1 Monday, 8th November, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.43 a.m.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

6 Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor versus Dario

7 Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Three short matters. First, we have just

11 received a revised copy of this witness summary. The

12 original came in to us at about 8.00 last night. We

13 would like to move in limine to preclude this witness

14 from testifying about matters or events outside the

15 period covered by the amended indictment, and I can, I

16 think, alert the Court's attention to the particular

17 paragraphs that we had in mind.

18 The first is paragraph 37, the second is 38,

19 the third is 39, and finally paragraphs 40 to 42, which

20 were apparently added today.

21 The second application that we would like to

22 make is to limit this witness to testifying about facts

23 rather than the expansive opinions that are contained

24 in this offer of proof, the most significant and

25 particular of which is paragraph 31, which analogises

1 Mr. Kordic's position to that of Adolf Hitler, but also

2 to the opinions contained in paragraphs 24, 27, 29, 30,

3 and 35.

4 And finally, Your Honour --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: 27?

6 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. 27, 29, 30,

7 and 33, in addition to paragraph 31.

8 And the third and final point is that we do

9 not --

10 JUDGE MAY: It may be easier to deal with

11 these points separately --

12 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE MAY: -- rather than trying to run them

14 together. The first point you take is that there is

15 reference to matters at the end of the statement,

16 paragraphs 37 onward --

17 MR. SAYERS: Correct.

18 JUDGE MAY: -- which deals with times outside

19 the indictment?

20 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour. And with the

21 Court's permission, when matters of opinion come up as

22 to which we object specifically, perhaps I could draw

23 the Court's attention to that at that time.

24 JUDGE MAY: Looking first of all at

25 paragraphs 37 onward, whether or not it's outside the

1 date of the indictment, it doesn't seem to be terribly

2 important and I wouldn't have thought very contentious

3 evidence. What's really the objection to it?

4 MR. SAYERS: Well, one example would be, Your

5 Honour, paragraph 38 appears to be a hearsay statement

6 made by someone other than the accused at a time

7 outside of the amended indictment. And we have been

8 provided with a copy of this witness's contemporaneous

9 diary, or at least pieces of it; I did not see any such

10 entry in the contemporaneous diary. Accordingly, we're

11 not in a position to concede that matter at all, even

12 if it were relevant, which I do not believe it to be.

13 But the last point, Your Honour, is with

14 respect to leading questions --

15 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with this point.

16 Let's finish this point.

17 Ms. Somers, yes, what do you say about this?

18 MS. SOMERS: Thank you, Your Honour. First

19 of all, the fact that certain things that the witness

20 knows came to him at a point outside the indictment is

21 irrelevant. What is relevant is that this Court has an

22 obligation under Rule 85(A), sub (vi), to have before

23 it "any relevant information that may assist the Trial

24 Chamber in determining an appropriate sentence if the

25 accused is found guilty on" --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Could you slow down,

2 please.

3 MS. SOMERS: -- "one or more of the charges in

4 the indictment," all of which must come in during the

5 course of the trial.

6 Further, the actual text refers to times

7 within the time of the indictment. The fact that there

8 are things that happened in '94 is a continuum of the

9 political activities, or they concern personae who were

10 very much at the heart of this indictment. So the

11 relevance is direct, but clearly Rule 85 would require

12 that the Court know what Dario Kordic was doing from

13 the time of the indictment all the way through the time

14 of apprehension, or surrender, as he calls it.

15 On Point 38, if the Court reads the question,

16 it talks about a comment made by Valenta, and it refers

17 directly to the things that happened during the

18 Muslim/Croat conflict, which is absolutely the heart of

19 this indictment. Further, if the Defence wishes to

20 cross-examine or to have Mr. Valenta testify, the

21 Defence is free to so bring him.

22 Virtually every point that has been raised by

23 the Defence has no merit, and in fact, the information

24 is critical to this Court's hearing a full picture of

25 this defendant's activities and authority.

1 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Yes,

2 Mr. Sayers, could we not agree about the period covered

3 by the indictment? It is of course quite clear that if

4 a testimony goes beyond the period of the indictment,

5 and in order to cause prejudice, and has nothing to do

6 with other counts, that objection would perhaps stand.

7 But here we are only dealing with some information

8 which is relevant and which is relevant to various

9 counts of the indictment and the period of the

10 indictment, even if it refers to a period after the

11 period covered by the indictment. But I believe that

12 we are fully entitled to hear this information, that

13 is, to establish the truth regarding the indictment

14 itself.

15 Therefore your objection really should tell

16 us, is it that it deals with some facts which have

17 nothing to do with the indictment, or rather that they

18 would represent some additional charges? But the fact

19 that it goes beyond the period covered by the

20 indictment I do not think provides sufficient grounds

21 to object to this testimony, unless it is --

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. For the reasons

23 Judge Bennouna has set out, we will admit the

24 evidence.

25 Your next point had to do with the various

1 opinions which were --

2 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

3 JUDGE MAY: -- mentioned; yes. Perhaps you

4 could deal with that briefly.

5 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour, I would be

6 happy to. This witness is no different from any other

7 witness who comes before the Court, and of course the

8 witness should be permitted to talk about the facts of

9 which he knows. But if he proceeds to give

10 wide-ranging, tall political opinions of the type that

11 are contained in the paragraphs that I've just recited

12 to the Court, then unfortunately we have to consume

13 time --

14 JUDGE MAY: Which paragraph again? Remind

15 us.

16 MR. SAYERS: Yes, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: The one about Hitler?

18 MR. SAYERS: Number 31.

19 JUDGE MAY: 31?

20 MR. SAYERS: And then there were a variety of

21 others, but paragraph 31 is the most representative.

22 Obviously, the Court is concerned with

23 expediency, for reasons we went into last week. If the

24 witness is permitted to express all manner of opinions

25 like this, we have to consume valuable time going into

1 these matters. And the Court has pointed out on

2 occasion, and perhaps appropriately, that obviously

3 these matters are not really a memory contest, but

4 really it is, in a sense, if the witness volunteers all

5 manner of opinions on the subject and then is shown

6 subsequently to lack a valid or sufficient factual

7 foundation for the utterance of those opinions. So

8 that's the basis for our objection.

9 JUDGE MAY: Just dealing with it for a

10 moment, and we can discuss it: The witness has had an

11 extensive military career -- we can see this between

12 paragraphs 1 to 15 -- he's had various jobs involving

13 the analysis of political matters, so we can see that.

14 Whatever the appropriateness of the parallel which is

15 drawn, and clearly again bear in mind that this is not

16 the case of a jury and we would not be influenced by

17 the type of the parallel, but why can the witness not

18 say, although it is not a parallel, nonetheless, there

19 was a mixture, as he appears to be saying, in his view

20 of military and political roles, and then he refers to

21 his experience in Kosovo, where he is now; why can he

22 not say that, with his background? Again, it's a

23 matter of opinion, but he's got a basis for saying it.

24 MR. SAYERS: If that's the view of the Court,

25 Mr. President, that's the view of the Court. But

1 obviously we would be entitled to explore, in some

2 detail, the basis for that opinion, since he professes

3 to be a political expert. And I think that if the

4 Court is inclined to permit him to express his

5 opinions, I'm certainly prepared to go into these

6 matters on cross-examination, with the Court's

7 permission.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 JUDGE MAY: We think that, first of all, it

10 will be for the Prosecution to establish that the

11 witness can give these opinions. We'll hear the

12 evidence about that.

13 In any event, we think that references to

14 Hitler will be extremely unhelpful and should be

15 excised because of the inflammatory nature of that sort

16 of reference.

17 Now, there was a third point.

18 MR. SAYERS: The third point was that the

19 Defence for Mr. Kordic, and I believe I can speak for

20 my colleagues representing Mr. Cerkez, we have no

21 objection to the Prosecution leading this witness

22 through paragraphs 1 to 17 and also, to the extent that

23 the Court deems relevant, paragraphs 40 and 41, which

24 I've just reviewed. That appears to be not

25 contentious.

1 I would also like to inform the Court, with

2 again the permission of my colleagues representing

3 Mr. Cerkez, that they do not propose to cross-examine

4 this witness. Accordingly, I will be conducting all

5 the cross-examination, just so that the Court is aware

6 of that. Thank you.

7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

8 Ms. Somers, apart from the matter which is in

9 dispute, which is the background of the witness in

10 order that he should be able to give political

11 opinions, apart from that, you can take it that we've

12 read about his career.

13 MS. SOMERS: It is considered read --

14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

15 JUDGE MAY: You can take it that we've read

16 about his career, and there's no need to go into it in

17 any detail. Paragraphs 1 to 60.

18 MS. SOMERS: Then start with 17, as I

19 understand. Fine.

20 JUDGE MAY: Well, apart from the matter which

21 is in issue, which is his political expertise, if any.

22 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.

23 JUDGE MAY: That you'll have to cover.

24 Yes. Can we have the witness, please? Can

25 we have the witness?

1 While we're waiting for the witness, there is

2 a matter which I note from last week which I want to

3 raise with you. It concerns the afternoons of the week

4 of the 29th of November. Because of Simic

5 over-running, in which two members of the Court are

6 involved, the afternoons of that week look as though

7 they are going to be required. But before making any

8 such order, I would like to hear from the Prosecution

9 as to what effect that will have.

10 MR. NICE: Can I deal with that after the

11 break?

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. NICE: The people dealing with witness

14 arrangements are not present in court at the moment.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course, but we would like

16 to hear from you about it.

17 [The witness entered court]

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would like

19 to take the declaration.

20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will

21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

22 truth.

23 WITNESS: J. FLOYD CARTER

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Carter, if you would like to

25 take a seat.

1 THE WITNESS: Thank you.

2 Examined by Ms. Somers:

3 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, if I may call you

4 Lieutenant Colonel Carter -- I realise you're retired

5 -- the Chamber has indicated that we may take as read

6 certain points about your background and your training

7 and your education. However, I would like to ask you

8 if you can discuss, from your background, education and

9 training, the times wherein you have had to use the

10 instrument of political analysis and/or military

11 analysis in such a manner that would enable you to

12 analogise contemporary situations and/or leaders, be

13 they political or military, to situations of precedent.

14 A. Certainly. My background is such that for at

15 least 15 years or more, I have had the occasion to rely

16 upon training within the military and subsequently

17 within the United Nations to review documents, records,

18 using various types of information and intelligence in

19 order to analyse and report on that information,

20 whether to -- whether to the Defence Department, the

21 Pentagon, or to the United Nations at various levels,

22 to include the special representatives of the

23 Secretary-General, Mr. Akashi and Mr. Annan, and

24 directly to the Secretary-General's office as well.

25 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, is one of the

1 tenants of analysis that history is often an indicator

2 of the present or future and thus requires careful

3 analysis and analogy?

4 A. Not invariably, but certainly there are

5 patterns that are established over a period of time.

6 And knowing the background of a particular region or

7 area and constantly working in that area, as I've done

8 in Asia for 16 years and the Balkans for six years

9 continuously, certainly one develops a sense, an

10 instinct, as well as the logic for certain

11 developments.

12 Q. Do you have experience, both practical and

13 theoretical and academic, with analysis of structures

14 and figures in both totalitarian and Communist-style

15 regimes?

16 A. Yes. By event of my educational background,

17 both in international relations and then in Asian

18 studies, with a speciality in politico-military

19 structures and systems, I learned about

20 Marxist/Leninist doctrine, and then practical

21 applications in Southeast Asia, and certainly in the

22 Balkans in the post-break-up of Yugoslavia.

23 Q. In your military training, did you have to

24 become familiar with the campaigns and figures of the

25 Second World War, both the Pacific theatre and the

1 European theatre?

2 A. Certainly, with particular emphasis in Asia.

3 But subsequently, when I was in the military, of

4 course, we were dealing with what was termed at that

5 time the Soviet threat in the Eastern Bloc, its

6 organisation and structure, with emphasis, of course,

7 upon military but also the political over-arching

8 structures that controlled, dominated, the military.

9 Q. Has your experience allowed you to compare

10 and analogise the actions, designs, objectives of

11 certain military and political figures from regime to

12 regime?

13 A. I would say that it enables one to, let's

14 say, look at certain patterns or parallels that exist

15 over time, yes.

16 Q. Lieutenant Colonel Carter, turning to Bosnia,

17 did you have any observation about the comparison

18 between the weaponry of the ABiH and the HVO?

