1 Wednesday, 1 October 2014
2 [Open session]
3 [Defence Closing Statement]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE KWON: Good morning, everyone.
7 Yes, Mr. Karadzic you have the floor.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Good morning, Your Excellencies.
9 Good morning to all. Thank you, thank you for giving me this
11 I come from a system where it was clear for 50 years that if
12 somebody is sentenced to ten years in prison, he must be guilty of
13 something because for nothing people got eight years in prison. That was
14 our justice; however, the west hasn't faired much better. When it was
15 established that Dreyfus, totally innocent, life imprisonment was reduced
16 to ten years in prison. So we've got two systems that have similar
17 results. They are particularly drastic and dangerous when they meet one
18 another: Western justice and our Balkan fate. Something like that
19 happened in the beginning of the 20th century when Austro-Hungary tried
20 many Serbs. The best known were the Banja Luka and Zagreb trials that
21 really shamed that country. And then Masaryk and other renowned persons
22 with a great deal of moral integrity were turned against the state
23 because the state acted in such a way. The Dreyfus affair and the
24 Austro-Hungarian trials happened then. And, in the meantime, nothing
25 that big or this wrong happened like this war that was imposed upon us
1 and these trials that followed that war.
2 From those days until today, until this case, there hasn't been a
3 situation when so many decent, innocent people, mostly Serbs, were
4 sentenced to high prison sentences that they are serving in different
5 European countries outside their homeland; and, on the other side, so
6 many perpetrators of crimes against Serbs, murderers, were set free. We
7 can pretend that that did not happen, but it did happen, and it will be
8 remembered for longer than the Dreyfus affair. And that will be studied;
9 everything that was done and how justice was meted out.
10 We know exactly why that was done in 1914, for the sake of the
11 Austrian breakthrough into the east, why that is being done towards the
12 end of the 20th century. With small nations, that we don't know. Let us
13 hope to God that this is just for the sake of NATO credibility or
14 different elections. But I'm afraid that that is on account of something
15 that is far bigger than that and that the entire world is going to pay
16 for a lot more.
17 To be honest towards the Trial Chambers, although the Judgements
18 and the elaborations provided by different Trial Chambers, are really
19 something that should be read and that one had to wonder at, how people
20 reach certain conclusions. I have to say that the Trial Chambers are
21 less guilty there because that is really the handiwork of the
22 Prosecutor's office. For example, in this case, the Prosecutor is
23 challenging the authenticity of the Serb fear of a new genocide, and they
24 say that that was imposed upon the people by Karadzic and the Serb
25 Democratic Party. There is not a single family that does not have living
1 witnesses or the offspring of those who were killed in the genocide that
2 took place in the Second World War. It would only be fair for the
3 Prosecution to come out and say that had there not been a genocide
4 against Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia 50 years ago, now it's
5 been longer than that but in relation to 1990 it would have been 50
6 years, then Karadzic and others would not have to defend themselves and
7 they would not have to explain why they were not actually trying to
8 convince the people of something that is wrong and that is not
10 The Prosecution did not err on the side of caution. They did
11 even more than they were allowed to do. In our system, the Prosecution
12 would not be allowed to do what was done in this Tribunal, in this case
13 more particularly. I'm more familiar with my own case. They would have
14 been cautioned. Perhaps the case would have been thrown out all together
15 because of the way in which it is being presented to the Chamber.
16 Now, what is all this about? I know the truth. The Prosecution
17 knows the truth. Who are we supposed to delude? The Trial Chamber. If
18 I were a member of the Trial Chamber, I would be offended. This degree
19 of falsifying facts, such bastardised sentences where only portions of
20 sentences given in response are being taken into account and then this
21 semantic bastard is being presented as a fact. I highly appreciated the
22 well-intentioned cautions issued by the Trial Chamber that I was not
23 defending the Serb people but that I was here to defend myself because
24 the Serb people were not on trial; however, you will see that it is the
25 Serb people who stand accused, the entire Serb people stands accused, and
1 that has been demonstrated over the past two days most tellingly.
2 This is how it is being done: The Prosecution cannot indicate
3 what my motives are for those actions that they are attributing to me, to
4 my friends, my collaborators, and the entire Serb community in Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina, this community consisting of 1.500.000 people. I did not
6 have any reasons to go into politics actively. I had a successful
7 professional career, a very nice one. Also as a physician, as a doctor,
8 I had a loving family, I had a good social network, including many
9 Muslims and Croats. Many of them remained my friends. As I'm a trained
10 psychiatrist and I received my training in England, the US, in
11 Yugoslavia, and Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, and also knowing the Russian
12 and English languages, I could have worked anywhere in the world. I was
13 not a candidate for any particular office.
14 Now, why did I do all of this? If I'm crazy, then the
15 Trial Chamber has to see whether I am responsible for my actions. If it
16 is a question of patriotism being equated with craziness, then the
17 Trial Chamber has to see what the Prosecution is doing. If I'm crazy,
18 are a million and a half Serbs crazy, who let their only sons go into
19 freezing trenches to defend their homes and families for three and a half
20 years? To vote at all referenda in favour of what the Serb Democratic
21 Party advocated and what I personally advocated? Did they have a motive?
22 Did the Prosecution show to the Trial Chamber in any way what it was that
23 happened? How come so many people agreed on this? Out of 12 million
24 Serbs throughout the world, at least 8 million stood by that policy -- or
25 rather, was opposed to the policy that was pushing us into war and into
1 defending our basic fundamental rights.
2 The Prosecution has really exaggerated here, the distinguished
3 Mr. Tieger. He said that I said that the SDS was full of idiots. The
4 SDS had within itself and behind it the elite of the Serb people,
5 university professors, academicians, writers, doctors, and there would be
6 some obstinate people too, and colloquially we could say that such a
7 person was an idiot but not really. This kind of membership made the SDS
8 the best party, the most self-sacrificing party among the Serb people and
9 throughout Europe, if you will. The dissidents who had the moral
10 strength to oppose Tito and communism now made an effort in favour of
11 their own people, and they opposed the new world order that did not take
12 into account the basic interests of the Serbs.
13 The luckier ones lost their property but the less-fortunate ones
14 lost their nearest and dearest. The Prosecution offends these people
15 deeply by the things they are saying, by fabricating this joint criminal
16 enterprise that involves these people too, because these people asked to
17 be represented honestly and to have their political objectives and their
18 struggle for freedom be represented and defended. Nobody could have
19 imposed that upon the Serbs. The Serbs are the most difficult people to
20 lead because they are not sheep. They are not obedient. So nothing can
21 be imposed on them just like that.
22 These weak allusions proffered by the Prosecution are trying to
23 lead the Trial Chamber astray. Various words that were uttered by MPs
24 over the phone and chitchat, et cetera, and then they're drawing
25 conclusions on the basis of that. And then the entire case and the
1 entire Judgement, therefore, is supposed to be based on conclusions,
2 based on hearsay evidence. That would really be another invention,
3 another precedent which would, indeed, be remembered. Allusions,
4 inferences, instead of evidence, that judgements would be made on that
6 For example, as a matter of fact, certain sentences uttered by
7 members of parliament are being misquoted here, although we heard two
8 prime ministers here, Lukic and Djeric. There were some extreme opinions
9 presented in debates, sometimes motived by political reasons, but these
10 extremist views never prevailed. The parliament does not meet for the
11 sake of sentences. The parliament meets to produce documents that would
12 be the foundation of a system. They did not show us a single document of
13 the Assembly of Republika Srpska that would have tolerated crime, let
14 alone led to crime as such.
15 The distinguished Mr. Tieger, a distinguished lawyer from the
16 Prosecution, since he has no evidence he decided to tarnish my
17 personality and he called me a liar and a mobster. That happened on the
18 very first day, and this was front page news in our media, as the
19 strongest argument provided by the Prosecution. That frees me from any
20 obligation to remain polite, but I'm not going to resort to that because
21 I have arguments. I believe that it was with a heavy heart that
22 Mr. Tieger decided to go for this kind of labelling and tarnishing a
23 person's reputation. He probably wouldn't have done that had he had a
24 single shred of hard evidence against Radovan Karadzic. In this way,
25 without any kind of evidence, the OTP is expecting the Trial Chamber to
1 make certain decisions, to draw certain conclusions, and to base the
2 Judgement on that which the Prosecution is proffering as evidence, and
3 this basically consists of allusions, random chitchat, testimony by their
4 own employees as experts, who managed to put the indictment itself into
5 evidence. We've written all of this. I don't need to repeat everything
6 that we've said in the final brief, how the employees of the OTP
7 testified, admitting that they made an effort to please the Prosecution,
8 to prove something that the OTP already knows, and so on. We have about
9 a dozen of those experts who, at any rate, should have been totally
10 impartial and they certainly were not.
11 Now, what is behind the Prosecution case, the so-called joint
12 criminal enterprise? This was probably taken from legal provisions that
13 deal with the prosecution of Mafia. There wouldn't have been an
14 indictment had it not been for this kind of unfair argumentation. There
15 would have been no indictments except for immediate perpetrators. If you
16 don't believe this, instruct the Prosecution to write up a -- or to patch
17 up an indictment against me that would exclude JCE. Let's see what
18 Karadzic would stand accused of then, apart from the joint criminal
19 enterprise. The only thing that would remain would be my good deeds,
20 towards my own people and towards the other two peoples. These good
21 deeds are reflected in major efforts to avoid a war, and also in
22 lessening the suffering of all three peoples once the war had broken out.
23 Honest persons, especially those who converse with God, know that that is
24 so, honest persons from all three ethnic communities.
25 The Prosecution adheres to the JCE, thus accusing each and every
1 Serb. It is not true that the entire Serb people is not being accused
2 because this trial - and not only this one, these trials in general - are
3 supposed to shift responsibility from other peoples to the Serb people,
4 and then after the Jewish people some other people are supposed to be
5 declared victims to simply change this overall perception of crimes in
6 the world, as it stands today.
7 The Prosecution did not come up even with approximate allusions
8 as to who and how founded this joint criminal enterprise, who determined
9 what would happen and what would be done by whom. The OTP draws
10 conclusions after a civil war happened, after crimes were committed in
11 that civil war, so they say that must be because the Serbs had founded
12 the Serb Democratic Party in 1990. Then, however, they abandoned this
13 idea that it was the beginning of the JCE, and they move it to 1991 and
14 the moment when the authorities were established after these elections.
15 And then they blacken our entire struggle for freedom, constitutionality,
16 and the rule of law, as if on all other sides the rule of law and honesty
17 and integrity towards partners were flourishing, as if there had been no
18 secret army founded on the other side, targeting exclusively
19 Bosnian Serbs, an army that was first intended to fight the JNA and
20 Yugoslavia and then Bosnian Serbs.
21 We've heard here many accusations against completely legal
22 actions in parliamentary life and lawful parliamentary decisions. I am
23 painted by the Prosecution as an autocrat who holds everything in his own
24 hands, although there is hard evidence that it's not me calling people
25 from the Ministry of the Interior; they were calling me to ask me about
1 the agreement I had made with the SDA and the HDZ, and they were afraid
2 of it because that agreement threatened the foundations of our state and
3 the provisions of that agreement were incompatible with the survival of
4 the Serbian people. And I hope the record will be corrected after we
5 hear the tapes.
6 So the Prosecution implies that the Serb Democratic Party should
7 not have cared about implementing the programme that was supported by 50
8 per cent of the vote, although the Serbian Democratic Party put in
9 positions of power the least amount of party cadres, and that's why I was
10 criticised by many Prosecution witnesses, including Neskovic and others,
11 who claimed that I had put power back into the hands of old cadres,
12 although I had tried to nominate professional and able people. Thus,
13 everything that happened in 1990 turns out to be suspect, whereas the
14 Islamic Declaration is mentioned nowhere.
15 I had asked Mr. Izetbegovic explicitly, and he said that he would
16 not renounce it for the sake of our political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 They pretend there had been no decision to establish the Patriotic League
18 on the 30th of March, 1991, and as if on the 30th of April, 1991, that
19 league had not really been established, and that's the date from which
20 their years of service are counted, as if the council for the defence of
21 Muslims had not been established, comprising officials who, instead of
22 defending Bosnia and all the ethnic communities, created a separate body
23 as a political wing of the Patriotic League. They pretend that until
24 September -- by September 1991, as if we -- as we saw from the documents
25 of Sefer Halilovic, the Patriotic League was not established in 103 joint
1 municipalities. They only didn't dare to establish them in Croat
2 communities. And in those communities, in many of them, Serbs were the
3 majority; 8 per cent were the Muslim majority. And if all that had not
4 been happening, the Serbs were trying to do something that was
5 prohibited. And the Prosecution completely overlooks the willingness of
6 the Serbs to compromise, and they ignore our demands to form associations
7 of municipalities by their own free will. Instead, we see that there are
8 orders to form joint municipalities in Kosovo. It was always the right
9 of people to organise themselves and form associations, to combine their
10 resources to meet their needs. Regionalisation is a red rag to the
11 Prosecution, as if it had been done in secret. The regionalisation was
12 carried out pursuant to the constitution and the laws, and especially in
13 view of the threats that Bosnia would secede violently and unilaterally
14 from Yugoslavia without dealing with the issues of the rights of Serbs,
15 and later Croats as it turned out.
16 The Prosecution overlooks that we accepted to give up on the
17 regionalisation at the proposal of Mr. Zulfikarpasic. The international
18 and our Western allies who regularly betray the Serbs - and they have
19 done so this time - had the opportunity to opt for European-oriented
20 Muslims in Bosnia. There are many of them, and there were two big
21 parties led by Fikret Abdic and Zulfikarpasic. No, they opted for the
22 other variant that led to war. The Prosecution says in their
23 paragraph -- they say that Bosnia-Herzegovina inevitably moved towards
24 independence while Karadzic was -- it's paragraph 28, Karadzic was
25 intensifying ... and so on and so forth.
1 Bosnia was not moving towards independence inevitably. It was
2 not inevitable. But in chair's opinion number 4 says that. It was not
3 inevitable and it was not clear. And we see that from the decision to
4 establish a conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina lead by Lord Carrington and
5 Ambassador Cutileiro. If it had been inevitable, why then all these
6 additional measures to enable it? And although the Serbs had accepted to
7 remain in an independent Bosnia, on the condition that they continue to
8 enjoy at least a part of what had been provided by the former joint state
9 of Yugoslavia, that proposal was supported by the European community.
10 That was a condition sine qua non. Without that, Bosnia could not have
11 moved towards independence. That was accepted, and within a week an
12 attempt was made to trick us.
13 We saw what Irfan Ajanovic was saying on the 18th of March.
14 "We will yet see who is a fool, who is fooling the European
15 community, who is not in favour in peace."
16 Since that did not happen within a week, it was the SDA that
17 rejected the agreement, Irfan Ajanovic later said that they only needed
18 to gain time, and why did they need that time? To trick the Serbs. The
19 Prosecution says that the Serbs had grabbed 65 or 70 per cent of the
20 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs demanded that much for
21 themselves, and they rely on different scribes serving at various
22 conferences and their understanding. But it is not confirmed by
23 Cutileiro or Akashi or anybody else who testified, it's nowhere in the
24 papers. On the contrary, Lord Owen says that it would have been the
25 first instance in history that an army that has not been defeated would
1 give back so much of the territory that it was at that moment controlling
2 and holding.
3 Let's look into these territorial issues. The Prosecution claims
4 that we were taking over power in different places and that we had
5 conquered 65 or 70 per cent of the territory. The evidence is replete
6 with proof that we had had that territory even before the war, and we had
7 an even larger territory before the war. And I said many times in the
8 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Don't try to violently impose some sort
9 of new state. That state will not be able to impose its power on 65
10 per cent on Bosnian territory. Nobody ever disputed that Serbs were the
11 majority in 65 per cent of Bosnian territory and that the Serb ownership
12 in Bosnia-Herzegovina was about 64 per cent.
13 We heard here that the late President Milosevic was smirking at
14 the idea, saying it was social property. If the Prosecution had looked
15 into our legislation, they would have seen that it was not state
16 property. It was social property, and farmland belonged to peasants.
17 Other people could not use it as grazing land unless they had an
18 agreement with the peasants. It's not nobody's; it's somebody's
19 property. However, in 1990, at the elections, the Serbs won absolute
20 power in 37 per cent of municipalities, rural but rather well-developed
21 municipalities, and a good amount of the vote in 47 per cent of the
23 The Prosecution says that the joint criminal enterprise implied
24 take-over of power in municipalities in which we already had power; and
25 in the municipalities in which we had power and in municipalities where
1 we were a minority party, there were conditions to form two or three
2 different municipalities. Even when we created the provisional borders
3 of Republika Srpska, we invited Croats and Muslims to establish their own
4 police stations wherever possible, not to go into Serb villages, and the
5 Serbs would not go into their villages to defuse tensions. There is no
6 way to throw out somebody from a municipality in which they have their
7 own police station, their own municipal authority. That was not the
8 purpose. The purpose was for the Serbs to protect what they already had,
9 and the Prosecution says here that Karadzic had said he would not allow
10 Alija's state to operate. Of course that kind of state would not work
11 because the Serbs would not accept it. But a state in which one-third of
12 the population occupying two-thirds of the territory as a majority
13 populace can function and will function, and I must mention that it was
14 late Mr. Izetbegovic who first suggested to divide Bosnia and who
15 proposed to apply his Islamic ideas only on the Muslim part of the
16 territory. He was then pushed into war. Somebody pushed him into war.
17 The conspiracy core inside the SDA pushed him. Zulfikarpasic discovered
18 it, as did some European countries. We will find out about that.
19 Zulfikarpasic left the SDA at that moment.
20 It was anyway Mr. Izetbegovic who suggested to divide Bosnia, and
21 I informed President Milosevic about that in an intercept reported on
22 29 May 1991. It's D -- we have it on the screen now.
