1 Wednesday, 20th October, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

7 IT-95-14/2-T, The Prosecutor versus Dario Kordic and

8 Mario Cerkez.

9 JUDGE MAY: Everybody seems to be standing

10 up.

11 Mr. Jennings, would you like to take a seat

12 for the moment, please, while we deal with these

13 matters. Yes, Mr. Sayers.

14 MR. SAYERS: Very briefly, Your Honour. The

15 Prosecution was kind enough to send us over last night

16 the final version of the outline of the testimony of

17 this witness, and I would just like to inform the Court

18 that we do not object to the Prosecution leading a

19 large part of the evidence, with the exception of

20 certain specified paragraphs, which I would like to

21 relate to the Court right now, if I may.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

23 MR. SAYERS: 19, 21 to 23, 26 to 40, 42, 43,

24 48 to 53.

25 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Excuse me,

1 Mr. Sayers. Did you say, if I heard well, 26 to 40,

2 from 26 to 40?

3 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 JUDGE MAY: Is there any objection to the

6 witness having a copy of the summary?

7 MR. SAYERS: I don't think so, Your Honour.

8 MR. NICE: May the witness take the solemn

9 declaration.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice,

11 please.

12 THE COURT: If you would like to take the

13 declaration, Major.

14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

15 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the

16 truth.

17 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat

18 now.

19 WITNESS: PHILIP JENNINGS

20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there is a small

21 number of exhibit --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

23 MR. NICE: There is a small number of

24 exhibits to be produced by this witness. I've had them

25 put together in chronological order. May they now be

1 distributed to the Chamber.

2 Examined by Mr. Nice:

3 MR. NICE: The Chamber may find it helpful,

4 without otherwise disturbing the selection of exhibits,

5 to look a little over halfway through for a

6 black-and-white, a three-sized map, and possibly to

7 take it out, although it may in due course return to

8 its position in the sequence.

9 JUDGE MAY: Number?

10 MR. NICE: It's 2781,1.

11 The reason I suggest to take it out is this:

12 As you'll hear from the witness, this is part of a map

13 that was provided to him by Mr. Kordic, and he keeps

14 the original of it. It happens to be a very good map

15 in terms of the detail it provides. I've asked the

16 witness, with the help of the usher, to leave the

17 coloured original on the ELMO so that it can, I think,

18 now be seen. It may prove a useful, regular point of

19 reference for us.

20 It's worth noting immediately, that although

21 the map is, I think, thought by the witness to be

22 accurate, it bears different grid lines and different

23 grid line numberings from the other map, with which we

24 are more familiar.

25 Q. Your full name, please?

1 A. Philip Francis Andrew Jennings.

2 Q. And you are presently a Major?

3 A. That is correct.

4 Q. A career officer?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. With the Cheshire Regiment?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Presently studying within your career for a

9 master of philosophy degree at Newcastle University?

10 A. That is correct.

11 Q. Being deployed in the former Yugoslavia in

12 the early part of 1993, taking command of a company

13 there on the 13th of January?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. The operations area that was your

16 responsibility, can you show it on the ELMO?

17 We'll just check that our video is working.

18 It wasn't working earlier. Your Honour, I don't know

19 if the Court has a picture. We don't.

20 JUDGE MAY: No.

21 THE WITNESS: No.

22 JUDGE MAY: What are they doing? It's

23 working.

24 MR. NICE: Thank you.

25 A. The map which you can see shows part of the

1 area, of my area of operational responsibility. You

2 can just bring it out more and do a slight refold.

3 Excuse me a moment, please. If I go from west to east,

4 the area of operational responsibility covered past

5 Vitez, which is shown here, up to the town of Travnik,

6 past it to Turbe, which was actually the front line

7 between the opposing forces at the time and down to a

8 place called Novi Travnik. Through Vitez itself, down

9 towards a bridge which I called the Kaonik Bridge, and

10 then going south on this road through Busovaca, and

11 down on that road to where it met Sarajevo just south

12 of Kiseljak. A mountain road going over the top to the

13 town of Zenica and the road which went from the Kaonik

14 Bridge through a place called Luke, which then -- it's

15 just off the map here -- looped around and was the main

16 approach route to Zenica.

17 That, and just off the road, were the main

18 areas of my responsibility.

19 Q. Was the UNPROFOR mission to support UNHCR in

20 the delivery of humanitarian aid?

21 A. Yes, the UNPROFOR mission was to conduct

22 operation in support of UNHCR in order to -- that being

23 the key; those are the key words: deliver humanitarian

24 aid. And it was up to us to interpret at that mission

25 to ensure that that aid was delivered.

1 Q. Very well. Incidentally, Major Jennings, the

2 reason I pause is to ensure that interpreters catch

3 up.

4 Were there two main approaches, one from

5 Mostar via Busovaca and the second via Prozor and

6 Gornji Vakuf?

7 A. That is correct. These were the two main

8 supply routes from the coast.

9 Q. Your commanding officer was Colonel Stewart.

10 With his approval, although you were commanding a

11 company, did you carry out certain liaison officer

12 functions, concentrating those functions on Busovaca,

13 Kacuni -- and if you want to point them out as I speak

14 them, do -- Busovaca, Kacuni --

15 A. Just a moment. I'll move the map again.

16 Q. Thank you. Merdani?

17 A. So Busovaca, Kacuni [Indicating].

18 Q. Merdani, and Katici, the purpose of these

19 liaison functions being to learn about local commanders

20 on both sides, HVO and ABiH, and pursuant to what the

21 army calls an implied task to negotiate with them?

22 A. That is correct.

23 Q. Although you were performing some of these

24 liaison functions, the official liaison officers at the

25 time were Martyn Forgrave, for Novi Travnik and

1 Travnik, and Matthew Dundas-Whatley for Zenica?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Did you meet the BiH commanders, Kulenovic

4 for Travnik, Refik Lendo for Novi Travnik; the HVO

5 commander, Colonel Filipovic?

6 A. I did.

7 Q. And on the 20th of January, at a meeting

8 attended by Forgrave, did Kulenovic inform you that the

9 situation in Travnik was tense, such that a small

10 incident could spark off a Muslim/Croat clash?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. And you or all of you assessed this as being

13 probably a genuine depiction of the position?

14 A. That is what we felt at the time.

15 Q. The HVO had a checkpoint on the main

16 Travnik/Novi Travnik junction -- which you can just

17 identify for us, if it's shown on that map --

18 A. I think it's just --

19 Q. It's just off, is it?

20 A. It's just off the map.

21 Q. We know it, in any event; we're familiar with

22 that -- which was reinforced with HVO soldiers and a

23 twin 30-millimetre gun mounted on a flat-bed truck?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. On the 21st of January, in Vitez, at a

1 conference, was it stated that the ABiH had set up a

2 new checkpoint in Busovaca, and this was interpreted as

3 an increase in tension; and that day or night, were

4 there eight explosions recorded within the Muslim

5 enclave, the HVO having set up checkpoints at either

6 end of the town?

7 A. That is correct. All of this was reported at

8 the daily 5.00 conference by the milinfo section, which

9 I remember at the time.

10 Q. You travelled to Tuzla on the 22nd, returning

11 on the 24th of January, to discover that the situation

12 in Kacuni was serious, two Croats having been killed

13 when a gun was fired at their vehicle which had slipped

14 into a convoy?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. You heard of this, I think, from the adjutant

17 who had gone to Kiseljak?

18 A. I heard it on the high-frequency net on my

19 Land Rover, and I listened to the reports, as did

20 everyone else on the net, as they were coming in, as

21 the situation unfolded.

22 Q. You went to collect the bodies and assessed

23 that in the two days you'd been away, tension in the

24 area had risen from tolerable to high?

25 A. Yes, that is correct.

1 Q. Were you informed of a lorry placed across

2 the road at Kacuni by Muslims?

3 A. I was informed of this on the evening of the

4 24th of January at the time that I was tasked to go out

5 and collect or to supervise the collection of the two

6 Croat bodies.

7 Q. And when you got to the junction -- which you

8 might point out for us --

9 A. The junction in question, please?

10 Q. Yes. Sorry. You headed on the road south to

11 Busovaca to get to Kacuni, and I think at a T-junction,

12 you came across a firefight?

13 A. That's correct. This was very early on the

14 morning of the 25th. I was informed that the lorry,

15 which contained logs, had been placed across the road

16 -- in the headquarters in Vitez I was informed of

17 this, but we decided not to actually go out until first

18 light on the morning of the 25th, and the incident in

19 question took place here [indicates], at this

20 T-junction, where there was a bridge. The name place

21 is Kaonik.

22 And the firefight was intense, an intense

23 amount of single machine-gun fire, and quite a large

24 number of soldiers on either side of the river.

25 Q. You returned to Vitez to discuss the

1 situation with Colonel Stewart; both of you headed for

2 Kacuni the same day, to discover buildings on the main

3 northern approach to Busovaca on fire, the evidence

4 suggesting a hurried departure by residents: For

5 example, laundry was smouldering, left outside

6 smouldering, along with houses that were burning;

7 things like that?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Busovaca had been subject to explosion and

10 fire, recent explosion and fire, and your assessment

11 was that explosions had occurred there prior to the

12 outbreak of fighting on the 24th of January; you

13 discovered new roadblocks, manned by the HVO, which it

14 was not possible to bypass, one at the north and one at

15 the south of the town?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. As recently as the 11th to the 16th of

18 January, you having travelled the same area and found

19 it safe to travel in a single armoured Land Rover?

20 A. That's correct.

21 A point worth making is that we felt safe

22 travelling in a Land Rover on its own, and we had clear

23 guidelines as to what type of vehicle could go out on

24 the road, whether it was a Warrior or a Land Rover,

25 whether it could go on its own or in pairs, dependent

1 on the assessed situation and how dangerous it was

2 deemed to be. And at that time, between the 11th and

3 the 16th, there was free movement of single vehicles.

4 Q. On the 25th of January, did you, in convoy

5 with Colonel Stewart, reach Kacuni --

6 A. Yes, I did.

7 Q. -- stopping some 40 metres short of the

8 bridge to discover that a lorry with flattened tires

9 blocked the road to anyone approaching from the north?

10 If you would just like to indicate again on the map,

11 and I'll read on.

12 A. [Indicates]

13 Q. Could you see HVO soldiers who had moved into

14 buildings no more than two to three hundred metres away

15 in the northern outskirts of Kacuni, and some time

16 later, did then-Brigadier Cordy-Simpson arrive from the

17 south, he, with Colonel Stewart, negotiating the

18 removal of the lorry, which was eventually removed; but

19 during this time, did you see HVO soldiers move into

20 position with a Wombat-type weapon which the HVO then

21 fired directly at civilian houses in Kacuni with very

22 destructive effect, the houses being targeted

23 effectively for summary destruction, there being no

24 justification for the military action taken, apart from

25 a single and apparently accidental or negligent

1 discharge of one rifle by one ABiH soldier in the area?

2 A. Yes, that is the opinion that I made.

3 JUDGE MAY: What is a Wombat type of weapon?

4 A. Your Honour, the expression is actually the

5 description of a weapon that was in the British armed

6 services when I first joined, but I was subsequently

7 shown pictures of types of weapons, and I identified it

8 as a ZIS-2. This is a wheeled, long-barrelled

9 anti-tank weapon.

10 Q. If the Court would turn now to its bundle of

11 exhibits, and if you'd just look at them again with

12 us. The first one is a map which has been marked,

13 which we can probably put on one side. It was marked

14 by you on an earlier occasion, I think?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. And identifies various places. I'll

17 endeavour to remember to deal with it right at the end

18 of your evidence, see if there is anything we've

19 missed.

20 Does the second sheet, Exhibit 862,2, show

21 the ZIS-2 Wombat type weapon to which you've referred?

22 A. Yes, that is the weapon which I identified.

23 Q. Paragraph 12. Did you intend to accompany

24 Colonel Stewart to Kiseljak, but for mechanical reasons

25 had to stay for some eight hours before your Warrior

1 vehicle could move, and during that time was there

2 intense fighting consistent and increasing, or

3 increased between the HVO and the ABiH until

4 nightfall?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. On the following day, the 26th of January,

7 did you return to Kacuni to see the commander, on

8 instructions to clear the bridge, knowing in advance

9 that it would not have been cleared because the dispute

10 had not been resolved? Was there a large explosion

11 next to your vehicle, which skidded across or off the

12 road? Did you find the lorry still blocking the road,

13 and were the BiH refusing to move it, saying that they

14 anticipated an attack? Colonel Stewart arrived with

15 the 3rd Corps Deputy Commander Merdan, an agreement was

16 reached that BritBat would man the bridges as an U.N.

17 checkpoint, allowing only U.N. and ICRC vehicles to

18 pass?

19 A. That is correct.

20 Q. You stayed at the bridge with the ABiH

21 Commander Sabit, who told you that they were expecting

22 an HVO offensive, three rounds of heavy artillery

23 exploded some 10 metres from you, only half an hour

24 after Colonel Stewart's departure, and one Warrior,

25 indeed, was hit from high ground to the north of Kacuni

1 by machine-gun fire?

2 A. That is correct.

3 Q. Were you able to judge, from your experience,

4 the gauge of artillery?

5 A. Using my experience in training, I was able

6 to judge it was on or around at least 120 millimetre,

7 because I had observed at close quarters such type of

8 fire during training.

9 Q. Were there any obvious military targets in

10 this area? Was there any need for the HVO to use

11 military force in this area?

12 A. Whilst there were some BiH in the houses, and

13 this is the north end of Kacuni next to the bridge

14 where we had established a checkpoint, there were no

15 obvious defensive and certainly no obvious offensive

16 positions. And in my opinion, I felt that the use of

17 such heavy indirect fire, weapons, was not justified.

18 Q. What did you judge to be the intended

19 target?

20 A. As is related in my testimony, when I

21 actually first arrived on the morning of the 26th,

22 there was an explosion next to my Warrior as I

23 approached the bridge, which caused me to skid off the

24 road. Following the three rounds of artillery fire,

25 again related in my testimony, the indirect fire

1 actually continued for an hour or so, of an intensive

2 nature, falling on or around my positions. I had four

3 Warriors with me. I drew the conclusion that I was

4 probably the target of this artillery fire.

5 Q. Did you think that there were no Muslims

6 residing in the houses which you'd seen being

7 destroyed, identifying them nevertheless as Muslim

8 because of their four-sided as opposed to ridged-roof

9 structure? The damage to these houses effected by

10 long-range artillery and Wombat-type small-calibre

11 anti-tank weapon that we've seen being fired at a range

12 of a few hundred metres had some Croat houses,

13 apparently, being caught and incidentally damaged, none

14 actually showing signs of being targeted?

15 A. I saw no Croat-styled houses being targeted

16 by this ZIS-2 weapon. I observed firing on the 25th of

17 January.

18 Q. You identify in your summary that it was at

19 Proscica, north of Busovaca-Kacuni road, that you had

20 actually seen the gun being fired?

21 A. That is correct. It was positioned about 50

22 to 60 metres off the main road, but clearly visible.

23 Q. The ABiH, to your knowledge, had no artillery

24 pieces in the area, and prior to the shelling, from the

25 25th to the 29th of January, had you seen one artillery

1 piece in Busovaca belonging to the HVO, a

2 long-barrelled weapon folded and ready to be moved?

3 A. Yes, I did.

4 Q. Did you deem the use of artillery totally --

5 on Kacuni to be totally unwarranted, and with your

6 knowledge of the way armies operate, did you assess

7 that instructions for such a shelling could not have

8 come from a junior, but must have come from a senior

9 commander, not least because the HVO artillery had

10 limited artillery fire power, and a decision to deploy

11 limited resources could not have been taken at a junior

12 level?

13 A. That was my opinion.

14 Q. Now, what you observed was at a time when it

15 was dangerous to get out of the vehicle, but despite

16 that, were you able to make an assessment, based on

17 experience, of where the artillery was being fired

18 from?

19 A. I was able to make a rough assessment, and I

20 must stress, a rough assessment. This was based on

21 specific training that I had received, which I could go

22 into detail if you wished.

23 Q. For the time being, can we have the

24 conclusion, in case the matter is not challenged, and

25 then we needn't trouble. What was your conclusion as

1 to this source of the artillery?

2 A. I believed that it was coming from the north,

3 northwest from the area of Busovaca itself.

4 Q. However, just tell us this: As part of your

5 method of assessing the source of the artillery, did

6 you look at the craters left by artillery shells?

7 A. When I felt it was safe to do so, I got out

8 of my vehicle and inspected the craters.

9 Q. Was Lieutenant Fooks an officer reporting to

10 you?

11 A. Lieutenant Fooks was directly under my

12 command in C company. He was my troop commander.

13 Q. Did he have any particular skills?

14 A. Yes, he did. He commanded a light

15 reconnaissance troop, one of whose roles is to go out

16 and seek out information. Part of this training is to

17 be able to make a rough assessment of the likely

18 direction of incoming artillery or mortar fire.

19 Q. Did he report to you on his conclusions about

20 the source of this incoming artillery fire?

21 A. That is correct. When I returned to Vitez,

22 as I did as regularly as I could during this three- to

23 four-day period starting from the 25th of January, he

24 had been out on the ground in the rough area carrying

25 out some information duties and had observed this

1 artillery fire and reported to me his conclusion.

2 Q. Which were?

3 A. He believed that he was able to hear the

4 sounds of either artillery or mortar fire actually

5 going off and took a compass bearing towards it. He

6 was able to observe from where he was the artillery or

7 mortar fire landing. He also timed the time of flight,

8 and from this was able to make out a rough assessment

9 of where he felt the fire had come from and gave me a

10 grid square, one square kilometre.

11 Q. Which was where?

12 A. Just to the northwest of Busovaca.

13 Q. Is it convenient to show that on this map?

14 A. I can show the rough area on this map, but I

15 believe that the area is actually on the map that you

16 referred to, which was the first exhibit.

17 Q. Let's take the first exhibit, lay that on the

18 ELMO.

19 A. It relates to these four lines of writing

20 here where I've put in a grid square. And there is an

21 arrow, and going to the right of that, pointing to the

22 grid square, which is an area to the northwest of

23 Busovaca.

24 Q. Thank you. The distance from Busovaca to

25 Kacuni being about how far?

1 A. In that area, if that was the area, about

2 five-and-a-half kilometres.

3 Q. Whoever was in Busovaca at the time, in your

4 experience, would they have been aware of this use of

5 artillery?

6 JUDGE MAY: I am not sure that we are going

7 to be helped by evidence of that sort. Anybody is

8 going to be aware that artillery is firing if they are

9 near it.

10 MR. NICE: Yes. So be it.

11 Q. This artillery firing went on for how long?

12 A. Sporadically, it went on for two to three

13 days, commencing the 25th of January.

14 Q. Thank you very much. Paragraph 26, please.

15 On the 26th of January were you patrolling in

16 Donji Polje? Please mark it on whichever map you find

17 convenient. If you find it convenient, mark it on this

18 one.

19 A. It's not marked on this map, but the rough

20 area --

21 Q. It may be convenient to go to the larger

22 scale map.

23 A. It is okay with this one that I am showing

24 here.

25 Q. We can see it, I think, on our own versions

1 because it's been highlighted for us. Thank you.

2 Was that a predominantly Muslim village where

3 you saw two or three HVO soldiers identified by

4 chequerboard red and white patches in camouflage

5 uniform walking out of a Muslim house which, some five

6 minutes later, you saw to be on fire, the location of

7 the house being between Donji Polje and Kacuni? And in

8 that area were some 40 houses over approximately 800

9 metres, houses that had been systemically burned

10 between the 26th and the 29th of January, there being

11 no ABiH in that region, was your conclusion that the

12 burning must have been by HVO?

13 A. That is correct. The incident is something I

14 personally observed. That is related in my testimony.

15 I had been briefed on the architecture of houses and

16 told that a four-sided roof was a Muslim style. That

17 is where I drew my conclusion. And that it was in the

18 course of patrolling along that specific stretch of

19 road that I saw the steady destruction of these

20 houses. I may not have actually observed every single

21 one being set fire to in the same way, but I did see

22 the end results as I returned every so often each day

23 over several days. And I can say categorically that

24 there were no BiH in that area, none whatsoever. None

25 whatsoever.

1 Q. Without looking at your summary, please, just

2 help us now in relation to the 27th of January. Did

3 you on that day return to the bridge?

4 A. I did, as I did every day during that

5 period.

6 Q. What did you see of the BiH, if anything?

7 A. Well, during that period there were very few,

8 I would say probably no more than about 20 to 30, in

9 individual houses. They were a variety of ages. They

10 were only lightly armed. In fact, I only saw one small

11 anti-tank weapon during that period. This is what I

12 would describe as a light anti-tank weapon which is

13 placed on the shoulder. I remember it clearly because

14 it was pointed at me, on the first day I went up to the

15 log lorry itself. But other weapons ranged from

16 Kalashnikovs to shotguns.

17 Q. Where was the BiH command at that time, or in

18 that locality?

