140214IT

Page 47079

1 Yes, Mr. Robinson.

2 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. On the subject of scheduling,

3 I just wanted to advise the Chamber that, as you've instructed, we have

4 waited until the end of our case before making bar table motions, but we

5 will be making some. So if you wish to set any dead-lines for those, it

6 would be helpful to know those as far in advance as possible, but we will

7 be working on those as we go along and after the testimony of

8 Dr. Karadzic concludes.

9 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber will come back to this issue. Thank

10 you.

11 Shall we bring in the witness.

12 [The witness takes the stand]

13 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, Mr. Jurisic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE KWON: We'll continue with your cross-examination.

16 Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

18 WITNESS: SLOBODAN JURISIC [Resumed]

19 [Witness answered through interpreter]

20 Cross-examination by Ms. Edgerton: [Continued]

21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Jurisic.

22 A. Good morning, Madam Prosecutor.

23 Q. Mr. Jurisic, in your written evidence you, I noted, said that

24 while the Muslims in Kljuc were being mopped up and disarmed by the

25 police and the army, there were some renegades who you said were out of

Page 47080

1 control, who were killing them at Velagici and plundering their homes and

2 destroying their property. And I want to ask you about that. But I want

3 to talk first about Velagici. Actually, you know who the perpetrators

4 are of the massacre at Velagici, don't you?

5 A. The day after this happened at Velagici, I found out in the

6 office of the president of the municipality, I heard the officers talking

7 about a crime that had been committed. I didn't know what had happened

8 at the time. However, when I heard that the military police would go and

9 arrest someone, later on it became apparent that the military police

10 identified two or three rogue soldiers who committed the crime. I know

11 that the investigating judge drafted a record and that the military

12 police took these two into custody in the Banja Luka detention facility.

13 They were subsequently released - I don't know how this came about - into

14 the 7th Kupres Motorised Brigade and they stayed in that brigade. This

15 was the extent of my knowledge. I only came to learn more of these

16 details later. I didn't know the real truth at the time. What I do know

17 is that the four of them were investigated and interviewed and detained

18 in the military remand prison in Banja Luka.

19 Q. And you also know, as you've just said, they were released, they

20 were never prosecuted; right? They weren't prosecuted until after the

21 end of the war?

22 A. They were released and assigned to the 7th Kupres Brigade. It

23 was only based on some reports and records that I saw that they were

24 there and that they stayed there until the end of the war, although they

25 were re-assigned to other units. However, they were not detained or

Page 47081

1 tried after that first instance when they were taken into custody in the

2 Banja Luka prison.

3 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, did you say something?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Excellencies, in line 18, I'd

5 like to know where this comes from, what's the reference for the fact

6 that they were never prosecuted?

7 JUDGE KWON: She asked -- she supplemented, they weren't

8 prosecuted until after the end of the war.

9 Shall we continue.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

11 Could we have a look, please, at P3616.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, there's a difference.

13 It's not true that they were not prosecuted. If -- they may not have

14 been put at trial until the end of the war, but it's not that a decision

15 was made not to prosecute them.

16 JUDGE KWON: That is beyond the intervention for the purpose of

17 cross-examination. The witness sufficiently understood the question. I

18 think we can continue.

19 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

20 Q. Mr. Jurisic, this document is from the military prosecutor's

21 office at the 1st Krajina Corps command, and it's dated 29 July 1993.

22 And this is the document -- and this document says that proceedings

23 against the suspects began in 1993 but were terminated. And the very

24 last sentence of the largest paragraph says that one of the reasons they

25 were terminated is "because of the stance of the deputy prime minister of

Page 47082

1 the Republika Srpska and the chairman of the Kljuc Municipality Executive

2 Committee ..."

3 So, Mr. Jurisic, this document shows that the prosecutions --

4 that the municipal authorities of your municipality were making sure

5 those prosecutions never happened; right?

6 A. I can only confirm for you that I didn't hear anything about this

7 from any of the official organs. After this happened, no meetings were

8 convened or anything of the sort. These were stories that circulated in

9 the municipality. I cannot claim that somebody was directly in favour of

10 this. I can only tell you that those of us municipal officials were not

11 aware of the fact that their release was being sought. I don't know how

12 anyone from the Executive Board could have -- we didn't even have a

13 president of the Executive Board. We only have -- had a vice-president

14 who was acting president. He was the vice-president to the previous

15 president who wasn't there anymore. I don't know if anybody talked to

16 the military. I can't deny it or confirm it. I know that they were

17 released, and that's the only thing I know. I don't know what followed.

18 I know that the perpetrators stayed within the Kupres Brigade until

19 further notice.

20 Q. Thank you --

21 A. Nobody informed us of the fact that there had been an

22 intervention to release them. My general impression of the whole affair

23 was that the municipal authorities and others, when it came to these

24 individuals who meted out their own justice, wanted to have them isolated

25 because they were a threat to the citizens of Kljuc no matter what their

Page 47083

1 ethnicity.

2 Q. All right. Let's go on then, given what you've just said about

3 the municipal authorities. Mr. Jurisic, we've got the log-books for the

4 Kljuc basic prosecutor's office from 1992 right through to 1995. And I'm

5 going to call them up, they're 65 ter number 26009, and we're going to

6 have to go to Sanction to have a look at these. And if you want to see a

7 paper copy, I can give you one, but the handwriting is pretty small and

8 you might need some kind of magnification, but I've got one for you if

9 you like.

10 Now, what you've got in front of you, Mr. Jurisic, is the

11 log-book for 1992 and we're going to look, first of all, at pages --

12 page 5 of this log-book which covers entries from 27 May to the

13 1st of June of 1992. And I've had a detailed look at this. First of

14 all, Mr. Jurisic, there's no criminal report submitted between the

15 1st of May and the 30th of June, so I just want to show you the type of

16 thing that did get submitted.

17 I want to go to entry number 50, it's about halfway down the page

18 and that shows that there was a criminal report filed against a Serb by

19 the name of Milan Radakovic for violation of Article 129 of the criminal

20 code in force. And I had a look at what that is, that is illicit

21 commerce. Let's go down to entry 51, that's the 30th of June, that's a

22 criminal report against two Serbs for aggravated theft. And we'll go

23 down to 52, 53, and 54 in succession. The next one dated June 30th is a

24 criminal report against a Muslim --

25 JUDGE KWON: But I'm not sure the witness can follow. Can he

Page 47084

1 read this?

2 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I could magnify it, but it

3 becomes -- the image becomes pixelated, but I could absolutely give him

4 the hard copy that I have beside me.

5 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could the Defence have a hard copy

7 as well so that we may follow.

8 JUDGE KWON: I hope Mr. Sladojevic could teach you how to upload

9 in your e-court.

10 Shall we continue.

11 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

12 Q. Now, we were at entry number 52, it's a report of an allegation

13 of fraud against a Muslim passing a bad cheque, I think. Entry number

14 53, that's another violation against a Muslim for fraud dated June 30th.

15 And the final one, entry 54, also June 30th, is a violation against a

16 Serb individual for grave offences against the safety of public

17 transport. And then when you've had a chance to look at that I want to

18 go over to the next page.

19 I want to go over to entry 57 on the next page, which is page 7

20 of 65 ter number 26009. And there you see an entry dated 16 July 1992

21 against a Muslim for a murder that happened in April of that year and he

22 sentenced to 20 years in jail. And entry number 63, dated September 4th,

23 shows a report against two Muslims for destruction of prominent

24 production facilities, in this case something belonging to Banja Luka TV.

25 And in November they were sentenced eventually to seven years in prison.

Page 47085

1 There were no criminal reports in this book submitted also around

2 the 10th of July, 1992. In fact, there's not a single criminal report in

3 this log-book that shows anyone was ever prosecuted in Kljuc for the

4 looting or the arson or the killings you discussed. No one was ever

5 brought to court.

6 Now, my question to you is: Being in the function that you were,

7 meeting with the people that you did - and we talked about those at the

8 beginning of your testimony yesterday - being present at

9 Municipal Assembly meetings throughout the course of the war, you would

10 know that, wouldn't you? You'd be able to confirm this, no one was ever

11 prosecuted for the torching, for the destruction, for the arson, for the

12 killings?

13 A. I didn't have any direct influence to wield in this, nor was I

14 able to follow from this register you've shown to me. I only know one

15 person, Radenko Kuburic, I don't know under which number I saw him, under

16 54, page 1. Page 1, number 54. As for the others against whom criminal

17 reports were filed, I can tell that all of them were Muslims. In what

18 way the prosecutor worked and what sort of offences were committed, well,

19 obviously there was arson and looting by these rogue groups. I don't

20 know what was within the police's power to do. The only thing I can

21 conclude from this is that reports were filed against one side only and

22 that's the Muslim side. It's very difficult for me to speak about the

23 specific case because I really don't have any knowledge about the people

24 or the offences committed. This was within the purview of the police to

25 attend the scenes. I wasn't able to follow that.

Page 47086

1 Q. All right. The system was working, though, wasn't it? That's

2 what this also shows. The prosecutor's office was working.

3 A. Well, the prosecutor's office was working, but it all depends -

4 well, the way I see it - how the police worked, how many crimes did they

5 uncover, how could they sanction this legally.

6 Q. So let's get back to the original question I asked you which you

7 didn't answer. You can confirm that there were no prosecutions for the

8 arsons, the destructions, the looting, and the killing that you talked

9 about. You would know that because of your position in the municipality;

10 right?

11 A. I could only hear of individual things, things that were done by

12 individuals, but I did not receive any reports from the ground because

13 that was not within my domain of work, all of these things that were

14 happening. Because as far as I know, what was always insisted upon was

15 that these perpetrators should be prosecuted and punished. Now, what the

16 prosecutor's office did was completely apart from my line of work. Only

17 when there were some characteristic cases, when there were reports from

18 the police, if it was something big. But I really cannot give a precise

19 answer to this. I cannot say. Because there were such cases all over,

20 so I didn't even know all these perpetrators so I cannot have a relevant

21 opinion in this regard.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have --

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But --

24 MS. EDGERTON:

25 Q. Just, please, Mr. Jurisic. I try not to interrupt you. Please

Page 47087

1 don't interrupt me. I really do try not to interrupt you.

2 MS. EDGERTON: Could I have 65 ter number 26009 as a --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm sorry.

4 MS. EDGERTON: -- Prosecution exhibit, please, Your Honours, and

5 what I would propose to do is translate the entries that we've referred

6 to.

7 MR. ROBINSON: Objection, Mr. President. I don't believe that

8 this witness is a proper witness who can lay a foundation for this

9 document. He's had nothing to do with the courts or the police, and as

10 we saw yesterday with the witness, without giving much detail in public

11 session, documents shown by Dr. Karadzic appeared which were not shown on

12 a log like this. So it's not -- we don't believe it's proper for the

13 Prosecution to produce this kind of document with this witness who has no

14 connection to it.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: Well, Your Honour, the connection is not really an

17 authentication issue, which isn't an issue here. The real issue or the

18 reason why this is relevant and being tendered is that not only is the

19 witness being impeached by it, but in fact, Your Honours, the witness

20 confirmed he recognised the name of one of the individuals who was listed

21 on this document, made comments about what the document shows, and

22 specifically recalled or, pardon me, generally recalled some of the

23 circumstances of the handling of these cases from his involvement in the

24 municipal organs of that time. I think he's established an excellent

25 foundation for its admission.

Page 47088

1 [Trial Chamber confers]

2 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber is of the view that the witness is not

3 in a position to make any comments on these items except the one he

4 identified, i.e., Radenko Kuburic. So we'll admit that part, but

5 otherwise we'll not admit the others.

6 We'll assign a number being marked for identification.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour that will be MFI P6671.

8 JUDGE KWON: And further, your purpose of impeachment has been

9 accomplished by putting the questions to the witness and hearing the

10 witness's answer.

11 Please continue.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Yes, thank you.

13 Q. And, Mr. Jurisic, you talked about the intentions of the

14 municipal authorities in one of your answers to me, saying that you and

15 the municipal authorities insisted that the perpetrator should be

16 prosecuted and punished. And I'd like to show you in that regard another

17 document, 1D -- pardon me, D1738.

18 Now, this, Mr. Jurisic, is a report to the 1 KK command dated

19 16 February 1993 on the situation in Kljuc, and it's based on a meeting

20 that you attended along with Mr. Banjac and Mr. Kondic and Mr. Kalabic.

21 And I'd like to go over to page 2 in both languages of this document, and

22 in B/C/S I think the paragraph is -- the relevant paragraph, you'll find

23 it at the second-to-last full paragraph from the bottom. It says,

24 talking about the events at the onset of the war, it says:

25 "Individuals and small and large groups of people began illegally

Page 47089

1 appropriating Muslim property in Muslim villages and hamlets during

2 combat operations in the local communes of Velagici, Sanica, Humici, and

3 Peci, and continued to do so when operations ended. This was done by

4 military personnel, members of the police, and local Serbs ..."

5 So what this document shows is that everybody knew who was doing

6 it; right? Yes or no?

7 A. I think that the police organs and the military security organs

8 that were in that area could identify those perpetrators. I don't know

9 to what extent this would have -- well, according to this report and some

10 of the things that I managed to hear in Kljuc from the people there, such

11 things did happen, yes, they did happen. Now, did the army do that? I

12 think the army had other tasks, the police too. However, certain

13 individuals, renegades, took every opportunity to get into that area that

14 was not covered and probably there was some looting.

15 Q. All right. Let's go down further in this document to page 3, the

16 second paragraph -- actually, the fifth paragraph on page 3 in both

17 languages.

18 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence for a moment.

19 Q. Now, actually, we'll start at the second paragraph. This says,

20 Mr. Jurisic -- this talks about the incidents that we're discussing --

21 second full paragraph, pardon me. This mentions that, apart from issuing

22 a decision taking appropriated property on to the state and into the

23 state coffers, it says: Nothing was done to prevent further acts of

24 unlawful appropriation of the property which had been proclaimed as state

25 owned.

