Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 48122

 1                           Thursday, 24 March 2016

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [Judgement]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.00 p.m.

 6             JUDGE KWON:  Good afternoon, everyone.

 7             Could the Registrar call the case, please.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you.  Good afternoon, Your Honours.

 9             This is case number IT-95-5/18-T, the Prosecutor versus

10     Radovan Karadzic.

11             JUDGE KWON:  The Chamber is sitting today to deliver its

12     judgement in this case.

13             Could we have the appearances, please.

14             For the Prosecution.

15             MR. TIEGER:  Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours.  And

16     good afternoon to all those in and outside the courtroom.  Appearing for

17     the Prosecution today are Alan Tieger, Hildegard Uertz-Retzlaff,

18     Ann Sutherland, Carolyn Edgerton, and Katrina Gustafson.

19             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you.  Mr. Tieger.

20             MR. TIEGER:  And, Mr. President, I should mention someone we

21     would never have forgotten and that is our case manager, Mr. Iain Reid.

22             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you Mr. Tieger.

23             For the Defence.  Mr. Karadzic.

24             MR. KARADZIC: [Interpretation] Good day, Your Excellency.  Good

25     day to everyone.  I am assisted today by my legal advisors,

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 1     Mr. Peter Robinson, Mr. Goran Petronjevic, Mr. Marko Sladojevic, and my

 2     associates Aleksandar Vujic and Aleksandar Stevanovic.

 3             JUDGE KWON:  Thank you, Mr. Karadzic.

 4             The accused was a founding member of the SDS and served as its

 5     president from July 1990 to July 1996.  He was the president of the

 6     National Security Council of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

 7     Herzegovina and on the 12th of May, 1992, the accused was elected as the

 8     president of the Presidency of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina.  From the 17th of December, 1992, he was the sole president

10     of Republika Srpska and the supreme commander of the armed forces of

11     Republika Srpska.

12             The accused stood trial for 11 counts:  Two counts of genocide;

13     five counts of crimes against humanity, namely, persecution, murder,

14     extermination, deportation, and forcible transfer; and four counts of

15     violations of the laws or customs of war, namely, murder, acts of

16     violence, the primary of purpose of which was to spread terror among the

17     civilian population, unlawful attacks on civilians, and the taking of

18     hostages.

19             In the indictment, the Prosecution alleged that the accused

20     participated in four joint criminal enterprises.  Hereinafter, I refer to

21     joint criminal enterprises as JCEs.  The Prosecution alleged the

22     following:

23             First, from at least October 1991 to 30 November 1995, the

24     accused participated in a JCE, the objective of which was to permanently

25     remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed

Page 48124

 1     territory in BiH through the crimes charged therein.  This is the alleged

 2     overarching JCE.

 3             Second, between April 1992 and November 1995, the accused

 4     participated in a JCE to establish and carry out a campaign of sniping

 5     and shelling against the civilian population of Sarajevo, the primary

 6     purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population.

 7     This is the alleged Sarajevo JCE.

 8             Third, between approximately 26th of May and the 19th of June,

 9     1995, the accused participated in a JCE to take hostage over

10     200 UN peacekeepers and Military Observers in order to compel NATO to

11     abstain from conducting air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military

12     targets.  This is the alleged hostages JCE.

13             And fourth, between the days preceding the 11th of July, 1995,

14     and continuing until the 1st of November, 1995, the accused participated

15     in a JCE to eliminate the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica by killing the

16     men and boys of Srebrenica and forcibly removing the women, young

17     children, and some elderly men.  This is the alleged Srebrenica JCE.

18             In addition, the Prosecution charged the accused for having

19     planned, instigated, ordered, and/or aided and abetted the crimes in the

20     indictment.  It also charged the accused as a superior pursuant to

21     Article 7(3) of the Statute.

22             While the Prosecution made its opening statement on 27th of

23     October and the 2nd of November, 2009, the first witness for the

24     Prosecution was heard on the 13th of April, 2010.  Closing arguments were

25     heard between the 30th of September and the 7th of October, 2014.  The

Page 48125

 1     Chamber sat for 498 trial days, during which it heard the evidence of

 2     434 witnesses.  It further received the evidence of 152 additional

 3     witnesses in writing.  In total, 11.469 exhibits were tendered into

 4     evidence.  The complete trial record amounts to over 48.000 transcript

 5     pages, over 95.000 pages of filings, and over 190.000 pages of admitted

 6     exhibits, totalling to over 330.000 pages of trial record.

 7             The Chamber's findings and the reasons for these findings will

 8     now be summarised.  However, it should be noted that this is only a

 9     summary and does not in any way form part of the judgement of the

10     Chamber.  The only authoritative account of the findings of the Chamber

11     is in the written judgement.  Confidential copies will be made available

12     to the parties at the end of these proceedings, and a public redacted

13     version will be also be made available to the public.

14             Before addressing the four components set out earlier, the

15     Chamber finds on the basis of the evidence that there was an armed

16     conflict in BiH throughout the period relevant to the indictment and that

17     the other general requirements for crimes under Article 3 of the Statute

18     are met.  In relation to crimes against humanity, it finds that there

19     existed a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian

20     populations at all times relevant to the indictment, that the relevant

21     crimes formed part of that attack, and that the perpetrators knew that

22     the crimes were part of that attack.

23             The Chamber will first address the municipalities component of

24     the case and the alleged overarching JCE.  It is alleged that crimes were

25     committed in the municipalities of Bijeljina, Bratunac, Brcko, Foca,

Page 48126

 1     Rogatica, Sokolac, Visegrad, Vlasenica, and Zvornik in eastern BiH; in

 2     the municipalities of Banja Luka, Bosanski Novi, Kljuc, Prijedor, and

 3     Sanski Most in the Autonomous Region of Krajina or ARK; in the

 4     municipalities of Hadzici, Ilidza, Novi Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Pale, and

 5     Vogosca in the Sarajevo region.  I will refer to these locations as the

 6     municipalities.

 7             The Chamber finds that beginning at the end of March 1992 and

 8     continuing through 1992, Serb forces took control of municipalities in

 9     Bosnian Serb-claimed territory in BiH.  During the course of and after

10     these well-planned and co-ordinated take-overs, there was an organised

11     and systematic pattern of crimes committed against Bosnian Muslims and

12     Bosnian Croats who resided in the municipalities.

13             The Chamber finds that a vast number of Bosnian Muslims and

14     Bosnian Croats in the municipalities were forcibly displaced from their

15     homes to other locations in BiH or to third states.

16             The accused's case was that the population movements in BiH were

17     voluntary and a natural consequence of the war, and that there was no

18     policy of expulsion.  The Chamber finds, to the contrary, that in many

19     cases, the victims were forced to leave following attacks against their

20     villages or after the take-over of towns by Serb forces.

21                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

22             JUDGE KWON:  Other victims were first arrested, detained in

23     detention facilities, and then transported out of the municipalities.

24     These expulsions resulted in drastic changes to the ethnic composition in

25     the municipalities.

Page 48127

 1             Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were also removed from

 2     positions of authority and dismissed from their employment in multiple

 3     municipalities.  In addition to unlawful arrests and arbitrary searches,

 4     there were restrictions placed on the movement of Bosnian Muslims in some

 5     of the municipalities.  Thousands of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat

 6     civilians were unlawfully detained in around 50 detention facilities

 7     across the municipalities.  Non-Serbs were often arrested en masse and

 8     taken to these detention facilities from their homes following attacks on

 9     villages or towns.  However, the Chamber notes that it did not enter a

10     finding of unlawful detention with respect to the detainees who were

11     combatants or civilians who had actively taken part in hostilities.

