Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 16020

1 Wednesday, 8 March 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario

8 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.


10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

12 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Cross-examined by Mr. Kovacic [cont'd]:

14 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Kalco.

15 A. Good morning.

16 Q. I hope you had a good rest.

17 A. Well, yes, I did.

18 Q. Mr. Kalco, you mentioned Mr. Marko Lujic

19 yesterday, and a document was produced seemingly

20 showing that he was a member of the brigade sometime in

21 the early days of the conflict.

22 Could the usher or the registrar please get

23 the document Z1009.1.

24 When you get the document, you will have a

25 look at it. But as we are waiting, perhaps -- Nihad

Page 16021

1 Rebihic, he was an intelligence officer in your staff,

2 wasn't he?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you know that he wrote several reports to

5 the 3rd Corps about the security, of course, but also

6 about individuals considered responsible for crimes in

7 the Lasva Valley; is that so?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Will you please look at item 1 on this

10 document? "Marko Lujic, son of Marko," and here will

11 you look, please, to the end of the document. Is that

12 "Rebihic"; will you agree with that? This is a

13 document which has already been tendered and admitted.

14 Now, if you look at this description, Marko

15 Lujic's activity described here does not seem to

16 indicate in any way at all that he was a member of the

17 brigade. Have you ever seen this report?

18 A. I have.

19 Q. You know about it?

20 A. I do.

21 Q. Would you then agree with what I'm putting to

22 you, that this description, written by your men, has

23 nothing to do with the person who would be a gunner in

24 the field?

25 A. Let me tell you, this act is dated the 2nd of

Page 16022

1 June, 1993, and Marko Lujic was a gunner, an

2 artilleryman, at the time of the first conflict in

3 Ahmici, when we prevented the HVO forces to pass on to

4 Novi Travnik. Yesterday, I said that we recorded, on a

5 tape, the conversation between Marko Lujic and Mario

6 Cerkez.

7 Q. Mr. Kalco, you know that Marko Lujic has a

8 son whose name is Mario?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Wasn't perhaps that conversation between him

11 and that son?

12 A. No, only with Marko Lujic.

13 Q. No, I'm sorry, perhaps I was not clear

14 enough. Was it perhaps a conversation -- or at least

15 we put it to you that it was a conversation between

16 Marko Lujic and his son Mario.

17 A. No, no.

18 Q. Very well. Yesterday, you told us quite a

19 lot about that car bomb on the 18th of April in Stari

20 Vitez which went off.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. But there are certain perplexities about

23 this. Some say 18th, some 19th, but we shall agree it

24 was the 18th.

25 A. It was the 18th at half past 5.00.

Page 16023

1 Q. And not to go back to various papers anymore,

2 in your statement to the investigators on the 15th and

3 16th of July, 1995, that is, at the time when your

4 memory was much fresher, you told them, and I shall

5 read it out: "On the 19th of April, 1993, on the third

6 day of the attack at 1300 hours in the British

7 Battalion compound in Bila, a meeting was held between

8 the BiH and the HVO. Sefkija Djidic was present, and

9 Mario Cerkez and Brkovic. Blaskic and General Merdan

10 were high military officers." And the last sentence:

11 "In the course of the meeting, at 1700 hours, from the

12 direction of the Catholic Church, a cistern filled with

13 four tonnes of explosives was driven by a driver tied

14 up in the truck."

15 First, I suppose that it was a confusion when

16 you say the 19th of April.

17 A. Yes, it is an error. Perhaps it was a

18 translation mistake.

19 Q. And at any rate, it describes it here,

20 because it says "three days after the attack," so we

21 agree with that.

22 It also transpires from this that at this

23 time, Mario Cerkez and your commander, Djidic, was

24 either at the BritBat or on his way back.

25 A. I agree with this, except that at the time

Page 16024

1 when the explosion took place --

2 Q. Mr. Kalco, Mr. Kalco, may I ask you to try to

3 go through my questions, and then my learned friend for

4 the Prosecution may ask you additional questions.

5 A. No, but may I simply add something about

6 this?

7 Q. No.

8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.

9 Mr. Kovacic, what is it that you want to ask

10 this witness about the incident? We'll get on more

11 quickly if we deal with it in an orderly way. What is

12 it that you want to put to the witness?

13 MR. KOVACIC: [Microphone not activated]

14 Djidic and Cerkez were in BritBat and on the meeting.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, the witness wanted to

16 add something to his answer, in relation to that.

17 Yes, Mr. Kalco.

18 A. Yes. Thank you. At a meeting at the British

19 compound, first came Sefkija in Stari Vitez, when the

20 Warrior opened, and which were both Mario and Sefkija

21 Djidic. I told Sefkija Djidic about the car bomb, and

22 at that moment Mr. Mario laughed cynically. That is

23 all I wanted to say.

24 Q. Thank you very much. I was about to ask you

25 whether they had arrived in a Warrior. And as for this

Page 16025

1 cynical smile, could you see his face well?

2 A. Oh, yes, indeed.

3 Q. And that is how you saw it?

4 A. Yes, that is how I saw it.

5 Q. Mr. Kalco, yesterday you told us a great deal

6 about a certain Miroslav Bralo; Cicko, rather. You

7 were asked a number of questions about him. Pursuant

8 to the JNA concept -- and you say that you took it

9 over, and that you also supposed that the HVO had done

10 the same -- who was responsible to initiate

11 disciplinary proceedings and ordering disciplinary

12 detention for military? Is it the direct superior of

13 that particular military?

14 A. The commander, the commander of a unit turns

15 the individual over to the relevant prosecutor.

16 Q. I shall ask you to look at a document.

17 Indeed, we can all see documents.

18 Mr. Kalco, the first document that you have,

19 you have the English version, and then below it the

20 Croat original. It says "85" on the Croatian version.

21 Are we looking at the same document?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Could it be placed on the ELMO, please. So

24 this is the document of the military police in Vitez of

25 the 3rd February 1993. And could we get a number.

Page 16026

1 JUDGE MAY: Put it on the ELMO. Yes.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The document will be numbered

3 D62/2.

4 MR. KOVACIC: The one from 3rd February.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, will you please

6 look at the heading and the signature. This document

7 seems to show that the detention of Miroslav Bralo, and

8 disciplinary detention at that, rather, military

9 detention, immediately after the act had been

10 committed, was ordered by Pasko Ljubicic. In view of

11 what you just told us, I believe that this indicates

12 the hierarchy, that is, who is vested with the

13 responsibility.

14 A. No, it does not show that.

15 Q. Right. Tell me, then, this. The reasons

16 indicated here for ordering the detention said that

17 Bralo planted an explosive in Esad Salkic's house. You

18 mentioned him already, didn't you? So will you agree

19 with me, this is a document of the 4th Battalion of the

20 military police, and that the person is Pasko Ljubicic,

21 whom you also mentioned in your conversations?

22 A. May I answer?

23 Q. No, but first answer me just this. Is this

24 the Pasko Ljubicic that you mentioned yesterday?

25 A. He is. Yes. His signature. But for Pasko

Page 16027

1 Ljubicic to issue an order on the detention, he had to

2 get the order from the unit commander that such and

3 such an individual was being turned over, that is,

4 Miroslav Bralo was being turned over to the military

5 police on such and such date.

6 Q. But who is Pasko Ljubicic's superior?

7 A. I don't know. All I know is that Mario

8 Cerkez was Cicko Bralo's commander.

9 Q. And what if Pasko Ljubicic was commander; in

10 that case who would be issuing such a warrant?

11 A. The superior commander, I presume.

12 Q. Right. Will you then look at the next

13 document dated 11th February. You also have the

14 English version first and then the Croatian version.

15 This is a decision of the relevant District Military

16 Court in Travnik ordering detention during

17 investigation. So this is court detention for Bralo

18 while the investigation is underway. Have you ever

19 seen a document of this kind?

20 A. No. This is the first time.

21 Q. Thank you. Do you, perhaps, know the judge

22 who signed there?

23 A. Oh, very well. He is my friend.

24 Q. Zeljko Percinlic, did he hold this same

25 position as then, that is a judge in the District

Page 16028

1 Military Court?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Thank you. And will you now look at the

4 third document, the 26th of March, 1993.

5 JUDGE MAY: Number for the second.

6 THE REGISTRAR: The number for the second

7 document is D63/2.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. And the third document of the 26th of March,

10 the judge extends the detention during -- pending the

11 completion of investigation, the same judge. Have you

12 ever seen this document?

13 A. Yes, the judge is the same.

14 Q. Yes. I'm sorry, it is not the same judge.

15 It is already the trial judge, because an indictment

16 had been issued, so it is after the investigation.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And do you know this judge?

19 A. Yes. Maric, yes.

20 Q. And he was a judge at the time?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you.


24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. And yet another document to do with Miroslav

Page 16029

1 Bralo. Carry Spork testified about 2483.2, and tab 23

2 are some documents related to Miroslav Bralo. And

3 there is a document marked Z1465.4.

4 Maybe, to save some time, Your Honour, could

5 I just show the witness my document, because that is

6 coming from the binder, and I don't know how that is

7 numbered.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Put it on the ELMO,

9 please.

10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. It was on this document, a report on the

12 wounding, signed by the commander of the battalion

13 that, first, somebody wrote the period of service of

14 Miroslav Bralo with the brigade, and then it was

15 amended by hand, and that amendment was initialled. It

16 transpires from this document that Bralo was with the

17 brigade between the 7th of August 1993 until the 19th

18 of September 1993. Have you ever seen this document or

19 heard about it?

20 A. No. Neither heard nor seen. All I know is

21 that this is an invalid document.

22 JUDGE MAY: The witness has not seen it

23 before. This is pointless, showing it to him. Return

24 it to counsel, please.

25 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, could I ask for

Page 16030

1 the signature, does he know the person?

2 JUDGE MAY: Look. Why don't you get this

3 evidence confirmed by your own witnesses?

4 MR. KOVACIC: That is Prosecution evidence.

5 I just want to ask the witness whether he knew anything

6 about that, because there was some indication that he

7 might.

8 JUDGE MAY: How is it going to help us?

9 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, it's a long story,

10 but there are a couple of documents relating to Bralo.

11 They are very conflicting amongst them.

12 JUDGE MAY: You can put it to the witness to

13 see if he recognises the signature, "yes" or "no".

14 Yes, put it back.

15 MR. KOVACIC: I'll just ask him the name.

16 There is no need to --

17 JUDGE MAY: I thought you wanted the witness

18 to identify the signature.

19 MR. KOVACIC: Not really the signature, Your

20 Honour, but the name of this commander.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Kalco, will you please tell us, if you

24 can read the name, Vlatko Matosevic, did you know him?

25 A. I did. But above that is Mario's signature

Page 16031

1 as well.

2 Q. But I'm asking you about Matosevic. Did you

3 know him?

4 A. I did.

5 Q. Was he a soldier in that brigade, as far as

6 you know?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you're saying that Cerkez initialled that

9 document?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Thank you very much. Let's move on to

12 another subject.

13 Yesterday, you spoke about an incident when

14 Ivan Sucic, your colleague and a member of Cerkez'

15 team, was detained by the military police of the army.

16 You said that actually he turned out to be drunk, and

17 you said that obviously he got drunk because of the

18 holiday. It was during Easter.

19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Yesterday, we

20 were shown Document Z462. Could we please have a look

21 at it? The witness saw it yesterday, actually.

22 [In English] No, no, it's Z462. Yesterday, it was

23 given. Sorry, it is my lapse. 642. Good. Sorry.

24 JUDGE MAY: Let the English go onto the

25 ELMO. Let the witness have the -- if it's possible, to

Page 16032

1 have the original.

2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Witness, please, I would like to draw your

4 attention to the beginning of section 4. This is

5 Cerkez' letter. You saw it yesterday?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And in section 4, in paragraph 4, it says

8 that Slavko Mlakic, a judge in the military court in

9 Travnik, and Ivan Sucic were going back from the Easter

10 mass. Do you agree that it was during Easter?

11 A. I don't know, I don't know. I can't

12 remember. I don't know. I can only say that they were

13 not detained by the military police or the authorities

14 of the BH army in Vitez.

15 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could the

16 registrar please show the witness Document D54/2.

17 Q. Mr. Kalco, could you please have a look at

18 this document, and please pay attention to the

19 signatories. The contents of this document show that

20 this was one of the meetings where attempts were made

21 to continue with some kind of cooperation; is that

22 correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Another thing, by the way, now that we've got

25 this document in front of us. In the introduction,

Page 16033

1 where those who are present were mentioned, your name

2 is there too, you were present, and also there was the

3 representative of the staff of Vitez, Marijan

4 Skopljak. Did he take part in that meeting?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Very well. Thank you. Let us proceed.

7 Yesterday, you spoke to us quite a bit about

8 the Vitezovi. Yesterday, you saw a document from the

9 Prosecutor, Z661. Could you please have a look at it

10 again?

11 Two things, please. First of all, in the

12 middle of the last paragraph, the last paragraph on the

13 first page, and it starts with the word "DEMAND" in

14 capital letters, Kraljevic spoke about extremes on both

15 sides, as far as I understood it; that is to say,

16 people who were acting to the detriment of both

17 peoples. Do you agree that both parties had their own

18 extremists?

19 A. Well, let me tell you. When one party acts

20 in extremist fashion, then the other one tries to

21 respond. However, it was the Croat side that was

22 always the first to start, and they had more

23 extremists. This document relates to Kraljevic before

24 the conflict.

25 Q. Very well. Could you please look at the

Page 16034

1 stamp next to his signature. It's quite legible, and

2 it says: "PPN Vitezovi, The Defence Department." Can

3 you conclude, on that basis, who this unit belongs to?

4 A. No, I cannot.

5 Q. Let me continue. Just an additional question

6 related to these extremists that you confirmed, in a

7 way.

8 Mr. Kalco, can one say that during 1992 in

9 your municipality, there were actually frequent

10 incidents, regardless of who caused them, and then the

11 other side would return, and then there would be peace,

12 and then this would happen again, and then the

13 politicians would act; is that a correct assessment for

14 1992?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Very well. Let us move on to another

17 subject.

18 You mentioned your visit to the cinema

19 yesterday, that is to say, your visit to the detainees

20 and the meeting. It wasn't said specifically. Perhaps

21 it should be put into a context. These meetings or,

22 rather, this visit on the 30th of April, wasn't it the

23 result of the ceasefire agreement that was signed at a

24 higher level and then here at the Petkovic-Halilovic

25 level?

Page 16035

1 A. I don't know whether it was signed at a

2 higher level. I just know that Petkovic and Sefer

3 Halilovic signed an agreement on ceasefire.

4 Q. Obviously, this visit was aimed at the

5 implementation of this agreement, wasn't it?

6 A. Yes, but in a very short period of time.

7 MR. KOVACIC: All right. Usher, I have no

8 need for that document anymore. You can remove it.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Cerkez and his command had

10 some offices in this same cinema building near the

11 hotel; is that correct?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. On the first floor?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. On that occasion, you visited him?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You saw him?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Mr. Kalco, a certain number of Bosniak

20 Muslims were detained in the school in Dubravica. Did

21 you visit that school?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Which did you visit? You visited the cinema,

24 didn't you?

25 A. Yes, the cinema and the public accounting

Page 16036

1 service.

2 Q. Mr. Kalco, did you notice which services or

3 which units were securing, guarding these buildings?

4 A. HVO soldiers.

5 Q. Could you not see that they belonged to the

6 military police? Didn't they have such insignia?

7 A. Well, very little. Mainly it was the HVO

8 from Vitez.

9 Q. Very well. Do you know who held the school

10 in Dubravica, who held that detention centre?

11 A. I knew -- I found out later that it was the

12 Vitezovi.

13 Q. Thank you. Do you know anything about

14 Kaonik, which is outside our municipality?

15 A. No, no.

16 Q. Thank you. The next subject that I wanted to

17 ask you about, and we would just like to clarify what

18 you said in this connection, the offensive of the HVO

19 against Stari Vitez on the 18th of July, 1993. That is

20 the one that happened during the summer. There is no

21 doubt that Darko Kraljevic was in charge; wasn't he?

22 A. Darko Kraljevic was in charge of this action

23 which started from the direction of Princip.

24 Q. All right.

25 A. From the direction of the garages, Novi

Page 16037

1 Vitez. Nakic was in charge, and I don't know who was

2 on the other side from the church, from the Rajic/Bilic

3 houses. I don't know who was there. I just know there

4 was Nakic and Dario Kordic.

5 Q. I imagine that Dario Kordic is a slip of the

6 tongue?

7 A. Yes, I apologise. It was Kraljevic. I

8 really apologise.

9 Q. Darko Kraljevic?

10 A. Yes. Yes.

11 Q. As a soldier, I believe that you agree that

12 this action was coordinated from several directions.

13 As you said, it had to have a commander, didn't it?

14 A. Yes, it wouldn't have been carried out

15 otherwise.

16 Q. In your last interview at the OTP on the 5th

17 of March, you said that Darko Kraljevic on his own was

18 in charge of this action?

19 A. Perhaps the translation was not good. He was

20 in charge of that action that took part -- that took

21 place from the direction of Princip.

22 Q. And there is another Nakic, isn't there?

23 A. Yes, there is this other Nakic who was in the

24 military police. Not Franjo Nakic.

25 Q. Oh, I see. So Nakic from the military

Page 16038

1 police?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And then you said, in connection with the

4 action concerning the collection of the dead bodies,

5 the soldiers' dead bodies, and you said that Boro left

6 15 bodies and said, "These were not ours. They were

7 not from Vitez."

8 A. At first we did not know how many soldiers

9 there were. We ascertained this only later. Boro

10 Jozic said, "These are not soldiers of the Viteska

11 Brigade or, rather, from Vitez." Later, as I said, we

12 realised that they were from Osijek, Daruvar, because

13 we found their documents, their military IDs and their

14 family photographs, et cetera. We handed that over to

15 the authorities in charge in Zenica. I don't know what

16 happened to this afterwards.

17 Q. Well, okay. Let's leave that. Mr. Kalco,

18 tell me about these IDs of these soldiers. Did you see

19 this personally?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you perhaps notice on these IDs and these

22 documents, at least on some of them, that they were

23 issued by the HOS?

24 A. By the Croatian army. Not the HVO. The

25 Croatian army.

Page 16039

1 Q. I am not sure whether we have understood each

2 other. I am asking you whether the HOS had issued some

3 of these documents.

4 A. No.

5 Q. The HSP party?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Can you tell us anything about the time when

8 these documents were issued? Do you, perhaps, remember

9 some of them?

10 A. 1991, 1992.

11 Q. All right. And as for the birthplaces of

12 these persons, were these persons from Bosnia?

13 A. No. No. Perhaps their parents were. All of

14 them were born there, in Osijek, Daruvar, et cetera,

15 the places I already mentioned.

16 Q. Apropos, since we've already mentioned Boro

17 Jozic, you know that he was killed in front of his

18 house in Vitez?

19 A. I don't know. Boro Jozic does not have a

20 house in Vitez. He has an apartment there.

21 Q. Well, that's what I meant when I said house,

22 in front of the apartment building where he lived. And

23 you didn't know this?

24 A. No.

25 Q. You knew him?

Page 16040

1 A. I knew him very well.

2 Q. And you never heard that he was killed in

3 front of his building that faces Old Vitez, in front of

4 the hotel?

5 A. Yes, I heard about it, but the question is

6 who killed him, the BiH army or the HVO, because there

7 is the possibility of either side having killed him.

8 No one is ever going to establish that.

9 Q. Is there any reason why you think that the

10 HVO did it? Do you think that this was a bullet that

11 went astray or what?

12 A. I don't know. I just know that at that time

13 the army did not fire at the apartment buildings, the

14 Kolonija, towards that part of Vitez.

15 Q. But there was a similar incident when Marko

16 Prskalo, a negotiator from Blaskic's staff, was hit in

17 front of the hotel?

18 JUDGE MAY: Now, what has this got to do with

19 the examination-in-chief or this trial? It seems to me

20 that we are going off on a chase, on a totally

21 different topic. And we really must concentrate on the

22 issues.

23 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour. I will not

24 go further.

25 Q. [Interpretation] Let us move onto another

Page 16041

1 subject, Mr. Kalco. The question relates to the

2 military model of subordination or, as you military men

3 like to say, the resubordination, the attachment of

4 units. You said that according to the JNA concept a

5 unit that came to a certain territory would have to be

6 subordinated to the highest unit in that territory.

7 A. Absolutely. And that is the model that the

8 army and the HVO abided by.

9 Q. So you agree with that, unless the order

10 specified otherwise?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. I would like you to have a look at some

13 documents, two or three of them, but the first one by

14 way of an example. Could the Registrar give the --

15 give Document 91/1 to the witness, please.

16 Mr. Kalco, I would like to use this document

17 by way of an example.

18 A. I had that particular one that had -- let me

19 tell you one thing. I can't read half of this. Do you

20 have the Croatian text?

21 Q. I have the Croatian text, but it's a poor

22 photocopy. But I'm sure you can see one thing there.

23 Please look at this signature, the bottom of the other

24 page. Is that Blaskic? Do we agree on that?

25 A. Yes, we do.

Page 16042

1 Q. And it also says who copies were sent to.

2 Just look at this, to all the formation in the

3 operative zone of Central Bosnia. Then it says:

4 Bruno Busic, Ludvig Pavlovic, Vitezovi, Travnik Police

5 Department, the 4th battalion of the military police in

6 Vitez. So four units were mentioned. If you can see

7 that just tell me what the date is.

8 A. It is the 16th of January 1993.

9 Q. So when an order is issued in this way, can

10 you see any kind of subordination or resubordination

11 amongst the above-mentioned?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Who are they subordinated to?

14 A. To the unit that is operating in that

15 territory.

16 Q. But the order is issued by the commander of

17 the operative zone?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is it true that, first and foremost, they are

20 all subordinate to him?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And then, if you look at the order further,

23 you will see whether there is coordination or

24 subordination; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 16043

1 Q. Let us not waste too much time. Jon Elford,

2 witness Jon Elford, there is a document in the binder

3 related to him. There is also an order issued by

4 Blaskic, where he sends this order to the Viteska

5 Brigade and the Zrinjski Brigade, and the 4th Battalion

6 of the military police. So it's three units

7 altogether. It's not really important which units they

8 are. He says, explicitly in this order, that it enters

9 into force immediately, and: "The commanders of the

10 above-mentioned units shall be held responsible by me

11 for the execution of this." Is this subordination or

12 coordination?

13 A. I think it's the other.

14 Q. Oh, you mean coordination?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Because it was specifically said so?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you very much. Your

19 Honour, it was part of the Elford binder and it was not

20 registered under separate --

21 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let's not waste any

22 more time on this. Let's move on.

23 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes,

24 quite. This document was not officially admitted by

25 the Chamber.

Page 16044

1 JUDGE MAY: No. But we'll not spend any more

2 time on it.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. In connection with this subject, just one

5 question. The light artillery rocket division, you

6 know that within the set-up of the operative zone of

7 Central Bosnia there was such a unit?

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not

9 hear the witness's answer.

10 Q. Theoretically, according to the JNA concept,

11 it belongs directly to the commander of the operative

12 zone?

13 A. Yes, but it can also be given to the

14 commander of the unit that is carrying out this

15 particular action, depending on the nature of the

16 operations concerned.

17 Q. However, if nothing is said specifically,

18 then it belongs to the organisation of the operative

19 zone?

20 A. Yes, that's it.

21 Q. Thank you. Now, we are going to play a tape

22 to you --

23 JUDGE MAY: Well, you are not going to. You

24 are going to ask the Trial Chamber whether you can do

25 that. What is it you want to play? What is it that

Page 16045

1 you want to play, Mr. Kovacic?

2 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

3 I have a tape here. Of course, I have a copy for the

4 Prosecutor. It was recorded by the intelligence

5 service of the HVO during the war. I have the

6 transcripts as well. And I would like to ask the

7 witness to do two things in this regard.

8 JUDGE MAY: Has it been admitted into

9 evidence so far?

10 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] No.

11 JUDGE MAY: This is something from the other

12 side. Now, if you want to call evidence about it, you

13 can do that, but you can't ask this witness about it.

14 You are merely asking him to comment.

15 Now, let's get onto something else.

16 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] With all due

17 respect, Mr. President, I am just seeking permission

18 for him to recognise whether he is the person speaking

19 on this tape, to see whether the tape is authentic in

20 terms of the persons whose voices are taped, because he

21 is the only one who can recognise his own voice.

22 JUDGE MAY: Have you made preparations for

23 this to be played?

24 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] The technical

25 booth has the tape, and we have the transcripts here.

Page 16046

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. But you are not to

2 take a lot of time with this.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour,

4 may I just suggest that we hear the first part -- only

5 10 or 15 seconds, so that the witness can say whether

6 it is him or not. We are going to play the tape then,

7 and I am going to put four or five brief questions

8 related to the transcript to him, and that will have

9 concluded what I had to do.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters now --

11 interpreters did not receive copies. The interpreters

12 ask for a copy, please.

13 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, could I ask the

14 director to put the sound on.

15 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the

16 interpreters have a copy.

17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Can we see

18 the transcript, Mr. President?

19 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry, who should see the

20 transcript?

21 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] We don't

22 have the transcript.

23 JUDGE MAY: The Prosecution should have a

24 copy.

25 MR. KOVACIC: We don't need it for the other

Page 16047

1 Defence. They have one. There were enough copies.

2 Something was wrong. There were three for Judges --

3 JUDGE MAY: Take one. We'll share.

4 MR. KOVACIC: I'm sorry. I'm sure there

5 was. Something was missed out. Could we now play the

6 tape, Your Honour?


8 [Audiotape played]

9 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

10 Voice 1: Hello. Hi, how are you? What's

11 up?

12 Voice 2: Nothing.

13 Voice 1: Everything is fine. Super - the

14 only thing is that that Smajic from Bila called around

15 9.00 and he says that he heard that there was shooting

16 in Travnik and he was only checking. The officer on

17 duty in the Travnik headquarters said that there

18 allegedly had been some skirmishes, something about

19 flags or whatever, I don't know.

20 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Kalco, shall we continue listening to the

22 tape or can you identify your voice?

23 A. I think it's not me.

24 Q. Could the director please play another

25 conversation from this tape, please.

Page 16048

1 [Audiotape played]

2 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

3 Voice 1: I don't know, it's not the flag. I

4 don't know. It's a placard or something. I don't

5 know. I don't know.

6 Voice 2: Well, whatever, I can do it

7 myself. I was born on my own. I grew up on my own.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Could we please

9 hear the beginning of the second conversation, because

10 that's where the tape is better, and then we are

11 through.

12 [Audiotape played]

13 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

14 Voice 1: How are things? Fine?

15 Voice 2: Nothing.

16 Voice 1: All quiet. What do you say, is

17 there any shooting where you are?

18 Voice 2: Says who?

19 Voice 1: Nobody is shooting. Nobody is

20 shooting.

21 Voice 2: It's the usual thing, Ustashas are

22 celebrating, you know.

23 Voice 1: That means that nothing is going

24 on?

25 Voice 2: No, nothing.

Page 16049

1 Voice 1: What about there.

2 Voice 2: Nothing.

3 Voice 1: Are you all right?

4 Voice 2: Yes.

5 Voice 1: When are you going to come here?

6 Voice 2: Come on. Drop by.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. At the beginning of the third conversation,

9 again your name is being used. It was not heard very

10 well in the first conversation or the second

11 conversation, we couldn't hear it well. Could you

12 please listen to this carefully.

13 [Audiotape played]

14 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

15 Voice 1: [Inaudible] called.

16 Voice 2: Just wanted to see what was going

17 on.

18 Voice 1: What are you doing?

19 Voice 2: Well, I've got a few men here.

20 We're on duty, whatever.

21 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Kalco, do you recognise your voice here

23 or not?

24 A. Yes.

25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you. I

Page 16050

1 would like to tender this into evidence, please, the

2 tape and the transcript, then.

3 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, what is there

4 significant in it --

5 MR. KOVACIC: [No interpretation]

6 JUDGE MAY: Let me finish, Mr. Kovacic. What

7 is significant in this document? Is there anything

8 which you say this witness said or was said to him on

9 which you rely?

10 MR. KOVACIC: It mostly shows -- indeed,

11 there are a couple of incidents mentioned which are

12 either very directly or indirectly within the picture

13 of what the witness said, and I will be very, very

14 brief on that. Indeed, out of those nine discussions,

15 nine separate discussions, I would put the question on

16 three or four just to identify whether the subject is

17 what I would presume from the discussion in reality

18 is.

19 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Do that.

20 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, sir.

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, do you have the

22 transcript in front of you?

23 Just a brief question up there. It says, the

24 first conversation, conversation 1, it is the person

25 who is on duty at the headquarters with you, and I

Page 16051

1 presume you must have called from outside to check --

2 A. This is in English. I don't understand

3 that.

