Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 371




4 Case No. IT-95-18-R61

5 Case No. IT-95-5-R61



8 Tuesday, 2nd July 1996

9 Before:



12 (The Presiding Judge)







19 -v-





24 on behalf of the Prosecution

25 (Open Session)

Page 372

1 (10.05 a.m.)

2 MR. TARIK KUPUSOVIC, recalled.

3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE [In translation] First of all, can everyone hear me?

4 On the counsel side? Fellow Judges can hear me? The Registrar? The

5 public gallery is working all right? No technical problems like we

6 had yesterday? The former Mayor of Sarajevo, welcome to you. Please

7 be seated. If you would kindly put on the head set? Can you hear me,

8 sir? Can you hear me?

9 THE WITNESS [In translation] : Very well.

10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: You are rested, are you feeling fine? Counsel, you

11 have the floor. I believe you wanted to go ahead with the video after

12 which the Judges will have some questions. You have the floor.

13 MR. BOWERS: Thank you, your Honour. That is correct. We would like to

14 proceed this morning with a video which is a compilation of many of

15 the pieces of video and film that the Office of the Prosecutor has

16 collected as evidence. While it could not possibly accurately portray

17 what it was like to live in Sarajevo during the siege, it is intended

18 as a type of slice of life of what it was like to live through the

19 sniping and shelling. So with the court's permission we would like to

20 have the lights dimmed and that particular video played.

21 (The video was played)

22 Examined by MR. BOWERS, continued

23 Q. Mr. Kupusovic, do you have any final comments for the court?

24 A. Your Honour, and all the Judges, I did not want with my testimony to

25 provoke anybody's emotions. The facts about the siege and the

Page 373

1 strangulation of Sarajevo are well known more or less to everybody. I

2 would like to point out, however, that we never lost hope in peace and

3 justice. This Tribunal was founded to defend the principles of

4 civilisations from the attack by war criminals. The onus is on you,

5 Prosecutors and Judges, to take care of this huge historical

6 responsibility. Whether barbarian principles will overcome, all

7 international organisations are capable of bringing war criminals to

8 justice and punish them appropriately. The justification for not

9 doing something can always be found. We must do something. Thank

10 you.

11 MR. BOWERS: Thank you. That concludes the Prosecution's presentation,

12 your Honours. We would now open it up for questions.

13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, Mr. Bowers. Let me turn to fellow

14 Judges: Judge Odio Benito, you have some questions? Please go right

15 ahead.

16 Examined by the Court

17 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Thank you. Sir, did your political party try to avoid

18 the war?

19 A. Yes, it did.

20 Q. What about the other political parties, did they try to avoid the war

21 also?

22 A. All parties worked on keeping the peace, except the Serbian Democratic

23 Party led by Karadzic.

24 Q. Many times you have used the expression "Karadzic's Serbs", that means

25 that there are other kinds of Serbs?

Page 374

1 A. By saying "Karadzic's Serbs", I mean those who spent, who pursued the

2 policy that brought about the situation in which crimes were

3 committed. During the entire war there were about 40,000 Serbs living

4 in Sarajevo which suffered in exactly the same way as other citizens

5 of Sarajevo, together with them, and in the entire Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina, in many towns, the victims of the war were Serbs,

7 different from Karadzic's Serbs.

8 Q. Yesterday you mentioned 12,000 victims of this siege, among them 1600

9 children. Do you know how many women and how many men died?

10 A. I do not know exactly, but roughly it is half and half.

11 Q. Finally, sir, I beg your pardon for asking this, but after this

12 horrible war, how do you see the future of your city, the future of

13 your family and the future of your country as well?

14 A. I see the future of my town, my country and my family as having begun

15 already. In Sarajevo, it is much easier to live now than it was

16 immediately after the agreement, the Dayton Agreement, was signed, but

17 the hurdle to serious reconstruction of the country, to

18 reconciliation, to reconstruction, are the war criminals that this

19 court is to try.

20 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Thank you, sir.

21 JUDGE RIAD: Mayor Kupusovic, in one of the interviews you showed us we

22 could hear Mr. Karadzic saying, "We could take Sarajevo any time". I

23 remember that looking at Sarajevo from the hill. In your assessment,

24 why did they not take Sarajevo and why did they inflict the siege on

25 it for such a long time? What was the purpose of this whole

Page 375

1 operation?

2 A. I am convinced that they could have entered Sarajevo and taken it the

3 first few weeks of the war, the first few weeks of May when the siege

4 started, but their goal was not to destroy the city completely,

5 because at the same time there were offices and high officers of the

6 United Nations and International Red Cross, many journalists. Their

7 goal was to divide the city, to make one part of the city exclusively

8 Muslim, another part exclusively Serbian and possibly another one

9 Croatian.

10 As they did not succeed in doing so at the beginning, then by a long

11 siege they wanted to make life in the city impossible, so that the

12 inhabitants of the city could feel hopelessness, to abandon their city

13 so that the city as such would die. Afterwards, when they wanted to

14 take the city, they could not do so without enormous human, technical

15 and other losses on their own side.

16 Q. Thank you for this answer. In your summary at the beginning, you

17 mentioned that the Serbs were a minority compared to the Muslims. Did

18 this minority suffer from any discrimination in Sarajevo?

19 A. By no means. There were about 42 per cent of Muslims in Sarajevo and

20 33 per cent Serbs and about eight to nine per cent Catholics,

21 Croatians, and other people from mixed marriages and others. But

22 never in Sarajevo has there been any uneasiness for anyone else by

23 somebody else, whether it was a Serb, a Romany, a Jew. In the

24 villages around Sarajevo before the war the Serbs launched propaganda

25 in order to cause the uneasiness of Serbs, to make it look as if they

Page 376

1 were jeopardised by the others. They never succeeded in doing so in

2 the city, but, unfortunately, in mono-ethnic villages inhabited by

3 Serbs exclusively, they succeeded in doing so. But this is a matter

4 for the future when the civilian population returns to their normal

5 views of life together.

6 Q. There were no clashes in the previous years between Serbs and Muslims

7 in Sarajevo?

8 A. No, there have never been any clashes, neither during the First World

9 War or the Second World War in the town itself. There have never been

10 inter-ethnic conflicts among the citizens of Sarajevo.

11 Q. Then what promoted the hostility? What influence was there to promote

12 this hostility?

13 A. This is all tied with the plans for Greater Serbia which included

14 annexing a large part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia. Wherever there

15 was an absolute or relative majority of Serbs, according to those

16 plans, all the Serbs were to live in one state and only Serbs in that

17 particular state. Only the Serbs is the part that brought about the

18 eviction and expelling of all the other people and the crimes that had

19 to accompany such a goal. In that context, Sarajevo had to be divided

20 for an enclave was to be left for non-Serbs which in due time would

21 disappear, as was the case in Srebrenica.

22 Q. We noticed in many interviews by Dr. Karadzic concerning Sarajevo; was

23 also General Mladic involved in this siege of Sarajevo in certain

24 ways?

25 A. He commanded all the troops of the Serbian army, of the Republika

Page 377

1 Srpska army, and he issued orders. Nothing could be done on the

2 military plane without General Mladic and their media, the media of

3 Republika Srpska, broadcast this news and this is a well-known fact.

4 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Mayor Kupusovic. Thank you.

5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mayor, just a further one or two questions: during

6 these four very long years there were a lot of negotiations about

7 cease-fires. Did you participate personally in any of these

8 negotiations and what was your impression? Did you think that there

9 was serious negotiating taking place? What were your feelings?

10 A. During the first two years of siege, I participated in commissions for

11 solving the problems related to water supply, supply of the

12 electricity and natural gas. On the technical level, on the level of

13 professionals, the arrangements were quite clear and proclamations for

14 the water, the electricity and the gas and other essential

15 infrastructure would not be used for war purposes.

16 However, these arrangements usually fell flat after a certain time

17 and later new arrangements were made. Later, as Mayor, I did not take

18 part directly in these negotiations, but through my assistance on the

19 technical level of Commissions for infrastructure, which were

20 conducted by the representatives of the United Nations in Sarajevo. I

21 think that these negotiations, that the representatives of the Serbian

22 side did not have any intention to abide by them, because their goal

23 was to show, to indicate, that they are the masters, the lords, of the

24 situation.

25 Q. Thank you. I have a question about the city status. In the Dayton

Page 378

1 Agreement how does that status work? What is your view of that? How

2 do you think it will work out in the future in the framework of the

3 Dayton Accord, and also what your fellow countrymen think of that

4 Agreement?

5 A. Sarajevo is one of several towns of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which

6 multi-ethnic, a multi-ethnic structure has been preserved and an urban

7 way of life, what had been defended throughout the siege of Sarajevo.

8 According to the Dayton Accord, Sarajevo has been defined as the

9 capital of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Croats and

10 Bosniaks, and the capital of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11 I think that very soon, although it has not happened yet, we will

12 reach a definition of the canton of Sarajevo and the city of Sarajevo,

13 and the district where all the institutions of the state of Bosnia and

14 Herzegovina, of both entities, will be based. It is essential that

15 the basic public services return to normal operation, that the

16 citizens start working and making a living, and then all these

17 problems behind us will be behind us indeed, and we will have a future

18 to look forward to.

19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you very much, Mr. Kupusovic. I do not have

20 any further questions. Fellow Judges, no further questions? Counsel,

21 no questions? The Tribunal would like to thank you. Thank you very

22 much indeed for your coming here. We are quite aware of the

23 difficulties this has given rise to for you to go over all of this.

24 We would like to thank you most heartily and wish you a safe trip

25 home. We do hope that you will be able to reintegrate more or less

Page 379

1 normal life. Thank you again. I think we can usher the witness out,

2 unless counsel for the Prosecution have any other questions?

3 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much.

4 (The witness withdrew)

5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Counsel for the Prosecution, would you like to take

6 the floor first? No? The Trial Chamber learnt on the first day of

7 the opening of this public hearing the actual charges against the

8 accused Karadzic and Mladic. The decision was read on first day and

9 it consists of inviting as amicus curiae two personalities for the

10 present hearing.

11 The moment has come for the Trial Chamber to hear the presentation

12 of Madam Christine Cleiren. We have asked her to attend this meeting

13 -- could you please wait one moment, one moment; I would like to

14 finish before -- the Chamber has asked Christine Cleiren who is a

15 member of the Expert Commission which was set up by the Security

16 Council to appear as amicus curiae to participate in this discussion,

17 to explain to us her findings in that Commission and also to tell us

18 about the practices of rape and how it is used as part of an overall

19 policy for ethnic cleansing.

20 I now invite Mrs. Cleiren to be taken to the witness stand. For

21 technical facilities, we will ask her to go there, but, please, I

22 would like to remind you that she is not a witness but an amicus

23 curiae so she will not have to swear an oath. So, please, if you

24 could take your head sets and be seated?


Page 380

1 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mrs. Cleiren, I will not repeat what I have just

2 said, but this is how we envisage the next statement. Do you hear me?

3 Do you hear me? Let me remind you that in the Rules of this court,

4 there is Article 74 which states that a Trial Chamber can, if it

5 thinks it is necessary in the interest of good administration of

6 justice, invite any organisation, anybody, any individual, to give a

7 statement on any questions which they deem relevant.

8 So I know that you have received the letter of invitation in order

9 to come to the Chamber. First of all, we would like to thank you for

10 coming here today.

11 I think the way we wish to structure the forthcoming hour or so will

12 be done in the following way. You will introduce yourself, you will

13 tell us who you are, what you have done, why you were appointed to be

14 part of the Commission. Then you will make the statement which you

15 think is useful for us and you will tell us your findings which you

16 have got when a member of the Commission of Experts.

17 After that, we will concentrate on the points which initiated this

18 invitation, that is to say, on the practice of rape or sexual violence

19 or assault since 1992. I would like to know the conclusions you had

20 in that Commission, your personal conclusions and findings.

21 Then the Trial Chamber, the one who asked you to come, will ask you

22 questions if they think it is necessary. This has been done also in

23 the cases by the witnesses called by the Office of the Prosecutor.

24 Then I will ask the Prosecutor to ask him whether he has any further

25 questions he wishes to put to you.

Page 381

1 Mrs. Cleiren, please speak freely. Do not worry. Tell us everything

2 you know openly, feel free. You are in front of an International

3 Tribunal, a court body, so please feel, tell us frankly and openly and

4 we will listen to what you have to say.

5 MRS. CHRISTINE CLEIREN: Thank you, your Honour, I will start to introduce

6 myself. I usually be a professor in criminal law and criminal

7 procedure in the Netherlands at the -- University. I was a member of

8 the Commission of Experts during eight months from October 1993 until

9 the ending of the Commission.

10 I was appointed in that Commission after the Chairman of the

11 Commission, Kalshoven, resigned and after another member of the

12 Commission, Professor Opsahl, died. Then in October 1993, two new

13 members were appointed, Judge Greve and myself.

14 In this Commission some tasks were shared, and that often with

15 regard to that tasks it is useful to say here that I was not

16 explicitly responsible for the sexual assault investigation or sexual

17 assault studies. On the contrary, most of that responsibility for the

18 sexual assault investigation was with the Chairman, Professor

19 Bassionni, and the only responsibility I had for this special team,

20 this special subject, was the legal study that is part of the annexes

21 of the final report of the Commission.

22 I will try to give you an overview of the activities of the

23 Commission of Experts with regard to sexual assault and rape and its

24 conclusions on that subject.

25 The Commission took several approaches to the questions that raise

Page 382

1 on this subject. It prepared a legal study to consider the criteria

2 for applying international humanitarian law instruments in this

3 context. This study dealt on the one hand with the possibilities and

4 on the other hand with the limitations of the law as it applies to

5 these specific crimes.

6 Besides, the Commission collected material. It received information

7 from a wide range of sources, governments, international

8 organisations, non-governmental organisations, religious groups,

9 women's groups, private individuals and the media.

10 In addition, the Commission carried out a field investigation to

11 interview victims and witnesses, specifically to answer the question

12 if there was a pattern of sexual abuse, of systematic sexual violence.

13 I will present you the patterns of rape and sexual assault which,

14 according to the Commission's Final Report, can be identified by these

15 findings, and the common threads run through the cases reported and

16 the systematic character of at least part of these cases, but not

17 before expressing some reservation and some caution with regard to

18 these findings.

19 In the first place, the Commission did not have a complete view on

20 the full extent of sexual violence for, among others, the following

21 reasons. The Commission did its work while the conflict was ongoing.

22 Second, we all know that reporting sexual violence is difficult and

23 this problem is exaggerated in war where there is a breakdown in law

24 and order and perpetrators are often soldiers. The victims may have

25 little confidence in finding justice and many seem to be reluctant to

Page 383

1 report their experience. Victims and witnesses fear the attackers.

2 They are ashamed and humiliated by what happened and many of them do

3 not dare to talk fearing the traumatic experience of passing through

4 again.

5 Another reason for being cautious is that the information the

6 Commission received contained allegations. However, the reliability

7 and the credibility of reports and testimonies could not be verified

8 by the Commission caused by various reasons.

9 Consequently, one must be extremely careful to draw conclusions

10 based on individual cases, among others, for the following reasons.

11 Individuals, as well as groups, may be driven by political or personal

12 revenge or by encouraging groups to report sexual violence.

13 Second, as time goes by, it becomes increasingly difficult to sort

14 out the true stories from the false ones. It is well known phenomenon

15 and also occurred in the Yugoslavian case that some people identified

16 themselves that extreme with victims of sexual violence that they

17 state de auditu-stories as their own experience.

18 There are indications that sexual violence was reported by the

19 parties in the conflict as an element of propaganda. The information

20 in the reports was second or third hand, and much of this of it was

21 very general.

22 In spite of these remarks, the Commission had reason to state that

23 sexual assault and rape were committed across widely, partly as the

24 result of individual or small group conduct without command direction

25 and without an overall policy, but partly as the result of an overall

Page 384

1 policy.

2 This conclusion is suggested by a number of recurrent patterns, the

3 cumulative effect of similar and analogous statements and the common

4 threads in the cases reported. In particular, the cumulation of

5 reports and statements supported and confirmed the view of the

6 Commission.

7 According to the Commission's Final Report, five patterns of rape

8 and sexual assault can be identified by the findings of the

9 Commission.

10 To inform you as adequately as possible, I will partly cite some

11 paragraphs of the text of the final report of the Commission on this

12 subject.

13 I will take them paragraphs 245 to 249. The five patterns we

14 distinguish are sexual violence with looting and intimidation. That

15 is the first pattern. The second pattern you can say is sexual

16 violence during fighting. The third is sexual violence in detention

17 facilities, and the fourth sexual violence in special rape camps, and

18 a fifth sexual violence in brothel houses. I will start with the

19 first. Then I will cite part of the report.

20 Paragraph 254: "The first pattern involves individuals or small

21 groups committing sexual assault in conjunction with looting and

22 intimidation of the target ethnic group. This is before any

23 widespread or generalised fighting breaks out in the region. Tensions

24 in an area grow and members of the ethnic group controlling the

25 regional government begin to terrorise their neighbours.

Page 385

1 "Two or men break into a house, intimidate the residents, steal

2 their property, beat them and often rape the females. Some of the

3 reported rapes are singular and some multiple. In either case, there

4 is often a gang atmosphere where the abuses are part of the same event

5 and all attackers participate even if they do not sexually assault the

6 victims".

7 That is the first pattern in which some cases or a large group of

8 cases can be placed.

9 "The second pattern of rape involves individuals or small groups

10 committing sexual assault in conjunction with fighting in an area,

11 often including the rape of women in public. When forces attack a

12 town or a village, the population is rounded up and divided by sex and

13 age. Some women are raped in their homes as the attacking forces

14 secure the area. Others are selected after the round up and raped

15 publicly. The population of the village is then transported to camps.

16 "The third pattern of rape involves individuals or groups sexual

17 assaulting people in detention because they have access to the people.

18 Once the population of a town or village has been rounded up, men are

19 either executed or sent off to camps, while women are generally sent

20 off to separate camps. Soldiers, camp guards, paramilitaries and even

21 civilians may be allowed to enter the camp, pick out women, take them

22 away, rape them and then either kill them or return them to the site.

23 "Reports frequently refer to gang rape, while beatings and torture

24 accompany most of the reported rapes. Survivors report that some

25 women are taken out alone, and some are taken out in groups. Though

Page 386

1 this is the general pattern, there are also many allegations that

2 women are raped in front of other internees, or that other internees

3 are forced to sexually abuse each other. In camps where men are

4 detained, they are also subjected to sexual abuse.

5 During the Commission's interviewing process, 15 people were

6 interviewed whose major allegations related to the same detention

7 camp. Some witnesses were men, and all of the women victims had been

8 raped. The women were sometimes gang raped by, or in the presence of,

9 the Camp Commander. Guards from the external ring of security around

10 the camp and soldiers who were strangers to the camp would be allowed

11 access to the camp for rape".

12 Then the fourth pattern, the sexual violence in special rape camps.

13 "The fourth pattern of rape involves individuals or groups committing

14 sexual assaults against women for the purposes of terrorising and

15 humiliating them often as part of the policy of "ethnic cleansing".

16 Survivors of some camps report that they believe they were detained

17 for the purpose of rape.

18 In those camps, all of the women are raped quite frequently, often

19 in front of other internees, and usually accompanied by beatings and

20 torture. Some captors also state that they trying to impregnate the

21 women. Pregnant women are detained until it is too late for them to

22 obtain an abortion".

23 Then the fifth pattern, that is, the sexual violence in what they

24 call brothel houses. "The fifth pattern of rape involves detention of

25 women in hotels or similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually

Page 387

1 entertaining soldiers, rather than causing a reaction in the women.

2 These women are reportedly more often killed than exchanged, unlike

3 women in other camps. One woman interviewed was detained in a private

4 house with a number of other women for six months. The women were of

5 mixed ethnicity. All the women were raped when soldiers returned from

6 the frontline every 15 days.