23 We were astounded and we were not prepared because we had not
24 been thinking about this at all. However, when it became clear that they
25 will not abandon the idea of Bosnia's independence and they mean to have
1 a unitary Bosnia ruled by a regime that was unacceptable to us, then we
2 accepted it on the condition that we also have independence. The
3 Prosecution says that Karadzic was spreading the perception of threats
4 against Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Prosecution does not want to
5 show to the Trial Chamber that in the Muslim part and the Croat-held part
6 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was Hitler's Allies who came into power. If
7 not President Tudjman, then his collaborators who came back from
8 emigration and took power. And Mr. Izetbegovic, beginning with 1939,
9 were members of the young Muslim movement and received al-Husseini, the
10 mufti who arrived to prepare the Handschar Division as Hitler's ally and
11 personal friend. Those were the things that all the intelligentsia among
12 the Serbs, all the educated people knew and wanted to defend the Serb
13 people from that, rather than conquer other peoples villages or territory
14 or impose their will on somebody.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, now because of -- thanks to that video
16 aid, we know that it's part of Exhibit D1282, but for the future
17 reference, you're better to put it on the record, in the future. Do you
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I apologise. For the
20 transcript, it's D1282 of the 29th of May, 1991.
21 So the OTP, without the obligation, to actually determine who
22 concocted this joint criminal enterprise wants the Trial Chamber to
23 believe it. They say Karadzic wanted an ethnically pure Republika Srpska
24 on 60 to 70 per cent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although the
25 record is replete with evidence that what that was about was the creation
1 of homogenous territory by not taking the inhabited places of others and
2 the regions belonging to others as part of the Republika Srpska. All
3 that time, Karadzic in the parliament of the Bosnian Serbs, in the
4 parliament of Republika Srpska, was fighting against coveting
5 territories, exaggerated territorial claims, and I quoted
6 Mr. Izetbegovic, who said "by God" -- this is P12. I believe that it is
7 page 38, where Mr. Izetbegovic said:
8 "For God's sake. When drawing the maps, please try to have the
9 least possible number of us in your parts and the least possible number
10 of your people in our parts."
11 This is a way to homogenise territories at the time when nobody
12 was even considering the possibility of war breaking out because there
13 was agreement that the problem should be addressed by not being overly
14 predatory and greedy in respect of territories belonging to others. So
15 what happened was that before the war, Dobratici, a group of Croatian
16 villages from the Skender Vakuf municipality, later Knezevo, in the
17 presence of European monitors was actually separated from Knezevo with
18 its Serbian majority on a voluntarily basis, and it was annexed to Jajce
19 with a Croatian majority.
20 However, the Prosecution is accusing Mr. Koljevic, an exceptional
21 person, dubbing him a Serb nationalist, extremist, and in paragraph 75
22 accuses him that he had said that the Serbs had accepted changes of
23 internal borders in order to accommodate ethnic reality. Changes of
24 internal borders meant what Mr. Izetbegovic was talking about, what I was
25 talking about, and on which such agreement had been reached even before
1 the war, and such a transaction had already been conducted between two
2 municipalities. So one group could not be retained by force of Croatian
3 villages in a majority Serbian municipalities if they felt better and
4 could meet their interests better in another municipality, and that was
6 The Prosecution goes on to abuse and to falsify data that it has.
7 How does it do that when in the Assembly of Republika Srpska I advocated
8 the acceptance of a plan, and when I spoke that or said that we should
9 not fight for too much territory, strive for too much territory, what
10 happened was that I am -- it is -- I'm depicted as having said I did not
11 want Muslims and Croats in the state. That never referred to Muslims and
12 Croats who would remain with us. That always meant -- that was always
13 directed against any requests for every Croatian village to be made part
14 of Republika Srpska because that would have meant misunderstandings, it
15 would have meant that people who would have become part of such a state
16 would have become enemies of that state, would not feel comfortable in
17 it, and we would not have their agreement generally speaking.
18 Where Yugoslavia is concerned, that's our common house, our
19 bitter agreement to Croatia's seceding from Yugoslavia by saying that we
20 should not fight at any cost for our enemies to remain in our house who
21 have attacked us in that century twice. The OTP portrays this as if we
22 were talking about domestic Muslims in Bijeljina, Srbac, Janja, or any
23 other place where they could, if they so wanted to, live normal lives.
24 This is what I talk about in Exhibit P87. I'll read it in
1 [In English] "When we sacrifice the state for the sake of one
2 village that wants to join it, if we start blowing like the balloon, we
3 can easily burst and we don't have the right to do that."
4 [Interpretation] I was saying exactly the same things in respect
5 of the mistake committed in 1980 by late King Aleksandar, when he
6 accepted that future big Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats,
7 and Slovenes, when he agreed to accept Croats and Slovenes into that
8 state and create at an inopportune moment a multinational state when you
9 could not create a state out of a tribe. That was not a job to be done
10 in the 19th century. That didn't happen in the 20th century.
11 I apologise. Actually, it was page 87 and the exhibit is D92
12 when I talked about the sacrifices made for a village.
13 So this position against coveting the territories of others,
14 against such greed for territory and exaggerated greed, is -- so my
15 position against it is mischaracterised. That, actually, I was saying
16 that what -- we should expel the Croats and Muslims from what we were
17 holding. The record is full of evidence that the Serbian side had
18 accepted and, in fact, had itself proposed and accepted to protect the
19 minorities in the cantons and in the republics, which the European
20 community had brokered upon a reciprocal basis and in a decent and humane
21 way. There is not a single shred of evidence that the Serbs wanted
22 anything but that.
23 The Trial Chamber in the Krajisnik case actually highlighted a
24 paragraph, I believe it was paragraph 109, where in respect of my words
25 which I uttered on the 14th of February, 1992, after the 13th of February
1 when we had established that there would be three Bosnias with Cutileiro,
2 so my words that they should be aware that there should be no escaping
3 from our parts, that Trial Chamber determined that, at that time,
4 Karadzic was still taking care of other -- of the interests of the
5 others, of the Muslims and the Croats. If we looked at the decision of
6 that Trial Chamber of this Tribunal, prior to that there was no joint
7 criminal enterprise. We actually have to set a new birthday for the
8 joint criminal enterprise, but they cannot show it to exist.
9 They can say there were murders that must have been according to
10 plan, and they take this KDZ240, (redacted) who, was not
11 supposed to testify about things that he knew nothing about, they take
12 him as a witness who says: I first thought that Karadzic had a great
13 analytical ability and then I actually realised that he was telling me
14 that what he was planning would actually happen. And I say that that is
15 not so. And I refer to my address to the Assembly -- speech to the
16 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the 15th of October, 1991, which the
17 OTP yesterday again represented this as a threat, although it is an
18 imminently anti-war address. I actually anticipated what would happen if
19 we opt for forcible secession, the forcible secession of unitary
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina from Yugoslavia. I reiterated that on -- also on the
21 25th of January, 1992, when I had this brief exchange with
22 Muhamed Cengic. We actually agreed to postpone the referendum until such
23 time as the government will have carried out the regionalisation. I told
24 him: We all know what will happen if an inter-ethnic -- a civil war
25 breaks out here, there will be massive loss of life. The Serbs will flee
1 to their parts, the Croats to their parts, and the Muslims to their
2 parts. And what will we get? What will we gain? The same thing that we
3 have now, but it will be much more homogenised, and we will have to sit
4 down and sign an agreement. In the meantime, there will be several
5 hundred thousand dead, several hundred cities demolished, and we shall be
6 where we stand today. We shall have to sit down and ensure three
7 signatures. Without three signatures, there is no Bosnia.
8 That was not clairvoyance. That was just simple watching what
9 was happening in -- following what was happening in Croatia, what was
10 happening, what had happened in all our lands in every war. Witnesses of
11 the Prosecution -- for the Prosecution here have confirmed that every war
12 in the lands of the former Yugoslavia had a civil component, a civil war
13 component, where our people, brethren of the same blood, same kinship,
14 but of different religions, exterminated each other.
17 So such my actions involving exchanges with foreigners are
18 portrayed as this or that, as if Karadzic had confessed. I cannot
19 confess, I cannot deny it, because I don't know until an investigation
20 has been carried out, or at least an inquiry to the military whether it
21 had, indeed, been so. So because of -- in the absence of real guilt and
22 real evidence, the OTP is actually portraying this as my confession.
23 Colm Doyle testified that I said that -- that they should not
24 open fire on Television Sarajevo, and I told him they will not shoot.
25 Somebody shooting, I don't know whether these are Serb forces, and he
1 said Karadzic accepted and apologised. But Karadzic, at that moment, was
2 not in command of anything. He didn't have any army to -- under him.
3 There were Territorial Defence forces of each municipalities. There were
4 individuals. There was the JNA - and I was not in command of the
5 JNA - and the OTP says Karadzic ensured that they shoot on Television
6 Sarajevo, that fire be opened on Television Sarajevo in April 1992.
7 So these are manoeuvres, and there is not a single allegation of
8 the OTP which does not need to be verified for veracity, for truthfulness
9 of the allegation.
10 Yesterday reference was made how I was accusing Beara and Mladic
11 because I was not guilty of something, but this is unheard of. This is
12 something I never did. I never defended myself by accusing others, and I
13 never accused anybody else of Srebrenica because I don't know what
14 happened. Now the picture is being put together, but that is not my
15 defence. In my opening remarks, I said I will not defend myself but by
16 pointing the finger of blame at other people. What I want is, I want to
17 know what happened, and I know what happened. Civil war happened that we
18 could have anticipated, that we saw before that in Croatia.
19 So it is a sea, an ocean, it is an abundance of things. There is
20 not a single sentence that should not be exposed to criticism because
21 this is not the way this is done -- actually, misleading the
22 Trial Chamber. This is not in the service of justice, distorting words
23 and sentences, is not that.
24 Yesterday they said that it is not true that there was no
25 communication between Pale and Sarajevo and Banja Luka and that I didn't
1 have influence, and they showed this telephone conversation between me
2 and Brdjanin from November 1991. Nobody is saying that at that time
3 there were no communications. KDZ101 - Dragan Kezunovic, not a protected
4 witness - he said that instead of several thousand telegrams a day, there
5 were about ten telegrams a day at the beginning of the war. That, that
6 is called the communications were down [as interpreted].
7 So the Trial Chamber and the Defence tried, albeit it is in an
8 unfavourable position, the Trial Chamber should actually check everything
9 that the Prosecution is saying and proffering. They said yesterday
10 Karadzic said that the incident in Kravica was triggered by an ostensible
11 mutiny and then a thousand men were executed, shot to death in Kravica,
12 as if Karadzic had said and then had them executed. First of all, it is
13 not a thousand; and, secondly, it was established here that there had
14 been an incident.
15 So these are things - I'm looking at the clock - but these are
16 things that are completely on a collision course with any notion of
17 justice, not to say international justice. In our country, in the former
18 system, this would not have been permitted to them. Just a sweeping
19 statement, there was this JCE between me and President Milosevic. What
20 we had was respect, at least on my part, but there was no agreement in
21 any other thing, on any other -- in any other respect. He was against
22 the creation of Republika Srpska; we were in favour of the creation of
23 Republika Srpska. He was against the establishment of the Assembly of
24 the Serbian people; I was in favour of that assembly. And we have
25 evidence here to that effect, because we didn't any longer have a chamber
1 of nations. He was in favour of accepting all or any peace plans. I
2 have never seen many of the alleged members of the JCE in my life, but
3 the Prosecution believes that they have no obligation to identify and
4 state how and in what manner was this plan which is being attributed to
5 us actually drawn up and developed.
6 So I am looking at the clock, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we'll have a break.
8 Before that, yes, Judge Morrison.
9 JUDGE MORRISON: Dr. Karadzic, you've been competing with what
10 sounds like a powerful electric drill. We will see if we can get it
11 silenced, but I can't guarantee that.
12 JUDGE KWON: The Registry will take a look into that. We will
13 have a break for 20 minutes and resume at 22 past.
14 --- Recess taken at 10.02 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 10.23 a.m.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
18 As for the transcript and for the Trial Chamber too, could my
19 indication of the mistakes made by the Prosecution in terms of proving
20 joint criminal enterprise, could that be translated and could that be in
21 the transcript, primarily when was the joint criminal enterprise
22 established or formed and then how and so on and so forth? They're going
23 to trip over the fact - "they," the Prosecution - are going to trip over
24 the fact that the Serbs kept giving concessions all the time in order to
25 prevent a war. We have superb evidence here. The late Vance - not
1 Harland who takes notes. In 1992 he informed Genscher that Dr. Karadzic
2 wishes to avoid war at all costs. How would it be possible to realise
3 any kind of joint criminal enterprise without a war? A JCE as
4 represented by the OTP. However, the Prosecution says, and keeps saying,
5 that the Serbs were not supposed to have any claims of their own as far
6 as Bosnia is concerned, that they were overdoing it, and so on and so
7 forth. The Prosecution is referring to some purported interview given by
8 the late Raskovic, a friend of mine, a colleague of mine. They say that
9 he gave an interview to Yutel, this TV station that was not exactly
10 objective or fair towards the Serbs. They say that he was different from
11 me, that he thought that Bosnia would not be Serb aside, that the Serbs
12 would not suffer genocide in Bosnia. That is in paragraph 118 and it is
13 P6617 on page 2. The late Raskovic allegedly said:
14 [In English] "It would not be genocide. Maybe it would not be
15 Serbophile," talking about Bosnia, "and it would be Serbophobe, but it
16 wouldn't be Serbocide either."
17 [Interpretation] Why would the Serbs accept that their country,
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, should be Serbophobe? And who can guarantee that a
19 Serbophobe Bosnia would not become Serbocide at a given point in time?
20 Now let us see what -- not what Vox says, because Vox said in
21 1990 what would happen to Serbs in Islamic Bosnia, and a year later when
22 they were criticised, they again published this text and said: Well, we
23 were just joking a year ago. Such jokes are never told in Bosnia, also
24 the way people do not talk about a rope in the home of a hanged person.
25 We understood that and we were right. Take a look at this, take a look
1 at what Ganic is saying to President Tudjman, D1143. That's the number.
2 Ganic says: You know that the world is going to let us marginalise the
3 Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the same exhibit at another section
4 he says: We are going to marginalise the Serb entity in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is that Serbophobe component, I guess. So it's
6 not Vox, it's the number two man of the Muslim authorities in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina who is saying that. He is saying he is going to
8 marginalise the Serbs and that he's going to marginalise the Serb entity;
9 whereas he and his people are planning to import 4 million Turks, the
10 alleged descendents of Bosniaks, and regularly they are bringing in
11 illegally Muslims from Sandzak just to vote there and their only
12 objective is to artificially change the ethnic picture of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Prosecution says that it was Karadzic who
14 wanted to change the ethnic picture of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And of course
15 they are fabricating evidence, inventing it, because there is no proof of
16 any such thing.
17 The Prosecution regularly misquotes words that I uttered
18 somewhere at some point in time. These are mainly political speeches, so
19 this is a clash of opinions, of different views, also struggling in
20 parliament against undemocratic views, and the experts Donia and Treanor
21 themselves admit that I was facing major difficulties in parliament;
22 however, every decision in parliament was unanimously adopted. It was
23 adopted because it was changed during the debate. The Trial Chamber has
24 our position in evidence. Democrats find solutions; whereas communists
25 make decisions. That means that the proposal has to be changed until
1 everyone finds it acceptable. That's the essence of democracy; whereas
2 Donia and Treanor, the Prosecution experts, say that they did not see a
3 single proposal of the Bosnian Serbs not get through parliament. Well,
4 it's because it did not remain unchanged, because it was not imposed on
5 the MPs, not that anything could have been imposed on them.
6 The Prosecution says that I -- I -- well, that's paragraph 43 of
7 their final trial brief. They say that this is a well-known thing:
8 [In English] "-- stressed to his followers that Muslims could not
9 live with others and that population transfer was the solution. The
10 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina..."
11 This is quotation:
12 "... conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is basically a conflict among
13 peoples, just as it was in the case between India and Pakistan and that's
14 nothing new. It resulted in a huge resettlement of the people."
15 [Interpretation] That's the paragraph. That's what it sounds
16 like. P938. This is what it says. It is page 36, like P12, page 18
17 through 20:
18 [In English] "Imagine the stupidity ..."
19 [Interpretation] I said how idiotic, imagine how idiotic this is,
20 that's what I said in the original, how idiotic it would be to create war
21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 [In English] "The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is basically a
23 conflict among peoples, just as it was the case between India and
24 Pakistan and that's nothing new."
25 [Interpretation] And then this is what it says:
1 [In English] "Settlement."
2 [Interpretation] I didn't say it resulted.
3 [In English] "And with a huge resettlement or exchange of
5 [Interpretation] So that's my position towards the instigation of
6 inter-ethnic wars and population resettlements. However, this was
7 butchered by the Prosecution and they are misrepresenting it, saying that
8 on the 14th of February, 1992 -- actually, this was earlier -- or, no,
9 later. But the 14th of February as well, 1992, that is P12, that I said
10 that Muslims could not live with others. However, they omit to say that
11 where fundamentalism arrives people cannot live together and that was the
12 key point, the key sentence. The Prosecution says that earlier on I said
13 that we live together, and so on and so forth. Yes, we lived together.
14 However, I encouraged people to live together and now this thing that I
15 said about fundamentalism. In the meantime, fundamentalism happened.
16 They took power. The SDA gave up on Yugoslavia. They opted for
17 unilateral secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even at the expense of peace.
