

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

CASE NO. IT-00-39-I

THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL

AGAINST

MOMCILO KRAJISNIK

AMENDED INDICTMENT

The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("the Statute of the Tribunal"), charges:

MOMCILO KRAJISNIK

with **GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR, and GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS** as set forth below:

THE ACCUSED

1. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, son of Sreten and Milka (née Spiric) was born on 20 January 1945 in Zabrdje, municipality of Novi Grad, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** has been a leading member of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter SDS) from the period of its establishment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** is a long-standing associate of Radovan KARADZIC, former President of the SDS. Together with Radovan KARADZIC, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** served on a number of SDS bodies and committees. On 12 July 1991, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was elected to the Main Board of the SDS.
3. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was President of the Assembly of Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnian Serb Assembly) from 24 October 1991 until at least November 1995.
4. From 27 March 1992 **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, together with Radovan KARADZIC and other members of the SDS, was a member of the National Security Council of the so called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Serbian republic). **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, together with Radovan KARADZIC and other members of the SDS, served on the expanded Presidency of the Serbian republic from the beginning of June 1992 until 17 December, 1992. From on or about 30 November 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, along with Radovan KARADZIC and other members of the SDS was a member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Serbian republic.

COUNTS

5. Between 1 July 1991 and December 30 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, acting individually or in concert with Radovan KARADZIC and others, participated in the below-charged crimes in order to secure control of those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those areas include but are not limited to the municipalities of: Banja Luka; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac; Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Hadzici; Ilidza; Ilija; Jajce; Kljuc; Kalinovik; Kotor Varo; Nevesinje; Novi Grad; Novo Sarajevo; Pale; Prijedor; Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Teslic; Trnovo; Viegrad; Vlasenica; Vogoca; Zavidovici; and Zvornik.

6. In order to achieve this objective, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** and Radovan KARADZIC, initiated and implemented a course of conduct which included the creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror tactics, that would have the effect of encouraging non-Serbs to leave those areas; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation of others. By 31 December 1992, this course of conduct resulted in the death or forced departure of a significant portion of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb groups from these municipalities.

7. Bosnian Serb forces including military, paramilitary, territorial defence and police units (hereafter Bosnian Serb forces), SDS and government authorities acting under the direction and control of **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, Radovan KARADZIC and others were engaged in a variety of actions to significantly reduce the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of these municipalities.

8. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces seized physical control of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5, often through violent attacks. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a co-ordinated and planned manner. Organisation and direction of the take-overs and following events were provided by the SDS, military and police leadership, and the governing organs of Serb municipalities, including the Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions.

COUNTS 1-6 (GENOCIDE, COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, EXTERMINATION, MURDER, WILFUL KILLING)

9. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-8 and Paragraphs 32-58 in Counts 1-6.

10. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, acting individually or in concert with Radovan KARADZIC and others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the destruction, in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in several municipalities, including but not limited to: Bijeljina; Bratunac; Bosanski Samac; Brcko; Doboj; Foca; Ilija; Kljuc; Kotor Varo; Novi Grad; Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski Most; Viegrad; Vlasenica; Zavidovici; and Zvornik. The destruction of these groups in these municipalities was effected by:

- a. the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats which took place during and after the attacks on and within the municipalities and the killing of Bosnian

Muslims and Bosnian Croats in and after they had been taken away from camps and detention facilities;

b. the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during their confinement in camps and detention facilities, and during their interrogations at these locations, police stations and military barracks, where detainees were continuously subjected to, or forced to witness, inhumane acts including murder, sexual violence, torture, beatings and robbery, and

c. the detention of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in camps and detention facilities under conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction in whole or in part of those national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such.

