140211ED

Page 46747

1 incriminate you and as a consequence you refuse to answer the question, I

2 must let you know that the Tribunal has the power to compel you to answer

3 the question; but, in that situation, the Tribunal would ensure that your

4 testimony compelled under such circumstances would not be used in any

5 case that might be laid against you for any offence, save and except the

6 offence of giving false testimony.

7 Do you understand that, Mr. Rasevic?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand that, sir.

9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

10 Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please proceed.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Excellencies, good

12 morning to all.

13 Examination by Mr. Karadzic:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Rasevic.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. Let us pause, please, both you and I. Let us speak slowly so

17 that every word would be recorded in the transcript.

18 Mr. Rasevic, have you given a statement to my Defence team?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have 1D9667 in

22 e-court. Could that please be shown to the witness.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Do you see that statement on the screen before you?

25 A. Yes, I do.

Page 46748

1 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed the statement?

2 A. Yes, I have.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the last page please be shown

4 to the witness.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Is that your signature?

7 A. Yes, it is my signature. And we also see the date when I signed

8 this.

9 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us whether this statement faithfully

10 reflects what you said, or is there anything that you'd like to correct?

11 A. For the most part, it faithfully conveyed what I said.

12 Q. If I were to ask you the same things today, if I were to put the

13 same questions to you today as were those that had been put to you then,

14 would your answers basically be the same as those contained in this

15 statement?

16 A. Basically they would be the same.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

19 statement on the basis of Rule 92 ter, Excellencies.

20 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objections, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Good morning, Your Honours.

22 I'm just wondering about what the witness meant when he said "for

23 the most part." I was just wondering what then is not correct.

24 JUDGE KWON: That's fair enough. Mr. Karadzic, if you could

25 clarify it with the witness, please.

Page 46749

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, when you said "for the most part, yes," is a fact,

4 is something substantial misrepresented in the statement?

5 A. When I said "for the most part," I meant that certainly some

6 points should -- some points would require broader explanations but I

7 accept this statement as it is. What is written there is part of what I

8 know and part of what I said.

9 Q. I don't know whether the transcript says "essence." In addition

10 to these broader explanations, is there anything else that you would like

11 to change in this statement?

12 A. Nothing else.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Would this do, Excellencies?

14 JUDGE KWON: Otherwise you have no objection Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, thank you, Mr. President.

16 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4307, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Now, I'm go to read out in the English language a brief summary

21 of Mr. Mitar Rasevic's statement.

22 [In English] Mitar Rasevic was the chief of security in the

23 KP Dom in Foca before and after the outbreak of the war.

24 Before the war, the KP Dom was a prison for the treatment of

25 alcoholics, drug addicts, and tuberculosis prisoners. The KP Dom was an

Page 46750

1 organ of the state administration and Mitar Rasevic was in charge of the

2 guards and their conduct. If the guards were in violation of orders or

3 misconduct, their actions were reported and appropriate punishments

4 given.

5 A few days before war broke out, he noticed that a number of the

6 prisoners were released but did not return which was carried out on the

7 order of the warden. Further, at roughly the same time, a large number

8 of convicts escaped. At the outbreak of war, a new warden was appointed

9 by the Crisis Staff. The army then commanded the KP Dom from the

10 beginning of the war. Mitar Rasevic was not invited to any meetings with

11 military or civilian authorities, and he had no personal knowledge of

12 paramilitary units in the KP Dom.

13 Mitar Rasevic was aware that the prisoner capacity in the prison

14 had been exceeded at the beginning of the war; however, bunk-beds were

15 installed as quickly as possible to alleviate this issue. Further, when

16 the heating broke, attempts were made to repair it and cauldrons were

17 heated to make bathing possible and the kitchen was reorganised to allow

18 the cooking to continue.

19 No distinction was made between prisoners of war and convicts.

20 Despite the food shortages, a minimum number of meals was endeavoured to

21 be provided.

22 The KP Dom has an arrangement with the hospital in Foca and a

23 doctor would visit twice or three times a week. The prisoners would also

24 be taken to the hospital if necessary and a nurse was present at the

25 KP Dom at all times.

Page 46751

1 Mitar Rasevic visited the prisoners in solitary confinement daily

2 and spoke to them personally, ensuring that they were not being

3 mistreated; the prisoners confirmed that they were not. If a prisoner

4 had been in solitary confinement for an extended period, Mitar Rasevic

5 would ask that their case be re-examined.

6 As Mitar Rasevic was unable to attend meetings at which the

7 running of the KP Dom was discussed, he was frequently provided with

8 orders which he had no input to, he was ordered to transport prisoners,

9 or prepare them to be handed over for the military police. Mitar Rasevic

10 did not have any input into the creation of these lists; he merely read

11 them out.

12 Never during his employment at the KP Dom was he present or aware

13 of any prisoners being beaten or mistreated, and no prisoners ever

14 complained to him about being mistreated. On the infrequent occasio he

15 saw a guard mistreating a prisoner in an interrogation, he would ask for

16 the interrogation to be stopped and the guard's conduct was reported.

17 Further, an order was created by the warden that prohibited

18 interrogations after 20 -- 8.00 in the evening as the guards did not feel

19 that investigating the prisoners in the evening was the proper thing to

20 do. There were also no mass interrogations after July or August 1992.

21 The lists of people to be interrogated were sent from the army and the

22 guards in the KP Dom fulfilled their orders.

23 Mitar Rasevic was not aware of any prisoners being killed during

24 an interrogation. The only deaths in the KP Dom were by natural causes

25 or suicide. Mitar Rasevic never saw or was aware of any bodies being

Page 46752

1 moved from the KP Dom, and he never saw traces of blood in the square or

2 on the walls of the KP Dom.

3 He never noticed large numbers of prisoners going missing during

4 the day or night. The only prisoners taken away were with the army's

5 authorisation. When he conducted night inspections, he saw that

6 everything was okay and that the guards were in their positions.

7 And that is the short summary.

8 Now I would like to pose several questions to Mr. Rasevic.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, how did the KP Dom function? On which basis? Did

11 you have any rules of your own?

12 A. Well, the KP Dom functioned as an institution before the war,

13 during the war, after the war, and it is certainly functioning now too,

14 on the basis of the Law on Criminal Sanctions as established by the

15 government. The rules on internal organisation and on the job

16 descriptions within the KP Dom were passed by the warden of the KP Dom,

17 and on the basis of that document, further rulings were elaborated for

18 guards duty, for instance, because each and every post had its specific

19 characteristics.

20 In 1992, when the war broke out, we applied, we continued to

21 apply this very same Law on Criminal Sanctions, and the same rules on

22 internal organisation, just like before the war.

23 Q. Thank you very much. I would just like that ask you kindly to

24 speak a bit slower.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D09672; could that please be shown

Page 46753

1 to the witness.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Can you tell us what this is that we see before us now? It is in

4 Cyrillic. Unfortunately, the translation hasn't been completed yet.

5 A. The rules on the internal organisation of the KP Dom Foca,

6 August 1992.

7 Q. Thank you. Had anything been changed in relation to the previous

8 legal provisions that were contained in such rules?

9 A. As far as these rules are concerned, nothing was changed. It was

10 simply copied, and work was done on that basis.

11 Q. Thank you. In your statement, there is a reference to prisoners

12 and detainees. Did anything change in terms of the organisation of life

13 in that sense?

14 A. Well, it is only natural that the category of military prisoners

15 of war was something new that we had to deal with once the war started.

16 However, as far as the implementation of these rules is concerned, they

17 were treated the same way as all other persons were treated; persons who

18 were imprisoned, detained at the KP Dom Foca, regardless of ethnicity,

19 regardless of the type of crime for which they had been detained.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please see page 9 in this

21 document.

22 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. It already disappeared.

23 But for the record, what is this KP Dom an abbreviation of?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KP Dom is abbreviated for

25 "kazneno-popravni Dom," which is a correctional penal facility. Only the

Page 46754

1 noun has changed in the meantime. At that time, it was called KP Dom.

2 JUDGE KWON: So "kazneno-popravni" means "correctional facility"?

3 Thank you.

4 Please continue.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellency, may I be of

6 assistance [In English] "kazneno," punish -- punishing -- I mean in

7 accordance with punishment; and "popravni" means correction to

8 rehabilitate and return the convict to the society.

9 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Could you please tell us what is regulated on this basis; and

12 what you were out of all of this? Actually, can you read out loud what

13 number 1 says and what number 2 says.

14 A. Number 1 is the head of the guards service. That was me at the

15 time. That's what it was called. There is a full job description there,

16 containing all the tasks of this head of the guard service.

17 As for number 2, that was called the supervisor of the guards.

18 This is a kind of komandir. There were four such persons. They were in

19 charge of working with the guards. They were in charge of internal

20 security, external security. So they were sort of deputies of mine.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we move on to the next page

23 now.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Just tell us, please, 3, 4, 5, what does that mean?

Page 46755

1 A. Three is guard, there's a description of that; then 4 is the head

2 of the service for re-education; and 5 are the instructors within that

3 service for rehabilitation, counselors.

4 Q. Thank you. Would you briefly tell us what number 6 is and what

5 number 8 is?

6 A. Again, that is within that service, that was the education of

7 persons who were detained and cultural and educational activities. There

8 was even a secondary school before the war.

9 Then number 7 is the department for criminal sanctions and for

10 keeping records for such persons, so these were the persons who were in

11 charge of documentation; and then number 8 within this educational

12 department, there is a person who was in charge of providing employment,

13 work to the person who were serving their sentences.

14 Q. What does this employment mean? Ah, I see, yes, you already

15 referred to that.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could we please have page 13 in

17 e-court now.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Can you tell the Trial Chamber what these services are that are

20 referred to here?

21 A. The KP Dom also treated alcoholics, drug addicts. It had a

22 separate section, a medical section, if I may call it that. Before the

23 war, a general practicer, a doctor, was employed on a full-time basis.

24 We had a dental technician. We had two medical technicians. This is

25 under 11, 12, and 13. And then item 14 is a special service, legal

Page 46756

1 affairs service. This is something else.

2 Q. Thank you. And the rest refers to internal organisation and

3 administration.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Mr. Rasevic, thank you.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

7 document for identification purposes before -- until a full translation

8 is provided.

9 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark for identification cover page and pages 9

10 to 13.

11 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4308, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I think it needs to be 8.

14 Starting at page 8. Not 9. Eight.

15 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Yes. Thank you.

16 Yes, I referred to the e-court page 9 which is page 8 in hard

17 copy. Yes. Pages from 9 to 13 in e-court.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, I see that you had a kitchen. Meals were provided.

21 Are you able to tell us anything about the provision of food when the war

22 broke out. How were the inmates fed and did you have sufficient

23 quantities of food? Were there any shortages or was food denied; and on

24 what basis?

25 A. Well, let me tell you right away. When I came back to KP Dom in

Page 46757

1 mid-May sometime, what I found was that the KP Dom was in ruins pretty

2 much. It was destroyed. And this destruction began at the beginning of

3 the war, when I was still there. The worst thing about it was the boiler

4 room which was actually the key installation, if I may put it that way.

5 It ran on coal. It was pretty much damaged because of shelling. The

6 coal, the burning of the coal provided the steam and that was the basis

7 for the kitchen. That's what the kitchen ran on. The pipes were broken,

8 and without major repairs it actually could not operate. In such a

9 situation we had to make do.

10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, thank you. We do not need to go into all the things

11 already said in the statement. I'm just interested in quantities and how

12 you obtained the necessary quantities.

13 In the statement, you said that the number of inmates rose. How

14 did you deal with that?

15 A. Since the number of prisoners rose, we asked for help from the

16 army. We asked them to supply us with a certain quantity of foodstuffs

17 because they were under the control of the army. So the army was obliged

18 to do this. We also had a farm that belonged to the KP Dom or -- and

19 that's where we also got some of our supplies. It was difficult but we

20 did manage to at least provide minimal quantities of food.

21 Q. Thank you. Was food denied? Was there any discrimination; and,

22 if so, on what basis? On what grounds was this done?

23 A. No. As for the KP Dom services, I can say with full

24 responsibility that there was no discrimination whatsoever. This wasn't

25 even technically feasible. Food was cooked in an improvised cauldron

Page 46758

1 which we received from the army, and everything was put into this

2 cauldron. And it was not possible to separate food for different

3 categories. And I state this with certainty.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness 0 --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please ask -- be asked to

6 repeat the number.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the number.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 1D09670.

9 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Do you recognise the document? Can you see what it's about? And

11 can you read to us to whom it was addressed and what it -- it is

12 requesting?

13 A. This is it a document of the 21st of October, 1992. It's

14 addressed to the Foca Red Cross. And it's a request for packages to be

15 issued to captured and detained persons as far as -- within auxiliary

16 assistance programme to prisoners and inmates. Persons located in this

17 facility require 130 packages of assistance for the imprisoned and

18 convicted persons.

19 Q. Is this 100 or 130 packages?

20 A. 130.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies, I would like to

22 tender this document.

23 JUDGE KWON: Any objections?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

Page 46759

1 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4309, Your Honours.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness see 1D09671.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. This is dated the 5th of March, 1993. Could you please

5 explain -- could you tell us something about it? It's addressed to the

6 Foca military barracks. And it says, "Based on the contract on leasing

7 KP Dom facilities for detained persons," and there are captured Muslim

8 and Serb individuals already in the Dom. Could you please tell us more

9 about this document. What did this mean?

10 A. When I returned to KP Dom in mid-May, the warden said that he had

11 signed a contract with military post in Foca, the military command there,

12 to place captured person and all soldiers who commit any kind of

13 violation to KP Dom in Foca, that the contract specifies that they would

14 take care of food and also the conditions of the accommodation of those

15 individuals. I saw that contract for the first time during my own court

16 proceedings. It was kept by the warden.

17 Based on this, from March 1993, probably the warden asked the

18 military post to provide certain quantities of food in order to feed that

19 category of persons.

20 I also would like to add that we requested on a daily basis

21 things. We even sold furniture around Montenegro in order to buy

22 foodstuffs for those funds in order to provide a reasonable amount of

23 food for everyone. This was a problem that we were struggling with. We

24 were looking for a way. Often we did not have understanding for our

25 problem, but we did do our utmost to provide those people, regardless of

Page 46760

1 who they were, to provide optimal conditions for them while they were

2 staying in the KP Dom.

3 Q. Thank you. If you allow me, I'm going to read it. This is a

4 request for beans, 200 kilograms; rice, 200 kilograms; potatoes,

5 200 kilograms; cooking oil, and so on and so forth. Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

8 document, please.

9 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

10 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4310, Your Honours.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. And how did the army respond? Did they deliberately keep the

14 food, meaning that they had the food but did not provide it?

15 What is your experience on this matter, as far as the KP Dom is

16 concerned?

17 A. Well, I did not get the impression that they did not provide it

18 deliberately. Quite the contrary. They would intervene in certain

19 cases. The army had problems with feeding their own troops at the front.

20 This is a problem that can get very complicated easily. It's very

21 difficult to satisfy everybody when there is a shortage.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 1D09669.

23 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. If you allow me, the receipts stamp says that it's the

25 18th of September, 1993.

Page 46761

1 Could you please tell us what this komanda TG Foca is and what

2 they have to do with you?

3 A. The tactical group command in Foca, as I said, was in charge of

4 prisoners of war and soldiers who had committed some sort of crime or

5 misdemeanour.

6 I said earlier that the army increasingly had problems with

7 supplying the army at the front. This was particularly pronounced, and

8 we also felt this at the KP Dom, once Serbia imposed sanctions. Then we

9 were not able to sell anything or buy anything from Serbia.