18 They sacrificed peace. The SDA formed a secret army consisting of over
19 100.000 people in 93 mixed municipalities. We saw all of that. The SDA
20 secretly sent its members to Croatia for training, just as the Ustashas
21 did before the Second World War, to Janka Puszta and Hungary where they
22 trained people to slaughter Serbs. Then after one year of a terrible
23 experience, deceit, abuse, abuse of institutions, abuse of police powers,
24 then the Serbs realised that when this form of political Islam arrives,
25 that form of government co-existence becomes impossible, living together
1 becomes impossible. We can only live one next to the other. We were in
2 favour of living one next to the other but not within the same political
3 system. If the Chamber were to follow what was happening -- what is
4 happening right now in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is only Serbs that are
5 being tried and there are video-clips of the crimes committed by Muslim
6 generals and they're not even being indicted. They're putting that off.
7 It's the same political system and there is that intention of abuse, of
8 subjugating others. That is not recommendable and that is not conducive
9 to a life together. However, the Prosecution portrays the Serbs as
10 vagabonds, who are sticking a thorn into a healthy leg in peacetime.
11 What I quoted is a verse by Njegos, and Njegos was indeed abused here,
12 and that is a fact that the Prosecution did not make an effort to get
13 semantic interpretations of our sayings, allusions, irony. When somebody
14 says that we were the most active in having the Muslims move out and if
15 you do not see that they are actually criticising the government, that
16 they're not doing anything else, this is what they say about Zvornik,
17 Bijeljina, this is irony, this is sarcasm, and the OTP are presenting
18 this as bragging, as boasting.
19 When I quote Njegos's verses, if you were to put them all in one
20 pot, a broth could not be blended together. This is poetry
21 from "The Mountain Wreath" that has been admitted into evidence. I
22 cannot find the page reference right now, but this is a verse by Njegos,
23 just like what I referred to earlier on was. But in somebody else's
24 language, a person cannot understand that but they should have made an
25 effort to get this interpreted properly rather than dragging Njegos
1 through court.
2 In paragraph 44, the Prosecution says when referring to talks
3 within the Presidency of Yugoslavia in January 1993 and after the
4 testimony of Minister Jovanovic here, the Prosecution still abides by
5 their own total misinterpretations of what they -- of what was said
7 [In English] "To remove non-Serbs from Serb-claimed areas and
8 maintain a revised ethnic structure persisted after much of the forced
9 displacement and that had taken place."
10 [Interpretation] First of all, the structure was not changed
11 because the obligation to return was always proposed by the Serb side and
12 guaranteed as well. The Prosecution takes as a basis for JCE, for which
13 they cannot say who established it and when. They say actually that the
14 essence of this is the Serb intention of removing Croats and Muslims from
15 territories that the Serbs aspire after, because during the war removing
16 civilians from areas of combat is an obligation, then the Prosecution
17 thought of saying permanent removal and then they added forcible removal
18 in order to ensure that this indeed constitutes a crime.
19 The removal of Muslims and Croats from territories that the Serbs
20 aspire after - which is not a crime - was never the plan of the Serbs;
21 rather, it was the struggle of Karadzic, Krajisnik, and all others not to
22 grab too much, that we should not take five Muslim villages for the sake
23 of one Serb village and that we should not create disgruntled people,
24 that is paragraph 46 where the Prosecution says in their brief that I
25 said that the Drina is pure. This is a discussion where we are preparing
1 for a conference and we are wondering what the conference is going to
2 give us, what they're going to agree to. It doesn't mean clean as in
3 ethnically cleansed, it means clear, that it will not be in dispute.
4 It's not that the Muslims didn't want the Drina. The Muslims wanted the
5 fall of Srebrenica, they wanted to exchange it for Vogosca and Ilijas
6 beforehand. Mr. Izetbegovic offered that to the people from Srebrenica;
7 however, they refused. So when we say purely Serb territories, it
8 doesn't mean cleansed Serb territories, it means indubitably Serb
9 territories. Cleansed is not the same as clean or pure. There is a
10 significant difference there. So you can see from the context that I am
11 speaking about what awaits us at the conference in Dayton, what will be
12 accepted, and for what we will have to struggle.
13 In defence of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan in 1993, I was defending
14 that plan before the MPs because they were saying some Serb towns and
15 municipalities, 90 or 100 per cent Serbs, are not anymore in the Serb
16 territory in the valley of the Neretva River, et cetera, and I told them:
17 Look, let's be honest, we also got some places where we were not a
18 majority. And the Prosecution portrays this as my bragging about the
19 success in grabbing other people's territories; whereas I was persuading
20 the parliament to accept the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. It was partly unfair
21 to us too, but it can't be fair only to us. In the same municipalities
22 along the Drina River before the war and when the war began, we were
23 offering to the Muslims to establish their own municipalities. Bratunac
24 and Vlasenica had signed an agreement and made a map -- in fact, maps.
25 And then somebody from Sarajevo ordered that they be rejected.
1 So no word about driving people out or taking over power. We
2 already had power. In Zvornik a plan had been made for two
3 municipalities to exist, and to this day two municipalities exist as they
4 did during the war. A large part of the Zvornik municipality was always
5 controlled by the Muslims and we never tried to take that. However, the
6 OTP claims that the Serbs took over Zvornik municipalities and that's not
7 true. When the war began, then the Serbs took over the town itself along
8 with the Serb parts, which in peacetime could have had two administrative
9 municipalities in its urban core.
10 In reference to Bratunac, it is said that somebody claimed there
11 was no longer a single Muslim left in Bratunac. At that point the Serbs
12 were controlling only the town and 20 per cent of the municipalities. 80
13 were in Muslim hands all the way up to October 1993. In that way, you
14 can condemn anybody if you do not have the obligation to prove facts. We
15 had to travel to Bratunac through Serbia because there was no direct
16 communication. Everything was occupied. And Podrinje was in the Muslim
17 hands for one whole year, occupied by at least 30.000 soldiers. These
18 are their facts. They are in the case file, in evidence. And it was
19 constantly a combat zone. The Serbs were suffering attacks in Podrinje
20 for a whole year and for a whole year we appealed to them not to go on
21 with it and that this area would eventually end up in the Muslim entity.
22 In all plans, I always allowed the possibility and it was always drawn
23 into every plan, the Vance Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, it was
24 always envisaged that Muslims would have 80 per cent of the territory in
25 the Drina Valley. That was envisaged and it would have been so had they
1 not opted for war. We will discuss Srebrenica tomorrow.
2 Your Excellencies, I have to point out the chronology of events.
3 The Muslims set fire to the valley of the Drina River at the very
4 beginning of the month of April. The crisis was created there on the
5 31st of March. We saw a document here of the Croatian intelligence
6 service and the Croatian Defence Council, showing that Captain Taric was
7 sent to Bijeljina on the 31st of March to take over power. And then he
8 really captured Bijeljina, took control of it. His snipers controlled
9 the entire town from the water-tower and from the high-rises. The first
10 victims fell, including a woman on her balcony, and then the Crisis Staff
11 of that municipality, not the SDS Crisis Staff, got together to discuss
12 what to do next. And then the OTP claims that the SDS invited Arkan to
13 come to Bijeljina. I believe even the -- in the indictment and the
14 pre-trial brief they say the crisis started when Arkan crossed the
15 border. Arkan crossed the border 15 hours after combat started, and on
16 that very day Arkan himself told the reporter:
17 "We came at the invitation of the Territorial Defence of
18 Semberija and the people."
19 A year later in another interview, he said: We were invited by
20 the SDS, because the SDS at that time was equated with the Serbian
21 people. I have to find that sentence. But on that day Arkan said what
22 he said, that he had been invited by the Territorial Defence, the
23 Territorial Defence of Semberija. And of course, they not only failed to
24 mention this, they falsified. And Prosecution chooses what he said two
25 years later to present as the truth, not what he said on that very day.
1 At the same time - and this is happening on the 31st of March - Karadzic
2 has no power at all. There is still a joint Presidency in place.
3 Biljana Plavsic and Fikret Abdic go at that time to Bijeljina to take
4 care of the situation on behalf of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
5 not on behalf of the SDS. And all this was going on a few days after the
6 massacre against Serbs in Sijekovac, in Bosanski Brod. And what does it
7 have to do with Radovan Karadzic or the SDS? And it is overlooked that
8 the party Crisis Staff is something quite different to the Crisis Staff
9 of the municipality. And five years into this trial they keep insisting
10 that the Crisis Staff of the party grew later into the Crisis Staff of
11 the municipality as a state agency. Yes, the same people were gathered
12 in it, but it's not the same thing. And in Bijeljina there is absolutely
13 no doubt who started it, who started the fighting and the crisis and with
14 what intentions. Also overlooked is the fact that among the 42 or so
15 casualties, less than 10 Serbs were included, but that's only because the
16 Serbs had escaped and the Muslims had check-points around the town. They
17 were exposed to bullets, to fire, the fire that was opened in response to
18 their fire.
19 I ask for your indulgence until I find the number of the
21 And they keep insisting that the SDS took over power in Bijeljina
22 on some day in April, the 2nd or the 3rd of April, after this conflict
23 began. Although witnesses from Bijeljina confirmed here that there was
24 no change in government, nobody took over power. The same authorities
25 were in place on the 31st of January, 1991, as on the 31st of January,
1 1995. There was no take-over.
2 It is also said here that Karadzic awarded Arkan, gave him a
3 medal. Arkan never decorated -- Arkan was never decorated by Karadzic.
4 He was decorated according to a proposal to decorate a unit consisting of
5 two detachments, and that was a unit that was not in Bosnia-Herzegovina
6 in 1995 or in 1992, and in 1995 when they offered their services they
7 were accepted and they were placed under the command of the army and the
8 police and there was no love lost between that unit, Arkan's unit, and
9 the army.
10 The Prosecution claims that Karadzic had the judiciary, the
11 investigating authorities, police, et cetera, he could have made arrests
12 and punished people. The president did not have such powers. Kovac was
13 asked here: If you had the authorities, the agencies, why didn't you
14 tell the president so that he can do that? And he said: No, that's not
15 the president's job. He didn't have such powers. He organises work in
16 state authorities. He cannot interfere with the work of the ministries
17 if the ministries are not going their job -- if they are doing their job;
18 if they are not, then he can try to reorganise them. However, the
19 Prosecution did not even care to look into the constitution and the
20 legislation that governs the conduct of the president of the republic,
21 but they do accept at the remark of one prime minister, saying that the
22 ministers of the army, police, and justice did address the president.
23 When there is a war on of course it is the obligation of these ministers
24 to address the president to see how these organs are going to be
25 resubordinated to the army because that needs presidential approval.
1 The Prosecution claims there is evidence that Arkan had committed
2 crimes but they didn't show that evidence. They wanted the president to
3 make arrests and judge people based on their reputation. We had a lady
4 witness here from Grbavica who had seen Vojvoda Aleksic accompanying
5 Dr. Seselj and she jumped up and said: Here is Vojvoda Aleksic. I asked
6 her: Do you know of any crime committed by Aleksic? She said: No.
7 Aleksic has a reputation because he is called Vojvoda and he has a long
8 beard, but he is an honest man, modest and humble man. Or concerning
9 this Vlaske from Ilijas who was unpleasant to UNPROFOR and the monitors.
10 He didn't care for them, didn't like them. He thought they were partial.
11 But there is no crime. However, the president is supposed to judge
12 people based on their reputation. Concerning Seselj who was so attentive
13 to the Muslims, he had in his Main Board of the Radical Party so many
14 Muslim members. His deputies always defended Muslims. His reputation
15 nevertheless is that he is against Muslims and some people always
16 exaggerate their reputation, just as they speak of Karadzic, although the
17 higher representative recently said that the Muslims never had a better
18 friend than Karadzic, the higher representative. Somehow this got swept
19 under the carpet, although I was really a true friend to the Muslims,
20 even to Mr. Izetbegovic. But my obligations toward my own people cannot
21 be set aside for the sake of friendship.
22 In 1995 Arkan's unit or Arkan did not commit any crimes against
23 anyone except Serb deserters, and the very next day their powers to bring
24 deserters into custody were revoked.
25 I began my speech with the Drina. Until the end of March while
1 the joint state was still in place, the Patriotic League and the
2 Green Berets were setting municipalities along the Drina on fire, with a
3 clear aim to bring UN forces to the Drina and cut off Bosnia from
4 Yugoslavia. Although recognition, international recognition was already
5 promised, it was expected on the 6th of April, it was already on the
6 horizon, they proclaim general mobilisation. Which kind of world could
7 recognise a country in which a general mobilisation is going on?
8 However, the international community did this in our case. It says that
9 Izetbegovic was against such a Bosnia-Herzegovina that was moving towards
10 independence, and the greatest experts of this world said that
11 recognition was a mistake, Lord Carrington, Badinter, Owen, Vance.
12 Bosnia should not have been recognised before all the three peoples had
13 agreed on it. So they had recognition promised to them already and they
14 still set fire on Foca, Zvornik, Bijeljina. And of course they failed.
15 They set fire to Bratunac only later, towards the end of April, and in
16 early May Judge Zekic was killed, and that's when what happened happened
17 in Podrinje. Podrinje was divided and several municipalities fall into
18 Muslim hands as well as 80 per cent of other municipalities and large
19 armed forces are on the attack every day.
20 In May, after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army,
21 municipalities were set to fire in the valley of the River Sana. And now
22 we have to defend ourselves from accusations in terms of what we did and
23 what it is that we wanted in the municipalities in the Bosnian Krajina,
24 which are municipalities Kljuc, Sanski Most, Prijedor, and Bosanski Novi
25 on the River Sana. The Prosecution does not have an explanation why the
1 war in those municipalities started only some six to eight, or rather,
2 seven weeks after the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They
3 didn't even try to explain why did not those Serbs immediately start to
4 implement their plan on expelling the Muslims from Republika Srpska.
5 During that time the Serbs were offering to Muslims in Sanski Most and in
6 Prijedor to form their own municipalities and their own police stations,
7 whereas the Prosecution says that the Muslim police were fired. Those
8 who refused to sign a declaration naturally opted for their own
9 municipalities, for their own police stations, but they could have
10 remained in the Serbian one.
11 So until the 22nd of May, until the incident in Hambarine, in
12 Prijedor, there was no war. On the 29th of April an order came to the
13 police station of the MUP of Bosnia and Herzegovina which was based on
14 the decisions of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying that an
15 attack should be mounted against the army and control of the Prijedor
16 municipality taken. That is when the Serbs actually consolidated their
17 own municipality and took control of that part, but they still offered to
18 the Muslims to form their own municipality. And they tried and went to
19 Ljubija to form their own municipality and their own police station.
20 Then the order came that that is not to be done but that combat should be
21 embarked on, and the combat started only on the 22nd of May because the
22 JNA had withdrawn on the 19th of May. The Hambarine incident was caused
23 by the Muslims, not by the Serbs.
24 Kozarac was next. Muslim population of Kozarac passed through
25 Serbian and Muslim lines and took shelter in the city of Prijedor, which
1 was Serb controlled, and the Serbs actually called civilians to take
2 shelter and to find shelter with their relatives or their friends, Serbs
3 in Prijedor.
4 Why did war break out in the valley of the River Sana? D3904
5 will explain that squarely, because it was ordered and because at the
6 headquarters in Sarajevo they were angry. Why were negotiations being
7 conducted there with the aggressors and the aggressors of course were
8 hailed from Bosnia, born and bred in Bosnia, Serbs. And this is what
9 Sefer Halilovic had to say on the 9th of December, 1992 -- sorry --
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: On the
11 10th of September, 1992.
12 THE ACCUSED: [In English] "The BH army in the Bihac region with
13 full attention and in organising its embryo, the Patriotic League, I was
14 in the region personally on six occasions. Therefore, the situation in
15 the wider region from the pre-war days until today is completely familiar
16 to me. I was even in a position to alert the government organs in that
17 region that armed combat was being obstructed since they waited rather
18 long and while war was raging in all the republic of BH. In this region
19 they were still negotiating with the aggressor."
20 [Interpretation] Of course, at the end of May this bore fruit so
21 that after Hambarine and Kozarac on the 27th of May simultaneously in a
22 number of places, including in Kljuc, conflicts broke out, Sanski Most as
23 well. And on the 30th of May, they attacked Prijedor from five
24 directions and reached the centre of the city, causing casualties and
25 causing problems.
1 And what happened then? Radio Prijedor announced that civilians
2 should withdraw. And after they had lost, the army took prisoner about
3 2.000, as it is written. The 1st Krajina Corps took prisoner about 2.000
4 Green Berets and handed them over to the investigation organs. All these
5 men had to be accommodated somewhere. Of course the government -- the
6 authorities in Pale didn't know anything about that. They had no
7 contacts whatsoever. This was also confirmed by Srdjo Srdjic that --
8 about what was done then, nobody else, Karadzic or Krajisnik. And what
9 did they do? They requested a detention unit to be made available
10 because the one which they had was too small so they got one in the
11 Omarska factory, where also before that and after that other people were
12 accommodated, on one occasion refugees and on other occasions the army,
13 the troops of Republika Srpska. So they got what they asked for.
14 The Prosecution says they were detained there, civilians were
15 detained there. This investigating centre, Omarska and Keraterm, was not
16 without investigations for a single day. Every day professional staff
17 was conducting investigations to see who of the people there were
18 prisoners of war and who were criminals, war criminals, and who was to be
19 released, and 60 per cent of the people were released from Omarska. Many
20 were arrested, many more were arrested, and many more were found there
21 that had participated in combat. Forty per cent of those people were
22 transferred to Manjaca. Ed Vulliamy, who was in Prijedor only once, he
23 wrote a good report - I'll give you the reference in a minute - he says
24 in his report:
25 "I passed through a Muslim village outside of Prijedor. It was
1 intact. There was just a white cloth hanging on the windows. The people
2 were going about their daily work ... et cetera, and I also saw Kozarac
3 which was demolished."
4 Then there is his interview with two Muslims. One Muslim says to
6 "I didn't take part in the fighting. It found me -- they found
7 me in the street, they took me prisoner and took me to Omarska. When
8 they found out I had not participated in the fighting, they set me free.