7 "The witness was told that the women had to do this because the

8 women in other camps (which the witness named and which has been

9 documented by other information gathered) were exhausted".

10 So these were the five patterns the Commission identified out of the

11 material they received. Summarising, we can say that sexual violence

12 seemed to be committed widespread. Part of the report of the rape and

13 sexual assault cases are clearly the result of an individual or a

14 small group conduct, without evidence of common direction or an

15 overall policy. However, many cases seem to be part of an overall

16 pattern.

17 This conclusion is, among others, based on the following: the

18 information the Commission had on sexual violence in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates that this practice was widespread. Over

20 80 cities and villages are alleged to have been the site of rape. In

21 approximately 30 cities or villages, rape I appears to have been

22 concentrated. It was hardly possible to determine if these areas

23 were the only areas of concentrated rape.

24 Some factors indicate a link between military action and rape and,

25 in particular, military action design to displace populations.

Page 388

1 Furthermore, these seemingly organised rape were conducted in

2 multiple, disparate locations and within a fairly close period of

3 time, between spring and late fall 1992.

4 Moreover, there seems to be a contemporaneous existence of

5 systematic rape and other violations of international humanitarian law

6 in the same regions. Violative conduct occurred simultaneously in

7 prison camps, in the field and in the occupied areas. For example,

8 while prison camps were the scene of large scale killing and torture,

9 they were also the scene of reported systematic rape.

10 So, you can try to say that there were centres of action of

11 violence, of violative conduct.

12 The Final Report of the Commission continues then with the common

13 threads that run through the cases reported whether they were outside

14 or in detention context. I will cite for you paragraph 250 on the

15 common threads: "(a) Rapes seem to occur in conjunction with efforts

16 to displace the targeted ethnic group from the region. This may

17 involve heightened shame and humiliation by raping victims in front of

18 adult and minor family members, in front of other detainees or in

19 public places, or by forcing family members to rape each other. Young

20 women and virgins are targeted for rape, along with prominent members

21 of the community and educated women.

22 "(b) Many reports state that perpetrators said they were ordered to

23 rape, or that the aim was to ensure that the victims and their

24 families would never want to return to the area. Perpetrators tell

25 female victims that they will bear children of the perpetrator's

Page 389

1 ethnicity, that they must become pregnant, and then hold them in

2 custody until it is too late for the victims to get an abortion.

3 Victims are threatened that if they ever tell anyone, or anyone what

4 has happened, the perpetrators will hunt them down and kill them.

5 "(c) Large groups of perpetrators subject victims to multiple rapes

6 and sexual assault. In detention, perpetrators go through the

7 detention centres with flashlights at night selecting and return them

8 the next morning, while camp commander often know about, and sometimes

9 participate in.

10 "(d) Victims may be sexually abused with foreign objects like broken

11 glass, bottles, guns and truncheons. Castrations are performed through

12 crude means such as forcing other detainees to bite off a prisoner's

13 testicles".

14 This threat we can identify on the material.

15 Summarising, or trying to summarise what we had as basic information

16 for this conclusion, is that there were great similarities among

17 practices in non-contiguous geographic areas; there was simultaneous

18 commission of other humanitarian law violations; simultaneous military

19 activity; simultaneous activity to displace civilian populations and

20 common elements of the commission of rape and sexual assault, like

21 maximising shame and humiliation not only to the victim but also to

22 the victim's community. The presence of these factors strongly

23 suggest that the systematic rape and sexual assault policy existed.

24 For the general conclusions of the Commission on this subject, I

25 will cite some elements of paragraphs 251 and 253: "Rape has been

Page 390

1 reported to have been committed by all sides to the conflict.

2 However, the large number of reported victims have been Bosnian

3 Muslims, and the largest number of alleged perpetrators have been

4 Bosnian Serbs. There are few reports of rape and sexual assault

5 between members of the same ethnic group".

6 252: "In Bosnia, some of the reported rape and sexual assault cases

7 committed by Serbs, mostly against Muslims, are clearly the result of

8 individual or small group conduct without evidence of command

9 direction or an overall policy. However, many more seem to be a part

10 of an overall pattern whose characteristics include similarities among

11 practices in the areas", and all the other factors I already

12 mentioned.

13 Paragraph 253: "These patterns strongly suggest that a systematic

14 rape policy existed in certain areas, but it remains to be proven

15 whether such an overall policy which existed which was to apply to all

16 non-Serbs. It is clear that some level of organisation and group

17 activity was required to carry out many of the alleged rapes.

18 Furthermore, rape and sexual assault should be examined in the context

19 of the practice of "ethnic cleansing" which is discussed in paragraphs

20 129 to 150 and the practices in detention camps discussed in paragraph

21 230. When viewed in these contexts, it is clear that grave breaches

22 of the Geneva Conventions occurred, as did other violations of

23 international humanitarian law".

24 So, an important element in the conclusions of the Commission is

25 that part of the sexual violence only can be understood within the

Page 391

1 context of the practice in the various camps and related to the

2 broader concept of "ethnic cleansing".

3 I will cite a part of paragraph 133 of ethnic cleansing and 134:

4 "The manner in which the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' is carried out

5 by Serbs in Bosnia is consistent throughout a certain geographic area

6 represented by an arc ranging from northern Bosnia and covering areas

7 in eastern and western Bosnia adjoining the Serb Krajina area in

8 Croatia.

9 "The practice of "ethnic cleansing" is carried out in strategic

10 areas linking Serbia proper with Serb inhabited areas in Bosnia and

11 Croatia. This strategic factor is significantly relevant to

12 understanding why the policy has been carried out in certain areas and

13 not in others.

14 "The coercive means used to remove the civilian population from the

15 above-mentioned strategic areas include mass murder, torture, rape and

16 other forms of sexual assault", so far.

17 Through the international media, public attention was focused on the

18 practice of sexual assault and rape in the former Yugoslavia at the

19 end of 1992.

20 Reports of systematic rape started to significantly decline in 1993.

21 By the summer of 1993 very few cases were being reported. These

22 facts and this factor can indicate for the Commission the ability of

23 the leadership to restrain and prevent such conduct when public

24 pressure mounted, and thus can be relevant to the issue of command

25 responsibility. You can find it back in paragraph 237: "This could

Page 392

1 lead to the conclusion that there was an overriding policy advocating

2 the use of rape as a method of "ethnic cleansing", rather than a

3 policy of omission, tolerating the widespread commission of rape".

4 Referring to the camps, it can be important to point out that the

5 Commission had rather detailed information on Bosnian Serb Republic

6 camps. These camps are ultimately intended to achieve ethnic

7 cleansing. The major part of the sexual violence seems to be occurred

8 in this kind of detention facilities.

9 For the practice in detention camps, I can mention paragraphs 223

10 and 230 of the Report.

11 In paragraph 132, the Commission emphasises with regard to the

12 policy of ethnic cleansing that responsibility for criminal conduct

13 must be determined on an individuals basis. This remark brings me to

14 the question of command responsibility with regard to sexual violence.

15 Sometimes camp commanders or field military commanders explicitly

16 ordered their subordinates to commit acts of sexual violence. In

17 these cases, the individual commander's criminal responsibility is

18 without doubt. In other cases, they fail to prevent sexual assault

19 and did not punish perpetrators when their crimes were disclosed.

20 This is a violation of a commander's duties and makes the commander

21 criminally responsible under international law.

22 The responsibility can be followed all the way up the chain of

23 command, to those who planned the policy, while pretending to know

24 nothing about it.

25 There is no doubt that there was a consistent failure to prevent the

Page 393

1 commission of such crimes and to prosecute and punish their

2 perpetrators.

3 I think I will leave it here. This was, in general, the position of

4 the Commission and the material which was the basis for their

5 conclusions.

6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam, in our concern not to stop the consistency of

7 your statement which has now been concluded, the Trial Chamber has

8 decided to have a break (which we have every morning roughly in the

9 middle of hearing), so we will adjourn now and we will start again at

10 11.30. At that time we will ask you some questions.

11 The hearing is now adjourned.

12 (11.10 a.m.)

13 (The court adjourned for a short time)

14 (11.30 a.m.)

15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: As I told you just before the break, the Tribunal

16 would like to ask you some questions. I first give the floor to Judge

17 Odio Benito. You have the floor.

18 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Thank you.

19 Examined by the Court

20 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Professor Cleiren, have you written and published

21 articles dealing with rape and other forms of sexual assault?

22 A. I wrote a part of the Annex of the Commission's Report, so that is

23 Annex II of all the Annexes. It is a legal study about rape. I wrote

24 an article in a journal, The Criminal Law Forum on the applicability

25 of several Articles of the Geneva Conventions, the violations of law,

Page 394

1 the crimes against humanity, and so on.

2 Q. Professor Cleiren, is it fair to assume that the outrage about the

3 alleged massive rapes committed against women was one of the main

4 forces leading to the creation of the Commission of Experts?

5 A. I think I have not enough information of that background to give you a

6 clear answer on this point.

7 Q. In the Commission's report it is stated, paragraph 142, I quote:

8 "There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the practices of

9 'ethnic cleansing' were not coincidental, sporadic or carried out by

10 disorganised groups or bands of civilians who could not be controlled

11 by the Bosnian Serb leadership". What evidence did the Commission use

12 to arrive at this conclusion and how does rape fit into the practices

13 of ethnic cleansing?

14 A. I try to give a clear answer, but it is not easy, as I tried to

15 illustrate in my presentation. Important is for the conclusion of

16 ethnic cleansing, the aspect I told on, let us say, the strategy, the

17 strategic factor, that the Serb -- that the practice of ethnic

18 cleansing is carried out in strategic areas linking the Serbia proper

19 with the Serbian inhabited areas.

20 This strategic factor is relevant, is significantly relevant, to

21 recognise the elements of policy, also the elements of policy in the

22 sexual assault cases. Besides that, the brutality with which these

23 acts of violence were carried out is important. They were carried out

24 by -- as I say, this is evidenced by a large number of killings,

25 torture, rape etc., and this complex of violative means indicates at

Page 395

1 least the target of an assumed policy.

2 But, nevertheless, in my opinion, it is hardly to say which and how

3 much evidence is required to state that there was a policy of ethnic

4 cleansing. However, the foregoing elements, let us say, the strategy

5 that they used and the brutality with which it was combined, and that

6 combined with the number of reports and the accumulation of similar

7 statements in it, and the accumulation of similar reports, that

8 indicates that there must be a policy or part of a policy.

9 The second question you ask is, how did rape fit into the practice

10 of the ethnic cleansing? It can be said that rape has been used, not

11 only as an attack on the individuals, but that it was intended to

12 humiliate, to ashame, to degrade the entire ethnic group. There are

13 reports of public rapes, for example, in front of a whole village, old

14 women, children, young children. Also, there are reports that the

15 rape, rape and sexual violence, was used to let people flee from their

16 region.

17 So, then you can say that it is part of a policy of ethnic

18 cleansing. Another argument can be that the perpetrators often told

19 their victims that they had to become pregnant or that they held them

20 in custody, that it was too late for the victim to have an abortion.

21 Also, often it is told that the women -- often the women were told

22 that they would have children of the perpetrator's identity and the

23 perpetrator's ethnicity, and they would be a living remember of what

24 happened in this war. Some perpetrators had declared that they were

25 ordered to rape. So, all these arguments together, you can think that

Page 396

1 rape was part of this policy of ethnic cleansing.

2 Q. In your expert opinion, how widespread was the practice of rape in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. It was rather widespread. As I told you, the information we had

5 contained statements of about 80 villages and cities. Their rape was

6 often reported, and it was spread over the whole, let us say, the

7 whole region, but especially in the strategic region that I told you

8 before, the arc between the Serbian and the Serbian inhabitants in

9 Krajina.

10 Q. Professor Cleiren, were there also rapes not necessarily associated

11 with ethnic cleansing?

12 A. Yes, I guess there are; the Commission also stated that there were

13 cases of rape and sexual violence without being part of a policy of an

14 ethnic cleansing. In several cases, it is not possible to make a link

15 to, let us say, a party or soldiers or a paramilitary organisation.

16 In other cases, it is fairly clear that there was a link. But

17 especially certainly in cases, I try to give you some practical

18 information, there were cases that the army came in a village, they

19 take off the men and the women stayed there with children and old

20 people. Part of these women is raped, not only by soldiers, but also

21 by the people who lived there. It is hardly to say that there was a

22 plan to do this, but it was the factual situation that brought it with

23 it.

24 So I guess you can say there were individual rape cases also. Maybe

25 it is possible to say that they were, effectively, caused by the

Page 397

1 breakdown of law and order, so they caused their own cases of sexual

2 violence.

3 Q. Professor Cleiren, in addition to the possible practice of rape for

4 the purposes of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could you tell

5 us briefly what is the history of women under armed conflict with

6 respect to rape?

7 A. Sorry, can you repeat your question, please?

8 Q. Yes. I am wondering if you could illustrate to the court as an expert

9 witness, as you are, the briefly what is the history for women under

10 armed conflict with respect to rape?

11 A. It is a well-known fact that in all wars in history rape is used or,

12 let us say, rapes occurred. It is not quite clear if rape is always

13 used as a factor or an instrument in war. It is impossible to say

14 that it is partly caused by the fact that there were hardly

15 investigations of the rape cases in history. But, nevertheless, it is

16 quite clear that it happened oft and hardly in every war.

17 Q. In your expert opinion, Professor Cleiren, under what circumstances

18 within a war context can rape be considered as a grave breach,

19 according to the Geneva Conventions?

20 A. Can you please repeat it?

21 Q. Under what circumstances within a war context can rape be considered

22 as a grave breach, according to the Geneva Conventions?

23 A. At first, it is important, of course, that it is a conflict with an

24 international character.

25 Q. Of course.

Page 398

1 A. But besides that, I guess there are -- I guess it is possible to

2 consider rape as a grave breach, and I think it is important to

3 recognise rape as a grave breach of the Conventions of Geneva.

4 The conditions under which -- it depends on the interpretation of

5 all the conditions of the grave breaches. I guess it is too complex

6 to illustrate all the arguments, to use it here. I tried to explain

7 these arguments in my article in Criminal Law Forum. I will hand it

8 over to you afterwards.

9 But the real conditions for the cases is -- I try to answer, it is

10 not easy to say -- I think it is important that especially the

11 individual cases can be prosecuted and punished by the Grave Breaches,

12 and especially those cases that are not so easy to bring under the

13 widespread systematic rape as necessary for the Crimes Against

14 Humanity.

15 So the Grave Breaches are in this perspective, they are easier to

16 prove, and I guess it can be useful to bring these facts under the

17 Grave Breaches. It is also a principle point to bring up on the Grave

18 Breaches because, let us say, it is a form of recognising the status

19 and the qualification of rape in war. So also from that perspective

20 it is important to recognise rape as a Grave Breach and the same is

21 for Violations of War and Customs of War.

22 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Thank you very much, Professor Cleiren, for your

23 statement. No further questions, your Honour.

24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I turn to my other side, do you have any

25 questions?

Page 399

1 JUDGE RIAD: Professor Cleiren, you mentioned five patterns of rape;

2 merely one of these patterns cannot be the result of individual

3 activity, and the rape for ethnic cleansing; the other forms perhaps

4 you mentioned, intimidating, looting and so on, this might have

5 occurred in previous conflicts and could be individual, but can you

6 say that rape for ethnic cleansing is the result of a general policy

7 from the higher command authorities?

8 A. As I understand well, you ask if the -----

9 Q. Shall I repeat my question?

10 A. Maybe, yes, OK.

11 Q. If the other forms of rape which you mentioned could exist also

12 without a higher policy or a command policy, can you say that ethnic

13 cleansing or rape for ethnic cleansing can also be the result of

14 individual activity or has it to represent a general policy by the

15 high command?

16 A. I think it is important in the rape cases that even if there is no

17 command there can be a form of ethnic cleansing, especially in the

18 cases of the camps, for instance, because in the camps men were

19 allowed to come in in some camps and they could rape women and the

20 commanders of the camp did not prevent it. They failed to prevent

21 this kind of conduct and they did not punish the commanders for doing

22 it. So, if you treat this chain of command up, then you will have,

23 let us say, the failure to prevent it on a great scale.

24 Q. One of the forms of the ethnic cleansing which you also mentioned was

25 to bring children of the perpetrators' ethnicity?

Page 400

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Which, in another way, is to change the ethnic character of the

3 population?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Could that be the result of individual cases or, through your enquiry,

6 it was a systematic policy?

7 A. I guess both. The Commission did not have enough information to

8 verify, let us say, these testimonies, who spoke in these terms. I

9 guess it is possible that both happened. There are indications that

10 it was commanded or that it was planned to do this, and it is

11 important in regard to the chain of -- now I have to say it in Dutch

12 -- [In translation]: It has do with the fact with the line of

13 inheritance, heritage.

14 Q. I did not get it. Is there translation for that?

15 A. Yes, it is translation. It has to do with the descendency, with the

16 succession. As far as we could see, it meant that producing a child

17 of another ethnic background was an automatic result of the fact that

18 the child would have the ethnic origin of the father.

19 Q. Was there also male rape or was it mainly addressed towards the

20 females?

21 A. No, both are reported, but especially the female rape cases are a big

22 number. You can see that there are more female victims caused by the

23 detention camps that were specially for women. So there were two

24 sorts of, two kinds of, two types of detention camps especially for

25 women and there were a lot of rape cases reported. But there were

Page 401

1 also men who were raped and men were a victim of very serious sexual

2 violence. Yes.

3 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Before I go to the Prosecutor, I would like to ask

5 you two or three questions: you were not there on the site yourself,

6 were you, not in the case of the rapes; is that correct? Were you

7 actually there?

8 A. Sorry, can you repeat?

9 Q. Yes. As I am preparing my question, I wanted to be quite sure you

10 were not on the site to carry out the investigations yourself. Were

11 you actually there carrying out the investigations?

12 A. No, I was not there. I was present at part of the investigation that

13 was held by the Commission in Zagreb and I was present at several

14 testimonies, testimonies also from the rape cases, but I did not do it

15 myself. So I was there only -- my task there was only, let us say, to

16 protect the rules that the Commission made before and to see if all

17 things were OK and to represent the Commission in Zagreb and in Split.

18 Q. Thank you. That was the clarification I wanted, so now I can ask you

19 my question. When you were drafting the Report you said you heard

20 testimonies, so you discussed with your colleagues from the

21 Commission. What was the general feeling, the general impression,

22 which you had? What is your impression? Was this the major problem

23 of the war in former Yugoslavia? Was the sexual aspect of ethnic

24 cleansing, of rape, was that the overall principle element or was that

25 one type of brutality amongst many others? What is your view, after

Page 402

1 having discussed it with your colleagues and having heard the

2 testimonies? You do not have to tell us what was written in the

3 Report, but what do you think?

4 A. My own experience in hearing the victims was that they did not

5 distinguish their own experience, their own wounds, the things that

6 happened, as a special form of -- they saw it and they brought it

7 within the whole violence and the violative conduct of the other

8 party. So they did not distinguish itself, and they did not want to

9 distinguish it because they did not want to hide their own experience

10 in relation to the other violative acts and the other victims. So

11 that is my experience in my own contact with victims.

12 The Commissioned considered the sexual assaults and rape problem as

13 a big problem and maybe, therefore -- the reason for considering it in

14 this way was, of course, that there was a high public interest in what

15 happened there, and all the world was looking to these publications on

16 the rape cases. So that was one of the meaning factors that the

17 Commission gave priority to this team, to this subject. It is in

18 relation to other violation that happened, the killings, the murder,

19 the torture, all kinds of these, I think the rape cases are not less

20 but have the same character of violence as the others, as the other

21 things like torture and killing, and that is the same as I had -- as

22 the experience was of the victims. So it is one of all these things

23 that happened to them.

24 Q. I would like to ask you a second question, Professor: did you or your

25 Commission at one point of time during your work see any protests that

Page 403

1 were made by the religious authorities or the medical authorities or

2 any moral centres, intellectuals, writers? Was there any discussion?