Page 47090

1 And then if we skip down to paragraph number 5, it talks about

2 people driving luxury cars and tractors and trailers, and the last

3 sentence of paragraph 5 says:

4 "These and other acts are being committed in full view of those

5 who are supposed to stop and prevent them and this in full co-ordinated

6 action and co-operation of the military and civilian police."

7 So the fact is, Mr. Jurisic, completely contrary to what you say,

8 people were looting and pillaging in a climate of complete impunity and

9 there was no intention on the part of Kljuc municipal authorities to

10 punish anyone because even by February 1993 it was happening under your

11 nose and you weren't doing anything about it. That's what was actually

12 going on, wasn't it?

13 A. I just know that at all meetings, starting from the Crisis Staff

14 and the Executive Board and so on, that what was always insisted upon was

15 that police was supposed to provide protection for 24 hours a day,

16 around-the-clock, for the Muslim and Croatian population. At first there

17 was some very good results achieved there for as long as the police could

18 do it around-the-clock. I remember at Biljansko Polje immediately when

19 the operation started - and this was rather characteristic so I remember

20 the name - Bogdan Skrbic was killed during the night during a looting,

21 but the police complained and said that it was very hard to prevent. And

22 I did not deny that this kind of thing did happen, but I claim that in

23 spite of all these efforts made to have the police and army prevent the

24 looting of property this did happen nevertheless. Now, how many measures

25 were taken against these people, I cannot say. I know that there was

Page 47091

1 looted property that was then taken back on roads, but obviously all of

2 this could not have been prevented. I'm absolutely not denying that this

3 kind of thing did happen. I'm not denying that that happened. To what

4 extent and who fared how, I really have no insight. I heard this

5 information briefly at meetings, and the police probably knew what was

6 happening there.

7 Q. I'll just ask you -- before I ask you one more question.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Your Honours, I'm approaching my time, which I

9 understood to be an hour and a half. And I feel I may, although I'm

10 usually quite diligent, leak over that by about another ten minutes and I

11 just wanted to foreshadow that with your leave, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE KWON: The Chamber has no difficulty with it. Please

13 continue.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

15 Q. Mr. Jurisic, you were a member of an organ that you said yourself

16 yesterday was the highest organ of authority in the municipality. It

17 would have been the simplest thing for you to ensure the rule of law was

18 enforced in Kljuc and the Crisis Staff didn't do that, did they?

19 A. Attempts to do that and to have public law and order did exist,

20 and that was done very responsibly but it could not have been carried

21 through completely. In Kljuc there were soldiers and all sorts of people

22 that nobody knew. They came from all sorts of places and to place them

23 all under control, that was very difficult. It would have suited us in

24 Kljuc the best to have public law and order, but often things did not

25 happen the way we would have wanted them to happen.

Page 47092

1 Q. You said now in your written evidence that you never heard anyone

2 order, plan, or investigate -- or, pardon me, instigate the expulsion of

3 non-Serbs from Kljuc. And I actually want to show you a different

4 document now in that regard.

5 MS. EDGERTON: P2641. That's not it. Let me check the number

6 that I was looking for.

7 JUDGE KWON: This is 4621 but you said 264.

8 MS. EDGERTON: I'm in complete sympathy. Transposing numbers is

9 something I do myself more often than I like.

10 Q. This document, Mr. Jurisic, is conclusions from a subregional

11 meeting of political representatives of municipalities -- the Serbian

12 municipalities of Bihac, Bosanski Petrovac, Srpska Krupa, Sanski Most,

13 Prijedor, Bosanski Novi, and Kljuc, your municipality, and it's dated

14 7 June 1992.

15 I'd like us to go over to paragraph 6, please, and that's on

16 page 2 in both languages.

17 Paragraph 6 reads that:

18 "All seven municipalities," the ones that I've just named, in

19 their "subregion agree that Muslims and Croats should move out ... until

20 a level is reached where Serbian authority can be maintained and

21 implemented on its own territory in each of these municipalities ..."

22 That's a plan to move non-Serbs from Kljuc, isn't it?

23 A. I don't know about this at all. This is the first time that I

24 see this. I'm not a member of any of that. I was not present anywhere.

25 Nobody showed us anything, and I claim with full responsibility that this

Page 47093

1 is the first time I see all of this. Who took part in this, I cannot

2 say.

3 Q. Right. That actually doesn't answer my question, but I'll ask

4 you -- I'll move on. So I'm a bit surprised because it was your job as

5 Secretary of National Defence to approve the departure of people from

6 Kljuc. And you're saying you don't know anything about this document or

7 this plan?

8 A. I don't know of anyone adopting such a plan. I had no

9 opportunity of seeing that or being present, especially this meeting,

10 some region. I never had the opportunity of attending any such thing.

11 Q. Well, now since it was your job to approve departure, I want to

12 ask you a couple more questions. Your evidence is that -- or actually,

13 when we finished off yesterday in your testimony in chief you talked

14 about fear in the population and that's exactly right. Non-Serbs in

15 Kljuc in the summer of 1992 were scared, weren't they?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Some people had lost their jobs. Some people had been arrested.

18 Some locations -- villages had been attacked. There was rampant crime,

19 in your own words, so that people weren't safe inside their own homes.

20 That would wipe away anybody's sense of safety and security, wouldn't it?

21 A. Certainly. I said yesterday and I'm saying today, these are

22 these terrible things that happen in war time, renegades, especially in

23 areas that are outside urban areas that are difficult to control. The

24 police went even during the night to secure these places. It was very

25 hard. All sorts of things happened. It would be unfair to say the

Page 47094

1 people did not live in fear. I can say here with full responsibility

2 that persons who were not non-Serbs also had such problems. There were

3 attacks against people, property, all kinds of revenge. So the situation

4 was highly complex.

5 Q. So let's talk about the non-Serbs for a minute. Based on what

6 you've said and what you said in your written evidence, they left because

7 they had no other real choice, did they? Because they had been subject

8 to systematic crimes, they felt they were at risk of crimes, and they

9 could have no confidence that the authorities were going to protect them,

10 that's why they left; right?

11 A. Well, people left primarily for these reasons of safety and

12 security because they saw that there was a war-time situation there, that

13 it was difficult. Also, people were jobless, they could not earn a

14 living, it was very hard to protect one's property. So people found a

15 way out by leaving that territory and finding other places where they

16 could live better. At the time I heard that there was -- well, let me

17 not call it guess-work, but let's say forecasts, namely that people of

18 Muslim ethnicity had received signals from their authorities. That's

19 what people were saying at least, that it would be best to leave all of

20 that until some other conditions were created. I don't know what that

21 was, but it became very massive.

22 Q. Now, on top of those people who -- those non-Serbs who hadn't

23 been killed and hadn't been arrested and wanted to leave who -- who came

24 to you, they had to get a permit and sign a statement that they were

25 leaving forever to get that permission; right?

Page 47095

1 A. This permit that we gave, that was just keeping records as to who

2 was leaving and also that such persons could have guarantees that they

3 reported to the military organ so that they could cross at all the

4 check-points that they would come across in Republika Srpska. This

5 permit was not only given to ethnic Muslims and ethnic Croats, but also

6 to ethnic Serbs if they would leave the area of the municipality --

7 Q. So --

8 A. -- we did not have people signing any kind of certificates about

9 handing over property or leaving on a permanent basis.

10 Q. So you're saying, so you're saying, that in order to get a permit

11 to leave, the non-Serbs of Kljuc didn't have to sign any documents; is

12 that what you're saying?

13 A. As far as we're concerned, I claim with full responsibility that

14 they didn't have to sign any documents whatsoever, those stating that

15 they were leaving their property or that they were leaving for good. The

16 only thing I did hear there was, I don't know, at some meetings, that at

17 the Crisis Staff of this ARK Krajina there was some document that arrived

18 from there about handing over property. But people who were trained

19 lawyers and who were well-versed said that that was impossible to carry

20 out because there was very little time. Also, the courts of law couldn't

21 deal with that and just to take one's word for that wouldn't mean a

22 thing. It just needed -- it was just necessary to keep records so that

23 the procedure would be very short and the people could have no problems

24 when going through check-points that were under police control and there

25 were quite a few of those because each and every municipality had them.

Page 47096

1 Q. So based on what you say, can I understand that so long as

2 non-Serbs said that they were leaving forever or giving their property to

3 the municipality, they were allowed to go; is that right?

4 A. Nobody asked them, as far as we were concerned, either to hand

5 over their property or to leave on a permanent basis. They wanted to

6 leave. Where they would go, how long they would stay, whatever. As for

7 property, as far as I know, there were possibilities of exchanges. I

8 know that people made these fictitious contracts. They wanted their

9 property to be guarded. I know there were exchanges for houses along the

10 seacoast, Pag and other places. However, the important thing for us was

11 to know whether people were going and whether their property was

12 remaining there so that we could protect it.

13 Q. Let's just have a look at one document and then I'll close,

14 that's P3462.

15 Right. Mr. Jurisic, this is a decision of the Kljuc

16 War Presidency that you were a member of of 30 July 1992 and this says,

17 under Article 1 that:

18 "... families and persons who issue a statement to the

19 appropriate organ ... declaring that they are moving permanently from the

20 territory of ... the municipality, shall be permitted to leave ..."

21 And if you go on to Article 2, that says if they haven't signed

22 their property over to the municipality or exchanged it with Serbs within

23 three months of leaving, the municipality is going to take it away

24 anyway. So --

25 MS. EDGERTON: And we can go over actually to the second page of

Page 47097

1 the document in both languages. Article -- sorry, we can stay on page 1

2 in B/C/S -- no, we are on the right page in B/C/S.

3 Q. Article 7 of this document says:

4 "On the basis of a state of voluntary moving ... from the

5 municipality or a legally valid contract," an exchange contract, "the

6 National Defence Secretariat," that's you, "shall grant ... agreement to

7 leave ... Kljuc ..."

8 So this is a contemporaneous document that says exactly what you

9 have just denied to us. People had to sign a statement, non-Serbs had to

10 sign a statement that they were leaving forever and give their property

11 to the municipality. There was nothing voluntary about it, wasn't there?

12 A. I repeat, as far as we were concerned, we did not ask for any

13 kind of proof about the hand-over of property or anything else. Any

14 citizen who said they wanted to move out would receive this permit in

15 order to be able to cross the check-points. We were not authorised to

16 carry out any kind of signing about the hand-over of somebody's property

17 or an exchange or there was no time-limitation. We would issue permits

18 to move outside of the municipality to Serbs as well who were leaving and

19 going to some other municipality, so that we would know where they were

20 moving.

21 We didn't ask for any certificates, we didn't receive any, I

22 don't know who could have asked for such a certificate. All I'm saying

23 is that if somebody came to the Crisis Staff to ask that, that was so.

24 We just wanted to have a record of all the property so that we would know

25 how many people left so that we could preserve what we could. In more

Page 47098

1 urban areas such as Kljuc and Sanica, this property to a great extent was

2 preserved, but there was no torching or any major destruction of the

3 buildings. There was more destruction of buildings in the rural, village

4 areas.

5 I am repeating this. I cannot say anything else. We -- there

6 was no certificate involved. A person would come, say: I'm going to

7 such and such a place, and we would issue a permit so that he would be

8 free to move. It was up to him what he would do with his house. We just

9 wanted to have a record that he handed over the property or that he was

10 leaving it behind or that he exchanged it, although that was not the

11 topic of our work, regardless of what he wrote. It does not have to --

12 it doesn't have to mean that the people in the Presidency and in the

13 Crisis Staff knew the regulations very well and were aware of what they

14 had to do.

15 Q. And have we just heard your defence to the allegations of forced

16 transfer and deportation that your facing in front of the state court in

17 Bosnia in the investigation against you? Is that your defence?

18 A. I don't know. I did not take part in any forcible transfer or in

19 any decisions on that matter. That was not my job by far, and that is

20 something that I would not have wished to have done anyway.

21 Q. Nothing further. Thank you.

22 THE ACCUSED: Could this document remain in the e-court.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.

25 Good morning to everyone.

Page 47099

1 Re-examination by Mr. Karadzic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Jurisic, good morning.

3 A. Good morning.

4 Q. Are you able to tell us if you know the signature of the late

5 Jovo Banjac and is this his signature?

6 A. Yes, I do recognise his signature, but I don't see where you are

7 showing it to me.

8 Q. It's the right half of the screen in Serbian.

9 A. Oh, you mean this document that we're seeing right now, that the

10 Madam Prosecutor was reading from to me just now?

11 Q. Yes. But I'm just pausing between question and answer and I

12 kindly ask you that you do the same.

13 JUDGE KWON: Shall we zoom in. Just the signature part.

14 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Did you ever see Banjac's signature and is this it?

16 A. I saw it a number of times, but this is very indistinct. I

17 cannot really see it very well or it's a bad copy, but from what I can

18 see this is not his. I've already seen this -- I've already seen his

19 characteristic JB in some documents and this is a little bit -- I don't

20 know. I'm not certain.

21 Q. Thank you. Are you able to tell us about the register where you

22 were shown that the criminal charges and acts from January, February,

23 March were submitted at that time? When did the Velagici crime actually

24 take place?

25 A. The crime in Velagici occurred on the 28th of September -- the

Page 47100

1 28th of June, in 1992.

2 Q. The end of June or May. And when would this then be expected to

3 be recorded in the register, then, if we're looking at the cases from

4 March?

5 A. I don't understand. How what should be?

6 Q. All right. I withdraw the question. Tell me, are you aware that

7 proceedings were suspended and that the charges were dropped?

8 A. Of the perpetrators?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. No, I'm not aware that the charges were dropped or that it was

11 suspended. I received some information later that those guys who

12 committed the deed in Velagici were interviewed at the military

13 prosecutor's office in Banja Luka and that they were released to go to

14 the war unit. There were such requests like that and that the actual

15 court proceedings would continue when conditions for that were created,

16 because all the required statements were actually collected or taken by

17 the military prosecutor's office.