KILLINGS

11. The killings by Bosnian Serb forces during and after the attacks on and within these municipalities include, but are not limited to:

- the killing on or about 1-2 April 1992 of at least forty-eight Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in Bijeljina town - Bijeljina municipality;
- the killing on or about 7-8 May 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats at the Crkvina warehouse - Bosanski Samac municipality;
- the killing on or about 4 May 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males at the Hotel Posavina - Brcko municipality;
- the killing on or about 10 May 1992 of thirty-four Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat civilians of the village of Gornja Grapska - Doboj municipality;
- the killing on or about 1 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers from Jelec - Foca municipality;
- the execution on or about 5 June 1992 of eighteen Bosnian Muslim villagers from Ljeevo - Ilija municipality;
- the execution on or about 30 May 1992 of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers of Prhovo, including women and children, and the mass execution on or about 1 June 1992 of over one hundred Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Velagici - Kljuc municipality;
- the killing on or about 13 August 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslim males of Dabovci village, and the killing in November 1992 of approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males of Grabovica village - Kotor Varo municipality.
- the killing on or about 23 July 1992 of the Bosnian Muslim villagers of Carakovo - Prijedor municipality;
- the killing on or about 25 May 1992 of more than thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat women and children in the village of Hrustovo - Sanski Most municipality;
- the execution throughout June 1992 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men, women and children of Viegrad at various bridges over the Drina, and the 14 June 1992 killing of more than sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat villagers from Koritnik village -Viegrad municipality;
- the killing on or about 2 May 1992 of approximately twelve Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Drum, and the killing on or about 16 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children of the village of Zaklopaca - Vlasenica municipality;
- the killing on or about 25 June 1992 of twenty-one Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat civilians from Vozuca village - Zavidovici municipality;
- the killing on or about 9 April 1992 of fifteen Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males

from the town of Zvornik - Zvornik municipality.

12. SDS and government authorities established camps and detention facilities in the municipalities. Following the attacks on the municipalities, Bosnian Serb forces rounded up tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and forced them to march to assembly points, for transfer to the camps and detention facilities. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were pulled from the columns during these marches and executed.

13. Many of those Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who survived the attacks and forced marches were taken to these camps and detention facilities, including but not limited to:

- Manjaca in Banja Luka municipality, from about 21 April to 18 December 1992;
- Batkovic in Bijeljina municipality, from about 1 June to 31 December 1992;
- the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac municipality, from 1 May 1992 throughout the period alleged in this indictment;
- Luka in Brcko municipality, from 7 May to early July 1992;
- Bare ammunition warehouse from 1 May 1992, Spreca prison from 1 May 1992, the SUP station from 1 May to 31 July 1992, Percin s Disco from 1 May 1992, Sevarlije JNA barracks from 1 May to 30 June 1992, and the JNA hangars near the Bosanska plantation from May 1992, all in Doboj municipality;
- KP Dom in Foca municipality, from 18 April 1992 throughout the period alleged in this indictment;
- Omarska from 15 May to 15 August 1992, Keraterm from 15 May to 6 August 1992, and Trnopolje from 15 May to 30 September 1992 in Prijedor municipality;
- Rasadnik/Sladara from 1 May 1992 throughout the period of this indictment, and Veljko Vlahovic School from 1 May to 31 August 1992, in Rogatica municipality;
- Betonirka from 27 May to 7 July 1992 in Sanski Most municipality;
- Suica from 2 June to early September 1992 in Vlasenica municipality;
- Celopek Dom Kultur from 29 May to 30 June 1992, Ekonomija Farm from about 7 May to 22 May 1992, Karakaj Technical School from 29 May to June 1992 in Zvornik municipality.

14. These camps and detention facilities were staffed and operated by military and police personnel, under the ultimate direction and control of senior Bosnian Serb leadership, including **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** and Radovan KARADZIC.