19 A. Certainly. Initially, during my early days

20 in Bosnia, November of 1993, and until the war between

21 the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks concluded as of

22 about 1 March 1994, one could see the relative

23 inferiority of the ABiH weaponry in contrast to the

24 HVO.

25 Q. Would you characterise in any way the Bosnian

1 army as one of heavy artillery or in some other

2 capacity?

3 A. No, it was mainly light infantry in nature.

4 They would rely upon mass manpower to achieve its goals

5 rather than the use of weaponry, whether it be

6 artillery or armour, although they did possess some

7 limited quantities of armour and artillery.

8 Q. Can you please explain the terms "internal

9 lines of communication" and how this term relates to

10 HVO superior positioning?

11 A. Certainly. The HVO benefited from internal

12 lines of communication in that their areas of control

13 within Central Bosnia were small pockets in Kiseljak,

14 Vares, also the Lasva Valley and the Vrbas Valley, and

15 they controlled the main roads through those areas, and

16 so they were able to rapidly move forces from one

17 threatened area to another. Of course, many of these

18 pockets were surrounded by the ABiH.

19 Q. On how many fronts were you aware of the ABiH

20 having to fight, and did this affect its status of

21 advantage or disadvantage?

22 A. Well, certainly the ABiH suffered from the

23 fact that it had no organised army to begin with, had

24 no external means of support or supply, basically, and

25 it had to fight on two fronts simultaneously during

1 much of the war from basically 1992 until early 1994,

2 both against the Serbs and the Bosnian Croats.

3 Q. You referred both to the Vrbas and Lasva

4 Valleys. Could you indicate which is the principal

5 city of the Vrbas Valley?

6 A. The principal city would have been Vitez.

7 That's where the HVO --

8 Q. Excuse me. Of the Vrbas, not the Lasva

9 Valley.

10 A. I'm sorry. The Vrbas Valley, the principal

11 city would have been Gornji Vakuf/Uskoplje.

12 Q. Is Prozor also in the Vrbas Valley?

13 A. That's correct. It's on the edge the valley,

14 above the Makljen Ridge.

15 Q. Were you aware of the HVO renting artillery

16 or tanks from the Serbs?

17 A. Yes. In my capacity as a civil affairs

18 officer, we certainly had meetings in Sarajevo of all

19 the civil affairs officers, and part of my area of

20 responsibility bordered on Kiseljak, and we had reports

21 from the UNPROFOR forces, the UNMOs, that is, U.N.

22 military observers, and civil affairs officers, that

23 there was an exchange basically between the Bosnian

24 Serbs and the Bosnian Croats, but regarding equipment

25 usage and rental, after a certain point in time during

1 the war. I believe it would have been the fall of

2 '93.

3 Q. Kiseljak is one of the municipalities in the

4 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna; is that correct?

5 A. That's correct. It bordered on the edge of

6 what at that time was controlled by the Bosnian Serbs

7 as well.

8 Q. Who is Ivan Santic? Would you describe his

9 position --

10 JUDGE MAY: There is no need to ask the

11 witness. We know who he is; he is the mayor of Vitez.

12 I don't think there is any dispute about that. Perhaps

13 you could just deal briefly with the witness's

14 impression of him in relation to the accused Dario

15 Kordic.

16 MS. SOMERS: Of course.

17 Q. In the course of your numerous dealings with

18 Ivan Santic, did you come to any conclusion about the

19 level of authority which he had, and to whom, if

20 anyone, he was subordinate?

21 A. I first made contact with Mayor Santic as of

22 mid to late November, 1993; had frequent contacts, not

23 quite daily, but almost, after that. As the mayor, he

24 looked after certain administrative issues within the

25 municipality, but on political issues he deferred to

1 Mr. Kordic.

2 Q. Although he was a mayor of a municipality or

3 town, did you hear him make comments which could be

4 described as derogatory toward the Muslim population?

5 A. Yes, he frequently referred to them as

6 "balija," which is a pejorative term for Muslims, and

7 suggested that for air drops, that pork should be

8 air-dropped to the Muslims. This is not a particularly

9 unique prejudice on the part of some of the Bosnian

10 Croats, but he certainly expressed it.

11 Q. Did you personally hear Dario Kordic make any

12 comment about the Christian world vis-a-vis the Islamic

13 world or its culture?

14 A. Yes --

15 MR. SAYERS: Objection to that, Your Honour.

16 It lacks a time period. Could we have some indication

17 of when this exchange occurred?

18 A. Certainly. The first time that I would have

19 heard something of that nature would have been in a

20 meeting at the Wolf's Lair; I believe it was February

21 of '94, then and subsequently on a couple of occasions

22 in -- later in '94, in the summer, and even in '95, he

23 believed that Bosnian Croats -- for that matter,

24 Croatians -- had a historic duty to defend Christendom

25 against inferior Muslim culture.

1 MS. SOMERS:

2 Q. Are you able to describe the nature of the

3 authority or responsibility for the HVO throughout

4 HZ-HB?

5 A. The HVO had a security role, and of course

6 during times of conflict, its presence and authority

7 reached into almost every aspect of society, to include

8 the delivery of humanitarian aid, the exchange of

9 prisoners and bodies, the distribution of food, water,

10 electricity. And certainly in the political sphere,

11 there was a blurring of roles between that of the HVO

12 and the party itself, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

13 Q. Was, then, military intervention and

14 involvement in traditionally civilian aspects of life

15 the norm, or was it an aberration?

16 A. No, it was the norm. This is a pattern that

17 manifested itself in Bosnia, and I saw it in Croatia as

18 well, and in Serbia, and presently I'm witnessing it in

19 Kosovo.

20 Q. You had indicated certain areas that were

21 falling under that control. What is your observation

22 as to the use of these areas or resources as

23 instruments of warfare?

24 A. I wouldn't ascribe it to any one particular

25 side. Both sides used water and electricity, the

1 distribution, the delivery of food, humanitarian aid,

2 or the exchange of bodies, prisoners, and wounded, in a

3 political fashion. Although the Bosnian Croats denied

4 that they did such, in fact they did do -- they did

5 manipulate these for political purpose.

6 Q. What particular forces of government within

7 political or military leadership become blurred, as you

8 see it?

9 A. Well, the HVO -- the roles of the HVO and the

10 party, the HDZ, tended to become more blurred and the

11 more operational and tactical down on the level.

12 Certainly at the Bosnia-wide level there was a

13 blending, but less so. But at the operational level,

14 let's say the operational zones, whether they were

15 southeast, northwest, central zone, or the Posavina

16 zone, the identity of the individual, the political

17 party leader, tended to become also the primary HVO

18 leader. In other words, in military parlance,

19 "Clausewitz on War" stated that war is an extension of

20 politics by other means. Mao says that power grows out

21 of the barrel of a gun.

22 JUDGE MAY: I'm sure this is right, but I

23 think, Colonel, we would be most helped if you would

24 restrict your evidence to what you saw in Bosnia. That

25 would be of real assistance to us, as opposed to the

1 more general historical background, if you could --

2 A. I understand.

3 JUDGE MAY: -- distinguish between those two

4 strands, please.

5 A. Your Honour, I was merely pointing out that

6 there is a theoretical blending which becomes practical

7 in nature on the ground in Bosnia, where the political

8 party rules over the military execution of tactical

9 events on the ground.

10 Q. Was it your observation --

11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

12 Microphone, please, for Ms. Somers.

13 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's put that in a less

14 leading fashion.

15 MS. SOMERS: I'm sorry.

16 A. I'm so sorry; I didn't hear the question.

17 JUDGE MAY: That's just as well.

18 Tell us about Mr. Kordic and his role, as you

19 observed it.

20 A. Certainly. I wouldn't want to overdraw the

21 analogy and certainly not infer that the personages are

22 of the same ilk.

23 MS. SOMERS:

24 Q. Excuse me; may I just stop you for a moment.

25 You were not in the courtroom earlier, but I would ask

1 that any particular figure may not be named, historical

2 figure, but perhaps a political regime analogy if you

3 wish, but I would be cautious, and the Court has

4 cautioned us not to do that.

5 A. Thank you. If you are looking for a World

6 War II analogy, it would be the identification of the

7 National Socialist Party and the Wehrmacht being

8 directed by that party. A similar sort of thing, but

9 at a much lower level, at the operational zone central

10 in Bosnia. Basically the individual within the old

11 Soviet system, although there is a carryover which

12 still continues to this day in Croatia, Bosnia, and

13 Kosovo, and Belgrade, of course, that the political

14 zampolit or political officer ensures that political

15 direction is executed down through the military chain

16 at the ground level.

17 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Ms. Somers,

18 could you please ask the witness if that is not the

19 case the world over, when the military serve a

20 particular policy; but military are not part of the

21 politics; they are applied, but doesn't it happen in

22 all the systems in the world, democratic or the

23 military ones which follow a certain political line?

24 A. To an extent, yes, sir; but in democracies,

25 there is a distinction between the political party, per

1 se, in this case the HDZ, whereas -- let's take the

2 United States, which I'm probably more equipped to

3 discuss. It's no particular political party; in fact,

4 it's the government that develops the policy, not the

5 party that develops the policy. And there is not the

6 blending in the field at the military level, let's say

7 the corps, division, brigade level, where you have a

8 political officer overseeing execution of military

9 events on the ground.

10 If I could elaborate a little bit also,

11 within the old stream system in Yugoslavia, which still

12 continues to a degree, the Ministry of Defence would

13 look over main-line conventional units; in the case of

14 the HVO, let's say, the 110, the 111 Brigade up in the

15 north, whereas the Ministry of Interior would tend to

16 look after the police, special police, and the

17 paramilitary units.

18 Q. Which leads to your observations on the

19 nature of the police in societies and republics of the

20 former Yugoslavia. Can you comment about the use of

21 the police: Is it as traditionally in the west, or

22 does it have another type of use?

23 A. In former Yugoslavia, whether it be during

24 the initial breakup, in which the Serb special police

25 used their tactics in order to agitate, or in the case

1 of in Bosnia, where the Bosnian Croats tended to use

2 special police in order to agitate, to force out the

3 movement of people through the use of propaganda or

4 outright intimidation in order to bring about certain

5 developments, whether it be the forced raising of a

6 flag, or lowering of a flag, or integration of Muslim

7 conscripts into the HVO rather than having them

8 independent; things of that nature.

9 Q. Do you know from experience whether or not

10 the use of the police is restricted just toward the

11 military, or does it also serve as an instrument of the

12 political leadership?

13 A. In fact it tends to be used more as an

14 instrument of the political leadership, which controls

15 both the military and the police, whereas the military

16 leaders, let's say in the case of General Blaskic,

17 would have been most likely confined to only using

18 conventional main-line units.

19 Q. My colleagues have brought to my attention

20 that in the course of asking one question, I did not

21 get a complete answer, and I wonder if the Court would

22 indulge me: On the issue of comments, derogatory

23 comments by Mr. Kordic toward the Muslim population, do

24 you recall any comment about the cultural level of the

25 Muslim population that was made by Mr. Kordic?

1 A. Actually, I believe I did address that

2 earlier when I mentioned that they had a historic duty

3 to defend Christendom against culturally inferior

4 Muslim culture.

5 Q. The White Road Convoy in 1993, in December,

6 what distinguished it from other convoys? Was it a

7 U.N. Convoy?

8 A. No, the convoy was put together by the

9 efforts of Dr. Slobodan Lang, a Croatian from the

10 republic of Croatia, and also some Muslim imams, and

11 the Bosniak representatives, to provide aid into

12 Central Bosnia. There were some 200 trucks, with

13 distribution to go equally to both nationalities.

14 Q. Meaning Muslim and Croat, I take it?

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Can you indicate the routes by which the

17 trucks were to come from Croatia down to their

18 destinations?

19 A. They went from Zagreb to Split and then up to

20 Tomislavgrad via Route Triangle and Diamond, which was

21 an old logging route improved by the British Battalion,

22 then up to Prozor, Gornji Vakuf, Uskoplje and then Novi

23 Travnik. And then the convoy split at the T-junction,

24 with part of it going to Travnik, that part destined

25 for the Muslims, and then up a back mountain road to

1 Zenica. The part of the convoy destined for the

2 Bosnian Croats went on to Vitez, Busovaca, and

3 Kiseljak.

4 Q. Were there discussions -- excuse me.

5 Were there discussions involving yourself,

6 Lieutenant Colonel Williams of BritBat, and the Bosnian

7 Croat and Bosnian representatives about the routes, the

8 actual road routes to be taken, and could you describe

9 the discussions and the ultimate result?