12             Bosnian Serb political and governmental organs and Serb forces

13     also established and perpetuated inhumane living conditions at a number

14     of detention facilities.  The victims were subjected to deplorable living

15     conditions.  Food and water were lacking, medical care was inadequate or

16     nonexistent.  Sanitation and hygiene facilities were poor as were

17     sleeping conditions.  In many of these detention facilities, detainees

18     were also subjected to torture, beatings, and physical and psychological

19     abuse by Serb forces.  During their detention, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian

20     Croat women and men were subjected to rape and other acts of sexual

21     violence by members of the Serb forces.  These crimes resulted in serious

22     mental or physical suffering or injury to the victims.  Non-Serb

23     detainees were also forced to perform labour at the front lines or were

24     used as human shields to protect Serb forces.

25             Following or during their expulsion from their homes, the

Page 48128

 1     property of the victims were seized by the Bosnian Serb authorities.

 2     There was also wide-spread looting of non-Serb property and extensive

 3     destruction of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat villages and property by

 4     Serb forces in many of the municipalities.  Serb forces destroyed

 5     multiple mosques, Catholic churches, and other cultural monuments and

 6     sacred sites in Bratunac, Bosanski Novi, Foca, Kljuc, Novi Grad,

 7     Prijedor, Rogatica, Sanski Most, Sokolac, and Zvornik.  The cultural

 8     monuments and sacred sites were targeted for destruction given their

 9     significance to the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat people in those

10     locations.  However, while the Chamber also finds that cultural monuments

11     and sacred sites were destroyed in Bijeljina, Pale, and Vogosca, the

12     evidence presented was insufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

13     who was responsible for that destruction.

14             Serb forces also killed many Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats

15     during and after the take-over of the municipalities.  Victims were

16     killed in mass executions or killed following attacks on non-Serb

17     villages.  Victims were also shot during their detention, or were taken

18     away from detention facilities and killed by Serb forces.  In other

19     cases, victims died as a result of severe beatings by Serb forces or died

20     as a result of the inhumane conditions which they were exposed to.  With

21     respect to 26 of the alleged scheduled killing incidents, the Chamber

22     finds that the element of killing on a mass scale and such intent were

23     established and, therefore, that they amounted to extermination.

24             The Chamber also finds that the perpetrators chose their victims

25     in the municipalities on the basis of their identity as Bosnian Muslims

Page 48129

 1     or Bosnian Croats and therefore that these crimes were committed with

 2     discriminatory intent.

 3             Accordingly, the Chamber concludes that members of the Serb

 4     forces and Bosnian Serb political and governmental organs committed

 5     murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war, and murder,

 6     extermination, deportation, forcible transfer, and persecution as crimes

 7     against humanity.  Judge Howard Morrison appends a dissenting opinion in

 8     relation to Scheduled Incident B12.2.

 9             Under Count 1, the Prosecution alleged that in seven of the

10     municipalities, namely, Bratunac, Foca, Kljuc, Prijedor, Sanski Most,

11     Vlasenica, and Zvornik, the alleged persecutory campaign included or

12     escalated to include conduct and intent which amounted to genocide.  The

13     Chamber finds that in these municipalities members of the protected

14     groups, i.e., Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, were killed and

15     subjected to serious bodily or mental harm and therefore that the

16     actus reus requirements for Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b) of the Statute

17     have been satisfied.  However, with respect to the acts under

18     Article 4(2)(c) of the Statute, while the Chamber finds that Bosnian

19     Muslim and Bosnian Croats were held in terrible conditions, it is not

20     convinced the evidence demonstrated that this amounted to conditions of

21     life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Bosnian

22     Muslims or Bosnian Croats in these municipalities.  Further, the Chamber

23     is not satisfied that the acts falling under Articles 4(2)(a) and 4(2)(b)

24     of the Statute were carried out with genocidal intent, that is, with

25     intent to destroy, in part, the Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat groups as

Page 48130

 1     such.

 2             In conclusion, the Chamber was unable to identify or infer

 3     genocidal intent on the part of the accused, the alleged JCE members, the

 4     physical perpetrators of these acts or from the pattern of crimes which

 5     were committed in these municipalities.  Having analysed the totality of

 6     the evidence on this issue, the Chamber is not satisfied that the only

 7     reasonable inference was that there existed intent to destroy part of the

 8     Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat groups in these municipalities as such.

 9     The Chamber therefore does not have sufficient evidence to find beyond a

10     reasonable doubt that genocide was committed in these municipalities.

11             The Chamber now turns to the accused's responsibility for crimes

12     which were found to have been committed in the municipalities.

13             The crux of the accused's case was that the objectives of the

14     Bosnian Serb leadership were not criminal and did not entail the

15     commission of any crimes.  In his submission, the movement of non-Serb

16     population in BiH was not the product of a JCE but was the result of

17     people voluntarily moving to areas which were controlled by their own

18     ethnic groups.  In the accused's submission, any individual case of

19     forced expulsion was the product of hatred or revenge and it was never

20     the objective of the Bosnian Serb leadership.  His Defence also suggested

21     that any crimes which were committed were isolated cases committed by

22     individuals, for example, paramilitaries, who were acting of their own

23     accord and not in furtherance of the alleged common criminal purpose.  In

24     his case, the central authorities were unsuccessful in trying to exert

25     influence at the municipal level, and that in an environment of chaos he

Page 48131

 1     was unable to do more than he did.

 2             The Chamber finds, to the contrary, that the creation of parallel

 3     Bosnian Serb political and governmental structures, the campaign of

 4     forcible take-over of municipalities, and the expulsion of non-Serbs were

 5     carefully co-ordinated, directed, and ultimately intended by the accused

 6     and the Bosnian Serb leadership.  In order to further these objectives,

 7     precise directions in the form of the Variant A and B instructions and

 8     the strategic goals were promulgated and promoted by the accused and the

 9     Bosnian Serb leadership.

10             The Chamber weighed the evidence received on the acts and conduct

11     of the accused and other alleged members of the overarching JCE in light

12     of the systematic and organised manner in which crimes were committed in

13     each of the municipalities.  On this basis, the Chamber finds that

14     between October 1991 and November 1995, there existed a common plan to

15     permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian

16     Serb-claimed territory through the commission of crimes.  The accused,

17     Momcilo Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, Biljana Plavsic, Ratko Mladic,

18     Mico Stanisic, Momcilo Mandic, Zeljko Raznjatovic, also known as Arkan,

19     and Vojislav Seselj formed a plurality of persons who acted pursuant to

20     this common plan and shared the intent for the crimes which formed part

21     of the plan.

22             The Chamber also concludes that the accused significantly

23     contributed to the overarching JCE.  The Chamber had regard to the impact

24     of his conduct by virtue of the functions and positions he held at the

25     time.  The accused was at the forefront of developing and promoting the

Page 48132

 1     idealogy and policies of the SDS and creating the parallel governmental,

 2     military, police, and political structures that were used to establish

 3     and maintain authority over Bosnian Serb-claimed territory and further

 4     the objective of the overarching JCE.  The accused was central in

 5     outlining the goals of the Bosnian Serb leadership, including, separation

 6     from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the take-over of Bosnian

 7     Serb-claimed territory, and the creation of a largely ethnically

 8     homogeneous Bosnian Serb state.  The accused was also a central figure in

 9     the dissemination of propaganda against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

10     Croats, which identified them as the historic enemies of the Serbs and

11     insisted that co-existence was impossible.  The accused played on this

12     historical narrative, and his rhetoric was used to engender fear and

13     hatred of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and had the effect of

14     exacerbating ethnic divisions and tensions in BiH.

