1 Tuesday, 20th July, 1999
2 (Open session)
3 (The accused entered court)
4 (The witness entered court)
5 --- Upon commencing at 2.30 p.m.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your
7 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor
8 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.
10 MR. STEIN: Thank you, sir.
11 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA (Resumed)
12 Cross-examined by Mr. Stein:
13 Q. Dr. Donia, my name is Bob Stein, and I
14 represent Dario Kordic. Although we speak the same
15 language, we are going to have to do it much slower
16 than we normally do. Is that all right with you?
17 A. I understand, yes.
18 Q. If there is any question I ask that you don't
19 understand, please let me know.
20 A. Yes, I will.
21 Q. Perhaps you can help us by finding out those
22 areas in which you actually can help us and those in
23 which you cannot. Let me first start by asking, you
24 are not a political scientist?
25 A. That's correct. I'm not.
1 Q. And you are not a political theorist?
2 A. No, I am not.
3 Q. You are not a journalist?
4 A. I occasionally write journalistic pieces, but
5 I am not a full-time journalist.
6 Q. You are not a member of the working press, as
7 it were?
8 A. No, not a member of the permanent, full-time
9 working press.
10 Q. You are not a constitutional lawyer?
11 A. I am not.
12 Q. Or a constitutional scholar?
13 A. No.
14 Q. In fact, you are not a college professor,
15 currently, are you?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. You are not an assistant or an associate
18 professor either?
19 A. No.
20 Q. You are not an instructor at a university?
21 A. No.
22 Q. You have no academic position currently at
23 the University of Michigan?
24 A. I am a research associate at the Centre for
25 Russian and East European Studies, which is an
1 appointment that means I consult from time to time with
2 them and lecture occasionally at various activities
4 Q. You are not paid by the University of
5 Michigan to teach students, are you?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Indeed, your position is a research position
8 as opposed to an academic position?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. As such, of course, you are not a tenured
11 member of the Michigan faculty?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. I gather you visit Michigan two or three
14 times a year?
15 A. Six, eight times a year.
16 Q. All right. From your home in Houston?
17 A. San Diego, California.
18 Q. San Diego, California. I'm sorry. I
19 misspoke. The majority of your working life, you
20 worked for Merrill Lynch?
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. That would be between 1981 and 1998?
23 A. August of 1998.
24 Q. And that was full-time employment?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. "Full time" in every sense of the word?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do I take it that after 1981, in the glut of
4 Ph.D.s, if you will, you left academia to work for
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Because you basically couldn't find a job
9 A. Well, I had several jobs and a couple of job
10 opportunities that I declined, but essentially you're
11 correct. The job market wasn't such that it enabled me
12 to find the kind of position that I wanted, so I left
13 academia and went to work for Merrill Lynch.
14 Q. For Merrill, you were a senior resident,
15 vice-president, and you had managerial
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And those management responsibilities were
19 over financial consultants; is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. In San Diego?
22 A. In Fort Worth, West Texas, and in San Diego.
23 Q. All right. During that period of time, your
24 full-time employment was focused on your
25 responsibilities for the brokerage house, Merrill
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Now, the opinion in your report, which has
4 been forwarded to all of us, has not been put out to
5 the general public for academic or scholarly review,
6 has it?
7 A. No.
8 Q. It has not been peer reviewed at all?
9 A. At all, no.
10 Q. Before writing your report, is it fair to say
11 that you never spoke with Dario Kordic?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And you never spoke, obviously, at least
14 while he was alive, to Mate Boban?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. Or Mr. Kostroman?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. Or Dr. Tudjman?
19 A. That's correct also.
20 Q. Did you ever read the pre-trial submissions
21 by Dario Kordic in this case?
22 A. No, I have not.
23 Q. Is it fair to say, therefore, that the
24 primary sources of the history, the current history
25 you're talking about were never specifically
1 interviewed by you?
2 A. Yes. I did interview Stjepan Kljuic briefly
3 at one point in 1995, but he would be the only person,
4 I believe, I referred to in the paper that I have
6 Q. Right. You never asked to interview Dario
8 A. No.
9 Q. And you never asked to interview Tudjman,
10 Kostroman, Boban, any of those parties?
11 A. No.
12 Q. It is also fair to say that Dario Kordic is
13 not mentioned in your 1994 book?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Now, the report that has been given to the
16 Court and to counsel doesn't appear to have a date on
17 it. Maybe I missed it. Did I? Is there a date on
18 your report?
19 A. I don't believe there's a date on it, no.
20 Q. All right. Then I would like to ask, when
21 was it written?
22 A. It was completed, I would say, briefly before
23 it was submitted to the Court, perhaps in April of this
25 Q. April 1998?
1 A. 1999.
2 Q. 1999, okay. That report was written after
3 your appearance in the Blaskic case; is that right?
4 A. That's correct.
5 Q. Did you do more research, more writing, more
6 analysis after your appearance in Blaskic and before
7 you wrote your report?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Okay. You reviewed that report before you
10 testified today?
11 A. I reviewed parts of it, yes.
12 Q. In fact, you made some corrections to it.
13 A. I made some additions and, I'm sure, some
14 corrections as well, yes.
15 Q. All right. Does that report now, as it
16 stands, give the full, complete opinion that you have
17 in this case?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Any additions, corrections or deletions you'd
20 like to make?
21 A. Well, the report, by its nature, is a
22 summary, and so I would present it to you as a summary
23 of my conclusions or views on a wide variety of matters
24 and could not probably give you additions, corrections,
25 updates without a very extensive further report.
1 Q. Let me rephrase it differently. To the
2 extent that the report sets out our opinions, it
3 doesn't have any additions, corrections or deletions
4 that you'd like to make now, as far as you know?
5 A. No.
6 Q. I also note that your report has either
7 footnotes, endnotes, or annotations. Can we agree on
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Your Ph.D. thesis I'm sure is filled with
11 footnotes, endnotes, and annotations?
12 A. Endnotes, bibliography, annotations. I don't
13 think there are any footnotes.
14 Q. When you write for learned journals, you're
15 expected to put either footnotes, endnotes, or
16 annotations in your work?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Those annotations and footnotes would give
19 the reader the ability to determine that which is your
20 conclusion versus that which you are borrowing from
21 someone else.
22 A. Among other things, yes.
23 Q. Did anyone instruct you not to put footnotes
24 or annotations in your report?
25 A. No.
1 Q. That was done on your own?
2 A. Well, I made the decision not to incorporate
3 footnotes in the report, yes.
4 Q. So the reader can't tell that which is your
5 own conclusion versus that which may be someone else's?
6 A. Well, I would say that the context makes that
7 clear in many cases but your point is valid. Without
8 footnotes, the sources of quotations are not known to
9 the reader.
10 Q. All right. Similarly, without footnotes it's
11 difficult to tell those of which opinions are yours and
12 those of which are opinions held by others in the
13 historical community.
14 A. Well, I would say that I have at least tried
15 to make clear the distinction, in the course of writing
16 the paper, between my own conclusions and those of
17 others when it became appropriate to do so.
18 Q. We can agree, and I believe, actually, that
19 Mr. Nice asked you this, that reasonable historians
20 reasonably disagree?
21 A. Absolutely.
22 Q. That's what the study of history is.
23 A. Among other disciplines that's exactly what
24 it is, yes.
25 Q. It's the debate by historians over historical
1 issues over time?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Who contacted you to make an appearance here
4 at the Tribunal? Was it the Prosecution or did you
5 contact them? How was your introduction to the
6 Prosecution made?
7 A. No, the Prosecution.
8 Q. They just called you up one day at Merrill
9 Lynch and said, "Would you like to come on board?"
10 A. I was not at Merrill Lynch at the time that I
11 was contacted by the Prosecution and invited to appear
12 in this case.
13 Q. Where were you?
14 A. I believe I was in Sarajevo.
15 Q. Where in Sarajevo? I don't mean physically
16 but what you were doing in Sarajevo?
17 A. I was just beginning some research on a
18 project there.
19 Q. The project was for whom?
20 A. It's a book I'm writing.
21 Q. That is a book in progress?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And you're writing at the library in
25 A. Well, I'll probably write it in San Diego but
1 the research will be done in a variety of archival
2 institutions in South-east Europe and probably a
3 variety of other places.
4 Q. Did the Prosecution let you know how they got
5 your name?
6 A. Well, they -- yes. They had my name from the
7 Blaskic matter.
8 Q. All right. I guess I'm going back before the
9 Blaskic matter. How did you get hired on for the
10 Blaskic matter?
11 A. I was contacted by a member of the
12 Prosecution team in Blaskic and invited to appear.
13 Q. Did you ask how they got your name?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What was the response?
16 A. I was referred to them by a senior historian
17 in the United States.
18 Q. And that would be?
19 A. That was Denison Rusinow.
20 Q. From what school?
21 A. He is at the university of Pittsburgh.
22 Q. You and Professor Rusinow are colleagues in
23 some fashion?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. That would be how?
1 A. Well, we've known one another since 1965,
2 when I was first in Yugoslavia and he was living in
3 Zagreb. So at the very beginning of my academic career
4 and somewhere early in his academic career we got to
5 know one another.
6 Q. All right. I'd like to turn our attentions
7 now to your book and your dissertation. Can we agree
8 that your field of concentration is not 1991 to 1994?
9 A. Well, I think early in my career my field of
10 concentration was the Austro-Hungarian period, and over
11 time it has broadened as I've done additional work
12 throughout the Twentieth Century, including the more
13 recent period.
14 Q. Your Ph.D. dissertation dealt with Bosnia and
15 the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1878 and
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The subject of your doctoral dissertation
19 were the Muslims in transition; is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. That subject was bounded by temporal limits?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And that study dealt almost exclusively with
24 elite Muslims?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Then, I gather, your dissertation was kind of
2 dusted off, if you will, in 1981 and published under
3 the title "Islam Under the Double Eagles, the Muslims
4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878 to 1914".
5 A. I'd prefer the concept of polishing it up
6 rather than dusting it off --
7 Q. Fair enough.
8 A. -- and extended it somewhat in time and in
9 topic to perhaps make it a more publishable volume.
10 Q. Sure. It was extended essentially by six
11 years or so?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. All right. That book as well, when it was
14 finally polished, focused on Muslims in the so-called
15 elite period or the elite Muslims, I should say.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Now, your second book was with Dr. Fine and
18 that's entitled "Bosnia, A Tradition Betrayed", and
19 that was published in 1994?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. Dr. Fine, as I gather, was your mentor at the
22 University of Michigan?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And he's still there?
25 A. He's still there.
1 Q. That book was written while you were employed
2 at Merrill full time?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. I guess, for the purpose of the record,
5 that's Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, Klein somebody?
6 A. Merrill Lynch is the name of the firm.
7 Q. You were responsible, in that work, for
8 anything after 1878; is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And Dr. Fine took the prior history?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. You didn't take a leave of absence from
13 Merrill to work on that project?
14 A. No.
15 Q. That 1994 book relies principally on
16 secondary sources as opposed to primary sources?
17 A. I would say except insofar as both his
18 research and mine had previously delved into primary
19 sources it relied exclusively on secondary sources.
20 Q. So it's fair to say the majority of the work
21 relies on secondary sources?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Just so we're all clear, secondary sources
24 versus primary sources is defined how?
25 A. Secondary sources are reports of others on
1 the basis of primary documents or findings.
2 Q. Is it fair to say that your 1994 book was
3 written primarily for a popular audience as opposed to
4 a scholarly audience?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And you don't claim that it's a scholarly
8 A. I would say it has scholarly merit. It was
9 not designed to be a monographic work purely for a
10 scholarly audience.
11 Q. Fair enough. Is it fair to say that up until
12 1994 and the publication of your second book plus one
13 other in the field, there really did not exist, in any
14 language, a single comprehensive history of Bosnia from
15 the arrival of the Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula until
16 the 1990s?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. So there was a gap in the literature which
19 you tried to fill?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Plus, I suppose, try to make a few dollars as
23 A. If that was an objective, it hasn't succeeded
24 very well.
25 Q. Well, we all bought some of your books.
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. You're welcome. Now, in 1994 -- your 1994
3 book, is it fair to say, was not annotated to any
4 significant degree?