10 A. Certainly. There were previous discussions

11 with General Alagic of the 3rd Corps in Zenica, and

12 subsequently there were discussions, I believe on the

13 15th of December, with Mr. Kordic, General Blaskic, I

14 believe Brigadier Skender, and the chief of police for

15 Vitez, Mr. Rajic. Colonel Williams was there, Larry

16 Hollingworth of the UNHCR, and myself.

17 Q. By which route did Mr. Alagic request that

18 the food be delivered or supplies be delivered to the

19 Muslim areas?

20 A. He preferred that the main route, the

21 hard-surface macadam route, be used through Vitez to

22 the flyover and then back to Zenica be used so that the

23 trucks wouldn't be stuck along the mountain road during

24 this harsh weather. The roads were particularly muddy

25 and slippery.

1 MS. SOMERS: I would ask the usher to

2 distribute to the witness exhibits already in evidence,

3 Z2612,3, I believe, and Z2781,2, as well, if possible,

4 as Z2612,7.

5 Q. Lieutenant Colonel, if you can reference the

6 approximate routes using a combination, if you will, of

7 the maps, to show preferably the roads by which the

8 ABiH representative wanted the delivery, if you are

9 able to do this.

10 A. Certainly. General Alagic wanted the

11 delivery to go along what is referred to --

12 MS. SOMERS: Could you put it on the ELMO,

13 please, on the projector, if you can.

14 Is the Court getting a projection of the

15 map? We aren't.

16 Q. Okay. You're kind of on your own here. I

17 don't have that projection, but if you could show the

18 Court, please.

19 Okay.

20 A. General Alagic preferred that the routing be

21 directed along what's marked here as E761661

22 [indicates], from the T-junction here, down through

23 Vitez, around to the flyover which leads back to Zenica

24 this way [indicates]. In lieu of that, Mr. Kordic and

25 General Blaskic insisted that this route over the

1 mountain road from Guca Gora be taken to Zenica.

2 Q. Which in fact -- sorry.

3 And which request prevailed?

4 A. The latter request prevailed.

5 Q. Of Colonel Blaskic and Dario Kordic?

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. Did BritBat also have a preference for roads?

8 A. The British preferred the Hardball Express,

9 because it would have been much easier for them.

10 Ultimately they had to rescue quite a few of the trucks

11 that went along the back road, the mountain road.

12 Q. The "Hardball Express" meaning the road --

13 A. The hard surface; sorry.

14 Q. Can you describe Dario Kordic's appearance at

15 the time you met him, and also Colonel Blaskic's

16 appearance on that December 15th meeting?

17 A. Both were dressed in uniform.

18 Colonel Blaskic did have rank insignia; Mr. Kordic did

19 not. Mr. Kordic was wearing -- other than a military

20 uniform, he had a large wooden cross on around his

21 neck.

22 Q. Did you have any observation about who was

23 leading the discussion, or was it fairly equally led?

24 A. Fairly equally led. But through body

25 language and otherwise, I would suggest that

1 Colonel Blaskic deferred to Mr. Kordic, and in

2 discussions as well to some degree.

3 Q. Do you recall the reasons that were given by

4 Blaskic and Kordic for not having the convoy travel

5 along the main HVO-controlled road?

6 A. The concern from their point was security, in

7 that they probably did not want to compromise

8 intelligence along the way, although that was an

9 unstated desire, I suspect, their concern being that

10 they were not too sure that they could control perhaps

11 reactions of the local Croatian populous.

12 Q. Did you and Lieutenant Colonel Williams --

13 sorry. Did you find that a plausible position?

14 A. Not entirely. We found that through

15 experience, that generally when an order was given,

16 that it was pretty much obeyed by the units on the

17 ground. The degree of control and discipline was

18 better in the HVO than it was, say, in the ABiH.

19 Q. Are you aware of any incidents of attack by

20 the HVO on the convoy in your area of responsibility?

21 A. No, none.

22 Q. Can you describe, please, or define the term

23 "interlink" in terms of operational strategy when

24 discussing policy and policy formulation and

25 implementation?

1 A. One of the things that we were trained, both

2 in the military and then certainly used during my time

3 in the United Nations, was the use of linkage analysis

4 to determine the degree of command and control through

5 the political levels down to the military levels as far

6 as execution is concerned.

7 Q. Concerning Bosnian Croat power and authority

8 and Dario Kordic, did you have any observations that

9 fit into the framework of what you have just discussed?

10 A. I would say that at the operational level for

11 the Central Operations Zone, that the synthesis of both

12 the political and the military existed in the personage

13 of Mr. Dario Kordic.

14 Q. How would that affect the planning of policy

15 and its implementation, if you're able to comment?

16 A. It would have been his responsibility to

17 ensure that policies that he assisted in the

18 formulation of that might have been sent from Zagreb,

19 certainly delivered from Grude, Mostar, the leadership

20 there, would be executed in terms of their military

21 objectives.

22 Q. On the 7th of February, 1994, a meeting was

23 held in the Hotel Vitez between yourself, Lieutenant

24 Colonel Williams, Kordic, and Colonel Blaskic. Could

25 you describe the purpose of that meeting and any

1 particular points which stick in your mind about the

2 meeting?

3 A. If I recall correctly, the basic purpose was

4 to discuss the delivery of humanitarian aid and also

5 the exchange of wounded from various areas. In

6 particular, I believe there were some wounded that were

7 in Stari Vitez that required -- that is a Muslim pocket

8 inside the Croat pocket. They required evacuation.

9 Q. Do you recall how Kordic and Colonel Blaskic

10 were dressed? And as to Colonel Blaskic, was there any

11 observation about the consistent type of dress he wore

12 throughout your time?

13 A. Colonel Blaskic was dressed in camouflage. I

14 don't believe Mr. Kordic was at that particular time.

15 Colonel Blaskic later, rather than wearing a camouflage

16 uniform, came to dress in a black uniform, black

17 coveralls. And if I recall correctly, basically that

18 was a pattern after the Washington Accords of March of

19 '94.

20 Q. What are political polemics, as you know the

21 term, and did they apply to this meeting?

22 A. Yes. Basically, during any meeting that one

23 might attend, whether it be with the Bosniaks or the

24 Bosnian Croats, they would engage in a little history

25 lesson as to who was guilty for what and attempt to

1 sway the listener to believe their particular line,

2 thus using political polemics to propagandise their

3 particular side. Mr. Kordic, as others, engaged in

4 this practice and at this particular meeting.

5 Q. At this particular meeting, what was the

6 nature of the accusation about the use of humanitarian

7 matters or aid by one side or the other?

8 A. Well, he accused the Bosniaks of manipulating

9 humanitarian aid and the delivery of water. In part,

10 he was correct, in that the Bosniaks would cut off

11 water from the mountains up above Novi Travnik and not

12 let a complete flow of water through. He inferred that

13 and stated that Bosnian Croats would never do such.

14 However, in fact, the delivery of humanitarian aid,

15 electricity, and water was manipulated by the Bosnian

16 Croat side as well.

17 Q. And was such a comment referred to, such

18 delivery of water, referred to by Mr. Kordic, vis-a-vis

19 the Muslims, in any part of the Lasva Valley at that

20 meeting?

21 A. Yes, with regard to Novi Travnik. But he

22 also said that unless they allowed water to go through,

23 then he would not release or allow the wounded in Stari

24 Vitez and other humanitarian cases to be addressed.

25 Q. On the 21st of February, 1994, a meeting was

1 held at a place called the Wolf's Lair. Would you take

2 whichever map at your disposal would best assist you in

3 showing the Court -- there's a map also in front of

4 you, if you can see.

5 A. It may take a second here to locate it. The

6 Wolf's Lair was located down after the T-junction from

7 Busovaca, and generally, although I don't have the grid

8 coordinate, it would have been in this area here

9 [indicates].

10 Q. Are you familiar with a location called

11 Tisovac?

12 A. I think that's approximately in the same

13 location. Colonel Williams was leading the convoy, and

14 so I wasn't following the map

15 Q Who was at that meeting?

16 A. Colonel Williams, myself, Larry Hollingworth,

17 Tihomir Blaskic, Dario Kordic, and I think Rajic was

18 there, Anto Rajic.

19 Q. Was that the chief of police of Vitez?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Who was Nikica Petrovic?

22 A. He was a liaison officer between the Bosnian

23 Croats and the International Community, as well as with

24 the Bosniaks themselves. He tended to inter-relate

25 with a Bosniak by the name of Beba Salko, who was his

1 counterpart.

2 Q. What was the area of responsibility of

3 Brigadier Skender?

4 A. It's my understanding that Brigadier Skender

5 controlled the Operational Zone Northwest, which I

6 believe was headquartered out of the Prozor area.

7 Q. Was Skender, Petrovic and Rajic then also --

8 sorry. Was Rajic, Skender and Petrovic also at this

9 meeting?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. What was the discussion?

12 A. If I might refer back.

13 Q. Surely. Or was this also about humanitarian

14 aid and about inspections?

15 A. Yes, thank you. It had to deal with the fact

16 that there had been some invasive inspections of UNHCR

17 convoys. And UNHCR, like the United Nations, having

18 diplomatic immunity, was not supposed to be subject to

19 having vehicles physically examined, and the HVO on

20 occasion had stopped some vehicles, opened doors, and

21 had people get out of their vehicles, checked the

22 property, the equipment, in some of these vehicles.

23 Q. What assurances were given as to the nature

24 of the future inspections, and who gave those

25 assurances?

1 A. After a protest was basically collectively

2 levied by Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Larry

3 Hollingworth and myself, and after some discussion,

4 Mr. Kordic and Colonel Blaskic agreed that inspections

5 would be limited to visual checks only and not invasive

6 physical searches of the vehicles or the convoys.

7 Q. Did Kordic make any references to having to

8 seek the approval of the Herceg-Bosna governmental

9 structures or did he make any assurances on his own?

10 A. He suggested that normally he would have to

11 have approval, but in this particular case he put the

12 final stamp of approval on that particular policy with

13 regard to the convoys.

14 Q. Did you have anything -- excuse me. Did you

15 participate in any investigation of a massacre alleged

16 by the Bosnian Croats to have taken place in

17 approximately March of 1994 at Krizancevo Selo in the

18 Vitez municipality, and if so, what was checked out and

19 what were the results?

20 A. Yes. We had a complaint from Mr. Kordic that

21 there had been a massacre to the north of Vitez at the

22 location of this village. The BritBat troops, the

23 Coldstream Guards, sent a detail up to check it out.

24 They had UNHCR there as well as ICRC and forensic

25 experts, and in checking it out, they did find a

1 grave. But the victims were all victims basically of a

2 conflict, a battle, and not executed or massacred.

3 Q. Did you find, then, the complaint to be

4 false?

5 A. Not accurate.

6 JUDGE MAY: Well, that's a very leading

7 question. If you want to ask it, ask what the finding

8 was. But I think the witness has given the finding.

9 Yes, let's move on.

10 MS. SOMERS:

11 Q. The Washington Agreement or Accords signed at

12 the end of February or the end of March of 1994, were

13 you informed of the presence of -- I'm sorry.

14 Following these agreements, were you informed of the

15 presence of HV or Croatian troops at checkpoints in the

16 area of Divjak in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

17 A. Yes. There was an old gas station that used

18 to be located on the left-hand side of the road going

19 to Vitez from Stara Bila, and that was burned down.

20 Just beyond that, there was a small building or

21 restaurant, and it was occupied by HV special police.

22 Both -- the current commander at the time, Lieutenant

23 Colonel Williams, complained about this to Mr. Kordic

24 and Colonel Blaskic, and subsequently there were other

25 incidents in which Colonel Williams' successor, Colonel

1 McCall, also complained of the presence of HV special

2 police in that location.

3 Q. To your knowledge, was the United Nations

4 made aware of the presence of HV troops on the

5 territory of Bosnia?

6 A. Yes, on several instances. When I was

7 personally there, in two different fashions. One,

8 Lieutenant Colonel Williams and the Coldstream Guards

9 actually had to rescue an HV general, I believe

10 brigadier general, and some other officers from the

11 mountainside near Tomislavgrad. They had been stranded

12 in the snow in bad conditions. He had also complained

13 of another incident of the presence of HV troops in

14 Central Bosnia. We, as civil affairs officers, were

15 aware of this in our meetings, when we would hold

16 monthly meetings in Sarajevo. This was reported, of

17 course, in discussions with headquarters in Zagreb.