15             He was also at the apex of political, governmental, and military

16     structures and able to use his power and influence to further the

17     objective of the overarching JCE.  He ultimately supported the military

18     implementation of their goals, which necessarily entailed the take-over

19     of territory and the forcible movement of the non-Serb population.  He

20     was central to the mobilisation and creation of the Bosnian Serb TO, VRS,

21     and a separate Bosnian Serb police structure.  Furthermore, following the

22     withdrawal of the JNA from BiH, the accused supported the operational

23     co-operation of military forces and local authorities and, in some

24     instances, paramilitaries.  These military structures and units were used

25     to take over power and maintain Bosnian Serb authority in Bosnian

Page 48133

 1     Serb-claimed territory and to further the objective of the overarching

 2     JCE.  While the accused did take some steps to control paramilitaries

 3     later in the conflict, these measures were only taken after these

 4     paramilitaries had been used to further the objectives of the overarching

 5     JCE and once they started turning against the Bosnian Serb municipal

 6     authorities.  The accused and other members of the JCE used their

 7     authority and influence over Crisis Staffs, TO, VRS, Bosnian Serb MUP,

 8     and paramilitaries to carry out the crimes envisaged by the common plan

 9     of the overarching JCE.  Furthermore, at times, paramilitaries, local

10     Serbs, JNA, Bosnian Serb MUP, TO and VRS units acted at the behest of the

11     Crisis Staffs which were under the accused's authority and influence to

12     commit crimes in furtherance of the common plan.  The crimes that were

13     committed by Serb forces in the municipalities are thus imputed to the

14     JCE members or to the accused.

15             While the civilian courts existed during the conflict and the

16     accused established the military courts, the judicial system functioned

17     in a discriminatory manner with a lack of attention to crimes committed

18     against non-Serbs.  The accused's failure to exercise his authority to

19     adequately prevent or punish crimes committed against non-Serbs gave the

20     signal that such criminal acts would be tolerated throughout the period

21     of the overarching JCE and, therefore, had the effect of encouraging and

22     facilitating the crimes which formed part of the objective of the

23     overarching JCE.

24             At the same time that he was learning about crimes committed

25     against non-Serbs and not taking sufficient steps to prevent or punish

Page 48134

 1     them, the accused consistently and systematically provided misleading

 2     information to representatives of international organisations, the

 3     public, and to the media in relation to these crimes.  By his denials

 4     that Serb forces were committing crimes in the municipalities and his

 5     disingenuous portrayal of the reality on the ground, of which he was in

 6     fact fully aware, the accused created an environment in which Serb forces

 7     could continue to commit the crimes through which the common purpose of

 8     the overarching JCE was implemented.

 9             The accused and the other members of the overarching JCE were not

10     only informed about the forcible take-over of towns by Serb forces but

11     were also aware that this had led to massive demographic changes through

12     the forcible displacement of non-Serb civilians and resulted in ethnic

13     homogenisation, which they supported.  In addition, the manner in which

14     the take-over of the municipalities was carried out by Serb forces also

15     involved the widespread practice of unlawfully arresting and detaining

16     thousands of non-Serbs prior to removing them from Bosnian Serb-claimed

17     territory.  The accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership were not only

18     aware of these detention facilities but used such unlawful detention as a

19     core element in achieving the objective of the overarching JCE.

20             Based on these findings, the Chamber concludes that the only

21     reasonable inference is that the crimes of deportation, forcible

22     transfer, and persecution were intended by the overarching JCE members to

23     achieve their objective.  The underlying acts of persecution which were

24     intended and formed part of the objective of the overarching JCE were

25     forcible transfer, deportation, unlawful detention, and the imposition

Page 48135

 1     and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures.  The accused

 2     and other members of the JCE shared the intent for these crimes.

 3     However, the Chamber is not satisfied that the other underlying acts of

 4     persecution or the crimes of murder and extermination were included in

 5     the common plan or intended by the accused.

 6             The Chamber now turns to determine whether these crimes were

 7     foreseeable.

 8             The Chamber had regard to the broad geographical scope of the

 9     common plan and finds that there was no genuine concern for the manner in

10     which power in the municipalities was taken and the plan of the

11     overarching JCE was executed.  The Chamber finds that, having regard to

12     the nature of the common plan and the manner in which it was carried out,

13     it was foreseeable that Serb forces might commit violent crimes against

14     non-Serbs during and after the take-overs of the municipalities and the

15     campaign to forcibly remove non-Serbs.  In addition, the evidence of the

16     accused's knowledge of criminal activity in the municipalities

17     demonstrates that he was well aware of the environment of extreme fear in

18     which non-Serbs were forced to leave.  The Chamber further finds that the

19     accused knew that the common plan, whereby thousands of non-Serb

20     civilians were expelled en masse from their homes during and after the

21     forceable take-over of towns and villages and detained in facilities

22     throughout the municipalities, was carried out in a context of

23     interethnic animosity and violence.  Furthermore, he knew that there was

24     a climate of impunity for crimes committed against non-Serbs.

25             Having weighed these factors, the Chamber finds that the accused

Page 48136

 1     ought to have known that the non-Serb population was vulnerable to

 2     violent crimes that might be perpetrated by members of the Serb forces

 3     who were carrying out the common plan.  The accused was indifferent to

 4     that possibility and acted in furtherance of the common plan with the

 5     awareness of the possibility that these crimes might be committed during

 6     the execution of the common plan and he willing took that risk.

 7             In consequence, the Chamber finds that murder, extermination, and

 8     persecution were foreseeable to the accused.  The underlying acts of

 9     persecution which were foreseeable were cruel treatment, forceable labour

10     at the front lines, the use of non-Serbs as human shields, the

11     appropriation or plunder of property, and the wanton destruction of

12     private property, including cultural and sacred sites.

13             Therefore, in conclusion, in relation to the municipalities

14     component, the accused bears individual criminal responsibility pursuant

15     to Article 7(1) of the Statute for persecution, extermination, murder,

16     deportation, and forcible transfer as crimes against humanity; and

17     murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war.  However, in light of

18     the conclusion the Chamber was not satisfied that genocide was committed

19     in the seven municipalities, the accused is not held responsible for

20     genocide under Count 1.

21             The Chamber will now address the Sarajevo component of the case

22     and the alleged Sarajevo JCE.

23             The Chamber finds that from late May 1992 until October 1995, the

24     civilian population of Sarajevo was shelled and sniped by members of the

25     Bosnian Serb forces, namely the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, or SRK.

Page 48137

 1     Throughout this period, the SRK units held positions on the hills around

 2     the city, thus encircling it and holding it under siege.

 3             From their positions, they deliberately sniped at civilians in

 4     Sarajevo, including at trams.  This practice of sniping at civilians was

 5     common and persistent.  It took place on an almost daily basis, and

 6     continued generally unabated during the entirety of the conflict.

