Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7421

1 Thursday, 23rd September, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 10.55 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case IT-95-14/2-T, the

7 Prosecutor versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, I'll address you.

9 I'm sorry we're late starting, but the hospital

10 appointment, as is the way of such things, was

11 delayed. We're ready now. Yes.

12 MR. SAYERS: I have one short matter to bring

13 to the Court's attention. It is dealing with the next

14 witness, who is apparently a Major in the Danish army,

15 Lars Baggesen.

16 We were presented last night with -- I'll

17 call it an offer of proof of about 38 pages,

18 249 paragraphs. It looks like there are many different

19 kinds of opinions embedded into this report about which

20 this witness is apparently going to be requested to

21 utter. So we would just register an objection under

22 Rule 94 bis.

23 I'm familiar with -- I know the Court's views

24 that military men should be permitted to offer opinions

25 within their area of expertise, and we accept that, but

Page 7422

1 some of these opinions go into the political area, and

2 we would object to those as being beyond the expertise

3 of the witness.

4 JUDGE MAY: Can you give us an example?

5 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. For example,

6 paragraph 246. The last page. We would think that

7 that would be an objectionable opinion, as would, for

8 example, paragraph 72 on page 11.

9 Those are just representative of several

10 areas.

11 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, have you indicated to

12 the Prosecution where these objections are?

13 MR. SAYERS: I have not had the opportunity

14 to touch base with the Prosecution, but I can give you

15 two or three more examples.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. SAYERS: For example, on page 25, Your

18 Honour, where the witness apparently is going to speak

19 about the apparent plan that the Croats had at the

20 highest levels, paragraph 168, 170. Those are the

21 sorts of things that we're talking about.

22 The witness is also apparently going to offer

23 opinions on a matter of military subjects such as the

24 shelling of Zenica on April the 19th, and of course,

25 that would be a closer question that would appear to

Page 7423

1 fall within the witness's expertise, provided a

2 foundation is laid that he has artillery experience and

3 expertise. But on the political matters, we think

4 that's beyond the witness's competence, beyond his

5 stated expertise and is really not particularly helpful

6 to the Trial Chamber.

7 On another matter, I am -- and consistent

8 with our approach not to object generally to leading

9 questions, I can indicate to the Trial Chamber the

10 specific areas where we would object to leading

11 questions by paragraph number if the Court wishes.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. SAYERS: We have no objections to it

14 other than these paragraphs, paragraphs 40 to 44, 71 --

15 JUDGE MAY: Let us make sure we have a note

16 of this. 40 to 44.

17 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. 71 and 72.

18 JUDGE MAY: To which you have an objection

19 anyway.

20 MR. SAYERS: Yes. 81 to 83, 88, 98, 115,

21 146.


23 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. And 151 and

24 152, 158 to 159, 162 to 164, and 168, and 170.

25 JUDGE MAY: To which you object. 168, 170.

Page 7424

1 MR. SAYERS: Yes. And 171, 192. If it would

2 be helpful, we have an extra copy if the Court --

3 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Sayers,

4 I think, regarding the principle of not being able to

5 express political opinions, the Chamber can only but

6 agree with you. So we will do so automatically

7 ourselves; that is to say that an expert should come

8 here to speak about the field of his expertise.

9 However, as you know, you can always, by applying this

10 method, which has, of course, produced results which--

11 because it has helped us to go forward more quickly.

12 As regarding questions that should not be

13 leading, you can say so when the time comes. The

14 Chamber, as you know, will rule on a case-by-case

15 basis. So there's no problem there.

16 As for the principle, of course we are not

17 engaging in politics here, we are in a Tribunal, so it

18 goes without saying.

19 As for a more general issue, you know that

20 our rules give us a certain degree of flexibility to

21 judge for ourselves the evidence that is produced and

22 to assess its value. That is what I think, and I think

23 we can proceed now.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Would you like to finish

25 your matters in dispute?

Page 7425

1 MR. SAYERS: Yes, if the Court pleases. I

2 have just a few more.

3 JUDGE MAY: You got to 192.

4 MR. SAYERS: The next one would be 202, 218,

5 235, and 236, and 237, 243 to 246, and that would be

6 it.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you,

8 Mr. Sayers.

9 Yes, Mr. Kovacic?

10 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honours, just for the

11 record, I would like to inform the Judges that we are

12 sharing this opinion. We discussed that, and we have

13 about the same feelings.

14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you.

15 Mr. Scott, we won't trouble you to argue the

16 various points now. It can be done during the course

17 of the evidence.

18 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: Those matters being in dispute,

20 as indicated, we have this document, and I wonder if we

21 can take it quickly, your leading matters. If need be,

22 you can simply refer to the matters. It may be helpful

23 if the witness, in fact, has the document in front of

24 him, unless there is any objection, and you can refer

25 to the various paragraph numbers.

Page 7426

1 MR. SCOTT: I have no objection, Your

2 Honour. The only question is how the record will be

3 made. Will this statement then become part of the

4 evidentiary record?

5 JUDGE MAY: That's a good point. It may be

6 simplest if you read the paragraph referring to the

7 paragraph, you read it out and say, "Is that right?"

8 But I hope we can move fairly quickly.

9 MR. SCOTT: I'll make every effort, Your

10 Honour. I appreciate Mr. Sayers giving us these

11 notes.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Can we have the witness,

13 please?

14 [The witness entered court]

15 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the solemn

16 declaration.

17 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

18 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

19 truth.

20 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.

21 A. Thank you.

22 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if we could then, in

23 light of the Court's comments before the witness was

24 brought in, if we could hand the witness, please, a

25 copy of his outline.

Page 7427

1 JUDGE MAY: Hand it to the witness, please.


3 Examined by Mr. Scott:

4 Q. Good morning, sir. You are Major Lars

5 Baggesen of the Danish army?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Let me say, procedurally, what we've agreed

8 this morning, Major Baggesen, is that you now have in

9 front of you an outline that's been prepared to assist

10 in covering your testimony. As I hope is clear, it is

11 not a script, by any means, but it will be an outline

12 to facilitate going through your testimony. And also,

13 in order to move as efficiently as possible, on the

14 points that are not heavily contested, or perhaps

15 contested at all, many of these paragraphs I will

16 simply put to you, if you will, and you can then

17 indicate if you agree or disagree. If you have

18 something you feel that you must add in terms of

19 accuracy, we will try to accommodate you. So just so

20 you know how we're proceeding, please.

21 A. Thank you.

22 Q. Also, as a preliminary matter, I understand

23 you made a book, essentially a diary, during the war;

24 is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 7428

1 Q. And do you have that with you today?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And you testified previously in the Blaskic

4 case; is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And in your Blaskic testimony, you made

7 reference to your diary in the course of your

8 testimony; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I just wanted to

11 bring that to the Court's attention and make it clear

12 that in the course of his testimony, for points of

13 detail, Major Baggesen does have his contemporaneous --

14 essentially notes -- which has been provided to the

15 Defence.

16 JUDGE MAY: Unless there is any objection,

17 the witness can refer to them.

18 MR. SAYERS: No objection from the Defence

19 for Mr. Kordic, Your Honour.

20 MR. KOVACIC: No objection, sir.

21 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

22 Major, if you want to refer to your diary to

23 check anything, you are free to do so.

24 A. Thank you, Your Honour.

25 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

Page 7429

1 Q. Major Baggesen, is it correct, then, that you

2 have been a career officer in the Danish army since

3 January of 1976, and your rank at the present time is

4 major?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is it also correct that you attended the

7 Danish army combat school, where you were trained in

8 infantry and armoured combat tactics?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. And I note from looking at your uniform, is

11 it accurate to say that you are also a trained airborne

12 officer?

13 A. Yes, I am.

14 Q. Is it correct that you have also been trained

15 at the Danish army special school for intelligence?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Following this training, you were an

18 intelligence officer engaged in analysing the forces of

19 the former Soviet Bloc and Warsaw Pact; is that

20 correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. From 1980 to 1986, you commanded a

23 reconnaissance platoon; is that correct?

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. And as I understand the functions of a

Page 7430

1 reconnaissance platoon, you are trained to find an

2 enemy's front line, to fight on the enemy front line,

3 and to do reconnaissance behind an enemy's front line;

4 is that correct?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Now, not only have you been taught yourself

7 and carried out intelligence functions, have you also

8 trained other Danish army intelligence officers?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In the course of all this training and your

11 professional military experience, is it fair to say

12 that you are quite familiar with the infantry and

13 armour training, tactics, and doctrine of the former

14 Soviet Bloc and Warsaw Pact forces?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. In short, Major Baggesen, is it fair to say

17 that you are a trained, professional, and experienced

18 military intelligence officer and military observer?

19 A. I would say so.

20 Q. In 1981, you served as part of the United

21 Nations force in Cyprus; is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. From 1986 to 1990, you were the operations

24 officer for the Home Guard Region 5, where you were

25 responsible for planning and carrying out military

Page 7431

1 operations; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And from 1990 to 1995, did you work for the

4 Danish army chief of staff?

5 A. Yes, I did.

6 Q. In 1995, you were promoted to major; is that

7 correct, sir?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And you are currently, again, the chief of

10 operations for Home Guard District 53, in charge of

11 operations and training for, is it correct,

12 approximately 6.000 men and women?

13 A. No, I was -- before July this year, I was

14 commanding Home Guard District 53.

15 Q. Yes?

16 A. With -- at that time I had 1.600 men under my

17 command. And now I'm chief of operations for Home

18 Guard Region 5.

19 Q. Okay. Excuse me.

20 A. Then I'm in charge of the operation and

21 training for those 6.000 men.

22 Q. Very good. And that is your current

23 position?

24 A. Yes, it is.

25 Q. Now, directing your attention to 1992, you

Page 7432

1 volunteered, sir, to serve as part of the European

2 Community Monitoring Mission, or ECMM --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you arrived in Zagreb in connection with

7 those duties on the 30th of March, 1993?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. The ECMM was the European Community

10 Monitoring Mission first established for the former

11 Yugoslavia in 1991; is that correct?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. Its general role was to observe and interact

14 with civilian and military authorities in an assigned

15 area for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing

16 ceasefire and other agreements; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Is it true, sir, that all of the members of

19 the European Community Monitoring Mission were

20 professional military men and women from different

21 armed forces in the European Community and/or the

22 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And you dressed in conspicuous white

25 uniforms, wore blue caps, and you were unarmed; is that

Page 7433

1 correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Was the reason for the white uniform to help

4 distinguish yourself from the combatants?

5 A. Yes, it was.

6 Q. Is it correct that the overall ECMM

7 headquarters was in Zagreb, Croatia, and under these

8 headquarters would then be a series of what were called

9 regional centres, and in a number of instances, under

10 the regional centres, there would be coordination

11 centres; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. And can you tell us which of the offices or

14 divisions below the Zagreb headquarters were you

15 assigned to on your arrival in Bosnia?

16 A. I was assigned to the regional centre in

17 Zenica.

18 MR. SCOTT: If I could ask the witness to be

19 shown exhibits 2573 and 2575.

20 Your Honour, there should be a packet of

21 exhibits for each of Your Honours, and of course sets

22 for the Defence as well. They have been -- if we've

23 succeeded, Your Honour, the stack of exhibits should be

24 in the order in which they will come up in Major

25 Baggesen's testimony. So again, hopefully Exhibit 2573

Page 7434

1 should be on top.

2 The only exception to that, Your Honour --

3 since I've stopped, procedurally, I'll tell the

4 Court -- the only exception to what I just said about

5 order is that there are some oversize exhibits,

6 photographs and maps and things, which have been

7 pulled -- they should be at the back, in a packet, at

8 the bottom of your stack, which, because they don't fit

9 into the stack, they will need to be pulled out from

10 time to time, or at least I suggest that they will.

11 Q. Major Baggesen, if you have Exhibit 2573 in

12 front of you, is this essentially a structural chart,

13 if you will, of the ECMM, at least as of May 1993?

14 A. Yes, concerning the RC Zenica, because there

15 was a lot of others with, you know, centres covering

16 the Balkans. This shows the organisation from the RC

17 Zenica.

18 Q. So, obviously, what you're saying is if you

19 start at the top with the Zagreb headquarters, there

20 could be a number of regional centres on the same line

21 with Zenica?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. This particular one focuses on regional

24 centre Zenica; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7435

1 Q. Down below that, and I apologise for this

2 probably several generation copy, it's not very

3 legible, but in the two boxes that have almost become

4 black underneath regional centre Zenica, can you just

5 tell the Court basically what would be the next level

6 of organisation?

7 A. The next level of the organisation is

8 coordination centres, and we had a coordination in

9 Travnik, a coordination centre in Tuzla, and a

10 coordination centre in Mostar, and the two black boxes

11 just underneath RC Zenica are teams who were staying in

12 Zenica were referring directly to the regional centre.

13 We had there, you cannot see it, but we had a team in

14 Zepce, a team in Vares, and a team in Kakanj, and the

15 other black box says that we have a liaison officer to

16 UNPROFOR stationed in Kiseljak.

17 Q. Very well. Thank you. During your tour of

18 duty, you were one of the teams operating out of the

19 regional centre in Zenica; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. In the beginning, in April, the

21 organisation was a little different. At that time we

22 didn't have the coordination in Travnik, so we have

23 teams going to Vitez directly from Zenica at that

24 time. But in May, because of the increased tension in

25 Travnik, we started up this coordination centre in

Page 7436

1 Travnik.

2 Q. Very well. If we can look then to the next

3 exhibit, 2575. Can you just tell the Court briefly,

4 we're not going to stay on these topics very long, but

5 can you just tell the Court briefly what that document

6 represents or is?

7 A. This shows the standard routine team task we

8 had. I would like to explain that. When I'm talking

9 about a "team," each team had two monitors from

10 different countries who had with us a driver and an

11 interpreter. So a team was consisting of four

12 members.

13 Q. All right. And in a substantial way, was

14 your daily task to go out with these teams into your

15 assigned areas to essentially monitor conditions on the

16 ground?

17 A. Yes, we did.

18 Q. All right. I think the document basically

19 speaks for itself, but a large part of your

20 responsibility would reference, in particular, to items

21 2 and 3, was to regularly liase and have contact with

22 both civil and military authorities; is that correct?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Now, in terms of RC Zenica itself, can you

25 tell the Court, did that cover what was essentially

Page 7437

1 known or referred to as Central Bosnia?

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. Did that include, to your knowledge, such

4 areas as Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, Zenica?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And, sir, you were then in Central Bosnia on

7 your assigned duties from approximately the 2nd of

8 April, 1993 to the 1st of July, 1993; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. Can you tell the -- well, I guess I can

11 continue leading. Excuse me.

12 Is it correct that at that time, RC Zenica

13 was headed by a professional French diplomat named

14 Jean-Pierre Thebault?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. His deputy was a Spanish ECMM official named

17 Juan Valentin; is that correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Is it also correct, sir, that during your

20 work in Central Bosnia, at one time or another you

21 essentially worked in all the monitoring teams that

22 were operating out of RC Zenica?

23 A. Not in all of them. I was not in the Mostar

24 area, and I was not in the Tuzla area, but I was

25 covering the areas as before mentioned.

Page 7438

1 Q. All right. Now, when you went to ECMM, were

2 you provided some training and briefing as to what your

3 job would be and essentially the facts on the ground,

4 if you will, as ECMM understood them to be?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And as part of that, when you were briefed --

7 was it explained to you that the principal Bosnian

8 Croat political leader in Central Bosnia was Dario

9 Kordic?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. And that was the official ECMM assessment; is

12 that correct?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Were you also told, as part of your briefing,

15 that the military HVO commander in Central Bosnia in

16 the Operative Zone was Colonel Tihomir Blaskic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And, sir, can you just tell the Court, this

19 is how you were briefed at the beginning of your tour;

20 is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. At the end of your tour did that assessment,

23 in your view, based on your experience, was that

24 accurate?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7439

1 Q. As part of your briefing, were you told that

2 the Bosnian Croat or HVO forces, at least at that time,

3 were better armed and equipped than the Bosnian Muslim

4 or ABiH forces?

5 A. Yes, they were in the beginning.

6 Q. And, again, was that consistent with your

7 observations in the field that, in fact, what you saw

8 was that the HVO tended to be better armed and equipped

9 than the Muslims forces?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Can you tell the Court, based on your prior

12 experience in intelligence and your training in the

13 Danish army, did it come to your attention that the

14 essentially Soviet Bloc or Warsaw Pact training tactics

15 and military doctrine applied to the military forces of

16 the former Yugoslavia?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So essentially in terms of command and

19 control, essentially in areas of responsibility, in

20 terms of lines of communication, in terms of combat

21 doctrine, these forces tended to act consistent with

22 the doctrine and training of the former Soviet Bloc?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Is it correct, sir, that in the former

25 Yugoslavia, up until at least 1991, all young men --

Page 7440

1 and I have a note here that I forgot to ask you but I

2 will in a moment -- had to do 12 months' national

3 service in the JNA? Is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. At what age did this national service apply?