5 A. No. It had footnotes but it was not
6 annotated in the manner of scholarly monograph, for
8 Q. Your book focused, again, on urban Bosnia?
9 A. No, I wouldn't say that was the case. It
10 dealt with urban/rural conflict among other things but
11 certainly attempted to provide a synthetic history of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina over many centuries.
13 Q. All right. The majority of your work,
14 however, focuses on urban Bosnia, would you agree?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And your own experience living in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina is and was primarily an urban
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, I take it you also show on your resume a
21 piece that you wrote in 1978, with an anthropologist
22 named William Lockwood called "The Bosnian Muslims
23 Class, Ethnicity, and Political Behaviour in a European
24 State". You were the co-author of that piece?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. In that piece, and I quote from it:
2 "Villages are most commonly ethnically
3 homogenous although some villages are mixed. In the
4 latter case, ethnic groups are usually segregated into
5 district neighbourhoods or hamlets."
6 Now, that's an observation that you made in
7 that work; correct?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. That is an observation that you still
10 believe; correct?
11 A. Yes. It was an observation that was valid as
12 of the time that it was written.
13 Q. 1978?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Fair enough. Do you find that valid today?
16 A. Much less frequently so in contemporary
18 Q. When from '78 to 1999 did the transition
20 A. After 1991.
21 Q. All right. Now, with respect to the subject
22 of ethnic groups, you said in the same piece:
23 "They tend to concentrate" --
24 Let me start again.
25 "They tend to constitute distinct social
1 systems superimposed on the same geographic region.
2 Contact is limited primarily to the economic sector,
3 especially among peasants, and this is reflected in
4 marriage patterns, visiting patterns, communication
5 networks, and world views."
6 Do you agree with that statement?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Then in 1995 you published a work called the
9 "Habsburg Imperial Army in the Occupation of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina." It was published in a publication
11 called "Insurrections, Wars, and the Eastern Crisis in
12 1870s." I gather your part of that work was pages 375
13 to 391?
14 A. Yes. I believe it was 1986 or '87 that that
15 was published.
16 Q. All right. I stand corrected. Now, in that
17 work you call Bosnia, "Those volatile Balkan
18 provinces." That's a quote from page 375. Do you
19 remember using that term?
20 A. Yes, uh-huh.
21 Q. You pointed out that the Austro-Hungarian
22 military organisations:
23 "Contributed to the imbroglio of ethnic and
24 social conflict in the occupied lands."
25 Then you went on to say that:
1 "While they,"
2 the Austrians:
3 "Disarmed most groups and persons with
4 violent intent and ensured that large-scale violence
5 was no longer a viable means for Bosnians to achieve
6 political aims, in doing so they often aroused the
7 antagonisms of the local populations. Thus, much
8 contention was merely rechanneled than eliminated and
9 many of the issues came to be fought out in the
10 political arena rather than by paramilitary forces."
11 That's a quote from page 375. Is that an
12 opinion you still abide by?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You went on then to say: "When Ottoman
15 administration began to weaken in the 17th and 18th
16 centuries, strife between the three major ethnic groups
17 intensified." Again, something you agree with?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. "Muslim landlords frequently abused their
20 peasants and local pashas arbitrarily taxed the
21 population. Peasants uprisings increased and were
22 frequently occasions of interethnic acrimony." Again,
23 something with which you agree?
24 A. I would probably today date that a little bit
25 later than I did in that essay and say that that
1 phenomenon started principally in the 18th century.
2 Q. In fact, you anticipated my next question
3 because you say, and this is at page 377 of the same
4 work: "The unrest of 1875 to 1878 exacerbated the
5 tendencies of all ethnic groups in Bosnia and
6 Herzegovina to organise armed bands. Serbs and Muslims
7 had the largest paramilitary groups. Deserters from
8 regular Ottoman army units, predominantly Bosnian
9 Muslims, wandered the countryside looting and
10 plundering." Agreed?
11 A. I think that was in reference to the period
12 after 1875 or perhaps even 1878 itself. I would have
13 to look again. I would stand by the statement for that
15 Q. So the only issue is the period of time?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. All right. Then you went on to point out
18 about the gendarmes, is what I would call them. How
19 would you call them?
20 A. Yes, that's good.
21 Q. By the Austrians, and you pointed out that
22 "Most native recruits came from the lower classes,
23 including many former surfs and urban vagabonds who had
24 grievances against Muslim landlords. Some of the new
25 recruits used their newly acquired status and weapons
1 to intimidate their former oppressors. Muslim
2 landlords found it particularly galling to be abused
3 by --"
4 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down
5 because of the translation?
6 MR. STEIN:
7 Q. " -- and religiously inferior. The gendarmes
8 thus --"
9 JUDGE MAY: Please slow down.
10 MR. STEIN: Yes.
11 Q. "The gendarmes thus often contributed to
12 ethnic and social conflict rather than reducing it."
13 Again, an opinion you still agree with?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. We're almost done our little trip through
16 your works, but let me just ask a couple of things
17 before I move on. You noted between 1878 and 1881 that
18 Serbian brigans terrorised Muslim landlords; is that a
19 correct statement?
20 A. It would be correct well into 1882.
21 Q. Consequently, I gather, "the gendarmes
22 functioned after 1883 mainly to," I can't read my own
23 handwriting here, essentially to vitiate against
24 collisions between the rival ethnic groups. That's a
25 paraphrase, not a direct quote.
1 A. I'm sorry.
2 Q. Is it fair to say that the gendarmes came
3 about after 1883 to try to deal with this situation?
4 A. Well, the gendarmes entered the picture in
5 order to establish order and Austro-Hungarian rule
6 following the peasant rebellion of 1881/1882, and that
7 role was really a dual one. It was both to establish
8 taxation authority and, generally, state authority, and
9 it was to end the conflict between peasants and
11 Q. And that conflict was a rival conflict
12 between rival ethnic groups?
13 A. It was a conflict between Serbian peasants
14 and Muslim landlords and was ethnic in character, yes.
15 Q. Then moving forward, you note: "By the early
16 20th century, the interest of Bosnian ethnic groups
17 were represented not by brigan bands but by ethnic
18 political leaders who presented their extensive demands
19 to high imperial authorities." Still a true statement?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, let's fast-forward to 1994 in your book,
22 and let me just give you a caption from that book that
23 I think capsulates what you're trying to say and ask
24 you if you still stand by it.
25 "Some observers have portrayed the Bosnian
1 conflict as a renewal of age-old mutual hatreds that
2 inexorably resurfaced after the collapse of Tito's
3 communist regime. In contrast, we assert that the
4 current Bosnian crisis is, in the context of Bosnian
5 history, an historical apparition, albeit with a single
6 important historical precedent, the interethnic
7 slaughter of the World War II era. Armed conflict,
8 ethnic cleansing, the bombardment of cities, and
9 atrocities against civilians in Bosnia were not
10 preordained consequences of ethnonational divisions in
11 Bosnian society. They developed as a result of the
12 transformation of the YPA into an instrument of Serbian
13 nationalists, the annexationist ambitions of the
14 Croatian and Serbian governments, and the eagerness of
15 national extremists to conduct unsavoury ethnic
16 cleansing campaigns with the endorsement and assistance
17 of organised armies in that region."
18 Does that capsulise your position?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. That book, in fact, "Bosnia-Herzegovina, a
21 Tradition Betrayed," has been criticised
22 for "overemphasising perhaps the degree of harmony
23 between the nations generally." Fair enough?
24 A. Among other things, yes.
25 Q. I actually have one here just to make sure
1 you know we bought it.
2 A. Thank you.
3 Q. In fact, your book was reviewed, when it came
4 out, by a variety of folks. One such review,
5 Mr. Kislinger, from the New Leader, wrote in September
6 of '94: "Donia and Fine's view of Bosnia culture is,
7 on the whole, compelling, but its presentation is
8 troubling. Having defined Bosnian tradition as free
9 from interethnic strife, they must engage in
10 contortions to explain the region's long record of
11 bloodshed, including peasant revolts under the Ottomans
12 and local nationalists, especially Serbian resistance
13 to Habsburg rule, Yugoslav and Titoist rule. All of
14 these have ethnic and religious --"
15 JUDGE MAY: Kindly slow down.
16 MR. STEIN: I will try again. Sorry.
17 MR. NICE: It may help the witness and the
18 other people taking notes if there are other copies of
19 the book that can be made available.
20 JUDGE MAY: At the moment, I think that is
21 going to take up more time.
22 Can you remember in these quotations, Mr.
23 Stein, to go as slowly as possible?
24 MR. STEIN: I'll try, sir. We always have
25 the yin/yang of going slow, but move fast, and I will
1 try my best.
2 Q. Picking up: "All of these have ethnic and
3 religious aspects. When such purported aberrations are
4 attributed solely to class differences or outside
5 forces, the argument begins to sound circular. Bosnia
6 is tolerant, and if it sometimes hasn't been, it was
7 not acting like Bosnia. By focusing on urban culture
8 as the true picture of Bosnia, the authors neglect the
9 more refractory countryside where, in fact, much of the
10 current conflict is rooted.
11 "Finally, the atrocities of World War II
12 constitute an exception so drastic it virtually
13 disproves the rule."
14 You've read that before, obviously?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Essentially, at least Kislinger was
17 critiquing your work as overly optimistic; right?
18 A. I didn't hear the word "optimistic" there. I
19 wouldn't characterise the book as overly optimistic.
20 Maybe I missed it but ...
21 Q. All right. He certainly was making some
22 critiques on the distinction between urban and rural
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Similarly, Mr. Robert Kingvold, in a book
1 review on foreign affairs, makes a similar kind of
2 observation about your book, does he not?
3 A. I've only seen one review in foreign affairs,
4 and you'll have to refresh my memory. I don't recall
5 anything negative in it but ...
6 Q. All right. He called it "something of the
7 character of a skilled high school text." Not very
9 A. Well, I think if you read the last sentence
10 of that review, you would find it very favourable.
11 Q. In the Times literary supplement, Charles
12 Kinna went on to say: "The author's treatment of
13 Bosnian history is somewhat facile. The style often
14 borders on invective, and from cover to conclusion, the
15 notion of a tradition betrayed buzzes annoyingly along
16 the surface of the narrative. The book's project is to
17 show that the current Bosnian government, in opposing
18 the territorial division of the republic into
19 ethnically based states, represents a 'tradition of
20 tolerance and coexistence that goes many centuries.'
21 To anyone familiar with the history of the Balkans, the
22 picture that emerges will appear rather rosy."
23 Now, there are other criticisms and critiques
24 of your works besides these, are there not?
25 A. Absolutely, yes.
1 Q. You acknowledge, sir, that there are
2 historians and experts in the Balkan regions who claim
3 that Balkan hatred existed long before any manipulation
4 of Balkan leaders?
5 A. Yes. I would probably be one of them. I did
6 not make the case then and I would not make it now that
7 there were no hatreds in the Balkans.
8 Q. Can we further agree that reports of
9 long-time neighbours raping, murdering, and expelling
10 their neighbours suggest that old hatreds lie so close
11 to the surface that it would not take much to bring
12 them out into the open?
13 A. I can't agree with that statement unless it's
14 bounded in time in terms of what sorts of hatreds or
15 animosities might be there. I would want to, I think,
16 qualify that somewhat in terms of time frame.
17 Q. Let's take 1991 to 1994.
18 A. I believe the statement that you read
19 suggested some age-old animosities, and my question
20 would be how old.
21 Q. Certainly, as presented by the Prosecution,
22 you agreed, and I believe you said the secretary of
23 state, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in the
24 early '90s and others took the long-standing view that
25 there were ethnic hatreds in the Balkans?
1 A. Secretary of State Christopher, in March of
2 1993, took the position that these people had been
3 killing each other for centuries as a way of announcing
4 the new American hands-off policy towards Bosnia. He
5 took that position consistently thereafter during his
6 tenure as secretary of state, at least until the eve of
7 the Dayton discussions. Yes, that was closely allied
8 with the policy preference of the U.S. government at
9 that point.
10 Q. Indeed, just to wrap this section up, we can
11 agree that there's no consensus on the issue of ethnic
12 hatreds in the dozens of books and articles published
13 in the last few years?