 7     Sarajevo civilians were sniped while fetching water, walking in the city,

 8     and when using public transport.  Furthermore, children were sniped at

 9     while playing in front of their houses, walking with their parents or

10     walking home from school, and even when cycling.  The SRK units would

11     open sniper fire on civilians on a number of notorious locations around

12     the city in which they had set up professionally constructed,

13     long-standing sniper nests.

14             The Chamber is also convinced that starting in late May 1992, the

15     SRK units engaged in deliberate shelling of the civilian population in

16     the city or opened disproportionate or indiscriminate fire on the city.

17     They did so using a multitude of heavy weapons, including 80- and

18     120-millimetre mortars, as well as artillery weapons, all of which were

19     located, more or less permanently, on the hills surrounding Sarajevo.

20     Thousands of shells fell on the city throughout the conflict including on

21     the residential areas and facilities such as hospital, markets, and other

22     locations where the civilian population would gather.  There was often no

23     military value in the targets that were selected by SRK's firing crews,

24     and fire was randomly scattered around the city.  In 1995, the SRK units

25     also launched a number of modified air bombs on the city, a weapon which

Page 48138

 1     was highly destructive and yet had not been tested properly.  As such,

 2     these modified air bomb attacks were indiscriminate.

 3             This practice of sniping and shelling of civilians continued for

 4     over three years.  Bearing in mind the longevity and the nature of the

 5     practice, the Chamber finds that the intention of the SRK units and their

 6     commanders was to target civilians and use indiscriminate or

 7     disproportionate fire on the city.  Thus, the Chamber is convinced that

 8     the SRK conducted a campaign of sniping and shelling of Sarajevo with the

 9     intention to, among other things, terrorise the civilian population

10     living there.  The Chamber also finds that this campaign resulted in

11     thousands of wounded and killed civilians in the city during the relevant

12     time.  Furthermore, the Chamber notes that all of the civilians living in

13     the city during that time experienced extreme fear and suffered great

14     hardship as they never knew when they would be targeted by the SRK.

15             The Chamber notes that in reaching these conclusions it relied

16     both on the general evidence relating to the situation in the city

17     between 1992 and 1995 and on the evidence concerning specific shelling

18     and sniping incidents listed in Schedules F and G of the indictment.

19     With respect to the latter, the Chamber finds the SRK responsible for all

20     but three of those incidents, namely, Scheduled Incidents F5, F7, and G6.

21     In addition, Judge Melville Baird appends his dissenting opinion in

22     relation to Scheduled Incident G8.

23             The accused argued that SRK units never targeted civilians but

24     were instead responding to attacks coming from the city and, in doing so,

25     focused on military targets located therein.  The accused also argued

Page 48139

 1     that the Bosnian Muslim side shelled and sniped its own civilians in

 2     order to lay blame on the Bosnian Serbs and provoke an intervention by

 3     the international community.  However, in reaching the conclusion I

 4     enunciated earlier, the Chamber rejected these claims by the accused.

 5             The Chamber accepts that the war was waged by both sides, that

 6     the two warring sides engaged each other throughout the conflict, and

 7     that the SRK units also targeted military personnel and military

 8     positions of their opponent.  However, the evidence in this case is

 9     replete with examples of SRK fire that was not directed at military

10     targets in the city but, rather, at civilian objects and of SRK fire that

11     was opened in a random or disproportionate manner.  The specific

12     Scheduled Incidents for which the SRK was found to be responsible are

13     clear examples of such fire.

14             Further, the persistence of the sniping and shelling directed at

15     the civilian population and the high number of civilian casualties in the

16     city cannot be explained by the fact that the war in Sarajevo was waged

17     by both parties.  It is therefore clear to the Chamber that civilians

18     were either directly targeted by the SRK as amply illustrated by the

19     scheduled sniping incidents, for example, or was subject to

20     indiscriminate or disproportionate fire, such as when the SRK launched

21     modified air bombs on the city or fired mortar shells on locations where

22     civilians would gather.

23             With respect to the accused's argument that Bosnian Muslim side

24     targeted its own civilians, the Chamber accepts that the Bosnian Muslim

25     side was intent on provoking the international community to act on its

Page 48140

 1     behalf, and as a result, at times engaged in targeting UN personnel in

 2     the city or opening fire on territory under its control in order to lay

 3     blame on the Bosnian Serbs.  However, the evidence indicates that the

 4     occasions on which this happened pale in significance when compared to

 5     the evidence relating to SRK fire on the city.  As such, they do not

 6     affect the Chamber's finding as to the SRK's practice of targeting the

 7     civilians in the city or launching indiscriminate or disproportionate

 8     attacks.

 9             The Chamber therefore finds that members of the SRK committed

10     murder, unlawful attacks on civilians, and terror as violations of the

11     laws or customs of war, and also murder as crime against humanity.

12             The Chamber now turns out to the accused's responsibility for

13     those crimes.

14             The accused's case in relation to this component was that there

15     was no Sarajevo JCE, no plan to establish a campaign of sniping and

16     shelling, and no intention to kill, attack or terrorize the civilian

17     population in the city.  Instead, according to him, the city was engulfed

18     in war, and the terror that the population felt was simply a regular

19     consequence of that war.  However, as I have already outlined, the

20     persistence of the sniping and shelling directed at the civilian

21     population and the high number of civilian casualties in the city cannot

22     be explained by the fact that there was a war in Sarajevo.  In addition,

23     the Chamber is convinced that individual snipers or sniper units within

24     the SRK, as well as its mortar and artillery firing crews, were all under

25     the control of the SRK command and ultimately the VRS Main Staff.

Page 48141

 1             Finally, from the very beginning of the conflict in BiH, the

 2     political and military leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, particularly the

 3     accused, Momcilo Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, Biljana Plavsic, and

 4     Ratko Mladic, recognised and championed the importance of Sarajevo to the

 5     Bosnian Serb cause and the conflict in BiH.  The city was important not

 6     only because of its symbolism and the fact that without it the Bosnian

 7     Muslim side would not have a functioning independent state but also

 8     because it carried special significance for the accused who had

 9     considered it his home town.  Because of this, they all desired to gain

10     control over Sarajevo, or at least parts thereof, a project to which they

11     were devoted throughout the conflict and which, given the multi-ethnic

12     nature of the city, could only be achieved by a wall of fire, that is,

13     through sniping and shelling.

14             Accordingly, the Chamber finds that there was a common plan that

15     started in late May 1992 and lasted through to October 1995, and that it

16     emanated from the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership.  The

17     primary purpose of that plan was to spread terror among the civilian

18     population of Sarajevo through the campaign of sniping and shelling.

19     Based on the evidence relating to scheduled sniping and shelling

20     incidents, the Chamber is also satisfied that this plan involved the

21     commission of murder, terror, and unlawful attacks against civilians.

22     The accused, Ratko Mladic, Stanislav Galic, Dragomir Milosevic,

23     Momcilo Krajisnik, Nikola Koljevic, and Biljana Plavsic formed a

24     plurality of persons who acted pursuant to this common plan and shared

25     the intent for the crimes that formed part of the plan.

