly as possible: How

5 come some of them could stay on and others could not? If the systemic

6 approach was that the Muslims should disappear, how come some can stay

7 and others do not stay. It is a perfectly legitimate question.

8 JUDGE KWON: No. Let's go back to the part which was dealt with

9 and start from there.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the beginning is there. The

11 Prosecutor suggested that Dr. Stakic deceived the journalist, speaking

12 about the life of Muslims in Prijedor although he knew --

13 JUDGE KWON: Then upload that document and ask your question

14 based upon the cross-examination.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know what the document is

16 now, but I know that it's in the transcript, that it was put to him that

17 I intentionally misled or deceived the journalist. But I'm going to

18 abandon the topic in order to save time.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Dr. Stakic, on page 51, yet again it was discussed whether you

21 could issue orders to the army or the police. Even if you did send an

22 order to the army or the police, what would happen to that kind of order?

23 A. Well, now that you've put that question, I'll answer by telling

24 you about something that I experienced in 1993 when I was no longer

25 president and when I was replaced by another gentleman, and I did have

Page 45295

1 some objections. The local committee of the party was objecting,

2 actually. They said that I am not influencing the army and the police

3 sufficiently. They actually wanted to have all assemblymen and all

4 members of the SDS freed of military obligation and military duty, and I

5 said we cannot do that. We can pass an Assembly decision, but they don't

6 have to observe that.

7 Now I'm going back to what I was saying, when this new president

8 came from that stream, that is to say, these people who thought that they

9 could -- or, rather, that I as president could have issued orders. I and

10 the late Dr. Kovacevic were sitting there. We had a colleague from

11 Belgrade who had come to perform some operations on some children so that

12 we wouldn't have to take them there. So it so happened that

13 Mr. Pero Colic, commander of the Prijedor Brigade, entered that

14 restaurant and said, "Look at the document that I got a few days ago from

15 the president of the municipality, where he says, 'I, president of the

16 municipality, hereby order Pero Colic ..." and so on and so forth," and

17 this man says I was wondering whether I should send the military police

18 to arrest him and take him to the front. But what prevailed was that we

19 shouldn't heighten tensions any further, so I gave up. Who does this man

20 think he is? Well, so much for that. That's what it would have meant,

21 if I even did write an order to him. I hope I was clear.

22 Q. Thank you. On page 42 it was suggested to you that the

23 Crisis Staff decided who would be released but not the way in which they

24 would be released. Could you tell us you did not allow these group

25 releases? What's the distinction between individual releases and group

Page 45296

1 releases?

2 A. I tried to explain that but I'll try to once again. The police

3 were assuring us, at least, and perhaps you'll see that, too. They got

4 all these lawyers busy, 40, 60 lawyers from their services, from the

5 court and I don't know from what other places. And they were

6 interrogating these detained persons, and they decided who was guilty and

7 who was not guilty, who would be sent to Trnopolje and who would be

8 released. Now, what was it that made us try to intervene? Precisely

9 that, that Serb criminals decided to enter these centres. And I don't

10 know how they did it there. Were they in cahoots with the guards or did

11 they deceive them, but they took people out. It wasn't groups. They

12 would go there and ask for particular individuals by name and surname,

13 and they said that they would return them, that they just needed to reach

14 some kind of agreement. Usually it had to do with extortion, to get

15 money from them or immovable property, if they had any. And the most

16 regrettable thing was that afterwards they would kill these people.

17 After this kind of knowledge, after we heard about this, we tried

18 to appeal to the police to prevent that kind of thing from happening and

19 not allowing such individuals to enter such centres in the first place.

20 Q. It was also suggested to you on page 33 or perhaps 34 that the

21 Muslim population in "celina" was attacked, and mention was also made of

22 Stari Grad.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

24 65 ter 20209. And the reference for what I said about the journalist is

25 page 17, lines 13 through 18.

Page 45297

1 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Page 70, seventy.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] One of the texts has been

3 translated. Can we get the English translation. This is dealing with

4 the consequences of the attack or removing the consequences of attack.