6 Did that become effective at age 18, age 19?

7 A. Normally it's 18, but I don't know the

8 correct age down there.

9 Q. All right, but was it, in your knowledge and

10 to your experience, was it the case that most of these

11 men in Bosnia that you encountered, if you will, there

12 were those who were over -- by the time of 1993, those

13 who were, say, more than 20 years old, under the prior

14 system had all had military training and experience?

15 A. Yes, because you have been in the JNA

16 before.

17 Q. And they have -- again, would have been

18 trained essentially consistent with, to your knowledge,

19 the Soviet Bloc-type of training tactics and doctrine;

20 is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was it your assessment, sir, that as of the

23 spring of 1993, the HVO was more of a standard regular

24 army at that time than, say, the Muslim army?

25 A. Yes. And I based this on -- because the

Page 7441

1 soldiers have been in the -- most of the soldiers have

2 been in the JNA before. So, therefore, they were using

3 the same equipment and tactics.

4 Q. As of the early spring of 1993, what was your

5 assessment of the ABiH or the Muslim armed forces?

6 A. It seems to me that the army of BH was a

7 beaten army at that time.

8 Q. And again --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Wouldn't the soldiers --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone please, Your

11 Honour.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Wouldn't the soldiers of the

13 ABiH also have been in the JNA in the same way as the

14 soldiers of the HVO?

15 A. Yes, but they didn't have all the equipment,

16 because when the JNA was -- what do you call it -- when

17 it stopped to exist in 1991, the Bosnian Serb army and

18 the HVO took over most of the equipment from the JNA,

19 but I think that the Muslims had the same training but

20 they didn't have the equipment.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.


23 Q. Major Baggesen, is it correct then that based

24 on your professional military experience and

25 observations, that during your tour of duty from the

Page 7442

1 2nd of April until the 1st of July, 1993,

2 Colonel Blaskic was the senior professional soldier in

3 charge of the HVO armed forces in Central Bosnia?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Is it correct that the Central Bosnia -- the

6 HVO Central Bosnia Operative Zone included the

7 municipalities of Busovaca, Vitez, Travnik, Novi

8 Travnik, Kiseljak, Visoko, Kakanj, Fojnica, Kresevo,

9 Gornji Vakuf, Vares, and all or part of Zenica?

10 A. Yes, in April 1993.

11 Q. In reference to just on that point, could you

12 look -- could the witness please be shown Exhibit 579?

13 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if there is no

14 objection -- I don't think the Prosecution [sic] have

15 any objection, I don't know why -- if the bundle of

16 exhibits, if the same stack of exhibits could be given

17 to the witness, that would save the usher from going

18 back and fourth.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That seems sensible.

20 Usher, if you would give the witness all the

21 exhibits.

22 MR. SCOTT: I also note that there are some

23 people in the gallery and there may be other people, of

24 course, on the monitors elsewhere, it might be --

25 facilitate the testimony to have some of these exhibits

Page 7443

1 on the ELMO, but I'll leave that to the Court's

2 discretion.

3 Q. Witness, do you have Exhibit 579 in front of

4 you?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. In reference to what you just said, this is

7 a -- appears to be an order by Tihomir Blaskic, dated

8 the 30th of March, 1993, appointing various HVO

9 military officers in the Bobovac Brigade in Vares. Do

10 you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The first one, just for -- just to indicate

13 on the document, the first one he appoints the chief of

14 headquarters of the brigade, the second one he appoints

15 the chief of intelligence affairs, and the third one he

16 appoints the chief of what appears to be an

17 anti-aircraft defence unit; is that correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. This would be consistent, would it not, sir,

20 with your view that Colonel Blaskic's, for instance,

21 command responsibility extended as far as the Vares

22 area; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In sum on these points, sir, is it correct

25 that it appeared that both -- based on both your

Page 7444

1 briefing and your on-the-ground experience, that the

2 HVO appeared to be a well-organised army and that

3 Colonel Blaskic was commanding a well-organised army?

4 A. Yes, it seems like that.

5 Q. In your experience, was it generally the case

6 that Colonel Blaskic -- then Colonel Blaskic's orders

7 were usually obeyed by his subordinate commanders?

8 A. Yes, it was.

9 Q. As a particular example, is it correct, sir,

10 that in the course of your duties with the ECMM, if you

11 were out in the field and going through an HVO

12 checkpoint, was it generally the case that if you had a

13 written order signed by Colonel Blaskic that you would

14 have no trouble getting through a checkpoint?

15 A. Not if you have a written order.

16 Q. Now, let me direct your attention to -- on

17 the 14th of May of 1993, in the course of your duties,

18 you had a meeting with some representatives of the HVO

19 and the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Travnik.

20 In the course of that meeting, sir, is it

21 correct that one of the HVO representatives provided

22 you with a listing of the various brigades -- well, the

23 command structure, if you will, and the brigades in the

24 Central Bosnia Operative Zone?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7445

1 Q. If you can look, please, at Exhibit 863.

2 This is obviously an English version, but do you know

3 this to be an English translation of the document that

4 you were provided by the HVO officer on the 14th of --

5 A. Yes. This is a list that my interpreter

6 translated to me and handed over to me.

7 Q. All right. And just to orient, to give

8 everyone some orientation to the document, at the top

9 of the page -- and I apologise that the left side is a

10 bit off the paper, but it seems to have gotten to the

11 point where whatever original better copy that may have

12 existed, it could not be, at least, readily located --

13 the leader of the HVO at the -- what would be the

14 Operative Zone, which I think is the missing letter

15 there at the left at the top would be OZMB, Operative

16 Zone middle Bosnia, that would be Colonel Blaskic; is

17 that correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Then were you also given his telephone number

20 the location of his headquarters?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So, for instance, in his case we know his

23 headquarters was located in the Hotel Vitez?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In the course of your on-the-ground

Page 7446

1 experience, sir, did that turn out to be, in fact,

2 accurate?

3 A. That is accurate.

4 Q. And just -- as a couple of additional

5 examples, if we go down to about the fifth box on the

6 left column, the indication was that in terms of the

7 Vitez Brigade, that Mr. Mario Cerkez was the commander

8 of that brigade. His telephone number was given to you

9 and it was indicated that his headquarters were in the

10 Vitez cinema. Do you see that?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Just at one more, the Busovaca Brigade, the

13 one right below that, would be indicated to be -- the

14 commanding officer being Dusko Grubesic, and his

15 headquarters being in what was called the Sumarija or

16 the Forester's Cabin; is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. To your knowledge, sir, all of these

19 commanders of brigades, below the first line, which

20 covers Colonel Blaskic, all these other units were

21 essentially subordinate to his command?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And that included the brigades and HVO

24 military in Kiseljak; is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 7447

1 Q. Just as an example, about the middle of the

2 page, the Ban Jelacic Brigade, that was the Kiseljak

3 HVO essentially; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Based on your experience sir, and your

6 briefings, can you tell the Court, who was the most

7 powerful HVO political leader -- at least in your

8 view -- in Central Bosnia during your time?

9 A. As we were told in the beginning, and as I

10 later on explained, it was Mr. Kordic.

11 Q. And again, this was more than your personal

12 view, wasn't it, sir?

13 A. Yes, it was.

14 Q. That was the official ECMM assessment?

15 A. It was.

16 Q. Can you share with the Court any observations

17 you have or can make about the working relationship

18 between Colonel Blaskic and Mr. Kordic? What did you

19 see about that?

20 MR. SAYERS: An objection to that question in

21 the absence of an appropriate foundation, Your Honour,

22 i.e., that the witness actually did see Mr. Kordic and

23 Mr. Blaskic operating together.

24 JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll find that out when he

25 answers the question.

Page 7448

1 Yes, Major.

2 A. Several times we saw Colonel Blaskic and

3 Mr. Kordic together.


5 Q. And -- all right. Let's go on, and we'll

6 come back, perhaps, to your -- did you see Mr. Kordic

7 in military uniform?

8 A. Sometimes he was wearing military uniforms,

9 sometimes he was wearing civilian dress, and sometimes

10 a mix of the two.

11 Q. Can you tell us, did you ever see Mr. Kordic

12 and Mr. Blaskic together at the HVO headquarters in

13 Vitez, for instance?

14 A. Yes, I did.

15 Q. During the time that you were in Central

16 Bosnia, did you have occasion to see --

17 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott,

18 excuse me for interrupting you for a moment. The

19 witness tells us that he saw Mr. Dario Kordic in a

20 uniform. What type of uniform? Could he remember what

21 kind of uniform he wore and whether there were any

22 insignia on that uniform?


24 Q. Can you answer that, sir?

25 A. When Mr. Kordic was in uniform, he was

Page 7449

1 wearing the same uniforms as other soldiers. I cannot

2 remember to have seen any insignia on -- I cannot

3 remember if he had any rank showing on his uniform or

4 not.

5 Q. Following up on your earlier question, then,

6 is it correct, sir, that on a number of occasions

7 during your tour of duty, that you saw Mr. Kordic and

8 Mr. Blaskic together?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In the course of your time on the ground

11 there, did you have any knowledge of how Mr. Kordic,

12 for instance, was portrayed by the Bosnian Croat local

13 media? How did they present Mr. Kordic, if you will?

14 A. They presented Mr. Kordic as the political

15 leader in the region, and he often had a comment in the

16 local news, in the local papers.

17 Q. Did you meet a man in the course of your

18 duties named -- a Bosnian Croat leader named Pero

19 Skopljak?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did Mr. Skopljak indicate to you or make a

22 statement to you about Mr. Kordic's role in Central

23 Bosnia?

24 A. I was working together -- in the end of my

25 period in Bosnia, I was working together with

Page 7450

1 Mr. Skopljak, and Mr. Skopljak told me that Mr. Kordic

2 was the political leader in Central Bosnia.

3 Q. Based on all these observations and your

4 experience, can you relate, then, the -- is it correct

5 to say Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic together, then, were

6 the two senior HVO leaders in Central Bosnia?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. As part of your training in the Danish army,

9 sir, did you have a -- what might be referred to as a

10 specialist badge in communications?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And that's, in fact, one of the insignias on,

13 I think, the right side of your chest; is that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Can you tell the Court, is it correct that

16 the HVO was in charge of the PTT or telephone

17 facilities and lines in the areas of Vitez, Travnik,

18 and Kiseljak? And I might add, is it correct, Busovaca

19 as well?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. In your experience, could you see and observe

22 that the HVO components or organisations in Central

23 Bosnia were able to communicate with each other through

24 a telephone network and through a fax network?

25 A. Yes, they were.

Page 7451

1 Q. Is it true that on a number of occasions,

2 Major Baggesen, you were able to observe HVO

3 communication capabilities, from seeing antennas, to

4 seeing radio equipment and operators, to seeing such

5 things as fax machines?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did you also see that the HVO was able to

8 communicate through a field radio communication

9 network?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. In fact, on a number of occasions, were you

12 actually able to see or observe these networks in

13 operations, both at the main HVO headquarters in Vitez

14 and at various other HVO headquarters?

15 A. Yes. Normally they didn't want us to see

16 that they had the radio equipment, but on some

17 occasions we were able to see them anyway.

18 Q. Why do you say that normally they did not

19 want you to see the communications equipment?

20 A. It's normal for an army to try to hide what

21 they have of communications equipment, not to show the

22 other part that they are able to have more or less

23 sophisticated radio equipment.

24 Q. Is it correct, sir, that in fact, you

25 understood that in addition to all the communication

Page 7452

1 capabilities that you've described in the last couple

2 of minutes, that it was to your knowledge that the HVO

3 had other or additional more sophisticated

4 communication capabilities?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Did there come a time during your tour in

7 Central Bosnia that the telephone company in Zenica

8 wanted to reconnect the telephone lines between Zenica

9 and Sarajevo, and it came to your attention or to

10 ECMM's attention that the telephone line had apparently

11 been cut somewhere in the vicinity of Kiseljak?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Is it correct that you went to the PTT office

14 in Kiseljak, which was under HVO control; you

15 subsequently found the actual PTT engineer in Kresevo,

16 and he told you that the phone lines at the PTT

17 building in Kiseljak had been damaged by shelling and

18 not repaired?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Is it also accurate to say that this PTT

21 engineer told you that it would be easy enough to

22 repair the telephone line, and all that was needed was

23 a written order from either Colonel Blaskic or Vinko

24 Lucic, the commander of the HVO military police in

25 Kiseljak?

Page 7453

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Now, did you have occasion then to meet with

3 the head of the PTT office in Kiseljak, who essentially

4 told you the same story, that the telephone line had

5 been cut by shelling?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Did he express to you that he really,

8 himself, could not see any reason to fix the line,

9 because in his view it was not necessary for Zenica to

10 have any contact with Sarajevo?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Is it accurate to say, sir, that at that

13 time, the majority ethnic community in Zenica was

14 Muslim, and the majority ethnic community under siege

15 in Sarajevo was also Muslim?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Did you have occasion, sir, then to

18 investigate the alleged shelling at the PTT building in

19 Kiseljak and determine whether in fact you thought

20 shelling had broken or damaged the telephone line?

21 A. Yes. We went to see the PT building and the

22 equipment, and we were able to see there was one

23 minor -- maybe two minor impacts on the building, but

24 it was not enough to make any damages on the

25 equipment. So --

Page 7454

1 Q. Go ahead.

2 A. We were sure that the telephone lines had

3 been just cut for the purpose not to let the Muslims

4 have contact between Zenica and Sarajevo.

5 Q. Would you look, please, at Exhibit 858,3.

6 Is that a copy, sir, of your daily ECMM

7 report for 1 May, 1993?

8 A. Yes, it is.

9 Q. And in paragraph 2 -- well, actually both

10 paragraphs 1 and 2, I suppose, are in reference to your

11 work, if you will, in connection with the telephone

12 lines and the particular connection in Kiseljak; is

13 that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. As a professional military officer and as a

16 specialist in communications, sir, can you tell us, was

17 it in your experience and observation that the Bosnian

18 Croats and the HVO forces had an effective

19 communications system in place in 1993 and was

20 generally able to communicate with its various

21 components and forces when it wanted to?

22 A. Yes. And they were able to control the PT

23 lines as well.

24 Q. Was it your understanding, by the way, that

25 the ECMM telephone calls, your own telephone calls,

Page 7455

1 were being monitored by HVO forces?

2 A. Not -- not in Zenica, but we had another

3 headquarters at a house in Vitez, close to the British

4 Battalion, and at that time we were using the PTT in

5 Vitez. Sometimes we were able to use the PT lines, and

6 other times we were not able to use it, and we were

7 told by a Croat interpreter that the reason for us not

8 to able to -- or the reason that sometimes the PT line

9 had been cut was because there was no one at the PTT

10 building in Vitez that was able to speak English, and

11 that was the reason.

12 Q. And the ability --

13 A. But we only have his word on it.

14 Q. I understand.

15 A. But it's a normal procedure.

16 Q. The issue of the ability to speak English was

17 to understand the -- their ability to understand the

18 conversations; is that correct?

19 A. Yes, to listen to our conversations.

20 Q. In fact, was it the ECMM official policy that

21 any sensitive or classified information should not be

22 discussed on the PTT lines?

23 A. Yes. That's a normal security procedure.

24 Q. In the course of your work in Central Bosnia,

25 are there many times -- and we're going to hear about

Page 7456

1 it in the course of your testimony -- when you would be

2 out in the field, going to HVO facilities, going to HVO

3 checkpoints, can you tell the Court whether -- is it

4 true that it was your experience that in a number of

5 instances, it was clear that your whereabouts or your

6 coming had been communicated ahead of you?

7 A. Yes, because very often, when we were going

8 to visit a brigade commander or another facility, it

9 seemed that they were prepared; that they knew that we

10 were coming. And the only way they could know was if

11 someone had told them that.

12 Q. Now, I want to spend a few minutes talking

13 about something called the Busovaca Joint Commission.

14 When you arrived in Zenica in early April of 1993, did

15 you become a member of what was called the Busovaca

16 Joint Commission?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were you briefed, in fact, about that

19 commission at that time by another Danish ECMM monitor

20 named Erik Friis-Pedersen?

21 A. That's correct. He was chairing the Busovaca

22 Joint Commission at that time.

23 Q. All right. And is it accurate to say, sir,

24 that the Busovaca Joint Commission was a commission

25 that had been formed by the ECMM, UNPROFOR, the HVO,

Page 7457

1 and the ABiH in early 1993 to try to address and solve

2 problems and conflicts between the Croat and Muslim

3 forces in Central Bosnia?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In fact, had that commission, to your

6 knowledge, essentially come out of the armed conflict

7 that had broken out about the end of January 1993?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And it was the purpose of the Busovaca Joint

10 Commission, again, to solve problems, build trust among

11 the various parties, and maintain or foster peace; is

12 that correct?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. If you could look, then, at Exhibit 512.

15 Is this, just briefly --

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, when you come to a

17 convenient break.

18 MR. SCOTT: We can finish this one, Your

19 Honour.

20 Q. Is this a copy of essentially what you

21 understood to be a founding document, or charter, if

22 you will, for the Busovaca Joint Commission?