9 I wanted to get to Trnopolje as soon as possible because it is safe
11 That is what he said.
12 The second Muslim said:
13 "I fought and when I saw that we were losing, I fled home, I took
14 off my uniform, and I saw to it that I got to Trnopolje as soon as
15 possible because it was safe there."
16 So two Muslims came to Trnopolje in two different ways, both of
17 their own volition. Not gladly, of course. The OTP distorted things.
18 Nobody says that people left -- were glad to leave their homes and their
19 places of residence and to the reception centre, but they did leave of
20 their own free will, in two ways, two Muslims. In the report by
21 Ed Vulliamy, that can certainly not be said to have been inclined towards
22 the Serbs. He describes how people reached Omarska and how people were
23 set -- released from Omarska. And there were professionals there working
24 every day and nobody interfered with their work. The police and the
25 judiciary conducted the screening in terms of who was to be released and
1 who was to be prosecuted and who would be a POW. So these are three
3 The first day here the Prosecutor said that some people were
4 investigated -- maybe it was not the first day, but at any rate. And
5 then it goes on to say if it was established that they were not criminals
6 they would be released. No, they would not be released. There are two
7 kinds of prisoners of war: Those who are captured and will be exchanged
8 because they are not guilty of any criminal offence; and those who are
9 taken prisoner but have committed a crime and they will be prosecuted.
10 Why would they be released? Because they would fight again. It is
11 legitimate to actually take the enemy prisoner until the conflict ceases
12 and until an exchange is conducted and until the NATO bombardment ceases.
13 I never said that it was a precondition for it to cease, but no exchanges
14 are to be made before it ceased.
15 So that this is also mis-characterised. Prijedor is not on the
16 confrontation line. The fighters who attacked Prijedor are not an army.
17 According to the law of war, they have no rights at all because they are
18 not a unit. This is designated and marked. They are mostly in civilian
19 clothes and they are active in the depth of our territory. Anywhere in
20 the world that is called terrorists, but anyway they were treated as
21 POWs. But in Prijedor in 1994, there was sufficient Muslims to massacre
22 six Serb policemen and a sufficient number of Muslims to ask me to let 80
23 trucks a day leave Prijedor a day. I refused that of course and let
24 about five trucks per day leave. That's also in the record. So until
25 the end of the war, terrorist groups in dug-outs in the woods, in their
1 hideouts and in deserted houses existed and were active, operated. And
2 they killed according to this pattern, let's kill Bozo Indjic and set his
3 house on fire. We have proof of that here. And then they would say: We
4 have killed Bozo and we set his house on fire. We also wanted to
5 Grozora [phoen] but she fled through the window. But we did burn her
6 house. So what army are we talking about? These are terrorist groups
7 deep in the depth of our territory, killing as they saw fit and whom they
9 We have proof about the dug-outs, about the combats, about the
10 Serbian civilian victims. So in Prijedor, to which I said Penny Marshal
11 and the other journalists, it was not the way it is portrayed by the
12 Prosecution here. There were crimes.
13 [In English] "There was many."
14 [Interpretation] But in a shift, a guard who abuses his position
15 stops to be that when his superior arrives; namely, the first -- the
16 immediate superior is to prevent such acts and it is prevented by the
17 state. That is my man who is preventing his subordinate from taking such
18 action. That is my man doing the prevention. We have hundreds of
19 examples. Here we have testimony. Say we were closed, shut off in the
20 municipality, not in the detention centre, then the criminals came and
21 they injected some yellow gas and the moment they turned their backs the
22 police took us out. And you will find, Your Excellencies, examples of
23 this kind, that the next level, the next superior level actually saw to
24 the rights of the civilians and of the prisoners and fought against
25 crimes and misdeeds of their subordinates, of which there was a number,
1 unfortunately, as is the case in every civil war. Please warn me of the
2 time. I'm not quite sure. Can I go on now?
3 JUDGE KWON: If it is convenient, we will take a break now and
4 resume at 11.40.
5 --- Recess taken at 11.21 a.m.
6 --- On resuming at 11.41 a.m.
7 JUDGE KWON: Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 In paragraph 79, the Prosecution claims that the leadership of
10 the Bosnian Serbs and when making up these abbreviations and acronyms
11 they were more creative than the Soviets, Soviet writers of acronyms and
12 abbreviations. BSL or say CBS for the Serbian language. It says that
13 they wanted to keep as many territories as possible and to ensure their
14 borders so that they would not be permeable as far as the Muslims were
15 concerned. Karadzic is saying something completely different:
16 [In English] "I guarantee that everything that extends the war in
17 an attempt by the West to enable Muslims to bring territories back in
18 order not to be -- to beg the Serbs, but now the entire international
19 community has to beg Serbs to give some territories back, so we have to
20 prepare our Serbs to lose as less as possible in a firm, responsible, and
21 statesman's manner, but that we get the main part, that is, that a state
22 outside any federation and confederation. And what is most important, in
23 our opinion, we must not accept at any cost any membrane not even to the
24 weakness association that outside Bosnian borders would be preserved
25 because it is a great danger today and tomorrow."
1 [Interpretation] So I'm advocating peace and I'm against the
2 splitting up of Bosnia and against the annexation of different
3 territories and I'm advocating modesty in terms of territorial
4 aspirations. A territory can be consolidated, ethnically consolidated,
5 in several ways. The way that was proposed before the war and practiced
6 before the war was what Mr. Izetbegovic proposed was the change of
7 municipal borders in order to leave out villages that did not wish to
8 belong to a particular unit, that preferred belonging to another unit.
9 So that was a way that was stricter. It prevailed before the war because
10 before every peace plan and before every peace conference that was the
11 main issue that he would raise. The OTP say here that I did not accept
12 the Cutileiro Plan. We did not accept the maps and I had to tell the MPs that
13 we were not accepting the maps because otherwise we would have had a very
14 difficult situation in parliament. And according to that setup, the
15 Serbs had the right to their own police and later on we would agree on
16 the rest. The Prosecutor says that even before the Cutileiro Plan the
17 Serbs were preparing and asking for their own MUP. Well, that's why it
18 was part of the plan because we had asked for that and the European
19 community thought that that was justified. However, we did not establish
20 the MUP before agreement was reached on the constitutional principles.
21 We asked, we were setting this forth as a condition, we were threatening,
22 we were saying things had to be done in a legal framework; however, we
23 did that only once that had been adopted.
24 In the same speech, I say:
25 [In English] "If we will redefine then we have to agree to
1 redefine, but, trust me, it can be described and calculated how much we
2 saved with the fact that we have not fought Croats for a year and a half.
3 We don't know. When I see young men in those areas I think: Would he be
4 alive if we fought Croats? That is God's will, that is the truth with
5 Croats that appeared naturally. Many people stayed alive. Huge material
6 means have been saved. This is the best moment for us to finish the war,
7 that a referee plays, the end on which occasion we have an excellent
8 score and it is better that we give something back, although I know that
9 it is hard for us and they will curse and spit on us and they will do a
10 lot to us. It is better that we give back than to ask back."
11 [Interpretation] So the Prosecution is completely disregarding
12 the context in which I am saying that the territories of others should
13 not be taken, that people should not lose their lives on account of
14 certain territories that we would return anyway, and so on and so forth.
15 So a false picture was created. And this paragraph 79, like the entire
16 case against me, is false.
17 Another way for having a pure territory is for the army of the
18 other side to take that area, round up the population from their homes,
19 and deport them somewhere. That did not happen in the case of the Serbs.
20 To a large extent, that did not happen as far as others were concerned
21 too, and this is how and why. There weren't any undefended places that
22 had declared themselves undefended. So the army could not enter a
23 particular town or village without fighting through defence lines. Once
24 the defence lines would be down, the population would leave even before
25 the army. The army would not wait for the enemy army to enter their
1 village or town. In the areas that the Serbs took, such as Jajce, such
2 as Odzak, such as Podrinje later, the Serbs, the Serb army, never had any
3 contact with civilians. The civilians had left earlier on from all of
4 these places. That's what the Serbs did. When Grahovo fell, Glamoc,
5 Petrovac, Sanski Most, Mrkonjic Grad, Sipovo, the people fled the very
6 instant they realised that the lines could not be held. So that was not
7 the way in which ethnic cleansing was carried out.
8 The third possible way was that the army that had their own
9 government in that territory would not have to fight its way in. They
10 would -- they could get the people rounded up and deported, but that
11 never happened. Witness 310 spoke about seeing, I don't know, 300, 400
12 people at Grbavica at 6.00 in the morning as they were crossing the
13 Vrbanja bridge. Is somebody trying to say that these people were rounded
14 up forcibly at their homes? How many soldiers would be needed for that
15 kind of thing? And what kind of chaos would that have meant? Obviously
16 that had been agreed upon, there were lists, lists were made. People
17 reported in advance and they waited for the time when they could cross
18 over. (redacted)
24 (redacted). That is
25 how things could have been done. It's not that people were rounded up in
1 their homes; that did not happen. Music talked the situation in Hadzici.
2 Seven times his family went for this agreed exchange of civilians and
3 every time it is the Muslim side that did not allow this to happen. They
4 would return to the sports centre and they would wait for the next
5 exchange, and it was only the seventh time that the exchange took place.
6 So that's what the witnesses told us here. They said to us that we would
7 have an hour or two to get ready, but, yes, that means two hours if they
8 wanted to get to that bus. They had placed their names on the list a lot
9 before that. They even paid all their dues to the state before that.
10 They settled all their accounts. And then they would be informed as to
11 when the bus would arrive. We saw that; however, Kotor Varos is not in
12 the indictment -- actually, I don't know whether we accepted that. You
13 know, at the Presidency it said -- they say: Well, the Croats from such
14 and such a place paid money and they were not exchanged so then their
15 money should be given back to them. So that is how they were leaving our
16 territory without any kind of fighting before that.
17 Please let us take a look at this, what one of the members of
18 parliament said, the late Branko Simic in P1369 on page 33 and 34. The
19 most liberal Banja Luka is asking for three documents to allow someone to
20 move out. Many municipalities are asking for all of 14 documents in
21 order to allow a person to leave.
22 Grgo Stojic, another Prosecution witness told us here about his
23 village, this Croat village in Sanski Most, how they surrendered their
24 weapons and they lived a normal life. They got a lady teacher who was a
25 Serb who came every day. The municipality paid for these classes. The
1 Muslims went to the centre in Sanski Most on market day to buy and sell
2 and they would return once they were done. And one day on a Monday, he
3 says: I noticed two criminals waiting for me. And these two criminals
4 took him to some other place where there were other Croats, they killed
5 them, but he managed to survive. From that instant when he established
6 contact with normal Serbs and the state organs, the police, hospital, the
7 Red Cross, and so on, that very moment he was saved. Danilusko Kajtez is
8 not Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska are the policemen who took him
9 in, who took a statement from him, who put him into hospital.
10 Republika Srpska are the doctors who treated him and informed the
11 Catholic organisation Caritas and took care of him so that he could
12 continue his medical treatment. And he appeared as a witness only after
13 the war, and that is why Danilusko Kajtez could not have been tried
14 because there weren't any witnesses. All of that is contained in our
15 final brief. And I also sent to the Trial Chamber and the OTP everything
16 that I have been saying. That's our response to their final trial brief.
17 Please take a look at this, what Grgo Stojic says. He needed
18 quite a few documents to leave. You have to pay for this and that and
19 then you have to pay taxes. You have to pay for transportation. You
20 have to pay for PTT, and so on and so forth.
21 [In English] "Those who wanted to leave had to apply to leave,
22 then were given a list of various certificates and documents that they
23 needed to provide. After that, if there was any outstanding tax, it had
24 to be paid. Then they would be put on the convoy list. After being put
25 on the convoy list, they would be notified about the next convoy. The
1 notification about the convoy came over the radio."
2 [Interpretation] So they drove people out by radio, and that's
3 called ethnic cleansing. There is no example of a case when official
4 authorities rounded people up and drove them out. There were
5 individuals, renegades, or refugees who had been driven out of their own
6 homes that had been set on fire, committed acts of retaliation. But this
7 is an official agency formed by ARK, that Arkan and private agencies
8 followed. They did leave their homes with a heavy heart, but they left
9 of their own free will. What happened with those who had not paid taxes,
10 who did not have the money? They were not able to leave. And what about
11 those who did not even ask to leave? They stayed in those towns until
12 the end of the war. There was not a single place that was devoid of
14 The Prosecution mentions Milivoj Milincic in a negative context.
15 Milos Milincic was the president of Srbac municipality and a member of
16 the Main Board of the Serb Democratic Party. Bosanski Kobas is a Bosnian
17 large place in Srbac, and before the war - we had that intercept -
18 Mr. Milincic informs me they don't accept for an outpost of the school
19 called Sveti Sava to bear the name Sveti Sava. In that intercept, I tell
20 him this is their ancestor too, just like Jacob, Isak, Abraham, and
21 Joseph. It is a Muslim ancestor, just as Serb. Still they didn't
22 accept, and they suggested another name, the name of Mesa Selimovic, an
23 important writer of Islamic faith. That's what I suggested. I did not
24 impose this on Milincic. He was asking for my advice and my support.
25 And before the war, we were trying to find a solution that the Muslims in
1 Kobas would find satisfactory. They did not move out. They formed a
2 unit of the Army of Republika Srpska called Mesa Selimovic. Throughout
3 the war, they fought for Republika Srpska. They did not fight for
4 the Serbs. They fought for the values that are common to Serbs and
5 Muslims: Democracy and a secular state.
6 Then the commander of that unit, later president of Bosanski Brod
7 municipality -- those are the Muslims then who didn't have to go
8 anywhere. They didn't have to leave. They signed up and joined the army
9 of their own will. But Milincic made that concession before the war and
10 met their request that the school be called not St. Sava but
11 Mesa Selimovic, and the Prosecution portrays this lovely man, an honest
12 man, in the way they do.
13 We saw from the document sent by the Muslim government to the
14 Prosecution in the beginning of July 1996 an overview of all the places
15 with the numbers of Muslim population before the war. For every
16 municipality, they say Serbs took over power in Laktasi municipality but
17 not by war, by settlement. The Serbs were there in government from the
18 beginning because the SDS had won the elections, but in all these
19 municipalities there was a significant number of Muslims. And the table
20 made by Ewa Tabeau shows that more Muslims left municipalities after the
21 Dayton Accords than before. When the war was over, when the borders were
22 clear, people started moving; until then, they stayed although they had
23 the option to sign up for convoys and didn't use that option.
24 In paragraphs 58 to 78, it is said that there was an alleged plan
25 of ethnic cleansing and that Karadzic was informed of it at a meeting
1 with the local authorities of Zvornik. It is perfectly clear what
2 Karadzic said. We can find it in P2937. We see it on the screen now.
3 "I was told that the Muslim inhabitants of Kozluk village in
4 Zvornik asked the authorities for permission to go to Hungary or Germany,
5 otherwise they would be considered hostages."
6 The Serb authorities asked for a signed document, including
7 requests made by the Muslims. The Serb authorities of Zvornik
8 municipality have written proof that inhabitants left of their own free
9 will. This evidence contains a list of names as well as a statement that
10 they were under no pressure. Each side has one copy. It is quite clear
11 that they were free to return whenever they wanted to and all of them or
12 almost all of them did return. Some remained in third countries. Before
13 departing, this organised departure, they were leaving in a chaotic way
14 and then the Orthodox priest and the Muslim priest came and told them,
15 together with the authorities, they should not leave. However, when the
16 conflict escalated the authorities were not able to guarantee safety even
17 to its own officials. Militaries slapped them around. They stripped
18 them naked, detained them, beat them, et cetera. That is the truth.
19 In paragraphs 44, 45, and later 77, 81, and 82 the claim is made
20 that during a secret meeting between Karadzic, Jovanovic, and Milosevic,
21 these three advocated the establishment of homogenised national
22 territories. They were against the freedom of movement that would
23 nullify the demographic structure of municipalities and the so-called new
24 reality. You can look it up yourselves.
25 At the beginning of his speech, Jovanovic very clearly stated
1 that ethnic cleansing is out of the question. Therefore, the territorial
2 link with Serbia and Montenegro, that is to say Yugoslavia, has to be
3 ensured in an indisputable way which is not transitory. But what is more
4 important is to make the territory that we get. And how do we get it?
5 We get it at conferences. This meeting took place before going to
6 New York for a conference discussing the Vance-Owen Plan, and whatever we
7 were getting we were not getting by firing weapons. We were getting it
8 at conferences. Continuing quote:
9 "Nationally homogenous, as much as possible, but not by means of
10 ethnic cleansing."
11 This is very different from the paragraph of the Prosecution
12 final brief, where it is claimed that I advocated ethnic cleansing.
13 Continuing quote:
14 "Ethnic cleansing is a trap. We should use a peace time process
15 of population exchange, in other words, migrations."
16 Migrations are a matter of people's own free will and they take
17 years to happen. If people want to go for that, it takes years. And my
18 support to Jovanovic was by saying: Yes, let things happen naturally.
19 Why would we even think of ethnic cleansing when people are deciding to
20 do this themselves? And we now see that the Muslims have returned to
21 Zvornik. If the Prosecution had looked at the map, they would have seen
22 that in Sapna and in other places of Zvornik were a Muslim municipality
23 of Zvornik and now that's Muslim territory.
24 Paragraph 59 states that the Bratunac leadership bragged that
25 there were no Muslims left in Bratunac, that ethnic cleansing had been
1 carried out by local authorities. At that moment the Serbs controlled
2 less than 20 per cent of Bratunac. In 80 per cent of the territory,
3 there was not a single Serb. In 20 per cent of the territory, there were
4 almost no Muslims. And in P548, I said we must not put pressure on
5 people to resettle. This is not for the benefit of the media. It was
6 said at a closed meeting with the leadership. We must not put pressure
7 on people to resettle.
