Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10791

1 Wednesday, 1st December, 1999

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.32 a.m.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours.

7 Case number IT-95-14/2-T.


9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Sayers.

10 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

11 Cross-examined by Mr. Sayers:

12 Q. Good morning, Mr. Brix Andersen. Just for

13 the record, my name is Stephen Sayers, and together

14 with my colleague, Mr. Naumovski, we represent Dario

15 Kordic. These gentlemen to the rear of me are

16 Mr. Kovacic and Mr. Mikulicic, who represent Mario

17 Cerkez.

18 I take it, sir, that you were interviewed by

19 the Prosecution two days ago and that you signed a

20 statement on that date, November the 28th, 1999;

21 correct?

22 A. That is correct, sir.

23 Q. You also authenticated a significant quantity

24 of documentation, by my count close to 800 pages.

25 Could you just let us know when those documents were

Page 10792

1 provided to you for your review?

2 A. They were provided on Sunday and Monday.

3 Q. Sir, now, you have stated in your direct

4 testimony that you had never met or spoken to

5 Mr. Kordic and you have never been to Central Bosnia.

6 Is that correct?

7 A. That is correct.

8 Q. So it would be accurate to say that all of

9 the assessments, conclusions, and opinions that we

10 heard from you yesterday are based upon the

11 conclusions, opinions, and observations of others lower

12 down in the organisation of which you were a member in

13 1993, the European Community Monitoring Mission;

14 correct?

15 A. It is correct that I had no personal

16 knowledge of what happened in Bosnia, as a governor,

17 but as to the sources, yes, my information was based on

18 what was reported to me by the ECMM monitors and the

19 RCs but also from the information received from the

20 presidency and UNPROFOR and other sources.

21 Q. Right. But just so the record is crystal

22 clear, you yourself had no independent personal

23 knowledge of any of the facts relevant to what was

24 happening in Central Bosnia or the facts that are

25 recited in your assessments and records; correct?

Page 10793

1 A. Correct. I have no -- I have no personal

2 access to facts as such in Central Bosnia. I was never

3 there.

4 Q. We can leave that subject now,

5 Mr. Brix Andersen. Would it be fair to say that as a

6 career diplomat, sir, of many years experience and

7 training, you are taught to be and are careful when you

8 make written conclusions, when you write written

9 conclusions?

10 A. Correct. Both written conclusion and

11 statements in other forms.

12 Q. And you would agree that it is important to

13 ensure the factual accuracy of the materials upon which

14 you rely to make sweeping conclusions about someone

15 that you have never met or spoken to? Wouldn't you

16 agree with that?

17 A. Yes, I would.

18 Q. And the reason is, of course, that if the

19 facts upon which you base the conclusions are not

20 correct or inaccurate in any way, then obviously that

21 affects perhaps vitally the validity of the

22 assessments, opinions, and conclusions that you write;

23 correct?

24 A. That appears to be correct, yes.

25 Q. Sir, let me just ask you if you have ever met

Page 10794

1 or spoken to any members of the HVO leadership, and

2 I'll mention some names to you. I'll just represent to

3 you that Dr. Jadranka Prlic was appointed president of

4 the HVO, the Croatian Defence Council, on the 14th of

5 August, 1992.

6 A. No, I did not meet him.

7 Q. I'll similarly represent to you, sir, that on

8 the same day, Stipo Ivankovic was appointed

9 vice-president or the first vice-president of the HVO.

10 Have you ever met or spoken to that gentleman?

11 A. No, I have not.

12 Q. On the 17th of October, 1992, some few months

13 later, Kresimir Zubak was appointed the second

14 vice-president of the HVO. Have you ever spoken to or

15 met that gentleman, sir?

16 A. I have not.

17 Q. On the same day as Mr. Zubak was appointed

18 vice-president of the HVO, Anto Valenta was appointed a

19 vice-president of the HVO too. Have you ever met or

20 spoken to him, sir?

21 A. No, I have not.

22 Q. There is a reference in your April the 17th

23 to 18th, 1993 report -- I think it's dated [sic]

24 Z735 -- to the head of the HVO department of defence, a

25 man by the name of Bruno Stojic. I believe he was

Page 10795

1 appointed on June -- in June of 1992 to that position.

2 Have you ever met or spoken to Mr. Stojic, sir?

3 A. No, I have not.

4 Q. All right. Have you ever met or spoken to

5 the president of an entity known as the Croatian

6 Community of Herceg-Bosna, a man by the name of Mate

7 Boban?

8 A. No, I have not.

9 Q. Let me just step back a little bit, sir, and

10 ask you some general questions about your understanding

11 of what was going on in Central Bosnia during the time

12 that you were responsible for your duties in the

13 European Community Monitoring Mission headquarters in

14 Zagreb. I believe that we've established that your

15 duties basically spanned the first six months of 1993;

16 is that correct?

17 A. I was there from August, beginning of

18 September, 1992, as a monitor, and with a view to

19 preparing the Danish presidency; that is, setting up

20 the organisation that we would run when we took over

21 from the British. Then I would stay on as Deputy Head

22 of Mission from the 1st of January. So from the 1st of

23 January through June, 1993, I was the Deputy Head of

24 Mission. Before that I was the regular monitor and

25 head of the Danish contingent.

Page 10796

1 Q. Please forgive the pause, Mr. Brix Andersen,

2 but we have to let the interpreters catch with us.

3 There is no doubt, sir, that throughout the

4 time of your involvement in the former Yugoslavia, from

5 August of 1992 up until the termination of your

6 position as Deputy Head of Mission in Zagreb at the end

7 of June of 1993, that there was a vicious ethnic civil

8 war raging throughout the territory; isn't that

9 correct?

10 A. That's correct.

11 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, the Court knows we

12 have a continuing objection to the characterisation in

13 questions as a "civil war." We haven't renewed it

14 often but just to make sure that it's on the record, we

15 object to the characterisation in question. Thank

16 you.

17 JUDGE MAY: That's ultimately for us to

18 decide.

19 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE MAY: I'm not sure really if it assists

21 us, who have to decide that ultimate question, to hear

22 it described as a civil war or not.

23 Mr. Sayers, I would say this: that it's a

24 question in similar terms which you've put to virtually

25 all the witnesses. I myself now can't see the point of

Page 10797

1 it, because clearly there was a war raging, and if the

2 next question is was it chaotic and confusing, you can

3 take it that it was. We don't need to hear that

4 repeated.

5 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, I am mindful of

6 those observations and I'm also mindful of the

7 observation that the Court made some days ago regarding

8 repeating territory over which we've already trodden,

9 but the purpose of this question for this particular

10 witness, since this witness has been offered to speak

11 with the voice of the ECMM, was not really to elicit

12 his personal opinions but, rather, to elicit the view

13 of the ECMM. I can confirm that with an ECMM document

14 that I think outlines the view of the ECMM, and I'd

15 just like the witness to confirm that, with the Court's

16 permission, obviously.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can put the document.

18 MR. SAYERS: This has already been admitted.

19 It's Exhibit Z1040, and I have an additional copy there

20 to be shown to Mr. Brix Andersen for his convenience.

21 Q. I just wonder, Mr. Brix Andersen, if you

22 would turn to page 9. Perhaps it might be useful to

23 have a copy for the ELMO, too.

24 JUDGE MAY: What is the document, please?

25 MR. SAYERS: The document, Mr. President, is

Page 10798

1 dated June the 10th, 1993, and it appears to be

2 entitled, "Excerpts of Political Material in ECMM Team

3 Reports."

4 Q. I'd just like to read to you one section,

5 sir, in the third paragraph. It says: "It is beyond

6 doubt in this area," and that's Busovaca and Novi

7 Travnik, "that a war which began as a common fight

8 against a common foe (the Serbs) has degenerated into

9 an outright civil war."

10 And that is the view of the ECMM at the time

11 of this particular document, June the 10th, 1993; isn't

12 that so, Mr. Brix Andersen?

13 A. Perhaps not quite, in the sense that if you

14 look at the first page of this document, it's entitled

15 "Excerpts of the Political Material in the ECMM Team

16 Reports." Now, that means that this is the unedited

17 observations and statements by the individual teams.

18 It was at the time thought to be useful to us

19 in headquarters to have the unedited opinion of the

20 monitors on the ground. So this would not have passed

21 through the CC or the RC chain of command to

22 headquarters. This would be the raw material written

23 by the team leader and his fellow monitor. So this

24 does not necessarily represent the opinion of the ECMM

25 headquarters.

Page 10799

1 Q. Well, what was the opinion of the ECMM

2 headquarters? Was it a civil war or wasn't it, sir?

3 A. I think that that question bears on the legal

4 qualification of the events in the former Yugoslavia,

5 and I think it is up to the Court to decide what the

6 qualification should be.

7 Q. You would agree, sir, that the situation that

8 confronted you in the former Yugoslavia was a

9 disintegrating country that had emerged from a

10 single-party system?

11 A. Yes. To my recollection, there was one

12 dominant party, but there were other parties as well.

13 That's besides the point perhaps.

14 Q. In the former Yugoslavia, there's no question

15 that there was a tradition of an omnipresent,

16 all-powerful central government; isn't that correct?

17 A. That is certainly correct.

18 Q. And in the early '90s, immediately before the

19 foundation of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on

20 March 6, 1993, there's no question that that central

21 government had disintegrated, at least in the territory

22 of the former Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina;

23 correct?

24 A. That is correct, yes.

25 Q. And really before the central government of

Page 10800

1 the republic was able even to start functioning,

2 Sarajevo had been surrounded and besieged, had it not,

3 sir, in April of 1992?

4 A. As you know, that was before my time with the

5 ECMM. That is certainly common knowledge.

6 Q. Right. And there is no question, sir, that

7 throughout your tenure or throughout the time of your

8 responsibilities for Central Bosnia, the central

9 government in Sarajevo was really not able to

10 communicate effectively with other parts of the

11 country; in effect, it really was not functioning at

12 all, was it?

13 A. The government obviously could not function

14 the way a western government functions today, but to

15 take it to the extent that there was no communication

16 between the government and the territory I think is

17 carrying it a bit too far. There was communication.

18 The members of the leadership and the government were

19 able to travel, with assistance from UNPROFOR and

20 others from time to time, but I don't think it's

21 correct to say that they were limited to Sarajevo

22 without communication to the rest of the country.

23 Q. You would agree, though, that the government

24 of a country effectively could not function, and the

25 result of that was that communities and peoples were

Page 10801

1 basically left to organise and fend for themselves?

2 A. I think I will stick to what I said in answer

3 to your previous question. Yes, there was a

4 government. Yes, they were doing what they could to

5 exercise control. Yes, they were facing difficulties,

6 more difficulties than most other governments would

7 face.

8 Q. All right. Have you actually ever heard of

9 the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

10 A. Yes, I have.

11 Q. Do you know what it was, sir?

12 A. I had heard of it. I had a general

13 impression of what was the gist of it, yes.

14 Q. Do you know what the powers of a

15 vice-president of the Croatian Community --

16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Sayers, I wonder what the

17 point of asking the witness this sort of question is.

18 If you have a case about what the powers were, it may

19 be simpler if you put it to the witness so that he can

20 comment on it as to whether he knew or not.