Page 48142

 1             The Chamber also finds that the accused significantly contributed

 2     to this plan.  Being at the apex of political, military, and governmental

 3     structures, the accused supported Mladic in his strategy in Sarajevo,

 4     which was to intensify the campaign of sniping and shelling and solve the

 5     situation in the city militarily.  As the supreme commander of the VRS,

 6     the accused also issued or approved military directives which concerned

 7     Sarajevo and thus prolonged the siege, allowing, in turn, the campaign of

 8     sniping and shelling to continue unabated.  Furthermore, having de jure

 9     control over the SRK and the VRS, which he was able to exercise

10     throughout the conflict, the accused was directly involved in military

11     matters in Sarajevo and issued many orders related thereto, both at the

12     strategic and at the operational level.  He also promoted and rewarded

13     Mladic, Galic, Dragomir Milosevic at various times despite his knowledge

14     that they were implicated in attacks on Sarajevo civilians.

15             From the moment the Sarajevo JCE came into existence, the accused

16     was also consistently informed about SRK attacks on civilians in the

17     city, including many of the Scheduled Incidents discussed in detail in

18     the judgement.  However, instead of ensuring that the targeting of

19     civilians stopped, he denied that SRK was responsible for the attacks and

20     instead accused the Bosnian Muslim side of perpetrating them.  He also

21     deflected any criticism related to SRK firing practices by raising

22     unconnected issues or by emphasizing that it was necessary to act in such

23     a manner in order to defend the Bosnian Serb territory.  Despite the

24     functioning system of military justice within the VRS and SRK, there was

25     not a single attempt to prosecute any SRK soldiers for opening fire on

Page 48143

 1     civilians in Sarajevo, revealing, in turn, that the culture within the

 2     SRK was one of absolute impunity.  While there were times when the

 3     accused made some attempts to curb the targeting of civilians in

 4     Sarajevo, this happened only when he was under pressure by the

 5     international community or under threat of a NATO intervention and never

 6     resulted in actual punishment of any SRK soldiers.  Conversely, when such

 7     pressure was absent, he allowed the campaign of sniping and shelling to

 8     intensify again.  He also intensified the campaign when the Bosnian

 9     Muslim leadership refused to agree to peace deals on his terms.

10             The Chamber is therefore convinced that the accused used this

11     campaign of sniping and shelling, causing terror among the civilian

12     population in Sarajevo, as a means of exerting pressure on the Bosnian

13     Muslim leaders and the international community in pursuit of his

14     political goals.  Based on all these contributions, the Chamber finds

15     that, as was the case with Mladic, Galic, and Dragomir Milosevic, the

16     accused was so instrumental in the Sarajevo JCE that without his support,

17     the SRK attacks on civilians in the city could not have occurred.

18             The Chamber also finds that the only reasonable inference that

19     can be drawn from these acts and omissions of the accused, and from his

20     statements outlined in detail in the judgement, is that he intended

21     murder, unlawful attacks on civilians, and terror, and that he shared

22     this intent with the other Sarajevo JCE members.

23             Accordingly, in relation to the Sarajevo JCE, the accused bears

24     individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

25     Statute, for murder, unlawful attacks on civilians, and terror as

Page 48144

 1     violation of the laws or customs of war, and for murder as a crime

 2     against humanity.

 3             The Chamber now turns to the hostages component.

 4             On the 26th of May, 1995, following NATO air-strikes against

 5     Bosnian Serb military targets in Pale, UNPROFOR and UNMO personal in BiH

 6     were detained by Bosnian Serb forces and taken to various locations

 7     throughout BiH.  Some of them were driven to locations of military

 8     significance to the Bosnian Serbs, such as the Mount Jahorina radar

 9     station, and various military barracks.

10             During their detention by Bosnian Serb forces, UN personnel

11     received threats.  Some of them were told they would be harmed or even

12     killed if NATO launched further air-strikes.  These threats were

13     communicated to the UN.  Some were handcuffed outside locations of

14     military significance.  Once it became clear that NATO would no longer be

15     conducting air-strikes, the accused ordered the release of UN personnel,

16     and by the 18th of June, all UN personnel had been released.

17             The Chamber finds that all UN personnel who were detained by

18     Bosnian Serb forces were entitled to the protections under

19     Common Article 3, including the prohibition against hostage taking.  The

20     Chamber rejects the argument that the NATO air-strikes resulted in UN

21     personnel being deemed combatants and therefore not entitled to the

22     protections set out in Common Article 3.  The Chamber finds that the UN

23     and its associated peacekeeping forces were not a party to the conflict

24     and, further, that the detained UN personnel took no active part in the

25     hostilities.

Page 48145

 1             Between approximately the 26th of May and the 19th of June, 1995,

 2     UNPROFOR and UNMO personnel were detained by Bosnian Serb forces and

 3     threats were made against them in order to obtain a concession, namely

 4     that NATO cease its air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in

 5     BiH.  The detention of the UN personnel was intentionally carried out for

 6     the purpose of obtaining this concession.  The Chamber therefore finds

 7     that the elements of the crime of taking hostages as a violation of the

 8     laws or customs of war, under Article 3, are met.

 9             The Chamber is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a JCE

10     existed with a common purpose of taking UN personnel hostage in order to

11     compel NATO to abstain from conducting air-strikes against Bosnian Serb

12     targets.  The common purpose came to fruition following the NATO

13     air-strikes on the 25th and the 26th of May, 1995, and ended once all of

14     the UN personnel were released.  The JCE involved a plurality of persons,

15     including the accused, Mladic, Krajisnik, and Manojlo Milovanovic.

16             The only reasonable inference the Chamber can draw from the

17     evidence it received with regard to the statements, acts and conduct of

18     the accused is that not only did he intend to detain the UN personnel,

19     but he also intended for threats to be issued against them during

20     detention in order to achieve the objective of stopping the NATO

21     air-strikes.  In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber found that, prior

22     to the hostage-taking events, the accused warned UNPROFOR that he would

23     treat UN soldiers as enemies if NATO air-strikes were conducted, and he

24     made it clear that if NATO conducted air-strikes, UN forces would be

25     attacked or at least detained.  On the 27th of May, 1995, the accused

Page 48146

 1     approved an order to place captured UN personnel and staff of other

 2     international humanitarian organisations at potential targets that may

 3     come under air-strike.  Once the hostages were taken, the accused also

 4     publicly warned against the use of military intervention to free the

 5     hostages, stating that it would end in a catastrophe and a slaughter.

 6     Therefore, the Chamber rejects the accused's argument that the

 7     Prosecution failed to prove his mens rea for this offence and his claim

 8     that although he had agreed to the detention of UN personnel, he never

 9     contemplated or agreed to threats being made against them.

10             The Chamber also finds that the accused significantly contributed

11     to the common purpose to take UN personnel hostage in order to deter NATO

12     from engaging in further air-strikes.  The accused was the driving force

13     behind the hostage taking and an active participant in every aspect of

14     the events.  He directly participated in the operation to take UN

15     personnel hostage as evidenced by his involvement in:  Formulating and

16     implementing the hostage-taking plan; the statements he made to attack

17     and detain UN personnel; directing others to detain the UN personnel and

18     place them in locations of military significance to the VRS after the

19     NATO air-strikes; monitoring the hostage-taking operation; receiving

20     reports about the hostages; and placing conditions on the release of the

21     hostages.

22             In relation to the hostages JCE, the accused therefore bears

23     individual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 7(1) of the

24     Statute for the crime of taking hostages as a violation of the laws or

25     customs of war.

Page 48147

 1             Finally, the Chamber will address the Srebrenica component of the

 2     case.