3 Do you have a feeling that someone, a religion or some moral

4 authorities, expressed themselves on this particular point of the

5 conflict whilst the conflict was going on for the many years whilst it

6 was going on?

7 A. Yes, many groups and also many institutes give us reports of their own

8 investigation to what happened on the sexual assault and sexual

9 violation and they expressed their -- I will go further in Dutch --

10 [In translation]: A lot of organisations and also a lot of victims

11 contacted the organisations and they informed the Commission about

12 their concern and about their dismay about what was going on. A lot

13 of organisations were active to give a lot of publicity to the sexual

14 violence that was occurring and, in particular, in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15 a lot of organisations there took care of the victims, an important

16 part of the victims, in so far as they were prepared to make known

17 that they were a victim, they were taken care of by religious

18 organisations. Those organisations informed the Committee and that

19 was about the testimonies that they had given to these religious

20 organisations.

21 Q. I understand. Sorry, I want to stress my question, in Serbia, from

22 the Serbian side, was there any protest? Was it said, for example,

23 that from bishops or from the major religions or writers, did they

24 talk about the problem of rape? You might have political ideas or

25 political structures for one's country, but that was not my question.

Page 404

1 What I want to know, I want to know about the rape element. Did your

2 Commission have any voice or opinion expressed from a health

3 authority, a moral authority, that said to you, "This is not possible"

4 or did you not have any such a statement made?

5 A. Surely, you mean from the Serbian side?

6 Q. Yes, for example.

7 A. (No translation of answer was audible)

8 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, could you start again?

9 THE WITNESS: So, on the part of the Serbs, we did not get any response.

10 Not to my knowledge, there was any response that the information

11 published, that there would not be correct or that they would oppose

12 this or that they would try to prevent this in the future. The only

13 thing that was clear, that on account of the large publicity between

14 April 1992 and December 1992, the number of notifications of rape and

15 sexual violence was decreasing, and that was the reason for the

16 Committee to assume that this publicity, apparently, had effect and

17 even had an effect on these commands and orders.

18 Q. Thank you. I have no further questions.

19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: All I want to say is that the Tribunal included in

20 its decision that, if you wish, you may submit all reports, all

21 written documents, which you think are good and which would support

22 your statements.

23 MISS CLEIREN: I would appreciate to hand over some documents, part of

24 which you have already. I will give you first the Annex of the

25 Commission's Report of rape and sexual assault, a legal study, and I

Page 405

1 will also hand over some reports of other organisations made for the

2 United Nations on the subject of rape. So do you want that I give the

3 precise definition or can I hand it over?

4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is it a long list?


6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Then do go ahead. Please list them so that we can

7 decide what we should do it with.

8 MISS CLEIREN: OK. I will hand over the part of the Annexes of the Final

9 Report of the Commission of Experts, Annex 2, Rape and Sexual Assault,

10 a legal study. The second is a Report for the Security Council from

11 the Mission of Dame Ann Warburton. It was a Commission for the

12 European Community and it gives also a view of the situation in the

13 former Yugoslavia.

14 Then I will hand a part of the Report of the Commission on Human

15 Rights on the question of violation of human rights and fundamental

16 freedoms, of rape and abuse of women in the territory of -- sorry, I

17 hear something I cannot understand. OK, sorry.

18 I will hand over the Annex of the Report of the situation on human

19 rights in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia by Mazowiecki. Then

20 I will last hand over the article I wrote in the Criminal Law Forum on

21 the subject of the applicability of Articles of the Statute. So that

22 is all that I guess it can be useful for you.

23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you very much. I look towards my fellow

24 Judges. The Registrar, would you like to take the documents from the

25 amicus curiae and include them in the files of the Tribunal? Mrs.

Page 406

1 Cleiren, I now will see whether the Prosecuting counsel has any

2 questions that they wish to put to you. Are there any further

3 questions which you think might be useful to put to the amicus curiae.

4 MR. OSTBERG: The Prosecution has been listening with the greatest

5 interest to the statement of Professor Cleiren. We thank her very much

6 for what we have heard from her. We have no questions. Thank you,

7 your Honour.

8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Having heard that, we would like to thank you for

9 having come here at our invitation. We now think that your hearing is

10 completed. So, could you perhaps accompany Mrs. Cleiren and we will

11 move on to the next witness?

12 (The witness withdrew)

13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Prosecutor, you have the floor.

14 MR. OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour. We now would like to call our next

15 witness and that is Miss Irma Oosterman, one of our investigators.


17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Will you put on your headphones, please? Do you

18 hear me, Madam? You are going to read the solemn declaration given to

19 you by the usher.

20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole

21 truth and nothing but the truth.

22 (The witness was sworn)

23 Examined by MR. OSTBERG

24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Madam, will you take a seat? You have the floor.

25 MR. OSTBERG: Thank you, your Honour.

Page 407

1 Q. Would you please state your name and maybe also spell it for the

2 record, please?

3 A. My name Irma Oosterman, that is, I-R-M-A O-O-S-T-E-R-M-A-N.

4 Q. What is your present occupation?

5 A. At this moment I work for the sexual assault in the war Tribunal.

6 Before that I worked for the Foca investigation. I was also involved

7 for the Prijedor investigation and for Srebrenica.

8 Q. Thank you, very much. Your Honour, the evidence you are now going to

9 hear will focus on the use of sexual assault as a degrading treatment

10 during the time covered by this indictment. The use of that measure

11 has been incorporated in the indictment charged as Grave Breaches and

12 Violations of Laws and Customs of War and as Crimes Against Humanity.

13 Before I ask you to tell us about your findings, I will ask you what

14 did you do previously to come to our Tribunal?

15 A. I worked for 14 years as police officer in the Netherlands. Before I

16 joined the Tribunal I was a general investigator.

17 Q. Did you have also cases involving sexual assaults?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. To what extent?

20 A. I was not a part of the vice squad, but I did some interviews of women

21 who were raped and were sexually assaulted.

22 Q. As a member of a team investigating these things, would you like to

23 tell the court if you have in this office where you work a special

24 team dealing with these questions?

25 A. Yes, we have a special team, the sexual assault team. We investigate

Page 408

1 the sexual assault and rape happened in former Yugoslavia and now we

2 are focused on Bosnia, the eastern and northern side in Bosnia.

3 Q. How many members have you on that team?

4 A. We have nine members in the team.

5 Q. Could you tell the court approximately how many witnesses you and your

6 team have interviewed concerning sexual assaults during this period

7 you have been working on it?

8 A. My team is several hundreds, myself about 50. I spoke with more women

9 and men, but not everyone is willing to testify in court or give a

10 real statement.

11 Q. But you have been interviewing at least 50 persons?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Are we talking about victims now?

14 A. We are talking about victims now.

15 Q. Could you tell us about where in the former Yugoslavia you have been

16 or the areas you have been covering in your investigations?

17 A. Several areas in the northern and eastern part of Bosnia.

18 Q. Can you name any of them?

19 A. I can name, of course, Foca.

20 Q. Is that a town or is it a municipality?

21 A. A municipality, Foca. For the rest, I am sorry I cannot talk about

22 that because that is still ongoing investigation.

23 Q. I see, but can you mention some of the camps where you have been

24 investigating things?

25 A. I can mention, of course, Omarska camp from Prijedor.

Page 409

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. And Foca High School, the Partizam sports hall and Bukb Ijlea from the

3 Foca area.

4 Q. Thank you. When you use the term "sexual assault", can you please

5 explain what you mean by that term?

6 A. By that I mean rape, I mean other kinds of sexual assault, like men

7 who were forced to perform fellatio on each other; women who had to do

8 that kind of things, the fellatio, oral sex, and then people were

9 forced to strip naked and went through all that kind of humiliation.

10 Q. So it is not only rape but there are different kinds of behaviour

11 connected with the sex of the person?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Can you try to describe for us what kind of people did commit this

14 kind of crime?

15 A. The victims we spoke with were raped by soldiers and guards of camps,

16 and sometimes even the commanders of the camps and even the Chief of

17 Police of a special area.

18 Q. Did it also happen that other peoples than those who belonged to the

19 camp or who were managing the camp, did these kind of things?

20 A. Yes, there were also men dressed in uniform, most of the time from

21 paramilitary groups, who had access into the camps and came to take

22 women away or rape them in the camp.

23 Q. So people who had, in principle, nothing to do with the camps were

24 invited to the camp by the commander to have a free access there?

25 A. I guess so because all the witnesses tell that the commanders knew

Page 410

1 about it. They saw women taken out.

2 Q. So you have had statements when women say that other people than the

3 people who belonged to the management did come in and did take them

4 away?

5 A. Yes, that happened often.

6 Q. You mentioned the Foca area. Is there any evidence of sexual assaults

7 of women occurring in detention camps in the Foca area?

8 A. Yes, we have a lot of evidence there. We had, for example, the Foca

9 High School and the Partizan sports hall where many women, children

10 and elderly people were detained in and soldiers, guards and other

11 people from paramilitary groups came in and took women out or

12 sometimes raped them in the school building themselves.

13 Q. Were there other patterns also? Did they take people out to stay for

14 some period of length outside in other houses than the camp?

15 A. Yes, they also took women out to other houses, sometimes even younger

16 children, girls, 13, 14 years, were taken out. In the Foca

17 investigation, we have one house where many women, young girls and

18 children were taken to and were held there as if it was a kind of

19 brothel.

20 Q. OK. Were there many such brothels or houses outside the camp?

21 A. OK, if we talk about Foca, then I can say that there was one we really

22 investigated, of course, there were other houses where women and

23 children were held for a couple of days as well, and they had to obey

24 all the orders. So they were rapes, sexual assault and that kind of

25 thing.

Page 411

1 Q. You mentioned the time, a couple of days, were there other longer

2 periods than a couple of days?

3 A. If we talk about the real detention camps, then it is a month, two

4 months, sometimes even longer. If I talk about the houses, then it

5 varies, sometimes two days, sometimes 10 days.

6 Q. What kind of people did commit these crimes in Foca?

7 A. In Foca, it was also guards from the camps, soldiers, policemen and

8 the Chief of Police was involved in it as well.

9 Q. The camp commander?

10 A. The camp commander was, in fact, the Partizan sport hall was also the

11 Chief of Police.

12 Q. So people in this position did also themselves commit sexual assault

13 or rapes?

14 A. Yes, and commanders of paramilitary groups.

15 Q. Have you been aware or been involved in investigations regarding

16 events pertaining to Srebrenica?

17 A. We have in-house information that women were taken out during the fall

18 of Srebrenica when the convoy was moving, but so far we did not

19 investigate this issue.

20 Q. Are there ongoing investigations of that kind?

21 A. Of course.

22 Q. What about Sarajevo? Do you have any information what happened in

23 Sarajevo of this type of things?

24 A. Recently, we got access outside Sarajevo in the Serb-held territory;

25 there is a hotel and a restaurant where women were held in, but so far

Page 412

1 our investigation is not focused on it, but of course we will ongo

2 that investigation.

3 Q. I am quite aware of the fact that you are involved in the

4 investigations, you cannot give names, places, dates and things like

5 that because these things have not yet been indicted. Nevertheless, I

6 will ask you if you can say something in general about these

7 investigations.

8 A. In general, I can say that you can see a pattern all over, women, men

9 were separated. Women, children and the elderly people were taken to

10 other separate places where men were taken, and then the soldiers and

11 guards started to take women out and rape them, sexual assaulted them.

12 Q. This is a kind of pattern, of course, but could you elaborate a bit on

13 this kind of pattern?

14 A. Of course, especially the soldiers told often that they were forced to

15 do it. They did not say who forced them to do it, but they were

16 ordered do it. They also told -----

17 Q. By their superiors?

18 A. Yes, of course, but I mean they did not say names, and that they

19 wanted to make Serb or Chetnik babies. The pattern was, yes, all over

20 the same.

21 Q. So there are statements of victims saying that the people who raped

22 them were ordered to do so?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Are there also, to your knowledge, people you have investigated who

25 said they were not raped, but they were asked by the soldiers to tell

Page 413

1 other people that they were raped?

2 A. We interviewed a couple of victims who told they were taken out to a

3 separate place, then the soldiers told them, "Tell the others that we

4 rape you", but in fact they did not. So -----

5 Q. What kind of conclusion do you draw from that?

6 A. The conclusion is that there was an order that the soldiers had to do

7 this.

8 Q. Have you found any evidence that commanders or the hierarchy of those

9 detention facilities that you have mentioned knew about these sexual

10 assaults?

11 A. I already told you about Foca, for example, the chief of police knew

12 about it. A couple of women went to him, complained about it but,

13 nevertheless, he was one of the people who raped women himself.

14 Q. Do you have any knowledge if this information did go even higher up in

15 the hierarchy to the commanders?

16 A. I have no information about it, but because all the witnesses tell

17 that all the commanders or the chief of police were aware of the fact

18 what happened, and I think it is a kind of general knowledge.

19 Q. Are there any statements about actions by paramilitary personnel?

20 A. Yes, they were also involved in this issue. In Foca, there was one

21 house where women, young girls from 13 years old and older, were held

22 and the Commander of this house was the Commander of paramilitary

23 group.

24 Q. Did you in your investigation also encounter rape directed against the

25 male population?

Page 414

1 A. Yes, we have several statements taken from men who were forced to do

2 fellatio on each other, even sons and fathers were forced to do so and

3 men were forced to put objects in each other's anus.

4 Q. Also, are there some statements of mutilation of the male genitals?

5 A. There were; we have one statement that one had to bite off the penis

6 of another man. He did not manage and then soldier came and cut off a

7 part of the penis and another one had to eat that part of the penis.

8 Q. Can you tell us something in general about the victims, what ages,

9 what kind of people or something special about the victims?

10 A. All the women we spoke with are civilians, the ages are from 13 years

11 about till even 60. Of course, we found out that the more younger,

12 attractive women were taken out more to be raped, but other women as

13 well -- all kinds of education, all kinds of different backgrounds,

14 but all were civilians.

15 Q. Ages also?

16 A. Ages, yes, from 13 to 60.

17 Q. This goes for men and women?

18 A. Men are a little bit older, I did not find younger boys, but what was

19 with the women was, of course, also that the younger girls were often

20 still victims -- I am sorry, virgin.

21 Q. Can you tell the court something about the demeanour of your victims

22 when you took statements from them? Tell us something about their

23 willingness or unwillingness to give statements or to appear as

24 witnesses maybe before this court?

25 A. Of course, it is very difficult for those women to talk with. Most of

Page 415

1 the time it is the first time that they tell what happened with them.

2 Husband does not know, children do not know. So every time we must

3 spend a great -- a long time with those women. They are very afraid

4 to appear here in court, just sit here, television, everything around.

5 Most of them asked for anonymity and sometimes even they do not want

6 to come because they are so afraid and so ashamed what happened with

7 them.

8 Q. Can you give us some percentage of willingness and unwillingness?

9 A. That is very difficult, but if I say I have 50 statements, maybe I

10 spoke with 100 women, so maybe it is half and half who are willing to

11 come. But the 50 statements we took, or I took, most of them asked

12 for anonymity because they do not want to sit here in court and

13 everyone facing perpetrator.

14 Q. Could you say something about the widespread type of activities? Is

15 this something that goes for all the part of Serb-held Bosnia or is it

16 just in some few places?

17 A. The areas we investigated is the pattern all over, the same, yes.

18 Q. How many areas? Could you number the areas you have been involved in,

19 all your team been involved in?

20 A. Seven, eight areas.

21 Q. Out of how many?

22 A. Out of how many areas?

23 Q. Yes.

24 A. I do not know.

25 Q. You do not know?

Page 416

1 A. No.

2 Q. OK, as we maintain that this is a widespread way of acting, then we

3 are, of course, interested in if it covers the area?

4 A. Yes, I understand.

5 Q. Is that, in your opinion, so, that this kind of activity covers?

6 A. It covers the area of the northern and eastern part of Bosnia, and

7 there we can see the pattern all over the same.

8 Q. I see. You said something about the general knowledge of it. Have

9 you heard somebody in your people you have been taking statements from

10 saying, directly or indirectly, that these things are brought to the

11 knowledge of the two people we have indicted in this special case,

12 namely, Karadzic and Mladic?

13 A. I did not interview people who told that they told them, but because

14 the commanders and the chief of police, they were aware of what

15 happened, because they went to complain, the commanders and the chief

16 saw what was happening, so that is why I think it is general

17 knowledge.

18 Q. It is general knowledge, in your opinion. Is there anything you would

19 like to add without me asking you specifically about it? Is there

20 something from the point of view of generality or widespreadness or

21 specifics, patterns and things like that?

22 A. OK, for me it is very important to know in what kind of state all

23 those victims are, because you must not forget that all those women,

24 most of them, the men are already killed or still imprisoned or still

25 missing, they do not want to know that the children, the family, the

Page 417

1 neighbours knows what happened with them. So, for them it is very

2 important to have anonymity, to come in court. Those women were

3 Muslim women. During the rapes the perpetrators were referring to

4 that, even forced to them to eat meat, drink alcohol. Those things

5 are very important for me.

6 Q. Did witnesses or victims you have been interviewing in Bosnia, are

7 these the greater part of it or have you been even interviewing

8 witnesses living today in another part of the world?

9 A. I also interviewed people who are living in other parts of the world.

10 Q. So that is to be understood that there are many witnesses living in

11 other parts of the world than in Bosnia?

12 A. Oh, yes, absolutely.

13 Q. Is the willingness of people living elsewhere greater to come to give

14 evidence here than the other ones?

15 A. I cannot say that it is greater. I mean, still for those people it is

16 very difficult to talk about what happened with them. They feel very

17 ashamed. So I do not see a big difference between that.

18 MR. OSTBERG: Thank you. Your Honours, considering the ongoing

19 investigations and the impossibility for us to go into direct details

20 of names and places and things like that, I hereby conclude my

21 questioning of the witness. Thank you.

22 Examined by the Court.

23 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: Thank you. Of course without endangering any ongoing

24 investigation and victims or witnesses, did you personally interview

25 rape victims in and around Srebrenica?

Page 418

1 A. I did not interview a witness, a victim from the Srebrenica area. I

2 think one of our members of the team interviewed one person who was

3 taken out of the convoy and was raped, but because of the ongoing

4 investigation I cannot offer any ----

5 Q. Yes, of course. Can you describe to the court what different problems

6 women suffered due to the rape and sexual assault?

7 A. If you mean talking about the abortions, you mean that?

8 Q. No, about the general problems, psychological problems, emotional

9 problems, harms?

10 A. Yes, they have physical and emotional problems. Some are still strong

11 because they want to survive and still live, and some do not want to

12 live any more, but because they have children they go on with these

13 kinds of things. Of course they have problems with vaginas and all

14 kinds of anal problems. Some women had to give their children away,

15 not their children but a child made by the Bosnian Serbs and some had

16 to give abortion.

17 Q. So, they suffer both, physical and psychological damage?

18 A. Absolutely.

19 Q. In addition to that, could you describe or tell to the Court if women

20 were also being beaten and killed in those detention camps?

21 A. We have interviewed people who saw that women were killed as well.

22 The women who were raped were threatened with guns, knives, sometimes

23 they made scratches on their bodies with knives, put a cigarette butt

24 on, that was during the rape.

25 JUDGE ODIO BENITO: No further questions. Thank you.

Page 419

1 JUDGE RIAD: Miss Oosterman, you mentioned that in cases of rape those who

2 committed it admitted they had received orders, and sometimes orders,

3 as you said, to make Chetnik babies?

4 A. Yes, that is correct.

5 Q. What was the procedure which was used and was it similar in all the

6 cases you have viewed? How did they manage to do that?

7 A. Like I have already told you, for example, women were taken out of the

8 camp, were taken to another house or another building, soldiers

9 ordered then to wash themselves, to clean themselves, then they came

10 back in the room or wherever they were, then they said, "I am going to

11 rape you and I will make you a Chetnik or Serb baby".