23 A. Yes, it is.

24 Q. All right. I assure both you and the Court

25 we're not going to go through the document in any great

Page 7458

1 detail. Looking at the second page, one of the persons

2 who played a role at the time in forming the commission

3 was Colonel Stewart; is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Looking at the last page -- and we'll come

6 back to this after the break, I believe, but as long as

7 we have the document in front of us now, is it correct

8 that there was an overall structure, and at essentially

9 every level, there would be an ECMM representative;

10 sometimes, in that particular area, a BritBat

11 representative; and then you would have at least one

12 representative from the HVO side and one representative

13 from the ABiH side? Is that correct?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. When you get down to the level of Team --

16 toward the bottom of the page, Team 1 and Team 2, what

17 were those teams -- I'll just pick Team 1 for an

18 example. What would Team 1 do on a daily -- what did

19 they do?

20 A. Normally, when we had a meeting in the

21 commission, we started in the house in Vitez at 7.00 in

22 the morning, and we had a discussion around the table,

23 and the HVO were telling what had been happening,

24 incidents in the last 24 hours, and then the BiH told

25 what they had seen of incidents the last 24 hours. And

Page 7459

1 after that, we formed teams; two, maybe three teams,

2 and then we went to a spot to do fact-finding. Because

3 there were a lot of rumours down there, and sometimes

4 we heard -- maybe the HVO told us that there had been a

5 massacre on a village, and then we went to the village

6 to see if it was correct or if it just was a rumour.

7 And sometimes it was correct, and other times it was a

8 rumour, but it was important for us to go to the spot

9 to see what had been happening, doing some

10 fact-finding. And if it only was a rumour, to

11 communicate that to the local public relations, to tell

12 them that everything is calm and there's nothing to be

13 afraid of.

14 Q. Very well.

15 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, we can stop there,

16 then.

17 JUDGE MAY: We'll take a short break now.

18 Ten minutes, please.

19 --- Recess taken at 11.55 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 12.10 p.m.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Scott.

22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

23 Q. Major, Baggesen, I've been reminded by the

24 interpreters to speak more slowly, and between the two

25 of us, and since I'm doing the talking, I'm afraid it's

Page 7460

1 mostly my fault, but between the answer and question,

2 if we can both break, especially for the interpreters,

3 it would be easier for them.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. All right. The Busovaca Joint Commission

6 then, is it correct -- just to bring everyone to the

7 same point, I'm looking now at paragraph 65 of the

8 outline -- is it correct that the usual leader of the

9 HVO delegation was Franjo Nakic, who was the HVO deputy

10 commander to Colonel Blaskic of Central Bosnia?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. The usual leader of the ABiH delegation was

13 Dzemal Merdan, who was the deputy commander of the ABiH

14 3rd Corps?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. By the way, as I understand it, the history

17 of the commission was that it was originally located in

18 Busovaca and then later moved to Vitez, I think

19 primarily to be closer to BritBat; is that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right. You mentioned before the break

22 that you would have these daily early-morning

23 meetings. One side or the other or both may make

24 various complaints or protests about alleged events.

25 They would essentially be allowed to say their piece,

Page 7461

1 and then teams would be formed to investigate the

2 allegations; is that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Typically what would happen is these teams,

5 consisting of the ECMM monitors, Dzemal Merdan for the

6 ABiH, Franjo Nakic for the HVO, along with the

7 interpreters, would then go to the places or make

8 further inquiry as to the allegations; is that correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Did it appear to you, sir, that Mr. Merdan

11 had more authority to act and deal with these matters

12 as they arose, without having to get additional

13 direction or authorisation from his superior

14 authorities?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. On the other side of the coin, did it appear

17 to you that Franjo Nakic --

18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. This is an area,

19 which as I understand it, is in dispute.

20 MR. SCOTT: I didn't understand that 69 was,

21 Your Honour, but I may be wrong.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, 69, let's take it from here

23 as being in dispute.

24 MR. SCOTT: All right.

25 Q. Can you relate to the Court, in reference to

Page 7462

1 the participation of the representatives of the ABiH

2 side and the HVO side, when the team would want to go

3 to, say, an HVO facility or location, a location

4 controlled by HVO, what would Mr. Nakic have to do?

5 A. Very often we will have to pass the

6 HVO headquarters at Hotel Vitez to get a written order

7 from Colonel Blaskic that allowed us to go to that

8 area.

9 Q. All right.

10 A. That was in most of the times. On the

11 opposite side, if we were going to BiH occupied area,

12 there was normally no problems to go there. Then it

13 was enough that Mr. Merdan was with us.

14 Q. Now, did you become familiar, in the course

15 of your time in Central Bosnia, with something called

16 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In fact, did --

19 MR. SCOTT: I'm jumping, for the moment, Your

20 Honour, to paragraph 73.

21 Q. After you'd been to Central Bosnia for a

22 couple of weeks or so, were you, in fact, briefed, not

23 only you, but the RC Zenica ECMM staff, on the

24 Vance-Owen Plan?

25 A. Yes, we were.

Page 7463

1 Q. You were briefed -- excuse me. You were

2 briefed on that by Ambassador Thebault?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Is it correct, sir, and I'm sure it could be

5 much more -- we could go into this in much more detail,

6 but the basic notion of the Vance-Owen Plan was that

7 essentially the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be

8 divided up into a series of provinces or cantons and

9 essentially apportioned out, if you will, to be

10 governed by the majority ethnic group in that

11 particular province or canton; is that correct?

12 A. That's correct.

13 Q. In fact, it was proposed that there would be

14 approximately some ten provinces --

15 MR. SCOTT: I'm looking now, Your Honour, at

16 paragraph 74. I'm jumping around here a bit, Your

17 Honour, to avoid leading, but we'll get to the same

18 place, if you'll allow me.

19 Q. There were ten proposed provinces or cantons?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And if you can look at Exhibit 2574. 2574.

22 It's a map or drawing.

23 Major Baggesen, is Exhibit 2574 a copy of a

24 map of Bosnia that you actually took from -- copied

25 from a Bosnian Croat newspaper during your time in

Page 7464

1 Central Bosnia?

2 A. I can't remember if it was from a Bosnian

3 Croat. I think it was maybe from a BH, maybe.

4 Q. All right. From a local newspaper?

5 A. Yes, from a local newspaper.

6 Q. On the document there are a number of bold,

7 black lines, if you will. Are those the lines between

8 the proposed provinces?

9 A. Yes. The border lines between the different

10 provinces.

11 Q. And on of the left side of the document there

12 are numbered boxes and names. Were those the provinces

13 by number and also were these the proposed, at least at

14 some point the proposed names for each of the

15 provinces?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Directing your attention, for instance --

18 we'll start at the bottom of the list -- the proposed

19 province number 10 would be called Travnicka?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Or Travnicka. Sorry. On the map there, and

22 again my an apologies for the quality, but about the

23 middle of Bosnia, in the circle a number 10; is that

24 correct?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7465

1 Q. That was going to be the Travnicka canton or

2 province 10; is that correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Then looking to the number 8, there was going

5 to be a province called -- referred to as Mostarska; is

6 that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Was it your understanding that among the

9 various cantons, that provinces 8 and 10 were going to

10 be proposed, in the course of discussions about the

11 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, as Croat provinces?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. All right.

14 MR. SCOTT: And just -- we're not going to

15 talk about this in terms of our particular area, but

16 just so the record is clear, there was a third Bosnian

17 Croat province, number 3, which is up in the top of the

18 country, Your Honours, marked number 3, and I just

19 point that out for clarification's sake.

20 Q. Now, are these your notes by the box, if you

21 will, by the list, in terms of the ethnic make-up of

22 the provinces?

23 A. No. The original was in black and white, and

24 I asked my interpreter just to colour it and to mention

25 what was the sort of populations in the different

Page 7466

1 provinces. As you can see, province 10, 8, and 3, they

2 are quite mixed.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. "Quite mixed" means that the majority in

5 those provinces are Croats, and then there's a

6 majority [sic] Of Muslims and maybe Serbs.

7 Q. All right. Now, before we come back to some

8 other points, is it correct that province 10 would

9 include the municipalities -- in reference to paragraph

10 77, Your Honours -- Busovaca, Vitez, Travnik, Novi

11 Travnik, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Fojnica,

12 Bogojna, Kupres, Duvno, and Livno?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And looking at the map, is it correct to say

15 that both cantons of province 10 and 8 would then

16 border on the Republic of Croatia to the south and

17 west? Is that correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Now, let's go to province 9. If we look on

20 the chart, that is to be described, at least here,

21 known as Zenicka, and that was indicated here as being

22 a Muslim mixed province; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. As you were briefed on the Vance-Owen Plan

25 and saw this and maps like it, did it become a concern

Page 7467

1 not only held by you but held by others at the ECMM,

2 that the Vance-Owen Plan might, in fact, reinforce or

3 promote ethnic division in Bosnia as opposed to

4 accomplish peace?

5 A. The official was that the Vance-Owen Plan was

6 a good plan, but there were a lot of individuals that

7 didn't like this plan because we were afraid that this

8 plan would increase the problems in the area.

9 Q. In fact, by the end of your tour at the end

10 of June or early July of 1993, looking back, would it

11 be your assessment that, in fact, at least as

12 interpreted or applied by one or more of the parties,

13 that, in fact, the Vance-Owen Plan did become a part of

14 the increased reason for the increased tensions and

15 conflict in Central Bosnia?

16 A. That's my personal opinion.

17 MR. SAYERS: Once again, Your Honour, I think

18 that calls for or tiptoes into the area of political

19 opinion.

20 JUDGE MAY: It's only a tiptoe.

21 MR. SCOTT: I won't go further, Your Honour,

22 except to respond that again, I think this was in the

23 course of the ECMM's role and his responsibilities of

24 monitoring and liasing on the ground.

25 JUDGE MAY: I think the fairest way dealing

Page 7468

1 with the controversial evidence is for the witness to

2 be asked what happened and then to tell us, if he

3 would, quite factually, without involving opinions,

4 because of course much of the controversial matter is

5 what we're going to have to decide, on all the

6 evidence, as to what actually were the motives of those

7 involved.

8 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

9 Q. Looking at -- looking again, and sticking to

10 the facts, if we look at the Exhibit 2574 --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- is it correct to say that when one looks

13 at the borders between proposed province 10 and

14 proposed province 9, at least the commonly-shared

15 borders, one can see, in fact, the territory that's

16 largely described in the facts of this case? Is that

17 correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. In the course of the three months in Bosnia,

20 did you see population shifts among the ethnic groups

21 across that line, if you will? And by that I mean the

22 line between central -- excuse me; the line between

23 province 9 and province 10.

24 A. Yes, we did.

25 Q. And tell the Court in your own words what you

Page 7469

1 saw.

2 A. What we saw when we were trying to implement

3 this plan was that there was a lot of ethnic cleansing

4 in that area. It seemed to us that the HVO wanted to

5 get rid of all the Muslims in province number 10, and

6 they wanted to have as many as possible Croats taken

7 out of Zenica -- that's belonging to province number 9

8 -- and move them to province number 10.

9 And as I earlier, in my earlier statement and

10 testimony, told you, the Court, it was not only an

11 opinion made by ECMM; it was the opinion made by

12 UNPROFOR as well.

13 Q. In that regard, please, can I show you and

14 direct the courtroom's attention to Exhibit 390,2.

15 I want to direct your attention, please, to

16 paragraph 2 on the first page. And again, to assist

17 the interpreters as much as possible, would you just

18 read paragraph 2 as clearly and slowly, within reason,

19 as you can?

20 A. "The tensions seem to be most severe in areas

21 where there is no clear majority of either ethnic group

22 in a particular opstina. Jablanica, (majority Muslim)

23 from experiencing the effects of ethnic turmoil. Over

24 the past week, the political and military leaders of

25 the Croatian Community of HERCEG-BOSNA have begun to

Page 7470

1 implement their 'understanding' of the proposed

2 settlement for the conflict in BH. This premature and

3 imperfect grab for control of provinces 3, 8, and 10

4 has resulted in extremely high tensions in these and

5 enjoining areas,"

6 Q. Slow down, please, if you can.

7 A. "and heavy fighting between Muslim and Croat

8 units in and around GORNJI VAKUF."

9 JUDGE MAY: Can you tell us what this

10 document is, please, Mr. Scott?

11 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. This is a

12 report of UNPROFOR command in Kiseljak, actually signed

13 by -- you'll notice in the upper box on the page, on

14 the right, signed by Brigadier Cordy-Simpson, dated the

15 24th of January, 1993.

16 MR. SAYERS: Let me just register a brief

17 objection to this, Your Honour. This document was

18 obviously -- and it speaks for itself, but it was

19 obviously drafted before the witness's arrival in

20 Central Bosnia, and I wonder if he has ever seen it

21 before.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, no doubt that's a point you

23 can make.

24 Yes.


Page 7471

1 Q. My question following on that, Major

2 Baggesen, was, in your experience in Central Bosnia,

3 did this assessment essentially -- which may have

4 started, in fact, before you arrived in Central

5 Bosnia -- continue to be the assessment of many, not

6 only among ECMM, but also at UNPROFOR?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. If I can direct your attention next to

9 Exhibit 612. Perhaps it's worth spending one moment on

10 this document, because the Court will probably see many

11 of these documents in the course of the remainder of

12 your testimony.

13 MR. SCOTT: So if I explain this one, Your

14 Honour, in a little bit of detail, the rest will be,

15 hopefully, clear.

16 Q. Do you have Exhibit 612 in front of you, sir?

17 A. Yes, I have.

18 Q. This appears to be a report, an ECMM report.

19 And at this particular level, looking at the cover

20 sheet, essentially a fax cover page, can you tell the

21 Court, and for the record, from where is this document

22 coming or report coming, and to whom is it being made?

23 A. This is a report made by our ECMM

24 headquarters in Zagreb. Every day ECMM headquarters in

25 Zagreb made this, daily monitor activity, based on all

Page 7472

1 the reports they had from all the RCs. Therefore you

2 would be able to see reports from RC Zagreb, from

3 RC Knin, RC Zenica, RC Szeged in Hungary, and

4 RC Belgrade, RC Skopje, and RC Tirana.

5 So this is a combined report of all the

6 reports, all the headquarters in Zagreb had from the

7 RCs.

8 Q. Would it be a fair description of the

9 reporting procedure that you, as an individual monitor,

10 would make a daily report, at least one of which we've

11 already seen, the monitor's reports at the local level

12 would generate a local, for instance, RC Zenica report,

13 the various regional centres would essentially collate

14 their report, and then they would be communicated at

15 increasing compilations of the levels up to a composite

16 report to the senior headquarters or the senior

17 diplomatic community; is that correct?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. Now, in this particular document, then, would

20 you look -- can I direct your attention to page 2.

21 "Page 2 of 4" is the actual way it's described at the

22 bottom of the page, paragraph 12.

23 In reference to that paragraph 12, could you

24 please read that statement into the record.

25 A. It just says: "On 4th April, Mate Boban,

Page 7473

1 leader of the Bosnian Croats, urged the Bosnian

2 Herzegovina President Izetbegovic to apply without

3 delay the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. According to

4 Mr. Boban, this would mean that the Muslim army retire

5 from the provinces designated to become Croat or accept

6 to be under the Bosnian Croat army command."

7 Q. And when the reference -- when there's the

8 reference to the three provinces, to your knowledge,

9 sir, that would be provinces 3, 8, and 10; is that

10 correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Consistent with those two documents and the

13 discussion -- or excuse me, your testimony over the

14 last few minutes, as the implementation of the

15 Vance-Owen Plan came to be more discussed and more

16 subject of your daily, essentially, meetings, did you

17 find that the behaviour of the Bosnian Croat side

18 changed or took on a different direction with the

19 implementation or proposed implementation of that plan?

20 A. It seemed to us that the Bosnian Croats maybe

21 had another opinion on how this plan should be carried

22 out. It was understood in the peace plan that the

23 population in the provinces should be a mixed

24 population with the Croats and Muslims. But as we see

25 it, the Croat -- Bosnian Croat understanding was that

Page 7474

1 it should be an ethnically clean province in those

2 three provinces.

3 Q. So that they would become something, if not

4 pure, but close to pure Croat provinces?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. All right. Now, moving ahead, is it correct,

7 sir, that on about the 12th of April of 1993, you and

8 other ECMM members were invited by Colonel Blaskic to

9 an Easter celebration at the HVO headquarters in Vitez?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Is it correct, sir, that both Colonel Blaskic

12 and Mr. Kordic were at the celebration?

13 A. Yes, they were both there.

14 Q. Do you recall how Mr. Kordic introduced

15 himself?

16 A. He introduced himself as president -- or

17 vice-president of the HDZ.

18 Q. Did he identify himself as an official or

19 leader with any other entity or organisation?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. What was that?

22 A. Well, he identified himself as he was a

23 political leader in that area.