19 A. I discovered that the actual headquarters,

20 the name of which I later learnt to be 333 Brigade, was

21 to the south-southwest of where the roadblock had been

22 established and where we had placed a Warrior as a

23 U.N. checkpoint.

24 Q. Efforts to meet the officer in command led to

25 your meeting whom?

1 A. I was introduced to a person who was

2 described as a deputy commander. I know that probably

3 his first name was Edin, without referring to my notes.

4 Q. Right. It may be the name is not challenged;

5 if not, I'll lead it: Veganovic?

6 A. Yes, that's correct.

7 Q. And via him, to whom?

8 A. To the commander himself, whose name, without

9 recollection, I can't recall at the moment, but was

10 clearly the commander of 333 Brigade BiH.

11 Q. Again, if there is no challenge, I'll put the

12 name to you: Anto Sliskovic?

13 A. Anto Sliskovic was not -- was -- may I --

14 JUDGE MAY: Unless there is any objection --

15 is there any objection to these names?

16 MR. SAYERS: Absolutely none, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: No. Let's --

18 MR. NICE:

19 Q. He was the assistant commander; is that

20 right?

21 A. Of the HVO.

22 Q. Yes. And you met also Marko Prskalo?

23 A. Of the HVO, described to me as a staff

24 officer.

25 Q. And you actually met these, I think, or you

1 met Sliskovic the following day at DutchBat

2 headquarters in Busovaca; is that right?

3 A. It took some time to establish who was who

4 during this period, and I did this mainly with the help

5 of the Dutch transport battalion, which were based just

6 south of Busovaca, my intention being to establish who

7 was in charge locally on each side, to try and bring

8 them together to resolve the dispute.

9 Q. Now, at a meeting with Sliskovic, were things

10 said which you interpreted as some form of promise or

11 threat?

12 A. Certainly not a promise, but the atmosphere

13 in the room where I brought together representatives of

14 both sides -- I would describe the BiH representative

15 as a -- definitely a junior deputy commander. The

16 atmosphere from Sliskovic was definitely threatening.

17 I had an interpreter, a very good interpreter, next to

18 me who conveyed exactly what was being said, and the

19 mood, which I could see myself, and the remarks were

20 certainly not helping the situation, which was to

21 establish a sensible discussion between the two sides.

22 Q. Was something said about civilians detained

23 at Kaonik?

24 A. One of the things which had been said by both

25 sides was the business of people -- civilians being

1 detained. At that meeting, Sliskovic did admit that

2 some Muslims were being held in a camp near Kaonik, and

3 I was able to establish through my milinfo section that

4 there were about 300 of these.

5 Q. And were these people civilians, or military?

6 A. They were civilians.

7 Q. Was anything said at this meeting by

8 Sliskovic about the Kacuni shelling which you had seen?

9 A. Yes, I clearly remember, it was the only

10 occasion I really brought the subject up about the

11 shelling, which certainly made a powerful impact on

12 me. I inquired why the area had been shelled, and

13 Sliskovic stated that that area where we were had been

14 shelled by the BiH. And I made the comment at the time

15 that I thought it was a ridiculous thing to say.

16 Q. By this stage, had you met Dario Kordic?

17 A. If we're relating to meetings which took

18 place on and around 28, 29, 30 January, no.

19 Q. And just yes or no: Was anything said at

20 these meetings in relation to Kordic?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So the penultimate sentence of paragraph 21

23 is slightly out of order, and I'll return to it later.

24 In due course, I think you were to form a view about

25 the relationship between Sliskovic and Kordic, but at

1 this stage, it was too early to form such a view?

2 A. Yes. My views were on the basis of what I

3 observed over following weeks, going through February.

4 Q. Next exhibit, please, and the 30th of

5 January. Tell us about this document --

6 A. I have to remove this.

7 Q. -- swiftly.

8 A. This was a document that was --

9 Q. Just going -- before you speak --

10 A. I beg your pardon.

11 Q. Not at all. I'm just going to inform the

12 Court, most of this document, but not quite all of it,

13 has been produced as Defence Exhibit 54/1.

14 Yes, Major.

15 A. This was a document in English, and also in

16 translation, with signatures, which related to a

17 meeting that was held at the school at Bila, the

18 headquarters of U.N. BritBat, chaired by

19 Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Stewart, my commanding officer,

20 on the 30th of January. The significant thing about it

21 is that it details the terms and conditions that were

22 agreed, and that a ceasefire should take place.

23 Q. As to the Kacuni checkpoint, by whom was that

24 to be manned?

25 A. This actually had been agreed on the 25th of

1 January, so therefore it had already been in place.

2 This was the sixth day it had been in place. It was

3 something that was agreed on the ground by Merdan, that

4 the log lorry would be removed if we actually placed a

5 Warrior on that bridge to control the flow of U.N.

6 traffic only, or associated ICRC.

7 Q. The second sheet of this exhibit has the

8 signatures of various people, self-explanatory. The

9 third sheet, which is new to the Chamber, has the

10 printed list of those present -- not printed, the

11 written list of those present at the peace

12 negotiations; is that correct?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 On the 28th of January, did you learn of a

16 DutchBat report concerning Muslim prisoners? Again,

17 don't read from the summary, if you would be so good;

18 just tell us about it.

19 MR. SAYERS: Just an objection to that, in

20 the absence of laying a proper foundation that this is

21 just first-hand rather than several times removed, Your

22 Honour.

23 JUDGE MAY: If the witness read the report,

24 he can tell us about it.

25 A. Sorry, can I be clear to exactly what you're

1 relating to, please?

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Yes. There were some Muslim prisoners

4 referred to in a DutchBat report, and you yourself may

5 have seen some Muslim prisoners?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. Now, before we move on, did you yourself read

8 the report from DutchBat?

9 A. The report was a verbal report. It was

10 delivered to me in the car park of the Dutch battalion

11 transport headquarters, where I happened to be at the

12 time, and therefore my presence there was

13 coincidental. I was happening to, as it were, be doing

14 my rounds.

15 Q. And --

16 A. And I was given a report of a number, 10 to

17 15 Muslims who were being forced to dig graves in a

18 local graveyard with HVO soldiers standing over them.

19 Q. Did this accord with any observations that

20 you had already made or were thereafter to make?

21 A. Well, having located the area of the

22 graveyard in question, in answer to your question,

23 having located the area, I did not observe them in the

24 actual act of digging graves with HVO soldiers standing

25 over them. This is what had been stated to me by Dutch

1 transport battalion personnel. But I did see Muslim

2 civilians standing around, about 10 or 15, with HVO

3 soldiers with weapons nearby.

4 To go on to answer your question, yes, I did

5 see other instances of Muslim civilians, specifically

6 an incident that took place on the southern approach to

7 the Kaonik bridge. I can't give a precise date, but it

8 will have been at that time, where I observed them

9 digging trenches. There was a -- what was clear to me,

10 a trench system, and they were digging them with armed

11 HVO soldiers standing over them. And I can recall at

12 least one elderly person there, an elderly man;

13 possibly a woman as well.

14 Q. Thank you. And the arms that the HVO had,

15 what type?

16 A. These were Kalashnikov rifles, slung over

17 their shoulder.

18 Q. Can you please point out, on whichever map

19 you find convenient, either the place where you saw

20 people that related to the DutchBat complaint or the

21 other incident to which you have referred?

22 A. In relation to where I saw Muslims after

23 having been told that they were being made to dig

24 graves, it was actually adjacent to a graveyard to the

25 northeast, the northeast area of Busovaca, around here

1 [Indicates]. There were actually two or three

2 graveyards, and I actually visited about three before I

3 found the right one.

4 The second incident, at the Kaonik [Realtime

5 transcript read in error "Konjic"] bridge, it was to

6 the south, actually in the area where I had witnessed

7 the firefight I related to on the morning of the 25th

8 of January.

9 Q. Thank you. Major, although you were there

10 for some time and know it live, if you call it "the

11 Konjic [phoen] bridge," it comes out slightly strange

12 on our LiveNote system; but if you can call it

13 "Kaonik," then it will make the note easier for us to

14 follow. Did you make subsequent attempts to get the

15 sides together in Busovaca, that being work that was

16 later taken over by Jeremy Fleming?

17 A. That is correct. I would say that the last

18 meeting I held between what I would call these local

19 level commanders was on or around the 30th, perhaps the

20 31st of July, but when I saw the ceasefire agreement on

21 the 30th, I knew that this had been formally taken

22 over. What I was conscious of then was ensuring that I

23 wasn't interfering with or causing some confusion,

24 particularly to HVO and BiH representatives, as to who

25 was leading this. So I felt that I'd finished the

1 initiative that I had taken up from the 25th of

2 January.

3 Q. On the 1st of February, did General Morillon

4 chair a meeting at the Bila school and was an agreement

5 signed by Blaskic, Hadzihasanovic and Morillon that all

6 external forces should be withdrawn from Busovaca,

7 there having been troops such as the Ludvig Pavlovic

8 from Capiljina stationed in Vitez involved in clashes

9 there and in Novi Travnik, and had there been

10 references in this meeting to external HVO groups, such

11 as the Alpha Force in Gornji Vakuf, the Black Shirts in

12 Kiseljak, and on the Muslim side, Mujahedin?

13 A. To the best of my recollection, that is

14 correct. I would state that I was not present at that

15 meeting, nor would I have been. It was a high-level

16 meeting chaired by General Morillon, and I was told

17 that an agreement had been made and had been signed.

18 But it was largely picking up from the agreement which

19 had been signed on the 30th of January.

20 As far as the formations which you mentioned

21 there are concerned, I can recollect being told about

22 them at the time, as indeed I would have read about

23 this and other things in milinfo summaries and at the

24 daily 5.00 conferences.

25 Q. Was Busovaca at the time occupied by a

1 Kiseljak HVO battalion?

2 A. To the best of my recollection, having been

3 briefed at the time, that is correct.

4 Q. Did you, in the course of your duties, keep

5 notes of various important events?

6 A. Yes, I did. I kept two notebooks.

7 Q. Have you eventually been able to find those

8 notebooks in your house or your temporary house in

9 England?

10 A. I found them, I think, about ten days ago.

11 MR. NICE: And extracts of those have, Your

12 Honour, been provided to the Defence. If and when the

13 witness refers to those notes, it may be helpful to the

14 Chamber if he puts them on the ELMO in the way I think

15 another witness did, without them necessarily becoming

16 an exhibit, unless anybody wants them to.

17 Q. So if you can shuffle the papers, as is

18 appropriate. You don't necessarily need to take one

19 document off; you can lay one on top of it quite

20 conveniently.

21 Did you on the 3rd of February find yourself

22 tasked to go to Busovaca?

23 A. Yes, I did. I was requested by the

24 operations room, the operations officer, to go and see

25 a man named Dario Kordic in relation to some things

1 that he wanted to state.

2 Q. What had led to your going there? What had

3 been the initial request?

4 A. He had requested to see Colonel Stewart. He

5 did not know me, and I, as I've already testified, was

6 not aware of him. The nature of my duties -- in other

7 words, I wasn't occupied at the time -- allowed me to

8 go out as the senior representative in the battalion at

9 the time. The commanding officer and the second in

10 command were otherwise engaged.

11 Q. Following this first meeting, did you

12 maintain regular contact with Kordic thereafter?

13 A. Yes. I then had a period between that day,

14 the 3rd of February, and the 27th of February, and I

15 saw Mr. Kordic for the last time. And whilst I have

16 not recorded all the meetings, I would say I saw him

17 approximately 15 to 20 times. Sometimes I saw him

18 twice in one day, dependent on what might have been

19 happening. So I would include those in the total.

20 Q. What was your approach to Kordic, generally,

21 and why?

22 A. Well, my approach to Dario Kordic was based

23 on two things: Firstly, what I had experienced to date

24 in my dealings with all commanders on all sides that

25 I'd had to negotiate with; and secondly, on the first

1 impressions which I gained from the first meeting on

2 the 3rd of February.

3 Would you like me to elaborate?

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. Relating to the first, that is the general

6 impression I made. There was very little trust around

7 on all sides. It was very difficult to get any form of

8 negotiation going whatsoever. You had to work

9 extremely hard at it, and you had to look for any angle

10 that you could, to a degree exploit, to get people

11 talking. You had to be -- you had to go out of your

12 way to establish your credibility. The main thing was,

13 if I said I was going to do something, I went to all

14 lengths to try and get it done, so that I could

15 establish some form of trust with the person who I was

16 talking with; they would take me as a credible person,

17 as a person of my word.

18 So that was my approach to things in general

19 with any, and I stress "any," person I was dealing

20 with.

21 With regard to Mr. Kordic, from the

22 impressions of my first meeting, I saw that almost

23 immediately -- I had been there in my fifth week of

24 constant operations -- that he was one person who I

25 could definitely do business with. It was clear to me

1 that he exercised a lot of power, potentially a lot of

2 power.

3 Q. How did you respond to your assessment that

4 he had power? How did you approach him?

5 A. Well, I decided that I needed to establish a

6 good working relationship with him. And because I saw

7 he was in a position of influence, power, then I

8 actually treated him with a great deal of respect in

9 the way that I addressed him, in my manner towards

10 him.

11 On the first meeting, certainly, and maybe on

12 some subsequent meetings, I saluted him when I entered

13 what was his working office in the basement of the PTT

14 building in Busovaca.

15 Q. Did this approach pay dividends?

16 A. I would say that if I looked at the whole

17 period, it paid dividends. It was a successful,

18 professional relationship in terms of what I was able

19 to achieve from the meetings.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I wonder whether

21 the witness could give us some of the indications that

22 suggested to him that Mr. Kordic was a man of power.

23 MR. NICE: Certainly, Your Honour.

24 Q. I think some of them will emerge later, but

25 it would be helpful if the witness dealt with the first

1 meeting and your first assessment.

2 Before you come to that first assessment, I

3 think it's fair to note that you actually made a nearly

4 contemporaneous assessment of the man that is not

5 included in either your statements or your summary, it

6 is included in another document to which you've

7 referred overnight; is that right?

8 A. That is correct. Yes.

9 Q. And, indeed, I haven't got it written down,

10 although you've told us about it. Tell us what the

11 document is first that you've been able to refer to.

12 A. It's a letter to my wife.

13 Q. Sent when in relation to this first meeting?

14 A. On the evening of the day that I had the

15 first meeting with Dario Kordic.

16 Q. Well, now, with what may be contained there

17 in mind, can you answer His Honour Judge Robinson's

18 question about, first of all, early indicia of power,

19 linking it, as you find it appropriate, to what you

20 would discover later in general terms, recognising we

21 are going to go through matters in detail?

22 MR. SAYERS: Just two things, Your Honour.

23 We were provided last night with some extracts from

24 Major Jennings' diary, for which of course we are

25 grateful. We have not been provided with a copy of

1 this letter, and in the absence --

2 JUDGE MAY: That's not surprising. You are

3 not going to see his letter to his wife. If he's going

4 to refer to any part of it, then of course it will be

5 necessary to put it on the ELMO, something of that

6 sort, but there is no need for the letter to be

7 produced.

8 MR. SAYERS: Of course, Your Honour, just the

9 pertinent extracts, of course.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. I think that letter may still be in the hotel

12 opposite, but it can be retrieved, or is it with you?

13 Explain where it is.

14 A. It is in my house back in England, Your

15 Honour.

16 Q. My mistake. And you refreshed your memory

17 from it before coming here?

18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. Then I return to the previous question, early

20 indicia of power.

21 A. This is in answering His Honour's question?

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. In answer to Your Honour, the -- relating to

24 the impression which I made -- and I will try and be

25 general, because there are instances of detail which I

1 am going to go on to discuss. With regard to the first

2 meeting, when I actually got down to what I would call

3 a bunker, it was a reinforced with sandbags command

4 centre. That was the immediate impression which I

5 gained in the lower basement of the PTT building.

6 Mr. Kordic sat at the head of the table, with uniform

7 personnel down either side. There was a radio on the

8 desk, and I believe a separate handset. And there was

9 a room off to one side. I later discovered there was a

10 fax machine in there, because that's where a fax came

11 from that I was shown at the time.

12 In terms of his manner, whilst being very

13 correct and courteous, as he always was to me, as I was

14 to him, in what he said and in how things were carried

15 out with practically no discussion, I quickly formed

16 the impression that he was clearly in charge. I was

17 very interested, because he was a man that I felt that

18 I could have negotiations with, dealings with, to get

19 things done, an impression which I had not gained from

20 any meetings that I'd had with other commanders, some I

21 would describe as disappointing, almost shambolic in

22 terms of the way conversation towed one way or the

23 other. These are the meetings on the 27th, 28th, 29th

24 of January with the lower-level commanders.

25 Q. How did the other uniformed -- the uniformed

1 men in the room approach or react to Mr. Kordic?

2 A. At this particular meeting?

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. Very little was said by them, either in

5 response to anything I had said -- I wouldn't say there

6 was complete silence, but during the course of a

7 meeting, which I believed certainly took place within

8 an hour, probably about 40 minutes, the people who were

9 doing all the talking were Mr. Kordic and myself. And

10 they sat and listened very attentively. There was not

11 much opinion offered. And this is in contrast to a

12 number of meetings I'd had both with army BiH and HVO

13 lower-level commanders, where sometimes it was -- I

14 could describe a free-for-all, and arguments between

15 various people at the table.

16 Q. What communication systems appeared to be

17 available to him?

18 A. Well, there were two handsets, and I'll be

19 clear about what I mean by that, because you can have a

20 handset which may be connected to a telephone or it may

21 be connected to a radio. But I believe there was one

22 of each: certainly a telephone in there, and also what

23 I believed to be a radio. There was this fax machine

24 which was next door, because I do recall on one

25 occasion -- I haven't a date for it. I haven't a note

1 for it in the notes which I made which have been

2 presented to you, but I can recall a fax being brought

3 through. I would say this was not in common in some

4 headquarters.

5 Q. Had you been informed in advance of any

6 position apparently held by him?

7 A. Yes, I had. And I routinely went to the

8 milinfo section before I went on any task to see if

9 there was anything they could tell me about an

10 individual I was going to meet or, indeed, an area that

11 I was going to visit; what had happened in the last few

12 days; who had said what; what, if anything, had been

13 agreed. This was standard procedure.

14 Q. So you knew what of his position or believed

15 what of his position?

16 A. I was told by the NCO, who was on duty in the

17 milinfo section that morning, that he was known to be

18 the vice-president of the HDZ; that he was young; an

19 ex-journalist; that he had also been known to style

20 himself or respond to the title "Colonel."

21 Q. What did you do by way of addressing him or

22 deciding how to address him?

23 A. When I went into the room, you had to go down

24 two flights of stairs to get to the basement where what

25 I would call his operations room was. As I entered the

1 room, he was at the head of the table. It was a long

2 room, with him -- a long table, with him at the far end

3 of the room from the entrance you came in. So I

4 assumed that it was him because of the layout of the

5 room, but I wanted to confirm who I was talking to.

6 And he stood up as I entered the room, so I got the

7 feeling that it was him. So I addressed my question to

8 him and I said, "Is it Colonel Kordic or Mr. Kordic?"

9 And he said, "Da." He didn't answer the question.

10 And I've been asked this many times, and that

11 is my definite recollection. And it was -- I decided

12 to call him Mister -- "Is Mister okay?" "Da." It was

13 not referred to again.

14 Q. How was he dressed?

15 A. On this occasion, as indeed on many other

16 occasions, he, like everyone else, wore the dark, drab

17 camouflage that I associated with HVO wearing trousers

18 and would usually wear a dark t-shirt, not always,

19 olive colour. He invariably wore what I would call a

20 large crucifix, largish crucifix around his neck. No

21 headdress.

22 Q. Was anything said about whether he was in any

23 sense a formation commander?

24 A. If it had not been at that first meeting, it

25 would certainly have been at a subsequent meeting that

1 I would have tried to determine what his position was.

2 And my recollection is I asked him, was he the HVO

3 commander? And he said, "No."

4 And I'm sure that I asked one or two more

5 questions, but I never established from him by word of

6 his own mouth what position he had, in terms of a

7 title. He did refute that he was the HVO commander in

8 Busovaca.

9 Q. Two other questions for short answers:

10 whether, A, you met him alone; and B, just the detail

11 of the protection before you ever got into the room.

12 A. I was never alone in the room with him on any

13 occasion. You had to get through two layers of

14 protection. The first was the actual entrance to the

15 PTT building, manned by armed HVO soldiers. You

16 established who you were and you were told to wait

17 inside at the top of the stairs. And then usually a

18 wait of no more than one or two minutes and then you

19 were led down the stairs and into the room that I

20 described previously.

21 Q. Using the notes that you made, as you need,

22 and laying them on the ELMO, if you do, can you tell

23 us, please, quite swiftly, what was the nature of the

24 complaints made at this meeting?

25 A. Dario Kordic had, after we had exchanged

1 courtesies, Dario Kordic -- and he also asked me who I

2 was and what my position was and what I had in terms of

3 numbers of Warriors. He then went on to make a number

4 of complaints, which I listed in my notebook in his

5 presence at the table. I think it would be easier if I

6 laid these on the screen.