8 In paragraph 60 concerning Ilidza, the Prosecution alleges that
9 the local authorities were driving the population out instigated by
10 Karadzic. Prosecution witnesses themselves denied -- it's P5065.
11 Prosecution Witness Prstojevic testified that there had been 55.000 Serbs
12 and 100.000 others in Ilidza. Prstojevic and Kezunovic denied having
13 heard such instructions, and Karadzic even said that not a single Muslim
14 or Croat must have a hair on their heads missing. Glavas confirmed it
15 too. He was also a Prosecution witness and he had no contact with me
17 In paragraph 67, the Chamber [as interpreted] says that Karadzic
18 supported the destruction of mosques in Banja Luka. In our final brief
19 in paragraph 1143, relying on D106, we refuted this completely.
2 In paragraph 57, the Prosecution says there was a ban on the
3 return of refugees -- correction, paragraph 68. There was a ban on
4 refugees and settlement of Serbs.
5 I refer you to paragraphs of our final brief --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Karadzic slow down and repeat the
7 numbers of the paragraphs.
8 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. The interpreters didn't follow the
9 numbers. I take it they cannot see this video aid, visual aid?
10 Please continue. If you could repeat the final numbers for your
11 final brief's paras, paragraphs.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just before that, it was a
13 reference to paragraph 68 of the Prosecution's final brief and our
14 responses in paragraphs from 989 to 999. I will not repeat what is in
15 our final brief and in the Prosecution final brief, paragraphs 69, 175,
16 and 406 to 428. The Prosecution deals with directives, especially
17 Directives 4 and 7, and the denial of humanitarian aid to Muslim
18 civilians. We have already dealt with it in our final brief in
19 paragraphs 12 -- in paragraphs 1294 to 1329 and 3309 to 3317.
20 I could also mention that Marrack Goulding, in February 1992 --
21 in December 1992, was saying that the international mass media are
22 misrepresenting the shipments of humanitarian aid which is quite
23 sufficient and the media are not properly reporting it.
24 Concerning Directives 1, reference to paragraph 407 to 409 of the
25 Prosecution final brief, it is claimed on the 5th of June, Karadzic told
1 Mladic to cleanse the area of Butmir, Hrasnica, Dobrinja,
2 Sokolovic Kolonija, and soon after that followed a directive dated
3 6 June, that's D232. The Prosecution intends to suggest that some
4 illegal activities were involved; however, the fact is that in April and
5 May 1992, the Muslim army and Muslim paramilitaries were constantly
6 attacking Serb-populated areas precisely from Butmir, Hrasnica, and
7 Sokolovic Kolonija.
8 The contention is further that -- actually, the Prosecution
9 overlooks the fact that military operations in those parts never targeted
10 non-Serb civilians and the directive itself shows that it contains an
11 order to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to protect non-Serb civilians, the
12 population there, the civilian population, during the operation. But the
13 Prosecution doesn't see fit to make reference to that. In its final
14 brief, in its paras 408 to 409, we saw Exhibit -- order of General Galic
15 which says the police and the army are bringing the civilians from the
16 combat zone to the barracks. I am unable to take care of them. Please
17 find some other accomodation for them. This is an obligation under our
18 defence law, it is an obligation for civilians to be moved out, not to be
19 resettled as is translated by the Prosecution in their documents. Moving
20 out, resettlement is a process of permanent transfer, but moving out is
21 regulated under the law and it has to be conducted. Here it is stated
22 that Krajisnik accepted -- admitted that an order of now General Andric
23 of 28th of May, 1992, on the ways of moving out civilians from Podrinje
24 constituted ethnic cleansing. This order of the 28th of May was also --
25 was created, in fact, a week after the parties to the conflict had signed
1 an agreement with the Red Cross. I believe that it is P1603 of the
2 22nd of May and all the other consequential agreements actually invoke
3 that original agreement from July and from the 27th of August and the
4 27th of -- 30th of October actually invoke that original agreement. The
5 only thing that Andric failed to do is to refer to that agreement, but
6 that was the gist of the agreement. The people and the civilians have to
7 be removed or moved out from the combat zone.
8 In the pre-trial brief, paragraph 70, the OTP states that on the
9 31st of May, 1992, Karadzic said, according to Mladic's diary, cleanse
10 Posavina of Croats. Mladic's diary is not a diary. They are just
11 en passant. These notes are not verbatim annotations, but they are
12 condensed form of what is happening, but the OTP could have checked up to
13 what extent this annotation was actually in keeping with documents and
14 other evidence. Did they find proof anywhere that a document had been
15 issued which would instruct or permit actions against the civilians?
16 Despite the large number -- the large body of evidence shown by the
17 Defence to the effect that vast efforts were invested to protect the
18 civilian population, the OTP is looking for a totally contrary
19 conclusion. The only conclusion to be drawn is that this sentence refers
20 to cleaning military -- cleansing military formations, military units of
21 Croats from Posavina. The Chamber already knows that Posavina is a
22 corridor, that the life line goes through Posavina, and it does not at
23 all refer to Croats as such. At that time we had Croats in our units.
24 We had a colonel who was a Croat in the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. We had
25 a lieutenant-colonel at Pale, the commander of the logistics base there.
1 We had a multitude of Croats in our army, so it does not refer to
2 civilians because they would not have stayed on in our army for a day if
3 civilians had really been in question -- I mean, these people in the
4 army. I have to underline again the Croats and Muslims who were in the
5 Army of Republika Srpska did not fight for the Serbian people; they
6 fought for common values, democracy, secularism, and freedom.
7 The directive which prohibits the maltreatment of civilians and
8 instructs observance of the Geneva Convention, this is D232, this is the
9 exhibit. The Prosecution says on the 8th of June Karadzic issued an
10 appeal to the public and to organs to help the Red Cross, but he issued
11 no order. He actually issued an appeal, not an order. And as for the
12 13th of June order which Karadzic issued, they call it instructions. It
13 is quite the contrary. On the 13th of June, it was an order and the
14 instruction was a supporting document in terms of the procedure to be
15 applied. The appeal issued to the public was to -- intended to create a
16 favourable atmosphere and position vis-à-vis the Red Cross and
17 international organisations, including humanitarian ones.
18 I issued 64 orders instructing observance of the humanitarian law
19 and protection of civilians. The OTP is totally disregarding all these.
20 They never even tried to actually refute documents of a strictly
21 confidential nature which are express orders to organs of the army and of
22 the civilian authorities to respect the Geneva Conventions and to respect
23 the civilian population and life as such. The OTP suggests that it was a
24 dual, a two-faced policy. On the one hand, orders were issued; whereas
25 on the other, countermanding orders were issued. But the Prosecution has
1 failed to show one single count -- order or countermanding order on the
2 Serbian side; whereas it has totally disregarded such orders on the
3 Muslim side.
4 So can we see D43, please. D43, that is my order of the
5 16th of April for a secession of actions directed at Srebrenica. In
6 order to belittle the importance of this order, the OTP says Karadzic did
7 this under pressure. First of all, under pressure, without any pressure,
8 it doesn't change -- it doesn't alter the fact that I stopped these
9 activities. Second, there were pressures throughout the war and
10 sometimes I buckled under pressure, I yielded to pressure to help us
11 survive, but I did not yield to pressure which meant heavy casualties or
12 heavy damage to us. But it is documented. You will see that I am
13 ordering that civilians should be protected. This is not what NATO asked
14 me, that investigation not be conducted because they could be abused,
15 that convoys be let through. Nothing of this content of this order has
16 been shown. Nothing was under pressure. But the Prosecutor does not
17 want the picture to be portrayed in terms of what my position was towards
18 humanitarian issues properly.
19 On that same day, Sefer Halilovic issued an order which is
20 document D343. The first one I mentioned was D43, it is just a mere
21 coincidence, from April 1993. And this one that I'm now talking about is
22 D343. It is also of the 16th of April. Can we see it, please. Can you
23 upload it, please.
24 Sefer Halilovic says in that document: The truce that we
25 ordered, forgot about it. This is only for propaganda purposes. You go
1 on with whatever you're doing. This is the moment when I stopped the
2 activities surrounding Srebrenica. And Sefer Halilovic actually ordered
3 a continuation of combat actions and disregard of the previous order.
4 What would the Prosecution give if they could only have found just a
5 single example of my own order or any order from the Serbian side which
6 is of such a dual nature, one issued for the public and the other
7 ordering totally contrary conduct. They haven't found it and there does
8 exists a Muslim one of that kind, but the Prosecution chose to disregard
10 In paragraph 74 and 541 of the brief of the Prosecution they
11 referred to the testimony of Ambassador Okun to the effect that Karadzic
12 exploited the results of ethnic cleansing, et cetera. Please take a look
13 at page 1818 of the transcript which is the testimony of Ambassador Okun.
14 What he says, I'm surprised to hear, that you are saying that I think
15 that your appeals were insincere. I said the opposite. I said that they
16 were praise-worthy. I said that they were commendable. I said that they
17 had merit, et cetera, et cetera. Ambassador Okun, in other words,
18 believes that it was so, as he put it. Here the OTP has put it to the
19 Chamber that President Dodik came after his testimony to greet me and to
20 kiss me three times. The Prosecutor thinks that that is important, but
21 they omitted to say that the Ambassador Okun also -- after the Chamber
22 had left the courtroom also came to greet me and to kiss me. Neither is
23 important except for private relations, but the Prosecutor chose to
24 report the first and to disregard the second, not to report it.
25 In paragraph 106 of the prosecutorial brief, the Prosecutor
1 contends that allegedly Karadzic had stated that Bosnian Serbs had the
2 support of the Serbian secret -- security service, that is, when Arkan
3 arrived. Their reference P1448 on page 133 does not make any reference
4 to Arkan or the state -- Serbian State Security Service. It just says
5 that the SDA -- SDS asked -- but only in the case of the JNA requested
6 from Serbs before the war not to organise their own army which was
7 supported by the State Security Service.
8 Regarding relations with Arkan, one should read our
9 paragraph 1076 to 1088; that is the Defence brief. When the OTP referred
10 to document P5888 to support the claim that Karadzic had orchestrated the
11 arming of Serbs outside JNA structures, this document actually says
12 something else. Here this is between me and Vukic. I don't have to read
13 it. You can see it on the screen. But for the sake of the public, I
14 should read it in English:
15 [In English] "Vukic: You know, fuck it. I -- they want us to
16 form the para units' army weapons. What do I --"
17 Karadzic says:
18 "No, no, no way. No, no, no way.
19 "Vukic: Do you know, what should we do? Tell me."
20 Karadzic said:
21 "I said no way. No Serbian army. It all has to ... those are
22 all under the reasoned things ..."
23 [Interpretation] So there is ample evidence that Karadzic never
24 encouraged the creation of Serbian imperial armies and all arming, any
25 arming, had to be done within the Territorial Defence which is under the
1 command of the JNA or within the reserve companies and battalions of the
2 JNA which were the reserve which could be drawn upon at any point in
4 In paragraphs 234 to 242 the Prosecutor says the government
5 belonged to Karadzic who controlled it completely. Our response to that
6 is in paragraphs from 2904 to 2933. The president has a number of
7 powers. They are reflected on the election of the prime minister
8 designate and they have to do with that and the harmonisation of
9 relations between state organs. The president shall also see to the
10 implementation of democratically adopted decisions in his party before
11 the war and after the freezing of the work of the party when the war
12 began. And if the prime minister designate with whom he proposed is not
13 doing his job well, he cannot remove him, dismiss him by himself. He has
14 to go before the Assembly. Neither the prime minister -- he cannot
15 remove them, prime minister or any minister. The Assembly was the
16 supreme organ of power. Of course the president had to see to it that
17 the state organs were doing their job well, not how they were doing, but
18 to harmonise their work. If a ministry is not functioning well, the
19 president could not replace the minister. He had to ask the government
20 to forward the proposal to that effect to the Assembly, which is the
21 case, as far as I know, in all democratic countries.
22 Paragraph 237 of the Prosecution's brief contends that Karadzic
23 reiterated in March 1995 this point when he told those who were attending
24 a Supreme Defence Council meeting, yes, that is the Supreme Command:
25 [In English] "... every honour to it if it succeeds; I am
1 responsible. The army is mine as much as the minister's. As much as the
2 prime minister is mine, so the army is mine ..."
3 [Interpretation] The Prosecution is abusing my clashes and
4 misunderstandings with structures, especially military structures, where
5 I'm trying to convince them that they have to carry out orders faster.
6 If they were doing all of that without any objections, then this sentence
7 would not have been there, and, by the way, my clashes with the officers
8 had nothing to do with any crimes of theirs. All witnesses testified
9 here that my conflicts with the officers of the VRS were of an
10 ideological nature because they had come from a different ideological
11 communist background. And when I asked the witness whether we could --
12 whether Mladic had committed crimes, he said: Ah, had he committed
13 crimes? We could have replaced him more easily.
14 Do I understand this correctly that this is time for a break?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes. We'll have a break for an hour and resume at
17 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.42 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 1.40 p.m.
19 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Tieger.
20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Mr. President. I advised the Defence
21 that I wish to very briefly raise one matter before we move deeper into
22 the submissions, and that is as follows: Although the Prosecution and
23 Defence agree that it is both appropriate and has been the practice of
24 the institution to submit slides used in opening or closing presentations
25 to the Trial Chamber, we are concerned based on a discussion with the
1 Defence that it may intend to go beyond what we would consider the proper
2 limits. So while it's clearly permissible and highly practical to submit
3 to the Chamber slides containing quotations from documents in evidence
4 that have been read out during the course of the oral presentation or
5 visual aids that are shown to the Chamber and discussed during the
6 presentation, it is not appropriate to submit to the Chamber submissions
7 on slides that have not been said to the Trial Chamber during the course
8 of the presentation, as that would obviously circumvent via a backdoor
9 written submission the ten-hour limitation. And the same is true we
10 would consider for lengthy footnotes. Either they're read out in court
11 or they clearly represent an effort to not use the time that would
12 otherwise be taken by providing a written submission.
13 So I wanted to raise that with the Court before Mr. Karadzic
14 moved too deeply into his presentation so he could incorporate those that
15 he considered important enough.
16 JUDGE KWON: Does the Defence want to add anything to this?
17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. President. It may turn out that we don't
18 use all of the slides that we presented for a variety of reasons,
19 including time and priorities, and we trust that as professional Judges
20 you will ignore those slides that have been submitted to you that have
21 not been discussed in Court.
22 MR. TIEGER: I'm sorry. Two issues, Your Honour, I apologise. I
23 don't want to get too deeply in this, but I think they should just be
24 withdrawn, first of all, by the Defence; and, second, there are slides
25 that have been alluded to where a portion of the slide is discussed and
1 then there are significant portions of text and commentary that have not
2 been orally stated and they present written submissions that are not
3 appropriate here.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE KWON: I confirm that the Chamber was in receipt of those
6 slides but also that we will not use it at all.
7 Shall we continue? Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 The distinguished Mr. Tieger on the 29th, on the first day, and
10 it also says so in the final brief, he said that Karadzic had control
11 over the local leaderships and he is referring by way of an example to
12 the SDS of Prijedor. We dealt with that in our final brief and we proved
13 that the SDS in Prijedor acted independently from the start to the end
14 and they had such aspirations and they carried out only the decisions
15 that they wanted to implement. This was even stated publicly. 1163
16 refers to that and D4057 as well.
17 Now, the Prosecution claims that Stakic admitted that people who
18 came to Trnopolje did not come voluntarily; however, Stakic said
19 something different. Of course it is being suggested that they were
20 brought in forcibly. That's not what Stakic said. However, on pages,
21 transcript pages 45238 to 45239 said the following. I'll read it in
23 [In English] "There were operations going on there. Is the army
24 when that day at the front line opened a pass gateway, if that is right
25 the war. And then they let these people get to town because they had set
1 out towards town of Kozarac, and then the people I walked with at the
2 Assembly told me that they had arrived during the night and that they
3 were staying in two buildings in town. And most of them were called upon
4 to stay with their relatives' friends. There were people with mixed
5 marriages ... and so on and so forth. I don't know who took these people
6 in. At one point in time when the police realised that these buildings
7 were overcrowded, they took buses. Once again, they asked these people
8 whether anybody had some private apartment or house to stay at with
9 someone, and then they got these other people who had fled from Kozarac
10 from the fighting and then they channelled them towards Trnopolje. I
11 never said and I don't want to say it now too and I don't want this to be
12 put to me that they were -- went voluntarily. What happened to them is
13 really sad and I regret it, but I am not saying that we did not make any
14 decision about this Trnopolje. We did not plan -- we did not plan this
16 [Interpretation] So creating an impression that Dr. Stakic said
17 something that he had not said does not assist in having the truth
18 established, and it is certainly not a contribution to international
19 justice. It is clear that the Prosecution needed not only a linguist,
20 but also an expert in semantics. What it means when somebody says "I was
21 forced to leave a certain place," it could have been something or it
22 could have been someone forcing him. But the Prosecution seems to be
23 satisfied that it is someone. To be forced by certain events is not the
24 same as being forced by a particular person.
25 Then also there is a question of voluntariness, doing something
1 voluntarily or happily. If somebody goes somewhere even if they're
2 leaving with tears in their eyes and with regrets, it's still their
3 decision. And amongst the alternatives at that person's disposal, he or
4 she chose the best one available. Drljaca, says the Prosecution,
5 informed the leadership about 5.000 Muslim corpses in the mine of
6 Tomasica. It is only Mladic's diary that is proof and the only witness
7 who testified about this was General Subotic, who explained here what
8 people knew or heard about that. It's on page 4138 to 4139. However,
9 these notes where there is an exaggeration or -- General Subotic
10 testified on T40138 to 40149.
