1 Wednesday, 10th November, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 3.05 p.m.

5 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your

6 Honours. Case number IT-95-14/2-T, the Prosecutor

7 versus Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez.

8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, as I said, we

9 will sit this afternoon until sometime after half past

10 four. Have you made some arrangements for the witness

11 to come back?

12 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Quite,

13 Mr. President. We have agreed with the witness that

14 the 25th of November, in the morning, would be the date

15 which would be quite convenient for the witness.

16 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

17 WITNESS: ALASTAIR DUNCAN [Resumed]

18 Examined by Mr. Lopez-Terres:

19 Q. General Duncan, yesterday you finished

20 testifying about the missile which was fired at your

21 camp and the results of the investigation which Colonel

22 Blaskic talked about.

23 Less than a week after that fire, your

24 interpreter, Ms. Dobrila Kolaba, was killed; is that

25 so?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. It happened on the 5th of July, 1993; is that

3 so?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Could you get the results under which this

6 shot was fired by an isolated soldier of the HVO, which

7 resulted in the death of your interpreter?

8 A. That was my opinion, yes. That was my

9 opinion of the events at the time and the

10 responsibility for the person who did it.

11 Q. According to your opinion and the angle from

12 which the shot was fired, you established that that

13 shot was fired from a position which was held by the

14 HVO.

15 MR. SAYERS: May I just object at this

16 point --

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, this is in issue.

18 MR. SAYERS: This is in issue. Also, it's

19 not charged in the amended indictment. We've heard a

20 lot of evidence about this already from the person who

21 actually conducted the investigation into this

22 incident. I would submit that it's not relevant.

23 Similarly, there are two other subjects which fall into

24 the same category: the shooting of the UNHCR driver,

25 about which the Trial Chamber has already heard a lot

1 of evidence, and also the assault on Grbavica on

2 September the 8th, once again about which the Trial

3 Chamber has heard a lot of evidence.

4 None of these things are charged in the

5 amended indictment, and we would respectfully submit

6 that they are irrelevant.

7 JUDGE MAY: That may be, but if they are in

8 dispute, the Prosecution are entitled to adduce

9 evidence about it.

10 But, Mr. Lopez-Terres, you can do that fairly

11 briefly because we have heard evidence.

12 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation]

13 Q. What explanations were you given by Colonel

14 Blaskic regarding the person who fired the shot, about

15 the person who was responsible for it?

16 A. I had a number of explanations as to a

17 possibility, that it could be a Muslim who had moved

18 across from his side of the front lines to the south,

19 occupied the house temporarily, and shot the

20 interpreter from there. It was judged to be by a

21 person or persons unknown, who had then moved back, as

22 it were, to his own lines.

23 Q. The interpreter that we are talking about was

24 not a Muslim, was she?

25 A. No, she was not. She was Serbian by origin.

1 Q. Did you voice some hypothesis regarding the

2 reasons for which that particular shot was fired?

3 A. I think there were two reasons the shot was

4 fired to kill her: Firstly, because she had

5 accompanied Bob Stewart for most of his six-month tour

6 and, therefore, had been a party to many of the

7 conferences he had been to with both Croat and Muslim

8 forces; secondly, I think it was done deliberately to

9 upset me as a new commander in post, as a way of

10 perhaps expressing their resentment of some of my

11 actions in that area.

12 Q. On the 5th of July, at the time when Dobrila

13 Kolaba was killed, were there other people in the camp

14 who were fired at?

15 A. No, just the one shot was fired. She was

16 shot in the head and she died before she hit the

17 ground.

18 Q. The explanation which was given you that a

19 Muslim might have fired that shot, did that sound

20 plausible to you?

21 A. It didn't sound at all plausible, no.

22 Q. A little bit later, on the 14th of July,

23 1993, the driver of the UNHCR was killed as he was

24 driving his vehicle in Stari Vitez; do you remember

25 that incident?

1 A. Yes, I do. I think, if I recall it, his name

2 was Boris; he was driving an armoured UNHCR vehicle.

3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, you mentioned

4 the date of the 14th of July. I notice that the

5 summary refers to the 14th of August.

6 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Yes, the

7 14th of August. If I said the 14th of July, then it

8 was merely a slip of the tongue. The 14th of August.

9 JUDGE MAY: That's understandable in your

10 case.

11 MR. SAYERS: We would stipulate, Your

12 Honours, that it was the 14th of August of that year.

13 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] It is the

14 14th of August; there is no question about that.

15 Q. And what explanation were you given regarding

16 the origin of fire of the shot which killed that

17 driver?

18 A. The explanation I was given by the HVO forces

19 was that this shot had again been fired by person or

20 persons unknown, possibly a Muslim, deliberately at the

21 vehicle.

22 Q. That explanation, did that sound plausible to

23 you?

24 A. That explanation did not sound plausible, on

25 the basis that the UNHCR were trying, as I was, to get

1 aid into the Stari Vitez area, the pocket of Muslims

2 who were there. It is, therefore, unlikely that a

3 Muslim would have fired that shot, and, indeed, as far

4 as I was concerned, the shot had come from the

5 direction of the HVO lines around Stari Vitez.

6 Q. A little bit later, but during the same

7 period of time, you were notified about proper

8 orchestration of a thing by the HVO soldiers who were

9 loading ammunition into a vehicle belonging to the

10 UNHCR, and it was the HVO soldiers who spoke about

11 that?

12 A. Yes, that's correct. It was my understanding

13 that soldiers from my battalion had been stopped and

14 blocked whilst escorting a convoy, and at that stage

15 HVO soldiers had loaded ammunitions onto one of the

16 trucks. They then moved away from those vehicles,

17 started filming, and recorded the miraculous find of

18 arms and weapons on an UNHCR vehicle.

19 Q. And what was the purpose of this whole

20 performance?

21 A. I believe it was to make a propaganda film,

22 which they had obviously made to show to their people

23 that they couldn't trust both the U.N. and UNHCR, who

24 were clearly running, in their opinion, running weapons

25 and supplies through to Muslim forces in their area.

1 Q. In the course of August 1993, and notably on

2 the 19th of August, 1993, you had an opportunity of

3 talking to Colonel Blaskic, who voiced certain threats,

4 saying that he would blow up the ammunitions factory in

5 Vitez if Vitez was taken over by the Muslims; isn't

6 that so?

7 A. Yes, this is so. Commander Tihomir Blaskic

8 briefed me in some detail as to the results of an

9 explosion in the factory, saying that it contained

10 poisonous gases and liquids, and that the result would

11 be almost probably the destruction of the entire Lasva

12 Valley, an area some 60 kilometres by 100 kilometres

13 long, which would be affected for some time. It would

14 be a huge explosion, resulting in a massive loss of

15 life.

16 Q. Did you take this threat as a form of

17 blackmail?

18 A. I took it as a direct threat against both my

19 own forces and UNHCR. And it was being held, therefore

20 -- he was intending to hold me responsible should he

21 have to blow things up. And therefore I did regard it

22 quite clearly as a blackmailing threat.

23 Q. General Duncan, I should like to show you a

24 report of your regiment of the 17th of August, which is

25 Z1172, of the 17th of August.

1 Will you please look at passage 4 on the

2 document and tell us if this report bears on the threat

3 that you have just told us about?

4 A. Yes, it does. It refers to it, that Blaskic

5 mentioned he had a considerable amount of explosive and

6 available in the factory.

7 Q. And saying that he had 100 kilograms of

8 explosives for every Muslim soldier, was that the

9 wording that was used by Colonel Blaskic?

10 A. I believe so, yes. It's to certainly

11 amplify, make entirely clear the amount of explosives

12 he had in the factory.

13 Q. Thank you. On the 4th of September, 1993,

14 Colonel Blaskic came to the camp of your regiment and

15 conveyed to you a message from Dario Kordic. Do you

16 remember that message?

17 A. Yes. It was on the 4th of September. He

18 came to my camp and we talked about a number of

19 matters, the matters we always talked of. But the

20 prime purpose of his visit on the 4th of September was

21 to give me a message from Dario Kordic, that there

22 would be no more exchanges of wounded out of the Vitez

23 pocket.

24 This exchange of wounded had been by mutual

25 agreement between the BiH and the HVO, but the message

1 from Kordic relayed by Blaskic was that all

2 arrangements were now finished, and there would be no

3 agreement of the evacuation of any more of the HVO or

4 the BiH out of combat areas.

5 Q. When you spoke about the wounded, were there

6 also civilians amongst them, or only military wounded?

7 A. There were in the hospital at times children,

8 women, people with mental problems, and people with

9 both wounds from the war and serious illnesses, such as

10 cancer. None were to be moved from then onwards.

11 Q. So there were two categories of wounded there

12 to be covered by this exchange; it was two categories

13 of wounded?