4 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have the

5 transcript in Croatian.

6 In the case of the first conversation, I

7 think the witness said he didn't recognise his voice,

8 as you allege it to be. Yes.

9 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Kalco, the first conversation, there is

11 mention of these flags here, and it doesn't really

12 matter who said it. I believe it was you. But you

13 talk about a flag, and you say, "Whoever did that, that

14 is, hoisted it up, to take it down tomorrow, because we

15 don't know what it is, whose it is. It's not a flag.

16 It looks like a banner or something like that."

17 To begin with, this is Eastertime, as the

18 preceding sentence shows. Can we agree that it was

19 Eastertime?

20 A. I don't really remember anymore.

21 Q. But do you remember that a huge, I mean an

22 enormous flag -- I mean one was never seen before or

23 after like that, huge, a huge green flag which was

24 spread over the road next to the tyre repair shop at

25 Bengir's in Stari Vitez, do you remember that?

Page 16052

1 A. Yes, yes, I do.

2 Q. And you were not particularly happy about

3 that either, were you?

4 A. I wasn't.

5 Q. Why weren't you happy about it?

6 A. Well, because it was a provocation for the

7 other people.

8 Q. By "the other people", you mean Croats?

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. And, in fact, in Travnik a few days before

11 that, some people got into fisticuffs and were injured

12 because of the flags, and that is why you did not like

13 that in Vitez?

14 A. Quite so, quite so.

15 Q. Is it true that it was put up by some

16 Mujahedins, by some extremists?

17 A. To tell you the truth, I do not know what you

18 mean by "Mujahedin". To begin with, in Stari Vitez,

19 there was not a single Mujahedin.

20 Q. But perhaps it was some extremists who put up

21 that flag?

22 A. Very likely.

23 Q. Right. Do you know if at that time a group

24 of extremists -- sorry. Thank you.

25 Now, the next conversation, I should also

Page 16053

1 like to ask you something about that, conversation

2 number 2 -- the third conversation, conversation number

3 3. I apologise. Conversation number 4, and you have

4 it marked there, the fourth conversation.

5 Here, at the bottom -- first, you are taking

6 part in this conversation. Let us try to identify.

7 This Neric who takes up the call, is that Hakija

8 Dzalilovic?

9 A. Neric was not a member of the BH army in

10 Vitez.

11 Q. Yes, but is it Hakija Dzalilovic? Could you

12 tell us who Neric is?

13 A. I don't know.

14 Q. Thank you. And towards the end of that

15 conversation in some place somewhere, he says:

16 "The fire place is gone. Kamin has left.

17 When did he leave?"

18 "He left an hour ago."

19 And I should like to tell you that at 21.30

20 some days before that, a very popular restaurant in

21 Vitez called Kamin was blown up. It was owned by

22 somebody called Slavko Jukic. Do you remember that?

23 A. I remember that.

24 Q. Do you -- does this person mean that Kamin?

25 A. No.

Page 16054

1 JUDGE MAY: There is an objection, which I

2 will hear.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] This is

4 merely a comment. I really do not understand what are

5 the conversations that the witness remembers having.

6 Mr. Kovacic is addressing him as if he owned up to all

7 these conversations. I think we should really

8 establish which conversations the witness recognises as

9 his own and accepts as his own amongst this large

10 number of conversations which are shown here.

11 JUDGE MAY: So far, there is nothing of any

12 significance in anything here. If there is and if

13 necessary, it will have to be replayed to see whether

14 the witness accepts it or not. But time is going, so

15 let's move on.

16 Yes, Mr. Kovacic.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. In conversation 6, in the beginning we have a

19 dialogue. Would you agree that it is you talking to

20 Zahid Ahmic?

21 A. No.

22 Q. No? You say it wasn't you?

23 A. No, it wasn't me.

24 Q. Very well, thank you.

25 Conversation 7, and this should be the

Page 16055

1 conversation between you and Sifet Sivro, and you

2 introduce yourself at the beginning. Will you please

3 have a look at it to see what it's all about, and then

4 I'll have one question.

5 Are you referring to the disarmament of

6 guards at the SPS, when somebody first tried to disarm

7 some guards who were Croats, because at that time

8 guards were still of mixed ethnicity, and after that

9 the Ustasha, and it says here, their special troops

10 came and disarmed the Muslim guards so that only Croat

11 guards remained? Do you agree that the conversation is

12 about that?

13 A. I do not know that it is that incident when

14 the HVO came, but the HVO did come and disarm the

15 Muslims.

16 Q. But before that, some Croats had been

17 disarmed, and that is what then led on to --

18 A. No, nobody was disarmed by the BH army. They

19 may have disarmed themselves so as to have a reason to

20 do what they did then.

21 Q. And then conversation 9, which is the last

22 page, also in the beginning we hear clearly that it is

23 you, because you give your name here, and you are

24 asking for a certain Almir, and in the beginning you

25 say, "Listen. We have some complaints from below that

Page 16056

1 Besim Trako and Petak --" is this Senad Petak whom you

2 mentioned yesterday and who was killed in the hotel on

3 the 21st of May?

4 A. Petak was --

5 Q. No. The person who was with him, yes, I'm

6 sorry.

7 A. There were two Petaks. I do not really know

8 who does this refer to. There were two brothers.

9 Q. Is it the other brother, the one who is

10 mentioned here? I can't find the right word, but were

11 they rather quarrelsome persons, rather, short-tempered

12 people before the war?

13 A. Yes, there were.

14 Q. And this shows -- this also says about some

15 incident, that they seized somebody's pistol, didn't

16 they, some Kulices [phoen]?

17 A. Yes, yeah, right.

18 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 [In English] Your Honour, I have no further questions.

20 [Interpretation] Mr. Kalco, thank you.

21 JUDGE MAY: Are you asking for the

22 transcripts to be put into evidence?

23 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, Your Honour, I am. Sorry

24 for that on the end.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

Page 16057

1 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

2 Mr. President, you are talking about the admission of

3 the transcript. Could we know the source of this

4 transcript, and can the Prosecutor's office check the

5 authenticity and the reliability of the translation?

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Has the tape been given to

7 the Prosecutor yet?

8 MR. KOVACIC: I just gave it. I gave it to

9 the Registry, and I see they distributed it.

10 JUDGE MAY: The next point is this: Where

11 does it come from, Mr. Kovacic?

12 MR. KOVACIC: It comes from the HVO

13 municipality services in Vitez. From time to time,

14 they were trying -- as you have heard in other

15 testimonies, they have heard to listen to each other.

16 Indeed, Witness Kalco mentioned that yesterday.

17 JUDGE MAY: We will admit it on this basis:

18 that, of course, the Prosecution can have the tape and

19 can test it and can also, if need be, comment on the

20 translation. But at the moment, it can be admitted.

21 What's the number?

22 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, of course. The tape is

23 there. Your Honour, if I may just add, I'm planning to

24 bring a witness, a technician who was working on that

25 job.

Page 16058

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

2 THE REGISTRAR: The audiotape will be number

3 D65/2 and the transcript D65A/2.

4 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. There is a matter I

5 want to raise with Mr. Kovacic.

6 Mr. Kovacic, you haven't challenged, in the

7 witness's evidence -- and we should be plain what your

8 case is about because you're obliged under the Rules,

9 if you're going to dispute something, to put it to the

10 witness -- first of all, in the October post office

11 meeting, that Mr. Cerkez said that the municipality

12 would burn down. Now, is it disputed that Mr. Cerkez

13 said that?

14 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President,

15 yes, of course I dispute it, and I thought it clearly

16 transpired from my question. Somebody said that there

17 would be a fire, not a threat.

18 JUDGE MAY: If that was the item that

19 followed that, we will get it straightened out.

20 Mr. Kalco, it's suggested that somebody said

21 that Mr. Cerkez didn't say the municipality would burn

22 down but somebody said there would be a fire. Is that

23 true or not? Just answer in a word, if you would.

24 A. I'm not getting the interpretation. I'm not

25 getting the interpretation. I can hear His Honour, but

Page 16059

1 I am not getting the interpretation.

2 JUDGE MAY: The question was this:

3 Mr. Cerkez, you said, said at the October meeting in

4 the post office that the municipality would burn down.

5 It is suggested by the Defence that that was not said

6 and that somebody said there would be a fire. Now, did

7 somebody say there would be a fire or not? Would you

8 tell us what the truth is?

9 A. Your Honour, I think it is the former, that

10 Vitez would be butchered and that the Bosniaks -- and

11 that the blame would rest with the Bosniaks, that is

12 the BiH army.

13 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Now, the next matter,

14 Mr. Kovacic, was this: that dealing with the 16th of

15 April, the witness's evidence was that he had

16 intercepted an order from Mario Cerkez to Marko Lujic

17 to fire at religious objects at Kruscica. And Lujic

18 subsequently asked for a break, said that they could

19 have breakfast and that the guns could cool down.

20 Now, is that conversation challenged?

21 MR. KOVACIC: That was challenged, Your

22 Honour, because I asked the witness whether that was a

23 discussion between Marko Lujic and his son, Mario

24 Lujic. And the second -- that was the first document

25 which I introduced to the witness, which shows that

Page 16060

1 this person, Marko Lujic, was far beyond --

2 JUDGE MAY: That's a separate point. It's a

3 separate point. So that I can understand your case,

4 are you saying that this conversation was not with

5 Mr. Cerkez, but was with somebody else? Is that the

6 point?

7 MR. KOVACIC: Exactly. Mario was another

8 person. And if I may, Your Honour, this other person,

9 Mario, was with the HVO.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, you've heard what's

11 suggested, that this was not a conversation with Mario

12 Cerkez. Was it or not?

13 A. Yes, it was with -- between Mario and Marko

14 Lujic.

15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes, thank you,

16 Mr. Kovacic.

17 MR. KOVACIC: I just want to refer on that

18 subject witness --

19 JUDGE MAY: This is all a matter of argument.

20 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I also challenge

21 when we were talking about the meetings on or before 20

22 October. There are some mixed up on places and

23 orders. Some persons were not here, but we do have

24 already exhibits in the case, so it is obvious.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. All that is a matter

Page 16061

1 for comment.

2 Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I should

4 simply like to comment on the witness's answer, looking

5 at the transcript. Mr. President, when you asked if

6 the conversation was between Mario Cerkez and another

7 one, he said, "Yes, the conversation was between Mario

8 and Marko Lujic." I believe it would be important to

9 say that it was Mario Cerkez. It was said that Mario

10 and Marko Lujic were talking, but to avoid any

11 ambiguity, perhaps we should make it -- perhaps we

12 should seek further precision, because the witness said

13 only "Mario."

14 JUDGE MAY: It's perfectly fine. He was

15 talking about his earlier evidence in which he said it

16 was Mr. Cerkez.

17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Very

18 well. Thank you.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

20 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

21 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kalco.

22 A. Good morning.

23 Q. I introduce myself, sir. My name is Stephen

24 Sayers, and together with my colleague, Mr. Naumovski,

25 we represent Dario Kordic. You've been asked a lot of

Page 16062

1 questions today and yesterday, and I'll try to be as

2 brief as I can, sir, and not go over territory --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Sayers, will you please

4 slow down. Yes, thank you.

5 Q. -- and not go over territory that we have

6 already been over, sir.

7 The first question. You were the deputy

8 commander of the 325th Mountain Brigade, the second in

9 command to Sefkija Djidic; is that correct, sir?

10 A. I was Sefkija Djidic's deputy. Sefkija

11 Djidic was the commander of the TO staff of the

12 municipality of Vitez, and I was his deputy.

13 Q. Very well. Now, in your direct testimony you

14 gave some descriptions of the takeover, essentially, of

15 the Vitez municipal government by the HVO. And I

16 believe, sir, that that was on June the 20th of 1992,

17 that that occurred; is that correct?

18 A. I did not say anything about when the

19 government was taken over, but it is that date.

20 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

21 Mr. President, this was -- this subject was not

22 broached in the examination-in-chief of this witness.

23 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on.


25 Q. You gave some testimony, sir, about dealings

Page 16063

1 with the Croat political and military leaders in

2 Vitez. And I believe that the people with whom you

3 dealt principally were Ivica Santic; correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. You also dealt with Mr. Skopljak, both Pero

6 and Marijan Skopljak?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And you also dealt with Mr. Anto Valenta;

9 correct?

10 A. It is.

11 Q. And Mr. Valenta was a school teacher who

12 taught at the high school in Vitez; correct?

13 A. Yes, he was a teacher at the secondary

14 school.

15 Q. All right. And the leaders of the Muslim

16 community were, I believe, Dr. Muhamed Mujezinovic, for

17 one; correct?

18 A. Correct.

19 Q. (redacted)

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I believe the chief of the military police

22 was Mr. Saban Mahmutovic; right?

23 A. Civilian police.

24 Q. Civilian police. And then the military

25 leaders were Mr. Djidic and yourself?

Page 16064

1 A. The military police was under our command.

2 Q. Did you have any meetings with Mr. Kordic in

3 the spring or summer of 1992, and speak to him

4 personally, so far as you are aware, sir?

5 A. No, I did not.

6 Q. And just one final question on this, while --

7 before I move onto another subject. The negotiations

8 between the Muslim side and the Croat side of the civil

9 and military authorities in Vitez, if you like,

10 continued on, really, until the outbreak of the war in

11 April of 1993; isn't that right? Or at least the

12 outbreak of the fighting between the Muslims and the

13 Croats in the Lasva Valley.

14 A. Yes, it was on the 30th of April, when a

15 military delegation of the HVO and a delegation of the

16 BiH army came.

17 Q. Thank you very much, sir. Let me skip over

18 some topics that I was going to cover, and let me turn

19 straight to the blockade at Ahmici on the 18th of

20 October 1992.

21 There seems to be some uncertainty, sir, in

22 the actual date of the blockade. Was it October the

23 18th, 1992, or the 19th or the 20th? Can you recall,

24 at this remove of time, seven years or eight years

25 afterwards?

Page 16065

1 A. Well, it was at that time. I do not have a

2 document with me. I believe it was the 20th.

3 Q. All right. This was the first time, though,

4 would it be fair to say, Mr. Kalco, that a troop convoy

5 had been stopped at gunpoint in the Lasva Valley?

6 A. Quite so.

7 Q. Now, you say, sir, that the troop convoy was

8 stopped, and it was stopped because it was carrying

9 troops from a variety of municipalities to Novi

10 Travnik. But isn't it true, sir, that Jajce had been

11 under prolonged and heavy attack by the Bosnian Serb

12 army forces at this time?

13 A. I think that Jajce was taken one of those

14 days and that there was a disarray between the BiH army

15 and HVO on one hand, because the Serbs were pushing

16 forward so that both the ABiH and the HVO began

17 retreating from Jajce. I said yesterday that the HVO's

18 objective was, because they had the explosives factory

19 in Vitez, and they also wanted to take the ammunition

20 factory in Novi Travnik, because of the artillery

21 weapons.

22 Q. Thank you, sir. You would agree, though,

23 that the town of Jajce actually was captured by the

24 forces of the Bosnian Serb army about ten days after

25 the blockade had been erected at Ahmici; isn't that

Page 16066

1 right? I don't think there is any dispute about that.

2 A. Yes. But there were some indications, there

3 were some signs, and the units were withdrawing from

4 Jajce, were pulling out of Jajce, because, of course,

5 they could not pull out overnight. It was clear that

6 Jajce was about to fall.

7 Q. What you are telling us, then, Mr. Kalco, if

8 I understand you correctly, is that the units of the

9 Muslim forces were withdrawing from Jajce because they

10 saw the writing on the wall, so to speak, and that the

11 HVO was doing the same thing; is that correct?

12 A. Both. Both forces. Yes. Except that the

13 HV, that in Jajce the command was in the hands of the

14 HVO.

15 Q. Thank you, sir. And, Mr. President, I just

16 draw the Trial Chamber's attention to Exhibit 151/1,

17 the entry for October 31st, 1992, which actually

18 contains a date that Jajce fell.

19 Let me just move onto another point, sir.

20 You related to us that instructions had been received

21 by your headquarters to erect the blockades at Stari

22 Bila and at Ahmici shortly before they were actually

23 erected; is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And I think and you said in your statement,

Page 16067

1 five years ago, that Ahmici was selected because it was

2 a natural choke point; the HVO forces could not pass

3 from any other direction, if they were stopped there.

4 Is that right, sir?

5 A. Quite. Because that is the boundary between

6 the Vitez and the Busovaca municipalities.

7 Q. All right. Now, you only went to Ahmici

8 after the fighting had already occurred; is that right,

9 Mr. Kalco?

10 A. After the fighting ended. No, not during the

11 fighting, but when the passions abated somewhat, it is

12 then that they went.

13 Q. That's what I thought you said. Now, let me

14 turn your attention to the first of the four items that

15 I would like to concentrate upon particularly.

16 You mentioned some negotiations that occurred

17 between the two parties on the opposite sides of the

18 dispute, let's say. And in your statement, five years

19 ago, you said that on October the 20th, at about 7.00

20 a.m., you received a telephone call from Ivica Santic,

21 requesting permission to come to the army headquarters,

22 your army headquarters, for a meeting. All these years

23 later, sir, do you actually recall what the date was,

24 or not?

25 A. Well, let me tell you. This was the 20th.

Page 16068

1 Not at 7.00, but at 7.00 in the evening, at 1900

2 hours. Not in the morning.

3 Q. All right. And you are certain it was on

4 October the 20th, 1992, right?

5 A. I think so.

6 Q. Very well. And, as I understand it, sir, a

7 delegation of people arrived in your headquarters

8 consisting of, amongst others, Ivica Santic, Pero

9 Skopljak, Mr. Marijan Skopljak, and Mr. Cerkez; is that

10 accurate to say?

11 A. Santic, Ivica was there, and Mario Cerkez.

12 Q. No others?

13 A. No.

14 Q. All right. Now, were there any

15 representatives of the civilian side, from the

16 Muslims? Mr. Kajmovic, for example, was he there?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. Kajmovic was there, Mujezinovic. There were

20 some others from the Muslim civilian authorities and

21 from the command of the BiH army.

22 Q. All right. If this is the meeting that I

23 think it is, Mr. Kalco, the Trial Chamber's already

24 heard a lot of evidence about this, and I don't want to

25 spend too much time on this. But let me just ask you,

Page 16069

1 was Mr. Kaknjo there?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And two other names, Mr. Sivro Bahtija and

4 Mr. Salkic Suad, were there too, as far as you can

5 remember?

6 A. I am not sure about Sivro, but Suad Salkic

7 was a member of the BiH army staff, and he was there.

8 Q. All right. And was it the next day, sir,

9 that you received a call from Dr. Franjo Tibolt, trying

10 to act as a mediator between the two parties, a nascent

11 to the dispute?

12 A. On the same day, after the meeting, we heard

13 from Dr. Tibolt that a meeting should be organised

14 between the army and the HVO at the medical centre.

15 And we came to that meeting, as I already said.

16 Q. Thank you indeed, Mr. Kalco. So as I

17 understand it, the chronology is that you had the

18 meeting with Mr. Santic and Mr. Cerkez first, and then

19 after that meeting you received a call from Dr. Tibolt,

20 in another attempt at mediation, and that was followed

21 by yet a third meeting that you had with Mr. Cerkez,

22 following which the fighting broke out; is that

23 accurate to say?

24 A. Precisely.

25 Q. Good. Thank you. And the meeting that you

Page 16070

1 had with Mr. Cerkez and -- at which Mr. Djidic was

2 present, that occurred at 6.00 a.m., the morning after

3 the first two conversations that you've talked about;

4 is that right?

5 A. 5.55 a.m.

6 Q. All right. Now, sir, the paragraph 23 of the

7 offer of proof that you apparently reviewed and signed

8 yesterday, contains a reference to a telephone

9 conversation that supposedly occurred between Ivica

10 Santic and Mr. Kordic. There was no mention of that

11 conversation at all in your statement five years ago.

12 Do you have a clear recollection of

13 Mr. Santic making a telephone call to someone, and him

14 telling you who that telephone call was being made to

15 or not?

16 A. It is correct that Ivica Santic, as president

17 of the HVO and mayor of Vitez, called. And after that

18 conversation, he said that he had talked to Mr. Kordic,

19 who was in Novi Travnik, and he received orders that

20 they had to be released, that units were to go from

21 Busovaca to Novi Travnik. Those were his orders,

22 because he was the man in charge in Central Bosnia,

23 Boban and him. And he was in charge of Central

24 Bosnia.

25 Q. Sir, as the deputy commander, did you report

Page 16071

1 that to your intelligence officer, Mr. Nihad Rebihic?

2 A. He was there.

3 Q. Do you know whether any contemporaneous note

4 or memorandum was made of that discussion, sir?

5 A. A note was made about the talk between the

6 two components. I don't know where the note is.

7 Q. All right, sir. Do you know whether that

8 note was passed up your chain of command to the 3rd

9 Corps in Zenica?

10 A. Yes. Yes.

11 Q. All right, sir. But since we don't have that

12 note, the only thing we have is your recollection of a

13 conversation that occurred eight years ago, or

14 seven-and-a-half years ago. Now, how long did that

15 conversation last, sir?

16 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. Let the witness

17 comment on that. It said that this all happened eight

18 years ago. Do you remember it, Mr. Kalco?

19 A. Yes, I remember well, because I didn't know

20 who he had been talking to. Mr. Santic said that he

21 called Mr. Kordic, and I remember that Mr. Kordic said

22 that he was in Novi Travnik. That's for sure; one

23 hundred per cent. If he talked to someone else and

24 just told us this, that's another matter. That's not

25 for me to say.

Page 16072

1 JUDGE MAY: It's time now for a break. If

2 you are moving onto the next topic.

3 MR. SAYERS: I have a couple of questions

4 about that.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 MR. SAYERS: I have just a couple of comments

7 about that conversation, but we can take a break now,

8 Your Honour. It's just as good as any time.

9 JUDGE MAY: And how long do you expect to

10 be?

11 MR. SAYERS: As I related yesterday, I would

12 think not more than half an hour total. I would

13 anticipate, realising that we have other witnesses

14 here, by 11.15 or 11.20.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll break for half

16 an hour.

17 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

18 Mr. President. Mr. President. May I have this pause

19 to let the witness examine this transcript of the tape,

20 and then say whatever he has to say about this, because

21 he will be leaving today.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, he can do so.

23 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.11 a.m.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

Page 16073

1 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President. May I

2 just say that there is a fairly urgent matter that we

3 need to take up following the conclusion of this

4 witness's testimony and before the next witness

5 testifies. That will take about five minutes, I would

6 think.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.


9 Q. Mr. Kalco, let us continue on chronologically

10 over the items that you talked about, insofar as they

11 concern Mr. Kordic, anyway. And as I said, I'll try

12 not to detain you here not more than another 15 or 20

13 minutes.

14 Now, you made no mention of this conversation

15 between Mr. Santic and Mr. Kordic in your statement

16 five years ago. The first time that we heard about it

17 was yesterday. Did you actually see Mr. Santic make

18 the telephone call that you've testified about, sir?

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 A. I saw it, because the telephone was on the

21 desk. There were 12 of us sitting there, and I saw

22 that somebody made a call to somebody. We did not know

23 whom. And after the conversation, he said what he

24 said. I don't want to repeat what I already have said.

25 Q. The point is, though, and I just want to

Page 16074

1 underscore this, you said during your direct

2 examination that you don't know what was said, you

3 weren't able to hear the conversation, and that's true,

4 isn't it?

5 A. Yes, quite. Nobody could hear -- nobody

6 could overhear the conversation. Santic was talking.

7 He was the only one who could hear, and he told us

8 about it.

9 Q. Thank you, sir. Let's move on to the next

10 point.

11 You do recall attending a meeting on the 22nd

12 of October, or shortly after the fighting broke out at

13 Ahmici, with the politicians in Vitez and your

14 commanding officer, Mr. Djidic, as well as

15 representatives from UNPROFOR, Captain Sajmon Elis, I

16 believe, and a representative of the ECMM, Mr. Anders

17 Levinsen. Do you remember that meeting, sir?

18 A. I do.

19 Q. And it would be fair to say, wouldn't it, and

20 I think you'll agree with this, that Mr. Kordic was not

21 involved in any way in the negotiations that led to the

22 reduction in tensions following the fighting in Ahmici

23 and the resolution of that situation that had occurred

24 just a few days before; is that right?

25 A. Quite right, he did not, because we talked to

Page 16075

1 relevant military and civilian authorities in the

2 municipality of Vitez, and Mr. Kordic comes from

3 Busovaca.

4 Q. Right. You did not consider Mr. Kordic to be

5 one of the relevant military or civil authorities in

6 the region, in your municipality, did you?

7 A. We did not consider him to be that in Vitez

8 itself. But in the region, yes, we did perceive him as

9 such, as he was the main personality in Central Bosnia,

10 from Kresevo to Kiseljak down to Kaonik.

11 Q. Have you ever spoken to Mr. Kordic, sir?

12 A. No. I already said that. No.

13 Q. Now, you gave some brief testimony about

14 members of a unit that wore oak leaf patches. I

15 believe they were called the Ludvig Pavlovic Brigade.

16 Do you remember that?

17 A. Yes, yes.

18 Q. And it's true, sir, that this brigade came to

19 Vitez, I believe you said in your statement five years

20 ago, around September of 1992 and caused all kinds of

21 problems; right?

22 A. Yes. It was when they arrived that the

23 problems culminated in Vitez, as against the previous

24 period, because they were teasing, provoking people,

25 beating people. When out in restaurants and coffee

Page 16076

1 shops, their behaviour was improper, and I suppose that

2 they were the ones, with HVO extremists in Vitez

3 itself, who were responsible for the blowing up of

4 Muslim facilities.

5 Q. All right, sir. Just three final points with

6 respect to this brigade.

7 Your troops reported to you that several

8 members of this brigade were actually killed in the

9 fighting at Ahmici on the 20th of October, 1992; is

10 that right?

11 A. We had received reports that some HVO

12 soldiers had been killed, but we did not know which

13 brigade it was or who were those soldiers; that is,

14 whether they came from Vitez, or perhaps from Ludvig

15 Pavlovic, or perhaps some other unit. I don't know.

16 Q. You said in your statement five years ago, on

17 page 4, that:

18 "Members of the Territorial Defence at

19 Ahmici told me that some of the dead HVO soldiers at

20 Ahmici on 20 October, 1992, were members of this

21 brigade. They knew this because of the oak leaf patch

22 on their uniforms."

23 Now, does that help you remember -- I know

24 it's a long time later, sir, but does that help you

25 remember whether there were members of this brigade

Page 16077

1 that your troops reported to have been killed in the

2 fighting in Ahmici on that date?

3 A. That is what I said in my statement, but I

4 did not see any one of them. And I believed what I was

5 told by the soldiers, by men of the BiH army who had

6 been at that front. I did not see them.

7 Q. No criticism intended at all. Following this

8 incident, though, you insisted to your immediate

9 superior, or the second in command of the 3rd Corps,

10 Colonel Merdan, that all HVO units, not from Vitez, had

11 to leave the municipality. That was one of the

12 conditions upon which you insisted during the ceasefire

13 negotiations and peace negotiations; is that right?

14 A. It is.

15 Q. And they did in fact leave the municipality

16 of Vitez around the 25th of December 1992; is that

17 right, sir?

18 A. Yes. Yes. Towards the end of the year. I

19 don't know the exact date.

20 Q. Thank you very much. Now, were you aware

21 that there had been an outbreak of fighting between HVO

22 or Croat forces and Muslim forces in the Busovaca

23 municipality in January of 1993?

24 A. Yes. Yes. The refugees from Kovacevac

25 arrived in Vitez from Vranjska, and then they were

Page 16078

1 transferred to Zenica.

2 Q. In analysing the tensions that gradually

3 increased between the Muslim residents of the Lasva

4 Valley and the Croat residents, sir, were you aware

5 that there had been a series of executions and murders

6 outside of Busovaca in the villages of Dusina, and the

7 villages around Kacuni, Oseliste, Gusti Grab, Donja

8 Polje, places like that?

9 A. I did hear those stories, but I wasn't

10 showing much interest for them because they were

11 outside of my area of responsibilities.

12 Q. So let me move on immediately, sir. You

13 don't know very much about that fighting at all; is

14 that fair to say?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Now, you talked about artillery assets and

17 artillery commanders. You became aware yourself of the

18 arrival of certain pieces of artillery ordnance in the

19 Vitez area in the spring of 1993, didn't you?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In fact, you were aware that two

22 155-millimetre howitzers had arrived in the area, one

23 based at Mali Mosunj, the quarry; is that right?