14 A. We could agree on that, yes.
15 Q. Journalists travelling amongst the region
16 tend to emphasise the deep-seated nature of the
17 hatreds, while books focusing on politics and history
18 tend to emphasise the responsibility of the leaders; is
19 that a fair statement?
20 A. As a very broad generalisation, yes, but I
21 can think of many exceptions to it.
22 Q. No question about it, going back to our
23 reasonable historians can reasonably disagree.
24 A. I would say that the generalisation for
25 journalists is no longer valid in terms of recent works
1 that have appeared by journalists who have spent
2 substantial time in the region.
3 Q. All right. I want to turn very briefly to
4 your time in the region. Do I take it you have
5 professional colleagues currently in Sarajevo?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And friends in Sarajevo?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Do I take it that many of those friends and
10 professional colleagues are Muslims or Serbs?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Few are Croats?
13 A. Some are Croats.
14 Q. But certainly the minority?
15 A. There's no majority. I would say that many
16 of them are, probably not a majority, but the plurality
17 of them are Bosniaks. Some are Serbs. Some are
19 Q. All living around the Sarajevo area?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do I take it in 1994, the fall, you began
22 discussions with Inis Kujundzic, and I'm sure I've
23 mispronounced that name, K-U-J-U-N-D-Z-I-C --
24 A. Kujundzic.
25 Q. -- who's the director of the national and
1 university library in Sarajevo, to help rebuild the
2 library holdings?
3 A. I had discussions with him, yes.
4 Q. Of course, the library had been destroyed in
6 A. In August of 1992, yes.
7 Q. Do I take it you, in March of 1995, delivered
8 a bibliography, along with Dr. Fine, and gave some
9 lectures in Sarajevo on the content of your works?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. You are currently working on a web page with
12 a University of Sarajevo professor?
13 A. I am not actively working on that project
14 right now. I'm aware of it and was involved very early
15 on in establishing it but am not actively involved at
16 this time.
17 Q. Your visit in 1994 was part of a mobile
18 university sponsored by the National Peace Foundation?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What is the National Peace Foundation?
21 A. I'm really not certain what -- I don't know
22 very much about it at all.
23 Q. Was that a paid visit or did they pay your
25 A. They arranged transportation into -- from
1 Zagreb into Sarajevo.
2 Q. And that visit was also part of the
3 Sarajevo-based FAMA, the F-A-M-A foundation?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. What is FAMA?
6 A. It is a word that stands for nothing. It is
7 a foundation that was established to facilitate the
8 visit of various people to Bosnia-Herzegovina by a
9 small group of people who support artistic and
10 scholarly work.
11 Q. Do you know where the financial support and
12 funds come for these --
13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Stein, we haven't really got
14 all the time in the world to go through this sort of
15 detail. Move on.
16 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge.
17 Q. I'm going to skip over something and move
18 right along here. I'd like to talk to you about a few
19 historical watersheds, if I may. First, the gathering
20 at Gazimestan, can you tell us about that?
21 A. This was a huge rally sponsored by President
22 Slobodan Milosevic on the 500th anniversary of the
23 battle of Kosovo.
24 Q. And its significance?
25 A. It was the major event in the, let's say,
1 transformation of the government of Serbia from being a
2 republic, which was committed to the ideals of the
3 socialist era, to a nationalist government.
4 Q. Those pieces of information you gathered
5 after your testimony in the Blaskic case; isn't that
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So you did some further research on the
10 A. I'm always doing research on such issues and
11 gather information, both by coincidence and by design,
12 so, yes.
13 Q. You were specifically asked about Gazimestan
14 in Blaskic and didn't know anything about it.
15 A. I said I didn't know, yes.
16 Q. Can you tell us also about the significance
17 of the miner's strike in Kosovo?
18 A. I would only be speculating if I addressed
20 Q. All right. Can you tell us if you know the
21 name Miroslav Solijevic?
22 A. I don't.
23 Q. Doctor, I want you to focus your attention,
24 please, on life in the country of Yugoslavia under the
25 communist system.
1 Would you agree that Marshal Tito ruthlessly
2 suppressed any expression of resurgent nationalism? He
3 enforced his doctrine of brotherhood and unity and
4 carried out purges of Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Slovenes,
5 Macedonians, and Albanians, balancing his repression of
6 one nation against that of another?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Would you further agree that nationalists
9 were forced into exile where they nurtured their
10 resentment in expatriate communities which proved
11 fertile breeding grounds for nationalism or they were
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And would you further agree that:
15 "Bosnia acquired a reputation for labouring
16 under the most repressive of all the communist regimes
17 in Yugoslavia? The authorities clamped down on each of
18 Bosnia's three communities. A Muslim trial would often
19 be followed by a case involving a Serb or a Croat.
20 "more than anywhere else in Yugoslavia the
21 doctrine of brotherhood and unity was rigidly enforced
22 in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
23 Do you agree with that?
24 A. The first one, if it pertained to Yugoslavia
25 as a whole, one would want to limit that assertion to
1 the early years of socialism. So I'm not quite
2 following, I'm afraid, your extensive quotation.
3 Q. Actually, I'm quoting from a book, "The Death
4 of Yugoslavia", by Laura Silber and Alan Little. Are
5 you familiar with this book?
6 A. Yes, I am.
7 Q. Have you read it?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. It is a recognised work on the area -- in the
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Well thought of and well regarded?
13 A. By most, yes.
14 Q. They note, at page 228 of the book, all that
15 I said. Let's break it down in its pieces.
16 "Bosnia had required a reputation for
17 labouring under the most repressive of all communist
18 regimes in Yugoslavia."
19 Agreed, disagreed?
20 A. That's the statement that I would specify
21 would particularly pertain to the early years. I think
22 that Bosnia actually went through several different
23 phases. At times it probably was far behind a couple
24 of its neighbours anyway, and then in the 1980s it
25 became very repressive of nationalist excesses,
1 deviations as they were called in that time, and then
2 totally lost that character at the end of the 1980s.
3 Q. Ms. Silber and Mr. Little say that:
4 "After Tito's death and the ensuing
5 political crises, the number of political trials
6 increased and the wounded Bosnian regime tried to
7 sustain itself through repression."
8 Agree, disagree?
9 A. I wouldn't agree with that statement as it
10 stands. I think that the Bosnian regime, up until the
11 late 1980s, was probably one of the most confident and
12 certainly the most loyal to Titoist ideals. So I
13 wouldn't describe it as wounded. In fact, it had
14 substantial links with the, let's say, federal
15 institutions and in some sense it benefited from their
17 Q. Doctor, are you aware that in July and August
18 of 1983, 13 Bosnian Muslims were tried in a Sarajevo
19 District Court, accused conspiring to transform Bosnia
20 into an Gazimestan?
21 A. I believe you can find that in "Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina, Tradition Betrayed", and yes, I am aware
23 of it.
24 Q. Were you further aware that there's actually
25 a part of the Criminal Code whose aim was to protect
1 the idea of brotherhood and unity, that would be
2 Article 134 of the Yugoslavia Criminal Code that is
3 translated to read:
4 "Incitement of national, racial, religious
5 hatred and intolerance.
6 "(1) Who, through propaganda or in any other
7 way incites or provokes national, racial, or religious
8 hatred, or infraction among nations and national
9 minorities that live within Yugoslavia shall be
10 punished with one to ten years of imprisonment."
11 Are you aware that was the law?
12 A. As you noted, I'm not a constitutional
13 scholar. I am aware that there was legislation that
14 permitted both republican organs and Central Yugoslavia
15 organs to prosecute national excesses.
16 Q. Thank you. Now, I want to know if we can
17 agree on this, and that is that:
18 "The configuration of national and ethnic
19 conflict which emerged during the period of
20 disintegration, and we're talking about disintegration
21 of Tito's republic, was intimately tied up with the
22 policies of communism. Communism was as much a part of
23 the problem as the solution to the problem of
24 intercommunal conflict in the region."
25 Would you agree with that?
1 A. You're asking me to agree to a very broad
2 general statement by someone else who has tried to put
3 it together, and I would not construe it that way. I
4 don't fully disagree with the statement but couldn't
5 adopt it as my own view of things.
6 Q. All right. That statement is from Dr.
7 Allcock's report. He will be a witness in this case
8 later. He also says:
9 "Efforts were made to promote a common
10 Yugoslav identity. This was based upon the picture of
11 peoples united in a common struggle against fascism in
12 brotherhood and unity."
13 You'd agree with that?
14 A. I would agree with it for the early period,
16 Q. You would disagree later on in the Tito
18 A. I would not agree with it for the period
19 after roughly the late 1960s.
20 Q. Let me just raise this with you, Doctor,
21 according to Dr. Allcock:
22 "The communist government engaged in periodic
23 campaigns against national chauvinism with
24 well-published prosecutions of those accused of
25 fostering intercommunal antagonism. These occasional
1 campaigns had the unwitting effect in certain
2 celebrated cases of making the objects of state
3 attention into future martyrs to the national cause
4 available to be employed as potent symbols of
5 continuing resistance to communist attempts to suppress
6 the nation when Yugoslavia began to break up. Thus
7 Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia both
8 acquired considerable political capital from their
9 experience of imprisonment at the hands of the
10 communist authorities."
11 That's a large chunk, I realise, and I will
12 give you a chance to discuss it, but do you agree in
13 principle with those precepts?
14 A. Yes. I would add Vojislav Seselj to that
15 list of names and would agree with the statement.
16 Q. Would you spell his name, sir, for the
18 A. S-e-s-e-l-j as -- maybe someone can provide a
19 better Slavic language --
20 Q. Very good, sir. Your report, in fact, notes
21 that Yugoslavia was held together by two key
22 institutions, the League of Communists and the JNA?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You go on to note -- I am sorry, I said your
25 book. I meant your report. You go on to say in your
1 report that according to the 1994 constitution, the JNA
2 was to uphold the socialist order and ensure the unity
3 of Yugoslavia as a country.
4 A. I think I specify 1974 constitution.
5 Q. Did I say '84?
6 A. You said '94.
7 Q. I'm sorry. Are you aware of the Serbian
8 Academy of Sciences and Arts?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. What is that, sir?
11 A. The Academy of Sciences existed in each of
12 the six republics of the former Yugoslavia and promoted
13 to the level or title of academic were those people who
14 were distinguished scholars in the view of the existing
15 members of the academy, so the academies functioned
16 both in a sense of meeting places of the leading
17 intellectuals of the time and also occasionally they
18 facilitated publication and certain types of scholarly
20 Q. This was in each of the republics?
21 A. In each of the republics.
22 Q. Were the findings, or the memos, or the
23 writings, or conclusions of the various academies taken
24 very seriously in the former Yugoslavia?
25 A. Well, the -- I don't know that they had
1 findings. They would frequently, as I say, facilitate
2 publication by members, and on occasion members would
3 come together to issue some sort of a political
4 statement or declaration, and any pronouncements of
5 their members or groups of members were always treated
6 with great seriousness, yes.
7 Q. By the way, just parenthetically, Dr. Tudjman
8 was a member of the Croatian academy, was he not?
9 A. I believe he was.
10 Q. In 1986, September of 1986, I'm given to
11 understand that the Serbian Academy of Sciences and
12 Arts essentially opined that:
13 "Yugoslavia, in its present form, was no
14 longer an adequate solution to the Serbian question."
15 Were you aware of that?
16 A. I think that date is wrong as well, if I'm
17 not mistaken.
18 Q. When do you think the publication occurred?
19 A. I think it was 1966.
20 Q. In '66.
21 JUDGE MAY: I don't think we need worry about
22 the date.
23 MR. STEIN: All right.
24 JUDGE MAY: It's quite a well-known
25 memorandum. Yes.
1 MR. STEIN:
2 Q. Can we agree that:
3 "The draft memorandum did not create
4 nationalism, it simply tapped sentiments that ran deep
5 among the Serbs but which were repressed and as a
6 result exacerbated by communism. The academy's tract
7 echoed opinions whispered throughout Serbia."
8 Perhaps a little dramatic in presentation
9 but, nonetheless, can we agree on that?
10 A. No.
11 Q. We cannot. You disagree with that, sir?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Again, that is presented by Ms. Silber and
14 Mr. Little in their book "Death of Yugoslavia." You
15 take issue with that?