21 MR. SAYERS: That's a fair observation,

22 Mr. President.

23 Q. Did you know that the president of the

24 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was actually the

25 supreme commander of the armed forces of the HVO, sir?

Page 10802

1 A. As to the exact functioning of the various

2 persons who were in the Herceg-Bosna leadership, I

3 would hesitate now, six years later, to have any

4 precise opinion.

5 Q. Did you have an opinion at the time in 1993

6 or did you not know?

7 A. I knew what was the main area of

8 responsibility of most of the important persons, but to

9 say that I could describe it in legal detail, no, I

10 don't think I could.

11 Q. Were you aware that Brigadier Milivoj

12 Petkovic was the chief of the general staff of the HVO,

13 the senior commanding officer of the military forces

14 headquartered in Mostar, sir?

15 A. I was aware of that, yes.

16 Q. And you were aware that the military

17 organisation of the HVO was split into various

18 operative zones under the command of separate

19 subordinate commanders subordinate to Brigadier

20 Petkovic; correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And I take it, sir, that in the Central

23 Bosnia Operative Zone, you were aware that the military

24 commander was Colonel Tihomir Blaskic.

25 A. Yes, that appears to be correct.

Page 10803

1 Q. Just one final question on personalities and

2 whether you had met them.

3 Did you ever meet Bozidar Rajic, the Minister

4 of Defence of the government of the Republic of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and a vice-president of the Croatian

6 Community of Herceg-Bosna?

7 A. I have no recollection that I met him.

8 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, was the ECMM ever aware

9 that the HVO was established as a temporary emergency

10 measure until some semblance of civilian order could be

11 restored in the country?

12 A. I think that's a difficult question to

13 answer, because most of what happened in the former

14 Yugoslavia was of a temporary nature at that time.

15 Q. Good point. Let me just ask you to take a

16 look, if you would, at a document that's already been

17 introduced into evidence. I don't think it's in your

18 bundle, but it comes from the ECMM archives, and I

19 think it was one of the documents that you were brought

20 here to authenticate. It's Exhibit Z1132, and it

21 appears to be a document entitled, "Excerpts of

22 Political Material in ECMM Team Reports," dated June

23 the 28th, 1993. Before we actually go into this

24 document, had you left your duties by that date or were

25 you still performing your duties, sir? That's June

Page 10804

1 28th, 1993.

2 A. I was still there at that time. We left, I

3 believe, on the morning of the 1st of July.

4 JUDGE MAY: Can we have it on the ELMO,

5 please?

6 MR. SAYERS: Yes. I'll put page 4, which is

7 the only page I wish to ask the witness about, on the


9 Q. Basically, sir, this is the second page of a

10 report from the coordination centre in Mostar, and it

11 records a meeting with Mr. Vlado Pogarcic, who was the

12 advisor for foreign affairs for Mr. Mate Boban.

13 Basically, there are a number of points recorded that

14 are made by Mr. Pogarcic. The one I want to draw to

15 your attention is on page 4, which says: "HVO/HDZ

16 always said that Community of Herceg-Bosna is a

17 temporary solution to allow to establish normal life

18 again. It will disappear as far as there is an overall

19 solution."

20 The question that I have for you is, sir: is

21 that basically consistent with the ECMM's understanding

22 of the functions of the Croatian Community of

23 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO, as a temporary solution in an

24 emergency?

25 A. As I said before, these reports are unedited,

Page 10805

1 in the sense that they contain the material reported

2 directly from the teams of the CCs. Now, as to the

3 substance of it, as I said before, everything was

4 temporary in the former Yugoslavia. There had been a

5 number of peace plans put forward by Mr. Akmadzic, by

6 Mr. Vance and Owen, so everything in that sense was

7 temporary. Everybody was hoping for a solution to the

8 whole conflict, so in that sense, yes, temporary.

9 Q. Thank you, sir. I have no more questions on

10 that document.

11 As there was a reference to the HDZ, did you

12 have any knowledge of who held what post within that

13 political party, sir, in 1993?

14 A. I had that knowledge in 1993. Obviously, six

15 years later, it will be difficult to say with certainty

16 what was the exact nature of that knowledge.

17 Q. That's fair enough, sir. All right.

18 With respect to Mr. Kordic, let me just ask

19 you some questions about him. I would like to begin

20 with what you described as your valedictory analysis

21 dated June the 16th of 1993, marked Z1065, and I think

22 that's in your bundle.

23 The only particular reference to Mr. Kordic

24 appears on page 4, paragraph 16, which you have already

25 read into the record. Is it true, sir, that the

Page 10806

1 factual information contained in this paragraph is

2 based, would it be fair to say, entirely on the reports

3 of Jean-Pierre Thebault to you, the head of the

4 regional centre in Zenica?

5 A. No, it would not. It would be based on his

6 reports and his assessments but also the assessment of

7 other people, other organisations, like most of what we

8 did in headquarters, we did not rely exclusively on one

9 source. We tried to balance information we received

10 with information from other sources.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. Like I explained with the mission of the

13 three ambassadors who went to Ahmici, yes, we did rely

14 on Mr. Thebault to be a competent and meticulous head

15 of the RC, which never meant that we would not find it

16 useful to have his information and his assessment

17 corroborated by other sources.

18 MR. SAYERS: All right. I wonder if I could

19 just ask the usher to put one page of Exhibit Z840 on

20 the ELMO. Page 3, please.

21 Q. In the comments section of Mr. Thebault's

22 April the 28th, 1993 memorandum, sir, he informs the

23 headquarters of the ECMM that Mr. Kordic is, in fact,

24 the cousin of Mr. Boban. Do you see that?

25 A. Yes, I do.

Page 10807

1 Q. Do you know where the ECMM ever came up with

2 that notion?

3 A. I'm sorry, could you repeat that?

4 Q. Yes. Let me put it a different way. Let me

5 suggest to you that Mr. Kordic is, in fact, not

6 Mr. Boban's cousin and is not in any way related to

7 him. Can you tell us or do you know where the ECMM

8 came up with that erroneous factual information?

9 A. No, I cannot. It was reported to us, and it

10 was a fact that we never questioned; not to my

11 knowledge, at least.

12 Q. All right. Let's go on -- thank you. I'm

13 through with that document. I appreciate it.

14 You make the contention in paragraph 16 of

15 your valedictory memorandum that Mr. Kordic is

16 supposedly, "Minister for Herceg-Bosna in the HVO

17 government." What does that mean, sir? Minister of

18 what?

19 A. I think it's fair to say that for many of the

20 people holding responsible positions in Herceg-Bosna,

21 it was difficult to have a precise description of their

22 titles. They would tend to differ from time to time.

23 Some of it could be changed, changes made in the

24 leadership. Some of it could be changes because of

25 translation errors. Some of it -- I don't know.

Page 10808

1 Basically, this is taken to mean that he held a

2 responsible position. Whether it was "minister" in our

3 sense of the word or whether it was a leading

4 personality was not of any great importance for the

5 thrust of this paper.

6 Q. I take it, sir, that -- and I'll suggest to

7 you that, in fact, Mr. Kordic was never minister for

8 Herceg-Bosna and that he held no position in the HVO

9 government. Could you just tell us where this

10 information came from, if you know?

11 A. The information came to us from the reports

12 from the RC's and from the teams. If you say it's

13 inaccurate, I really have no other comment to that,

14 other than Mr. Kordic's name repeatedly came up in

15 reports from the field, from other sources also, as an

16 influential person. Whether he held this or that title

17 is perhaps, to me, not quite as important as the

18 importance of his position.

19 Q. Thank you, sir. Do you know, in order to

20 clear up this confusion, apparently, as to the status

21 and functions of Mr. Kordic in Central Bosnia, do you

22 know whether anyone actually asked him what his

23 position was and what his powers were?

24 A. I don't know. A number of ECMM monitors must

25 have met him. I suppose that they would have had the

Page 10809

1 opportunity to ask him the question if they felt it was

2 a relevant question to ascertain his formal, precise

3 title. Perhaps they also had the opinion, but I'm

4 speculating, that the fact that he seemed to exercise

5 authority was sufficient for them when they were

6 discussing things with him, rather than to ascertain

7 his exact legal title. I don't think I can comment any

8 closer.

9 Q. Thank you, sir. And I don't mean to quibble,

10 but the long and the short of it is you just don't know

11 whether anybody asked that particular question of

12 Mr. Kordic himself, do you?

13 A. That's correct. I don't know.

14 Q. Similarly, you don't know whether anybody

15 took the trouble to ask the question of the head of the

16 HVO government, Dr. Jadranka Prlic, what functions, if

17 any, Mr. Kordic had in that government? You don't

18 know, do you, sir?

19 A. I don't know for a fact, that's true.

20 Q. On the political front, the same is true with

21 respect to Mr. Boban, the president of the Croatian

22 Community of Herceg-Bosna and also the president of the

23 HDZ. You do not know whether anyone within the ECMM

24 took the trouble to ask him what Mr. Kordic's functions

25 or powers were, do you?

Page 10810

1 A. Well, it's like I said just before. We were

2 less concerned with the formal legal title of the

3 people we were dealing with, the same as we within the

4 ECMM actually had very few titles and very few titles

5 were used. It was a question of mostly the authority

6 that the person seemed to exercise. If you were an

7 influential person, then that would be sufficient for

8 us to talk to him or relay his views and the

9 information he would give to us.

10 Q. I appreciate the repetition of that answer,

11 Mr. Brix Andersen, but the question was --

12 JUDGE MAY: I think the question has been put

13 often enough. Now, let's move on.

14 MR. SAYERS: On the military front then,

15 Mr. President.

16 Q. Do you know whether anybody questioned the

17 military authorities in Central Bosnia,

18 Colonel Blaskic, for example, as to whether Mr. Kordic

19 had any military power whatsoever, and if so, the

20 extent of it or the limitations on it? You don't know

21 that, do you?

22 A. No, I don't.

23 Q. And on the highest level, the same is true

24 with respect to the commander in chief of the HVO armed

25 forces, Brigadier Petkovic. You don't know whether

Page 10811

1 anybody clarified with Brigadier Petkovic whether

2 Mr. Kordic had a military role and, if so, what was it

3 and what limitations were attendant to it; would that

4 be fair to say?

5 A. It would be fair to say, yes.

6 Q. Thank you. Let me turn to a different

7 subject, sir. Mr. Anto Valenta, about whom you gave

8 some testimony and whose name is mentioned in the ECMM

9 reports and who was, in fact, a vice-president of the

10 HVO, his name is actually mentioned in Exhibit Z859,1.

11 It's a May the 1st, 1993 special report, and I believe

12 it is in the package that you have in front of you. If

13 you would just turn to it, sir. I actually have --

14 A. Could I have the reference, again.

15 Q. Yes. It's Z859,1, sir, and May the 1st,

16 1993.

17 MR. SAYERS: There are just two pages that I

18 would like the usher to put on to the ELMO, if I may.

19 Q. The first page is page 2, sir, of this

20 special report, and it's right at the bottom of the

21 page where the reference is made that: "Mr. Valenta,

22 HVO vice-president, located in Travnik where he took a

23 decisive part to the recent troubles, just before the

24 conflict."