24 A. Yes. And Prahulje, Nova Bila.

25 Q. Yes, sir. Could you give us your best

Page 16079

1 estimate of the distance between the quarry at Mosunj

2 and the second location that you've identified,

3 Prahulje near Nova Bila?

4 A. I don't know what you mean.

5 Q. Well, would you agree that the quarry at Mali

6 Mosunj is about two kilometres away from Prahulje?

7 A. Thereabouts, yes.

8 Q. Just one question, sir, in connection with

9 the testimony that you gave surrounding Mr. Miroslav

10 Bralo. Were you aware that Mr. Bralo had actually been

11 imprisoned at the Kaonik military detention facility

12 and that he was in gaol in March of 1993, as a result

13 of the unfortunate murder of Mr. Esad Salko -- Salkic.

14 I'm sorry.

15 A. We knew that he had been detained, but he

16 spent a very short time in prison. He moved about. He

17 was quite free. And I presume he was allowed to go

18 free after the investigation. And I really don't feel

19 like talking about Bralo any more, because he used to

20 boast that he had killed over 50 Bosniaks, and so on

21 and so forth. The gentlemen in the HVO know that.

22 Q. Mr. Kalco, I don't blame you in the least.

23 The last question I have on the subject of this

24 unsavoury individual is you never saw him at liberty

25 yourself in March of 1993, did you, with your own eyes?

Page 16080

1 A. Yes, I saw him in Vitez on a couple of

2 occasions in a luxury car. He was loaded at the time,

3 when people did not work. And when we survived only

4 owing humanitarian aid, he was loaded with German

5 marks, he was spending Croatian dinars. I don't know

6 where he got them. But I know that he wasn't poor.

7 Q. All right, sir. I appreciate you may have

8 seen him, but did you see him in March of 1993, to the

9 best of your knowledge?

10 A. I know it was March. After that event, I did

11 see him. It was after those incidents that I saw him.

12 Q. Thank you for clearing that up, sir.

13 Now, in connection with the testimony that

14 you gave about the alleged assassination attempt upon

15 Mr. Darko Kraljevic. Do you know whether any reports

16 were made of that event, and your conclusions to your

17 intelligence officer, Mr. Rebihic, or passed on up your

18 chain of command to the 3rd Corps in Zenica?

19 A. Yes, a report was made, a proper, good

20 report, and sent to the 3rd Corps. Where that report

21 is now, I don't know. I suppose it is somewhere in the

22 archives.

23 Q. Very well. It would be fair to say, sir,

24 that you, as the second in command, wanted to ensure

25 with your intelligence officer, Mr. Rebihic, that

Page 16081

1 accurate, contemporaneous records were made of any

2 significant event in your area of responsibility; is

3 that right?

4 A. Yes, quite. That is right. So that people

5 should know who did what, where they did it, what are

6 the consequences of that, and so on.

7 Q. Yes, sir. And, in fact, that was one of your

8 duties and one of the duties of your intelligence

9 officer, Mr. Rebihic; right?

10 A. I was his superior, and he did his job when I

11 ordered him to do so.

12 Q. All right, sir. Now, with respect to the

13 kidnapping of Commander Zivko Totic on the 15th of

14 April. You were aware of that incident; correct?

15 A. I was attending the celebration of the army

16 day in Zenica, and that is when I heard that. But it

17 is again outside our area, that is the territory of the

18 Vitez municipality. It is Zenica, so that is where I

19 heard about it, at that particular meeting, at the

20 celebration.

21 Q. Were you able to see the televised press

22 conference that was held in the morning of the 15th of

23 April, showing video footage of the circumstances under

24 which Commander Totic had been kidnapped and his four

25 escorts slaughtered?

Page 16082

1 A. A part of it, yes. I don't really remember

2 any detail, but I did see some of it.

3 Q. And do you remember seeing Mr. Kordic give a

4 speech during that press conference at all, sir?

5 A. Yes. Yes. Let me just tell you, if I may.

6 The press conferences held by Mr. Kordic could not be

7 followed in Zenica, could not be taped in Zenica, so

8 that we tape-recorded all these press conferences and

9 sent tapes to the 3rd Corps in Zenica.

10 Q. Oh, I see. Any time that there was a

11 significant press conference containing either

12 political or military information of interest to your

13 commander and you, you would make a videotape of the

14 conference and send it up the chain of command in due

15 course to your superiors at the 3rd Corps; is that

16 accurate to say?

17 A. Yes, quite.

18 Q. All right. Mr. Kalco, do you know a

19 gentleman by the name of Fuad Berbic, the former TO

20 commander in Ahmici?

21 A. I do. We served in the JNA together.

22 Q. He was a professional soldier; is that fair

23 to say as well?

24 A. No. Reserve.

25 Q. Thank you for correcting me. What did he do,

Page 16083

1 sir, for a profession, for his job?

2 A. He was a commander of the unit in Ahmici --

3 Q. And --

4 A. -- and member of the local staff in the

5 area.

6 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that he

7 was extremely critical of the way that the entire

8 barricade incident had been organised in October of

9 1992?

10 A. No, as far as I know. Perhaps, but I don't

11 know anything about it.

12 Q. Very well. I'll move on to one question

13 concerning the fighting that broke out in Stari Vitez

14 on the 16th of April.

15 It's true, isn't it, that in the first wave

16 of the fighting that broke out there, your forces

17 killed 11 HVO soldiers and suffered three fatalities on

18 your side?

19 A. Yeah, we had three dead on the first day of

20 the conflict.

21 Q. Yes. And --

22 A. There were HVO soldiers killed. I don't know

23 how many.

24 Q. In your statement five years ago, sir, maybe

25 your memory was fresher then than it is now, but let me

Page 16084

1 just read you a statement on page 9 and see if it

2 refreshes your recollection. You said there: "In the

3 first attack, three BiH soldiers were killed, but we

4 killed 11 HVO soldiers." Does that help you remember

5 what happened in the first attack there on the 16th of

6 April, 1993?

7 A. Yes, true. We knew that it was about 11, and

8 we also think that there were more.

9 Q. All right. Just a couple of questions in

10 connection with the Stari Vitez truck bomb explosion.

11 Are you sure of the date of that explosion,

12 sir, whether it was the 18th, or the 19th, or is that

13 not clear to you at this point?

14 A. True, at half past 5.00, and it was a

15 Sunday. On Friday, they attacked Vitez. The 16th,

16 17th, that is, Friday, Saturday, and then it was

17 Sunday, so it must have been the 18th.

18 Q. Was the electricity still working at that

19 time, sir, on the 18th or the 19th when the truck bomb

20 exploded; yes?

21 A. Yes. Yes, there was still electricity on the

22 18th or, rather, on the 16th and the 17th, and after

23 the explosion, it was cut off, there was no more

24 electricity.

25 Q. Now, you related certain comments made by

Page 16085

1 Mr. Kordic allegedly in a television programme that

2 evening. Let me just ask you, were you the only person

3 to see that programme, sir?

4 JUDGE MAY: How can he answer that question?

5 MR. SAYERS: There may have been other people

6 with him in the room, sir.

7 JUDGE MAY: That's a different matter. Did

8 you see it alone or were there others with you?

9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you indeed, Mr. President.

10 A. Well, it was at the command. I don't know

11 how many officers of the command were there. But since

12 there was no electricity, we had a battery-powered TV

13 set, and we would charge batteries for our stations all

14 the time. After that, it was 15 or 16 days without

15 electricity after that, so that we had our radio

16 stations, and we had light, and we had also a TV set,

17 that is, so we could watch it and listen to it.

18 MR. SAYERS: Very well.

19 Q. Let me just ask you, were you alone in the

20 room where the TV programme was broadcast or were there

21 other people there with you, and if so, who were they?

22 JUDGE MAY: He's answered that question.

23 A. I said that already.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do you know the names of

25 anybody who might have been there or not, Mr. Kalco?

Page 16086

1 A. Well, I have it written down here in that

2 notebook of mine. I know that the signals men were

3 with me, two or three of them, and I could not say

4 right now who else from the staff members was there.

5 MR. SAYERS: All right.

6 Q. Just two lines of questions. First, did you

7 make a videotape of this television broadcast and send

8 it up your chain of command, as was your normal

9 practice?

10 A. Well, yes. We recorded that conversation as

11 well. We could not send it up immediately because it

12 was closed. However, when negotiations took place on

13 the 30th of June or, rather, on the 30th of April, when

14 the ceasefire was in place, we gave this tape to our

15 officers, who handed it over to the 3rd Corps in

16 Zenica.

17 Q. Thank you very much indeed, sir. Now a

18 follow-up question from that. Have you ever seen a

19 videotape of that press conference, or news

20 announcement, or whatever it was from that day to this?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You have. And when did you see that?

23 A. When we taped it, then I watched it again.

24 We watched it again, the command. We watched this tape

25 to see whether it turned out all right.

Page 16087

1 Q. And I take it that the tape quality was good,

2 you could hear what people were saying.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And the image quality was good as well; is

5 that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, you're quite correct, Mr. Kalco. In the

8 question that I asked you, that was the correct

9 answer. But let me ask you this: From the time that

10 you turned over the videotape that you made to your

11 superior officers in the 3rd Corps after June of 1993,

12 until today have you seen that videotape or that

13 programme rerun on TV?

14 A. No, no, no.

15 Q. All right. Let me turn to another subject.

16 This --

17 JUDGE MAY: Before you do, is it disputed

18 that Dario Kordic said that the ammunition depot had

19 been activated, there would be more explosions of the

20 kind, and the ABiH members should surrender?

21 MR. SAYERS: It is disputed, Mr. President,

22 yes. My client has no recollection of making any such

23 a statement on the 19th and really no recollection of

24 being informed that there had been an explosion in

25 Stari Vitez.

Page 16088

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

2 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

3 Q. If I may, Mr. Kalco, let me turn to the

4 conversation that you had with Colonel Blaskic on the

5 30th of April.

6 Now, you told us yesterday that

7 General Petkovic was in attendance with Colonel Blaskic

8 at this meeting that you had with them. But in your

9 statement five years ago, you said that it was actually

10 Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Filipovic, and Commander

11 Totic. Let me just read you a statement that you

12 made. On page 10, it says: "On 30 April 1993, I

13 attended a meeting in Stari Vitez with Blaskic,

14 Filipovic, and Totic." Let me just ask you, sir, was

15 Commander Totic present at this meeting or wasn't he?

16 A. Yes.

17 MR. SAYERS: I just refer the Court to

18 Exhibit 79/1, Annex C, which shows that Commander Totic

19 was not, in fact, released from custody in Zenica, as a

20 captive of the Mujahedin, until --

21 JUDGE MAY: That's all a matter of comment.

22 MR. SAYERS: Maybe I should put it to the

23 witness.

24 Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Kalco, that, in fact,

25 Commander Totic was not present at this meeting because

Page 16089

1 he was still a captive of the Mujahedin in Zenica and

2 was not released until May the 17th, 1993?

3 A. He was at the meeting in Vitez.

4 Q. That's as best you remember it, sir, is it?

5 JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that.

6 A. Yes.


8 Q. All right. Now, did you, in conformity with

9 your normal practice, make contemporaneous notes and

10 memoranda, or memorandum, about this conversation that

11 you'd had with Colonel Blaskic and send it up your

12 chain of command to the 3rd Corps in Zenica?

13 A. Well, let me tell you, there was Sefer

14 Halilovic, there was Rasim Delic, there was Vehbija

15 Karic. They made notes. I only made a report for

16 internal purposes, and I informed the staff in Vitez.

17 And they probably made a report for the 3rd Corps or,

18 rather, the Supreme Command of the BiH army. We didn't

19 do that.

20 Q. All right, sir. You would agree that it was

21 a very important event for you, to receive visits from

22 the Commander in Chief of the Armija of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Commander in Chief of the

24 HVO; right?

25 A. Yes, precisely. And we thought that the

Page 16090

1 ceasefire achieved then would stay on, and that there

2 would be no war. And it went on only for a few days,

3 and then the conflict started again. Fortunately,

4 people were released from prison.

5 Q. Well, let me just ask you, what is true,

6 sir? Is it that Colonel Blaskic, Colonel Filipovic,

7 and Commander Totic were present at this meeting, as

8 you said five years ago, or is it true that General

9 Petkovic, General Halilovic, and Colonel Blaskic were

10 present at this meeting, as you said yesterday and

11 today?

12 A. Well, let me tell you. When I stated this

13 five years ago, it was true. And also what I said

14 yesterday, that's it. There was this broader meeting.

15 Not to repeat all of that. At any rate, Petkovic led

16 the HVO team, and Sefer Halilovic was the Chief of

17 Staff of the Supreme Command of the BiH army, and he

18 led the army delegation. It was the three of them, and

19 I was the fourth one from Stari Vitez.

20 Q. All right. Let me pass onto my two final

21 topics. Firstly, you gave some testimony about seeing

22 someone that you identified as Mr. Kordic on the 8th of

23 August of 1993. Now, sir, you were actually standing

24 inside a building in Stari Vitez, weren't you?

25 A. It was not a building. It was ruins, the

Page 16091

1 remains of a building that had been shelled. I was

2 touring the lines, and in the village of Krcevine I saw

3 what I spoke of yesterday, and that is correct.

4 Q. All right. Now, how far away were the ruins

5 of this house from the southern bank of the Lasva

6 River, sir?

7 A. I think about 500 or 600 metres. You can see

8 it well with binoculars. You can even discern

9 features, faces.

10 Q. All right. Perhaps I misunderstood you,

11 sir. Did you say that you were about 500 metres away

12 from the southern bank of the Lasva River, at the place

13 that you were standing, looking for your binoculars?

14 A. I don't know. The distance between myself

15 and this HVO line in Krcevine was 500 to 600 metres,

16 approximately. That is the northern side, Krcevine.

17 And I was on the southern side.

18 Q. All right. Yes. In other words, you were on

19 the southern side of the Lasva River, and Krcevine, as

20 the Court can see from the map, is over on the northern

21 bank of the Lasva River, isn't it?

22 A. Yes. Or, to put it better, I was on the

23 right bank of the Lasva River, and they were on the

24 left bank of the Lasva River.

25 Q. All right. Now, you couldn't hear a word

Page 16092

1 that was being said, could you, during the --

2 A. No. No. No. No way.

3 Q. All right. And you say that Mr. Kordic was

4 in plain view, along with all the other military

5 commanders, looking through your optical instruments at

6 them 500 metres or so away; correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And in plain view of anybody who was standing

9 in the area that you were, with optical instruments as

10 well?

11 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. Sure.

14 Q. Now, you also gave some testimony about

15 Mr. Kordic appearing on TV later that night or the next

16 day. Did you make a videotape of that news conference

17 or announcement, sir?

18 A. Yes, we recorded that too. And we kept it in

19 our headquarters until the ceasefire. After the

20 ceasefire, we gave it to the 3rd Corps in Zenica.

21 Q. Yes, sir. I take it, that you also made a

22 contemporaneous note or a memorandum or a report

23 yourself, or your intelligence officer did, and that

24 that was passed up the chain of command?

25 A. Yes.

Page 16093

1 Q. All right.

2 A. My intelligence officer made a report based

3 on the data that I gave him. He made a report to the

4 3rd Corps.

5 Q. Right. Final subject, sir. Helicopters.

6 You gave some testimony on this subject. Isn't it true

7 that the helicopters that you saw were generally small,

8 non-cargo helicopters, the first being a Galeb model,

9 and the second being a French Gazelle model helicopter;

10 correct?

11 A. They were small helicopters for the most

12 part. They had two or three flights one evening, even

13 four. Sometimes they would actually land, and in other

14 places they would just parachute the parcels that they

15 were transporting. We benefited from that too, because

16 sometimes we got the parcels containing ammunition and

17 other things that were meant for the HVO.

18 Q. Yes, sir. I think you said that yesterday.

19 Here is my final question. In connection with the

20 assault that was launched upon Stari Vitez in the

21 middle of July of 1993, the 18th, I think you said,

22 isn't it true that the bulldozer that -- or the

23 converted bulldozer that you described, was actually

24 halted, having been struck by a shoulder-launched

25 missile fired by one of your troops fired from Stari

Page 16094

1 Vitez?

2 A. Correct. Correct. Yes. Thank God it was

3 hit. Had it not been hit, I wonder what would have

4 happened.

5 MR. SAYERS: Thank you indeed,

6 Mr. President. No further questions.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, so that we understand

8 your case, is it disputed that Mr. Kordic was on the

9 front line on the 8th of August 1993?

10 MR. SAYERS: I enquired of my client

11 yesterday on that subject, Mr. President. And if

12 you'll bear with me for just 30 seconds. He believes

13 that the incident that Mr. Kalco may have been

14 referring to is a visit that he made to that village,

15 many civilians had been killed in the village, and he

16 came to visit their families. And what was related as

17 to what was supposedly said on TV the next day is

18 disputed.

19 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.

20 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

21 Re-examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:

22 Q. Before I ask you some questions, in order to

23 specify things, I should like to go back to the tape

24 that was produced this morning. Mr. Kalco, during the

25 break you had an opportunity to go through the contents

Page 16095

1 of the conversations which appear on that tape. There

2 were nine conversations, all in all. And you

3 recognised your voice in five of these conversations,

4 and they are one, two, three, eight, and nine. And you

5 put your signature, as I asked you, to each one of

6 these conversations. Is that so?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. A photocopy of this transcript, in the

9 Bosniak language, has been submitted to the Chamber,

10 together with the signature of the witness. It is

11 D65/1, and it was submitted to you.

12 JUDGE MAY: It should be added to the exhibit

13 which we already have. And I'll be reminded of the

14 number. I think -- was it 65/2? That document which

15 the witness has signed, if you would hand it in now,

16 can be marked D65/2.A. If you'll hand it in, unless

17 there is something you want to ask about it.

18 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have two

19 questions regarding these conversations, but not as to

20 the document as such.

21 JUDGE MAY: Let the document go in.

22 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] The copy

23 in question is the one which was handed to us by the

24 Defence a moment ago. We do not have any other.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, is that your signature

Page 16096

1 on the document?

2 A. It is.

3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Hand it in now,

4 please, to the Registry, and it can be marked.

5 Is there any difficulty about marking it

6 D65/2.A?

7 THE REGISTRAR: The transcript was marked

8 D65/A.2. Maybe mark this one D65/B.2.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's get it marked -- no,

10 don't hand it to the witness. Hand it to the Registry,

11 please.

12 Now, Mr. Kovacic, what point can you be made

13 to make?

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, microphone for

15 Mr. Kovacic.

16 MR. KOVACIC: I just wanted to point out,

17 since it was not really standard procedure, but we do

18 accept the discussion -- the taped discussion under

19 number 4 was recognised by the witness during his

20 cross-examination, so he either did not recognise that

21 when going through those materials or he changed his

22 mind.

23 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

24 MR. KOVACIC: That is the one, if I may

25 remind, where I put the questions about restaurants.

Page 16097

1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.

2 Yes, Mr. Lopez-Terres.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Kalco, the conversations which were shown

5 to you this morning, could you tell us, what were the

6 telephone lines on which they could have been recorded?

7 A. PTT telephones, regular PTT telephones,

8 because the post office was held by the HVO and they

9 probably recorded all of it. Well, of course they

10 recorded it. I'm sure that even now they have my own

11 telephone bugged at home.

12 Q. And these conversations, there were nine of

13 them, and you recognised five of them. Do you have any

14 idea as to when they were taped? Was it over a long

15 period of time or was it much shorter?

16 A. It was mostly the second half of 1992 and

17 until the conflict in 1993. There were probably other

18 conversations as well, but they are not here.

19 Q. And the telephone lines was the line that you

20 used from your office, that is, from the headquarters

21 of the Territorial Defence; is that so?

22 A. Precisely. We had that telephone line, and

23 we also had a radio link with the units that were on

24 the ground.

25 Q. Thank you. This is all regarding telephone

Page 16098

1 lines.

2 Yesterday, Mr. Kovacic asked you some

3 questions about BH army soldiers who were going to the

4 front against the Serbs, and it is this subject that I

5 should like to address now. The BH army soldiers, at

6 the time that we are referring to, that is, in '92/'93,

7 did they all -- did each one of them have a weapon?

8 A. Well, let me tell you. When we ended our

9 conflicts with the HVO, we had 70 per cent of weapons,

10 and when we finished the war with the Serbs in Bosnia

11 and Herzegovina, we had armed the entire army, at least

12 we in Vitez, because we did not have any weapons.

13 Q. In other words, as the soldiers were coming

14 back on a leave, on a week leave, as you said, did they

15 bring their weapons back home with them?

16 A. I think that only officers brought their

17 weapons home, their rifles, and the soldiers who had

18 their own pistols. All other weapons remained at the

19 front line for the shift that was taking over the front

20 line.

21 Q. To your knowledge, Mr. Kalco, how many

22 soldiers from the Vitez municipality, and especially

23 the Vitez Brigade, were deployed on the front against

24 Serbs in April 1993?

25 A. I think one detachment, 100 to 200 men from

Page 16099

1 Vitez; up to 200 men, not more.

2 Q. In April 1993; we agree on that?

3 A. In April.

4 Q. Do you know where they were deployed? I'm

5 referring to the Vitez Brigade.

6 A. Probably at Vlasic, in the Turbe/Vlasic area,

7 over there. I don't know that they were anywhere else.

8 Q. To your knowledge, did those soldiers come

9 back to Vitez prior to the 16th of April, or in the

10 days following the 16th of April, or did they stay at

11 the Serb front?

12 A. They returned before the conflict, before the

13 16th of April, 1993.

14 Q. If I understand you, the 16th of April, 1993,

15 on that day there were no more Vitez soldiers or

16 soldiers from the Vitez Brigade on the Serb front any

17 longer.

18 A. No, no.

19 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Kovacic also mentioned various

20 units which were in the Vitez municipality, and he

21 asked several questions about the military police. Was

22 there a military police unit within the Vitez Brigade?

23 A. Every brigade had its own platoon of the

24 military police. It consisted of at least 30 men and

25 perhaps even more.

Page 16100

1 Q. And who was the commander of the military

2 police unit in the brigade?

3 A. The commander of the brigade. He had a

4 commander of this military police unit, but he was the

5 commander of all units within his brigade.

6 Q. In other words, Mr. Mario Cerkez was the

7 superior officer of the military police unit which was

8 part of his brigade?

9 A. Absolutely.

10 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I think that that

11 was not the issue on the direct, that we are entering a

12 new area.

13 JUDGE MAY: Let's keep moving.

14 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

15 Q. On the 18th of April, that was the day of the

16 car bomb explosion. You confirmed today that it was,

17 indeed, the 18th of April. After the explosion, you

18 said that it was followed by an infantry attack?

19 A. Yes. There was an attack coming from all

20 sides, from the eastern side, from the new part of

21 Vitez, from the garages, from Princip, from the church,

22 across the Lasva River from the Rajic/Bilic houses;

23 that is to say, an all-out attack coming from all sides

24 of Vitez.

25 Q. And this attack practically came on top of

Page 16101

1 the car bomb explosion, did it?

2 A. Precisely. That is when people were so

3 frightened, they didn't know what was going on. That's

4 when the infantry attack started, along with artillery

5 preparations.

6 Q. In view of the scope of the attack, the

7 Vitezovi could not have launched it by themselves

8 alone?

9 A. I think had they had five times as many men

10 as they did have, they could not have done it on their

11 own. There had to be other units involved as well.

12 May I mention another thing in this context

13 to the Court. If one looks at the entire conflict or,

14 rather, the encirclement of Vitez, there were these

15 so-called improvised bombs. We called them babies.

16 They were made of weapons that were highly

17 destructive. They were filled with iron scraps and

18 then concrete too. So after they would explode,

19 soldiers or the population in general would be wounded

20 terribly, all of those who would be injured by this.

21 Q. You also spoke of the second attack on the

22 18th of July, 1993, on Stari Vitez, when there were at

23 least 27 dead on the HVO side, and this also was a

24 coordinated attack, that is, different forces of the

25 HVO in Vitez, including those of the brigade?

Page 16102

1 A. Precisely. From Princip, the Vitezovi; from

2 the garages --

3 Q. You don't have to go into details. I only

4 wanted you to confirm it.

5 Mr. Borislav Josic, who took over 12 bodies,

6 also came from the Vitez Brigade, didn't he?

7 A. Yes, yes. He was an officer, and he took

8 over the dead HVO soldiers from me.

9 Q. And as for Miroslav Bralo, he was also

10 mentioned before, this morning he was shown documents

11 according to which he had been taken into custody and

12 detained, at least for a while. To your knowledge, was

13 Mr. Bralo ever brought to court and did he receive a

14 sentence for the murder of Mr. Salkic?

15 A. There was no trial, because he would be

16 detained and then he would be released, and I abide by

17 the statement I made yesterday and today. I don't want

18 to repeat it, once again.

19 Q. As to the documents that were shown to you

20 this morning, you noted that Mr. Bralo was indicated as

21 the person appearing in the military registry of the

22 municipal headquarters in Vitez. Did you say that?

23 A. Right. That's right. You are right.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, I think we must

25 bring this examination to an end. This witness has

Page 16103

1 been giving evidence for more than a day.

2 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] There was

3 a new document that was adduced this morning,

4 Mr. President. I thought we should go through that,

5 but I shall turn to some other points.

6 Q. Mr. Sayers also asked you some questions this

7 morning and in this regard. You were asked as to the

8 date when the meeting at the post office took place.

9 And was it the 19th or the 20th of October? And you

10 said that the attack on Ahmici had taken place in the

11 morning of the 20th of October, and that the meeting at

12 the post office preceded it. So it must have been the

13 19th of October, in the evening?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. You were shown a document, which was Colonel

16 Blaskic's order on the 16th of January 1993, and that

17 was 811, and it said that Ludvig Pavlovic -- I think

18 you were shown this morning. You were shown the

19 document this morning. It is of the 16th of January

20 1993. Colonel Blaskic issues orders to this brigade

21 saying that it is -- which means that it was still in

22 Vitez, on the 16th of January 1993, and this brigade

23 was still in Vitez.

24 A. I think that at that point in time it was

25 leaving Vitez, in January. In January 1993. I don't

Page 16104

1 know the exact date.

2 Q. But you recognise that that unit could still

3 have been in the region of Vitez on the 16th of January

4 1993?

5 A. Yes. Yes.

6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have no

7 more questions, Mr. President.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kalco, that concludes your

9 evidence, and you are free to go. Thank you for coming

10 to the International Tribunal to give your evidence.

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you too, sir.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

13 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President. Very

14 briefly, if I might just hand up to the Trial Chamber

15 some documents that were delivered to us today. They

16 concern Witness AO, a witness who testified, I believe,

17 yesterday and the day before.

18 MR. NICE: Probably better at this stage if I

19 can interrupt, to deal with this in private session at

20 this stage, I would have thought.

21 MR. SAYERS: It can certainly be dealt with

22 in private session.

23 JUDGE MAY: Before we go into private

24 session, is this a matter which has to be dealt with

25 now, or can it be dealt with when we at least finish

Page 16105

1 the next witness, who needs to get away?

2 MR. SAYERS: Yes, it can be dealt with after

3 that, sir.

4 JUDGE MAY: We'll see what this is and

5 consider that then. Let's call the witness.

6 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, with respect to

7 this next witness, we received an offer of proof late

8 last night, and without prejudice to our position that

9 generally this isn't the right thing to do, we would

10 not be adverse to having the witness statement taken as

11 read, in the interests of saving time.

12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Mr. Kovacic, are you

13 involved in this witness?

14 MR. KOVACIC: No, we don't have objection,

15 Your Honour.

16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I am grateful for

17 that. And I will confine myself, I think, to three

18 topics, which I'll ask for some clarification.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. As far as timing is

20 concerned, we started this session rather later than

21 normal, so we'll go on till 12.40. We'll adjourn for

22 lunch until ten minutes past 2.00.

23 [The witness entered court]

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the

25 declaration.

Page 16106

1 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

2 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

3 truth.

4 THE REGISTRAR: If you would like to take a

5 seat.


7 Examined by Mr. Nice:

8 Q. Brigadier Hayes, you have signed a summary of

9 your evidence, I think, prepared over the last day or

10 so; is that correct?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And do you sign it on the basis that it's an

13 accurate account of evidence that you could give?

14 A. I do.

15 Q. That summary sets out your involvement in

16 affairs into which we are inquiring, starting on the

17 6th of April of 1993, when you went to Kiseljak?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. The 11th of April, when there was the attack

20 on Srebrenica?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Followed by the incident at Ahmici, which

23 perhaps changed the focus of attention, and led to your

24 making one or two trips in that area. Is that correct?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 16107

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could a pause be made,

2 please, between question and answer.

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, the interpreters are

4 asking you to pause.

5 MR. NICE: My apologies to the interpreters.

6 Q. Just deal briefly, please, if you may, with

7 the 8th of May joint statement by Mladic and Halilovic

8 about the ceasefire. Just in a sentence or so, what

9 was the effect of all of that?