10 The deputy commander, Colonel Milan Maljkovic, from what I can

11 see, issued an order that quantities of food for military units be

12 reduced due to food shortages. I think this is what it's about in the

13 briefest possible way.

14 Q. What is the title of the document?

15 A. Reduction of the portions of food articles.

16 Q. Thank you. Can we look at 2: Those are going home to spend the

17 night are not allowed to receive food rations; is that correct?

18 A. Yes. Because some soldiers would eat at home and now this is

19 something that the army banned.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I tender this document as a MFI

22 document.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll mark it for identification.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As MFI D4311.

25 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

Page 46762

1 Q. Just one more question and one more document during the

2 examination-in-chief.

3 Mr. Rasevic, did you ever have an opportunity to find out

4 anything about preparations for war and anything about the question of

5 establishing illegal units? Do you have any knowledge about that? And

6 is that knowledge something that is confirmed in practice?

7 A. Well, I can say this: I worked in an institution that was a

8 multi-ethnic one, and I must say that - and I'm proud of that - I must

9 say that there were no pronounced multi-ethnic conflicts among the

10 officials of KP Dom, and, in particular, in my service. Tensions in Foca

11 already began in 1992 with the well-known Focatrans affair. This is a

12 transport company. During my own trial, I learned, based on an interview

13 from a SDA functionary in Foca who said in this interview which was given

14 either before or after -- during or after the war, boasted that as early

15 as 1992, in Ustikolina, which was part of the Foca municipality, he

16 formed an armed unit numbering 100 men, which was under the command of

17 Cavrk who died. That's what he said.

18 Q. Thank you. Did I understand you correctly: Was this in 1992 or

19 1990?

20 A. It was in 1990. I'm sorry if I said 1992.

21 Q. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness --

23 JUDGE KWON: Did the witness talk about his own trial in his

24 statement?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he did,

Page 46763

1 Your Excellency, in paragraph 2.

2 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes. Thank you.

3 Please proceed.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown 1D09668,

5 please.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Sir, are you able to tell the Trial Chamber what this publication

8 is, "Oslobodjenje"?

9 A. This is a newspaper that was published in Sarajevo even before

10 the war. During the war, it was also published, I don't know where.

11 It's a newspaper where this interview appeared.

12 Q. Is it the leading newspaper in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was

13 considered and still is probably an official newspaper?

14 A. Yes, it was --

15 JUDGE KWON: That's a very leading question.

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, actually, since -- [Overlapping

17 speakers] ... since quite some time now he is leading. Witness speaks of

18 1992 and then he says is it not that you speak of 1990. That was already

19 when I wanted to jump up but it was too late. And now it continues like

20 this.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Can you tell us the name of the person who gave this interview?

23 A. It is Halid Cengic. He was a high-ranking personality in the SDA

24 party, in Foca.

25 Q. Thank you.

Page 46764

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us see the following page.

2 Can we enlarge the central part.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. I'll read out what it says. It's a -- under the subheading, line

5 20, and it says:

6 "But as early as the 2nd of August, 1990, he established an

7 illegal unit at Ustikolina. The 18th," or is it 180, I can't see well,

8 "of them swore on the Qur'an that in the name of Allah they would fight

9 for the defence and the religion of Bosnia and the Bosniak people."

10 Did you know that and how did this tally with your information

11 about their organisations even before the war?

12 A. It is possible that I misspoke when I said 1992 because,

13 actually, the year was 1990.

14 Q. Thank you. How did this reflect on the relations in Foca before

15 the war?

16 A. Even then their relations were not so good in the Foca

17 municipality. The very fact that the establishment of two transport

18 companies began, one where there were only Muslims, and the other where

19 there were only Serbs - both as staff and as issuers of the services -

20 we, at the KP Dom were able, until the beginning of the war, maintain --

21 to maintain good relations and to avoid any effect of all that on us, the

22 KP Dom, because although this institution was very interesting to the

23 ethnic parties.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 I would like to tender this document offered for identification.

Page 46765

1 It will be good if we could have it entirely translated because it speaks

2 about the roots of the conflict in Foca?

3 JUDGE KWON: I don't think we have a basis to admit this one

4 through this witness. All he commented upon was a year.

5 Please move on to another topic.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Your Excellencies. But

7 for the record, the witness said that they were aware of this and that in

8 spite of all that, they were able to preserve good relations at the

9 KP Dom. But if you don't want it, all right.

10 No more questions at this point, Your Excellencies.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examination by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:

15 Q. Good morning, Mr. Rasevic.

16 A. All right --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Good morning.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

19 Q. Mr. Rasevic, until recently you served a seven-years prison term

20 for your participation in the events in the KP Dom Foca; right?

21 A. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. And your colleague, Mr. Todovic, the assistant warden in the

23 KP Dom, was convicted in the same trial as you to a person term of

24 12 years and six months; right?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

Page 46766

1 Q. And Mr. Krnojelac, the warden of the KP Dom, was convicted in a

2 trial before this Tribunal to a prisoner term of 15 years. You are aware

3 of this; right?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. Let me quote from the appeals judgement of the 6th of November,

6 2008.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And Your Honours, it is 65 ter 25870,

8 page 29 in the English and page 31 in the B/C/S.

9 Q. And referring to the treatment of the non-Serb detainees in the

10 KP Dom, the judgement states and refers to:

11 "A gross and flagrant denial of fundamental rights of the

12 individuals in violation of international law such as the right to life,

13 liberty, and security, the right not to be subjected to torture or to

14 human or degrading treatment, on the grounds of membership in a group of

15 people or a community of a different ethnicity and religion."

16 Mr. Rasevic, that sums up the findings of, in your trial in

17 Bosnia, on the treatment for the non-Serb detainees in the KP Dom. And

18 you do not deny the truth of that, do you?

19 A. I will always deny that this was done by members of the guards

20 service. I got no information from prisoners that they had been

21 maltreated by the professional guards of Foca KP Dom.

22 As for the conduct of others during the interrogation, during

23 interrogations, I had no information about it. Maybe they didn't dare

24 report it, or they thought that I was unable to do anything about it. At

25 any rate, I cannot comment that.

Page 46767

1 But I can make comments with regard to the service I was the head

2 of; namely, that I had no information to the effect that they were doing

3 that in an organised and systematic manner.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page please be admitted.

5 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, since it has been put to the

6 witness, I don't see any reason why it should be admitted.

7 JUDGE KWON: Can we do without it, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff? The

8 Chamber has a general reservation about receiving the judgement of other

9 chamber or the other court.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I thought the reservation related to the

11 judgements from this Tribunal but not from the other tribunals, but -- or

12 other courts, but I have no problem. I have cited it, so I have no

13 problem. Yes.

14 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

15 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

16 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, I also want to refer to a -- the appeals

17 judgement related to page 32 and in the English, in page 34 in the B/C/S,

18 because it states in this part of -- of the appeals judgement that your

19 sentence of originally eight years and six months was reduced to seven

20 years because of your attempts to alleviate the suffering of the

21 detainees, coupled with your sincere remorse.

22 Mr. Rasevic, do you still feel this sincere remorse of what

23 happened to the non-Serbs in the KP Dom?

24 A. If the Trial Chamber allows me to explain a little, to clarify.

25 Throughout my professional career, I was a true professional.

Page 46768

1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, our time is very limited, so I think your answer

2 could actually be a yes or no, and we come to more details later on

3 anyway.

4 A. Let me tell you, even today, I am truly sorry for everything that

5 happened to those people later and what I learned about that. As a human

6 being, I will always feel remorse.

7 Q. You were interviewed as a suspect by the investigators of the

8 Office of the Prosecutor in September and October 2004 here in The Hague.

9 Do you remember this?

10 A. I mostly do. But it was a long time ago.

11 Q. And let me just cite something that you said then.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can we please have 65 ter 25867 on the

13 screen, page 249.

14 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, we only have it in English language so you

15 cannot read it in your own language. But I'll read slowly:

16 "But I will tell you one thing, I felt a great deal of compassion

17 to the people who were imprisoned there. And it was very difficult for

18 me to see my former teacher, my neighbours, and friends with whom I

19 celebrated almost every new year being held there. And there was nothing

20 I could do to help them except to sneak some items to them in secret.

21 "I deeply and sincerely regret the fate that befell all of these

22 people that you mentioned."

23 And a few lines further down you say:

24 "And I will personally apologise to these people to their faces."

25 And then further down a little bit, it says:

Page 46769

1 "And I strongly oppose all the evil that was done to these people

2 and I condemn all of those who did that to them. And I think that these

3 people need to be punished because that is the only way that we can put

4 an end to this evil."

5 Mr. Rasevic, when you speak of those people that need to be

6 punished for the evil done to the non-Serbs in the KP Dom, were you

7 referring to the Crisis Staff and the military command who decided about

8 arrests, detention, and interrogations?

9 A. Don't put things that way. I think that those people really

10 should be punished who assumed the right to do what they did. I don't

11 know whether it was the Crisis Staff who did it. I know that those

12 people were brought in based on a document that the military post

13 forwarded to the KP Dom, but who the people were who gave the orders and

14 later misused some -- somebody's order, these people should be punished.

15 I'm not an investigator, so I cannot go into that. But I think that not

16 only here but in any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina all people who assumed

17 the right to take somebody's life without a trial should be held

18 responsible, no matter whether it happened in Foca, Sarajevo, Travnik, or

19 wherever.

20 That's my general position.

21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page please be

22 admitted.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll admit this page.

24 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6655, Your Honours.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Page 46770

1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in your statement to the Defence, in paragraph 2,

2 you mentioned in the last sentence that you were never -- that you were

3 not a member of the new parties because you did -- because you did not

4 agree with the nationalist platforms of these parties.

5 Mr. Rasevic, it was when these nationalist parties were

6 established that conflicts and ethnic strife started; right?

7 A. Well, I don't know. I won't call them nationalist parties. They

8 were ethnic parties. Whether they later became nationalist that's for

9 somebody else to assess. But I wasn't there. I'm still a -- I still

10 feel a kind of nostalgia for Yugoslavia, and I don't think that will

11 change ever.

12 Q. You yourself stated that you did not agree with the nationalist

13 platforms. That's why I asked you.

14 Anyway, Mr. Rasevic, before the outbreak of the conflict,

15 Dr. Mandic, a medical doctor, one of the SDS leaders in Foca, approached

16 you and wanted you to side with the Serbs and help them to get hold of

17 the armoury arsenal of the KP Dom; correct?

18 A. I don't know where you got that information. There was a

19 conversation, and I happened to be at the hospital. He didn't say that

20 the weapons should be given to the Serbs. Maybe I made a mistake. He

21 said, Don't let the Muslims get hold of these weapons. And I was against

22 both the Serbs and the Muslims getting hold of those weapons.

23 We were probably the only ones in Bosnia-Herzegovina who

24 destroyed their weapons. That's what we did at the KP Dom. Everybody

25 was arming themselves, but we destroyed over 60.000 pieces of ammunition

Page 46771

1 to prevent both the Serbs and the Muslims to get hold of them. We didn't

2 differentiate.

3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you testified in your Defence case on the

4 11th of December, 2007, before the State Court in Bosnia and we will now

5 look at one page.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866 on the

7 screen. And page 9, please, in the English and page 10 in the B/C/S. In

8 the English it's at the end of the page, and in the B/C/S it's on -- on

9 the top of the page.

10 Q. And I quote:

11 "One man saw me there. That man at that time was one of the Serb

12 leaders, and he was -- he has seen -- he was seen as a leader -- a Serb

13 leader during the Focatrans affair as well."

14 And a few lines down:

15 "He asked me, Are you going take your side? And I was thinking,

16 Take what side, in what sentence? And he told me, You cannot be on

17 neither side. What do you think you are going to do with the armoury

18 arsenal or with the armoury storage place?"

19 Next page in the English, please, the B/C/S remains:

20 "And I told him, I'm doing my job. There is no need for me take

21 any sides. And what are you saying about the armoury arsenal, the

22 weapons storage? And he told me, All you have to do is to appoint the

23 guards as we tell you and we'll barge in and take over the armoury

24 arsenal."

25 But then you said:

Page 46772

1 "And I left and went to see the warden and told him about this."

2 Mr. Rasevic, that is what you said then, and that's correct what

3 you said then; right?

4 A. I would repeat the same even now. Nobody could exert influence

5 on me that would have a bearing on the manner how I went about my work.

6 Q. And this Serb leader was Dr. Mandic, whom you know as a doctor

7 from the Foca hospital; right?

8 A. To tell you the truth, this is the first time I hear that he was

9 a sort of leader in the SDS. I really didn't know that he was a person

10 of importance in their ranks.

11 I can kind of doubt that, really, but I really don't know. I

12 cannot comment.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Then we need to have, again, the -- we have

14 to move to page 14 in the English and page 14 in the B/C/S. It's both in

15 the middle of the page.

16 Q. And your Defence counsel, Mr. Prodanovic asked you:

17 "Before I put your next question, when you talk about the SDS

18 leader who was trying to exert influence on you, can you tell us his

19 name?"

20 And your answer is:

21 It's Dr. Mandic. He worked in the hospital."

22 That's what you said then. You speak, and you did so before,

23 speak of the Serb leader; correct?

24 A. Yes. That question was phrased by the lawyer. And I replied

25 that it was Dr. Mandic whom I ran into at the hospital. It wasn't

Page 46773

1 because I knew him and went there to see him.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can these three pages just

3 discussed please be admitted.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit P6656, Your Honours.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

7 Q. And after the clashes started and the KP Dom was hit by a rocket,

8 as it was in the middle between the two sides, together with Mr. Tesovic

9 you transferred about 96 non-Serb convicts via Montenegro to the Tuzla

10 prison so that they would be safe, right, that's what happened?

11 A. Yes. It was our assessment that if we save those people, and

12 they were all ethnic Muslims, Croats, and Albanians, 98 of them, and we

13 did that in agreement with the BH authorities.

14 Q. And on your way, you stopped at the Velecevo female prison and

15 you stayed there for a while; correct?

16 A. Yes. For the first three or four days of the war, I was with the

17 convicts from Foca KP Dom. There was also Alija Berber, the deputy

18 warden, and some 40-odd guards of different ethnicities.

19 Q. Let me stop you. I'm just talking now about what -- some events

20 in Velecevo female prison and we don't need any more details. My

21 question was only that you stayed there and it's correct; right?

22 A. Yes, it's right.

23 Q. And at that time you say you saw military men with rank insignia

24 at the Velecevo female prison. It was sort of a command post; right?

25 A. I think that at that time it wasn't a command post, because there

Page 46774

1 were still female convicts in that prison. We arrived there with a total

2 of 125 convicts.

3 Suddenly, on the following day, some soldiers turned up, but I

4 didn't know who they were or what they were. They seemed very

5 aggressive.

6 Q. And on that occasion, while you were in Velecevo you encountered

7 one of your Muslim colleagues from the KP Dom who told you that he was

8 captured and that you and Mr. Tesovic tried to get him released.

9 You remember that?

10 A. Yes, I remember. He was a colleague from work, a dentist. We

11 were able to convince those people to let them go and they did. But

12 later on, he was arrested.

13 Q. And when you say "those people," you convinced those people, that

14 includes Mr. Velibor Ostojic, who was also at Velecevo at that time;

15 correct?

16 A. Yes. We also spoke to him. He immediately tried to -- but he

17 had problems persuading the soldiers. They were from outside somewhere.

18 I know that he had a hard time persuading them. My impression was that

19 he didn't have the power to take that decision himself. The beginning of

20 the war was a very difficult time.

21 Q. Because of your activities to help the non-Serbs convicts out and

22 not siding with Dr. Mandic and the like, Mr. Radojica Tesovic, the

23 warden, was replaced by Mr. Krnojelac; correct?