25 Then there's a reference to Mr. Kostroman,

Page 10812

1 who is supposedly or who is described as: "General

2 Secretary of the HVO travelling the area."

3 Do you know what kind of decisive part in the

4 recent troubles Mr. Valenta took? Was that ever

5 reported to you or do you have no current recollection

6 of that, sir?

7 A. I have no specific recollection of that.

8 Q. All right. If would you turn to the second

9 page. It's under paragraph 3, "Provisional

10 conclusions." It appears on page 6, I believe, of this

11 document. There's a reference, in the first full

12 paragraph of this letter, if you would just -- yes. To

13 a letter that had been sent or: "Very clear letter

14 sent the week before to the ECMM by an HVO

15 vice-president, who is the real number two, after Mate

16 Boban, of the HVO as a political body, Mr. Valenta."

17 Supposedly, the author of this special report

18 was to meet with Valenta that afternoon, as he was just

19 coming back from a town called Citluk, where he had

20 played a major role as the HVO representative in charge

21 of the situation in Central Bosnia.

22 This is what was reported to you by the head

23 of the regional centre in Zenica in May of 1993;

24 correct?

25 A. Yes. Correct.

Page 10813

1 Q. You're not aware of any information to

2 suggest that the assessments and conclusions contained

3 in this document are factually incorrect, are you,

4 sir?

5 A. No, I'm not.

6 Q. You describe two documents in connection with

7 your direct testimony. Thank you, I'm through with

8 that. The first was a fact-finding mission report that

9 was generated, I think, by three Ambassadors. It was

10 Exhibit Z910 and dated May the 12th. I don't think we

11 need to put this one on the ELMO. I'll just touch very

12 lightly on this.

13 Apparently the Ambassadors wanted to meet

14 with the responsible local authorities to the extent

15 that they could. Isn't that correct, sir?

16 A. Yes. They were sent there to see for

17 themselves what had happened --

18 Q. Right.

19 A. -- form their own opinion and talk to the

20 people necessary.

21 Q. Right. They were taken around by UNPROFOR;

22 correct?

23 A. They were taken around by ECMM but with the

24 escort of UNPROFOR.

25 Q. As far as you're aware, they spoke to

Page 10814

1 everybody to whom they wished to speak in order to come

2 up with valid conclusions regarding their fact-finding

3 mission; correct, sir?

4 A. That I don't know. I know that they have

5 reported on the conversation they've had. I have no

6 recollection that they had wished to see other people

7 whom they couldn't see. They may have had other wishes

8 which for practical or other reasons could not be met.

9 Q. Very well.

10 A. I don't know.

11 Q. You are aware, sir, that they did, in fact,

12 have a meeting with Mr. Valenta, the HVO

13 vice-president; correct?

14 A. Right.

15 Q. You are aware that they had no meeting with

16 Mr. Kordic; correct?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. All right.

19 A. To the extent -- if I can add that -- that it

20 is not reflected in the report, and I have no

21 recollection, six years later, whether or not they had

22 met Mr. Kordic and not reported it.

23 Q. That's a very fair observation, Mr. Brix

24 Andersen. You also made one reference to a report by

25 Charles McLeod, Exhibit Z926. I only have one question

Page 10815

1 in connection with this document.

2 Mr. McLeod records that he -- "I went to the

3 area to talk to leading members of the community on

4 both sides."

5 Are you aware, sir, that not only did Mr.

6 McLeod not meet Mr. Kordic, he never attempted to meet

7 with Mr. Kordic, never asked --

8 JUDGE MAY: How is the witness going to know

9 this sort of thing? It doesn't help us, and, anyway,

10 we heard Mr. McLeod.

11 MR. SAYERS: I think, Your Honour, the point

12 is made and there is no need to beat a dead horse.

13 Let's move on.

14 Q. One of the documents that was contained in

15 the package of materials that you were asked to review

16 and authenticate, Mr. Brix Andersen, was

17 Exhibit Z856,1, and it consists of three -- actually,

18 two separate documents. It looks like there is a press

19 release from HINA, the press agency [Realtime

20 transcript read in error "president"] In Zagreb that

21 you referred to. I don't know whether you have a copy

22 in your package.

23 The press release, and we'll try to locate a

24 copy of this document just in a few seconds, the press

25 release makes reference to a joint statement issued by

Page 10816

1 President Boban of the Croatian Community of

2 Herceg-Bosna, and President Alija Izetbegovic of the

3 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on April the 25th,

4 1993, regarding the political and military situation in

5 Central Bosnia.

6 Do you recall whether you ever saw a copy of

7 that joint communiqué?

8 A. I don't recall that.

9 Q. I wonder if the usher would just show you the

10 document marked as Exhibit D27/1, please.

11 MR. SAYERS: While that's being located,

12 Mr. President, I think there's one transcription error

13 on line 7, page 25. The word "president" with the term

14 "president agency" should read "press agency."

15 Q. You may or may not have seen this joint

16 statement, Mr. Brix Andersen. There are actually two

17 separate documents. There's a joint statement issued

18 by President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban, witnessed by

19 Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and then at the end there is a

20 separate document regarding the command structure for

21 the BiH army and the HVO, signed by the commanders in

22 chief, President Izetbegovic, and Mr. Boban, and by the

23 military chiefs of the general staffs of both

24 organisations, General Sefer Halilovic and General

25 Milivoj Petkovic. Have you ever seen this document

Page 10817

1 before?

2 A. I believe I have, but I wouldn't say it with

3 one a hundred per cent certainty.

4 Q. Very well. The --

5 A. When I say I believe I have, then it is

6 because the information there would have been known to

7 me somehow. Whether it is based on these documents

8 it's impossible to remember now.

9 Q. That's all the questions I have for that. If

10 you have no clear recollection of it, then there's no

11 point in going through the document, Mr. Brix

12 Andersen.

13 One document would I like you to look at and

14 verify for us though is this document that was attached

15 to Exhibit Z856,1. Unfortunately I only have one copy

16 of it so I'll put this on the ELMO, please.

17 Do you recognise this document as a press

18 release issued by the HVO public relations office on

19 May the 1st of 1993, sir?

20 A. I believe I've seen it, yes.

21 Q. And from the faxed information that's

22 contained on the top of the first page, is it accurate

23 to say that this document was being faxed within the

24 ECMM to its various offices, to people that needed to

25 see it? I believe the fax date appears as May the 3rd

Page 10818

1 of 1993.

2 A. No. The information I can see seems to

3 indicate that this document was sent from the ECMM to

4 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen. The

5 acronym UM KRYPTO, that is the name of a fax machine in

6 Copenhagen. So it was sent from Zagreb to Copenhagen,

7 it appears to me.

8 Q. The only point that I would like you to

9 confirm or deny, as the case may be, is that this

10 document was in the possession of the ECMM by May the

11 5th of 1993 at the latest?

12 A. Yes, it would have been there on the 3rd of

13 May.

14 Q. All right. I wonder if the usher could just

15 show you page 2 of this document. Paragraph 4. Were

16 you aware that the HVO public relations office, sir, I

17 believe in Mostar, had announced to the world at large

18 that an investigative commission would be appointed to

19 investigate the facts regarding the crimes that had

20 occurred in the recent past in the interethnic fighting

21 that had broken out in Central Bosnia and else where?

22 A. Yes, I remember that.

23 Q. Thank you.

24 A. Meaning, when I say I remember that, yes, I

25 remember seeing it in this statement.

Page 10819

1 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. I'm through with

2 that.

3 The next topic I'd like to address is the

4 ceasefire negotiations, Mr. Brix Andersen, that

5 actually brought something of an end, perhaps a lull,

6 in the fighting that occurred in Central Bosnia.

7 Were you aware that the head of the regional

8 centre of the ECMM in Zenica was a participant in those

9 negotiations?

10 A. Yes, I was.

11 Q. And those negotiations occurred on the

12 highest military level, did they not? Perhaps that's

13 an unclear question. Let me --

14 A. I'm just waiting for the translator. Yes, I

15 was aware of that.

16 Q. Participants in those negotiations included

17 not just the head of the regional centre in Zenica but

18 also the commanding officer of UNPROFOR in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lieutenant-General Philippe

20 Morillon; correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. And the most senior military officers on the

23 part of the competent factions, Brigadier Petkovic for

24 the HVO, General Halilovic for the ABiH; correct?

25 A. That is correct.

Page 10820

1 Q. Do you recall that you actually -- did you

2 actually write a memorandum about those negotiations

3 yourself, sir, as far as you can recall?

4 A. Are you referring to the briefing notes I

5 used in Geneva?

6 Q. That's a good place to start. You actually

7 did make a reference to the ceasefire negotiations in

8 your briefing notes and briefed, in the document that

9 you prepared, for Lord Owen's use; is that correct?

10 A. The document Lord Owen used was much later.

11 Q. All right.

12 A. My recollection, that was in the first third

13 or first half of June.

14 Q. Let me move on, sir, but just ask you to

15 agree that Mr. Kordic took no part whatsoever, as far

16 as you're aware, in any of those ceasefire negotiations

17 or any of the original ceasefire negotiations that

18 occurred in Vitez involving representatives of the HVO

19 and ABiH sides.

20 A. I couldn't give you a precise answer to

21 that. No, I don't have any recollection of it today.

22 It doesn't mean it did not happen. It may not have

23 been reported to me or I may have forgotten.

24 Q. You just don't know; correct?

25 A. I don't know today.

Page 10821

1 Q. Moving on in time, you made a reference to a

2 meeting held at Medjugorje on May the 18th of 1993. Do

3 you recall that? Once again, sir, it's true that all

4 of the principal civilian and military leaders on both

5 sides were present at that meeting; correct?

6 A. That is correct, including my own minister.

7 Q. And Mr. Kordic took no role whatsoever in any

8 of those negotiations, did he, sir?

9 A. That I don't know. It was not reported to me

10 that he did. He may have been there without it being

11 reported.

12 Q. Once again, though, you simply don't know

13 whether he was there or not, so you can't help us out

14 on that subject, can you?

15 A. That is correct.

16 Q. One general question concerning a body known

17 as the Busovaca Joint Commission. Have you ever heard

18 of that body or does that not ring any familiar bells

19 in your recollection?

20 A. It does ring a bell.

21 Q. It's true, isn't it, that as far as you're

22 aware, Mr. Kordic took no role whatsoever in the

23 negotiations that were chaired by one of the ECMM

24 monitors, Mr. Jeremy Fleming, I believe, that led up to

25 the establishment of that body; correct?

Page 10822

1 A. It's correct I have no recollection of it.

2 Q. And would it be fair to say that you -- were

3 you aware that Mr. Kordic -- not only did he not take

4 any role in those negotiations, he never sat on the

5 Busovaca Joint Commission at all and never attended a

6 single of the daily meetings held by that institution?

7 A. I really don't know whether he was there or

8 was not.

9 Q. Fair enough.

10 A. If he were there, it would somehow have been

11 reflected in the reporting, I'm confident, but I'm not

12 sure.

13 Q. Very well, sir. Let me move on to another

14 topic.

15 You were asked some questions in connection

16 with Exhibit Z943,2, which was a two-page document. It

17 looks like it's signed by Torbjorn Junhov. I think

18 that's in your package, and it is dated the 19th of

19 May, 1993, regarding the relations between Bosnian

20 Croats and Muslims and application of the agreements

21 that had been worked out at Medjugorje. Just one point

22 of detail on this, since this document shows

23 essentially how the Vance-Owen Plan was supposed to

24 work.