10 A. This was a meeting in the airport at Sarajevo

11 where a Bosnia-wide ceasefire was signed between

12 General Mladic and General Halilovic, a bilateral

13 ceasefire. The result of that was an increase in

14 fighting in Central Bosnia and particularly in Mostar.

15 And it was the perception of the headquarters that I

16 worked in that the Croats perceive the possibility of

17 some modified peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a

18 result of which they were intent on seizing as much

19 land as they could get. Any ceasefire at that time

20 froze the front lines where they were, and

21 consequently, if you were not in possession of a

22 certain piece of ground, you would lose it.

23 Q. A brief comment on paragraph 10, the mixed

24 military working group meeting on the 9th of June. And

25 just explain what the role or the relationship was

Page 16108

1 between Petkovic and Siber, and why?

2 A. On the 9th of June, we had a mixed military

3 working group meeting in Kiseljak at the United Nations

4 headquarters there. General Petkovic was representing

5 the HVO as the commander in chief, Colonel Siber, or

6 Mr. Siber, was representing the Bosnian army. General

7 Petkovic refused to negotiate with Mr. Siber, on the

8 grounds that it was not a Bosnian army, and Siber,

9 therefore as a Croat, could not represent that army.

10 It was, in General Petkovic's eyes, a Muslim army.

11 This was not unusual. The same attitude

12 would quite often be taken by the Serbs if Colonel

13 Divjak represented the Bosnian army.

14 The result of it was that the negotiations

15 could not be held, and we had to delay until General

16 Delic came from Sarajevo to represent the Bosnian

17 army.

18 Q. I want you now, please, to just give us a

19 summary of your involvement in the Convoy of Joy, so

20 far as in particular it involved the defendant, Dario

21 Kordic, your judgement of his involvement in that, and

22 also Anto Valenta.

23 A. When General Delic arrived in Kiseljak, the

24 meeting took place between Petkovic and himself, with

25 the aim of establishing a bilateral ceasefire between

Page 16109

1 the Croats and the Muslims, to build on the ceasefire

2 that had been agreed between Serbs and Muslims on the

3 8th of May. We had heard about the Convoy of Joy; a

4 convoy organised by a Muslim from Tuzla to bring

5 supplies from the coast up to Tuzla, that were needed

6 in the Tuzla enclave.

7 General Petkovic undertook to try to secure

8 the safe passage of the convoy through Vitez. We

9 believed that there could be some trouble at Vitez. He

10 contacted the HVO in Vitez by using HVO communications

11 from their own headquarters in Kiseljak, but was unable

12 to secure the safe passage of the convoy.

13 He asked if United Nations could escort the

14 convoy, but it was explained to him that as it was not

15 an UNHCR sponsored convoy, we were not able to do so.

16 He left Kiseljak to go to Mostar at the end

17 of the meeting, and undertook to go personally to Vitez

18 to try and secure the safe passage of the convoy. He

19 failed to do this. And my opinion was that although he

20 was the commander-in-chief of the HVO, his authority

21 within the Vitez pocket was somewhat limited.

22 Shortly after this, we heard that the convoy

23 had in fact been attacked, some drivers had been

24 killed, some vehicles had been hijacked, and the rest

25 of the convoy had been scattered.

Page 16110

1 The British Battalion in Vitez was trying to

2 gather the remains of the convoy together into a quarry

3 where they could guard them, and then escort them out

4 of the pocket. In view of what had happened, this

5 seemed to be the only sensible course of action, which

6 would avoid any further loss of life.

7 I decided that I would go to Vitez to see the

8 situation for myself. I travelled there, and on

9 arrival, I was briefed by the British Battalion on the

10 situation. During this briefing, the Muslim who had

11 organised and was leading the convoy was brought into

12 the British camp, and I had a chance to speak to him.

13 He was a man on the verge of a breakdown. It was clear

14 to me that he had been extremely shocked by what had

15 happened to the convoy, and that it had been totally

16 unexpected. He was very distressed. He was very

17 emotional.

18 I went out onto the ground to see the

19 situation for myself, and at the eastern end of the

20 Vitez pocket I came across a series of vehicles that

21 were being hijacked by uniformed Croats, HVO and

22 police.

23 At some point during this time, I met with

24 Ambassador Thebault. Nobody on the ground, on the

25 Croat side, appeared to be making any attempt to stop

Page 16111

1 the hijacking. I asked who had the authority to

2 prevent this sort of action, and I was directed to

3 Dario Kordic. After about an hour, we found Dario

4 Kordic in a wood yard, which is to the west end of the

5 pocket. Ambassador Thebault and I spoke to him. We

6 complained about what had happened to the convoy, and

7 that the -- it had been attacked and that vehicles had

8 been looted, and were still being looted.

9 Kordic said that he was doing his very best

10 to gather the convoy together, that he had about 80

11 vehicles that he needed to collect. In fact, I think

12 eventually about 40 vehicles were retrieved from the

13 convoy.

14 Despite what he was saying, I got the

15 impression that he was not being entirely truthful, and

16 that he was not actually doing his best to stop the

17 looting or collect the convoy remnants together,

18 despite the fact that he very clearly did have

19 authority within the pocket and, in my opinion, it was

20 within his gift to have stopped the looting and

21 collected the convoy together.

22 We went back out onto the ground to go to the

23 quarry where the vehicles were being gathered under the

24 guard of the British Battalion. Anto Valenta was

25 leading us to this quarry. On the way, we passed a

Page 16112

1 line of vehicles which were quite clearly from the

2 convoy. They were being looted by HVO soldiers. In my

3 opinion, it would have been impossible for Mr. Valenta

4 not to have seen what was happening, but he chose not

5 to stop. Rather, he ignored it and carried on.

6 Ambassador Thebault and myself stopped. We managed to

7 prevent the looting, but unfortunately there were no

8 more Muslim drivers who could collect the vehicles and

9 take them to the quarry. We continued on to the

10 quarry. We saw the situation there.

11 And towards the end of that day, we again saw

12 Dario Kordic and again complained about what was

13 happening on the ground. Once more, he assured us that

14 he was doing his best to collect the convoy together,

15 but once more I was less than reassured that he was

16 actually doing his best. I felt that his attitude and

17 the attitude of the HVO in the Vitez pocket was one of

18 indifference to the convoy, to the individuals, to the

19 hijacking of the vehicles, and to the looting that was

20 going on.

21 Q. Just three matters of detail. So far as

22 Petkovic is concerned, did you think his efforts were

23 genuine?

24 A. I did.

25 Q. And should a general at that level have been

Page 16113

1 in a position to have control over people at the level

2 of the Vitez pocket?

3 A. Certainly, as commander-in-chief of the HVO,

4 he should have been able to have authority over the HVO

5 in the Vitez pocket. They should have reacted to the

6 orders and instructions that he gave them. And I have

7 no doubt that he was genuinely trying to secure the

8 safe passage of the convoy.

9 Q. In your talks with Kordic, did he identify

10 anyone as superior, as subordinate, or collateral to

11 him who had either been responsible for stopping the

12 convoy or who would have had authority and power to

13 release it?

14 A. He did not.

15 Q. Was the occasion when you went there with

16 Valenta in broad daylight?

17 A. It was. It would have been at about 2000.

18 It did not get dark until 2200 at that time of year in

19 Central Bosnia.

20 Q. Two other things.

21 Paragraph 18. On the 19th of June of 1993,

22 were there some Muslim families, who were close to the

23 U.N. camp in Kiseljak, who were evicted?

24 A. There were. There was a certain amount of

25 intimidation of Muslim families in the town of Kiseljak

Page 16114

1 going on at the time. This family came from houses

2 that were opposite the camp, very close by. It was a

3 group of women, children, and at least one youth.

4 Numbers were in the region of ten, I believe. We

5 admitted them to the camp because they were too

6 frightened to return to their homes. They stayed in

7 the medical centre, where we accommodated them.

8 Vinko Lucic, who was the HVO-UNPROFOR liaison

9 officer in Kiseljak, whom we knew quite well, came to

10 speak to them to try to persuade them to return to

11 their homes, but they refused to go. They were too

12 frightened. We subsequently transported them to

13 Visoko.

14 Q. Finally, on your summary and on the question

15 of linkage, can you tell us just a little about the

16 Muslim hospital and the incident there in August and

17 September of 1993?

18 A. Towards the end of August and beginning of

19 September, General Briquemont, as commander of the

20 UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, was attempting to negotiate

21 further ceasefires in the evacuation of wounded

22 civilians from certain locations.

23 I was in East Mostar at the time. I visited

24 the Muslim hospital that was there, and having seen the

25 conditions, I went to the HVO headquarters on the west

Page 16115

1 bank to try to negotiate the evacuation of the wounded

2 from this hospital. The evacuation was refused on the

3 grounds that in Nova Bila, in another hospital, Croat

4 wounded were not being allowed to be evacuated by the

5 Muslims. We were told that once the Nova Bila wounded

6 had been evacuated, then the Muslim wounded from the

7 east bank could be evacuated.

8 We achieved the evacuation of the wounded

9 from Nova Bila and the evacuation of the wounded from

10 the hospital on the east bank of the river in Mostar

11 was also partially successful.

12 There was clear linkage between the two, but

13 again at this time this was not an unusual situation.

14 Q. A linkage between two different parts of

15 Bosnia; is that right?

16 A. Right, a linkage between what was happening

17 in Mostar and what was happening in Central Bosnia

18 around the area of Vitez.

19 MR. NICE: May the signed summary become

20 Exhibit 2815, please. Two exhibits, both distributed

21 to Defence and also to the Chamber. But one needs to

22 be replaced, because a missing page has now been

23 inserted. So first 1097.1, which is the replacement

24 document.

25 MR. SAYERS: Let me just register an

Page 16116

1 objection to these documents Your Honour, in

2 principle. They have not been delivered to us by the

3 January the 20th deadline that this Court imposed, and

4 I have not seen the third page to which counsel refers,

5 and so we object.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let the Defence have the new

7 copy.

8 MR. NICE: Here they are. Sorry.

9 I can now turn to --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,

12 Mr. Nice.

13 JUDGE MAY: Microphone.

14 MR. NICE: Thank you.

15 Q. If I can turn to Exhibit 1097.1, you're not

16 named on this document, but this comes from your

17 headquarters?

18 A. Yes, it does. It comes from Mr. Viktor

19 Andreev, who is the head of civil affairs. I'm sorry,

20 it comes from Albert Benabou, who was the civil affairs

21 representative in Mostar, to Viktor Andreev. I am, in

22 fact, named on the one that I'm looking at, Brigadier

23 Hayes, chief of staff.

24 Q. Thank you. And the only passage I want you

25 to deal with on this particular document is at the

Page 16117

1 first substantive page after the cover sheet,

2 Mr. Boban's declared positions, where it reads that:

3 "The Vance-Owen Plan is subject to

4 modifications, and those changes must be acceptable to

5 the Croats.

6 "Relations with Mr. Izetbegovic.

7 Izetbegovic must give up the idea of a Muslim state.

8 In the field, there is another reality.

9 "I will never agree to the establishment of

10 a Muslim state," emphasised Mr. Boban.

11 "Fikret Abdic, a Muslim member of the

12 presidency, is considered, according to Mr. Boban's

13 advisors, capable of naming someone who will replace

14 Izetbegovic."

15 And then over the page:

16 "Alija Izetbegovic is my enemy. His

17 declarations in Ankara, Madrid, Paris, and London are

18 against the peace process," specified Mr. Boban.

19 Does that match the sentiments being

20 expressed more generally at the time on your

21 experience?

22 A. It does. I should perhaps point out that I

23 was looking just now at the wrong document. I

24 apologise.

25 Q. Yes.

Page 16118

1 A. My name does not appear on this particular

2 document, but it did go to the headquarters, and I

3 would have seen it. Yes, it does.

4 And as regards the relations with the

5 UNPROFOR paragraph, it would be incorrect to say that,

6 as is stated there, the Croats were the only ones to

7 accept the presence of UNPROFOR. The Muslims had -- or

8 the Bosnians had UNPROFOR stationed. Visoko was an

9 area within their control, and of course Sarajevo

10 itself was an area within their control, so we were

11 stationed on territory which they controlled.

12 Q. The second document I want you to look at is

13 provided necessarily in its complete form, 1145.3, but

14 I want it for one sentence of one of its attachments.

15 But it has to come to you in its complete form.

16 The document, dated the 18th of July, does

17 have your name on it, and if we go in four pages, we

18 come to a very poorly-photocopied, just-readable

19 document from Pogarcic. Have you found that document?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And in the middle of this letter, which is

22 itself in English, do we see a reference to the milk or

23 the milk convoy; is that right?

24 A. Yes, powdered milk for the children of

25 Mostar.

Page 16119

1 Q. And we see here that the president of the

2 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, it must be

3 Mr. Boban, has instructed all HVO commanders that upon

4 something -- and it goes on. So here is reflected, in

5 this letter, an instruction from the president, Boban,

6 down to the HVO commanders at a local level. Would

7 that be something that you might expect or not expect?

8 A. One would normally expect such direction to

9 go to the commander-in-chief and then be passed on down

10 the military chain of command to the commanders in the

11 field. It's slightly unusual for it to be passed

12 direct, in this manner, to the commanders at a lower

13 level. It perhaps indicates that the

14 commander-in-chief did not exercise complete authority

15 in the manner which one would expect.

16 Q. And, indeed, in the manner which you didn't

17 find in Petkovic when he tried to exercise authority in

18 relation to the Convoy of Joy?

19 A. Correct.

20 MR. NICE: Thank you. That's all.

21 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

22 Q. Brigadier, good afternoon. My name is

23 Stephen Sayers. Together with my colleague,

24 Mr. Naumovski, we represent Mr. Kordic.

25 I understand that you have to be out of here

Page 16120

1 by 4.00 today, and we will make sure that that

2 happens.

3 The first question: With respect to Exhibit

4 Z1145.3 about which you've just spoken, have you ever

5 spoken to Mr. Pogarcic about this document or about the

6 document that is contained in this exhibit?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Have you ever spoken to Mr. Pogarcic at all?

9 A. Not as far as I know.

10 Q. Did such orders ever go out, as apparently

11 Mr. Pogarcic relates in his 16th of July 1993 letter?

12 A. I can only say if he instructed it. I

13 surmised he did. I could not state categorically that

14 I knew such orders had been passed.

15 Q. It remains in the realm of surmise?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Have you ever spoken directly to Mr. Boban?

18 A. No.

19 Q. All right, sir. You met with the

20 investigators who worked for the Prosecution and gave

21 them a statement over a three-day period in November of

22 1996; correct?

23 A. I did.

24 Q. And in that statement you referred to a

25 diary. Did you maintain this diary contemporaneously?

Page 16121

1 A. I did.

2 Q. Have you reviewed the diary in preparation

3 for your testimony today?

4 A. No, I haven't, because it is in storage in

5 the United Kingdom. I am actually posted in Africa at

6 the moment.

7 Q. Very well. Now, before you took up your

8 position in Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did not receive any

9 specific training, did you?

10 A. I did not.

11 Q. You just took a media course at the senior

12 staff college, I believe?

13 A. That's correct. But I have had a

14 considerable amount of training before that, having

15 completed both the army staff college, the higher

16 commanding staff course, and something called the Royal

17 College of Defence studies, which is a year long

18 course.

19 Q. Absolutely, Brigadier. Please forgive the

20 halting delivery, but since we speak virtually the same

21 language, the interpreters often are challenged, and we

22 can create some serious problems if we overlap. So I'd

23 appreciate it if you'd just have a small delay after

24 each of my questions, and I'll try to do the same,

25 after --

Page 16122

1 A. I apologise. I should have learnt, after six

2 and a half months in Bosnia.

3 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that before you

4 went to Bosnia-Herzegovina, you knew very little about

5 the country or, indeed, about the former Yugoslavia?

6 A. That would be correct.

7 Q. All right. And I believe, sir, that you

8 received some briefings from the Ministry of Defence

9 before you took up your duties regarding the British

10 military perspective on Bosnia-Herzegovina; is that

11 fair to say?

12 A. Yes. They were in the form really of

13 documentation that I was required to read.

14 Q. But it would be accurate, wouldn't it, to say

15 that you actually received no formal briefing from any

16 United Nations organisation in connection with the

17 duties that you assumed as the second in command of

18 UNPROFOR in Kiseljak?

19 A. That would be correct, but I was not second

20 in command. I was the chief of staff. There was a

21 commander, there was a deputy commander, and then there

22 was the chief of staff. The chief of staff's

23 responsibility is to run the headquarters.

24 Q. All right. So you were number three in the

25 chain of command, if you like? Would that be fair to

Page 16123

1 say?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And without dwelling on that, I take it your

4 immediate predecessor was Brigadier Cordy-Simpson?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. Now, I believe that you made a short

7 reconnaissance visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina just for

8 informational purposes in mid-March of 1993?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. And took up your position of chief of staff

11 to the United Nations command or of the United Nations

12 command on April the 6th of 1993?

13 A. I think I arrived in Kiseljak on the 7th.

14 Q. All right. And just so that we all

15 understand your tour of duty, I believe that you handed

16 over to your successor --

17 A. Brigadier Ramsey.

18 Q. -- Brigadier Ramsey, on the 13th of October?

19 A. 13th or 14th, yes.

20 Q. All right. Now, you dealt primarily with

21 military matters, I take it, sir, and you had in your

22 office, or within your headquarters, a civil affairs

23 office that was headed by a career diplomat,

24 Mr. Andreev; is that right?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 16124

1 Q. What you tried to do was to complement each

2 other's functions, depending upon whether the

3 particular issue at hand was military or civil?

4 A. We were always talking to each other to make

5 certain that whatever we were doing was -- there was a

6 synergy between us.

7 Q. All right. And I believe -- just two or

8 three days after your arrival, you had the opportunity

9 to meet with President Izetbegovic; correct?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And discuss three things, I believe:

12 Necessary repairs to the sanitary system in Sarajevo;

13 unauthorised crossings into Sarajevo airport, in

14 violation of agreements relating to the airport; and

15 thirdly, your request to President Izetbegovic to allow

16 ethnic Bosnian Serb residents residing in the city of

17 Tuzla to be able to leave and travel to a Serbian

18 enclave, Zvornik, if they wished to; is that right?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And despite, ostensibly, agreement on all

21 three issues, you noticed very little progress on any

22 of these issues throughout your six month tour in

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina; isn't that right?

24 A. That's correct.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, when you come to a

Page 16125

1 suitable moment.

2 MR. SAYERS: This would be a convenient

3 moment, Your Honour. Just for the Trial Chamber's

4 information, in the interests of expediency, I've

5 prepared a binder of exhibits that I intend to use with

6 Brigadier Hayes. And for everybody's easy reference,

7 I've actually highlighted the points which I want to

8 refer to, so we don't have to flip through papers. And

9 I'd like to distribute those just at the beginning of

10 the session this afternoon.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

12 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

13 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, would you be back,

14 please, at ten past 2.00, when we will continue your

15 evidence.

16 I must warn you not to speak to anybody about

17 your evidence, until it's over, and don't let anybody

18 speak to you, please. Thank you. Ten past 2.00.

19 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.40 p.m.







Page 16126

1 --- On resuming at 2.13 p.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

3 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President, and

4 good afternoon, Brigadier Hayes.

5 Q. Before we broke for lunch, I was just about

6 to turn to the question of the Vance-Owen Plan, about

7 which you made some comments in the statement that's

8 been identified as your evidence today, and I believe

9 that you said, sir, on page 3 of your statement, that

10 on April the 15th, 1993, which was the day before the

11 fighting broke out in the Lasva Valley, your

12 headquarters started work on the military aspects of

13 the implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. Is that

14 correct?

15 A. That's correct. We were doing contingency

16 planning.

17 Q. I wonder if you could just tell us and the

18 Trial Chamber exactly what it was that you were doing

19 in connection with preparing for the military aspects

20 of the implementation of this plan, sir.

21 A. The plan involved certain -- well, the

22 division of the country, and there was some areas of

23 mixed population which were going to different ethnic

24 groups. And it was in those areas that we believed

25 there would be a requirement for a U.N. presence to

Page 16127

1 ensure that there was no violence. That's what we were

2 looking at, and we were assessing the strength that we

3 had against the requirement that might come up if the

4 Vance-Owen Plan was implemented.

5 Q. Was it your view, sir, as a high-ranking

6 officer in UNPROFOR, that the Vance-Owen Plan actually

7 called for the ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 and for those divisions to be essentially homogeneous

9 areas; ethnically, that is?

10 A. I don't think so. As I remember, there were

11 areas which were still mixed which were to be passed or

12 were to fall under the jurisdiction of either Serbs or

13 Croats or Bosnian. I had no perception of there being

14 what might amount to an ethnic division of the country.

15 Q. Would it be fair to say that you did not pay

16 a great deal of attention to the political details of

17 the Vance-Owen Plan and the way in which political

18 power was to be distributed and shared in each of the

19 provinces?

20 A. That would be correct.

21 Q. In that case, there's not a lot of sense in

22 taking up too much time on this subject, other than to

23 say the following thing, sir.

24 Your primary focus at this time, in the

25 middle of April of 1993, and very understandably, was

Page 16128

1 upon the terrible situation that was occurring in

2 Srebrenica; correct?

3 A. That is correct. That was the focus of the

4 United Nations Security Council at the time, and the

5 resolutions that they were passing obviously required

6 work from us for them to be implemented.

7 Q. Yes, sir. And on April the 16th, when the

8 fighting in the Lasva Valley broke out, your attention

9 was consumed, if you like, with negotiations between

10 Mr. Radavan Karadzic, on the one hand, and Ratko Mladic

11 on the other and -- well, actually between those two;

12 isn't that correct?

13 A. Well, they weren't negotiating between

14 themselves, no. My attention was focused on

15 discussions at Sarajevo Airport between

16 General Halilovic of the Bosnian army and

17 General Mladic to get a ceasefire around the Srebrenica

18 area, as was called for in United Nations Security

19 Council Resolution 819, I think it was.

20 And subsequently to that and once that

21 ceasefire had been agreed, I was directed by General

22 Volgren and General Morillon to work out the details of

23 it to ensure that humanitarian aid was allowed through

24 to Srebrenica, and a U.N. presence was established

25 there.

Page 16129

1 Q. So there were active negotiations under way

2 is what you're saying, I believe, between General

3 Halilovic, on the one hand, the commander of the ABiH,

4 and General Mladic, the commander of the BSA. Is that

5 right?

6 A. That was the high-level negotiation. Later

7 on, both those commanders-in-chief delegated

8 responsibilities for negotiations to -- General Mladic

9 delegated it to General Gvero, and General Halilovic

10 delegated it to Mr. Siber, Colonel Siber.

11 Q. One matter of detail concerning the

12 Vance-Owen Plan, and then I'll move on to another

13 subject.

14 It's true, is it not, as far as you

15 understand it, that Mr. Karadzic signed the plan on May

16 the 2nd on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, but it was

17 subject to ratification by the Bosnian Serb assembly or

18 parliament in Pale?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And I believe, sir, that the plan was

21 rejected by that body on May the 6th of 1993.

22 A. I cannot remember the exact date, but it was

23 rejected by them, correct.

24 Q. All right. Let me turn to the fighting that

25 occurred in April, sir, and the negotiations that led

Page 16130

1 to a ceasefire.

2 We know that fighting broke out on April the

3 16th, and we also know that a ceasefire agreement was

4 negotiated at high level about four days later between

5 General Morillon, Ambassador Jean-Pierre Thebault,

6 Generals Halilovic and Petkovic, and also

7 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart from BritBat was there, and

8 this ceasefire agreement was negotiated in Zenica. Do

9 you know anything about that ceasefire agreement?

10 A. I'm afraid I don't. I was not involved in

11 those negotiations.

12 Q. All right. You were asked some questions

13 during your brief direct examination here today

14 concerning the chain of command and the way in which

15 orders filtered down from the supreme commander of the

16 HVO, who was Mate Boban, to subordinate military

17 commanders. Let me ask you -- let me ask to have

18 distributed the booklet of exhibits that I have put

19 together and, for the Court's information, these have

20 already been distributed both to the Prosecution and to

21 the co-defendant and to the interpreters, Your Honour.

22 I wonder if we could have this marked as a

23 collective exhibit. It has separate tab numbers.

24 THE REGISTRAR: Document marked D201/1.


Page 16131

1 Q. Brigadier, just for your information, this is

2 an assembly of ten exhibits in total, and I have

3 highlighted the portions which I want to draw your

4 attention to. If you would just turn to Tab 1 on pages

5 3 and 4 of that tab. This tab is a milinfosum number

6 170 from the 1st Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment,

7 dated April 18, 1993. And attached to this milinfosum

8 is an agreement reached between President Izetbegovic

9 and Mate Boban for a ceasefire on April the 18th,

10 1993. Have you seen this document before?

11 A. Not that I can recall.

12 Q. All right. I wonder if I could just ask the

13 usher to place two previously marked exhibits on the

14 ELMO, and this subject need not detain us for very

15 long, sir.

16 The first document, sir, has already been

17 marked D84/1, and it is a copy of an order signed on

18 the same day as the ceasefire agreement negotiated at

19 the very highest level, signed by Brigadier Milivoj

20 Petkovic, and carrying into force the four points that

21 were agreed upon by President Izetbegovic and President

22 Boban.

23 Now, speaking from your perspective as a

24 military man, this is the way that you would normally

25 expect the chain of command to work; the supreme

Page 16132

1 commander passes an order down, and then the commander

2 in chief of the armed forces distributes the order to

3 his subordinate operative zones; isn't that right?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. All right. And if you would look at the

6 second document, Brigadier, previously marked Exhibit

7 Z715. This is an order entered the same day, or issued

8 the same day by Colonel Blaskic, the commander of the

9 Central Bosnia operative zone, to the brigades and

10 forces under his command, and carrying into force the

11 order previously issued by Brigadier Petkovic, his

12 commanding officer, and by President Boban.

13 Once again, sir, would you agree that that's

14 the way that you would expect the chain of command to

15 work?

16 A. I would.

17 Q. Thank you very much. That completes the

18 questions I have for that.

19 The next question, Brigadier, concerns the

20 mixed military working group about which you testified

21 today. Would it be fair to characterise the fixed

22 military working group as the only extant form, on a

23 formal basis, that existed for an ongoing dialogue

24 between the three warring factions in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian

Page 16133

1 Muslims, and the Bosnian Serbs?

2 A. Yes. But there were mixed military working

3 groups at all levels. The one that I used to attend

4 was the one at the highest levels, between the

5 commanders in chief, and if they delegated to their

6 immediate subordinates, then I would chair those

7 negotiations as well.

8 Q. And as I understand it, sir, for the Muslim

9 contingent, if I may characterise them that way,

10 General Halilovic initially was the highest -- was

11 initially the commander in chief of the ABiH, to be

12 replaced in the middle of June, I believe, or at the

13 beginning of June, June the 8th to be precise, by

14 General Rasim Delic; is that correct?

15 A. I believe General Halilovic was replaced

16 earlier than that, because it was General Delic who

17 came to Kiseljak as commander in chief to negotiate

18 with General Petkovic, when General Petkovic refused to

19 speak to Siber, and that was at the beginning of --

20 Q. Yes, you've already said that was May the

21 8th.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Very well. But you would agree that General

24 Halilovic was replaced at some point in May by General

25 Rasim Delic, as the commander in chief?

Page 16134

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Very well. And occasionally their deputy,

3 Colonel Siber, would negotiate in the mixed military

4 working group, if his immediate commanding officer was

5 not available; is that right?

6 A. Either Colonel Siber or Colonel Divjak.

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. One of those two.

9 Q. And for the Croats it was always General

10 Petkovic who was negotiating while you were present

11 with the mixed military working group, or his

12 subordinate, Colonel Lucic, from Mostar. Is that

13 right, as far as you can remember?

14 A. That is correct. Though on many occasions --

15 well, several occasions in Sarajevo, when we were

16 having meetings, it was the commander of the HVO

17 brigade in Sarajevo, whose name I cannot remember at

18 the moment. But he represented the Croats, and Colonel

19 Lucic was always on hand with him.

20 Q. All right. And for the Bosnian Serbs it was

21 General Ratko Mladic, who was the principal negotiator,

22 or his deputy, General Gvero; is that right?

23 A. That's correct. I did not negotiate in

24 Sarajevo Airport with anyone other than General Gvero,

25 though, on the ground I made several or had several

Page 16135

1 negotiations with General Milanovic, the Serbian chief

2 of staff.