12 Q. Where were they kept when they had the baby?

13 A. I am sorry?

14 Q. Were they kept in detention until they had the baby?

15 A. We received information that that happened with women as well. So I

16 did not interview someone, but we spoke with orphan houses, NTOs, and

17 we know there were babies born as a result of that.

18 Q. This method was adopted, was applied in several cases which you

19 examined in several places?

20 A. Yes, your Honour.

21 Q. The same method?

22 A. Yes, the same method.

23 Q. The same method, I mean they all presented that they had high orders

24 from the command?

25 A. They said they received orders.

Page 420

1 Q. They said they received orders. What happened to these women after

2 they had the baby or what happened mainly to the women who were raped?

3 Were many of them killed afterwards?

4 A. No. Many of them, of course there were many killed as well, but there

5 are still many alive but what I already told you, there are very

6 emotional and physical problems.

7 Q. What happened to the whole family?

8 A. It depends. It is various. Sometimes a husband does not live any

9 more; sometimes they saw other children were killed. It is all

10 different. I cannot say it is like this.

11 Q. I mean, usually they had to leave their place of residence?

12 A. Of course, yes, they had to leave and went to the so-called free

13 territory.

14 Q. You mentioned also there were assaults against men?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Like forcing a man to eat the genital organs and castration. Was it a

17 rather customary way of doing it or was it individual cases?

18 A. I cannot say that it was, that this happened so often. We received

19 information, we spoke with witnesses and victims who were there.

20 There was one particular case where many men were held and they were

21 forced to do that with each other. I am not talking about the cutting

22 of the penis but fellatio and oral sex.

23 Q. So there were males raped too?

24 A. There were men raped in so far as not the soldiers raped them, but

25 they forced or ordered the detainees to do that with each other.

Page 421

1 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much.

2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I have one question in particular. Can you hear me?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Fine. Were there any doctors in these camps, Serb doctors in

5 particular? So were there any doctors and did you hear anything about

6 the reactions they might have had seeing what was going on? I think

7 everybody knows what was going on with regard to the mutilations.

8 Were there any reactions on the part of the doctors? Did you hear

9 that from anybody? Did anybody tell you or anybody saw it or was

10 there no medical attention at all?

11 A. I spoke with some witnesses who went to the hospital. I cannot tell

12 more about which hospital, where it was, but the doctors they spoke

13 with most of the time were not interested in those women. Those were

14 the Bosnian Serb soldiers.

15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you very much. The court has no further

16 questions. The Tribunal would like to thank you for your testimony.

17 I think we can leave it at that. The Registry or the Prosecution can

18 perhaps show Miss Oosterman out.

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

20 (The witness withdrew).

21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Prosecution, please proceed.

22 MR. BOWERS: Your Honours, our next witness, Dr. Colin Kaiser, will be

23 testifying on the destruction of cultural and sacral sights. We have

24 several visual displays we would like to set up in the courtroom. If

25 there is an appropriate place for lunch, this might be a good time to

Page 422

1 do that so we do not waste any time setting up the displays.

2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Counsel, we are not running late or anything. Let

3 me have a quick look at my colleagues for action. We are going to

4 adjourn this session and resume at 2.30 this afternoon. The session

5 is adjourned.

6 MR. BOWERS: Thank you, your Honour.

7 (12.40 p.m.)

8 (Luncheon Adjournment).

9 (2.30 p.m.)

10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: The hearing is resumed. Please be seated. Counsel

11 for the Prosecution?

12 MR. BOWERS: Thank you and good afternoon, your Honours. As its next

13 witness, the Prosecution calls Dr. Colin Kaiser to the stand.

14 MR. COLIN KAISER, called.

15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Can you hear me? Can you hear, Mr. Kaiser?

16 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can hear you.

17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Will you read the oath that is in front of you,

18 please?

19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare I will speak the truth, the whole truth

20 and nothing but the truth.

21 (The witness was sworn)

22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Please be seated. Dr. Kaiser, the

23 indictment within the procedure of Rule 61 of the case against

24 Karadzic and Mladic, the Prosecution wanted you to appear here as a

25 witness. So could you introduce -- you have the floor, Prosecutor.

Page 423

1 MR. BOWERS: Thank you, your Honour.

2 Examined by MR. BOWERS

3 Q. Dr. Kaiser, would you please state your full name and spell it for the

4 record?

5 A. My name is Colin Reid Erlin Kaiser. C-O-L-I-N R-E-I-D E-R-L-I-N

6 K-A-I-S-E-R.

7 MR. BOWERS: Your Honours, each of you has been provided with a binder for

8 this particular witness with the various photographs that he will be

9 discussing, but we also have an updated evidence exhibit list for you

10 with a smaller version of the map that is at Dr. Kaiser's side and

11 transcripts of an audio radio tape that we also intend to play. So if

12 I could present these to the usher to provide the court for inclusion

13 in their binders?

14 (To the witness): Dr. Kaiser, could you please begin by telling the

15 court about your academic background and the variety of work that you

16 have done concerning cultural and sacral sites, please?

17 A. By training and education, I am a Social and Institutional Historian,

18 a graduate of the University of London. I have worked for the

19 International Council on Monuments and Sites which is a

20 non-governmental organisation that works very closely with UNESCO. I

21 worked with them for six years and I was three years the Director of

22 the International Secretariat.

23 In November 1991, I was asked by the Director General of UNESCO to

24 go to Dubrovnik as one of two observers for The Hague Convention and

25 the World Heritage Convention. I continued to work with UNESCO on the

Page 424

1 question of Dubrovnik for several months. Toward the end of 1992, I

2 began working with the Committee on Culture and Education of the

3 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on the Council of

4 Europe, yes, on the question of war damage to cultural heritage in

5 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I went on Missions for the

6 parliamentary Assembly in November/December 1992. In March 1994, in

7 June 1995, in October 1993, I worked for the Commission of Experts in

8 Dubrovnik which was preparing the work for this Tribunal.

9 In October 1994, I went back to work for UNESCO as a consultant in

10 Mostar on the cultural heritage and I worked there in three long

11 missions, each about six weeks and two months, until the summer of

12 1995. In October 1995, UNESCO asked me to go to Sarajevo to be its

13 representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14 My recent work is not specifically cultural heritage; it involves

15 all the fields of UNESCO's activities.

16 Q. Thank you. During the course of your work with the cultural and

17 sacral heritage in the former Yugoslavia, have you had occasion to

18 write any reports or articles?

19 A. I have contributed to eight information reports of the Parliamentary

20 Assembly on destruction of cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina. I have contributed to the Report of the Commission of

22 Experts 1993. For UNESCO I have written reports specifically on

23 Mostar. The Council of Europe Reports are public documents. The

24 Reports of UNESCO are much more of a confidential institutional sort

25 of document.

Page 425

1 Q. Thank you. In the course of your work, have you had occasions to read

2 and study various reports and publications about the status of the

3 cultural and sacral heritage in the area of the former Yugoslavia?

4 A. I read a certain amount of material about the cultural heritage, much

5 of it rather general. However, in my work for the Parliamentary

6 Assembly, for UNESCO, I have had access to a lot of documents that are

7 mainly lists of cultural heritage, and a certain number of documents

8 that are generally reports. The reports are of some interest.

9 The reports began to come out in 1993. There are four reports I

10 would like to mention. There was one report prepared by the Institute

11 for the Protection of Cultural Historical and Natural Heritage of

12 Serbia, which was about the destruction of sacral heritage in Croatia

13 and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This document dates from January 1993.

14 The report of Slobodan Mileusinic called "Spiritual Genocide" written

15 in 1994 which is about the destruction of Serbian Orthodox heritage in

16 Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina over the period 1991/1993. In

17 September 1993, the Republic Institute for the Protection of Cultural,

18 Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo

19 produced an information document. A recent report, which is extremely

20 important, was produced by the Institute for the Protection of

21 Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina based

22 in Sarajevo. This report, the first version of it, was written in

23 September 1995 and has an annex, April 1996. These documents are --

24 the lists are, of course, what lists are; the lists are not very

25 accurate. They are from the early part of the war.

Page 426

1 The other documents are extremely incomplete. The Serbian documents

2 deal specifically with a certain type of heritage which is Orthodox

3 heritage. The last two documents which I mentioned are of great

4 interest because they attempted to give a larger view of the

5 destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is

6 the cultural heritage of everybody. The document that was compiled in

7 September 1993, of course, has a problem because it was compiled under

8 difficult circumstances. There was little access available by the

9 people of Sarajevo to territory outside. The report of September 1995

10 is a different document. It has more documentation. It is more of an

11 overview than earlier documents.

12 Q. Thank you. You mentioned previously the Council of Europe reports.

13 Could you just take a minute and describe for the court what those

14 reports were and how widely they were circulated?

15 A. The Council of Europe in 1992 began asking a lot of questions about

16 what was going on to the cultural heritage in Croatia and

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was not a topic which generated a great

18 deal of interest in the press. The press was interested in such

19 isolated incidents, important incidents, as the burning of the

20 National University library in Sarajevo and the Oriental Institute

21 also in Sarajevo. But, generally speaking, we did not know very much

22 about what was going on.

23 So, this initial purpose was to try to find this information with

24 the intention that, perhaps, if enough information were available, the

25 International Community would pick up on it and would perhaps pressure

Page 427

1 local authorities into minimising the destruction of the cultural

2 heritage.

3 It was aimed at the International Conservation Community in the hope

4 that it could intervene, that international agencies could intervene,

5 to carry out protective works in cultural heritage where it was

6 possible to do so.

7 So these were the basic purpose, and we were also hoping that there

8 would be a little bit more active intervention in the field. The

9 machinery of The Hague Convention was not functioning at all.

10 Although we live in a global village with an age of wonderful

11 information and everything, it was extraordinary what we did not know.

12 One of the successes of the reports was to stimulate monitoring of

13 cultural heritage in Bosnia and also in Croatia by the European

14 Community Monitoring Mission. I helped set up this system myself in

15 1994. It worked mainly with respect to sacral buildings, sacral

16 heritage, it and it has worked a little bit fitfully. The ECMM now

17 has a very heavy mission in Bosnia helping OSCE, and it has neglected

18 its monitoring cultural heritage in the past few months.

19 I would just say that this is a very frustrating activity in its

20 earlier stages because in the earlier stages if you could not be on

21 mission, you were collating a lot of reports; you were submitting them

22 to a kind of critique de texte, comparing them, and it was often a

23 futile exercise. What was very important was, in fact, the field

24 visits which has permitted us to check the reports and permitted us to

25 go and look at things that were not mentioned in the reports.

Page 428

1 Yes, you asked about the distribution. Well, these are public

2 documents; in other words, the Council of Europe distributed them

3 everywhere. They were distributed to Cultural Heritage authorities in

4 Croatia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were also given to the Serbian

5 representative in Strasbourg.

6 Q. Thank you. If you could just take a few minutes and please give the

7 court a general overview of the cultural and sacral heritage that

8 existed in the Bosnian Herzegovina region before the outbreak of the

9 war.

10 A. Well, I think everybody has to bear in mind that Bosnia-Herzegovina is

11 on a cross-roads, it is a north/south cross-roads between Central

12 Europe and the Mediterranean world, and it is also on what is often

13 called a fault line between civilisations, between Christendom in the

14 west and Islam in the east. This is a country that has an

15 extraordinarily rich cultural heritage. I will speak mainly about

16 immovable cultural heritage and not about movables. With respect to

17 the movables though, we can find enormous numbers of Neolithic,

18 Paleolithic Iron Age, Bronze Age sites all over the country. The

19 traces of the Roman occupation are also extremely numerous, for

20 example, the famous site in Mogorjelo in the Neretva Valley but also

21 in Hadzici -- no, Ilidza in Sarajevo.

22 There are remnants, vestiges, of the early Christian Byzantine and

23 Romanesque periods. There are early Slavic hilltop settlements,

24 houses. There is the famous Bogomil culture, the Medieval culture,

25 so-called; the Bosnian church as well which has left the famous stecci

Page 429

1 which are large blocks of stones, tombstones, all over the country.

2 It is worth pointing out that this is a kind of bedrock of the

3 cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is something which is

4 shared commonly by everybody in the country. Although there are

5 accusations that archeological sites are misused by tanks and

6 artillery, this has really had to be checked, but by and large, from

7 my own work, I have seen that this heritage is not so badly damaged.

8 The problem comes with the 15th and 16th centuries. There is the

9 Ottoman conquest in the 15th and 16th centuries, and this changed

10 extraordinarily the landscape of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Then you had

11 mosques, Mesjids which are mosques without minarets, medresas,

12 mektebs, hamams, fountains, Turkish style houses. In the cities, in

13 the villages, you have mahala districts. One can say that the Turks

14 brought with them a very specific form of urban civilisation which has

15 always marked the Bosnian towns and cities throughout its history.

16 At the same time there was the disappearance or rarification, perhaps,

17 of Christian churches and monasteries, some of which were destroyed,

18 some of which deteriorated.

19 In the 19th century there was a loosening up of the Empire, the

20 Empire, of course, in its declining phase, and one finds more, I

21 should say, western influences in terms of architecture. This was the

22 period in which we began to find Orthodox churches being built, new

23 Orthodox churches, new Catholic churches.

24 The Austrian occupation in 1878 bought about another revolution,

25 because we can see today the impact of Austrian town planning on such

Page 430

1 cities as Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka; architectural styles and

2 historicism, universities, libraries, municipal buildings, theatres.

3 This was also the great period of church building, of Orthodox and

4 Catholic church building. In fact, the Franciscan establishments that

5 are all over Bosnia-Herzegovina have their present aspect from this

6 period.

7 By the 20th century, one could say that Bosnia was totally

8 integrated into European vision of architecture and town planning. Up

9 until World War II, however, you would find the sort of typical,

10 vernacular, domestic architecture in the countryside.

11 Being on a cross-roads, there is a tremendous amount of mutual

12 influence. For example, the mosques, the great mosques of the 16th

13 century, and even later, were built by Christian Herzegovinian

14 stonemasons. It is a common tradition that it was Dubrovnik

15 stonemasons that actually built the Old Bridge at Mostar. The

16 Vucjakovica mosque in Mostar has Gothic traces. So there is this type

17 of intermingling.

18 The Austrians brought with them a pseudo-Moorish style, which was

19 there own homage to the eastern ambience which they found. This style

20 was in turn taken by local architects and adapted, which was what they

21 did with art nouveau styles. So you find this tremendous interchange

22 and sort of mutual influence.

23 In terms of the common use and common respect of heritage, it is

24 extremely interesting to point out that the Bogomil tombstones, nobody

25 is really sure who is under them, but there is a feeling that it is

Page 431

1 not just Catholics, it is also Orthodox and Muslims.

2 If we take such a famous pilgrimage site as the Church of St. John

3 in Podmiljacja near Jajce, we find that this was a great healing site

4 and people from all confessions came to this site. In Sarajevo

5 itself, there is a pilgrimage which is taken from the Orthodox

6 cathedral to St. Anthony's Catholic Church to the Turkish period

7 Mausoleum of the Seven Brothers. People will make this pilgrimage and

8 they will offer gifts at each shrine.

9 In other words, you find this kind of mutual appreciation and

10 sometimes this has strange echoes during the war. When I was in

11 Olovo, in central Bosnia, there is a Franciscan church which was one

12 of the major Catholic pilgrimage sites in Yugoslavia. This church had

13 no damage at all. The Bosnian Serbian army which was very nearby and,

14 in fact, these were local people, they would not attack this church.

15 However, the mosque which was 200 metres down the hill had a whole

16 number of artillery impacts in it. So this is kind of testimony to

17 what Bosnia was, in fact, before the war.

18 One thing that should be pointed out is that the war has tended to

19 ethnosize cultural heritage which, in fact, was not ethnosized in the

20 past. Perhaps the people who destroyed the Old Bridge at Mostar

21 thought they were destroying Muslim cultural heritage. Certainly, the

22 reactions to the destruction of the bridge were, "They are destroying

23 our heritage, our Muslim heritage", but in fact the Old Bridge was

24 something that was held in common by Serbs, Croats and Muslims. This

25 must be kept in mind when considering all types of heritage, including

Page 432

1 things which are now considered only to be sacral objects of one

2 faith. They were often, in fact, objects that were shared.

3 Q. Could you just detail the current status of efforts to develop a

4 complete picture of the damage to the cultural and sacral sites in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

6 A. I am sorry to have to say that the current status of these efforts is

7 that they really are about zero. There is no co-operation between the

8 entities, and there is no co-operation at the present time even inside

9 the federation. Also, it should be pointed out the international

10 community is not doing this job either.

11 I regret this very much because there are a lot of myths that grew

12 up around the destruction of cultural heritage, and these myths may

13 end up becoming founding myths for new hatreds and a new war. I think

14 some sort of international commission should, in fact, help to draw

15 up an inventory to try to determine to a degree, not in a penal sense,

16 but what the causes are and who are the responsible agents for it.

17 Q. Thank you. At this time we would like to draw up on the screen

18 Exhibit 161, which is 6/15. That will be on the computer screen. It

19 is a smaller version of the larger map to the left of Dr. Kaiser. Dr.

20 Kaiser, using this map, we would ask you to just give a general

21 summary of the overall nature and extent of the damage to Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina's cultural and sacral sites.

23 A. Well, I think I would like to refer, perhaps, to some figures before I

24 comment the map -- is that all right?

25 Q. Absolutely fine.

Page 433

1 A. I would like to go back to the last report that was prepared by the

2 Institution for the Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural

3 Heritage in September 1995. The first thing to take into

4 consideration is, well, first of all, this report has a lot of

5 mistakes in it. I mean, the people who prepared it do not have access

6 to western Herzegovina. They do not have access to the Republika

7 Srpska. There are things like double counting; there are problems in

8 presentation; there is a problem of mixing of all sorts of buildings

9 in it. So it is not -- it is for from 100 per cent, you know,

10 accurate, but it is an extremely interesting document.

11 To address, first, the question of sacral buildings and the damage

12 to sacral buildings, this report mentions that 1,183 mosques

13 throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina have been damaged to

14 some extent. I repeat "damaged"; they do not say "destroyed". Then

15 504 Catholics churches, 36 Orthodox churches and 5 Synagogues. So

16 this gives a certain idea of the order of damage to sacral buildings.

17 If you take a close look at the buildings that have been damaged and

18 try to categorise them according to heritage, you get a somewhat

19 different result. One thing I should point out is that in

20 ex-Yugoslavia there was a fairly precise classification for cultural

21 heritage. At the top level there was the so called zero monument.

22 The zero monument was a monument of world class importance and in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina there was only one. It was the Old Bridge at

24 Mostar; however, which was never on the UNESCO list, in spite of what

25 has been said. Monument value (1) was a national monument; (2) was a

Page 434

1 regional monument and (3) was a local monument. It not always easy to

2 distinguish between a (2) and a (3) and (1) and (2).

3 But if we turn back to these figures that I have given you, the

4 report indicates that of the 1,183 mosques, 190 of them were

5 classified buildings. Of this some 500 churches, something like 48 of

6 them, I believe, Catholic churches are classified; of the Orthodox

7 churches, it is a smaller figure, it is only eight, and then two of

8 the Synagogues were classified buildings.

9 The report then goes on to note that 392 other historic buildings

10 have been damaged to some extent. This gives us a total damage of

11 about 640 listed historic buildings. Now, the inventory of classified

12 buildings in Bosnia-Herzegovina runs up to 3,991. This means that,

13 according to this Institute report, about 16 per cent of the listed

14 cultural heritage has been damaged to some extent. It does not mean

15 that 640 historic buildings are damaged in the territory of Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina. To keep in mind that the Bosnian register of monuments

17 was woefully incomplete, but it is not the only country that has

18 incomplete registers. There are some 61 town and rural ensembles

19 complexes which are also classified, and we do not how many damaged

20 buildings of historic interest there are here.