14 A. As I understand it, it was all wounded.

15 There was no differentiation at all. I had been

16 personally around that hospital and seen all those

17 wounded people, and so I was well aware that there were

18 women and children and other people in that hospital.

19 Q. And that message which was brought to you by

20 Colonel Blaskic from Dario Kordic, in what form was it

21 done? Was it merely verbally or was it in writing?

22 A. It was in writing. It was a written message.

23 Q. And Colonel Blaskic read that message out to

24 you, did he?

25 A. Yes, exactly. He read the message out to

1 me. I do not have and was not given a copy of the

2 message.

3 Q. And in the following days, you left the area

4 of Vitez, and it was during that period of time that

5 Grbavica was attacked. I am not asking you about the

6 details of that attack, just a comment regarding the

7 nature of destruction inflicted on the area of Grbavica

8 during that attack.

9 A. The attack on Grbavica took place two days

10 after I had left for two weeks' military leave as part

11 of my seven-month, eight-month tour in Central Bosnia.

12 The attack involved the massive destruction of property

13 on the top of that hill where the Grbavica was based,

14 in my opinion, totally above and beyond what was

15 required to secure that hill by military means.

16 I had no problem with the concept of that

17 hill being secured. It was a clear military

18 objective. But I believe the way in which it was

19 secured showed excessive use of violence against the

20 local population.

21 Q. Did you also observe that in other villages

22 which you visited?

23 A. At times, yes, there was also destruction on

24 other villages. The level of destruction would

25 normally result in -- as a result of prolonged battles

1 over an area which had become fixed and static front

2 line, because both sides will be shelling each other or

3 mortaring each other for some time. But in this case

4 what was significant about Grbavica was the level of

5 destruction done in such a short time.

6 Q. And as regards other villages that you saw

7 the large-scale destruction, was it always justified by

8 military objectives?

9 A. Not always, no.

10 Q. And at that time how did you interpret the

11 justification, the explanation of that scale of

12 destruction?

13 A. I think the destruction was done to ensure

14 that no one who ever lived or had lived in that village

15 could ever return, because of the wholesale

16 destruction. It would have required a complete rebuild

17 of the area to get it back to anything -- like, it was

18 a complete flattening and raising, if you like, of the

19 ground.

20 Q. You therefore confirmed that on the 22nd of

21 September, 1993 you talked to the liaison officer,

22 Colonel Blaskic, called Darko Gelic [Realtime

23 transcript read in error "Kraljevic"] regarding the

24 threats to two officers that we spoke about yesterday,

25 that is, Lee Whitworth and Mark Bower, in relation to

1 that attack?

2 A. Yes. He came to tell me, not for the first

3 time, that my two liaison officers, Bower and

4 Whitworth, were being threatened by HVO forces. The

5 normal wording was along the lines of we could no

6 longer -- we, the HVO, could no longer guarantee their

7 security as they move around and about. My reply was

8 the normal reply, which was this was totally

9 unacceptable, on the basis that I had threats, similar

10 threats issued against myself, that no one could -- no

11 one would be responsible should HVO soldiers decide to

12 have a go, as it were, at me and my officers. It's

13 irritating and I thought a rather foolish way of doing

14 business.

15 I should perhaps add that my normal response

16 for such threats was to drive straight down to the

17 Hotel Vitez and speak with Colonel Blaskic about them,

18 firstly, because it embarrassed him enormously, but it

19 also normally sorted out the problem as soon as

20 possible.

21 Q. Just a detail for the transcript. It says

22 Darko Kraljevic is the name of the liaison officer.

23 Evidently, that is not Darko Kraljevic, but Darko

24 Gelic.

25 On the 27th of September, 1993, General, you

1 again went to the cottage, to the summer cottage that

2 you spoke about yesterday, to talk to Dario Kordic

3 about the problem, about a certain problem, that is,

4 the blockade of Stari Vitez. Do you remember that

5 meeting?

6 A. Yes, I do. The purpose of the meeting was,

7 firstly, to take my successor, who is a

8 Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Williams, to meet Dario

9 Kordic. And secondly, as of that moment I believed

10 that Tihomir Blaskic was away and not in the Vitez

11 pocket. I wanted to discuss some matters between us.

12 Those matters were to do with freedom of

13 movement, which he assured me personally that we now

14 had freedom of movement throughout the area; that is,

15 freedom of movement for U.N. vehicles and UNHCR

16 vehicles. But that he did confirm most strongly that

17 further access to the pocket of Stari Vitez would be

18 denied for as long as the forces of the

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina army, the BiH, continued attacking

20 the Vitez pocket.

21 Q. And was that announced by the person

22 responsible for civilian affairs in your camp? And I

23 believe it was two days after your discussion with

24 Dario Kordic, wasn't it?

25 A. I think it was issued two days before my

1 discussion, and that's the reason I went to speak to

2 Dario Kordic about it.

3 Q. I should now like to show you a document,

4 which seems to be related to what we're talking about.

5 It is the document 1213, and it was already produced

6 during the testimony of another witness.

7 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Could we

8 have the document on the ELMO, please.

9 Q. Will you please look at the penultimate

10 paragraph and tell us whether it refers to that

11 discussion about the U.N. civilian officer.

12 A. Yes, that confirms what I just said. This

13 was two days before, where my civil defence officer,

14 Mr. Randy Rhodes, who is a citizen of the United

15 States, who worked for some months with me in the

16 British Battalion area, had met with Dario Kordic, as

17 it says, and the denial of access to Stari Vitez was

18 going to continue until the BiH ceased their current

19 attacks.

20 Q. Thank you. During October 1993, another

21 humanitarian aid convoy was to pass through your area

22 of responsibility, and you decided at that time, I

23 believe, to reroute this convoy, to make it take

24 another route rather than the one which had been

25 envisaged.

1 A. Yes, that's correct. This, I believe, was in

2 the middle of October, round about the 16th or 17th. I

3 should make it clear: This convoy was not a U.N. or

4 UNHCR convoy; it was a convoy similar to the previous

5 Muslim convoy that wished to come up through the Vitez

6 pocket and on to the north, to the Tuzla area.

7 I had decided that it would be foolish to

8 again risk this convoy coming through the Vitez pocket,

9 and therefore I made arrangements for it to move round

10 through the Travnik area, and those arrangements were

11 made with the BiH. It would move off to the west,

12 around to the Travnik area.

13 I did not tell the HVO commanders about these

14 arrangements that I'd made to divert the convoy, in the

15 event the convoy was diverted and got through

16 successfully, but at the same time, my liaison officers

17 reported to me that there were a number of HVO soldiers

18 which had formed an ambush position on the entry point

19 to the Vitez pocket, which was the road that ran from

20 Gornji Vakuf up through.

21 The only people that were aware of this

22 convoy coming were myself and the senior commanders,

23 who were aware of the convoy's arrival -- that is, the

24 senior HVO commanders, who were aware of the convoy's

25 arrival; timings, roughly, but no details of routes.

1 The assumption was that we were going to use the same

2 route as we'd used last time; that's up from Gornji

3 Vakuf, Novi Travnik, through Vitez, and then up and

4 away to Zenica.

5 I should add that I spoke briefly, in a

6 heated discussion, with Tihomir Blaskic after the

7 convoy had been rerouted. When he asked me why I had

8 not sent it along the valley, as he assumed it would go

9 along that way, I replied, fairly bluntly, words to the

10 effect that his track record stank.

11 Q. To go a little bit ^back?, concerning your

12 meeting with Dario Kordic in Busovaca on the 27th of

13 September, do you perhaps recall, how did Dario Kordic

14 behave that day? What was his conduct? Was he in a

15 particular mood? Did you notice anything in

16 particular?

17 A. Not particularly. He was in a fairly

18 cheerful mood, I think, at that stage. He was very

19 pleased to be introduced to my successor, which I had

20 done out of politeness. But he seemed entirely happy

21 to take decisions and front up, as it were, for these

22 important decisions regarding freedom of movement and

23 blocking the route into Stari Vitez. Very calm, very

24 much in command, I would say.

25 Q. Did he perhaps explain why he was assuring

1 you that the convoy could move freely, whilst two days

2 before that, he said something completely different to

3 Randy Rhodes?

4 A. I'm not sure. He obviously had a change of

5 heart and realised that if we blocked all convoys, then

6 no aid would get through to his own people either;

7 therefore, he was, if you like, cutting off his nose to

8 spite his face, and it would be better to allow all

9 convoys through.

10 Q. Let us go back now to the second Convoy of

11 Joy that you already told us. On the 16th or 17th of

12 October, you told us that there were soldiers setting

13 up a kind of an ambush on the route which the convoy

14 was supposed to take. Do you know where, and how did

15 you learn that it was Zarko Andric, nicknamed Zuti, who

16 was there awaiting the convoy?