5 Yes. This is it. Everybody can see it.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. But I'm asking you to look at the very short text in the upper

8 right-hand side corner. Apologies, this is on the 5th of June, 1995 [as

9 interpreted]. What does it say on the upper right-hand corner?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you zoom in on that part?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Attackers came from Stari Grad. Do

12 you me to read just this or should I continue?

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Maybe you could give us your own summary.

15 A. At 4.30 this morning, members of Muslim paramilitary formations

16 carried out an attack from various directions and from various areas, and

17 in particular from the direction of Stari Grad, Pecani, and Tukova --

18 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And they attacked the facilities of

20 the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor, the police station, Prijedor hotel,

21 the city bridge on the Sana.

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

23 Yes, continue, please.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Could you please tell us whether you accepted the Prosecutor's

Page 45298

1 suggestion that the population in "celina" in Stari Grad was attacked?

2 A. No, I would not describe it that way. I tried to answer the

3 Prosecutor's question by answering why they hadn't crossed the bridge on

4 the Sana, because there is only one bridge on the Sana that was opened at

5 the moment because it was secure. There was a police and military

6 check-point there. And as for the Prijedor hotel, where one part of that

7 unit was billeted, they didn't go from there. They went down the stream

8 of the Sana and they arrived in the centre. When they were withdrawing,

9 they took the same route, whereas the troops followed them.

10 Q. Thank you. A few interventions --

11 JUDGE KWON: It's purely my personal observation, but I find it

12 strange that you base your questions in your re-examination on the

13 question put by the Prosecutor during her cross-examination, not on the

14 answers given by the witness.

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if I could just add, Your Honour, that the

16 question was "whether you accepted the Prosecutor's suggestion that the

17 population in 'celina' in Stari Grad was attacked." What I put to him

18 was that after the attacking force was repelled, the army destroyed the

19 neighbourhood.

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MS. GUSTAFSON: So it's also not an accurate characterisation.

22 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, the witnesses are

24 used to our system, and they cannot be mindful of the tricks in the

25 questions, and I cannot intervene during the cross-examination and that's

Page 45299

1 why I'm asking.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] "Celina" is not a place. "Celina"

3 is the word for entire population. It's not a place. It's not a

4 location. So when a witness confirms something without this --

5 JUDGE KWON: Please, please.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness did say you're very

7 skillful in what you do because he sensed that the questions were tricky.

8 Okay. Very well, then.

9 MS. GUSTAFSON: Totally inappropriate.

10 JUDGE KWON: Let's move on.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is inappropriate is the fact

12 that we are being tried in such a system.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Can we now see the removal of consequences through a glance and

15 tell us whether this is corresponds to what you knew about the situation

16 at the time. This document or, rather, this text.

17 A. Do you want me to read it aloud?

18 Q. No, no, just look at it. Could we look at the very short

19 paragraph: At the meeting of the Crisis Staff, problems of the

20 temporarily resettled population was considered after they took refuge in

21 some of the camps in order to save [indiscernible] from war operations?

22 What camp did the author have in mind?

23 A. I suppose that he had in mind Trnopolje because Keraterm and

24 Omarska were places where people were put to be investigated after having

25 been arrested during combat. And as for Trnopolje, as I've already told

Page 45300

1 you, people would go there to seek shelter. And then when the Red Cross

2 started organising their departure, it was allowed for the people to join

3 their families up there.

4 Q. What is the meaning of the term "those who moved out

5 temporarily"?

6 A. I've already answered a question to that effect. The document

7 was signed by all the three parties, and in that document there was a

8 reference to temporarily moving out during the war while the population

9 was in danger as a result of war operations, and I personally accepted

10 that. And I thought once some day when peace was restored, that all

11 those who wanted to return would be able to return to their homes. And

12 this is indeed what is happening, what is still happening, in accordance

13 with the Dayton Accords, as far as I know.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I would like to

15 tender this document but we would also request the part on Stari Grad to

16 be translated, the part that Dr. Stakic started reading out.