18 Q. All right. Thank you. Mr. Jurisic, the Muslims who remained in

19 Kljuc, did they feel safe enough to come to the police and to report any

20 crimes that they were victims of?

21 A. From what I could see, I mostly saw people who lived in Kljuc and

22 its environs, and most of them remained in the areas around Kljuc. There

23 was some five or six suburban areas that belonged to Kljuc, and those

24 people felt more comfortable and more at ease. I remember that they

25 reported even minor details, robberies, attempts, and -- until I saw this

Page 47101

1 in these proceedings here, I was surprised because I thought that that

2 area was very well -- very nicely preserved from destruction and killing

3 and anything else like that. And I think that people were in contact

4 every day in merchants' shops, then they would come back, I would see

5 them at the market on Saturday, and the organs that were functioning were

6 coming to work normally. Particularly where I was, I think the doors

7 were open to all the citizens of Kljuc, just like that -- it was before

8 the war. There were people in Kljuc who were -- who stayed behind,

9 particularly prominent people who were there throughout the war. They

10 socialised with their mates who were there, their colleagues from work,

11 and so on and so forth.

12 Q. When you say more prominent people, who do you mean? Of which

13 ethnicity were these people?

14 A. What I meant to say was more prominent people as we are prone to

15 say today, these were people whom I knew from political life, public life

16 before the war. There were quite a few of them. And as opposed to some

17 others who might have a different opinion on that, regardless of how much

18 somebody would agree with me or disagree with me, these more prominent

19 people in Kljuc were very tolerant, very conciliatory, and they did

20 everything to overcome all the things that were not all right because

21 they knew the horrors of war. And I met these war -- these people

22 throughout the war, during the time that I was there. I could even name

23 these people if necessary. I could mention the names of people who

24 stayed there.

25 Q. Are you able to tell us of which ethnicity these people were?

Page 47102

1 This is what I wanted to know.

2 A. I am speaking exclusively of members of the Muslim ethnic group.

3 There were some Croats as well, but they were not so many of them because

4 before the war, Kljuc had under 1 per cent of such citizens. As for the

5 Muslims, there was just a difference of 1 per cent or something like that

6 there, so that a large number of people stayed in Kljuc. They even

7 remained after we actually all moved out in 1995.

8 Q. Thank you. These villages near the town, the Muslim villages

9 that were preserved, were there any paramilitary units there and was

10 there any fighting there?

11 A. I didn't notice any fighting in those villages. Perhaps some

12 individuals went somewhere towards Pudin Han or somewhere else, but there

13 was no attack on the town, no problems at all. These houses were all

14 mixed together, Muslim and Serb houses. There were no incidents, and

15 ultimately I think that people protected one another, as was right, and

16 prevented from any major damage being inflicted on anyone. And even

17 today when I pass through Kljuc, I see that those houses are practically

18 untouched as if there had been no war. You could notice some things in

19 odd places, but practically it was all untouched.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we show the witness 1D2720.

21 1D27020.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. We don't have a translation, so I would kindly ask you to tell

24 the Trial Chamber what this is briefly and who is reporting whom to the

25 police. 27020. This is the 30th of December, 1992. Are you able to

Page 47103

1 tell us who is the person who is submitting the complaint and can you

2 read the typewritten part where it says what the complaint actually is?

3 JUDGE KWON: Just a second.

4 Let's collapse this document. As Defence objected to the

5 admitting of log-book of Prosecutor's document and then put something --

6 another criminal report to the witness.

7 Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Exactly why I stood on my feet, Your Honours, and

9 on top of that incredibly leading.

10 JUDGE KWON: Yes, could you put your question, Mr. Karadzic, to

11 the witness first.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On page 24, line 5, I asked whether

13 Muslims were free to report to the police any crimes committed against

14 them. And the answer starts on line 8 onwards. And I just wanted to

15 show some documents as examples of the things that were reported to the

16 police by the Muslim citizens. Even Serbs reported Serbs, but I don't

17 know if I'm going to show that.

18 JUDGE KWON: Before putting the question or putting the document,

19 why don't you ask the witness whether he remembers these individuals?

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I don't know whether

21 he can know each individual person. These people came to the public

22 security station, not to him, but he knows about this occurring.

23 JUDGE KWON: You will have another proper opportunity to tender

24 those documents through proper witnesses. I don't think that this

25 witness is capable of commenting on this document. Spend your time more

Page 47104

1 efficiently. It's up to you how to use your time, but as I expressed our

2 concerns, please bear that in mind.

3 Please continue.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then that witness would have

5 to be me because there is no other witness.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Mr. Jurisic, the Prosecution stated that Serb crimes against

8 Muslims were ignored. Do you stand by your assertion that this is not

9 correct and that such crimes were also investigated?

10 A. I stand by the assertion that crimes were investigated and

11 reported. However, in the municipality we were not satisfied with all

12 that was done. We felt that more could have been done because later,

13 regardless of the war and the way this was manifested, any attack on

14 property or house especially in places bordering on Kljuc could have been

15 reported. The police was out in those villages and hamlets and houses

16 very frequently, looking into it. I remember that there were criminal

17 reports, minor theft, embezzlement in Kljuc. I would like to emphasise

18 that there were no excesses in Kljuc, no actions of that kind. There

19 were very few killings, nobody was detained. So I think it was an

20 example in the whole region in comparison to other towns.

21 Q. And what was the situation in the municipality? Did you have

22 enough fighters and other things and where exactly where your fighters?

23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please repeat the last

24 sentence.

25 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters didn't hear the

Page 47105

1 last sentence of your question.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Where were the fighters of the Kljuc municipality? Was there

4 enough manpower in Kljuc sufficient to provide security for all?

5 A. We were engaged on three fairly large fronts. Our forces were

6 drawn out. There was the Kupres front, where we gave a battalion to the

7 7th Kupres Brigade in August 1992. The complete brigade of the

8 17th Light Infantry Brigade went to the Jajce front. The engineering

9 regiment that we also had to man was engaged at Laniste, it went from

10 unit to unit where it was supposed to carry out its tasks. However,

11 because of a shortage of men at the lines, a lot of civilian police

12 officers were engaged in these war units, combat units, so that there

13 wasn't always a sufficient number of policemen that could efficiently

14 keep everything under control.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at 65 ter 18431,

17 please. 18431. I'm probably going to tender these criminal reports from

18 the bar table.

19 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Can you look at this, please. This is the 22nd of August, 1992,

21 it's already the War Presidency, and it says that the combat

22 operations around Kljuc -- actually, due to the war operations linked to

23 the Jajce municipality, the security situation in the area of Kljuc

24 municipality has been significantly worsened. And then in the next

25 paragraph it says:

Page 47106

1 "A large number of people from the area of Kljuc municipality

2 have been engaged in the war units, so the area of the municipality has

3 been literally unprotected from all sorts of incidents that could arise

4 at any given moment. We are absolutely unable to provide for protection

5 to any prisoner of war," and so on and so forth.

6 So how did this situation reflect as far as you were concerned --

7 JUDGE KWON: Please read slow.

8 Yes, please answer the question.

9 No, I told Mr. Karadzic to read slow when he reads from the

10 document. Now can you answer the question?

11 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. How did this, what was read in this paragraph, correspond to what

13 you knew about the security situation and the security forces that was

14 supposed to provide security?

15 A. I know that the bulk of the police and military forces were

16 engaged in surrounding fronts, and if this is the estimate of the

17 military police and the army that this was insufficient, then I am really

18 not up to agreeing or disagreeing. I know that they were absent, a large

19 number of people. But as for whether this number was sufficient to keep

20 everything under control, that is up to the authorised organs to make

21 that determination. But I think that the forces were stretched thin at

22 the fronts.

23 Q. Thank you very much.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to tender this

25 document.

Page 47107

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll accept it.

2 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4365, Your Honour.

3 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Jurisic, yesterday you were asked not to say reproachfully

5 why you did this and that in the area of defence. Can you tell us what

6 sort of powers the municipality had when it came to defence and what did

7 you do, if you did anything, that went beyond the remits of the law?

8 A. In view of the developments in Bosnia and the petition that

9 happened, everybody had to do what the majority of the population in a

10 given area asked them to do, where you had an area with a Serb majority

11 or a Muslim majority, you had to keep that in mind. So whatever you did,

12 you were in trouble. One side would insist on you enforcing the law and

13 the other on you not doing exactly that. It was such a situation that no

14 matter who was involved, whether they were president of the republic,

15 whether they were senior officials, everybody felt that they could do

16 things that were above and beyond the law.

17 In the process of mobilisation and the duties incumbent on the

18 Secretariat for National Defence, difficulties began to arise in the

19 month of January when Republika Srpska was proclaimed and when in March

20 the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared. These difficulties

21 came to a head in the month of June, and when it came to mobilising the

22 Territorial Defence we had summoned the entire detachment and the

23 response was good. However, nothing could be done further because the

24 detachment split along the ethnic lines and was dysfunctional. We had

25 the impression that people were somehow advised not to respond to our

Page 47108

1 call-ups. Mr. Asim Egrlic, an SDA official who was also president of the

2 Executive Board, when he was testifying in Sarajevo on one occasion, he

3 confessed that, in September of 1991, they received a message from the

4 head office of the SDA in Sarajevo not to respond to the call-ups. So we

5 were in a paradoxical situation. If the Secretariat for National Defence

6 was the structure that was supposed to have at its disposal all the

7 conscripts, we were in such a situation where the Muslims, in fact,

8 engaged in the recruitment process for the TO and the reserve force of

9 the police but without responding to our call-ups.

10 All of this led us into great difficulties for both sides. We

11 were walking along a very thin line between two sides or else we could

12 side by one of the sides. We had the legislation in force, the JNA

13 wasn't our armed force, and for as long as it was there we respected it.

14 When the VRS was set up, we sided with that --

15 Q. Thank you. Let me ask you this: Did you know what the official

16 insignia was in December of 1992 of our forces?

17 A. Our forces?

18 Q. The army and the police.

19 A. [No interpretation]

20 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the witness's

21 answer.

22 JUDGE KWON: What was your answer, Mr. Jurisic? Could you repeat

23 it.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was I aware of the insignia?

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

Page 47109

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was aware of the insignia

2 because I studied international laws of war, which said that in order for

3 a soldier to have that status, he has to wear a uniform with clearly

4 displayed insignia, he has to carry weapons, and he has to have a

5 military commander above him, that's the army. Otherwise, it's not an

6 army, it's just various groups. The insignia is there to show his

7 membership, the weapons to -- for him to fight with, and the commander

8 for him to know what to do.

9 JUDGE KWON: Did you touch upon this issue, insignia?

10 MS. EDGERTON: No, not at all.

11 JUDGE KWON: How does this arise from the cross-examination,

12 Mr. Karadzic?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I am about to show the

14 witness, because the witness said that this was something that wasn't

15 done by the regular forces, I was about to ask him what the insignia

16 mentioned in the report refers to. I cannot lead the witness, so I have

17 to lay a foundation and the foundation is in the cross-examination where

18 it was put to the witness that it was done by the regular forces, whereas

19 the witness said that the regular forces were there to protect all the

20 citizens alike.

21 JUDGE KWON: It's up to you how to spend your time again. But if

22 the witness said it was done by the regular forces, is it not sufficient?

23 We'll take a break for half an hour. We'll continue at 11.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

25 --- On resuming at 11.01 a.m.

Page 47110

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 Can the witness be shown 1D27020 -- 022.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately we don't have a

6 translation yet because I didn't know these things would be contested.

7 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. But I'll ask you to delve into this document. On the

9 8th of December, 1992, the public security station attended a scene where

10 a robbery was committed against Ifeta Sadikovic, Fadil's wife, from

11 Krasulje. What is Ifeta's ethnicity?

12 A. Muslim.

13 Q. Thank you. As far as you're concerned, can you tell us how did

14 it happen that those from Hripavci and Krasulje came to be temporarily

15 residing in Kljuc? Can you tell us in the capacity that you had as the

16 head of the Secretariat for National Defence.

17 JUDGE KWON: I'm not sure where you're heading.

18 Let's collapse this document.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Excellencies -- [In English] I

20 can tell it in English if you ask witness to remove headphones.

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if you could do that. Could you kindly take

22 off your headphones, please, Mr. Jurisic.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can you hear us, Mr. Jurisic?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, but I wasn't hearing

25 the interpretation of what the gentleman was saying.

Page 47111

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes, if you could remove your headphones, please.

2 Yes, Ms. Edgerton first.

3 MS. EDGERTON: I just -- I rose because I had no idea what was

4 happening, Your Honours. An untranslated document that was put to the

5 witness in a leading way and I just think when we go too far down this

6 road, we're on the edge of Dr. Karadzic actually manipulating the

7 evidence in re-direct examination.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic.

9 THE ACCUSED: Excellencies, first from this document it appears

10 that the police went out on the terrain of the crime scene to investigate

11 a heavy robbery against Muslim citizens. Then it is obvious that the

12 civilians from the -- those villages are moved to the very city under the

13 Serbian control. And finally, in the middle it said that the Muslims

14 described the guys who robbed them and threatened them, so and so, and

15 said that the emblem on their own beret was very big and not usual. And

16 it shows what was alleged by the Prosecution that the people suffered.

17 We see from whom they suffered and what was the position of the

18 authorities.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE KWON: Why don't you put your question to the witness

21 without putting -- without showing the document?

22 Mr. Jurisic, thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

24 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Jurisic, what became of the civilians in the villages where

Page 47112

1 there was fighting going on?

2 A. Which villages are you referring to?

3 Q. Well, say Krasulje, Hripavci, and in general in the villages

4 where there was fighting going on, what became of the civilians, where

5 were they put up if they did not remain in these villages?

6 A. I have no idea. I think they were relocated to safer areas,

7 especially in the village of Krasulje where there was a mopping-up

8 operation. According to a statement in Sarajevo, a great many of them

9 withdraw to a small hill, Galaja, together with others from Sanski Most.