17 A. I learned this from my liaison officers, who,

18 you will remember, are a team that worked very closely

19 for me, reporting back directly, and my liaison officer

20 from that area reported that it was Zuti. I do not

21 know his other name and I have never met Zuti, save

22 that he was reported as the commander of the troops

23 that had formed that ambush, and the ambush was facing

24 across the road on the way that these trucks would

25 obviously have to come up, should they come up.

1 Q. What reputation did Zuti enjoy? Very

2 briefly, please.

3 A. He was a black marketeer, I believe. He was

4 racketeering. He was using the war for his own

5 personal ends. He had, on occasion, it was reported to

6 me, met Muslims at the interface between the two

7 forces, the HVO and the BiH, outside my camp in Vitez.

8 Not a very rosy picture. Responsible for hijacking

9 vehicles and running a gangster organisation.

10 Q. He was a former policeman, I believe.

11 A. I believe so, yes. He was a former

12 policeman, I believe.

13 Q. Have you ever met this gentleman, Zarko

14 Andric?

15 A. Never.

16 Q. General Duncan, I should now like to show

17 you, because we're talking about that individual, to

18 show you briefly some comments which this person made

19 to a journal, Globus. This was an interview, and there

20 he made some comments about you. This is document

21 2784.

22 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, if I may, I'm

23 going to object to this. Apparently, it's a newspaper

24 article published after the beginning of this case, in

25 Globus, which I believe is a Croatian newspaper. It

1 concerns interviews and hearsay upon hearsay upon

2 hearsay. It has no reliability whatsoever, and I don't

3 think that it's helpful to the Trial Chamber in

4 addressing issues that occurred in 1992 and 1994 when

5 it was published last year.

6 JUDGE MAY: It makes scurrilous allegations

7 against the witness.

8 MR. SAYERS: Yes.

9 JUDGE MAY: You don't rely on those

10 allegations, I take it.

11 MR. SAYERS: Absolutely not, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE MAY: Well, Mr. Lopez-Terres, does it

13 take us any further?

14 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I merely

15 wanted the Chamber to hear which were these comments,

16 the observations which are made on his account by this

17 man, Zuti, and the witness just told us that he had

18 never met that person. It merely shows the credibility

19 of the testimony.

20 JUDGE MAY: Zuti is not a witness. We've

21 heard some other evidence about him, I think. I don't

22 think it's going to take us any further to read about

23 his sort of comments here. As I say,

24 they're scurrilous and nobody is going to rely on

25 them. So I don't think we're assisted by that.

1 If you would like to move on now and let's

2 see if we can finish this examination.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] To

4 conclude, that person accused General Duncan of very

5 serious crimes, and I merely wanted to hear what

6 General Duncan would want to tell us as regards these

7 allegations; nothing else.

8 Q. But, General Duncan, during your activities

9 there, while you were in command in that region, did

10 you have an opportunity to personally note the presence

11 of soldiers, of the troops of the Republic of Croatia,

12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

13 A. Yes. There were a number of reports from my

14 soldiers who regularly passed along the road which we'd

15 cut from an area south of Gornji Vakuf, right down to

16 the south, to Tomislavgrad, of HV soldiers moving on

17 that route, not frequently but from time to time.

18 Although I can't remember the date exactly, I

19 can remember returning from Tomislavgrad on one

20 particular day and seeing a D-32 howitzer, a truck with

21 HV markings, and, as I remember it, two soldiers with

22 HV flashes on their shoulders. This artillery was

23 used, I believe, to engage the Muslim forces in the

24 Gornji Vakuf area, and the sightings were below the

25 lakes -- I saw them below the lakes in the Prozor

1 area. I only personally saw them once, but I did have

2 reports from my subordinates.

3 In addition, it was a standard task for

4 anyone moving between Vitez and the south to watch out

5 for anything they saw -- civilians, HVO, HV, or any

6 military activity -- along the routes they travelled.

7 Q. My last question. You already spoke about

8 this yesterday. Could you indicate to the Court, could

9 you tell the Court about the conclusions that you

10 arrived at at the end of your term in that area

11 regarding the authority of the HDZ political

12 authorities and the HVO authority?

13 MR. SAYERS: I object to that as beyond the

14 stated expertise -- the military expertise of this

15 witness, Mr. President. I believe he has already given

16 several opinions in this vein, and I think that any

17 such opinions would simply be speculation and surmise

18 on the part of the witness.

19 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I merely

20 wanted to hear the conclusions that the witness arrived

21 at. This is a witness who is fully entitled to arrive

22 at some conclusions, whatever their worth.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE MAY: We will admit the evidence on

25 this basis, that the witness was present and observing

1 and, therefore, was in a position to form a view about

2 these matters, but we will be grateful if it could be

3 dealt with briefly.

4 A. Sir, thank you. I will be brief, as

5 directed.

6 I think during the time I was there, I could

7 sum events up by saying that a couple days after my

8 arrival, I was visited by the senior or one of the

9 senior HDZ officers, that is, Valenta, and briefed in

10 detail, and I have already explained that briefing,

11 what it covers, and therefore there's no point in

12 repeating it, save to say that I thought he had

13 expounded the feelings -- the political will of the HVO

14 in that area and the HDZ in that area.

15 After that I saw a number of events that I believe

16 put that well into effect, and, if you like, Ahmici was

17 the trigger before my arrival, in that this hatred of

18 the Muslims and a requirement to clear them away,

19 assisted by the JNA, as expounded by Valenta, was put

20 into effect by the team of three people: that is,

21 Valenta, with the doctrine and concepts; Kordic, who

22 had the political control of the people; and Tihomir

23 Blaskic, who actually owned most of the forces, the

24 instrument. And during my time there, those three

25 elements combined the team.

1 I noted that Kordic had considerable

2 influence and power, and we have already recorded and

3 talked about those occasions where he was able to take

4 swift, decisive action in the area and also laid down

5 policy within the Vitez pocket.

6 In summary, then, the team was working

7 together to an organised programme with a clear aim. I

8 also noted it was unusual for politicians to be so

9 closely allied to the military; to have an office in a

10 military headquarters and to be based in there is, in

11 my experience, very unusual. There was clearly a tight

12 control over the organisation.

13 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] I have no

14 further questions, Mr. President.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

16 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Good afternoon,

18 Brigadier. Sir, my name is Steve Sayers. Together

19 with my colleague, Mitko Naumovski, we represent Dario

20 Kordic. These gentlemen to my right, Mr. Kovacic and

21 Mr. Mikulicic, they represent the other accused, Mario

22 Cerkez.

23 Now, General, or Brigadier, rather, you are

24 not contending, I believe, that Mr. Kordic controlled

25 the military police, are you?

1 A. I would contend that Mr. Kordic controlled

2 the military police as and when it was required, yes.

3 Q. You actually do draw a distinction between

4 the civilian police and the military police, don't

5 you?

6 A. Yes, I do. They are two different entities.

7 Q. And you remember covering precisely that

8 point in the Blaskic case about one and a half years

9 ago, and expressing the opinion that while it was your

10 view that Mr. Kordic had some influence over the local

11 police, you stressed that he had no influence over the

12 military police?

13 A. As I recall, I made that statement to a

14 Mr. Hayman, who was investigating and defending the

15 Tihomir Blaskic. And I made that statement, I think,

16 in April 1996, if my memory serves me right.

17 Q. All right. Well --

18 A. And in the light -- at that stage I had not

19 reflected on any events between 1993, when I left

20 Central Bosnia, and that time. Since then I have had

21 time to look at my diaries and reflect more on events.

22 Q. All right. Well, let's take a look at the

23 statement that you made to the Prosecutors, including

24 Mr. Gregory Kehoe. I take it you remember meeting with

25 him in December of 1996?

1 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

2 Q. And you were interviewed --

3 THE INTERPRETER: Will the counsel please

4 make a pause between question and answer, for the sake

5 of interpreters.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Sayers, you are being

7 asked to observe a pause between question and answer,

8 and the same goes for the witness.

9 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. Yes, I'll slow

10 down.

11 JUDGE MAY: Also, I think if you are going to

12 cross-examine the witness about his statement in

13 detail, he should have a copy of it.

14 MR. SAYERS: I agree entirely, Mr. President,

15 and we have a copy here.

16 Q. I wonder if you would turn to page 3. And

17 the large paragraph in the page actually describes the

18 Convoy of Joy incident upon which --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could one copy, please, be

20 placed on the ELMO, because the interpreters do not

21 have this statement. Could it be placed on the ELMO,

22 please?

23 A. I have just been interrupted by the

24 interpreters.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could a copy be placed on

1 the ELMO, because the interpreters do not have copies

2 of this statement.

3 MR. SAYERS: I wonder if we could put a copy

4 of this on the ELMO, page 3.

5 Q. Specifically, I'd like to draw your attention

6 to the passage towards the bottom of the page, which

7 begins with the sentence:

8 "During this incident it became clear to me

9 that it was Kordic who was controlling the actions of

10 the local police and the civilians."