15. The killing by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats in these camps and detention facilities, or after they had been taken away from them, includes but is not limited to:

- the May 1992 summary execution of Bosnian Muslim detainees in Luka Camp - Brcko municipality;
- the killings through May and June 1992 of military aged Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat male prisoners from Suica camp - Vlasenica municipality;
- the killings in June 1992 of over thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croats male prisoners at the Celopek Dom Kultur; the mass killing on or about 1-5 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and sixty Bosnian Muslim males at Karakaj Technical School; the killing on or about 5-8 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat prisoners at Gero s slaughterhouse - Zvornik municipality;
- the mass killing on or about 14 June 1992 of forty-seven Bosnian Muslim men from Rajlovac camp - Novi Grad municipality;
- the execution on or about 15 June 1992 of at least ten Bosnian Muslim males from Viegrad

- Rogatica municipality;
- the execution on or about 20 July 1992 of over one-hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the "Brdo" region of Prijedor at Omarska camp; the execution on or about 24-25 July 1992 of approximately one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males in Room 3 of Keraterm camp; the mass execution on or about 21 August 1992 of approximately one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from Trnopolje camp on Vlasic mountain in Skender Vakuf - Prijedor municipality;
- the repeated beating, torture and killing over the month of July 1992 of thirty-six Bosnian Muslim detainees in Foca KP Dom; the killing on or about 5 August 1992 of over twenty Bosnian Muslim male detainees from Kalinovik municipality who were taken to Foca KP Dom, and from there later killed near Jelec - Foca municipality.

CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM

16. In the camps and detention facilities, Bosnian Serb forces and others who were given unrestricted access to the camps, subjected Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from the municipalities to physical and mental abuse, causing them serious bodily or mental harm. As a result of these inhumane acts, during the period from late March 1992 to 31 December 1992, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats died in these detention facilities.

CONDITIONS CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION

17. Conditions in the camps and detention facilities included inadequate food, often amounting to starvation rations, foul water, insufficient or non-existent medical care, inadequate hygiene conditions and lack of space.

18. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 10 through 17 above, or had done so. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** participated in:

Count 1: GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 2: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(e), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 3: Extermination, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(b), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 4: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 5: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 6: Wilful killing, a **GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949**, punishable under Articles 2(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

**COUNT 7
(PERSECUTIONS)**

19. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 9-17, Paragraphs 23-24 and Paragraphs 32-58 in Count 7.

20. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, acting individually or in concert with Radovan KARADZIC and others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5. These persecutions included but are not limited to:

a. the killing by Bosnian Serb forces of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats during and after the attacks on the areas and municipalities listed in Paragraphs 10 and 11, and in the camps and detention facilities as described in Paragraphs 12 and 15;

b. the forced transfer or deportation by Bosnian Serb forces of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5;

c. the inhumane treatment and/or torture of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5. During and after the attacks on these municipalities, whether they were taken to detention centres, police stations, military barracks, private homes or other locations, Bosnian Serb forces subjected Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serb civilians to brutal, inhumane treatment, which included beatings, sexual violence and death threats on a daily basis. Many were forced to witness executions and brutal assaults of other detainees;

d. the constant humiliation and degradation by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5. In the detention facilities, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb males and females suffered egregious, inhumane conditions on a daily basis. Detainees were deprived of adequate nutrition, adequate medical care, hygienic sanitation facilities, and were forced to endure inhumane accommodations. The detainees subsisted in an atmosphere of constant terror fostered by random brutality. Physical violence, mental suffering, sexual violence and other degrading and humiliating circumstances that constituted fundamental attacks on their humanity were repeatedly inflicted upon the detainees;

e. the denial of fundamental rights by Bosnian Serb forces to Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5, including the right to work, freedom of movement, the right to judicial process, and the right of equal access to public services including proper medical care;

f. the wanton destruction by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian

Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns and villages in the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5. During and after the attacks on these municipalities, Bosnian Serb forces systematically destroyed Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns, villages and property, including homes, businesses and Muslim and Roman Catholic sacred sites. Buildings were shelled, torched or dynamited. The destruction was so extensive that nothing but portions of buildings and rubble remained in many of these municipalities. Buildings associated with the Serbian Orthodox religion remained untouched.

21. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraph 20 above, or had done so. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** participated in:

Count 7: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY**, punishable under Articles 5(h) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

COUNTS 8-9 (DEPORTATION, INHUMANE ACTS)

22. The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 19-21 and Paragraphs 32-58 in Counts 8-9.

23. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, with Radovan KARADZIC and others, acting individually or in concert, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the forced transfer and deportation of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5.

24. From early April 1992, the organised forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of these municipalities began. They were deported to areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the internationally recognised government and to Croatia and Serbia. The forced transfers and deportations were organised by the Bosnian Serb police forces and other Bosnian Serb municipal organs operating at the direction of the Crisis Staffs. In many cases, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs were required to sign documents stating that they were turning over all of their property to the Bosnian Serb republic in order for Bosnian Serb authorities to allow them to leave or to release them from detention facilities.

25. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing the acts described in Paragraphs 23 and 24 above, or had done so. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

By these acts and omissions, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** participated in:

Count 8: Deportation, a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY** punishable under Articles 5(d) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Count 9: Inhumane acts (forced transfer), a **CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY** punishable under Article 5(i) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

26. As an active member of the Bosnian Serb leadership during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992 **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, acting individually or in concert with Radovan KARADZIC and others, exercised both formal and/or defacto power and control over the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this Indictment.

27. In particular, through his positions as member of National Security Council and a member of the Presidency of the Serbian republic, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, with Radovan KARADZIC and others, controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment;

a. On 27 March 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly created the National Security Council of the Serbian republic. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, was one of its eight members. Radovan KARADZIC was its President. Radovan KARADZIC was of the view that decisions of the National Security Council should bind all the executive organs, the police and government, particularly in urgent situations where decisions had to be taken on war, peace and other matters of national security. The stated function of the National Security Council was to consider political, legal, constitutional and other issues of interest for the security of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Until the three-member Presidency was formed on 12 May 1992, the National Security Council was effectively the main body of authority in the Serbian republic;

b. Radovan KARADZIC was elected President of the Presidency. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** continued to attend meetings of this three-member Presidency until he became a formal member of this organ when it was expanded on or about 1 June 1992. From that time, until its dissolution in December, 1992, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was an active member of the expanded Presidency of the Serbian republic. The expanded Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the Bosnian Serb army in peace and war and of the Bosnian Serb police forces in war and other emergency situations. The Presidency decided on the deployment of the army in war; appointed, promoted and discharged officers of the army of the Bosnian Serb republic. In addition, the Presidency received reports on the activities of units under its command;

c. As a member of the expanded Presidency, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** had the authority to punish or to initiate investigations or proceedings against any persons or members of the armed forces under his command who were believed to have committed crimes on the territory of the Serbian republic;

d. On 17 December 1992 the expanded Presidency was disbanded and Radovan KARADZIC was elected sole President of the Serbian republic (Republika Srpska).

28. In addition, through his position as member of Main Board of the SDS, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, acting individually or in concert with Radovan KARADZIC and others, exercised power and control

over the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities, including Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War Commissions who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment;

a. On 12 July 1991, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was elected to the Main Board of the SDS. Radovan KARADZIC was President of the Main Board. Effectively, the Main Board was the main authority within the party's hierarchy; it formulated the party's policies and ensured that they were put into effect. The Main Board and SDS leaders exercised direct control over the activities and policies of all levels of the SDS, including the municipal boards;

b. The Main Board ordered the creation of the SDS Crisis Staffs in municipalities where Serbs lived. The chairmen of the SDS municipal boards were frequently the Presidents of or members of the Crisis Staffs. Crisis Staffs included military and police officials among their members. Crisis Staffs exercised complete executive, legislative and regulatory authority in the areas under their control and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces.