7 Do you think it would be possible to get-- we

8 may need to do them one at a time.

9 I think it's easier, Your Honour, if I just

10 relate to it, rather than making -- because these are

11 notes I actually took at the time.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you go through them

13 fairly briefly, Major.

14 A. Just very briefly, the first one related --

15 basically he stated -- he was aware of the 30th of

16 January ceasefire, and I actually had the document with

17 me -- which is an exhibit, which we've already been

18 through -- and he said, "Da, da, yes, yes, I'm aware of

19 that. The BiH are the ones who have broken the

20 ceasefire. I wish to make the following complaints."

21 And they are serial numbered. The first

22 related to three HVO soldiers who had been killed by

23 army BiH, where they had been killed, where he believed

24 the BiH soldiers had come from.

25 In 2 -- can you move that, please -- a

1 shelling that had taken place. So the first is

2 actually a time, 15.45 hours on the 1st of February;

3 the next one a shelling, that two civilians had been

4 killed, Croat civilians, and a child.

5 Another incident on the 3rd. This is

6 probably the one which caused the most activity

7 afterwards, because actions were taken as a result of

8 these protests. And this, and over on the following

9 page, relates to an incident or incidents in the area

10 of the villages of Merdani and Katici, very close

11 proximity to each other, which really purported to say

12 that BiH dressed as HVO, with HVO emblems, had come and

13 had taken up to 100 women, children, forcibly taken

14 them away. They had lists of these people he could

15 make available.

16 And at this stage, the -- when I say

17 "roadblock," because we're going to come on to discuss

18 it, this is the blockage of the main Vitez/Zenica road,

19 a significant blockage; about 100 metres of road was

20 blocked as a result of an explosion. Efforts had been

21 ongoing as part of the ceasefire agreements gauged

22 first of all by Colonel Stewart and then General

23 Morillon, the 1 February meeting; a precondition was

24 the opening of that roadblock.

25 He stated the HVO engineers had gone to look

1 at it and they had been fired on by BiH. And as a

2 result of these instances, he then said that he wasn't

3 going to give any further assistance to removing the

4 roadblock until their protection, the HVO engineers'

5 protection, could be guaranteed, and that he was

6 delaying the exchange of prisoners detailed in the

7 ceasefire document by 48 hours.

8 And these relate to notes I took at the

9 time.

10 Q. Very well.

11 A. I then actually made a summary of the notes,

12 and indeed a second summary. And this I actually made

13 when I went back to the school prior to giving my

14 information to the operations room and to the milinfo,

15 which was a routine procedure.

16 Q. And you set out there the taking of the women

17 and children?

18 A. He'd also talked about telephone

19 communications --

20 Q. I'm just coming to that, yes?

21 A. I'm sorry. I beg your pardon.

22 Q. Go on, then.

23 A. The telephone communications, this was a

24 dispute that was probably going into its second week.

25 The power had been supplied in some areas but not in

1 others.

2 Q. Now, please, deal with item 4 of this report.

3 A. We'll move up to -- and this is relating to

4 the extensive roadblock which I just described. I

5 realised -- we all realised this was a major stumbling

6 block. It was going to take a significant effort to

7 open this roadblock. It was a precondition to a

8 ceasefire taking place. He said to me it was possible

9 that assistance could be given to open this roadblock.

10 And of all the things that were stated, whilst they

11 were all very important, very important, this was the

12 one that interested me in particular, as a company

13 commander whose task was specifically to keep these

14 roads open for the safe passage of humanitarian aid, as

15 well as satisfying a major precondition which would

16 have acted as a confidence-boosting measure to all

17 sides.

18 Q. Was prisoner exchange delayed?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, the prisoner

20 exchange was delayed for 48 hours, but an exchange of

21 prisoners did take place subsequently. I was not

22 involved in that -- the detail of that exchange of

23 prisoners.

24 Q. Turn to the last page of this part of the

25 report. I think it continues on one further sheet.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Summarise the effect of that, please.

3 A. There is a degree of repetition in this.

4 It's a summary of a summary, actually. It all relates

5 to the same 3rd of February meeting.

6 You'll see in certain questions I've put a

7 subsequent question; the question was for myself. In

8 other words, I was taking the material and I was trying

9 to work out what were the implied tasks; as a result of

10 being given this information, what did I then have to

11 go on and do? Because I wasn't just listening to

12 protests and doing nothing about them.

13 Q. Now, as a result of this first meeting, what

14 assessments did you make? You told us about them in

15 summary already, as supplemented by what you wrote to

16 your wife and that you reminded yourself of before you

17 came here.

18 A. Well, as I've already stated, and I will try

19 and elaborate: As a result of having finished the

20 meeting and pondered on what I'd been told, and also on

21 my recollections of the meeting later that day, Dario

22 Kordic was the first person that I had come across in

23 five weeks of operations, dealing with a whole host of

24 people, who gave me a good feeling that there was

25 someone that I could deal with on a one-to-one basis,

1 and if I could establish my credibility, I could get

2 certain things done. I could, with his assistance,

3 open the roadblock; open humanitarian aid; build up

4 confidence between each side. And I saw it as part of

5 my duty to cement that relationship.

6 I have to say that the impression which I

7 gained at that meeting, and in all subsequent meetings,

8 was I did not like the person of Dario Kordic, in terms

9 of how he conducted himself. He was a very loud

10 person, a very arrogant person in approach -- and that

11 is my personal opinion -- not somebody who I would have

12 chosen to have dealings with subsequently, but I

13 decided that I would, in order to get things done.

14 Q. And your assessment of his military or civil

15 powers and authority?

16 A. At that stage, I was yet to see something

17 happening on the ground. We had had a meeting and a

18 conversation, if we are talking specifically about the

19 3rd of February.

20 Q. Very well.

21 A. I was yet to -- to actually have concrete

22 evidence of something that he had done that I could

23 take or gain an opinion of, other than -- the

24 impression I gained was that I went to see someone who

25 had been described as the deputy president of the HDZ,

1 and from my experience, five weeks' worth at that

2 stage, I walked into what I took the impression of

3 being a functioning operations room, with military

4 personnel in there.

5 Q. And a last question, if this is convenient to

6 the Chamber, before what may be a break: What, if

7 anything, of the fact that he said what he did about

8 prisoner exchange, given the signatories to the

9 ceasefire and so on?

10 A. Well, he stated to me --

11 MR. SAYERS: Objection to this, Your Honour,

12 and that is that there is no deadline for prisoner

13 exchanges imposed in the document that has been marked

14 as Exhibit Z421,1A, and I would certainly hope that the

15 Trial Chamber has that in mind as this testimony is

16 considered.

17 JUDGE MAY: Do you want this piece of

18 evidence, Mr. Nice? If so, perhaps you could rephrase

19 the question to make it plain what point you're

20 making. The point, I understand, is that he wasn't a

21 signatory to the ceasefire, and yet he was talking

22 about prisoner exchange; is that the point?

23 MR. NICE: Yes.

24 Q. What, if any, significance did you find in

25 his ability to talk about prisoner exchange, and why?

1 A. Mr. Kordic stated to me that he was delaying

2 the exchange of prisoners by 48 hours. What we were

3 trying to establish, all of us, was who was actually in

4 charge. This was not a straightforward thing. It

5 wasn't up to that stage; it wasn't for the remainder of

6 the tour I was there. And it was my belief, based on

7 the chain of command I'd been told about, and the

8 signatures to it, that that's what had been agreed, and

9 suddenly this -- for the first time in my experience,

10 certainly, there was a new name. There was a person

11 there who had come into the equation, stating, "Well, I

12 am delaying it by 48 hours."

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn now for half

14 an hour, so that will be 11.35.

15 Mr. Nice, I notice there's a lot of material,

16 but it would be helpful if you could get through the

17 witness's evidence in chief by the luncheon

18 adjournment.

19 MR. NICE: I certainly hope to. There is a

20 lot of material, and I'll just do my very best --

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MR. NICE: -- and lead wherever I can.

23 JUDGE MAY: If you can deal with that. Of

24 course, the material at the moment is dealing directly

25 with one of the accused, but one hopes it can be dealt

1 with as briefly as possible.

2 Major, could you please be back in half an

3 hour, and could you remember, in this and any other

4 adjournments there are in your evidence, not to speak

5 to anybody about it, and that does include the members

6 of the Prosecution.

7 A. Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

9 --- Recess taken at 11.05 a.m.

10 --- On resuming at 11.35 p.m.

11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

12 MR. NICE:

13 Q. Major Jennings, bearing in mind we must move

14 at a slightly brisker pace, if we can. Next paper

15 exhibit in the stack, the two photographs, very

16 quickly, if you can just take them. In the stack.

17 Tell us what they show.

18 A. Excuse me. I'm sorry. This is not on. It

19 doesn't need to be.

20 Q. It is on, but -- yes.

21 A. This relates to my activities subsequent to

22 the 3rd of February, and I decided to make the opening

23 of the roadblock on the Zenica road my main objective.

24 I discussed this with Colonel Stewart. I had his

25 approval. It was done properly.

1 Q. This picture shows what?

2 A. And this picture shows a lorry which had been

3 drawn across the road about 500 metres from the road

4 blockage itself, actually denying me access to get at

5 the road to even look at the lorry. I am there in the

6 top picture talking to a HVO representative -- I don't

7 know his name -- with my interpreter and a member of

8 the ECMM.

9 The bottom one is the same place, but from a

10 slightly different angle. It shows the countryside

11 around. I had to negotiate to get even the lorry

12 removed before I could then actually move on to have a

13 look at the roadblock itself.

14 In my discussions with the engineer

15 commander, I said that I had had a meeting with Dario

16 Kordic. I was trying to establish the roadblock

17 itself, where it was, what I needed to do to it.

18 Q. Did you have any success with the lorry?

19 A. Eventually, yes. It was typical of something

20 that could take up to two or three hours.

21 Q. Paragraph 31, paragraph 30 being slightly out

22 of order. Paragraph 31, again without looking at your

23 summary, if you would be so good. On the 6th of

24 February, did you have a meeting?

25 A. Yes. I requested a meeting with Dario

1 Kordic. I had, by that stage, been able to look at the

2 roadblock and actually work out a military plan for its

3 removal, which was heavily dependent on engineer

4 support, the use of engineer equipment.

5 My problem was assuring the HVO engineers and

6 Dario Kordic himself that I would give the necessary

7 protection to his HVO engineers. And the reason for

8 this was that part of the blockage was probably between

9 two and four tilt mines which had been placed under a

10 lorry at the scene, not dissimilar to the lorry that

11 you just looked at.

12 The BritBat policy was not to use British

13 engineers to remove mines. Dario Kordic had agreed

14 that his men would remove them, but only if I could

15 guarantee protection.

16 So I had specifically gone to see him because

17 I was not clear in my own mind where the front lines

18 were, where I actually had to put my outer cordon of

19 men. And we got down to the nitty-gritty of where

20 positions were. Mr. Kordic, not unlike any commander I

21 had dealings with, was reticent about giving

22 information away, of where front line positions were.

23 And this I could understand. Everyone was very cagey

24 about getting information of where their troops were.

25 It was all a matter of trust. And it became apparent

1 that the map I was looking at was not very good; it

2 wasn't very detailed.

3 It was then that Mr. Kordic offered me a map

4 to assist in identifying the specific villages, ridges,

5 contours, tracks, streams, what have you. He gave an

6 instruction, and a man went to another room and very

7 quickly returned with the map which we've already used

8 this morning in evidence. It's the map that I have

9 here by my side. And this is the map which I then

10 subsequently used, not only in this roadblock clearance

11 operation, but for other operations subsequently.

12 Q. That's Exhibit 2781 and, as the Chamber can

13 see, it has JNA at the top of it.

14 On that same 6th of February, did you hear

15 anything of Muslims in the area of Katici?

16 A. I cannot say that the passage which is

17 related there, that is, immediately after the incident

18 relating to the map, actually took place on the 6th of

19 February or whether I was told about that on the 6th of

20 February. What I can say is I did not observe such an

21 incident taking place, that is, the use of the

22 civilians as human shields. I was told about it at the

23 headquarters in the course of my briefings.

24 Q. We'll deal then with a meeting, if there was

25 one, where reference was made to what was happening in

1 Gornji Vakuf. Explain briefly how such topics came to

2 be discussed.

3 A. This passage relates to a conversation that

4 took place probably later, in February. I have not a

5 date for it. And the reason it is there is that as

6 part of trying to develop a relationship with Dario

7 Kordic, I tried to end meetings by inviting him to talk

8 about things of a more general nature; I mean, more

9 generally in the area of operations; to try and talk in

10 a more relaxed way. And the subject of Gornji Vakuf

11 came up. And I merely stated and had noted with

12 interest that he seemed to be aware that there were

13 difficulties with ongoing negotiations to try and

14 achieve a ceasefire in the Gornji Vakuf area. It

15 seemed to me to be a long way outside of what I

16 perceived to be his area of responsibility.

17 Q. I'll return to paragraph 32 later. Paragraph

18 33, again, without looking at the document yourself,

19 when did you start the removal of the roadblocks?

20 There may be a date error that we've got to correct.

21 A. Well, I definitely started it on the 7th of

22 February, the following day. It was a Sunday. And I

23 started it as soon as possible after first light,

24 because I envisaged it was going to be a long

25 operation. And as soon as I had got my cordon in place

1 -- what I mean by that is my soldiers in armoured

2 vehicles in, as it were, a ring around the area we were

3 going to do it -- I then commenced the operation.

4 Q. Did you discover from the HVO engineer who

5 was there something about the condition of the vehicle

6 cab?

7 A. Yes. The things that -- the things had

8 proceeded very well. The first thing we had to do was

9 remove the tilt mines from underneath the lorry and

10 then we had to actually drag the lorry away. After we

11 had removed the tilt mines, the HVO engineer -- I would

12 say commander, the person who had been shown to me to

13 be in charge of the engineers in that particular party,

14 that's the title I would give him, then talked about

15 some form of assistance in moving an object or building

16 or what have you, and was pointing to things on the

17 ground. And I said, "Well, I don't know anything about

18 this. We are moving a roadblock." And he then said,

19 "Well, there is still an explosive in the bonnet."

20 Q. What did you do?

21 A. Well, I realised -- well, everyone left the

22 area immediately, because we were right next to the

23 lorry, and we obviously had to ensure the safety of all

24 personnel, so all British, French -- because there were

25 French U.N. there assisting us -- and the HVO engineers

1 themselves, all left the area. We went about 100, 200

2 metres away. It was clear to me that something had

3 gone wrong and I wasn't going to get any further with

4 the HVO engineer representative there. So as it was

5 Dario Kordic who I had gained the approval of to assist

6 in removing the roadblock, I decided to go and see him

7 straightaway.

8 I have to say I was slightly concerned

9 because I felt that if things went wrong and we

10 stopped, we would not clear the roadblock. There had

11 been so many occasions where it had come to a halt.

12 Q. All right. Press on.

13 A. I then went to see Dario Kordic in his

14 headquarters and gave him a brief resume of where we

15 had got to. He then started talking about putting an

16 object in place. Actually, there was a very small

17 T-junction next to the roadblock itself, and I wasn't

18 clear what this was, and this is when he actually drew

19 an object in a notebook which I was carrying.

20 Q. The next two sheets of the notebook, please.

21 Explain, please.

22 A. The object at the bottom of the two pages --

23 this is a different notebook to the one you saw

24 before -- was a hand drawing, you can see it there at

25 the bottom in outline, a hand drawing of what turned

1 out to be what I would call a prefabricated concrete

2 object. I got the dimensions of it and the approximate

3 tonnage, and what Dario Kordic was requesting was

4 BritBat's assistance in moving this and putting it on

5 the T-junction next to the roadblock.

6 Now, at this stage I was in a very difficult

7 position, because I had something in the region of over

8 200 French and British personnel on the ground, in

9 position, the promise of getting a roadblock opened

10 which had been blocking the road for nearly two weeks,

11 and the prospect of things coming to a grinding halt.

12 And I therefore took the decision on my own initiative

13 to say -- and the words I used, "I will see what I can

14 do about it." As a result of that, he then said,

15 "Okay, we can press on." I then returned to the

16 position, and when I returned, the HVO clearly had

17 received some message to the effect that the unblocking

18 of the road operation could continue.

19 I omitted to say that in saying I would see

20 what I could do, I said I couldn't do anything that

21 day; I would look at it the following day.

22 Q. Did you in fact have any intention of giving

23 the help he required?

24 A. When I looked at that, there was no way I

25 could give any assistance with regard to what would

1 have been, in effect, establishing the infrastructure

2 of a checkpoint -- as I would have to neither side, to

3 maintain impartiality.

4 Q. Two questions to be dealt with: How long did

5 it take you to get back to the roadblock? What, if

6 any, indications of communications were available to

7 Mr. Kordic at that time?

8 A. It took me about twelve minutes in my Warrior

9 to get from the PTT building back to the roadblock

10 itself. I was unhindered on the way back.

11 As I have previously said, there were two

12 handsets, one definitely a telephone, on the table.

13 Q. Knowing the deployment, or in general knowing

14 the deployment of troops at the time, what effect would

15 this roadblock have had on the potential advance of

16 ABiH?

17 A. It's something which I considered some time

18 after removing the roadblock. As I've said, my primary

19 concern was to clear a road, but when I was

20 subsequently asked why I thought the roadblock was

21 there in the first instance -- if you will recall, Your

22 Honour, it was blown up and established on the 25th of

23 January, at the start of the outbreak of intense

24 hostilities between the two sides -- and this is only

25 my assumption: I believed that the road had been

1 blocked because it was the main road from Zenica, where

2 any likely BiH attack with vehicles or what have you

3 could have taken place, could have come on that road

4 round and then down into the area around Busovaca. But

5 I wasn't considering that specifically at that time.

6 Q. Did you ever obtain any direct evidence, or

7 any evidence, in the form of somebody saying something,

8 as to who had instructed the creation of the roadblock?

9 A. I can't specifically say that -- or indeed

10 definitely recall that a specific person had given the

11 direct order to establish the roadblock.

12 Q. Paragraph 34.

13 MR. NICE: Incidentally, the passage to

14 the -- the passage relating to the object that was

15 drawn in the pocketbook got omitted from the summary in

16 error; it's contained in the earlier witness

17 statements.

18 Q. Paragraph 34. I think we may be turning to

19 the next of your pocketbook entries, please.

20 There's a reference there to the 11th of

21 February. Just explain that, if you can.

22 A. This -- there is an incident, which I

23 recorded in my notebook on the 11th of February, which

24 is not actually related to the diagram I've just put up

25 on the screen.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I was called to Dario Kordic's headquarters.

3 I would just add, at this stage, I was being requested

4 in person. And when I arrived, Dario Kordic stated

5 that an attack had, within the hour or so, taken place

6 on his soldiers by soldiers of the BiH who had

7 approached -- his soldiers were in -- I'm not sure if

8 I've got the pronunciation correct -- Podjele, but that

9 is what I recorded in my notebook, and that BiH

10 soldiers had attacked them, unprovoked, from the north,

11 from the area of Katici, Modani, that area, and that

12 two of them had been killed, and that he had the

13 identity card of one of the Muslims which showed him to

14 have come from outside of the area, from actually well

15 outside of the area of Central Bosnia, and made a

16 protest about it. I was given a photocopy of the

17 documents, which I subsequently took back to Vitez and

18 reported to milinfo.

19 Q. Paragraph 35, which is out of order; 34

20 next.

21 Did you find some explosives on one occasion?

22 A. Yes, that's correct. Having opened the

23 roadblock, my daily activities involved driving around

24 the area of responsibility that I showed to you

25 previously, particularly on the road to Busovaca, the

1 road to Zenica; what I would call troubleshooting, to

2 see if there was any problems.

3 It was actually a soldier in my Warrior who

4 noticed what we term a "command wire." This wire was

5 across the road, and I dismounted and very carefully

6 followed the command wire to a small girder bridge.

7 And underneath the bridge I saw what I can only

8 describe as an enormous quantity of explosives.

9 Q. Can I just interrupt you there for a minute

10 so that the Chamber can make better use of the

11 summary: The date of this event?

12 A. I believe it to have been on or around the

13 12th of February.

14 Q. Can we look at the next -- right, you

15 think -- yes, right. Press on, then. My mistake.

16 A. There is on the screen at the moment a

17 drawing. At the top, it's actually a rough drawing

18 showing the road, a river below it, and then the

19 bridge, and then the layout of the command wire, "CW,"

20 and then underneath it a cross-section of underneath

21 the bridge, showing the quantity of explosive.

22 I have to say that this was a diagram drawn

23 by an explosives/ordnance/demolition EOD expert, a

24 captain in the Royal Engineers; he actually drew this,

25 because I obviously reported this when I went back to

1 the base, and an expert was sent out to look at it, and

2 he drew this drawing.