11 Do you see that?

12 A. I am sorry, I've --

13 JUDGE MAY: Where is this, please? Where are

14 you reading from?

15 MR. SAYERS: One inch up from the bottom of

16 the second paragraph on the page, Your Honour.

17 A. I have it here. Yes, thank you.

18 JUDGE MAY: I don't have it. Page 3. Yes.

19 Right. We have it.

20 MR. SAYERS:

21 Q. Now, sir, you were asked this question by

22 Mr. Hayman in the Blaskic case on June the 3rd, 1998,

23 at page 9142. The question was:

24 "Is it also correct that during this

25 incident it became clear to me that it was Kordic, it

1 was Kordic who was controlling the actions of the local

2 police and the civilians who were both blocking the

3 roads and looting the convoy? Is that also true?"

4 And your answer to that question, I believe,

5 sir, was:

6 "That is true, yes, but I would stress it was

7 the local civilian police and not local military

8 police. It's as it says in my transcript."

9 Do you remember that exchange?

10 A. Yes, I do. Yes.

11 Q. And, in fact, you also went on to say that it

12 was your view that in your -- in the Convoy of Joy

13 incident, it was Mr. Kordic who commanded, if you like,

14 the people, and it was Colonel Blaskic who commanded

15 all of the HVO forces in that area, including the

16 military police, or should; isn't that correct?

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. Now, other than this single incident, are you

19 aware of any other facts which established the

20 existence or nature of Mr. Kordic's asserted control

21 over the local police, sir?

22 A. Yes, in that for the Convoy of Joy, as we

23 called it, when the word came to release the trucks and

24 move them off, this was affected speedily, and both

25 civilian and military police at that stage allowed

1 things to happen within the hour.

2 Q. Other than the Convoy of Joy incident, any

3 other facts, not opinions, that establish the existence

4 or the nature of Mr. Kordic's asserted control over the

5 local civilian police?

6 A. Yes, in that he had assured me, I think on

7 the -- we referred to it before on the 27th of

8 September, when I took Colonel Williams to see him,

9 that U.N. vehicles would have free access, freedom of

10 routes. That involved those civilian police who were

11 on roadblocks and military police. I mean, in order to

12 let us go through, everyone who was manning roadblocks

13 within the area would have to know that we were okay to

14 go through. And he said that was going to happen.

15 And he also denied us access to Stari Vitez,

16 and that would involve preventing us getting through by

17 some person or persons standing on a road.

18 Q. Is that the sum total of the facts upon which

19 you rely for that opinion that you articulated?

20 A. I think that's a fairly major commandability,

21 if you like, to allow freedom of movement for a large

22 area of all U.N. vehicles at his say.

23 Q. As I understand it, you met Mr. Kordic on a

24 grand total of five occasions, the first, I think you

25 testified, on May the 9th?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Two days before you formally took up your

3 duties as commanding officer of the Prince of Wales Own

4 Regiment of Yorkshire; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And correct me if I'm wrong: The second

7 incident, the second meeting, was on May the 19th?

8 Yes?

9 A. Yes. I mean, I wouldn't contest that it's

10 probably about five times that we met face to face.

11 Q. Right. Just so that the record is clear, the

12 third meeting was on June the 11th and the Convoy of

13 Joy incident, as you described; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. On September the 27th, about three or four

16 months later, then you met Mr. Kordic in the Busovaca

17 region; correct?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And finally, you had a farewell dinner with

20 him on November the 6th?

21 A. 6th of October. Yes, that's correct.

22 Q. 6th of November?

23 A. I'm sorry.

24 Q. Did you ever ask Mr. Kordic whether he had

25 control over the military police or the civilian

1 police?

2 A. No, I had no particular reason to ask him.

3 If I may, I could refer back to the --

4 Q. A very simple question, sir. It's a yes or a

5 no.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer it.

7 A. It's quite clear. I'd established a command

8 system within that area where I relied specifically

9 upon my liaison officers to give me information. And

10 as a military man, my military focus in who I talked to

11 was to Tihomir Blaskic as a military man. So we didn't

12 have duplication.

13 You will be aware also, I had a civil affairs

14 officer, Mr. Randy Rhodes, and I was delighted to see

15 him arrive, because he could deal with the civil

16 matters, which he did, with the Mayor and Valenta and

17 others.

18 So the fact that I only saw Mr. Kordic --

19 yes, Mr. Kordic, on a number of occasions, is not

20 unusual, in my opinion.

21 Q. Let me just wait for the interpreters. A

22 point though, and I think you agreed with this: You

23 never yourself ever asked him whether he had any

24 control over either the civilian or the military

25 police, did you?

1 A. No. But, sir -- Your Honour, am I allowed to

2 amplify slightly?

3 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

4 A. He never asked me if I had any control over

5 my forces either. It's something -- it was taken for

6 granted. He knew my position, I knew his position.

7 MR. SAYERS:

8 Q. Did you ever ask Colonel Blaskic whether

9 Mr. Kordic had any control over the military police?

10 You didn't, did you?

11 A. No, sir, I didn't.

12 Q. And you didn't ask anyone else in the HVO,

13 either in the military or in the civilian government,

14 did you, that particular question?

15 A. I asked no one -- I personally asked no one

16 in the HVO. As I already testified, I had asked my

17 officers, liaison officers, company commanders and

18 patrols to find out the structure of the HVO and the

19 command arrangements.

20 Q. Yes, Brigadier, I think we all understood

21 that testimony. And I gather, from your opinion, then,

22 that it's your view that the liaison officers charged

23 with the task of conducting those inquiries would have

24 been in the best position to make the determination of

25 the control that Mr. Kordic had or did not have over

1 the local police force; correct?

2 A. Yes. They were best placed within their

3 areas to judge that, but I perhaps was the only person

4 placed to judge the totality of what my ten liaison

5 officers were doing. Now, I think that's important.

6 Q. And the liaison officer most particularly

7 charged with discovery of that information, I think,

8 was Captain or then-Captain Lee Whitworth?

9 A. All my liaison officers were charged with

10 that, because there were HVO police over the entire

11 area, within the Vitez pocket, within Busovaca, down at

12 Kiseljak, and certainly in Travnik within the early

13 days. So it was a combined responsibility to find out

14 what was going on.

15 Q. All right. Let me turn, if I may, to one

16 other subject, the first meeting that you had on May

17 the 9th of 1993 with Mr. Kordic. I believe that you

18 had actually been taken by Colonel Stewart to see

19 Colonel Blaskic on that day; correct?

20 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

21 Q. Was this the first and only meeting that you

22 had had with Colonel Blaskic in the presence of

23 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart?

24 A. Yes, sir, this was -- one of the purposes of

25 this meeting was for me to be introduced to Blaskic.

1 Q. Did you make any notes or contemporaneous

2 memoranda regarding this particular meeting?

3 A. Not at that stage. I made some notes in my

4 personal diary later on, when I reconstructed it, but

5 at the time I was not, as it were, in the driving

6 seat. It was a meeting that Colonel Stewart had

7 arranged with Commander Blaskic. I was there because

8 it was very early days, merely to get a feel for what

9 was going on, to listen to the discussion, and to meet

10 the various personalities.

11 Q. Did you see any reference in a milinfosum to

12 this conversation, sir?

13 A. I would have at that stage been reading the

14 milinfosums, I am sure; in fact, it would be unusual if

15 it wasn't recorded in a milinfosum. But I couldn't

16 recall the detail of the milinfosum. I know that we

17 discussed primarily the matters surrounding Ahmici, as

18 that was utmost in Colonel Stewart's mind at the

19 moment, and I believed we had representatives from the

20 ICRC there as well, and we discussed the problem of

21 prisoners, which was a problem at that stage.

22 Q. Do you have a clear memory of Colonel Blaskic

23 explaining to you the three theories about which you've

24 testified on direct examination, or is it only a vague

25 recollection, sir?

1 A. That is a very clear memory.

2 Q. Let me put it to you, sir, that actually you

3 and Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart discussed, prior to

4 going to this meeting, what Colonel Stewart was going

5 to say, and just for the elucidation of the

6 Prosecution, I am referring to the testimony of

7 Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart in the Blaskic case in open

8 session, pages 23810, 23811 and 23812.

9 Let me put it to you, sir, that the decision

10 was made to confront Colonel Blaskic and actually find

11 out who was in command of the HVO forces, and indeed

12 that's exactly what happened; isn't that true?

13 A. We conferred before the meeting, if you say

14 conferred; we talked briefly about how to handle the

15 meeting. And I've already described how Colonel

16 Stewart was clearly going to take the lead and I would

17 sit in the back seat. He was certainly going to ask

18 some penetrating questions about Ahmici, yes.