21 We must consider there is a lot of vernacular architecture.

22 Vernacular architecture may not be on anybody's list because it has

23 been badly changed, but it is part and parcel of a cultural landscape.

24 The truth of the matter is we do not know how many historical

25 buildings have been damaged or destroyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is

Page 435

1 not the 16 per cent that is indicated, it is not 640 but, to be honest

2 with you, I cannot tell you how many there.

3 To turn back to this map, I make an observation, it looks to me like

4 this is a map of destruction which is imputed, in fact, to the Bosnian

5 Serbs.

6 Q. That is correct.

7 A. I would say that it is a probably a little bit conservative. There a

8 certain number of municipalities in which there are no dots at all,

9 Sokolac, Kalinovik, Sekovici, Lopare -- no, there are some in Brcko,

10 Srbak and Laktasi, but I think the map gives a good idea of the range

11 of destruction of mosques and churches in the territory of the

12 Republika Srpska or else territory that was controlled by the Bosnian

13 Army throughout most of the war.

14 This map includes damage which can be imputed to military causes

15 because some of the dots are on frontline areas, for example, Konjic.

16 This is a front line area here. But a dot, for example, in

17 Nevesinje, this is not front line area, this is behind the frontlines.

18 The map does not give a good idea of the geographical range of

19 destruction, that is, which could be attributed to Bosnian Serbian

20 forces or other elements. I would like to know if I could refer to my

21 notes, would it be possible ---

22 Q. Certainly.

23 A. -- for some other figures?

24 Q. Dr. Kaiser, while you were referring to your notes, I would point out

25 to the court that this particular map with the designations of the

Page 436

1 damaged mosques and the damaged Catholic churches is based on the

2 investigations that the Office of the Prosecutor has undertaken. As

3 Dr. Kaiser indicated, this is a very conservative representation at

4 this point where we have been able to marshal the information and get

5 a verification with which we are satisfied. So this is a very

6 conservative estimate.

7 A. I would again refer to the report and I would refer to a particular

8 type of damage which is mentioned in the report and this is damage by

9 explosives. The report mentions, gives a category 4(B) which is

10 destroyed by explosives. To be a little bit cautious, I take the

11 category 4(B) and say that this is a building which is heavily

12 damaged or destroyed by explosives.

13 The report indicates that in the Republika Srpska, or else it was

14 controlled by the Bosnian Serbian army, 161 mosques and mesjids were

15 dynamited or destroyed by the use of tank mines, and 75 Catholic

16 churches. I think that this figure is probably reasonably accurate

17 within 10 per cent plus or 10 per cent minus. The buildings indicated

18 fully 70 of the mosques, 70 were listed monuments and eight of the

19 Catholics churches.

20 If we were to take destruction by other elements, according to the

21 use of explosives, for example, attributed to the HVO, the report

22 indicates 12 mosques and two Orthodox churches and monasteries,

23 especially in the Neretva Valley area. All of these buildings are, in

24 fact, listed buildings. I think that this estimate for the HVO would

25 be a little bit low.

Page 437

1 The report does not indicate any buildings destroyed by explosives

2 in territory controlled by the armija, and I have never seen a

3 building destroyed by explosives in the territory controlled by the

4 army in my own missions.

5 Q. For clarification, when you refer to the "armija", is that the army of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

7 A. Officially the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes.

8 Q. Could you give the court just then a general overview of the actual

9 responsibility for the destruction of cultural and sacral sites in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

11 A. Excuse me, general overview in terms of?

12 Q. In terms of the entities responsible, just a comparative breakdown,

13 please?

14 A. I think that these figures about dynamiting, in fact, are fairly

15 faithful in terms of who is responsible for most of the damage. I

16 repeat that we do not know everything in the Republika Srpska, and we

17 have to be very careful, we have to investigate the whole territory,

18 but I think it is indeed correct to say that the Bosnian Serbian

19 entity was responsible for much more damage and destruction of

20 cultural heritage than the other entity or the two subentities.

21 Q. Thank you. You personally have visited many of these sites of

22 destruction, correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Would you just briefly explain to the court the various ways one can

25 determine the nature and the source of the damage found at these

Page 438

1 cultural and sacral sites?

2 A. Well, to go in terms of least damage to most damage, in architectural

3 terms, I mean, one first could point out that there is damage by

4 pillaging and small arms fire. This is not so serious for the building

5 but it can often be very serious for the contents of a building. Then

6 the second type of -- of course, this is difficult to attribute this

7 sort of damage. It can be kids throwing stones through windows and

8 not necessarily a soldier shooting but somebody else shooting.

9 Then there is artillery damage. Artillery damage is very easy to

10 recognise. It is often easy to attribute, particularly in areas, in

11 front areas that have remained stable for a long time. You simply

12 look to see where the front is and where the enemy is. After a

13 certain amount of experience with buildings, you can recognise the

14 type of shell that it is. This type of damage from artillery, of

15 course, is spectacular. It makes good film footage. But, in fact,

16 there are very few buildings that are pummelled to the ground by

17 artillery.

18 There is, however, another type of damage that is associated with

19 artillery and that is burning damage. That is usually much more

20 serious. Burning damage can be done often by heavy mortars, a heavy

21 mortar through the roof of a building into the attic can set a very

22 nice fire. It is not always easy to attribute where the mortar is

23 shot from, especially when the roof has gone and the internal

24 structure of the building has gone.

25 Then there is a question of burning damage by arson which is set by

Page 439

1 troops or set by unknown parties.

2 Finally, the last type of damage is the resort to explosives which

3 is by far the most serious type of damage.

4 Q. If we could direct the court to your trip to Mostar. I believe you

5 took that trip in December 1992; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, that is correct.

7 Q. What was the purpose of your trip in December '92?

8 A. Well, the purpose of the trip was that we did not really know much of

9 what was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of the cultural

10 heritage and what was happening. Mostar is a very, very important

11 town in terms of its heritage. It had been a scene of a battle and,

12 despite the fact that it was liberated with relatively open access, we

13 did not really know much about it. So the objective was to get to

14 some site that was fairly easy of access. At this point you must keep

15 in mind that this activity of looking at cultural heritage was not

16 regarded by anybody as being very important, so it was very difficult

17 to sort of wonder around central Bosnia; you could not get any help

18 from any of the big agencies, UN agencies or others. So, I mean, this

19 was handy in terms of a local vehicle to drive up the Neretva Valley.

20 Q. Was this first trip shortly after what we will refer to as the first

21 battle of Mostar?

22 A. Yes. It was in December 1992. The first battle of Mostar ended in

23 the mid part of June.

24 Q. Who were the primary participants in the first battle of Mostar?

25 A. Well, BSA, which had more or less completely surrounded the town

Page 440

1 through most of the battle, and local defence units and especially the

2 HVO.

3 Q. Would you tell the court what you saw during your first mission to

4 Mostar?

5 A. Well, I saw a great deal of artillery damage done to the town of

6 Mostar which I attribute to the BSA because the BSA was much, much

7 better armed than the HVO. There was a lot of damage from explosives.

8 The BSA dynamited all the bridges in Mostar except for the Old Bridge

9 -- a tremendous amount of burning damage. Most of the Austrian period

10 buildings, in fact, which were burnt out in Mostar were, in fact,

11 burned out in the first battle and not in the second battle. There

12 was damage from explosives to the new Orthodox church in Mostar which

13 was completely destroyed in the summer of 1992 as a reprisal, and

14 there was a lot of reprisal damage in the Neretva Valley to villages

15 inhabited by Serbs, to the monastery of Zitomislici, a 16th century

16 monastery. So there was a tremendous amount of damage to see.

17 Q. Did you arrive at any conclusions as a result of your observations in

18 Mostar?

19 A. Well, it was an extremely frightening experience. I had some

20 experience of Croatia, and I had never seen anything so intensive and

21 I had not yet seen this sort of cycle, initial damage and reprisal.

22 It seemed to me at the time that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

23 rather more vicious, in fact, much more vicious than the war in

24 Croatia, and that there was a great danger of really extensive and

25 serious damage to the cultural heritage. Finally, the question came

Page 441

1 into my mind, in fact, well, maybe was this damage to cultural

2 heritage, in fact, part of the strategy of war?

3 Q. Could you elaborate on that just a bit?

4 A. On the last part?

5 Q. The last statement.

6 A. Well, as I say, it is a question of my surprise. In Mostar,

7 practically everything of cultural value had been hit, and it is

8 extremely surprising to see Austrian buildings which do not

9 particularly have any strategic value, and maybe they are not first

10 class monuments, but they are part of a landscape deliberate burnt out

11 and, of course, in this tremendous amount of damage to the mosques.

12 But to see buildings, this first time I also saw sacral buildings that

13 were dynamited. This is quite an extraordinary thing to see,

14 particularly a venerable building like the monastery at Zitomislici.

15 So I began to ask myself questions, I mean, what is going on here and

16 what is going to happen? What is everybody up to in this part of the

17 world?

18 Q. OK, thank you. At this time if we could have the lights dimmed,

19 please, and we have a series of photographs showing some of the damage

20 to Mostar at the hands of the Serb forces. This first photograph is

21 Exhibit 162, 6/1. Could you describe this, please, Dr. Kaiser?

22 A. This is the Sevri Hadji Hassan mosque which is listed as a monument of

23 third level in Mostar. It is Donja Mahala, right near the Neretva

24 River. This building was before 1620. On the left, where you see the

25 roof of the red house, well, there was a minaret there and the minaret

Page 442

1 is totally destroyed. If you look at the facade, you can see a lot of

2 damage which is, in fact, artillery damage done and this is done by

3 the BSA.

4 Q. Thank you. For reference, your Honours, this particular mosque is one

5 of the ones named in the indictment. If we could have Exhibit 163

6 shown, please, Dr. Kaiser?

7 A. This is the Franciscan Church of St. Peter and St. Paul. It was built

8 in 1863. It was built at a period in which the Ottoman empire was

9 sort of loosening up before the Austrian occupation. This was

10 destroyed and burned by shelling in May 1992. It was done by the BSA.

11 Q. Again, your Honours, this particular Franciscan church also appears in

12 the indictment itself.

13 A. Just maybe one other comment is that the church is totally destroyed,

14 but to the right are the buildings of the monastery which received

15 extremely little damage.

16 Q. Thank you. Now if we can have Exhibit 164, please? Dr. Kaiser?

17 A. Well, this is entrance to the Catholic Bishop's Residence. This

18 residence was built in 1906. It housed a library, the episcopate

19 library, of 50,000 volumes and a library, a personal library of the

20 Bishop of 10,000 volumes. It was destroyed, burnt out by shelling

21 also in May 1992 by the BSA.

22 Q. If we could have Exhibit 165 shown, please?

23 A. This is the Ibrahim Aga Saric mosque built in 1623. This is, in fact,

24 a monument which is classified level (2). This is an example of

25 mosque shooting, of minaret shooting, in fact. The minaret is cut

Page 443

1 from just below the gallery up and you can see the type of damage that

2 part of the falling minaret can do. It has come down through the

3 roof. This was also done by the BSA.

4 Q. Your Honours, this particular mosque is referred to in the schedule

5 that is part of the statement of facts that supports the indictment.

6 If we could have Exhibit 166, please?

7 A. This is the Karadjo Begova mosque built in 1557. This is a monument of

8 national importance. You can see here that the pinnacle of the

9 minaret is shot off at the level of the cerefa. What you cannot see

10 is on the other side of the minaret there is a very, very big impact,

11 an artillery impact, about a third of the way down. This damage was

12 also done by the BSA in the summer of -- during the period of battle,

13 the first battle of Mostar.

14 Q. Thank you. Your Honours, again this particular mosque is listed in

15 the schedule underlying the indictment. Finally, if we could have

16 Exhibit 167, please?

17 A. This is an interior shot of the Koski Mehmed Pasha mosque built in

18 1618/1619. It is a level (2) in terms of monument classification.

19 You can see shots through the dome. You can also see an artillery

20 impact down at the bottom of the picture. In addition, this mosque,

21 its minaret is cut, completely cut, at the level of the drum.

22 Q. Again, your Honours, this particular mosque is listed in the schedule

23 supporting the indictment.

24 Dr. Kaiser, one cannot help but notice the damage to the minarets;

25 do you attach any significance to this?

Page 444

1 A. Well, in Mostar there are 14 listed historic mosques and 12 of them

2 were damaged in the first battle. Five of them have their minarets

3 cut at one level or another. The remaining four have been hit on the

4 minaret and usually high. You will see some from this picture. I have

5 seen all over the country that often the minaret shooting is, in fact,

6 rather high. It is at the gallery level.

7 So, one is not entirely sure what the motivation of the shooting is.

8 I mean, it could be alleged that this is an observation post that is

9 being shot at, the same way that often it is alleged that the belfry

10 of a church is being shot at. But, if you take a look at such cases

11 as the Koski Mehmed Pasha Mosque, with the shots through the dome and

12 on the drum of the dome, if you take a look at the Sevri Hadji mosque

13 which has lost its minaret completely and has all these shots all over

14 the southern facade, well, you find that there is a will, not just to

15 bang away at a possible shooting post, but in fact to destroy a

16 minaret completely and also to do significant structural damage to the

17 mosque.

18 The mosque minaret is a very characteristic sight in a Bosnian town.

19 It is on the horizon. You can see the town sometimes for long ways

20 away because of the minaret. The minaret means that this is a town

21 which is inhabited by Muslims. It is a sign of the presence of

22 Muslims. It is also the sign, an historic sign. It is a sign of the

23 period of the Ottoman Empire which could be regarded, perhaps, by some

24 parties as a period of occupation.

25 So, the siting on a minaret, the targeting of a minaret, certainly

Page 445

1 does have a symbolic significance to it. It is trying to change this

2 Bosnian town, to eliminate the memory. It can also often be taken as

3 a kind of a warning. If you damage the minaret high, you do not shoot

4 it down completely, you can see from far away also that the minaret

5 has been damaged and that, perhaps, you are not wanted.

6 Q. Thank you. If we could now move to another trip that you took to

7 Konjic-Olovo and other areas. I believe that trip was in June 1994;

8 is that correct?

9 A. Yes, it was in June. In March I made a trip which was in western

10 Herzegovina, in Mostar. In June, I went to central Bosnia. The

11 objective of this trip was the same thing as the objective of other

12 trips, is that we did not have very much information about what had

13 happened on the frontlines between the federation and the Republika

14 Srpska. At the same time, we did not know very much really what

15 happened in the pocket areas, that is, the areas that were affected by

16 the war of 1993/1994 between the Croats and the Muslims. So again it

17 was a fact-finding trip.

18 Q. What did you see on this trip and what conclusions did you reach?

19 A. Would you like me to give you my itinerary?

20 Q. Certainly, yes.

21 A. OK. Well, we visited, for example, Konjic here, Olovo, Kladanj -- I

22 am first showing you the towns that are on the front line -- Kalesija,

23 Tuzla, Gradacac, Gracanica, Zavidovici, Maglaj, Tesanj, Travnik. So

24 these were the frontline areas and on the frontline areas include also

25 villages in this area, on this part of the trip. Well, we saw a

Page 446

1 tremendous amount of artillery damage done by the Serbs. It was

2 somewhat -- one has to be a little bit nuanced. It was said often

3 that Travnik had been destroyed by the BSA and that Tesanj had been

4 destroyed by the BSA and Kladanj had been destroyed by the BSA.

5 Fortunately, one discovered, we discovered that in these towns there

6 was, in fact, rather little damage from the artillery. On the other

7 hand, we found such towns as Maglaj or Konjic, just to name two of

8 them, or Gradacac, in particular, we found a lot of damage to cultural

9 heritage, to sacral buildings and to sacral heritage.

10 Then there was the other part of the trip which was, of course, in

11 the pocket areas and the areas in which there had been a lot of

12 fighting between the Muslims and the Croats; Prozor, Gornji Vakuf,

13 Bugojno, Vitez, Zepce was the Croatian pocket here. What could be

14 observed in these areas was also a certain amount of resort to

15 explosives by the HVO.

16 Generally speaking, Orthodox churches in these areas were not

17 touched very badly. They were often locked up. As I say, the

18 question of the stone through the window, that sort of thing, and the

19 territory of the armija, one would across from time to time an

20 Orthodox or a Catholic church, particularly in a rural area, which

21 would be burned. But, generally speaking, the churches in the towns

22 were also carefully, well, in fact, guarded after a certain manner of

23 speaking. So those would be the sort of general conclusions of the

24 trip.

25 Q. Thank you. Now if we could have the lights lowered once again? We

Page 447

1 have several photos from this trip. First, if we could have Exhibit

2 168 brought up, please? I believe that is 6/7. Dr. Kaiser, would you

3 describe what is shown here?

4 A. Well, this is the Carsijska Mosque in Konjic. This is, apparently,

5 not a listed monument -- I am a little bit surprised -- and this is an

6 example of minaret shooting. You can see a shot very high at the

7 gallery level and another one lower. It looks as if there was,

8 perhaps, the beginning of an intention to do more damage to the

9 minaret than that.

10 Q. Your Honours, this particular mosque is actually named in the

11 indictment. What entity would have been responsible for this

12 shelling?

13 A. This would be the BSA.

14 Q. If we could have Exhibit 169, please?

15 A. This is the Vardacka Mosque in Konjic. Well, the damage is obvious,

16 it is high, it is to the pinnacle. You will see down below there at

17 the right monitor is European Community Monitoring Mission staff, and

18 they said that this damage and the damage to the preceding mosque was

19 probably done by tanks.

20 Q. Is this mosque also damaged by the BSA?

21 A. Yes, this is done by the BSA.

22 Q. Your Honours, for a point of reference, this particular mosque is

23 included in the schedule supporting the indictment. Now if we could

24 have Exhibit 170, please?

25 A. This is an unnamed mosque, but it is a mosque of quality. You can see

Page 448

1 it is a stone mosque in Olovo. This is a mosque that is just 200

2 metres down the hill from the Franciscan church that I mentioned. You

3 will see either an artillery or tank impact on the wall. If you look

4 up to the left, you will see damage done to the roof and further up to

5 the right also to the roof, and you also see that the post in the

6 window has also been shot out. This was done by the BSA. Local

7 people said it was done on one occasion in February '93.

8 Q. Again, your Honours, this particular mosque is contained in the

9 schedule supporting the indictment. Thank you. I would like to move

10 to a trip that you took to Banja Luka recently. When did you have

11 occasion to visit Banja Luka?

12 A. I visited it at the beginning of June of this year.

13 Q. Could we please have Exhibit 171, 6/10, brought up on the screen,

14 please? Dr. Kaiser, have you seen Exhibit 171 before? Have we shown

15 this to you before?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. What does this represent?

18 A. Well, it is a rather schematic town plan of Banja Luka.

19 Q. What does it show?

20 A. Well, it shows mainly the centre area town, but what it shows mainly

21 is the location of the mosques.

22 Q. Is there any significance to the concentration of the mosques shown on

23 the map?

24 A. Yes, there is. I mean, this is in some ways the perimeter of the

25 Turkish town. Banja Luka was conquered a bit late in 1528 by the

Page 449

1 Ottomans. It is in the north western part of Bosnia. It was of great

2 strategic importance for them, so it was also extremely important for

3 them to leave their mark. The foundation of these mosques is

4 extremely symbolic of a regime, of a way of living, and so this

5 accounts for this concentration of mosques in this particular area. I

6 should also say that the Turks built a fortress, well, rather built on

7 the ruins of a Christian fortress, they built a very big fortress. So

8 this town, whole town, is a symbol of their power.

9 Q. In referring to this map, could you describe to the court what parts

10 of the city you are were able to visit on your trip to Banja Luka in

11 June?

12 A. Well, we came in to the town from the south which is from the right.

13 There is a road, you can see a little arrow there, and that is the

14 road to Mrkonjic Grad and that is the main street. So we went

15 completely up the main street following it as it sort of keeps going

16 to the left, and then past up towards our hotel which was off the map

17 to the north. I also on one occasion came back down the main road,

18 and right practically in the centre of the map there is a bridge

19 across a river. I crossed this bridge, took the right turn,

20 right-hand turn there and continued down the road. That is really

21 what I saw of this area that I can remember.