24 A. When I arrived in mid-May, I returned from Serbia where I handed

25 over the prisoners, I went back to my work at the KP Dom, and I learned

Page 46775

1 that Milorad Krnojelac was appointed warden. He said that it was a

2 Crisis Staff that appointed him. Only later, some eight months or so

3 later, the minister of justice confirmed that appointment because, until

4 that time, we had no contact with them, the ministry.

5 Q. And you yourself, when returning, experienced harassment and

6 threats and you felt unsafe in your position in the KP Dom; correct?

7 A. Well, you know how it goes. I felt threats, verbal taunting, why

8 I had protected those convicts of a different ethnicity and taken them to

9 Tuzla. They would surely fight us as soon as tomorrow. But those were

10 only verbal threats. They never became physical. And they were issued

11 by individuals. There were individuals who had already lost someone in

12 the war. And then they would say, You treat them so well and I lost two

13 or three family members, and the like. But nobody from the local

14 authorities ever summoned me to tell me anything that could be described

15 as a threat. Those were all individual problems, and you know, at the

16 beginning, it was difficult to control some individuals.

17 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867.

18 Q. And you have, again, the statement you gave to the ICTY,

19 page 184. And you say here:

20 "There was an anathema around me. I was in their black box. I

21 was something like a small Serb or a Serb with a small s. And all I did

22 I did secretly on the sly from my own guards."

23 Mr. Rasevic, you feared your own guards as you did not -- as you

24 did not know who was siding with the SDS policies; correct?

25 A. Well, of course. You know what? People change very quickly in

Page 46776

1 war time. But that did not keep me from doing my job professionally and

2 to show, by way of an example, how this should be done. Some of these

3 guards tried to behave a bit more radically, and in this way I tried to

4 show them that they shouldn't behave that way, and therefore the

5 situation became better and better in terms of the work carried out by

6 the guards, and so on.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page be admitted.

8 JUDGE KWON: We'll add this page to the Exhibit P6655.

9 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the Krnojelac Trial Chamber in its judgement of

11 15 March 2002 and I refer here to paragraph 118 on -- on page 50 -- 54 in

12 both pages [sic]. This Trial Chamber found that the non-Serb males from

13 Foca were imprisoned indiscriminately in the KP Dom with no consideration

14 of age, state of health, or civilian status, and that there were many

15 elderly persons among the detained and there was a substantial group of

16 ill, wounded, physically handicapped, and mentally disturbed persons

17 among the detained men; that's correct, right?

18 A. I would not fully agree with that. I can explain why I don't

19 think that is quite correct.

20 Q. [Microphone not activated] Sorry. There were many elderly

21 persons among the detained, were there not?

22 A. I really don't know whether there were that many elderly people

23 over the age of 65. I did not have any documents in terms of how old or

24 how young people were. But it is certain that there were no detainees

25 younger than 18 at the KP Dom. Whether there were people of 65 and

Page 46777

1 above, I don't think so. I didn't have that impression. I don't know

2 whether that was the case in the beginning, until mid-May; but after

3 that, certainly not.

4 Q. And you knew quite number of the non-Serb detainees. Your

5 doctors, your own teacher, your own professor, and even your own

6 colleagues, and you knew that they were civilians and they were not

7 captured during fighting on front lines; right?

8 A. Let me tell you straight away: It is not for us to assess

9 whether somebody is a civilian or not, that's not within our job

10 description, and whether somebody had been detained rightly or wrongly.

11 Any person in the -- who was brought to the KP -- no person who was

12 brought to the KP Dom, regardless of ethnic background, did not come

13 there without any documents. Then these documents that --

14 Q. Mr. Rasevic, that's in your statement that was admitted in

15 writing. You do not need to repeat this. I just asking you as a person

16 who knew -- sorry.

17 A. [No interpretation]

18 Q. Yeah --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not understand the

20 answer.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether they had done

22 anything. Those who brought them in knew that. I really don't know --

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the

24 sentence.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Page 46778

1 Q. Can you repeated the sentence, please, the last bit. The

2 interpreters couldn't understand.

3 A. I don't know whether they had do anything, whether they had

4 committed a crime. That is what those who detained them knew, or rather,

5 they were supposed to know. Now my subjective opinion is something quite

6 different. I had that before the war vis-a-vis certain convicts as well,

7 but that does not change the status.

8 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in documentation by the Crisis Staff, or later the

9 military command, there was this standard terminology that or that person

10 was captured in war operations, but you knew it's not correct; right?

11 A. I don't see how I could have known. How could I know? When

12 there is war in town and around, how could I know whether that was or was

13 not the case?

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866 on the

15 screen.

16 Q. And it's again your testimony in Bosnia, page 32 in the middle,

17 and then going into 33 in the English. And in the B/C/S, it's 30, the

18 lower part going into page 31.

19 You discuss here with your Defence counsel a certificate of the

20 Crisis Staff of the Serb municipality Foca for Hasan Pilav captured by

21 Serb units. And it's a document from the 26th of April, 1992. Captured

22 in war operations, and so on and so forth.

23 And then asked, you say:

24 "Yes, I knew Hasan Pilav and his wife.

25 "So" --

Page 46779

1 And your Defence counsel asked you:

2 "So was he captured in combat operations?"

3 And you say, "No."

4 So this is only a form which says war operations, yes, but

5 Hasan Pilav, this specific person was not captured in the combat

6 activities.

7 And your Defence counsel asked you:

8 "So this is only a standard form which would be used to

9 everyone."

10 And your answer is:

11 "Yes."

12 Mr. Rasevic, you knew that it was a pretext for at least the

13 persons you knew -- of whom you knew they were not captured in combat;

14 right?

15 A. First of all, this document has to do with the

16 26th of April, 1992, when I was in Serbia. I knew Hasan Pilav and his

17 wife. The lawyer was showing a document of the Crisis Staff, and he

18 said, as he defended me, that we, from the KP Dom, were not the ones who

19 made decisions. This is a document from April, and I came from Serbia to

20 the KP Dom only in mid-May. It was the army or the Crisis Staff that

21 issued the document, and nobody could enter the KP Dom or leave the

22 KP Dom without such a document. That was the essence of the question --

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear the end of the

24 sentence.

25 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

Page 46780

1 Q. The end of the sentence, can you repeat it?

2 A. That was just an introduction. That was evidence provided by us,

3 how somebody was brought to the KP Dom and how people were taken out of

4 the KP Dom. It was certainly not we who were authorised in that sense.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this page please be

6 admitted.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this to Exhibit P6656.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we have another page of that same

9 testimony. Page 44 in the English, in the middle, and page 41, bottom,

10 in the B/C/S and going over into page 42.

11 Q. There is another document that you discussed in your testimony in

12 Bosnia, and you basically read it out. And it is a telegram by the

13 command of the Herzegovina Corps, dated 14th of January, 1993, with a

14 note of urgent sent to the Command of the Tactical Group Foca, pursuant

15 to the decision of the command of the Main Staff of Republika Srpska, the

16 following persons should be released from the KP Dom; namely,

17 Nazif Cengic, Hilmo Cengic, and Fehim Cengic. On 15th January, 1992,

18 they should be transferred. They will be transported the border of

19 Yugoslavia and released. The command shall be informed about after the

20 execution of this order. And signed by General-Major Radovan Grubac.

21 Mr. Rasevic, these Cengics were very old persons; right? They

22 were far beyond 70; correct?

23 A. Well, I don't know. I -- well, they were not old, not all of

24 them. One person was elderly and one person was very young. And I don't

25 see what -- I mean, this is just proof that it was the military command

Page 46781

1 that decided who would be detained and who would be released. And that

2 is what I still assert in general terms. That's how it functioned.

3 There was no other way.

4 Q. And this exchange was decided by the very top level of the VRS;

5 correct?

6 A. Well, I cannot give any comment on that. I mean, the document is

7 self-explanatory, as far as I can see here, the command of the

8 Herzegovina Corps. I don't see what the top leadership of the RS has to

9 do with this. Whether they decided on that, that is not something that I

10 can confirm.

11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And can this -- sorry. Can this page please

12 be admitted.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add that page.

14 Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Perhaps I missed something, but I

16 did not notice an exchange there. It seems to be a unilateral release.

17 Could that please be explained to me? Who was exchanged for who

18 or what? If somebody could explain --

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think he could clarify this basically

21 in -- in the examination -- in the re-examination.

22 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

23 Shall we take a break, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff?

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes, Your Honour. And I also have to

25 foreshadow that -- as I already mentioned -- as we already mentioned in

Page 46782

1 the -- in the -- in filing from Friday, for -- the time for

2 cross-examination, the statement has been added to substantially, so I

3 may need perhaps a bit longer but I will only address it when it really

4 arises. Just to foreshadow that this may be coming at some point in

5 time.

6 JUDGE KWON: We thought one and a half hours would be sufficient,

7 but we'll see how it evolves.

8 We'll have a break for half an hour and resume at three

9 past 11.00.

10 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

11 --- On resuming at 11.07 a.m.

12 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, the Chamber has looked at the

13 revision of the statement again, and the Chamber is of the view that an

14 additional half an hour would do.

15 Would that be sufficient?

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I think so, yes.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.

19 Can we please have 65 ter 25880 on the screen.

20 Q. And as it is coming up, it is a -- a cable of Colonel Marko Kovac

21 of the 31st of August, 1992, to the Trebinje Information Centre. The

22 Foca Tactical group was part of the VRS Herzegovina Corps headquartered

23 in Trebinje; right? That's the chain of command, Mr. Rasevic?

24 A. Well, I'm not very knowledgeable as far as military matters are

25 concerned, but I cannot know what this means. I think it belonged to the

Page 46783

1 Herzegovina corps.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we have the second page in the -- in the

3 English -- in the English.

4 Q. And if we look at point 5 of this cable, there was a reference

5 that in course of the 30th of August 1992:

6 "We released from prison a total of 55 elderly, unfit Muslim

7 males.

8 "And on 31st August, we released 30 [sic] women and children to

9 keep a visiting commission from discovering them and as an alibi."

10 Mr. Rasevic, this 55 elderly unfit Muslim males, that relates to

11 KP Dom non-Serb detainees; right? That's a transport to Montenegro, you

12 remember?

13 A. Yes, I remember these 55. As for the 40 women and children, they

14 were never at the KP Dom. I claim that with full responsibility.

15 Q. They were in the partisan sports hall; right?

16 A. That I don't know.

17 Q. And this release, was it related to the ICRC visit that was

18 basically coming to the KP Dom; do you recall?

19 A. I really don't know about that because nobody was duty-bound to

20 inform me. It probably had to do with something, but I don't know what

21 it had to do with. I cannot comment upon things that I don't know.

22 Q. In paragraph 35 of your statement, you state that no prisoner was

23 ever killed in the KP Dom. Mr. Rasevic, your regular working hours were

24 until the -- 1500 in the afternoon. That's at least what you say in

25 paragraph 25; right?

Page 46784

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You were not present during night-time with a few exceptions;

3 correct?

4 A. Yes. When there was a regular check of whether the guards were

5 vigilant.

6 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you cannot honestly claim that no prisoner was ever

7 killed in KP Dom. The best you can claim is that nobody was killed in

8 your presence; is that not right?

9 A. I can claim with a great deal of responsibility that on the

10 premises of the KP Dom, as far as I know, nobody was ever killed.

11 Outside the KP Dom, I cannot say. I don't know. But in the KP Dom, that

12 somebody was killed there, I never heard of any such thing. Even during

13 my trial in Sarajevo, that had not been established.

14 Q. The Krnojelac Trial Chamber established in this regard - and I

15 refer here to 65 ter 25868, pages 132 to 138 in the English, and 120 to

16 124 in the B/C/S - and I just summarise a few things.

17 Paragraph 33, they find that in the month of June and July 1992,

18 KP Dom guards went to the rooms of the detainees after the roll-call and

19 called out from a list the names of individuals to accompany them for

20 integrations.

21 The persons called out were taken from their rooms to the metal

22 gate at the entrance of the administration building. One by one or in

23 small groups, they were called into the ground floor room of that

24 building. They were taken into one of the rooms, left and right side of

25 the staircase. They were often beaten. The beating lasted well into the

Page 46785

1 evening and sounds of beatings and screams of victims could be heard by

2 other detainees.

3 And in paragraph 334, they refer to when the beating stopped.

4 Victims were sometimes taken to an isolation cell. In other instances,

5 sounds of pistol shots were heard and then the sound of a vehicle with a

6 faulty pipe was heard starting in front of the KP Dom. It was a

7 Zastava KD belonging to the pool of the KP Dom and the reflection of the

8 headlights of the vehicle could be seen by witnesses travelling along the

9 Drina ridge.

10 Mr. Rasevic, do you deny the truth of that?

11 A. First of all, when a guard receives a list of persons that are to

12 be interrogated by a person, he was only able to take these persons out

13 of the room and to hand them over to the interrogators. That was the

14 only role of the guard. The guard would then return back to his

15 workplace. I claim with full responsibility that in the KP Dom, at least

16 to the best of my acknowledge, and I'm sure that I would have found out

17 in some way -- I'm saying that nobody was ever killed on the premises of

18 the KP Dom. Now whether there was mistreatment during the interviews,

19 during the interrogation by investigator, members of the military, that I

20 cannot say. But on the basis of the knowledge that I have to this day,

21 there were no killings committed in the KP Dom.

22 As for outside the KP Dom, that is something different.

23 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the Trial Chamber in your own trial, in Bosnia - and

24 I'll refer here to 65 ter 25871, page 9 -- page 9 and page 2 and 3 in the

25 English and page 3 in the B/C/S - they found the very same pattern of

Page 46786

1 events of killing.

2 Do you claim that the witnesses in both these trials did not tell

3 the truth?

4 A. I'm telling you I tried to slow that down. Unfortunately, I did

5 not management but I'm telling you how it functioned, and I'm telling you

6 what my knowledge was. Witnesses could not really see all of that ...

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 17, the witness says -- it

10 says here "slow down" and the word is actually "challenge" or "deny."

11 Because, in Serbian, they are very similar: "Usperim,"[phoen] "osperim."

12 [Phoen]

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

14 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in your interview with the investigators to the

15 ICTY, you yourself stated that the witnesses told the truth, did you not?

16 A. Yes, as far as my attitude to them was concerned. I've already

17 stated they testified very correctly. Finally, out of the 38 witnesses

18 of the prosecution of the BH, 36 spoke very favourably about me, but as

19 for certain things, I think that they exaggerated.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25868 on the

21 screen. That's in English. And the B/C/S is pages 124 to 126. And so

22 138 in the English; and 124 in the B/C/S. It's actually paragraph 1 --

23 paragraph 339. 339 -- that's in English it should be on page 138. 138.

24 But it's paragraph 339 on page 138.

25 JUDGE KWON: Page 120. Oh, no, it's in B/C/S.

Page 46787

1 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: In B/C/S it's basically starting. In B/C/S

2 we have the first -- in the very bottom. But the English is ... but I

3 can -- actually it would be easier for the interpreters, though, but I

4 can read the English --

5 JUDGE KWON: It will be coming very soon.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yeah.

7 JUDGE KWON: 137. E-court page 137.

8 E-court page 137 in English.

9 Why do we move the B/C/S, which was correct?

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes.

11 Q. But I can actually read the names. It's about the names. This

12 Trial Chamber -- the Krnojelac Trial Chamber established the -- the --

13 that 25 victims were killed in the manner that I just described. And in

14 the -- in your own trial --

15 JUDGE KWON: What's the paragraph number?

16 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: 339.

17 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The next page, 138.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Yes. It starts -- and now we have the --

19 lost the B/C/S. Yeah, that's ...