19 Q. He actually stated to -- he challenged

20 Colonel Tihomir Blaskic on the matter of who was in

21 command, who was responsible for the soldiers of the

22 HVO, and Colonel Blaskic actually confirmed before both

23 of you that he was the Commander; isn't that correct?

24 A. That's correct. I mean, I don't have the

25 benefit of this transcript, obviously, but that's

1 correct.

2 Q. Let me put it to you also, sir, that there

3 was not actually any discussion of the three theories

4 -- the Serbs, the Muslims themselves, or Muslims

5 dressed as a HVO -- at that time; in fact, Colonel

6 Blaskic never articulated that view to you. Would you

7 agree with that?

8 A. My recollection is that he did it, and he did

9 it at that meeting.

10 Q. Let me just read you a very brief exchange on

11 page 23812 of Lieutenant-Colonel's testimony. He is

12 being asked about page 310 of the book that he wrote,

13 "Broken Lives," and this question is asked:

14 "You recounted a meeting with Dario Kordic

15 in which Mr. Kordic had suggested that the

16 Serbs had been responsible for Ahmici? Do

17 you recall that?

18 Answer: I do.

19 Question: I take it you find that an

20 incredible explanation?

21 Answer: Well, yes, I just -- I remember

22 laughing myself sick.

23 Question: Would you agree that Colonel

24 Blaskic never made such an explanation to you

25 for Ahmici?

1 Answer: I would definitely agree that

2 Colonel Blaskic never made such a statement

3 to me, that the Serbs were responsible for

4 that action, which, of course, goes to show

5 you, you know, that Kordic was not a

6 soldier."

7 JUDGE MAY: Well, what you are putting, you

8 know, is simply the evidence of another trial, of

9 another witness. This witness can only give his own

10 evidence. I'm not sure that we are really assisted.

11 Colonel -- I'm sorry, Brigadier, does this

12 make you change your mind in any way? I'm not sure of

13 the point of the question.

14 A. Sir, I've tried to relate the facts as I

15 remember them.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 A. And the fact that Bob Stewart's -- Colonel

18 Bob Stewart has gone on the record and said that, I

19 mean, I can't dispute that he said that. It is at odds

20 with what I thought was said.

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I mean, why we are here is

22 to hear your evidence, not to hear what somebody else

23 said about it.

24 And Mr. Sayers, if you want to challenge the

25 evidence in this way, putting it to this witness, of

1 course, doesn't do that. You'll have to call the

2 witness.

3 Now, I don't think we are going to get much

4 further with that.

5 MR. SAYERS: I am inclined to agree,

6 Mr. President. I don't think we will, in view of the

7 witness's testimony. But let's leave it at that.

8 Q. In connection with the briefing that you

9 received from Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart regarding the

10 situation, the political and military situation, isn't

11 it true that Colonel Stewart told you that Colonel

12 Blaskic was, in his opinion, the real commander of the

13 HVO in Central Bosnia, that he never thought that

14 Kordic was the commander and never referred to Kordic

15 as the commander or anyone else?

16 A. Colonel Stewart briefed me on the orbat,

17 similar to the one we discussed. He certainly

18 mentioned that Blaskic was the op zone commander, the

19 commander of the HVO in the area, but I believe he was

20 talking about the HVO military and that he was the

21 military man responsible for the Vitez area. I'm aware

22 that the HVO is more than military, though.

23 Q. Isn't it also true that he instructed you

24 that whenever Colonel Blaskic said something, it

25 happened lower down, and that he, therefore, felt that

1 it was reasonable to assume that Colonel Blaskic had

2 effective command and control over his forces in the

3 Vitez-Busovaca pocket?

4 A. That is very reasonable to assume. I can't

5 imagine that Colonel Stewart would have gone on talking

6 to Blaskic throughout his entire time, and certainly I

7 would have not talked to Blaskic in my time if I

8 thought that he didn't have an influence and effect and

9 an efficient command train, which he had, and that is

10 witnessed by the excellent defence by the Bosnian Croat

11 forces of that Vitez pocket. You would have to have a

12 very efficient, well-organised command chain to do

13 that.

14 Q. Did you know that Colonel Stewart had

15 actually never met Mr. Anto Valenta before the day that

16 you and he went to go to see this gentleman?

17 A. I think that's true, yes. I think he

18 mentioned to me that -- he commented it was unusual

19 when Valenta had asked me to go up see him on, I think,

20 the 12th, if my memory serves me right, because he had

21 never seen Valenta himself.

22 Q. Let me just ask you a few preliminary

23 questions relating to the May the 19th meeting in

24 Busovaca.

25 This was the second meeting that you'd had

1 with Mr. Kordic, and I believe that you had been

2 invited by him to lunch, together with a gathering of

3 local politicians and soldiers, as well as you and

4 Lieutenant-Colonel Schipper; correct?

5 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

6 Q. It was on this occasion that you invented the

7 name for the mountain lodge as the Eagle's Nest, I

8 think was your testimony?

9 A. Yes, that's also correct.

10 Q. And you made that choice of name deliberately

11 and consciously, did you not, for the images that it

12 evoked?

13 A. Yes, sir, I did.

14 Q. So it would be fair to say that eight days

15 into your tour, you had branded the Croats as Nazis;

16 correct?

17 A. No, that wouldn't be correct. Eight days

18 into my tour, I had been part of and witnessed the

19 shovelling of charred bodies into plastic bags; I had

20 seen scenes of destructions, people being killed; I had

21 heard from the milinfosums what was going on. With

22 that background, and with a very vicious war going on,

23 where, I would admit, atrocities appeared to be

24 committed by both sides, when you are then taken for

25 lunch to a hunting lodge in a wooded area, a

1 mountainous wooded area of one of the most beautiful

2 parts of that country, there was a stark flashback in

3 my mind, and I'm sorry if that's a product of my

4 education and my upbringing, but I made

5 this juxtaposition. It was a reaction. I'm not making

6 an excuse for that reaction, but I'm saying that it was

7 my honest reaction at the time.

8 Q. Let me turn to Exhibit Z2653, which was the

9 orbat you were shown, or one of the orbats.

10 MR. SAYERS: I wonder whether the usher would

11 get a copy of Z2535,1, which is an earlier version of

12 this orbat.

13 Q. I don't think it is in those package of

14 materials that you have in front of you. It was

15 earlier admitted. It's Z2535,1.

16 Taking a look at Exhibit Z2535,1, Brigadier,

17 this was an orbat, or an order of battle, prepared by

18 your military information officer, Captain Simon

19 Harrison; correct?

20 A. Yes, sir, that's correct.

21 Q. And it shows the operations zone for Central

22 Bosnia, Vitez/Travnik, reporting to the HVO command in

23 Mostar, doesn't it?

24 A. Yes, sir. That's at the top of the page.

25 That's correct.

1 Q. Who was the chief of the general staff to

2 whom Colonel Blaskic reported, sir? That was General

3 Milivoj Petkovic, was it not?

4 A. It was Petkovic, yes, whom I'd met on a

5 number of occasions.

6 Q. And the offices of the general staff of the

7 HVO were actually located in Mostar, were they not?

8 A. Yes, sir, I believe so.

9 Q. You are not suggesting, sir, that the dotted

10 line that connects the political wing, HDZ, and the --

11 well, we'll confine our attention to that for the time

12 being. You're not suggesting that that dotted line

13 indicates any kind of a command relationship with the

14 HVO military forces, or that the HVO was under the

15 command of the HDZ/BiH, are you?

16 A. I am. That dotted line implies entirely that

17 there is a relationship between the two. The dotted

18 line is, as it says, the political wing of the HDZ and

19 the op zone, and the reason for that is because --

20 well, firstly, their offices were in the same building,

21 in Vitez town, and we believed that there was unusual

22 political direction on the operations of the HVO

23 forces.

24 I think you'll note, and if my memory serves

25 me right, if you looked at the similar level of command

1 in the BiH army, we did not show a similar political

2 structure in that place because we did not believe

3 there was the same relationship between the politics

4 and the military in the BiH as there was in the HVO.

5 There was a different relationship.

6 Q. Do you remember being asked to explain the

7 significance of that dotted line one and a half years

8 ago in the Blaskic case, sir?

9 A. I can't recall my exact words. You probably

10 have them there.

11 Q. Yes. Page 9045 to 9046 of the Blaskic

12 transcript. The question was for you to explain the

13 significance of the line, "... the one without the Xs

14 first ..." in other words, the dotted line, and your

15 answer was as follows:

16 A Sir, if I might briefly explain this.

17 This was prepared by my military

18 information officer --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow

20 down. The interpreters do not have that text.

21 A -- Captain Simon Harrison, and it shows

22 on the top line, in the centre, the op

23 zone Central Bosnia, Vitez/Travnik, with

24 a commander, Tihomir Blaskic, and a

25 deputy commander, Franjo Nakic. On the

1 left of that, with a dotted line,

2 because it is not under command or in a

3 command relationship, is the political

4 wing of the HDZ.