18 They could come back to us with questions in that

19 regard and ask for information.

20 MS. SOMERS: Would the usher please

21 distribute two exhibits, Z1379,1 and Z1380,1. They are

22 at the back of the diary.

23 The two particular exhibits, Your Honours,

24 are Security Council exhibits attached at the very back

25 of the packet which you have just received.

1 Q. Turning your attention to -- do you have in

2 front of you the document that is from 17 February

3 1994? This document signed by then Secretary-General

4 Boutros Boutros-Ghali makes reference to the presence

5 of HV troops, troops of the Republic of Croatia, on the

6 territory of Bosnia. Are you familiar with the types

7 of allegations set forth in this particular document?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Does this document reflect accurately your

10 understanding of the situation?

11 A. Yes. The presence of HV troops in organised

12 military units, as well as volunteers.

13 Q. Turning your attention -- excuse me -- to

14 Exhibit 1380,1, dated 18 February 1994, it is a

15 response fashioned by Mr. Nobilo, Mario Nobilo, the

16 ambassador, the permanent representative, Croatia, of

17 the Security Council to the United Nations. Do you see

18 the explanation, if any, offered for the presence of

19 troops?

20 A. Mr. Nobilo, in paragraph 2, suggests that

21 these were volunteers and that they had departed the

22 Neretva region in Bosnia and had gone south beyond

23 Metkovic, which is basically on the boundary with the

24 Republic of Croatia.

25 Q. On the map that you have in front of you, the

1 colour, which is Z2612.7, although it's not a very

2 complete map, if it's complete enough to show the area

3 of Neretva River near Mostar.

4 A. Well, basically the Neretva goes in this

5 fashion [indicates] down to Mostar. That's the

6 beginning of the Neretva, and then goes from Mostar

7 down south.

8 Q. Can you show the boundary of Croatia and

9 Bosnia, please?

10 A. Well, no, not -- well, other than here,

11 [indicates], the southern boundary is not reflected on

12 this map.

13 Q. Thank you. Did you meet with Dario Kordic

14 after the Washington Accords were signed? Did you have

15 continued contact?

16 A. Yes, on several occasions. I was requested,

17 through Mr. Kordic's office, to provide security and to

18 be present with him during certain visits in the

19 post-Washington-Accord period so that he could travel

20 freely in Central Bosnia and particularly to Bugojno

21 and Travnik, where minority Croat populations lived.

22 Q. Did Kordic himself --

23 MR. SAYERS: Just for the record, Your

24 Honour, I would like to renew the objection to the

25 testimony beyond the scope of the amended indictment

1 for the reasons previously stated.

2 JUDGE MAY: We have already ruled on that,

3 Mr. Sayers.

4 MS. SOMERS:

5 Q. You said "through Mr. Kordic's office." Are

6 you aware of whether or not the request came personally

7 from Dario Kordic?

8 A. I can't say directly, but I believe it

9 probably did, and also it was relayed to me in addition

10 through Salko Beba from the Bosniak side, because --

11 well, it's my understanding that they had a fair degree

12 of confidence that if I stated that security would be

13 provided, that it would be provided, and certainly with

14 my personal presence there, that it would add an

15 additional measure of security.

16 Q. In this post-Washington era, did you observe

17 Mr. Kordic have any shift of his public persona,

18 vis-a-vis political or military?

19 A. Yes. Rather than being referred to as

20 "Colonel," which he had been on occasion, he took on

21 more of a political public role, and I never saw him

22 again after that dressed in uniform. And then he

23 became, I believe as of April of '94, the

24 vice-president of the HZ-HB or the Croatian Community

25 of Herceg-Bosna, and then later in the year became the

1 president of the BH-HDZ, the HDZ party of Bosnia.

2 Q. The security which you arranged for

3 Mr. Kordic, were you aware of any concerns Mr. Kordic

4 had about travelling through Central Bosnia?

5 A. Well, obviously by requiring a personal

6 presence, not only mine but BritBat, he must have had

7 some measure of concern for his life and security.

8 Q. Were you aware of any particular concerns he

9 had about travelling through territories that were held

10 by Muslims?

11 A. Yes, certainly. Whether he travelled to

12 Gornji Vakuf, Uskoplje, Travnik, or Bugojno, he feared

13 for his life, as did Anto Valenta.

14 Q. In June of 1994, did you also accompany

15 Mr. Kordic, at his request, to a meeting in Gornji

16 Vakuf?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And that was a political meeting?

19 A. Basically, these meetings were in order to

20 facilitate implementation of the Washington Accords and

21 bring about the federation between Bosnian Croats and

22 Bosnian Muslims.

23 Q. In July of 1994, was a comment made to you by

24 Anto Valenta concerning Zepce, which is part of HZ-HB

25 in the Lasva Valley, and its relationship or connection

1 during the time of the Muslim-Croat conflict which was

2 terminated by the Washington Accord?

3 A. Yes. It was his contention that there was no

4 connectivity or linkages between those areas as far as

5 direction or chain of command from Vitez/Busovaca,

6 either by the HVO or the HDZ. I knew this not to be

7 true. The BritBat Coldstream Guards' intelligence

8 officer -- not only that one but subsequently the

9 information had been provided that, in fact, there was

10 interconnectivity between those operational pockets.

11 Q. You made a reference to Mr. Kordic's

12 continued authority in the Herceg-Bosna government,

13 which experienced several changes both in name and in

14 form. The HR-HB, from '93, did it assume a different

15 name after the Washington Accords, if you can recall?

16 A. Yes. After the Washington Accords, I believe

17 about April time frame, it then became referred to as

18 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna for political

19 purposes, because they couldn't refer to themselves as

20 a republic, per se, and still be within the federation.

21 Q. That polity had originally been referred to

22 as HZ-HB, the Croatian Community, is that correct,

23 before the change to HR-HB?

24 A. Prior to 1993, that's correct. In 1992, I

25 can't exactly remember, but probably the fall of 1992,

1 early '93.

2 Q. The former head of the HDZ-BiH, Mate Boban,

3 what became of him if Kordic became the president of

4 the HDZ-BiH?

5 A. Mr. Boban went to Zagreb, where he assumed

6 the position of director of INA, which is the Republic

7 of Croatia state petroleum and energy company.

8 Q. Did you change your position within UNPROFOR

9 from civil affairs officer to political officer, and

10 during what time period?

11 A. I was civil affairs officer for Central

12 Bosnia Canton basically until January of '95. Then I

13 became the civil affairs coordinator for the entire

14 sector southwest until August of '95, and then went to

15 Zagreb, to the headquarters, to be the political

16 officer for Bosnia-Herzegovina for First Special

17 Representative Akashi, and later for Special

18 Representative Annan, who came in late October

19 through March of '96. He was acting in the dual

20 capacity as the head of the peacekeeping operations and

21 as SRSG.

22 Subsequently to that, I also worked as a

23 political officer with the U.N. liaison office in

24 Zagreb until May of '98, and I continued to follow

25 developments in Bosnia.

1 MS. SOMERS: Would the Court like me to -- I

2 have three more question. Shall I continue?

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you would like to finish

4 this, please, and then we'll adjourn.

5 Q. Finishing a question earlier asked about Mate

6 Boban, are you aware of the date of his death and the

7 circumstances surrounding his death in 1997? The

8 reports of his death, rather.

9 A. Yes. I was in Zagreb at the time, and of

10 course we followed the developments when he was

11 suddenly taken ill and then a ceremony was held. I

12 found it a bit curious, in that it was a closed-casket

13 sort of funeral, and normally for people of, let's say,

14 his distinction, normally it would be an open-casket

15 funeral. But other than that, there's no indications

16 of solid evidence as to his demise.

17 Q. Did you also serve as a political officer in

18 Belgrade, and if so, when did you terminate your

19 service in Belgrade?

20 A. In May of 1998, I left Zagreb and began work

21 as a political officer in Belgrade, where I followed

22 developments in the former republic of Yugoslavia,

23 Serbia, Montenegro, and in particular, Kosovo.

24 Q. Just a point about your position as legal

25 officer. Did it involve -- perhaps, if you've said

1 this, stop me -- the political analysis of developments

2 in and between Bosnia and Croatia and/or Bosnia and

3 Yugoslavia?

4 A. As a political officer in Zagreb, yes, I

5 followed developments not only in Bosnia but the

6 interrelationship between the two, particularly with

7 regard to the implementation of the Washington

8 Agreement and the Dayton Accords.

9 Q. From 1995 until October of 1997, which was

10 when Kordic was surrendered, did you follow anything

11 about his whereabouts or any of his political career?

12 A. On a couple of occasions, I personally saw

13 him in Zagreb. In fact, one case he was attending an

14 affair in Zagreb, and he was known to travel back and

15 forth fairly frequently visiting his residence in

16 Zagreb.

17 Q. Did he receive any awards that you know of

18 from the Republic of Croatia?

19 A. Yes, he received some fairly high awards from

20 the Republic of Croatia for his efforts in Bosnia.

21 Q. As a last point, you had kept a diary, copies

22 of the relevant pages of which have been provided to

23 the Office of the Prosecutor and given to the Defence.

24 MS. SOMERS: I would simply ask the usher --

25 I believe it has been distributed, and I will bring to

1 the Court's attention that it is Exhibit Z2783, and

2 that some of the responses in this testimony came from

3 entries in that diary.

4 I have no further questions.

5 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now. Twenty-five

6 minutes.

7 --- Recess taken at 11.14 a.m.

8 --- On resuming at 11.40 a.m.

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

10 MR. NICE: Witnesses for the 29th of

11 November, there are two or three, depending on how we

12 do this week, who will have been booked for some time

13 and who are international. One way or another, we'll

14 be able to cope with them. The balance of the week was

15 to be filled with witnesses from the former

16 Yugoslavia. Arrangements have been made for them to

17 attend, but I'm sure that we will be able to cut the

18 list without unusual difficulty, and therefore we are,

19 for that week, flexible. But thank you very much for

20 giving us the opportunity to be heard and to think

21 about it first.

22 JUDGE MAY: Well, thank you for being

23 flexible. In fact, having discussed the matter

24 further, I think it likely that two days would be

25 sufficient. So we will have two days remaining -- two

1 afternoons, I should say. Sorry, two afternoons would

2 be sufficient, and therefore we would retain two

3 afternoons in Kordic.

4 MR. NICE: So seven sessions as opposed to

5 nine; that's very helpful.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

7 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

9 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

11 Q. And good morning, sir.

12 My name is Steve Sayers. Together with my

13 colleague Mitko Naumovski, we represent Dario Kordic,

14 and we have some questions for you.

15 I understand, sir, that you have already been

16 interviewed by the Prosecution and by an attorney named

17 Andrew Cayley on August the 23rd of 1996, just over

18 three years ago?

19 A. That's correct. And at that time you had

20 available the contemporaneous diary that I believe

21 you've brought with you today; correct?

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And therefore you are able to consult your

24 diary at your leisure to ensure that the information

25 that you conveyed to that attorney was accurate;

1 correct?

2 A. Yes, that's correct. It would have been

3 available.

4 Q. Just some matters of background, sir. Your

5 speciality for about 16 years was essentially in matters

6 connected with various countries in Asia, was it not?

7 A. That's correct. Sixteen out of twenty-five

8 years with the American military.

9 Q. All right. Now, you arrived in the Balkans,

10 I believe, in November of 1993; correct?

11 A. Right.

12 Q. You first received the --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the other witness's

14 microphone be switched on, please.

15 A. I'm sorry; could you repeat that?

16 MR. SAYERS:

17 Q. Yes. You received your first briefing at the

18 United Nations headquarters in Zagreb; correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. How long did it last, sir?

21 A. Approximately one week.

22 Q. And who gave you that briefing?

23 A. Well, various people. It was an orientation

24 briefing for the overall former Yugoslavia, and more

25 particularly, I think there was a one-day orientation

1 for Bosnia.

2 Q. Just so the record is clear, of the one-week

3 briefing that you received, only one day was devoted to

4 Bosnia?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. Had you undertaken any study prior to your

7 arrival in Zagreb individually, any individual study to

8 help you understand the political structure that was

9 likely to confront you and the military situation that

10 was likely to confront you when you arrived in Bosnia,

11 sir?