25 MR. SAYERS: Just for the Trial Chamber's

Page 10823

1 information, I had previously pointed out Exhibit

2 Z571,1, pages 138 to 39, and that was in the testimony

3 of Brigadier Duncan. There's no need to go over that

4 again.

5 Q. But would it be fair to say, sir, that as of

6 this date, the governmental arrangements envisaged for

7 Province 10 under the Vance-Owen Plan, the Travnik or

8 Travnicka province, were as follows: The provincial

9 governor was to be a Croat; correct?

10 A. If you ask me detailed questions like that, I

11 think my answer would be I have no recollection over

12 and beyond what is in the document.

13 Q. All right. In that case, I would just like

14 to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to the bottom of

15 this page which deals with Travnik and providing that

16 the governor would be a Croat, the vice-governor would

17 be a Muslim, and that the interim provisional

18 government would consist of five Croats, four Muslims,

19 and one vacancy. If you have no knowledge of this

20 document, sir, we will move on, but just one point of

21 detail. Do you know who the provincial governor was

22 supposed to be, the Croat provincial governor?

23 A. I have no recollection now. I may have had

24 at the time, but I'm not sure.

25 Q. There's a reference in Exhibit Z1013, a

Page 10824

1 special report dated June 3rd, 1993, on page 2 that

2 says: "The mayor of Bugojno, Mr. Seljic, HVO, has now

3 been appointed as governor by the Bosnian Croats, and

4 it seems to everybody, including the Bosnian Muslims,

5 to be a good beginning." Does that refresh your memory

6 at all?

7 A. Vaguely, yes.

8 Q. And it is true that Mr. Soljic was supposed

9 to be the Croat governor of Province 10, as far as

10 you're aware; correct?

11 A. According to the document here, yes.

12 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, do you recall the ECMM

13 ever receiving any reports concerning the structure of

14 the military forces in Busovaca and the chain of

15 command within those forces?

16 A. Not offhand.

17 Q. All right. With respect to the document

18 about which I was just asking you some questions,

19 there's a reference, sir, to high political and

20 military leaders from the Croat and Muslim side being

21 present, namely President Izetbegovic, Mr. Boban,

22 Mr. Ganic, and a gentleman by the name of

23 Mr. Akmadzic. Does the name "Akmadzic" ring a bell?

24 Do you know who he was?

25 A. It does ring a bell, yes.

Page 10825

1 Q. Do you recall that Mr. Akmadzic was one of

2 the five vice-presidents of the HDZ political party?

3 A. Yes, I remember that.

4 Q. And it was envisaged, sir, that a military

5 committee consisting of President Izetbegovic,

6 Mr. Boban, Mr. Ganic and Mr. Akmadzic would be formed;

7 correct? If you take a look at page 2 of the document

8 that we were just discussing, Exhibit 943,2.

9 JUDGE MAY: Whereabouts should the witness

10 look, Mr. Sayers?

11 MR. SAYERS: On page 2, Your Honour. It's

12 rather difficult to read because the copy is a little

13 blurred, but it appears under Roman Numeral V, "Central

14 Government." It's May the 19th, 1993, sir. I have a

15 copy for the ELMO, if that would assist the witness.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

17 MR. SAYERS: Thank you.

18 Q. If you would just look down at Roman

19 Numeral V, sir, it says, "Central Government. It was

20 agreed that in accordance with existing constitution of

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the following changes should be

22 made: A military committee of four should be

23 established," and it contains the four names that I

24 just recited. It also goes on to say that those

25 members affected would have to resign their positions

Page 10826

1 and that it was further agreed that Mr. Prlic would be

2 appointed the prime minister of the government. You

3 were aware that Mr. Prlic was actually the president of

4 the HVO at this time, were you not, sir?

5 A. Yes, I was.

6 Q. All right, thank you. The next document that

7 I'd like to just ask you a few questions about is

8 Exhibit Z993, Mr. Brix Andersen, May the 29th, 1993.

9 MR. SAYERS: I have a copy for the ELMO,

10 Mr. President, if the usher would be so good as to put

11 it on there.

12 Q. The first page to which I would like to draw

13 your attention is actually page 7. Once again, sir,

14 this is an official ECMM document; correct?

15 A. Yes. This is a document in a series of

16 briefings prepared by the headquarter staff.

17 Q. And so this sets out the position of the ECMM

18 headquarters on the date of this document, anyway, the

19 29th of May, 1993; correct?

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. Would you turn to page 7, paragraph 8, sir?

22 One question about this. The observation is made by

23 the ECMM headquarters that: "While the Vance-Owen Plan

24 may be the preferred solution for the West, it may

25 falter in attempts to impose it on a region where the

Page 10827

1 natural political evolution may be toward three

2 constituent states." That was the view of the ECMM at

3 the time this document was prepared; correct?

4 A. No, it was not. As I said, this was a

5 briefing document prepared for the headquarters. Now,

6 this did not reflect, shall we say, the official

7 position of the ECMM as we would report it to

8 headquarters. This would be more a sort of discussion

9 paper for our internal understanding of the situation.

10 This was not supposed to be made public. It was not

11 supposed to be sort of a background paper for policy

12 decisions. This was how we saw it, and this was how we

13 thought it would be useful to stimulate the monitors'

14 thinking about what was going on on the ground. So it

15 does not reflect European policy on this.

16 Q. But nonetheless --

17 A. At that point in time, we were still

18 committed to the implementation of the Vance-Owen

19 Plan. What it says here is that it would be a

20 difficult job, which it has also proved to be.

21 Q. This does represent what the headquarters was

22 disseminating to monitors as briefing materials;

23 correct?

24 A. That is correct. We disseminated this to

25 monitors for their information, not as a policy

Page 10828

1 statement that the Vance-Owen Plan was about to fall.

2 On the contrary, at every given opportunity we declared

3 that we were firmly behind the implementation of the

4 Vance-Owen Plan. But we could also see what was

5 happening in the real world.

6 Q. And it's true that the plan actually evolved

7 in July and August of 1993, as far as you're aware,

8 into the Stoltenberg-Owen Plan which actually did

9 envisage a union of three constituent republics of

10 three constituent peoples; correct?

11 A. Yes. But as you indicate, this is after I

12 had left the mission, so I didn't follow events quite

13 as closely as when I was in Zagreb.

14 Q. But you are aware of the basic details of the

15 Stoltenberg-Owen Plan, and that's about the most basic

16 detail; is that correct?

17 A. That is correct.

18 Q. All right. Next, sir, page 7 again,

19 paragraph 10. The observation is made by the

20 headquarters that the rise of nationalism among the

21 peoples of this region has created what are arguably

22 legitimate aspirations for self-determination and

23 sovereign state status. Then you go on to observe the

24 challenges that are connected with that particular

25 observation. Was that the view of the ECMM at this

Page 10829

1 time at the end of May 1993?

2 A. It was our assessment that there was a rise

3 of nationalism. I think that very few people would

4 doubt that. I think also that it is true that what had

5 been created was what was arguably legitimate

6 aspirations. That goes for all of the peoples in the

7 former Yugoslavia, for the Krajina Serbs, for the

8 Serbs, for the Croats, for the Croatians, for the

9 Muslims. What we tried to grasp was how do we explain

10 to ourselves and to the outside world exactly where is

11 the limit. The view of the mission was that we would

12 try to understand what were the political motives

13 behind the events on the ground, while at the same time

14 being very careful not to accept or condone the methods

15 with which the peoples of the region tried to implement

16 these political principles. So we tried to make a

17 clear distinction between our analysis of the political

18 aspirations and the methods of the leadership and the

19 methods of the troops and the people on the ground. I

20 think that is, in essence, what the mission was about.

21 Q. Thank you, sir.

22 A. But never accepting the methods which were

23 not democratic, legitimate, in every single aspect of

24 it.

25 Q. You were aware, I take it, at all times, sir,

Page 10830

1 that the Croat segment of the population of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina was a small minority, about 17,3 to 17,8

3 per cent of the total population; correct?

4 A. Total population of what?

5 Q. I beg your pardon?

6 A. Total population of what?

7 Q. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republic.

8 A. I think there are many statistics. It

9 depends a little on when you make the census. Yes, we

10 were aware that the Croat community was fairly small

11 when you compare it to the total population of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yes, we were also aware of the

13 fact that in Herceg-Bosna, there was a majority. But I

14 don't think it's fair to ask if I remember all the

15 figures to the exact point.

16 Q. I agree.

17 A. But we had the basic understanding of the

18 figures for the whole of the country and for the

19 various provinces, yes.

20 Q. Two final questions in connection with this

21 document, sir. If the usher would turn to the next

22 page, page 8, there's a summary prepared by Mr. Pugh

23 from the information section. The conclusion appears

24 here that there is a separate but parallel agenda that

25 exists among all three parties to this conflict. Do

Page 10831

1 you have any knowledge of what that agenda was or what

2 the discussions on the subject of that tripartite

3 agenda were?

4 A. I think that the fair answer to that question

5 is that whenever we were dealing with events in

6 Yugoslavia, you wouldn't expect one agenda only from

7 any given party. There would always be one extra or

8 several extra agendas.

9 Q. And you found that to be the case with

10 respect to all of the various participants in the

11 conflict; correct?

12 A. As a general statement, yes, like I just

13 said, but depending on the level at which you are

14 operating and the territory which was involved. There

15 was never any clear agenda, one agenda, for each of the

16 parties, covering all aspects at all levels and all

17 territories.

18 Q. Thank you, sir. Can I just draw your

19 attention, lastly, on this document to paragraph 14.

20 There's a rather resigned tone about that paragraph,

21 which indicates that the ECMM's view is that: "The

22 Vance-Owen Plan, while still the official international

23 solution, may not be able to be implemented because of

24 the deep-rooted animosity among the warring parties,

25 and the capacity to live together may simply not

Page 10832

1 exist."

2 Was that the official ECMM view at the end of

3 May 1993?

4 A. Yes, it was. And we were right, weren't we.

5 But with the added comment that the official position

6 of the ECMM was to work for the implementation of the

7 Vance-Owen Plan until the day that Lord Owen himself

8 declared it didn't serve any purpose any more and you

9 had to start afresh. So we were loyal to the political

10 directives we received from the presidency and from the

11 Member States, but it didn't mean that we did not think

12 about what we saw on the ground ourselves.

13 Q. Sir, was there a perception on the part of

14 the ECMM that UNPROFOR, the UNPROFOR forces in Central

15 Bosnia, were not able to function at full effectiveness

16 because of the tremendous limitations upon their

17 mandate, being confined, as they were, to providing

18 assistance to the UNHCR in the provision of

19 humanitarian aid?

20 A. I think you're putting it more squarely than

21 I would subscribe to. I think UNPROFOR was doing their

22 very best to implement their mandate as they construed

23 it. They were facing great difficulties, which was

24 obvious.

25 Q. In your valedictory address, June the 16th,

Page 10833

1 1993, Exhibit Z1065, on page 7, you make the

2 observation that: "The current conservative

3 interpretation of the mandate limiting UNPROFOR to

4 support of UNHCR convoys has given the impression of an

5 ineffective organisation and has deeply affected the

6 credibility of the International Community."