24 Q. Can you recall, from your discussions or the

25 times that you heard Mr. Kordic speak, when he talked

Page 7475

1 about the country as part of the former Yugoslavia

2 known as Bosnia-Herzegovina, did he talk about it in

3 terms of saying "Bosnia-Herzegovina," or did he speak

4 of it consistently in terms of "Herceg-Bosna"?

5 A. Normally, when Mr. Kordic was discussing

6 that, he was using "Herceg-Bosna."

7 Q. Can you tell the Court, around the time of

8 the Easter celebration, had there been a particular

9 event close by in Travnik that had caused some turmoil,

10 to begin?

11 A. Yes, actually because during this Easter

12 celebration, Mr. Thebault, who was head of RC Zenica,

13 he was a little delayed for the celebration because he

14 went to Travnik, because there had been some problems

15 in Travnik concerning some flag raising. The Croat

16 population in Travnik had begun to fly the Croatian

17 flag and not the official flag of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

18 That creates problems in the area, and when Ambassador

19 Thebault went to Travnik, he was stopped in a

20 checkpoint and he was forced back. The HVO checkpoint

21 pointed their weapons against him and forced him out.

22 So he was not able to go to Travnik. So he was a

23 little delayed for this celebration, and he was very

24 upset when he arrived to the celebration.

25 And actually, because we wanted to go to

Page 7476

1 Travnik to monitor the situation in the area, because

2 we think that it would be a major problem if the Croats

3 were going to use the Croatian flag in this population,

4 that was at that time, I think that the Croats were a

5 minority in Travnik, and of course the Muslim or the

6 Bosniaks in that area wanted that official flag of

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina to be used up there.

8 So therefore, together with another monitor,

9 after the celebration, we went to Travnik. We were not

10 allowed to go there, because Mr. Thebault told us it

11 was too dangerous to go up there, but we felt it was

12 necessary to go up there. So we went to monitor the

13 situation in Travnik.

14 Q. All right. Before we go to talk about your

15 trip to Travnik, is it fair to say, then, Major

16 Baggesen, that the flying of the Croatian flag was

17 known to be provocative to the Muslim community at this

18 time?

19 A. Yes, it was.

20 Q. During the Easter celebration, did both

21 Colonel Blaskic and Mr. Kordic make speeches?

22 A. Yes, they did.

23 Q. I'm directing your attention to Exhibit 670,

24 6-7-0. Did it come to your attention, around this

25 time, that Mr. Kordic did encourage or, in fact, was

Page 7477

1 encouraging the flying or displaying of the Croatian

2 flag?

3 A. We knew that he had his fingerprint on it, if

4 you can understand that.

5 MR. SAYERS: I object to that opinion, Your

6 Honour.

7 JUDGE MAY: Why? If it is something the

8 witness knows about, he can tell us. He's put it in

9 graphic terms.

10 Perhaps, Major, you could tell us why the

11 accuse Mr. Kordic had his fingerprint on it?

12 A. Because we knew from a statement in some of

13 the local media that he asked them. Kordic and other

14 Croat political leaders asked the population to raise

15 the Croatian flag.


17 Q. In fact, if I can direct your attention, sir,

18 on Exhibit 670, to the end of the fourth paragraph,

19 there's a statement made:

20 "Every flag that they see in passing will

21 remind them that this is the living space of the

22 Croatian people."

23 Then continuing on:

24 "Therefore, let us be conscientious and

25 display our flags."

Page 7478

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. You went to Travnik then, in fact, to

3 investigate an incident where two Muslim soldiers had

4 been killed, related to it an incident about the flying

5 of the Croatian flag; is that correct?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Now, let's continue on.

8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, we're at

9 paragraph 95.

10 Q. You and your ECMM colleague then went on to

11 Travnik to try to determine what the situation was; is

12 that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Were you able to get through the HVO

15 checkpoint there?

16 A. Actually, I cannot remember if we were

17 allowed to pass the checkpoint or not.

18 Q. What happened on your way there? This was an

19 HVO checkpoint?

20 A. Yes. At the junction on the way to Novi

21 Travnik and Travnik, there was an HVO checkpoint at

22 that spot.

23 Q. Did these appear to you to be what you might

24 call regular HVO soldiers?

25 A. Yes, there was HVO soldiers there.

Page 7479

1 Q. Did there appear to you to be some other

2 soldiers there that you knew or sometimes referred to

3 by -- not only you but other International Community

4 members referred to sometimes as HOS, H-O-S, soldiers?

5 A. Yes. We saw HOS soldiers there as well.

6 Q. What did you know about the HOS soldiers at

7 the time? They were there at the same checkpoint, at

8 the same time, with the HVO soldiers; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct. We even passed -- on our way

10 to the checkpoint, we passed a headquarter where we

11 were able to see that HOS were in the area, because

12 they were showing the Croatian flag and they were

13 showing the flag that was normally used by HOS units.

14 Q. Can you describe that flag for us?

15 A. Just like a pirate flag with -- a black flag

16 with a skull and with bones -- crossbones on it.

17 Q. What did you know about these HOS soldiers in

18 terms of who they were at that time? I mean, what type

19 of a unit were they? Did they dress differently?

20 A. They dressed differently. Normally they were

21 wearing black uniforms. We knew that in the beginning

22 HOS units, they were specially trained units, and in

23 the beginning, the HOS units were apart of HVO and a

24 part of BiH, but at this time, I think that other HOS

25 units were belonging to HVO.

Page 7480

1 Q. When you say "specially trained units" or

2 special units, in what way did you understand them to

3 be special?

4 A. I think they had a special training for --

5 and were units used for special purposes. So they were

6 able to do other things than just be normal soldiers.

7 Q. In the course of your time in Central Bosnia,

8 did you and other ECMM members come to have any

9 understanding of any particular role, if any, that

10 these special units played in connection with some of

11 the events, the more notorious events in Central Bosnia

12 that you became involved in investigating?

13 A. We often learned that when we came to an area

14 where there had been some killings of civilians, it was

15 often HOS units who were behind that.

16 Q. Now, going on to about the 13th or 14th of

17 April, 1993, there was an event, was there not, where

18 four HVO officers were kidnapped in the Travnik area?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. And the HVO made one of these types of

21 protests or complaints to the Busovaca Joint

22 Commission; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Then around the same time, on about the 15th

25 of April, the commander of the HVO Jure Francetic

Page 7481

1 Brigade, Zivko Totic, was kidnapped in Zenica. His car

2 was stopped and his four bodyguards were killed; is

3 that correct?

4 A. That's correct. And an eyewitness in the

5 area was killed as well.

6 Q. Did RC Zenica subsequently become involved in

7 investigating these events?

8 A. Yes. Busovaca Joint Commission made a team

9 and ordered this team to investigate in the matter.

10 Q. All right. Before continuing on, would you

11 look at Exhibit 635.1?

12 MR. SCOTT: It should be the next document on

13 top of everyone's bundle.

14 Q. 635.1, is this a copy of the daily

15 operational report from the Busovaca Joint Commission?

16 A. Yes, it is.

17 Q. I meant to point this out to you sooner and I

18 passed it. Paragraphs 1 and 4, does this talk about,

19 in fact, these problems with the demonstrations of the

20 Croatian flag and some of the incidents that had been

21 caused about that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. For instance, item (B) talks about:

24 "The shooting incident last evening in

25 Travnik."

Page 7482

1 That's one of the incidents you were talking

2 about a few minutes ago?

3 A. Yes, it was.

4 Q. Was Mr. Friis-Pedersen, the chairman of the

5 Busovaca Joint Commission, about at this time?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Then going on to Exhibit 693. Again, this

8 report covers a broad area of the ECMM; is that

9 correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So the Court will see, everyone will see

12 there are many reports from different regions and

13 groups, but directing your attention to page 4,

14 paragraph 16 -- well, there is a number there, 16.4, I

15 guess, because that's the date. I'm sorry, just the

16 bottom of page 4.

17 This composite report includes the reports

18 from RC Zenica; is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Starting at the bottom of page 4. For

21 instance, on page 5, under the heading -- near the

22 heading -- sub-heading "Novi Travnik," there is the

23 reference to the preliminary work concerning the four

24 kidnapped HVO officers. Do you see that?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7483

1 Q. And jumping all the way down to paragraph --

2 excuse me, page 10. At page 10 of the document, again

3 in reference to the sub-heading "Zenica," there's a

4 report concerning the kidnapping of the officer Totic;

5 is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Now, going back to the first entry with that

8 background, on page 4, was it the assessment of

9 RC Zenica, as reported up the ECMM chain of command, on

10 the 16th of April, 1993, again I'm looking at the

11 bottom of page 4:

12 "Situation is very tense in Central Bosnia

13 with open fighting in the Vitez and Jablanica areas.

14 The two sides appear to be reluctant to enter into

15 substantial negotiations for ceasefire. Seems that

16 both sides are determined to size ..."

17 I'm going to suggest, Your Honour, that should be

18 "seize,".

19 "... or protect whatever they believe

20 belongs to them in order to strengthen their position

21 in future negotiations."

22 Was that the ECMM assessment on the 16th of

23 April, sir?

24 A. Yes.

25 JUDGE MAY: Just one matter we were

Page 7484

1 considering. Going back to Exhibit 2574, the newspaper

2 report of the Vance-Owen Plan, you remember that we

3 have had other documents setting out the plan and other

4 maps of it.

5 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE MAY: It may be that no one can answer

7 this at the moment, but does the newspaper report, in

8 fact, reflect the plan?

9 MR. SCOTT: I can't answer that question

10 myself, Your Honour.

11 Q. Do you recall, Major Baggesen, whether the

12 report, the newspaper article, if you will, that

13 accompanied -- or that this map was part of, described

14 or gave some account of the Vance-Owen Plan?

15 A. I don't recall that.

16 JUDGE MAY: I don't suppose at this length of

17 time the witness can possibly remember, but in fact, if

18 you look at Exhibit 1658, there we have the plan, which

19 I think was taken from the evidence earlier. I don't

20 want to waste time now. Perhaps somebody could have a

21 look over the adjournment.

22 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I believe -- if it's

23 1658, the map is substantially the same.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I mean, that's my

25 impression, but perhaps someone can have a look. If

Page 7485

1 there is any difference, we can be told.

2 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry, I would regard it as

4 very useful not just to have the plan itself, but that

5 part of it which indicates the racial composition, the

6 mixture.

7 MR. SCOTT: Yes. I'm sure we can provide

8 that, Your Honour.

9 Q. All right. If we can finish with

10 Exhibit 693, Major. On the bottom of page 4 -- I'm

11 sorry. Excuse me, I lost my place.

12 On about the middle of page 5, in reference

13 to the paragraph headed "Zenica," let me direct your

14 attention, please, to a couple of sentences into that

15 paragraph and ask you if this is correct, and not only

16 correctly written but, in fact, was the assessment that

17 you were familiar with at that time on the ground.

18 I'm looking at the language that says, "ECMM

19 is trying hard to relax the tension, but both sides,

20 especially in the higher military level, are not

21 willing to take part in negotiations before the

22 achievement of their political and military

23 objectives."

24 A. Yes, as far as I can remember.

25 Q. That was your personal assessment at the time

Page 7486

1 as well; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm looking at the

4 clock. I'm at the Court's pleasure. I'm about to

5 start a different topic. We can start it and break any

6 time, or if the Court wishes, we could stop now.

7 JUDGE MAY: This is --

8 MR. SCOTT: Basically paragraph 102.

9 JUDGE MAY: Well, perhaps you can deal with

10 those two matters very briefly, 102 and 103, and we'll

11 stop there.

12 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. Now, we have talked in the last few minutes,

14 sir, that there were these -- among other things, I'm

15 sure -- these two particular incidents concerning the

16 HVO officers. And is it correct that the regional

17 deputy chief of ECMM, Mr. Juan Valentin, and you,

18 yourself, formed a Busovaca Joint Commission team with

19 Dzemal Merdan and Franjo Nakic to investigate these

20 incidents?

21 A. Yes, that's correct. And together with us,

22 we had some of the local civilian police.

23 Q. As part of this, did your group, as just

24 described, travel to Novi Travnik and Bugojno --

25 A. Yes.

Page 7487

1 Q. -- to visit the Muslim 7th Brigade

2 headquarters?

3 A. That's correct. The reason for us to visit

4 the 7th Muslim Brigade was that the HVO thought that

5 this 7th Muslim Brigade was a unit that was behind the

6 kidnapping of the four HVO officers in Travnik and of

7 the HVO brigade commander in Zenica. That's the reason

8 why we visited the 7th Brigade.

9 MR. SCOTT: All right, then, Your Honour, if

10 we could stop.

11 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now until half

12 past 2.00.

13 Major, would you remember, please, during

14 this and any other adjournment, not to speak to anybody

15 about your evidence. Don't let anybody speak to you

16 about it, and of course that includes members of the

17 Prosecution team.

18 A. Yes, I'll do that, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: Could you please be back at half

20 past 2.00.

21 A. Yes, I will do that.

22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

23 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.



Page 7488

1 --- On resuming at 2.32 p.m.

2 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, before we start with

3 the witness, I think I can answer the Court's question,

4 at least in part. The map on 2574, the newspaper map,

5 is in all respects the same as 1658, save this -- and

6 when I say that, I'm referring to the map on the top of

7 1658 -- in the newspaper map, the municipalities of

8 Vares and Visoko have been grouped with Sarajevo,

9 whereas in the map which is part of 1658, they are

10 included in proposed province 9.

11 I'm afraid, at the moment, I can't offer you

12 any particular explanation for that except it is the

13 way the map literally did evolve over time. We can

14 find the answer to that, but those are the only

15 differences between those two maps as we can see it.

16 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.


18 Q. Now, Major Baggesen, we had left off, you and

19 an ECMM are -- actually, a Busovaca Joint Commission

20 team, including the HVO representative and the ABiH

21 representative, had gone to Novi Travnik and Bugonjo to

22 investigate, and you were on your way back, and is it

23 correct that on your way back from that trip you were

24 stopped -- you stopped, yourself, in Novi Travnik to

25 give a report to the local HVO commander there?

Page 7489

1 A. Yes, we did that.

2 Q. What made you think to stop and give this

3 report?

4 A. We wanted to tell the local brigade commander

5 about our findings because, as far as I can remember,

6 the four staff officers were from his brigade command.

7 Therefore, we wanted to tell him about our findings

8 just so the level of information was the best as

9 possible.

10 Q. During the course of that meeting, is it

11 correct, sir, that the local commander of the HVO

12 military police came into the meeting, was very unhappy

13 with you and the others that you had not, by that date,

14 found the kidnapped officers or their kidnappers, and

15 said that the only solution, in his view, was to arrest

16 Dzemal Merdan?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. Did he, in fact, arrest Dzemal Merdan at that

19 time?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is it correct that the HVO officers with you

22 are present, both the Travnik -- Novi Travnik commander

23 and Franjo Nakic were surprised at his action but

24 essentially said that they could not stop it because

25 they didn't have the authority to control this military

Page 7490

1 police officer?

2 A. Yes, they said that. They said the only one

3 who was able to give orders to the military police

4 commander was Colonel Blaskic.

5 Q. Did you protest the arrest of General Merdan?

6 A. Yes, we did, because when Mr. Merdan was

7 travelling together with us in the Busovaca Joint

8 Commission team, he was a member of the team and he was

9 under our protection.

10 Q. Did that result then in you and your ECMM

11 colleague likewise being placed under arrest?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Was an HVO guard put on you?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. What happened after that?

16 A. After that, of course, I made another

17 protest. Then I asked Sabljic, to use his phone, and I

18 tried to get in contact with Colonel Blaskic, and I

19 tried to get in contact with my own headquarters to

20 tell them about the new situation.

21 Q. Yes. Were you able to it reach anyone at


23 A. Not at that time, because we were not able to

24 get in contact with UNPROFOR, but we asked our

25 headquarter in Zenica to get in contact with UNPROFOR,

Page 7491

1 to the British Battalion in Vitez, and to ask them to

2 come and rescue us.

3 Q. Is it correct that when you told the military

4 police commander that UNPROFOR would, in fact, come to

5 retrieve you, that the police commander was very

6 unhappy?

7 A. Yes. Actually, he told us that if UNPROFOR

8 units would try to come and help us out, his units

9 would open fire against the UNPROFOR units.

10 Q. Were you able to, after that point, in fact,

11 reach Colonel Blaskic on the telephone?

12 A. We tried to get in contact with

13 Colonel Blaskic. I can remember we were not able on

14 the first try because he was not present at his office,

15 but he was in the building somewhere. On our second

16 try, we were able to get in contact with

17 Colonel Blaskic, and we told him about the situation,

18 and he asked to speak with the HVO commander, and he

19 did.

20 Q. When you say the "HVO commander," this was

21 the --

22 A. No, the military police commander.

23 Q. What happened as a result of the conversation

24 between the military police commander and

25 Colonel Blaskic?

Page 7492

1 A. At the beginning of the conversation, it took

2 place at Mr. Sabljic's office. We had been there the

3 whole time. But after awhile, the military police

4 officer didn't want to speak with Colonel Blaskic in

5 that office, so he went to another office and continued

6 his conversation with Colonel Blaskic, and after awhile

7 he came back and released us.