12 A. I had started doing some independent reading,

13 one "The Fall of History" -- sorry, "The Fall of

14 Yugoslavia," and the other one a short history of

15 Bosnia.

16 Q. "The Fall of Yugoslavia"; that's the book

17 authored by Misha Glenny, is it?

18 A. That's correct.

19 Q. A former journalist; correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. All right. You also received a briefing from

22 the BritBat component of UNPROFOR -- please forgive the

23 contraction. I believe that the BritBat component of

24 UNPROFOR was the Coldstream Guards regiment when you

25 were present in Central Bosnia; correct?

1 A. It was there -- I believe it had arrived

2 sometime in September. I of course arrived in

3 mid-November. It departed in May and was replaced by

4 the Royal Anglians and then by the Royal Highland

5 Fusiliers, and by the Devon and Dorset, all of whom I

6 worked with, and subsequent to that with two -- well,

7 during that time and subsequent, worked with three

8 regimental commanders, Brigadiers Reith, Ridgeway, and

9 Pringle.

10 Q. Thank you, sir. But it would be fair to say

11 that the Coldstream Guards was the BritBat component of

12 UNPROFOR from the time of your arrival in Central

13 Bosnia until the end of March of 1994; correct?

14 A. Correct.

15 Q. You were briefed that Mr. Kordic was the

16 political leader of the Croats in Central Bosnia, I

17 believe?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You were briefed that Colonel Blaskic was the

20 senior military commander of all of the HVO forces in

21 Central Bosnia; correct?

22 A. Correct. Of that operational zone.

23 Q. When you refer to "that operational zone," is

24 it true that the operational zone formerly known as the

25 Central Bosnia Operative Zone had been renamed, prior

1 to your arrival, the 3rd Operational Zone?

2 A. I believe that's correct, yes.

3 Q. And Colonel Blaskic was the senior military

4 commander in charge of that particular Operative Zone?

5 A. Affirmative, until he was replaced by Colonel

6 Filipovic.

7 Q. All right. Who was the Muslim political

8 leader in the Central Bosnia area when you were there,

9 sir, prior to March of 1994?

10 A. Basically it was a pretty fragmented

11 situation as far as political leadership was concerned

12 within the Bosniaks. It tended to be almost tribal in

13 nature, oriented around municipalities or villages.

14 Very personality-dependent. I'm trying -- the key

15 political person would have been in Zenica, and

16 Salcinovic would have been the last name.

17 Q. What was that name again?

18 A. Salcinovic.

19 Q. And what was his position, sir?

20 A. Basically he assumed the position of

21 governor. During the period of time that he was there,

22 he was one of the political people within Zenica

23 itself. I didn't have -- other than at the

24 municipality level, I didn't have too much contact with

25 the Bosnian leadership at the higher levels -- at that

1 point in time. Later I did.

2 Q. In your journal, sir, and we have been

3 provided with some relevant pages, the journal was kept

4 contemporaneously; correct?

5 A. Correct. Now, there is a portion that's

6 missing, which unfortunately I couldn't recover; it's

7 at home in Washington, D.C. It covers a period

8 initially when I was there. It's one of these

9 flip-over notebooks that basically covers daily events

10 from mid-November through to early February.

11 Q. And you've lost that, have you?

12 A. Well, it may be lost. It's packed, and of

13 course most of my possessions are in Washington, D.C.,

14 in boxes that I haven't opened for -- well, almost six

15 years.

16 Q. Prior to the end of March of 1994, correct me

17 if I'm wrong, but there's only one entry for Mr. --

18 that mentions Mr. Kordic in your diary, and that's

19 February the 21st of 1994. Would you agree with that?

20 A. February 21st? Yes, and I believe February

21 the 7th as well.

22 Q. All right.

23 A. Although that may have been also separately

24 in another -- in another booklet as well.

25 Q. How do you mean, another booklet?

1 A. Well, because the transition between one book

2 and the other book occurs in early February, and so

3 some notes may have been kept in one and then

4 transferred over to the other, incompletely.

5 Q. Suffice it to say, though, that whatever that

6 other book is, you have not been able to consult it or

7 review it in order to refresh your recollection?

8 A. That's correct.

9 Q. Now, in November of 1993, you've told us that

10 you were assigned to work as a civil affairs officer in

11 Central Bosnia; right?

12 A. Right.

13 Q. Your predecessors in Vitez were, I believe,

14 first Randy Rhodes; right?

15 A. That's correct. Randy Rhodes was there I

16 believe from March or April of that year until about

17 September, and then Luc Duchesne took over in a

18 temporary capacity until I arrived.

19 Q. Now, as civil affairs officer, your principal

20 area of concentration was really the rehabilitation and

21 reconstruction of a country that had been ravaged by

22 civil war; correct?

23 A. Yes. Also we had a political reporting

24 responsibility and interface with political leaders at

25 the lower level, at the municipality level, and of

1 course that inferred some connections with the military

2 as well.

3 Q. Fundamentally, though, your area of

4 responsibility, if I might use that term, was

5 coterminous with the BritBat area of responsibility;

6 correct?

7 A. Affirmative. A huge area at that time.

8 Q. Including areas such as Gornji Vakuf in

9 Herzegovina; correct?

10 A. That's correct, and even went down to

11 Tomislavgrad and almost west to Mostar at that point.

12 Later on it did -- in Sector Southwest, it did include

13 that area. And it went north to Zepce, Zavidovici,

14 just to the south of Doboj.

15 Q. Now, you've given some testimony connected

16 with what you have referred to as Croat pockets,

17 pockets of area controlled by the Croats that you

18 discovered when you arrived in Central Bosnia in

19 November of 1993. Turning to the Vitez/Busovaca pocket

20 to begin with, it's true that that pocket was entirely

21 surrounded by ABiH forces; correct?

22 A. That's correct. At one point they were

23 joined, and then -- well, along with the Kiseljak

24 pocket, and then through various attacks, the pockets

25 became divided, but the Vitez/Busovaca pocket basically

1 remained intact and under HVO control.

2 Q. Right. Actually, there had been an ABiH

3 offensive against the Vitez/Busovaca pocket in

4 September of 1993, which was unsuccessful, and you were

5 aware of that; correct?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Similarly, you were aware that the ABiH

8 launched another offensive in -- just before Christmas

9 of 1993, on December the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th; correct?

10 A. That's correct, and it's recorded in my

11 journal.

12 Q. And finally, the ABiH launched another more

13 successful offensive in January of 1994 which succeeded

14 in -- for a time, anyway -- cutting off the main supply

15 route between Vitez and Busovaca; correct?

16 A. That's correct, and it forced reliance upon

17 the Santici back road in order to establish any sort of

18 road communications through the area.

19 Q. Would it be fair to say that in the

20 Vitez/Busovaca pocket, your perception as a

21 representative of the United Nations was that a siege

22 mentality prevailed?

23 A. On the part of virtually everybody, not only

24 in the Croatian pockets, but the Bosniak areas as well,

25 because the Bosniaks were surrounded by the Serbs.

1 Q. But in the Vitez/Busovaca pocket --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- a siege mentality prevailed?

4 A. I would expect that would be the case, and

5 certainly the Bosniak subpocket in Stari Vitez and

6 Kruscica, so ...

7 Q. Exactly, sir. Wouldn't you agree that this

8 was a --

9 A. It depends on where you are exactly.

10 Q. -- an extremely complex geographic,

11 political, military and ethnic situation, wasn't it?

12 A. Pockets and wheels within wheels and pockets;

13 exactly.

14 Q. Turning to some of the other pockets, the

15 Kiseljak pocket, you've described; that was also

16 surrounded by ABiH forces throughout the period from

17 your arrival until the end of -- well, up to the

18 signature of the Washington Agreement; isn't that

19 correct?

20 A. That's correct. The ABiH controlled the area

21 just outside, to the east of Busovaca, until an area

22 probably, I'd say, five kilometres to the west of

23 Kiseljak. They controlled the road area there.

24 Q. Would you not agree that throughout the first

25 four months of your tour in the area, the HVO was

1 essentially on the defensive?

2 A. In many ways, that's certainly the case,

3 because they had suffered succeeding defeats, and

4 that's one of the reasons that essentially they agreed

5 to the Washington Accords.

6 Q. I do not want to spend too much time on this,

7 sir, but there's no question that the following towns

8 were actually captured immediately before your arrival

9 in the area or during your arrival in the area; Travnik

10 for one. Correct?

11 A. Before my arrival.

12 Q. Kakanj was before your arrival too?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Bugojno?

15 A. Bugojno, before.

16 Q. Fojnica?

17 A. Fojnica before.

18 Q. And the Croat enclave in Vares, the Vares

19 area, which may have been somewhat outside of your area

20 of responsibility, was actually captured in its

21 entirety in November, early November of 1993; correct?

22 A. Actually, I believe it was earlier than that,

23 probably October that that occurred. But yes, that was

24 outside our area. That was basically within the Tuzla

25 region.

1 Q. And there's no question that in connection

2 with the military defeats suffered by the HVO in all of

3 these major towns and areas, large quantities of

4 refugees flooded out of those towns following the

5 military actions; correct?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. So by the time that you arrived in the area,

8 it would be fair to summarise that the Croat population

9 in Central Bosnia had been squeezed, if you like, into

10 first four and then three enclaves: the Vitez/Busovaca

11 enclave; the Kiseljak enclave; the Vares enclave, which

12 ceased to exist in late October or early November of

13 1993; and finally the Zepce enclave?

14 A. That's correct. They had suffered succeeding

15 defeats.

16 Q. Now, upon your arrival in Kiseljak at the

17 middle -- in the middle or the end of November of 1993,

18 you were confronted by an extremely tense and lawless

19 atmosphere; would you not agree?

20 A. Correct, particularly in Kiseljak. There

21 were a lot of -- there was a lot of random violence

22 and gangs; some military that were engaged in harassing

23 not only citizenry but the U.N. as well.

24 Q. Right. Beatings, shootings and robberies

25 were commonplace; correct?

1 A. It didn't happen every day, but frequently,

2 yes.

3 Q. But you would agree that criminal activity

4 was rampant, and the civil authorities had little, if

5 any, grip on law and order in that enclave, at least as

6 far as you could see; isn't that right?

7 A. I would say, in contrast to the Vitez pocket,

8 that it was more chaotic and under less control.

9 Q. You never found anybody from any one of the

10 warring factions who you could ever identify as being

11 in charge of civil affairs in the area, or military

12 affairs, for that matter; isn't that true?

13 A. I'm sorry; again? I'm not quite sure I've

14 caught the direction of your question.

15 Q. That's all right. If I ask you a question

16 which is unclear, please tell me, because that's my

17 fault, not yours.

18 You never were able to identify anybody from

19 either of the warring factions in that area, on the

20 Muslim side or the Croat side, who was in charge

21 civilly or militarily, were you, sir, in Kiseljak?

22 A. Well, I was only there for about a week, and

23 that was in a transition period before going to Central

24 Bosnia, and even during that period, a week or so, I

25 went to Sarajevo for a brief orientation as well. So

1 it really wasn't my -- I hadn't settled into a job,

2 per se.

3 Q. Just one final point in connection with

4 that. While you were there for this one week, Kiseljak

5 was targeted on a number of occasions by ABiH mortars;

6 correct?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. Let me turn to your arrival in the town of

9 Vitez, sir. I believe that was in early December of

10 1993?

11 A. No, actually, it was mid-to late November

12 when I was there.

13 Q. All right. Now, you say that you set up the

14 office of civil affairs next to the operations room of

15 the headquarters of BritBat?

16 A. That's correct.

17 Q. Where was it before that?

18 A. Well, it had been around a corner, and it was

19 a little bit smaller office, and by moving nearer the

20 operations room it made me more accessible. And in

21 contrast to my predecessor, I was a bit more senior and

22 long in the tooth and with military experience, and so

23 I think Colonel Williams understood that and felt a bit

24 more comfortable in that regard.

25 Q. You would agree that the situation

1 confronting you when you arrived in Vitez in

2 mid-November of 1993 was pretty grim; isn't that

3 correct?

4 A. Absolutely. It was like something out of

5 World War II. Pretty grey and dismal.

6 Q. Most of the buildings that you saw in Vitez

7 were marked -- pockmarked by shell fire or gunfire

8 strikes; correct?

9 A. It was a mix. In certain areas that had been

10 predominantly inhabited by Muslims, those were pretty

11 well destroyed, the roofs gone, and burned down. In

12 areas in which it was obvious that there was a direct

13 confrontation and fights going on, buildings were

14 pockmarked on both sides, indicating that the building

15 itself was a site of confrontation.