7 Then you make some suggestions regarding a

8 possibly more expansive interpretation of UNPROFOR's

9 mandate. But the conclusion that I've just read to

10 you, that's a conclusion that you had reached at the

11 end of your tour, essentially in the middle of June of

12 1993, is that correct, sir?

13 A. It is correct that this is a conclusion I

14 signed on to in a report to my government. I think

15 it's fair to say that if I had written the same paper

16 for publication, I would perhaps have termed it

17 slightly different, but in a sense it would be the

18 same.

19 Q. Thank you. The final topic that I would like

20 to cover with you, sir, and I appreciate your patience,

21 is the testimony that you gave regarding the asserted

22 presence of Croatian army units or forces in southern

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You never saw any reports of the

24 presence of HV or Croatian army troops in Central

25 Bosnia, did you, sir?

Page 10834

1 A. You have the reports before you. I was not a

2 monitor in the field in this period of time. We used

3 not a lot but we used some of the resources of the ECMM

4 in order to ascertain whether or not the HV were

5 operating inside Bosnia or whether they were giving

6 support, in terms of equipment or supplies, to the

7 HVO.

8 As is stated in several of the reports, it

9 was, of course, difficult to find such information

10 because, obviously, it would be in the interests of the

11 HVO and especially the HV to try to keep it concealed

12 to us and UNPROFOR. Nevertheless, it was our

13 considered opinion that the HV did give assistance to

14 the HVO.

15 If you go back to the paper regarding the

16 Medjugorje meeting, it would be difficult for us or for

17 the West to tell President Tudjman that he should limit

18 the support and that he should exert influence on the

19 HVO if we thought that Croatia did not assist the HVO.

20 And this was done on behalf of the European presidency,

21 it was done by the president himself, my Foreign

22 Minister, and was done with the knowledge of all the

23 member governments.

24 Now, if our information had been inaccurate,

25 there would have been one or more of the member states

Page 10835

1 whose representatives would have objected to this

2 statement being made. The fact that the presidency was

3 able to make the demands --

4 Q. I going to cut you off, sir. I appreciate

5 your answer but the question is a very narrow one. You

6 never saw any reports of the presence of HV or Croatian

7 army troops in Central Bosnia --

8 JUDGE MAY: The witness cannot be expected to

9 remember everything that's in the reports. As he

10 points out rightly, you have them. Now, if there's any

11 further point you want to make about it, do.


13 Q. We have been provided with three reports.

14 Let's take a look at one or two of them, sir.

15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Mr. Sayers,

16 yesterday you said that you would finish this

17 cross-examination this morning. Moreover, it is a

18 cross-examination based on the examination of certain

19 documents. You have been cross-examining the witness

20 for about an hour and a half, and I really should like

21 to know -- I would appreciate you telling me how long

22 do you intend to go on, bearing in mind that

23 Mr. Kovacic also needs to cross-examine this witness.

24 So how long will you take do you think?

25 MR. SAYERS: Your Honour, I'm mindful of the

Page 10836

1 commitments I made to the Trial Chamber yesterday. As

2 I informed the Trial Chamber, this is the last subject

3 about which I have questions for Mr. Brix Andersen, and

4 I would anticipate maybe another 20 minutes of

5 questions and I'll be through. So Mr. Mikulicic will

6 have the remainder of the time, which should be a good

7 hour and a quarter, I think.

8 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can look at the

9 documents -- we'll adjourn, take our break now -- and

10 reduce it to 10 minutes if it's merely one subject.

11 MR. NICE: Can I just raise an administrative

12 query at one stage this morning in order to plan

13 witnesses for this week and next week?

14 JUDGE MAY: It may be convenient when we've

15 completed this witness.

16 Yes. Half an hour.

17 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 11.34 a.m.

19 MR. SAYERS: Thank you, Mr. President.

20 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, we've been given ten

21 minutes, so please give me a hand. We'll try to rush

22 through these three exhibits in short order.

23 The first is Exhibit Z1151,1, and I have a

24 copy here for the ELMO. This is a document dated July

25 30, 1993, and I appreciate that this postdates your

Page 10837

1 involvement in the area, sir. But if you take a look

2 at the first page, the observation is made that it is

3 very difficult for ECMM teams to provide a definite

4 answer to these questions, questions such as HV

5 involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as military

6 intelligence is strictly forbidden to them for their

7 safety in the field. That was true throughout your

8 tour as deputy head of the mission; is that correct?

9 A. That's correct. We were very concerned about

10 the security of our monitors. We were unarmed and we

11 were not able to protect ourselves. Therefore, we made

12 a point of being seen -- not only being but being seen

13 to be impartial, and to engage in intelligence

14 gathering would not be impartial. But there is a

15 difference between intelligence gathering and providing

16 information on what is obvious on the ground.

17 Q. But suffice it to say that it was the

18 position of the ECMM that it was difficult for monitors

19 to gather military intelligence for the reasons stated

20 in this document; correct?

21 A. That is correct. We would try to get the

22 information from the ground that occurred, but we would

23 not go to the extreme that a military unit perhaps

24 would go in order to obtain such information.

25 Q. If I could just draw your attention to the

Page 10838

1 second page, sir.

2 If you could just lower the page, Mr. Usher,

3 by about two inches, actually lower it instead of

4 pushing it up. There you go.

5 Now, would it be fair to say, sir, that the

6 best that the ECMM had accumulated as of July the 30th,

7 1993, on this subject, HV involvement in BiH, were the

8 hints or evidences in three areas of Herzegovina

9 summarised on this page?

10 A. Six or seven years later, I don't think I can

11 provide any more specific information than what is in

12 the document here, over and above to say that it was an

13 issue in which we took great interest. We wanted to be

14 able to verify to our governments whether or not

15 Croatia was involved, so we went to some lengths in

16 order to obtain such information without endangering

17 our personnel. And we were quite confident that the

18 Croatian government, the Croatian army, did operate

19 within Bosnia-Herzegovina with equipment, with

20 personnel.

21 Q. You never obtained any definitive information

22 regarding the magnitude of that involvement, though,

23 did you, sir?

24 A. Not over and above what is in the reports in

25 evidence here.

Page 10839

1 Q. Well, moving along -- I'm finished with that

2 document -- the next one that I would like to address

3 to you is Exhibit Z1012 about which you gave

4 testimony. This is a document dated June the 3rd,

5 1993. I have one question on page 1. If you go

6 under --

7 Mr. Usher, if you could show paragraph 2,

8 please, on the ELMO. Thank you. That's good.

9 There's a reference here to a trickle of

10 confirmed proof, and as of June 3rd, 1993, the position

11 that the existence and extent of HV involvement has

12 always been difficult to define, and the many reports

13 provided by the BiH Armija have seldom been confirmed

14 by ECMM, UNMOs, or UNPROFOR, and that's correct, isn't

15 it?

16 A. That is correct, but you must also understand

17 again that we did not get involved in what is strictly

18 intelligence gathering, and it wasn't necessary for our

19 purposes. Our purpose was only to demonstrate that

20 there was a high degree of probability, bordering on

21 certainty, that the Croatian army was involved. That

22 was enough for us to report to the presidency and to

23 the capitals that there was a problem which we couldn't

24 solve on the ground and which would be an issue that

25 should be dealt with at the level of capitals and for

Page 10840

1 capitals to decide whether or not to approach President

2 Tudjman or others in order to stop such assistance.

3 Now, we didn't have to provide specific information on

4 where and when we decided particular pieces of

5 equipment or troops, but our assessment was, and it

6 still stands, that there was HV involvement in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document,

9 and the last document that I have for you is Exhibit

10 Z1050, which is a document dated June the 13th, 1993,

11 and about which you testified, sir.

12 This is right at the end of your tour, and as

13 you've stated in your direct examination, part of the

14 mission of the monitors on the ground was to look for

15 proof of HV involvement specifically. In Item 7, the

16 observation is made that regardless of the outcome of

17 the debate over HV presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the

18 international perception is as you've or as this

19 document articulates. There is no question that there

20 was an active and ongoing debate about the nature,

21 existence, or magnitude of the involvement of HV troops

22 in south-western Herzegovina; isn't that correct?

23 A. It's true that we started to debate within

24 the ECMM the extent to which there was HV presence and

25 assistance. We did not discuss and we did not doubt

Page 10841

1 among ourselves that there was such an involvement.

2 Q. The debate, though, was still unanswered as

3 of this date, was it not, June the 13th, 1993?

4 A. No, it was not. The debate would have been

5 over, at the very latest, in preparing for the

6 Medjugorje meeting. At the Medjugorje meeting, the

7 presidency explained to President Tudjman that the time

8 had come to stop HV involvement. These statements were

9 on the basis of several reports, of course, to the

10 presidents in Copenhagen and to capitals, but one of

11 the sources would, of course, be the ECMM, and at that

12 point in time there was no doubt about Croatia's

13 engagement.

14 Q. Let me just ask you one question in that

15 regard, sir. With regard to paragraph 5 of this

16 document, apparently there had been a discussion

17 between the headquarters of the ECMM and Major General

18 Slobodan Praljak from the Croatian Ministry of Defence,

19 and it was reported by Major General Praljak that

20 while -- he denied that there was any direct

21 involvement by HV combat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

22 didn't he?

23 A. According to the report, yes.

24 Q. And reported to you that people in HV

25 uniforms may have been spotted but those were the

Page 10842

1 individuals who were chosen to join the HVO for

2 personal reasons; correct?

3 A. It is correct that that is in the report. It

4 was not our assessment that it was a true

5 representation of the facts.

6 Q. My final question, meeting the 10-minute

7 deadline: Do you know whether the ECMM ever prepared

8 any written analysis containing the conclusions that

9 you've just reached, that the reports of involvement of

10 Croatians on behalf of the Croat forces in south-west

11 Herzegovina, for personal reasons, was, in fact, not

12 true?

13 A. I have no specific recollection of any

14 document over and above the documents that have been

15 brought into the court as evidence here, but still, it

16 was the general assessment of the ECMM headquarters, as

17 well as the monitors on the ground, that there was such

18 involvement.

19 Now, sometimes you come to a point where you

20 do not dispute the facts and you do not dispute the

21 assessments. So over and above the documents you've

22 seen here, there was no need perceived to prepare any

23 specific analysis of the subject. We took it for

24 granted. And the behaviour and the reactions of the

25 various individuals was, in a way, to confirm our

Page 10843

1 assessment. The document you pointed out here seems to

2 confirm it, and the reaction of the Croatian government

3 seems to confirm it. There was no dispute of the fact,

4 there was no Member Government which responded to

5 Copenhagen that ECMM was out of line, which would have

6 been the case if we had made an erroneous assessment of

7 such an important issue.

8 Q. So as far as you're aware, the three

9 documents which we've just looked at basically set out

10 and summarise the sum total of information available on

11 that subject, HV involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12 south-west Herzegovina specifically, available to the

13 ECMM after the conclusion of your six-month tour in

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

15 A. No, it does not. These documents are the

16 documents which have been brought before the Court.

17 There may be other documents in the files of the ECMM.

18 There may be other documents in the files of the Member

19 Governments. These documents are there. There may be

20 other information. You cannot conclude from my

21 statement that this is all the ECMM knew about

22 the HV involvement.