5 Do you remember giving that testimony?

6 A. If that is what you're reading from my

7 testimony, then that is probably what I said, yes. I

8 would have to obviously admit that.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Brigadier, may I ask you,

10 then, what is your evidence today as to the

11 significance of, first, the broken line between the

12 political wing and the op zone and any other unbroken

13 line? What is the significance of the difference

14 between those two?

15 A. Thank you. The unbroken line is what we'd

16 call direct command and, therefore, there is a clear

17 command chain. That is a solid line, the clear command

18 chain. The broken line is a relationship between the

19 two headquarters, which may run from liaison to the

20 exchange of information to the exchange of policy, or

21 whatever, but it doesn't imply that one has primacy

22 over the other, particularly as they are put there on

23 the same line, the top line, sir. So we thought, and I

24 had them inserted for equal status but on that same

25 line. And as it shows on the right of that diagram,

1 similarly, that dotted line across again to the joint

2 commission in Travnik, which was a BiH-HVO joint

3 command of equal status but not under command.

4 Does that make it clear, sir?

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I gather you're saying,

6 then, the broken line does signify some

7 relationship.

8 A. Yes, it does. Yes, sir. It is a

9 relationship of liaison, of exchange of policies and

10 ideas.

11 MR. SAYERS:

12 Q. Let me just go into some background matters,

13 General, and I'll try to move through these fairly

14 quickly.

15 You were in command of the Prince of Wales

16 Own Regiment of Yorkshire in Central Bosnia from May

17 the 11th, 1993 to November the 12th, 1993; is that

18 correct, sir?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Your mission was to facilitate the supply of

21 humanitarian aid through Central Bosnia, up as far as

22 Tuzla in northern Bosnia; correct?

23 A. My mission was to ensure the delivery of aid

24 into and throughout my area of responsibility, yes. In

25 broad terms, the very thing you've said.

1 Q. And this involved giving armed protection to

2 UNHCR or U.N.-sponsored organisations; correct?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. You yourself, sir, do not speak Croatian, I

5 take it.

6 A. I can speak a few words of greetings and

7 familiarities, but that is it, sir. Could I just add

8 that was a deliberate policy, not to speak Croatian, in

9 order to avoid misunderstandings, which I've seen

10 before with interpreters -- or without interpreters.

11 Q. The liaison officer for Busovaca, I believe,

12 was Captain Boris Cowan; do you recall that?

13 A. Yes. His name was Bruce Cowan but he was

14 known as Boris.

15 Q. Incidentally, did you make any personal notes

16 in your diary connected with your conversation with

17 Mr. Valenta in early May of 1993, sir?

18 A. Yes, I did.

19 Q. Did you use those notes to refresh your

20 recollection before you came to testify about that

21 conversation yesterday?

22 A. Yes, I've read through them.

23 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I wonder if we

24 might make to an application to see any notes that the

25 Brigadier has consulted to refresh his recollection,

1 obviously with any personal information excised and

2 redacted.

3 JUDGE MAY: Has the Prosecution seen these

4 notes?

5 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Not at

6 all, Mr. President.

7 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, do you have any

8 objection to showing the parties your notes?

9 A. Sir, I do, for a number of reasons; first,

10 because I had been going through a very messy divorce

11 with my wife, there were a lot of very personal notes

12 in my diaries and in my notebooks, not only to do with

13 that, but to do with a lot of other matters, to do with

14 the reports and performance of my soldiers, how I

15 felt --

16 JUDGE MAY: Can I just interrupt for a

17 moment. Clearly, those personal matters would not be

18 discloseable. But I suppose one way to deal with it

19 would be for you to black out all the -- to get a copy,

20 if this wouldn't be too much trouble, and highlight out

21 all the personal bits and just produce the bits

22 relating to conversations with Valenta and the like.

23 Is that a possible solution?

24 A. Sir, that's technically possible, yes, sir.

25 I mean, if I can be entirely honest, sir, I'm somewhat

1 unhappy because, in my mind, that would create a

2 precedent to opening up the rest of my diary, as it

3 were.

4 JUDGE MAY: Well, it shouldn't. It's merely

5 a solution which we sometimes employ to get around the

6 difficulty. You would have control of your diary. You

7 would simply produce, when you come next, the extracts

8 which relate to your evidence, I mean, if that is,

9 first of all, a practicable solution and, second of

10 all, one which isn't going to involve you in too much

11 administrative work.

12 A. Yes, I'm sure I can do that.

13 JUDGE MAY: Any objection to that,

14 Mr. Sayers? You only want the bit about, say, the

15 conversation about Valenta?

16 MR. SAYERS: The ones that we're particularly

17 concerned with are conversations with, obviously, our

18 client, Mr. Kordic, if there are any entries in the

19 diary that relate to that.

20 A. That's fine, sir. The entries in my

21 notebooks, had I realised I'd be sitting in a court

22 now, would have been made much neater at the time. I

23 have a problem reading my own writing at times.

24 JUDGE MAY: It applies to a number of us.

25 Would you do that?

1 Now, if, for any reason, you change your mind

2 or you get into difficulty, you find it difficult, or

3 whatever, then would you be in touch with the

4 Prosecution about that, you'll have leave to talk to

5 them, so that they may know, if necessary, and an

6 application can be made to the Court or matters can be

7 resolved in one way or another. But, otherwise, would

8 you come with those redacted or, as we call it here,

9 edited highlights from your diary?

10 A. Certainly, sir. I mean, obviously, we need

11 to establish now, in order that I don't miss any bits

12 out, exactly what is required between now and the

13 25th. I am entirely willing to comply with that.

14 JUDGE MAY: I suspect any conversations that

15 you've had that you've related in your evidence or any

16 of the incidents which you've related in your

17 evidence. So it's those things which you've covered.

18 A. Right, sir, certainly.

19 JUDGE MAY: Any notes relating to those, but

20 cutting out any personal matters and comments about

21 your soldiers or anything like that.

22 A. Right, sir.

23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Lopez-Terres, you could

24 assist, no doubt. If the witness is in difficulty for

25 any reason, of course, he can tell you and you can

1 either bring the matter up with the Court or discuss it

2 with the Defence to find a solution.

3 MR. LOPEZ-TERRES: [Interpretation] Very well,

4 Mr. President. This is the first time that this

5 problem arises before this Chamber. A solution has

6 been suggested, and we shall do whatever we can.

7 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Brigadier, did you ever have the occasion to

9 see Mr. Kordic on press conferences during the seven

10 months that you spent in Central Bosnia?

11 A. No, I don't think I did.

12 Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to

13 scrutinise any translations of materials that he had

14 apparently authored?

15 A. Yes, sir. But could I just add that for the

16 majority of the time I would expect that to have been

17 done by my civil affairs officer, Mr. Randy Rhodes.

18 And if there had been anything of importance that

19 Mr. Rhodes thought that I should see, then he would

20 have made sure I'd seen it.

21 Q. Suffice it to say, though, Brigadier, that

22 sitting here today you don't remember any such

23 materials?

24 A. No, sir, I don't.

25 Q. The views that were expressed to you by

1 Mr. Valenta that you found distasteful, isn't it a fact

2 that Mr. Kordic didn't express any analogous views to

3 you during the five meetings that had you with him?

4 A. That is absolutely correct and quite

5 correct. But, I mean, I have to remember they are

6 working for the same organisations. They are going to

7 the same political meetings, as we've already

8 discussed. They were sent down south. They were in

9 the -- his office; I believe he had an office in Hotel

10 Vitez, which Mr. Valenta also used. I must admit I

11 never went to that office, but they were working

12 together.

13 Could I just add that, I mean, if Mr. Valenta

14 did not want me to know those views, he clearly

15 wouldn't have got hold of me three days into my

16 operational tour and briefed me quite clearly on them.

17 Q. Mr. Valenta had only recently arrived in

18 Vitez, had he not?

19 A. I'm not aware of that, but I have to take

20 your word for it.

21 Q. Well, it's true that Mr. Kordic never

22 articulated any views to you that would suggest that he

23 subscribed to these extremist theories that were voiced

24 to you by Mr. Valenta; isn't that a fact?

25 A. That's correct, yes.

1 Q. Just one general question, sir, and I think

2 that you've actually written a paper on this particular

3 subject. But in wartime, would you not agree that it's

4 perfectly normal for the warring forces to try to use

5 the press to -- and media to build up an image of their

6 own status, the power and strength of their forces and,

7 correspondingly, the weakness of the opponent forces?

8 That's fairly standard in wartime, isn't it?

9 A. It's fairly standard. It has to be handled

10 with great care, as I explained in my article.

11 Otherwise you can do more damage to your own side.

12 Perhaps I should add that the only other

13 article I have written for the military is on military

14 ethics, which is about behaviours and standards in

15 warfare.