16 A. I would not formulate the conclusion that
18 Q. All right. How would you formulate the
19 conclusion, sir?
20 A. To what?
21 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,
22 you're doing something that I'm rather familiar with.
23 You are taking our expert through the whole literature
24 on Yugoslavia as if you are asking him to defend his
25 doctoral thesis, and that is not the point of the
1 cross-examination. I think that what interests us, as
2 members of this Trial Chamber and as professional
3 Judges, is to cross-examine the expert Donia on what he
4 alleges in his report. You have Mr. Donia's report.
5 It was presented to us by the Prosecutor.
6 Could you please limit your comments to what
7 he himself said, because that is the objective of a
8 cross-examination. It is not to take Dr. Donia through
9 all the literature on ex-Yugoslavia as if we were
10 testing his knowledge.
11 You have already touched upon his
12 credibility. I think it is time for us to focus on the
13 report. Could you please do that? We have it in front
14 of us.
15 I know that you have a host of literature
16 that you have brought with you, many books, but you
17 will have the opportunity to use them, I believe, on
18 another occasion.
19 MR. STEIN: Certainly I take your point, Your
20 Honour, and I was really trying to bring myself up to
21 create for the Court a picture of life under the
22 communist country, a theme we had talked about with
23 some of the witnesses, but I will certainly move on.
24 Q. Doctor, can you help us with one short
25 question, and that is: In the late 1980s, as the
1 Republic was breaking down, can you, in a very short
2 way, describe for all of us the manner in which the
3 Serbian government, headed by Mr. Milosevic, came to
4 the forefront in Yugoslavia?
5 A. I'm not too sure what you mean by "came to
6 the forefront." The fact is that the efforts of
7 President Milosevic to essentially transform the
8 leadership in various republics gave Milosevic control
9 of four of the eight members of the collective
10 presidency, and the way in which that happened was
11 essentially through, first of all, his taking power
12 within the Republic of Croatia -- or, excuse me, the
13 Republic of Serbia. He tried to take power later in
14 the Republic of Croatia, but he took power over the
15 position of his former mentor in Serbia, and then
16 arranged a series of street demonstrations in the three
17 republics that were -- or one republic that was closest
18 to Serbia, namely Montenegro, and also in the
19 autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo.
20 By using street demonstrations, which had
21 really never been a part of the political repertoire
22 for major decision-making under socialism, the
23 leaderships of those areas resigned or were forced out
24 and replaced by leaders loyal to President Milosevic.
25 He made similar efforts to destabilise the
1 government of Slovenia, and more subtle efforts to
2 destabilise the government of Bosnia, and subsequently
3 came to support the Serbian minority in the Republic of
4 Croatia. That process is the way in which the Serbian
5 government came to play in an inordinately important
6 role in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia in its
7 final days.
8 Q. Is it fair to say also in so doing, Milosevic
9 rode the wave of nationalism that he created?
10 A. I don't think that he created it. He
11 stimulated it and supported an existing trend that had
12 been whipped up for some time, for several years prior
13 to that in Serbia.
14 Q. And used it for his own political ends?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. To enhance his power?
17 A. To enhance his power and the role of Serbs
18 and the Republic of Serbia within the Socialist Federal
19 Republic of Yugoslavia.
20 Q. All this, of course, is not limited purely to
21 Serbia. He was thinking beyond his borders, as you
22 just indicated?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. When Milosevic was doing all that we just
25 discussed, certainly the other republics were reacting
1 as well?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Do I take it that you agree or disagree that
4 the Slovenian president was the first to really come to
5 heads with Mr. Milosevic?
6 A. I would say the first people to come to heads
7 with Mr. Milosevic were the leaders of Vojvodina and
9 Q. Why would you say that?
10 A. Because that -- let me just correct that and
11 say that I think that Milosevic was at loggerheads with
12 the leaders of virtually every republic effectively
13 from the time that he came to power.
14 Q. You mentioned again Vojvodina and Kosovo as
15 the first targets. Why do you think they were the
16 first targets?
17 A. The effort that Milosevic made was to assure
18 leadership loyal to him in republics in which he could
19 most easily accomplish his objectives. The obvious
20 targets were those which were constitutionally part of
21 Serbia, that is, the autonomous provinces, and
22 Montenegro, which was also historically sympathetic
23 with Serbia.
24 Q. All right. Thereafter, after those first
25 preliminary political skirmishes, where was the focus
1 of Milosevic's aims then?
2 A. I describe that process, I guess, as the
3 creation of a greater Serbian coalition, and I think it
4 would be safe to say that his aspirations lay in all
5 areas of the former Yugoslavia, particularly those in
6 which there was a substantial Serbian population.
7 Q. Can we agree that Slovenia was the first
8 republic to really break from the fold?
9 A. As the declarations of independence of
10 Slovenia and Croatia took place on the same day, by
11 virtue of the armed conflict, Slovenia was the first
12 one which broke free. But I would not necessarily see
13 the Slovene effort as particularly ahead of the
14 Croatian one after the elections of 1990.
15 Q. All right. So it's your view that the
16 republics of both Slovenia and Croatia basically
17 launched their own existence at the same time and
18 consequently departed from the republic at the same
19 time; is that right?
20 A. That's a process, and the two, at that point,
21 tended to move forward together. I would say this: I
22 think the tensions between the Slovenes and the Serbs
23 prior to the elections of 1990 would, in fact,
24 correspond to your original premise in the question,
25 that those were probably the worst relations in the
1 period prior to the elections.
2 Q. Can we agree, Doctor, that in these early
3 discussions, the issue between Serbia and Slovenia
4 really boiled down to the acceptable level of democracy
5 or democratisation?
6 A. No, I wouldn't concur.
7 Q. Doctor, let me ask you about the different
8 visions that there were when the republic broke down in
9 terms of the internal organisation of Yugoslavia, so
10 we're going to rewind a little bit. Can we agree that
11 the Serbs wanted a centralised government whereas the
12 Slovenes wanted the opposite?
13 A. When you say "republic," I take it you mean
14 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
15 Q. Exactly.
16 A. Your question was that the Serbs wanted a
17 centralised government and the Slovenes wanted the
19 Q. Exactly.
20 A. By which you mean a decentralised government,
21 a decentralised federal government?
22 Q. Yes.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And Serbia was confidant -- I don't mean
25 confidant. Serbia's position was that introducing a
1 one man, one vote would halt the forces that were
2 tearing apart the federation?
3 A. At one point, that was the view of the
4 Slovene leadership, yes.
5 Q. And that view was held for what reason, sir?
6 A. They were hoping that the federal elections
7 at the federal level would defuse the, let's say,
8 Serbian nationalist momentum.
9 Q. That would be because why?
10 A. I'm sorry. I'm not following your --
11 Q. Why would the nationalist momentum be
13 A. I think there were two reasons for it:
14 Number one, I think they hoped that this would be more
15 than simply a plebiscite in which everyone voted along
16 ethnic lines, but the Serbs within Yugoslavia, the
17 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, did not
18 constitute a majority.
19 Q. But they could outvote the Slovenes; isn't
20 that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And the Slovenes, on the other hand, insisted
23 on retaining a one federal unit, one vote government,
24 which was set forth in the 1974 constitution?
25 A. Yes. I think this is grossly oversimplifying
1 it. I'm not sure what time period you're talking about
2 here, and perhaps it would be wise to identify the time
3 that you're referring to. Let me ask if you can
4 identify perhaps a time it refers to.
5 Q. This would have been in the late '80s when
6 the republic was still in existence and they were
7 debating what it was going to look like post-Tito.
8 A. So prior to the break-up or destruction,
9 whatever, of the League of Communists?
10 Q. Exactly.
11 A. Yes. That generalisation would hold for that
12 time, yes. Within the Socialist Federal Republic of
13 Yugoslavia, there were all these discussions about how
14 to arrive at some sort of resolution that would
15 preserve the federation, and the Slovenes tended to be
16 extremely oriented towards a decentralised solution and
17 the Serbs towards a central one.
18 Q. I'm going to jump ahead somewhat. After 1990
19 in Bosnia, that became the same kind of issue, with the
20 one man, one vote issue versus the one area issue.
21 A. What's the question? I'm not sure what --
22 Q. The same kind of debate occurred in Bosnia
23 after 1990 as to what Bosnia was to look like; isn't
24 that right?
25 A. It was one of many issues that was raised,
1 but I think that once the elections were scheduled,
2 this ceased to be, let's say, a point of contention.
3 It was a concern to the -- let me put it this way: I
4 think the concern of the leadership of the HDZ, the
5 Croatian Democratic Community, after it was formed came
6 to focus around the establishment of the community of
7 Croats as one of three co-equal communities, and that
8 to assure that co-equality -- they wanted to assure
9 that equality because it was the smallest of the three
10 national groups in Bosnia.
11 Q. I jumped forward but I want to go back again
12 to when the break-up of the former Yugoslavia was
13 occurring. Can we agree that at that point in time, it
14 was Milosevic's preference to gain control over
15 Yugoslavia through the existing structures of the
16 communist party and the federal government, but that
17 option apparently slipped by his grasp? Do you agree
18 with that?
19 A. I would formulate it somewhat differently. I
20 think the primary concern of -- again, depending on
21 specifically the time frame, the greatest concern that
22 Milosevic had was, in fact, the triumph of the
23 reformist approach, and so his effort was focused on
24 defeating this effort by the reformist group so that he
25 ended up kind of sabotaging that initiative in order to
1 assure that the purely nationalist perspective would
3 Q. Can we agree further that, at least according
4 to Noel Malcolm, Milosevic's second option was that if
5 Yugoslavia could not be controlled as a single entity,
6 he would carve out of it a new entity, an extended
7 Serbian territory which would be his and his alone?
8 A. I would just like to point out that I did not
9 concur with your earlier statement.
10 Q. I understand.
11 A. So I'm not agreeing further.
12 Q. All right.
13 A. Would you ask the question again, please?
14 Q. Sure. Would you agree with Noel Malcolm's
15 observation that if Yugoslavia could not be controlled
16 as a single entity, then Milosevic would carve out of
17 it a new entity, an extended Serbian territory which
18 would be his and his alone?
19 A. Can you identify the period that you're
20 talking about?
21 Q. During the break-up of the republic.
22 A. What would that be?
23 Q. Any time frame that you would like to use,
25 A. I would say that that statement would be
1 broadly true and in the course of a sequence of events
2 from -- I would find difficulty putting specific time
3 frames around it, but certainly from somewhere in early
4 1991 going forward to the period of the war.
5 Q. Fine. In that time frame, you agree with the
6 statement; is that right, Doctor?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Can we agree further, there is a thing called
9 the greater Serbian coalition?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And the greater Serbian coalition had members
12 found in Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Croatia, and
13 Bosnia; right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Of course, these populations were not
16 contiguous with each other?
17 A. Generally, that's true. They weren't all
18 contiguous with one another.
19 Q. As a result, Serbia, in some ways, had to
20 neutralise Muslims and others in areas in which Serbs
21 were in a minority, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo?
22 A. Again, without a time frame that you're
23 speaking about, I'm not sure I can stipulate to that.
24 Q. That would be during the period 1991 to
1 A. Again, with relationship to various areas at
2 various times, I would concur with the statement.
3 Q. Again, I think we can agree that
4 Mr. Milosevic supported and fomented Serbian
5 nationalists movements in all the other republics of
7 A. Yes, except Slovenia.
8 Q. And that's primarily because there are very
9 few Serbs in Slovenia?
10 A. No contiguous Serbian population there, yes.
11 Q. Can we agree that after the 19 -- well, let
12 me rephrase that. You're aware, of course, that in
13 1989 there were amendments to the Serbian constitution?
14 A. Yes, I think that's mentioned in the paper
15 and in the book.
16 Q. These were done, again, by the Serbs
17 themselves unilaterally?
18 A. They were done unilaterally by the Serbian
19 government, yes.
20 Q. Serbia wanted to introduce a one man, one
21 vote which means that the numerically superior Serbs
22 could outvote the Slovenes? Would you agree with that?