 3             As the Chamber has already found, as early as October 1991, there

 4     existed a common plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

 5     Croats from Bosnian Serb-claimed territory.  In early 1993, following a

 6     series of Bosnian Serb attacks in nearby villages, including Cerska and

 7     Konjevic Polje, the Bosnian Muslim population fled to Srebrenica, which

 8     was proclaimed a safe area on the 16th of April, 1993.

 9             In March 1995, the accused issued Directive 7, ordering the

10     Drina Corps to "create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with

11     no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica."

12             Following the issuance of Directive 7, restrictions on

13     humanitarian aid and UNPROFOR resupply convoys intensified, resulting in

14     disastrous conditions in the Srebrenica enclave.

15             On the 2nd of July, days after the accused's visit to Drina Corps

16     command, the Drina Corps commander, Milenko Zivanovic, issued an order

17     for active combat operations aimed at reducing the enclaves of Srebrenica

18     and Zepa to their urban areas.  Bosnian Serb forces launched combat

19     operations on 6th of July, and on the 9th of July the accused was

20     informed that favourable conditions for extending the attack towards

21     Srebrenica had been created.  The accused approved this and ordered the

22     take-over of Srebrenica.  By the end of the day on the 11th of July, the

23     town fell to the Bosnian Serb forces.  Bosnian Serb forces called upon

24     those who remained to leave their houses.  Mladic turned to the

25     television cameras and said, "Finally the time has come to take revenge

Page 48148

 1     on the Turks in this region."

 2             The Bosnian Muslim population had already fled the relentless

 3     shelling of the town earlier that day.  The vast majority of the

 4     able-bodied men formed a column and departed the enclave on foot in an

 5     attempt to reach Tuzla, while the women, children, and elderly men moved

 6     north to the UN compound in Potocari.  As they fled, the group moving

 7     towards the UN compound was shelled.

 8             The humanitarian situation in Potocari was also catastrophic.

 9     During the night between the 12th and the 13th of July, the Bosnian

10     Muslims who gathered in Potocari could hear the sound of gun-fire in the

11     vicinity; some observed members of the Bosnian Serb forces beating and

12     sexually assaulting Bosnian Muslims, while other Bosnian Muslims were

13     taken away by members of the Bosnian Serb forces and did not return.

14     These combined circumstances exacerbated the fear and panic permeating

15     the atmosphere in Potocari.

16             That evening and the following morning, Mladic summoned members

17     of UNPROFOR and representatives of the Bosnian Muslim population gathered

18     in Potocari to a series of three meetings at Hotel Fontana in Bratunac in

19     order to discuss their fate.  During one meeting Mladic told the Bosnian

20     Muslim representative that he wished to receive "a clear position ... on

21     whether you want to survive ... stay or vanish ... the future of your

22     people is in your hands, not only in this territory."

23             However, overnight, Mladic, Zivanovic, and deputy Drina Corps

24     commander Radislav Krstic mobilised a vast quantity of buses to report to

25     Bratunac on the following day.  At the third and final Hotel Fontana

Page 48149

 1     meeting held the next morning, Mladic gave the impression that the wishes

 2     of the Bosnian Muslim representatives would be respected but also implied

 3     that they had no choice but to leave in order to survive.  He also

 4     announced that Bosnian Muslim males between the ages of 15 and 70 would

 5     be subjected to a screening procedure.

 6             Just prior to the meeting, Drina Corps chief of security

 7     Vujadin Popovic told Bratunac Brigade chief of security Momir Nikolic

 8     that the Bosnian Muslim women and children gathered in Potocari would be

 9     transferred, while the military-aged men would be separated.  Popovic

10     told Nikolic that "all the Balijas should be killed."  The accused

11     challenges Momir Nikolic's credibility both generally and in relation to

12     this conversation specifically.  However, as enunciated in detail in the

13     written judgement, the Chamber finds Momir Nikolic's testimony on this

14     point to be reliable and thus accepts his account of the conversation.

15             Between midday on the 12th of July and 8.00 p.m. on the 13th of

16     July, approximately 30.000 Bosnian Muslim women, children, and elderly

17     men were bussed from Potocari to Bosnian Muslim-held territory.  Mindful

18     of Mladic's statement at the Hotel Fontana meetings, the Chamber finds

19     that the collective circumstances arising from the imposition of

20     restriction of humanitarian aid pursuant to Directive 7, the attack on

21     Srebrenica as well as the atmosphere in Potocari, created a coercive

22     environment in which the Bosnian Muslims had no other viable alternative

23     but to leave the enclave.  Contrary to the accused's contention that the

24     departure of Bosnian Muslims from Potocari reflected a genuine choice on

25     the part of the population, the Chamber finds that the removal of Bosnian

Page 48150

 1     Muslim population was forced.  On the basis of the totality of evidence,

 2     noting in particular the mobilisation of the massive bussing resources

 3     which took place as Bosnian Serb forces consolidated control over the

 4     Bosnian Muslims gathered in Potocari, the Chamber finds that, as

 5     Srebrenica fell, the long-term strategy aimed at removing the Bosnian

 6     Muslim population from Srebrenica began to be transformed into a concrete

 7     common plan to eliminate them.  This elimination operation first took the

 8     form of forcible removal of the Bosnian Muslim population.  The Chamber

 9     has no doubt that Mladic's overtures at the Hotel Fontana meetings were

10     merely a facade intended to mask the fact that a concrete common plan was

11     already in place to forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim women, children,

12     and elderly men from Srebrenica on the vehicles that had already been

13     mobilized.  Noting the pervasive involvement in the encirclement and

14     ultimate take-over of Potocari by Bosnian Serb forces, as well as the

15     large-scale bussing operation, the Chamber is satisfied that

16     Ratko Mladic, Milenko Zivanovic, Radislav Krstic, Vujadin Popovic, and

17     Svetozar Kosoric shared the common purpose of eliminating the Bosnian

18     Muslims in Srebrenica by forcibly removing the women, children, and

19     elderly men.

20             After the first convoy departed Potocari, members of the Bosnian

21     Serb forces began to separate the Bosnian Muslim men and boys,

22     approaching the vehicles, forcing them to leave behind their families as

23     well as personal belongings such as ID cards, and taking them to the

24     building known as the white house, which was located across the road.

25     Separations continued throughout the day on the 12th and the 13th of

Page 48151

 1     July.  As the house filled and became crammed with Bosnian Muslim males,

 2     buses arrived to take them to Bratunac where they were detained in

 3     equally crowded conditions throughout the town.

 4             Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb forces began to receive information about

 5     the column of Bosnian Muslim males attempting to reach Tuzla and began to

 6     take steps to intercept it by way of ambush or shelling.  Following

 7     vigorous attacks on and pursuit of the column, on the 13th of July,

 8     between 1500 and 2.000 Bosnian Muslim males, who surrendered or were

 9     captured, came to be detained by Bosnian Serb forces at the

10     Konjevic Polje intersection, the Sandici meadow, and the Nova Kasaba

11     football field.  In the afternoon and evening, the detainees were removed

12     from these locations and taken either to the Kravica warehouse or on

13     trucks and buses to Bratunac town.  Beginning late that afternoon and

14     continuing over night, Bosnian Serb forces killed between 755 and

15     1.016 Bosnian Muslim males at the Kravica warehouse.