8 Q. What was his appearance when he came back

9 into the room?

10 A. He was red-faced.

11 Q. You were released at that time, including

12 Dzemal Merdan?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Around this same time did Colonel Blaskic

15 order, to your knowledge, the HVO to close the road

16 between Gornji Vakuf and Travnik?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were you able to return then to Zenica after

19 that time?

20 A. After that time we were able to continue our

21 travel.

22 Q. All right. Now, on the 15th of April, 1993,

23 is it correct that a Canadian ECMM monitor named Remi

24 Landry joined you in continuing to investigate these

25 several incidents?

Page 7493

1 A. Yes, that's correct. He replaced Juan

2 Valentin.

3 Q. Did you go to Vitez, the two of you, and

4 spend the night in Vitez, on the night of the 15th of

5 April, instead of returning to Zenica?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Jumping outside of the chronology but not to

8 leave the five HVO officers, a part of the story,

9 unresolved, is it correct, sir, that some weeks after

10 this that all five of the HVO officers were released

11 unharmed as part of an ECMM arranged prisoner release?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Kordic was present

14 at this ceremony or event when the HVO officers were

15 released?

16 JUDGE MAY: That, I think, is in dispute, is

17 it? Is it in dispute? I seem to have a note to that

18 effect.

19 MR. SCOTT: You're correct, Your Honour.

20 It's my mistake. I apologise. I missed my own note.

21 Q. Can you tell the Court, Major Baggesen --

22 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you could describe --

23 Major, were you present when the HVO officers were

24 released?

25 A. Yes, I was.

Page 7494

1 JUDGE MAY: And can you tell us who was

2 there?

3 A. It was -- this incident with the kidnapped

4 officers, we investigated that and we found out that

5 the kidnappers were not BiH but the Mujahedins in the

6 area, and as the Prosecutor told you, ECMM and UNPROFOR

7 were there to release them after we had been having

8 some meetings with the Mujahedins.

9 I was responsible for releasing of the four

10 HVO officers from the Novi Travnik area or the Travnik

11 area, and the four officers were handed over to me by

12 the Mujahedins at a secret place, and from there, with

13 an escort from the police battalion, I took them to

14 Vitez, to the Hotel Vitez, where Colonel Blaskic and

15 Mr. Kordic were present.

16 And then the four officers were handed over

17 to them.

18 JUDGE MAY: Can you tell us roughly when that

19 was? If the kidnapping was the 13th, 14th of April, is

20 it possible to say roughly how long after the

21 kidnapping this event occurred?

22 A. I think it was after a month or something.

23 But we have it somewhere in the statement.

24 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

25 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, we can probably

Page 7495

1 provide an ECMM report about that. I don't have it

2 with me today, but I think it will indicate that it was

3 approximately three or four weeks after --

4 A. I can find it in my diary, if you want.

5 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, if I might just

6 point the major to May the 17th in his diary, I think

7 that's -- is that when it was?

8 A. Yes, that's correct. Monday, the 17th of

9 May.


11 Q. And your testimony, Major Baggesen, is that

12 Colonel Blaskic and Mr. Kordic were part of -- would it

13 be called a reception committee, if you will?

14 A. A welcome commission. And as far as I can

15 remember, it was covered by the local TV.

16 Q. Now, going back to our chronology --

17 MR. SCOTT: Unless the Court has other

18 questions about that? Thank you.

19 Q. You and Mr. Landry had spent the night in

20 Vitez, the night between the 15th and 16th of April.

21 Is it correct, sir, that on the morning of the 16th of

22 April, about 5.30, you woke up to the sounds of

23 artillery fire; you realised that there was heavy

24 fighting going on and that some of the firing was close

25 to Vitez?

Page 7496

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. You could hear firing from heavy machine

3 guns, and heard that both the artillery fire and the

4 mortar fire was what might be described as outgoing?

5 Is that correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. As a military person, perhaps any military

8 person, you can tell the Court, and as someone trained

9 in artillery, how could you tell that this was outgoing

10 fire?

11 A. Because when a mortar or artillery is firing,

12 you can hear the noise from that. It's different from

13 the impact; it's not the same noise or the same sound.

14 So there is no doubt for us as trained military

15 persons.

16 Q. Could you also tell, or have at least a -- or

17 make an assessment as to what this was the type of

18 artillery or mortars that were being used?

19 A. From what we were able to hear, it was medium

20 artillery, either medium or heavy mortars.

21 Q. And both the sound -- both the fact that the

22 sounds were of outgoing fire and the nature of the

23 weapons being used, did that help you come to any

24 conclusion about who was doing the firing?

25 A. Yes, because we knew that the HVO had

Page 7497

1 positions around in the area, so it was obvious that it

2 was from the HVO positions.

3 Q. Did you or ECMM have any information around

4 that time that the ABiH forces in the Vitez area were

5 armed with that type of weapons?

6 A. We have no information on that. UNPROFOR had

7 patrols in the area, and we had patrols in that area,

8 and we had never seen any signs of Armija, BiH,

9 positions.

10 Q. Would it be fair to say that to your

11 knowledge, or the ECMM's knowledge, the ABiH forces, if

12 at all, were armed with either small arms or light

13 machine guns?

14 A. At that time, in that area, yes.

15 Q. Now, is it correct, sir, that you and

16 Mr. Landry decided to leave for Zenica right away,

17 about 6.00 on the morning of the 16th?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And that you went to an HVO checkpoint in

20 Dubravica, and on the way there you came upon a circle

21 of five Muslim civilians who were lying on the road --

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. -- stomach down?

24 And what did you do at that time?

25 A. Just after we passed them, we stopped our

Page 7498

1 vehicle, and we would have liked to go out to see if

2 these men still were alive, or what had -- try to

3 monitor the situation, try to find out what has been

4 happening there. But when we went out of our vehicles,

5 we were shot at, so we were forced back to our vehicle

6 and forced out of that area again.

7 Q. Who was shooting at you?

8 A. HVO.

9 Q. And then, as you proceeded on down the road,

10 were you stopped at an HVO checkpoint at Dubravica?

11 A. Yes, we were.

12 Q. And was that an HVO -- was that checkpoint

13 manned by HVO soldiers?

14 A. Yes, it was.

15 Q. What did you do then?

16 A. Then we had to go back.

17 Q. You went back to Vitez?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Approximately how many HVO soldiers do you

20 recall being at this checkpoint?

21 A. I can recall that there were more than

22 normal. As I can remember, there were maybe ten or

23 more in that area, and normally there was only two or

24 maybe three soldiers manning this checkpoint.

25 Q. Did the increased manpower at the checkpoint

Page 7499

1 mean anything to your -- impress you as having any

2 particular significance?

3 A. It showed us that something was going on.

4 Q. All right. Later on the 16th of April, 1993,

5 about 9.30 in the evening, did you and Mr. Landry

6 decide to make another attempt to drive from Vitez to

7 Zenica?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What happened on that occasion?

10 A. We were able to see that there was still

11 fighting in the area. We were able to see that -- when

12 we were passing Vitez, we could see a lot of burning

13 houses in the old part of Vitez. We were able to pass

14 the Dubravica checkpoint, and when we continued, we

15 were able to see that the whole sky over Ahmici was

16 totally illuminated by a big fire.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. And when we were passing Ahmici, we were able

19 to see that it looked like -- that the whole area was

20 burning.

21 Q. All right. Before we come back to Ahmici,

22 when you passed by, and you said the area of -- in

23 Stari Vitez was -- there was a lot of firing and some

24 houses on fire there, was Stari Vitez the portion of

25 Vitez where primarily the Muslim community lived?

Page 7500

1 A. Yes.

2 MR. SCOTT: Now, if we can look at

3 Exhibit 2193, which is one of the photographs that's in

4 the packet that was at the bottom of the bundle, Your

5 Honour, and again, it's marked in the lower right

6 corner as 2193.

7 THE USHER: 2193?

8 MR. SCOTT: Yeah, 2193. Perhaps you can put

9 that on the ELMO so that we can see -- when you point

10 out things on the map, everyone will be able to see

11 what it is you're pointing to.

12 Q. All right. Now, have you marked on this --

13 this is an aerial photo of Vitez; is that correct?

14 A. Yes, it is.

15 Q. Have you marked on this map the checkpoints

16 that you encountered on the 16th of April?

17 A. Yes. Actually those checkpoints marking this

18 map were some permanent checkpoints. Those checkpoints

19 were there before this incident that we're ...

20 Q. All right. Did there continue to be

21 checkpoints at these locations on the 16th of April?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you refer to the one that's farthest to

24 the top of the page and further to the left. What

25 particular traffic did that checkpoint have the ability

Page 7501

1 to control, if you will?

2 A. The checkpoint I mentioned as HVO checkpoint

3 2 was able to control the road down to Vitez.

4 Q. All right. I'm sorry, just hold on one

5 moment, please. I think we're looking at two

6 different -- just so the record is clear, let's start

7 with the other one, the other checkpoint, higher on the

8 page would be approximately 10.00 or 11.00 --

9 A. Okay. That's the Dubravica checkpoint.

10 Q. What traffic does that checkpoint control?

11 A. Controls the traffic coming from the two

12 roads, one of the roads is what we were calling the

13 mountain road to Zenica, and the checkpoint was

14 controlling the other road as well. So by manning this

15 checkpoint you were able to control the junction and

16 the traffic coming into that area.

17 Q. Now let's go to what's been marked as HVO

18 CP 2. What additional or different traffic, if any, is

19 controlled at that checkpoint?

20 A. This checkpoint controlled the traffic from

21 the main road into Vitez.

22 Q. All right. Now, on this second attempt, when

23 you and Mr. Landry left Vitez at 9.30 that evening, you

24 were able to get through both checkpoints; is that

25 correct?

Page 7502

1 A. Yes, that's correct.

2 Q. And then you were just about to tell us a few

3 minutes ago, when you got to Ahmici, you could see that

4 essentially the entire sky was on fire because the

5 village was burning?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What did you do after that?

8 A. We were trying to get into Ahmici, to monitor

9 the situation, but we were stopped at the checkpoint on

10 one of the roads going to Ahmici, and we were not

11 allowed to go in there. This was an HVO checkpoint.

12 Q. Again, before we get to that particular

13 checkpoint, when you approached Ahmici, is it correct,

14 sir, that you could not only see the fires burning but

15 you could also see machine gun fire?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Could you see the tracers from the machine

18 gun fire?

19 A. We could see the tracers, yes.

20 Q. Was there tracer fire in both directions or

21 tracer fire only from one direction?

22 A. Only from one direction.

23 Q. From what you knew about the disposition of

24 forces at that time, from what side was the machine gun

25 fire coming? You saw no return fire?

Page 7503

1 A. No return fire.

2 Q. When you saw that the village was on fire,

3 could you at that time see that the minaret on the

4 mosque was still standing?

5 A. At that time it was still standing.

6 Q. Can you describe to the Court what that

7 looked like to you?

8 A. Actually, it was an awful sight, because we

9 could see the minaret and we could see all the -- the

10 whole sky around the minaret was totally in flames.

11 Q. Had you come to know, sometime shortly before

12 this, from one of your interpreters, that the mosque --

13 that particular mosque in Ahmici had just been built or

14 renovated a short time before this?

15 A. Yes, I was told that. A few days before I

16 went to Ahmici actually just to see the mosque, because

17 the people in Ahmici were very proud of this mosque.

18 Therefore, I went up to see the mosque.

19 Q. Was it your understanding that the Muslims in

20 Ahmici actually raised the money to build or renovate

21 this mosque themselves?

22 A. I was told that. When we were at Ahmici,

23 everything was calm in Ahmici. There was no sign of

24 military activity in Ahmici.

25 Q. How soon before the 16th of April had you

Page 7504

1 been in Ahmici?

2 A. I cannot recall the exact date, but I think

3 it was a few days before.

4 Q. Would it be in your diary?

5 JUDGE MAY: For the moment, do we need that

6 date? If it's a few days before, that's sufficient.

7 MR. SCOTT: Very well.

8 JUDGE MAY: Major, don't bother.


10 Q. Now, were you able to reach an -- make an

11 assessment, based on what you could see of the village

12 burning, how those fires had been started? If you can

13 make that kind of assessment, then tell the Court what

14 you base that on.

15 A. The fire in Ahmici was not a result of the

16 shelling against the area, so we concluded that because

17 there was so many houses that were burning, that

18 someone had put fire to the houses.

19 Q. How can you tell that it wasn't caused by

20 shelling?

21 A. Because normally if it was a result of

22 shelling, you would be able to see it on the roof on

23 the houses because then all the tiles would have been

24 blown off.

25 Q. There would be artillery damage to the houses

Page 7505

1 themselves?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. But when you saw these houses burning they

4 were essentially intact houses that were on fire?

5 A. What we were able to see from our position

6 outside the town, because we were not allowed to go

7 into the town. But we were able to see some of the

8 houses from there.

9 Q. All right. Let's go to Exhibit Z1585, which

10 should be the next -- I hope, the next photograph in

11 the packet of oversized materials.

12 JUDGE MAY: We don't have the packet of

13 oversized materials, I don't think.

14 MR. SCOTT: That's it. I see what Judge

15 Robinson has, Your Honour. If not, we'll certainly

16 provide more.

17 Q. All right. Now, on Exhibit 1585, Major

18 Baggesen, can you indicate where -- when you

19 attempted -- when you and Mr. Landry attempted to enter

20 Ahmici on the night of the 16th of April, where was the

21 checkpoint where you were stopped?

22 A. We were stopped in the checkpoint situated

23 here [indicates], and we were able to look up at this

24 road.

25 Q. This is the -- you were on the main road

Page 7506

1 between Vitez and Zenica; is that correct?

2 A. Yes. That's the road running out here

3 [indicates].

4 Q. And the turnoff, at least, is oriented on

5 this particular photograph, the turnoff to the left,

6 leaves the main road and goes up into the village of

7 Ahmici; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. What did the HVO -- well, did the HVO soldier

10 tell you that the reason that he would not allow you

11 and Mr. Landry going up into the village was because

12 there was too much fighting?

13 A. We were told there was heavy fighting in the

14 area and it was actually because of our own security we

15 were not allowed in that area.

16 Q. From the advantage point that you and

17 Mr. Landry had, could you see any actual fighting in

18 the village at that time?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Could you see what appeared to the persons or

21 bodies lying on the ground?

22 A. From our positions in the checkpoint we were

23 able to see persons on the ground, lying on the

24 ground. We were not able to see if they were alive or

25 dead.

Page 7507

1 Q. Is it correct, sir, that you were surprised

2 by these events, what you saw happening in Ahmici and

3 the surrounding area on the 16th of April, because ECMM

4 had not seen any sign of actual fighting between the

5 HVO and the ABiH in that area up about that time?

6 A. Yes. Because when I went to Ahmici a few

7 days before, there was no signs of any military

8 activities.

9 Q. Did you see -- I'm sorry?

10 A. There was no fortifications, there was no

11 barbed wire, there were no soldiers around. There was

12 only civilians there.

13 Q. As you travelled around the Vitez-Zenica area

14 on the 16th of April, you and Mr. Landry, is it

15 correct, sir, that you only saw -- the only soldiers

16 you saw that day were HVO and HOS soldiers?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Throughout your travels on that day you did

19 not see any Bosnian government forces or Muslim forces?

20 A. No, we didn't.

21 Q. Did it appear to you, sir, that the HVO had

22 effectively sealed off the Vitez area, with all traffic

23 being controlled in and out?

24 A. Yes, because all the checkpoints were heavily

25 manned, more than normal, so we concluded that they had

Page 7508

1 sealed the area.

2 Q. If I could draw your attention and the

3 Court's attention to Exhibit 2613, which again is

4 another map in the packet.

5 On this map have you previously marked

6 various checkpoints, some belonging to the HVO and some

7 belonging to the Muslim forces?

8 A. Yes. Those checkpoints were, say, the normal

9 picture of checkpoints before and after this episode.

10 Q. As you testified a moment ago, can you tell

11 the Court that based upon your knowledge of the area,

12 by these particular HVO checkpoints could you

13 effectively control access into the Vitez area?

14 A. Yes. Those two checkpoints here were the

15 checkpoints I showed before on the aerial photograph

16 [indicates], and they are controlling the road from

17 Zenica to Vitez, through the mountains.

18 There was a checkpoint in the Kaonik area,

19 and that checkpoint was controlling all the traffic

20 coming from east [indicates].

21 There was a checkpoint near Travnik

22 controlling all traffic coming from Travnik and from

23 the Novi Travnik area [indicates].

24 At that time, I don't have any information

25 concerning HVO checkpoints in this area [indicates],

Page 7509

1 but we learned later on that there were some

2 checkpoints up here, but I don't know exactly where

3 they were.

4 So they were able to control all the traffic

5 into that area.

6 Q. Now, just for point of reference and while we

7 have this map in front us, if you go to the HVO marked

8 checkpoints, the two in Vitez at approximately the

9 lower middle of the page, can you point out to the --

10 if you'll go out about 3.00, probably about four --

11 maybe four centimetres or so from about 3.00 there, can

12 you point out Ahmici?