23 Q. If such documents exist, however, you

24 certainly weren't shown them in preparation for your

25 testimony yesterday and today, were you, sir?

Page 10844

1 A. No. I was shown the documents which are in

2 the folder here and which have been referenced to the

3 Court.

4 Q. Thank you very much indeed, sir. I

5 appreciate your testimony.

6 MR. SAYERS: Thank you very much,

7 Mr. President. No further questions.

8 Cross-examined by Mr. Mikulicic:

9 Q. Good morning, Mr. Brix Andersen. I am Goran

10 Mikulicic. I'm a lawyer from Zagreb, and with my

11 colleague Mr. Kovacic, I represent the second accused

12 in this case, Mario Cerkez.

13 Mr. Brix Andersen, the ECMM headquarters in

14 Zagreb where you discharged your functions was, if I

15 may put it that way, a multi-national, multi-ethnic

16 organisation, wasn't it?

17 A. Yes, it was.

18 Q. So there are people who came from different

19 countries, members of the European Union. Would it be

20 then correct to say that members from different

21 countries, members of the European Union, also brought

22 with them different views about the situation in the

23 then Yugoslavia, which would correspond, which would be

24 in agreement with the official positions of the

25 countries they came from?

Page 10845

1 A. That would not be correct to say. If you

2 came there --

3 Q. Yes, sorry.

4 A. The people were assigned by their

5 governments. They came to the ECMM with their own

6 background and experience. We were under the command

7 and control, whichever word you prefer, of the ECMM

8 headquarters. They were briefed on the situation by

9 the ECMM over and above whatever national briefings

10 they may have received. They were not there to

11 represent national political points of view. Some of

12 them, from countries which had had close relations to

13 one or the other of the parties, would have the

14 advantage of perhaps understanding better the

15 situation. Some of them even spoke the language, which

16 of course was an advantage. But, no, they were there

17 as monitors. They were under our control. They did

18 not represent the Member Nations.

19 That level of control was exercised through

20 the presidency which rotated with the European

21 presidency. So whatever political input had to come

22 from capitals would come via the presidency.

23 Q. Yes, I quite understand that,

24 Mr. Brix Andersen, but as you say yourself, there were

25 different people with different backgrounds coming from

Page 10846

1 different cultural environments and different levels of

2 education too. So would it be fair to conclude that

3 when on the ground those people, of course, acquired

4 and developed their own views, of course within the

5 broad context of the monitoring mission?

6 A. I don't want to be splitting hairs with you,

7 but it's very much a question of your definition. No,

8 they did not have their own personal views. They had

9 the views of the mission. They had -- you have to

10 remember also that the teams always operated with at

11 least two people. There were always two monitors on a

12 team, plus a driver, plus an interpreter, but there

13 were always two monitors. They would very seldomly be

14 from the same country. They would prepare their

15 reports together. So for one monitor to influence a

16 report in a direction which was not based on the facts

17 of the points of view expressed to them during

18 conversations would be very, very difficult. So we

19 made a special point of trying to ensure that all the

20 monitors were impartial, and we didn't have any

21 incidents of the kind you were referring to, where

22 reports were obviously influenced by personal belief or

23 national instructions.

24 Q. I understand that. Would this same

25 conclusion could be applied vice versa too; that is, I

Page 10847

1 mean, the briefings of the new monitors who would

2 arrive in Zagreb and take over the functions. So that

3 is, were the briefings on the ground just as well

4 balanced when this comes to the ECMM?

5 A. The ECMM was set up very much like a military

6 organisation, which it was not, but about 75, 80 per

7 cent of the monitors were military men or women. And

8 when things are done the military way, it is done very

9 meticulously and it is down according to format. So

10 there would be very little chance of any briefer to

11 express and to impress on the monitors he was briefing

12 his own personal points of view. It would be done on

13 the basis of standard material with very little

14 diversions from time to time.

15 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation]

16 Mr. Mikulicic, I should like to ask Mr. Andersen if

17 when those monitors were briefed that what has already

18 become international, but were those also asked to

19 distinguish between the facts they reported and the

20 opinions that they may have held or come to on the

21 basis of what they had seen? Was a distinction made

22 between the facts and their personal opinions?

23 A. Yes, Your Honour. We made a point of

24 distinguishing between facts and assessment. Now, when

25 you read the various reports, especially the kind of

Page 10848

1 reports which are termed "political excerpts," you will

2 see that that dividing line is not always easy to

3 find.

4 One reason is the difference in background.

5 Some of the monitors were fairly young officers or

6 reserve officers; some were fairly senior, be from the

7 level of 1st Lieutenant to Colonel, on the monitor

8 side; and they were military men. The diplomats or

9 civilians who were there would rank from a young first

10 secretary to an Ambassador. So there was a huge

11 difference in background of the people.

12 There was also a difference in command of

13 English, English being the language of the mission. It

14 is fairly obvious from the reports which have been

15 brought into evidence in the court.

16 So, yes, it was the opinion of the mission

17 that there should be made a distinction between facts

18 and assessment. In practice it was sometimes difficult

19 to uphold that distinction for the reasons I mentioned,

20 coupled in some cases also with pure fatigue, because

21 many of these people were working very, very long hours

22 under difficult circumstances.

23 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] And to

24 complete my question -- Mr. Mikulicic, I do apologise

25 to you -- a certain level of this European mission were

Page 10849

1 there to established facts, to find the facts. You

2 received the information, but before you make your

3 report do you try to go through all the information

4 and, therefore, gather it, infiltrate in order to

5 produce a report on facts?

6 A. Your Honour, we have different reports before

7 us. The mundane reporting system was based on the fact

8 that every team reported at the end of every day what

9 they had done for the whole of the day. That would

10 include political talks, whatever military

11 establishments they had visited, monitoring of weapons

12 in storage in some cases, monitoring of ceasefire

13 lines, simple questions as to their logistics, et

14 cetera.

15 These reports would be sent to the

16 coordination centre, which would compile a combined

17 report based on the various team reports. That again

18 would be sent to the RC, which would again condense the

19 report before sending it off to Zagreb.

20 Now in Zagreb, the chief of operations and

21 his people in the operations centre would compile a

22 draft daily report which would be sent over to

23 Copenhagen after it had been reviewed by the political

24 advisor, by the chief of staff, by myself, and

25 ultimately shown to the head of the mission before we

Page 10850

1 sent it to Copenhagen.

2 In Copenhagen it would again be looked over

3 by a desk officer and then disseminated to the capitals

4 of the European Union and with copies made to the

5 co-chairmen, Vance and Owen.

6 JUDGE BENNOUNA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

7 Thank you very much.


9 Q. So these reports that you are referring to,

10 what kind of reports were they? Were they internal

11 reports or were they public reports; that is, reports

12 that could perhaps be published and given to the

13 media?

14 A. The reports that were made were internal in

15 the sense that they would, probably all of them, be

16 marked ECMM restricted. That means that they were not

17 for publication. They were meant for the next higher

18 level in command, and they were ultimately to be

19 distributed to the member states of the European

20 Union. Only if they were marked "press communiqué", or

21 whatever, would they be made available to the public,

22 not the regular reporting.

23 Q. So if I understand it, the reports which were

24 shown to be ECMM restricted, they were meant for

25 restrictive use only. Who would be the individual who

Page 10851

1 would authorise giving such reports to anyone outside

2 the ECMM, who had such an authority?

3 A. It depends on who you would give the report

4 to. If you give it to the co-chairman, the liaison

5 officer, would, of course, be authorised to do so. If

6 it was to the U.N., UNPROFOR, yes, of course, the

7 liaison officers could do it. If we're talking about

8 the public, meaning the media, such decisions would

9 normally have to be taken by a person who was confident

10 that he could take that responsibility. What I'm

11 trying to say is that there were no written-down,

12 formal, legal, strict rules on the dissemination of

13 these reports. But again when they were marked

14 restricted, they were not intended to be made public,

15 but they could be distributed to friendly agencies and

16 governments.

17 Q. Thank you. Let us move on to another topic,

18 Mr. Brix Andersen.

19 We shall be helped, I believe, by a map, and

20 I should like to ask the usher to help me to distribute

21 it and show it to you. It is about the position of the

22 Croat national minority in the territory of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Mikulicic, what is the map

25 that you're showing the witness, and where is it from,

Page 10852

1 please?

2 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] This map is

3 showing the ethnic composition of the municipalities in

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the 1991 census, and the

5 map was used as a Prosecution exhibit in the Aleksovski

6 case, produced through the expert witness Professor

7 Bianchini.

8 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

9 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Anderson, we spoke about the Croat

11 community or Croats, if you will, in the territory of

12 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. On this map, the

13 Croats are in red. However, if you look at this map,

14 then you will see that in three -- that Croats in

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina are grouped in three areas; in the

16 north in the municipalities of Bosanski Brod and

17 others; then in Central Bosnia there is municipalities

18 of Vitez, Busovaca, and so forth; and in south-west

19 Bosnia, that is the municipalities bordering on

20 south-east Croatia.

21 Now, my question is, and I'm referring to the

22 ECMM mission, in your view was the ECMM aware of the

23 difference between individual -- were you aware of the

24 fact that various Croat communities in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina did not always share the interests,

Page 10853

1 bearing in mind their geographical location and the

2 surroundings and environment in which they lived?

3 A. Can you rephrase that question for my better

4 understanding?

5 Q. Yes. I do apologise for not being clear

6 enough.

7 So Mr. Andersen, my question is the

8 following: Did the ECMM see the Croat community in the

9 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an integral and

10 uniform community, in view of the geographic location,

11 but did it also perceive that there were differences

12 between individual Croat communities, in view of their

13 geographical location?

14 A. Yes. We were aware of the 1991 census. We

15 knew of these figures. We knew the approximate

16 distribution of the various ethnic groups in

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also knew, as is clear from

18 this point of the report in evidence here, that the

19 wishes and aspirations and interests of the Croats in

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina were not always the very same,

21 depending on where in Bosnia they were located. That

22 is true. You will see one of the reports referring to

23 some of the Croat communities to the east and to the

24 north of the provinces or the districts you have marked

25 in red here. So, yes, we tried our very best to

Page 10854

1 understand the composition of the population in the

2 various parts of the territory.

3 Does that answer your question?

4 Q. It does, yes. Thank you. Perhaps just

5 another question.

6 Will you please look at the north-west part

7 of this map marked green, which shows the predominance

8 of predominantly Muslim municipalities of Velika

9 Kladusa, and others. Are you familiar with the name of

10 Fikret Abdic and his political standing, his political

11 activities?

12 A. I know the name of Mr. Abdic, yes.

13 Q. Do you know that Mr. Abdic is a Muslim by

14 ethnicity?

15 A. That is my understanding, yes.

16 Q. Do you know that at some point during the war

17 which was raging in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Abdic, as

18 the political leader of the area that we referred to,

19 which is usually called Cazin's Krajina, that he

20 proclaimed an independent province there, that is,

21 independent of the central government in Sarajevo?

22 A. Yes, we knew that.

23 Q. And do you know that as a result, a conflict

24 broke out between Muslim forces loyal to Fikret Abdic

25 and the Muslim forces loyal to the central government

Page 10855

1 and the BH army?