3 Q. What happened when you found this and saw

4 some men?

5 A. Well, I was very surprised to see this. I

6 was also aware that since the main road had been opened

7 on the 7th of February, organisations such as the Red

8 Cross, UNHCR, had been driving around the area and

9 using this small girder bridge to visit the hamlets of

10 Katici, Merdani, and others, pursuing the claims of

11 hostage-taking, civilians being kept against their

12 will, which had been made by Dario Kordic -- and,

13 indeed, other representatives from the BiH side -- and

14 I was actually angry because no one had spoken about

15 this, and I was aware that these organisations were

16 using this bridge unaware of the fact that this

17 demolition was in place.

18 I had seen some of the HVO soldiers; I saw

19 them on a day-to-day basis and would wave to them, what

20 have you, and I saw some nearby, so I went up to them

21 and exchanged greetings and then, very firmly and very

22 clearly, said, "I'm talking business now. I've just

23 seen an enormous amount of explosives, and I want to

24 know what's going on and who's put them there."

25 They were immediately uneasy and shifting

1 from one foot to another, and I didn't give up, and I

2 pressed them. I said, "They haven't just appeared out

3 of nowhere. I want to know who's actually put them

4 there, how they got there."

5 And one of the men said to me, "Don't tell

6 Dario Kordic what I'm about to tell you." I remember

7 that very clearly. I said, "Okay," or words to that

8 effect. He then said that they had been ordered to put

9 the explosives underneath the bridge; they, the HVO

10 engineers.

11 I then went on to ask them why on earth,

12 firstly, there was such a quantity of explosive under

13 it and what was the purpose of putting it there. They

14 said because they were afraid of an attack or the HVO

15 were afraid of an attack from Muslims, from the other

16 side of the river, to which I said that was a

17 ridiculous thing to say.

18 Q. Can you just, while we've got the picture

19 drawn by your colleague of the bridge, the river, and

20 the road in mind, can you just locate it for us on the

21 larger map, which is the one that deals with it most

22 conveniently.

23 A. Can you close in on that area there as much

24 as you can. Right. Here we have, as you can see, the

25 villages of Katici, Merdani very close to each other;

1 the roadblock cleared on the 7th of February was just

2 here. You can actually see a small dotted track

3 leading up. This was a small T-junction. This is

4 where I had been requested to assist in placing a

5 structure to establish a checkpoint.

6 Just underneath it, just at the top of my

7 pointer now, you can see a small diagonal black line

8 going from slightly top left to bottom right, which

9 crosses the river here. That's actually the bridge in

10 question, a very small girder bridge.

11 Q. You've given us your opinion on the

12 plausibility of the explanation offered by the

13 engineers. What effect would blowing up that small

14 bridge have had?

15 A. The only thing I can think of was that it

16 would have left the only crossing point on that stretch

17 of road. I am hesitating. I am trying to remember the

18 correct pronunciation of the Kaonik bridge.

19 Q. Kaonik.

20 A. The Kaonik bridge. It would have been the

21 only crossing point then to the south to Busovaca. It

22 was what we would term, in military terms, a reserve

23 demolition; in other words, the explosive is being put

24 in place with a command wire and it's being left there

25 so that they can very quickly blow it if they wish to.

1 Whether that's plausible or not, I don't know, but

2 that's the only explanation I could think of, from a

3 military point of view.

4 Q. A few supplementary questions. Were these

5 engineers civilian or military?

6 A. They were military. They were wearing

7 military uniform.

8 Q. Then if you'd put these questions together in

9 a single answer: Did you complain to Kordic? If not,

10 why not, and to whom did you complain, and with what

11 effect?

12 A. I had to make a very careful decision here as

13 to how I was going to deal with the situation. I had

14 to ensure that the explosives were removed. That was

15 the number one priority, so that any organisations that

16 were going around could no longer be in danger. I also

17 had to ensure that I maintained what was becoming a

18 delicate balance of relationships in terms of getting

19 things done, negotiations.

20 Therefore, I decided to use the ECMM as the

21 appropriate channel for making a complaint. So I gave

22 a brief statement to Mr. Jeremy Fleming of the ECMM

23 stating what I had found, in brief what the HVO

24 engineers had said; the fact that the thing existed and

25 it was needed to be removed. That way it passed over

1 to the work of -- the ongoing work of the ECMM

2 commission. And I knew -- I was satisfied that it

3 would be dealt with.

4 I did not report it to Mr. Kordic, bearing in

5 mind that the HVO engineers had said to me, "Don't tell

6 Dario Kordic what we are about to tell you." I could

7 not have easily related to him the circumstances of how

8 it had been found, how I had found out about it,

9 without revealing the identity of these individuals.

10 And I decided not to do so because I was finding their

11 help, even at a lower level, was assisting me in my

12 day-to-day work. That is why.

13 Q. Paragraph 36. Again, don't read the

14 summary. Speak from memory, please, until I say

15 otherwise. Was there at one stage a question of a

16 joint ABiH-HVO checkpoint?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you date it and summarily tell us about

19 it?

20 A. I cannot date it. What I can say is it is

21 one of the initiatives that was put forward by the

22 ECMM. This was a commission with three representatives

23 on either side from the BiH and the HVO. In order to

24 restore confidence, their proposal was to identify

25 certain checkpoints where there would be equal numbers

1 of BiH and HVO. And this was a common aspiration for

2 all the main checkpoints.

3 In a conversation on a day I cannot recall,

4 in the context of which I cannot recall, I can recall

5 Dario Kordic saying he would not continue with this

6 initiative until certain conditions, certain things had

7 been achieved.

8 I have to say that I, in part, understand the

9 reason why. Because he didn't -- he, in his own mind,

10 didn't feel that the situation on the ground had

11 reached the stage where such a measure could be put

12 into place, but he was saying it wasn't going to

13 happen.

14 Q. Did you remain in contact with Mr. Kordic

15 after the matters you've told us about?

16 A. Yes. I saw him on as frequent a basis as I

17 could.

18 Q. Paragraph 37, which should be linked with

19 paragraph 48. And in your pocketbook it's the next

20 page, I think. 22nd of February. Was there a meeting

21 on that day?

22 A. There was. I had wanted to go and see Dario

23 Kordic. He actually had wanted to see me as well. I

24 had wanted to see him because I came across a

25 particular incident of an UNHCR convoy which had been

1 stopped somewhere in the vicinity of Busovaca, I think

2 to the north. He had wanted to see me because, from

3 his point of view, Busovaca was not getting its fair

4 share of aid. And when we sat down, he then gave me

5 the detail of what he believed to be the number -- of

6 the amount, the tonnage of aid that had been received

7 by Busovaca. Without referring to my notes, I think it

8 was 39 tonnes in a period of time.

9 Q. If you'd look at your notes -- just a

10 minute.

11 A. It was 60 tonnes.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please go ahead.

13 MR. NICE: I'm sorry.

14 Q. If you look at your notes, I think the "39"

15 may be misplaced with another number.

16 A. Yes. It was 50/50. I did it the wrong way

17 around. It was 60 tonnes in a 39-day period.

18 Q. Perhaps you would like to put your notes on

19 the ELMO, if that would help.

20 A. It's point number 2. The first part of it

21 relates to our conversation. I was stating, "Why is

22 this U.N. convoy being stopped?" Mr. Kordic said, and

23 I think fairly, "Look, there are hundreds of vehicles

24 going past. They are not escorted by U.N. We've got

25 to exercise some control." I thought that was

1 reasonable. And, actually, that specific one was

2 cleared up.

3 He then went on to say, "Now, I want to say

4 something to you. Busovaca is not getting its fair

5 share of aid, which is coming up from Kiseljak in that

6 direction. We've only received 60 tonnes in 39 days.

7 We are not getting enough. We want more."

8 He then, actually, went on to say that a

9 meeting was taking place, a civil meeting in Busovaca,

10 and they were discussing a proposal to physically block

11 the road with civilians, I presume Croat civilians, if

12 something wasn't done about it. I can continue if

13 you --

14 Q. I think that's probably sufficient. As to

15 the roadblock, and as to the checkpoint, does a man

16 called Jorge de la Mota fit in here?

17 A. Yes, he does. He was the head of UNHCR in

18 Zenica, and I knew of this and his appointment. And I

19 decided that -- and this was all to do with the

20 business of maintaining a relationship, do what you

21 promised to do. So I actually went, after that

22 meeting, to Zenica and went in to see -- I tried to see

23 Mr. De la Mota. I didn't see him straightaway. I saw

24 his operations officer, which is actually on the next

25 page. I could put it up.

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. I took these notes, actually, in the UNHCR

3 office. There it is. "Kim, UNHCR ops officer, Zenica."

4 They said, from their point of view, Busovaca last

5 received aid on the 15th of February. It was 55 tonnes

6 and it's scheduled for another 20 tonnes on the 25th of

7 February. Mr. De la Mota then said, "I am going to go

8 and see Dario Kordic myself." I then returned to

9 Mr. Kordic's headquarters, and this was later the same

10 day, I believe. I haven't got the time to be exact.

11 And a meeting then took place which was really between

12 Mr. De la Mota and Mr. Kordic. And I just sat and

13 listened to it.

14 Q. All right. In which case we can move on to

15 the 23rd of February. First of all, do you have notes

16 for the 23rd of February meeting or not? Your notes at

17 this stage may be hard to interpret, if it ever becomes

18 necessary, in detail.

19 A. There were three or four meetings between the

20 22nd and the 23rd of February. They were either in

21 Dario Kordic's headquarters or they were in the UNHCR

22 headquarters in Zenica. And, very briefly, my

23 recollection is that I had the meeting with Mr. Kordic,

24 which I have already related, I went to Zenica to speak

25 to Mr. de la Mota. He returned separately, but we

1 arrived about the same time, and he had a frank,

2 business-like conversation with Mr. Kordic about the

3 distribution of aid. He then said he was going to have

4 a meeting the following day and he intended to have the

5 meeting at 4.00 at the UNHCR headquarters with

6 representatives of all those in fold, where they would

7 attempt to thrash out what was perceived to be the

8 problem.

9 On the morning of the 23rd, so prior to that

10 meeting at the UNHCR headquarters in Zenica, I called

11 unannounced, which I sometimes did, at Mr. Kordic's

12 headquarters, really to talk further to him about

13 aspects of this distribution of aid and other things.

14 And I didn't walk into the room every time. I had to

15 wait until I was escorted downstairs. And when I

16 entered the room, this was in the morning of the 23rd,

17 I saw two youngish-looking men sat down who were

18 dressed in black uniform with distinctive patches on

19 their arms with HOS on them. Mr. Kordic seemed quite

20 at ease with me coming down and seeing them there. And

21 he introduced them to me as the commander and deputy

22 commander of the HOS in Zenica.

23 The other person who was present in that

24 room, the only other person, was Mr. Sliskovic. This

25 is part of the opinion I gained later, that he must

1 have had some form of influence, above others, to have

2 been present in that room, to have been deemed

3 important enough or worthy to be in that particular

4 room. The other thing is that Mr. Sliskovic had shaved

5 his beard off, which I commented on at the time.

6 I then subsequently went to the planned

7 meeting, the 4.00 meeting at Zenica, where I saw the

8 HOS representatives, but, to the best of my

9 recollection, I did not see Dario Kordic.

10 Q. I have our copy of Exhibit 2116. What can

11 you say about that?

12 A. That is definitely largely the type.

13 Certainly the fact that it's a circle, that it has what

14 I call the red and white chequered emblem on it. It

15 had the words "HOS." I cannot recall specifically

16 seeing the initials which are underneath, the words

17 "HSP," et cetera.

18 Q. By this stage, then, a matter we touched on

19 earlier and said we'd return to: Your assessment, if

20 any, of the relation between Kordic and Sliskovic?

21 A. Having found that the person who had been

22 sent to represent the HVO in Vitez when I was first

23 trying to get leaders of both sides to get together,

24 this is the meetings, 28th, 29th or so of January, I

25 had remembered that it was Sliskovic who was actually

1 chairing these meetings. And when I saw him again on

2 his own, the only HVO representative in that room,

3 bearing in mind everyone I'd seen on various occasions

4 when I had been down into his headquarters, I felt that

5 he must have had quite a close relationship with Dario

6 Kordic. But those are the only two instances on which

7 I base my opinion.

8 Q. A stolen Mercedes, there is a long story

9 here, but tell us, if you can, really quite

10 succinctly.

11 A. Yes, I will.

12 Q. I've been referring to an error in dating. I

13 think it's probably at paragraph 41. I think.

14 A. Right. In essence, on or around the 22nd of

15 February we were informed that a Dutch Mercedes, U.N.

16 Land Rover, had been taken at gunpoint. There was a

17 single driver in it, and the pair had escaped with a

18 radio and a weapon. And Colonel Stewart placed a very

19 high priority on its return. I believe that part of

20 the reason for this was to demonstrate we were not

21 going to accept instances of hijacking and, as such,

22 attacks on U.N. personnel. And I therefore believed it

23 was a high priority for myself too, to try and do

24 this.

25 I decided to put this to Dario Kordic. And I

1 bluntly said to him, "Now, we've done a lot of work

2 with each other. We've had some success opening the

3 roadblock, trying to ease the movements of convoys and

4 what have you. This is important to me as a

5 representative of the United Nations. It's important

6 that we must demonstrate that we can't tolerate

7 instances like this. You are a man of influence. Can

8 you help me?" And he agreed to help me.

9 This vehicle was subsequently recovered and

10 seen by me on the 27th of February.

11 Q. When it was recovered, the circumstances of

12 that?

13 A. Briefly, the circumstances were I was in the

14 headquarters of Vitez, I was called to the operations

15 room, a telephone call that had come from Dario

16 Kordic's headquarters stating that they had the

17 Mercedes and the key. The Dutch had seen this and had

18 surrounded it, but they were refusing to give the key

19 to them. He would give the key only to Major Philip

20 Jennings or Captain Martin Forgrave. Captain Martin

21 Forgrave was not available, so I went immediately to

22 his headquarters.

23 Q. Noticing what about the arrangements of the

24 building?

25 A. For the first time, Dario Kordic's office was

1 not in the basement. It was actually on the ground

2 floor immediately to the right-hand side of the

3 entrance. Also, there was virtually no sandbagging, so

4 you actually had open windows, although they had logs

5 diagonally placed -- all buildings had logs diagonally

6 placed in front of the windows. And when I went in, I

7 saw the Land Rover outside, which had Dutch vehicles

8 blocking it on either side, and a number of Dutch

9 personnel, Dutch military police were there as well.

10 I went in. Dario Kordic was expecting me.

11 He sat in this room, as I say, with a number of people

12 I recognised by face, and had the key, not -- the key

13 on its own on the desk in front of him, which I was

14 very pleased to see, and expressed my thanks

15 straightaway.

16 And he then stated, briefly, the

17 circumstances in which he had been able to recover it.

18 And when I thanked him, he said, "Well, don't thank

19 me. The person you have to thank is the chief or the

20 policeman, chief policeman in Vitez, Mr. Pasko." I

21 wrote it down at the time.

22 Q. Was that somebody you would recognise?

23 A. Well, I did go and see Mr. Pasko to extend my

24 personal thanks later that day. I thought it was

25 proper to do so. And after an enormous amount of

1 machine gunfire had finished, a separate incident, I

2 was able to locate him and thank him.

3 Q. And that machine gunfire, does that relate to

4 this vehicle?

5 A. Yes, I believe it directly relates to the

6 vehicle. I wasn't aware that this had happened, but

7 the group that the vehicle had been taken back from had

8 driven, I believe, from Travnik, where they were based,

9 to Zenica, a faction of the HVO, to express their

10 displeasure, which they did by -- they confronted HVO

11 who were there, brandishing weapons, shouting insults

12 at each other, then drove off firing their automatic

13 weapons into the air.

14 Q. So the key being returned to you, not to the

15 Dutch, who were available to collect it if -- it could

16 have been handed over to them?

17 A. I believe it could have been handed over to

18 them, yes, but he had stated that he was not going to.

19 MR. NICE: If the registry could very kindly

20 find Exhibit 2778 for us.

21 While that's being found, can the witness

22 look at the last of the paper exhibits, Z502 and

23 Z502A.

24 Q. Tell us first of all about the paper

25 document, and then we'll look at the photograph.

1 A. This is a document -- this is a document that

2 was drawn up at the time of the meeting, and I believe

3 I'd seen a translation of it. I had an interpreter

4 with me, as always, and it was a covering note to a

5 list of items from the vehicle, which said -- I believe

6 it said, "I, Dario Kordic, am handing over this

7 vehicle, in the state found, to Jennings of the British

8 Battalion." And that was brought in and we both signed

9 it.

10 Q. And then 2778, please, the photograph.

11 MR. NICE: Perhaps that can be placed on the

12 ELMO; thank you.

13 Q. What, if anything, about the man in the

14 photograph?

15 A. I can't quite see him.

16 I can't positively identify this particular

17 individual, although I met him, because I recognise the

18 features of his face. And it was certainly connected

19 with this incident.

20 Q. Paragraph 45: On the 9th of March, did you

21 pass through Prozor on the way to Split?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. There seeing houses in the Muslim area of the

24 town destroyed by Croats, some houses being side by

25 side with Croat houses which had been left intact?

1 A. That is correct. I was actually on my way

2 down to Split. I had not come up through Prozor; I had

3 come up via Mostar, when that route was still open.

4 And I remember seeing destruction to -- in terms of

5 architecture, Muslim houses, which were very close to,

6 almost side by side with other buildings which were

7 untouched which were not of Muslim architecture.

8 Q. Can you place the map, please, back on the

9 ELMO. Paragraph 46.

10 A. Could I ask which area it's in relation to,

11 so I can --

12 Q. Kula, Krcevine.

13 A. I think actually the larger --

14 Q. Yes, it's marked on the smaller-scale map, so

15 as I read the text, perhaps you would point things

16 out.

17 By the third week of March, was the HVO

18 trench system well-established, with HVO soldiers in

19 the trenches in the Busovaca/Kacuni area around Kula

20 and Krcevine?

21 A. Is it possible to increase the --

22 Q. I think the -- don't forget, we've got our

23 own copies. If you just point it out, so in case the

24 Judges haven't found it already, we can find it. It's

25 to the east of Busovaca, I think.

1 A. It would be somewhere around here

2 [indicates].

3 Q. Yes. Thank you.

4 At that stage, was ABiH infantry limited in

5 number, lacking heavy infantry weapons, although they

6 had one -- or they showed one light anti-tank weapon?

7 A. Yes. That is the case throughout all these

8 instances I have related; that is, from the start of

9 fighting on the 24th, 25th of January. The specific

10 reference to the light anti-tank weapon, the LAW, was a

11 weapon displayed -- indeed, pointed at me -- on the

12 25th of January.

13 Q. At the beginning of this period, had there

14 been a preponderance of simply personal weapons,

15 shotguns and hunting rifles, amongst the BiH, whereas

16 the HVO was much better equipped, in your assessment?

17 A. Yes, in my assessment, that was correct.

18 Q. And you saw a group of 40 or 50 who appeared

19 to have had what appeared to be field training?

20 A. Yes, this is correct. This relates to the

21 morning -- late morning of the 25th of January. This

22 was when Colonel Stewart was on the bridge with

23 Brigadier Cordy-Simpson, and also when I had seen the

24 ZIS-2 weapon firing some 40 metres or so -- I looked

25 behind me -- that is, back up north, ultimately towards

1 Busovaca, and I saw soldiers -- and this was a rare

2 event; I saw soldiers what we would call "shake out" in

3 a military formation. They were moving across ground,

4 clearly tactically aware, using cover, ground.

5 Q. And this was 40 or 50 of what group?

6 A. HVO.

7 Q. Thank you. And overall, to what artillery

8 pieces, if any, then, did the ABiH in this area have

9 access?

10 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat the question,

11 please?

12 Q. Yes. To what artillery pieces, if any, did

13 the ABiH have access during this period?

14 A. To -- as far as I was aware, none. Certainly

15 as far as anything I had seen.

16 Q. Before I move to one or two concluding

17 paragraphs, I think I have omitted two matters of

18 detail. I think you told us about seeing the two HOS

19 commanders on a second occasion; is that correct?

20 A. Yes, I did see this -- these were the two HOS

21 commanders who I saw at the UNHCR meeting that had been

22 called by and chaired by Mr. de la Mota.

23 Q. Was there a crossing of refugees at Turbe,

24 paragraph 41, that you want to refer to?

25 A. Yes. I think its main significance was that

1 this marks more or less the end of my intense area of

2 operations in the area around Busovaca, Kacuni, and

3 that area. Not that the situation had been solved, but

4 really, as troubleshooters, very thinly spread on the

5 ground, this was then the next main effort. This was a

6 scene of ethnic cleansing on a very large scale, where

7 some two to three thousand Muslims who had lived to the

8 south of Banja Luka were bussed up to the Bosnian

9 Serb-controlled area, the front lines, and had to walk

10 across, and I was involved in that.