17 JUDGE KWON: I am not sure which part you made Mr. Stakic read

18 out in addition to those that have been already translated. Shall we

19 mark it for identification, pending English translation?

20 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI D4203, Your Honours.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

22 MS. GUSTAFSON: Just to put on the record now that I'm not sure

23 exactly what Dr. Karadzic is referring to. I may have objections when

24 this is translated because at this point I just can't.

25 JUDGE KWON: Very well. That's the purpose of marking for

Page 45301

1 identification.

2 Do you have more questions, Mr. Karadzic?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will finish on time, your

4 Excellencies. I have a few short questions. Can this entire document be

5 tendered? We would like to have all the text because they could be of

6 much help to the Trial Chamber if Dr. Stakic confirms that that is what

7 indeed happened at the time and that "Kozarski Vjesnik" accurately

8 conveyed news of the situation.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With all due respect, we did not

10 meddle with the editorial policy of "Kozarski Vjesnik," and now you have

11 not given me an opportunity to read all that. However, the parts that I

12 read, I can agree with them.

13 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you. You said that at first there was no communication but

15 you still managed to receive certain instructions.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to remind the

17 participants of the fact that P02716 on page 22 says that during the

18 first 45 days, we did not have any contacts, and this is from a meeting

19 with the leadership of Prijedor. We can call it up if you wish --

20 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Do you --

22 MS. GUSTAFSON: If he wants to call up a document, that's fine.

23 But this preliminary exposition on what the document says is

24 inappropriate.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The document has been admitted.

Page 45302

1 I'm just asking the doctor whether it is true whether there were to

2 contacts and whether that corresponds to what he experienced.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said to the -- I apologise to

4 everybody and to the interpreters. Can I be allowed to answer?

5 JUDGE KWON: What? I don't remember what the question was.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: The question appears to have been based on P2716,

7 so I think as an initial step that should be called up.

8 JUDGE KWON: So before we see the document, what is your

9 question, Mr. Karadzic?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked Dr. Stakic, since during

11 cross-examination his contention that there had been no contacts was

12 challenged and some instructions were shown, I am now asking Dr. Stakic,

13 considering that at that first meeting we had noted that there had been

14 no meetings, that was page 2716 -- that was P2716, page 22. I am asking

15 him now if that's consistent with what he knows.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I agree with you. I answered the

17 same to the lady from the Prosecution. Although, I didn't have the exact

18 number of days that we hadn't seen each other. I don't know exactly how

19 soon the corridor was closed. But I know that I had no contact with you,

20 personally. Nor did the others, I believe, because we in Bosnian Krajina

21 were not able to reach anyone outside by phone. And I also added that I

22 don't know whether the army or the police had some communications of

23 their own.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. And my last question. Evidence was led in the form of evidence

Page 45303

1 of Witness Srdjo Srdic in 2002 that it was the Crisis Staff that

2 organised it all --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic repeat the last part of his

4 question.

5 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, just a second. Could you repeat your

6 last sentence again for the benefit of the interpreters.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask Dr. Stakic -- I

8 cannot show this document of three or four passages that the Prosecution

9 cited.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. I'm just asking how old he was, Srdjo Srdic, in 2002?

12 A. I think over 70.

13 Q. Thank you. I cannot clear that up now because we have no time.

14 Thank you, Dr. Stakic, for coming here and for your evidence. I have no

15 further questions.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Stakic. That concludes your

17 evidence. On behalf of the Chamber, I would like to thank you for your

18 coming to The Hague to give it. You are free to go.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. I thank

20 the ladies and gentlemen of the Prosecution and Mr. Karadzic and his

21 Defence team. I hope that I managed to give some contribution at least

22 to your efforts to shed light on the events of 1992. It's up to you, of

23 course. Thank you and goodbye.

24 JUDGE KWON: Our thanks also go to Mr. Ostojic for your

25 assistance. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. And I also

Page 45304

1 appreciate the kind indulgence of the staff and the interpreters and

2 everybody involved.

3 Hearing is adjourned.

4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.07 p.m.,

5 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the

6 18th day of December, 2013, at 9.00 a.m.