2 A. In general, yes. I don't think I would be

3 able to give you the precise details of the fighting

4 and the times, but yes.

5 Q. Very well. So I won't insist on this

6 particular topic anymore, but I should like to ask

7 could we get the number for this exhibit, please?

8 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be

9 numbered D49/2.

10 MR. MIKULICIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 Q. Let us move on to another subject,

12 Mr. Andersen, and that is the relations between the

13 Republic of Croatia and the Republic of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

15 I assume, and you yourself said, that before

16 you assumed this responsible role, that you, of course,

17 took pains to gather some information about the

18 situation in that part of the world. That is so, isn't

19 it?

20 A. That's true.

21 Q. In this regard, I should like to ask you to

22 look at a document which has already been tendered here

23 as an exhibit, and I also have copies for you and for

24 the ELMO so we could follow it easier. This is

25 Document D98/1.

Page 10856

1 So this is an agreement on friendship and

2 cooperation between the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina

3 and the Republic of Croatia, and I should like to draw

4 your attention, Mr. Andersen, that evidently there has

5 been an error in this document which was that it was

6 referring to the 21st of July, '91, and it was '92 in

7 fact, because in '91 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

8 did not exist yet.

9 So Mr. Andersen, you must be aware that on

10 the 6th of April, '92, the Republic of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence, its

12 sovereignty. Do you know that in the wake of that,

13 that is, the very next day, the 7th of April, it was

14 the first one to recognise the sovereignty of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Are you aware that the Republic of Croatia

18 was the first country member of the world community

19 which sent its ambassador to the Republic of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the war was going on in the

21 occupied Sarajevo?

22 A. I couldn't say that I knew for certain that

23 it was the first, but I knew that it was one of the

24 first.

25 Q. Will you now please look at Item 3 on page 2

Page 10857

1 of the document? It says here that the Republic of

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina expresses its gratitude to the

3 Republic of Croatia for having received and provided

4 for refugees. The ECMM, and you personally, were aware

5 of the fact that the Republic of Croatia, as the war

6 raged in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as during the war

7 that raged in the Republic of Croatia, offered refuge

8 to some 250.000 Muslim refugees who had escaped to the

9 territory of the Republic of Croatia?

10 A. In general, yes. I'm not quite so certain

11 about the figure, but the order of magnitude seems to

12 be about right.

13 Q. Will you please look at Item 6 on the same

14 document. The ECMM, and you personally, were you aware

15 of the fact that in keeping with this agreement, the

16 HVO became an integral part of the armed forces of the

17 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

18 A. That is what the document says, yes.

19 Q. Will you please now look at Item 7. Did you

20 know that under this agreement, the Republic of Bosnia

21 and the Republic of Croatia assumed a mutual or

22 reciprocal obligation to grant dual nationality to

23 their citizens?

24 A. In general, yes, and I seem to remember that

25 the implementation of it was complicated. But in

Page 10858

1 general, yes.

2 Q. And could you please look at page 3 of this

3 document now. I would like to draw your attention to

4 the end of the third section, where it says that the

5 states would continue their cooperation in the

6 military sphere and would coordinate military

7 operations. Were you aware of this agreement?

8 A. I don't have a memory of it which is

9 sufficiently clear to say "yes", but in general, that

10 was the impression that we had, yes.

11 Q. Very well. So we don't need this document

12 anymore.

13 You said, during your examination-in-chief,

14 Mr. Andersen, that you got some basic impressions.

15 After all, you stayed in Zagreb, the capital of

16 Croatia, so I have a question in relation to that.

17 You personally and the ECMM mission, were you

18 aware of the fact that the Republic of Croatia had

19 passed certain laws whereby the citizens of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina would be expelled from its territory? I'm

21 referring to persons of Muslim ethnicity and I'm

22 referring to the period when you were there. Were

23 there any laws that would block their bank accounts,

24 freeze their assets, or something to that effect?

25 A. I have no recollection of having seen any

Page 10859

1 such law or decree, no.

2 Q. The International Community, and, of course,

3 through the activity of the ECMM, decided, as you told

4 us, to exert some pressure on the Republic of Croatia

5 through its president, Dr. Tudjman, that he use his

6 influence and try to put a stop to the fighting between

7 the Muslim and Croat communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

8 is that correct?

9 A. That is correct.

10 Q. My question would be the following: Was

11 there indeed an attempt made by the Republic of

12 Croatia, through its president, to influence both

13 communities, naturally the Croat community more, but

14 both communities in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

15 and there are numerous examples that would point that

16 out, not to go into all of them now?

17 A. Yes. In the pile of documents brought into

18 evidence, there are communiqués and reports on

19 President Tudjman visiting and talking to Bosnian Croat

20 leaders and to the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. Mr. Andersen, could you please have a look at

22 a document that you already saw during your

23 examination-in-chief? I'm talking about document Z910,

24 910/1. I have a copy here so you don't have to look

25 through all your documents.

Page 10860

1 MR. MIKULICIC: Could the usher please assist

2 me and have this placed on the ELMO and have it

3 distributed as well, please.

4 Q. Could you please have a look at page 3 of

5 this document. So, Mr. Andersen, you said during your

6 testimony that on the 24th of April, 1993, a meeting

7 was organised in Zagreb under the patronage of

8 Lord Owen, so to speak. The meeting was attended by

9 Mr. Alija Izetbegovic as the representative of the

10 Muslim community and Mr. Boban as the representative of

11 the Croat community from Bosnia-Herzegovina. President

12 Tudjman had, in a way, given the initiative for calling

13 this meeting.

14 Do you have any information about this?

15 A. I have the information in the documents that

16 you have put before me, yes.

17 Q. Could you please have a look at another

18 document which was already tendered in this case. This

19 is D33/2.

20 You see an appeal that was addressed by

21 President Tudjman to the Muslim and Croat leaders in

22 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, calling upon them

23 to stop fighting. He also invited them to Zagreb on

24 the 24th of April, 1993, to attend a meeting with

25 Lord Owen. You can see the last line of this

Page 10861

1 document.

2 Is that the meeting that we talked about?

3 A. I believe it is, yes.

4 Q. Thank you. So let us go back to that meeting

5 and to its aftermath. There was a press release

6 through HINA, the Croat news agency, and it was said

7 that attempts were made to stop the fighting. Is it

8 true that the Croatian parliament established a

9 multi-party delegation with a view to its going to the

10 critical areas in order to bring about a ceasefire?

11 A. I remember that there was a delegation

12 formed. I have no clear recollection of whom they met

13 and what the results were, but I remember that the

14 delegation was discussed and I believe it was formed.

15 Q. Would it jog your memory if I said that in

16 Bosnia, unfortunately, it was not possible for this

17 delegation to visit these critical areas?

18 A. I believe that is the term in one of the ECMM

19 reports, yes.

20 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Andersen, that President

21 Tudjman, during his visit to Turkey, which is also a

22 predominantly Muslim republic in terms of the ethnic

23 background of the population and religious, that an

24 agreement was reached to set up a governmental

25 commission between Croatia and Turkey that would be

Page 10862

1 sent to Bosnia as a goodwill mission?

2 A. Yes, I remember that.

3 Q. Are you aware of the fact that

4 President Tudjman also talked to the highest

5 representative of the Islamic community in Croatia and

6 Slovenia and asked him to influence his Muslim

7 believers to the effect of having the fighting stopped

8 in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

9 A. The way you're asking the questions, it calls

10 for a more or less yes or no. Yes, I was aware of it,

11 but if you'll allow me the further comment that I've

12 already made before, that in many cases in the former

13 Yugoslavia, people had more than one agenda. I think

14 that is also a remark to cover the activities of

15 President Tudjman. He's on record, as you have stated

16 here, of appealing to the various parties. He's on

17 record of having met with the Turkish representatives

18 and Muslim representatives in Croatia and Slovenia.

19 That, I think, is one of the agendas, to be seen to

20 exert influence. It was our assessment that in order

21 for this agenda to be the prevailing one, there was

22 still a need for some prodding.

23 Q. If I understood your answer correctly,

24 Mr. Andersen, in spite of these efforts the conflicts

25 did not stop in the area, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is

Page 10863

1 that right, at least at that time?

2 A. The conflict did not stop at that time. It

3 went up and down but it didn't stop.

4 Q. I know, Mr. Andersen, that you left your post

5 sometime in July 1993. However, I'm going to ask you

6 something about the following: Do you know something

7 about the agreement from the 30th of July, 1993,

8 between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of

9 Bosnia, so to speak, and this agreement resulted in a

10 joint declaration between Presidents Tudjman and

11 Izetbegovic in Geneva in September 1993? Do you know

12 about this joint declaration?

13 A. I know of it. I have no precise information

14 on what went on there -- I had left the mission and I

15 was preparing for another assignment -- but in general,

16 yes.

17 Q. Mr. Andersen, could you please have a look at

18 the text of this joint declaration and tell me whether

19 that is the document that we've just been discussing?

20 MR. MIKULICIC: I would like to have it

21 admitted into evidence, please.

22 THE REGISTRAR: Document is numbered D50/2.


24 Q. Of course, Mr. Andersen, I'm not going to ask

25 you about the document itself because it's

Page 10864

1 self-explanatory; however, I would like to hear your

2 comment. Is that the meeting we discussed which was a

3 consequence of the Geneva agreements between

4 Izetbegovic and Tudjman?

5 A. That is what I believe, but as we have talked

6 about, I wasn't there at the time. I was preparing for

7 another assignment, so I didn't follow events closely

8 enough to have any specific opinion on this document.

9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Andersen, for having been

10 patient with me.

11 MR. MIKULICIC: Thank you, Your Honours. I

12 have no further questions of this witness.

13 MR. SCOTT: If the usher could leave the last

14 document, perhaps we should start with that.

15 Re-examined by Mr. Scott:

16 Q. The document which is Exhibit D50/2, looking

17 at this document, sir, this appears to be essentially

18 what might be considered a peace agreement or ceasefire

19 involving Bosnia in terms of the conflict between the

20 Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims. Does that

21 appear to be the case from looking at the document?

22 A. Yes, it would, but I mean, there are no

23 signatures, there are markings, et cetera. So whether

24 this was the actual final document is difficult to

25 say. It could be a draft. It could have been signed.

Page 10865

1 I think it was signed, but I mean ...

2 Q. Assuming for the moment -- putting aside the

3 ultimate authenticity of the document and whether this

4 was ever signed or not, which we can perhaps suspend

5 for the moment, this, though, was an agreement to

6 resolve a conflict that at least by some accounts was,

7 some would suggest, and certainly Croatia had

8 suggested, was purely internal to Bosnia-Herzegovina;

9 is that correct?

10 A. Yes, signed by President Tudjman.

11 Q. Yes, and that was my question. But to

12 resolve an agreement, by his account wholly internal to

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the two parties signing it was

14 the president of that country and, in fact,

15 Mr. Tudjman, the president of the wholly third country

16 or foreign country; is that correct?

17 A. That's correct. And that is consistent with

18 what the ECMM held for true, that the Republic of

19 Croatia was an important factor in the events of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Q. You've said a few moments ago that

22 Mr. Tudjman's visits to various places such as Turkey

23 and other public appearances for the purposes of being

24 seen to support a peace effort concerning Bosnia was

25 considered by ECMM to be one of his agendas. Can you

Page 10866

1 tell the Court what might have been his other agenda?