10 So the question was raised of whether they should continue their journey

11 on to Bihac or return to Krasulje. When the mopping-up activities were

12 over, according to what one Muslim stated before the court in Sarajevo,

13 half of them returned to Krasulje. So people would seek refuge

14 temporarily for the duration of the fighting or the mopping-up activities

15 which were taking place, after which they would return home.

16 Q. The transcript says in line 17 that -- it says that you had no

17 idea. Did you say that you had no idea or according to what you know?

18 A. What do I have no idea of?

19 Q. Of where the civilians were seeking refuge.

20 A. I don't recall this question at all.

21 Q. Thank you. If the victims would describe their perpetrators as

22 having a large emblem on their cap quite untypical, would that have been

23 an emblem of the regular Serb forces?

24 A. They were not members of the regular Serb forces. Nobody could

25 identify them, either by their uniform or by anything else. Simply put,

Page 47113

1 they were people - I don't know how to put it - the dogs of war who were

2 roaming the area in search of booty and targeting victims. There were

3 attempts to get a grip on them to put them under control of the forces

4 which had a command of their own and had discipline.

5 Q. Thank you. If a perpetrator would threaten a victim that nobody

6 should know of what happened or else that person would be killed, what

7 was the intention behind this, then, to conceal this from whom?

8 A. I'm not sure what you're talking about, conceal from whom. I

9 wasn't involved in that. I suppose there were different cases of

10 blackmail, so those who fell victim to looting would conceal that and be

11 silent on the matter because there were threats made and these threats

12 could be made after misdeeds were perpetrated that fell foul of the law.

13 Q. What was the position of the authorities when it came to the

14 destruction of Muslim buildings such as mosques, et cetera?

15 A. As far as I know, the position was to do everything to preserve

16 these buildings. However, there were incidents happening at night,

17 things that were beyond control, but the destruction was inflicted in

18 such a way as to make it quite clear to those who were privy to

19 explosives that these were deeds of amateurs. It was done

20 unprofessionally, so the conclusion could be drawn that these were

21 riotous groups who wanted to clear the terrain for their own ulterior

22 motives.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown

25 65 ter 893. [In English] There should be a translation.

Page 47114

1 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Have a look on your right-hand side, the 1st of February, 1993,

3 the destruction of a mosque. The Prosecutor requested that an action be

4 taken in accordance with the law.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have the next page.

6 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. This is an on-site investigation and the description of the site

8 says that the surroundings buildings were damaged as well as the cellar.

9 Is this what you were talking about, that they would be using large

10 amounts of explosives in an unprofessional way?

11 A. Well, I know that when the mosque in Kljuc was destroyed, Serbs

12 have gone through -- had gone through a great deal of fear. During the

13 explosion, pieces of debris were thrown several hundred metres around.

14 The glass panes on the surrounding buildings were smashed. There were

15 people residing in the vicinity. There were some industrial sheds there

16 that were destroyed. The area was populated by both the Serbs and

17 Muslims and they were in fear of their lives because there was great

18 destruction. And as I said, none of the windows on the buildings

19 surrounding the area were left intact. That was the scale of the

20 explosion. I know that an investigation had to be launched against

21 unidentified perpetrators and, to the best of my knowledge, the

22 perpetrators were never identified.

23 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Edgerton, did you touch upon this issue?

24 MS. EDGERTON: The destruction of the mosque? No, not at all.

25 And the whole -- this whole last couple of paragraphs of transcript could

Page 47115

1 have been dealt with without showing the witness the document in any

2 case.

3 JUDGE KWON: How does this arise from the cross-examination,

4 Mr. Karadzic?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What the witness said was being

6 challenged, namely, that all citizens were protected equally irrespective

7 of religious or ethnic affiliation. What was stated was that there were

8 no criminal reports filed in cases when Muslims were victims. So this is

9 a general challenge to this witness's statement and this is proof that

10 that is wrong. On page 15, for example, there is a challenge regarding

11 the impartiality of the authorities in terms of protection and

12 prosecution of cases where Muslims were the victims. Page 17 speaks of

13 the fear of Muslims, and now we hear that Serbs were afraid too.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may, Excellencies, on

16 page 17 --

17 JUDGE KWON: No -- no --

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- in line 20 to 25 --

19 JUDGE KWON: I said "no," Mr. Karadzic.

20 In terms of general challenge, the Chamber will allow the

21 question.

22 But, Mr. Robinson, I'm forming the impression that Mr. Karadzic

23 is going to use or exhaust 325 hours before he reaches his testimony.

24 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, actually we are calculating

25 it and we are leaving 16 hours for his testimony, so he'll have to be

Page 47116

1 disciplined in order to accomplish that, but that's what we're heading

2 for.

3 And if I could also say that I think your ruling that you've just

4 made was correct. But I do think that given the witness's lack of

5 knowledge about the investigative procedures in Kljuc and about what the

6 police did, that it would have been better for Dr. Karadzic to tender

7 these documents through the bar table because I don't think the witness

8 is in a position to add much and it is not a very good use of our time.

9 But anyway, he's free -- and I think what he's doing is legally correct,

10 and so we appreciate that you're willing to allow him to do that and hope

11 that it will still result in him having enough time to give his

12 testimony.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

14 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

16 I'd like to tender this document.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. And a general question to you, Mr. Jurisic: Are you aware of a

19 single case of a crime committed against a Muslim or a Croat that was

20 hushed up by the authorities or where the authorities rejected the case,

21 did not offer any protection?

22 A. I already said that this was not within my line of work but

23 everything that happened that was illegal and unlawful had to be

24 punished. The court of law was supposed to work, the police as well.

25 And I remember once that Mr. Franjo Komarica, the bishop of Banja Luka,

Page 47117

1 directly addressed the president of the Municipal Assembly, Jovo Banjac,

2 asking for the remaining Croats in Kljuc to be protected as well as their

3 Catholic church. In spite of all of these things that were done, later

4 on -- well, the church was of a very light construction and it was easy

5 to torch. So it seems that ultimately some kind of groups of hooligans

6 torched it after all. The authorities never wanted anything like that to

7 happen because this disturbed the Serb and Croat and Muslim population

8 when things like that happened. This is something that people were not

9 used to. It was only the older people who were afraid, but those from

10 the 1950s and 1960s were not familiar with any such thing.

11 Q. Thank you.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Has this been admitted?

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll receive it.

14 THE REGISTRAR: As Exhibit D4366, Your Honours.

15 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

16 MS. EDGERTON: And, if I may, I would just like to foreshadow

17 that if Dr. Karadzic continues down this route, I'm going to be asking

18 the Court to renew our tender of the log-books that were previously

19 denied.

20 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Yesterday, page 86 of yesterday's transcript, it was suggested to

24 you that -- actually, I'm going to read it out exactly and then it's

25 going to be interpreted to you.

Page 47118

1 [In English] "What you said, Mr. Jurisic, was that the action

2 taken up until the 27th of May, 1992, effectively were pursuant to

3 instructions from the top political leaders of the Serbian people; isn't

4 that right?

5 "A. We received all of this that had to do with mobilisation.

6 We received all of that from the command of the military district of

7 Banja Luka." And so on and so on.

8 [Interpretation] Today do you stand by that, that you were

9 subordinated to the military district of Banja Luka and that you received

10 orders from them, not from Pale?

11 A. Can I just say in two words, that we as the municipal

12 authorities, while the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina functioned,

13 absolutely, we were linked to the republican Secretariat for

14 National Defence, which later after the multi-party elections became part

15 of the Ministry of Defence. So we had this two-way communication.

16 As for all military affairs, we were never directly linked to the

17 secretariat or the ministry; rather, we had a stop in between and that

18 was the command of the military district and it roughly corresponded to

19 the then-area of responsibility of a corps. When the Ministry of Defence

20 was established we remained linked to the command of the military

21 district. So all mobilisation, recruitment, manning of the armed forces,

22 all of these things we received from the military district from

23 Banja Luka. We did not receive anything from Pale at the time, but we

24 could never be directly linked in terms of mobilisation and military

25 matters directly to the highest republic organ.

Page 47119

1 After this reorganisation, we were told that from the

2 1st of July, 1992, we would belong to the secretariat of the Ministry of

3 Defence that was established at the level of the corps. And then the

4 command of the military district ceased to exist in Banja Luka and two

5 secretariats were formed. The secretariat in Banja Luka that was in the

6 area of responsibility of the 1st Krajina Corps, that was the 5th Corps

7 until then, the 5th Corps of the JNA. However, since the JNA had ceased

8 to exist, well, then our municipality of Kljuc came to belong to the

9 secretariat of the Ministry of Defence in Drvar that covered

10 12 municipalities in the area of responsibility of the 2nd Krajina Corps,

11 so that was the way things were.

12 We never had these direct links. We had links with the republic

13 organ only as far as regulations were concerned, civilian protection, the

14 service for surveillance, and so on.

15 Q. Thank you.

16 A. The military part was there -- let me just say one more thing.

17 The Ministry of Defence or previously the Secretariat for

18 National Defence, we never received any instructions directly from them

19 until 1991, when these powers became intertwined. And then from the

20 command of military district we were told that we should send recruits,

21 conscripts to the army. And then from Sarajevo, from the ministry, they

22 send certain telegrams stating that no such persons should be sent and

23 that is when this intertwining took place. When this happened it was for

24 the first time --

25 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.

Page 47120

1 What were the links, what was the communication between Kljuc and

2 the centre of the republic, or rather, the government in Pale?

3 A. Well, when the corridor was cut off, it was a generally known

4 thing that all kinds of communication ceased to exist. There were no

5 communications in terms of railways, roads, et cetera. So until the end

6 of June/beginning of July, we did not have any communication until the

7 corridor was reinstated.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Sorry, two things. I would be able to make my

9 objections in a more timely fashion if Dr. Karadzic and the witness spoke

10 more slowly. And second, there's no way I dealt with anything related to

11 communication in the cross-examination; that's squarely outside of the

12 cross-examination.

13 JUDGE KWON: I agree, Ms. Edgerton.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to express my disagreement.

15 It says here that you received instructions, page 86 yesterday --

16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, the communication issue was not

17 raised.

18 MR. ROBINSON: Mr. President, if I'm recollecting it correctly,

19 she did ask questions concerning whether they were following the

20 instructions of the republican authorities, which would go directly to

21 the issue of communication.

22 JUDGE KWON: And he confirmed. And then -- I will consult my

23 colleagues.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE KWON: Please move on to another topic, Mr. Karadzic.

Page 47121

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

2 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Can you tell us, Mr. Jurisic, until when did you have a

4 Crisis Staff? When did it grow into the War Presidency?

5 A. I cannot give you the exact date, but I think it was the month of

6 August, 1992.

7 Q. Thank you. And did you receive my decision of the 31st of May

8 abolishing the Crisis Staffs? P2608, that's the number for the

9 participants.

10 A. I cannot confirm that directly. I do not recall that date,

11 whether it was then or some other time. There were so many dates, so

12 many things happened. Without looking at documents, it's very hard for a

13 person to be able to say anything. It was the president of the

14 Crisis Staff, the president of the Municipal Assembly that knew that the

15 best.

16 Q. Thank you. Also what was shown here was that you attended

17 certain meetings and you didn't know exactly what these meetings were.

18 Tell me, if there were a rally of citizens from a local commune, if they

19 wanted to be informed about certain preparations, who would they invite

20 from the Assembly?

21 A. By the very nature of things, I think they'd invite somebody from

22 the military, the Ministry of Defence, the police. These were the people

23 who were in charge of that structure.

24 Q. And if the military was not there, who would they ask out of the

25 civilian authorities?

Page 47122

1 A. Then the president of the Assembly, the president of the

2 Executive Board, the commander of the police, the public security

3 station. That would be it.

4 Q. Who was secretary of the Secretariat of National Defence?

5 A. I was.

6 Q. Thank you. I have to ask you once again, did you receive after

7 the war broke out any instructions from Pale in relation to anything?

8 A. As far as defence was concerned, we did not. The first time I

9 had direct communication regarding defence was with Drvar, August 1992.

10 I came across General Subotic. He was minister of defence and I saw him

11 there and I saw Minister Sajic who was minister of national defence in

12 the AR Krajina over there, when they gave us the Law on Defence and the

13 Law on the Army and when they told us that our organisation that we had

14 had until then, the command of the military district in Banja Luka, that

15 then -- from then onwards it would be the Secretariat for National

16 Defence and that we in the municipality had no further functions, that we

17 could not be in any structures, so that we could fully devote ourselves

18 to defence matters because in some municipalities there were certain

19 challenges. The municipal authorities did not accept what the army and

20 the Ministry of Defence were asking for, so they tried to have as much

21 independence as possible so the people could decide on the basis of

22 regulations.

23 Q. Thank you. Could you please tell us in the briefest possible

24 terms during your testimony -- actually, did you have the same position

25 when you testified then as you have today?

Page 47123

1 A. I always have the same position and the same opinion. I did what

2 I did and I always stand by that at any level, at any trial, before any

3 court. I cannot say anything that I do not know --

4 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not hear the end of the

5 witness's answer.

6 JUDGE KWON: Witness and Mr. Karadzic, the interpreters did not

7 hear the end of the witness's answer. Could you repeat it.

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. You said: "I cannot say anything that I do not know."

10 A. At each trial before each court, during each questioning or when

11 I provide a statement, I say only what I know, what I saw, and about

12 which I'm 100 per cent certain. If something happens like a different

13 word that I would use, perhaps a different word, that is not any change

14 in my position. But simply, a person as a human being is not a tape

15 recorder to be able to be repeat word for word what he said at an earlier

16 occasion.

17 Q. Thank you very much.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show the witness

19 65 ter 26008. English page 3, Serbian 12.

20 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. We will read it here. It's there in the Serbian and in the

22 English. You say this:

23 "I think that on the 14th of May, the then Assembly" --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.

25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you tell the interpreters where

Page 47124

1 you are reading from.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the main answer of the

3 witness in the Serbian at the bottom of the page. In the English it's:

4 "I am talking about the Assembly session ..."