3 Q. Now, it's true, is it not, that Mr. Kordic

4 never attended a single one of the mixed military

5 working group meetings that you attended?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. No one contended that his attendance was

8 essential, did they?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Or even necessary, important or helpful, for

11 that matter; is that right?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. All right. In fact, it would be fair to say

14 that his name did not crop up, as far as you can

15 remember, during the mixed military working group

16 meetings over which -- at which you were present; is

17 that right?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. All right. Now, you say, sir, at page 5 of

20 your statement, that at some point following the

21 concerns or your involvement with the Srebrenica

22 matters, you turned your attention to the fighting in

23 Central Bosnia, and that you received a briefing from

24 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart on the 26th of April. You

25 said that on page 5 of your statement.

Page 16136

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. All right. Basically, the subjects that you

3 were discussing, and the briefing that you were

4 receiving from your subordinate, was the question of

5 how UNPROFOR could react to dampen down the fighting

6 that was going on in that area; is that right?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. All right. And you both agreed that this was

9 difficult to do, because UNPROFOR had no mandate to

10 become involved in the fighting, one way or the other;

11 is that right?

12 A. That's correct. But by continuing to operate

13 framework operations, as we called them, and

14 establishing an U.N. presence in the area, it was

15 possible to deter attacks on civilians and also,

16 obviously, it helped to secure the area for the

17 delivery of humanitarian aid. But principally the

18 presence helped to deter attacks on civilians. But you

19 could not be everywhere at the same time, obviously.

20 Q. You would agree that the principal mission of

21 BritBat, anyway, was to facilitate UNHCR aid convoys,

22 the delivery of humanitarian aid to those people that

23 needed it?

24 A. That was the mandate as stated, but the

25 mandate was always being stretched.

Page 16137

1 Q. All right. Now, you were briefed, that the

2 military commander in the Vitez-Busovaca pocket was in

3 fact Colonel Tihomir Blaskic, the commander of the

4 Central Bosnia operative zone, under General Milivoj

5 Petkovic; isn't that correct?

6 A. I can remember Blaskic's name coming up. I

7 am sure that I knew he was a commander in the region,

8 but I honestly can't remember the exact detail of what

9 I was told.

10 Q. Perfectly understandable, sir. It was a long

11 time ago. Now, to the best of your recollection, the

12 name Dario Kordic did not arise during your briefing by

13 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, did it?

14 A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

15 Q. Very well. Now, you gave some testimony,

16 sir, surrounding a joint ceasefire agreement covering

17 all of Bosnia that was negotiated on May the 8th of

18 1993, between Generals Halilovic and Mladic. And I

19 believe that a joint statement was prepared and signed

20 by the two Generals and issued -- sort of announced in

21 front of TV cameras. Is that consistent with your

22 recollection?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And this agreement announced the arrival of a

25 ceasefire for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I take it?

Page 16138

1 A. That's correct. Between the Serbs and the

2 Muslims. And it was -- it was a bit of a surprise.

3 Q. And, frankly, it didn't come to pass, did

4 it? The Muslims and the Serbs did not cease fighting

5 from May the 8th onwards?

6 A. No ceasefire lasted a great length of time,

7 but that was one of the earliest ceasefires, and there

8 was certainly a great deal of hope attached to it, an

9 expectation that for once we might succeed.

10 Q. All right. Now, Brigadier, no criticism is

11 intended by this comment, but on page 8 of your

12 statement you said that on June the 8th Halilovic was

13 removed from his seat as commander in chief of the

14 Bosnian army and was replaced by General Delic. You

15 may have had a clearer recollection three years ago

16 than you do -- well, three-and-a-half years ago than

17 you do today. Is that consistent with your

18 recollection?

19 A. I remember that General Halilovic had been

20 attending the negotiations. There was a dispute

21 between himself and President Izetbegovic about his

22 attendance at a meeting in Sarajevo. He refused to

23 attend the meeting. He was ordered to attend the

24 meeting. He had to get there in very quick time. He

25 was not able to take the Mount Igman route and pass

Page 16139

1 through the tunnel under the airport. We offered to

2 take him, under UNPROFOR escort. He was an extremely

3 frightened man, but he was ordered to attend by

4 President Izetbegovic, and he came with us. And I

5 believe that is when we negotiated the 8th of May

6 ceasefire.

7 After that, General Halilovic was no longer

8 on the scene, and the next time that we had a

9 negotiation at commander in chief level, it was General

10 Delic who came along. And my understanding was that

11 General Halilovic had handed over command or, perhaps,

12 been removed from command of the Bosnian army, and

13 General Delic had taken over.

14 Q. Very well, sir. It's the timing of the

15 removal that is of interest to the Defence. And you

16 did say that it was around June the 8th of 1993. Let

17 me just suggest to you that one day after that,

18 actually, on that day, June the 8th, a major offensive

19 was launched by the ABiH in the area of Travnik, and

20 then one day later another major offensive was launched

21 against the HVO by the ABiH in the area of Kakanj.

22 Does that sound consistent with your recollection of

23 the course of the fighting, sir?

24 A. I remember that there were Bosnian offensives

25 taking place and the fighting there certainly did flare

Page 16140

1 up at about that time. I can remember there being

2 attacks in Travnik. I can remember there being attacks

3 in Kakanj.

4 Q. All right. Now, in your statement, on page 8

5 you refer to a meeting of the Joint Operations Centre

6 in Vitez on June the 6th of 1993. Is it your

7 understanding that this was a joint forum established

8 pursuant to the ceasefire agreement negotiated in

9 April, earlier in the year, for Muslims and Croats to

10 list their grievances and to resolve those grievances

11 without fighting?

12 A. On the 6th of June?

13 Q. Yes. Just to --

14 A. If you would.

15 Q. Yes. You just said, on page 8 of your

16 statement: "On the 6th of June --" and I appreciate

17 dates are difficult to remember so many years

18 afterwards, but you said in your statement:

19 "On the 6th of June, I attended a Joint

20 Operation Centre meeting at Vitez. The meeting,

21 attended by the Muslims and the Croats, was used to

22 list violations of the ceasefire or problems that they

23 were having with the other side."

24 Maybe you have no recollection of that.

25 A. I'm sorry, but at this stage I have no

Page 16141

1 recollection of that. I do remember, though, that

2 meetings that occurred at lower levels were quite often

3 used as a forum in which to put forward grievances.

4 The bones of contention were normally the recovery of

5 bodies or the evacuation and exchange of wounded.

6 Q. All right. Let me just ask you, sir, were

7 you aware that General Enver Hadzihasanovic, the

8 commander of the 3rd Corps, had, for several weeks

9 prior to the launching of the Travnik offensive and the

10 Kakanj offensive, been refusing to meet with his

11 counterpart, Colonel Blaskic, the commander of the

12 Central Bosnia Operative Zone, to negotiate an amicable

13 resolution of differences without open warfare?

14 A. I do have recollections of there being

15 difficulty in being able to establish meetings at that

16 level, yes. The exact details of it, I cannot

17 remember.

18 Q. If I could ask you to turn to Tab 2, sir, of

19 the documents. We'll go through these fairly quickly.

20 It's the last page that I'm interested in. There,

21 BritBat's intelligence officer makes the observation

22 that:

23 "Our CO's continued attempts to talk

24 constructively with command at 3rd Corps have fallen on

25 deaf ears, and the command appears to be sidestepping

Page 16142

1 the issue."

2 This is a milinfosum from the 1st Battalion

3 of the Prince of Wales Own, number 43, dated the May

4 the 21st, 1993. Does that refresh your recollection a

5 little bit about the problems that were occurring in

6 trying to establish a constructive dialogue between the

7 ABiH commander and the HVO commander?

8 A. I can recall at the time that the ABiH had

9 the upper hand, and that having the upper hand, they

10 were reluctant to enter negotiations which would have

11 required a cessation of hostilities. They kept going

12 with their offensives. And my recollection of it is

13 that the HVO were getting quite desperate because they

14 were taking a bit of a beating from the BiH, and that

15 whilst they were very keen to have the negotiations and

16 to stop, the BiH, having the upper hand, were not happy

17 to let them off the ropes.

18 Q. All right. And we can travel through the

19 next few exhibits very quickly, sir.

20 At Tab 3 is a milinfosum from the very next

21 day, number 23, dated May the 22nd, 1993, and the

22 observation is made by BritBat that:

23 "Blaskic has been keen to attend meetings

24 that the commander of the 1PWO PWO," Lieutenant-Colonel

25 Duncan at that time, "had been trying to arrange."

Page 16143

1 And then the milinfosum goes on to say:

2 "But Hadzihasanovic has stated that while he

3 is personally happy to attend, he must first consult

4 with Halilovic, the comment being that it would appear

5 that the commander of the 3rd Corps is prevaricating

6 for some reason, as it is hard to believe that he is

7 unable to contact his next higher command."

8 Were you informed by Lieutenant-Colonel

9 Duncan that these difficulties in establishing a

10 constructive dialogue were occurring?

11 A. I was well aware that within the BiH, the

12 requirement to pass orders down the line was -- the

13 reason that orders were not passed down the line or

14 appeared to be ignored at levels was always put down to

15 the lack of communication that the BiH had, and that

16 from their headquarters in Sarajevo, it was not always

17 possible for them to reach their commanders on the

18 ground. Personally, I found that hard to believe.

19 Q. Very well, sir. Could you just turn to

20 Tab 4. This is another milinfosum four days later, as

21 June is approaching, milinfosum 27, where it's noted

22 that it has been Hadzihasanovic who has proved to be

23 unwilling to attend the meetings that the commanding

24 officer of BritBat was trying to put together.

25 I take it that you received copies of these

Page 16144

1 milinfosums, or extracts of them, on a fairly regular

2 basis.

3 A. All these milinfosums would have been passed

4 into the milinfo or the G2 cell at the headquarters.

5 They would have been consolidated, and a summary of

6 these milinfo summaries themselves would have been

7 passed around the headquarters. I would not have seen

8 each one of these individually unless there was

9 something of particular significance or particular

10 importance in them.

11 So I would have known about it, and it would

12 probably have been presented, in the daily morning

13 briefing that we had, in the summary of the milinfo

14 that was given out at those meetings. I was aware of

15 the difficulty, certainly.

16 Q. Thank you very much, Brigadier.

17 If I could ask you to turn to the next

18 milinfosum, number 5 -- Tab 5, rather, milinfosum 37,

19 dated June the 5th, 1993.

20 Before we cover what's on page 2, would you

21 agree that the offensive that was launched in Travnik

22 and Kakanj was an offensive that would have required

23 considerable advanced logistical preparation and

24 involved many thousands of troops?

25 A. I don't think necessarily it would have

Page 16145

1 involved considerable logistic preparation.

2 Very briefly, the situation, in a simplistic

3 way, was that the Serbs and, to a lesser extent, the

4 Croat military had heavy weapons and firepower,

5 artillery, tanks. The Muslim strength or the Bosnian

6 strength was in infantry. And in areas where firepower

7 could predominate on the -- could dominate the

8 battlefield, then Serbs and Croats always had the upper

9 hand. In areas where infantry could dominate the

10 battlefield, then the Muslims or the Bosnians would

11 have the upper hand. Consequently, urban areas were

12 the favoured area for the Bosnians to operate in, and

13 wooded areas. It doesn't take a great deal of logistic

14 preparation to get an infantry offensive going. You've

15 got to get the men there, but there are not a

16 tremendous amount of supplies. So from a sort of

17 professional military point of view, logistic

18 preparations would not have been very lengthy for it.

19 Q. All right. And in your professional military

20 opinion, Brigadier, wouldn't you agree that the Lasva

21 Valley area was a pretty much ideal battleground for an

22 infantry battle, if you like, with large amounts of

23 wooded, hilly areas overlooking the Lasva Valley, if

24 you like?

25 A. Yes, there was certainly plenty of

Page 16146

1 opportunity for infantry to dominate areas of the

2 battlefield, particularly the urban areas.

3 Q. All right, Brigadier, thank you.

4 Let's just move on to this milinfosum number

5 37 in Tab 5, the exhibit at which you're looking.

6 Apparently Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan met General

7 Hadzihasanovic, who adopted an extremely hard-line

8 attitude throughout, and left after only 25 minutes to

9 attend another meeting. Apparently, he began the

10 meeting with the assertion that fighting would soon

11 begin in Kakanj, and then goes on to explain why, and

12 then makes the observation that negotiation with the

13 HVO was not an option. Then he also makes the

14 observation that:

15 "Hadzihasanovic and Suvalic," who I think

16 should be "Dugalic", but I stand to be corrected on

17 that, "were disparaging of the international political

18 attempts to resolve the situation in Bosnia, and that

19 the General stated, when informed of impending troop

20 increases, that he had little faith in diplomacy and

21 the political process."

22 And then the observation is made, sir, that

23 the BiH were no longer prepared to restrain themselves

24 and were likely to take the military initiative in the

25 Lasva Valley, where they enjoy a tactical advantage

Page 16147

1 over the HVO, which I think is broadly consistent with

2 what you have just said. And there's nothing

3 surprising in these comments to you, as you read them

4 seven years later, is there?

5 A. No. No surprise at all.

6 Q. If you would turn to the next milinfosum,

7 sir, June the 6th, which is two days before the BiH

8 offensive started. The last page contains the comment

9 that:

10 "The prospects for the ceasefire holding in

11 Travnik look remote, with both sides demonstrating

12 little faith in the motives of the other."

13 And then the observation is made that:

14 "3rd Corps, judging by the attitude of its

15 commander, seems poised for further military action,

16 having clearly rejected the concept of negotiation."

17 And then the observation is made that:

18 "The restraining influence at present may

19 well be the progress north of the large convoy destined

20 for Tuzla."

21 At the time that you were discussing with

22 General Petkovic some arrangements regarding this Tuzla

23 convoy, sir, were you aware that a large offensive had

24 been launched in the Travnik region, around Travnik and

25 Novi Travnik?

Page 16148

1 A. Yes. We knew that there was an offensive and

2 there was fighting there, yeah.

3 Q. All right. The next tab, sir, continues the

4 story, and on the third page -- it's actually marked

5 with a "5" at the bottom. 00273938 is the number. It

6 says that:

7 "1PWO," presumably Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan,

8 "met Enver Hadzihasanovic last week. He remarked that

9 Kakanj would be the next town to experience fighting.

10 Similarly, two independent visitors to 3rd Corps HQ

11 today were told that fighting was taking place in the

12 town."

13 And that's the 9th of June, sir.

14 A. What page are we looking at?

15 Q. It's page -- it's stamped on the bottom

16 "00273938". Are you with me?

17 A. Yes. It's paragraph 17, isn't it?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. I see, yes.

20 Q. And if you could just turn to the last page,

21 sir, this milinfosum is dated two days before the

22 Convoy of Joy incident, about which you testified and

23 which we'll cover in just a minute, but the observation

24 is made that:

25 "It would appear that Enver Hadzihasanovic

Page 16149

1 and 3rd Corps are orchestrating a carefully-planned and

2 phased attack against the HVO in the areas of Travnik

3 and the western Lasva Valley. In this context,

4 Hadzihasanovic's constant refusals to meet Blaskic and

5 his failure to attend negotiations concerning the

6 situation in Travnik during that phase of the current

7 fighting perhaps receive explanation."

8 Other observations are made on that page, and

9 we can all read them. There's no point in belabouring

10 the issue. But there is no question, sir, that the BiH

11 were militarily dominant in the Lasva Valley and that

12 they were actually prosecuting their advantage at the

13 beginning of June of 1993. Would you agree with that?

14 A. I would.

15 Q. All right, sir. Now let's turn to the Convoy

16 of Joy.

17 On June the 11th, the ABiH offensive had been

18 going on for three days. Were you aware that large

19 numbers of refugees -- it's been estimated by the

20 European Community Monitoring Mission that there were

21 as many as 20.000 Bosnian Croat refugees as a result of

22 that fighting -- were you aware that large numbers of

23 refugees had flooded into the Lasva Valley just shortly

24 before the Convoy of Joy arrived?

25 A. Again, I cannot remember exact details, but I

Page 16150

1 would not be the least bit surprised if refugees had

2 been -- well, people had been displaced by the fighting

3 and would be moving to areas that they considered to be

4 areas of safety.

5 Q. All right. And these were, just so the

6 record is clear, because I think there's been an

7 omission, these were Bosnian Croat refugees, weren't

8 they?

9 A. They would be, yes.

10 Q. Would you agree, sir, that it would really be

11 suicidal to route a convoy, organised by Muslims to

12 provide aid to the beleaguered and besieged town of

13 Tuzla, to route that convoy straight through the middle

14 of an active war zone?

15 A. I don't think it's suicidal. Convoys were

16 going through the whole time, because UNHCR convoys

17 were going through, NGO convoys were going through. So

18 suicidal, I think, is a bit of a strong term.

19 Q. I agree with you, but this was not an UNHCR

20 convoy, was it?

21 A. No, nor were some of the NGO convoys that

22 went through. This was not an isolated convoy that

23 didn't have UNPROFOR protection. There were other

24 convoys.

25 Q. But it was a private convoy, wasn't it?

Page 16151

1 A. It was organised by the Muslims in Tuzla.

2 Yes, it was, if you like, a commercially organised

3 convoy, and a large one.

4 Q. And so this convoy organised by the Muslims

5 was routed right up through the main supply route that

6 led to Novi Travnik, intended to take a right turn on

7 the main Travnik to Vitez road, go right through Vitez

8 to Zenica, on its way north, in the middle of a very

9 large ABiH offensive?

10 A. I can't remember the exact route that it was

11 due to take, but it was certainly coming up into the

12 Vitez pocket, traversing through the Vitez pocket and

13 then north to Zenica.

14 Q. You would agree, sir, would you not, that a

15 purely private convoy was not within the mandate of

16 BritBat to protect?

17 A. I've already said that it wasn't an UNHCR

18 sponsored convoy, therefore, as I said to General

19 Petkovic, the United Nations could not escort it. What

20 we did do, because we anticipated that there could be

21 difficulty, that's why we were asking General Petkovic

22 to ensure its safe passage, the British Battalion did

23 have its Warrior armoured vehicles out on positions

24 throughout the route, almost to picket it, if you

25 understand that sort of old fashioned expression.

Page 16152

1 Q. All right. One final question on this

2 subject, on this particular aspect of the subject. In

3 this picket duty, as you phrased it, British soldiers

4 opened fire on the HVO and actually killed three --

5 JUDGE MAY: We've had evidence about this.

6 There is little point in going over it again.

7 MR. SAYERS: I agree, Mr. President, but only

8 insofar as this witness provides an identification of

9 the number of HVO soldiers that were killed. There is

10 some fuzziness in the evidence in that, and I believe

11 the Brigadier puts it at three.

12 Q. Is that correct, sir?

13 A. I honestly -- again, I can't remember. The

14 number does seem to strike a chord, but the British

15 certainly only opened fire after the convoy had been

16 fired on itself.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. And that would be within the mandate.

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. A stretched mandate, admittedly, but

21 protecting civilian life.

22 Q. Very well. Let's move onto your involvement

23 in the events of June the 11th. Were you aware that

24 there had been a serious incident the night before you

25 arrived in the area in which eight small children had

Page 16153

1 been killed when an artillery shell exploded in a

2 playground in which they were killing?

3 A. I was not.

4 Q. Now, sir, do I understand it to be the case

5 that you had not spoken to Mr. Kordic ever, prior to

6 June the 11th of 1993?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And you've never spoken to him after that

9 date, I take it?

10 A. No. I spoke to him twice, when I was down

11 there.

12 Q. Twice on one day. Right. But from June the

13 12th to this very day, you've never spoken to him

14 again, right?

15 A. I have not, no.

16 Q. All right. So you only met him on two

17 occasions on one day, in your entire six-month tour of

18 duty?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. All right. Now, do you know what his

21 position was?

22 A. I understood, from talking to the people on

23 the ground, not exactly what his position was, but that

24 he did have the authority within the pocket to ensure

25 that the convoy would be going through, and could go

Page 16154

1 through safely. And from what I had learnt from

2 General Petkovic, as I have already said, his authority

3 appeared to be limited in that area. And I was told,

4 when I asked the question, that the man who did have

5 the authority, who could guarantee the safety of the

6 convoy, was Dario Kordic.

7 Q. All right. Let's take that one at a time.

8 You had dealt with General Petkovic fairly regularly

9 before this incident; correct?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And he was a military man, a professional

12 military man who spoke your language; is that right?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. All right. What did he tell you about

15 Mr. Kordic's authority in the Vitez-Busovaca pocket, if

16 anything?

17 A. I never asked him, and it was never

18 mentioned.

19 Q. All right. Well, who did you speak to, to

20 determine exactly what Mr. Kordic's position was, and

21 what the parameters of his powers were, if any?

22 A. I believe that we -- when I was briefed in

23 BritBat, his name may have come up, but I cannot

24 guarantee that. All I can tell you is that when I went

25 out on the ground, and the looting was happening, and

Page 16155

1 the vehicles were being hijacked, that the people on

2 the ground, when I asked with Ambassador Thebault, how

3 we could stop this, who had the authority, I was

4 directed to go to Dario Kordic.

5 Q. All right. And who directed you to go to

6 Mr. Kordic?

7 A. The individuals who were on the ground. They

8 would have been HVO soldiers, officers probably. I

9 cannot remember exactly. But it was no surprise to --

10 Q. Were they or weren't they officers or

11 soldiers, or don't you know?

12 A. I cannot remember at this time.

13 Q. I take it, that you didn't make any notes as

14 to whom you spoke?

15 A. No, not -- if it's not done in the statement,

16 as exactly to whom I spoke on the ground, no. But

17 Ambassador Thebault was there and it seemed to be no

18 surprise to him.

19 Q. Do you know whether these people were members

20 of the home guard, or members of the HVO?

21 A. They were members of the HVO, as far as I

22 could ascertain.

23 Q. All right.

24 A. I had no doubt in my own mind that I was

25 talking to people on the ground who, having hijacked

Page 16156

1 vehicles -- that there was a chain of command there.

2 The people on the ground were not prepared to stop it.

3 And when I asked them, they passed me up the line

4 metaphorically to Dario Kordic.

5 Q. All right. It wouldn't be particularly

6 surprising, in an area thronged by refugees, sir, for

7 the political figure to be pointed to, in a time of

8 turmoil such as this. Wouldn't you agree?

9 A. No, I wouldn't agree.

10 Q. You wouldn't?

11 A. No. I wouldn't agree because it wasn't a

12 political matter. It was a straightforward matter of

13 indiscipline by soldiers on the ground; soldiers and

14 policemen, for that matter, on the ground.

15 Q. Did you ever see Mr. Kordic give any orders

16 to military people, sir?

17 A. No, I didn't. Because when I spoke to him,

18 he assured me he was doing his best, and that he would

19 gather the convoy together; that there were no -- no, I

20 could not -- I could not swear that there were people

21 there to whom he could have passed the order, when I

22 spoke to him.

23 Q. And it's true that you didn't engage him in

24 any dialogue at all, as to what his military power was,

25 if any, did you?

Page 16157

1 A. No, I had no reason to engage him in any

2 military dialogue, as you put it. I was merely there

3 with Ambassador Thebault, because he was the person I

4 was directed to, by people on the ground, involved in

5 the looting, involved in the hijacking of the vehicles,

6 clearly acting in an undisciplined way. I was directed

7 to him as the person who could put a stop to that and

8 who could gather together the remnants of the convoy

9 and get them under the protection of the British

10 Battalion in the quarry.

11 Q. All right. Was there anybody else at this

12 meeting, other than you and Ambassador Thebault?

13 Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, for example?

14 A. No, Colonel Duncan was not there. He was out

15 on the ground, as far as I can recall, commanding his

16 battalion and getting the vehicles -- getting the

17 lorries from the convoy that were scattered in the

18 pocket, shepherded as far as he could into the quarry.

19 There were some other people there. I cannot remember

20 who they were. I would surmise that Anto Valenta was

21 there, because subsequently he led us to the quarry.

22 But I could not again swear that he was present during

23 these discussions.

24 Q. Nothing wrong with that. You just can't

25 remember. It was a long time ago. As far as you

Page 16158

1 remember, it was Ambassador Thebault, you, Mr. Kordic

2 and maybe some others?

3 A. And I suspect -- or I believe, if it was not

4 Anto Valenta who was there, he certainly came to the

5 area because he was the one who undertook to take

6 leaders to the quarry. We had a certain amount of

7 difficulty in finding where Mr. Kordic was.

8 Q. [Microphone not activated]

9 A. No. He was a political figure, I believe,

10 but I don't know exactly.

11 Q. There is not, sir, is there, a single

12 reference in your statement of three years ago, given

13 to the Prosecution's investigators, to the effect that

14 you made an inquiry as to who you should see, and you

15 were directed, by persons unknown, to go and see

16 Mr. Kordic?

17 A. If there isn't, then it should be in there,

18 because I can remember full well asking on the ground.

19 Q. All right. Let me just ask you, see if I can

20 jog your memory on this. Had you been briefed that

21 Mr. Kordic was the vice-president of the presidency of

22 the Croatian community of Herceg-Bosna?

23 A. I understood that he had links with

24 Mr. Boban, but at what stage that information came to

25 me, I honestly again don't know. At this stage of the

Page 16159

1 time that I was in Bosnia, what was happening in

2 Central Bosnia was very much new territory to me. I

3 had been entirely focused on Srebrenica, on the

4 problems between Muslims and Serbs. What was happening

5 in the Lasva Valley was very largely left to the

6 British Battalion, as a very effective organisation,

7 which again almost had its own chain of command down to

8 the British Brigadier, who was the senior British

9 officer on the case. And indeed, they were more likely

10 to pass information and answer to them than they were

11 to the United Nations. So this was new.

12 I do know that I was told at some stage that

13 Dario Kordic had links to Mr. Boban. I understood at

14 some stage that -- I understood them to be Mr. Boban's

15 deputy and a political military figure, but at what

16 stage I was told that, I'm afraid I could not tell you.

17 Q. All right. Do you recall whether you were

18 told that he was one of the vice-presidents of the

19 Croat political party or the principal Croat political

20 party, the HDZ-BiH?

21 A. I don't recall that. I mean, when you say he

22 was a vice-president, it does strike a chord in my

23 mind, but again, at what time? I wouldn't -- I

24 honestly could not say. I mean, when I -- I can only

25 go back to saying, in regard to all of this, that I had

Page 16160

1 not seen Dario Kordic before, I had not had dealings

2 with Colonel Blaskic. Indeed, it wasn't until right

3 near the end of my time that I met Colonel Blaskic.

4 When I went into the pocket, it was to assess

5 the situation, give direction to the British Battalion,

6 who were under pressure, who had stretched the mandate,

7 in the action trying to protect the convoy. When I saw

8 the looting happening on the ground, I enquired as to

9 who had the authority to stop this, because nobody on

10 the ground appeared either to have the authority or the

11 inclination to stop it. And I was directed to Dario

12 Kordic.

13 Q. All right. Did you ever subsequently discuss

14 this incident, the Convoy of Joy incident with General

15 Petkovic?

16 A. No, I don't think I saw General Petkovic. I

17 don't know when I next saw him. General Petkovic, at

18 some stage, almost vanished from the scene. I have a

19 feeling that shortly after this time we didn't actually

20 see him again. I cannot say that I spoke to General

21 Petkovic about it.

22 Q. You've described the attitude that you saw in

23 Mr. Valenta, in the HVO troops regarding this convoy,

24 as one of indifference. You can certainly understand

25 why the attitude would be one of indifference, given

Page 16161

1 the offensive that was taking place against the HVO

2 simultaneously, can't you?

3 A. Yes. You can understand it in that context.

4 But indifference to the convoy does not give you any

5 reason or any right to kill drivers, to hijack

6 vehicles, to loot vehicles. Indifference is not a

7 strong enough reason to let actions like that continue

8 under your very nose, if you are a military force.

9 Q. Very well.

10 A. And the convoy was civilian. There were no

11 military in the convoy. They were civilian. And the

12 drivers were pulled out of the cab, as I understand it,

13 and they were shot. Indeed, I think some were killed

14 in other rather more unpleasant ways.

15 Q. All right. You met Mr. Kordic the second

16 time on June the 11th, later in the evening, I believe,

17 and he told you that he was doing his best to try to

18 repacket or repackage the convoy; right?

19 Would you just turn to Tab 8 of the exhibit,

20 where the observation says that: "The restrictions on

21 the free movement of the Convoy of Mercy would appear

22 to have been lifted in accordance with Dario Kordic's

23 instructions of yesterday. The dispersed vehicles had

24 been repacketed and moved relatively unmolested to the

25 Zenica mountain road where BiH control begins."

Page 16162

1 Just one question, sir.

2 A. Paragraph 2, is it?

3 Q. Yes, it is. The highlighted language there.

4 Do you know what Mr. Kordic did or to whom he spoke to

5 try to resolve this situation?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. All right.