16 In central Vitez, not that many buildings had

17 been destroyed directly. Some had been subjected to

18 long-barrelled automatic weapons from 50 calibre and

19 above, markings from them and mortar rounds that would

20 have been fired from Stari Vitez into central Vitez.

21 In particular, Hotel Vitez had been hit many times.

22 Q. All right.

23 A. And Hotel Vitez was the headquarters for the

24 HVO.

25 Q. The civil affairs office produced reports on

1 a fairly regular basis; correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. [Indiscernible] reports and weekly situation

4 reports?

5 A. That's correct.

6 Q. You gave some testimony concerning the

7 linkage, if you like, to the provision of humanitarian

8 aid to other concessions sought by the various factions

9 to which a request was made. I'd just like to show you

10 two exhibits on that, if I may: the first dated

11 September the 1st, 1993, a report prepared by one of

12 your predecessors, Mr. Rhodes, from the civil affairs

13 office in Vitez.

14 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

15 D124/1.

16 MR. SAYERS:

17 Q. Just a few brief questions on this document,

18 sir. You can see in paragraph 2, your predecessor

19 makes the observation that all sides have been guilty

20 of using or denying the use of humanitarian aid,

21 medical treatment, and supplies -- water, power,

22 et cetera -- to further their military or political

23 aims.

24 A. Correct, and I made that statement also

25 earlier.

1 Q. Right. If you turn over to the next page,

2 there are some comments made or summarised in

3 paragraph 5 made by Colonel Hadzihasanovic. Did you

4 ever meet or speak with -- I think General

5 Hadzihasanovic?

6 A. On a couple of occasions, but most of my

7 contacts tended to be, militarily, with General Alagic

8 and his immediate staff.

9 Q. That's general Mehmed Alagic; correct?

10 A. Correct. And one of his staff officers,

11 Colonel Merdan.

12 Q. Was General Alagic the commander of the 3rd

13 Corps, headquartered in Zenica, while you were present

14 in the area, sir?

15 A. Affirmative.

16 Q. All right. Did General Alagic ever mention

17 to you that the ABiH, insofar as Stari Vitez was

18 concerned, had three options: the first to permit the

19 Muslims within the Stari Vitez area to surrender; the

20 second to permit them to be evacuated en masse to the

21 southwest, and the third to keep them besieged and

22 pressured so that ABiH supplies from Croatia would not

23 be completely withheld?

24 A. No, he never directly made any statements of

25 that nature to me. However, within BritBat, in

1 discussions with BritBat, that was certainly mentioned.

2 Q. All right. In your discussions with General

3 Alagic, did he ever, on this subject, tell you that --

4 and I'm citing the book that he published in 1997 --

5 "Faced with this overall situation, we chose the last

6 option. Instead of liberating Vitez, we chose to leave

7 it as a strategic vent for the supplying of other parts

8 of Bosnia"?

9 A. I'll take General Alagic at his word. I

10 would say that both sides had an interest in a way of

11 preserving Stari Vitez, because had the pocket not been

12 there, then it would have probably made the Croatian

13 pocket even more vulnerable to a mass attack from the

14 ABiH.

15 Q. Thank you. The point I was trying to

16 elucidate was that the situation of the Muslims in

17 Stari Vitez was considered by the 3rd Corps and that

18 the deliberate decision was made essentially to

19 preserve the status quo in order to ensure the

20 continued supplies of materiel to the ABiH through

21 Croatia. That was the view of your office and of your

22 immediate neighbours, the BritBat contingent in Vitez;

23 correct?

24 A. A manipulation of the population in order to

25 serve other interests, yes.

1 Q. And on the subject of -- well, I'll save that

2 for later.

3 You asked -- you were asked some questions

4 about the Croat political party. The HDZ-BiH is the

5 acronym that we use. Was that the acronym by which it

6 was known when you were in the area, sir?

7 A. It became more known or more properly

8 addressed within our circles at BH-HDZ, but the same

9 party.

10 Q. Whatever the acronym, it's the same party.

11 Have you ever, with your political expertise,

12 scrutinised any of the founding documents of that

13 party, setting forth its basic constitution or

14 elaborating its party political platforms throughout

15 the years?

16 A. Not in depth, but I have seen them. And I

17 attended actually a -- I'm trying to think of the

18 correct term. At the invitation of Mr. Kordic, a

19 conference in Busovaca in 1994, and the precepts that

20 were evidenced at that time and some of the documents

21 that I looked through are, on the surface, very

22 reasonable.

23 Q. Speaking about the testimony that you gave

24 regarding the comments assertedly made by Mr. Kordic

25 concerning Muslims, would you agree with me that there

1 is no record whatsoever in your contemporaneous journal

2 about those comments, sir?

3 A. That is correct, there is none in my

4 journal. This is from recollection.

5 Q. Recollections of conversations that occurred

6 in February of 1993, you say?

7 A. Over various occasions, and not just with

8 Mr. Kordic but also with Mr. -- or, rather, General

9 Roso, Mr. Valenta, and a few others.

10 Q. What was Mr. Kordic's position within the

11 BH-HDZ prior to March of 1994, sir?

12 A. Within the BH-HDZ?

13 Q. Correct.

14 A. He was a vice-president.

15 Q. How many vice-presidents were there?

16 A. Quite a few.

17 Q. He was just one of these vice-presidents; is

18 that correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. Do you know what the powers of -- the

21 prescribed powers of a BH-HDZ vice-president are?

22 A. It would depend upon the position within the

23 party structure itself, and whether the individual

24 would be operational on the ground or not, and what

25 degree -- some of the designations of vice-presidents

1 would be honorific in nature and others would be more

2 functional in nature.

3 Q. Do you derive this from the records and

4 documents about which you've testified you regularly

5 consult, or is this just your opinion?

6 A. No, this was based upon not at the time but

7 records reviewed by myself in my capacity within the

8 U.N. liaison office in Zagreb subsequently, following

9 up developments in Bosnia.

10 Q. Would these be documents that were generated

11 by the BH-HDZ itself, which actually delineated the

12 specific powers of a vice-president, or military

13 intelligence documents of the type that you regularly

14 consulted concerning conclusions arrived at by others?

15 A. A combination of both, taking open-source

16 information and then cross-checking that against

17 statements and interviews, discussions, that were held

18 either personally or by other colleagues with

19 individuals within the HDZ not only in Bosnia but in

20 Croatia as well.

21 Q. Who was the president of the BH-HDZ in

22 Busovaca; do you know?

23 A. In Busovaca?

24 Q. Yes, sir.

25 A. The mayor of the city was Florijan Glavocic

1 [sic], and I can't recall whether he was the president

2 of the HDZ or not. I might have it in my notes. It's

3 not something that I concentrated on.

4 Q. Let me put it to you, sir, that the mayor or

5 the president of the HVO civilian government was

6 actually Zoran Maric. Isn't that correct?

7 A. That's correct initially, that's correct, and

8 then Florijan took over after that.

9 Q. Florijan Glavocevic was actually the head of

10 the HDZ-BiH in Busovaca, wasn't he?

11 A. I'm trying to recall now. Yeah, that's

12 correct.

13 Q. You gave some testimony in connection with

14 your initial meetings with Vitez politicians. Your

15 first meeting, I believe, was within three or four days

16 of your arrival in Vitez sometime in November of 1993,

17 and you met with various local businessmen and

18 politicians; correct?

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. The meeting was chaired by Ivica Santic;

21 correct?

22 A. One of the meetings, yes.

23 Q. And his actual formal title is not the mayor

24 of Vitez, although that's a good vernacular --

25 A. Analogy, yes. The president.

1 Q. The president of the HVO municipal

2 government; correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. Now, you were instructed that Mr. Santic had

5 occupied this position for the last six or seven

6 months; correct?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Isn't it true that he actually had been in

9 that position for about two years?

10 A. Well, that's possible, but I hadn't been

11 there for that period of time and I was taking

12 information basically as presented by Luc Duchesne, and

13 that would have covered the time that he was

14 knowledgeable and that Randy Rhodes might have been

15 knowledgeable.

16 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that you told the

17 prosecutors three years ago that you never, in fact,

18 actually heard Mr. Santic say anything derogatory about

19 Muslims?

20 A. I don't believe I said that, because I can

21 certainly recall the anecdote that he told me about

22 parachuting pork in to the Muslims, and that was maybe

23 not the first or the second meeting but certainly

24 within the first couple of months that I was there.

25 Q. Have you seen any reference to that comment

1 in any of the daily reports or weekly situation reports

2 that you prepared as the civil affairs officer of the

3 United Nations in Vitez?

4 A. No. I wouldn't have included that

5 particularly.

6 Q. Let me just read you a portion of your

7 statement from page 3, which says: "I never heard him,

8 Mr. Santic, say anything derogatory about Muslims,

9 although I do remember he used the pejorative term of

10 'balija' when describing Muslim people."

11 A. Well, that's a pejorative term. It's

12 negative.

13 Q. What does it mean?

14 JUDGE MAY: Are we assisted by this

15 argument? The witness has given his evidence about

16 it. Let's go on.

17 MR. SAYERS: I believe that's correct, Your

18 Honour. I'll move on.

19 Q. Just one question, though. You would agree

20 that it's not unusual to refer in less than

21 complimentary language to opposing forces when you're

22 engaged in a civil war?

23 JUDGE MAY: We don't need evidence on that

24 point.

25 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

1 Q. Now, speaking of Mr. Santic, he was

2 responsible for running the civil government in the

3 entire municipality of Vitez, was he not?

4 A. That's correct, administratively, in

5 practical terms.

6 Q. And in your dealings with Mr. Santic -- I

7 think you said that you met him 30 times or so -- if

8 issues relating to police, freedom of movement or

9 security arose, he routinely referred you to

10 Mr. Valenta, didn't he, sir?

11 A. Mr. Valenta or to Mr. Kordic if it couldn't

12 be solved basically at that level, although it tended

13 to be a mix.

14 Q. You said, on page 4 of your statement, that

15 when dealing with Santic, "if certain issues were

16 raised during discussion, we were always referred to

17 Ante Valenta. By 'certain issues,' I mean issues such

18 as the police, freedom of movement and security."

19 That's what you told the prosecutors three years ago;

20 right?

21 A. Well, it's certainly the first call of

22 recourse, but above him would have been Mr. Kordic.

23 Q. You didn't make any contention to the

24 prosecutors along those lines three years ago, did you?

25 A. No, I didn't.

1 Q. All right. And I believe that Mr. Santic

2 later became the Deputy Minister of Energy in the

3 government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4 Correct?

5 A. That's correct, and I had some meetings with

6 him subsequently after that concerning the Bratstvo

7 munitions factory and then independent of that in

8 Sarajevo.

9 Q. One of the other politicians that you met in

10 Vitez was Pero Skopljak; correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. And in your view, you had determined that he

13 was the leader of the HDZ party for Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 in Middle Bosnia; correct?

15 A. Right, particularly for the Vitez area if --

16 in that particular area, and if -- my first line of

17 recourse to getting anything done, if I couldn't get it

18 done through Santic or Valenta, I also used or went to

19 Mr. Skopljak to address various issues, to include one

20 I can recall on freedom of movement.

21 Q. Three years ago, you told the prosecutors

22 that this gentleman was the leader of the HDZ party for

23 Middle Bosnia; correct? Page 10.

24 A. I don't have the document, but if that's what

25 it has. But I would focus it down more to the Vitez

1 area. It's like you referred to Florijan being the

2 leader for the Busovaca area. Mr. Skopljak would be

3 more like for the Vitez area.

4 Q. His function was to attach the party seal of

5 approval required for higher-level decisions; correct?

6 A. Right.

7 Q. And indeed in your view, with your experience

8 that you've derived over the years, the local political

9 authorities in Vitez and Busovaca could do nothing

10 without his assent, and that was always clear to you,

11 wasn't it?

12 A. He was one of the key actors, yes.

13 Q. You do agree that you say -- that you said on

14 page 10, "It was always clear to me that the local

15 political authorities would do nothing without his,

16 Mr. Skopljak's, assent"; correct?

17 A. That's part of the formula, and Mr. Kordic

18 would have been higher than Mr. Skopljak.