11 The Prosecution presented an enormous number of alleged victims
12 from Prijedor, whereas I have a list of 250 soldiers that the
13 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina had registered as casualties in the fighting
14 in or around Prijedor. So everything that the Prosecution says -- the
15 Defence actually expects the Trial Chamber to double-check all of this
16 because obviously the OTP doesn't want to get to the truth but to emerge
17 victorious and I am not sure that that would be right.
18 The OTP also says that Karadzic wanted a state without many
19 internal enemies, again quoting Mladic's diary, P1477, page 258.
20 However, on that page, this is what I said. Again, this is a shortened
21 version. It is not verbatim. It's not recorded verbatim. I'll read it
22 out in English:
23 [In English] "We are on the threshold of achieving our
24 centuries'-old dream of creating our own state without many internal
25 enemies. We were very mistaken about the Yugoslav orientation of the
1 Muslims. Izetbegovic is a religious fanatic. He is for a division of
2 BH. The Muslims have formed green, red, and black berets. Izetbegovic
3 is hoping for further intervention. He is supported by MUP and
5 [Interpretation] So it is not an expulsion. It is not including
6 people and ethnicity who do not wish to be in a particular state. That
7 is why testimony about the creation of Yugoslavia was necessary and the
8 documents referring to that. Yugoslavia came into existence through the
9 victory of Serbia and the Allies in the First World War. The Croats were
10 defeated. They were panic-stricken. They frantically wished to join the
11 state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes because they were afraid that the
12 promises of the London Conference would establish the border of Serbia on
13 Virovitica, Karlovac, Ogulin. The king -- the king who reigned then,
14 King Aleksandar, agreed and that was a very, very dear -- and a very dear
15 price was paid for that terrible mistake, a million and a half victims in
16 the Second World War. Do not include the territories of others. Do not
17 help the enemy in that way, especially when there is fundamentalism. We
18 even have housewives nowadays who are leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina, going
19 to Syria to fight for Islam.
20 On page 37 of Monday's transcript, the Prosecution answered their
21 own accusations when they said that the Defence in their final brief gave
22 an abundance of evidence to the effect that Karadzic did everything to
23 avoid the war. I'm going to read it in English now:
24 [In English] "While painting Izetbegovic as a man who actively
25 sought war, falsely, Karadzic paints himself as a man who sought only
1 peace, filling pages of his brief with various pronouncements ... that he
2 at every opportunity tirelessly advocated for peace."
3 [Interpretation] Of course the Defence called a great deal of
4 evidence. We do not need to make these bastardised constructs and to
5 butcher sentences as the Prosecution did, and in this way they are trying
6 to mislead the Trial Chamber. Why didn't the Prosecution give any proof
7 that Karadzic was in favour of the war? And why does the Prosecution
8 forget that it was the Muslims who declared war on the Serbs, it wasn't
9 the Serbs who declared war on the Muslims? And why are they forgetting
10 that Karadzic throughout 1992 publicly asked Izetbegovic to withdraw this
11 declaration of war? And he did not introduce a state of war in
12 Republika Srpska so that the life of ordinary citizens would not become
13 militarised. That's the way it was, and we have proof. We have evidence
14 from Mr. Vance. A week before the Lisbon Agreement, he states that
15 Karadzic wanted to avoid war at all costs. The entire behaviour of
16 Karadzic and the Serbs from the beginning of September 1991 is in favour
17 of an easing of tensions. When the historic Serb-Muslim agreement went
18 down the drain because it was rejected by the SDA, then the
19 Autonomous Region of the Krajina was established. However, the Serbs
20 remained in favour of sacrificing everything for peace. So then in
21 September 1991 we adopted conclusions to the effect that all proposals
22 were legal, legitimate, that they were all on the table, and that nothing
23 is going to be imposed on anyone, that all decisions should be reached by
24 consensus. And already on the 14th and 15th of October, we encountered
25 this deception because independence was declared illegally. Even then,
1 on the 15th of October, up until the 25th of March, the Serbs were
2 prepared to give concessions just in order to avoid the war. On the 18th
3 we -- on the 18th of March, we agreed to the Lisbon Agreement and then
4 the SDA refused to agree to that, and then there was this slaughter in
5 Sijekovac and Brod and then the National Security Council and the
6 government and the constitution, everybody had to deal with that, in
7 Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. And the Prosecution held that against
8 me. Now it was impossible to communicate with a minority and minority
9 rights could not be exercised if there is no such council.
10 The Prosecution also says that the local leadership in Celinac
11 passed certain racist measures for the Muslims of Celinac, they say the
12 non-Serb population, and they are leaving out important parts of document
13 P628. P2638 is the number of the document.
14 And he says due to the combat activities going on in the
15 territory of Celinac municipality and further afield, reasons occurred
16 for non-Serbs in Celinac to be given a separate status with clearly
17 defined rights and obligations and duties. And it goes on to list 34
18 persons out of several thousand. Only those persons who were known for
19 their anti-army activities that could result in case the army arrives or
20 passes in some sort of aggression against those 34 non-Serbs. The
21 president of Celinac municipality, Mr. Kovacevic, confirmed that this
22 applies only to these 34 persons who are named and it was for their
23 protection because the municipality could not provide 34 policemen to
24 constantly guard these people.
25 The Prosecution, however, does not specify it applied only to 34
1 people. They say it applied to non-Serbs. The Prosecution does not
2 provide any evidence that Arkan had committed any crimes before he
3 arrived in Republika Srpska, and they refer to documents P2888 and
4 another 8, page 4. All that is written there is that some members of
5 Arkan's unit made trouble but there is no mention that Arkan committed
6 any crimes in Brcko. There is also no mention of non-Serbs. We heard
7 here that Arkan had been arrested in Croatia before the war began in our
8 lands, and apart from his bad reputation, they didn't find anything else
9 and they released him. One cannot be judged on the basis of their
10 reputation and especially not by the president of the state.
11 [In English] "During the first month of the war in Brcko, members
12 of the volunteer formation of Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan,
13 were also present. They made a significant contribution to combat
14 activities but have, on the other side, caused problems similar to those
15 caused by the majority of volunteer formations."
16 [Interpretation] Maybe it's time for me to extend my response to
17 include an answer to the Chamber's question number 2. This document
18 suggests that the volunteers were a problem. The volunteers were
19 governed by a decision of the Presidency of Yugoslavia which was a
20 legitimate body. From the moment they sign up to the Territorial Defence
21 or a military unit, they become equal in their rights and duties to any
22 other serviceman. However, there is not a single group or individual who
23 came to Republika Srpska saying: I want to be a paramilitary man. They
24 all signed up to be volunteers. The evidence of that is used against me
25 and the Prosecution says they were on the payroll of the
1 Territorial Defence of Zvornik or Brcko or wherever. They have to be on
2 some payroll. That man did not come there as a paramilitary man. He was
3 a member of the army so he had to be on the payroll. Nobody was happy
4 with volunteers until such a time as they all submitted to a single
5 command or were expelled. That's how it happened in Zvornik, Brcko,
6 Bijeljina, and Bratunac. We've heard here that paramilitary units
7 multiplied mainly in rich municipalities, municipalities that had wealthy
8 businesses or factories or enterprises. They would come a couple of
9 times to do a stint on the front line and then they become renegades and
10 there was no such power that could remove them from the payroll because
11 they were a power unto themselves.
12 In all the documents of the police and the army, there is
13 evidence and proof of efforts made to either resubordinate them and make
14 them again subordinated to the Territorial Defence, to the police, or the
15 army, or to expel them. In Bratunac, before the killing of Judge Zekic,
16 the War Presidency even issued an order specifying a dead-line by which
17 paramilitary groups must be expelled from Bratunac, and those
18 paramilitary groups had originally signed up as volunteers. And the girl
19 who was raped in Croatia by these volunteers, who were then Croatian
20 soldiers, was brought here to testify. In P1448, page 252 -- the
21 document is P1478. Again, it is obvious that individuals from the unit
22 ran out of control and out of command, not that the Arkan's unit had
23 committed crimes:
24 [In English] "Volunteer formations enjoyed exceptional success.
25 They were led by Arkan and Seselj."
1 [No interpretation]
2 [In English] "Volunteer formations enjoyed exceptional success.
3 They were led by Arkan and Seselj. Arkan's withdrew orderly, but some
4 that stayed broke free of his control."
5 [Interpretation] Of course Arkan was not in Zvornik during that
6 fighting and especially not Seselj and Seselj never commanded any unit
7 because his volunteers were disciplined and they were under the command
8 of the JNA.
9 Document P3056, particularly the document that says that Karadzic
10 was informed of Arkan's crimes and it is a document dated
11 24 September 1995, saying that Karadzic was informed of rumours, not
12 facts, and it states: Considering that the presence of Arkan's
13 paramilitary formation has caused armed clashes and incidents involving
14 individuals and parts of VRS units, as well as unrest among citizens due
15 to rumours that he had arrested all Muslims in Sanski Most and liquidated
16 a number of loyal Muslim citizens.
17 So from this document, we see a number of things. One, that
18 there is no love lost between Arkan and the army; two, that there were
19 rumours that in -- that on 24 September 1995 there were sufficient
20 Muslims in Sanski Most and among them many loyal Muslims but no proof
21 that this crime had happened, just rumours. And we will remember
22 document -- a document by Minister Kovac from January 1994 that was
23 presented here where he writes to his subordinates: Do not send me
24 material wherein the investigation has not been completed. I cannot
25 bother the president with rumours and incomplete investigations, send
1 just the reports about finalised investigations that resulted in criminal
2 complaints so I can inform him properly.
3 The Prosecution claims and it showed something on Monday that the
4 Yellow Wasps were part of the state system persecuting non-Serbs, despite
5 evidence that the police under President Karadzic expelled Yellow Wasps
6 and returned them to Serbia, of which they were nationals and where they
7 were tried for war crimes before a court of Slobodan Milosevic. Two
8 alleged members of the so-called JCE, Karadzic and Milosevic, one of them
9 is arresting these people and the other one is trying them. It just
10 doesn't work. We refer to it in paragraphs 1089 to 1114 of our final
11 brief. That is the real truth. It has been suggested here that we
12 proceeded with the arrests of Yellow Wasps because they had been rough on
13 Minister Ostojic. But the Prosecution doesn't ask why they had been
14 rough with Minister Ostojic and all the civilian authorities in Zvornik
15 and why Zuca came to look for General Subotic at Pale because they knew
16 by that time that the authorities were going to drive them out. They
17 would not have subjected a minister of the Government of Republika Srpska
18 to such humiliation if the government had been supporting them. That is
19 a clear truth and it needs to be said clearly. Never in Bratunac or
20 Zvornik or Bijeljina or Brcko would have paramilitaries turned against
21 the authorities if the authorities had not turned against the
22 paramilitaries first. That is a very simple fact and the truth.
23 The Prosecution also refers to directives as foundations as the
24 basis for crimes and it keeps pointing to directive number 1, but they
25 skip over important language ordering protection for civilians and POWs.
1 That's D232. Other directives are dealt with in paragraphs 1294 through
2 1329 of our final brief and in the section dealing with Srebrenica. Here
3 I have to note also that on page 75 of Monday's transcript the
4 Prosecution says, concerning directive 4, that Mladic allegedly said in a
5 telephone conversation, that's document P4795, that everybody in the
6 enclave should be killed and civilians expelled. But they omit two
7 important things. First, it was a summary of a telephone conversation
8 done by the Muslim intelligence service or the Croatian army; and,
9 second, Mladic said the following -- Mladic said the following when he
10 was wounded: Upon entering Srebrenica, everybody carrying weapons is to
11 be killed. The wounded and civilians are to be led out of the town.
12 This directive and Mladic's orders, referring to Srebrenica 93, are
13 covered in our final brief and ultimately nobody entered Srebrenica in
15 The Prosecution put a sign of equality between those who carry
16 weapons, who were combatants, and civilians, deceiving and misleading the
17 Trial Chamber. They also say that Karadzic had bragged to Bob Djurdjevic
18 that directive 7 was his own order, but if Karadzic had been responsible
19 for this order to commit crimes then Djurdjevic would certainly not have
20 testified as he did on page 25957. This is the evidence he gave:
21 [In English] "I have known about Dr. Karadzic, and my opinions I
22 formed on him and specifically what I have seen and witnessed on July the
23 13th and 14th, 1995, in my visits, there in Bosnia I cannot conceive a
24 circumstance where Dr. Karadzic would be party to any such crimes."
25 [Interpretation] Thus, little notes, entries, incomplete
1 sentences, free-ranging discussions among MPs that had no consequence and
2 were never entered into any documents. This is the evidence that the
3 Prosecution has just Radovan Karadzic and this is the fate of this
4 indictment. If this is a real court, then this indictment will be
5 rejected in its entirety.
6 Again, on page 15 -- 16 on Monday it was said - at least that's
7 the interpretation I got - that somebody said Muslims are not people. In
8 English it's probably not a problem. But in Bosnia it would mean people
9 as a nation. Muslims are not a nation. Serbs believe Muslims to be
10 Serbs who had converted to Islam and not a separate nation and all real
11 Muslims remained Serbs to this day. I will come back to that first day
12 of closing arguments. I have a few more points to make.
13 In paragraphs 484 to 503, the Prosecution in the final brief
14 suggests that Karadzic had available different systems of communication.
15 Our response to that is that all communication systems referred to by the
16 Prosecution has been well explained in our final brief in paragraphs 500
17 to 540, including documents to which -- which the Prosecution selectively
18 invokes, including reports of the MUP itself which is lamenting over the
19 absence of -- and lack of communication in this resorting to courier
20 communications at the end of the 20th century.
21 I should also like to draw your attention to the fact that the
22 Prosecution from the beginning to end is acting selectively on every
23 occasion. The Prosecution omits to at least comment some substantive
24 parts of the evidence. For instance, the witness Ranko Vukovic testified
25 in detail about problems associated with the communications system, and
1 it is in our paragraphs 511 to 513. The Prosecutor touches upon parts of
2 his testimony in their final brief - 484 to 487 are the paragraphs - but
3 the Prosecution does not mention an entire chapter in his statement which
4 actually addresses the question of the republican communications centre.
5 Along the same lines the Prosecution -- or rather, in the same way the
6 Prosecution treats documents of the MUP which refer to communications in
7 paragraphs 488 to 489 of their final brief and even refers to two MUP
8 reports from April and December 1992 in paragraph 489 of the final brief.
9 These are documents P2760 and P2761.
10 The Prosecution fails to accept that these reports clearly
11 demonstrate that the communications systems were practically
12 non-existent. The Prosecution goes on along the same vein, and in
13 paragraph 493 which also deals with communications in the state security
14 system, again on the principle of selectivity and with selective approach
15 to the testimony of Mr. Kijac, who was cited in extenso, in toto in
16 paragraph 522 of our final brief. In paragraph 525 of the Prosecution it
17 is claimed that Karadzic failed to react to information of the MUP of
18 17 July 1992 regarding detention conditions, conditions in detention
19 units and prisons. And we replied in paragraphs 666 to paragraph 679.
20 Just for your information, the president does not do that job. The
21 moment the president becomes aware and sees that the MUP has come by
22 information, it is -- that is sufficient for the president. The
23 president can expect the MUP to deal with the matter. The president is
24 not a Johnny factotum. He doesn't even have the powers to do that. So
25 it is sufficient for the MUP to be aware of the situation and they will
1 deal with the situation.
2 Excellencies, all knowledge about crimes that the Prosecutor has
3 actually obtained is from Serbian organ sources and mostly from the MUP.
4 These are documents which actually demonstrate that the MUP is combatting
5 crime, and the Prosecutor says: Aha, this policeman reported this crime
6 in such and such a street. Clearly that is his work, that is his job.
7 How can you then have this posited against me or Republika Srpska or any
8 Serbian official? How can you have the fact that the MUP reported crimes
9 and detected crimes, how can you hold that against us instead of being
10 grateful to the MUP for having documented all that, every single crime?
11 And when it is possible for the people, the perpetrators, to be put on
12 trial, that would be done. Even today some trials are taking place
13 according to the documents of the Serbian MUP. We have a document from
14 Sanski Most. The judiciary actually inherited 30 cases from the Serbian
15 MUP and the Serbian organs and these are cases against Serbs who have
16 perpetrated offences against Muslims and Croats.
17 In paragraph 527, it is stated that Karadzic reluctantly agreed
18 to approve -- to permit the International Red Cross to visit Manjaca in
19 July 1992. We explained that in paragraphs 644 and 645 and 583, namely,
20 that Karadzic actually called the Red Cross before June 1992 and ordered
21 that they be allowed free access to all prisons and to all camps for
22 prisoners of war. And these are documents D426 and D477.
23 It is well-known what our attitude to the Red Cross was. In
24 secondary school, I was actually -- I'm actually a veteran of the
25 Red Cross. I actually had a whole school join the ranks of the
1 Red Cross. And in 1962, I was a congressman at the second congress of
2 the Red Cross of the International Red Cross in Belgrade. Not all people
3 where everybody in the Red Cross actually comported themselves in keeping
4 with standards, but the Red Cross actually had all doors open. We opened
5 all doors to them. And we publicly supported the Red Cross. We wanted
6 the people to know that we were in favour of their work and we made it
7 possible by our documentation.
8 Kupresanin also talked about this and about Manjaca, and he was
9 Karadzic's personal envoy whenever assistance needed to be extended to
10 Muslims, Croats, who were in the war-gripped areas.
11 [No interpretation]
12 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Karadzic. We didn't receive the
13 English translation for some time. If you could -- could you repeat.
14 THE ACCUSED: So I repeat it in English.
15 Paragraph 513, Prosecution final brief. In early April, Karadzic
16 was personally informed by two international observers about the events
17 in Zvornik. Journalist Martin Bell, on 8th and 10th of April, saw
18 Arkan's Tigers providing the fire-power for the eviction of Muslims from
19 Zvornik and countering a column of around 20.000 fleeing Muslims who
20 pleaded for help. Upon returning to Sarajevo, he urged Colm Doyle to
21 inform Karadzic about the number of refugees fleeing Zvornik, which he
22 did. And other international observers also saw signs of crime. Holding
23 a press conference to make as much noise as possible when he returned to
24 Sarajevo, after protesting by several means, he met with Karadzic,
25 Plavsic, and Koljevic on 11th of April. Upon receiving this information,
1 Karadzic agreed that terrible things were happening, but claimed that
2 Serbs were suffering the same type of violence and denied having any
3 control over paramilitaries in Zvornik.