11 Q. The one paper exhibit I haven't yet got you

12 to produce -- out of order, I'm afraid -- 862, the

13 small photograph, just for completeness, relates to, in

14 a sentence?

15 A. This is a photograph that was taken on the

16 morning of the 7th of February, where -- I believe that

17 this was taken early in the day, when I was discussing

18 points of detail about the removal of the obstacles

19 that made up the roadblock with HVO engineers.

20 Q. Thank you. Just yes or no to this: Were you

21 aware of the terms of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Paragraph 32, but before we come to that,

24 paragraph 49, I turn to -- again, don't read, because

25 these are conclusions, please.

1 What, if any, pattern of behaviour did you

2 detect in Kordic as between any public or private

3 display?

4 A. Well, as an example, it was interesting to

5 note that to the best of my recollection, Mr. Kordic

6 was not present at the meeting called by Mr. de la Mota

7 on the afternoon of the 23rd of February. As an

8 example, it was typical of a pattern of his name being

9 mentioned in connection with things happening on the

10 ground but him never actually appearing at a formal

11 meeting, such as the ones at the school, to the best of

12 my memory, or to -- as the signatory to a document such

13 as the one that was shown earlier, the 30th of January

14 ceasefire agreement. Of course, you've seen a document

15 that he signed where I signed as well, but that's in

16 relation to the return of a vehicle, which I hardly

17 think is of the same scale.

18 Q. Your assessment of his power in the area, and

19 the assessment of whether there was anybody superior to

20 him in that area?

21 A. My assessment is that certainly with regard

22 to the conduct of day-to-day operations, so things

23 happening in real time, there was practically nothing

24 which occurred without his name being mentioned out on

25 the ground, or instances which I can relate where he

1 will have stated something, and in very short time,

2 I've seen the end result of it actually out on the

3 ground.

4 Q. Your assessment in relation specifically to

5 military and/or police matters?

6 A. I would say both.

7 Q. And over what area? Use the map if that will

8 help.

9 A. Yes. Instances that I saw where his

10 influence was related to, starting from Busovaca

11 itself, in the -- all the area down to what was more or

12 less the front line between the Bosnian Croats and the

13 army BiH, at the front edge of Kacuni itself and areas

14 to either side. Now, "to either side"; I cannot be

15 specific, as I cannot for either of the opposing

16 forces. I stuck to the main routes. All the way up to

17 Kaonik, going east from Kaonik up to a roadblock that

18 we cleared on the 7th, and, indeed, along this road

19 here [indicating], towards this place name, "Luke,"

20 and then going from the bridge, again, past a number of

21 checkpoints, up to a checkpoint which was on the main

22 road just to the east of Vitez itself.

23 Sorry, I'm up here now. Up to the east of

24 Vitez. I would say Vitez itself because of the

25 reference to Mr. Pasko, and I would also say -- by

1 implication, I have to say -- up to Travnik, because

2 that is where the vehicle actually came from, although

3 it could be argued that that was Mr. Pasko's doing on

4 his behalf.

5 Q. You spoke of or were asked by me about

6 police; was there an incident involving a head of

7 police at Busovaca?

8 A. Yes, on a date that I cannot recall -- nor do

9 I have anything in my notebook, so this is memory -- I

10 was travelling on the road. I came across a lorry with

11 two Muslim civilians standing by the side of it, and

12 this was, I would say, no more than about 50 to 100

13 metres from the PTT building. I inquired -- as always,

14 through the interpreter -- what was wrong, because they

15 looked uncomfortable, and they -- were told that they

16 were driving some supplies, were heading for Zenica and

17 had been stopped, and they had been told that they were

18 going to be detained.

19 This was contrary to the spirit of freedom of

20 movement that we had discussed on a regular basis. I

21 must admit I was annoyed, so I went in to Mr. Kordic's

22 headquarters. I think some people in the room were a

23 bit irritated to see me, because I had been in there on

24 a regular basis and had interrupted a meeting, and I

25 was forceful and angry about the incident which I had

1 come across, and wanted to know why they had been

2 stopped, what was going to happen to them.

3 Mr. Kordic said he would then get a chief of

4 police. He then appeared. I didn't get his name. I

5 can recall that he was shortish, had a dark moustache,

6 quite fleshy about the face, and that he was wearing

7 the uniform of the HVO -- not the HVO; I beg your

8 pardon -- the Croat police, the civil police. It's a

9 dark -- distinctive dark blue uniform.

10 He looked unsettled, out of breath, and

11 clearly he had dropped everything to get to the

12 headquarters as quickly as possible, where Mr. Kordic

13 basically told him to sort it out and assured me that

14 these people could go on their way. And I observed

15 this happening.

16 Q. In addition to what you've already told us

17 about checkpoints, is there one other incident in

18 relation to a checkpoint that you recall?

19 A. Yes, there is. I would call this a fairly

20 typical incident. I was driving south from Busovaca, I

21 think on my way to look at Kacuni, and I was stopped at

22 a checkpoint by two HVO soldiers, and I remonstrated

23 that I had authority as U.N. for free passage on the

24 road. They denied me access, so I went back to the PTT

25 building -- this was a separate occasion to the one

1 I've just related -- and said, "If we're going to work

2 together, I must be allowed to go about my daily

3 business unhindered."

4 And he said, "I will sort it out." And by

5 the time I'd got back, and this is literally two

6 minutes, they had received a message that I was to be

7 let through, and I went on my way.

8 Q. Was there any checkpoint that you came across

9 that appeared to be susceptible to the control of

10 anyone else in the time you were there?

11 A. Not specifically by name, no, as far as I can

12 recall.

13 Q. Then, overall, you say you were aware of the

14 terms of the Vance-Owen Plan; how, if at all, did what

15 you saw fit with any aspects of that plan?

16 A. Well, the first thing I would say -- and

17 again, in brief -- there was widespread concern amongst

18 the population, the opposing forces, about the

19 consequences of implementation of this plan, in that --

20 in how it related to the establishment of cantons and a

21 change of boundaries. And specifically, tensions were

22 created by representatives on both sides, army BiH and

23 HVO, who were making declarations right -- well, prior

24 to, we believe the date is such-and-such a date, "I

25 want to make it quite clear that all Muslim or Croat,"

1 dependent on who was saying it, "are to come in and

2 stockpile their weapons; furthermore, the existing

3 heads of police or commanders will be replaced by those

4 according to who should have been predominant in the

5 canton."

6 This caused an enormous amount of tension,

7 before the proposed date of the implementation of

8 this.

9 Q. The attack you witnessed and spoke of,

10 however at all did that fit in?

11 A. Could you refresh my memory, please?

12 Q. The attack on the 6th of February. Did you

13 make any conclusions about the attack that you'd seen?

14 A. I'm afraid I'll have to --

15 Q. It doesn't matter. I'm not going to take it

16 further. It's probably a matter for the Chamber, in

17 any event.

18 Thank you. Will you wait there, please.

19 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

20 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, by agreement with

21 counsel for the co-defendant, Mr. Cerkez, I will be

22 asking all of the questions of this witness, in view of

23 the fact that there was not a mention of Mr. Cerkez

24 during the direct examination.

25 Q. Good afternoon, Major Jennings.

1 A. Good afternoon.

2 Q. As I told you, my name is Steve Sayers. This

3 is Mr. Naumovski, and together we represent Dario

4 Kordic.

5 I would just like to give you an outline, if

6 I may, of where I am going in the cross-examination,

7 both actually for your purposes and also for the Trial

8 Chamber's.

9 First I am going to ask you a series of

10 general questions connected with the duties of liaison

11 officers and the military chain of command, things

12 within your area of expertise and competence.

13 Secondly, I am going to focus fairly

14 carefully on the fighting that occurred in the Busovaca

15 area between January the 20th and the date of the

16 ceasefire, January the 30th, that 10-day period.

17 Third, I am going to ask you some questions

18 in connection with the ceasefire agreements that were

19 signed and the other agreements.

20 Fourth, I am going to cover each of the

21 meetings that you had with Mr. Kordic, which I think

22 you've agreed all occurred over a three-week period in

23 February. Correct?

24 A. That's correct, yes.

25 Q. Finally, and I'll try to cut this down, I

1 have some miscellaneous questions on the specific

2 testimony that you've given today, and I will try to

3 ask you as few questions in that area as possible.

4 The first question, sir: You, I believe, do

5 not speak any Croatian; is that correct?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. The principal interpreter that you used, I

8 believe, was Sergeant Thornton?

9 A. One of the three interpreters that I used, I

10 would say, during this period.

11 Q. Who were the other two?

12 A. Well, one is deceased. Dobrila Kolaba, who

13 was killed in July '93. And the other I'm not happy to

14 divulge.

15 Q. All right. Would that be because he or she

16 is a member of the British armed forces?

17 A. No. Because the person in question was a

18 member of the local population, and is still alive.

19 Q. Fair enough. I don't think we need to press

20 that. Would it be fair to say that you used Sergeant

21 Thornton's services mostly?

22 A. I would say that I used, if we talk about the

23 period that we've been through this morning, I would

24 say that I used Sergeant Thornton about a quarter of

25 the time.

1 Q. Which one of the interpreters did you take

2 along with you during your three weeks of visits to

3 Mr. Kordic's office?

4 A. All three. One of all three.

5 Q. And you have no way now of determining which

6 one was with you in any one particular meeting, I take

7 it?

8 A. That would be difficult, although there are

9 certain instances, if you wish to discuss, I could try

10 and recollect who was there.

11 Q. We'll see if that's important as we go

12 along.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I take it, sir, you have given two prior

15 statements to the investigators for the Prosecution:

16 one on April the 25th and 28th of 1995?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. And one on February of 1997 and March of

19 1997, which was, apparently, signed on April the 29th,

20 1998?

21 A. Correct.

22 Q. Have you given any other statements to

23 representatives of the Prosecution?

24 A. To the representatives of the Prosecution,

25 no.

1 Q. Anybody else?

2 A. To a counsel for the Defence, I believe, of

3 Mr. Blaskic, a Mr. Russell Hayman.

4 Q. And that concludes the number of people that

5 you have spoken to?

6 A. That is correct. Or I've given a statement

7 which I've signed and agreed.

8 Q. Are there other instances --

9 A. That would be very difficult, because it's a

10 subject which, of course, one doesn't forget and you

11 have conversations about it. But if we could be

12 specific in terms of what would arrive here as evidence

13 or as a witness statement, no other one, no.

14 Q. Very well. Now, you've stated, and I don't

15 think there is any dispute about this, that you've

16 essentially been a military man your entire adult life?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Your rank is currently Major?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And that is a rank that you have held since

21 September of 1990?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. When you arrived in the areas, as unfortunate

24 and tragic as it may be, it's a fact, nonetheless, that

25 it was not unusual to see burned out Serb, Muslim or

1 Croat villages; isn't that correct?

2 A. That is correct. There was a degree of

3 destruction already there related to all three parties,

4 shall we say.

5 Q. Would it be fair to say that, once again, as

6 reprehensible as it may be, the technique of burning of

7 houses and villages was a relatively standard technique

8 used by the three warring factions, in your

9 experience?

10 A. Well, I never actually witnessed a specific

11 act of the burning of a house by an identifiable BiH

12 soldier.

13 Q. Let me just read you an entry from milinfosum

14 111 on the 18th of February, 1993, which was during

15 your tour in the area. In the Kacuni area it was

16 reported that approximately 50 BiH soldiers in the area

17 were with an armoured truck, and the comment was that

18 the commander reported that two houses were Muslim, and

19 the third a Croat house, had been set on fire in

20 retribution for the two Muslim ones.

21 Once again, sir, as reprehensible as it may

22 be, there was basically tit-for-tat house burning, to

23 use a vernacular, going on on both sides?

24 A. Can I make it clear that my statement related

25 to my personal experience, in other words, what I

1 witnessed. I am not saying that such instances did not

2 take place.

3 Q. Right.

4 A. On the basis of milinfosums and the fact that

5 we received daily briefings about things that were

6 going on, we took them to be correct.

7 Q. That's exactly what you heard from the

8 intelligence that had been gathered by the British

9 forces in the area, that this was not an isolated

10 one-way phenomenon, if you like; it was --

11 A. Oh, no. No. No.

12 Q. Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, that is correct. Yes.

14 Q. Very well. Now, did you know that the total

15 population of the town of Busovaca, according to the

16 1991 census anyway, was 3.899?

17 A. I did not know that fact.

18 Q. Well, it would be fair to describe Busovaca,

19 would it not, as a pretty small town?

20 A. Smallish, but I believed it also had been a

21 very significant place as well. But in terms of

22 population size, that would not surprise me.

23 Q. Please forgive the delays in the questions.

24 A. I understand.

25 Q. We are routinely cruel to the interpreters by

1 failing to have breaks between the question and the

2 answer. So if you would help me out, I'll try to do

3 the same.

4 Your predecessor, I take it, was Major Andrew

5 McDonald?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You have previously described that you were a

8 liaison officer. Would it be fair to say that it was

9 perceived that there had been a gap in coverage,

10 essentially, between the western Lasva Valley that was

11 the primary area of responsibility of Captain Forgrave,

12 and the Zenica area which was the primary area of

13 responsibility of Captain Matthew Dundas-Whatley, and

14 so for a period of time you basically plugged the gap?

15 Would that be fair to say?

16 A. Yes, it would. This was a very temporary

17 gap, and I think it's also worth adding, to give this

18 balance, that resources were extremely thinly spread at

19 any one time and activities had to be directed to where

20 main events were taking place. At that stage, the main

21 events were in Gornji Vakuf, with fighting and

22 associated fighting, I believe, in Novi Travnik and

23 Travnik. That's where the tension was, not in

24 Busovaca.

25 Q. All right. Now --

1 A. I'm sorry. Excuse me. As a point of detail,

2 you described me as a liaison officer. I carried out

3 certain liaison officer duties in my capacity as a

4 company commander and indeed ensured and went out of my

5 way to ensure that I did not blur the edges of any

6 responsibility and ensured that any information I

7 gained, I passed to the liaison officer in question.

8 Q. Who was the liaison officer in question?

9 A. Well, actually, it was covered by Captain

10 Martin Forgrave as well. He had quite a large area to

11 cover. And with Captain Dundas-Whatley. They actually

12 worked as a pair to a degree at times, although

13 officially these were their designated areas of

14 responsibility.

15 Q. I understand that you were the CO of Charlie

16 company?

17 A. I was the officer commanding of C company,

18 yes.

19 Q. You realise that during the time that you

20 were performing your visits to the Busovaca-Kacuni

21 area, that you were ultimately to be posted up north to

22 Tuzla, the Tuzla region; correct?

23 A. That's correct, yes.

24 Q. All right. Now, you've told us that one of

25 the first things that you tried to do when you assumed

1 control of your company on January the 13th was to find

2 out who the local commanders of both the HVO and the

3 Muslim forces were; correct?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. Well, didn't you already know that, because

6 your regiment had actually been stationed in the area

7 for three months?

8 A. But I had only arrived on the 13th of

9 January. And one of the most important things is to

10 put a face to a name. And, also, to introduce myself.

11 It was an equal thing. It was very important that I

12 established my credentials as the new company commander

13 so that they saw my face too.

14 Q. And, as I understand the information

15 reporting regime, if you like, the liaison officers

16 would report back to the milinfocell every day any

17 significant meetings, any significant events, anything

18 that was noteworthy, and that the people who were in

19 charge of preparing milinfosums would put those

20 significant meetings and events into a military

21 information summary that was prepared by the milinfosum

22 every day?

23 A. If they could.

24 Q. And the officer in charge of your milinfocell

25 was Captain Christopher Leyshon?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Assisted ably by Sergeant Jim Connelly, I

3 take it?

4 A. That is correct.

5 Q. You relied upon these milinfosums to give you

6 a view of what was going on in your area of

7 responsibility to a large degree; isn't that fair to

8 say?

9 A. Yes, we all did.

10 Q. Just one brief background question on the

11 mission of UNPROFOR, of which BritBat was a part. The

12 primary role, in fact the almost exclusive role of the

13 U.N. forces in Bosnia, was to escort UNHCR convoys into

14 an area where humanitarian aid was needed. Would that

15 be fair to say?

16 A. That is a significant task, but it wasn't the

17 primary mission.

18 Q. Were you authorised ever to provide armed

19 escorts to purely private convoys, sir?

20 A. There were -- when you say "private," do you

21 mean non-governmental organisation, NGOs?

22 Q. I mean organisations not affiliated in any

23 way with the United Nations, or with the UNHCR.

24 A. No. We were working in support of the

25 UNHCR. And, indeed, on matters of such policy, we took

1 our direction from them.

2 Q. So you would not be permitted to provide

3 UNPROFOR weaponry and armed force to a purely private

4 convoy? That's what you are saying, correct?

5 A. Well, we would not, no.

6 Q. Now --

7 JUDGE MAY: When you get to a convenient

8 moment, we'll adjourn. It's 1.00.

9 MR. SAYERS: It seems like a perfectly

10 convenient time, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Major, would you be

12 back, please, at half past 2.00.

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

14 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.

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20

21

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24

25

1 --- On resuming at 2.30 p.m.

2 MR. SAYERS:

3 Q. Major, good afternoon.

4 A. Good afternoon.

5 Q. Now, addressing the initial researches that

6 you testified about, it's true that you never met the

7 commander in chief of the ABiH forces, General Sefer

8 Halilovic; is that correct?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. Similarly, you never met the commander in

11 chief of the HVO forces, Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic;

12 correct?

13 A. That is correct.

14 Q. Similarly, would it be fair to say that you

15 never met the 3rd Corps ABiH commander, General Enver

16 Hadzihasanovic?

17 A. I met or was introduced to him, no.

18 Q. And you never actually met Colonel Blaskic,

19 either, did you?

20 A. I recall seeing Colonel Blaskic at an

21 occasion at the school, on a date I can't remember, at

22 a distance. I was not introduced to him.

23 Q. And you've never spoken --

24 THE INTERPRETER: Would counsel please slow

25 down.

1 MR. SAYERS:

2 Q. Have you ever spoken to Colonel Franjo Nakic,

3 his second in command?

4 A. No, I have not.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please slow

6 down.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, if you haven't heard,

8 "Could counsel please slow down," from the

9 interpreters.

10 MR. SAYERS: I stand justly upbraided.

11 Q. Have you met Colonel Dzemal Merdan, the

12 deputy commander of the 3rd Corps?

13 A. I was briefly introduced to him on the

14 morning of Tuesday, the 26th of January, at the bridge

15 at Kacuni, and watched him being interviewed by Kate

16 Adie of the BBC.

17 Q. That was in the episode where Colonel Stewart

18 and you went down to the Kacuni checkpoint?

19 A. That was -- that occurred early that day, all

20 within about an hour or so.

21 Q. Now, would you agree, or tell me if you don't

22 know -- and that's true, by the way, of all my

23 questions -- the 3rd Corps in Zenica, under the command

24 of General Hadzihasanovic, had approximately ten to

25 twelve thousand line troops available to them; would

1 you say that's a fair approximation?

2 A. As memory serves me, yes, and I'm pausing to

3 try and recollect if I could remember an exact figure

4 that had been quoted to me at the time.

5 Q. Very well. As you reviewed the milinfosums

6 available to you, do you remember coming across one

7 specifically dated January the 18th, 1993, milinfosum

8 number 79? And I have a copy if you need to see it,

9 but the point I want to draw to your attention is a

10 report that the ABiH had 11.000 troops in the town as

11 opposed to 1.000 HVO troops.

12 A. Which town, please?

13 Q. Travnik.

14 A. I do not recall that.

15 Q. If you need to see the milinfosum, I'd be

16 happy to show it to you; but in the interests of time,

17 let me read you, from page 1: "The LO team visited the

18 BiH exchange officer for Travnik, who stated that the

19 situation was tense." And then it goes on to say: "He

20 claimed that the BiH were much stronger than the HVO in

21 Travnik, having 11.000 BiH soldiers in the area in

22 comparison to only 1.000 HVO soldiers." Is that

23 dramatically different from your recollection of the

24 state of affairs, or does it reflect your understanding

25 of the --

1 A. It's difficult to say so, based on my

2 memory. May I say as well, briefly, that in the period

3 immediately after taking command, there was an

4 initiative to examine whether some of our forces could

5 assist with resupplies in Sarajevo, and that was one of

6 the first things that I was actually involved with in

7 the period 15, 16, 17, 18 January, which came to

8 nothing. It was only after that that I was able to

9 turn my attention in detail to what was going on. I

10 had been there less than a week at that stage. I'm

11 sure you can appreciate it was a very steep learning

12 curve.

13 Q. Believe me, Major, I genuinely appreciate how

14 steep that learning curve is.

15 How long did you spend trying to climb or

16 rappel your way up that learning curve?

17 A. I would say that I was climbing all the

18 time. I think that it was an enormous amount to deal

19 with. The battalion had been in position for about

20 eight weeks, deploying in November of the previous

21 year. I came out on a rotation of -- a planned

22 changeover of company commanders. I would say it took

23 me the best part of about the first ten days, two

24 weeks, to have what I could say a genuine understanding

25 of what was going on, or what I believed was going on.