23 A. What period are you talking about?
24 Q. After the March 1989 amendments.
25 A. What document are you suggesting that they
1 wanted to introduce this one man, one vote principle
3 Q. Doctor, as a general matter, and I'm asking
4 the question, can we agree that Serbia wanted to
5 introduce a one man, one vote system which would mean
6 that the numerically superior Serbs would outvote the
8 JUDGE MAY: Where does this appear in the
9 report? How does it arise from the report or the
10 witness's evidence, Mr. Stein?
11 MR. STEIN: Yes, sir. The report mentions,
12 but I don't think fully, the ambitions of Mr. Milosevic
13 and its effect on the region, and this question lays
14 the foundation for that. It also lays the foundation
15 for the ultimate political debate within the republic
16 itself, the former republic, and within Bosnia. It's
17 all part of the period.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Stein, I said yesterday that
19 time would be limited, and I repeat that. We've got at
20 least one other witness for this week. We will be
21 adjourning in a few minutes when you get to a
22 convenient moment. You should aim to finish your
23 cross-examination this afternoon.
24 MR. STEIN: This is a convenient moment.
25 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Before we adjourn, is
1 Dr. Allcock here or will he be here tomorrow?
2 MR. NICE: He is here and available for
4 JUDGE MAY: How long is he likely to be in
6 MR. NICE: No longer than this witness in
8 JUDGE MAY: Cross-examination of that
10 MR. STEIN: As we mentioned the other day, we
11 have not had full time to work with our client in the
12 Croatian version of his report, and as a result, we had
13 an agreement with the Prosecution by which we would do
14 a limited exam initially, followed by the rest of our
15 exam after we had more time to digest the report in
16 Croatian. It was contemplated he would make two
18 JUDGE MAY: How much of his report have you
19 managed to get through in the Croatian?
20 MR. STEIN: Not much, sir.
21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kovacic, have you much for
22 this witness?
23 MR. KOVACIC: For Dr. Allcock, not too much,
24 but I would like to know -- I'm waiting for what the
25 other Defence will define, and then I can decide
1 whether to go broadly or not.
2 JUDGE MAY: As far as this witness is
4 MR. KOVACIC: Probably fifteen minutes, half
5 an hour maximum, I guess.
6 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Very well. We will
7 adjourn now and sit again at ten past four.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.14 p.m.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Stein.
11 MR. STEIN: Thank you, sir.
12 Q. Doctor, let me just wrap up where we were
13 before we go to another area, and that is, can we agree
14 that in 1990, and that's the period we're talking
15 about, it was not the goal of either Slovenia or
16 Croatian politicians to break up the former
18 A. Well, I would not want to speculate on the
19 motives of at least some of them. It was certainly not
20 the stated goal.
21 Q. I'd like to turn our attentions, please, to
22 the meetings that took place in and around the
23 Karadjordjevo meeting, and I'd like to give to the
24 Court, please, a summary that we prepared relative to
25 the meetings that were taking place in and about
1 January of 1991 through July of 1991.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D41/1.
3 MR. STEIN:
4 Q. Doctor, I've tried to do this in a summary
5 way. Would you take a look at the document? You can
6 see the source materials at the end. When you're done
7 looking at it, just let us know.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Doctor, having taken a look at our document
10 now marked D41, is this a fair summary of the meetings
11 that were going on in January, February, March, April,
12 up to June and July '91 regarding the future of the
13 former Yugoslavia?
14 A. I think it's a fair and excellent summary of
15 the meetings between the heads of the various
17 Q. Fair enough. Do I take your answer to mean
18 there were also meetings going on below the
19 heads-of-republic levels?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Amongst other politicians?
22 A. Amongst other politicians, between heads of
23 republics and other politicians, including those from
24 other republics.
25 Q. Sure. Does your study of the period also
1 indicate that although these were the official
2 meetings, there were pre-meeting meetings, post-meeting
3 meetings, phone calls, other kinds of communications?
4 A. There certainly were, yes.
5 Q. The Karadjordjevo meeting that we were
6 discussing yesterday and today, occurred right in the
7 middle of that, in March of 1991, am I right?
8 A. It did.
9 Q. Now, yesterday you opined that that was the
10 meeting at which Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Tudjman divided
11 up Bosnia; is that correct?
12 A. I believe you'll find that I suggested that
13 they reached an agreement in principle to pursue the
14 division of Bosnia but reached no agreement on the
15 territorial provisions of that division.
16 Q. Indeed, your report at page 36 says that they
17 met behind closed doors and "probably reached an
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, this is a new conversion for you; is
21 that right?
22 A. No. I would say that I have become convinced
23 by several interviews that I've seen in the press by
24 Mr. Dusan Bilandzic in which he describes quite
25 explicitly the agreement that was reached at
1 Karadjordjevo, and then the subsequent effort to
2 achieve a territorial agreement which failed. That
3 interview, I think, was first done with Nacional
4 sometime late in 1991 and was subsequently reproduced
5 in a number of places, and in addition, I believe, he
6 testified regarding that meeting in the Blaskic matter.
7 Q. You, in the Blaskic matter, testified as to
8 this meeting, that you were an agnostic as to whether
9 or not such an agreement was reached?
10 A. I did.
11 Q. You've now changed your opinion?
12 A. I feel confident that given the evidence I've
13 seen from Mr. Bilandzic that, yes, this did indeed take
14 place, again the agreement in principle without an
15 agreement on territorial provisions.
16 Q. In the Blaskic case, you indicated that you
17 could not conclude anything other than that there was
18 extensive speculation and you could draw no conclusion
19 from that speculation.
20 A. I think I noted that there was extensive
21 speculation in the press immediately subsequent to that
23 Q. Now, Mr. Bilandzic did not participate in
24 these negotiations; correct?
25 A. He participated in the subsequent territorial
1 discussions, according to his account.
2 Q. I want to make clear that we understand that
3 the meeting between Milosevic and Tudjman was man to
5 A. I don't know that there's absolute certainty
6 on that, but that's been the report from the people who
7 were closest to it, yes.
8 Q. Right. There's no one closer and these two
9 men, who's ever come out and said they were in that
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. I'd like to hand you a letter in both
13 Croatian and English.
14 MR. STEIN: Unfortunately, Judge, we don't
15 have a French version. We'll make sure that happens.
16 I'd like to pass this around.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D42/1.
18 MR. STEIN:
19 Q. Have you had a chance to look -- well, when
20 you have had a chance to consume that letter, just let
21 me know.
22 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein, I
23 think that we need a better copy. We're no longer so
24 young, so we can't read just any copy. The visibility
25 of this one is not very good, even in English. Even in
1 English it is not legible. So that I am not only
2 complaining about the fact that I only have an English
3 version but also regarding the readability of this
5 MR. STEIN: We'll rectify, that Your Honour.
6 I'll get a better copy. We concur with your --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please,
8 Mr. Stein. The microphone is not switched on.
9 MR. STEIN:
10 Q. Doctor, have you had a chance to read the
12 A. Yes, I have.
13 Q. I want specifically -- this is a letter dated
14 July 5, 1992. I want to specifically focus on
15 paragraph 3. This is, of course, Dr. Tudjman writing
16 to Mr. Izetbegovic.
17 "Serbian aggression in Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina has inflicted huge suffering to both Muslim
19 and Croatian peoples. Most of the aggressor's
20 operations are continued to be directed at the
21 districts where Croats constitute majority. That fact
22 reveals the absurdity of the accusations about the
23 conspiracy between Croatian and Serbian representatives
24 at the expense of the Muslim people."
25 Did you follow that, Doctor, as I was reading
1 it, because of the blurred copy?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. My question to you is that certainly reveals,
4 does it not, that Dr. Tudjman certainly was denying
5 that there was an agreement to divide up Bosnia,
6 doesn't it?
7 A. I think Dr. Tudjman has consistently denied
8 that there was an agreement to divide up Bosnia, and it
9 is particularly disingenuous to have this letter, dated
10 July 5th, which is only two days after the Croatian
11 Community of Herceg-Bosna had assumed powers of
12 sovereignty over its territory and, one, the universal
13 condemnation of the United States State Department, the
14 world press, and the various leadership groups within
15 Sarajevo, and the members of the Croatian Community or
16 the HDZ who were opposed to this partition policy.
17 Q. Doctor, we can agree, can we not, that
18 Croatia was the first country to recognise the
19 independence of BiH?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And Croatia was the first to send an
22 Ambassador to BiH?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now just posit this, Doctor, if you will,
25 people change their minds do, they not, and isn't it
1 conceivable that even if there was the kind of
2 discussion that you have now converted to believing
3 between Tudjman and Milosevic, that given the nature of
4 what happened thereafter, Tudjman changed his mind?
5 A. Well, I think probably the most compelling
6 evidence of the likelihood of an agreement at
7 Karadjordjevo in fact comes from behaviour, the
8 behaviour of the HVO, the Croatian Community of
9 Herceg-Bosna, and the HDZ as it fell under the control
10 of those forces who favoured separatism from Bosnia.
11 So is it possible that he changed his mind?
12 Yes. Is there evidence that he ever did? I haven't
13 seen any evidence that would suggest that he changed
14 his mind on this issue.
15 Q. How about evidence of the fact that in 1992,
16 President Tudjman accepted the internationally agreed
17 upon boundaries of BiH?
18 A. I think there are many instances of this
19 nominal recognition and verbal acceptance, and
20 accompanying denials of any agreement at Karadjordjevo
21 or anywhere else on the part of President Tudjman. One
22 can find no shortage of declarations, pronouncements,
23 and statements such as this. The record is replete
24 with them.
25 Q. So on the one hand you're positing influence
1 and innuendo gained through newspaper accounts, and on
2 the other hand we have the actions of recognising
3 Bosnia, of sending an ambassador, of recognising their
4 international borders, yet you draw the conclusion that
5 he participated in a division of Bosnia in 1991?
6 A. The behaviour to which I refer is the
7 behaviour of actual organisations, military and
8 civilian, that carried out the intended partition. I
9 recognise your point, that there are numerous other
10 pronouncements and declarations, and as I have
11 indicated, I think that it's hard to find a press
12 conference that President Tudjman had in this period in
13 which he didn't deny that there was such an agreement
14 or such an intent.
15 Q. Certainly on the issue of whether or not
16 there was such an agreement, that's again one of these
17 things that historians can reasonably disagree on?
18 A. I think the record on the question of an
19 agreement in principle at Karadjordjevo is now
20 overwhelmingly in favour of the idea that there was.
21 Q. Overwhelmingly means there is a minority view
22 as well.
23 A. Yes. There's always a minority view.
24 Q. And Mr. Milosevic, the other party to the
25 agreement, has also spoken about whether there was one;
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. He basically said, and I'm going to quote
4 from him, if I may:
5 "Tudjman told me he wanted an independent
6 Croatia but we simply could not agree. He wanted to
7 destroy the federal institutions and I could not agree
8 to that. I suggested, as I had before, that we should
9 change the constitution to allow self-determination.
10 "There has been speculation that we decided
11 how to split Yugoslavia. I can tell you now that if we
12 had decided that there, we could have done it
13 immediately. I believe the best solution for all was
14 to live in one country."
15 He's quoted in Ms. Silber and Mr. Little's
16 book and that's the quote. Do you take him at his word
17 for that?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Let's again look at actions. The next day
20 after this purported agreement, the Serbs attacked and
21 took over a police station, correct, in Plitvice?
22 A. I couldn't, just independently sitting here,
23 confirm that. I will just take your word for it that
24 that was the date of it.
25 Q. In August '91, Vukovar, which was a Croatian
1 city, was completely destroyed by the Serbs; right?
2 A. I would say that was a later date. It was
3 utterly destroyed in the latter months of 1991,
4 culminating in the abandonment of the city by the
5 Croatian forces. I believe it was November 17th.
6 Q. When did the destruction start?
7 A. Oh, it started August, yes.
8 Q. August of '91?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Right after this agreement supposedly?
11 A. Well, that's a ways after the agreement but,
13 Q. All right. Then Dubrovnik was destroyed as
15 A. No, Dubrovnik was not destroyed.
16 Q. When was the attack on Dubrovnik?
17 A. There were several attacks on Dubrovnik.
18 Q. The first?
19 A. Sometime in the August/September time frame.
20 Q. Of 1991?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. After this purported agreement?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, again, regardless of what was said or
25 not said between the parties, there began conflict,
1 real armed conflict in the summer of 1991 between Serbs
2 and Croats?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. In October of '91 there was a peace
5 conference right in this very city, correct?