8 A. I don't remember seeing any vehicles come

9 into the quarry while I was there, other than escorted

10 by the British Battalion. I did not see any vehicles

11 that were brought in by HVO. The only vehicles that I

12 saw in possession of the HVO were ones that were

13 hijacked.

14 Q. All right. Brigadier, we are making very

15 good progress. I don't have very much for you. Just

16 one question in connection with paragraph 17 of the

17 statement that you signed relating to the town of

18 Fojnica.

19 You say that despite an agreement signed on

20 the 13th of June 1993, on the 2nd of July, fighting

21 spread to -- fighting which had been north of Kiseljak

22 spread to Fojnica. You were instrumental in

23 discussions that were directed to having the town of

24 Fojnica declared a safe area, or a safe haven?

25 A. Yes.

Page 16163

1 Q. And you met all of the Croat Muslim

2 political, religious, and military leaders, right? And

3 they all agreed to try to cooperate to avoid a conflict

4 and to avoid interethnic tensions; is that right?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. And, in fact, the agreement, so signed on

7 June the 13th, supported, I believe, by the local

8 military commanders, made Fojnica a so-called "peace

9 area," is that right?

10 A. That's right. They wished to see it

11 established as a safe area, in the same way that other

12 areas had been so designated by the U.N. Security

13 Council. That was not possible, and they then opted to

14 make Fojnica an area of medical importance, I think was

15 the phrase that was used, under the Geneva Convention,

16 because there were some hospitals there, and which

17 particularly specialised in rehabilitation of the

18 wounded.

19 Q. I wonder if you would just turn to Tab 10 in

20 the package, which is an European Community Monitoring

21 Commission background report concerning the condensed

22 history of events in Fojnica, and it's dated October

23 the 6th, 1983.

24 Just by way of background, Brigadier, I

25 believe that on June the 30th, your commanding officer,

Page 16164

1 General Morillon, came down to Fojnica and held up

2 Fojnica to the world as an example of what could be

3 achieved, if the two sides and their leaders genuinely

4 wanted to live in harmony, right?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. All of the international press was there, so

7 far as you are aware?

8 A. -- was there, certainly. Fatal.

9 Q. And then two days later the ABiH attacked

10 Fojnica and basically displaced approximately 6.500 of

11 the Croat population that lived in that town; isn't

12 that right, sir?

13 A. I don't know how many people were displaced.

14 Certainly fighting began, and subsequently I learned

15 that it was, or I was told that it was a Bosnian army

16 attack, probably the 7th Muslim Brigade. They were not

17 people who were involved in the town itself or in the

18 agreement. They were forces that came from outside,

19 which was the one thing that both sides in Fojnica

20 feared would happen.

21 Q. Would it be fair to say that in your

22 experience in your six month tour, the 7th Muslim

23 Brigade could regularly be expected to be seen whenever

24 there was fighting going on?

25 A. There was so much -- I know what you mean,

Page 16165

1 but when there was fighting going on in Central Bosnia,

2 there was always the talk of the 7th Muslim Brigade

3 being used. It was as much a psychological ploy as

4 anything else. Certainly, they were effective

5 infantry, shock troops, if you like. Quite often, the

6 7th Muslim Brigade was announced as being on its way,

7 with the psychological -- to give a psychological

8 impact and to actually create fear in people. They

9 certainly could not have been in as many different

10 places as they were alleged to have been.

11 Q. Very well. If you would just turn to the

12 second page of Tab 10, sir, right at the bottom.

13 Observations are made by the ECMM to the effect that

14 only 150 Croats were left in town, that before the

15 fighting began, 41 per cent of the population, or 6.600

16 people were of Croat ethnicity, and that the majority

17 had left for Kiseljak. And that prior to their

18 departure, they had been subjected to discrimination

19 and the other things that this report goes into.

20 Is that consistent with your recollection of

21 the events that occurred in Fojnica?

22 A. I can remember the fighting. The fighting

23 split the population. The town, I believe, fell into

24 the hands of the Bosnians. The Croat front line moved

25 to the east -- the far side of actually a handicapped

Page 16166

1 childs hospital. Whether the Croat population of

2 Fojnica was subject to intimidation or not, I don't

3 know. The two communities did want to live together.

4 I expect, when people are coming from inside,

5 particularly if the word is that it's the 7th Muslim

6 Brigade, the sensible would leave in fear of their

7 lives and would have gone to the nearest perceived safe

8 area, which would have been Kiseljak.

9 Q. Thank you. I am now through with the package

10 of exhibits. So you can close that up. I just have a

11 few subjects to touch upon before I close.

12 Would it be fair to say, sir, that following

13 the Convoy of Joy incident, you turned your attention

14 immediately to higher level affairs, if you like, at

15 Sarajevo Airport, and that you presided over

16 discussions between Generals Mladic, Delic, and

17 Petkovic on June the 15th at a mixed military working

18 group meeting?

19 A. I can't remember the date, but certainly

20 attention switched back to Sarajevo, which at that

21 stage was again becoming the centre of the

22 International Community's interest; and the beginning

23 of the American desire to use aircraft to destroy or

24 contain the Serb artillery was beginning to hit the

25 headlines, and also the whole saga of the siege of

Page 16167

1 Sarajevo was beginning to capture everybody's

2 attention.

3 Q. All right. You also --

4 A. That's not to say, though, that the fighting

5 in Central Bosnia was not important. There was a lot

6 of fighting going on there. And there were certain

7 things that did focus our attention. One was the

8 plight of the refugees in Kakanj. We ended up with a

9 group of them living with the French battalion.

10 Q. Those were Bosnian Croat refugees?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. All right. Well, let me try to conclude this

13 fairly quickly. You talked in your statement about

14 some problems that occurred in Kiseljak in July of

15 1993, in Visoko, where Mr. Lucic and Ivica Rajic

16 attended a party given by the Canadian Battalion in

17 Visoko, and the base was surrounded, because the

18 Bosnian Muslims wanted to arrest these two gentlemen;

19 correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Now, your base of operations, unless I am

22 much mistaken, was, in fact, in Kiseljak, wasn't it?

23 A. That's where the United Nations headquarters

24 was, the headquarters for the United Nations protection

25 force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, yes.

Page 16168

1 Q. Would it be fair to say that you never,

2 throughout your six month tour of duty, ever saw

3 Mr. Kordic actually in Kiseljak itself?

4 A. No. It was not that easy to move from Vitez

5 to Kiseljak, because anybody would have to go through

6 the territory that was controlled by the Muslims and

7 cross over at least two if not more front lines.

8 Q. Yes, sir, and I'm not sure about what the

9 answer was, but I think the answer was that you never,

10 in fact, saw him in Kiseljak. Is that right?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. All right. And as far as you're aware, what

13 political influence he had, if any, you never saw any

14 manifestation of that in Kiseljak or the Kiseljak

15 pocket because it was completely surrounded by that

16 time during your six-month tour of duty as the third in

17 command of UNPROFOR; would that be fair to say as well?

18 A. I didn't see him in Kiseljak at all. The

19 only -- or the person we dealt with for most of the

20 time in Kiseljak was Vinko Lucic.

21 Q. Yes. But no one ever said that if a problem

22 cropped up, for example, that needed a swift solution,

23 or any kind of a long-term solution, for that matter,

24 that it would be Mr. Kordic that you would have to see?

25 A. Not in Kiseljak, no.

Page 16169

1 Q. Who would that person have been?

2 A. In Kiseljak?

3 Q. Colonel Lucic; is that --

4 A. Colonel Lucic was the UNPROFOR -- the liaison

5 officer, and if there was a problem there, we would

6 have spoken to him. He would have probably spoken to

7 the local commander, Rajic. But to be honest, the

8 position that Vinko Lucic actually held, the degree of

9 authority and power he had was never entirely clear to

10 me. Rather more than he professed, I think.

11 Q. You were asked some questions about the

12 linkages between evacuations of wounded in Eastern

13 Mostar and the hospital at Nova Bila. Isn't it true,

14 sir, that General Hadzihasanovic was a thorn in your

15 side, if you like, and caused you great difficulty by

16 refusing to allow the Nova Bila evacuation?

17 A. Certainly the Nova Bila evacuation was

18 blocked, yes, and he, as the commander there, would

19 have had a hand in that.

20 Q. And in fact, sir, he informed you that if you

21 tried to move the wounded out of Nova Bila, forces

22 under his command would open fire on any BritBat

23 vehicles moving the wounded; isn't that true?

24 A. I seem to recollect some threat like that,

25 yes. At the same time, no one was being allowed to be

Page 16170

1 evacuated from East Mostar.

2 Q. You said on page 11 of your statement:

3 "In particular, 3rd Corps Commander

4 Hadzihasanovic refused to allow the evacuation from

5 Nova Bila and threatened to fire on any BritBat

6 vehicles moving wounded."

7 Does that jog your memory?

8 A. Yes, that's correct. We did eventually

9 achieve the -- that again is an example of the

10 linkage. He refused to allow them to be evacuated

11 because of what was happening in East Mostar. It

12 wasn't just a Serb who linked things. All three sides

13 would link activities in various areas.

14 MR. SAYERS: Brigadier, I'm much obliged for

15 your testimony today. Thank you very much.

16 That concludes my questions, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Mikulicic.

18 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Good day, Brigadier. My

21 name is Goran Mikulicic, and together with my

22 colleague, Mr. Kovacic, I'm Defence counsel for the

23 second accused. I am going to put a few questions to

24 you simply to clarify some of the points that you spoke

25 about.

Page 16171

1 Let us go back to the convoy for a few

2 minutes, please. If I understood your testimony

3 correctly, the convoy was stopped in the area of Novi

4 Travnik, and you described that as the Vitez pocket in

5 a broader sense; is that right?

6 A. That's correct. It was stopped, as I

7 understand it, in the area of the front lines on the

8 edge of what I describe as the Vitez pocket, but it was

9 to the west of it, yes.

10 Q. In an effort to work out this situation, you

11 conducted certain meetings, you talked to people. You

12 already explained this to us. Brigadier, were you

13 aware of the fact that in the town, Vitez, the command

14 of the Operative Zone for that area was located and

15 that Colonel Blaskic was the top military person in

16 that area; were you aware of that fact at the time?

17 A. I knew that Colonel Blaskic -- I knew

18 Colonel Blaskic by name as the Croat -- a Croat

19 commander, the Croat commander in the area, yes.

20 Q. Although you were aware of that, nevertheless

21 you did not even try to talk to Colonel Blaskic in

22 order to resolve the situation regarding the convoy; is

23 that right?

24 A. That's correct, because when I went out on

25 the ground, it was not to Colonel Blaskic that I was

Page 16172

1 directed by people on the ground to get what was

2 happening to the convoy stopped; it was to Dario

3 Kordic, not to Colonel Blaskic.

4 Q. However, there was another high-ranking

5 military officer there, and that was General Petkovic;

6 correct?

7 A. No. General Petkovic at that time had left.

8 General Petkovic had been in Kiseljak with us, carrying

9 out some negotiations as I have explained. He

10 contacted Vitez, the HVO in Vitez, about the convoy

11 using the communications of the HVO in their Kiseljak

12 headquarters. This failed to secure the release of the

13 convoy.

14 General Petkovic then had to leave to go to

15 Mostar to carry out some other duties; I believe in

16 relation to the fighting that was going on there. He

17 undertook to go via the Vitez pocket. Indeed, that was

18 probably the only way that he could go. He personally

19 went to the scene where the convoy was being held,

20 attempted to secure its release, but again failed. He

21 then left the scene.

22 General Petkovic was not there when

23 subsequently I went to Vitez. He had left the scene.

24 Q. I understand. However, you do know that

25 before you came, General Petkovic was in the area where

Page 16173

1 the convoy was stopped; is that right?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Brigadier, to the best of your knowledge and

4 according to the chain of command that exists in an

5 army, when a top-ranking military person is in a

6 certain area, does that person then exercise total

7 authority over the entire military in that area?

8 A. When General Petkovic was there, his

9 authority should have been supreme, to use a rather

10 grand phrase. Yes, as the senior commander, his

11 authority would supersede the authority of other

12 commanders on the ground, though I do not know who

13 Colonel Petkovic -- General Petkovic actually met.

14 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you,

15 Brigadier. No further questions.

16 MR. NICE: A couple of things, please,

17 Brigadier.

18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

19 Q. Such convoys as this, how common were they?

20 A. This was, from the size of it and the way

21 that it was organised, unique. But there were other

22 convoys that went through -- from non-governmental

23 organisations that went through unescorted by UNPROFOR,

24 unorganised by UNHCR.

25 Q. To reach the Vitez pocket, would this convoy

Page 16174

1 have passed over other territory that was

2 Croat-controlled?

3 A. Yes. It did start from the coast, from

4 Split. It traversed or moved north through

5 Croat-controlled territory. It would have followed, as

6 far as I know, the only route that would have been open

7 to it, which was known as Route Diamond, which went --

8 it went through the Gornji Vakuf area and so would have

9 gone through Croat-controlled territory predominantly

10 and small areas where the Muslims controlled the

11 territory.

12 Q. On reaching the Vitez pocket, would it have

13 confronted a checkpoint of some kind?

14 A. There would have been a checkpoint on the

15 road on the front lines, yes.

16 Q. Which, I suppose, would there have been the

17 option of turning it back and refusing it entry?

18 A. There is always that option. I suspect that

19 physically it would have been quite difficult to turn

20 the convoy around. But, yeah, the option would have

21 been there.

22 Q. Was there any suggestion that the

23 Croat-controlled checkpoint had said "No"?

24 A. "No" to the passage of the convoy?

25 Q. Yes.

Page 16175

1 A. Yes. I mean the convoy was blocked. It was

2 not allowed to move forward at all.

3 Q. And then it was hijacked?

4 A. There were, as I remember it, there were --

5 they were there for quite some time. The situation got

6 quite heated. There was then some shooting. Some

7 drivers were killed. And at that stage, vehicles were

8 hijacked and the convoy scattered, as it were, rather

9 like a flock of frightened birds. It scattered

10 northwards, and it was almost a case of each driver for

11 himself to try and get through Vitez and on up to

12 Zenica and safe territory.

13 Q. How were the other drivers killed who weren't

14 shot?

15 A. I understand that they were actually taken --

16 pulled out of the vehicles and killed by women using

17 pitchforks.

18 Q. You spoke of the distress of the man in

19 charge of the convoy. Were you able to judge whether

20 his expectations of success with this convoy had

21 initially been genuine?

22 A. Very genuine. I don't believe he had any

23 suspicion that he would not be allowed to travel

24 through to the north. He might have had a fear that he

25 would be stopped and would have to hand over some of

Page 16176

1 the goods that he was carrying by way of a bribe, if

2 you like, or a levy to get through. But for the

3 vehicles to be hijacked and for people to be killed was

4 totally and utterly shocking and surprising to him, and

5 as I say, he was on the verge of a breakdown.

6 Q. Was there any other route to bring food to

7 the civilians in the area to which he was taking this

8 convoy?

9 A. No, it was the only route that the convoy

10 could have followed.

11 Q. Was that known generally to everyone at the

12 time?

13 A. I'm sure it was.

14 Q. You've been asked about your knowledge or,

15 more particular, your ignorance of Kordic before this

16 incident. You've told us, and we needn't go into it

17 again, of the judgement you formed of him. But does it

18 follow from what you've told us that you didn't

19 approach this issue with any prejudgement of the man

20 because you knew very little about him?

21 A. That would be correct. I had not met him

22 before. I knew very little of him. I went to the

23 person to whom I was directed, believing that this was

24 the man who could guarantee the safe passage of the

25 convoy or get the vehicles collected back together that

Page 16177

1 had been scattered, but I was not reassured by the

2 meeting with him. I didn't have any faith in his

3 words. When he said that he was doing his best, I

4 regret that I did not believe him.

5 Q. You've been asked about why you didn't press

6 him, perhaps, for his identified authority, but tell

7 us, how was he dressed?

8 A. He was dressed in a camouflaged uniform.

9 Q. With or without insignia or with anything

10 else around his neck, that you can recall?

11 A. I can't recall that.

12 Q. And two other things, different topics.

13 Yes, Petkovic. Did Petkovic suggest that you

14 should turn your attention to Blaskic?

15 A. No. No. General Petkovic went to the area

16 to exercise his own authority. It was never suggested

17 that we should speak to Blaskic.

18 Q. Two other general questions, each very

19 short.

20 You've been asked about the comparative

21 success of the BiH as opposed to the HVO at the time

22 you were in the area, and the use of the word

23 "dominant" was made. But can you give us any comment

24 on the comparative weaponry of the two sides or not?

25 A. Yes. As I alluded to in what I was saying,

Page 16178

1 the strength of the Serbs and, indeed, the Croats was

2 that they had greater access to heavy weaponry than did

3 the Muslims. The Bosnian army or the Muslim army was

4 predominantly infantry and would have used small arms

5 and mortars.

6 Q. And finally you've been asked about authority

7 in and communication from Kiseljak. Did you know, one

8 way or another, by what means, if any, people were

9 communicating from Kiseljak to other parts of the Lasva

10 Valley by telephone and/or by means of transport?

11 A. There were telephone lines. I believe that

12 the HVO had its own radio net, and I believe there were

13 radio communications from Kiseljak to Vitez, a normal

14 military communication network.

15 Q. And any transport communication of which you

16 were aware?

17 A. Not that I was aware of. If somebody -- if a

18 Croat wanted to travel from Kiseljak to Vitez, he would

19 normally ask to travel with us. I mean you could go

20 there, but it was quite dangerous.

21 MR. NICE: That's all. Thank you very much.

22 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, that concludes your

23 evidence. You are released. Thank you for coming to

24 the International Tribunal to give it.

25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

Page 16179

1 [The witness withdrew]

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, there are one or two

3 administrative matters before we break. The first is

4 something which we want to raise about the

5 international armed conflict.

6 Judge Robinson.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice and Mr. Sayers, it

8 seems to me that the essential questions relating to

9 this issue are questions of law and, in some cases,

10 fact, mixed law and fact. The exhibits, in my view,

11 would generally be admissible, the Chamber being left

12 to determine what weight to attach to them. For that

13 reason, I don't think it is necessary to have any

14 prolonged hearing on this. In fact, I think a hearing

15 could be obviated and replaced by written submissions

16 on this question, highlighting the important areas,

17 areas that are important to each party.

18 MR. NICE: I suppose Mr. Lopez-Terres, who I

19 think has charge of those particular binders at the

20 moment, may be pleased to know that an oral submission

21 would not be required at the moment. We, of course,

22 would be only too pleased to put in a written

23 submission. I don't know whether it's thought that

24 it's appropriate now, before the ending of the

25 Prosecution's case, or if, like all other submissions,

Page 16180

1 it should come simply in due course.

2 JUDGE MAY: In due course.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I think it can come in

4 due course. That would be in order.

5 Mr. Sayers.

6 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I had anticipated

7 that the international armed conflict documents would

8 be treated pretty much identically with the other

9 documents. I think that with the exception of the

10 objections which we've noted on our charts to illegible

11 documents, documents that aren't signed and so forth,

12 most of those objections -- actually, the illegibility

13 objections, I think, are valid. The other objections

14 pretty much go to weight, as the Trial Chamber has

15 stated in the past, and, frankly, I don't see that a

16 hearing on the issue would be particularly necessary

17 because we would simply be ventilating the same

18 arguments that have already been made.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I'm glad to see we're

20 ad idem on that.

21 JUDGE MAY: We will consider whether we

22 should exclude any of the documents. If there are

23 illegible and that sort of documents, that would have

24 to be attended to. But that apart, we'll admit the

25 documents and order submissions, the Prosecution

Page 16181

1 certainly to put in a document explaining what they

2 rely on in the exhibits; Defence, if they wish to

3 respond.

4 MR. SAYERS: I'm almost certain that we would

5 wish to respond, and with the Court's permission, we

6 would like to do so in due course, having seen the

7 arguments of the Prosecutor.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, within two weeks of

9 the close of the case.

10 MR. NICE: I'm sure we can do that.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, and two weeks for the

12 response.

13 MR. SAYERS: That seems fair, Your Honour.

14 Thank you.

15 MR. NICE: Although in light of

16 Judge Robinson's observation about it being a matter

17 for the Chamber to decide, I think the presentation

18 will be a summary and general, rather than laborious

19 and specific.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 MR. NICE: Now, I know Mr. Sayers wants to

22 raise something, and I know what it is, but there's

23 also another witness. Now, that witness, Mr. Hamill,

24 has been here since the weekend. I think his time for

25 getting away this afternoon to catch a plane is half

Page 16182

1 past 5.00. He won't actually be very long in chief.

2 His summary, I hope, has already been

3 distributed. But even if it hasn't, his presentation

4 will not take very long. I don't know if there's any

5 way that the Chamber can at least try to accommodate

6 him.

7 JUDGE MAY: I would hope so, if he's been

8 here since the weekend. Is there extensive

9 cross-examination?

10 MR. SAYERS: The next witness is an artillery

11 ballistics expert witness. We have not previously been

12 provided with a written report, as I understand, as

13 required by Rule 94 bis, but we're prepared to go ahead

14 with this cross-examination anyway.

15 Just as with the previous witness, in the

16 interests of time, I've prepared a highlighted binder

17 of exhibits that I would distribute, which we should be

18 able to go through fairly quickly. But I doubt that

19 we'll be through in one hour, Your Honour, I really

20 do.

21 JUDGE MAY: It may be, if the Prosecution are

22 quick, an hour and a quarter will be available. It may

23 be convenient to take the adjournment now and begin a

24 few minutes before 4.00.

25 We'll deal with this question about the

Page 16183

1 statement when we've got time tomorrow.

2 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, we regard that as a

3 fairly serious matter, as I'm sure the Court can

4 understand, and we would like to be heard on that.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.

6 We'll adjourn now until five to 4.00.

7 --- Recess taken at 3.37 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 4.00 p.m.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the

10 declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

12 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

13 truth


15 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a

16 seat.

17 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if I might just

18 jump in. It seems to me that in order to utilise the

19 time most efficiently, we could take this statement as

20 read, since it's essentially an expert report, and jump

21 immediately into cross-examination.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

23 MR. NICE: Perhaps I can just clarify a few

24 things.

25 Examined by Mr. Nice:

Page 16184

1 Q. Full name, please?

2 A. John Gerard Brenton Hamill.

3 Q. We can see you've done over 25 years in

4 gunnery in Bosnia, elsewhere around the world, and

5 you've also been an instructor. One point of

6 amplification, is calculating the place from which

7 artillery fires a practical skill used by soldiers on

8 the ground?

9 A. Yes, it is.

10 Q. The reason being, that if you are being fired

11 at, and you can't see where the guns are firing from,

12 you actually need to work it out?

13 A. You need to work it out in order to return

14 fire.

15 Q. Is that a skill, therefore, in which

16 artillery officers are trained?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And were you so trained?

19 A. I was.

20 Q. Next point, just to deal with what's

21 contained in your summary, and indeed in your

22 statement, because the Judges don't have the full

23 statement, necessarily. You are concerned here with

24 the shelling of Zenica, but you didn't go and conduct

25 an examination at Zenica until the 6th of April 1997,

Page 16185

1 or thereabout?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. I think you spent how many days conducting

4 your examination?

5 A. I spent a full week, at that time, between

6 here and Zenica itself.

7 Q. There is a video, which is cued to be played,

8 of Zenica at the time. It's exhibit number -- I'll

9 come to the exhibit number. 2258. I am not going to

10 ask that it all be played, but just a small portion of

11 it, or a portion of it so that we can see what this

12 video amounts to.

13 [Videotape played]

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. If you find anything you want to comment on.

16 This was a contemporaneous video of Zenica shelling.

17 Apart from showing people who had been killed, does it

18 from time to time shows sites of and even some detail

19 of where the shells landed?

20 A. Yes, it did.

21 Q. Unhappy details. More for the general

22 quality of the film and the sort of detail it was

23 showing. Right. I am going to pause there, because of

24 want of time.

25 Did you see the whole of this film, which

Page 16186

1 is --

2 A. I did.

3 Q. -- available? Were you able, although you

4 didn't see the film at the time, to compare what that

5 contemporaneous film showed of the scene and of where

6 the shells fell with your own examination conducted in

7 1997?

8 A. Yes, I was able to do a comparison. And

9 also, I had photographs taken at the time, which I also

10 used to compare to the ground, as I saw it, with

11 documentary data.

12 Q. Those photographs are 2281, I think you'll

13 find -- I must be incorrect. The three pictures from

14 2281. Thank you. Two pictures from 2281. Take mine.

15 That won't do. To save time, can you use my

16 photographs, and we'll just use those and we'll make

17 sure we get the right numbers attached to them later.

18 Thank you very much. Just look at these three

19 photographs in sequence and tell us the sort of things

20 of significance that you can see on those photographs.

21 They will be placed on the ELMO.

22 A. This was the scene of the sixth shelling.

23 You can see where the crater has been formed underneath

24 the bus shelter.

25 Q. Right. Next photograph?

Page 16187

1 A. This was the second shell that fell in Zenica

2 to that day, at 1210 hours.

3 Q. We can see on our screen, somewhat

4 indistinctly, marks going out from the central

5 position. Are they of significance in working out the

6 origin of a piece of artillery shelling?

7 A. They certainly are. They are what we use.

8 They are called strikes, and we use the direction of

9 the strikes to fix the direction that the round is

10 coming from.

11 Q. Using this photograph, explain that general

12 technique, please, to the learned Judges.

13 A. In general terms, although it can't be seen

14 from a photograph, and it's not possible to do crater

15 analysis, per se, from a photograph, the pattern of the

16 shells is very distinctive, particularly when it falls

17 on hard ground like this, asphalt, concrete or

18 whatever. And by laying sticks along, or taking

19 compass bearings along the strikes, particular strikes,

20 which are the widest, you then work out, by having the

21 angle, the direction to the gun in question. So in

22 general terms with this, because the strikes are mainly

23 this way and this way, the round would have come in

24 from that side. But that's very general. It can't be

25 specifically done from a photograph. It must be done

Page 16188

1 on the ground.

2 Q. Yes. Is there a hemispherical distribution

3 of these strikes, or semicircular distribution of the

4 strikes?

5 A. More or less semicircular, yes.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness wait for

7 the end of the question, please.

8 Q. -- half round plastic compass, as it were,

9 plastic --

10 A. Protractor.

11 Q. Protractor. And the flat bit, is that the

12 direction from which the shells come? The other bit.

13 The round bit.

14 A. [No audible answer]

15 Q. Last photograph, please. Just to give a

16 general --

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please pause

18 between answer and question.

19 JUDGE MAY: You are being asked to pause

20 between question and answer.

21 MR. NICE: And I will do so.

22 A. Once again, we have a photograph of the 6th

23 shell.

24 Q. Will you please now lay on the overhead

25 projector -- when you went to examine the scene.

Page 16189

1 JUDGE MAY: We are getting the B/C/S on our

2 channel.

3 THE INTERPRETER: It should be okay now. The

4 interpreter apologises.

5 JUDGE MAY: All should be well. Yes, thank

6 you.

7 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, the objection is

8 this. We think it's unbelievable that one day before

9 the close of the Prosecution's case we should be

10 getting brand new exhibits which have never previously

11 been produced to us before, especially exhibits which

12 were apparently prepared in 1997. It's all the more

13 remarkable --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Slow down, please,

15 Mr. Sayers. Slow down.

16 MR. SAYERS: -- witness who has not prepared

17 a report that's been provided to us, and this exhibit

18 is now going to be introduced through this expert

19 without a report. We simply haven't been given this

20 before. I think it's too late now. The order that the

21 Court has entered, requiring delivery of all exhibits

22 to us by the 28th of January, is as clear as a bell,

23 and there is just no excuse for late delivery. So we

24 object to it under these circumstances. Thank you.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice.

Page 16190

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I gather that, as a

2 matter of fact, the map is in the Zenica binder. But,

3 in any event, it's referred to in the witness

4 statement. And I am sorry if it didn't go out with the

5 witness statement, as I discovered today. It could

6 have been asked for. It could have been found in the

7 Zenica binder. In any event, the statement, which the

8 Defence have had now for months or a year or so or

9 whatever it is, provides the source information that is

10 being plotted on this plan, and so, of course, it's

11 less than ideal, and I wish that they had had it

12 earlier. It's going to save time rather than do

13 anything else to use the map. The map is the best

14 exhibit.

15 JUDGE MAY: Does it say anything new?

16 MR. NICE: No. It says what's -- it says

17 what's in the statement, so far as I know.

18 [Trial Chamber confers]

19 JUDGE MAY: We will admit this document,

20 first of all, because we are told it was -- it had been

21 part of the Zenica binder. In any event, it is merely

22 stating what the evidence says in sketch form. The

23 Defence can, of course, cross-examine upon it.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. Mr. Hamill, will you please explain, rather

Page 16191

1 than me going through questions and answers, the plan

2 and the markings on it dealing with the craters, in the

3 order in which they were formed.