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You say here:

7 "I am thinking about the Assembly session in Banja Luka. Since

8 that communication was already difficult at that time, when we received

9 that in writing ..." and so on and so forth.

10 Does that correspond to what you -- today?

11 A. I answered about that at the trial of Odanovic Marko before the

12 BH court in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was his witness, and when I was saying

13 that, I just had one dilemma and you can see that here in this document,

14 that I said that this was on the 12th or on the 14th of January -- May.

15 However, after I checked and I determined that it was exactly on the

16 12th of May when a decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic -- as

17 a result of which the Yugoslav People's Army withdrew from Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina and the Army of Republika Srpska was formed then. And the

19 Territorial Defence did not exist from that time on formally but was

20 transformed into the Army of the Serbian Republic, so that our

21 detachment, which at that time was mobilised, it was no longer --

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not catch what the witness

23 said.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- it was part of the 30th Division

25 which was headquartered in --

Page 47125

1 JUDGE KWON: No, no. Witness, we are not able to follow you.

2 Could you repeat when from the -- where you said: Army of the

3 Serbian Republic formed from something, yes. So:

4 "... Territorial Defence did not exist from that time on formally

5 but was transformed into the Army of the Serbian Republic ..."

6 Could you repeat from there.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course. On the

8 12th of May, 1992, by a decision of the Assembly of the Serbian Republic,

9 the Territorial Defence ceased to exist because a decision was reached

10 that the Yugoslav People's Army should withdraw from the area of Bosnia

11 and Herzegovina. And since with the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's

12 Army the Territorial Defence was formed and the detachment of the

13 Territorial Defence in Kljuc which was mobilised at that time became part

14 of the army and became one of the battalions. I don't know exactly the

15 number of the battalion, but it became part of the 30th Division which

16 had its seat in a small barracks, Kula near Mrkonjic Grad.

17 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Thank you.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now look at page 23.

20 Unfortunately, this page has not been translated, but I'm only going to

21 read two lines. This is the Serbian page 23.

22 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Can I please ask you -- actually, I'm going to read your answer:

24 "Well, I think he was -- all of that perhaps went through at a

25 time when communication was really the most difficult that it ever had

Page 47126

1 been."

2 Do you still stand by this statement of yours that this was the

3 time --

4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic --

5 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] --

6 Q. -- when the communications were proceeding with the most

7 difficulty ever?

8 JUDGE KWON: I told you to move on from the topic -- issue of

9 communication. You are not listening to the Chamber's instruction. Move

10 on to another topic.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. On page 20 today you were asked in reference to P3462 about that

14 text by Mr. Banjac, whose signature I asked you about. Are you able to

15 tell us what the rights of the municipality were -- or actually, the

16 defence ministry in relation to the disposal of movable and immovable

17 property during the war and does that disposition mean actually taking

18 over property rights?

19 A. Taking over or assuming property rights, according to the Law on

20 All People's Defence --

21 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

22 MS. EDGERTON: I think that's a leading question. I think the

23 answer's been suggested to the witness.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE BAIRD: Mr. Robinson, can you assist us on this question?

Page 47127

1 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Judge Baird. I think the last -- after "and"

2 made it suggestive.

3 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes.

4 MR. ROBINSON: If he could ask the question without that part, it

5 would be proper.

6 JUDGE BAIRD: Yes, I agree.

7 JUDGE KWON: Will you ask the question again?

8 MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Jurisic, did the municipality have any rights or the defence

10 have any rights to dispose with property during war time?

11 A. The municipality and the Secretariat for the National Defence

12 according by law has the right to dispose with all human and material

13 resources which can contribute to the defence of the country. Such

14 facilities, properties, articles are never confiscated on a permanent

15 basis, but are only confiscated for the needs of the army. If the person

16 from whom the property was confiscated keeps the documents indicating

17 that he handed over such property, proceedings are conducted after the

18 war or after the action is completed when the state is obliged to restore

19 the property. And if it is destroyed, it should pay compensation;

20 otherwise, it should return the property if it is unharmed.

21 Q. Thank you very much.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions, and I

23 would like to tender page 3 from this document, English page 3, Serbian

24 page 12.

25 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Ms. Edgerton.

Page 47139

1 A. Good afternoon.

2 Q. I would like to start by asking you just a couple of questions

3 about the statement you gave to Dr. Karadzic's Defence that he showed you

4 here a few minutes ago. Could you just explain how did it work? Did you

5 get this as a draft or did you write the whole thing yourself?

6 A. I gave the statement to the investigators -- to an investigator,

7 Mr. Furtula, and it was partly supplemented during my conversation with

8 President Karadzic.

9 Q. Now, when you gave that statement, did you have documents with

10 you? Did you use documents?

11 A. Of course. I used all the documents that I had.

12 Q. Were they your own documents or were they shown to you by the

13 investigator or was it a mix of both?

14 A. It was a mix of both.

15 Q. So in your statement where you quote some things, like at

16 paragraph 5 where you quote a speech from Dr. Karadzic, you found that

17 quote in a document; it's not something you remembered?

18 A. Yes, of course.

19 Q. And did you -- you wrote in some detail about minutes of

20 Main Board meetings. Did you do that from your memory or do you have a

21 notebook?

22 A. I did that on the basis of my own notes that I kept while I was a

23 member of the Main Board. I did that at the sessions that I attended.

24 Q. And when -- in that collection of documents that you had and the

25 Defence gave you initially, did you review any military documents, either

Page 47140

1 from the JNA or the Bosnian Serb army?

2 A. Well, I reviewed military documents that I considered to be

3 relevant for my testimony.

4 Q. And what military documents were those?

5 A. It was, first of all, the Law on Defence and Protection of the

6 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and then the Law on Defence and

7 Protection of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and then

8 different bylaws that pertained to defence, the Law on Armed Forces of

9 the SFRY, the Law on Defence of Republika Srpska, the Law on the Army of

10 Republika Srpska, an order on the application of rules of international

11 law in Republika Srpska, instructions on how to act with prisoners of

12 war, and other documents that I may remember as we continue to talk.

13 Q. In that collection of documents you reviewed, did you see any

14 documents with evidence, for example, that Bosnian Serb forces sought

15 territory in which Muslims were a majority?

16 A. For the most part I read regulations, but absolutely nowhere did

17 I find a document instructing the armed forces of Republika Srpska to

18 take territories where the Muslims constitute the majority population.

19 However, I'm saying that I read regulations for the most part.

20 Q. All right. And now when you met Dr. Karadzic or his Defence team

21 here on the day that you signed this statement, did you review more

22 documents?

23 A. In the meantime, most of these documents that I found to be

24 important, I took them along and I re-read them by way of preparation.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We did not hear the rest

Page 47141

1 of the witness's answer.

2 MS. EDGERTON:

3 Q. The interpreters didn't hear what you said after "re-read them by

4 way of preparation." Would you be able to repeat?

5 A. Most of the documents on the basis of which I gave this

6 statement, I took along and I read them, not the entire documents, but

7 those parts that I considered to be relevant. I did not have any

8 additional documents.

9 Q. All right. So in your proofing with Dr. Karadzic here, you were

10 not shown any additional documents; is that right?

11 A. A moment ago I received just one document from the President that

12 has to do with the minutes of the session of the Executive Board of the

13 SDS. I got that just as I was walking into this room. I think that the

14 document is not particularly relevant to the indictment.

15 Q. All right. Now just about your jobs, am I correct if I say that

16 you became president of the Pale SDS Municipal Board in April 1991?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. And am I also correct if I say that you were a member of the

19 Crisis Staff for Pale in April, May, June, and July 1991 -- 1992, pardon

20 me?

21 A. Yes, ex officio, I was a member of the Crisis Staff in the period

22 of -- well, the Crisis Staff functioned in Pale only for about

23 two months.

24 Q. And what function did you serve then after that period of time

25 where the Crisis Staff, as you said, ceased functioning?

Page 47142

1 A. You mean professionally where I was?

2 Q. Well, actually, there's not -- when you talked in your statement

3 about the functions you served, there's actually not a single date

4 reference as to the terms of office that you held except when you added

5 something to your statement here to say you served with the Main Board

6 until 1996. So what were you doing in August 1992?

7 A. I started working in the Ministry of the Interior and I was a

8 desk officer for legal affairs. After that, in roughly 1994, again, I

9 was a counsellor for legal affairs in the Ministry of Defence.

10 Throughout this time I was a member of the Main Board of the SDS and

11 president of the Municipal Board of the SDS in Pale.

12 Q. All right. Now, just before I move on to another area, when you

13 talked about the document that you received from Dr. Karadzic, when

14 exactly did you receive it? Just a few minutes ago or before you came

15 into this courtroom and took the oath to testify?

16 A. I received it when I came here.

17 Q. Well, was that just a few minutes ago, while we were on the lunch

18 break?

19 A. No, no, when I came here, when I came here.

20 Q. Right. Now, just in terms of your work with the Crisis Staff, is

21 it also -- can you also confirm that for a period of time you were on the

22 Crisis Staff for SAO Romanija?

23 A. No, the -- there never was a Crisis Staff for Romanija, never

24 existed. There was an Assembly of SAO Romanija and there was a

25 government of SAO Romanija and there was a regional board for the SDS for

Page 47143

1 Romanija. A Crisis Staff never existed at regional level as far as the

2 SAO Romanija is concerned.

3 MS. EDGERTON: Could we have a look, please, at 65 ter number

4 21353, please.

5 Q. So this is from -- it's a newspaper article, you can see, from

6 "Oslobodjenje" dated 26 March 1992.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Maybe Mr. Sarac would be helped if you actually

8 made the one in his language bigger.

9 Q. Although you can understand and read English, I think, can't you,

10 Mr. Sarac?

11 MS. EDGERTON: Can you enlarge the one in B/C/S, please.

12 Q. So this newspaper report says that -- it's still really, really

13 tiny, but if you can go down to, I think, the third full paragraph, it

14 says that Malko Koroman asserted he had terminated the five non-Serb

15 police officers in Pale and three in Sokolac on the order of the

16 government of SAO Romanija. So who gave him the order then?

17 A. Well, Malko Koroman was chief of the public security station in

18 Pale. He could have possibly issued an order like that for Pale, but not

19 for Sokolac because Zoran Cvijetic was the chief of the public security

20 station there. So I mean -- I don't know if that's the way it was, who

21 it was that could have issued that order to him.

22 Q. Who was in the government of SAO Romanija that would have issued

23 the order to Malko Koroman? That's what I'm interested in.

24 A. The minister of the interior was Zoran Cvijetic. He was minister

25 of the interior of the SAO Romanija. As I've already said, SAO Romanija

Page 47144

1 did not have a Crisis Staff but a government that functioned up until --

2 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are not sure about the year.

3 MS. EDGERTON:

4 Q. And you were a member of the Assembly of SAO Romanija; right?

5 A. No, I was just a member of the regional board of the SDS for

6 Romanija.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

8 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe when this is listened to

10 they're going to correct this, but line 8, the witness said that it was

11 until October 1992 that the government functioned, I think.

12 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Sarac?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think that this has to be

14 checked. I think that all governments were abolished then but I'm not

15 sure. It's not that it worked with particular intensity. Perhaps it was

16 earlier.

17 JUDGE KWON: No, I'm asking your answer -- what your answer was

18 because the interpreters missed it. What did you say, up until when?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think that the government

20 worked until October 1992, but that is just on the basis of memory. I

21 don't have a single document.

22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

23 MS. EDGERTON: That's fine. Thank you.

24 Q. Now, in your statement you talked -- we'll move on to 1992. And

25 you spoke at paragraph 22 about a declaration of imminent threat of war

Page 47145

1 and mobilisation of the Territorial Defence on the 15th of April. Now,

2 you know, don't you, that that decision of the 15th of April was actually

3 militarily implemented the following day, on the 16th?

4 It's not a trick question. Would you agree with me that the

5 decision was militarily implemented the next day?

6 A. Well, you see, mobilisation cannot be implemented as fast as

7 that. It's a lasting process.

8 Q. All right. Let's have a look at another document, maybe I'll be

9 clearer.

10 MS. EDGERTON: P2412, please. Right.

11 Q. This is the decision to -- to the government of the autonomous

12 regions and the Serbian autonomous regions, to all the Serbian Assemblies

13 on the mobilisation of the Territorial Defence.

14 MS. EDGERTON: Now, if we could go over to page 2 in both

15 languages.

16 Q. You see the decision was issued by General Subotic, who was a

17 minister at the time. And paragraph 2 of this document -- or, pardon me,

18 paragraph 1 says:

19 "The municipal Territorial Defence staffs that have operated

20 regularly so far shall remain in the same formation and

21 establishment ..."

22 And that's actually what was happening in Pale, wasn't it, their

23 mobilisation had been effected and the Territorial Defence in Pale was

24 functioning; right?

25 A. Yes, of course. The command of the Territorial Defence of the

Page 47146

1 municipality of Pale was functional practically until the VRS was set up

2 with some small exceptions, because it had been operational from the

3 earlier period, the entire structure.

4 Q. From the earlier period actually predating this order; isn't that

5 the case?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. All right. Then let's look at another document. Maybe you can

8 confirm it for me.

9 MS. EDGERTON: It's P6094. This is a 2nd Military District

10 Command document and it's dated April 8th, 1992. And if we can go over

11 to the second page of this document, please.

12 Q. Under the heading "4th Corps" --

13 MS. EDGERTON: And let me just see if I have the right page in

14 B/C/S because I don't have paragraph numbers.

15 I think you have to go back to the first page in B/C/S, please.

16 Thank you.

17 Q. Under the heading "4th Corps," second paragraph, it says:

18 "During the afternoon, the members of the Territorial Defence

19 from Pale municipality opened mortar fire on the sector Vratnik and on

20 the old part of the city of Sarajevo ..."

21 So not only was the Territorial Defence in Pale functioning at

22 that point in time even before the forces were implemented, it was

23 shelling parts of the old town of Sarajevo. That's what this

24 contemporaneous document shows; right?