1 MR. NICE: I think, Your Honour, I wonder if,

2 when documents are quoted from, even if the Chamber and

3 the witness isn't bothered with them, if I could be

4 provided with a copy. It would make life easier, and I

5 can deal with matters swiftly then.

6 MR. SAYERS: We'd be more than happy to do

7 that, provided, in the interests of equality of arms,

8 that is reciprocated, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE MAY: Well, we're not going to go into

10 a quarrel about this. If you quote from a document,

11 then you must show it to the other side.

12 MR. SAYERS: Very well.

13 JUDGE MAY: If you are going to, Mr. Sayers,

14 you should have a copy, and when you quote from it,

15 hand it over.

16 MR. SAYERS: Very well.

17 Just handing to the usher a copy of

18 milinfosum number 79, Your Honour.

19 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D101/1.

20 MR. SAYERS:

21 Q. Major, as the Prosecution has requested, you

22 are now able to see what I was quoting from in

23 milinfosum number 79. And you have no reason to

24 believe that that information is incorrect; would that

25 be fair to say?

1 A. No, I would not.

2 Q. The next document I would like you to look at

3 is milinfosum number 112, which has already been marked

4 as Exhibit D62/1.

5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. Specifically, sir, I want to draw your

7 attention to a comment made by General Hadzihasanovic

8 on the 19th of February, 1993, or thereabouts,

9 assessing the strength of the -- the troop strength of

10 the ABiH at 52.000. And the comment is that this

11 figure is believed to be a fair assessment of the

12 strength of BiH forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Would

13 that be a fair assessment of the troop strength, as far

14 as you are aware?

15 A. I would have to say, as far as I was aware,

16 and also that I would take the judgements of the

17 milinfo centre in that. I would have no reason to

18 disbelieve that.

19 Q. Would you agree that in the Lasva Valley

20 area, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina generally, the ABiH

21 forces outnumbered the -- sorry, the ABiH forces

22 outnumbered the HVO forces?

23 A. From what I personally saw?

24 Q. Yes.

25 A. It would be very difficult to say.

1 Q. You just don't know?

2 A. Well, to be honest, if we are talking about

3 what I personally saw, what I personally believed.

4 When I described this morning my area of operational

5 responsibility, I did specify that it was on or around

6 the main supply routes. Now, if a formation, which I

7 would understand tactically would be well off a road,

8 in the countryside, camouflaged, it wouldn't be my

9 business to be going in there. I therefore wouldn't be

10 in a position to be able to say if they were of those

11 numbers.

12 And in all these things, as far as the

13 milinfosums are concerned, if there is a comment, the

14 comment is on the basis of the milinfo centre assessing

15 a vast amount of information coming in and making a

16 comment, a judgement. That is what I would go with.

17 Q. All right. On the subject of ABiH artillery,

18 were you aware that in early January ABiH

19 152-millimetre artillery pieces had been seen in the

20 area of Travnik?

21 A. If this had been reported in a milinfosum, I

22 may have read it at the time, but obviously I can't

23 recollect it --

24 Q. All right.

25 A. -- right now.

1 Q. Just quoting you from a document that's been

2 marked as D45/1, milinfosum number 70, 9th of January,

3 1993, it says:

4 "The LO reported that a BiH heavy artillery

5 piece, 152-millimetre or larger, is believed to be

6 [inaudible] 900 metres to the east of the hospital and

7 the north of town."

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please

9 slow down, especially when he reads a document.

10 A. [Inaudible] -- on the 20th of February.

11 Q. I would be more than happy to show you mine,

12 if the usher wishes. Just give this to you, D45/1.

13 It's been identified.

14 JUDGE MAY: Where is this, Mr. Sayers, that

15 we are dealing with?

16 MR. SAYERS: Under the entry for Travnik,

17 Your Honour.

18 A. Well, this, of course, relates to a date when

19 I was not actually in the theatre of operations. I

20 took over the company on the 13th of January and I

21 actually arrived -- in fact, on the day this was

22 produced I was still making my way via Zagreb to

23 Split.

24 Q. I understand, sir. But one day before you

25 arrived in the area of operations, this artillery piece

1 was actually spotted in the area, wasn't it?

2 A. If this document says that it was spotted in

3 the area, then I have no reason to disbelieve it. But

4 I certainly can't recall it.

5 Q. All right. Maybe we can cut through this.

6 You basically confined your attention to the main

7 supply routes themselves? You didn't actually travel

8 out to the outlying areas, did you?

9 A. Not on a routine basis. If it was part of a

10 specific task that I was involved with, then I would do

11 it. But the nature of the specific liaison officers,

12 as opposed to myself as a company commander, were quite

13 different. And as I've said earlier, I would liase as

14 part of my general duties as a company commander.

15 But at the end of the day, I had 120 men,

16 some 14 Warriors, a troop of Scimitars, and it was my

17 responsibility to assist the UNHCR in getting aid up

18 the main supply routes.

19 Q. Yes. But if tanks had been moving, for

20 example, in the Zenica area, you never saw any, did

21 you?

22 A. No, I did not.

23 Q. All right. Just to clarify in my own mind,

24 you weren't actually formally a liaison officer; you

25 were a company commander?

1 A. That's correct. And I've made it quite clear

2 in all my testimony that was the case.

3 Q. But you just filled in as an LO doubling up,

4 if you like, in the Busovaca area?

5 A. For a specific period of time I concentrated

6 more on liaison-type duties. Never at any stage did I

7 formally become the liaison officer for the Busovaca

8 area. No.

9 Q. Now, turning our attention to just a few

10 questions on the military chain of command, sir. There

11 is no doubt that Colonel Blaskic was the overall HVO

12 military commander for the entire Central Bosnia

13 operative zone, is there?

14 A. At the level at which I was working, I was

15 quite clear that Colonel Blaskic was the named person

16 who was in charge of operations in that area.

17 Q. He commanded all HVO military operations in

18 the Central Bosnia operative zone, didn't he?

19 A. It was stated that he was the nominated

20 commander, yes. That's what I was told and that's what

21 I believed.

22 Q. And you saw nothing to indicate that he had

23 less than full command over his troops, did you?

24 A. Well, I would say that there were occasions,

25 which I related this morning, where I was surprised at

1 some of the things that I believed purported to have

2 come from him, with his agreement, seemed to have been

3 overridden by another person. I was surprised.

4 Q. Now, at the time that the conflict

5 broke out --

6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Excuse me.

7 Mr. Sayers, regarding the previous answer of the

8 witness, could the witness please explain in more

9 detail what other person? You spoke about the

10 responsibility. You said you were surprised. What

11 other person? That things that should have come from

12 or the order should have come from Colonel Blaskic

13 came, as a matter of fact, from another source, from

14 another person. You mentioned there was another

15 person. What other person did you have in mind?

16 A. Yes, Your Honour. To answer your question,

17 the person that I had in mind was Dario Kordic, but, if

18 I could be specific, it wasn't that an order had come

19 from him. The instances which I related to, the one

20 specific one, was it seemed that an order or an

21 agreement, an agreement that had been previously made,

22 had been overridden by Dario Kordic. And this

23 specifically is the delay in the exchange of prisoners

24 by 48 hours.

25 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

1 MR. SAYERS:

2 Q. And we'll get to that, Major, in due course.

3 Did you understand that the commander of the

4 Nikola Subic-Zrinjski Brigade in Busovaca was commander

5 Niko Jozinovic?

6 A. Yes, I believe I was introduced to this

7 person by Captain Martin Forgrave on or around the 20th

8 of January.

9 Q. All right. And the deputy commander of that

10 brigade was the gentleman that you've described, Anto

11 Sliskovic; correct?

12 A. Yes, I understood him to be the deputy

13 commander. In fact, he introduced himself. He said he

14 was the deputy commander.

15 Q. Did you understand that the HVO forces under

16 the command of Colonel Blaskic were divided into three

17 operational zones containing nine brigades?

18 A. I couldn't be clear on this information. I

19 have to be honest.

20 Q. Turning to the civilian political structure

21 in Busovaca, did you ever gain any understanding of who

22 the President of the HVO government in Busovaca was?

23 A. Not the President, no.

24 Q. Did you ever meet Mr. Zoran Maric?

25 A. No, I did not.

1 Q. Did you know who the head of the local HDZ,

2 BiH party was?

3 A. No, I did not.

4 Q. Do you recognise the name Florijan

5 Glavocevic?

6 A. No, I do not.

7 Q. How about on the Muslim side, just south of

8 Kacuni, Major Jennings; who was the leading political

9 figure on the Muslim side, please?

10 A. I would not know the name of the leading

11 political figure.

12 Q. I would just like to have another milinfosum

13 marked, sir, and ask you whether you consulted this

14 before you started to meet the principal military

15 figures. It's milinfosum number 75, dated January the

16 15th, 1993.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Document D102/1.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

19 MR. SAYERS:

20 Q. The two things that I would like to ask you

21 about are really under the first heading in Busovaca.

22 It says: The HVO brigade, Nikola Zrinjski, is

23 commanded by Niko Jozinovic. Was this information that

24 was available to you before you started to meet the

25 local military figures, sir?

1 A. I'm sorry, can you just go to where it is,

2 that name is?

3 Q. Yes. It's under heading (1), Busovaca,

4 subparagraph (b).

5 A. (b). I do have recollection of this. I will

6 have read this document; how much time I had to read it

7 -- I would have read this document, in retrospect,

8 because, as I said earlier, I was actually on that

9 day -- is it the 15th of January?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. I was preparing to go into Sarajevo, and

12 reading documents relating to that.

13 Q. And as you can see under the next entry, a

14 number of BiH tanks were noted being transported or

15 moving under their own power towards Zenica. Were you

16 aware of that, that the BiH actually had tank assets?

17 A. Well, I believe I would have looked at this

18 at the time.

19 Q. And therefore you would have been aware that

20 the BiH army had tank assets, would you not?

21 A. It would have been reported as such, that

22 they had tank assets.

23 Q. Yes. I will have some more questions on this

24 particular subject more as we go along, but I just

25 would like you to confirm, Major, that at the command

1 level of the Nikola Subic Zrinjski Brigade, during the

2 period of time that you were having your meetings with

3 Mr. Kordic, the brigade was actually undergoing a

4 change of command; isn't that correct?

5 A. I am aware that there were details

6 disseminated about a change of command, yes.

7 Q. In fact, in the first week of February or so,

8 commander Niko Jozinovic was actually replaced by

9 commander Dusko Grubesic; do you remember that?

10 A. No, I don't, but if that was the case, I'm

11 sure it took place.

12 Q. All right. Let me turn to the subject of the

13 fighting that occurred in January. The precipitating

14 factor for the fighting that occurred, at least in the

15 Busovaca area, was the erection of a checkpoint by the

16 ABiH forces at Kacuni, right on the main road; isn't

17 that true?

18 A. I'm not sure that that is the case. Are you

19 saying that that was the catalyst that started off the

20 fighting that took place?

21 Q. Well, let's just go through it piece by

22 piece, if I may.

23 MR. SAYERS: The next milinfosum is

24 milinfosum 81, on the 20th of January, 1993.

25 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

1 D103/1.

2 MR. SAYERS:

3 Q. Just one very brief question about this, on

4 page 3, under Item 4, "Busovaca." It's right at the

5 bottom of the page, Major.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It says: "The BiH in Busovaca area have

8 erected a new checkpoint at Kacuni. This is the only

9 BiH checkpoint en route from Vitez to Kiseljak and is

10 located just north of the BiH brigade headquarters."

11 A. Mm-hmm.

12 Q. That, I take it, is a reference to the

13 brigade headquarters of the 333rd Mountain Brigade.

14 A. I believe it would be, yes.

15 Q. And this checkpoint was reported to be well

16 manned by soldiers equipped with both automatic weapons

17 and an RPG-7; correct?

18 A. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm.

19 Q. Just for the record, that's a

20 rocket-propelled anti-tank weapon, is it not?

21 A. Rocket-propelled grenade.

22 Q. And do you recall that the purpose of that

23 checkpoint, sir, according to the British army, was to

24 prevent reinforcements of HVO troops coming from

25 Kiseljak and Kresevo?

1 A. I can't recall that specifically, no.

2 Q. All right. If I could just show you the

3 document that's marked as Exhibit D53/1.

4 A. Thank you.

5 Q. It's on page 2, Major, the item that I want

6 to discuss with you, under "Busovaca."

7 The document says: "The new BiH checkpoint

8 placed in Kacuni was put in place to prevent HVO

9 reinforcements coming from the Kiseljak/Kresevo" -- I

10 guess it means "area." And in fact, on January the

11 20th, reinforcements attempting to pass the checkpoint

12 were actually turned back. Do you see that?

13 A. Just about.

14 Q. It's not a very good copy --

15 A. No.

16 Q. -- I admit.

17 That was information that was known to you

18 contemporaneously, was it not?

19 A. Only in the sense that all milinfos were

20 available to you to read. And this is an important

21 point, because I have had many milinfos presented to me

22 about events pertaining -- of some six-plus years ago.

23 And these I take, as I have already said, as accurate

24 because they are produced by the milinfo centre. But

25 to answer a question, I therefore knew that to be the

1 case, I would have to place the caveat: It depends on

2 whether I had actually had the time, given the nature

3 of my duties, where at times, even in my own notebook,

4 there are gaps of two or three days, I'd been out on

5 the ground spending hours, literally, on a specific

6 task, and there are only so many hours in a day.

7 Q. I take your point fully, Major.

8 A. I mean, that is -- I'm not trying to be

9 defensive; I'm trying to explain what it was actually

10 like, operating at company commander level, not back in

11 the headquarters at Vitez, where one could take a

12 measured look; my job was to ensure that things

13 physically happened on the ground, and I obviously

14 assimilated as much information as I could. So

15 therefore I can't say that I can say I definitely would

16 have known that.

17 Q. Let me just ask you to agree, Major, that the

18 erection of a checkpoint blocking access along the main

19 supply route from Busovaca to Kiseljak was an event of

20 extreme significance --

21 A. Oh, yes.

22 Q. -- was it not?

23 A. Oh, yes.

24 Q. So from a military perspective, this would

25 have been certainly one of the most significant things

1 that was happening at this particular point in time;

2 you would have to agree with that, wouldn't you?

3 A. It was important.

4 Q. Right.

5 A. At the same time, as recorded in my notebook

6 of events at the time, there was a report of eight

7 explosions reported to be in the Muslim enclave in

8 Busovaca, close to the main supply route. All of these

9 things were very important.

10 Q. All right. Now, in this time period, did you

11 come to have information that detachments of a

12 specialist unit by the name of the 7th Muslim Brigade

13 had been deployed in the Kacuni area right at the end

14 of January of 1993 and immediately prior to the

15 massacre in the village of Dusina on the 26th of

16 January, sir?

17 A. I do recall the name of the brigade in

18 question.

19 Q. We could have --

20 A. I can't say it was definitely -- my memory

21 doesn't recall that "Yes, and it was in connection with

22 that specific date." But I do recall conversation,

23 discussion, in and around the 5.00 daily briefings,

24 where we were updated about such outside forces.

25 Q. I wonder if the usher would show you Exhibit

1 D61/1, which is a milinfosum dated February the 2nd of

2 1993. And although this may seem to be somewhat out of

3 chronological order, I think you will see that it

4 really fits in.

5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. First of all, Major, on the first page --

7 this is the day before you actually had your first

8 meeting with Mr. Kordic -- it's confirmed that the

9 commander of the Nikola Subic Zrjnski Brigade, as of

10 February the 2nd, is still Niko Jozinovic; do you see

11 that?

12 A. I do, on the first line, yes.

13 Q. And the deputy commander is Anto Sliskovic;

14 right?

15 A. Yes, I've got that, yes.

16 Q. And the area immediately to the west of

17 Busovaca was controlled by the 325th BiH Broska Brigada

18 -- which means "Mountain Brigade," I believe -- that

19 was information that was known to you; correct?

20 A. Within the outlines of -- without repeating

21 myself, within the outlines of what I previously said

22 about milinfos.

23 Q. Now, the specific question that I want to ask

24 you is on page 2, under note 4. At the bottom of that

25 page, it states, or at least the British

1 intelligence-gathering organs of the army

2 said: "Separate sources state that elements of the 7th

3 Muslimski Brigade are deployed north of Kacuni. This

4 is a mobile brigade controlled directly from Zenica.

5 Reliable information indicates that at least 80

6 soldiers from the 7th Brigade were moved to the area

7 approximately five days ago."

8 And there are also complaints in this note to

9 the effect that the commander of the 3rd Corps was

10 claiming that he had little control over these groups,

11 and that they did not in fact report to Kacuni. Does

12 that ring a bell of any familiarity to you?

13 A. The only bell that it rings is the general

14 question about the accountability of outside, sometimes

15 referred to as extremist forces. And I do recall,

16 because of course there were such elements on both

17 opposing sides, about the -- specifically the question

18 of who they were accountable, who they took their --

19 their chain of command through.

20 But I don't -- I can't say to you, reading

21 these lines, "Yes, I remember that, yes, I read that, I

22 digested this information."

23 Q. And I wouldn't expect anything else, Major.

24 After all, it was six years ago.

25 You make another reference to some explosions

1 that occurred in the town of Busovaca on the night, I

2 believe, of the 24th of January, was it?

3 A. No, I believe that the explosions actually

4 occurred -- in my notebook, it has the 21st.

5 Q. All right.

6 A. Therefore it will have related to the

7 previous 24 hours; therefore it will have been the

8 night of the 20th/21st, during the night.

9 Q. All right. And this kind of bombing of

10 businesses, if you like, was taking place on both

11 sides, both Croat businesses and Muslim businesses, in

12 towns such as Vitez, was it not?

13 A. In general, yes, it was.

14 Q. In fact, on the 23rd of January, 1993, do you

15 recall hearing about a Croat cafe and another business

16 being bombed?

17 A. In Vitez?

18 Q. In Vitez.

19 A. Yes, I have recollection of that.

20 Q. All right. Now, turning to the immediate

21 flashpoint of the conflict, if you like, on the 24th of

22 January, 1994, you were actually not present in the

23 area when that conflict broke out; correct?

24 A. That is correct.

25 Q. So what you are relating to us is what you

1 understand from other people?

2 A. No. I listened to it on the high-frequency

3 net, live, as it happened.

4 Q. All right.

5 A. But I did not witness it.

6 Q. My understanding is that on the 24th of

7 January, two vehicles tried to slip into a convoy and

8 were targeted by rocket-propelled weapons fired by ABiH

9 forces, and that in the ensuing destruction, two people

10 were killed.

11 A. That is my understanding, yes.

12 Q. Do you know who they were?

13 A. The individuals?

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. No, I do not.

16 Q. Do you know that one of them was a

17 policeman -- and tell me if I jog your memory or not --

18 by the name of Nikica Petrovic?

19 A. No, I cannot recall that.

20 Q. I'm sorry, I'm corrected: Ivica Petrovic.

21 All right.

22 Do you know a gentleman by the name of Ignjac

23 Kostroman? Did you ever meet him?

24 A. No, I cannot recall that name.

25 Q. Can you recall whether any reports were

1 received by the British intelligence units of the army

2 that attempts had been made to abduct Mr. Kostroman and

3 Colonel Blaskic in the Kacuni area on January the

4 21st?

5 A. No, I cannot recall that.

6 Q. Would it be fair to say that the killing of

7 the two Croat citizens at Kacuni on the 24th of

8 January, 1993, sparked about five or six days of

9 fighting that was eventually brought to an end by a

10 negotiated ceasefire?

11 A. I believe that was the principal catalyst.

12 Q. And Mr. Kordic took absolutely no part in the

13 negotiations that led to the conclusion of the

14 ceasefire, did he?

15 A. Not as far as I'm aware, no.

16 Q. I would just like to show you a

17 contemporaneous entry, if I may, in the diary of your

18 CO, Colonel Stewart, where he describes the outbreak of

19 hostilities, and I'd just like to ask you if you agree

20 with it.

21 A. Excuse me, please: Is this his book --

22 Q. No.

23 A. -- or a diary?

24 Q. It's his diary.

25 A. His diary.

1 Q. I've had excerpts made, which I would like to

2 show to you, if I may.

3 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Is the Prosecution

4 going to call Colonel Stewart at the moment?

5 MR. NICE: He is certainly on our list, but I

6 haven't seen his diary.

7 JUDGE MAY: You haven't seen the diary?

8 MR. NICE: I haven't seen the diary. I

9 haven't seen it myself yet.

10 THE REGISTRAR: Document D104/1.

11 MR. SAYERS: This is a document that we

12 actually received from the Prosecution.

13 Q. With respect to the conflict on January the

14 25th, here is what Colonel Stewart has to say. And

15 this is on the bottom of page 9 and the top of page

16 10.