4 A. The first two craters were formed at 1210 by

5 shells falling in this area here [indicates]. The

6 letters "MPI" stand for mean point of impact, which is

7 the spot between the two shells. The second pair fell

8 here [indicates] and here. Again, within a very short

9 period of time, at around 1224. And the final two

10 shells fell here and here, at approximately 1229. And

11 that concluded the shelling on that day.

12 Now, what I can say about them, that for the

13 first and this third pair, as such, there was a

14 distance between them of between 14 and 30 metres.

15 There was a considerably greater distance between the

16 3rd and the 4th, which were also almost

17 contemporaneous. This has been explained in the

18 report. My reading of it was that there was a slight

19 error on the third round, an error of range or

20 elevation, because the bearing is consistent with the

21 1st and the 5th rounds.

22 Q. Let's, to avoid any confusion of technical

23 language, pick up first the bearing, that is the

24 direction from which the shells had come. Did you have

25 two sources of information: One, your observations on

Page 16192

1 the ground of the actual shell craters, where they were

2 left; and two, information coming from ECMM monitors,

3 some of whom we've heard, who conducted their own

4 calculations of bearings at the time?

5 A. Yes, I did. I initially had a report from

6 the ECMM, a crater analysis. When I examined the

7 craters on the ground, I found no reason to disagree

8 with their analysis, although some -- quite a

9 considerable time had passed. The craters in most

10 cases were still clear enough to get the general

11 direction, not a specific direction in mils, but

12 certainly the general direction within a few degrees

13 left or right of the direction of fire.

14 Q. So if we look at the numbers one and two on

15 the bottom of the three pairs, just remind us again how

16 close were they together?

17 A. They were about -- they were about 14 metres.

18 Q. And the arrow shows the direction from which

19 it is being suggested those two shells came.

20 A. That is correct. West.

21 Q. Then the next two up, which are a little

22 further short, they didn't travel quite so far, it

23 would appear. Same general bearing, 4.800. Is that

24 right?

25 A. That is quite correct, 4.800 mils.

Page 16193

1 Q. Their distance apart?

2 A. Their distance apart was, if I remember,

3 about 70 metres. However, that is not the significant

4 aspect. What is significant is their deviation from a

5 centre line between them. Both them lay astride the

6 centre line, which is the line drawn on as 4.800 mils;

7 one slightly north by a few metres, and one slightly

8 south by a few metres. They were consistent as regards

9 bearing, but not as regards range.

10 Q. The last pair at the top, how close together?

11 A. Thirty metres.

12 Q. We haven't yet dealt with, but you must know

13 your source of information as to the order in which

14 these shells fell; was that from ECMM monitors or from

15 some other source?

16 A. Yes. I spoke to witnesses on the ground.

17 Q. One or two or how many?

18 A. Numerous. We spent several days in Zenica,

19 and I spoke to considerable numbers of people who had

20 been there during the shelling; those who lived in

21 houses beside where the shells fell, other witnesses

22 who were brought to me by MUP. I must emphasise that I

23 had no direct, personal knowledge of the times myself,

24 and got it from witnesses.

25 Q. Was there consistency or inconsistency in the

Page 16194

1 accounts that you were given as to the order of the

2 shells?

3 A. There was considerable consistency. And the

4 most consistent fact that I came across was that the

5 shells were described as falling in the three groups of

6 two.

7 Q. Did they all hit the ground directly, or did

8 any of them land up first somewhere else?

9 A. Four of the rounds impacted on the ground.

10 One of them impacted on the wall of a house in Stari

11 Carcija [phoen], and one of them impacted on a tree

12 just outside the radio station.

13 Q. On the basis that they fell in the order that

14 you've heard, in the three groups of two, what was your

15 conclusion as to the number of pieces of artillery that

16 were firing?

17 A. I concluded that there were two pieces of

18 artillery in use. Given the fragments that I had --

19 was given, which purported to be from those shellings,

20 it seemed to me quite clear that it was a D-30 J-gun

21 which fired. This is a hand-loaded weapon, which takes

22 time to fire a second time. Only a certain number of

23 rounds can be fired from it in a minute. So if there

24 were only five seconds between the shells being fired,

25 the logic was that two guns were involved.

Page 16195

1 Q. What, if anything, is the significance or

2 what is to be derived or interpreted from three pairs

3 of shells doing that which you see evidence for on the

4 ground and from the other witnesses, and as shown in

5 this plan, going from south to north, with the changes

6 of distance that you've spoken of?

7 A. I see this as a very professional piece of

8 artillery work. I believe that it was -- the rounds

9 were observed as they were landing and the fire was

10 adjusted, and the fire was adjusted in a way that seems

11 to me to be, "Add 100, add 50," from an observer who

12 would be in a general southerly direction from the

13 target to be engaged.

14 Q. What might have been the intended object of

15 this shelling?

16 A. I think it is most likely that the intended

17 target was the radio station on the banks of the river.

18 Q. The reason for that conclusion?

19 A. Two rounds, 5 and 6, bracketed the area, and

20 then the firing ceased. Normally, artillery fire

21 ceases when the target has been successfully engaged.

22 There was nothing else in that area that I could see

23 that would be a likely target.

24 Q. When you say "bracketed the area", two

25 questions that you might deal with, and we'll come back

Page 16196

1 to the type of artillery piece in a minute. But given

2 the artillery piece you believe this to have been, what

3 degree of accuracy can be achieved? And the second

4 question involved with that is how near to a target

5 does a shell have to land in order for the shelling to

6 count as a success?

7 A. A shell of the nature of that size, of about

8 122 millimetres, would have a lethal radius of

9 something in the region of 40 to 50 metres, and it

10 would have a danger radius of around 300 metres. So if

11 a round fell within 25 or 30 metres of the target, it

12 would neutralise it, and I would say that that is an

13 acceptable level of accuracy for neutralisation

14 purposes. By "neutralise", we mean put out of action,

15 prevent from engaging in the activity which it had been

16 engaged in beforehand. It doesn't necessarily mean

17 destruction.

18 Q. The accuracy of this sort of shelling?

19 A. The D-30 J, firing the type of ammunition

20 which I believe it fired, has a beaten zone at a

21 maximum range of around 45 metres by 10 metres. That

22 means that about 50 per cent of the shells will fall in

23 an elliptical pattern; fired from the same gun, at the

24 same bearing, at the same elevation, will fall within

25 an area 45 metres long by 10 metres wide.

Page 16197

1 Q. So on your plan, you've drawn a possible

2 location of an observer, and is the general position

3 that where artillery is being aimed from many

4 kilometres away, you need an observer to see where the

5 first shell lands?

6 A. You need an observer generally to see where

7 every shell lands, unless the target has previously

8 been adjusted and recorded or a similar target within

9 certain very limited parameters has already been

10 engaged by that particular type of weapon within,

11 again, a particular area.

12 Q. Why do you choose this line as the line along

13 which a possible observer might have been positioned?

14 A. I think it's quite likely. It could also

15 have been in the opposite direction to the north. But

16 if you look at the three sets of rounds, the first set,

17 the second set, MPI-corrected, and the third set all

18 give an "add or a drop" pattern. Given that the north

19 side or the east side of the river was in ABiH hands

20 completely, and given that there was high ground to the

21 south, you can just see on the edge of the map the

22 beginning of the contour lines leading to high ground

23 where an observer could be stationed. Similarly, there

24 were very high buildings in this area which could have

25 housed an observer who could have been relaying

Page 16198

1 information to guns by radio or by telephone, if

2 telephones were working.

3 Q. You've also marked the nearest military

4 installation or, rather, an arrow in its direction.

5 Tell us about that.

6 A. This is the nearest military installation.

7 It is 310 metres from the closest round, which was

8 number 3. Yet after number 3 was fired, 5 and 6 were

9 fired in a direction away from that particular military

10 installation. Therefore, I concluded it was not the

11 target.

12 Q. What was that military installation?

13 A. I'd have to examine my notes. The

14 headquarters of the 301st Mechanised Brigade of the

15 Armija located in the Prostor building.

16 Q. Then if we could mark your summary, which I

17 think you've gone through your summary and checked it

18 for accuracy, have you not?

19 A. I have.

20 Q. We'll mark that, with the Court's leave, as

21 an exhibit. But two other issues.

22 In order to identify the type of artillery

23 piece, were you provided with a bag or container of

24 remnants from the shelling?

25 A. I was.

Page 16199

1 Q. That contained two fuses?

2 A. It did, and various bits of shell case

3 fragments.

4 Q. And the fuses showed you what?

5 A. The fuses showed me, given the writing on

6 them, showed me that it was, in fact, an OF 462 Z shell

7 which was fired. The reason I say that is because the

8 fuses themselves were RGM-2 fuses, which are

9 specifically fitted to that type of shell.

10 Q. Now, was that type of shell in use by any of

11 the warring parties in the former Yugoslavia at the

12 time of this shelling?

13 A. That shelling was only used by the D-30 J,

14 which was a Yugoslav-built variant of a Warsaw Pact

15 weapon.

16 Q. To your knowledge, did any of the warring

17 parties have access to that weaponry at that time?

18 A. To my belief, they did.

19 Q. Does that weapon have a known and defined

20 range?

21 A. It does. Firing that particular shell, it

22 has a defined maximum range of 15 thousand and about

23 280 metres.

24 Q. With the knowledge that you had then

25 collected, did you try and find out where it might have

Page 16200

1 been fired from, these shells?

2 A. I did.

3 Q. Using the map that's on the board and the

4 pointer -- there's a loudspeaker that should pick up

5 your voice -- could you explain to the Judges what it

6 was, please, that you -- and for counsel, what it was

7 you were able to conclude?

8 A. Based on the fact that the shell came from --

9 the shells came from the west, due west, from --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for the

11 witness.

12 A. The shells came due west into Zenica.

13 Therefore, I went west along the road between Vitez and

14 Travnik and examined the area, and I found a feature in

15 Puticevo which provided ideal gun platforms.

16 MR. NICE:

17 Q. Looking at the map, we see the front line for

18 the Serb troops to the west of that. Could the gun

19 concerned or the artillery piece concerned have been

20 fired from within Serb territory?

21 A. Under no circumstances.

22 Q. Were it to have been fired from the Puticevo

23 feature, would that have been at maximum range, or near

24 maximum range, or what?

25 A. It would have been very close to maximum

Page 16201

1 range.

2 Q. Why did you prefer that as a possible site to

3 any of the intervening places at a shorter distance

4 between there and Zenica itself?

5 A. The weapon would have been firing on maximum

6 charge, which would have meant a noise level of

7 something in the region of 180 decibels; an extremely

8 loud noise, in other words, which would have been heard

9 over a very wide area. If it had been much closer to

10 Zenica, it would have been within distance -- hearing

11 distance of Armija locations. I heard no reports that

12 anyone had heard rounds being fired on that day.

13 Therefore, I concluded, from logic, that it was a good

14 distance away from where Armija units were located.

15 Q. Just remind the Judges. Roughly, where were

16 the BiH positions?

17 A. The Armija were located in Travnik itself, in

18 Zenica, and somewhat west of Zenica.

19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, if we are to get

20 through this --

21 MR. NICE: Yes. I think I've probably

22 concluded. In any case, everything else contained in

23 your summary, including the comments that are made

24 about launch time and so on, may this summary become

25 Exhibit 2816, please?

Page 16202

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Sayers.

2 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I'll do my best to

3 finish today, but I can't guarantee it. But let's get

4 started.

5 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

6 Q. You served as a United Nations military

7 observer in Sarajevo from May of 1993 to August of

8 1993?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. So you were in the country when the shelling

11 actually occurred?

12 A. That is not correct. The shelling occurred

13 on the 19th of April.

14 Q. I'm sorry, April the 19th, 1993. But you

15 undertook no contemporaneous investigation of the

16 shelling incident at all, did you?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Right. Throughout your tour of duty as a

19 United Nations military observer, you never witnessed

20 any deliberate attacks on civilian targets, did you?

21 A. I witnessed attacks on targets in which there

22 were civilians, yes.

23 Q. On page 2 of your statement, sir, five years

24 ago, you said: "I never witnessed myself a deliberate

25 attack on civilian areas from the sector in which I was

Page 16203

1 working." Is that right?

2 A. From the sector in which I was working,

3 that's correct.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Would the witness please

5 speak into the microphone.

6 A. From the sector in which I was working at the

7 time, that is correct.


9 Q. Yes. Now, you've given two separate

10 statements to the Prosecution's investigators, is that

11 right, one in 1995 and one in 1997?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. In the 1995 statement, there wasn't any

14 question asked of you about the Zenica shelling

15 incident, was there?

16 A. I was not aware of the Zenica shelling

17 incident at that time.

18 Q. So your first involvement, and I think you've

19 said this, was in 1997, four years after the shelling

20 had actually occurred?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And that was the first time that you actually

23 made a visit to the site, four years later; right?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. All right. Now, when you were asked to take

Page 16204

1 a look at this incident, I take it you studied the file

2 in the Tribunal or in the Prosecution's office in The

3 Hague. Is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Did you see -- have you reviewed the

6 testimony of Major Baggesen in this case?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Have you reviewed the testimony of Colonel

9 Landry in this case?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Have you reviewed the testimony of Professor

12 Jankovic, a ballistics engineer in the Blaskic case?

13 A. Yes, I have.

14 Q. Are you a ballistics engineer?

15 A. No, I'm not. I'm an artillery officer.

16 Q. All right. Have you reviewed the testimony

17 of the investigating judge who investigated this

18 incident in Zenica, Mladen Veseljak?

19 A. I may have done. At this stage, I don't

20 remember. If I did, it was at that time in 1997.

21 Q. Have you actually seen the extensive report

22 that was produced by Mladen Veseljak concerning the

23 Zenica shelling incident, sir?

24 A. I can't answer that.

25 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I wonder if I

Page 16205

1 could ask for the booklet of exhibits that I've put

2 together to be distributed to everybody. For

3 everybody's convenience, they are highlighted.

4 Just for your information, Mr. Hamill, they

5 are separately tabbed. We'll have an exhibit number

6 attached, and then I'll refer to a tab number and you

7 should see what I'm referring to highlighted in your

8 copy, sir.

9 I wonder if I could ask you to turn first in

10 this exhibit, after it's been given a number by the

11 registrar --

12 THE REGISTRAR: The number will be D202/1.


14 Q. Could you turn, sir, to Tab 6. This is a

15 copy of the report that was prepared by the

16 investigating judge, Mladen Veseljak, on the 19th of

17 April, 1993. Have you ever seen this document before?

18 A. I honestly couldn't say.

19 Q. All right. If you could just turn to page 2,

20 sir, the investigating judge recites that:

21 "Many large and smaller shell fragments were

22 found at the scene. Based on a fuse found at the

23 scene, members of the crime squad concluded that the

24 shells were fired from a 150-millimetre calibre, and

25 shell fragments were then taken for further expert

Page 16206

1 analysis."

2 Were you aware of that conclusion,

3 155-millimetre calibre?

4 A. I was.

5 Q. Did you ever speak to Judge Veseljak?

6 A. No, but it's not correct.

7 Q. All right. Did you review the testimony of

8 the artillery expert used in the Blaskic case,

9 Mr. Sefjulah Mrkajlevic?

10 A. No, I did not.

11 Q. Now, it's true, sir, is it not, that the

12 European Community Monitoring Mission prepared

13 absolutely no reports that you've seen concerning this

14 shelling incident?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. Where did you get the shell fragments from,

17 sir? Who gave them to you?

18 A. I was given them in the police station in

19 Zenica by a representative of the MUP.

20 Q. (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 A. No.

23 Q. All right. Were you aware that

24 Mr. Mrkajlevic, in the Blaskic case, testified that all

25 the shell fragments had been turned over to the

Page 16207

1 Canadian Battalion?

2 A. No, I'm not aware of that.

3 Q. All right. Did you see any chain of custody

4 records concerning what you just --

5 A. No.

6 Q. You have to wait for the interpreters, to be

7 fair to them. Have you seen any chain of custody

8 records confirming that this bag, or whatever it was

9 that you were given, containing bits and pieces and two

10 fuses had been kept in the custody of the MUP or the

11 Ministry of the Interior from the time of the shelling

12 until the time that they were turned over to you?

13 A. No, I did not.

14 Q. All right. Now, you say that it's impossible

15 for these shells to have been fired from Serb

16 positions; is that right?

17 A. I say it's impossible for them to have been

18 fired from Serb positions if, in fact, the fuses which

19 were given to me were the fuses which detonated those

20 rounds which exploded in Zenica on that day.

21 Q. We'll get to the fuses in just a second,

22 sir. But could you turn to Tab 10. I'm sorry, Tab

23 11. This is a report that was prepared by the European

24 Community Monitoring Mission concerning a shelling

25 incident on Vitez and on Zenica May the 9th, 1993, and

Page 16208

1 the actual shelling occurred the day before. Have you

2 ever seen this report before?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And this report concludes that 152-millimetre

5 shells were fired from the Vlasic feature from Bosnian

6 Serb artillery on both locations; correct?

7 A. It says that, but that's not relevant.

8 Q. Well, there is no question, sir, is there,

9 that Bosnian Serb artillery had Zenica in range from

10 its positions in Vlasic, as you can see from that

11 exhibit. Isn't that true?

12 A. That is absolutely correct, but the point is,

13 the point is --

14 Q. No need to argue.

15 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

16 A. The point is that the weapons that were used

17 at the time, on that day on the 19th, bears no

18 relationship to that question. They were

19 122-millimetre D-30 J's based on the fact that the

20 fuses that I was given were in fact fuses that were

21 used.

22 Q. All right. You say that the RGM-2 fuse is

23 used in the OF 62 shell that is fired from a

24 122-millimetre weapon; correct?

25 A. The fuse is very specific to a particular

Page 16209

1 shell, which is the OF 482Z, yes.

2 Q. Actually, the RGM-2 fuse is used in a

3 152-millimetre shell of a designated OF 540; isn't it,

4 sir?

5 A. If it is, I wasn't made aware of that until

6 now.

7 Q. And equally true, sir, the RGM-2 fuse is used

8 in a 130-millimetre shell designated OF 482, isn't it?

9 A. I base that finding on books which were given

10 to me of the weaponry of the Yugoslav army, in none of

11 which I could find the RGM fuse used for anything other

12 than this particular shell, which was used for this

13 particular gun.

14 Q. Sir, you presumably have read the testimony

15 of Professor Jankovic in the Blaskic case, where he

16 makes precisely that point, that those fuses, the RGM-2

17 type fuses, are used in three separate calibers,

18 120-millimetre, 152-millimetre, and 130-millimetre.

19 A. That may be the case, but I can say from the

20 firing tables that I was given, I could find no other

21 reference to the RGM-2 fuse.

22 Q. You are not saying, sir, I take it, that a

23 RGM-2 fuse is not used in a 152-millimetre shell, or a

24 130-millimetre shell, as testified by the ballistic

25 engineer, Professor Jankovic?

Page 16210

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could you, please, slow

2 down for the interpreters.

3 A. I am not saying that. What I am saying is

4 that given the information that I had, the only

5 reference that I could find to it in Yugoslav field

6 manuals was in relation to a 122-millimetre shell.


8 Q. All right. Turning to the reports that Judge

9 Veseljak prepared. He makes a reference to one fuse

10 found at the scene. If you take a look at page 2 of

11 Tab 6, sir.

12 "Based on a fuse found at the scene, members

13 of the crime squad concluded that the shells fired were

14 of 155-millimetre calibre."

15 Where did the other fuse come from?

16 A. I have absolutely no idea.

17 Q. Now, you say in your statement on page 2,

18 that April the 19th was the first occasion on which the

19 city of Zenica was shelled?

20 A. I was given to understand that by people at

21 the scene.

22 Q. Were you aware that Zenica had actually been

23 shelled the night before, on the 18th of April, 19 --

24 JUDGE MAY: No, Mr. Sayers. The witness has

25 just said that what he was told was that they were

Page 16211

1 shelled the first time on the 19th. He's obviously not

2 aware.

3 MR. SAYERS: I don't like to play games with

4 the witness.

5 Q. Could you just turn to Tab 4, sir, which is

6 an ECMM document. The local situation in Zenica, which

7 says:

8 "The situation is quiet, as these lines are

9 being typed, throughout the night and the day there was

10 sporadic shelling."

11 And the date is April 18, 1993. Were you

12 aware of that?

13 A. No, I was not.

14 Q. No one told you that. All right. You said

15 that at 800 mils elevation, or 45 degrees, a D-30 J

16 weapon has a 50 per cent probability of landing in what

17 you referred to as a beaten zone, which is an ellipse,

18 45 metres by 10 metres; is that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Which also means that it has a 50 per cent

21 probability of not landing in that beaten zone, doesn't

22 it?

23 A. It does, but the probability curve can be

24 worked out statistically. It's not very large.

25 Ninety-nine per cent of rounds will fall within an area

Page 16212

1 90 metres by 20 metres.

2 Q. All right.

3 A. -- 95 per cent.

4 Q. And you would agree that that accuracy of the

5 fall of shot depends upon a wide number of variables,

6 wouldn't you?

7 A. Absolutely.

8 Q. And we'll go into those in just a minute.

9 You also said that the D-30 J weapon has a slow rate of

10 fire?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Let me put it to you, Mr. Hamill: D-30 J can

13 fire eight rounds per minute, can't it?

14 A. It may well do, but that is at extreme stress

15 on the crews. Generally, I would have said five rounds

16 per minute, max.

17 Q. One every 12 seconds, right?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. But at eight rounds a minute, that's one

20 every seven-and-a-half seconds?

21 A. Seven-and-a-half seconds, yes.

22 Q. Now, were you aware that the -- what

23 information did you have that the HVO actually had

24 122-millimetre calibre weapons in their arsenal?

25 A. None.

Page 16213

1 Q. Let's take a look at Tab 1, sir, which is a

2 milinfosum dated November the 15th, 1992, number 16.

3 And I turn you to page 3, where there is a reference to

4 an HVO 203-millimetre gun, nicknamed Nora by local

5 villagers. Were you aware that the HVO had a

6 203-millimetre weapon nicknamed Nora?

7 A. No, I was not. But I was aware that the

8 Yugoslav army had been well equipped with artillery

9 before the war.

10 Q. All right. Similarly, sir, if you would just

11 turn to Tab 16. There is a report on page 3, paragraph

12 11A, of two 155-millimetre Nora howitzers in the Mosunj

13 quarry. It says it remains to be corroborated, but

14 were you aware that the HVO had 155-millimetre weapons

15 in their inventory?

16 A. As I said, I am aware that the -- all the

17 factions had various weapons, because the JNA was

18 extremely well equipped with artillery. And again, if

19 you look at this, this contradicts your last comment

20 where the Nora was described as 203-millimetre --

21 talked about 155-millimetre Noras.

22 Q. Yes, sir. Now, the ABiH also had heavy

23 artillery, did they not?

24 A. They did.

25 Q. For example, if you look at Tab 2, they had

Page 16214

1 152-millimetre weapons available to them, or larger;

2 correct?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. And if you also take a look at Tab 12, sir,

5 the ABiH, at least, if you look at paragraph 8C, had

6 122-millimetre D30 weapons in their inventory, didn't

7 they?

8 A. I don't doubt it.

9 Q. And, indeed, that howitzer at 122 millimetres

10 was observed in the Travnik area firing at Vitez, or in

11 the Vitez direction, on the 13th of May 1993, wasn't

12 it?

13 A. So it appears.

14 Q. Now, you always found the Bosnian Serbs to be

15 very secretive about their artillery assets, didn't

16 you?

17 A. I did.

18 Q. And it was known that Bosnian Serb artillery

19 had positions high on the Vlasic feature at Mount

20 Palinik; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Which is, I think, 1.933 metres above sea

23 level or about 6.000 feet high, right?

24 A. May well be.

25 Q. All right. And there is no question, sir,

Page 16215

1 that the Bosnian Serb army had in its inventory

2 155-millimetre weapons; correct?

3 A. This is irrelevant to this particular

4 shelling, because the shelling did not come from

5 Vlasic. It came from the west. Vlasic is to the

6 north-west.

7 Q. If you'd answer my question, sir. The

8 Bosnian Serb army had 155-millimetre ordnance in their

9 arsenal, did they not?

10 A. Yes, they did.

11 Q. And 152-millimetre ordnance, 130-millimetre

12 ordnance, right, and 122-millimetre ordnance?

13 A. Right.

14 Q. Now, sir, would you turn to Tab 21, page 2.

15 A gentleman from whom we've heard in this case, a

16 gentleman with the 3rd Corps, I can't remember his

17 name, so I won't mention it. I can't remember whether

18 he was in closed session, so I won't mention the name,

19 but you can read it there. This gentleman from the 3rd

20 Corps stated that various four to six rounds had fallen

21 in the town centre in Zenica, and that these rounds had

22 been fired from Bosnian Serb artillery held positions

23 on the Vlasic feature. Right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. So once again, sir, there is no question, is

Page 16216

1 there, that Zenica was in range of Bosnian Serb

2 artillery on the Vlasic feature?

3 A. Absolutely.

4 Q. Now, when were you informed that this

5 shelling started?

6 A. I was informed the shelling started at 1210

7 hours on the 19th of April 1993.

8 Q. All right. Would you turn to Tab 5, please.

9 This is an entry from the battlefield diary or war

10 diary prepared by Major Baggesen, Exhibit D75/1. Have

11 you spoken to Major Baggesen?

12 A. No.

13 Q. All right. If you turn to the 19th of April,

14 you can see that he records in his contemporaneous

15 diary the fact that the attack began at 0930 hours. Do

16 you see that?

17 A. I see that.

18 Q. Is that the first time that you are aware of

19 that information?

20 A. Yes, it is.

21 Q. All right. And the shelling continued,

22 according to Major Baggesen's war diary, into the

23 afternoon. Do you see that?

24 A. I see that.

25 Q. Now, it's true, as you can see from other

Page 16217

1 entries in Major Baggesen's war diary, that Zenica was

2 shelled fairly regularly after April the 19th, 1993.

3 Let me give you a few examples. If you turn to the

4 entry for April the 21st, where 130 people were wounded

5 in a shelling incident. Were you aware that a shelling

6 had occurred just two days later?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Do you know who fired those shells?

9 A. No.

10 Q. All right. And just anyone can read it.

11 I'll just read out the dates: April the 22nd, April

12 the 26th, fired at 1130 at night. Incidentally,

13 Mr. Hamill, it would be rather difficult for a forward

14 observer to walk shots in at 1130 at night; wouldn't

15 you agree?

16 A. No, I wouldn't agree at all.

17 Q. By the way, you say --

18 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Mr. Sayers, can you please

19 stick to the testimony in chief, because this is

20 expertise. We are not going to go through to the whole

21 shelling from the beginning of Zenica. Can we stick to

22 the expert itself. Because we can ask this witness:

23 Do you know this and this? And he doesn't know. This

24 is not the sense of the -- of his testimony anyway.

25 MR. SAYERS: I understand, Your Honour. I

Page 16218

1 think that the -- it is material, however, that Zenica

2 was regularly shelled, and this individual who has been

3 -- or this gentleman, who is being produced as an

4 expert, didn't even know about that, and I wasn't told

5 about that.

6 JUDGE MAY: I don't think that's going to

7 help. Look, he just deals with one particular

8 shelling, and he gives evidence about it. And we would

9 be helped, really, if you are contradicting his

10 evidence, if you deal with it.

11 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

12 JUDGE MAY: What are you -- I mean, I don't

13 want to interfere with your cross-examination, but it

14 may help if we know the direction you are heading.

15 MR. SAYERS: The direction -- the direction

16 is that there is simply no way for anybody to tell

17 where the shells came from, or what the calibre was on

18 April the 19th, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, ask him some

20 questions about that.

21 MR. SAYERS: I will.

22 Q. With respect to crater analysis, sir, you say

23 in your statement, statement number one, five years

24 ago, that crater analysis can give you just a general

25 sense of direction from which incoming fire was

Page 16219

1 actually fired. But it's not possible to determine the

2 range from forensic examination of a shell crater; is

3 that correct?

4 A. Correct.

5 Q. Now, to do a crater analysis, the first thing

6 you need is a very accurate compass, don't you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Because you need to know what the magnetic

9 deviation of the particular compass is, right?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. It's certainly relevant, when you are doing

12 this compass analysis, or compass reading, to try to

13 determine the direction from which the shell came,

14 whether there is any magnetic metal in the vicinity,

15 right?

16 A. Right.

17 Q. Would you just take a look at one of these

18 photographs that you were shown. I don't have a number

19 on mine. It's one of the copies of Exhibit Z2281.