4 [Interpretation] (redacted)
8 (redacted). We
9 saw that the authorities in the end managed to actually gain control of
10 the paramilitaries and to actually try them for war crimes.
11 This is April. We're talking about April. What can Karadzic do?
12 The JNA is still there. The central commands of the Territorial Defence
13 do not exist. The communications are down. And let me remind you that
14 on the 16th of April we have that document on the list. Our secretary,
15 woman secretary, Radmila, from the MUP, she called Belgrade to ask
16 Arkan's office who is controlling Zvornik. If the police, given all
17 their potentials, doesn't know who is controlling Zvornik, how can
18 Karadzic who is dealing with hundreds of other matters and only responds
19 when he is asked to deal with something specific, how could he know or
20 should he know what was happening in Zvornik? The Prosecution doesn't
21 see fit to divide these two things. No. They keep referring to the
22 joint criminal enterprise. Let the Prosecution find something outside
23 the JCE and something specific. There is nothing, gentlemen. The -- are
24 joint criminal enterprise something that applies to the Mafia whether in
25 Rome or in Naples. But here we have a people attacking a people, a
1 neighbour attacking a neighbour. And we knew that that was the way it
2 was going to be. When I say to foreigners: Everyone is guilty and it
3 was chaos. They say: Karadzic justified this and accepted this. No, I
4 am not countenancing this. There is no justification for crime. I'm
5 just saying what happened, but it was not done by the state, it was not
6 done by the authorities. The source of all information of the
7 Prosecution is actually the criticism of the authorities of illegitimate
8 practices. That is actually the source of the information.
9 Paragraph 323 of the Prosecution's brief in footnote 1185 in English, in
10 the --
11 [In English] "Karadzic liked to meddle in cadre problems and
12 always wanted to have a finger in the pie."
13 [Interpretation] This quotation is correct, but the witness
14 himself said, the witness for the Prosecution, that he actually was
15 mistaken and that this was taken out of context. President Karadzic was
16 involved in agreements as the president of the SDS -- actually, in
17 appointments, in appointments, to the effect that personnel policy in the
18 police was honoured in accordance with the agreement between the SDS, the
19 SDA, and the HDZ. I did not impose any personnel on the MUP, but if
20 someone from the Serbian MUP called me and told me they have tricked us,
21 our hands are tied, agreements are not being observed, we cannot
22 discharge our duties, that is when I intervened. There is not a single
23 example that I imposed on anyone any particular arrangement or solution
24 or appointment in fact.
25 The Prosecution has clear evidence that until the 1st of March I
1 continued to work as a physician. In the party, I worked in the
2 afternoons on a voluntary basis and I served the party cadres in the
3 government in order to enable them to do their job. A party wins
4 elections upon a specific programme. The president of the party does not
5 interfere and does not impose decisions and solutions, but he must see to
6 the implementation of democratically adopted decisions or agreements with
7 the other two sides, and in multi-national societies, the representative
8 of the people must respect his people, that people, and carry out what he
9 was elected for and got the votes for. Because the very meaning of the
10 so-called ethnic parity, the proportional representation is actually in
11 everybody representing the interests of the constituency that elected
12 him. The Serbian communists regrettably did not do that successfully for
13 over 50 years and were easily manipulated, and I would -- I would want to
14 say to our neighbours: You are wrong. Democracy has not only come to
15 your door. To your great surprise, the Serbs have also seen democracy.
16 So they also have a right to democratic practices. Let's see
17 paragraph 59 of the Prosecution. It refers to Bratunac, to problems with
18 the local leadership at a meeting. This is P1478, page 258. They
19 informed Karadzic that the para armies -- paramilitaries were responsible
20 for the wholesale chaos that was reigning and that is totally opposite to
21 the contention of the Prosecution in paragraph 59.
22 JUDGE KWON: Could you repeat the paragraph number. 59?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The final brief of the Prosecution
24 paragraph 59, where it is contended -- also contrary to the Prosecution
25 document P1478 page 258 from which you can see that Karadzic was informed
1 that the paramilitary units were responsible for the misdeeds. It was
2 stated at that time: There are no Muslims in Bratunac. It actually says
3 in the municipality of Bratunac, this is a --
4 [In English] "It is a fully liberated town."
5 [Interpretation] That is correct, but that is only 20 per cent of
6 the municipality. Ljubisav Simic, president of the municipality,
7 stated -- in paragraph 61 of the Prosecution brief, they claim that
8 Karadzic supported the destruction of mosques in Bosanska Krupa. And our
9 answer to that is that during the Municipal Assembly session then
10 Karadzic rejected the speech of the member of parliament who was saying
11 that the refugees would not be able to return or that mosques were
12 destroyed. P1379, that's the number, page 25.
13 After that meeting Karadzic signed a declaration stating that all
14 citizens who left the territory can return to their homes when they wish,
15 D4807. So a member of parliament can say whatever he wants to say, but
16 if it does not become part of a document, it doesn't matter. The law
17 protects the MPs and they can say whatever they want to say, but they
18 cannot stand trial for anything they said.
19 I'm relying on your own decision regarding the break.
20 JUDGE KWON: Before we take a break, shall we go into private
21 session briefly.
22 [Private session]
11 Pages 47900-47903 redacted. Private session.
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
17 We'll take a break for 20 minutes and resume at ten past 3.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 2.51 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 3.14 p.m.
20 JUDGE KWON: Yes, Mr. Karadzic, please continue.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
22 In paragraph 66 of their final brief, the Prosecution said that
23 Karadzic stated that the SDA planned to make Foca become the Islamic
24 centre, the European Islamic centre. And it was announced very
25 aggressively and it was worked on as such. We dealt with that in our
1 paragraph 44. Even during the communist times, before the elections,
2 August 1989, Halis Cengic, the father of Hasan Cengic established this
3 paramilitary formation in Foca and had it armed. Foca was a
4 predominantly Serb town. The municipality may have had a Muslim
5 majority, but it doesn't really matter. Things cannot be done that way,
6 including both Serbs and Muslims.
7 In paragraph 357 in this footnote 1339, it is claimed that
8 Stanisic -- Minister Stanisic admitted that he was carrying out
9 Karadzic's orders:
10 [In English] "Stanisic indeed admitted -- implementing Karadzic's
11 orders; however, the Prosecution conveniently omitted an example of such
12 order cited on the same page in terms of the authority that everyone had.
13 We should all do our best to allow access to the International Red Cross
14 and you sent this to the Ministry of Justice and to the MUP and to the
16 [Interpretation] That is Stanisic's testimony on pages 46369 to
17 46370 and also on page 46403. The document is D0103.
18 So this was permanent. It's as if you cut off a plant's flower,
19 it would look like a thorn. If you leave out an essential part of a
20 document or a statement, it's precisely that: Removing the flower,
21 removing the most beautiful part of the plant, and then you are turning
22 that plant into a mere shrub. In our system this would really bring the
23 Chamber into trouble. They would have to double-check all the assertions
24 made by the OTP because none of that is correct. Everything was
25 mutilated, butchered, and I'll try to prove all of that tomorrow. These
1 are bastardised forms, sentences that are bastard sentences, half of a
2 sentence is the Prosecution view and the other half is a witness's
3 statement. So it is hard to swallow something that is that kind of a
5 In paragraph 504, in footnote 1834, they say:
6 [In English] "Many Defence witnesses affirmed that there were
7 communications during the relevant period."
8 [Interpretation] Now, the Prosecution wants to believe Defence
9 witnesses. And otherwise, except for five or six foreigners who
10 testified, they suggested that 234 witnesses here, excluding those five
11 foreigner witnesses, so they're saying that 234 witnesses of the Defence
12 came here to lie. Now, if the Trial Chamber is going to accept that or
13 if that is the position of the Prosecution and it is the position of
14 their final brief, that 235 people came here to lie for Radovan Karadzic
15 and be exposed to their cross-examination 20 years later, 20 years after
16 the events that they came here to testify about, then it is clear that
17 international justice was buried before it was even born.
18 I am really sorry now that we did not bring all the 600 witnesses
19 that I wanted to call here because it would have been twice as difficult
20 for them to say that 600 people came here to lie. I can imagine how
21 accused persons who called 30 Defence witnesses fared. They were just
22 swept away. Nothing was taken into account. As for paragraph 504, the
23 evidence presented by the Prosecution confirms that the communication did
24 exist, or rather, communications existed but they were severely limited.
25 And that just corroborates the Defence case and that can also be seen in
1 the testimony of Cvoro, T30928 through 30; then D2678, paragraph 8; then
2 D4463, paragraph 268; and Djukanovic's testimony on page 36, 190 to 192.
3 I'm astonished that the Prosecution does not have the courage and
4 flexibility to give up on some senseless claim. Then everything else
5 they were saying would sound more convincing, whereas this way all of
6 this makes no sense whatsoever. We all know what communications were
7 like. We know that all of these communication routes remained in the
8 Muslim and the Croat Federation, but they keep on insisting as if we
9 haven't had these four years of trial here and as if we haven't heard
10 almost 500 witnesses.
11 In paragraph 86, there is this allegation, I'll read it out in
13 [In English] "In a part that deals with the JCE members, it is
14 cited that Mladic at the Assembly stated only my concern is to have them
15 vanish completely, suggesting some sort of alleged plans to forcibly
16 remove non-Serb population."
17 [Interpretation] Our position is that Mladic talked about the
18 enemy only, the enemy army in uniform and with weapons. That is P1385,
19 page 49. This is what that looks like:
20 [In English] "The enemy that we are facing is getting stronger
21 every day, and that fact that the enemy in Zepa, Mostar, Gorazde,
22 Srebrenica, Orasje, Bihac, Kladusa, Tesanj, Zenica, or Sarajevo does not
23 even think of surrendering means that they are determined to fight until
24 the last one of us lives. They declared war on us. They made a common
25 declaration and stated it in public. They started the war at first.
1 They are heading this war, but that is not my concern. My concern is not
2 that they will create the state. My concern is to have them vanish
4 [Interpretation] We heard General Dzambasovic here and he clearly
5 stated that the war time objective of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was
6 to free every little part of Bosnia-Herzegovina; freeing
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina means of Serbs, what else? It's not mosquitos. And
8 the Serbs would be expelled, as President Tudjman said to
9 Holbrooke - unfortunately this hasn't been admitted - and as Ganic says,
10 We're going to have them marginalised. Mladic is not talking about
11 political aspects or civilian aspects or economic aspects.
12 The Army of Republika Srpska suffered unjustified criticism from
13 me. We heard a member of the Main Staff here who said the president,
14 inter alia, criticised us for being so militant. What else could the
15 army be but militant? Why do you want to win? Well, it's in the nature
16 of the military that they want to win. I am a commander who commanded
17 stop rather than move most often. We had plenty of territory anyway. We
18 had enough to give away, but the Prosecution did not notice that. So
19 it's clear that Mladic is speaking about the enemy.
20 In paragraph 96 -- I'm sorry. I really have to make an effort
21 because my glasses are not adequate. I'll get back to this.
22 Now I'd like to deal with paragraph 199. It is the 1st Corps
23 of -- General Talic expelled the Serbs from the Krajina, that is dated,
24 and we dealt with that in paragraphs 1668 through 1025 and in paragraph
25 1206 to 1209. We saw how much paper has to be collected here, how many
1 documents have to be collected in order to reach a list to be part of the
2 a caravan and this is a total distortion of the truth.
3 As for these paragraphs, the ones that we're dealing with, the
4 ones where we deal with these allegations, that is, these are genuine
5 orders, genuine orders that were strictly confidential and issued as such
6 to units. They are supposed to take care of civilians, they are supposed
7 to be humane and human, and General Talic, that could be seen from the
8 transcript of the meetings of the War Presidency of Kotor Varos, he is
9 giving suggestions and instructions as to how Siprage could be kept happy
10 and at peace, that should be given a teacher, proper communications,
11 public transportation, and so on, so that they would be kept happy, so
12 that there would be nothing to make them unhappy.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, could you repeat the Defence para
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have them up there. The Defence
16 paragraphs that deal with 199 of the Prosecution brief. So it is 1668 up
17 to 1205 and then paragraphs --
18 JUDGE KWON: Just a second. Is it 1168?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 1668. I beg your pardon,
20 1168. Thank you, Excellency, you have really -- yes, 1168 to 1205.
21 JUDGE KWON: Please continue.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In the footnotes of these
23 paragraphs, we find documents that are not propaganda because they are
24 strictly confidential documents, orders to protect. I don't know anyone
25 in that leadership who wanted to harm Muslims or Croats as a community
1 or, even less, the civilians who lived in our area. They could have
2 stayed to live there until the end of the war, all those who didn't want
3 to fight at least. In paragraphs 228 and 229, the Prosecution contends
4 that the SDS was distributing weapons together with the JNA, which
5 indicates that the JNA and the SDS were pursuing a joint criminal plan
6 because - and we see a subheading that refers to certain paragraphs of
7 the OTP final brief which claims that Karadzic supported the recruitment
8 of JNA. We responded to this allegation in our document P979,
9 specifically a footnote in it which is a report from one military
10 district. I will read in English:
11 [In English] "Population in the JNA. The district command
12 received the most telegrams, letters, and telephone calls from Muslims,
13 thanking for -- thanking us for having prevented bloodshed. We have
14 information that the SDA and some other party leadership -- leaderships
15 are considering a plan to gain -- to again turn the Muslim people against
16 the JNA. So far, they have not been successful in that."
17 [Interpretation] Let me not read everything. You can all see it
18 for yourselves. The point is this: The Serbian Democratic Party was
19 supporting the call-up for recruitment, namely, that conscripts should
20 respond to the military call-up, which is a legal obligation. Anybody
21 who does differently is committing a crime, and Mr. Izetbegovic himself
22 says: Yes, yes. It is the law but now everything has become rather
23 fluid and there are laws and laws. And now we read in this report of the
24 2nd Military District from March 1992.
25 Looking at the whole picture, the SDS leadership and the Serbian
1 people have embraced the JNA, they have been protecting it wherever
2 objectively possible, responding to call-ups to join the army and
3 volunteer units, co-operating with commands as much as possible, acting
4 fairly and responsibly with the strategic war supplies, et cetera, which
5 is logical because the Serbian people are threatened too. It goes on to
6 say the appearances of MUP leaders on TV these days indicate that the
7 ethnic groups of this republic are well armed along party lines, Muslims
8 around 60.000 men, Croats 35.000, Serbs 2-.000, et cetera. The Serbs who
9 responded to the JNA call-up were issued with weapons against receipt.
10 They were in the reserve force; they were not paramilitaries. And still
11 there were 20.000 people who got hold of weapons by passing this
12 procedure, otherwise the JNA would not have indicated this number.
13 We've also heard here that reservists in Yugoslavia had always
14 had the right to take weapons and uniforms and equipment home and they
15 always had to be on stand-by. Under the Law on National Defence and
16 Social Self-Protection, every military conscript is duty-bound to act
17 when the country is under attack without waiting for a call-up. That law
18 erases the distinction between civilian and soldier. We are on trial
19 here on the charge that our professional armies that live in barracks
20 because they are highly trained and well equipped, but we are talking
21 here about armed people, and Tito wrote it into law as the doctrine of
22 armed people, whereas General Razek, not only him, but he was the most
23 impressive, stated that this was the nature of our war: Neighbourhood
24 against neighbourhood, civilian against civilian, soldier against
25 soldier. There was no distinction as long as people were of military
1 age. And the Prosecution should study our laws and see if the things
2 they hold against us were perhaps perfectly legal or even ordered.
3 In one intercept, intercept number 96, one of the conversants is
4 Minister Mandic who allegedly -- and this is P1149 and P1143. Mandic
5 says that Turks should be kept in encirclement and starved, arrested,
6 expelled, et cetera. Concerning P1149, Mandic explicitly informs his
7 collocutor that their conversation is being eavesdropped. The collocutor
8 is informing Mandic about the events at Visoko, saying that he doesn't
9 want to attack anybody but the Muslims are attacking them, and that's why
10 by that time 14 people had been killed. Mandic says several times that
11 Muslims had lied many times they would not attack anybody, especially not
12 their neighbours, but then they attack them from the back and kill
13 people. Mandic cites the example of Koroman, where in Renovica Koroman's
14 people were ambushed and killed. He says such people should be expelled
15 without any weapons and never allowed to return. And in the continuation
16 of that conversation, they discuss Serbs who had been slaughtered and the
17 intensification of Muslim military preparations and the establishment of
18 the Sandzak division.
19 So this is a conversation between Mandic and a private person,
20 and this document is used to support the thesis about a criminal plan.
21 In our country, it's quite common for people to say: I'll kill you or
22 I'll do something to your mother, but it never happens.
23 In document P1143, there is only a reference to a special
24 assignment for 30 to 40 people. There is no mention of human shields or
25 work on the front line, as the Prosecution says. In P1152 civilians are
1 not mentioned in the intercept at all. Instead, the reference is made to
2 Muslim women who could have been captured during the fighting or in a
3 combat zone. I analysed the lists of those killed in the
4 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It's D1115. All in all there are only
5 6 per cent of women among the killed. So a Muslim woman could get killed
6 only accidentally. The amount of women killed is actually the same
7 number that they had in the Muslim army. They had more Serbs than women
8 in their army.