29. From 24 October 1991, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** used his position as President of the Bosnian Serb Assembly to direct the establishment of separate Serbian municipal governments in SDS-claimed areas. He requested the Yugoslav National Army (hereafter JNA) for arms, ammunition and other military equipment to protect the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Bosnian Serbs and other citizens voted to remain in a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** encouraged SDS deputies to the Bosnian Serb Assembly to support the takeover of power and securing control by the SDS over territory claimed as part of the Serbian republic, on one occasion calling for ethnic separation. Resolutions taken by the Bosnian Serb Assembly were immediately communicated to and implemented by Serbian municipal authorities.

30. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** also exercised power and control over the organs and institutions noted in Paragraphs 26 through 29 by virtue of his close association with Radovan KARADZIC, SDS President, President of the Presidency of the Serbian republic and later President of the Serbian republic; and from the role they shared as the principal policy makers of the SDS.

31. Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, both through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership were committing the crimes alleged in this indictment or had done so, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

32. All acts or omissions charged as Genocide or Complicity in Genocide, were committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

33. All acts and omissions charged as Crimes against humanity were part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and/or other non-Serb civilian populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

34. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of international armed conflict and partial occupation existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

35. All acts and omissions charged as Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ("grave breaches") occurred during the armed conflict and partial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

36. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was required to abide by the laws and customs governing the conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional protocols thereto.

37. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering, committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal Statute.

38. **Momcilo KRAJISNIK**, while holding the positions of superior authority as set out in the foregoing paragraphs, is also criminally responsible for the acts of his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Tribunal Statute. A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinate(s) were about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

ADDITIONAL FACTS

39. The SDS was one of the three ethnically oriented parties that emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 in preparation for multi-party elections to be held in November of that year. From its inception, Radovan KARADZIC was the SDS party's president, whilst **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** was a leading party member. Each of the three parties was aligned with one of the three principal ethnic groups in Bosnia: the SDS was the principal Serb national party; the Party of Democratic Action (hereafter SDA) was the main Bosnian Muslim national party; the Croatian Democratic Community (hereafter HDZ) was the leading Croat national party. The results of the elections reflected the dominance of these three main national parties. At the Republic level, the SDA won the most seats in the Assembly, followed by the SDS and then the HDZ. The remaining seats were split between other parties, including the former Communist Party.

40. The central idea within the SDS political platform, as articulated by its leaders, including **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** and Radovan KARADZIC, was the unity of all Serbs within Yugoslavia as the only way of protecting the Serbian national interests. This idea was related to the concept of a "Greater Serbia" which began to openly circulate in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) in the late 1980s. The SDS regarded the separation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federal Yugoslav system as a threat to the interests of the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

41. The results of the November 1990 elections meant that, as time went on, the SDS would have had insufficient political authority to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina in Yugoslavia through democratic political processes. In the spring of 1991 the SDS began to organise certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina into formal regional structures through the concept of "Associations of Municipalities" which existed under the 1974 Yugoslav constitutional regime.

42. Parallel to its organisational structure, which covered republic, regional, municipal and local community levels, in 1991 the SDS leadership developed a closed, covert internal system of command, control and communications. In this system, the main authority belonged to the central SDS party organs and, in particular, to the President and the Main Board of the party, thus ensuring

complete control by the party's leadership.

43. In late June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars fought in Slovenia and Croatia after the two republics declared independence on 25 June. The JNA withdrew from Slovenia after a very short period, allowing for its secession from the SFRY. In Croatia, however, the fighting continued throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1991.

44. For the war in Croatia, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the male population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These orders were opposed by the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which issued orders to the population that they did not have to respond to the mobilisation. As a result, very few Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats answered the call-up. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs responded in large numbers, exhorted to do so by the SDS.

45. As the war in Croatia continued, it appeared increasingly likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina would also declare its independence from the SFRY. The SDS however, wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia. As it became clear that they would not be able to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Yugoslav federation, the SDS began in earnest the creation of a separate Serbian territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By September 1991 the SDS proclaimed one Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb Autonomous Districts (hereafter SAOs). The SAOs became the first territorial foundation on which the Serbian republic was to be founded.