20 Q. You see under --

21 JUDGE KWON: Next page for the B/C/S.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: B/C/S, you see first the name, Alija Altoka,

23 and then on the next page in the B/C/S you see more names, and all

24 together it's also more names on the next page in both languages.

25 Q. Mr. Rasevic, these names should be very familiar to you because

Page 46788

1 in your own trial, in Bosnia, the trial chamber actually came up with the

2 very same names. And I would only want to address one more, and that's

3 the person number -- it was mentioned number 25, and that is Kemal Tulek.

4 Kemal Tulek was your former guard; right?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did you notice that after one such night he was gone, he

7 disappeared?

8 A. Yes. When I came to work in the morning, they told me that

9 members of the military security took Kemal Tulek away - because all the

10 guards knew him, that's why they told me - that he was taken out for

11 integration, he and I think two or three other persons. So they took him

12 out of the KP Dom. The papers were all properly signed. What happened

13 to him later, I don't know. I think that he is on this list of missing

14 persons or something like that. But that night he was not interrogated

15 at the KP Dom. He was taken away before 2000 hours.

16 Q. You were not there on that day; right? So you cannot really

17 claim that?

18 A. I can just claim that he was not killed at the KP Dom. I can

19 claim that because the guards and the duty officer told me that, that he

20 and two or three other prisoners were taken out of the KP Dom. Now

21 whether somebody abused that later, I cannot say because I don't know.

22 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in paragraph 30 of your statement, you claim that

23 the detainees did not have a view outside the KP Dom because the

24 administration building obstructed the view.

25 Mr. Rasevic, the building in which the detainees were kept

Page 46789

1 were -- had more floors than the administration building and, thus, the

2 detainees in the top rooms could look over the administration building

3 and see part of the iron bridge over the Drina; correct?

4 A. Yes. They could just see the top of the bridge, the iron bridge,

5 not the bottom. And they could see a house on the opposite bank of the

6 Drina that was a little taller. They couldn't see the road or the actual

7 bottom part of the bridge, lower part.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25946 on the

9 screen. And that is a sketch of the KP Dom. And ... yes.

10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there is your signature on top of this next to the

11 24th of September, 2004; right?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. So the -- certain markings on there are made by you. And my only

14 question is: The room 11, you have indicated room 11 on the building A

15 with windows onto the building B and also windows facing the

16 administration building; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this sketch be admitted, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE KWON: Where is building 11?

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Room 11. There is a marker -- a little

21 arrow next to the tree. The little tree next to building A, you see

22 number 11. Yes. That's where it is. And that indicates room 11.

23 JUDGE KWON: Mm-hm.

24 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

25 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, room 11 had four -- four separate rooms and

Page 46790

1 also a little main hall and those kind of things; right?

2 A. Yes. It was a collective, as we called it. It had four sleeping

3 areas, washing area, toilet.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you.

6 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6657, Your Honours.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have Exhibit P03353 on the

8 screen. And this is a set of photos. And we only need to look at the

9 fifth photo.

10 Q. And as it is coming up, Mr. Rasevic, you recall that a team of

11 investigators visited the KP Dom in summer 1996, and you were among those

12 KP Dom staff members showing them around, and they made photos; correct?

13 A. Yes. I was with them in 1996, I think it was.

14 Q. Yes. And where this little arrow, yellow arrow is, that's the

15 start of the iron bridge over the Drina; correct?

16 A. That is the top part of the iron construction. You cannot see

17 the actual road. You can only see a small section of it.

18 Q. And this photo would be the view of the detainees, that the

19 detainees had from the top floor of the building where they were housed;

20 correct?

21 A. Yes. But I remember when the investigators were there, military

22 prisoners of war were never placed in this small room from where the

23 photograph was taken. It was a few of them. And they were separate from

24 the rest of the inmates. And this is also something that I told the

25 investigators at the time.

Page 46791

1 Q. In paragraph 30 of your statement, you claim it was physically

2 absolutely impossible for the detainees to see the rooms where

3 interrogations took place.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have P3569, page 4, on the

5 screen. Page 4. Yeah.

6 Q. Mr. Rasevic, the little -- the -- the circle with number 2

7 indicates where room 11 was; correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. The investigators measured the distance between the building and

10 the administration building, and they measured it as being 10.2 metres

11 and 11. -- up to 11.75 metres.

12 Would you agree with this?

13 A. I never measured it; but, yes, I believe that is so.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have the next page.

15 Q. And here these yellow arrows also show where room 11 was, facing

16 the admin building; correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And in the picture below, there is the infamous metal door that

19 all the witnesses spoke about; correct?

20 A. They're not infamous. It's the main entrance to the KP Dom. I

21 don't know why they would be termed as "infamous."

22 This is the only way to come in and out of the facility.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we now please have 65 ter 11289C on the

24 screen.

25 Q. Mr. Rasevic, if you look at the lower photo, that is what the

Page 46792

1 investigators found was the view of the detainees from room 11 had on

2 part of the administration building in which, according to their

3 testimony, night-time interrogations took place. Agree?

4 A. I don't know exactly where they were interrogated.

5 Night interrogations were forbidden at the insistence of the

6 military authorities at the end of May or June because inmates could not

7 be taken out and guards would not enter the premises of the prisoners and

8 inmates after 2000 hours. This is what was set down in the rules --

9 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the last sentence.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11 Q. Can you please repeat the last sentence, please. Interpreter

12 didn't hear it.

13 A. Well, if you understood me. Already by the end of the June, at

14 the insistence of the KP Dom administration, there was request to the

15 army to stop interrogating persons after 2000 hours in the premises of

16 the KP Dom, nor could they be taken out of the KP Dom because this was

17 something that was regulated by our internal rules. I believe that these

18 were premises that were used for interrogations, among other premises

19 that were used for the same purpose.

20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, could that be a mistake that you said June? Could

21 it be July, end of July? Even August?

22 A. No, no, it wasn't early August. Definitely. Possibly it could

23 have been early July or mid-July. I cannot really remember that anymore.

24 It's been a long time since -- after all.

25 Q. And if we look at the next page, that's basically -- it's

Page 46793

1 basically the same -- it's the same window, same room, same view, but

2 there is -- actually some panes were put there to reflect the situation

3 at that time; correct?

4 A. Yes. Since glass was broken because of shooting, we had to

5 improvise something. We didn't have any glass to replace the panes. So

6 this is the sort of protection that was put up.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, can this exhibit please be

8 admitted.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Exhibit P6658.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

11 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you are aware that many of the non-Serb detainees

12 disappeared in so-called exchanges; correct?

13 A. Yes. I learned that after the war, unfortunately. At the time

14 when people were being taken away, I thought all of that was regular.

15 And I thought that there was permission given for them to be taken out of

16 the KP Dom and that's how it was done. In some cases, that was pursuant

17 to permission, but, in other cases, unfortunately, it was not.

18 Q. And in the -- the Krnojelac Trial Chamber, and I refer here to

19 page -- paragraphs 479, 4 -- and 480, this -- this -- that Trial Chamber

20 found that in nine such exchanges, between August 1992 to March 1993,

21 between 181 to 223 detainees were taken from the KP Dom and disappeared.

22 That is basically consistent what your -- the trial chamber in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina also found, that approximately 200 people disappeared;

24 correct?

25 A. I couldn't determine the exact number, but that a large number of

Page 46794

1 people were taken out under the pretext of exchanges or being released,

2 that is true. Some people were also exchanged, but all of this is in the

3 records that were maintained by the military.

4 Q. In paragraph 20 of your statement, you describe the food

5 situation in the KP Dom and you state that:

6 "We never made a distinction between the prisoners of war and the

7 convicts, so the food was cooked in the same cauldron for everyone."

8 And today you gave even more details to this effect.

9 Let me put to you what the Krnojelac Trial Chamber found in

10 relation to this. And that's paragraph 442, and they say:

11 "While the Trial Chamber is satisfied that there were certain

12 restrictions on the quantity and the quality of the food available during

13 the conflict, it finds that the food available was not distributed

14 equally among the detainees. Serbs received more food and of better

15 quality than that given to the non-Serbs. Serbs were allowed second

16 helpings at meals and weight loss was negligible during the period of

17 their detention..."

18 And that -- Mr. Rasevic, that was the situation, at least in the

19 year 1992 and until the -- the ICRC came in 1993; correct?

20 A. First of all, the situation in 1992 was bad for all convicts, as

21 far as food was concerned, and technically it was impossible. Food was

22 cooked in one cauldron. The cauldron was not divided inside into Serb

23 and Muslim sections. The food was the same for everyone. I state that

24 with full responsibility. We did not differentiate when we were

25 distributing food. Everybody had the possibility of receiving visits and

Page 46795

1 having extra food brought in, cigarettes, and so on. This is something

2 that happened. But as for prisoners of war, military prisoners of war,

3 there was nobody who would be able to do that for them. But as for the

4 cauldron, until we fixed the boiler and had enough steam, all the food

5 was cooked in one cauldron that was sent by the army. And finally, one

6 of the men who was distributing food was a Muslim. He was also there

7 distributing food with some other Serbs. I don't know if somebody

8 perhaps received more or less in a portion. I mean, there was always

9 something like that going on.

10 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you yourself tried to help and asked the warden to

11 have the leftovers provided to the non-Serb detainees, the leftovers from

12 the Serbs; right? Because they ate later after the Muslims; right?

13 A. No, not quite. That depended on the daily schedule set by the

14 warden. He would set the times when food would be distributed. I did

15 ask that food be distributed, extra food, that some of it would be set

16 aside for Serbs who would be eating later and that the surplus would be

17 distributed to the military prisoners of war. I did get permission for

18 this and this was actually done. As for whether this was enough or not,

19 I really cannot say. I think it probably wasn't. I mean, it would be

20 nonsense to say that it was good quality food, but it was food, and it

21 was the only thing that was possible at the time, in terms of quantity

22 and quality.

23 Q. Mr. Rasevic, in paragraph 25 of your statement, you claim that

24 you have never been present while any of the detainees were beaten or

25 mistreated.

Page 46796

1 A. No, I was never present in such a situation.

2 Q. Let me refer you to an incident that involved the detainee

3 Salko Mandzo, nicknamed Kelta. He was beaten by a dozen military

4 policemen and cut with a knife during the interrogation because they

5 thought he would be a person close to one of the Muslim leaders Saja;

6 correct?

7 A. Yes, I just happened to be passing by on my way back from the

8 farm, and I could see that they were interrogating somebody. I asked the

9 duty officer. They said they were interrogating Kelta and I kind of

10 stopped and I was saying, What are you asking Kelta? And then one of the

11 interrogators said, We're checking whether he has anything to do with

12 Saja. And I said, What Saja? He is just a miserable person. He

13 couldn't get to Saja. And then they stopped beating hum. It's true I

14 went to -- up to him. I greeted him. He was bleeding. I gave him a

15 handkerchief to wipe the blood off. And I took him back to the compound.

16 He is still alive today. They said that, We have to call the boss. It

17 seems that we have the wrong man. It's not the one that we were looking

18 for.

19 So I had the fortune by just coincidental intervention to save a

20 man.

21 Q. And, Mr. Rasevic, you were also present when Ekrem Sekovic, after

22 a successful -- unsuccessful attempt to escape on the 8th of July, 1993,

23 was brought back to the KP Dom and he was severely beaten by Borilo after

24 his return; right?

25 A. Well, first let me say that it was "Ekrem Zekovic," not

Page 46797

1 "Sekovic." He escaped from KP Dom and there was a search organised for

2 him, and probably while they were searching for him, I wasn't there. I

3 spoke with Zekovic later. However, he told me that he was beaten, abused

4 by members of the military security. They wanted him to admit who gave

5 him the clothes that he had on when he escaped. I was actually the one

6 who gave him the clothes. He did not want to admit that. He said to me

7 then, They can kill me, but I'm not going to tell on you. He did not

8 ever tell me that any of the guards had beaten him. He told me that he

9 was interrogated for a few days. I did suggest to him that he should

10 admit that and he said, No, I'm not going to do it. Let it be like this.

11 I talked to Zekovic to this day and we sometimes do talk about

12 this.

13 Q. Yes, and Mr. Zekovic, while he was in the isolation cell, he

14 continued to be abused, mistreated; correct?

15 A. I came after ten days or so from the coast. I went to the

16 seaside and then I went to see him and I spoke with him. And that's all

17 that he told me, that he was beaten. He didn't tell me when or anything

18 like that. And he came out of the solitary confinement cell very quickly

19 after that.

20 Q. And the food rations for the non-Serb detainees were half for

21 quite some time, also as a collective punishment; right?

22 A. I don't know about that. Really, I don't know whether this was

23 done. I cannot comment on that because I was away for those ten days. I

24 don't know if there was any punishment undertaken during that ten-day

25 period, and if it was, then that was really not all right.

Page 46798

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, can I ask for an explanation?

2 Does the Prosecutor believe -- does the -- is the Prosecution thinking

3 about those ten days, in particular, or in a general period?

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I was actually only referring to the events

5 surrounding Mr. Zekovic, and that's described also in paragraph 233 of

6 the Krnojelac judgement. But we have no time to go into more details to

7 this effect.

8 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there is one additional point that I would like to

9 discuss with you.

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, do I have enough time? It will

11 take another, let's say --

12 JUDGE KWON: I think your time will be up around -- at the end of

13 this session. You have about 40 minutes.

14 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Oh. That's good to know. That's good to

15 know, because I was running through my script. Then I can actually

16 discuss something else with you, of which I was afraid I had no time.

17 Can we please have 65 ter 25927 on the screen.

18 Q. And as it is coming up, it is another document from

19 Commander Kovac from the 20 -- 27th of October, 1993. The -- the date is

20 a little bit difficult to see from -- from this -- in the B/C/S version,

21 but the stamp on the next page, the stamp from the office -- the other

22 office, then you can see it's the 27th.

23 Here, we have this document listing 55 persons, and if you look

24 at the first paragraphs, Mr. Kovac refers to these captured persons as

25 Turks. Turks. Captured Turks. That was the term that the military

Page 46801

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 [Open session]

7 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

9 Q. Mr. Rasevic, this list of detainees from October 1993 contains

10 only 51 names but, at that time, there were more non-Serbs detained in

11 the KP Dom; right?

12 A. Yes. I don't know why that information was requested for an

13 exchange or release or whatever, but, yes, there were more. The

14 Red Cross had been there before and registered them.

15 Q. Mr. Rasevic, there are only 51 listed here in this list because

16 quite a number of detainees were hidden from the Red Cross so that they

17 were not registered as KP Dom detainees; isn't that correct?

18 A. I don't know if they were hidden. But people would be at work

19 when the Red Cross came to visit because they only gave us half an hour's

20 notice. So I'm not sure how the army handled that. But it is certain

21 that there were more prisoners. And I believe that eventually they were

22 all exchanged.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 24, the witness said, "I

Page 46802

1 don't know that they were hidden." And it was interpreted as,

2 [In English] "I don't know if they were hidden." Not if they had been.

3 JUDGE KWON: I don't see much difference, but thank you.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867, page 229 on

5 the screen.

6 Q. And that's your statement to the ICTY investigators.

7 And -- 229. And there, I ask:

8 "Now that you mentioned the ICRC, you were involved in hiding

9 detainees from the ICRC, were you not?"

10 And you say:

11 "No. The prisoners were hidden from them, that's true. People

12 would come from the military security prior to the visit, and I think

13 this happened once or twice."

14 Mr. Rasevic, that's what you said.

15 A. Yes. I still stand by that. It means that the army came and

16 took people away. Whether they were hiding them or whatever they were

17 doing, I don't know. But we, from the KP Dom, did not do that. We were

18 not involved. Finally, all those people were later again registered and

19 exchanged, but what methods were applied and what exactly they did, I

20 still fail to understand.