19 MR. SAYERS: All right.

20 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

21 MS. SOMERS: I beg your pardon, but because

22 these pages are not numbered, unfortunately, could you

23 refer to the ERN reference number at the top that would

24 give us the page number? The statement is not a

25 numbered statement, as I have it.

1 MR. SAYERS: I would be delighted to do so,

2 but the document that we've received does not have an

3 identifiable ERN number on it. It actually only has

4 numbers that go from D2490 -- it starts with D2940 and

5 actually descends to 2480, and I was reading from page

6 2480.

7 JUDGE MAY: That sounds like a Registry

8 page. They do the things backwards. Yes.

9 MS. SOMERS: Sorry, Your Honour. I just had

10 trouble locating the particular passage, and perhaps if

11 I could just get it from the number of pages from the

12 last signature page, of the last page, that would help

13 me.

14 JUDGE MAY: Do you have a different one from

15 the Registry?

16 MS. SOMERS: No, I have a differently

17 numbered one. I'll make arrangements.

18 MR. SAYERS: It's actually on the last page,

19 third paragraph down, three lines from the bottom.

20 MS. SOMERS: Thank you very much.

21 MR. SAYERS:

22 Q. Now, turning for a minute, sir, to Mr. Anto

23 Valenta, what was his position?

24 A. He was designated as one of the

25 vice-presidents.

1 Q. Of what?

2 A. Of the -- well, initially when I met him, of

3 the northern portion of the HR-HB, the Croat Republic

4 of Herceg-Bosna.

5 Q. I put it to you, Mr. Carter, that the Croat

6 Republic of Herceg-Bosna did not have an office of

7 vice-president. Did you know that?

8 A. That's the way he represented himself.

9 Q. I also put it to you that Mr. Valenta was one

10 of three vice-presidents of the HVO and had been for

11 some considerable time prior to your arrival; at least

12 a year. Do you agree with that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. In fact, let me just show you a document.

15 Maybe this will jog your memory, and since you say that

16 you've looked at the official records that are in the

17 public record.

18 Just for the record, this is an October the

19 17th, 1992 decision appointing Mr. Valenta as one of

20 the vice-presidents of the HVO.

21 THE REGISTRAR: The document is marked

22 D125/1.

23 MR. SAYERS:

24 Q. Have you ever seen this document before, sir?

25 A. No, I have not.

1 Q. All right. Did you know who the other two

2 vice-presidents were?

3 A. No. This is before my time, and I would

4 point out that this is before the republic was created

5 in '93. And, of course, subsequent to the Washington

6 Accords, it reverted back to the Croatian Community of

7 Herceg-Bosna.

8 Q. It's not your testimony, sir, that the HVO

9 was somehow abolished by the foundation of the Croatian

10 Republic of Herceg-Bosna on August the 28th of 1993, is

11 it?

12 A. No, not at all.

13 Q. Are you aware of any information that would

14 suggest to you that Mr. Valenta was not, in fact, or

15 did not continue to be a vice-president of the HVO

16 throughout the first five months of your tenure in the

17 Vitez/Busovaca area?

18 JUDGE MAY: The witness can only deal with

19 what he knows himself. He's given his evidence on the

20 point. Now let's move on to something else.

21 MR. SAYERS: Very well.

22 Q. Who was the president of the HVO, sir?

23 A. In our particular area or outside of our

24 area?

25 Q. The president of the HVO throughout

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do you know?

2 A. I couldn't say to that effect, no.

3 Q. Did you know that Mr. Valenta was the HVO

4 civil affairs representative throughout the Lasva

5 Valley, sir?

6 A. Certainly, he was our primary point of

7 contact and wielded some considerable authority, and

8 deference was made to him partially because of his

9 writings that he had done previously, which basically

10 urged for cantonisation.

11 Q. Were you aware that it was the view of the

12 European Community Monitoring Mission that Mr. Valenta

13 was the real number two in the HVO after Mate Boban?

14 A. No. When was that allegation or --

15 JUDGE MAY: Don't bother.

16 A. Okay.

17 MR. SAYERS:

18 Q. Did you review any of the documents by Randy

19 Rhodes, one of your predecessors, any of the reports

20 prepared by him, insofar as they related to the

21 political structures of the Croat authorities in the

22 Vitez/Busovaca pocket, sir?

23 A. Not initially, no, because there had been a

24 change in the battalions and a change in location, so

25 some of the material -- well, many of the materials

1 during his presence were not available, and so I had to

2 rely to some extent initially, certainly, on Luc

3 Duchesne's brief knowledge of the area.

4 Q. All right. I take it, sir, that you did not

5 have the opportunity to speak with Mr. Randy Rhodes

6 directly.

7 A. No. He had already left, already departed.

8 Q. And the person to whom you did speak, Mr. Luc

9 Duchesne, had only been in the area for a very short

10 period of time; correct?

11 A. That's correct, approximately four or five

12 weeks.

13 Q. Just to bring a conclusion to this line of

14 questioning, you have not seen any of Mr. Rhodes'

15 reports, I take it, subsequently.

16 A. No, I have not, other than the one that you

17 showed me.

18 Q. In that case, we can move on. Thank you.

19 Did you know that Mr. Valenta still works for

20 the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

21 A. Yes. In fact, I saw Mr. Valenta. I'm trying

22 to recall, but I believe it was 1996 or 1997 in

23 Sarajevo.

24 Q. Now, you gave some testimony concerning the

25 chain of command within the HVO. Sir, it would be fair

1 to say that as a former military man or as a military

2 man with more than 25 years of experience, it was your

3 view that Colonel Blaskic was able to exercise

4 effective command and control over all HVO forces in

5 the Vitez/Busovaca pocket, even down to the infantry

6 company level; correct?

7 A. Correct, conventional units.

8 Q. And how many soldiers are actually in an

9 infantry company?

10 A. Well, it depends upon whose system you're

11 looking at. Within the Yugoslav system, the Croatian

12 HVO, approximately 100 men or less.

13 Q. Whenever you met Colonel Blaskic, he always

14 wore a rank badge of colonel on his breast pocket;

15 correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. And also rank epaulettes on his sleeve too?

18 A. On occasion, it would. Certainly a change

19 when he went into black uniform.

20 Q. Was your first meeting with Colonel Blaskic

21 on December the 15th, 1993, the date that you first met

22 with Mr. Kordic too?

23 A. I believe that's correct, yes.

24 Q. And --

25 A. I don't believe I met him any time prior to

1 that, or if it was, it was an incidental meeting of no

2 particular consequence.

3 Q. It would be true to say that following that

4 meeting, you were in no doubt that Colonel Blaskic was

5 indeed the commander of the HVO military forces in

6 Central Bosnia; correct?

7 A. Right.

8 Q. You gave some testimony about the White Road

9 Convoy. It would be fair to say that in that instance,

10 as in all others, you were unaware of situations in

11 which Colonel Blaskic's military orders were not

12 carried out; correct?

13 A. As far as conventional units were concerned

14 and my knowledge basically during my time there, there

15 may have been incidents, but generally speaking, his

16 orders were carried out.

17 We had a couple of incidents in which British

18 troops were fired upon by Croatian HVO. They were

19 fired back at, and we never had any repeated incidents

20 of it. But I would say that's an anomaly rather than

21 the norm.

22 Q. You never asked Colonel Blaskic whether there

23 were any military units that were outside of his

24 command, did you, sir?

25 A. No, I never deliberately asked him that.

1 Q. And, similarly, you never asked either

2 Mr. Valenta or Mr. Kordic whether any military units

3 were under the political chain of command, did you?

4 A. No, I never did.

5 Q. Turning to the December the 15th, 1993

6 meeting that you gave some testimony about, it was

7 Colonel Blaskic who actually did most of the talking at

8 that meeting, wasn't it?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Mr. Kordic was actually, sir, not in uniform

11 at all, as you testified in your direct examination.

12 Wouldn't you agree with that?

13 A. I'm getting the dates confused, but at one

14 point, that's correct. On the 21st of February at the

15 Wolf's Lair, he was in uniform.

16 Q. Not at the first meeting; correct?

17 A. No.

18 Q. The mountain road via Guca Gora, about which

19 you've testified the White Road Convoy ultimately

20 travelled, that was territory controlled by the ABiH

21 forces; correct?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. One of the concerns articulated to you by

24 Colonel Blaskic, and articulated on a fairly consistent

25 basis after this first meeting, was the concern that

1 convoys such as the White Road Convoy were being used

2 to smuggle arms and ammunition; isn't that correct?

3 A. That's correct.

4 Q. And his concerns in this instance, at least,

5 turned out to be justified because explosives,

6 detonators, and ammunition were discovered being

7 smuggled in that convoy; correct?

8 A. In one of the vehicles, that's correct.

9 Q. That was despite the reassurances and

10 representations made by ABiH commanders to you, amongst

11 others; correct?

12 A. Correct, but it was never determined who

13 placed the explosives in the vehicles.

14 Q. And you say that the convoy proceeded without

15 incident, without being attacked, to Zenica. On its

16 return to Herzegovina, however, on December the 22nd,

17 the convoy was attacked, wasn't it?

18 A. When it returned back into the Stara Bila and

19 then the Gornji Vakuf areas, it was attacked, and I

20 believe there were one or two Croatian drivers that

21 were killed and injured -- or injured and killed,

22 excuse me.

23 Q. That was actually the day that the ABiH

24 offensive, the Christmas offensive, or just before

25 Christmas of 1993, started; correct?

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. And that was the offensive which resulted in

3 the fatalities at Krizancevo Selo. I don't think you

4 mentioned the number of people that were killed there,

5 but it was about 75, wasn't it?

6 A. I don't recall the exact figure, but it was

7 certainly a fairly high number. It was quite a

8 confrontation.

9 Q. Were you actually present when the bodies of

10 the people killed at Krizancevo Selo were dug up or

11 exhumed three months later?

12 A. No.

13 Q. All right. At the time of the White Road

14 Convoy, sir, you were actually aware that the ABiH was

15 actively planning offensive operations aimed at the

16 Vitez/Busovaca pocket; correct?

17 A. UNPROFOR, BritBat, and myself had indications

18 to suggest that they had intended an offensive. We

19 made very strong representations to Dr. Lang and

20 suggested to him that he must move his convoy

21 immediately prior to the 22nd. He declined and did not

22 leave until the 22nd.

23 Q. Did you ever let Colonel Blaskic or anybody

24 else within the Croat military leadership know that

25 such an impending attack was about to be launched so

1 that casualties could be minimised?

2 A. No, it's not our role to provide information

3 to one side or the other. But for humanitarian

4 purposes, we attempted to let Dr. Lang know that it

5 would not be in the interests of he or his convoy to

6 remain there, and we made very strong representations

7 to him.

8 Q. Let me turn to the level of knowledge that

9 you have about the structure of government within the

10 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, sir.

11 This entity had been in existence for two and

12 a half months by the time that you arrived in Central

13 Bosnia; correct?

14 A. I'm not sure of the exact date, but, yeah,

15 for some bit.

16 Q. Did you ever read the constitution of the

17 Republic or the documents that set it up and defined

18 the powers of its various organs?

19 A. No. If I recall correctly, the only

20 constitution or founding documentation that I read had

21 to do with the Croat Community and not with the

22 Republic itself.

23 Q. Were you aware that the supreme commander of

24 the HVO armed forces, according to the constitution,

25 was the president of the Republic, sir?

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. And who was that?

3 A. Sorry?

4 Q. The president of the Republic.

5 A. Mate Boban.

6 Q. Prior to February the 14th of 1994, sir,

7 could you just tell us what position, if you know,

8 Mr. Kordic held within the government of the Croatian

9 Republic of Herceg-Bosna?

10 A. As one of the vice-presidents.

11 Q. I put it to you, sir --

12 A. And self-styled, and in various

13 documentations that I've seen, referred to as colonel

14 in the HVO as well.

15 Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Kordic, "What position

16 do you hold within the Croatian Republic of

17 Herceg-Bosna," sir?

18 A. No, I didn't, because that information was

19 given to me by the British. I didn't ask him directly;

20 that's correct.

21 Q. Would it fair to say, sir, that there was

22 some considerable confusion regarding the precise role

23 of Mr. Kordic within the Croatian Republic of

24 Herceg-Bosna, in your view, and also in the view of the

25 British intelligence services; would that be fair to

1 say?