9 The previous document was an intercept between colleagues from
10 MUP, Kvesic and Dojic, and they are obviously bantering. Mandic
11 testified and said on page T4609 and T4610:
12 [In English] "Alibabic was having this conversation recorded. It
13 was being intercepted, so we mocked him in a specific Bosnian or, shall I
14 say, Serbian way. We were trying to, yeah, joke about the advancing of
15 the 182, 2nd and 3rd Armies. This was more like a joke or a conversation
16 of former associates, some of whom had gone to be with their people, the
17 Croats, and others with their people, with the Serbs. And I did
18 everything on purpose. I exaggerated everything on this purpose. I was
19 ridiculing Munir Alibabic and his staff who were listening in on our
20 conversation and making those reports because of a couple of days before
21 that they had aired some of our conversations on television and had
22 spoken in very bad terms about some of my associates. So I believe that
23 this was a flippant conversation on our part. I wasn't something -- it
24 wasn't something reflecting the actual situation in the battle-field or
25 something which was consistent with our actual mood at that time. This
1 is what I was about."
2 [Interpretation] All this is happening because the Prosecution
3 has no real evidence and that's why they rely on intercepts that do not
4 institute any kind of document. They don't even give an indication that
5 something is in the offing. From this conversation, we can see that the
6 conversants are constantly laughing, they are one Serb, one Croat, who
7 parted ways, took different sides, but they remained professionals. And
8 in our final brief, paragraph 130, we describe how Munir Alibabic and the
9 SDA acted while eavesdropping on Serb leaders. They listened in to all
10 of us, even before the war. As soon as we formed joint authorities, Serb
11 officials were unlawfully wire-tapped. In paragraph 290, the Prosecution
12 cites Mico Davidovic's evidence that the SDS was pursuing a policy of
13 expelling Muslims. Davidovic was not a member of the SDS and could not
14 have been familiar with SDS policy. In addition, we have seen his
15 transmogrification here in the courtroom and the tears in his eyes when
16 shown a huge number of Karadzic's document about the protection of
17 non-Serbs. We dealt with that in paragraphs 751 and paragraphs 1115 to
18 1122. Davidovic testified about this even without knowing about it, and
19 he said, If I had known it then I would have retired and I would have
20 joined you in your efforts to establish law and order. That sheds much
21 more light on his actual testimony. In paragraph 291, the Prosecution
22 cites that Serb authorities restricted the amount of money that non-Serbs
23 were allowed to take when leaving and quotes the Hanson report. The
24 answer to this issue is that it was all governed by the federal law on
25 foreign currency, and that's D1307. Ms. Hanson admitted that she did not
1 take this document into account when writing her report.
2 In that document, it is clearly stated anyone who owns money
3 legally taken out of a bank is free to take that money up to a certain
4 amount, and that is quite normal. Even in the United States you cannot
5 bring in more than 10.000 dollars in cash without proving its provenance,
6 but one needs to read that document in order to understand that it was
7 completely within the law. In paragraph 94 it is said that the policy of
8 dismissing non-Serbs was dictated from Pale. What we say is that Radic's
9 allegations in the Tribunal are refuted by contemporaneous documents from
10 1992 and we dealt with that in our paragraphs 1001 through 1016. Radic
11 provided evidence under 92 quater and he struggled to explain that
12 Karadzic and Krajisnik criticised him for not cleansing Banja Luka. But
13 he said she brought it up. I never spoke about this myself. This is a
14 man who was politically not on very good terms with us but he was very
15 fair to Muslims and Croats. This evidence was literally forced out of
16 him. You will see that paragraph where Radic is subjected to literal
17 mistreatment. He's being milked by the person who took his statement in
18 Banja Luka and by the Prosecutor here in the courtroom so that he finally
19 says what they want. Radic says: I opposed the replacement of
20 executives and managers who were not Serbs and I invoked the authority of
21 Karadzic. He used my name to protect non-Serb directors and businessmen
22 and I was also criticised myself for keeping different managers in
23 state-owned enterprises because state-owned companies have the right to
24 appoint their own directors. Nobody touched companies, nobody interfered
25 with them.
6 [In English] Can we go for a while in private session, please.
7 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
8 THE ACCUSED: And if --
9 [Private session]
5 [Open session]
6 JUDGE KWON: Yes, we are now in open session.
7 Please continue, Mr. Karadzic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
9 In paragraphs 444 to 450, that's six paragraphs in the final
10 brief of the Prosecution, the claims are made that the JNA was waging war
11 alongside with the SDS and was a Serbian army. We have treated this in
12 our paras 378 to 383. And in paragraph of the Prosecution 448 reference
13 is made to document --
14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the number.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- which refers to a meeting of
16 Mr. Izetbegovic with Blagoje Adzic and Kostic in Skoplje in April 1992.
17 The Prosecution is attempting to support its contention about the
18 pro-Serbia JNA while omitting substantial parts of that document. So
19 Adzic says the situation is calming down, everybody is practically
20 fighting the Muslim army. In some places it is the Green Berets or the
21 Patriotic League, et cetera, but according to our information they have
22 over 50.000 men. In some areas, they are even calling it Alija's army.
23 And then he also adds there are Croatian paramilitary forces which are
24 35.000 men strong and they're formerly under your staff. He goes on to
25 talk about the Croatian occupying army from the Republic of Croatia which
1 was present in Bosnia practically all the time, and I'm not going to read
2 all of this, but this is what was admitted by the Prosecution. And Adzic
3 openly tells them there -- that is their mistake because they're not
4 co-operating with -- actually say in BH territory that less than
5 15 per cent of members outside of the BH Territory and Adzic tells him:
6 That is your own mistake, Mr. Izetbegovic, because you did not co-operate
7 with the JNA. And he goes on to say: Mr. President, you have to unblock
8 all the barracks and the military facilities if you really want to arrive
9 at peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unless that is done, that will lead
10 to war and this is the end of April, the 29th of April. After this
11 meeting and after the agreement for the JNA to withdraw, there were
12 orders issued. Here's what Adzic says: Today this order came from
13 Efendic who wants -- anyone who wants peace should not be issuing such
14 orders. This is what Adzic said and he was showed this order of the 29th
15 of April and the similar one was issued on the 12th of April and this is
16 an order which actually caused the taking over of part of Prijedor,
17 taking control over part of Prijedor. This is a document which was
18 Telefaxed to every police station and the Serbs who worked in those
19 stations saw what lay in store for them on the basis of that order.
20 Adzic is referring to Efendic's order which is registered as D222. A
21 couple of days after Adzic's agreements with Izetbegovic, the
22 Green Berets and the Patriotic League massacred the JNA on the 2nd of
23 3rd of May in Sarajevo and on the 15th of May in Tuzla. The army was
24 withdrawing but they could not actually get out alive or at least not
25 without wounds. So these were unnecessary casualties, unnecessary
1 victims, and the Prosecution should be aware of that.
2 In paragraphs 451 to 460, reference is made to purported
3 Karadzic's control over territorial units. We deal with this in our
4 paragraph 5934 to 960. Even before the war broke out, Karadzic -- as
5 well as during the war, Karadzic was a political person. As the
6 president of the republic, I was the supreme commander. The Prosecution
7 is investing vast efforts to determine that I was a president, I was an
8 able president, and I was the supreme commander. This is not the point.
9 The point is what I -- orders I issued. At the first request for the
10 indictment against me to be accepted, the Prosecutor was Mr. Harmon or
11 perhaps Mr. Tieger, I'm not sure, he was actually waving with my order
12 about observing the Geneva Conventions from June. Here it is proved that
13 Karadzic was issuing orders. It wasn't important what was in the order.
14 According to the Law on the Army which was already cited by the
15 Prosecution and according to my decision on the establishment of the army
16 and the organisation of the army of the 15th of June, I actually handed
17 over tactical command to the professionals, the strategic level of
18 command means and is exhausted in preserve the life-line. Preserve the
19 corridor. It has to be opened. Preserve the Serbian settlements and
20 neighbourhoods in Sarajevo. You have to preserve people. You have to
21 preserve territory. These are strategic decisions and the rest is
22 professional. And this is something that Karadzic did not -- was not
23 involved in.
24 Excellencies, can we have a couple of minutes longer because I
25 want to wrap up this topic properly?
1 JUDGE KWON: Actually, I wanted to raise the issue as well, the
2 time issue, because I would like to conclude the Defence closing argument
3 tomorrow as much as possible. And I was informed that you have spent
4 four hours, 45 minutes, short of your time allocated to you. So how
5 about going 15 minutes more, if -- it should be okay.
6 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
7 JUDGE KWON: I thank all the staff for their indulgence. We can
8 continue until quarter past 4.00.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
10 In paragraphs 461 to 482, the Prosecution addresses the issue of
11 volunteers and paramilitaries and I can actually compliment my response
12 to question number 2 by the Chamber to explain. We addressed the
13 question of paramilitaries in paragraphs 384 to 399 and paragraphs 1052
14 to 1131. At this point, I can just adduce a few basic facts, give you a
15 few remarks to help explain our position. The trial -- I recommend to
16 the Trial Chamber the entire transcript P6211, which is cited in para 465
17 of the OTP's final brief. We see Arkan's role in Bijeljina, at whose
18 invitation he came there, namely, the people of Semberija and the local
19 TO, contemporaneous with his stay there and from which you can see that
20 the Muslims led by the SDA, and in particular the mercenaries from
21 Kosovo, Sandzak and Kotor Varos where are sniping, killing, and
22 slaughtering the local Serbs. Arkan noted that the refugees both
23 Muslims -- the Serbs could not return to their homes. The transcript
24 shows that the delegation in Bijeljina on -- was there on behalf of the
25 BH, Biljana Plavsic and the minister of defence and Fikret Abdic, and
1 they -- they were surprised. Biljana Plavsic was actually surprised by
2 the situation that had nothing to do with the Sarajevan propaganda.
3 Everything was quite the opposite, and the number of casualties, Muslims
4 and Serbs together, was nowhere near what was said. Similarly, in para
5 474 of its final brief, OTP alleges in document P3056 how Mladic in
6 September 1995 had informed Karadzic that Arkan was killing. We have
7 already said this. In the document itself, in Mladic's document itself,
8 it is defied as rumours. In paragraph 477 it is stated that allegedly
9 Momir Bulatovic supported paramilitary units and the document P6165 is
10 selectively cited. We had a witness here, Mr. Bulatovic took the stand,
11 and we were able to clarify this matter with him. And the meeting that
12 is referred to that is something which happened at the supreme -- the
13 National Supreme Defence Council of Yugoslavia. That is what it was
14 about. Namely, President Milosevic reacted furiously to allegations that
15 allegedly the prime minister of Republika Srpska, Lukic, that Pale and
16 the leadership were involved in crimes. President Milosevic asked that
17 all paramilitary units which were involved in maltreatment of non-Serb
18 population in Serbia should be immediately arrested. And I shall read in
20 [In English] "We must catch all of them. Our police arrested
21 Lukic and he is behind bars. He must not talk about -- we must not talk
22 about that because we want to arrest some others too. He's a murderer
23 and a criminal. It is new to me that the people with whom we seriously
24 discussed that are the disguised promoters of the idea that Muslims
25 should be killed and expelled from this Serbian and Montenegrin -- from
1 this area. We have nothing to talk about with such people. First of
2 all, the state -- this state is not composed of Serbian and Montenegrin
3 people only. We also have Muslims, Croats, Hungarians, and 38 other
4 nationalities. If we keep talking about Serbian and Montenegrin people,
5 we keep developing the fascistic ideology according to which all those
6 who are not Serbs or Montenegrins are second-class citizens. That is
7 contrary to our institution. Serbia is a democratic state of all of its
8 citizens. We are a state of all citizens."
9 [Interpretation] The reference here P6161, pages 3 to 5. This is
10 also the reference cited by the Prosecution but they do not actually
11 adduce the nature of this document. Further, they adduce some hearsay
12 and some allegations to the effect that Vladimir Lukic, the prime
13 minister of Republika Srpska, had said something that is inappropriate in
14 respect of non-Serbs, citizens of a different ethnicity. But it is a
15 fact that Lukic never in -- had the intention of non-Serbs being killed
16 or expelled, as confirmed by his contemporaneous documents.
17 In this document which is D3060, it is stated:
18 [In English] "If our enemies insist on continuing the war, we
19 must insist on the obligations this Assembly took upon itself when it
20 adopted a declaration on peace. Already today we must begin creating
21 conditions so that citizens who have left their homes because of war --
22 because they didn't feel safe and felt their property -- save them and
23 their property that was threatened once permanent peace has been
24 established can return to the territory of Republika Srpska. We must
25 guarantee to all citizens of all ethnicities all rights under the
1 constitution and laws. We have taken these obligations upon us and we
2 have to fulfil them."
3 [Interpretation] Prime Minister Lukic and the government
4 programme and the words he addressed to the Assembly two months before
5 all this hearsay, this slander of Mr. Lukic before the Presidency of
6 Yugoslavia, and this is what it says. It is particularly important:
7 [In English] "And even distribution of aid to the Muslims and
8 Croats, something the commission will pay particular attention to."
9 [Interpretation] That is in document D3061, page 8.
10 So the rumours that are being presented to this Trial Chamber
11 have to do with what Brdjanin purportedly said, that only 3 per cent of
12 Croats should stay on or something like that. That's what
13 President Tudjman said about the Serbs, but nobody said that. We heard
14 Sveto Selinovic, who denied that he even knew that man, this Muslim
15 witness from Rogatica who claimed here that he had heard that from him.
16 And we saw this witness from Prijedor who said that the programme of the
17 Serb Democratic Party and of Serbs was that there is no co-existence
18 between Orthodox Serbs and non-Serbs. That is one of the key points of
19 the Islamic Declaration that is being ascribed to us, just like Tudjman's
20 maxim is being ascribed to us; namely, that only 5 per cent of those who
21 do not belong can stay on. None of the Serbs said anything like that.
22 That is the situation in which it is possible to present hearsay,
23 rumours, slander, and to promote them as evidence since there is no
24 substantive evidence in documents or in actions. Also, jokes, allusions,
25 irony, sarcasm, all of that is represented in its literal form and is
1 being offered to the Trial Chamber as evidence against the Serbs. At
2 that time, we had war declared against us and there are twice as many
3 Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina compared to the Serbs. And then
4 their armies were involved and then take into account NATO, especially
5 their intelligence services, then also take into account the
6 reconnaissance assistance and the rapid deployment force and then the air
7 strikes that were there by way of assistance.
8 Excellencies, the Serbs were cornered and they behaved far better
9 than anyone else would have behaved if cornered in that way. It was
10 total destruction that threatened them, and the Prosecution is saying
11 the -- some Serb blurted something out in an unofficial conversation, in
12 a private conversation. That is how the entire Serb people have been
13 attacked and our Western allies betrayed us yet again and they opted for
14 non-European variance in Bosnia, although they did have Muslims of a
15 preeminently European orientation. I see the time and I thank you for
16 the extension. If there are three minutes left, perhaps I could present
17 paragraph 480 as well of the Prosecution brief, where they are trying to
18 say that the VRS -- well, actually, the Prosecution is trying to distort
19 an authentic order, to arrest and try members of paramilitary forces for
20 crimes that they had committed. But the Prosecution is trying to say --
21 trying to say that the army wanted to include the paramilitaries in their
22 own units. These are groups of organised people, these paramilitaries.
23 Just by being members of the paramilitary, they do not have to be people
24 who are criminals. We disowned them and we are going to prosecute them
25 and we did that. We arrested them, and so on. And it is the legal
1 obligation of the army --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: It has become too fast for
4 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Karadzic, please slow down. You are far too
5 fast for the interpreters.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you. I'll do my best.
7 JUDGE KWON: If you could repeat from, "... it is the legal
8 obligation of the army ..."
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The fact that self-organised groups
10 are being included, yes, they are paramilitary groups but that doesn't
11 mean that they committed crimes. However, it is a legal obligation to
12 include paramilitary groups into the army, and it is on that basis that I
13 issued the order on the 13th of June; that is to say, to have
14 paramilitary units become part of the VRS, otherwise they will be
15 arrested. We disowned the paramilitaries, all of those who are not part
16 of the VRS. Those we prosecuted, arrested, et cetera, throughout
17 Republika Srpska. And there is documentation to that effect. 481 is the
18 last paragraph that I'd like to deal with. The Prosecution says that
19 Veljko Milanovic terrorised Muslims in Prnjavor before the war. However,
20 the document states that individuals from that unit were involved in
21 clashes with the police too and that Karadzic not only had nothing to do
22 with such individuals but was strongly against them. There is evidence
23 supporting this, D4077, paragraphs 31 to 32; as well as telephone
24 conversations, D4080 and D4078, where I say to my interlocutors and they
25 say: Not everybody is a criminal, only a few of them. And I say: All
1 right. Have those few arrested. We want nothing to do with criminals.
2 If the entire unit is not criminal, then those who are criminals have to
3 be arrested. And later on, there were interventions to the effect that
4 they should be released, and my response was - and we also have this in
5 documents - only based on the law, only if it's based on the law. If
6 there's reasons for detaining them, they should remain in detention. And
7 if there are any further decisions to be made on keeping them in custody,
8 that is for the judiciary to decide. So this was even before the war.
9 There are no examples to the contrary. The Prosecution is saying that
10 Karadzic promoted a policy of impunity. If that were the case, I would
11 have to intervene with the judiciary and the police asking them not to
12 punish anyone, and that did not happen. However, the Prosecution think
13 that I have some kind of services for which I'm going to arrest and
14 threaten, and so on. Presidents do not do that in any country. It is
15 state organs that do that. And a president only harmonises and
16 supervises what is happening. And then if somebody does something wrong,
17 then the president can see how the different branches of government can
18 be harmonies. Thank you for this extension, and I think that this will
19 do for the day.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. We'll adjourn for today and continue
21 tomorrow morning at 9.00.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.19 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 2nd day of
24 October, 2014, at 9.00 a.m.