6 A. Yes. The conference on Yugoslavia was
7 convened here in The Hague and was in more or less
8 continuous or ongoing session for some time.
9 Q. Dr. Tudjman was present?
10 A. At some of them he was, yes.
11 Q. At that peace conference he agreed with
12 others there would be no unilateral change of borders,
13 did he not?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Indeed, ultimately the Vance-Owen Plan -- let
16 me rephrase that. When the Vance-Owen Plan finally
17 came out, Bosnia was recognised within the existing
18 borders that had existed in 1991; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, I'd like you, if we can, to turn to
21 page 34 of your report, for those of you who have the
23 A. I, unwisely, do not, Mr. Stein.
24 Q. Maybe we can put a copy of it up on the
25 ELMO. Just the one page would be fine.
1 You quote, at page 34 of your report, Warren
2 Zimmerman. Do you see the quote that's listed in your
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. You say, and the quote speaks for itself, so
6 I won't repeat it for everyone, but, again, you use
7 this as evidence of Dr. Tudjman's positions; correct?
8 A. Among other things. I quoted this citation
9 from Mr. Zimmerman because it spells out somewhat
10 President Tudjman's thinking on why he believes that
11 Bosnia should be a part of Croatia. As I indicated
12 yesterday, there was a much more extensive session on
13 the 14th of January, 1992 in which Ambassador Zimmerman
14 was regaled for about an hour about the fact that
15 Bosnia ought to be part of Croatia.
16 Q. Let's just stick with this quote. The first
17 sentence is important: "Unlike Milosevic, who is
18 driven by power, Tudjman betrayed an obsession with
19 creating nationalism." That's what it says.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Now, I'd like you, if we can, to take a look
22 at the actual work that you're quoting from itself,
23 Warren Zimmerman's book, and while it's being passed
24 around, we just have the cover page, Warren Zimmerman
25 was whom?
1 A. Warren Zimmerman was the last U.S. ambassador
2 to Yugoslavia.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit D43/1.
4 THE INTERPRETER: Is there a copy for the
6 MR. STEIN: The interpreters have asked for a
7 copy, and there certainly is an extra one.
8 Q. Would you put the Zimmerman pages in front of
9 you, Doctor?
10 A. Yes, I have them.
11 Q. In fact, having taken a look at it now,
12 you've transposed two pages from Zimmerman's book, have
13 you not?
14 A. I've done it in the normal fashion of taking
15 two sentences and separating them by the three
17 Q. The first sentence of Zimmerman's book has a
18 word difference that I think is important. Let's start
19 first with the paragraph that is on page 75: "Unlike
20 Milosevic, who was driven by power, Tudjman betrayed an
21 obsession with Croatian nationalism. His devotion to
22 Croatia was of the most narrow-minded sort." Right?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You must have made a typographical error
1 A. I did. Yes, I did.
2 Q. Indeed, if the paragraphs are read as the
3 book flows, can we agree that there is a little
4 different meaning?
5 A. I would certainly agree that the section we
6 just read from would -- I mean, I think it's, indeed,
7 the case that President Tudjman is not obsessed with
8 creating nationalism. So this rendition of it is a
9 welcomed correction.
10 Q. At page 74, Zimmerman notes: "The most
11 troubling part of our conversation concerned Bosnia.
12 Tudjman stated flatly, and with no evidence, Bosnia has
13 historically been a part of Croatia and has always been
14 in Croatia's geopolitical sphere. Not only do Croats
15 live in Bosnia, but most Muslims in Bosnia consider
16 themselves Croats." Right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, having read these in context, can't we
19 conclude that the discussion, as referenced in
20 Zimmerman's book, dealt with Croatia proper, the nation
21 of Croatia proper, let me finish the thought, and had
22 no specific application or reference to his attitude
23 towards Bosnia?
24 A. I am not following that line of reasoning
25 here. I would see your point in the second -- on the
1 page 75 quote in his statement that his devotion to
2 Croatia was of the most narrow-minded sort. That
3 pertains to Croatia. The statement on page 74, it
4 seems to me, is pertaining to Bosnia.
5 Q. The two need to be read together, don't you
6 think, Doctor, in due fairness?
7 A. I put them together and probably omitted the
8 intervening sentence or two there and would say that
9 the first paragraph here, in which Ambassador Zimmerman
10 finds himself very troubled by these assertions that
11 Bosnia has historically been a part of Croatia,
12 pertains to Bosnia.
13 Q. All right. We will let the reader make his
14 own judgement. You and I can agree that Dr. Tudjman
15 never advocated in his book or anywhere else a violent
16 overthrow or changes in the borders?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. We can further agree that Dr. Tudjman does
19 not, in his works, underline or show or disseminate any
20 nationalistic -- let me rephrase that. Dr. Tudjman, in
21 his works, does not reveal any nationalistic hatred
22 towards any nation, and specifically towards Bosnia?
23 A. I'm afraid you and I could not agree on that,
25 Q. Okay. Let me show you your testimony in the
1 Blaskic case. You were asked:
2 "Q Tudjman, in that work, does he anywhere
3 underline or disseminate nationalistic
4 hatred towards any nation, and
5 specifically towards the Bosniaks?"
6 And your answer was no.
7 A. I'd have to be refreshed on what work we're
8 speaking of. I am specifically thinking of the first
9 version of his book which pertained to -- in which he
10 made some comments which the Jewish community found
11 highly offensive and which were removed in the
12 subsequent publication of that book.
13 Q. Removed by whom?
14 A. By President Tudjman.
15 Q. So after he found that the Jewish community
16 found them offensive, he had them removed?
17 A. That's correct, yes. He issued a revised
18 version of the book which was actually a substantial
20 Q. What does that indicate to you?
21 A. It indicates that my original statement that
22 he -- your original proposition that there was no
23 hatred expressed toward any group is not a valid
25 Q. Let's rewind. You, in Blaskic, of course,
1 agreed that there was no hatred to any group expressed
2 in his books?
3 A. No, I did not. I said that the version of
4 the book that I had at hand was at issue, so I can't
5 concur with your conclusion here.
6 Q. Fair enough. But I want to raise this issue
7 of the reaction of Jewish folks who read the book.
8 When, apparently, Dr. Tudjman heard about that, he
9 changed the book; is that right?
10 A. He reissued the book, yes.
11 Q. Okay. Can we also agree, in his writings,
12 Dr. Tudjman does not specifically advocate a course or
13 action in a particular situation. He isn't specific?
14 A. I would agree, yes.
15 Q. I think we've already pointed out that the
16 source hasn't been that Lord Owen noted that as of
17 November 1992, Dr. Tudjman had accepted and recognised
18 the borders of Bosnia would be -- well, I'm garbling
19 that. Dr. Tudjman, as of this time, had accepted the
20 recognition of BiH within its internationally
21 recognised borders.
22 A. There are a number of quotations that I took
23 from Lord Owen, I believe, and that sounds right, but I
24 can't specifically verify it for you.
25 Q. Now, I note in your report to us, at page 34,
1 that you note that Dr. Tudjman argued that Bosnia
2 should be part of Croatia based on Croatia's economic
3 and geopolitical interests and on the ethnic
4 composition of Western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia.
5 Now, do I take that to mean your work concluded, at
6 least as to this section, that there was an economic
7 union between the two areas?
8 A. I didn't conclude that, no. There is an
9 economic relationship, an important economic
10 relationship between the two areas, and I think that in
11 trying to characterise President Tudjman's
12 understanding, he postulates the notion, and this is
13 from his work published in, I think, 1981, the Columbia
14 University book, press book, he spells out at some
15 length his views on the geopolitical, economic whole
16 that he believes constitutes what, to him, should be
17 part of Croatia.
18 Q. And, indeed, that economic whole had been,
19 prior to 1981, et cetera, the whole nation of
20 Yugoslavia which benefited from being just that, a
21 nation; correct?
22 A. Yes, and there were economic relations across
23 those boundaries under the socialist republic, yes.
24 Q. Now, you note at page 36 of your report the
25 population from 1961 to 1991, and you cite the
1 statistics there. Is it fair to say that the Croatian
2 population was relatively stable during that period of
4 A. The Croatian population was relatively
5 stable, and the Muslim population grew during that
6 period of time, throughout the whole of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina and most of the constituent parts.
8 Q. The result, of course, is that the Croats
9 became a smaller and smaller minority?
10 A. Depending on the area which one looks at,
11 that is not true across the board. In some areas, the
12 percentages actually remained quite stable. The
13 Croatian emigration was, in fact, part of the -- there
14 are a number of reasons for it, but this is not merely
15 a matter of the number of people who were there staying
16 stable but the -- go ahead. I'm sorry.
17 Q. Doctor, I just want to stick to a very small
18 point, and that is, you show in your chart, Muslims and
19 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1961 to 1991, the nation
20 as a whole, that is to say, Bosnia and Herzegovina?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Looking at the totality of that situation,
23 the Croats were becoming a smaller and smaller
25 A. The word "minority" may not quite be
1 appropriate here, since there was no majority group.
2 Q. Fair enough.
3 A. But they were becoming a smaller percentage
4 of the total population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 Q. You were also asked, and I'm going to ask you
6 again, whether or not your study in this area has
7 concluded whether there were specific plans by
8 Dr. Tudjman to expel people from Bosnia. Do you recall
9 that discussion with Judge Riad?
10 A. I think I interpreted his question as
11 meaning, were there specific plans in terms of what to
12 do with those people who were the targets of the
14 Q. Let's go through that then. The question
16 "JUDGE RIAD: Quoting Lord Owen's book,
17 Balkan Odyssey, and mentioning
18 Dr. Tudjman had one goal, 'to control
19 the territory which he believed
20 historically belonged to Croatia,' what
21 was precisely the territory mentioned
22 and were there any plans foreseen to
23 gain this territory?"
24 You answered something about a theoretical
25 position, and the judge refined it, and he said:
1 "JUDGE RIAD: Any steps to implement this
2 wish ..."
3 And the judge further went on to say:
4 "... but as far as the population were
5 concerned, were there any plans, as far
6 as the people living in these areas,
7 plans for people living in these areas?
8 What were they supposed to be dealt
10 And then you asked:
11 "A Oh, you mean the people who were not
13 He said yes, and your answer was:
14 "A No. I know of no specific plans that
15 were created to deal with the
16 non-Croatian population, no. I don't
17 think that there was. That wasn't
18 something that was, let us say,
19 premeditated, a preplanned part of these
20 annexation ambitions."
21 Do you recall your testimony?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You essentially told the judge, apparently
24 under an interpretation you now give, that there were
25 no plans by Dr. Tudjman relative to these folks; is
1 that right?
2 A. Yes. You may hear me, in that answer, trying
3 to grasp exactly what he meant, and my answer pertained
4 to were there plans in terms of what to do to dispose
5 of the non-Croat population of these areas. That's the
6 answer that I, at the time, intended to give him, and
7 my answer today would be there were no plans that I
8 know of that had been drawn up and drafted for the
9 removal or disposition of the non-Croat population.
10 Q. The reference --
11 JUDGE MAY: Let me see if I've got this
12 right. We don't have the transcript in front of us, so
13 I don't know how this question arose, but as you
14 recollect, Doctor, were you being asked about President
15 Tudjman or about other plans?
16 A. I think I was being -- as I recall, sir, I
17 was being asked about President Tudjman.
18 JUDGE MAY: It would be helpful to us if you
19 could answer the question in relation -- give us your
20 answer, yes.
21 A. Let me suggest that I know of no plans that
22 President Tudjman held, drew up, or promulgated which
23 specifically provided for the expulsion or disposition
24 of the non-Croat population.
25 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
1 MR. STEIN: Perhaps, for the
2 Court's edification, we can put first page 853 and then
3 page --
4 JUDGE MAY: I think this point has been
5 clarified, unless anybody else wants to deal with it.
6 MR. STEIN: For the record, it's 853, 854,
7 and 855 of the Blaskic case.
8 Q. Doctor, let's see if we can also agree on a
9 couple of principles. As a watershed, the dissolution
10 of Yugoslavia as a nation was completed by April 27,
11 1992? Would you agree with that? That's the
12 conclusion of the Badinter commission?