20 Well, actually, why don't you just show him this. If

21 you put that on the ELMO, it might be the best way of

22 doing it. And you can see that there's a large amount

23 of metal around that particular crater, can't you?

24 A. There is a certain amount of metal, but if

25 you move far enough away from it, your compass won't

Page 16220

1 get disturbed.

2 Q. Do you know whether the people that measured

3 the angle of incoming fire with their compass moved far

4 enough away from those metallic features when they did

5 their analysis on the 19th of April?

6 A. I don't know what they did, but I know what I

7 did.

8 Q. Now, do you know what the magnetic deviation

9 of the compass used by Major Baggesen and his

10 colleague, Mr. Lausten, was on the 19th of April?

11 A. No. But I do know what the magnetic

12 deviation of my compass was. I used a tested prismatic

13 compass.

14 Q. And a tested prismatic compass is preferable

15 to use, because it actually lists the magnetic

16 deviation on it, doesn't it?

17 A. No.

18 Q. How do you determine what the magnetic

19 deviation of your compass was?

20 A. My compass was tested to be accurate, so it

21 was accurate. And all I had to do was place the

22 magnetic deviation of Zenica on it, which I got from a

23 local map.

24 Q. All right. Now, when you first visited

25 Zenica in 1997 to look at the scene, it's true that

Page 16221

1 insufficient traces remained to conduct any kind of an

2 accurate crater analysis; isn't that right?

3 A. There are degrees of accuracy involved. I

4 saw nothing in my analysis which differed from the

5 analysis which I had been given as Major Baggesen's

6 analysis. And even allowing for some deviation, we are

7 talking about gross error here. The shells, obviously

8 came, even to an untutored eye, from the west,

9 generally west.

10 Q. All right. Let's take a look at some of the

11 variables that -- that are -- that affect the accuracy

12 of fall of shot, sir. The first variable, or set of

13 variables, the purely mechanical variables, the actual

14 ordnance itself. One would be the so-called tube life,

15 the amount -- the number of rounds that have actually

16 been shot through the gun tube. The more rounds that

17 have been shot through the tube, the less accurate the

18 piece becomes. Would you agree?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. You don't know what the tube life of a

21 particular piece of ordnance at issue was, do you?

22 A. No.

23 Q. The next variable is the quality of the

24 explosive propellant actually used. Because with

25 uneven burning characteristics, the trajectory of the

Page 16222

1 expelled shell can be affected. Wouldn't you agree

2 with that?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you don't know what kind of propellant

5 was used on the shell at issue, do you?

6 A. No.

7 Q. All right. The next set of variables are the

8 meteorological variables, if you like. Any proficient

9 artillery officer, before he fires off a round at a

10 specific target, has to know, for example, the air

11 temperature, right?

12 A. That's very useful, yes.

13 Q. Because the hotter the air, the less dense it

14 is, and therefore the greater the range. Right?

15 A. In general terms, yes.

16 Q. And the denser the air, the less the range,

17 or the steeper the fall of shot?

18 A. Right.

19 Q. Do you know what the air temperature was on

20 the 19th of April, when you say the shelling occurred

21 around midday?

22 A. No.

23 Q. The next variable is barometric pressure.

24 You have to know that, because that affects air density

25 and, in fact, air density influences the fall of shot

Page 16223

1 as well; correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. All right. And do you know what the

4 barometric pressure was around midday on the 19th?

5 A. I am given to understand it was roughly

6 standard temperature and pressure.

7 Q. Who told you that?

8 A. People on the day.

9 Q. Can you identify anybody particularly?

10 A. Specifically, at this stage, no.

11 Q. Now, I can certainly understand that

12 contemporary observers would be able to tell you what

13 the temperature may have been on that day, but how

14 would they have been able to tell you the barometric

15 pressure on that day, sir?

16 A. Some people are sensitive to pressure.

17 Q. All right. The next variable, sir, is winds

18 aloft. You need to know the strength and direction of

19 the wind through the various levels that the shell

20 passes during its ballistic trajectory, because winds

21 aloft effect the direction of flight. Correct?

22 A. That's quite correct.

23 Q. And it's typical, isn't it, that the higher

24 you go, the harder the winds blow, generally speaking?

25 A. Generally speaking, that would be acceptable,

Page 16224

1 yes.

2 Q. Now, what is the top of the ballistic

3 trajectory above sea level of a D30 J 122-millimetre,

4 do you know?

5 A. As I don't have the ballistic tables at hand,

6 I couldn't tell you.

7 Q. All right. Let me suggest to you that the

8 maximum height that a 122-millimetre shell can reach at

9 a 45-degree angle, which is a maximum firing angle

10 would be 6.000 metres, or approximately 19.000 to

11 20.000 feet. Do you know what the winds aloft were on

12 the 19th of April?

13 A. Personally, no.

14 Q. Wouldn't it be fair to say, sir, that you

15 have no information that the HVO had any kind of

16 meteorological facilities whatsoever?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. Another factor that you have to take into

19 account is the Coriolis force, the rotation of the

20 earth. Is that right?

21 A. That's correct at extreme ranges.

22 Q. And this was fired, in your opinion, at

23 extreme range?

24 A. Very likely.

25 Q. Now, other variables include the actual

Page 16225

1 range -- I mean, the more extreme the range, the less

2 accurate the weapon becomes. Wouldn't you agree?

3 A. Generally, yes.

4 Q. And conversely, the closer you are, the more

5 accurate the fall of shot would be expected to be?

6 A. It doesn't actually work like that. It

7 depends on whether you've got one fixed charge or a

8 number of charges. Generally, if you have a weapon

9 with, say, five charges, then at the maximum extent of

10 each charge the inaccuracy will be greater.

11 Q. Do you know how many charges were used on the

12 19th of April 1993, in any of the weapons?

13 A. All I can say is that if it was fired at

14 15.000 metres, or thereabouts, it was fired at maximum

15 charge.

16 Q. All right. Do you know -- well, another

17 variable is the accuracy of the maps available to the

18 artillery commander. Right?

19 A. Strictly speaking, yes. And that's why we

20 fire adjusting rounds, which was done on this occasion

21 to shoot out barometric temperature, Coriolis, and

22 other variations.

23 Q. Similarly, another variable is the accuracy

24 of the firing data charts that are actually maintained

25 in the command post. Right?

Page 16226

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And do you know anything about those, whether

3 they were accurate or not for this particular weapon on

4 the date at issue?

5 JUDGE MAY: Are you seriously asking the

6 witness if he knew what was in the command post on the

7 19th of April? Mr. Sayers --

8 MR. SAYERS: It's a more generic question,

9 Mr. President.

10 Q. Do you know whether the HVO had accurate

11 firing charts available, generally speaking, sir, for

12 this particular type of weapon?

13 A. Generally speaking, yes, they did.

14 Q. From whom did you discover that?

15 A. I spent a long time in the area and in the

16 mission, and I know a lot of people. I have spoken to

17 HV, I have spoken to HVO, I have spoken to Armija, I

18 have spoken to VRS people, and it's quite obvious that

19 if they have the weapons, they have the firing tables

20 to go with them.

21 Q. All right. One final variable is the level

22 of training of the particular gun layers in the

23 artillery battery members. Right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Do you know whether the HVO artillery members

Page 16227

1 were well trained or anything about their training?

2 A. It's clear from their shooting that they were

3 well trained.

4 Q. It's clear from whoever shot the weapon that

5 they were well trained; wouldn't you agree with that?

6 A. I would say it's clear from the HVO shooting,

7 generally, that they are well trained.

8 Q. All right. Now, one sure way to determine

9 the source and range of artillery fire is artillery

10 locating radar. Wouldn't you agree?

11 A. Yes, absolutely.

12 Q. If you just turn to Tab 9, sir. I think it's

13 Tab 9. You can see that the ECMM addresses arguments

14 regarding another shelling incident in Zenica, or Vitez

15 I believe, April the 27th, 1993, arguing about the

16 source of the shelling: "And the ECMM monitor strongly

17 felt that the situation could be resolved, once and for

18 all, if locating battery could be made available to

19 clarify the situation."

20 Do you see that?

21 A. I see that, yes.

22 Q. And the next tab on page 2 makes the

23 contention that the problem of verifying firing units

24 and targets must be solved so that there is no question

25 as who is firing on who. The only way to do that is by

Page 16228

1 artillery-locating radar. Do you concur with that?

2 A. Within limits, I concur with it.

3 Q. All right. That would certainly have

4 eliminated any doubt at all, wouldn't it?

5 A. I would have done it, had it been available.

6 Q. Right. Now, did you expect any of the shell

7 fragments collected by Mr. Lausten which were turned

8 over to the Canadian Battalion?

9 A. No.

10 Q. Do you know whether the shell fragments that

11 you inspected, sir, in 1997, fours year after the

12 incident, were the shell fragments that were collected

13 by either Mr. Lausten or Judge Veseljak?

14 A. As I already made clear, I went on

15 information that was given to me at the time, and I

16 cannot speak for the chain of evidence, and I cannot

17 say exactly where the fuses came from, nor the

18 fragments, merely what they meant to me.

19 Q. And to be perfectly fair to you, Mr. Hamill,

20 you did say on page 4 of your 1997 statement that you

21 looked at two RGM-2 fuses, and that these fuses

22 purported to come from shells fired on Zenica on April

23 the 19th. Right?

24 A. Of course.

25 Q. But you are not sure of that fact, are you?

Page 16229

1 A. Of course not.

2 Q. Would it be fair to say, sir, that you do not

3 yourself know, and you have not performed any

4 calculations yourself of the angle of descent of the

5 shells that landed in Zenica on April the 19th?

6 A. That's not possible.

7 Q. It's not possible --

8 A. It is not possible to do that type of work.

9 Q. All right. Have you ever seen any treatises

10 or technical data on how to do crater analysis,

11 anything that's in writing, any published treatises or

12 anything like that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Could you identify one for us, so we can all

15 see how to go about doing it?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Please do.

18 A. Sorry, I am not with you.

19 Q. Can you identify for the Court, and for us,

20 any authoritative treatise on how to do a proper crater

21 analysis?

22 A. I couldn't give you a name, but I have used

23 two; one produced by artillery school, and one produced

24 by, if I remember right, the Royal Artillery in the

25 United Kingdom.

Page 16230

1 Q. All right. Now, you have given us your

2 conclusions regarding the source of the artillery

3 fire. You say that -- I believe that it was at the

4 eastern end of the Puticevo feature; is that right?

5 A. Based on the information that I was given, I

6 would estimate that that was the most likely place to

7 locate artillery of that type to fire into Zenica on

8 that bearing.

9 Q. All right. Do you know whether the HVO

10 actually had any artillery assets there that day?

11 A. I do not.

12 Q. And no one has contended to you that any such

13 artillery assets were located there that day?

14 JUDGE MAY: Come on. Look, he is an expert.

15 He comes here to give his evidence of the analysis

16 which he made. He is not giving hearsay evidence or

17 anything of the sort. The witness has told us how he

18 has come to his conclusions. You may challenge those

19 conclusions, Mr. Sayers, but there is no point asking a

20 series of hypotheses and a series of matters which he

21 might or might not be aware of. Now, let us

22 concentrate on his analysis.

23 MR. SAYERS: All right.

24 Q. Let me address one other question, sir. You

25 eliminated, as a possibility, the site of the quarry at

Page 16231

1 Mali Mosunj as being the potential firing point, right?

2 A. I did.

3 Q. And I think that the reason that you did that

4 would be that that would have required an angle to the

5 -- from the quarry to the point of the centre of

6 Zenica, where the shells fell, at 4.500 mils, or about

7 253 degrees true, right?

8 A. That is correct, yes.

9 Q. And you concluded that a 17-degree difference

10 would be just too much, given the ECMM conclusions of

11 their investigation on the 19th of April, and yours; is

12 that right?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. All right. And so, sir, you would discount

15 the Mali Mosunj quarry as being the firing point, in

16 your opinion?

17 A. In my opinion, I discount it, yes.

18 Q. Now, on page 5 of your statement three years

19 ago, you said that it's possible that the shells were

20 fired closer to Zenica than either the Puticevo feature

21 or the Mosunj quarry, given the confused nature of the

22 front at the time?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. And you still abide by that opinion today?

25 A. I do.

Page 16232

1 Q. Yes, all right. If you could just turn to

2 the last tab on this document, sir, there are a series

3 of statistics from the U.S. Department of Defence,

4 December of 1995, entitled, "Bosnia Country Handbook."

5 Looking at the D-30 J weapon, the extended

6 range on that weapon is listed at 17.300 metres. Were

7 you aware of that before today?

8 A. Yes, I was.

9 Q. So the conventional range is 15.300 metres,

10 but the extended range is actually 2.000 metres more

11 than that?

12 A. Using a different projectile.

13 Q. What kind of projectile?

14 A. To the best of my knowledge, it was an M-95,

15 but I wouldn't swear to it. Correction, it was not an

16 M-95, it was an -- it was not the OF 482.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. I read about it at the time in the firing

19 manuals issued by the Yugoslav national army or the

20 Yugoslav People's Army, and the fuse that they used was

21 a different fuse to the RGM-2 on that particular shell.

22 Q. All right. If you take a look at the last

23 page here, there's data on 152-millimetre howitzer

24 M-84. The conventional range on that weapon is 17.200,

25 and the extended range is 24.400 metres; right?

Page 16233

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. That weapon, as I said before, sir, uses an

3 OF 540 shell, doesn't it?

4 A. I do not know.

5 Q. And you do not know that that OF 540 shell is

6 detonated by an RGM-2 fuse?

7 A. No.

8 Q. And the page before that is a 130-millimetre

9 weapon, an M-46. The conventional range of that weapon

10 is 27.490 metres. Let me just ask you, sir, were you

11 able to determine, from the fragments that were given

12 to you, that the shell fired was actually a

13 122-millimetre calibre?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Were you handed a large fragment of the shell

16 that was quite intact, or were these very small pieces

17 that were in the bag that was given to you?

18 A. They were very small pieces.

19 Q. And were you aware that Judge Veseljak

20 actually collected a very large fragment that he found

21 to be quite intact?

22 A. I was not aware of that.

23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Sayers,

24 with all due respect, I think, you should stop this

25 kind of exercise. This is not the first time that you

Page 16234

1 go back to what Judge Veseljak did, and the witness has

2 already told you that he was not abreast of the

3 investigation conducted by this judge, that he did not

4 follow all that, and you are turning around an expert

5 opinion. Are you contesting it or not? If you do,

6 then challenge and tell us what you are challenging, or

7 if you are not an expert, you may also, at a given

8 moment, call in an expert who will challenge this

9 expert opinion.

10 We have testimony here which is very strictly

11 confined to an area, which is an expert opinion on the

12 shelling of Zenica at a particular moment in time and

13 with some conclusions which this witness is offering

14 us, and I believe you should adhere to this.

15 We cannot continue like this, going into

16 things, establishing what the witness knows, what he

17 doesn't. Tell us, what you are challenging in this

18 testimony itself? You are going around this expert

19 opinion. You are not addressing this opinion

20 directly. Either tell us what you want, really, what

21 you are challenging in this case, or then call a

22 witness of your own.

23 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Your Honour, but the

24 only point to the question was that I was trying to

25 establish that this gentleman was not given all of the

Page 16235

1 shell fragments that were actually collected by the

2 gentleman that did the investigation on the 19th of

3 April.

4 JUDGE MAY: I think we've covered the shell

5 fragments. We've got the point.

6 MR. SAYERS: Yes, I think so too, Your

7 Honour.

8 Q. Let me just put it to you, Mr. Hamill, that

9 if a 152-millimetre shell uses an RGM-2 fuse, and if a

10 130-millimetre shell uses an RGM-2 fuse, as does a

11 122-millimetre shell, OF 462, and you're given just the

12 fuses and some small fragments, you can't tell what the

13 calibre of the shell was that actually hit Zenica on

14 the 19th of April, 1993, in all fairness, can you?

15 A. If it is the case that other weapons use that

16 fuse, contrary to the information that I was given at

17 the time, then of course I accept that.

18 As I said earlier on consistently, my report

19 is written purely on the facts as I knew them and

20 information that I was able to ferret out from forces

21 in the Armija, for example, who provided me with the

22 range tables for the full range of Yugoslav weapons of

23 the day. And nowhere did I find a reference to that

24 particular fuse, except for the D-30 J.

25 Now, if you're telling me it is used

Page 16236

1 somewhere, then I have to say that in the range tables,

2 which are the official range tables of those weapons, I

3 saw no reference to it, because believe me, I looked.

4 Q. I understand, sir, and I don't mean to

5 challenge you, but I just mean to put to you the

6 position very simply. If those weapons, all three of

7 them, use -- of different calibres use RGM-2 fuses,

8 then you can't tell what calibre of weapon actually hit

9 Zenica or what calibre of shell hit Zenica on the 19th

10 of April, can you?

11 A. [Inaudible] that a long time ago.

12 MR. SAYERS: Right. Thank you. No further

13 questions.

14 MR. KOVACIC: No, sir, no questions. Thank

15 you.

16 MR. NICE: A few things, if I may, in

17 re-examination.

18 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

19 Q. By the time of your own personal inspection,

20 the craters had lost definition, to a degree, I think.

21 A. Some of the craters had lost definition to a

22 greater degree than others, but some of them were still

23 very, very clear. The one at the bus stop was quite

24 clear, and what I described as number 1, the first

25 shell to land, based on the testimony of other people,

Page 16237

1 was also still very clear.

2 Q. So from your own inspection at that time, how

3 many compass degrees of error or allowance have to be

4 made, in your judgement?

5 A. I would say that it came in on a true bearing

6 of 4.800 mils in the case of number 1. Number 2 --

7 Q. I'm going to stop you again. I'll come to

8 that in a second. But by the time of the loss of

9 definition of the craters, insofar as there had been a

10 loss, do we have to allow for any greater error or

11 margin of error at the time of your inspection than,

12 for example, at the time of the inspection by the ECMM

13 monitors?

14 A. It depends on the type of blurring. In the

15 case of one shell, in particular, there was no

16 blurring, as such, and the marks were very, very clear

17 and related very, very closely to the photographs that

18 I had seen that were taken on the day or, correction,

19 that purportedly were taken on the day.

20 Q. So overall, taking into account the

21 photographs, the ECMM monitors' assessments and your

22 own inspection of these craters, within how many

23 degrees do you say it was due west?

24 A. I am satisfied that it came in due west.

25 Q. So if we look at your plan, because you've

Page 16238

1 been asked about the Mosunj quarry and we can see it

2 marked on the plan, is that, in any sense, a candidate

3 site or not?

4 A. In my view, it is not a candidate site. But

5 further, it was also HVO held at the time.

6 Q. The Vlasic feature, which you've been asked

7 about but we haven't yet just identified it on the map,

8 can you tell us where it is by compass bearing or by

9 pointing it out?

10 A. The Vlasic mountain extends north of

11 Travnik.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

13 MR. NICE:

14 Q. Thank you. Any possibility of that being the

15 source of these artillery shells?

16 A. The Vlasic Mountain extends north of Travnik,

17 and that is generally in a north-westerly direction.

18 This is clearly 45 degrees or 800 mils from 4.800

19 mils. Now, if I excluded rounds coming in from 4.500

20 mils, I'm certainly excluded rounds coming in from

21 roughly 5.200 or thereabouts.

22 Q. Thank you. Just a couple more questions.

23 The fragments, you weren't able to say from

24 what size of shell they came. Were they consistent or

25 inconsistent with the possibility of their coming from

Page 16239

1 the shell you've described?

2 A. They were just shell fragments.

3 Q. Thank you. These fuse manuals and so on that

4 you looked at coming from the JNA, in your experience,

5 are these documents exhaustive and complete?

6 A. They are extremely exhaustive and they are

7 extremely complete, and they relate to every aspect of

8 what your learned colleague mentioned earlier on, such

9 as wind speed and direction, barometric pressure, chart

10 temperature, air temperature, and it gives the

11 variations for each of those at an exhaustive list of

12 ranges, generally in terms of pair hundred metres.

13 Q. And the manuals that told you of the use to

14 which fuses were put for particular shells, again in

15 your experience, how exhaustive are they?

16 A. These were the same manuals. What I examined

17 was the manuals of the particular weapons, which gave

18 the shell types, their fuses, the ranges and the

19 elevations that one would use.

20 Q. And no sign of this fuse to you being used

21 for any other weapon -- for any other shell available

22 to the JNA at that time?

23 A. I looked through them exhaustively in order

24 to find what shells would have used that fuse, and I

25 must say I didn't find it. That is not to say that

Page 16240

1 such shells do not exist. But I, in my exhaustive

2 examination of the JNA manuals, could find no reference

3 to them.

4 Q. But when you were being -- I must be careful

5 I'm not going too fast.

6 When you were being asked about variables,

7 one of them was the absence of meteorological

8 information. But here you're postulating the use of an

9 observer, and you use the term "adjusting rounds",

10 which may need defining. With an observer, does the

11 absence of meteorological information necessarily

12 become significant?

13 A. With an observer, the absence of

14 meteorological information or accurate mapped data is

15 unimportant.

16 Q. And what are "adjusting rounds"?

17 A. Generally, the information is given to the

18 gun position by the observer as to the location of the

19 target, and the battery, or single gun, or a

20 combination of guns in question fires what is called an

21 adjusting round. The observer sees where this round

22 falls in relation to the target, and he gives a

23 correction down to the guns by way of left or right,

24 add or drop, in relation to his position to the

25 target. Then a second round or group of rounds is

Page 16241

1 fired, and again the observer checks to see where they

2 are in relation to the target, and generally the third

3 set of rounds would be accurate, they would be on

4 target.

5 We have seen an example of it, according to

6 the testimony given to me during my investigation, in

7 this particular shelling, which was a classic example,

8 to my mind, of, "Add 100, add 50," or alternatively,

9 "Drop 100, drop 50," if the observer were in the

10 north, that is, on the other side of the river.

11 Q. And if the third rounds hadn't been on

12 target, what would you then have seen?

13 A. It would have called for an additional set of

14 rounds.

15 Q. Finally, on the question of the timing or the

16 time of the shelling, you've told us about your

17 information and the times given to you, and you've told

18 us about how the order of the shelling was always

19 consistent in its account or consistent in its

20 account. Were you having people describing hearing one

21 shell and then getting out of the way and finding

22 another one; is that the way the story gets told?

23 A. More or less. It depended on the individual

24 in question.

25 Q. Very well.

Page 16242

1 A. But as I say, the consistency was that there

2 was a very short period of time between each of the two

3 in the groups, in the three groups. One witness said,

4 "Maybe two seconds." Another one said, "Oh, maybe

5 four or five seconds." But it was a short period of

6 time, certainly less than seven and a half seconds.

7 Q. And then the time between the rounds, as you

8 got them, were, I think, 12.10 --

9 A. 12.24 --

10 Q. The final two at 12.29?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. You've been asked about whether you've read

13 Professor Jankovic's report, and you have, or his

14 testimony. Is there anything you want to add by way of

15 dealing with it now or have you dealt with it in the

16 course of answering Mr. Sayers' questions?

17 A. I think I dealt with it in the course of

18 answering your learned colleague's questions, but I

19 would say that generally it was irrelevant to this

20 particular case, and how relevant it is to the

21 remainder of the trial, I don't know.

22 Q. Irrelevant because?

23 A. Because it didn't deal with this particular

24 type of shell.

25 Q. You've been challenged as to whether you've

Page 16243

1 been, as it were, available to inspect this at the

2 time, I think. At the time, were you dealing with

3 another shelling or did you deal with another shelling

4 in the course of your time in Bosnia, the market

5 shelling?

6 A. I did, but --

7 MR. SAYERS: I do not believe that was

8 challenged, Your Honour, and that was not raised on

9 direct or cross-examination.

10 MR. NICE: Very well.

11 Q. But I believe you did deal with the Merkale

12 shelling in Sarajevo.

13 A. I did, but that was 1994.

14 MR. NICE: Very well. Nothing else, thank

15 you. And I'm grateful to the Chamber for sitting to

16 accommodate the witness.

17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Hamill, that concludes your

18 evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give

19 it. You are free to go.

20 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

21 [The witness withdrew]

22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, tomorrow.

23 MR. NICE: The position tomorrow is that

24 there are the two witnesses who probably will be quite

25 short. There's the third witness we have been speaking

Page 16244

1 of and I won't name who we've been hoping to get here

2 and eventually discovered we were going to be able to

3 get, as I understand it. So there will be three

4 witnesses tomorrow.

5 There are a number of administrative matters

6 and one or two rulings still to be dealt with.

7 You have, I hope, now received not only the

8 Defence skeleton argument in relation to formal

9 statements and affidavits, but I hope you've received a

10 document from us, including a schedule, by way of

11 response.


13 MR. NICE: It's been filed, and I'm sorry it

14 hasn't found its way through. I'm sure it will come

15 through in one form or another tonight.

16 There have been some issues about transcripts

17 and one or two other issues, but it may be possible,

18 because I know that this would be the desire of the

19 Chamber, to conclude matters tomorrow.

20 JUDGE MAY: Are the video arguments in

21 comprehensible form?

22 MR. NICE: Yes. There is another schedule

23 being produced over the weekend, much more complete, I

24 think, and I hope it addresses the Defence concerns.

25 Indeed, I think now it is much fuller in relation to

Page 16245

1 the identification of transcripts to videos.

2 JUDGE MAY: And is it on its way?

3 MR. NICE: I hope so, yes.

4 JUDGE MAY: Because if we're going to deal

5 with these matters, we must have these schedules

6 tonight. I don't know if the Registry can help.

7 MR. NICE: Well, if we're allowed to approach

8 you in the informal way, other than through the

9 Registry, then I can, as soon as I leave here, ensure

10 that the documents are made available to you.

11 JUDGE MAY: Could you do that, please.

12 MR. NICE: And to the Defence as well, if

13 there are any of them that they are missing at the

14 moment.

15 JUDGE MAY: Well, the Defence should have

16 them too, yes.

17 MR. NICE: Yes, of course.

18 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, if I may address

19 the Court very, very briefly.

20 As our colleague Mr. Nice just said, we have

21 been also informed about the possibility of having a

22 witness -- I guess I cannot use his name. That was a

23 witness under number 10 in previous listings of

24 transcripts. We have been told about that possibility

25 of his appearance an hour ago, indeed while we had the

Page 16246

1 afternoon break, for the first time, and that is not in

2 accordance with the batting order by which we should

3 have been informed in at least 14 days, and then within

4 that frame it might have been changed, whether first

5 day or last day, but it was not listed. Indeed, this

6 witness was listed last time -- forgive me if I'm

7 wrong, but many months ago; sometime, I guess, in

8 October or November. And after that, the case was

9 dropped. He appeared in the list of possible

10 transcripts, and we were not informed about the

11 possibility he's coming here.

12 We simply, under this -- after so many trial

13 hours in the courtroom continuously, I don't see the

14 possibility that we can really prepare this witness for

15 tomorrow morning. He had been testifying in two other

16 cases; in one of them, quite a great deal of

17 testifying. There are a couple of his earlier

18 statements, and I really see the problem here.

19 I'm not raising that objection just as a

20 formality.

21 JUDGE MAY: No, I'm sure. But there has been

22 talk of this witness being called. His transcript was

23 produced, and he's been on the list for a great deal of

24 time. Well, Mr. Kovacic, see how you get on tonight.

25 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, certainly.

Page 16247

1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] In French

2 they say, and I believe that in other languages the

3 same holds true, that you should sleep on it and you'll

4 be wiser in the morning.

5 JUDGE MAY: Not too much sleep.

6 MR. KOVACIC: No. Since we did study at that

7 time many transcripts, and luckily this one fell in the

8 category to be discussed, I have to admit that I did

9 not read it, really. I mean I went through, and that

10 was three weeks ago, if I'm not wrong. So if I'm

11 preparing a witness, if he was testifying in two cases,

12 I have to go through.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, see what you can do,

15 as I say, by way of preparation. If need be, we shall

16 have to sit on Friday morning to accommodate you, but I

17 hope that can be avoided.

18 MR. KOVACIC: Yes, thank you, sir. I

19 certainly will. And in some earlier occasions, if I'm

20 not wrong, you did admit that such a witness could

21 appear later for cross.

22 JUDGE MAY: In this case not, because this is

23 right at the end of the Prosecution case.

24 MR. KOVACIC: And not to add that he is a

25 very repetitive witness as well. He's maybe not

Page 16248

1 needed.

2 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

3 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, there's also the

4 Witness AO issue that needs to be resolved, the sooner

5 the better.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We shall have that in mind

7 for tomorrow.

8 Very well. Nine tomorrow, please.

9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

10 5.32 p.m., to be reconvened on

11 Thursday, the 9th day of March, 2000,

12 at 9 a.m.