21 Q. Mr. Rasevic, some were never registered, and those not registered

22 were particularly at risk because they could disappear without leaving

23 any trace in the lists of the ICRC or anywhere; isn't that correct?

24 A. You know what I think, but that's my personal opinion and without

25 any firm foundation, that there were some prisoners of war who were

Page 46803

1 interrogated and processed. And there was another group who were never

2 interrogated. They were set aside for exchanges against Serb prisoners

3 from other prisons. And I believe that other group, that was not

4 registered, was there only for that purpose, only for exchange, because

5 allegedly the other side had the same practice.

6 Q. And one of those was Dr. Aziz Torlak, a medical doctor. Do you

7 remember him being in the KP Dom?

8 A. Yes, he was there.

9 Q. And he was not registered because he was always hidden when the

10 ICRC came; do you remember?

11 A. I cannot say because the army came with a list and took some

12 people away. He may have been, but I'm -- or, rather, that list was not

13 really available to me.

14 Q. Dr. Aziz Torlak was taken away in summer 1993 for allegedly the

15 need for a battalion of the VRS and he disappeared and he's dead;

16 correct?

17 A. I know that he was taken away. I was told that he was taken away

18 to be exchanged. Unfortunately, during my trial, I found out that the --

19 the exchange never came about. Why not, what happened? No idea.

20 Q. Mr. Rasevic, you say in paragraph 13 of your statement that you

21 started to work in the KP Dom in mid-May 1992.

22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25931 on the

23 screen.

24 Q. And we have a decision of the Warden Krnojelac of 27 April, 1992,

25 appointing you to this position; correct?

Page 46804

1 A. Yes. But let me explain. On the 27th, I was in Serbia. I only

2 returned after the 1st of May. I know that for sure. And where did this

3 date come from? I don't know. It was probably due to some

4 administrative reasons, but that doesn't change the essence of my work

5 and my information.

6 Q. Mr. Rasevic -- sorry. You mentioned your frequent visits to the

7 isolation cells. When you did that, you saw injured -- injuries on the

8 detainees -- looked up there; right?

9 A. It was my duty and my task to always visit people in isolation

10 cells, and I did see injured people. And I asked whether the injuries

11 had been inflicted by any of my guards, but the answer was, No, this has

12 nothing to do with your guards. And that was all in terms of

13 conversation.

14 Q. You asked him only about the guards and they said, No, it were

15 not the guards. But they also told you that it were the military police

16 that beat them up; right?

17 A. I don't remember that I engaged in such a conversation with them.

18 I would often ask them if they had medical problems. If they said yes, I

19 would refer them to the nurse for him to take subsequent steps.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25866.

21 Q. And it's your testimony in front of the Court, the State Court in

22 Bosnia.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: And we need now page 114 in the English, and

24 107 in the B/C/S -- or 108 in the B/C/S. 114. 114 in the -- in the --

25 in the English. 114. And, in the B/C/S, it is 108.

Page 46805

1 Q. And you speak here with the prosecutor about the solitary cells

2 and what you saw. And then the prosecutor asks:

3 "Does it mean that sometimes when you were visiting solitary

4 cells and when you were visiting rooms, did you ever see a prisoner with

5 injuries?

6 And you say:

7 "Well, yes, there were some bruises on the prisoners that I would

8 spot ..."

9 "Did you enquire? Did you ask them why? How come that they have

10 those injuries?"

11 And your answer is:

12 "My exclusive question was, Did my guards beat you up? Did they

13 do it to you? And the prisoners would tell me, No, the military police

14 officers and the military security officers did that to me."

15 So that's what you said; right?

16 A. Possible. Clearly, somebody must have beaten them. If it wasn't

17 my guards, then it would have been the military police or the military

18 security. That is quite possible. I probably said that, and I stand by

19 it.

20 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can this page please be admitted,

21 Your Honour.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll add this to Exhibit P6656.

23 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

24 Q. Mr. Rasevic, when you heard that these interrogators from the

25 military police, military security, when they beat up the non-Serb

Page 46806

1 detainees, you did not do anything about that? Not writing a report or

2 restrict access to them? You didn't do anything?

3 A. Let me first tell you. Those people had their own superiors.

4 Secondly, I would report all -- everything that I noticed to my

5 warden. But it wasn't actually in writing. I went to see him and told

6 him. And, after that, he must have intervened with the military command

7 because the military was responsible for the interrogation of those

8 people at the KP Dom, not we. I only insisted that my guards should not

9 do that, and I was greatly successful in that.

10 Q. [Microphone not activated]

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF:

13 Q. Mr. Rasevic, one of your main duties and the duties of your

14 guards under your command was providing the security for all inmates;

15 right?

16 A. Yes, and that's what they did.

17 Q. That means, if you get aware of persons from outside beating up

18 the detainees you were providing security for, did you not have to stop

19 that?

20 A. Oh, please. When a guard hands over the facilities for

21 interrogating prisoners of war to the military, the guard did not have

22 the right to enter subsequently and be present at the interrogation. If

23 we noticed injuries, he would inform the warden -- and the warden, the

24 command. And our responsibility ended there. And if anybody needed

25 medical assistance, they would get it.

Page 46807

1 Q. Mr. Rasevic, I want to go back -- and that would be basically my

2 last point. I want to go back to the judgement of the Krnojelac case,

3 paragraph 339 that we looked at before, where we looked at the 25 names

4 of victims that were killed. As this Trial Chamber found -- and this

5 Trial Chamber also found that guards were involved in this night-time

6 interrogations that left people dead. And the guards listed are

7 Milenko Burilo, Zoran Matovic, Milovan Vukovic, Dragomir Obrenovic,

8 Radovan Vukovic, Slavoko Koroman, Dragan Zelenovic, Vlatko Pljevaljcic

9 and Predrag Stefanovic.

10 None of these guards were of disciplined or reported to or

11 investigated for their conduct; right?

12 A. Please. First of all, some of them are not guards of mine at

13 all, Zelenovic, Koroman, who were -- left for the front immediately

14 after, and so on. They weren't there at all.

15 Secondly, I always asked each prisoner, even when I noticed

16 injuries on their bodies, whether any of my guards had been involved in

17 that, and they would always reply, No. And how, based on what, am I

18 supposed to have found out? If anybody was involved, they are

19 responsible for that themselves, and they should be held liable. Even

20 before the war, convicts sometimes would not report physical violence and

21 it would be learned of only subsequently. Whether it was for fear or for

22 any other reason, I don't know. But they said that my guards had not

23 taken part in that, that my guards had nothing to do with it.

24 And then how could I have launched an investigation? Eventually

25 most of them said that most of my guards were very fair to them. If in

Page 46808

1 any individuals did their own thing behind my back, well, that I cannot

2 say.

3 Q. Mr. Rasevic, my last question refers to what you said, again, in

4 your statement to the ICTY.

5 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Can we please have 65 ter 25867 on the

6 screen. And it's page 197 on the bottom and goes over into 198.

7 Q. You say, speaking about your knowledge:

8 "I was shocked to read -- to read what I read," referring to the

9 statements of the people in the Krnojelac case and in the State Court,

10 "they hid it from me. They must have gone to great lengths to hide it

11 from me because if I had known for a second and I understand that those

12 Muslims, that they didn't tell me anything even if I -- if in response to

13 my direct questions, if when I asked them, if they had any problems if

14 anything was wrong, because they must have been afraid of talking. They

15 must have been afraid of further revenge."

16 So you were fully aware that the detainees would never say

17 anything about the guards because they would fear an immediate violent

18 response; right?

19 A. Let me tell you, I thought that some people, some prisoners who

20 were at the KP Dom, could trust me fully, and so they were in a position

21 to tell me. Because we had known each other from before.

22 Let me tell you also that among them there were military

23 prisoners of war who ratted on the military security in order to get some

24 benefits. But probably they were more afraid of each other than of the

25 guards and their revenge. Once -- not once did they tell me that my

Page 46809

1 guards had anything to do that -- do -- do with that.

2 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour can this page be admitted?

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes we'll add these pages to Exhibit P6655.

4 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No further questions, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

6 Mr. Karadzic, do you have any re-examination?

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Excellencies. Thank you.

8 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

9 Q. [Interpretation], Mr. Rasevic, I'll start with the most recent

10 thing on page 63, lines 13 through 15. It was read out, as you said, and

11 I'm going to read out in English:

12 [In English] "If I had known for a second and I understand that

13 those Muslims, that they didn't tell me anything even if I -- if, in

14 response to my direct question, if, when I asked them, if they had any

15 problems if anything was wrong because they must have been afraid of

16 talking, they must have been afraid of further revenges."

17 [Interpretation] Can you tell us if you knew for a fact that they

18 were hiding something or is it the way you stated it here?

19 A. I asked people of whom I expected to tell me the truth, and

20 people who thought -- would trust me. And their answer was always that

21 it wasn't the case, that my guards hadn't participated in that.

22 Q. Thank you. On page 50 food was discussed. Did Muslim prisoners

23 of war or convicts -- or, rather, were they forced to eat pork?

24 A. No. The Serbs didn't get any pork either because we didn't have

25 enough of it.

Page 46810

1 We didn't get such -- we weren't getting such supplies. So

2 nobody was forced to do so and I believe that they would have eaten it if

3 there had been any. If you take into consideration the situation with

4 regard to food, nobody would have asked questions.

5 Q. Thank you. Where were the families of the Serbian detainees at

6 the time; and where were those of the Muslim detainees? Who was in a

7 position to bring food?

8 A. I am glad you asked this question.

9 Until mid-June, both Muslims -- Muslim prisoners and the others

10 got regular portions. Until 1500 hours, there were columns standing

11 there, waiting. When the Muslims left Foca there was no one left to

12 bring food, possibly some friends occasionally. On the other hand, the

13 Serbs were still there and they were in a position to -- to supply food.

14 However, the Muslim prisoners got regular visits all the way until maybe

15 late June, until the time when the Muslims left Foca.

16 Q. Thank you. Line 11 then, it seems to have been interpreted

17 regular portions, did you have regular portions or regular visits?

18 A. You mean in that last case?

19 Q. Until mid-June.

20 A. Regular visits.

21 Q. Thank you. Can you remember when the Red Cross visited the

22 KP Dom for the first time?

23 A. I think it would have been around May 1993. But don't nail me on

24 that.

25 Q. Thank you. Then document 25880 -- 25880, the telegram of

Page 46811

1 Mr. Kovac of August -- the 31st of August, actually, mentions a

2 commission that was announced. Did our domestic authorities, the

3 Ministry of Justice, the government, have any control, or did they

4 inspect your prison?

5 A. In 1992, all the way until 1993, we were totally isolated, in

6 terms of traffic and everything. So the answer is no, they didn't come.

7 They couldn't. They would have had to travel through Serbia and

8 Montenegro, which a very long journey. At any rate, I never noticed

9 anyone.

10 Q. D466 is a cabinet decision dated 9 August 1992 about the

11 establishment of a commission to inspect collection centres and

12 prisoners. Did Mr. Kovac mention the announced visit of the Red Cross in

13 August 1992, according to what you know now, what you've just said?

14 A. I really don't know. I was in no position to communicate with --

15 if you mean Colonel Kovac. He was the military commander and he mostly

16 communicated with the prison warden. Whether he announced anything to

17 him, I don't know.

18 Q. Thank you. Those elements from the military that you have

19 mentioned, were they under full control? Were they fully disciplined?

20 Could one say that they were acting as a disciplined army?

21 A. You know something? When a war begins, one system breaks down

22 and another isn't established yet. And then there are groups who -- that

23 roam about, and for a time, at least a month or so, they were difficult

24 to control. They were coming in from all over the place, Serbia,

25 Montenegro. It was very difficult to cope with them. It was only the

Page 46812

1 army that was in a -- that had the ability to control them. We were

2 preventing several attempts by paramilitary formations to enter the

3 KP Dom. You think it was easy? No, sir. But we were able to do it.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 65 ter 24866, please.

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. This is a report following the inspection of the public security

7 stations of Foca, Cajnice, Rudo, but we're not interested in that. But

8 Foca is on page 1. It says here that the -- they were unable to find the

9 court and the prosecutor's office. The names of the persons were known

10 but they had left.

11 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter cannot find where the accused

12 is reading from.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you -- could you indicate from

14 where you are reading.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Paragraph -- ah, the

16 second-but-last paragraph from the bottom. No, actually, in English, it

17 must be on the following page. In Serbia, it's the last-but-one,

18 starting with the words [B/C/S spoken].

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I don't really understand to

20 which particular part of my cross-examination these police statistics

21 could refer. I did not address these kinds of matters.

22 JUDGE KWON: Hmm. Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please turn back one page in the

24 English.

25 Excellencies, here the witness said that his guards were fair,

Page 46813

1 but that in the army there were some elements that were in a position to

2 act differently. This document shows that such elements disarmed the

3 police, the regular police, and beat them up and maltreated them. This

4 is what I want to show so that we -- so we'll see that the last sentence

5 states that it was ordered to document war crimes.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I reply?

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. I'll ask you. I'll ask you. Can you see this last but one

9 paragraph where it says:

10 "Police was disarmed and mistreated ..."

11 How does that tally with your experience of some elements who

12 were not only mistreating Muslims but also Serbs and even the police?

13 A. My wife also worked at the MUP, so I know about that. I know

14 that they mistreated them. They disarmed all the MUP employees and threw

15 them out, and this went on for several days, I think. And I also said

16 that they tried to attack us at the KP Dom, too, but we somehow managed

17 to fend them off.

18 So these were people who took power into their own hands. Now

19 what was their aim? Looting, all sorts of things. Can you imagine in a

20 town like that where there is no electricity, where we were blocked, we

21 didn't have electricity for two or three months, it was very hard to keep

22 them under any kind of control, and I believe that this is what this

23 report pertains to.

24 Q. Thank you. You said that they took power into their own hands.

25 I think that that should be interpreted differently, not this way that it

Page 46814

1 has been interpreted.

2 What was the attitude of the authorities in relation to

3 mistreatment --

4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

5 Yes, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff.

6 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honour, I still think that this has

7 nothing to do whatsoever with the cross-examination. The

8 cross-examination was focussing on the events within the KP Dom and about

9 a pattern of official access to detainees and what happened during

10 interrogation. It had nothing to do with the -- what was happening

11 between the Serbs outside in Foca.

12 JUDGE KWON: Is it not related to the pattern of military police

13 abusing their powers?

14 I will consult my colleagues.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll allow the accused to continue.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. What was the attitude of the authorities in relation to these

19 people who took power into their own hands? I don't like that

20 interpretation. I would prefer alienated from the power.

21 So what was the attitude of the authorities towards these things

22 that happened that caused trouble for you as well in terms of the

23 detainees?

24 A. As far as I know, the authorities tried to resolve this problem,

25 and they did manage to do it within a few days with the assistance of the

Page 46815

1 military command and active-duty police officers. So after a few days,

2 the situation returned to normal, more or less.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

5 document into evidence.

6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we will admit this.

7 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4312, Your Honours.

8 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, it was your intentional decision

9 not to tender 65 ter 25880, which included facts from Foca?

10 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No, actually, I intended to tender all the

11 exhibits that I pulled up.

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 Mr. Karadzic also dealt with it.

14 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, no objection, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE KWON: We will admit that as Prosecution exhibit.

16 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit P6660, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, shall we continue after a break?

18 THE ACCUSED: No, no. I'll finish before -- before the break,

19 Excellency. Only two questions.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, then please continue.

21 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Rasevic, was the sports hall a

23 prison?

24 A. As far as I know, that was some kind of a reception centre from

25 which people were transported to wherever they wanted to go. Muslims, in

Page 46816

1 the direction of Montenegro, they could not go in any other direction,

2 and then further on towards Macedonia, and so on.