2 A. I'm perhaps overlooking a few, but the one

3 certain agenda could be for Croatia to be seen as a

4 country with close ties to the West and which would

5 ultimately become members of the Western organisations

6 and interlinked in the Western economic system. I

7 think that was one of the paramount interests of

8 President Tudjman and Croatia, and that was one of the

9 reasons why they seceded from the former Yugoslavia.

10 They didn't want to be part of that economic and

11 political system. They wanted, together with Slovenia,

12 to join the north-western part of Europe.

13 Q. Did you at ECMM sense any conflict between

14 the agenda on the one hand to be seen as, if I can say

15 it this way, a respectable member of the Western

16 European community and on the other hand the desires of

17 the Bosnian Croat leadership to be part of or

18 confederated with Croatia?

19 A. I think it calls more for speculation than

20 for a statement of fact, but there's very little

21 question that Croatia wanted both to the extent

22 possible --

23 Q. Very well.

24 A. -- in case of conflict between the aims. I

25 would tend to believe, but others would perhaps defer,

Page 10867

1 but I would tend to believe that Croatia's linkage with

2 the respectable West would have overriding importance

3 to the government and to Dr. Tudjman.

4 Q. Very well. And staying on President Tudjman

5 for a moment, there was an earlier document, perhaps we

6 can just refer to it without taking the time to pull it

7 out again, Defence Exhibit 27/1, which was the

8 agreement signed between, I think again,

9 Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban in Zagreb around the

10 23rd of April, 1993, in which Tudjman also signed it.

11 Well, I think I'm going to have to correct

12 myself. Forgive me. It's probably going to be

13 necessary to look at the document. Defence 27/1.

14 Perhaps we could just look at the third page,

15 signature page, first on the ELMO, if that's possible.

16 Mr. Brix Andersen, if you could let the usher

17 see that momentarily to put it on the ELMO. Thank

18 you.

19 On the third page, just confirming that it

20 was, in fact, signed by Mr. Boban, President

21 Izetbegovic, and President Tudjman. If could I then

22 direct your attention to paragraph 5, starting on

23 page 2 --

24 MR. SAYERS: Mr. President, just for the

25 accuracy of the record -- obviously the document speaks

Page 10868

1 for itself -- but I think that to be fair, the question

2 should reflect that Dr. Tudjman witnessed that

3 agreement. He did sign but only as a witness, not as

4 one of the contracting parties.

5 MR. SCOTT: No position to the contrary, Your

6 Honour.

7 Q. If you look at paragraph 5, the document

8 states: "The signatories of the joint statement

9 condemn most severely all violations of the rules of

10 International Humanitarian Law regardless of their

11 perpetrators, both sides having been responsible,

12 according to data available so far, and undertake to

13 urgently initiate joint and individual inquest

14 concerning each instance of violation of such rights

15 and immediately examine personal responsibility for the

16 conflicts and crimes perpetrated against the civilian

17 population."

18 Now, sir, would you agree with me that in the

19 wake of the events around Ahmici and the Lasva Valley

20 in April of 1993, there was considerable international

21 pressure, partly reflected back by this document,

22 considerable international tension brought to bear on

23 these atrocities?

24 A. There was a great deal of attention, yes. We

25 wanted that attention also. That was why we sent the

Page 10869

1 three Ambassadors to Ahmici.

2 Q. Can you tell the Court whether or not as part

3 of this international essentially world class interest,

4 was part of that focus brought on President Tudjman and

5 his government, to try again to use the influence to

6 get some answer to the causes and perpetrators of these

7 atrocities?

8 A. It was the constant aim of the co-chairman

9 and whoever met with President Tudjman and others to

10 see to it that the atrocities were limited in number

11 and scope and that the people who had committed them,

12 they were brought to trial.

13 Q. To your knowledge, sir, by the time you left

14 the ECMM at the beginning of July, 1993, had any public

15 report or criminal charges been brought or military

16 discipline been exercised, to your knowledge, over any

17 party involved or allegedly involved in carrying out

18 the atrocities in the Lasva Valley?

19 A. Not to my knowledge, no.

20 Q. Concerning the questions about the views of

21 individual monitors, can you tell the Court: Did you

22 ever find Ambassador Thebault to be biased or

23 prejudiced for or against any particular of the parties

24 involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

25 A. I most certainly did not. He was a very

Page 10870

1 competent, very professional French diplomat.

2 Q. Concerning -- there was a series of questions

3 concerning Mr. Kordic's role or position. Do you

4 recall receiving any reports from the field, either

5 from ECMM or UNPROFOR or otherwise, indicating that in

6 any meetings or communications with Mr. Kordic that he

7 expressed a disagreement or rejection of the view that

8 he was, in fact, a powerful and central figure among

9 the Bosnian Croat leadership?

10 MR. SAYERS: Objection, to the extent that

11 that calls for speculation, Your Honour. That would

12 assume that Mr. Kordic would be aware of the reports

13 that were being made about him by the ECMM, and this

14 witness has stated that those were entirely internal

15 reports.

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, if I could --

17 JUDGE MAY: The question is allowable. It's

18 an open-ended question and the witness can give a

19 response.


21 Q. Did you get my question or would you prefer I

22 repeat it, sir?

23 A. I think I would prefer to know exactly what

24 I'm responding to.

25 Q. Yes, absolutely. Let me just simply read it

Page 10871

1 back to you. I'm not sure I can improve on it. Do you

2 recall receiving any reports from the field, either

3 from ECMM or UNPROFOR, otherwise indicating that at any

4 meetings or communications with Mr. Kordic, that he

5 expressed a disagreement or rejection of the view that

6 he was, in fact, a powerful and central figure amongst

7 the Bosnian and Herzegovinian -- actually, if I could

8 correct that to say the Bosnian Croat [realtime

9 transcript read in error "Bosnian and Croatian"]

10 leadership?

11 A. I never saw such reports.

12 Q. Did you have any information that both

13 Mr. Kordic's colleagues, if I can use that term, his

14 fellow members of such things as the HDZ, the HVO, and

15 members of the international organisations in Central

16 Bosnia frequently referred to him as "Colonel Kordic"?

17 JUDGE MAY: That's a leading question.

18 MR. SCOTT: Well, all right, Your Honour.

19 I'm sorry to belabour this, but I think it's

20 important for the transcript. My last question, line

21 14 of the screen, should be "the Bosnian Croat

22 leadership."

23 Your Honour, if you could give me just one

24 moment, please. Your Honour, I think in the interests

25 of time, and I know the Court does not want us

Page 10872

1 presumably to stand here and read lengthy passages from

2 the documents in evidence, perhaps I can indicate to

3 the Court this: There was a considerable line of

4 questions about the question whether, in fact,

5 Herceg-Bosna was not intended by the Bosnian Croat

6 leadership as a temporary authority ultimately loyal to

7 the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are a

8 series of documents that are already in evidence, and

9 if time allowed and if the Court was so inclined, I

10 could take the witness through them. But I would point

11 the Court to Exhibits Z859,1, Z1013, and Z993, in

12 particular, which I can simply represent to the Court,

13 and I'm happy to go there if the Court wishes me to,

14 deals with this issue at length in which the ECMM's

15 position is that that characterisation of Herceg-Bosna

16 is not accurate.

17 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

18 MR. SCOTT: If I could just maybe close on

19 this point, Your Honour, and then I have only one other

20 point to make.

21 Q. Mr. Brix Andersen, if I can direct your

22 attention to Exhibit 1065, your, as you've called it

23 several times, your valedictory report, do you have

24 that still? Perhaps if you could keep your finger on

25 that for one moment, 1065, and then could you also find

Page 10873

1 and have in front of you Exhibit 1061. It's actually

2 just the document immediately before it, I believe.

3 Sorry if that's unwieldy, but if you would look first

4 at Exhibit 1061, to the fourth page where you testified

5 yesterday about the four aims of the HVO. Do you have

6 that in front of you?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. By the time that your tenure ended in early

9 July of 1993, did you and ECMM see that the HVO views

10 or aims had changed in any significant respect from

11 those four aims or did they continue to be the same?

12 A. It's my belief and my understanding of it

13 that they were still the aims.

14 Q. And, in fact, if you will look then at 1065

15 very briefly, Your Honours, to page 2, carrying over to

16 the top of page 3, do you not at those locations in

17 many respects reaffirm and restate those same aims?

18 A. Yes, I do.

19 Q. In terms of the friendship or cooperation

20 agreement that Mr. Cerkez's counsel showed you, in

21 terms of military cooperation, let me -- if we can

22 hopefully do it shortly this way: Was it ECMM's

23 assessment, again at least continuing up until the time

24 that you left that organisation, that the State of

25 Croatia and its armed forces were not involved in

Page 10874

1 Bosnia, only in connection with fighting against what

2 might be called the Serb forces, but that the State of

3 Croatia and its armed forces were also involved in

4 supporting and involved in the armed conflict between

5 the Bosnian Croats and the Muslims?

6 MR. SAYERS: Objection to the leading nature

7 of that question, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE MAY: No, this is an International

9 Tribunal. We are not in some national jurisdiction

10 where we have to have these constant interruptions.

11 But it doesn't help, equally, if leading questions are

12 asked. Counsel should be experienced enough not to do

13 that.

14 Now, is that concluding the witness's

15 evidence?

16 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, and I can ask

17 that several different ways but I'm trying to be

18 sensitive to the time factor. I would be happy to take

19 the Court's guidance either way.

20 JUDGE MAY: I think we've had this question

21 answered several times. We don't need to hear it

22 again.

23 Mr. Brix Andersen, thank you for your

24 evidence. Thank you for coming to the International

25 Tribunal to give it. Your evidence is now concluded,

Page 10875

1 and you're free to go.

2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 [The witness withdrew]

4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I've just got this

5 manila bundle. I wondered whether it's going to be of

6 use when the witness gives evidence next week or

7 whether it's intended to produce yet another bundle.

8 MR. NICE: I think we're undecided on that

9 yet, and we probably won't be able to decide until the

10 end of Monday. But can we keep it in mind, and if we

11 keep that manila bundle to hand, we'll try and remember

12 either to say, "That's the bundle to use," or, "There's

13 a substitute bundle."

14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. And if we can use the

15 same one, so much the better.

16 MR. NICE: I absolutely agree. I think it

17 would be sensible to use the same bundle.

18 Your Honour, it's 10 to 1.00. The next

19 witness is the subject of an application in respect of

20 protection, so at some stage we perhaps should go into

21 private session. I have doubts -- I'm going too fast.

22 I have doubts about the wisdom of starting this

23 witness. Perhaps we can go into private session and

24 I'll explain why.

25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We won't start the witness,

Page 10876

1 in any event.

2 MR. NICE: Very well. If we can go into

3 private session, I can deal with the application and a

4 couple of administrative matters as well.

5 [Private session]

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 (redacted)

13 (redacted)

14 (redacted)

15 (redacted)

16 (redacted)

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 10877













13 pages 10877-10881 redacted private session



16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

17 1.00 p.m., to be reconvened on

18 Thursday, the 2nd day of December, 1999,

19 at 9.30 a.m.