13 A. Yes, Ahmici is situated here [indicates].

14 Actually, between those checkpoints here.

15 Q. So the HVO effectively controlled access on

16 either side of Ahmici?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Then if you look, please, again, basically at

19 the 6.00 position below the HVO checkpoint around

20 Kaonik, again, just for purposes of orientation, at the

21 bottom of the map is that the town of Busovaca?

22 A. Yes. So in this area [indicates] they were

23 able to control as well the Busovaca road. The

24 Busovaca road is going from Busovaca and further south

25 and are connected with Kiseljak.

Page 7510

1 Q. Now, looking back on the events of the 16th

2 of April, 1993, did you reach any professional military

3 judgement, sir, on how those attacks were carried out

4 or the nature of those attacks?

5 A. In our opinion, it was a military attack

6 against a civilian target, if you can call this for a

7 target, but it was a military operation.

8 Q. What do you base that on?

9 A. Because we only saw HVO in that area, and we

10 didn't see anyone that returned fire against the

11 HVO-controlled area.

12 Q. How many -- do you have an estimate of how

13 many soldiers, based upon your military training and

14 experience, how many soldiers would have been required

15 to carry out the operations that you saw in the

16 Vitez-Ahmici area on the 16th of April?

17 A. Actually, it's a very difficult question to

18 answer, but I think a minimum of 600 men just to seal

19 the area and to do the attack against Ahmici.

20 Q. Sir, based on your 20 years of military

21 experience -- and you are the Operations Officer now of

22 your unit in Denmark; is that correct?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. So it would fall to you to plan an operation

25 and carry out an operation like this, wouldn't it?

Page 7511

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Can you tell the Court what would go into the

3 organisation and carrying out a military operation

4 involving something like 600 soldiers?

5 A. You have to do proper planning, because it's

6 not just enough to order the soldiers to go in and make

7 that attack. You have to make an operational order

8 doing that. And this order, there should be orders

9 concerning the logistics, because you have to bring

10 ammunition, you have to bring fuel, you have to bring

11 other things to do an action like this.

12 Q. You have to transport your troops into the

13 area?

14 A. Yes. I don't think, at that time, it was --

15 to transport the soldiers from -- for example, from

16 Vitez to Ahmici, you don't have to use vehicles for

17 that because of the distance, but normally you have to

18 plan how to use trucks and all that as well.

19 We concluded that this was not only a small

20 unit, because it was too big an incident. So you were

21 not -- it would have to be carried out by more than one

22 small unit.

23 Q. What you saw happen in Vitez and Ahmici on

24 the 16th of April, could that have been carried out

25 by --

Page 7512

1 JUDGE MAY: This is going beyond the

2 military -- I'm sorry. You were going to ask about the

3 unit.

4 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE MAY: I was looking at 152.

6 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Your Honour. I'm not

7 quite at that point yet.

8 Q. Could that attack or those events have been

9 carried out by a small group of individuals acting as a

10 renegade or individual unit?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Without attributing any -- I don't want you

13 to discuss the state of mind of who might have been

14 involved in the attack, but based on your military

15 experience, if you're correct that this was an attack

16 on a civilian population, why would that be done? Why

17 do you attack a civilian population?

18 JUDGE MAY: I don't think this is a matter

19 for a military officer. This is something that we're

20 going to have to decide, isn't it. We're going to

21 decide what inferences we can draw from the evidence as

22 to why the attack might have taken place, if there was

23 one.


25 Q. Let me finish up the area this way: Again,

Page 7513

1 both on the 16th and the days leading up to the 16th,

2 you had not seen any Muslim armed forces or

3 preparations in the area of Ahmici; is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. If you'll go to Exhibit 738, which we're now

6 back into the documentary exhibits as opposed to the

7 photographs.

8 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honour, I've

9 skipped, for the moment, 735. It might cause some

10 confusion, but I find in my notes it's either

11 unnecessary or comes later.

12 Q. We have 738. If I can direct your attention

13 to paragraph 9 on the bottom of page 2. Was the ECMM

14 assessment of this -- and this is a report -- excuse

15 me. This is a report for the week of the 11th to the

16 18th of April, 1993. It's a weekly summary.

17 On the item that I just directed your

18 attention to, is it correct that it was the ECMM

19 official assessment at that time that the relations in

20 Central Bosnia deteriorated sharply during the week. A

21 possible explanation for the tension in the area could

22 be the suspected aim of the HVO, while the world's

23 attention is focused on Srebrenica and East Bosnia --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- to take over the territory of the two

Page 7514

1 provinces described in the Vance-Owen Plan as

2 predominantly Croat while the Muslim community is

3 determined to avoid this?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And do you recall, sir --

6 JUDGE MAY: I think you ought to read the

7 next sentence for the sake of completeness.


9 Q. Yes. You also reported that HVO and BiH

10 forces fought openly in Vitez, Zenica, and Travnik.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. All right. And to follow up on the

13 president's question and your testimony a moment ago,

14 there were -- is it correct to say, sir, that there was

15 fighting with Muslim armed forces in that wider

16 Vitez/Zenica/Travnik area, to your knowledge?

17 A. Yes, there was.

18 Q. But not around Ahmici?

19 A. Not around Ahmici.

20 Q. And just as a matter of historical interest,

21 do you recall, with this reference to Srebrenica, do

22 you recall that it was exactly this same time, or this

23 weekend, that was when Srebrenica finally fell?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Directing your attention to paragraph 11 of

Page 7515

1 the next page -- and I'm not going to read this one,

2 but I think everyone has it -- if you will read that to

3 yourself, and again, do you recall that being the ECMM

4 assessment, and did you agree with that assessment?

5 A. Yes, I do.

6 Q. If we could go to Exhibit 813.

7 MR. SCOTT: All right. I'm only going to --

8 the conclusions are similar, but this is an ECMM

9 report, Your Honour, the reason why this looks very

10 similar to Exhibit 738. I think that it will just

11 simply show that it's another one of these reports in

12 the chain.

13 Q. But in this particular item, directing your

14 attention to paragraph 15 on page 2 on Exhibit 813, and

15 was that your -- directing your attention to paragraph

16 15, was that your personal -- did you agree with that

17 analysis?

18 A. Yes. This was the official ECMM conclusion.

19 Q. Where it states, "The declared position of

20 the Bosnian Croat authorities to implement the

21 Vance-Owen Plan, forcing the Muslim population to leave

22 the so-called 'Croat provinces,' provoked a reaction

23 which resulted in strong and brutal fighting, with

24 actions against the civilian population, especially in

25 the Zenica and Vitez regions."

Page 7516

1 Is what you saw in Ahmici and the Vitez area

2 on the 16th of April consistent with that conclusion?

3 A. Yes.

4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'm going to briefly

5 touch on three additional exhibits as part of the

6 record, without spending a lot of time on them, but I

7 think this witness is able to identify them.

8 Q. If you can look at Exhibit 719, which is

9 titled "Special Report on the Middle Bosnia Situation,"

10 do you recall RC Zenica around this time -- this is

11 dated the 18th of April, 1993 -- preparing a report or

12 assessment of the events over the preceding several

13 days --

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. -- in Central Bosnia?

16 And just by a point of reference, the

17 handwritten notation toward the lower left-hand part of

18 the page, are those Remi Landry's markings?

19 A. Yes, it is.

20 Q. He was the colleague who was with you on the

21 16th?

22 A. Yes, and this special report is made by him

23 and I.

24 Q. The two of you together?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7517

1 Q. And, in fact, directing your attention to the

2 third page, does it include both your signature and

3 Mr. Landry's signature?

4 A. On the third page? Yes. And the first two

5 words, "Venlig Hilsen," that's in Danish, and that

6 means "Yours Sincerely."

7 Q. Very good.

8 A. Because this is not the original. This is a

9 copy, as I was sending to another one.

10 Q. All right. Let's go on to Exhibit 720, dated

11 the 18th of April, 1993. This is going to ECMM

12 headquarters in Zagreb; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And was the purpose of this report, in

15 particular, to relate the statements or allegations

16 that were being made by the head of the army of

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina 3rd Corps? And directing your

18 attention to item 3 and carrying on to the next page.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. In terms of the bottom of that page, second

21 page, the initials "J. Valentin," was that the deputy

22 head of the RC Zenica?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And Mr. Dagos was the operations officer?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 7518

1 Q. If we go to Exhibit 754, this is a report

2 from the Busovaca Joint Commission dated the 20th of

3 April, 1993. Directing your attention to the second

4 page, did you know both of those individuals?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Mr. Erik Friis-Pedersen was the head of the

7 Busovaca Commission at that time?

8 A. Yes, he was.

9 Q. And Henk Morsink was a Dutch monitor; is that

10 correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Were there various efforts to establish a

13 cease-fire around the 16th of April and the days

14 thereafter?

15 A. Say again, please?

16 Q. Yes. Were there various efforts, both by

17 UNPROFOR and by the ECMM, on the 16th of April and in

18 the next few days, trying to establish a cease-fire?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Looking back to Item 1 on that report, is it

21 correct that -- "In the Vitez area, still very tense

22 and even getting worse in the afternoon, with a lot of

23 firing from positions around the area of BritBat camp.

24 Many refugees with luggage on the streets and snipers

25 everywhere. In Travnik, situation also got more tense

Page 7519

1 from midafternoon, due to firing from many HVO high

2 ground positions around the city"?

3 A. Yes, that's correct.

4 Q. Now, on the morning of the 19th of April,

5 1993, did you find yourself in the town of Zenica?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And --

8 A. That's our headquarters.

9 Q. I'm sorry?

10 A. That's our headquarters, in Zenica.

11 Q. And about 9.30 that morning, did you hear

12 shelling coming into the centre of town?

13 A. Yes, and we were able to see that from our

14 headquarters. We were situated at the Hotel

15 Internacional, and from our window, we were able to see

16 the area that was attacked.

17 Q. Did you and another ECMM colleague named

18 Allan Laustsen -- who was another Danish monitor; is

19 that correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Were you able to respond to the area where

22 the shells had exploded?

23 A. Yes. After the attack in the afternoon, we

24 went to the area that had been shelled, and we found

25 out that it was the marketplace in Zenica. We were

Page 7520

1 able to see the impacts in the area, and we were able

2 to see the damages in the area.

3 Q. Is it correct, sir, that 13 civilians were

4 killed and many others injured as a result of this

5 shelling?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And that the majority of the killed and

8 injured were Muslim civilians?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Who were in the town market at the time?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. As a Danish officer, have you had training in

13 the use and effects of artillery?

14 A. Yes, basic training.

15 Q. Mr. Laustsen, wasn't he, in fact, a former

16 Danish artillery officer?

17 A. Yes, Laustsen is an artillery officer. He is

18 now a police officer, but he is a reserve officer in

19 the artillery in Denmark.

20 MR. SCOTT: We're now going to the separate

21 packet of exhibits, Your Honour. If the witness could

22 look at -- first, starting with Exhibit 2282,1.

23 Q. Is this a photograph that you took in the

24 area of the shelling?

25 A. Yes. That's correct. That's from the

Page 7521

1 marketplace. And on the opposite side of the road,

2 where all the people from the market were placed, and

3 all the killed and injured people. But I didn't want

4 to take pictures of that, so I just took a picture of

5 this area.

6 Q. So you're looking away from the main impact

7 location; is that correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. If you'll go to Exhibit 2282,2, what is that?

10 A. That shows another impact in the bus stop,

11 just close to the river.

12 Q. Who is that in the picture?

13 A. That's my colleague, Allan Laustsen.

14 Q. This was a bus stop?

15 A. Yes. There were no buses, so there were no

16 injuries in that area.

17 Q. If you go to 2282 -- I'm sorry. Before you

18 go there --

19 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I'll have to

20 inquire, because there were some additional photographs

21 that were added after the bundles were first handed

22 out, and I don't know whether they made it into your

23 bundle or not. 2277,1?

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I've got that.

25 MR. SCOTT: All right. Very well.

Page 7522

1 If you have that on the ELMO, 2277,1.

2 Q. Now, is this looking back the other

3 direction? What -- the car in the foreground that we

4 see, is that the car that you photographed before?

5 A. Yes, it is.

6 Q. And now we're looking back more toward the

7 marketplace; is that correct?

8 A. Yes. On this picture you're able to see all

9 the killed civilians.

10 JUDGE MAY: At some stage we need to go

11 through these and make sure we've got them all.

12 MR. SCOTT: All right, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: But we don't want to waste time

14 now.


16 Q. The photograph we're looking at now, 2277,1,

17 for instance, there's a body in the middle of the

18 street; is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And over to the right of that body, on the

21 sidewalk, is that one of the areas where there was a

22 principal impact?

23 A. Yes, there was.

24 Q. You'll see there's little tables and chairs

25 set up, if you will, along a wall; do you see that?

Page 7523

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. That's where a number of the civilians were

3 killed?

4 Would you go to Exhibit 2277,2.

5 JUDGE MAY: I think, unless there's a

6 particular point the witness can deal with and you want

7 to ask him about, we can see these pictures for

8 ourselves.

9 MR. SCOTT: All right, Your Honour. If we

10 can just go, then, to -- well, let me stop on 2277,

11 because it is a better picture that relates to his

12 further testimony about his crater analysis.

13 Q. If you look at 2277,2, Major, that is an

14 impact crater; is that correct?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And some of those markings and the edges of

17 that crater, are those sometimes called "splashmarks"?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. That's from the shrapnel exploding?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right. If we go to Exhibit 2282,3 --

22 MR. SCOTT: Which is only a Xerox of the

23 photograph, Your Honour, and I apologise for the

24 quality. I'm sure there's a better version that can be

25 obtained at some point, but I'll just simply have the

Page 7524

1 witness describe it.

2 Q. There was one particular crater that you

3 photographed and looked at with some greater degree of

4 attention and care; is that correct, sir?

5 A. Yes.

6 Specific to this impact that I took the

7 photograph of, because this was one of the impacts

8 where we based our investigations on.

9 On this pact, we were able, with a simple

10 investigation, to see what direction the shell came

11 from.

12 Q. All right. Before you get to that -- well, I

13 see Mr. Sayers is on his feet.

14 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I think at this

15 point we're coming to paragraphs 158 and 159. The only

16 objection is this: I think that any opinions that the

17 witness may have based upon what he referred to as

18 basic training that he received in artillery, that they

19 require expert opinion and I don't think that he has

20 the expertise necessary to utter those opinions. There

21 is -- his colleague, Mr. Lawson, apparently has some

22 artillery training, and I understand that Mr. Lawson is

23 coming up to testify in the next week or two, so maybe

24 it would be better to have any opinions from him rather

25 than someone who has simply had basic training.

Page 7525

1 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Scott, that's a point.

2 MR. SCOTT: It's a point, Your Honour, but if

3 the content is not contested, Your Honour, I see little

4 point is served not simply saying -- letting this man

5 who has come here to testify about it so say.

6 JUDGE MAY: I gather this is a matter which

7 that is in issue. Is that right, Mr. Sayers?

8 MR. SAYERS: It is. Yes, indeed.


10 Q. Do you have-- you were with -- you have

11 basically artillery training in the Danish army; is

12 that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And Mr. Laustsen, who was with you, was an

15 artillery officer?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Did the two of you, working together, come to

18 a conclusion?

19 A. Yes, we did.

20 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I think he should

21 be able to state it.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, we don't want to have the

23 evidence twice over when it can be dealt with fairly

24 shortly. We are not bound by complicated rules about

25 qualifications. The witness clearly has some knowledge

Page 7526

1 of artillery matters and, therefore, he can give the

2 evidence but, Mr. Scott, it mustn't be repeated, or if

3 so, it must be repeated in short form.

4 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, you will see here

5 that on the outline that there are basically two or

6 three questions and it will be over in about 30

7 seconds.

8 JUDGE MAY: Very well.


10 Q. Looking at the crater, were you and

11 Mr. Laustsen able to reach an opinion as to the type of

12 artillery that had been used to make these -- fire

13 these rounds?

14 A. Yes. We based that on the size of the

15 impact, because your bigger size -- a big impact shows

16 it's a big shell, and a short impact shows it's a small

17 shell. Is that clear enough?

18 Q. At some very basic level. That particular

19 part is no more complicated than that, but how about --

20 could you tell from there what type of a shell -- gun

21 would have made that kind of an impact, roughly

22 speaking?

23 A. We conclude that this should be from a

24 122-millimetre gun.

25 Q. Based upon your military experience, what's

Page 7527

1 the approximate range of that kind of artillery

2 weapon?

3 A. Up to 15 kilometres.

4 Q. Now, going further, were you able, from

5 looking at the crater and doing some fieldwork, to

6 reach any conclusions about the direction from which

7 the shells were fired?

8 A. Yes, we were.

9 Q. Did you make a compass -- take a compass

10 reading on the impact?

11 A. Yes, we did.

12 Q. And --

13 A. Not for only this impact but for those

14 impacts in -- for this attack, we took a compass

15 bearing from all the impacts.