16             That evening, Miroslav Deronjic, whom the accused had appointed

17     two days earlier as the civilian commissioner for the Serbian

18     municipality of Srebrenica, complained to Main Staff chief of security,

19     Ljubisa Beara, about the presence of the buses full of detainees parked

20     throughout Bratunac town which were causing concern to the Bratunac

21     population.  At approximately 8.00 p.m., Deronjic spoke to the accused,

22     who asked, how many thousands?  Deronjic replied that there were about

23     two for the time being but there would be more during that night.  The

24     accused then told Deronjic "all the goods must be placed inside the

25     warehouses before 12.00 tomorrow ... not in the warehouses over there,

Page 48152

 1     but somewhere else."

 2             Beginning that evening, pursuant to Mladic's order, thousands of

 3     Bosnian Muslim males were bussed from Bratunac to Zvornik, where they

 4     were held for short periods of time at the Orahovac school, the Petkovci

 5     school, the Rocevic school, the Kula school, and the Pilica cultural

 6     centre.  Over the following few days they were taken from their places of

 7     detention to nearby locations throughout Zvornik municipality:  A field

 8     in Orahovac, the Petkovci dam, the banks of the Drina river near Kozluk,

 9     and the Branjevo military farm.  There they were shot by members of

10     Bosnian Serb forces.  Even prior to the large-scale killings in Zvornik,

11     beginning on the 12th of July Bosnian Muslim male were shot by Bosnian

12     Serb forces at Potocari, Sandici meadow, Luke school near Tisca, on the

13     bank of the Jadar river, and outside the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac.

14     In the days following the conclusion of the killing operation in Zvornik,

15     members of the Bosnian Serb forces continued to kill Bosnian Muslim males

16     who came into their custody, as exemplified by the killings of Bosnian

17     Muslim males at Snagovo, Bisina and Trnovo.  The evidence tendered in

18     this case has shown that at least 5.115 Bosnian Muslim males were killed

19     in connection with the Scheduled Incidents charged in the indictment.

20     However, the Chamber has been unable to establish beyond a reasonable

21     doubt that Scheduled Incident E2 took place as alleged in the indictment.

22             The Chamber is satisfied that these killings were carried out

23     pursuant to a systematic and highly organised plan.  In reaching that

24     conclusion, the Chamber is mindful that Bosnian Serb forces began to

25     obtain detailed intelligence regarding the presence of Bosnian Muslim

Page 48153

 1     males amongst the population in Potocari on the night of the 11th of

 2     July and, around the same time, began to receive reports about the

 3     existence and movement of the column of Bosnian Muslim men and boys

 4     attempting to make their way towards Tuzla.  Further, before the third

 5     Hotel Fontana meeting at 10.00 a.m. on the 12th of July, Popovic told

 6     Momir Nikolic that all the Balijas should be killed.

 7             The Chamber is convinced that a plan to kill all the able-bodied

 8     Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica had been established by the

 9     time the third Hotel Fontana meeting commenced.  The accused contends

10     that the plan to kill the Bosnian Muslim men and boys detained by Bosnian

11     Serb forces did not exist at least until the killing incident at the

12     Kravica warehouse on the afternoon of the 13th of July.  However, the

13     Chamber considers that this incident marks the beginning of the

14     large-scale implementation of the plan to kill, which already existed.

15             This insidious operation was overseen and implemented on the

16     ground by numerous VRS officers at all levels of the command hierarchy,

17     from the Main Staff to the members of the battalions of the Zvornik and

18     Bratunac Brigades.  The Chamber particularly notes the ubiquitousness of

19     security officers from the Main Staff, Drina Corps, and Zvornik, namely,

20     Beara, Popovic, and Drago Nikolic, at the killing sites across Zvornik

21     between the 14th and the 17th of July, 1995.

22             The Chamber further finds that complex killing operation would

23     not have been possible without the authorisation and orders of the VRS

24     commander, Mladic.  Accordingly, the Chamber finds that Ratko Mladic,

25     Ljubisa Beara, and Vujadin Popovic shared the expanded common purpose of

Page 48154

 1     eliminating the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica by killing the men and

 2     boys, and thus intended murder, extermination, and persecution through

 3     the underlying act of killing.

 4             Further, the Chamber notes the Bosnian Serb forces' vigorous

 5     pursuit of the members of the column and their dogged commitment to

 6     killing all Bosnian Muslim males taken into Bosnian Serb custody,

 7     irrespective of whether they were combatants or civilians, and regardless

 8     of whether they were captured or had surrendered from the column.  The

 9     Chamber considers that this, combined with the manner as well as the

10     systematic and highly organised nature of the killings, demonstrates a

11     clear intent to kill every able-bodied Bosnian Muslim male from

12     Srebrenica.  Noting that killing every able-bodied male of the group

13     results in severe procreative that may lead to the group's extinction,

14     the Chamber finds that the only reasonable inference is that members of

15     the Bosnian Serb forces orchestrating this operation intended to destroy

16     the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such.

17             In conclusion, mindful of the omnipresence and involvement of

18     Beara and Popovic at multiple mass killing sites in Zvornik, their

19     numerous actions in furtherance of the killing operation, and the fact

20     that the vast operation was conducted with Mladic's essential

21     involvement, the Chamber is satisfied that the members of the Srebrenica

22     JCE who agreed to the expansion of means so as to encompass the killing

23     of men and boys, i.e., Mladic, Beara, and Popovic, intended to kill all

24     the able-bodied Bosnian Muslim males which intent, in the circumstances,

25     is tantamount to the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica

Page 48155

 1     as such.

 2             The Chamber now turns to the accused's responsibility for the

 3     crimes which were found to have been committed in the Srebrenica

 4     component of the case.

 5             The accused acknowledges that he approved the initial plan to

 6     shrink the Srebrenica enclave and thereafter to take the undefended town

 7     of Srebrenica, but claims that this plan never contemplated the execution

 8     of Bosnian Muslim detainees.  The accused asserts that he was never

 9     informed about these killings.

10             The Chamber has found that, at least by the time Directive 7 was

11     issued in March 1995, the accused and Mladic had devised a long-term plan

12     aimed at the eventual forcible removal of the Bosnian Muslims in

13     Srebrenica, and considers that the accused's establishment of Bosnian

14     Serb structures in Srebrenica to be demonstrative of the intent to

15     permanently and forcibly remove the Bosnian Muslim population.  In

16     reaching this conclusion, the Chamber notes that throughout the operation

17     in Srebrenica, the accused was receiving information through various

18     channels, including contacts with high-ranking VRS officers such as

19     Milan Gvero and Zdravko Tolimir, as well as Zivanovic, on the night of

20     the 11th of July, and Mladic during afternoon of 13th of July.  The

21     accused also met twice with Tomislav Kovac of the Republika Srpska MUP

22     who spent the evening of the 13th of July and the day of the 14th of

23     July in the Bratunac and Srebrenica areas.  The accused also received

24     regular written reports from multiple branches of the Bosnian Serb

25     forces, including daily VRS combat reports, which revealed that the

Page 48156

 1     Bosnian Serb forces observed relatively few able-bodied Bosnian Muslim

 2     males in Potocari and described the actions taken by Bosnian Serb forces

 3     in pursuit of the column.