46. As viewed by the SDS leaders, a major problem in the creation and control of Serbian territory was the significant Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations that lived in areas the SDS claimed. Thus, a significant aspect of the plan to create a new Serbian state was the permanent removal or "ethnic cleansing" of nearly all of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations from those areas, allowing for the presence of only a small number of non-Serbs who would agree to the conditions for living in a Serb-dominated State.

47. In the autumn of 1991, the JNA began to withdraw its forces out of Croatia and re-deploy them in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Working in conjunction with certain elements in the JNA, the SDS began to covertly arm the Bosnian Serb civilian population.

48. A separate Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the SDS, was founded on 24 October 1991 as the highest representative and legislative organ of Serbs in Bosnia.

49. In late December 1991 the leaders of the SDS began preparations for the physical take-over of power in those municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina where Serbs did not have clear control, and for the subsequent implementation of a general plan for ethnically cleansing the areas they considered to be Serbian. The take-overs were executed following instructions issued by the SDS leadership, often through Crisis Staffs that were brought into being for this purpose.

50. The Crisis Staff was modelled on an entity that had existed as part of the defence system in the SFRY, and was designated to take over the functioning of the municipalities or republic government, as the case may have been, during times of war or a state of emergency when the Assembly, normally the highest authority of government, would not have been able to function.

51. The Crisis Staffs began functioning in SDS-claimed municipalities in late December, 1991. They operated at both the regional and municipal levels of authority as the bodies that would be responsible for the co-ordination of the execution of most of the operational phase of the plan for ethnic cleansing.

52. On 31 May and 10 June 1992, the Presidency ordered the re-designation of the Crisis Staffs as War Presidencies and then War Commissions in the municipalities. The War Presidencies/War Commissions maintained the same structure and virtually the same authority as the Crisis Staffs, and were still commonly referred to by the public as Crisis Staffs.

53. The Crisis Staffs were to cease operation when the Assemblies were able to meet or to conduct business again. The regular municipal organs would then resume operation, generally under the direction of the same SDS leaders. These municipal organs then approved or validated the actions of the Crisis Staffs.

54. On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly, under the leadership of **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** proclaimed the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina". The territory of that republic was declared to include "the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the genocide conducted against it in World War Two," and it was declared to be part of the Yugoslav federal state.

55. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began to seize physical control of ethnically mixed municipalities that had been declared part of the Serbian state, including but not limited to the municipalities listed in Paragraph 5. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a similar, co-ordinated and planned manner. The attacks, take-overs and subsequent events were planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies, War Commissions and other SDS and government authorities acting under the control and direction of the SDS leadership, including **Momcilo KRAJISNIK** and Radovan KARADZIC.

56. On 15 April 1992, the acting Presidents of the Serbian republic issued and signed a proclamation declaring immediate threat of war.

57. Also on 12 May the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to create the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter VRS), effectively transforming the JNA units remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other armed forces working in concert in Bosnia and Herzegovina into commands of the new army. The Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed Ratko MLADIC as Commander of the VRS Main Staff. In this capacity Ratko MLADIC was directly subordinate to the Presidency.

58. The JNA "officially" withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, but military operations directed against the non-Serb population continued to be carried out by the VRS and Bosnian Serb police. The JNA, which had been re-named the Yugoslav Army (hereafter VJ) during the SFRY's reconstitution as the FRY in April 1992, continued to have strong links with the VRS. It provided critical combat, financial, and logistic support to the Bosnian Serb military effort. Many officers, commanders, soldiers, logistical centres and much equipment and supplies of the former JNA was left behind for Bosnian Serb use. Former JNA officers were transferred from their posts in JNA units to the same units VRS successor, and most remained in command of those units throughout the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The salaries of VRS officers continued to be paid by Belgrade. Additionally, from time to time after 19 May 1992, elements of the VJ had a direct role in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided critical combat support to the VRS.

At The Hague
The Netherlands

Carla Del Ponte
Prosecutor