17 A. All right.

18 Q. "All hell was happening on the road to

19 Kiseljak. Apparently a HVO vehicle following Sergeant

20 Smith's two Warriors was attacked by Muslims in the

21 village of Kacuni and in the resultant events two

22 soldiers were killed. Both sides, Croats and Muslims,

23 were having a go at one another, with the Croats based

24 in Busovaca and the Muslims based in Kacuni."

25 It's phrased in a fairly wry manner, I think,

1 Major Jennings, but would you agree that's a fair

2 characterisation of what was going on?

3 A. The expression, "having a go at one another,"

4 I can understand and sympathise with the frustration

5 that the commanding officer was feeling at the time;

6 that despite all efforts to try and prevent things,

7 yes, they were having a go. I think it is certainly a

8 phrase I would identify with.

9 Q. All right. He also describes a visit to the

10 commander of the 3rd Corps, General Hadzihasanovic, and

11 complained that the BiH had started the trouble, if you

12 see that on the bottom of page 9, about halfway through

13 the concluding paragraph.

14 A. Yes, I do.

15 Q. All right. Did you have any discussions

16 about who was actually responsible for the outbreak of

17 the fighting?

18 A. About the specific instance that led to it?

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. To be perfectly honest with you, I was

21 dealing with the situation at the time.

22 Q. On the next page, page 10, and this is the

23 last question I have on this, Colonel Stewart contends

24 that in some anger he had telephoned Colonel Merdan in

25 Zenica and told him that this time the Muslims were at

1 least in some way to blame.

2 You would not disagree with that

3 characterisation?

4 A. I would say yes. I would say that when I

5 arrived on that morning, the morning of Tuesday the

6 26th of January, the Muslims controlling the roadblock,

7 this log lorry, weren't prepared to listen to a single

8 word I was saying. They were being extremely

9 difficult.

10 Q. All right, sir. The next document that I

11 would like to draw your attention to, and I am going to

12 have to put this one on the ELMO and make copies

13 available in due course, is milinfosum number 86, dated

14 January the 25th, 1993. I would like to have this

15 marked, anticipatorially as the next exhibit, please,

16 and we will produce it tomorrow morning.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D105/1.

18 MR. SAYERS:

19 Q. If you would just turn to page 2, Major. In

20 the "comment" the preparer of this milinfosum observes

21 that:

22 "Several of the houses around the two

23 checkpoints in Kacuni were reported to be burning. It

24 is believed that these houses may have belonged to

25 Croats, the occupants having been ethnically cleansed

1 by the Bosnian army."

2 That was, indeed, an accurate encapsulation

3 of what you saw yourself with your own eyes; correct?

4 A. Not just specifically that. There were a

5 number of houses, houses belonging to both sides.

6 Q. And if we could just orient the Trial Chamber

7 to what we were talking about. I believe that you've

8 previously stated that a map marked Z2781,1 depicts the

9 area where you were principally involved, and it might

10 make some sense to put this on the ELMO so that you can

11 point out a couple of locations to the judges.

12 If you could just move the map a little

13 westward, please, and southward, please. I wonder if

14 you would point out for Their Honours the location of

15 the village of Dusina with the pointer, Major. I think

16 you will find it northwest or northeast of Busovaca.

17 A. You need to come down.

18 Q. That's right. It's on the top right of the

19 screen.

20 A. Sorry, please bear with me.

21 Q. Certainly.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, no doubt counsel can help

23 the witness with it. Whereabouts is it, Mr. Sayers?

24 MR. SAYERS: If you go out about 30 degrees

25 from Busovaca, Your Honour, Dusina is approximately, it

1 looks like it's four inches on the screen.

2 A. I've now located where you are referring to.

3 Q. Thank you. You also referred to seeing a

4 number of houses burning at Donje Polje. If you could

5 point that out to the --

6 A. [Indicates].

7 Q. Now, could you tell me how many -- your

8 understanding was that this was a Muslim village?

9 A. There were Muslim houses within it. I think

10 I used the phrase "predominantly Muslim." I was not

11 therefore saying it was a Muslim village.

12 Q. And your conclusion relating to the fact that

13 this was a predominantly Muslim village was based upon

14 your observation that it contained houses which had

15 four roofs, correct?

16 A. Yes. That is the basis on which I went, and

17 I don't suppose it's inconceivable that someone else

18 could live in them. You know, I have to be quite clear

19 about this. I always said: Now, here, Muslim houses

20 have four sides to the roof. That's the basis on which

21 I took it. So it was an assumption that it was a

22 Muslim family that lived in there.

23 Q. I don't think this is going to be contested,

24 Your Honour, but according to the 1991 census, the

25 total number of Muslims living in --

1 JUDGE MAY: You can make the point in due

2 course. You say there is -- what do you say the

3 figures are?

4 MR. SAYERS: The number of Muslims living in

5 the village were zero and the number of Croats living

6 in the village, Your Honour, were 709, with five Serbs

7 and about 15 others.

8 JUDGE MAY: As far as the witness is

9 concerned, can you comment on that, Major, or not?

10 A. I can't dispute on the census which is there,

11 which obviously was taken and must be correct. I go on

12 the basis of my memory of what I saw in that area.

13 MR. SAYERS:

14 Q. Major, I have absolutely no criticism of

15 you. Let's continue on, if we may.

16 You yourself were in Busovaca on the 25th

17 upon your return to the BritBat compound at Novi Bila,

18 correct?

19 A. I went to the Dutch transport -- you are

20 referring to Busovaca? I went to the Dutch transport

21 battalion headquarters, to the compound, once I had --

22 or my vehicle had been repaired. This was when it was

23 out of action for about eight hours. I think this was

24 at least 8.00 or 9.00 at night --

25 Q. Actually, let me take you back a little bit

1 to the morning of January the 25th. Isn't it true that

2 you were not sure even where Kacuni was on the morning

3 of the 25th of January, 1993?

4 A. I knew where I was going with regard to a

5 map, a grid reference that was placed on the map.

6 Bearing in mind that I had returned from Tuzla on the

7 Sunday evening, it was reported, which was correct,

8 that I was tasked to go and recover the bodies, and I

9 had gone to see and looked in the operations room where

10 Kacuni was. I had started working out a plan. But a

11 decision was made -- it's actually not reported in any

12 of this -- that because it was after dark, it was

13 considered to be too dangerous to send anybody out at

14 that particular stage.

15 So when I set off on the morning of Monday

16 the 25th -- I'd actually been through Kacuni when I'd

17 gone to Sarajevo weeks previously as part of this

18 reconnaissance, but I'd not taken specific note of this

19 village, indeed, any other of the villages going down

20 on the route. But I do not think it's fair to say I

21 did not know where Kacuni was, and what that might

22 imply.

23 Q. Let me just read you from your statement

24 given to the investigators for the Prosecution four

25 years ago. On page 4 you described leaving in your

1 Warriors. That's an armoured fighting vehicle?

2 A. That's correct, yes.

3 Q. On the morning of the 25th, 1993. You

4 encountered a fire fight at the T-junction. "I stopped

5 on the bridge itself. I was not exactly sure where

6 Kacuni was. And in view of the fire fight, I informed

7 the ops room of the situation."

8 A. Indeed. Well, I have to say -- I mean, it is

9 a choice of words. Fine. But I am sticking with what

10 I was saying, that I knew I had to continue to where

11 Kacuni was marked on my map. But bearing in mind that

12 I had actually entered into what was an extensive fire

13 fight, on the 25th of January, and that what we were

14 doing was we were going to investigate an obstacle that

15 had been placed across the road. I actually had four

16 Warriors with me, and I was about to enter a period of

17 intensive fighting between two opposing factions. I

18 had to consider, bearing in mind that I had not been at

19 Kacuni, I was not present in the incidents the previous

20 day, whether it was worth me pressing on, perhaps

21 endangering British lives. Bearing in mind, of course,

22 there had been the recent death of Lance Corporal Wayne

23 Edwards in Gornji Vakuf on the 13th of January.

24 I therefore decided to call a pause and

25 return to Vitez.

1 Q. Would it be fair to say that your -- well, we

2 can move on. Turning to the incidents of the 26th and

3 27th of January, were you aware that there had been a

4 series of attacks in the Dusina area and to the

5 northeast and east of Busovaca in the region of

6 Nezirovici and Gusti Grab, and that a significant

7 number of Croat civilians had been executed?

8 A. I can't recall that right now. Here,

9 speaking to you answering that question, I can't recall

10 that.

11 Q. All right. I would just like to show you or

12 ask the usher to show you Exhibit D58/1, which is a

13 milinfosum dated the 29th of January, 1993, and this

14 might refresh your memory, Major.

15 On page 1, a reference is made to the fact

16 that a LO team visited the HVO HQ in Busovaca on that

17 day, the 29th of January, and spoke to the commander

18 Niko Jozinovic. Were you amongst those people?

19 A. No.

20 Q. All right. And then the HVO commander goes

21 on to identify the villages that have been attacked and

22 destroyed by the BiH, including the villages that I

23 just mentioned?

24 A. Uh-huh.

25 Q. He goes on to describe the fact that 12 old

1 people between 65 and 70 years old had been killed and

2 that a further 30 people had been arrested. Did you

3 ever have the opportunity to investigate the

4 circumstances under which those Croat civilians had

5 been detained?

6 A. No, I did not.

7 Q. Did you know that there was a detention

8 facility in Kacuni called the silos where all of these

9 people were cooped up?

10 A. I was aware that there was a detention

11 facility at Kacuni. And the area I went to [indicates]

12 here is -- this is where the blockage was. You then

13 get to this T-junction here. There was a BiH

14 checkpoint on it, a very small one. I then travelled

15 up this. This is actually related to in the diary or

16 book written by Colonel Stewart as well. In fact, I

17 think it's actually -- I had a very quick glance --

18 it's related in that previous piece of evidence. I

19 would say about one and a half, one, one and a half

20 kilometres up here was the centre of 333 brigade.

21 That's where I met the Commander Mekic, his name was.

22 And I was shown the compound.

23 And I saw two ICRC Land Rovers there at the

24 time and -- well, they were clearly dealing with it.

25 They were doing some form of verifying and

1 documentation. But I was there to see the commander at

2 333 brigade with regard to the ongoing -- my desire to

3 get sides together with regard to the various disputes

4 in Busovaca and Kacuni.

5 Q. Thank you. Could you turn to the second page

6 of the exhibit that you have, Exhibit D58/1. And right

7 at the bottom there is a reference to a Zvonko Razic.

8 I think it's actually Rajic. It's misspelled. Did you

9 ever come to know the circumstances under which

10 Mr. Rajic was executed and --

11 A. Well, I mean, it said -- it does say he was

12 killed there, so to use the word "executed," you know,

13 I would go by what is stated in the milinfo, and that

14 states that he was killed. So was I aware of the

15 circumstances in which he was killed? No, I am not.

16 Q. Very well. Then I'll move on. The next item

17 that I would like to cover with you in this is on the

18 very next page, right up at the top, where Commander

19 Jozinovic from the brigade in Busovaca reports the

20 circumstances under which civilian detainees had been

21 released and then rearrested after numerous incidents

22 of sniping. Were you aware of these facts or not?

23 A. I can't say that I can recall those facts at

24 the time. I may have had the opportunity to read this

25 milinfo. Again, I was dealing with preparations for

1 negotiations to deal with specific points that were

2 holding up a ceasefire in and around the

3 Busovaca-Kacuni area.

4 Q. All right. Would you agree that from January

5 the 20th, 1993, when the roadblock in Kacuni went up,

6 until the time that you left the Busovaca area, and

7 thereafter, as far as you are aware, the Muslim forces

8 actually controlled the stretch of the main supply

9 route between Kacuni and the village to the south by

10 the name of Bilalovac?

11 A. Yes, they did.

12 Q. All right. And this effectively cut off the

13 municipality of Busovaca from the municipality of

14 Kiseljak?

15 A. Yes, there was a blockage. We did set up a

16 second U.N. checkpoint at Bilalovac subsequently, yes,

17 I remember that.

18 Q. All right. Turning now to your meeting with

19 Deputy Commander Sliskovic on January the 30th, about

20 which you spoke. It would be fair to say that you took

21 an immediate dislike to this gentleman --

22 A. Not an immediate dislike, no.

23 Q. Really?

24 A. Not an immediate dislike.

25 Q. You told him immediately, however, in your

1 first meeting, that his version of events was, in your

2 view, ridiculous; right?

3 A. No. This was one specific comment that he

4 made on the only occasion where I said why were we, in

5 my opinion, why were we being shelled. And, please, I

6 ask you to bear in mind that these events had only

7 taken place two or three days before. I was still,

8 shall we say, very cross about the fact that people had

9 been trying to kill me and my soldiers in the course of

10 my duty. But, carrying on professionally, I stated why

11 were we being shelled, by what I believed, on the basis

12 of examination of shell crater, et cetera, to come from

13 Busovaca. My comment was in reply to his statement

14 that it must have been the Muslims. I just couldn't

15 see that.

16 Q. Right.

17 A. So it was only that one specific thing. I

18 think it would be wrong to say that I took an instant

19 dislike and immediately said that this was ridiculous.

20 It's not the case. These meetings took hours, days to

21 bring together. It was a torturous process. And there

22 were always, to a degree, formalities and courtesies.

23 If anything, it was very important to ensure that both

24 sides felt settled at the table. You had to go through

25 who is who, who is representing who, and get all that

1 down. And then you would actually start on the points

2 of detail.

3 Q. All right. But you did, nonetheless, express

4 your view to him that his explanation of the chronology

5 of the shelling was ridiculous; correct?

6 A. What I said to him was I believed it was a

7 ridiculous statement to say that we on those days had

8 been shelled by the Muslims, the army BiH.

9 Q. And in your statement you say that you

10 considered Mr. Sliskovic to be a specifically

11 unfriendly and sinister person --

12 A. Yes. I did use those words, yes.

13 Q. And that was your reaction the first time

14 that you met him?

15 A. That was the reaction, which I ended up with,

16 the meeting having been concluded. And it was as a

17 result of watching how he conducted himself during the

18 course of a meeting that lasted at least two hours.

19 Q. Very well. You also testified that Jeremy

20 Fleming from the ECMM took over the negotiating

21 process, if you like, principal responsibility for

22 liaising with the various representatives of both

23 sides, once he put in an appearance?

24 A. No. This is not the case. To be specific,

25 the initiative to set up a commission, to investigate

1 the ongoing disputes over power supply, telephone

2 lines, what have you, was suggested by Brigadier

3 Cordy-Simpson, the chief of staff at HQ Kiseljak, who

4 suggested to Colonel Stewart that they should now

5 formally take this on. And, to be honest, I thought it

6 was a very sensible decision, because I was starting to

7 get bogged down in meetings.

8 Q. And that decision ultimately led to the

9 genesis of the Busovaca Joint Commission?

10 A. At Brigadier Cordy-Simpson's initiative,

11 yes. That's my understanding.

12 Q. That was a commission that met in February on

13 a fairly regular basis at the Hotel Tisa in Busovaca;

14 isn't that correct?

15 A. Yes, it did. I think there was a very odd

16 occasion it met -- certainly the first meeting, what

17 one might say is the inaugural meeting, took place in

18 Bila at the school, which is documented. And then the

19 regular place was the Hotel Tisa.

20 Q. And the purpose of this commission was to

21 create a forum, if you like, for a dialogue between the

22 sides and a resolution of all of the problems that were

23 erupting in the Busovaca area, without further

24 conflict?

25 A. That is correct. With, as I remember, three

1 representatives from each opposing side.

2 Q. And Mr. Kordic was never one of those?

3 A. He was not.

4 Q. And he didn't attend any of the sessions of

5 the Busovaca Joint Commission, as far as you are aware,

6 did he?

7 A. Not to the best of my knowledge.

8 Q. Very well. Just a few questions in

9 connection with the general ceasefire agreement that

10 was marked as Exhibit Z421,1A. That may find itself in

11 the tidal wave of papers --

12 A. That's okay.

13 Q. Two things with respect to this agreement.

14 First, paragraph 6 states that the release of all

15 prisoners on both sides shall be organised by the

16 International Red Cross. Do you see that?

17 A. I do.

18 Q. All right. There is no time limit for the

19 release of prisoners, as far as you are aware, was

20 there?

21 A. I have to say in layout this may be a little

22 different from a document which I had --

23 Q. How do you mean?

24 A. It is in the tabulation.

25 Q. Well --

1 A. It says at the top "translation."

2 Q. That's fine. But you are aware that the --

3 let me just put it to you.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. The first time that any deadline for the

6 release of prisoners was actually prescribed by any

7 joint order of General Hadzihasanovic and Colonel

8 Blaskic was actually February the 13th, 1993, was it

9 not?

10 A. I can't immediately recall that.

11 Q. Very well. Could I just ask the usher to

12 show you Exhibit D55/1. Maybe that will jog your

13 memory.

14 Major, this is a copy of a series of orders

15 signed by Colonel Blaskic and General Hadzihasanovic.

16 I think that the one that interests us is on the 4th

17 page in, where the command is made that "all imprisoned

18 and kept persons should be released unconditionally and

19 immediately by February 15, 1993, not later than 1200

20 hours." Do you see that?

21 A. I can see that, yes.

22 Q. All right. You are not aware of any order

23 that was signed by anybody that contained a deadline

24 before this February the 13th, 1993 order, are you?

25 A. Well, looking at the 30th of January

1 ceasefire, I had an impression from memory that there

2 was a date. But looking at this piece of paper, there

3 is no date or time.

4 Q. Very well, sir. Let me just move on to the

5 next point. The provision that appears in paragraph

6 7(d), I think you gave some testimony about this, but I

7 just want to make sure that this is the provision that

8 you --

9 A. I'm sorry, can I just make sure that I am

10 back to the --

11 Q. That's Z421,1A and paragraph 7(d) requires

12 the joint commission to supervise the withdrawal of all

13 units which are not from the local municipality and to

14 complete their withdrawal by 1600 hours on Monday, the

15 1st of February, 1993.

16 That's the particular provision that

17 Mr. Kordic was complaining about when he showed you

18 identification papers taken from BiH soldiers hailing

19 from the Banja Luka region?

20 A. Right.

21 Q. All right. We can move on.

22 A. I can see a connection there, yes.

23 Q. Yes. In terms of the ceasefire negotiation

24 and agreements, just a few final questions. You made a

25 reference in your 1998 statement, specifically on page

1 8, to the fact that Colonel Stewart knew the importance

2 of getting the higher commanders of the warring

3 factions together in order to give more authority to

4 the agreements of the 30th of January, 1993. Right?

5 A. Uh-huh. Yes.

6 Q. And the higher commanders were actually

7 Colonel Blaskic, right, and General Hadzihasanovic?

8 A. That is what I believed to be the case.

9 Q. I've shown you the orders dated February the

10 13th, the whole series of them signed by both of those

11 gentlemen?

12 A. Uh-huh.

13 Q. All right. In fact, as I understand it,

14 Major -- and you may not have a memory of this, maybe

15 you do; just let us know -- there was a summit meeting

16 held in the town of Kakanj on February the 13th, and

17 that's where the joint orders were actually signed, in

18 the presence of both General Morillon and also General

19 Petkovic and General Halilovic, the very highest

20 level --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- of the military --

23 A. Those names are all highest level, yes.

24 Q. All right.

25 You gave some testimony relating to the

1 Vance-Owen Plan, and you said that you were familiar

2 with it. I don't propose to go through these

3 documents, because they are relatively complicated, but

4 do you have any recollection of the constitutional

5 principles that were embedded into that agreement?

6 A. My understanding is of this at the time, and

7 still is -- it is not a document with which I am

8 intimately familiar -- was that it cut across existing

9 lines of demarcation of responsibility. It changed the

10 emphasis in particular areas, throughout Bosnia, not

11 just in the area in which I was operating, the result

12 of which was that the balance of power was going to

13 change from the status quo that had existed at the

14 time. And this was causing concern to all parties.

15 Wherever I went and spoke, no one had a good word to

16 say about the implications of implementing this

17 particular plan, both army BiH or HVO.

18 Q. Let me just ask you one question on this:

19 Were you aware that prior to the signature of that

20 plan, there was considerable doubt whether any one of

21 the three sides -- or actually whether two of the three

22 sides were actually going to sign it?

23 A. I possibly can recollect that, yes.

24 Q. Do you recall when the plan was actually

25 signed, sir, by all three sides?

1 A. Well, it was certainly after the events that

2 we have been going through during the course of today.

3 Q. Let me just suggest to you that it was

4 actually January the 30th, after the fighting had

5 already occurred.

6 A. Mm-hmm.

7 Q. Does that ring a bell?

8 A. Well, then, it slightly surprises me, because

9 I thought it was afterwards.

10 Q. No problem.

11 Turning now to the meetings that you had with

12 Mr. Kordic over the three-week period in February of

13 1993, you actually asked DutchBat, I believe, between

14 the 24th and 27th of January, to help introduce you to

15 the local HVO commanders; correct?