25 A. It's a document of the JNA which I have no knowledge of. I can

Page 47147

1 tell you that, under the law, the TO units were resubordinated to the

2 JNA. Until the JNA withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina that was the case.

3 There could have been a paramilitary organisation, a volunteer group, or

4 somebody doing things wilfully, but I'm not privy to the details.

5 Q. So this document - if you go over to the second page - it's a

6 standard military daily combat report.

7 MS. EDGERTON: Second page in B/C/S, please. And then again.

8 Q. The signatory - and you can go over to the last page as

9 well - the signatory, Slobodan Tripkovic, member of rank, is doing this

10 job. The man who signed this document, the duty team, has an obligation,

11 Mr. Sarac, to make sure his information is accurate because he's sending

12 it up to his command. It doesn't say anything about any kind of renegade

13 here, any kind of wilful behaviour, does it? Are you saying he got it

14 wrong?

15 A. I simply don't have any information about the contents of this

16 document. I'm not an expert that could comment on who could take

17 decisions or issue orders, et cetera.

18 Q. Fine. Fine. We'll move on. I want to go to that part of your

19 statement where you talk the 400 men from Bratunac and it's at

20 paragraph 41. Now, in the first draft of your statement, Mr. Sarac, you

21 said that:

22 "The local or republican leadership never found out how these

23 people had been captured or why they were transferred to Pale ..."

24 And then in what you finally signed, you amended that evidence to

25 read:

Page 47148

1 "The local leadership never found out why these people were

2 transferred to Pale, whereas the republican leadership was out of town in

3 Banja Luka at an Assembly session ..."

4 So you changed your evidence, right, because it appears from what

5 you now say, you knew how these people had been captured?

6 A. We never came to learn how these people were captured. This

7 amendment to my statement was due to the fact that subsequently I found

8 out that the entire republican leadership was out of town attending an

9 Assembly session.

10 Q. Did you even see these 400 men come into Bratunac?

11 A. Yes. I was in a cafe at a time when these trailer-trucks

12 carrying these people came to Pale. We tried to notify the republican

13 leadership at once; nobody knew anything. They spent four days at Pale.

14 We were trying to help them through the Red Cross by providing them with

15 food, blankets, and so on. They were put up in the gym because they had

16 to be put somewhere. We tried to find out where they had come out and

17 learnt that some paramilitaries who wore the red berets did that, that

18 the goal behind their actions was to discredit Pale and the republican

19 leadership.

20 After having spoken to President Karadzic and President Krajisnik

21 and -- or rather, President Krajisnik and President Djeric, because

22 President Karadzic was away, we insisted that these people be released,

23 and the fact is that they were all in civilian uniforms. We had full

24 support. Later on President Karadzic came, appropriate orders were

25 issued, and these people were transferred to Muslim-controlled

Page 47149

1 territories. I think that they only spent four days at Pale.

2 Q. And you would have seen, then, that these men were physically

3 abused, like they had been bruised and they had been beaten and they been

4 mutilated, you would have seen that; right?

5 A. There were no visible injuries. I don't know if there were

6 injuries that could be observed. I didn't spend a great deal of time

7 there. Right away with the deputy and president of the Crisis Staff, I

8 busied myself with trying to find out what can be done with these people

9 and how they can be assisted, and in fact this was seen through to the

10 end.

11 Q. Thank you. Now, you spoke about Renovica as well in your written

12 evidence. It was the Crisis Staff's decision to send the police to

13 Renovica on 22nd of May, wasn't it?

14 A. As far as I remember, the chief of the police station settled

15 with their leader that they should surrender weapons, and it was the

16 police patrol that was supposed to do that. It was not a decision, it

17 was an agreement.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

19 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said it wasn't a police

21 action but a police patrol and "action" wasn't recorded.

22 MS. EDGERTON:

23 Q. Is that correct, Mr. Sarac?

24 A. Yes. It was a police patrol which, based on the agreement

25 between the chief of the police station and the leaders of the Muslims in

Page 47150

1 the area, which was supposed to do this. It came under fire and two

2 policemen were killed.

3 Q. And the person who commanded that operation was Malko Koroman;

4 right?

5 A. Yes.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. The question stated

7 that it was an operation, whereas the witness clearly said that it was a

8 patrol.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I concur fully.

10 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Let's continue.

11 MS. EDGERTON:

12 Q. Now, you know, Mr. Koroman actually some years ago was

13 interviewed by the ICTY and the interview was audio recorded. And he

14 spoke about that operation, and I'd like to have a look at that

15 transcript.

16 MS. EDGERTON: It's 65 ter number 26014. And we could go, when

17 we get it, to page 76.

18 Q. It's, unfortunately, not available in your language, but are you

19 able to read it, Mr. Sarac, or would you like me to read it to you and

20 have it translated, the portions I'd like to put to you? It's your

21 choice.

22 A. It's best that it's interpreted to me.

23 Q. That's fine. In this main -- this large paragraph that you see

24 on the page in front of you, Mr. Koroman talks about that action and he

25 says:

Page 47151

1 "I participated and I know of that action, it's in regard to a

2 part of Pale ... where some 90 to 92 per cent of the population were

3 Muslims and maybe some 87 per cent were Serbs ..."

4 Although I don't know quite how that mathematically works out.

5 And he said further:

6 "There were army barracks there, storage mostly, a lot of

7 ammunition ..."

8 And that's correct, isn't it, both at Renovica and Donja Vinca,

9 those are the old JNA storage facilities for their logistics brigades;

10 right?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. And he says:

13 "In May, then, Muslims prevented police from Pale arriving into

14 Renovica and we received an order to establish order in that part of the

15 municipal territory."

16 And then he goes on to talk about how he went there, he says that

17 they were in police uniforms and one of their "targets was to secure the

18 barracks as well because certain groups were entering the barracks and

19 taking ammunition ..."

20 So we'll go over to the next page. I'll tell you what

21 Mr. Koroman said and I'll ask you a couple of questions.

22 And at the next page he says that -- he says they came without a

23 military formation and when they arrived in Renovica they were shot at by

24 the Muslims, two policemen were killed -- although he says some policemen

25 were killed, five or six were wounded. And then he says:

Page 47152

1 "Then 200 inhabitants were not what I would say detained, they

2 were taken into custody, our custody, they were held at the school at

3 Renovica ..."

4 And then they found -- on that occasion they encountered 35 or

5 37, maybe 33 men who surrendered with weapons and they took them with us

6 to the police station at Pale and he says that they were sent to Kula

7 10 or 15 days later.

8 And at the very bottom of the page he said:

9 "We handed over the barracks to the army ... and that was the

10 very last day that the police entered Renovica."

11 So my question to you is: You can confirm that there were

12 actually people from Renovica held in the hall behind the police station

13 at Pale as well; right?

14 A. You see, the police station did have a room where it kept

15 suspects of criminal offences. That was the case before the war, during

16 the war, and today. In this case, it obviously had to do with a police

17 patrol whose objective was to enforce the rule of law in that part of the

18 Pale area, which was within the purview of the Pale SJB.

19 Q. What size of patrol is required to take in more than 230 people

20 into custody?

21 A. I absolutely doubt that that was the number of the persons

22 involved. I don't think that it was possible at all. There could not

23 have been more than 10 to 15 people. Was this an error? There was

24 strange circumstances. People were afraid, people gave different

25 statements, perhaps to accommodate someone. I don't know. I can't

Page 47153

1 comment on that.

2 Q. So you're saying Mr. Koroman, who you said did everything he

3 could to help the Muslims, and you described him in your statement as a

4 man of integrity, you're saying Mr. Koroman got it wrong when he said

5 this in this audio-recorded interview with the ICTY?

6 A. I'm absolutely certain that no more than 15 individuals were

7 captured in this particular -- on this particular occasion.

8 Q. And is that because you were in your capacity as a member of the

9 Crisis Staff receiving reports on the operation? How else would you

10 know?

11 A. Yes. He informed us of it at the meeting of the Crisis Staff and

12 it had to do with a small number of people. We insisted that these

13 individuals, if they were not guilty, should be released at once; and if

14 guilty, should be transferred to Kula and placed in the jurisdiction of

15 the prosecutor's office. After all, there has to be documentation

16 indicating this and it would have to have been part of the records of the

17 Kula prison.

18 Q. Yes. Well, the evidence is actually, Mr. Sarac, that the

19 prisoners from Renovica actually weren't released to Kula until the

20 11th of July. So you're quite right, but the transfer took some time.

21 That's actually the case, isn't it?

22 A. No. The last -- or actually, after the departure of this group

23 of 400 Muslims from Bratunac, there were no more -- they were transferred

24 to Kula far sooner.

25 Q. Well, what I'd like to put to you is, Mr. Sarac, that

Page 47154

1 Mr. Koroman's accounting of the events is actually far closer to reality

2 than your assertions that you're giving us now. The Crisis Staff, I'll

3 put to you, gave the order to Mr. Koroman to assume control over the

4 area. He reported to you about the operation and he calls it an

5 operation, and the evidence before this Chamber is that he came to

6 Renovica with dozens of soldiers. One witness said about a hundred

7 soldiers, which is completely consistent with the size of forces he would

8 need to take effective control over the area. It's actually in your

9 interests, isn't it, to say that the incident was of a much smaller scale

10 than even Mr. Koroman told us?

11 A. I'm absolutely certain that the incident was of a much smaller

12 scale, more than ten-fold. I don't know which police forces were

13 involved in this. It is possible that at the time -- I suppose that the

14 SJB had a hundred policemen overall in the station so they could not have

15 spared more than a dozen, but I'm sure that the Defence can call

16 Mr. Koroman and ask him to explain this to us.

17 MS. EDGERTON: Before I move on, could I have these two pages

18 tendered as Prosecution exhibits, please?

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Robinson.

20 MR. ROBINSON: Well, Mr. President, I think they've been put --

21 fully put to the witness and we don't normally admit these statements

22 which are considered for the purpose of litigation. So I don't think

23 that there's any -- it's not part of our practice to admit it, and since

24 it's been put to the witness there's no reason to.

25 JUDGE KWON: I see your point. Do we need to admit Mr. Koroman's

Page 47155

1 interview?

2 MS. EDGERTON: If I could just have your indulgence, I'll have a

3 word with Mr. Tieger.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

5 [Prosecution counsel confer]

6 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

7 Q. Now, Mr. Sarac, are you similarly so sure that no one in the gym,

8 the hall behind the police station at Pale was beaten?

9 A. I have to information about that. I did not receive information

10 that there had been mistreatments.

11 Q. Well, you actually said in your statement that it was untrue.

12 Are you now saying that you simply have no information about that?

13 A. According to the information I had, it is not true that people

14 were mistreated in the gym.

15 Q. Well, even Dr. Karadzic's -- one of Dr. Karadzic's Defence

16 witnesses who you know, Mr. Hrsum - pardon me for the mispronunciation -

17 said he couldn't rule it out, and that's at transcript page 32942. He

18 said: Well, I can't say that maybe there were no abuses by those who

19 secured the premises or that maybe they allowed entry to certain

20 individuals. And then Mr. Koroman in this same document - if we could go

21 to page 88 - actually confirms that. At the bottom of this page he said:

22 "I received information, maybe on some second or third day, from

23 a worker of mine, Tomislav," and the last name is misspelled which is

24 Vrsan, "that there are individuals from those units who are entering the

25 gym and harassing the detainees."

Page 47156

1 And he said Mr. Hrsum informed him because he knew that he would

2 stand up for them - you can go over to the next page - for their

3 protection.

4 So police officials, one of whom who gave evidence under oath

5 here and the other one who stated this in an audio-recorded interview,

6 have both said that they couldn't rule out the possibility that there

7 were beatings. And this Chamber has heard that prisoners in the gym were

8 called out by name by soldiers they knew and beaten, one man until he

9 passed out, and the beating only stopped when a soldier came up and told

10 them they were beating the wrong guy. That soldier, this witness said,

11 was Milomir Tepis, and that's at transcript page 15304 to 05 and P2839.

12 And Milomir Tepis has actually -- was convicted in 1999 to 13 years'

13 imprisonment for the beatings of prisoners committed at the Dom Kulture

14 in Pale, that hall.

15 So two police officials with control over the institution have

16 said it could be possible, and a court in your own country has actually

17 convicted one of the perpetrators and you don't have that information, as

18 a man who was a member of the Crisis Staff of Pale at that time?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I remark that paragraph 57

20 speaks about beatings by guards --

21 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, it's totally inappropriate to

22 intervene in such a way.

23 Yes, Mr. Sarac, please answer the question.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All I said was that I as a member

25 of the Crisis Staff did not get information that they were mistreated and

Page 47157

1 beaten there. People in the police station who were directly responsible

2 for that probably knew that. Under the Law on Common Affairs that was

3 under their jurisdiction. So I was only talking about the information

4 that I had at my disposal.

5 MS. EDGERTON:

6 Q. So why didn't you say that in your statement, that you simply

7 didn't know and had limited information at your disposal, rather than

8 saying that it was untrue that prisoner were beaten?

9 A. Could you please just help me by telling me which paragraph that

10 is?

11 Q. I can do that in one second, no problem.

12 THE ACCUSED: If I may help, 57, I suppose.

13 MS. EDGERTON:

14 Q. Absolutely, paragraph 57. At paragraph 57 you said these facts

15 are not true.

16 A. And then I go on to say, according to what I know, none of the

17 detainees were mistreated, which doesn't mean necessarily that there were

18 no incidents. Which was later something that was confirmed by those.

19 Q. All right. Well, then I have a question actually. In your

20 statement from paragraph 50 -- in paragraph 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, and

21 so on, 58 and 59, you've said a series of incidents, assertions, claims,

22 aren't true. How, then, are we to take that based on the qualification

23 you've just made in your statement? Does that mean you simply -- when

24 you say it's not true, does that mean you simply just don't know?

25 A. I can say what I know about each of these particular cases. You

Page 47158

1 cannot apply the principle in general to each of these situations because

2 each one is different.