22 Q. In walking around the area last month in Banja Luka, did you notice

23 any minarets in this general central area of Banja Luka?

24 A. No, no, minarets.

25 Q. If we could have the lights dimmed, please, and Exhibit 175, 6/13

Page 450

1 brought up on the screen, please? Dr. Kaiser, do you recognise this

2 photograph?

3 A. Yes, this is, in fact, the one mosque I saw. This is the one on the

4 other side of the river.

5 Q. Does this photograph accurately depict the way it looked last month

6 when you visited there?

7 A. Yes, it does.

8 Q. Your Honours, if we could now have Exhibit 172, 6/11 brought up on the

9 screen? For reference, this is a smaller version of the enlarged

10 photograph that we have here in the courtroom. Dr. Kaiser, would you

11 tell us a little bit about the mosque depicted in Exhibit 172, please?

12 A. Yes, this is the Ferhad Mosque. It was built in 1579 by the bey in

13 Banja Luka whose name was Ferhad Pisa Sokolovic. He built it with a

14 ransom money he received from giving back the Sana of a Christian

15 captain who had been killed in a battle. This is an extremely

16 important building. It is No. 1 on the classification. In fact, it

17 is one of two buildings like this in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 Now, why is it of a particular nature? Most mosques have simply a

19 central plan, a central chamber which is square, rectangular. This

20 one is rather different. It has, in fact, along both sides what could

21 be considered to be naves. You will see right between, near the base

22 of the minaret and the square central section, you will see a little

23 bit of a trough roof and this indicates where the other nave is.

24 Also, at the rear, at the south end of it, there is a semi-dome

25 because we have a circular apse, we call a circular apse, where the

Page 451

1 main mihrab is. So we have three naves in this mosque. Under the

2 stone pore where the other two naves are, we also have mihrabs at the

3 right side and the left side. So this is a very, very -- in terms of

4 the faithful, there is a lot of faithful who are going to be gathered

5 here in this mosque, outside and inside. It is comparable to the

6 Ghazi Husrev Bey mosque in Sarajevo. It has an extremely large

7 minaret 41.5 metres high. You will see, in the foreground you will

8 see one mausoleum. There, in fact, were three. Ferhad Pasa Sokolovic

9 was, in fact, buried in one of the mausoleum and, apparently, standard

10 burials were buried in one of the other ones. You can also see, not

11 very well, but near the entrance on the left you will also see a

12 fountain.

13 So this was an extremely important and imposing building. When it

14 was built, in fact (and it is thought that it was built by one of the

15 students of Mimar Sinan who was one of the main Turkish architects

16 working in Constantinople at the time), it is not just, it should not

17 be, we should not limit the importance of this building and say this

18 is an important sacral Islamic building; this is an important building

19 in Banja Luka. This building was, perhaps, the symbol, the monument

20 symbol, of this town. It was a reason for civic pride. You will find

21 it in all guide books. You will find it on postcards. This is

22 something that I believe all citizens of Banja Luka identified with

23 and found reason for pride in the existence of this mosque.

24 Q. Could we have Exhibit 174, 6/14, brought up, please? Your Honours, to

25 demonstrate Dr. Kaiser's point, this is just a postcard from the area

Page 452

1 depicting this particular mosque. Dr. Kaiser, when you were in Banja

2 Luka last month, did you see anything that looked like this particular

3 mosque?

4 A. No.

5 Q. If it had still been there would you have seen it?

6 A. Definitely.

7 Q. At this time if we could have Exhibit 173 brought up on the screen,

8 that is 6/12? Again, this is a smaller version of the enlargement we

9 have here in the courtroom. Your Honours, recently we had

10 investigators from the Office of the Prosecutor go to these sites in

11 Banja Luka when we were finally allowed some access to the area. This

12 photograph which is, in fact, two photographs put together, both of

13 those photos were taken by one of our investigators in late April.

14 This, in fact, represents what is left of the mosque. It is now a

15 vacant lot.

16 There are some points of reference with the "before" and "after"

17 photograph. The tall trees in the background, the one tall tree on

18 the right, and the building in the rear that is still standing, those

19 are two points of reference that you can compare with the "before" and

20 "after" photographs.

21 Dr. Kaiser, in your opinion, why would the Bosnian Serbs so

22 thoroughly destroy a mosque of this nature and eliminate all traces?

23 A. Well, if you want to get rid of all traces, or if you want to get rid

24 of all Muslims in a particular area, and you assimilate mosques to

25 Muslims, it is quite clear that you would go after this building,

Page 453

1 particularly because it is so important in terms of the image of the

2 town. It seems rather logical that this would be part of the step of

3 eliminating the Muslim presence and also eliminating a large part of

4 the history of Banja Luka.

5 Q. Do you know what effect this destruction might have had on the local

6 population?

7 A. I have not had this discussion with the local people -- I hope to

8 have it one day -- but I have had, but in similar discussions, for

9 example, in Mostar one comes across, for example in Mostar west, there

10 was a great deal of shock, regret and shame about the destruction of

11 the Old Bridge. I think there was probably something akin to that

12 reaction in Banja Luka. I would notice that there is still a

13 photograph of the Ferhad Mosque in the museum in Banja Luka. It has

14 not been removed.

15 Q. At this time we would like to move to some other trips that you have

16 taken. Recently, have you been able to travel through the areas of

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina controlled by the BSA?

18 A. Yes, about half a dozen times.

19 Q. When did you begin travelling in these areas?

20 A. The first trips to Pale were in February and then in April we began

21 moving a little bit more to other locations.

22 Q. Maybe you could take the pointer and the map and just generally show

23 some of the areas that you have been able to visit recently?

24 A. Well, one trip I took down to Gorazde, down through here, and this

25 means that you have to cross through the Republika Srpska to go

Page 454

1 through Rogatica, notably; another trip down to Foca through Republika

2 Srpska, and another trip up to Doboj here which is just inside the

3 Republika Srpska; of course, the trip to Banja Luka here, and I have

4 also been through part of the anvil area here, Mrkonjic Grad, and then

5 up through Bosanski Petrovac, up to Bihac, and this area was also

6 under the control of the Bosnian Serbian army.

7 Q. I would briefly like to review some of the areas you have been to.

8 You have been to Donji Vakuf?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who currently controls Donji Vakuf?

11 A. It is in the Republika Srpska.

12 Q. Do you know if Donji Vakuf had any mosques or minarets before the war?

13 A. Yes, it had two mosques at least.

14 Q. In your trip through Donji Vakuf, did you see any minarets or mosques?

15 A. No.

16 Q. All right. Similarly, you have been in Rogatica, as you have said?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were there mosques and minarets in Rogatica before the war?

19 A. Yes, there were several mosques, including some listed buildings, I

20 believe.

21 Q. Rogatica is in the control of the BSA?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you went through Rogatica did you see any mosques or minarets?

24 A. No.

25 Q. You have been to Foca?

Page 455

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 Q. Is it the same situation there as far as mosques and minarets being

3 present before the war?

4 A. I did not examine the town completely, but I saw no mosques and I saw

5 no minarets. Foca was very important because it had 10 mosques, all

6 of them listed, including the great Ilidza Mosque.

7 Q. Foca is in BSA control as well?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Finally, with regard to Doboj, you have been through Doboj?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did Doboj before the war have mosques and minarets?

12 A. Yes, it did.

13 Q. Were you able to see any mosques or minarets when you went there?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Throughout your entire travels in the area controlled by the accused

16 Karadzic and the accused Mladic, have you seen any minarets at all?

17 A. In 1995, when I was based in Mostar, the early part of 1995, I visited

18 Kupres which had just been taken back by the HVO. In Kupres there was

19 a mosque, an unfinished mosque, and an unfinished minaret which were

20 intact.

21 Q. That is the extent of the number of minarets that you have seen in

22 your travels through Serb controlled territory?

23 A. That is the only one I have seen.

24 Q. Thank you. If you could take a moment for the court and describe to

25 them the significance of this type of destruction of cultural and

Page 456

1 sacral sites in human terms?

2 A. Would it be possible for me to look at my notes again on this?

3 Q. Absolutely.

4 A. Well, according to the information that we have, there seems to be to

5 have been an attempt in the territory of the Republika Srpska to

6 eliminate the Islamic sacral heritage. This corresponds to between

7 100 and 200 mosques that are classified of historic value. We do not

8 know exactly still how many of them are destroyed, but we have a lot

9 of fears about this. Those are buildings built in the 16th and 17th

10 centuries.

11 These are obvious and obviously an important part of the heritage of

12 country, but they are not just a part of the heritage of the country;

13 they are part of the European heritage. If you take with the

14 exclusion of Spain, we are talking about the western most penetration

15 of the Ottoman Empire. The buildings are important for the Bosnians

16 and they are important for our history as well. I think their loss

17 is, in fact, something that is irreplaceable.

18 It would appear that there has been a similar tendency with respect

19 to Catholic churches in this area. This usually represents a more

20 modern heritage. One may have whatever judgement one wishes to have

21 about the aesthetic value of historicist architecture from the period,

22 but it is part and parcel of cultural heritage, 19th century churches.

23 I should point out that there has often been a lot of damage done to

24 Ottoman heritage in the Neretva Valley. This is serious as well,

25 perhaps less serious in numerical terms. There has been damage also

Page 457

1 done to Orthodox heritage in the Neretva Valley. This is serious, but

2 this is totally at a different dimension.

3 What is the significance, though, of the destruction of the Islamic

4 heritage and the Catholic heritage in this area? In the reports of

5 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, we always talked

6 about cultural cleansing alongside ethnic cleansing. In other words,

7 you cannot simply ethnically cleanse a people and eliminate them

8 entirely this way. The way of eliminating them also involved a

9 destruction of their heritage. In other words, you are eliminating a

10 sacral building and in this way you are eliminating the memory of

11 having lived together. So I think this is one of the general

12 importance of destruction of this type of heritage.

13 If you turn to such other questions as the destruction and loss to

14 civil, secular, cultural heritage, we would find that there has been

15 an awful lot of damage in towns to buildings of all periods, to

16 vernacular architecture, to houses. In the countryside, there has

17 often been an awful lot of damage in ethnic cleansing and ethnic

18 counter cleansing, also in central Bosnia.

19 If you add up together these different types of damage, you come

20 with a rather obvious conclusion. I mean, you have a kind of radical

21 change in the physical environment in which people are living. This

22 means that you are talking about the removal of the signposts of

23 collective and individual life. In this sense, we are talking about a

24 spiritual impoverishment for people all over the country.

25 Remember, although we have this problem of the ethnic identification

Page 458

1 of cultural heritage, in fact, what you are doing is that the

2 destruction of a mosque is a destruction of something within a Serb or

3 something within a Croat as well. Destruction of an Orthodox church

4 is a memory that a Croat has. You are dealing, breaking down the

5 whole identity with the destruction of this cultural heritage. Now,

6 much of what has been destroyed, let us say, dynamited and raised,

7 well, in fact, hardly any of it will rise again, and much of what has,

8 in fact, been heavily damaged in the war will be destroyed in the

9 process of reconstruction.

10 So we are talking about something which really is a catastrophe for

11 the peoples on the spot.

12 Now, there are two, perhaps, final questions that come to mine mind.

13 The first is, is this type of destruction a precedent? Secondly,

14 what does it represent for us?

15 To answer the first question, I think one has to go back

16 to the history of the region. I think that the Ottoman conquest was

17 probably not as tender as some complacent historians had made it out

18 to be. I think there was probably a lot of destruction carried out by

19 the Turkish armies of cultural heritage, sacral buildings.

20 It must be remembered that when the Austro-Hungarians reconquered

21 the parts of Croatia which were under the control of the Turks, they

22 virtually eliminated all sacral and secular buildings associated with

23 the Ottoman rule. It should be remembered also that in World War II,

24 the Ustashas did a tremendous amount of damage, an appalling amount of

25 damage, to Orthodox heritage in Croatia and also in the diocese of

Page 459

1 Banja Luka.

2 It should also be remembered that in 1945, after the war was over,

3 for example, in Mostar there were six mosques, historic mosques, and

4 mesjids that were pulled down; in Kladanj there were four. So, in

5 this area there are precedents and there are memories of the

6 destruction of cultural heritage. It has been done commonly in the

7 past.

8 So one could say that this is not being invented, it is not new, it

9 did happen, but is there something new in it? There is, perhaps, a

10 conjunction of removing peoples and removing the traces of peoples and

11 carried out by states that knew all the rules. Remember that the

12 military forces that have done this damage were very well versed in

13 the laws of war. They all knew The Hague Convention. The civil

14 authorities knew fully well the value of the heritage that was being

15 destroyed on their territories and which, by their own laws, they were

16 bound to protect. All of this was done in full view of an

17 international community that was far better informed and more

18 concerned than people in the 16th century or even in the 1940s.

19 I think that we are in the presence of a kind of synthesis,

20 synthesis of practices from the past with the efficiency of modern

21 state and a 20th century sophistication in social engineering in

22 reverse. The authorities fully understood the significance of

23 heritage as one of the bonds that holds together a society, and

24 particularly a society people who have differing traditions.

25 I do not want to sound overdramatic or prophetic, but such

Page 460

1 combinations of brutality and sophistication strike me as a rather

2 ominous challenge for the future. In all of our societies, there are

3 movements, there are political parties, people and intellectuals who

4 dream of cleaning their territory and cleaning their history, and the

5 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown how it can be done and that it can

6 be done.

7 Q. At this time point, your Honours, we have a final exhibit and this

8 would go towards notice and knowledge for the accused Karadzic. With

9 your permission, we would play that?

10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, please go ahead. Go ahead.

11 MR. BOWERS: If we could have Exhibit 177 which is an audio tape played?

12 This is a rebroadcast by the BBC, February 27th 1992 radio broadcast

13 by Radio Sarajevo. We have translations. Hopefully, we can have this

14 translated as it is being played.

15 (The tape was played):

16 (In translation):

17 "In our conference today, I have received an announcement which says

18 that yesterday at 11 o'clock, just shortly before midnight, a bomb

19 fell on a significant cultural building of Banja Luka. This is the

20 first time something like this has happened in our history. I fear

21 that this is a type of revenge that is taking place. This is an

22 attempt to provoke us, to provoke confrontation. We are not blaming

23 the Serbian people for this attack of vandalism, but we are blaming

24 the extremists. The Muslims must also contain themselves and must not

25 react to it.

Page 461

1 "The sacral cultural heritage is something we hold very sacred. I

2 condemn this act of vandalism and I do not think that the Serb people

3 are responsible, but that fascists are responsible. I condemn all

4 acts of such vandalism".

5 Q. So, your Honours, we can see from this broadcast that as early as

6 February 1992, the accused Karadzic was made aware of the risk that

7 these sacral and cultural sites were at with the upcoming hostilities

8 being planned at that very time.

9 Finally, we would like to note for the court that we have had

10 investigators in Srebrenica recently in connection with that

11 investigation, and that the practice of this destruction of sacral and

12 cultural sites continued on through July 1995. If we went to trial,

13 we have photographs showing minarets and mosques in the Srebrenica

14 area. When our investigators were there recently, there are no traces

15 of minarets and these mosques have been destroyed.

16 That concludes our presentation and we would now open it up to

17 questions from the court.

18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. I look towards my colleagues first.

19 Examined by the Court

20 JUDGE RIAD: Dr. Kaiser, I would like to thank you for your clear and most

21 informative survey of the destruction of the cultural and spiritual

22 heritage in Bosnia, in particular. Just to dispel any doubt

23 concerning some of the very clear conclusions which we could reach

24 listening to you, I would like you to tell me, could it have been

25 possible that such damage would result from the exchange of fighting

Page 462

1 in any of these areas or it had to be a premeditated and well

2 organised attack?

3 A. This is a difficult question to answer. It is not impossible that you

4 can develop a dynamic of destruction as things go on, it is not

5 necessarily premeditated, but I think that one can only draw a

6 conclusion when one has looked at the total, the long calendar of the

7 destruction of cultural heritage in the area, sacral heritage, I say a

8 calendar, to follow it all the away across the territory. Perhaps

9 this calendar will help the Tribunal to be able to sort out what the

10 intentions were, but I could not personally say that this was

11 definitely a premeditated plot.

12 Q. Speaking of this calendar, you gave us a synthesis of the calendar by

13 mentioning that 1,123 mosques were damaged, 504 Catholic, 36 Orthodox

14 and five Synagogues. Judging by the percentage of the damaged, let us

15 say, religious heritage, could you conclude that it was a strategy in

16 all the war or, at least, in some of the factions had it as a

17 strategy, judging by the number and the systematic way it was done ---

18 A. If it was -----

19 Q. -- and was it more due to the attitude of one of the parties in

20 particular or a general systematic strategy?

21 A. Well, if it was not the strategy at the beginning of the war, it

22 certainly became part of the strategy. You cannot possibly have 1,183

23 damaged mosques without something fairly deliberate being done. I

24 return back to my original position; it certainly became one, it was

25 very useful, but destruction or damaging of a minaret is clearly a

Page 463

1 sign to a population. I know of an example in western Herzegovina

2 where you have a village which is totally undisturbed, with a village

3 of Muslims in 1993, and then in 1994 or 1995 you have one shot on the

4 minaret. This is a signal. Hitting a minaret is also one way of

5 chasing, chasing the people. So, in fact, this can be actually

6 integrated very carefully into the method. It can be part of the

7 method.

8 JUDGE RIAD: Thank you very much, Dr. Kaiser.

9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: My first question goes to the Council for the

10 Prosecution. Do you have all the reports which were mentioned at the

11 beginning of the presentation of Dr. Kaiser?

12 MR. BOWERS: Yes, your Honour. We have these reports and they are very

13 voluminous, so we have not presented them as exhibits, but if the

14 court would like access to them, we absolutely can provide them.

15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you, counsel for the Prosecution. I have

16 taken note. I now turn to Dr. Kaiser. As regards the systematic

17 character of the destruction that you mentioned, doctor, was there any

18 damage to Muslim cemeteries?

19 A. (In translation): At the beginning of the war ... (No translation of

20 answer was audible) It was -----

21 Q. Thank you. I think there was a break.

22 A. May I continue?

23 Q. Please continue in the language which is the easiest for you.

24 A. I will continue like this otherwise it will be difficult for you. So

25 what happened is in the visits, in my trips, I saw it was really a

Page 464

1 question of individuals who decided to shoot, but I never saw a

2 cemetery which was bulldozed down. I never saw a site where I could

3 have thought had been bulldozed. I could have imagined that in

4 Mostar, for example, where you had the Vucjakovica mosque that was

5 dynamited in 1993, now that mosque was surrounded by a cemetery that

6 was used heavily during the war, unfortunately. Now, there were some

7 tombstones which were damaged, but no-one disturbed that cemetery.

8 That is something I find time and time again, and also in the

9 Republika Srpska because you can recognise the Muslim cemeteries very

10 easily.

11 Q. Thank you. I also wanted to ask you whether during your

12 investigations, even if this goes beyond our presentation, so in the

13 visits you mentioned you also looked at the other monuments which are

14 part and parcel of the heritage of a people, the universities, the

15 libraries, etc., the administrative buildings, the courtrooms; could

16 you very briefly give us some brief idea of whether those buildings

17 were damaged so you could ruin the inheritance of a people?

18 A. No, I think I was concentrating now on the questions which you were

19 putting to me as regards cultural heritage and sacral sites. But I do

20 not want to minimise the importance of this destruction of the rest of

21 the inheritance or heritage. I mentioned the town of Mostar, in

22 particular, where I said the buildings during the Austrian period, the

23 bars(?), the administrative buildings, the schools, etc., they were

24 burnt during the battles there, and this type of building is an

25 integral part of the town.