3 Q. Thank you. It was also mentioned that you confirmed that one

4 detainee did not take part in the armed rebellion. Did the army only

5 capture those who were caught with a rifle in their hands on the

6 separation line, or were there other crimes committed against the

7 military for which they could arrest people and bring them in?

8 A. You know, not a single military POW could have been brought in

9 without an accompanying document from the military. So that document

10 would say that such a person is being brought into custody because of the

11 commission of a war crime. Where? We don't know. Some people were

12 arrested in combat. Others were arrested in town. Then whether they

13 committed certain incriminations somewhere, we don't know, but that is

14 what the documents would say.

15 Q. Thank you. Last question. You said that in Velecevo there were

16 some soldiers who were not from Foca. What was the army then that was

17 official in Foca and that was officially present in Foca?

18 A. You know that's the beginning of the war. These were

19 self-organised people. They organised themselves until the

20 Army of Republika Srpska was re-established. Now these people who came,

21 my feeling was that they had come somewhere from Serbia. Who they were,

22 I think that even in -- they didn't even belong to an organised army in

23 Foca. Quite simply, they entered. It was a porous border. They were

24 very aggressive. By the way they spoke, I cam to the conclusion that

25 they were not from Foca because they did not speak Ijkavian.

Page 46820

1 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Klickovic.

2 A. Good afternoon, Mr. President.

3 Q. Let us please speak slowly. Let us pause between our questions

4 and answers so that it would all be recorded in the transcript.

5 Have you provided my Defence team with a statement?

6 A. Yes, that's correct, I gave a statement.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the witness please be shown

9 1D9687. Could we please have that in e-court.

10 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Do you see the first page of that statement of yours?

12 A. I do.

13 Q. Thank you. Have you read and signed this statement?

14 A. Yes, I read it and I signed it.

15 Q. Thank you. Please do not be confused by the fact that many

16 paragraphs were taken out of your statement. The reason is the fact that

17 your municipality is not in my indictment so the participants in these

18 proceedings, the Chamber and the Prosecutor, were not interested in that

19 part.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could the witness now be shown

21 the last page so that he could identify his signature.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Is that your signature?

24 A. Yes, that is my signature.

25 Q. Thank you. Taking this into account, namely, that these

Page 46821

1 paragraphs were taken out of your statement, what remains in your

2 statement, does that faithfully reflect what you said to the Defence

3 team?

4 A. No. Everything that remained in the statement is correct.

5 Q. Thank you. If I were to put the same questions to you today in

6 this courtroom as were those that were put to you when you took -- when

7 you gave this statement, would your answers basically be the same?

8 A. Yes. The answers would -- well, perhaps not exactly identical in

9 terms of sequence of words and thoughts, but in form they would be the

10 same.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

13 statement into evidence according to Rule 92 ter.

14 JUDGE KWON: Do you have any objections, Ms. Gustafson?

15 MS. GUSTAFSON: No, Your Honours. Thank you.

16 JUDGE KWON: We'll receive it.

17 THE REGISTRAR: It receives Exhibit D4313, Your Honours.

18 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

20 Now I'm going to read out in the English language a summary of

21 Mr. Gojko Klickovic's statement and then I'm going to put a few more

22 questions. I'm going to deal with that live.

23 [In English] Gojko Klickovic served as the chairman of the

24 Executive Committee of the Municipal Assembly of Bosanska Krupa between

25 December 1991. After that, he was appointed it's the president of

Page 46822

1 Crisis Staff of Bosanska Krupa, and when the war broke out, he became

2 president of the War Presidency of the municipality. He served two terms

3 as a prime minister of the Republika Srpska. In December 1997 -- in

4 December 2007, the office of the BH prosecutor charged Mr. Klickovic with

5 participation in a joint criminal enterprise, crimes against humanity,

6 and war crimes. He was later acquitted of all allegations in both first

7 instance and the appeals judgement.

8 Mr. Klickovic was present at the session of the Main Board of the

9 SDS in Sarajevo when the manual was distributed and that became known as

10 the Variant A and B. This manual had no binding character and everything

11 in it was in accordance with the applicable laws.

12 Mr. Gojko Klickovic states that nobody ever advocated the

13 creation of an ethnically pure Serbian state on the territory of

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15 In July 1996, as prime minister, he was asked to ensure that

16 President Karadzic complies with the agreement that Karadzic himself had

17 reached with Holbrooke. He was told that President Karadzic had been

18 promised by Holbrooke that he would not be prosecuted in The Hague if he

19 steps down.

20 Dr. Karadzic was a real democratic leader. He did not easily

21 resort to issuing orders as instruments of power, and all his orders and

22 decisions were in keeping with the laws and regulations, states

23 Mr. Klickovic. His main objective was to fight for people, for life, for

24 peace, and stability in every situation.

25 And that is short summary. Now I would like to pose several

Page 46823

1 questions to Mr. Klickovic.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Klickovic, I would like to put a few questions to you.

4 As member of the Main Board, not an official in your

5 municipality, could you now tell the Trial Chamber how come this

6 happened? How come you got interested in the SDS and how come you took

7 part in its creation?

8 A. I will say that I was on the Main Board of the SDS from

9 July 1991. Actually, have been until this day. That is to say, that I

10 have been a member of the SDS throughout. So from the very outset, when

11 the party was founded in 1990, I was an active member, because I was

12 attracted by the programme of the Serbian Democratic Party. Its

13 intention was basically to preserve the Socialist Federal Republic of

14 Yugoslavia and to preserve the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

15 within Yugoslavia.

16 How do I put this? For me, that was guarantee that the Serb

17 people would remain in a single state. It was a guarantee for me that

18 peace would be preserved in that way and it was easier to do that in a

19 big powerful Yugoslavia rather than in some small partially states that

20 were already being heralded, because things started getting quite heated

21 from 1989 onwards, and it became obvious that this creation of the West

22 was now being dismantled by the West itself.

23 The programme of the SDS, the way I saw it, was at first the

24 programme of the Serbian Democratic Party from Croatia. That was the

25 programme of the party that was led by Dr. Raskovic, a kind man, a

Page 46824

1 psychologist, a doctor, a humanist. And this programme established the

2 basic principles, and I was attracted by these basic principles because

3 when I first started working, my job was in the -- then League of

4 Communists of Yugoslavia, in the municipal committee of Bosanska Krupa,

5 and this idea that was contained in that political organisation and

6 party, it was quite simply accepted in this new programme of the future

7 Serbian Democratic Party that also just wanted to preserve Yugoslavia and

8 to spare those areas of a new war. Any kind of separation without the

9 consent of others in the former Yugoslavia would have led to war.

10 Q. Thank you. You mentioned that in 1989 things started getting

11 heated, as you said.

12 What did you mean by that? And did you have any insight in terms

13 of what was going on in Yugoslavia or at least in your own neighbourhood?

14 A. Well, as an official in the League of Communists, beforehand, and

15 also as a person who was a scholar, I certainly was familiar with the

16 situation in the former Yugoslavia and especially things became totally

17 clear to me after the 11th Congress, when, in fact, it became obvious

18 that Yugoslavia would be dissolved.

19 The very fact that the League of Communists was separated into

20 different republics and this federalisation meant that Yugoslavia was on

21 the path of conflict and that, as such, Yugoslavia would not stay on

22 because the retrograde forces, particularly in Croatia and Slovenia, not

23 only in 1989 but before that, in 1987 and 1988, they showed their true

24 face.

25 Let me just say something else. If we look at 1987, what

Page 46825

1 happened in May, when the doctrine and strategy of All People's Defence

2 was being adopted, or rather, of the armed forces of Yugoslavia, it

3 became obvious already then that there were states within a state. That

4 is to say, there is Slovenia in Yugoslavia, there is Croatia in

5 Yugoslavia, and also Macedonia was sort of inclined towards that too. It

6 already became obvious that the west and different services were working

7 on the breakup of Yugoslavia. Not to speak about resistance vis-a-vis

8 the state institutions of Yugoslavia. That meant the defence of the

9 area, especially the secretariat of the interior and the army. So that

10 is where it first became evident that Yugoslavia would be broken up.

11 As for these individual phenomenon, we can speak about this at

12 great length. Already in 1988 and 1990 there were quite a few of them.

13 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us briefly about the organisational and

14 election activity of the SDS in your region, what its intonation was and

15 how you would assess it?

16 A. I have to say that that region or, rather, this area of the

17 then-Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina approached election

18 activities in a rather tolerant manner on the eve of the first

19 multi-party elections in this area, probably because of the agreements

20 that had been reached at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, between the

21 HDZ, the SDA, and later on, the SDS too. I'm saying "later the SDS"

22 because the SDS was the last one to be organised as such, and you

23 yourself witnessed the fact that Alija Izetbegovic already in July 1990

24 warned the Serbs, saying, What are you waiting for? Why don't you get

25 organised too. It is time for us to move onto democracy, a multi-party

Page 46826

1 system, and so on.

2 As for this area, there was good co-operation in this period

3 between the SDA -- actually, Muslims were the majority population in our

4 area, but there were also Croats and the HDZ and also another party, the

5 SDP, the Socialist Alliance, and so on.

6 So there were others, but the key forces were the Party for

7 Democratic Action and the Serb Democratic Party that were rather

8 fair-minded, and they also attended each other's rallies. Perhaps I

9 could even say that they helped each other organise their respective

10 infrastructures because both parties wanted to prepare these first

11 multi-party elections in the best possible way so that these forces of

12 Communism, or rather, socialism could be overcome. All of that was

13 rather -- pretty good, if I can put it that way. The relations were

14 based on tolerance and understanding.

15 I think that it was the month of October 1991 when at this rally

16 in Velika Kladusa, there was that mass gathering and that showed that,

17 after all, the SDA would work together with the HDZ and other Croat

18 parties that had already been organised, not only in Croatia but also in

19 the area of Herceg-Bosna, in our areas where there was a Croat

20 population, because they tied together the two flags, and they said that

21 they would move together towards victory. That is to say, that in the

22 future government, in the future parliament, in the future institutions

23 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would function together and that they would

24 try through outvoting to resolve all problems.

25 All right. I will slow down.

Page 46827

1 Q. Thank you. I believe that you gave an answer to my next

2 question - what the basis for the coalition was - but I see that

3 basically you have answered that question.

4 When did tensions arise? When was there a deterioration in

5 relations when the new government started functioning, the one that

6 replaced the regime and the system as such?

7 A. Already in 1991; that is to say, as soon as this joint government

8 was established together, these joint authorities and we all participated

9 in that, on the basis of the outcome of the election. Already during the

10 first four months, there were some disagreements. Parties that had a

11 full majority and that were dominant in the executive and in parliament,

12 they wanted to establish in the administration as well the same kind of

13 relations. If one looks at the population in these areas, I will give a

14 specific answer.

15 Bihac, Bosanska Krupa, and other municipalities in the

16 surrounding area, they had a minority. They participated in all of this

17 with less than one-third, that is to say, that the other side could

18 outvote them, and they could do whatever they wanted to do.

19 The first such misunderstanding happened when there was a

20 rationalisation of the staff in these structures. It was supposed to be

21 brought in line with the population structure, which meant that a lot of

22 Serb employees would be dismissed. Of course, this led to tensions and

23 also problems in the assembly and the Executive Board and other organs of

24 government. This was certainly how other problems surfaced too.

25 The next problem that appeared and that was present all the time

Page 46828

1 was the attitude towards the institution of the Yugoslav People's Army.

2 We know that in 1991 there was this resolution, or perhaps we can say it

3 was a declaration. The Assembly of the Serb people made it known that

4 Serbs would respond to JNA call-up. That is to say, they would serve in

5 the armed forces because Yugoslavia officially existed all the way up

6 until midnight on the 25th of April when the new "zabljak" constitution

7 was adopted and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was established on

8 that basis. We thought, as legalists, that for as long as Yugoslavia

9 existed and for as long as there were regulations in force that we had to

10 abide by these regulations. And certainly, as for the institution of the

11 armed forces, we saw that institution as a protection and safety for the

12 Serb people because we knew that the Serb people were living in different

13 places that were not interconnected, all the way from Slovenia to

14 Macedonia.

15 So we struggled for the survival of these federal institutions,

16 and we wanted to give our full contribution to the work of these

17 institutions.

18 The Serbs served in the JNA. They were deployed in the structure

19 of the armed forces, and they regularly responded to call-up. This kind

20 of response meant being dismissed from work, being jobless, and it led to

21 problems and torture in that area. Once they would return from the

22 reserve force and from the territories of Croatia where we were deployed

23 to serve in the armed forces of Yugoslavia, there were unpleasant things

24 that happened in the area of Bihac, Krupac, Petrovac, Sanski Most,

25 Novi Grad because these people were being singled out, labelled,

Page 46829

1 threatened, from different sides. They were being told that they should

2 not respond to the call-up, that they should not serve in the JNA. As

3 opposed to others, we did that, and this was this other conflict that

4 clearly showed that it would not be possible to continue that way for a

5 long time with this kind of structure of government.

6 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us -- actually, you said that

7 young Serbs served in the military. Where were young men, Muslims and

8 Croats, from your area, and did you have any information about their

9 military organisation and arming?

10 A. Since the municipality of Bosanska Krupa and, later on, the Serb

11 municipality of Bosanska Krupa is along the border with Croatia, we knew

12 full well what was going on in the surrounding area, and we were aware of

13 everything that was going on in that area. We responded to this call-up.

14 Others did not. We went to serve in the forces of the Socialist Federal

15 Republic of Yugoslavia, the legal force, but the other members of the

16 armed force - I'm referring to Bosniaks, rather, Muslims at the time -

17 they, within their territorial units and units in local communes,

18 compiled lists, conducted training, decided who their commanders would be

19 along party lines and on the basis of party discipline. That is to say,

20 that they ask not respond. They didn't want to talk about going into the

21 armed force that they were a member of because they all had military

22 cards of the former Yugoslav People's Army. They were all deployed in

23 various units. They had their own assignments; but, according to the

24 orders issued by the party, the SDA, they stayed at home. They -- they

25 went over weekends to conduct exercises organised by the Patriotic

Page 46830

1 League, the Green Berets, and so on. But, at any rate, these were units

2 of at the time that could not fit into any law or legal provision that

3 had to do with All People's Defence in Yugoslavia. That is to say, that

4 these were units that acted outside the system but under the auspices of

5 powerful political parties because the SDA was certainly the most

6 powerful political party in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 So these were these first problems, and that was when there was a

8 hint of the problems that were yet to happen.

9 Q. Can we now go back to domestic politics now.

10 Can you tell the Trial Chamber, in view of your long mandate at

11 the top of the Serbian Democratic Party, who and how was the policy of

12 the Serbian Democratic Party set and what was the role of the Assembly,

13 the Main Board, the Executive Board and the president in the party during

14 the time that you were in the leadership?

15 A. I can say the real truth and the essence regarding the way we

16 worked because I was a member of the Assembly of the Serbian Democratic

17 Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I was a member of the Main Board. For

18 a while, I was in the Executive Board, and also, for a while, I was the

19 director of the directorate of the Serbian Democratic Party so that I can

20 say --

21 JUDGE KWON: Could you speak very slowly, please.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Can you please repeat what you said after saying: "I was a

24 member of the Assembly of the Serbian Democratic Party," and then

25 everything else. Slowly.

Page 46831

1 A. I was a member of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina. I was a member of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic

3 Party. I was, for a brief period, a member of the Executive Board of the

4 Serbian Democratic Party. For a while, I was the director of the

5 directorate of the Serbian Democratic Party. Now I am still a member of

6 the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic Party.