16 Q. Essentially, you wound up with a composite

17 reading of some sort?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. What was the compass reading that you recall?

20 A. Two hundred and seventy degrees. That was

21 from west.

22 Q. Based upon your knowledge of again the

23 disposition of forces in the area, who controlled the

24 ground from which you determined that shells were

25 fired?

Page 7528

1 A. HVO.

2 Q. If I can ask you to look at Exhibit 2282,6,

3 which again is a map, Your Honour.

4 Looking at 2282,6, did you draw --

5 essentially, this is a map of the Zenica locality.

6 There is a line that's been drawn, if you will, out

7 from the left of the city or town of Zenica. Does that

8 indicate to you approximately the direction from which

9 the shells were fired?

10 A. Yes. The marketplace is situated here, and

11 using our compass, we were able to see that the firing

12 was from this direction against Zenica, and I suppose

13 that the position was over in this area here, and we

14 knew that this area was under HVO control.

15 Q. Is that area sometimes known generally as the

16 Bila area?

17 A. Yes, that's the Bila area.

18 Q. Now, based on your training and experience,

19 were you able to see in Zenica that day, on the 19th of

20 April, any military targets in the area of the shell

21 impacts?

22 A. No. Actually, we knew where the military

23 targets, as you call them that, were in Zenica, and

24 there was no military targets in that area.

25 Q. If I can direct your attention to

Page 7529

1 Exhibit 2282,4, which, for ease of reference, is this

2 exhibit.

3 Is Exhibit 2282,4 a map or a drawing of the

4 city of Zenica?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. What does the letter or initial "M"

7 designate, approximately the middle of the document?

8 A. That's the marketplace where the impacts were

9 found.

10 Q. Now, also around this same map, encircled --

11 in the circled items, as an example there's a number 11

12 at approximately the 12.00 position, about six or seven

13 centimetres above the "M" there's a number that's

14 circled 11, and once you see that one -- Your Honour,

15 I'm doing this for everyone's benefit -- you'll see

16 that there are other similar markings around the

17 document.

18 Do those relate to the legend that's provided

19 as part of 2282.5, showing -- and with a code or a key

20 as to what those locations are?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So for instance, if we look at item number 1,

23 which is about at the -- well, if you can show -- it's

24 probably -- maybe it's easier for you, on the ELMO, to

25 show where you see item -- it's location 1?

Page 7530

1 A. At the top of the point [indicates].

2 Q. Over on the far left edge. And that was the

3 3rd Corps command or headquarters; is that correct?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. Of the ABiH forces. Now, based on your

6 military training and experience, what would be a

7 reasonable margin of error for a well-trained gun crew

8 firing something like a 122 millimetre piece of

9 artillery at a range of up to 15 kilometres? What

10 would you expect some reasonable, if we can call it

11 that, margin of error would be?

12 A. If we have to compare it with trained

13 artillery personnel?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. I think 50 metres.

16 Q. You'd expect a well-trained gun crew to be

17 able to hit a target within approximately 50 metres of

18 the aim point?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And what would be a margin of error for a

21 much -- a not so well-trained gun crew?

22 A. I think at the top 100 metres.

23 Q. Can you tell the Court, looking at

24 Exhibit 2282,4, what's the distance on this map between

25 the shell impacts in the marketplace and what you would

Page 7531

1 have considered, based on your knowledge, the closest

2 military target?

3 A. The closest military target is number 5.

4 There's approximately 500 metres from this area to the

5 marketplace.

6 Q. Five hundred metres?

7 A. Five hundred metres, yes.

8 Q. So about five times the margin of error for

9 even a badly trained crew; is that correct?

10 A. Yes. And actually, when you are firing a

11 artillery gun, the most difficult is not the sideways

12 but it's to shoot long enough, because it's very easy

13 to point a gun in the right direction.

14 Q. It's not -- you're saying it's not so much

15 whether the shell's to the left or right but whether

16 it's either short or over the target?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In your professional military judgement,

19 Major, was there any -- was there any military target

20 within a reasonable margin of error to the impact

21 point?

22 JUDGE MAY: No. I don't think that's a fair

23 question. We've heard the evidence which the witness

24 has given.

25 MR. SCOTT: Very well. If I can just have a

Page 7532

1 moment, Your Honour. I think some of this we've now

2 covered in the course of the testimony.

3 Q. All right. Just to finish on Zenica then,

4 the shelling was into the town marketplace at about

5 9.30 on the morning of April 19th, 1993; is that

6 correct?

7 A. Yes. And the ECMM had a conclusion on this

8 attack.

9 Q. Yes. Can you state, that please?

10 A. ECMM concluded that this attack was not

11 against a military target but against a civilian

12 population.

13 Q. Moving on to Exhibit 757.

14 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Scott, when you get to a

15 convenient moment, we'll adjourn, perhaps when you

16 finish this topic.

17 MR. SCOTT: Adjourn for the day, Your Honour,

18 or for a break?

19 JUDGE MAY: No, for a break.

20 MR. SCOTT: Thank you. All right. I think

21 we can cover this exhibit in fairly short order.

22 Q. This is another of the ECMM reports, is that

23 correct, sir?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. And directing your attention to the last

Page 7533

1 page, this is signed by someone named Brix-Andersen?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who is Brix-Andersen?

4 A. Ole Brix-Andersen was a Danish Ambassador

5 sitting at our headquarter in Zagreb.

6 Q. Looking at the text of this report,

7 approximately a little over one and a half pages, I

8 take it much of this report would, in fact, have been

9 written at the level of RC Zenica; is that correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Do you recall whether you or Mr. Landry or

12 Mr. Laustsen, in fact, had a hand in preparing this

13 report?

14 A. I think this report is made on conclusions

15 of -- on our reports.

16 Q. So again, you would have done your daily

17 reports and then people above you, such as Mr. Thebault

18 or others, would have consolidated those reports into

19 another report; is that correct?

20 A. Yes. This is a report sent from

21 Brix-Andersen to the Danish Minister of Foreign

22 Affairs, because at that time Denmark had chairmanship

23 in the EC, and that's why Brix-Andersen is sending his

24 report to a Danish government.

25 Q. For the record, I'm sure everyone knows, but

Page 7534

1 when you say the "EC" you're talking about the -- what

2 was then the European Community?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And in terms of conclusions and assessments

5 stated in this document, would you agree with them,

6 sir, and were they consistent with your observations in

7 Central Bosnia in the middle of April 1993?

8 A. Yes.

9 MR. SCOTT: I think we can stop there, Your

10 Honour, for now.

11 JUDGE MAY: You're moving on to a new topic?

12 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We shall be sitting

14 until quarter to 5.00. We will adjourn for ten minutes

15 now.

16 I see you've got quite a bit to do, but if

17 you can complete the witness today so we may start

18 cross-examination tomorrow, it may allow the witness to

19 finish.

20 MR. SCOTT: We'll push on, Your Honour.

21 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

22 --- Recess taken at 3.47 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 4.04 p.m.


25 MR. SCOTT: Yes, sir, Your Honour.

Page 7535

1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: To which paragraph did you

2 reach?

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, I've reached

4 approximately 168, which, in light of the Court's

5 concerns of objections, I'm not going to ask, but

6 that's 168.

7 JUDGE BENNOUNA: I hope you will follow the

8 direction of the -- the president's direction to allow

9 us to finish this afternoon.

10 MR. SCOTT: I would like to, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Thank you.

12 MR. SCOTT: In fact, I was just going to say

13 that I have confirmed with Mr. Sayers again the exact

14 numbers of the more objectionable paragraphs, and he

15 confirmed that we have the same number, so again, with

16 both that in mind and the Court's direction in mind,

17 I'll go back to leading through the paragraphs fairly

18 quickly, unless and until there is further objection.

19 And I'll advise the witness of that as well, so we'll

20 probably move quickly, but with a view toward the

21 interpreters as well.

22 Q. Major, you testified this morning, correct,

23 that the proposed province 9 under the Vance-Owen Plan

24 was this -- included Zenica, which, in contrast to

25 provinces 8 and 10, was a Muslim majority --

Page 7536

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- province?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. In the course of your tour of duty in Central

5 Bosnia, did you see conduct that appeared to you not

6 only to move Muslim Bosnians out of province 10, but

7 also to move Croats out of province 9?

8 A. Yes, we did.

9 Q. Is it correct that in some of these

10 instances, it involved the movement of Bosnian Croats

11 who were living in Zenica and the surrounding villages,

12 with the apparent purpose of increasing the Croat

13 populations; that is, by moving these Croats and then

14 increasing the Croat populations in Vitez and Travnik?

15 A. Yes, that's correct.

16 Q. And can you tell the Court, is it correct

17 that on the 24th of April, 1993, there were a lot of

18 rumours being stated or circulated among the Bosnian

19 Croats saying that the Muslims were going to attack and

20 kill all of the Croats in Zenica and the small villages

21 south, and, I might add, west of Zenica? Is that

22 correct?

23 A. That's correct. We formed a team and we

24 investigated the rumours. We even took the Catholic

25 priest in Zenica with us in the team to do some

Page 7537

1 fact-finding in that area.

2 Q. And the Catholic priest was Father Stjepan?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And if I can direct your attention and the

5 Court's attention to Exhibit 696, I'm going to handle

6 the next several exhibits as a group, if we can,

7 major. If you look at Exhibit 696, would you also have

8 in front of you and look at Exhibit 698.

9 Based on your investigation, sir, can you

10 tell us whether -- the statements in Exhibits 696 and

11 698, did you find the statements in those documents to

12 be consistent with or supported by the facts on the

13 ground as you found them?

14 A. Actually, when we were doing our

15 fact-finding, there was nothing there that we could

16 relate to those documents.

17 Q. Let me ask you, on 696, at the first

18 paragraph, it ends by saying that the Mujahedin forces

19 have, quote, "even started using tanks against women

20 and children." Did you have any evidence or have any

21 information at the time that any Muslim forces had used

22 tanks against women and children?

23 A. No.

24 Q. In reference to paragraph -- excuse me,

25 Exhibit 698, did you find any information to support

Page 7538

1 the allegation toward the bottom of the text of that

2 statement that 60 civilians have been massacred in the

3 Kuber area?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Would you look next at Exhibit 708. In

6 Exhibit 708, Colonel Blaskic makes the allegation that,

7 again, second and third paragraphs: "In the city

8 itself, the arresting, harassing, and robbing of

9 civilian women and children is going on for a long time

10 now. The men arrested are thrown under tanks."

11 A. No.

12 Q. You saw no facts to support that?

13 A. No. And I can remember that we asked for

14 proofs, and they were not able to provide us with

15 proofs, and we didn't find any proofs on this during

16 our fact-finding.

17 Q. Going to Exhibit 718, this is a Busovaca

18 Joint Commission report for the 18th of April, 1993.

19 Directing your attention to paragraph 8, there was a

20 meeting -- the members of the Busovaca or

21 representatives of the Busovaca Joint Commission met

22 with Mario Cerkez around that time, around the 18th of

23 April; is that correct?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Looking down a couple of lines into that same

Page 7539

1 paragraph, it makes a reference to the hearsay massacre

2 in Zenica and the Kuber hills, and then he goes on to

3 say, with apparent reference to Mr. Cerkez: "He is

4 also concerned of BiH digging trenches near the BritBat

5 camp."

6 Once again, had you seen any information to

7 support any alleged massacre around Zenica or the Kuber

8 hills?

9 A. No. During our fact-finding, we only found

10 minor damage in those villages.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I wanted to find out: Was

12 the fact-finding in response --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was the fact-finding in

15 response to specific allegations of Muslim atrocities?

16 A. Your Honour, every time when we had a protest

17 or something similar, we went to that area to see if we

18 were able to confirm the protest, to see if anything

19 had happened or it just was a rumour or some sort of

20 propaganda.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.


23 Q. Before continuing on, if we can go back and

24 look at Exhibit 696, the document apparently signed by

25 Dario Kordic. This was sent to, among other things --

Page 7540

1 excuse me, among other persons or organisations, it was

2 sent to Colonel Stewart, it was sent to Mr. Thebault,

3 it was sent to the Red Cross in Zenica. Is that

4 correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Directing your attention to the second

7 paragraph, Mr. Kordic and the others said, "We ask your

8 help in organising the evacuation of the Zenica Croats

9 to the area of Cajdras." Do you see that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Again, what would have been the effect, in

12 terms of the movement of populations and ethnic groups,

13 from moving the Croats from around Zenica to further

14 west, around to the west of Cajdras, in connection with

15 the Vance-Owen Plan?

16 A. Yes. This was obvious, that the HVO wanted

17 all the Croats out of province number 9 -- it was the

18 Muslim province -- and move them to province number 10.

19 Q. All right. Now, continuing on, please, did

20 you find -- I'm looking now, Your Honour, at paragraph

21 174.

22 Did you find, around this time, then, that

23 there was a movement of Croats out of Zenica and the

24 surrounding area to a location including and around the

25 Croat village of Grahovcici? And my apologies for the

Page 7541

1 pronunciation.

2 A. Yes, because of all these rumours, a lot of

3 Croats flew out of Zenica, and I think it was 2.000

4 Croats who went to Grahovcici.

5 Q. Directing your attention to Exhibit 765, in

6 connection with these rumours and the movement of

7 Croats out of Zenica, did the ECMM prepare a report

8 titled "Special Report on Croats in Zenica,

9 20/21 April, 1993," which has been marked as 765?

10 I'm sorry, is that correct, sir? Was such a

11 report prepared?

12 A. Yes, it was.

13 Q. And, in fact, looking at the second page, is

14 it signed by three ECMM monitors, or at least in typed

15 script, including yourself, "Lars"?

16 A. Yes. The other two are Torborn Juhnov, a

17 Swedish monitor, and Remi Landry, the Canadian monitor.

18 Q. Now, with particular attention to paragraph

19 number 2, did your report state -- and I'm not going to

20 read the entire paragraph, but just to set the scene:

21 "The following Zenica Croat suburbs were visited to

22 clarify the housing situation and see if it was safe to

23 have their inhabitants return," and you give a list of

24 villages, including Cajdras; do you see that?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7542

1 Q. Skipping down to about the end of that

2 paragraph before you get to the list of villages. Is

3 it correct, sir, that --

4 "In all of the villages visited, the Croats

5 interviewed mentioned that they had received aid and

6 protection from their Muslim neighbours during the

7 fighting."

8 And then you give a list after that of the

9 damage or situation in each of those villages; is that

10 correct?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. Going to item 3 on the next page, that makes

13 reference to your trip with Father Stjepan?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Item 3(A):

16 "In that village, the village was not

17 damaged, and the local Croats told us that they were

18 protected by their Muslim neighbours."

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Now, directing your attention to item 4,

21 "Conclusions," did you and your team reach the

22 conclusion that:

23 "Except for the village of Zaljev, the

24 damages were less than expected. Father Stjepan had

25 been told that all of the above-mentioned villages had

Page 7543

1 been destroyed and left."

2 A. Yes, that's correct.

3 Q. And in terms of your observations in these

4 villages at this time, is it true and correct then that

5 Father Stjepan agreed, a Croat, a Croat Catholic

6 priest, agreed with your assessment?

7 A. Yes. He asked us to help in getting the

8 refugees or the few people back to their homes.

9 Q. I'm jumping ahead, based on the testimony in

10 the last few minutes, to paragraph 181.

11 The net results of this mission was that you

12 found that-- you thought they -- ECMM, in an assessment

13 with which Father Stjepan agreed, that the Bosnian

14 Croats who had fled that area could, in fact, safely

15 move back into their homes?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. You then and mister -- excuse me, Father

18 Stjepan went to Grahovcici and arranged to meet with

19 representatives of the Croat refugees to tell them that

20 it was safe for them to go home?

21 A. Yes, that's correct. And Morsink was there

22 as well.

23 Q. Is it correct there were about 2.000 Croat

24 refugees in that village?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7544

1 Q. When you talked to the Croat refugees, is it

2 correct that they told you that when they fled the

3 villages, they had been told rumours or heard rumours

4 of Muslim killings and attacks in those villages?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. And that those rumours had come from other

7 Croats?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Did you learn that the various stories that

10 were being spread around that time about alleged Muslim

11 perpetrated massacres were being used to scare the

12 Bosnian Croats from going back to their homes around

13 Zenica?

14 A. Yes.

15 MR. SAYERS: Once again, I object to that

16 sort of question. I think it's leading and it calls

17 for opinions that are beyond the expertise of the

18 witness, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: The witness can say, in this

20 court, what he was told by the refugees.


22 Q. On the 26th of April, 1993, you and

23 Mr. Morsink and Father Stjepan developed a plan and

24 went back to Grahovcici with the plan to transport the

25 Croats back to their homes using some buses that Father

Page 7545

1 Stjepan had actually arranged for; is that correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. Is it correct, sir that at an HVO checkpoint

4 at Novi Selo, the convoy was stopped and refused

5 passage by the HVO military police?