Page 465

1 For example, as I was saying the theatre, the bars, the schools,

2 are something that are used daily and come up also in different towns

3 where you found the history in the library, in the university, the

4 national library of Sarajevo. It was not a Catholic or Muslim

5 building, but it was part and parcel of the town. Everyone shared the

6 services of the library, the Serbs the Croatians and the Muslims.

7 During our trips there, we tried to focus on that heritage. You are

8 absolutely right when you are saying there is not only the sacral

9 heritage, there is also the heritage of everyday, of part and parcel

10 of their life, and that is equally important. It is just as important

11 as the rest. That heritage was heavily damaged.

12 When I talk about buildings that will no longer be built up again,

13 after the war you might think that some efforts are going to do for

14 the churches and for the mosques, at least those who have not been too

15 damaged, but for many other buildings in the civilian life, the

16 damages that have been done to those buildings will probably end in

17 their destruction, and they will depend entirely on the Austrian

18 period which runs the serious risk of disappearing in its entirety.

19 Q. I would also like to ask you based on the figures you have given me

20 that -- I will start again so that you can hear the beginning of my

21 question. Based on the figures that you have given us, we have

22 noticed that there was almost no synagogue, that there was no

23 synagogue which was damaged. Could you give us an explanation as

24 regards that?

25 A. Now, there are not a lot of synagogues in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the

Page 466

1 synagogues in Sarajevo had minor damages, but there is one thing you

2 should not forget, that when you look into Sarajevo, there was an

3 enormous amount of damage done, particularly in the modern areas.

4 There were some historical buildings who were heavily damaged, like

5 the library I mentioned. You can think also of the Magribija Mosque

6 which is in Marin Dvor which has lost its minaret. There are lots of

7 minor damages and destruction done to the churches, to the mosques as

8 well. But one thing that struck me the first time when I went to

9 Sarajevo was, in fact, I have never seen so many minarets during all

10 my trips, but what struck me was that the damage that was done was,

11 fortunately, less than in other towns.

12 There were other different intentions. There were different

13 targets, and there was not any particular reason to attack the

14 synagogues if you had the churches or the mosques. In Mostar, there

15 is a synagogue that goes back many years, that was slightly damaged,

16 but it has not acted as a synagogue for many, many years, since 1945.

17 The Jewish component, which is a very important part for Bosnia,

18 particularly as regards their memories because the Jewish population

19 is very, very small, they suffered a lot during the Second World War

20 and there is not a large percentage of Jews, therefore, they were not

21 a particular target.

22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: The court, Dr. Kaiser, thank you for your

23 presentation. I see that the Prosecutor is making a sign to me.

24 Would you like to add something, another question?

25 MR. BOWERS: Yes, your Honour, if I might, if I could just respond to

Page 467

1 Judge Riad's question regarding a possibility of legitimate military

2 damage? At trial, the Prosecutor would be prepared to expand on the

3 calendar that Dr. Kaiser mentioned as well as the geographical

4 locations because when you put the time lines together with the

5 geographical locations, what we would be prepared to show is that much

6 of the damage occurred behind the frontlines so there could be no

7 military purpose. Also many of the sacral sites were damaged in areas

8 where there was little or no resistance whatsoever, so again there

9 would be no military purpose.

10 Finally, even in areas where there was resistance, such as in the

11 town of Brcko, the mosques were fired upon when the fighting was

12 actually in a different part of the city. So again there could be no

13 military purpose. So we would be prepared to present this more

14 detailed and extensive testimony when we go to trial.

15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Dr. Kaiser, I would like to thank you for your

16 presentation. Thank you on behalf of the International Tribunal. We

17 are very grateful to you. This is the end of your presentation. We

18 will adjourn until 4.30.

19 (4.10 p.m.)

20 (The court adjourned for a short time)

21 (4.30 p.m.)

22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Counsel for the Prosecution, the court accepts the

23 exhibits that you submitted in connection with the previous witness.

24 So, if the Registrar would please take note of that for the case

25 file?

Page 468

1 You have the floor, sir.

2 MR. BOWERS: Thank you, your Honour. As its next witness, the Prosecution

3 would call Captain Patrick Rechner, please.


5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Please remain standing, and put on the head sets, if

6 you would? Let us see, first, can you hear me, Captain? Do you hear

7 me?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Now you are going to remain standing to read the

10 declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the whole

12 truth and nothing but the truth.

13 (The witness was sworn)

14 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you. Please be seated. Captain Rechner, you

15 have been called by the Prosecution in connection with -- you do not

16 need -----

17 THE WITNESS: I also speak French.

18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: So let me repeat that. You have been called by the

19 Prosecution as part of the public hearing in connection with the

20 charges against Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. You are before the

21 International Criminal Tribunal. The Tribunal would ask you to speak

22 without any fears and you will please proceed, counsel.

23 MR. BOWERS: Thank you, your Honour.

24 Examined by MR. BOWERS

25 Q. Captain, would you please statement your full name and spell it for

Page 469

1 the record?

2 A. It is captain Patrick Anthony Rechner. The first name Patrick is

3 spelt P-A-T-R-I-C-K, my middle name is Anthony spelt A-N-T-H-O-N-Y,

4 and my last name Rechner is spelt R-E-C-H-N-E-R.

5 Q. Captain, you are currently serving in the Canadian army; is that

6 correct?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. What is your rank and branch of service?

9 A. I am a Captain in the Infantry

10 Q. What languages do you speak?

11 A. I speak, I can say eight in different levels of fluency; English,

12 French, Czech, Polish, Slovak, German, Russian and Serbo-Croatian.

13 Q. Did you serve in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding areas?

14 A. Yes, I have.

15 Q. Could you please take the court through your various assignments?

16 A. I served -- is that strictly in Bosnia-Herzegovina or throughout the

17 former Yugoslavia?

18 Q. Throughout the former Yugoslavia.

19 A. I first served there as a member of the Canadian Battalion from

20 February until May 1993 and western Slovenia, or UN protected area

21 sector west. Then I returned for 12 months tour of duty as a UN

22 military observer from July 1994 until July 1995.

23 My first assignments as a UN military observer were in Zadar, in

24 sector south, and I stayed there until December 1994 also working in

25 Knin and Benkovac. Then at the end of December 1994, exactly 31st

Page 470

1 December 1994, I was posted to Pale where I had remained until 18th

2 June 1994 -- correction, 1995.

3 Q. You have served as a United Nations military observer; is that

4 correct?

5 A. That is correct.

6 Q. Could you just briefly explain to the court what are the

7 responsibilities of a UN military observer?

8 A. The UN military observers have different responsibilities, depending

9 on which mission they are employed in throughout the world. In the

10 former Yugoslavia, our main task was to effect liaison between the

11 different warring parties and also between the warring parties and the

12 UN military command, that is, UNPROFOR.

13 Also, we were unofficially dealing with the humanitarian

14 organisations, trying to provide them with some assistance and

15 developing local communities to aid their work. Our last job was to

16 report directly to the Security Council on any conflict activity and

17 on the full scope and type of conflict that was occurring wherever we

18 could get access to in the former Yugoslavia.

19 Q. How were you personally selected as a United Nations military

20 observer?

21 A. For Canadian military officers, the requirement is to serve, to be

22 minimum in the rank of captain and complete a minimum of six years of

23 commissioned active service as an officer. In our case, we just

24 applied to be selected as a UN military observer. Our military,

25 regimental system or then branch of service then looks at the

Page 471

1 candidates and makes the choice and gives the names directly to the

2 UN.

3 Q. After being selected as a military observer, where was it that you

4 were first stationed?

5 A. At first, I was for about two weeks in Zadar in Dalmatia.

6 Q. Then where did you move?

7 A. And then to Knin in sector south.

8 Q. Then would you take us through that chronology again?

9 A. OK. Zadar, those two weeks, it was just as a normal UN military

10 observer doing patrolling duty. In Knin, I was there from the end of

11 July 1994 until the beginning of November 1994. I was employed as the

12 Chief Operations Officer for the UN military observer headquarters in

13 Knin. Then from the beginning of November 1994 until the end of

14 December 1994, I was a team leader stationed in Benkovac, that is in

15 sector south as well, and my responsibility was for the southern half

16 of the UN protected area of sector south.

17 Q. At some point you were assigned to Pale?

18 A. Yes, that was on 31st December 1994.

19 Q. What was the period of your service in Pale?

20 A. In Pale, I was there from that date until when I was released after

21 the hostage taking on 18th June 1995.

22 Q. What responsibilities did you have in Pale?

23 A. In Pale, there were four military observers stationed there as part of

24 the liaison team. Our duties involved passing letters between the UN

25 and the Bosnian Serb government, and also between the UN and the

Page 472

1 Bosnian Serb military headquarters which was actually located in Han

2 Pjesak, about 60 kilometres from Pale.

3 Occasionally, we would also have some meetings with the local

4 political leaders, but mostly it involved telephone calls and sending

5 messages by fax. Then towards the second half of April, I took over

6 as the team leader and Chief Liaison Officer to the Bosnian Serb

7 government and the Military High Command, that is, the Bosnian Serb

8 Military High Command.

9 Q. Who were some of the leaders or individuals from the Pale

10 administration that you would have contact with?

11 A. The major figure was Professor Koljevic, the Vice President, because

12 his other task or position that he filled was the Chairman of their

13 government committee for co-operation with the UN and UNPROFOR. We

14 also dealt directly with Dr. Karadzic's office, specifically with his

15 secretary, Mira, and Mr. Jovan Zametica who was Mr. Karadzic's

16 spokesman and political adviser. We also had some dealings with Mr.

17 Kalinic, the Minister of Health.

18 Q. How often did you communicate with these people?

19 A. Directly with Professor Koljevic, it was quite rare, but with his

20 secretary, Zeca(?), it was almost on a daily basis and with Dr.

21 Karadzic's office, that is, with his secretary, Mira, or Mr. Jovan

22 Zametica, it was also on a daily basis.

23 Q. Some time in May 1995 did you have a meeting with Koljevic?

24 A. Yes, it was either right at the end of April or beginning of May 1995,

25 I went to see him in my capacity as the Chief UNMO Liaison Officer

Page 473

1 with Colonel Ermolajev, who was the Deputy Senior Regional Military

2 Observer, that is, the Deputy of all of the observers working in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 We had a whole bunch of military observers that were blocked in the

5 safe areas and were not allowed any access out either to rotate them

6 or for leave. So we tried to gain the intervention of Professor

7 Koljevic to assist us in working with the Bosnian Serb military to

8 make an exception for some of these UNMOs to let them out.

9 Q. What happened as a result of the meeting?

10 A. As a result of the meeting, Professor Koljevic did intervene and about

11 one week or 10 days later we were able to get the UN military

12 observers from the safe area of Zepa out.

13 Q. That meeting occurred in late April or early May; is that correct?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. Of 1995?

16 A. That is correct.

17 Q. What happened on 25th May 1995?

18 A. 25th May 1995 was the day of the first NATO bombing of the bunkers on

19 the outskirts of Pale.

20 Q. Could you determine approximately how many bombs fell on that day?

21 A. We were not able to determine exactly, but we heard two loud

22 explosions and saw two large billows of smoke from locations, what we

23 estimated about 10 kilometres south of our house in Pale.

24 Q. What was in that general area where you saw the smoke?

25 A. At that time we had no idea whether it was a military facility or

Page 474

1 something else. In fact we were not sure it was bombing because the

2 size of the explosion and the cloud of dust and smoke that arose was

3 much larger than we would normally expect from a single bomb dropped

4 by an aircraft, that is a bomb of 1,000 or 2,000 pounds, but as we

5 found out later the large size of the explosion and the large amount

6 of smoke and dust was a result of the bunkers being hit in the

7 secondary explosions inside the bunkers.

8 Q. Did you see any damage to civilian structures on 25th May?

9 A. No, no damage. But if I can explain, on 25th May we were also

10 confined to our accommodations. We did not have any freedom. We were

11 told not to leave our accommodations, so we could not go out to

12 investigate.

13 Q. Where were your accommodations located?

14 A. It is in the centre of Pale more or less, about 300 metres from the

15 Bosnian Serb presidency, that is Dr. Karadzic's office.

16 Q. You did not see any damage in the immediate vicinity of your

17 accommodations?

18 A. No.

19 Q. All right. What happened on the next day, 26th May?

20 A. The next day at about 10 o'clock the bombing was resumed. It looked

21 to us it was the same targets as the previous days or the same general

22 area, that is south, and we estimated about 10 kilometres. The only

23 difference from the previous day was that it was much more intensive.

24 We had counted throughout that morning from about 10 o'clock until

25 about 11 o'clock about 12 explosions.

Page 475

1 Q. Shortly after the bombing began on 26th did something occur outside

2 your accommodations?

3 A. Yes, within about five or 10 minutes of the first bomb being dropped

4 there were two shots that were fired just outside of our

5 accommodations and some loud voices. Would you like me to continue?

6 Q. What did do when you heard these shots?

7 A. At the time I was not in our office. I was upstairs, so I just waited

8 a few minutes to see what would happen. I did not here anything

9 further and then I went downstairs to investigate what had happened.

10 Q. When you went downstairs were you able to go into a section that was

11 isolated from the office itself?

12 A. . Yes, I think it may help if I describe our office and accommodations

13 in Pale. We were living with a local family in their house. It was a

14 three-storey house, that is three storeys including the ground floor.

15 The family lived on the middle floor and we lived on the top floor.

16 On the bottom floor there was on one side the living room and the

17 kitchen and on the other side was our office which was a converted

18 garage. So, I had gone down the stairs from the top floor which is

19 the third level down to the main floor. There was a small door in the

20 back of our office which was slightly ajar, so I looked in there and

21 saw three armed individuals. Then I went into the kitchen to make

22 some telephone calls trying to find out if these people had been sent

23 there officially to protect us or whether they were just some local

24 out for revenge.

25 Q. When you decided to make some calls who did you contact?

Page 476

1 A. The first person I called was Dr. Karadzic's office and I spoke with

2 his secretary Mira and I explained to her that there were three people

3 in our office armed, who had entered about 10 o'clock and asked her if

4 she could send someone by to investigate what was going on. She asked

5 me if -- first of all, she asked me what time they came, so I said

6 about 10 minutes or so after 10 o'clock, which was about five minutes

7 earlier of the time of my telephone call. She asked me if there were

8 soldiers. So I said, well, it was difficult to tell because only one

9 of them was dressed in a proper uniform, but she said, no, if they

10 came shortly after 10 that they were sent officially. That was the

11 first telephone call I made.

12 Q. Why was your first reaction to call Karadzic's office?

13 A. First of all because we had been dealing directly with him and because

14 we were worried that some people may be out to take revenge on us

15 because of the bombing. We thought it was best to deal with the

16 highest level. But we had also through Mr. Jovan Zametica, that is

17 Mr. Karadzic's spokesman and senior political officer. We had the

18 intervention of Mr. Karadzic in a previous incident to help us resolve

19 hijacking that had occurred in trying to get our vehicle back.

20 Q. Now what happened after Karadzic's secretary confirmed to you that the

21 men were there on official business?

22 A. I also wanted to confirm with Mr. Zametica himself, if I could get a

23 hold of him, if he knew what was going on and also to inform him that

24 we had some armed people in our office. So I called him in his hotel

25 room at the Hotel Bistrica in the Jahorina area which is about 15

Page 477

1 minutes drive from Pale. Mr. Zametica confirmed, saying that he had

2 heard that something was being prepared to send some people into our

3 office, that is sending some soldiers into our office. I asked him

4 what he meant by that, and he said that he could only suggest that we

5 be as co-operative as possible.

6 Q. So you received confirmation from the accused Karadzic's secretary and

7 also Karadzic's spokesman that the armed men were there on official

8 business?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. Are UNMOs United Nations military observers armed?

11 A. No, UN military observers are not armed. In fact that is what

12 distinguishes us principally from the other UN forces in the former

13 Yugoslavia. So we are not armed. We live and work in the local

14 communities and we work in small international teams typically of six

15 officers from all around the world.

16 Q. What happened after you confirmed with your two sources that the men

17 were there on official business?

18 A. It was almost immediately as I put the phone down after speaking with

19 Mr. Zametica that one of our interpreters who was in the office came

20 out and called for me in a loud voice. So I came out of the kitchen.

21 I asked her what she had wanted and she said I was needed in the

22 office. So I followed her in the officer and there confronted three

23 or at that time it was to armed men because the third one had gone

24 outside.

25 Q. How were the two men dressed and how were they armed?

Page 478

1 A. One was dressed in a typical camouflage uniform that the Bosnian Serb

2 soldiers wear with a helmet as well. The other one had a red t-shirt

3 and camouflage pants. Both of them had automatic weapons that are AK

4 47s and the one with the t-shirt had some hand grenades as well.

5 Q. When the interpreter brought you to these two men what happened next?

6 A. I was told to sit down and then after a few seconds they told me to

7 get in touch with my headquarters by radio and to put them through to

8 my headquarters which I did.

9 Q. What took place once you got in touch with your headquarters?

10 A. I just explained to my headquarters that we had some armed people in

11 our office and they wished to speak with them, so I passed the handset

12 from the radio to the Bosnian Serb soldier who actually spoke perfect

13 English. He explained to our headquarters that he wanted the bombings

14 stopped immediately and if it was not going to be stopped that they

15 would start executing us.

16 Q. Did this Serbian soldier have you make an additional call?

17 A. Yes, because our office explained to them that the UN military

18 observers had nothing to do with the bombing, that they were not able

19 to do anything immediately. So then the soldier asked me to put him

20 in touch with General Smith's office. That is General Rupert Smith

21 who was the Commander of UNPROFOR at the time in Sarajevo. So I

22 called his office with which we dealt quite regularly as well on our

23 telephone and put the soldier in touch with General Smith's

24 aide-de-camp.

25 Q. Did you overhear the conversation that took place?

Page 479

1 A. Yes, the Bosnian Serb soldier also explained very angrily that he

2 wanted the bombing stopped immediately, and he explained that from

3 that moment on every bomb that would be dropped, for every bomb that

4 would be dropped one of the UNMOs would be killed.

5 Q. What happened after this call was concluded to General Smith?

6 A. I assumed that the aide-de-camp explained to him that it would take

7 some time to get the bombing stopped, so we just waited and the

8 Bosnian Serb soldier explained that his military commander would come

9 in a few minutes and that we would just wait and that is what we did.

10 About 10 minutes later, which would be about 11 o'clock that morning,

11 a group of soldiers came led by a person whose name was something like

12 Srdjan who was the Commander of this particular unit of which these

13 two soldiers came in to our office initially, and the ones who

14 initially made the telephone calls and the radio calls to our

15 headquarters.

16 Q. Was this unit part of the Bosnian Serb army?

17 A. I would assume so, whether it was a regular or paramilitary unit I

18 cannot say.

19 Q. What happened when they arrived?

20 A. We were taken in our own vehicle to a location called Jahorinski Potok

21 to be which is the location where the bunkers were, that is the

22 bunkers that were hit the previous day and also that morning by the

23 NATO air strikes.

24 Q. When you arrived at Jahorinski Potok what was the situation?

25 A. We were held up at the main gate to the complex because it was locked

Page 480

1 and the soldiers present there did not have the key. So it took about

2 10 minutes or so before they could find someone to open it. In the

3 meantime a group of civilians had gathered who had lived right on the

4 outskirts of the bunkers. The situation was very tense. They were

5 very angry seeing UN people because in their minds we were responsible

6 for the bombing. One of the individuals broke away from the group and

7 came to our vehicle, opened the door and assaulted me.

8 Q. What happened when this individual assaulted you?

9 A. Fortunately our guards reacted quickly, so just after a couple of

10 small punches and kicks he was pulled off. As he seemed to relax he

11 quickly pulled out us his pistol, cocked it, that is chambered around,

12 and tried to get a round or get a shot off at us. Again our guards

13 reacted in time and prevented him from shooting us.

14 Q. Now you mentioned there were bunkers at Jahorinski Potok. What did

15 these bunkers contain?