7 So I really am in a position to reply to this question

8 definitively as to how and in what manner it worked and functioned from

9 the top, all the way down: From the Assembly, down to the SDS

10 Local Board. In essence --

11 Q. Well, now, can you tell us what the role of the Assembly was?

12 Who set policy, who changed the policy, who implemented the policy of the

13 Serbian Democratic Party?

14 A. I was just about to say that the democratic principle was the

15 basis on which the programme goals were established, as well as the main

16 tasks of the Serbian Democratic Party. Everything that was adopted was

17 done exclusively and only in the Assembly, by the Assembly, which was

18 convened once a year, and, if there was any need, it could be convened

19 twice or even more often. However, in practice, it was convened once a

20 year. This would be when the report would be submitted, as well as when

21 the programme would be set for the following year for the Executive Board

22 of the Assembly, for the president. The Main Board, in the meantime,

23 would also convene but rarely, perhaps twice a year, only to analyse what

24 had been done or implemented of the conclusions from the annual assembly

25 session.

Page 46832

1 When the programme was being prepared, or any other conclusion, a

2 broad number of people took part in this process who were not necessarily

3 members of the party. Certain institutions also took part, academic

4 institutions, writers' associations, and they would help to prepare

5 certain programme tasks because the programme of the Serbian Democratic

6 Party was more of a people's programme, a source programme, the goal of

7 which was to maintain or preserve peace in that area, to try to preserve

8 Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its goal was also to maintain

9 good relations in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was Yugoslavia

10 in -- in -- in a small scale. And it was the only party that propagated

11 idealogical reconciliation in that area.

12 People divided amongst themselves, and this was present among the

13 Serbs and among other nations as well. Serbs had Communist and

14 anarchists, so the idea of the programme was to erase these ideological

15 differences and to establish relations of tolerance, full respect,

16 regardless of anybody's views. The methodology and the way the Serbian

17 Democratic Party operated in these organs was really so tolerant that all

18 the actors, all the participants, could discuss for however long they

19 wanted if they had something new to present. There was no restriction,

20 no obstruction, in this, and I also think that at that time nobody was

21 excluded from the Serbian Democratic Party because they had a different

22 opinion, except for one person who was a bit more radical and who

23 deviated from the party concept.

24 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell us this: You mentioned that you

25 were present when the instructions known as instruction A and B was

Page 46833

1 distributed. Are you able to tell the Trial Chamber on what basis did

2 the Serbian people and the Serbian Democratic Party opt in favour of...

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please be asked to repeat the

4 last part of his question.

5 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last part question -- your

6 question.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. This procedure of regionalisation, regionalisation, was there any

9 legal or constitutional basis for this process?

10 A. I have to say that this is a very broad question, and I'm going

11 to attempt to answer just in bullet notes because this is actually a

12 whole set of questions. I would like to be clear and precise, and I

13 don't want to take up too much time when I do this.

14 Let's me start from regionalisation. We know that

15 regionalisation was also set by the Law on the Territorial and Functional

16 Organisation in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in

17 the constitution. Some matters were regulated by amendments from 1976,

18 1989 and 1990. It is correct that only the names or titles were changed,

19 or the headings, depending on the political situation and the

20 circumstances at that particular point in time in a specific area.

21 Here's an example. The Autonomous Region of the Krajina. That

22 was a regional -- or it was an association of the municipalities of the

23 Banja Luka region which rested on the same principles as the Autonomous

24 Region of Banja Luka or the Association of Municipalities of Bihac to

25 which we belonged. In the first stage, it was organised also in keeping

Page 46834

1 with the current laws and the constitution of the Socialist Republic of

2 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Other than giving political connotations to these regions, there

4 is nothing of particular importance there. They were dealing with the

5 same questions, the same problems; but, again, I say this depended on the

6 situation and the moment in time in which that particular community was

7 acting. And it is correct that later there was regionalisation along

8 national lines or ethnicity so that we had this regionalisation, which

9 means that the Croats organised the HAO, the Muslims organised MAO, and

10 the Serbs organised SAO, but all of that was the same, with the same goal

11 to resolve some problems faster and in a more organised way, and in case

12 of any kind of danger or endangerment to resolve the security factor more

13 easily.

14 Therefore, this was completely founded in the constitution and

15 the law. As far as the creation of these regional communities is

16 concerned, which later became autonomous regions, and this was something

17 that was valid for Serb, Muslims, Croats, and Bosniaks. That would be a

18 part of the answer.

19 As for the second part, the instructions that really -- this is

20 something that I have to say. This instruction was the basis for action

21 and for the work of the prosecutor's office. Unfortunately, in my own

22 proceedings, I asked the prosecutors 30-odd times why they do not say

23 which law of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the law

24 of the defence of the republic or the constitution I violated and why I

25 was brought to the -- before the court. What was it that I did that was

Page 46835

1 counter to the laws that were then in effect?

2 This is a document probably that has been misused and that will

3 be studied for a long time in legal history. Because, in itself, it

4 meanings nothing. As far as I'm concerned, as a member of the Main Board

5 and as an official at the local level, it meant nothing to me. And I did

6 not even take it at the Holiday Inn conference room when it was

7 distributed. I think that it was distributed upon your insistence. You

8 said, Distribute it, for God's sake, and everybody can read it for

9 themselves and then they can see what they want to do then. In itself,

10 the document has no legal force. I didn't even deal with it, but it was

11 just out of party discipline that I looked to see what was actually

12 written there. The instruction that was drafted was drafted, in my

13 opinion, for the purpose of establishing, I would say, a -- a code of

14 behaviour in the field, in complex situations because we already, at that

15 time, in 1991, had a pretty complex situation in the area of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina, which was dictated by an even more complex and worse

17 situation in Croatia. And I believe that the document really did receive

18 a lot of publicity, negative publicity, and it was considered as the

19 bearer of all evil in that area. When you look into it in more detail,

20 the document was formed and is based in the constitution of the Federal

21 Republic of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

22 from 1974, also based in -- on the Law of All People's Defence of the

23 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1982, based on the Law on

24 All People's Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from

25 1984 and 1987, and also in the strategy and the doctrine of the armed

Page 46836

1 forces which was published on the 25th of May, 1987, in the Law on

2 Yugoslav People's Army from 1985, in the Law on Armed Forces from 1985,

3 in certain provisions of the republican Executive Council of the

4 Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the election result of the

5 party elections, in the plebiscite of the Serbian people held in 1991,

6 and recommendations of the Assembly of the Serbian People of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina of the 11th of December, 1991.

8 Q. Thank you. Thank you.

9 A. I'm not finished yet.

10 Q. Well, I would like to ask you to be a bit more brief.

11 A. I will try to cut it short.

12 Every word from those instructions could be found in some of

13 those 250-odd articles of these laws that I have referred to. I worked

14 on some of those regulations. I know that, and that is why I assert that

15 the document is completely irrelevant in order to establish war crimes.

16 According to the document, there should have been no war crimes at all.

17 Q. Thank you. I'm waiting for the interpretation.

18 Are you able to tell us -- you mentioned the recommendations of

19 the 11th of December. Where you thinking of the recommendation on the

20 formation of Serbian municipalities, Serbian municipalities assembly --

21 municipal assemblies where there were conditions for such a thing?

22 A. Yes. And these were recommendations from a joint session of the

23 Assembly in which all three peoples took part, and it was stated there

24 that regionalisation should not be used in a negative way, in order to

25 raise interethnic tensions. We needed to wait a little for the joint

Page 46837

1 Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to adopt the regulations and to

2 regulate this and then the -- the -- the process of regionalisation

3 should proceed. And these recommendations from the 11th of

4 December actually preceded the drafting of these instructions, which

5 somebody later called Variant A and B.

6 It's not a variant. It's just something that depends on the

7 situation where these regulations were supposed to be applied. So these

8 recommendations practically initiated the political organisation of

9 behaviour in the field in order to prevent conflicts.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Are you -- may I just ask you

11 something? I don't have LiveNote if something is not. I am afraid. Are

12 the booths working?

13 JUDGE KWON: While it is working on the common drive, it does not

14 work on the personal one.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. It's good that

16 it's working somewhere at least.

17 Thank you.

18 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I wanted to ask you this: When did you adopt this decision in

20 your municipality?

21 Actually, in the question, there are some errors. The question

22 is wrong in lines 6 on page 91; 7, onwards, these are assemblies of the

23 Serbian people in these municipalities.

24 When did you decide in your municipality to form the Assembly of

25 the Serbian People?

Page 46838

1 A. This decision on the formation of Assembly of the Serbian

2 Municipality of Bosanska Krupa was taken in December -- actually -- 1991.

3 It was supposed to have been taken in June 1991. But listening to you,

4 actually, we kept postponing this in the hope that we would repair

5 relations because the discussion on the formation of the Serbian

6 municipality of Bosanska Krupa, in accordance with the Law on Referendum

7 of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1975 was

8 implemented in the course of the summer, and we prepared -- and we

9 prepared to round off our municipality and inform all the political

10 factors about it from the SDA in the Bosanska Krupa municipality. This

11 would be the SDA at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina, up to the president

12 of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic and yourself, as well as all of our

13 Presidency members.

14 Therefore, we could have done this much earlier, but we expected

15 that at the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina a solution would be found so that

16 we would not have to do this in a moment that was full of tensions, that

17 was tense, i.e., not to form the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa,

18 which, in the institutional sense, was already completed, but we made it

19 official in December. We formed our organs and set off with working in a

20 normal way without trying to initiate any conflicts with our parts in the

21 SDA.

22 This is about the municipality. We accepted this as some kind of

23 necessary resolution -- solution.

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the question.

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. -- Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat your question.

Page 46839

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. You said that you began in June and took the decision in

3 October and completed it in the 11th of December; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Because the dates were not recorded. That is, in June or July,

6 you began; and October you took the decision; and the process ended on

7 the 11th of December.

8 JUDGE KWON: [Previous translation continues] ... just a second.

9 Please speak slowly, both of you.

10 Please continue. Can you answer the question?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let's be clear about the dates.

12 The public discussion about the economic justification for the

13 establishment of the municipality had been over by June 1991. We got the

14 mandate to establish the Serbian municipality of Bosanska Krupa.

15 In October of the same year, we decided to do that after the

16 continued conflicts within the authorities with the SDA.

17 On the 11th of December, 1991, we officially constituted the

18 Assembly and all of its bodies.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Thank you. If that was done before the instruction dated

21 19 December, based on what was it done?

22 A. The instruction of the 19th of December was something that we

23 didn't need at all. Because we had laws and regulations of the Socialist

24 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina that were in force, and they provided for -- for the

Page 46840

1 organisation of assemblies according to certain procedure and so on.

2 So we proceeded in accordance with the Law on Referendum and the

3 Law on Territorial Organisation, and we also submitted an application to

4 the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to give us

5 approval. They never did. But they never refused us either. Other

6 municipalities, such as Brod, Modrica, and others were singled out and

7 criticised for such activities. We acted in accordance with laws and

8 regulations in force and that was in line with the programme of the

9 Serbian Democratic Party, which was fully legalist.

10 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, what kind of connections do

11 you have with Pale? And what kind of connections existed between your

12 neighbouring municipalities in Pale? How did you work in your

13 municipalities, you and your colleagues from the Main Board?

14 A. Well, let me tell you, the Serbian municipality of Bosanska

15 Krupa, the Serbian municipality of Bihac, then Bosanski Novi, we had very

16 bad communication because there were problems with the telecom, and it's

17 generally known why, we could only communicate with you at Pale through

18 the delegates and the club of representatives of the Serbian Democratic

19 Party, which you favoured. And you always said that there was no need

20 to -- to double these activities because the delegates and the Assembly

21 were elected representatives of the Serbian people.

22 Therefore, meetings of the Main Board often didn't take place.

23 There would have been a doubling of functions, there would have been

24 costs for travel, and instructions, if required, could be brought by

25 delegates.

Page 46841

1 At any rate, I and my co-workers at the municipality didn't have

2 a great need to consult anyone because we knew the programme of the

3 party, and we knew the laws and regulations, and we adhered to them. The

4 instruction or any other document of imperative character were not

5 binding. We didn't see it as such. There were only there in case

6 anything unforeseen should happen on the ground.

7 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what you know about the preservation

8 of peace and legality and law and order, as well as combatting of crimes

9 in your municipality and neighbouring ones, with respect to the

10 participation of the Main Board and the authorities.

11 You may remember who was number one at Mrkonjic Grad or Prnjavor

12 or Laktasi, how the line of the Main Board of the Serbian Democratic

13 Party functioned in these municipalities and others?

14 A. I remember almost each member of the Main Board by municipality,

15 but I can answer generally that the members of the Main Board, where they

16 exerted the most influence in those municipalities the inter-ethnic

17 relations were best. I was a member of the Main Board at Bosanska Krupa;

18 At Novi Grad, it was Mr. Pasic; At Sanski Most, Mr. Brkes; at Petrovac,

19 Mr. Novakovic --

20 Q. Slow down, please.

21 A. At Petrovac, it was Mr. Novakovic; at Gradiska, Mr. Ivastanin; at

22 Srbac, Kupresanin, Milincic, and so on. There were all people who were

23 first-day members of the SDS, and they knew the basic principles upon

24 which the SDS was built. And, in that sense, we weren't faced with many

25 negative things or a negative attitude towards Bosniaks or Croats.

Page 46842

1 Tolerance was present very long. Actually, until the SD --

2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please start over.

3 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Klickovic, if you could repeat your answer from

4 where you referred to tolerance.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was speaking about the members

6 whom I listed.

7 We really paid great attention to tolerance, and we cared about

8 good relations between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and we didn't allow

9 any negative events, because that was also our task in the field that we

10 had got before the conflict. We knew that this was the condition to

11 mitigate the conflict. We expected that Europe, the west, would resolve

12 the problem, and that there would be no conflict. We never expected a

13 war to break out, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And I think that

14 wherever we were in positions of responsibility, we, from the SDS, human

15 resources were well protected, and people were able to go to safer

16 places.

17 For example, at Novi Grad, during conflicts, there were also

18 some -- there was also some influence from outside, and JNA units were

19 moving. The Muslim population was offered temporary shelter at

20 Banja Luka or Doboj, but I know from my daily contacts that many left for

21 third countries or other countries that used to be part of former

22 Yugoslavia.

23 At Mrkonjic, we -- there was Luka Culic, a member of the

24 Main Board. They were faced with great problems. They had to protect

25 churches and other buildings from -- even from Serbs who did not agree

Page 46843

1 with them.

2 At Bosanska Krupa, where I was, when there was combat along the

3 Una river where there are mostly Muslim-populated places, we had to act

4 to preserve the lives of those people, and we were successful.

5 Q. Thank you. Now very briefly, you mentioned the rifts in the

6 Serbian people, divisions into left and right Serbs. Were the divisions

7 among the Muslims? And were there any entities with which you had good

8 relations?

9 A. Yes. I have also mentioned the rifts among the Serbs. And it

10 also applies to other peoples. This is probably inherent to the Balkans.

11 In our region, there was a division into the supporters of

12 Fikret Abdic and the supporters of the SDA hard-liners, whose leader was

13 Alija Izetbegovic. We co-operated with those who supported Fikret Abdic

14 and wanted peace in the region. They wanted many things to be tackled

15 differently. But we also took every opportunity to maintain good

16 relations with Bihac, which was the -- the spearhead of the SDA

17 hard-liners. We wanted to avoid shooting and the destruction of property

18 because we knew we didn't play an important role in the resolution of the

19 global situation. We only wanted there to be as few victims as possible

20 and as little suffering because we knew that only in such a way would we

21 be able to build a sound Bosnia.

22 Q. Thank you. When the war broke out, did have you information

23 about convoys passing through and did you have information about the

24 misuse of convoys for the arming of the 5th Corps?