3 Q. Right.

4 JUDGE KWON: So Ms. Edgerton's question is this: When you say

5 all these facts are not true, can we understand it to mean that according

6 to the information you had those facts were not true?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely.

8 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

9 Please continue, Ms. Edgerton.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Fine. Thank you.

11 Q. Now, you talked about paramilitary forces in Pale, saying that

12 there -- initially there were no paramilitary organisations and then

13 there was one unit called Charlie's Unit which was terrorising the

14 population. And then saying at paragraph 53 that the paramilitaries were

15 banned and prosecuted, but that's actually not the case, is it? Even two

16 months after Dr. Karadzic's order banning paramilitaries, Arkan's men

17 were staying at the Hotel Panorama.

18 A. My statement says that these were not Arkan's men, but a unit

19 commanded by a certain Charlie. This unit did not take part in any

20 fighting. It exclusively looted and terrorised the local population,

21 regardless of their ethnicity. We did notice this problem, we informed

22 the top leadership, including President Karadzic and the defence minister

23 and others from the corps command. After that, a unit was engaged from

24 Trebevic and a police unit, and then they expelled that unit from Pale.

25 After that, no paramilitary unit participated.

Page 47159

1 Q. Tell us when that happened.

2 A. I don't know exactly. I assume that that could have been

3 sometime in June 1992, but I'm not absolutely sure. You know, it was

4 a -- it was a difficult thing to do, to expel that unit. It was a

5 trained, well-organised and well-armed unit. A lot of time was required

6 to be able to do that, and our people, military and civilian commanders

7 who were conducting the operation carried out the operation without a

8 single error.

9 Q. Now, also in your statement you said at paragraph 9 that Karadzic

10 was a leader who had no control over the army and certain parts of the

11 government. But you weren't a soldier during the war, were you?

12 A. No. I worked at the Ministry of Internal Affairs as a civilian

13 and then I worked at the Ministry of Justice. I was a civilian working

14 on legal affairs in both institutions.

15 Q. So you never attended meetings of the Supreme Command; right?

16 A. That is correct. As an SDS official, I think that I would not

17 have been allowed to attend anyway. Everybody knew who members of the

18 command were and they attended and then somebody else could be invited to

19 the meeting for very specific reasons.

20 Q. You wouldn't have seen any of Dr. Karadzic's military directives

21 or any of his orders to the military?

22 A. No. I just saw those that were published, that is, the order on

23 the application of international law in the armed forces as well as

24 instructions on the treatment of prisoners of war. I did not have access

25 to others that were issued because probably they were also confidential.

Page 47160

1 Q. You weren't present at his meetings with his military anywhere in

2 the war theatre; right?

3 A. No. I was at a meeting with him only once when -- this was in

4 1995 and it was dealing with military issues, and this was in 1995 when

5 the order was issued to re-direct the Trebevic Battalion to a different

6 area and that another unit from the Krajina come to that area. That was

7 when they asked me from the command to use my authority to try to speak

8 with President Karadzic because many saw conspiracy in it. Many of them

9 heard stories that that area was supposed to fall, that it was supposed

10 to be traded off for Gorazde.

11 I spoke with Mr. Karadzic. I said that people were concerned,

12 that there was a number of people who were prepared to leave for fronts

13 in other areas, but we were concerned because that area could fall

14 because nobody would defend that area except the people who lived there.

15 I did encounter a lot of understanding. President Karadzic called

16 General Mladic and he explained to him what the problem was. He did not

17 have an attitude of issuing orders to him in the sense that he was

18 ordering him to do something. He said that he knew about the problem and

19 that he thought that that unit could achieve certain results, but in view

20 of the fact that the citizens were concerned about it, that measure would

21 be reviewed and that was done so that the Trebevic Battalion remained at

22 Trebevic. And thank God the enemy forces did not manage to take Pale in

23 that offensive on the Sarajevo front, precisely thanks to that move.

24 Q. And that was in August 1995; right?

25 A. More or less, yes.

Page 47161

1 Q. Now, you also weren't party to Dr. Karadzic's conversations with

2 any members of his Main Staff, other than this one incident that you've

3 just described to us, you weren't a part of those conversations; right?

4 A. No. I was in President Karadzic's office as he spoke to

5 General Mladic on the phone. I never attended any meeting with the

6 military leadership, it wasn't something that my position would permit me

7 to do.

8 Q. And that conversation on the phone refers to this single meeting

9 that you've just told us about in August 1995; right?

10 A. Yes. He called General Mladic in my presence, he explained what

11 the problem was, and he received the promise that the order would be

12 withdrawn, the order about the reassignment of the Trebevic Battalion to

13 a different theatre.

14 Q. So really what you've told to us, you weren't anywhere in the

15 military chain of command; right?

16 A. Correct, no.

17 Q. So this Court has actually received a great deal of evidence

18 about how the command and control of the army actually worked from the

19 people who were a part of it. General Gvero, even way back in 1992,

20 explained it to the Bosnian Serb Assembly, and I'll tell you what he

21 said. It's from D422, e-court page 63 and B/C/S pages 62 and 63 in

22 English.

23 General Gvero said:

24 "Shortly, the basic elements are there's the Supreme Command of

25 the army, and that's the president as the supreme commander, and in our

Page 47162

1 situation this will be the Presidency. All the elements of defence and

2 the army are subordinated to this institution. We in the army are

3 following this and trying to fully observe it ..."

4 So that is a very clear contemporaneous statement by one of

5 Dr. Karadzic's senior commanders about how the line of command was

6 supposed to function and how it did, they were doing what they were told;

7 right?

8 A. You have that in the constitution and in the Law on the Army.

9 The president of the republic is the supreme commander, but he's not

10 authorised or responsible in the operational sense. He cannot issue

11 orders specifically to a unit. His authority is set by the republican

12 constitution, the Law on Defence, the Law on the Army. So it's a little

13 bit broader of aspect of command of the armed forces, which include some

14 civilian structures as well.

15 But as for the armed forces, the principle that applies there is

16 the principle of subordination and singleness of command. These

17 principles are important in the Yugoslav People's Army and they're still

18 in force today. I think they apply in all countries of the world.

19 Q. I just want to show you an order from Dr. Karadzic.

20 MS. EDGERTON: It's P4925. All right.

21 This is an order, it's a document that's entitled: Amendment or

22 supplement to directive 6 and it was issued by Dr. Karadzic on the

23 12th of December, 1993. And we could go to paragraph 2, subsection 2, in

24 both languages, so that's on the same page in English. But on the B/C/S

25 document you'd have to go over to page 2.

Page 47163

1 Q. This is an order, Mr. Sarac, that says: By -- I'll wait until we

2 see the document.

3 It says: By 21 December 1993 when the Geneva negotiations are

4 resumed to improve the SRK -- the SRK's operational and tactical position

5 by seizing Zuc and Mojmilo to ensure the most favourable position for

6 dividing the town of Sarajevo.

7 All right. You see that?

8 A. I can hardly see anything it's so dark.

9 MS. EDGERTON: I think what we need to do is in the B/C/S go back

10 to page 1.

11 Q. If you can't see, you should just tell us.

12 MS. EDGERTON: Go to the paragraph at the bottom of the page,

13 please, and enlarge it.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's better now.

15 MS. EDGERTON:

16 Q. All right. These are the tasks that Dr. Karadzic issued to the

17 VRS, very specific military tasks, with a view to improving the position

18 for the division of the city before the Geneva negotiations. And we

19 could probably, if it's all right with Mr. Sarac, go over to page 2 now

20 at the top of the page.

21 A. Very well.

22 Q. To --

23 A. And if you can just zoom in a little bit, please.

24 Q. All right. This tactical order was implemented by General Mladic

25 two days later, on the 14th of December, he issued an order to the

Page 47164

1 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, and he said in the order on the basis of the

2 decision reached by the highest officials of the Serbian people - and

3 it's P3052 - he issued the order to take over control of Zuc, Orlic, Hum,

4 and Mojmilo, among others, to finally provide conditions for the division

5 of Sarajevo. And then the day after that, on the 14th of December, the

6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps issued a command to carry out the operation. So

7 that's P1196. And I can show you any of these things if you'd like to

8 see them.

9 But what I want to put to you is not only do we have

10 contemporaneous statements of people in the direct chain of command, this

11 Court has military documents illustrating the effectiveness of

12 Dr. Karadzic's tactical as well as strategic control. So your assertion

13 that Dr. Karadzic didn't have control of the army actually has no basis

14 in the facts; isn't that the case?

15 A. I didn't say that he didn't have control of the army. He had

16 supreme control. All of this is legitimate. This is a directive that

17 was submitted to the Main Staff for implementation. One must

18 differentiate between the supreme commander and the operations commander.

19 He has nothing to do with the actual execution of the assignments, but

20 must just say what the tasks are and what the goals would be that would

21 need to be implemented before each peace conference. This was something

22 that was done by each of the sides. This is something that is being done

23 in Syria now as well.

24 I just want to add, I'm a little bit surprised, I'm being treated

25 as if I were a military expert. I'm asked to look at military documents.

Page 47165

1 I wish that I were, but unfortunately I am not.

2 Q. Well, your written evidence says at paragraph 9 that Dr. Karadzic

3 was engaged in peace plans and unable to keep things under control,

4 especially when it came to the armed forces. Making an assertion like

5 that, Mr. Sarac, it's for me to inquire what the basis of your evidence

6 is?

7 A. Yes. I assert that most of the time President Karadzic dealt on

8 preparing ways to resolve the situation and seek peace in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. He did not deal that much with the work of the

10 government even though he did have that right under the constitution to

11 convene the government in the same way as the armed forces. The reason

12 for that was because he was busy with these other things and didn't have

13 enough time. My subjective assessment is that he actually liked that

14 part of the job the best because of his profession of psychiatrist.

15 Q. So it's not that Dr. Karadzic couldn't keep things under control

16 when it came to the army, he just liked to do other things better?

17 A. Well, there was a great antagonism between the military and

18 civilian organs. A couple of times President Karadzic tried that but he

19 didn't manage to. In the war, authority and power lies in the hands of

20 those who have the weapons; the prime minister, the president do not. So

21 that is a fact, at least when we're talking about these local wars,

22 that's how it is.

23 In my statement, among other things, as an example it says that

24 we in the municipality as civilian structures were not satisfied with the

25 work of the police station. We pointed to a series of problems. It was

Page 47166

1 agreed with the minister of internal affairs, Mr. Stanisic, to make cadre

2 changes. A thousand people assembled and prevented the implementation of

3 the decision to which there was a right, according to the law. Can you

4 imagine how it was then if a minister could not resolve a question in his

5 own backyard, you can imagine how it was then on a broader level.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to repeat the

7 last sentence.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Sarac, could you repeat the last sentence of

9 your answer.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that the question is how

11 effective the government is of the president, the Chief of the

12 General Staff. I mentioned an example from Pale where they tried to

13 legally replace the head of the police station, but this was prevented by

14 a crowd of rabble collecting. The prime minister and the president did

15 not have that power. I know what their authority was, but simply the

16 minister of defence, of the interior were not able to actually exercise

17 the power that they had the right to under the law. That's the essence

18 of it.

19 MS. EDGERTON:

20 Q. Now, even though you might have sensed some antagonism between

21 the military and the civilian organs, you're not saying that there was

22 any cracks in the civilian-military machine, are you? Because

23 Dr. Karadzic himself said at the 50th Assembly Session, P970:

24 "How can there be a split between the supreme commander and his

25 subordinate commander? There's no split. If there's a split, it's clear

Page 47167

1 who will have to go. I haven't resorted to firing Mladic or any of his

2 assistants ..."

3 And he never did, did he? Things continued to function; right?

4 A. You see, you have to understand statements of this sort as a show

5 that you're putting on for the people. It was necessary to appease the

6 masses. The point behind this statement was to reassure people that

7 there were no conflicts, that everything was fine, so as to avoid having

8 people in general siding with one or the other side.

9 Q. Things --

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript doesn't reflect --

11 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 23, before "it was necessary

13 to appease," the witness said that there was a rift, a conflict, but it

14 was necessarily -- necessary to conceal this before the masses, but there

15 was a conflict.

16 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm having said so, Mr. Sarac?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 JUDGE KWON: Before you continue, Ms. Edgerton, for planning

19 purposes, I'd like to know how much longer you would need.

20 MS. EDGERTON: A good half an hour, certainly no less.

21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.

22 MS. EDGERTON: Thank you.

23 Q. So to go back to my question, you're not saying that the RS

24 stopped functioning? You're not saying that the civilian-military

25 leadership of the Republika Srpska broke down, are you? Things kept

Page 47168

1 running.

2 A. As I said, the people involved were clever people so ultimately

3 some sort of a compromise was found. Had this conflict come out into the

4 open, I don't think that we would have Republika Srpska today.

5 Q. Now, you also said that Dr. Karadzic had trouble controlling his

6 own government. I wonder, have you been watching this trial at all,

7 Mr. Sarac?

8 A. In part.

9 Q. So would you have seen Mr. Djeric, Dr. Karadzic's prime minister,

10 coming to testify in his defence and telling all of us that

11 President Karadzic and Krajisnik were the Alpha and Omega of the

12 government? Did you see that?

13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Prime Minister Djeric was a Prosecution

14 witness for the information of Ms. Edgerton. And while we're at it,

15 making corrections, Dr. Karadzic did attempt to discharge General Mladic

16 on the 4th of August, 1995, so it would be good to put -- if you're going

17 to put broad questions, to make sure they're accurate.

18 MS. EDGERTON:

19 Q. Did you see that? And, yes, he was a Prosecution witness. I

20 just have a note delivered to me from Mr. Tieger to that effect as well.