13 A. As a state, yes.
14 Q. Although it's been said in this trial in a
15 variety of places and ways, the Muslims were the most
16 numerous nation within BiH, about 43 per cent?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And the Croats were the smallest, about 17
19 per cent?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And then there were 31 per cent Serbs,
22 Yugoslavs, and others?
23 A. I think the percentage of Yugoslavs was
24 somewhere around five or six per cent.
25 Q. Yes, I'm sorry. I misread my own notes.
1 There were 31 per cent Serbs, five per cent Yugoslavs,
2 and two per cent others?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Would you agree that the Muslims perceived
5 themselves as a nation only recently, that is, within
6 the past 20 or 30 years?
7 A. I would make this distinction in my answer:
8 I think that they became and perceived themselves as a
9 political community much before that and, in fact,
10 probably in the 19th century and defined themselves as
11 a nation within the past 35 years.
12 Q. All right. As a sovereign nation then, you
13 say that they started to see themselves within the past
14 35 years?
15 A. I would not use the word "sovereign."
16 Q. All right. Do you agree that they started,
17 at one point in time, that is, the Muslims and BiH, to
18 see themselves as a sovereign nation?
19 A. No.
20 Q. You do not?
21 A. The word "sovereign" and "nation" in this
22 sense don't go together. I think that that
23 terminology, if you're looking at the period from, say,
24 the 1960s, enters into the assertions of the political
25 rhetoric, but in terms of being sovereign, that is, not
1 subject to the authority or jurisdiction of some other
2 state, that would be an incorrect interpretation of the
3 term. I just offer that as a clarification of what
4 you're defining.
5 Q. Certainly we can agree that the Muslims were
6 the only peoples within Yugoslavia that couldn't point
7 to one of the republics as their own republic?
8 A. They pointed to the Republic of Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina as their republic.
10 Q. They couldn't point like the Serbs to Serbia,
11 the Croats to Croatia. They said, "This land is
12 ours." That's your opinion, isn't it?
13 A. No, they pointed to the Republic of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Socialist Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as the place in which most of them
17 Q. Now, maybe I'm confused.
18 JUDGE MAY: I think you better slow down for
19 the interpreters.
20 MR. STEIN:
21 Q. I'm confused by your answer, Doctor. Did
22 they see Bosnia-Herzegovina as their nation? Is that
23 what you're telling us?
24 A. No, I did not say that, and that's not the
25 formulation. Let me just perhaps suggest the
1 formulation that was used, and that was that the
2 Bosnian Muslims are a nation, starting in, let's say,
3 sometime in the 1960s, and they live in the Republic of
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina and, together with the nations
5 of the Croats and Serbs, find this to be their
7 Q. Indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina was always
8 known --
9 JUDGE MAY: Pause for the interpreters.
10 MR. STEIN: Very good, sir.
11 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Excuse me,
12 Mr. Stein. I should like to complete this information
13 that is being given to us by the expert, Dr. Donia.
14 You made a distinction in your report between
15 Bosnian and Bosniak. Could you please clarify this
16 distinction for us?
17 A. Yes, I'll try. In 1993, the Bosnian Muslim
18 leadership met and decided to change the name of their
19 group from the Bosnian Muslims to the Bosniaks. This
20 was done principally because the Bosnian Muslim name no
21 longer reflected the nature of the community because
22 the Bosnian Muslim nation consisted of many people who
23 were secular Muslims or even non-practising or
24 atheistic Muslims. It sounds like a contradiction
25 which is why the name change took place.
1 Thus, from 1993 on, one finds the term
2 "Bosniak" universally deployed by the international
3 community to refer to the group previously called the
4 Bosnian Muslims, and the same takes place for domestic
5 use within Bosnia. Thus, the term "Bosniak" is
6 distinct from Bosnian in that the term "Bosnian" refers
7 to any person who is an inhabitant of the territory of
9 I will share with you my own assessment of
10 that name change. It solved one problem, which was the
11 religious association with the now secular nationality,
12 but it created another one, which is the one that
13 you've just raised, namely that the distinction between
14 "Bosnian" and "Bosniak" requires subtlety and close
15 attention to detail, both in foreign languages and in
16 the language of the region.
17 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) To make this
18 quite clear, I consider it to be very important and
19 interesting, you said that the term "Bosnian Muslims"
20 no longer reflected the reality of the community
21 because there were people among them who were
22 secularised. There were others who were even atheist.
23 How could you qualify the religious practice
24 within Bosnia in this period of time which you studied
25 in your work and in your report?
1 A. It is perhaps ironic that just at the time
2 that the name was changed, in fact, there was greater
3 religious observance being practised, and that trend
4 really began some time late in the socialist period,
5 perhaps the 1980s, and continues to this day.
6 The practising Muslims will now frequently
7 describe themselves as Bosniak by nationality and
8 Muslim by religion.
9 MR. STEIN: Thank you, Judge.
10 Q. While we're on this subject, I'm given to
11 understand and I ask your comment, Mr. Izetbegovic
12 apparently does not prefer to use and is against the
13 name "Bosniaks"?
14 A. There are a number of people who are opposed
15 to the use of the term "Bosniak," and many of them are
16 my colleagues as historians. Amongst the Bosnian
17 Muslim community, some of them are, in fact, opposed to
18 it because they are not Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims and
19 object to this very close similarity of terms.
20 So I would say that there is broad consensus
21 within the community of Bosnian Muslims -- that there
22 is general agreement but far from complete consensus.
23 Q. On the use or non-use?
24 A. On the term "Bosniak." It's regularly used
25 in the press, it's universally used by the
1 International Community to distinguish Bosnian Muslims
2 from other nationalities, but within the group, the
3 term as a term of self-ascription is not universally
4 agreed upon.
5 Q. Going back to where we were before we took an
6 interesting discursive on the term "Bosniak," Bosnia
7 was indeed referred to as the Republic of Croats,
8 Serbs, and Muslims after World War II?
9 A. That's exactly right. That formulation was
10 carefully -- it's interesting to, say, look at the
11 constitution of 1974 for Bosnia, which in the first
12 three provisions lists the Muslims first in one, the
13 Croats first in one, and the Serbian first in one. So
14 there was this official effort to provide complete
15 equality of recognition of these three nationalities
16 within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 Q. It also seems like that is a recognition of
18 the fact that there are three distinct nationalities
19 within BiH as opposed to Slovenia, Serbia, Croatia,
20 where there are certainly minority peoples but are
21 known as the home of the Croats, the Serbs, or the
23 A. Again, I'm not a constitutional specialist on
24 this, but I don't think that -- the socialist
25 constitutions of those republics, I think they
1 recognise the status of the other nationalities.
2 Q. I understand that, but my point is, I guess,
3 not a political or constitutional one, it's more of a
4 nationalist one. In the loose sense of the word, BiH
5 was also, as well as in the official sense, the home of
6 the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Muslims, whereas the
7 other republics were, with certain of the minorities,
8 the home of the Croats?
9 A. I grant your nationalistic point and would
10 note that Bosnia is, in fact, the only republic without
11 a national majority.
12 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Excuse me,
13 Dr. Donia. You're talking about an absolute majority
14 or a relative majority?
15 A. No one had an absolute majority. No group
16 had an absolute majority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. So
17 I'm speaking of a relative majority or what I think of
18 as a plurality which would have been that of the
19 Bosniaks or Bosnian Muslims.
20 MR. STEIN:
21 Q. Doctor, Mr. Izetbegovic is quoted as saying:
22 "We want to have a state because a people
23 without a state is a family that was expelled to a
24 meadow. It rains and the family does not have a roof
25 over its head. People without a state are as that
1 family without a roof. God save us from belonging to
2 the people without a state."
3 I'm going to skip a few lines.
4 "In our state, we will live how it suits
5 us. No one will prescribe us how we should live as it
6 was before the case. One thing is sure: In this
7 state, Islam will be respected."
8 Doctor, I want to ask you about that quote.
9 Firstly, are you familiar with it?
10 A. I believe it comes from the Islamic
11 declaration written by Mr. Izetbegovic.
12 Q. What do you take it to mean, Doctor?
13 A. I take it to be one of the ambivalent
14 statements that Mr. Izetbegovic and many others make
15 regarding the status of the relationship between the
16 Bosnian Muslims and the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Part of that quote, that is, the notion that the
18 Bosnian Muslims must have a state, that is, a state
19 which they call home, I think has been implemented in
20 the period after the collapse of socialism and, in some
21 sense, existed even before it, although I'm sure
22 President Izetbegovic would not agree with that.
23 The notion that we will do anything we want
24 to in that state is a statement that I think he would
25 not make himself today and not seek to implement. I
1 don't mean by that to suggest that the Bosniak
2 community will not exercise its power within Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina within reasonable ways, but it will seek
4 and pursue power, in other words, but it has not sought
5 to willy-nilly disregard legal norms, conventions
6 within Bosnia-Herzegovina.
7 Q. In 1994, Doctor, December, Mr. Izetbegovic is
8 quoted as saying:
9 "Finally, we are becoming a nation and we
10 are creating our country. All nations did it in
11 blood. History does not make gifts. We cannot be an
13 Doctor, I ask you, doesn't it seem to you, in
14 1999, looking back at this period, that Mr. Izetbegovic
15 was, A, clearly indicating his goal for a Muslim state
16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
17 A. No, I wouldn't concur.
18 Q. My second question along these lines, even
19 though you don't agree with the first statement, would
20 you agree that Mr. Izetbegovic certainly has,
21 throughout his writings and his philosophy, indicated
22 that he wanted to have an independent Muslim state in
24 A. No.
25 Q. Let's talk for a minute, if we can, about the
1 SDA party. The SDA party is the Party of Democratic
3 A. Stranka Demokratske Akcije, which is the
4 Muslim party, which bears no name, Muslim or Bosniak,
5 within it but is nevertheless the expression of that
7 Q. It was established in 1990, was it not?
8 A. It was.
9 Q. By the way, the SDS, which is the Serbian
10 party, was established in July of 1990; correct?
11 A. I think that's right, yes.
12 Q. And the SDA in May of 1990?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And the HDZ in August of 1990?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So the HDZ was the last of the parties
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. At the time the SDA was established, would
20 you agree it was actually established -- I know you're
21 an historian and not a lawyer or constitutionalist --
22 would you agree it was established illegally?
23 A. It was actually established at a time when it
24 was unclear what the future legislation was going to be
25 regarding the naming of the political formations that
1 were then being brought together. This explains why
2 the name "Muslim" or "Bosniak" does not appear within
3 it because it was formed at this period of uncertainty.
4 Q. The period of uncertainty is still Yugoslavia
5 law is outstanding; correct?
6 A. Yugoslavia law is outstanding at that point
7 in time, yes.
8 Q. And that forbade the names of
9 nationalistic --
10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Stein, you're not bearing in
11 mind the interpreters. Will somebody sit next to him
12 and tell him?
13 MR. STEIN: I think that's the ultimate
14 stroke, Judge. I will --
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
16 MR. STEIN: I was a tad thrown off, so I will
17 try again.
18 Q. It was illegal to use nationalistic names
19 during this period of time, was it not?
20 A. During the time that the SDA was formed, yes,
21 it was.
22 Q. Can we agree that among the people who
23 established the SDA, 40 of the real originators were
24 from the Young Muslims -- I'm sorry, not 40, eight. Do
25 you know what the Young Muslims are?
1 A. I do, and I just don't know. The number
2 sounds right. There was certainly some Young Muslim
3 participation in the formation of the party.
4 Q. And the Young Muslims, sir, to familiarise
5 the Court and everyone else, were what?
6 A. The Young Muslims were a group that first
7 organised in the 1930s and were associated with a
8 specifically Islamic understanding of how society ought
9 to be organised. They were subject to various
10 imprisonment and persecution both by the inner war
11 Yugoslavia state and by the socialist regime
12 immediately after World War II and came to reconstitute
13 themselves as Yugoslavia started to come apart.
14 Q. Are you aware, sir, also in the election
15 campaigns for the SDA, that the SDA used religious
16 leaders to attract people to their party?
17 A. Yes. I'd say they did and all political
18 formations did of the three nationalist groups.