16 Q. But in terms of the use of the press to build

17 up your own impression of your own power, exaggeration

18 and hyperbole are part of the verbal arsenal, if you

19 like, of the press forces of warring factions, aren't

20 they?

21 A. If you are using exaggeration and hyperbole

22 on what is a basic truth, yes. If you are using

23 exaggeration and hyperbole on what is untrue, then you

24 are using a very dangerous tactic that can backfire on

25 you.

1 Q. You yourself, sir, I think in your extensive

2 and impressive military background, have received

3 considerable training in the Geneva Conventions and

4 their applications and also in the other instruments of

5 International Humanitarian Law; correct?

6 A. Yes, although not as much, perhaps, as I'd

7 like.

8 Q. Do you know what kind of training programme

9 was in place for the HVO troops regarding the Geneva

10 Conventions or matters relating to International

11 Humanitarian Law?

12 A. I do not specifically know that, but I would

13 surmise that anyone who is a signatory to that and

14 ratified the Geneva Conventions would be bound to

15 produce training programmes to give their soldiers a

16 minimum knowledge of military law, and the law of armed

17 conflict as it applies to soldiers fighting both in

18 internal conflict and, if you like, in more general

19 external war.

20 Q. Yes, sir. But you simply do not know whether

21 any such of a regime was in place for the HVO forces,

22 do you?

23 A. I don't, no. I mean, in a well-disciplined

24 and well-organised force, which the HVO was, there was

25 training done, and I was very much aware that soldiers

1 were trained. That force has also published a set of

2 rules and regulations, as we are also aware. I would

3 be surprised if for their protection they had not done

4 such training.

5 Q. Two areas that you covered, which I will

6 address extremely briefly, the first relating to

7 complaints of ethnic cleansing on both sides. There is

8 no question that your office received regular

9 complaints from the HVO and also from the other side,

10 the Muslim side, concerning alleged forcible expulsion

11 of civilians from their homes throughout your tour;

12 isn't that correct?

13 A. Yes. Yes.

14 Q. Similarly, constant complaints were made by

15 both sides about their civilian detainees being used to

16 dig trenches and for other kinds of manual labour?

17 That's true, is it not?

18 A. Yes, it is. Yes.

19 Q. You yourself, however, in all of your seven

20 months in the area, never actually saw any civilians

21 being used to dig trenches, did you, sir?

22 A. No. But, as I've tried to point out before,

23 my journeys were quick and fast to talk to the right

24 level of commander. If anyone would have seen it, it

25 would be my liaison officers or my soldiers on patrol

1 in the ground. It would be, I would have thought,

2 highly unlikely that I would have seen any anyway.

3 Q. And I take it the same goes for prisoners of

4 war, soldiers being used for the same functions; you

5 never actually saw any soldiers being impressed into

6 trench-digging operations or other items of manual

7 labour, did you?

8 A. No, I didn't -- I'm somewhat confused as to

9 why you are asking these questions, because, I mean,

10 it's obvious I have not seen them, but others would

11 have done perhaps. Because I haven't seen them,

12 doesn't mean I didn't believe they were happening. And

13 the reports came in from both sides to say they were

14 happening.

15 Q. All right. Let me address with you -- you

16 gave some brief testimony concerning the Vance-Owen

17 Plan, I believe. Were you familiar with the way that

18 that plan was actually intended to operate, or the

19 provisions of it?

20 A. I'm sorry, it's a huge plan. I am familiar

21 that it was a -- one of the attempts at bringing a

22 political and peaceful solution to the area, by

23 suggesting a partition into various areas for the three

24 warring factions at that time in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25 That level of detail I am aware of. Below that, apart

1 from being aware on occasions as various versions came

2 out as to where lines were being drawn, I was aware of

3 that.

4 Our information as to the detail of that plan

5 relied on some very poor faxes, where some of the lines

6 could have been a couple of kilometres wide.

7 Q. All right. Suffice it to say that in

8 connection with the actual map-drawing exercise that

9 was part of the Vance-Owen Plan, there was considerable

10 disagreement with the contours of those lines on the

11 part of the ABiH forces in Travnik, for example; was

12 there not?

13 A. I don't know, to be honest. I thought I had

14 enough to do trying to get the aid through than

15 worrying about somebody else's job. Whilst I welcomed

16 a political solution, I wasn't going to get involved.

17 Again it goes back -- this was not my place

18 to talk to the politicians about these things.

19 Q. I understand, sir. Did you have any

20 understanding about the way that the political

21 organisation of these proposed cantons was supposed to

22 work, or was that something that you did not pay a

23 great deal of attention to?

24 A. I was aware of cantons, and I was also aware

25 of, if you like, the ethnic balance that would have

1 come out of some of those cantons, and therefore the

2 hope that the political organisation set up would

3 reflect those ethnic minorities or majorities, but not

4 in great detail, no.

5 Q. Were you aware in province 10, for example,

6 the Travnicka province -- and just for the Court's

7 information, I am referring to Exhibit S571,1, which

8 was the Vance-Owen Plan, put into evidence by the

9 Prosecution. There is an annex that explains how the

10 political organisation of each of these provinces was

11 supposed to work at page 138 and 139.

12 Were you aware, sir, that the provincial

13 governor of province 10 was destined to be chosen by

14 the Croat political party?

15 A. I was not aware of that. And, as I've said,

16 in my position of hopefully impartiality, it would have

17 been wrong of me to make any comments which might

18 prejudice the outcome of the Vance-Owen Plan.

19 Q. Maybe we can truncate this line of

20 questioning. Would it be fair to say, and I think you

21 have said this, that you don't really know about the

22 political organisation; the fact that the vice-governor

23 was going to be appointed by the Muslim political

24 party; that there was going to be a provincial interim

25 government of 10, with five members selected by the

1 Muslim political party, four by the Croat political

2 party, and one by the Serbs? Did you know that?

3 A. I didn't know that, but I knew in principle

4 that there would be some sort of power-sharing

5 arrangement. The exact detail I was not aware of.

6 Q. All right. Were you aware that Kiseljak and

7 the so-called Kiseljak or River Lepenica Valley was not

8 in province 10, the so-called Croat-controlled

9 province?

10 A. I mean, I can't, in all honesty, say I was

11 aware of that. I mean, I was aware of the structure

12 but, as I say, I really didn't get involved in

13 speculative plans, because my pouring over the

14 Vance-Owen Plan and trying to decipher it would not

15 have helped my job in that pocket.

16 Q. Let's depart from that subject and just step

17 back to the historical context of your seven-month

18 tour.

19 It would be fair to say that from May of 1993

20 onwards, the Croat military forces in Central Bosnia

21 suffered a series of serious military defeats at the

22 hands of advancing Muslim forces? That's true, is it

23 not?

24 A. Yes. There was, if you like, a situation of

25 stalemate with some Croat initiatives just before I

1 arrived. There then was a major offensive by the BiH,

2 and that then stabilised to leave the pocket

3 situation. And that is where I left the situation,

4 with a stable pocket situation.

5 Q. It's true, is it not, that there were, I

6 think in Central Bosnia, four isolated enclaves when

7 you arrived? The first would be the Vitez-Busovaca

8 pocket, the second the Kiseljak pocket, the third the

9 Vares pocket, the fourth the Zepce pocket; and

10 actually, there is a fifth one, the Kakanj area. Is

11 that fair to say?

12 A. I don't think they would be classed as

13 pockets when I arrived. They certainly hardened into

14 pockets later on. I can't speak about Zepce, Kakanj or

15 Vares in any detail. It was my impression, when I

16 first arrived, that there was a degree of movement of

17 individuals still going on between the areas that later

18 polarised as pockets.

19 Q. If I could ask you to look at the revised

20 orbat about which you testified, Exhibit Z2,653. Put

21 that on the ELMO for everybody's reference.

22 A number of these brigades, sir, have crosses

23 through them. Those are brigades that were eliminated

24 as the result of military defeats suffered by the Croat

25 forces; correct?

1 A. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I could

2 explain, the normal form on amendments to these

3 documents would be initially a deletion of those units

4 that had disappeared to all intents and purposes,

5 followed by a reissue at a later date of an amended

6 version.

7 Q. The Frankopan brigade and the Travnicka

8 brigade ceased to exist as a result of a major Muslim

9 offensive between June the 8th and the June the 12th in

10 Travnik; correct?

11 A. I cannot challenge the dates, but if you are

12 referring to -- I think it's the Francopan and the

13 Travnicka. Yes, they were destroyed to all intents and

14 purposes.

15 Q. Similarly, the Jure Francetic Brigade had

16 been destroyed in Zenica, I believe, prior to your

17 arrival?

18 A. Yes, sir, that would have been prior to my

19 arrival.