21 My mistake.

22 Did you know about Prime Minister Djeric's testimony?

23 A. Unfortunately, I did not follow the testimony of the former

24 Prime Minister Djeric.

25 Q. And --

Page 47169

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I ask for a reference that by

2 testifying in my case, Djeric said that Karadzic and Krajisnik were the

3 Alpha and the Omega.

4 MS. EDGERTON: Transcript page 27952.

5 Q. Now, again in front of the Republika Srpska Assembly, this time

6 in 1993, the 34th Session, which is P1739, Dr. Karadzic himself spoke

7 about his relationship with the government. And at English page 255 and

8 B/C/S page 289 he said:

9 "I usually don't do other things except for representing the

10 republic and watching over the internal politics, but believe me, the

11 government is mine. I am responsible for its functioning. I appoint and

12 propose the government mandator. I have a brilliant relationship with

13 Vlado Lukic," the prime minister at the time, "we're often together, he

14 often comes to my cabinet ..."

15 So, Mr. Sarac, Dr. Karadzic in his own contemporaneous statements

16 and his prime minister in front of these Chambers contradict you; right?

17 A. You see, this too could only be a show for the public. What I

18 said - and you didn't quote this from my statement - was that he did not

19 even have control over some parts of the government. I attended an

20 Assembly meeting and I recall being surprised by a question that was put

21 by the president, who said that he didn't know what became of the money

22 that was coming from the Central Bank, from the mission. His purview was

23 foreign affairs, culture, defence in part, whereas for the rest there

24 were strong individuals in place who were very hard to exercise control

25 over. Of course, under the constitution, the president appoints the

Page 47170

1 prime minister designate. In exceptional cases he may call a meeting of

2 the government, even chair the meeting. I think that the president

3 availed himself of this possibility only in a handful of occasions.

4 Q. In your statement, to go on to another area, at paragraph 20 you

5 were also very clear in the point that the Crisis Staffs in the territory

6 of the Serb republic had no command over the armed forces and, more

7 specifically, the JNA. So --

8 A. Of course, this is common knowledge. The Crisis Staffs did not

9 have the power to command the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, the

10 TO units, or the police units. The Crisis Staffs were in fact set up

11 pursuant to the federal Law on All People's Defence and the Law on

12 People's Defence of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina because

13 conditions were not in place for War Presidencies to be declared pursuant

14 to a declared state of war. The Crisis Staffs did not have any powers to

15 command in the field of defence and protection. As I said earlier, when

16 it came to the armed forces, the principles of subordination and

17 singleness of command apply. Had the Crisis Staffs had any sort of power

18 over the military and the police, it would in actual fact have meant that

19 there was two-track command in place which is not something that existed

20 under the SFRY military doctrine.

21 MS. EDGERTON: Your indulgence.

22 [Prosecution counsel confer]

23 MS. EDGERTON:

24 Q. You're not disputing that the Crisis Staffs were the highest

25 authority in the municipalities, are you?

Page 47171

1 A. The Crisis Staffs had the sort of powers that the

2 Municipal Assembly would have in peace time. So the Crisis Staffs were

3 duty-bound to hand-over all the decisions they had taken to the

4 Municipal Assembly for confirmation at the earliest opportunity. This is

5 what were earlier -- in the earlier period the committees for emergency

6 situations or councils for national defence that existed in all

7 municipalities. So this was some sort of an extended Executive Board

8 because one would automatically become a member of these committees for

9 national defence, although you had the possibility of co-opting

10 additional members. I can even cite the articles of the relevant

11 legislation pursuant to which Crisis Staffs were set up.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The transcript.

13 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Line 24 the witness said this was a

15 transformation of what were earlier these committees for emergency

16 situations. So this was a transformation of these structures into

17 Crisis Staffs, and this isn't in the transcript.

18 JUDGE KWON: Do you confirm that, Mr. Sarac?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

20 MS. EDGERTON:

21 Q. So you're giving us a very formalistic approach. You haven't

22 actually looked at any Crisis Staff documentation from anywhere across

23 the breadth of the RS, perhaps outside of your own municipality, Pale;

24 right?

25 A. I reviewed all the documents of the Crisis Staff of the

Page 47172

1 municipality of Pale, and I can claim with absolute certainty that all

2 the decisions were taken in accordance with the legislation in force at

3 the time. I was not reviewing the decisions issued by other

4 Crisis Staffs, but of course I always take a legalistic approach. I'm a

5 lawyer by profession. I always follow the same line of thinking, and

6 that's my view today, the one that I had at the time.

7 Q. And so I take it you weren't, in March of 1992, at the

8 RS Assembly on the 27th, P1634, when Dr. Karadzic said, at English

9 page 23, B/C/S page 39, when he said to the delegates: When you return

10 to your municipalities, especially the newly formed ones, establish

11 Crisis Staffs and find a number of reserve officers for those staffs and

12 have them register everyone who owns weapons as well as units.

13 And when he said: They should organise Territorial Defence, and

14 if the JNA is there, they must be placed under command.

15 So this is Dr. Karadzic specifically instructing not only the

16 formation of Crisis Staffs, but what forces should be placed under their

17 command. You weren't there to hear that, were you?

18 A. No. But if it's a transcript, I have no reason to doubt the

19 contents and I don't see anything untoward in them. In the former

20 Yugoslavia and later on in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, there

21 was the so-called concept of All People's Defence and social self

22 protection. All the socio-political communities from the local community

23 to the municipality to the republic to the federation had to have plans

24 for emergency situations, combat scenarios, et cetera. The political

25 organisations had to have them as well, such as the League of Communists.

Page 47173

1 Q. Mr. Sarac --

2 A. Later on when the --

3 Q. Mr. Sarac --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- you actually answered my question in one syllable when you

6 began speaking. And if you want to not stay here so long, perhaps we

7 could try and abbreviate this. And if you want to tell Dr. Karadzic any

8 of these things in his re-direct examination, you could feel free.

9 I want to go on to one last area and it's about the non-Serbs in

10 Pale. Is your evidence that all the citizens of Pale were treated

11 equally and that there were no distinctions made between Serbs and

12 non-Serbs?

13 A. From -- on the part of the municipal authorities, but not between

14 the municipal and republican --

15 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter isn't sure about the answer.

16 MS. EDGERTON:

17 Q. Do you think you could repeat that answer. The interpreter

18 didn't understand you.

19 A. By the authorities, from the municipal to the republican

20 authorities, no distinction was made and no discrimination took place

21 along those lines.

22 Q. But, you know, you've already said it's not out of the question

23 that they were threatened; right?

24 A. Mind you, you have to look into the specific historical

25 situation. At that time we had 12.500 refugees at Pale. At one point --

Page 47174

1 or previously the policemen were always in charge of neighbourhoods and

2 knew what was going on. At this point in time, this was not the case

3 anymore. I know that there was some private groups that went around and

4 threatened people. What I'm stating is that this was not the official

5 authorities. I know that even at one meeting of the Crisis Staff,

6 Mr. Coro raised this issue about a man whose name was not mentioned and

7 the representative of the police station said that there were people

8 coming at Pale in uniform from elsewhere and other municipalities. So

9 there could have been cases like that one. What I'm claiming with

10 certainty is that nobody from the Pale police station was responsible for

11 such conduct.

12 Q. Well, what I'm putting to you is that life for the non-Serbs in

13 Pale - and this Chamber has heard it - life for the non-Serbs was

14 actually a misery. They were harassed and threatened by the Bosnian Serb

15 police. They were harassed and threatened and assaulted by

16 paramilitaries, special units who could do whatever they wanted, but they

17 were known people from the area including Rajko Kusic. They couldn't

18 travel. They had no TV. They had no phone lines. They couldn't even go

19 into some shops. Life for them was a misery, and they had been

20 complaining about it to municipal authorities for months; right?

21 A. There were complaints made. The municipal authorities tried to

22 help with this as best they could. Throughout the time they were at

23 Pale, we had excellent communication with them. We helped them as far as

24 we were able to. However, I tell you, in a situation where we had

25 12.000 refugees at Pale and there was the peculiarity, there were

Page 47175

1 refugees from Pofalici, a number of whom had been killed and nobody has

2 been held to account for that, it was impossible to keep things under

3 control. As for the domestic police forces and the domestic population,

4 the local population, I can claim with absolute certainty that conduct on

5 their part was proper and decent. There were even quite touching scenes

6 when these people were leaving Pale. I'm sure that you must have heard

7 about it.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Can the witness repeat his last sentence.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Transcript.

10 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat your last sentence, Mr. Sarac.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that when Muslims were

12 leaving Pale, there were moving scenes where their Serbian neighbours

13 were seeing them off, kissing them, saying good-bye, and this is not

14 something when it came to one -- the one side, the second side, or the

15 third side, this is not something that was ever experienced elsewhere in

16 the country.

17 THE ACCUSED: And in line 20 on previous page, it had been said

18 in Pofalici had been killed up to 300 Serbs.

19 JUDGE KWON: You overlapped with the interpretation.

20 THE ACCUSED: I think it is now in the transcript. In line 20,

21 the witness said: Refugees from Pofalici where up to 300 Serbs had been

22 killed.

23 JUDGE KWON: Very well.

24 MS. EDGERTON:

25 Q. Now, in these desperate conditions when republican leader

Page 47176

1 Nikola Koljevic tells the members of the non-Serb community: It doesn't

2 matter what you want, that you want to stay on living here, it doesn't

3 matter what you want, but the Serbs don't want to continue living with

4 you here. That --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a reference, please.

6 MS. EDGERTON: P733, paragraph 38, page 7, pages 12 and 13 in

7 your language, Dr. Karadzic.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can the witness be shown this,

9 please.

10 MS. EDGERTON: Perhaps Dr. Karadzic could do this in his

11 re-direct examination --

12 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

13 MS. EDGERTON: -- if he would like to.

14 Q. When they get -- when the non-Serbs get told that by a republican

15 leader, living in these desperate conditions, that leaves them with no

16 choice about where they might find safety and security. They have no

17 confidence when the leader tells them that he doesn't want to be living

18 with them anymore, that they're going to be able to live safe and

19 protected, can they? They have no confidence?

20 A. You saw the letter by the Pale Crisis Staff addressing the

21 Muslims. The Crisis Staff did everything in its power to help these

22 people, to provide them with supplies and everything else. As for the

23 statement by late Professor Koljevic, I really cannot believe that he

24 said this. It's an expressional humanist, a Shakespearologist, who spoke

25 English better than an English lord. I would really like to hear a

Page 47177

1 recording of this statement if it exists. Never in his life did

2 Nikola Koljevic state something like this nor did I ever hear him say

3 this. It could only be hearsay evidence, nothing else.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do believe it would be fair if

5 the witness were told who said this or shown it --

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, you can show his statement.

7 Yes, shall we continue.

8 MS. EDGERTON: Just for a couple of seconds more.

9 Your Honours, your indulgence.

10 Q. It's fair that the non-Serbs in Pale -- it's fair to say that the

11 non-Serbs in Pale were actually left with no choice about whether they

12 could stay or go, isn't that the case, given all the conditions that

13 you've described and you've agreed to in your testimony?

14 A. Mind you, the economic situation was disastrous. Food was in

15 short supply, but whatever there was, was shared around. Most of it went

16 to the refugees as well as to the local population. There was no

17 discrimination on that score, I assure you. That it was nice living in

18 Pale at the time, well, certainly not because in that case we would not

19 have seen as many Serbs leaving the area.

20 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

21 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please wait for the

22 interpretation to end.

23 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat. You're delaying it.

24 Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In line 8, the witness said it was

Page 47178

1 shared amongst everyone, not shared around. [In English] To everyone.

2 JUDGE KWON: Shall we continue. Thank you.

3 MS. EDGERTON:

4 Q. Mr. Sarac, the non-Serbs didn't have any real choice about where

5 they could stay -- whether they could stay or go, did they?

6 A. You see, the freedom of movement is guaranteed under the

7 constitution. We were aware of the sensitivity of the situation. There

8 were dozens of delegations of Muslims coming and asking that they be

9 allowed to leave to Sarajevo until the situation got stabilised. A

10 Municipal Assembly was held. The meeting lasted the entire day, and

11 ultimately this conclusion that you referred to was issued, which

12 reiterated what the document stated, that the citizens of Muslim and

13 Croat ethnicity who so wished be allowed to change their place of

14 residence in an organised fashion and that the police station should

15 facilitate the implementation of the decision. The majority submitted a

16 request to this effect. Let me just emphasise that it had to do with the

17 change of place of residence, not domicile or permanent residence.

18 Residence is temporary. Domicile is permanent --

19 Q. Mr. Sarac --

20 A. -- so their place of permanent residence would remain in Pale,

21 whereas their place of residence would be the place of their choosing.

22 Q. I'd like you for a second for this last question to stop taking a

23 legalistic approach and put yourself in the shoes of your non-Serb

24 neighbours and what they were experiencing at the time, because you were

25 there and you saw it and you heard about it and you've talked about it in

Page 47179

1 your statement. You've said how difficult it was. They had no real

2 choice anymore, did they? All they were looking for was safety and

3 security. They had no real choice about whether or not they could stay

4 or go; right?

5 A. I repeat, in Pale at that point in time it wasn't easy for

6 anyone, for Serbs or Muslims. These people thought that it was the

7 better choice to go to the Federation, and that happened elsewhere too.

8 That is to say that there was no organised action to expel these people,

9 I mean to expel them. They left according to the procedure, about which

10 you have documents. That it was easy for us, no, it wasn't easy for them

11 or for us. The situation was very bad for all citizens of Pale.

12 MS. EDGERTON: I'm done, Your Honours.

13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, how much do you need for your

14 re-examination?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excellencies, I'll be done before

16 3.00, considerably before 3.00.

17 JUDGE KWON: We need to change the tape in five minutes and which

18 take about 15 minutes.

19 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

20 JUDGE KWON: In order to continue, we need some break. We better

21 have a break for 15 minutes now and continue for your re-examination, but

22 there are a couple of things I'd like to deal with.

23 First, Mr. Robinson, the Defence's motion for the -- I forgot the

24 name, to request the -- your request that Mr. Jankovic's counsel to be

25 present in the courtroom is granted, Aleksandar Aleksic.