19 Q. So all the three nationalist groups used
20 their religious figures to gather the faithful, if you
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. As of September 1990, can we agree that
24 Mr. Izetbegovic announced that the SDA opposed the
25 principle of a national parity and that the next
1 government would be best formed on the basis of one
2 man, one vote?
3 A. I couldn't either confirm that for you, nor
4 certainly would not argue with the likelihood that he
5 made that statement.
6 Q. All right. That's the same principle we
7 hearkened to earlier in today's discussion, that is,
8 the one man, one vote principle versus the one
9 federation principle, which was discussed by Milosevic,
10 if you recall.
11 A. I don't share -- I mean, you're leaping over
12 many events in the meantime and in a very different
13 context, so I don't know that I've stipulated that this
14 is the instant principle in both cases.
15 Q. All right. Doctor, according, again, to
16 Ms. Silber and Mr. Little, they claim that:
17 "Izetbegovic announced in 1990 that the SDA
18 opposed the principle addition of a national parity and
19 that the next government would be formed on the basis
20 of one man, one vote. Izetbegovic was attempting to
21 play the same game in Bosnia that Milosevic had in mind
22 for Yugoslavia."
23 That's where I got that concept.
24 A. I appreciate that there's a wealth of
25 information in that volume, I use it myself very
1 frequently, but I don't always find their conclusions
2 and parallels to be ironclad in terms of the evidence.
3 Q. Right. Their point is that unless civil and
4 individual rights were secured through institutions,
5 majority vote would guarantee Serb domination
6 throughout the country in the case of Mr. Milosevic.
7 Would you agree?
8 A. Yes, I agree with that statement.
9 Q. And in Bosnia, the same principle would give
10 the Muslims, the Republic's largest ethnic group, 44
11 per cent of the 4.35 million population, that is the
12 greatest authority, one man, one vote?
13 A. No. That's not the case and that's not the
14 way that events evolved, which is my problem with that
15 conclusion. Amongst the Muslim voters who went to the
16 polls on November 18th, 1990, there was a substantial
17 percentage who voted for non-nationalist parties.
18 There were also some Croats who did so and a few Serbs,
19 but the assumption, which was made by some nationalists
20 in 1990, that every single person of Croat nationality
21 would vote for the HDZ, that every single Muslim would
22 vote for the SDA, proved to be -- or that every Serb
23 would vote for the SDS, never came about and, in fact,
24 until very late in the election campaign, the great
25 fear of all three nationalist parties was, in fact, the
1 triumph of the reform communists and socialists. They
2 operated effectively as partners in the election
3 campaign, so I don't -- I can't follow this -- I can't
4 agree to this linearity between a one man, one vote,
5 the principle, and the ultimate outcome for the
7 Q. Well, Doctor, let me make sure I understand.
8 Certainly we can agree that during the elections that
9 you just talked about, 83 per cent of the Croats voted
10 for the HDZ, 78 per cent of the Serbs voted for the
11 SDS, and 76 per cent of the Muslims voted for the SDA.
12 A. Yes. Those are --
13 Q. Those are facts on which we can agree?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. So that the constituent peoples were, in
16 fact, voting for these parties along constituent
18 A. Largely.
19 Q. All right. The SDA was also established in
20 Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Germany,
21 Switzerland, America, and Canada, among others, would
22 you agree?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Of course, President Izetbegovic was elected
25 on 30 November, 1991, I have, but I think that may be
1 actually 26 May, 1990?
2 A. I think your May date is correct.
3 Q. He was re-elected on 30 November, 1991.
4 A. Yes. I think that -- yes.
5 Q. The objectives of the SDA were the
6 introduction of religious holidays, state holidays --
7 I'm sorry, introduction of religious holidays as a
8 state holiday. That was one of the objectives?
9 I'm sorry, Doctor, maybe -- can we agree that
10 one of the objectives of the SDA was the introduction
11 as a state holiday of religious holidays?
12 A. One of many objectives, yes.
13 Q. Okay. And some of the others?
14 A. I don't have their platform in front of me
15 and I couldn't --
16 Q. Now, can we focus for just a minute, because
17 we focused on certainly Dr. Tudjman, on
18 Mr. Izetbegovic, the other party who was controlling
19 some of the events in this region.
20 It's reported from his early youth he
21 dedicated himself to Islamic work. Is that fair, with
22 your knowledge of Mr. Izetbegovic?
23 A. Yes, and I would say that I think he was in
24 youth and remains a devout Muslim.
25 Q. He was part of the Young Muslims that we
1 talked about earlier?
2 A. Very much so, yes.
3 Q. He was arrested in 1946, was he not?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And his arrest was for significant
6 participation in founding the Muslim journal Mud Zijad,
7 M-u-d Z --
8 JUDGE MAY: What's the relevance of all
9 this? 1946. Come on. Let's move closer to the events
10 in question.
11 MR. STEIN:
12 Q. Mr. Izetbegovic also started writing, as did
13 Dr. Tudjman; is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. His first -- or his doctrine is set out in
16 the Islamic declaration that you mentioned earlier?
17 A. I don't know what you mean by "doctrine."
18 Q. Well, his feelings, his ideas, his thoughts
19 are set out?
20 A. I would say his general philosophy of history
21 finds its expression in that work.
22 Q. That was first published in 1970?
23 A. Yes, but I think it dates somewhat earlier,
24 if I'm not mistaken.
25 Q. And it was republished in 1990?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. He advocated, in the Islamic declaration, a
3 general Islamic moral and religious regeneration;
5 A. I can't stipulate to that without having some
6 documentation to --
7 Q. Have you read the Islamic declaration?
8 A. Yes, I have.
9 Q. A return to true Islamic values? "Yes"
10 or "No."
11 A. I would say that's a fair summary of much of
12 the declaration, yes.
13 Q. Re-Islamisation of Muslims?
14 A. Yeah, I think that's accurate.
15 Q. And the creation and strengthening of
16 different types of Islamic unity?
17 A. Yes, that's true.
18 Q. And finally, struggling up to and including
19 political and armed war for the creation of Islamic
20 order in countries where Muslims represent majority or
21 near majority of the population?
22 A. Without having the language in front of me, I
23 couldn't stipulate to that.
24 Q. Is that a fairly close characterisation?
25 A. I can't stipulate to it.
1 Q. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by the term
2 "stipulate." Could you agree or disagree that that's
3 the essence of what he was saying?
4 A. Based on what I have in front of me and from
5 my knowledge, I couldn't agree to that statement, no.
6 That doesn't mean I would disagree with it upon closer
7 inquiry but --
8 Q. All right. We'll take a look at it and
9 provide it to you if we can, Doctor.
10 Again, he was arrested in 1983; is that
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. His arrests were for counter-revolutionary
14 and conspiracy, and he was sentenced to 14 years in
16 A. That's correct.
17 JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance of this,
18 Mr. Stein? Can you explain?
19 MR. STEIN: Sure. The OTP has decided,
20 through this witness, to talk about Dr. Tudjman.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, precisely. Why aren't you
22 cross-examining about that instead of this, what seems
23 to be a relevant matter.
24 MR. STEIN: The other player in the equation
25 is of significance. The views expressed by the
1 political leader of the Muslims in the SDA are
2 significant in --
3 JUDGE MAY: But you're cross-examining him
4 about his criminal record in 1983. Now, we need to
5 move on.
6 MR. STEIN:
7 Q. Now, Doctor, let me ask you this: In the
8 1980 period and after his release from prison,
9 Mr. Izetbegovic had rather extremist views about his
10 nation and his people, will you agree?
11 A. No.
12 Q. He aligned himself with Ayatollah
13 Khomeini, "Yes" or "No?"
14 A. Well, I wouldn't say he aligned himself with
15 Ayatollah Khomeini in any working since, no. He was
16 very fond of being in touch with and travelling in the
17 Islamic world, did so -- does so to this day, and has
18 certainly courted the support of Islamic countries for
20 Q. And he's quoted in both 1984 and later in
21 Belgrade in 1988 as saying:
22 "There can be neither peace more coexistence
23 between the Islamic faith and the non-Islamic social
24 and political institutions."
25 Are you familiar with that?
1 A. No.
2 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to order that you move
3 on to another topic.
4 MR. STEIN: All right, sir.
5 JUDGE MAY: And quickly, because we're going
6 to adjourn soon.
7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: (Interpretation) Mr. Stein,
8 you are at liberty to call an expert on Mr. Izetbegovic
9 if you wish. You can do that through another expert,
10 but this expert didn't come for that purpose. I think
11 you must accept that.
12 JUDGE MAY: I must say we have had no
13 particular evidence about Mr. Tudjman, so I'm not sure
14 that I see any relevance about Mr. Izetbegovic.
15 MR. STEIN: I take your point.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. STEIN: Your Honour, it's 5.27. I'm at
18 your disposal.
19 JUDGE MAY: It's only because I now find we
20 aren't under the pressure of time that I'm not going to
21 limit your cross-examination as I said earlier today,
22 but you must have in mind the amount of time that's
23 being taken about these matters. How much more have
24 you got?
25 MR. STEIN: Whatever more I have is going to
1 be cut and eliminated. I'll take a very close look at
2 it, sir.
3 JUDGE MAY: Because we would want to start on
4 the next witness tomorrow.
5 Doctor, would you be back, please, at half
6 past two tomorrow?
7 A. Yes, I will.
8 MR. NICE: Can I raise an administrative
9 matter in relation to the next witness?
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
11 MR. NICE: Mr. Stein is correct in say that
12 we discussed the position he'd be facing in the version
13 of the report in Serbo-Croat having been served the
14 10th of July, it seemed to me that if he was bound to
15 be cross-examining beyond the end of week, then there
16 would be no problem one way or another with his only
17 having had the report in B/C/S whatever number of days
18 it is, because Dr. Allcock can't come back next week in
19 any event. Therefore, if there was outstanding
20 cross-examination, it would have to be at a later
21 date. Beyond that I hadn't gone into any agreement,
22 and we'd simply left unresolved the question of
23 entitlement of expert reports in B/C/S.
24 But there's another administrative issue
25 about Dr. Allcock and it is this --
1 JUDGE MAY: I wonder if we could let the
2 witness go so he doesn't have to sit here listening to
3 all of this. Thank you, Doctor.
4 (The witness withdrew)
5 MR. NICE: We intend to introduce through
6 Dr. Allcock a film, it lasts about an hour, that Your
7 Honour, Judge May, has seen in the Kupreskic case, I
8 think last week. It's called, "We're All Neighbours."
9 It's by Tone Bringa.
10 It would seem to me potentially possible to
11 save Your Honour having to see that film a second time
12 if we could effectively incorporate it in part of the
13 pre-reading of the report, so that were Your Honour's
14 two colleagues to have time and were we to have a copy
15 of the film available either tomorrow morning or the
16 morning after, or assuming that Your Honour's
17 colleagues had the time, then they might be able to
18 view that privately in the same way as the Defence will
19 be able to do, and because Your Honour Judge May's
20 recollection of the film will no doubt be very recent
21 and alive, we could simply deal with the document as
22 having been considered and cross-examination on it
23 could take place directly.
24 At the moment, I'm using the somewhat slow
25 copying services here to ensure that there are copies
1 of that video for the Defence tonight. Once that's
2 done, I can then ensure that another copy is made
3 available, or two, for the Judges Chambers should that
4 be helpful. Alternatively, the original could be made
5 available because it wouldn't be being used in court.
6 JUDGE MAY: We'll see what arrangements have
7 been made.
8 MR. STEIN: We haven't seen the film. If
9 it's appropriate and we view admissible, we will, I
10 think, agree with my colleague. It seems a perfectly
11 reasonable use of time if the technology exists to view
12 it out of court, but I reserve until we see it to
14 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
15 MR. NICE: So far as this witness is
16 concerned, Mr. Hart's (phoen) concerned, and I think
17 rightly, that I should not let pass the issue whether
18 it has to be formally produced as an exhibit in the
19 case, that is, the report of Dr. Donia. I expect it
20 does have to be produced and given a label but I'm not
21 sure what the practice is in other cases. Can I leave
22 that with the staff to deal with?
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
25 at 5.34 p.m. to be reconvened on
1 Wednesday, the 21st day of July,
2 1999 at 2.30 p.m.