6 A. Yes, that's correct. And they it even took

7 the buses from us and left us without the buses.

8 Q. Did the military police indicate to you

9 where -- well, strike that.

10 Is it correct that the military police said

11 that the HVO in Travnik had ordered that all refugees

12 be stopped from returning to their homes around Zenica

13 and that they instead be taken to Novi Bila?

14 A. Yes, that's correct. That's what they used

15 our buses to do.

16 Q. If we can just momentarily look back at 2574,

17 the map from the newspaper article. If you can just

18 put that on the ELMO, then we can refer to that rather

19 than everyone needing to perhaps go digging for it.

20 Sir, looking at the map which is 2574, can

21 you look at that map and, perhaps if there's anyway to

22 get closer, some in closer on the border between 9 and

23 10 -- is there anyway the video unit can do that?

24 Thank you very much.

25 The movement of these Croats from -- which

Page 7546

1 started out around Zenica and to take them to Novi

2 Bila, would that have the effect of moving these Croats

3 from province 9 and into province 10?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. In talking to the refugees, sir, did you

6 learn that many of them had, in fact, wanted to return

7 to their own homes following your visit and Father

8 Stjepan's visit the day or two before, but they told

9 you that when they arrived at an HVO checkpoint they

10 were stopped and forced to go back by the HVO to

11 Grahovcici?

12 A. Yes. We had a meeting with some

13 representatives from the refugees in Grahovcici, and

14 they told us that some of them already tried to get

15 back to their homes but they were stopped by HVO at

16 checkpoints and forced back to Grahovcici. The Croat

17 refugees told us that the HVO soldiers fired their

18 weapons against them, to force them --

19 Q. Warning shots?

20 A. Yes, warning shots, to force them back.

21 Q. Now, it's correct, sir, that you and your

22 group eventually got these buses back from the HVO; is

23 that correct?

24 A. Yes, because we made a protest at the spot.

25 At the same time a UNMO, United Nations military

Page 7547

1 observer, came to that area and he helped us, by his

2 radio equipment, to send this protest to someone, and

3 after a while we got our buses back.

4 Q. As a result of that were you, in fact,

5 ultimately able to arrange for approximately 1.400 of

6 these 2.000 to be returned to their own houses back in

7 the area around Zenica?

8 A. Yes, that's correct. The rest -- I think,

9 300 had already been forced by HVO -- or moved by HVO

10 to the Bila area, and 300 of them wanted to stay in

11 Grahovcici.

12 Q. All right. Now, moving forward, toward the

13 end of April --

14 MR. SCOTT: I'm looking at paragraph 194,

15 Mr. President.

16 Q. Toward the end of April, did you engage in

17 another series of missions now in a different part of

18 that area in Central Bosnia, more to the south around

19 Kiseljak?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is it correct that based -- that the ECMM

22 had, during this time, developed increasing concerns

23 about what was happening in the Muslim villages in the

24 Kiseljak area?

25 A. Yes, that's correct.

Page 7548

1 Q. On the 27th of April, is it correct that an

2 ECMM team consisting of you and Henk Morsink travelled

3 to the Kiseljak area with the UNHCR and a doctor and a

4 nurse from Medecins du Monde, under escort of two

5 Canadian Battalion armoured personnel carriers which

6 themselves were equipped with heavy machine-guns?

7 A. Yes, that's correct.

8 Q. Why did you have to go with armoured

9 personnel carriers at that time?

10 A. Because at the time it was not safe for us to

11 travel around the area in our soft-skinned vehicles.

12 It happened often, almost every day, that someone shot

13 after us, so we were not secure in our soft-skinned

14 vehicles. Therefore, in this part we could not move

15 without armed protection from UNPROFOR. And

16 specifically when we were going to the --

17 Q. I'm sorry. If we could stop for a moment.

18 I'm sorry, it's my fault. I missed one exhibit.

19 Before we continue on to Kiseljak, would you

20 just look at Exhibit 832? We'll just identify it and

21 move on.

22 Is Exhibit 832 a report that you prepared and

23 bears your signature on the second page, your report

24 for the 26th of April, 1993, which talks about your

25 efforts to return these Bosnian Croats from the Bosnian

Page 7549

1 Croat territory back to the area around Zenica?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And if the Court has the time to read the

4 document, they'll see that it talks about the fact of

5 the three -- the story about the three buses and all

6 the rest of that story; is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Very well. All right. Now, if we can go

9 back to Kiseljak. So you're moving around in armoured

10 personnel carriers now because, in fact, for safety

11 reasons it was necessary?

12 A. Yes, it was.

13 Q. Is it correct then that on the 27th of April,

14 you and Mr. Morsink went to the Rotilj near Kiseljak?

15 A. Yes, we did.

16 Q. Did you have reports that Muslim civilians in

17 this village had been killed by the HVO?

18 A. Yes. That was one of the reasons that we

19 were going to Rotilj again. There had been a team

20 there earlier. They had reported on incidents in

21 Rotilj, and now we went to Rotilj to see how the

22 civilians were there.

23 Q. All right.

24 A. And if they still were there.

25 Q. If I can direct your attention to

Page 7550

1 Exhibit 818. This is a report by your colleague --

2 well, two of your colleagues, including on the second

3 page, Remi Landry; is that correct?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Was it on the basis of Mr. Landry's report,

6 which you can see on the top part of the first page of

7 the report concerns the village Rotilj -- do you see

8 that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. In fact, was it largely based on his report

11 that you organised a mission to go to Rotilj?

12 A. Yes. That was why we were bringing a nurse

13 and a doctor and a representative from UNHCR, because

14 they were not able to have any help because Rotilj is

15 situated in what you would call a valley and surrounded

16 by a hilly terrain, and on this hilly terrain the HVO

17 had positions. So every time some of the inhabitants

18 of Rotilj tried to go out of the village, they were

19 shot at. So the HVO controlled that area, and so they

20 were not able to have any food or anything else into

21 the village. We knew from the team with Remi Landry

22 and Dimitrios Dagos that there was a lack of help, so

23 we went in with some help.

24 Q. When you tried to enter -- well, were you

25 able to actually get into Rotilj that day?

Page 7551

1 A. Into Rotilj, yes.

2 Q. Now, did you move, on that day, to another

3 Muslim village called Gomionica?

4 A. Yes, because we heard from UNPROFOR

5 headquarters in Kiseljak that they were able to see

6 that there had been a lot of burning houses in that

7 area, but the headquarters in Kiseljak was not able --

8 the UNPROFOR headquarters in Kiseljak was not able to

9 go up there. Therefore, we went to Gomionica to

10 monitor the situation there.

11 Q. All right. By the way, did you find the

12 conditions that you saw in Rotilj, yourself, to be

13 consistent and to bear out Mr. Landry's report?

14 A. Yes. We were told exactly the same about the

15 situation, and we were told about the incidents by the

16 inhabitants.

17 Q. I'm sorry, but to direct your attention back

18 to Exhibit 818, what you saw when you went to Rotilj

19 supported the allegations set forth in Mr. Landry's

20 report; is that correct?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Now, did you try -- you tried to get into

23 Gomionica, and what was the result of that?

24 A. Actually, we were not allowed. We tried the

25 first one checkpoint -- one route -- road into

Page 7552

1 Gomionica, but we were stopped at the checkpoint. Then

2 we tried another road into Gomionica and again we were

3 stopped at a checkpoint. At this checkpoint -- both

4 those checkpoints were manned by HVO. At the last

5 checkpoint they gave us ten seconds to leave that

6 area. They put up the anti-tank gun in firing

7 positions against us and aimed all their weapons

8 against us.

9 Q. Around that time, were you -- did the HVO

10 commander at that particular checkpoint tell you that

11 he had orders from the HVO commander in Kiseljak, Ivica

12 Rajic, to close all the roads and stop all U.N. and

13 ECMM vehicles from travelling in that area?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. I take it, based upon this threat of arms,

16 you and your team did leave the checkpoint?

17 A. Yes, we did.

18 Q. By the way, in the course of your testimony

19 today, is it fair to say that in the course of your

20 travels around Central Bosnia, you had frequent

21 problems at HVO checkpoints?

22 A. Yes, that's correct.

23 Q. In connection with the map that we were

24 looking at earlier today, we also saw that there were

25 some ABiH checkpoints. Did you have any problems

Page 7553

1 moving through those checkpoints?

2 A. Not through those checkpoints, no.

3 Q. All right.

4 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour.

5 Q. All right. Now, moving on to 1920, if we can

6 look at Exhibit 1920, on Exhibit 1920,1, have you

7 marked on this aerial photograph the location of the

8 two checkpoints which you tried to -- it's actually

9 three, I'm sorry -- that you tried to gain access

10 through around the village of Rotilj and Gomionica --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- on the 26th and 27th of April?

13 A. Right. We were stopped at this checkpoint at

14 first [indicates], and the second time we were stopped

15 at this checkpoint [indicates].

16 Q. All right. Which of the checkpoints -- do

17 you recall which checkpoint it was where the officer

18 said that he had orders from Ivica Rajic to not let

19 U.N. vehicles move around the area?

20 A. It was in this checkpoint up here

21 [indicates]. And this checkpoint was heavily manned.

22 There was only a few soldiers in this checkpoint

23 [indicates], but this checkpoint was a very heavily

24 manned and armed checkpoint.

25 Q. Now, moving forward, then, paragraph 211:

Page 7554

1 Did you and your team then try to visit the villages of

2 Polje Visnjica and Visnjica?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And your group was stopped there again by HVO

5 checkpoints and denied access to those villages?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Is it correct, sir, that on that occasion the

8 HVO soldiers placed mines on the road in front of you

9 and took firing positions against you with

10 rocket-propelled grenades?

11 A. Yes. They had a lot of anti-armour mines on

12 a rope, and they pulled this rope with the mines out in

13 front of us. And again, they took fire positions

14 against us with anti-armour weapons, anti-tank weapons.

15 Q. And then your group, as a result of this, on

16 that day, on the 27th of April, returned to Zenica?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What was the result of your not being able to

19 get into these villages? I mean, how did this affect

20 your ability to carry out your mission that day, by

21 being turned back at all of these various checkpoints?

22 A. We were not able to carry out our task for

23 that day, so we were not able to monitor the situation

24 in the area. And it was obvious for us that it was

25 because the HVO didn't want us to monitor the

Page 7555

1 situation, and that indicated that something had

2 happened in those areas.

3 Q. On the 28th of April, did another ECMM team,

4 including yourself, and again a nurse, go to the area

5 north of Visoko to investigate the situation involving

6 Muslim refugees in that area?

7 A. Yes, we did.

8 Q. And did you find that when you moved up --

9 I'm going on to paragraph 214 -- that when you went to

10 the Red Cross in Visoko, that you found that

11 approximately 1.038 Muslim refugees had come from the

12 Kiseljak area, including the villages of Svinjarevo,

13 Jehovac, Gromiljak, Behrici, Gomionica, and Bilalovac,

14 had come from that area and enrolled with the Red Cross

15 just in the few days around that time?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And these were refugees in fact coming from

18 the very villages that you were trying to investigate

19 based on the allegations of Croat atrocities?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. If we can look at Exhibit 835, is Exhibit 835

22 a report prepared by you and Mr. Morsink?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And it bears your signature on the bottom of

25 the page?

Page 7556

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Does this report describe your efforts to go

3 into the villages that you described a few moments ago

4 on the 27th of April, 1993?

5 A. Yes, that's correct.

6 Q. And directing your attention to the last line

7 of -- the last sentence of what would be -- well, it's

8 hard to describe. If you can see, maybe you can find

9 where I'm making reference.

10 This confirmed again, and you did include in

11 your report, that the HVO commander, quote, "stated

12 that his commander, Ivica Rajic, had given orders to

13 stop all U.N./UNHCR and ECMM vehicles"; is that right?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And looking to Exhibit 841, is this your

16 report from the 28th of April, 1993?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. And in reference to the second part of

19 numbered paragraph 1, this records your conclusions

20 about the 1.038 refugees coming from the Kiseljak area;

21 is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you got to Gomionica on the -- I don't

24 know if it was the second or third time you had tried

25 to enter the village, you did, in fact, finally succeed

Page 7557

1 in entering the village; is that correct?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And is it correct, sir, that what you found

4 when you got there is that the village was totally

5 destroyed; all of the inhabitants had left the area?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. And is it correct that when you left your

8 vehicles and tried to conduct a more detailed

9 investigation, that you and your colleagues were shot

10 at by several bursts of automatic weapons fire?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And did you know from which positions this

13 automatic weapons fire came?

14 A. From the HVO positions.

15 Q. And were you once again forced to withdraw

16 from that area?

17 A. We had to do it, yes. Even if we had those

18 APCs from CanBat, we were not allowed to return the

19 fire at that time, because of our rules of engagement.

20 Q. In fact, a very momentary story, sir: You

21 found yourself lying in a ditch for a while, being

22 fired at by machine guns; is that correct?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. And how did you get out of that situation?

25 A. Actually the two APCs -- we were not close to

Page 7558

1 the APCs, but they were able, when there was a pause in

2 the fighting, to rescue us out.

3 Q. So the APCs came -- essentially the APCs came

4 to you and were able to get you out of the situation?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Is it correct, sir, that on the 29th of

7 April, an ECMM team, including yourself, with, again,

8 an armed Canadian Battalion escort, visited the Muslim

9 villages of Polje Visnjica, Visnjica, Hercezi, Doci,

10 and Gomionica?

11 A. Yes. At this time we were allowed -- we could

12 go into Gomionica without problems.

13 Q. And could I ask you --

14 MR. SCOTT: I suggest the court look at

15 Exhibit 847.

16 What I suggest, Your Honour, I think we can

17 finish this exhibit, and we will be at least well on

18 our way to finishing the rest of the exam.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes.


21 Q. Is 847 a copy of your report, along with

22 Mr. Laustsen --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- on the 29th of April?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7559

1 Q. And you signed the bottom?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. All right. The conclusions I will let, I

4 think, speak for themselves in 2, in your findings in

5 paragraph 2 about village-by-village -- going to the

6 protest, can you tell the Court what had happened in

7 connection with the HVO checkpoint about which you

8 lodged a complaint?

9 A. We were stopped in the checkpoint at Polje

10 Visnjica, and our interpreter, who was a young Muslim

11 man, was taken out of our vehicle and was threatened --

12 and they told him that -- actually, they wanted to

13 shoot him, but they didn't because we were there.

14 Q. And as a result of your mission on that day,

15 directing your attention to paragraph 4, would you just

16 simply read that into the record, please.

17 A. Paragraph 4?

18 Q. Yes.

19 A. "Team conclusion, it is obvious that an

20 ethnic cleansing had taken place in that area."

21 MR. SCOTT: I propose we stop there,

22 Mr. President.

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Scott. You'll start

24 again, then --

25 MR. SCOTT: At 219.

Page 7560

1 JUDGE MAY: -- at 219, and you have four more

2 pages to go.

3 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour. I think we've

4 moved, if I may say so, I think very quickly with a

5 very major witness. We'll try to continue doing so.

6 We're trying to move as fast as we can.

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, clearly we've moved

8 with some speed.

9 Perhaps I can say to the Defence I hope that

10 can be kept up tomorrow. You will have the best part

11 of the morning in which to cross-examine. If possible,

12 the witness should get away. It is unfair on witnesses

13 to have to come back.

14 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I agree that it's

15 unfair for witnesses to have to come back, but this

16 witness has given a colossal number of opinions today,

17 and we're going to have to cross-examine him on those,

18 and I do not think that we will be through in half a

19 day. Perhaps one day.

20 JUDGE MAY: You know, we must speed the

21 cross-examinations up. I know this is an important

22 witness, and I know that -- and I'm not criticising you

23 in particular, Mr. Sayers, but when a witness takes a

24 certain amount of time in chief, it's quite wrong that

25 the cross-examination should take sometimes 50 per cent

Page 7561

1 longer. There is a Rule here that cross-examination

2 should be limited purely to matters which were covered

3 in examination-in-chief, or direct examination, and I

4 think that rule has got to be followed more closely.

5 And I shall be certainly watching out for that.

6 Of course you must have time to put your case

7 and to cross-examine an important witness fully, but we

8 must make as much progress as we can, and if possible,

9 I suggest we try and finish the witness.

10 MR. SAYERS: I agree entirely, Your Honour,

11 and I think that we've been through with many of the

12 witnesses -- there have been about 50 witnesses who

13 have testified, much of the background material, and I

14 will try assiduously to avoid reploughing that

15 territory which has been ploughed very many times. I'm

16 going to try to bore in on the opinions that this

17 witness has given, and the grounds for them, with the

18 Trial Chamber's permission. Thank you.

19 JUDGE MAY: Well, I agree that he's covered a

20 lot of territory, and we have covered it quickly today,

21 but let's keep it up tomorrow.

22 Half past 9.00.

23 Major, would you be back, please, at half

24 past 9.00 tomorrow, to continue with your evidence.

25 A. I'll do that, Your Honour.

Page 7562

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

2 4.50 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

3 the 24th day of September, 1999, at

4 9.30 a.m.