16 A. Between the -- I would say the earliest I

17 started that was the 27th.

18 Q. All right. And the first person to whom you

19 were introduced was actually the HVO press officer by

20 the name of Marko Prskalo?

21 A. No, I remember Marko Prskalo, who -- my

22 memory is, because I asked everybody who they were,

23 everybody who I met, and sometimes I might get the

24 right answer, and he said -- and sometimes they were

25 reticent, actually; I'm not being flippant. Sometimes

1 they were reticent to say what their responsibility was

2 until they were certain of your credentials.

3 A staff officer working within the HVO

4 command in Busovaca was how he described himself.

5 Q. And it was Mr. Prskalo, the staff officer,

6 who proceeded to introduce you to the deputy commander

7 of the Nikola Subic Zrinjski Brigade, Mr. Sliskovic;

8 correct?

9 A. I think that's correct, yes.

10 Q. All right. And actually the brigade

11 commander, Mr. Jozinovic, declined to meet with you --

12 A. I think that's correct, yes.

13 Q. And that wasn't a one-sided thing, because

14 the brigade commander from the 333rd Broska Brigada --

15 A. Mekic.

16 Q. -- Mekic, Dzevad Mekic, referred to meet with

17 you as well --

18 A. Declined to. They all declined.

19 Q. All right.

20 Let me turn, if I may, to the first meeting

21 that you had with Mr. Kordic, on February the 3rd,

22 1993. There is in your April 1995 statement an entry

23 that you were tasked to go to Busovaca, quote, "as a

24 Dario Kordic had telephoned with a number of complaints

25 and asked to see the colonel," unquote.

1 Would it be fair to say that you had not

2 heard the name "Dario Kordic" before this time?

3 A. Well, in the same way as I may or may not

4 have recalled milinfos which were there on a daily

5 basis, I may have come across the name of Dario

6 Kordic. This was the first time it had any

7 significance for me.

8 Q. All right. Now, actually, sir, Jeremy

9 Fleming was present at this meeting as well, wasn't he?

10 A. On the 3rd of February?

11 Q. Yes, sir.

12 A. I can't rule that out. He may well have

13 been.

14 Q. And it was actually, I put it to you,

15 Mr. Fleming who did most of the talking, and not you;

16 isn't that right?

17 A. Well, I'm not sure if that's exactly the

18 case, based on memory.

19 Q. All right.

20 MR. SAYERS: Let me just ask the usher to put

21 Mr. Fleming's --

22 JUDGE MAY: You're going to ask him to

23 comment on what some other witness has said?

24 MR. SAYERS: No, Your Honour. I'm just going

25 to ask him whether this version of events is consistent

1 with his recollection. And if it's --

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you're going to ask him to

3 comment on what some other witness has said. Is that

4 right?

5 MR. SAYERS: I'm actually not going to ask

6 him to comment on what Mr. Fleming said, Your Honour,

7 no. I'm just going to ask him to take a look at this

8 version of events and see if that's consistent with his

9 recollection.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's a comment on what

11 the other person said.

12 Is Mr. Fleming going to give evidence?

13 MR. NICE: He's listed. It's my present

14 intention still to call him, but as you know, I'm

15 reviewing the position of witnesses generally. But at

16 present, he's still on the list.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, Mr. Fleming said

18 something along the lines that you've put; is that

19 right?

20 MR. SAYERS: It's actually a very short --

21 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter whether it's

22 short or not.

23 MR. SAYERS: That's correct, Your Honour,

24 yes.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

1 Does that help your recollection at all,

2 Major, or not?

3 A. Your Honour, as I've said, I can't definitely

4 say that Mr. Fleming was not there.

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

6 MR. SAYERS:

7 Q. During this first meeting, there were

8 complaints about soldiers from outside the local

9 municipality, weren't there, sir?

10 A. These related to the attacks on HVO soldiers,

11 which, when I looked at them on my map, several

12 kilometres to the northwest, west of Busovaca, I

13 took -- dare I say I took particular care and attention

14 to plot on my map and have a look at all of the grid

15 references which I was given to see if I could make

16 some sense of it.

17 Q. Well, suffice it to say that Mr. Kordic made

18 a complaint, at paragraph 7(d), the January 30th

19 ceasefire agreement had actually been violated; isn't

20 that fair to say?

21 A. I have to say I think that you are referring

22 to a complaint that he made to me on the 11th of

23 February with regard to a BiH soldier who had been

24 killed, and he was able to show me his identity card,

25 that he came out of the area. On the 3rd of February,

1 there was no such evidence.

2 Q. Are you saying that Mr. Kordic did not

3 complain about externals?

4 A. No, I'm not.

5 Q. Now, you had been briefed that Mr. Kordic was

6 a vice-president of the HDZ, briefed by an NCO;

7 correct?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Was that NCO Sergeant Connelly?

10 A. No, it was a lance corporal.

11 Q. Lance corporal? All right.

12 A. They weren't always there in the office.

13 Q. You were told that he was the local

14 representative for the HDZ, were you not?

15 A. No, I seem to recall I was told that he had a

16 title of vice-president of the HDZ, which really had

17 effect in Central Bosnia.

18 Q. Let me just ask you to take a look at the

19 next exhibit, milinfosum 87, dated January the 26th,

20 1993, please.

21 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Document D106/1.

23 MR. SAYERS:

24 Q. If you would just turn to page 2, halfway

25 down the third paragraph, the comment says: "Dario

1 Kordic is the local representative for the HDZ. He

2 claims to be the deputy to Mate Boban and has

3 considerable influence in the local area with

4 Croats/HVO." Do you see that?

5 A. I do see that, yes.

6 Q. All right. Now you're saying that you were

7 told that he was the vice-president of the HDZ?

8 A. And wrote it in my notebook at the time.

9 Q. Yes. What is the HDZ? Did you know?

10 A. I -- I didn't know a great deal about it,

11 other than it was a political organisation, alongside

12 the HVO, which was a military organisation.

13 Q. All right. And he stressed to you that he

14 was not a formation commander; he was not affiliated

15 with the military. Correct?

16 A. No, he did not.

17 Q. Well --

18 A. If you are referring to a briefing which I

19 received on the morning of the 3rd of February, prior

20 to going out to see Dario Kordic for the first time, a

21 verbal briefing from this young NCO, I base my memory

22 largely on the notes which I took.

23 Q. I think we've got our wires crossed, Major.

24 A. Okay, sure. Sure. Yes.

25 Q. What I'm talking about is what you were told

1 by Mr. Kordic. He actually stressed to you that he was

2 not a formation commander; isn't that correct?

3 A. In one occasion, when I was trying to

4 establish what his role and his responsibility was --

5 Q. Yes.

6 A. -- he did use the words he was not a formation

7 commander; he was not the -- as I say, I think I said

8 to him, "Are you the HVO commander?"

9 Q. And he said no?

10 A. And he said no.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. And I think I put that in my testimony.

13 Q. Yes. And you had been briefed that he was an

14 ex-journalist?

15 A. Ex-journalist, yes.

16 Q. And you met him at an office in the basement

17 of the PTT building; that's the postal telegraph and --

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. -- communications building? All right.

20 Did you have a discussion with your

21 colleagues at the milinfocell about what you've

22 described as a very significant conversation with

23 someone who obviously had a lot of local influence?

24 A. Subsequently.

25 Q. Yes?

1 A. If it wasn't that evening, it would have been

2 very shortly afterwards.

3 Q. I'd just like to show you the milinfosum for

4 that day, February the 3rd, 1993, dated -- number 95.

5 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Document D107/1.

7 MR. SAYERS:

8 Q. And while that's being put in front of you,

9 do you recall the name of the interpreter that you had

10 present at that meeting?

11 A. No, I cannot.

12 Q. The only purpose of this exhibit, sir, is,

13 I'd just like you to agree -- and we don't need to

14 spend two seconds on it -- there is no mention of the

15 February 3rd conversation in this milinfosum, is there?

16 A. Mm-hmm. It doesn't completely surprise me.

17 It depends on the time of day that you had actually had

18 the meeting. And this is actually a not-infrequent

19 occurrence, because when I was going through these

20 milinfos at various stages over the -- you know, in

21 1995, and then again in 1998, because I was obviously

22 shown them to refresh my memory, there were certain

23 things that I was puzzled -- not just in this

24 particular instance, but in others. And I think that

25 this boils down to the time of day that you actually

1 brought this information in. Because it worked on a

2 24-hour cycle, and they had to get out milinfos by a

3 certain time of the day so it was fresh for everybody

4 to read, as part of a routine.

5 The other thing is that at the end of the

6 day, it was down to the judgement, ultimately, of

7 milinfo, who will have discussed this with the

8 operations officer, as what was considered to be

9 important enough to be included in the milinfo; and

10 perhaps someone on the ground, who felt something was

11 interesting or relevant, it was not perceived to be so

12 back at the headquarters. So I'm not surprised to see

13 that.

14 Q. Very well. Did you know that --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Major, may I just ask you,

16 if you were late in bringing the information and missed

17 a particular day, was there a system where it could be

18 carried over to the following day's milinfosum?

19 A. Yes, Your Honour, there should have been. I

20 will have actually passed the details of my meeting,

21 but thereafter, how it was assimilated, I didn't have

22 any part in. But if it missed something, it was then

23 collected for the following day.

24 MR. SAYERS:

25 Q. Picking up on that point, Major, we actually

1 have the milinfosum for the next day.

2 MR. SAYERS: Let me have that marked as the

3 next exhibit.

4 THE REGISTRAR: Document 108/1.

5 MR. SAYERS:

6 Q. Major, if you take a look at Item 1 in

7 "Busovaca," you will see that there is a discussion of

8 the recent Mujahedin attack on the village of Kula, but

9 there is no reference to the conversation that you had

10 with Mr. Kordic; isn't that right?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. All right. Thank you.

13 Now, did you know that Mr. Kordic held weekly

14 meetings with the media, the press, the TV, and so

15 forth?

16 A. Yes. I'm aware of that because on one

17 occasion, when we were talking about the frequency of

18 meetings, Dario Kordic did say there was a particular

19 day that was not a good day, and would I please avoid

20 it if I could, because he would be busy having what I

21 remember as press conferences.

22 Q. In fact, on several occasions when you tried

23 to telephone him, you couldn't reach him because you

24 were informed that he was at briefings with the media;

25 isn't that right?

1 A. That could have been the case. I don't

2 recall making -- I don't recall making that many

3 telephone calls to him. What I might sometimes do is

4 go to the ops room and say, "If it's convenient, I'd

5 like to see Dario Kordic today. If you get a chance,

6 could you get through and see if it is convenient to do

7 so?" Because I didn't want to pester him.

8 Q. Well, I don't think there is any dispute

9 about this. On page 17 of your statement one year ago,

10 you said, "When I telephoned Kordic to get appointments

11 to see him, on two occasions I was informed that Kordic

12 was at briefings with the media"; is that correct?

13 A. That's correct, yes.

14 Q. All right. And in fact, your opinion was

15 that Dario Kordic showed the Croat people in Busovaca

16 that he was their patron and that any action taken by

17 him was to the advantage of his people; isn't that

18 right?

19 A. I believe I used those words in the previous

20 statement.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And that's your view, isn't it?

24 A. I believe that he represented the people of

25 Busovaca. If you take an incident like the dispute

1 over the amount of aid that was coming into Busovaca,

2 he was speaking on their behalf. If you're talking

3 about the freedom of movement between Kiseljak and

4 Busovaca, he was speaking on their behalf. And he

5 obviously was trying to do his best to ensure that such

6 freedom of movement and fair delivery of aid took

7 place. I think that's a fair comment.

8 Q. Did he ever let you know that his wife and

9 three children lived in a house in the western part of

10 Busovaca, about 100 metres from the front lines, and

11 that his house had actually been struck by gunfire in

12 fighting in January 1993?

13 A. He may well have told me that. I can't

14 recall it.

15 Q. Just a few background questions regarding his

16 position. Did you know that he was actually the

17 vice-president of an entity by the name of the Croatian

18 Community of Herceg-Bosna?

19 A. Would that have a -- initials, like HDZ?

20 This was something different, I take it.

21 Q. HZ-HB. HZ-HB.

22 A. I have heard the organisation HZ-HB -- no, I

23 have heard of it, but I can't say specifically within

24 the context of a position that Mr. Kordic may have

25 had.

1 Q. One of the exhibits that you identified was a

2 document or a receipt that you were asked to sign, and

3 this is signed by Mr. Kordic, or by Pukovnik Kordic, as

4 the --"Du presidnik [phoen] HZ-HB," which is the

5 vice-president of the HZ-HB.

6 I don't want to make a meal of this, Major,

7 but would it be fair to say that you really don't know

8 what the HZ-HB is?

9 A. Oh, I don't know, no. I mean, I -- I've

10 never said that I have a full understanding of what the

11 organisation is.

12 Q. Would it be fair to say that you don't know

13 about the internal organisation of the HVO: Who was

14 its president, who was the head of the Department of

15 Defence, and so forth?

16 A. If I can answer in, shall we say, two parts:

17 Firstly, if you're asking me right now, I don't think

18 that I can recall such matters of detail of events

19 which occurred such a long time ago. I am confident

20 that I had a reasonably good grasp, as much as anybody

21 could, of the lower-level organisation, those levels

22 that I was dealing with on a day-to-day and a weekly

23 basis.

24 And affiliated to that, in reference to the

25 last question, I didn't spend much time finding out

1 about political organisations.

2 Q. Once again, Major, no criticism of you.

3 You're a military man.

4 Let me turn to the next meeting that you had

5 with Mr. Kordic, on February the 6th of 1993, or at

6 least I believe it was February the 6th.

7 A. I believe it was, yes.

8 Q. All right. After this meeting, isn't it fair

9 to say that Mr. Kordic prepared and issued a press

10 release, and that he actually spoke with the press on

11 the telephone and announced the removal of a road

12 obstruction with your help?

13 A. That is correct, yes. This is a recollection

14 that came to me, sincerely, in the last 24, 48 hours.

15 I recalled being there and asking the interpreter what

16 was happening, because it was all actually happening

17 very fast. He was preparing, just as you've said,

18 et cetera, et cetera.

19 Q. Thank you.

20 Turning to the issue upon which I touched

21 briefly, the change in the command at the Nikola Subic

22 Zrinjski Brigade, do you have any recollection of when

23 that change in command actually occurred?

24 A. I can only say that it was on or around the

25 period of the events that we have been describing in

1 detail.

2 Q. And Mr. Sliskovic remained the deputy

3 commander of the military forces of the HVO in Busovaca

4 throughout the transition?

5 A. To the best of my recollection.

6 Q. Let me just suggest to you that -- well,

7 let's have this marked as the next exhibit: Milinfosum

8 Number 103, 11th of February, 1993.

9 THE REGISTRAR: Document D109/1.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, how much longer do

11 you think you're going to be in cross-examination?

12 MR. SAYERS: If I can task the interpreters,

13 Your Honour, I hope to be through by the end of today,

14 if at all possible. And if not, then I would have

15 probably an additional 10 minutes for the major

16 tomorrow.

17 JUDGE MAY: Let's go on for another ten

18 minutes.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE MAY: Ten minutes.

21 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Mr. President.

22 Q. Showing you the milinfosum, it's reported

23 there that commander Dusko Grubesic has replaced

24 commander Jozinovic, and the date of that is February

25 the 11th, 1993. It's at paragraph 5, sir, or part 5.

1 Is that correct?

2 JUDGE BENNOUNA: Which page is it?

3 MR. SAYERS: Page 3, Your Honour, item

4 number 5.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you don't know what the reason for the

7 change in command was, do you?

8 A. I cannot recall what the reason was.

9 Q. Very well. Now, turning to the next meeting,

10 by my count the third that you had with Mr. Kordic, on

11 the 7th of February, this is the meeting in which you

12 indicated Mr. Kordic indicated a desire to have a

13 concrete structure placed at the Kaonik intersection,

14 and he wanted the assistance of UNPROFOR, and you made

15 a decision, quote, "to half-promise that this would be

16 done," unquote, didn't you?

17 A. I did. I think the words I used were, "I

18 will see what I can do about it."

19 Q. All right. On page 9 of your statement five

20 years ago, you stated, quote: "I made the decision to

21 half-promise that this would be done." Is that

22 accurate?

23 A. If those are the choice of words I used at

24 the time, then yes.

25 Q. And actually, in reality, you had no

1 intention at all of giving any practical assistance to

2 the establishment of that checkpoint, did you?

3 A. Or of any other checkpoint on any of the

4 opposing sides, no.

5 Q. Next exhibit for the usher is milinfo number

6 79 on the 7th of February, 1993.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Document is marked D110/1.

8 MR. SAYERS:

9 Q. I just would like you to agree with me, and I

10 don't think there is any dispute about this, that there

11 is no reference to this conversation that you had with

12 Mr. Kordic in this milinfo --

13 A. I wouldn't expect there to be any reference

14 to something that took place, literally in about ten

15 minutes in the morning, to ensure that the operation

16 went ahead successfully; and indeed, on this day I know

17 I didn't return to the headquarters until about 1900,

18 2000 hours.

19 Q. Let's turn to the incident regarding the

20 mines or the enormous quantity of explosives about

21 which you testified. Would you agree, sir, that there

22 is absolutely no reference to that incident in your

23 diary, the contemporaneous diary that you kept?

24 A. Yes, I have no notes that I took at the

25 time.

1 Q. All right. One item that you discussed was

2 that you said that these gentlemen, these HVO engineers

3 with whom you conversed, stated that they were acting

4 under orders.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. But you deliberately decided to refrain from

7 asking them under whose orders, didn't you?

8 A. I didn't want to press them at the time.

9 Q. I know, but you deliberately made the

10 decision not to ask them that, didn't you, sir?

11 A. That's correct, yes.

12 Q. All right. And again, you decided again

13 deliberately not to ask Mr. Kordic about that?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. So the fact of the matter is that you just

16 don't know under whose orders those explosives were

17 placed on the bridge, do you?

18 A. I don't believe I've ever said that they were

19 definitely placed there under the orders of Dario

20 Kordic in any of my testimonies.

21 Q. You also stated that you made a formal

22 complaint to the ECMM. Was that in writing?

23 A. I reported to the ECMM. I believe I must

24 have given the circumstances in writing. I can't rule

25 out that I may have passed it verbally to an ECMM

1 official, if I'd found one.

2 Q. All right. And the interpreter that you used

3 on that occasion -- and we know who that was, because

4 we have a photograph of it -- and that was introduced

5 in the Prosecution's exhibits, that was Sergeant

6 Thornton?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. How fluent is he in Croatian; do you know?

9 A. I certainly believed him to be good enough to

10 accompany me on that particular occasion. A caveat I

11 would put to that is that you couldn't always have your

12 choice of interpreters, because there were many

13 important things happening, and it was the perception

14 of the person who dealt them out as to who had the most

15 claim.

16 Q. Thank you. I don't need to ask you any

17 questions in connection with the fifth meeting that I

18 believe you had on February the 22nd. But let me go

19 over to the sixth meeting on February the 23rd. This

20 is the incident when you dropped in on Mr. Kordic

21 unannounced and you saw two gentlemen in black uniforms

22 with HOS markings on their leather jackets. Did you

23 know that one of them was Matija Brajinovic, who was

24 actually the head of the HSP party in Zenica?

25 A. No names were mentioned.

1 Q. Very well. Did you know that the HOS forces

2 at this time were actually part of the -- in Zenica,

3 anyway, were actually part of the ABiH, not the HVO?

4 A. That I cannot recall.

5 Q. Do you know what the HSP party is?

6 A. No, I do not.

7 Q. That's fine. If I could just ask the usher

8 to show you Exhibit D17/1,20.

9 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn after that.

10 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.

11 Q. This is an April the 5th, 1993 decision to

12 merge the HOS with units of the HVO, and it states that

13 HOS units that were a part of the units of the ABiH

14 shall merge completely with the HVO. This is in

15 Zenica, sir. Were you aware that in fact the HOS

16 forces in Zenica were part of the ABiH rather than the

17 HVO?

18 A. When I'd first arrived in theatre at the --

19 in the middle of January, I had an occasion to go into

20 Novi Travnik -- it was one of my familiarisation visits

21 -- and was shown the layout of forces in that area.

22 And I was shown where the HVO positions were, where the

23 BiH were and where the HOS were, and definitely took it

24 that they were on the same side.

25 Q. Would it be fair to say -- and this is the

1 last question, Mr. President -- that the position of

2 the HOS remained something of a conundrum in your

3 experience in the theatre?

4 A. Yes. I can certainly recall that their

5 position was not completely clear.

6 Q. Thank you very much indeed, Major.

7 A. Thank you.

8 JUDGE MAY: Well, we'll adjourn now.

9 Major, could you be back, please, tomorrow,

10 half past 9.00, to conclude your evidence.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.

12 --- Whereupon hearing adjourned at

13 4.10 p.m., to be reconvened on

14 Thursday, the 21st day of October, 1999,

15 at 9.30 a.m.

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