20 Q. Going over to the right, the Kotromanic

21 brigade had been destroyed as a result of Croat

22 military defeats in Kakanj in June of 1993, pretty much

23 simultaneously with the defeats suffered by the Croats

24 in Travnik? Would that be fair to say?

25 A. Yes. I mean, these details are as in the

1 footnotes.

2 Q. Just to round out this line of questioning,

3 Brigadier, the Bobovac brigade in Vares was destroyed

4 as a result of the capture of Vares in the first part

5 of November of 1993; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, it is. Destroyed, I think, is perhaps

7 -- would be better to say defeated, in that most of

8 the people who could get away, obviously, re-formed

9 into other organisations.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, when you leave this

11 topic, it would be about time to adjourn.

12 MR. SAYERS: I was just about to enter into

13 another topic, Mr. President, so this would be a fine

14 time.

15 JUDGE MAY: Very well. And do you anticipate

16 we should be able to finish on the morning of the

17 25th? Perhaps you would like to think about that and

18 try and concentrate on it.

19 MR. SAYERS: I will, as always, and I hope

20 the Trial Chamber has seen that we have been making

21 efforts to do this. We will try to do so, Your Honour,

22 yes.

23 JUDGE MAY: Brigadier, if you'd be back,

24 please, on the morning of the 25th. If you could

25 provide a photocopy of your notes, as I say, with the

1 relevant bits blacked out. If, in any way, providing

2 it is onerous or proves impossible, perhaps you could

3 get in touch with the Prosecution about it and let them

4 know.

5 If, on the other hand, you are able to do it

6 without too much difficulty, if you could let us have

7 it earlier, so people can read it before the hearing.

8 And that will save time.

9 THE WITNESS: Certainly, sir.

10 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to go now,

11 please, and be back then.

12 [The witness withdrew]

13 JUDGE MAY: I think Mr. Kovacic was first.

14 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I just

15 wanted to say that I would also probably have quite a

16 few questions. It depends how much Mr. Sayers will

17 take from me, but I certainly will have.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I have in mind that you said

19 earlier that you would. I haven't forgotten.

20 MR. KOVACIC: Thank you, sir.

21 MR. NICE: Can I just take this opportunity

22 to explain to the Tribunal -- it will only take a

23 minute or so -- that we have filed today, but have

24 copies available here in Court, the document that I

25 forecast was coming this week about witnesses and our

1 present position on witnesses who remain to be called.

2 The document is available. I hope it's with

3 -- it's not available. Yes. Here they come.

4 JUDGE MAY: We shall take it as unfiled.

5 MR. NICE: These have been filed

6 confidentially, and so they will be available to my

7 learned friends in due course. The format of the

8 document may be worth just a minute's explanation while

9 it's being distributed.

10 If the Chamber goes immediately to page 13,

11 it will see something begins "Witnesses by Category."

12 Now, what follows from page 13 is, essentially, what

13 you have between pages 3 and 12 but differently

14 ordered. So the document comes with two different ways

15 of presenting information, for your assistance.

16 I am asked whether we should be in private

17 session. I don't think we need be in private session,

18 although there is one thing that I am going to mention

19 that is a touch delicate.

20 If the Chamber then comes back to the

21 beginning, to page 2, this sets out with some notes our

22 present position. It's not an invitation to

23 intervention in any way with our list or an acceptance

24 that it requires intervention; it's an expression of

25 our current position.

1 And if the Chamber then goes to page 3, it

2 will find a table which reflects the overview of

3 witnesses, which I trust the Chamber found helpful.

4 And so what happens there is we've identified,

5 according to codes that are explained, the various

6 witnesses whose evidence should be before you.

7 Now, I am revealing in this document those

8 for whom we are seeking subpoenas. Applications for

9 subpoenas have been lodged ex parte and confidential in

10 the usual way, but of course the Defence will now know

11 from this document, because it seemed helpful for

12 everyone to know, which witnesses we now judge we are

13 going to be dealing with by subpoena. But they will

14 recognise that that knowledge is something they should

15 not impart elsewhere. It should remain confidential.

16 But if, without putting a name on it, you

17 look at the bottom of page 3, the very first witness,

18 you'll see that witness is a witness, T.B.C., to be

19 called in respect of whom a subpoena may be required.

20 If we go to page 4 of this document, you'll

21 see, in the second column, that for your convenience

22 I'm simply following through the original overview of

23 witness page numbers, so the next witness can be found

24 at page 6 of the original overview. He's not to be

25 called because a transcript will suffice, N.T.B.C.T.

1 The next witness, again, I won't put a name,

2 features at page 7 of the overview and is a witness to

3 be called, willing to attend.

4 So, in that way, the first part of this

5 document, going from page 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and through to

6 8, deals with all those first witnesses. The first

7 category of witnesses in the overview says which ones

8 should be before you and the method by which they

9 should be before you, whether by being called, by being

10 a transcript of evidence from another case, by being in

11 affidavit form, or otherwise, and the notes on the

12 right-hand side explain the position.

13 From page 8, not surprisingly, we pick it up

14 with international witnesses, that goes through to page

15 9, 10; then at 11, international armed conflict

16 witnesses; at 12, experts and the improper term,

17 quasi-experts, has crept in there, but we can overlook

18 that, experts; then there is a residual list of

19 to-be-decided witnesses, with comments beside them.

20 When you come to page 13, that same

21 information has been rescheduled according to

22 categories, so that starting at page 13, these are the

23 witnesses to be called who are willing, and they are

24 listed on the following pages.

25 If you go to page 17, at the foot of 17,

1 you'll see the list of those in respect of whom a

2 subpoena is required; 18, witnesses whose evidence can

3 be dealt with by affidavit or statement; at 21,

4 witnesses by transcript. So that the same information

5 appears, scheduled in two different ways for your

6 convenience.

7 You'll discover that the village crime base

8 witnesses are not dealt with in this list. They're

9 explained at the beginning, an explanation I've given

10 before; namely, that you will be presented with village

11 binders, which are further explained in this document,

12 and then, having considered the state of evidence about

13 the village and whether witnesses who we propose should

14 be before you can be agreed or read, or whether they

15 have to be called, then the village crime base

16 witnesses may be additional.

17 The position, subject to the village crime

18 base witnesses, is that, starting today and including

19 the present witness, I think there are 39 witnesses

20 identified; that should leave 26 witnesses after

21 Christmas, of whom 13 should be very short.

22 That's the position, and I hope it's an

23 informative document and helps the Chamber in the way

24 that it wanted.

25 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

1 MR. NICE: One other point, while I'm on my

2 feet, and I can say that perhaps Mr. Lopez-Terres would

3 find it a little more difficult, there is a concern

4 about some inconsistency in relation to the approach to

5 diaries, I know. It doesn't concern us because we

6 quite understand the need for particular witnesses to

7 produce whatever material they're happy to produce, but

8 based on the previous practice, for example, with

9 General Cordy-Simpson, I think the announced policy was

10 that wherever a witness looks at a document but doesn't

11 show it to us and doesn't want it to be produced, but

12 refreshes his memory from it, then it probably won't be

13 produced.

14 I repeat: We're not concerned, save to say

15 that we must be able to tell witnesses what the

16 position is if they inquire. It seems to me that this

17 witness was, in the event, content, at the questioning

18 of the Court, to make available extracts from his

19 diary, but I gently remind the Court that there may be

20 something of an inconsistency, and we've got to be

21 careful how we approach our witnesses on these delicate

22 issues.

23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice,

24 when do you think -- I don't know if you can answer me

25 today -- but when do you believe you will be able to

1 conclude the case?

2 MR. NICE: That question can be answered, of

3 course, by knowledge of how long each witness will take

4 and what court sittings are available, knowing the

5 problems that the Tribunal has with other commitments.

6 If I'm right, there are about 26 witnesses

7 after Christmas, plus maybe a few village witnesses,

8 and if 13 of those are very short witnesses who can be

9 dealt with many per day, and 13 are reasonable length

10 witnesses, then my guess, without checking with

11 Ms. Verhaag on statistics, is that recently we've been

12 dealing with substantial witnesses at something between

13 one and two sessions per witness. It started off

14 rather longer; it was about two sessions for a

15 substantial witness, sometimes longer. We've now got

16 it down to one, sometimes a little bit more. So if

17 there are 13 substantial witnesses, that might be, say,

18 20 sessions, and if there are 13 short witnesses, then

19 it will be a few more session than that.

20 It's more realistic to think in terms of

21 sessions, particularly given the uncertainties that

22 there are about the scheduling of the Court's diaries

23 for reasons outside of our control.

24 Maybe these matters can be more helpfully

25 dealt with, so far as timetable is concerned, at a

1 Status Conference, now that the information is

2 available to you.

3 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn now. Monday

4 morning -- no, I'll be reminded. Friday morning, half

5 past nine.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

7 5.00 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,

8 the 12th day of November, 1999, at

9 9.30 a.m.

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