2 A. I would say that Mr. Kordic, as others, took

3 on various guises and functions over the period of

4 time, some of them evolutionary in nature, through

5 promotion; some of them, as I was indicating in my

6 testimony, there is a blurring of distinction and

7 responsibility, particularly in times of conflict,

8 where roles that are generally political in nature

9 are -- sorry, military in nature are assumed by the

10 military --

11 Q. It's a very simple question. Isn't it true

12 that there was a degree of doubt or confusion regarding

13 Mr. Kordic's precise position within the Croatian

14 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, in your view and in the view

15 of your colleagues in the military community?

16 A. Perhaps there are -- I would suggest that

17 there are others that perhaps have a clearer view than

18 I might have, but some confusion in my mind, yes. Not

19 necessarily confusion, but duplication of various

20 responsibilities.

21 Q. Well, are you aware of anyone who just asked

22 the question, "Mr. Kordic, what is your position within

23 this new republic?"

24 A. The question -- if Mr. -- or Brigadier

25 Williams testifies, I'm sure he'll give you an answer

1 in that regard.

2 Q. Are you aware that he actually asked that

3 question, sir?

4 A. I'm not aware, but ...

5 Q. Let me put it to you, sir: Isn't it true

6 that Dario Kordic was one of 69 legislators in the

7 House of Representatives --

8 A. In the assembly, yes.

9 Q. Yes. In addition, the only appointments that

10 he ever held were as the president of one of the

11 commissions of the House of Representatives and a

12 member of a ten-member commission on foreign affairs

13 and internal security prior to February the 17th of

14 1992? Did you know that?

15 A. No -- well, not specifically, no.

16 Q. Did you know that --

17 A. But that would have been prior to 1992.

18 Q. Well, in 1994, or right at the end of 1993,

19 the government of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna

20 was appointed by the -- by the House of

21 Representatives; did you know that?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Who was the prime minister, sir?

24 JUDGE MAY: Why are we asking questions?

25 It's not a school test.

1 A. I'm afraid that --

2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't remember,

3 probably, what happened six or seven years ago. If

4 there is some point about it, Mr. Sayers, put it in

5 terms.

6 MR. SAYERS: That's fair enough,

7 Mr. President.

8 A. I'm afraid my knowledge has waned with time,

9 but --

10 Q. That's all right.

11 A. -- and limited to the personal relationships

12 that I might have had at the time with Mr. Kordic,

13 Mr. Prlic, and some others.

14 Q. All right. Just before we go through these,

15 and it won't take very long, did you make any

16 contemporaneous notations in your diary as to who held

17 what position when?

18 A. Yes, I have a legend that indicates at

19 certain times when various individuals assumed various

20 responsibilities, if I might refer to it.

21 Q. Certainly, but let me just, in the interest

22 of accelerating the pace of proceedings here, just

23 suggest to you: Isn't it true that the prime minister

24 of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was

25 Dr. Jadranko Prlic?

1 A. Yes, and he also assumed the responsibility

2 of foreign minister at one point, too.

3 Q. Isn't it also true that there were ten

4 separate ministries, each headed up by a different

5 person, and Mr. Kordic wasn't one of them?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Isn't it true, sir, that the Croatian

8 Republic of Herceg-Bosna held a major convention in, I

9 believe, the city of Neum in February of 1994, and it

10 was at that time that a gentleman by the name of Ivan

11 Bender was appointed as the chairman of the House of

12 Representatives, the legislative organ of the

13 government; correct?

14 A. Correct. I do recall that.

15 Q. And simultaneously with that appointment,

16 Mr. Kordic and Mr. Vlado Santic from Bihac were

17 appointed as deputy chairmen of the house of

18 representatives; did you know that?

19 A. Not specifically, no. But I recall the

20 incident about Mr. Bender.

21 Q. And you would agree with me that before that,

22 Mr. Kordic held no position within the government of

23 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna of which you were

24 aware; isn't that true?

25 A. Not in a formal status, except as reported to

1 me by the British and information subsequently

2 collected within the U.N. liaison office. One of the

3 notations I have on page 44 is that Kordic is removed

4 from military chain of command but remains deputy

5 president of Herceg-Bosna, dated the 30th of April.

6 Q. But you have no personal knowledge whatsoever

7 of the facts relating to that entry, do you?

8 A. That information was provided to me by the

9 British military intelligence.

10 Q. I understand, sir, but you would agree that

11 you are just reporting what other people have told you;

12 right?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. All right.

15 A. And another entry I have on the 21st of June,

16 page 62, Kordic declared HDZ president.

17 Q. Were you aware, Mr. Carter, that a

18 presidential council of nine persons was established on

19 December the 10th of 1993 by President Boban?

20 A. No. I can't honestly say that I would

21 have --

22 Q. Very well.

23 A. -- been aware of that.

24 Q. Turning to Mr. Kordic for just a few moments,

25 before the end of March of 1994, I believe that you had

1 a grand total of three meetings with him; is that

2 correct?

3 A. Three that I have recorded. There may have

4 been more, but I don't believe so.

5 Q. Mr. Kordic would routinely be present if

6 anything of political significance was being discussed;

7 isn't that correct?

8 A. I would say, in a trans-Vitez or trans-Lasva

9 Valley context, that's correct. I tended to try to

10 relegate my contacts at the level appropriate; in other

11 words, with the mayors or the political representatives

12 of the specific area, whether it be Busovaca or Novi

13 Travnik or Travnik or Vitez.

14 Q. Did you know that before the civil war, that

15 Mr. Kordic was a journalist and that he did not have a

16 military background?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Were you aware that Mr. Kordic was elected as

19 the president of the commission for the implementation

20 of the Washington Agreement by the republic, sir?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And it was in connection with his functions

23 in that capacity that he made the requests to you for

24 safe passage through Muslim-controlled areas to places

25 such as Bugojno; correct?

1 A. That is correct.

2 Q. All right. The only time that you ever saw

3 Mr. Kordic in camouflage clothing was the February

4 the 7th, 1994, meeting about which you've testified;

5 correct?

6 A. I believe it was the 21st of February. It

7 was the one at the Wolf's Lair, that I recall.

8 Q. Well, reading from page 7 of your statement

9 -- I don't think there is any dispute about this; it's

10 page 2483 of the document we've been given. Relating

11 to the 7th of February, 1994, meeting, you said, "I met

12 Dario Kordic inside this building," which you've

13 referred to as the Wolf's Lair. "He was in a

14 camouflage uniform, although I do not remember seeing

15 any badges or rank insignia on his uniform. It was the

16 only time that I ever saw him in uniform." Does that

17 refresh your memory?

18 A. There was one incident; it was at the Wolf's

19 Lair. I thought it was the 21st, but it might have

20 been the 7th.

21 Q. At this time, the ABiH was still in control

22 of the portion of the main supply route just outside of

23 Santici; correct?

24 A. That's correct. The HVO resumed -- resumed

25 control of it sometime in late February, early March.

1 I don't remember the exact date.

2 Q. Turning to the February the 21st meeting

3 about which you've testified, the first comment made to

4 you in that meeting was that the Croatian Republic of

5 Herceg-Bosna had its own laws, just as did UNPROFOR;

6 and that comment was made to you by Mr. Kordic, was it

7 not?

8 A. I believe that's correct, yes.

9 Q. And Mr. Kordic said that notwithstanding his

10 assurance to you that convoys -- U.N.-sponsored convoys

11 should not be subject to physical inspections, that

12 would have to be approved by the central government of

13 the republic in Mostar; correct?

14 A. Correct. But he made the decision on the

15 spot, at the end of the meeting. He assumed the

16 responsibility himself, which is the appropriate

17 decision.

18 Q. And he specifically did so as a gesture of

19 goodwill, did he not?

20 A. Certainly that was the impact, yes.

21 Q. Did you or anyone of whom you know ever ask

22 Mr. Kordic what the limits on his political

23 decision-making powers were?

24 A. No, not specifically.

25 Q. All right. You gave some short testimony,

1 and I won't spend too long on this, about meetings that

2 you held with HVO commanders and HR-HB dignitaries on

3 February the 25th of 1994. That was a meeting with

4 Colonel Filip Filipovic; correct?

5 A. Right.

6 Q. And also present was General Ante Roso;

7 correct? Do you remember that?

8 A. Vaguely, yes.

9 Q. Were you aware that General Roso, unlike

10 Mr. Kordic, was actually a member of the government of

11 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna and that he also

12 sat on the presidency?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All right. Turning to the Washington

15 Agreement, this was negotiated in Washington, D.C., and

16 signed approximately March the 14th or so of 1994; is

17 that correct?

18 A. I believe it was March the 1st, but --

19 Q. March the 1st? I may be wrong.

20 A. Early March.

21 Q. Mr. Kordic was not a participant in any of

22 the negotiations on the Croat side, was he?

23 A. No.

24 Q. In fact, the Croat representative was an HVO

25 vice-president by the name of Kresimir Zubak, was it

1 not?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And he actually signed the Washington

4 Agreement on behalf of the Croat contingent; correct?

5 A. That's correct, and he subsequently assumed

6 responsibility as the president of the Federation.

7 Q. Yes. I have just one question in connection

8 with the burned-down fuel station at the village of

9 Divjak. That's a village that is to the south of

10 another village called Grbavica; correct?

11 A. I would say to the south and east, yes.

12 Q. Yes. Now, let me just conclude your

13 examination, if I can, just by going over some of the

14 opinions that we heard from you for the first time last

15 night and this morning. With respect to the asserted

16 rental of Bosnian Serb artillery and tanks, have you

17 ever seen any receipts for that, any documentation that

18 would support it?

19 A. No, not either directly or indirectly within

20 the U.N. These are reports that we had from both

21 Zagreb and internally.

22 Q. Suffice it to say, though, that neither you

23 nor anybody else of whom you are aware ever spoke to

24 any Croat commander who confirmed that; correct?

25 A. No one that I know directly, no.

1 Q. And the same is true with respect to Bosnian

2 Serb army commanders, too; no one has ever confirmed

3 that story to you, or anyone else that you know of.

4 Correct?

5 A. Not to me directly, no.

6 Q. All right. Were you aware -- just one

7 question about the president of the HR-HB: Were you

8 aware that the president, in addition to being the

9 commander in chief of the armed forces of the HVO, also

10 had the specific power to appoint and dismiss

11 high-ranking military holders of office?

12 A. It makes sense.

13 Q. With respect to the HV military police about

14 which you testified very briefly, you didn't see any of

15 these gentlemen yourself, did you?

16 A. The -- yes, I did, as a matter of fact. In

17 the -- in the store, the restaurant that was next to

18 the burned-out garage.

19 Q. How many of them did you see?

20 A. Five. Five, six.

21 Q. Did you ask them whether they were from

22 Croatia or from Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. I looked at their patches, and they were HV

24 patches with "Policija" under it.

25 Q. All right, but the question was: Did you

1 ever ask them, either yourself or through an

2 interpreter, where they came from?

3 A. No.

4 Q. Do you speak Croatian yourself?

5 A. No. I understand Serbo-Croat.

6 Q. The last question, sir, with respect to

7 Mr. Boban and his fortunes after the signature of the

8 Washington Agreement, let me put it to you that he was

9 actually one of 15 sector directors in the INA, and

10 that the actual director of the INA -- and I think you

11 know this -- was a gentleman by the name of

12 Dr. Gregoric; is that correct?

13 A. I'm sorry, I wasn't aware of that

14 specifically. I thought he was a director. But he was

15 on the board of INA. Okay.

16 Q. Thank you very much, sir. I have no further

17 questions.

18 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

19 JUDGE MAY: Two minutes.

20 MS. SOMERS: Your Honour, may I ask the Court

21 if tomorrow morning I could have ten minutes? Because

22 it'll go beyond two minutes.

23 JUDGE MAY: Really?

24 MS. SOMERS: Just to clean up, it would -- I

25 will keep it very focused, but I would ask just for ten

1 minutes in the morning.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Carter, can you come back

3 tomorrow? It'll be tomorrow afternoon, not tomorrow

4 morning.

5 THE WITNESS: That's fine, Judge.

6 MS. SOMERS: Thank you.

7 JUDGE MAY: No more than --

8 MS. SOMERS: Absolutely.

9 JUDGE MAY: -- a few minutes.

10 If you come back then, please, would you

11 remember during this adjournment not to speak to

12 anybody about your evidence, of course, and that

13 includes members of the Prosecution.

14 THE WITNESS: Very well, sir.

15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much.

16 Half past 2.00 tomorrow.

17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

18 1.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,

19 the 9th day of November, 1999, at

20 2.30 p.m.

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