16 A. Yes, the bunkers were located I would say about 2 kilometres or so

17 inside the complex and from what we could tell they contained mines,

18 mortar and artillery ammunition.

19 Q. Were the soldiers able eventually to get access to the complex?

20 A. Yes, not by key though. As I mentioned, after about 10 minutes

21 someone came and they managed to open the lock by smashing it with a

22 hammer. We were taken into the complex but not immediately to the

23 bunkers. We were first taken to some warehouses a few hundred metres

24 inside the complex.

25 Q. Were you handcuffed?

Page 481

1 A. We were handcuffed once we arrived at the warehouses and I assume we

2 stopped there just to await final confirmation that the air strikes

3 had been called off. Then I would say about 10 minutes or so after

4 arriving at the warehouses we got the message by our radio in the

5 vehicle that the air strikes had now been called off.

6 Q. Now while waiting at the warehouse did you have any contact with a

7 Lieutenant Colonel?

8 A. Yes, there was one Lieutenant Colonel from the Bosnian Serb army who

9 was with us from the moment the group of soldiers, that is the second

10 group of soldiers, arrived at our accommodations and he was filming

11 the whole proceedings.

12 Q. Did he make any reference to a pistol he was carrying?

13 A. Yes, well, not only him but all of the soldiers were very angry, very

14 hostile. This Lieutenant Colonel mentioned that even if the NATO air

15 strikes -- well, I should mention first that he had explained we would

16 be kept at the warehouses to prevent any NATO air strikes, but he

17 added that even if we were not to be killed by any resumption of air

18 strikes he would come by later in the day and shoot us personally. So

19 he pulled out his revolver and showed us the handle on which he had

20 two notches cut, explaining those two notches represented two people

21 that he had killed and he would be very happy to have three more

22 notches for the three officers and my team on his pistol as well.

23 Q. While you were in the area of the warehouse were you also forced to

24 re-contact your headquarters?

25 A. Yes. I think the first time was just to confirm after we got the

Page 482

1 message that the air strikes would be called off, to confirm that they

2 were actually called off, and then we were loaded back in the vehicles

3 and driven to the bunkers themselves. On our way there I was told to

4 contact my headquarters and explain that we would die for the sake of


6 Q. Who instructed you to make this statement to your headquarters?

7 A. That was the Lieutenant Colonel who was filming the proceedings, and

8 the one I mentioned had threatened to shoot us at the end of the day

9 if the NATO air strikes did not kill us.

10 Q. Did anyone mention or comment on why there was someone there filming

11 the proceedings?

12 A. No, no one commented on it.

13 Q. Now you were eventually moved to another area within the complex,

14 correct?

15 A. Yes, we were moved from the warehouse to the actual bunkers where we

16 were handcuffed. That was the only place we were moved around inside

17 that complex on 26th May.

18 Q. What happened when you were taken to the area near the bunkers?

19 A. We were taken to -- there were four bunkers, two of which had been hit

20 by the aerial bombs. Myself and the Russian military observer,

21 Captain Pavel Teterevsky, I was handcuffed, he was tied to a lightning

22 rod in front of the bunkers and the third UNMO Captain, Oli Zidlik,

23 was handcuffed to the door of the bunker itself about 10 metres in

24 front of us.

25 Q. So there were three of you there?

Page 483

1 A. Yes, there were three. I mentioned at the beginning that there were

2 four military observers in my team. The fourth one was away on leave

3 at the time. So there were only three of us in Pale on 25th and 26th

4 May.

5 Q. Now once the Serb soldiers handcuffed you to the lightning rod, how

6 close were you to the ammunition bunkers?

7 A. I was in front of one that had not been destroyed, about 10 metres in

8 front of it, and that was 10 metres in front of Captain Zidlik who was

9 handcuffed to the front door of that bunker, that is of that same

10 bunker that had not been hit.

11 Q. About what time of the day was this when you were handcuffed to the

12 lightning rod?

13 A. I would say this would be close to about 11.30 that morning.

14 Q. Could you tell if any of the bunkers in the immediate vicinity had

15 been hit by the bombing?

16 A. Yes, we had seen shell or bomb craters as well as the back half of one

17 bunker which was to my right as I was facing it blown out, and the

18 other one to my left had been hit from the top.

19 Q. Were additional hostages eventually brought to the area where were you

20 handcuffed to the lightning rod?

21 A. Yes, at about 1 o'clock, 1300 hours that day, we saw team members from

22 the other UN military observer team in Pale taken to the same complex

23 driven by Bosnian Serb soldiers in their own, that is in the UN

24 vehicles. This other team of military observers was a normal group of

25 observers that fulfilled the functions of patrolling and monitoring

Page 484

1 conflict activity. They were stationed in Pale as well. So they had

2 been rounded up at about 1300 hours and brought to the same complex

3 where we were being used as human shields.

4 Q. How many additional observers were there?

5 A. There were altogether five.

6 Q. What did the Serb soldiers do with these additional five observers?

7 A. They put them in different locations throughout the complex. All four

8 of them or four of the five I understand were kept in other areas

9 close to the warehouses where we had been initially held up. The

10 fifth was a Polish UNMO, Major Kalbarczyk, and he was taken further up

11 the road past us to a bunker that we could not see about 300 metres

12 away around a bend, but that had been hit that morning and where the

13 ammunition was still exploding.

14 Q. So, in your opinion, the Polish observer was placed in the most

15 dangerous location?

16 A. Among us certainly, yes.

17 Q. How long were you handcuffed to the lightning rod?

18 A. In my case it was about five and a half or six hours, that is from

19 about 11.30 that morning until 5 o'clock that afternoon or shortly

20 after 5 o'clock.

21 Q. At some point after being handcuffed to the lightning rod did some

22 soldiers return to check on you?

23 A. Yes. They actually came first about one hour after we were handcuffed

24 there just to give us some water, and then also when they brought the

25 other military observers at 1300 hours they came by just to check on

Page 485

1 us to make sure we were still firmly handcuffed. Then at about 1430

2 or just before 1430 two soldiers came up to check on us. They were

3 discussing amongst themselves whether they had enough time to go up

4 further to check on the Polish UNMO who I had explained was about 300

5 metres away at the other ammunition bunker. These two soldiers had

6 mentioned or one of the two soldiers was telling the other one that if

7 they went up to check on the Polish observer they would not have

8 enough time to get out of the area before 1430 hours which they

9 explained was the time that the UN had announced that the air strikes

10 would resume.

11 Q. What language were these two soldiers speaking?

12 A. These two soldiers were speaking Serbo-Croatian. I understood that and

13 also Captain Oli Zidlik, the Czech observer from my team, he speaks

14 fluent Serbo-Croat and he understood that as well.

15 Q. While you were chained or handcuffed to the lightning rod, did any

16 officials visit you?

17 A. Yes, we were first I think it was about 1530 hours that afternoon, two

18 groups of military officers, fairly senior, the top ones being of

19 full Colonel rank, came by just to see us but they seemed more

20 interested in the damage that had been caused by the air strikes.

21 Then there was a group of civilians which I had assumed was a

22 political delegation, and among them, that is among the civilian

23 group, was also Jovan Zametica who I mentioned was Karadzic's

24 spokesman and political adviser.

25 Q. Did you have any conversation with Zametica?

Page 486

1 A. Yes. Zametica had stopped to chat with me. I had explained to him my

2 surprise at the way we were treated roughly, that is in our capacity

3 as their liaison team. I mentioned to him an incident earlier where

4 the Bosnian Serb government and military had protested very vehemently

5 against the forceful extradition of two liaison officers from the

6 Bosnian Serb army in Goran Vakuf by the British UN forces. I

7 explained to him, "In the light of your complaints about that, how do

8 you explain the way that we are being treated?" He answered that

9 obviously times had changed and he seemed content with what was

10 happening or the way we were being treated, that is used as human

11 shields, and he remarked: "I wonder what General Smith will do now?"

12 Q. At some point you were released from the lightning rod?

13 A. Yes. That was at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. A group of two

14 soldiers came by in one of our UN vehicles and took me and the Polish

15 UNMO who was further up the road, 300 metres away, and we were

16 transported to the radar site at Jahorina.

17 Q. On the way did anything happen?

18 A. Not much. Once we pulled off the main road that goes to the hotels at

19 Jahorina and pulled off that road on to a dirt track, we stopped and

20 they blindfolded us.

21 Q. What were your thoughts when they blindfolded you?

22 A. It is difficult to say. We were not sure what was happening, if we

23 were being taken away to the executed as a reprisal for any air

24 strikes or whether we were being taken to be detained somewhere.

25 Q. While riding in the vehicle on your way to the Jahorina radar site,

Page 487












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13 English transcripts.Pages 487 to 493.













Page 494

1 did you hear one of the Serbian soldiers in the car say anything about

2 Mladic?

3 A. Yes. We had four or five soldiers in the vehicle and they were

4 talking amongst themselves, and one of them asked a question why we

5 were going up to Jahorina and the other one answered that Mladic had

6 told them that he wanted some UN people filmed there.

7 Q. Was this conversation in Serbo-Croatian?

8 A. Yes, it was.

9 Q. You understood that conversation?

10 A. Yes, I did.

11 Q. Now eventually you arrived at Jahorina radar site, is that correct?

12 A. That is correct. I say Jahorina radar site because it was on Mount

13 Jahorina later one of the other soldiers mentioned that they had a

14 large radar complex on Mount Jahorina. I am not sure if the one I

15 call Jahorina radar site is the main one or if it is just another

16 site, but it was certainly in the area of Mount Jahorina.

17 Q. Was that general area with the locations of the radars of any

18 strategic importance?

19 A. I am not an Air Force officer, so it is difficult for me to comment

20 exactly, but certainly any operating radar site is of great strategic

21 importance. Also later in our detention one of the guards mentioned

22 that from the radar site on Jahorina the Bosnian Serb forces were able

23 to monitor NATO aircraft taking off from bases in Italy and flying

24 over the former Yugoslavia.

25 Q. What happened when you finally arrived at Jahorina radar site?

Page 495

1 A. The vehicle stopped. We were taken out of the vehicles. We were also

2 handcuffed on the way up. The handcuffs were taken off and the

3 blindfolds were taken off. The Lieutenant Colonel who had been

4 filming us earlier in the day, that is the Lieutenant Colonel from the

5 Bosnian-Serb army, he was present with his video camera plus two

6 civilians, one a reporter whose name we later found out was Snezan

7 Lalovic and whom we had met a couple of times later on during our

8 hostage ordeal, and there was also a civilian camera man present.

9 Q. What happened?

10 A. So we got out of the vehicles. The blindfolds had been removed. Two

11 of the soldiers took out their weapons and put on black masks. Then

12 they took Major Kalbarczyk who was the Polish observer, to the actual

13 radar dome and sat him down there, handcuffed him to the radar dome

14 and conducted some sort of an interview. It was too far for me to be

15 able hear what they were asking. That lasted about 10 minutes.

16 Q. After the completion of what appeared to be an interview, were you

17 taken away from the radar site?

18 A. Yes. They did not film me at the time up there, so we were loaded

19 back in the vehicles, handcuffed and blindfolded and we were driven to

20 the Hotel Bistrica. It was a funny situation, because it was

21 completely relaxed. They took us to the main lounge of the hotel.

22 They asked us if we would like anything, coffee or beer, so I had a

23 coffee and I think Major Kalbarczyk also had a coffee. It was also

24 with the soldiers who had taken us, so there were the two of us, the

25 observers, the reporters, Snezan Lalovic, and about five or six

Page 496

1 soldiers. We had waited there. I assumed the soldiers were waiting

2 for instructions on what to do next with us. After about 15 or 20

3 minutes Major Kalbarczyk and I were taken with about three other

4 soldiers to have supper in the hotel which was actually quite a nice

5 meal.

6 Q. After your meal, were you taken to another location to spend the

7 night?

8 A. Yes, we were taken to a military barracks which is the military

9 barracks where we were held from then on throughout the 24 days of our

10 hostage ordeal. It was called Koran barracks according to the local

11 soldiers. It was right on the outskirts of Pale. It was there that we

12 met the other military observers from the Pale area with whom we had

13 had no contact at all during that day. For us it was also a sense of

14 relief to be there, because the soldiers had explained to us earlier

15 we would be spending the night handcuffed in the different locations

16 within the bunker complex, and that they would make some arrangements

17 later on just to give us some blankets so that we would not freeze

18 overnight. It was, as I mentioned, quite a relief when we found we

19 would actually be able to spend the night in a real building and not

20 out in front of the bunkers.

21 Q. How many hostages were there in this barracks?

22 A. At that time there were 10 of us. There were the three officers from

23 my team, five officers from the other UN military observer team from

24 Pale and two officers from the team in Gorbavica which is a suburb of

25 Sarajevo.

Page 497

1 Q. Were you moved to different location the next day?

2 A. Not the next day. It was on the third day, 28th May. Later in the

3 afternoon we were moved from the building where we had been had been

4 for the first three days which was a room in a large dormitory

5 building to a small guard house within the same complex near the main

6 gate. It was in the small guard house where we remained from 28th May

7 until 18th June.

8 Q. On May 28th were you allowed to go back to the liaison office?

9 A. Yes, I was.

10 Q. And what did you try to do when you arrived at the office?

11 A. We had gone back there. They allowed two of us to go back to our

12 accommodations and also the accommodations for the other observer team

13 in Pale to pick up some change of clothes and things to wash with,

14 toiletries and so on that we would need whilst staying at this

15 military barracks. When I entered our office one of our interpreters

16 was there because I had instructed our interpreters to continue

17 working as we were being led away the first stage of the hostage

18 ordeal. So this interpreter was there. I had instructed her to fax

19 a message to our headquarters in Sarajevo telling them that we were

20 fine. It was at that point that our landlord, Mr. Danjlo Savac who

21 also happened to be in the office, was able to understand that I was

22 instructing my interpreter to fax something. He immediately

23 interrupted the proceedings stating that Mr. Krajicnik, that is the

24 speaker of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly, had called him and explained

25 that we were not under any circumstances to be allowed to make any

Page 498

1 telephone calls or fax any messages. The landlord, Mr. Danjlo Savic,

2 mentioned to me that I was to do as I was told and if everything would

3 work out in three or four days we would all be set free.

4 Q. How is it that Krajicnik would have this type of contact with your

5 landlord?

6 A. Our landlord was an old friend of Mr. Krajicnik from before the war.

7 We had actually been able to use Mr. Krajisnik's influence earlier

8 when our vehicle had been stolen, we suspect by the local police, to

9 get the this vehicle returned.

10 Q. Now at some point after you had been taken hostage, did you learn of

11 some allegations that the Serbs had been making against you and the

12 military observers?

13 A. Yes. I heard from some of the other observers, I think it was either

14 the end of the first day or the beginning of the second day, sorry,

15 toward the end of the second day when they had been in their

16 accommodations, that their interpreters told them that they had seen

17 on local television screens our images and the local television

18 explained to the public that we, that is myself, Captain Zidlik and

19 Captain Teterevsky, that is our observer team, we had been the UN

20 people who were actually involved in guiding in the air strikes, that

21 is acting as forward air controllers, which is an absolute lie.

22 Q. Were even capable of doing that type of observation if you ever wanted

23 to?

24 A. No. First of all, none of us was trained for that sort of activity.

25 We had none of the technical equipment such as radios or the

Page 499

1 observation equipment required to guide in the air strikes, and we

2 were not even able to see the target from our accommodations. As I

3 mentioned earlier, those bunkers were about 10 kilometres away. When I

4 had said we observed the explosions, all we had seen was we had heard

5 the noise and then seen the clouds of smoke and dust 10 kilometres

6 away rise up from the ground.

7 Q. Did you ever confront anyone about these false allegations?

8 A. Yes, we confronted the reporter Snezan Lalovic whom we had seen on

9 second day about it, and also later on when he came to see us on 31st

10 May. Mr. Lalovic explained that because the other sides in the war

11 were lying in their propaganda, the Serbs also had to lie and that it

12 was perfectly justified for them to be lying and accusing us of such

13 activity in order to support their propaganda.

14 Q. On or around May 29th did you attempt to get in touch with Kolevic's

15 office?

16 A. Yes, on 29th May I and another military observer, we were sent to our

17 accommodations again to pick up some things that we had forgotten from

18 the first couple times, and also I believe to do some laundry. We had

19 made an arrangement with the guards that every few days one or two of

20 us accompanied by two of the guards would go to our accommodations to

21 drop off our dirty laundry to get cleaned by our landlord's family

22 because we had already paid for that month's rent.

23 So, we first went to the accommodations for the other observer team

24 in Pale, and in their accommodations one of my interpreters who was

25 off duty, she was present, and as I knew that we would be going in a

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1 few minutes from that accommodations to my own accommodations, I had

2 asked my interpreter to call my office and instruct the interpreter

3 who was on duty from my office to call Professor Koljevic's office and

4 ask Professor Koljevic's secretary, whose name is Zeca to call our

5 accommodations about five minutes later. I mentioned "five minutes

6 later" because five minutes should have coincided with my arrival at

7 my accommodations.

8 So when we left the accommodations of the -- to make it easier I

9 will call the other UNMO team in Pale Sierra Echo 1, that was their

10 radio call sign. So when we left Sierra Echo 1's accommodations and

11 arrived at my own accommodations, as I walked in the door the

12 telephone rang. On the other line was Professor Koljevic's secretary.

13 My interpreter who had picked up the phone turned to the guard and

14 said that Professor Koljevic's secretary would like to speak to me.

15 The guard said, fine, and the receiver from the telephone was passed

16 to me and I spoke with Professor Koljevic's secretary.

17 Q. Were you able to set up any sort of meeting?

18 A. Yes. Up till that point I had thought that perhaps the whole hostage

19 taking or at least the way we were treated may have been a big mistake

20 because of our good working relationship before with the Bosnian Serb

21 government and the military. So I had asked if Zeca could arrange for

22 me to see Professor Koljevic very soon, that it was have very urgent

23 for me to speak with him. She said she would organise it for the next

24 day. Then she asked me to put the guard who was with me, and his name

25 was Captain Radovan Vojvodic. So she, that is Zeca, Professor

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1 Koljevic's secretary, instructed Captain Vojvodic that there would be

2 a meeting organised the following day for me to attend with to see

3 Professor Koljevic.

4 Q. Were you able to eventually have a meeting with Koljevic?

5 A. Much, much eventually. The next day nothing happened. Captain

6 Vojvodic, the guard, mentioned that he was unable to get in touch with

7 Professor Koljevic's office and similar stories or explanations were

8 offered over the following days. It was not until three days before

9 being released, that is on 15th June, that Professor Koljevic had

10 finally arranged for me to see him.

11 Q. When you finally had the opportunity to see Koljevic, how did the

12 meeting go?

13 A. My main concern was for us to be able to make contact with our next of

14 kin, and then also discuss with him some of the rougher or more

15 difficult aspects of our treatments, and also to discuss with him what

16 sort of future working relationship could be established between the

17 UN military observers and the Bosnian Serb government in the light of

18 our very poor treatment as hostages. In that meeting we discussed

19 that. Professor Koljevic mentioned that as a result of the crisis

20 which was the result of the bombing itself, that the relations between

21 the Bosnian Serb government and the UN were at an all time low, and

22 that a completely new working relationship would have to be

23 established. He also justified the hostage taking, saying that

24 although he understood that it was very difficult for us, he added

25 that the Bosnian Serb government needed to send a very strong message

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1 to the UN and used the analogy of an electric shock, explaining that

2 in case of certain medical conditions an electric shock may, although

3 kill a person in some cases, may cure him. So they said they needed

4 to send an electric shock to the UN to try to cure the relations

5 between them and the UN.

6 MR. BOWERS: Your Honours, I think that may be an appropriate place to end

7 for the day.

8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, it is 5.30. The hearing is adjourned. We

9 shall go on tomorrow morning, Captain, at 10 o'clock.

10 (5.30 p.m.)

11 (The court adjourned until the following day)