 4             As mentioned before, at approximately 8.00 p.m. on the 13th of

 5     July, the accused spoke to Deronjic, who, as civilian commissioner of

 6     Srebrenica, answered directly to the accused, about the fate of the

 7     thousands of Bosnian Muslim male detainees then being held in Bratunac

 8     town.  Despite the fact that they did not explicitly mention the killing

 9     of detainees during the conversation, the accused and Deronjic spoke in

10     code, referring to the detainees as goods which had to be placed inside

11     the warehouses before 12.00 the following day.  Moreover, the Chamber

12     recalls that immediately after this conversation, Beara and Deronjic

13     discussed where - not whether - the detainees were to be killed.  It is

14     therefore clear that by that time a decision had already been made to

15     kill the detainees, and Deronjic invoked the accused's authority to

16     convince Beara to accede to their movement to Zvornik.  The Chamber finds

17     that this conversation, in addition to the accused's subsequent acts,

18     demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the accused's agreement to the

19     expansion of the objective to encompass the killing of Bosnian Muslim

20     males.  As the president of the Republika Srpska and supreme commander of

21     the VRS, the accused was the sole person within Republika Srpska with the

22     power to intervene to prevent the Bosnian Muslim males from being killed.

23     Yet, far from intervening to prevent the killing from taking place at

24     all, the accused himself ordered that the Bosnian Muslim male detainees

25     who were then being held in Bratunac be transferred elsewhere to be

Page 48157

 1     killed.  They were then taken to Zvornik and killed.

 2             With full knowledge of the ongoing killing operation, the accused

 3     declared a state of war in the area of Srebrenica-Skelani municipality on

 4     the 14th of July.  This had the practical effect of allowing the armed

 5     forces deployed in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps to

 6     utilize all human and material resources without having to follow

 7     complicated procedural protocols, thereby facilitating the ongoing

 8     killing operation.

 9             On the basis of the totality of the evidence, the Chamber finds

10     that the accused shared the expanded common purpose of killing the

11     Bosnian Muslim males of Srebrenica and that he significantly contributed

12     to it.

13             The Chamber now turns to the issue whether the accused

14     participated in the Srebrenica JCE with intent to destroy the Bosnian

15     Muslims of Srebrenica.

16             The Chamber has no doubt that the accused knew that the thousands

17     of Bosnian Muslim male detainees being held by Bosnian Serb forces in the

18     Srebrenica area constituted a very significant percentage of the Bosnian

19     Muslim males from Srebrenica.  Despite his contemporaneous knowledge of

20     its progress, the accused agreed with and therefore did not intervene to

21     halt or hinder the killing aspect of the plan to eliminate between the

22     evening of the 13th of July and the 17th of July.  Instead, he ordered

23     that the detainees be moved to Zvornik, where they were killed.

24     Moreover, once Pandurevic reported on the 16th of July that he had opened

25     a corridor to allow members of the column who had not yet been captured

Page 48158

 1     or surrendered to pass through, Milenko Karisik, head of the RJB, was

 2     promptly sent to investigate and the corridor was closed within a day.

 3     Finally, the Chamber recalled that although the accused touted the

 4     opening of the corridor when speaking to the international press, in a

 5     closed session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly held weeks later he expressed

 6     regret that the Bosnian Muslim males had managed to pass through Bosnian

 7     Serb lines.  Accordingly, the Chamber finds that the only reasonable

 8     inference available on such evidence is that the accused shared with

 9     Mladic, Beara, and Popovic the intent that every able-bodied Bosnian

10     Muslim male from Srebrenica be killed, which, the Chamber finds, amounts

11     to the intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such.

12             The Chamber notes, however, that it can only conclude that the

13     accused agreed to the expanded common purpose as of the time of his

14     conversation with Deronjic at 8.00 p.m. on the 13th of July.  He

15     therefore cannot be held responsible for the killings and the related

16     acts of persecution which occurred prior to that time through his

17     participation in the Srebrenica JCE.  Regarding those killings which

18     occurred prior to his conversation with Deronjic on the night of

19     13th of July, the Chamber finds that the accused knew or had reason to

20     know that crimes had been committed by his subordinates in the aftermath

21     of the fall of the Srebrenica enclave, and that he failed in his duty as

22     supreme commander to take necessary and reasonable measures to punish the

23     commission of genocide, murder, extermination and killings as an

24     underlying act of persecution.  He is therefore criminally responsible

25     for such failures pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.  However,

Page 48159

 1     since the Chamber has already found the accused responsible for genocide

 2     on the basis of his participation in the Srebrenica JCE, the Chamber will

 3     not enter a conviction pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute in

 4     relation to Count 2.

 5             The Chamber now turns to sentencing.  In determining the

 6     appropriate sentence to be imposed on the accused, the Chamber has had

 7     regard to the particular gravity of the crimes for which he is found

 8     responsible and the significant contribution he made to their commission.

 9     These are among the most egregious of crimes in international criminal

10     law and include extermination as a crime against humanity and genocide.

11             In mitigation, the accused presented evidence in relation to an

12     agreement he claims to have entered with Richard Holbrooke in July 1996,

13     whereby he resigned from public and party office and withdrew from public

14     life with the understanding that he would not be prosecuted at the

15     Tribunal.  The Chamber considers that regardless of the reason or reasons

16     behind his decision, the accused's decision to resign from public and

17     party offices in July 1996 is a mitigating factor.  The Chamber has also

18     given regard to the accused's other arguments, such as his expressions of

19     regret, his good conduct at the Tribunal's Detention Unit, and his

20     personal circumstances.

21             With respect to cumulative convictions where there were

22     overlapping killing incidents, the Chamber finds that murder as a crime

23     against humanity was subsumed under extermination, and no conviction with

24     regard to these incidents is entered under Count 5.  From all remaining

25     established killing incidents, the Chamber enters a conviction for murder

Page 48160

 1     as a crime against humanity.  This does not impact the conviction for

 2     murder as a violation of the laws or customs of war under Article 3 of

 3     the Statute which is not impermissibly cumulative with murder or

 4     extermination as crimes against humanity.

 5             The Chamber now turns to the disposition.

 6             Mr. Karadzic, could you please stand.

 7             For the reasons summarised during this hearing, the Chamber,

 8     having heard all of the evidence presented by the Prosecution and the

 9     Defence, finds you, Radovan Karadzic:

10             Not guilty of Count 1, genocide.

11             Guilty of the following counts:

12             Count 2, genocide;

13             Count 3, persecution, a crime against humanity;

14             Count 4, extermination, a crime against humanity;

15             Count 5, murder, a crime against humanity;

16             Count 6, murder, a violation of the laws or customs of war;

17             Count 7, deportation, a crime against humanity;

18             Count 8, forcible transfer as other inhumane acts, a crime

19     against humanity;

20             Count 9, terror, a violation of the laws or customs of war;

21             Count 10, unlawful attacks on civilians, a violation of the laws

22     or customs of war; and

23             Count 11, hostage taking, a violation of the laws or customs of

24     war.

25             The Chamber hereby sentences you, Radovan Karadzic, to a single

Page 48161

 1     sentence of 40 years of imprisonment.

 2             Please be seated, Mr. Karadzic.

 3             The accused has been in custody since the 21st of July, 2008, and

 4     pursuant to Rule 101(C) of the Rules, he is entitled to credit for time

 5     spent in detention thus far.  Pursuant to Rule 103(C) of the Rules, the

 6     accused shall remain in the custody of the Tribunal pending the

 7     finalisation of arrangement for his transfer to the state where he shall

 8     serve his sentence.

 9             Judge Howard Morrison and Judge Melville Baird append partially

10     dissenting opinions to the judgement.

11             The Court stands adjourned.

12                            --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.40 p.m.