25 A. This is a rather broad question. I need a couple of sentences to

Page 46844

1 answer it. But there are also -- there's also more than one segment to

2 it.

3 Let me point out that the -- that international aid that came to

4 the Cazin region, which is near Bihac, we have information, including

5 documents, that instead of fuel and food, ammunition and weapons were --

6 were being transported. And this Tribunal saw these documents in other

7 trials.

8 I will single out two persons who were involved. Hajrudin

9 Osmanagic, commander of the District Staff of Bihac, and Sead Palic, an

10 intelligence guy from Bosanska Krupa. He was born at Ostraznica [phoen]

11 and he worked for that humanitarian aid organisation, but when we found

12 his documents we saw what was being transported, from sniper-sights,

13 through ammunition, through barrels for light weapons. In other words,

14 lethal assets.

15 That's not all. There was the Corolici [phoen] airstrip that you

16 could access by helicopter or by smaller transport planes. It was used

17 for the transportation of provisions for the 5th Corps.

18 And let me also say that JNA units also passed through the area.

19 Often individuals or small groups of soldiers or officers were stopped

20 and robbed of their weapons, ammunition, or means of transport. We have

21 specific evidence to corroborate that because the Secretariat of the

22 Interior at Bosanska Krupa, their crime investigation service, staffed by

23 Serbs, initiated about a dozen proceedings against persons who committed

24 crimes of alienation of property and so on. However, the proceedings

25 were never completed, and it is clear why. Because it was the policy of

Page 46845

1 SDA that decided about everything, including who would be tried and who

2 would not.

3 Q. Thank you.

4 1D8890. Could we please see it. I will show you only one

5 document, Mr. Klickovic. I will tender the rest over -- over the bar

6 table.

7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Gustafson.

8 MS. GUSTAFSON: Thank you, Your Honours.

9 At this point, I'd like to note that we've had nearly an hour of

10 detailed direct examination, much of which going well beyond the scope of

11 the witness's statement.

12 I'd like to note that we had no advance notice that this would

13 take place, no information by way of a proofing note or anything else

14 that the -- this information be elicited. No notice that this document

15 would be used in the direct examination. Obviously this makes our

16 cross-examination preparations -- hampers our cross-examination

17 preparations and our estimates, and this is the kind of notice that we're

18 entitled under Rule 65 ter, and I'd just like to ask that, in the future,

19 this not happened again, that we get the notice to which we're entitled.

20 Thank you.

21 JUDGE KWON: Fair enough.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume responsibility for that.

23 It's very true. But this statement has really been butchered. And I

24 wanted to point out this municipality as an example for leading Defence

25 evidence. Since that has all been cut out, I must now ask general

Page 46846

1 questions to elicit the information desired. If he was merely a

2 municipal dignitary, he was also a member of government, and so on. And

3 I really apologise for these documents. There is more than one. But

4 I'll show only one so that Mr. Klickovic can comment on it.

5 Could you please zoom in.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. And you, Mr. Klickovic, tell us what this document is. Who is

8 sending it to who?

9 A. Even without looking at it, not only this one but a series of

10 such documents, they were considered by the court in Bosnia-Herzegovina

11 where I was tried. I know very well what it says.

12 This clearly shows what kind of aid was being provided and to

13 who. We know who, at the time, was commander of the 5th Corps of the BH

14 army, Ramiz Drekovic. We know through who that went to Bihac. As I

15 said, Sead Palic was in charge of Krupa.

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Klickovic, since we do not have English

17 translation, we do not know what this is about. So please tell us what

18 this document is about and then proceed to explain whatever you like.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I apologise.

20 This document is about ammunition supplies for the 5th Corps and

21 the supply of explosive devices that the 5th Corps used for combat

22 purposes.

23 This document is marked military secret, strictly confidential,

24 and this was a job that was done by people that I mentioned:

25 Hajrudin Osmanagic, Commander of staff, and his deputy, Hadzic.

Page 46847

1 At that time, they did about their work in Zagreb. They had

2 something similar to an embassy, or maybe it was an embassy department,

3 and it was all sent to the commander of the 5th Corps, Ramiz Drekovic --

4 or, rather, his command. I doubt that he as commander actually counted

5 bullets.

6 So this document shows what was being transported instead of

7 humanitarian aid. We also had information who manned in -- border

8 crossings at the time of the -- of the international forces up there.

9 Whether they controlled what was in the tank or trunks or not, we don't

10 know. But we know that under the veil of humanitarian aid, something

11 else was being transported. We tolerated that because we let

12 humanitarian aid pass through our territory, even if it was for the

13 Muslims or the Croats. It was pursuant to the orders of Dr. Karadzic.

14 This was not the first time that, instead of food and medication,

15 ammunition, explosive devices, rocket fuel were being transported. I was

16 shown a number of such documents, and I personally made it part of

17 defence evidence at the BH Court.

18 Q. And could you please tell us through who did this happen. Who

19 transported these assets?

20 A. I don't know if I confirmed that already, but all of this was

21 done with the agreement of the UNHCR and the international sponsors,

22 meaning that those assets that were being transported did not have to be

23 their property but they had their markings and were under their control

24 and monitoring. These were assets, transport means that would cross over

25 exclusively under the supervision of international factors.

Page 46848

1 Q. I would like to tender this document, please, and I have no

2 further questions at this point for this witness.

3 JUDGE KWON: We'll mark it for identification.

4 THE REGISTRAR: It receives MFI D4314, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE KWON: I take it you can start your cross-examination,

6 Ms. Gustafson.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON: Yes, Your Honours. Thank you.

8 Cross-examination by Ms. Gustafson:

9 Q. And good afternoon, Mr. Klickovic.

10 A. Good afternoon.

11 Q. If I could just start by clarifying the dates -- periods during

12 which you served as prime minister.

13 Is it correct that you were the prime minister of the

14 Republika Srpska between roughly May 1996 and January 1998?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. At -- in your statement, you talk about the Variant A and B

17 document, and you spoke about it at length as well this afternoon. You

18 claim that the document had no binding character and, indeed, today you

19 said "it meant nothing to me."

20 You did, in Bosanska Krupa, create a Crisis Staff pursuant to the

21 Variant A and B instructions, didn't you?

22 A. No. We formed a Crisis Staff pursuant to the Law on All People's

23 Defence of the Socialist of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Articles 98, 99, 100,

24 101, 102, 103 and 104.

25 MS. GUSTAFSON: If we could have 65 ter 06700, please.

Page 46849

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript, please.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Ah, it's all right now. I see that

4 it has been corrected now. That it's all right now. 100. 102. I think

5 102 is missing.

6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

7 MS. GUSTAFSON:

8 Q. You can see, Mr. Klickovic, this is an extract from the minutes

9 of the 3rd Session of the Bosanska Krupa Serb Municipal Assembly

10 Executive Committee held on 24 December 1991 with you chairing and

11 conducting the proceedings.

12 And you can see the agenda item 3(a) is implementing the

13 instruction on establishing a Crisis Staff; and on the next page, in the

14 B/C/S, at the bottom of the page in the English, under item 3(a) it says:

15 "The chairman briefed those present on the instruction on

16 establishing SDS Crisis Staffs in BH, and, in accordance with the said

17 instruction, proposed the establishment of a Crisis Staff. This was

18 followed by establishment of the Crisis Staff of the following makeup..."

19 And then it lists the members.

20 Now, the instruction on establishing SDS Crisis Staffs in BH that

21 you referred to in this meeting is the Variant A and B instructions ;

22 correct?

23 A. Yes, it's correct that it says so in the minutes. But I was

24 obliged to inform everybody with any document that arrived.

25 However, the Crisis Staffs are a legal category, and there is no

Page 46850

1 dilemma about that. The War Presidencies are constitutional category.

2 And I did say what the basis was for this to our members. Membership in

3 the Crisis Staff is regulated by law, by Article 67 of the Law on All

4 People's Defence, which states precisely who would become a member of the

5 Crisis Staff. By virtue of their function here, they're just mentioned

6 by their names: Deputy, chairman, and so on. Only names are added, but

7 everything is regulated by laws, and there's no need for any other papers

8 or any instructions. Everything is already there. I think the deputy

9 brought it, and I was obliged to inform everybody that this instruction

10 exists, and that this will be something that will be done in all our

11 neighbouring municipalities, and we, ourselves, also had our own

12 municipality and our own, organs and we would implement it there.

13 Q. And the document says:

14 "And in accordance with the said instruction," which you've

15 agreed is the Variant A and B instruction, you proposed the establishment

16 of a Crisis Staff. This was followed by establishment of the

17 Crisis Staff.

18 Now that reflects the municipal leadership, SDS leadership

19 establishing a Crisis Staff in Bosanska Krupa pursuant to the Variant A

20 and B instructions; correct?

21 A. I don't see anywhere that it says Variant A and B. Therefore,

22 there is no Variant A and B.

23 The regulations regulated the forming of the Crisis Staffs. We

24 just used the document that arrived for information purposes only. We

25 would have done this without it as well because it's not binding.

Page 46851

1 Secondly, at the time the situation in our area became critical.

2 Had we needed it, we would have formed the Crisis Staff even earlier, but

3 we believed that we would overcome the situation in talks with our

4 partners in the SDA and that we would not be needing a Crisis Staff at

5 all.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender this document.

7 And I'd like 65 ter 26007, please.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

9 THE REGISTRAR: It receives exhibit number P6661, Your Honours.

10 MS. GUSTAFSON: And if we could have page 30 of the English and

11 page 27 of the B/C/S of this document, please.

12 Q. Now, Mr. Klickovic, the document coming up now is a part of the

13 interview you gave to the Office of the Prosecution in 2003. And I'd

14 like to direct your attention to the bottom of your page in your

15 language. It's the middle of the page in the English. Where you are

16 asked about the very document we just saw, which has the reference number

17 0091-4271.

18 And you're asked: "You are familiar with this document? Do you

19 remember it?"

20 And you say: "I remember the content of the document and that,

21 so that's the -- you know, the least problem. I remember the content

22 because it was the result of the instructions."

23 And then the investigator describes the document and says: "It

24 states that the Crisis Staff is actually being set up. Do you agree with

25 that?"

Page 46852

1 And you answer: "Yes."

2 Now, again, your reference here to the instructions is a

3 reference to the Variant A and B instructions; correct?

4 A. Again, in this statement also - which was given a long time ago -

5 the Variant A and B document is not mentioned. The law does not

6 recognise Variant A and B, and that is why I never mentioned Variant A

7 and B.

8 I simply spoke about the instruction before the investigative

9 organs because I was forced to do so because they did not even want to

10 hear that there were constitutional and legal regulations on this matter.

11 I tried to explain how the instruction came about. However, no one was

12 interested. I said in the beginning that the instruction is a very

13 strange document and that somebody misused it to substantial degree.

14 Q. If we could go to the next page in both languages.

15 You said no one was interested in hearing your reasons about the

16 creation of the Crisis Staff.

17 On this page, at the top in the English, and in the middle in the

18 B/C/S, you were asked: "Right. And the reason for that creation of this

19 Crisis Staff was what?"

20 And you said: "The situation at the time in the area, the

21 instructions that came from the SDS party, and also the results of the

22 events of events that went on in the second paragraph of October."

23 You refer to the plebiscite, the memorandum on independence.

24 And then you say: "So those -- all those events resulted in

25 these instructions. Both -- they came from both the president of the

Page 46853

1 party and the executive body of the party."

2 Now, here, Mr. Klickovic, you were asked directly why the

3 Crisis Staff was created. You do not refer to the Law on All People's

4 Defence in any manner whatsoever. You refer to the instructions that

5 came from the president and the executive body of the party, and that is

6 a reference to the Variant A and B instructions, isn't it?

7 A. Again, I do not refer to Variant A and B.

8 And, secondly, I said that reference to any kind of rule or law

9 before any prosecutor's office meant nothing. They kept going back to

10 instructions, Variant A and B. It's correct that I said that the Crisis

11 Staff was formed because of the situation in the field and because of the

12 instructions that came from the top, in order to prevent an escalation of

13 the conflict because of certain minor things and other things that were

14 happening. Because I said that it was these instructions that were a

15 limiting factor in terms of the conflict. And if I remember correctly, I

16 said that here as well to an investigator of The Hague Tribunal, that the

17 situation in the field was such that the time of crisis had already

18 arrived.

19 However, during a crisis, during -- Crisis Staffs are formed

20 pursuant to the relevant laws.

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... we saw a moment ago that you

22 created a Crisis Staff in Bosanska Krupa on the 24th of December, 1991.

23 That is, four days after the Variant A and B instructions were issued.

24 We see here in your previous interview that you said the Crisis Staff was

25 created pursuant to instructions that came from the president and the

Page 46854

1 executive body of the party.

2 If you are not talking about the Variant A and B instructions,

3 what are -- instructions are you talking about?

4 A. I did not talk about Variant A and B. I do not intend to talk

5 about them, and I'm not interested about them. I'm talking about the

6 legal organ, which is based on key legal organs in force at the time.

7 The Crisis Staff is an institution which, during times of crisis, has the

8 task of restoring the original situation, or resolving a situation, if

9 the situation begins to escalate out of control.

10 Why are we talking about the 24th? I could have formed the

11 Crisis Staff on the 19th in the evening. I could have done it as soon as

12 I arrived. However, there are activities of the Crisis Staff in

13 Bosanska Krupa before the 19th. We need to find the date on when the

14 order of evacuation was issued, or the order on the transfer of

15 endangered Serb citizens from the left to the right bank. And then you

16 will see that without a Crisis Staff being named, it was actually doing

17 its work.

18 So this cannot be connected in any way to the paper that I

19 received from the party because, as I said, even today, that paper means

20 nothing to me.

21 MS. GUSTAFSON: I tender these two pages of the interview.

22 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll admit it.

23 THE REGISTRAR: It receives exhibit number P6662, Your Honours.

24 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I cannot find in the Serbian

Page 46855

1 version what the Prosecutor said about something coming from the

2 president. There is no coming from the president in the Serbian version.

3 Perhaps we can look at the document again, both in Serbian and in

4 English.

5 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

6 MS. GUSTAFSON: I see in the middle -- at line 20... my B/C/S is

7 basically non-existent. But there appears to be a line -- a reference to

8 the president of the SDS in line 21 of the B/C/S.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please ask the original to

10 be read so that the interpreter could translate it.

11 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

12 Yes, Mr. Klickovic. Could you read out your words there so that

13 we can hear the translation.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You mean "GK, 16? The current

15 situation," is that what I'm supposed to read?

16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "The current situation in that area

18 and the instructions that came from the Serbian Democratic Party as a

19 consequence of events from the second half of October, the plebiscite of

20 the Serbian people, as a reaction to the declaration of independence or,

21 rather, the initiative to the memorandum..."

22 The initiative of the memorandum had not been clarified yet.

23 And then: "Following that course of events," this activity came,

24 meaning "instructions from the party level and representatives of the SDS

25 in executive organs of the joint power."

Page 46856

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 11, "predstavnik,"

2 "representative," was turned into "predsjednik," "president."

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

4 MS. GUSTAFSON: If I could just clarify -- this is the usual

5 situation with interviews where it is not a translation but it's two

6 transcriptions of what is happening simultaneously in two languages, so

7 sometimes the transcripts aren't verbatim.

8 I note the time, if Your Honours wish to break.

9 JUDGE KWON: We'll adjourn for today and resume tomorrow at 9.00.

10 Mr. Klickovic, I'd like to advise you not to discuss about your

11 testimony with anybody else while you are giving testimony here.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand.

13 JUDGE KWON: Hearing is adjourned.

14 [The witness stands down]

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.51 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of

17 February, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.