1 Wednesday, 29 September 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.

6 THE REGISTRAR: Case Number IT-00-39-T, The Prosecutor versus

7 Momcilo Krajisnik.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Good morning to

9 everyone.

10 The Chamber has considered how we would proceed with the present

11 witness. He has to leave Thursday morning. We inquired with the parties

12 whether there would be any possibility to continue this afternoon. That

13 seems, and the Chamber accepts that, also in view of the limited time for

14 preparation and the late disclosure of several documents that it would

15 not be a good idea to try to force the Defence into this afternoon's

16 session. Therefore, most likely, after the Defence has started

17 cross-examination of this witness, we'll stop then, and the witness will

18 then be recalled at a later stage. The Chamber always tries to avoid

19 this, but under the present circumstances, there seems to be no

20 alternative.

21 Then, I also inform the parties that next Tuesday we'll have a

22 late start in Court. That means that we'll start at approximately 11.00.

23 So we'll miss the first session of one hour and a half and then have with

24 one break another session.

25 Then, Mr. Harmon, are you ready to continue the

1 examination-in-chief?

2 MR. HARMON: I am, Your Honour. Good morning. Good morning,

3 Counsel.

4 MR. STEWART: May I just mention one thing, Your Honour. We are

5 grateful for the Chamber not pushing us on this afternoon. That would

6 have been unrealistic and we appreciate that.

7 Your Honour, may I just mention that there was the question of

8 the missing CD. Your Honour remembered that there was a problem. We

9 delivered a CD to the UN DU. Just so that Your Honour and everybody

10 knows what happened, it just -- most unfortunately, it appears got lost,

11 went astray, for purely physical, practical reasons. It fell off some

12 sort of trolley or truck or something like that. It picked the wrong

13 time to do it. But I have -- the superintendent of the Detention Unit

14 yesterday invited me to go and have a word. He explained to me what

15 happened, and it was accompanied by a gracious apology in the

16 circumstances because it shouldn't have happened. It is all now

17 resolved, and it's not the sort of thing which is likely to be repeated.

18 It was an entirely accidental matter, and it has been resolved.

19 JUDGE ORIE: It's good to hear it was accidental and not

20 systematical error. Madam Usher, would you please escort the witness

21 into the courtroom.

22 MR. HARMON: Just for Your Honours' attention, we'll be referring

23 to 31052.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Harmon.

25 [The witness entered court]

1 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning, Mr. Kljuic.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good morning to you all.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Although it may be unnecessary, I'd like to remind

4 you that you're still bound by the solemn declaration you've given at the

5 beginning of your testimony.

6 MR. HARMON: If the witness could be provided with the binder of

7 intercepts, and I will proceed. The usher could assist Mr. Kljuic, we

8 will be referring to Tab 31052, intercept of the 13th of February 1992.

9 WITNESS: STJEPAN KLJUIC [Resumed]

10 [Witness answered through interpreter]

11 Examined by Mr. Harmon: [Continued]

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, as soon as you've oriented yourself,

13 please tell Mr. Harmon so that he will start your examination.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you can start.

15 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Mr. Kljuic.

16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, this is an intercept of the 13th of February 1992.

17 The parties identified are Lukic and Radovan Karadzic. First of all,

18 very briefly, can you tell us who Lukic is.

19 A. He's a legal expert who took part in the SDS team in

20 international negotiations on the establishment of the system in Bosnia

21 and Herzegovina.

22 Q. Let me direct your attention and the Court's attention to a

23 paragraph.

24 MR. HARMON: Your Honours, in the English version, it's on page

25 1. It is toward the second Karadzic from the bottom. And let me quote

1 Mr. Karadzic to you, Mr. Kljuic.

2 "They want to bring our price down as much as possible so they

3 can achieve success, to bring their price down and so as to achieve

4 success. However, we cannot make concessions. We said we had made as

5 many concessions as we could make. Our optimum is a Greater Serbia, and

6 if not that, then a federal Yugoslavia. If not, and this is the only

7 thing, there are no further concessions." Can you comment on that

8 particular passage by Mr. Karadzic.

9 A. Well, actually, it's quite clear. In keeping with their public

10 proclamations and secret statements and projects, they weren't interested

11 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an independent one, a sovereign one with all three

12 ethnic groups on a footing of equality and all citizens being equal.

13 They had the project of a Greater Serbia. And failing, that then a

14 federal Yugoslavia. However, as this was a conversation after Slovenia

15 and Croatia had seceded, that is to say there was no federal Yugoslavia

16 in the way it was in 1995 to 1990, but a federal Yugoslavia, a rump

17 Yugoslavia, with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and Macedonia

18 left. And in that way, the non-Serb people would have absolutely no

19 chance of existing.

20 So here we have three points clearly expressed here. The first

21 is a Greater Serbia; the second is a federal Yugoslavia without Croatia

22 and Slovenia; and the third, what they actually did later on.

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it's the very clarity of those points

24 as expressed in this transcript which raises the question of largely in

25 these areas why this -- these matters are being explored with this

1 witness at all. 90 per cent of the answer that he gave there is either

2 absolutely well known or is absolutely obvious from the transcript. So

3 it might be that we will get through this whole area more efficiently if

4 we actually focus, and the questions might focus on that, on what this

5 witness can actually add from his personal knowledge that we can't simply

6 get anywhere.

7 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, if I could proceed uninterrupted in

8 this examination, I can conclude within the time period. It's up to me,

9 Your Honour, to identify what parts of the intercepts I think are

10 important and ask the questions in the way I deem them appropriate.

11 Unless there is an objection. And I find this objection unreasonable. I

12 think it is time consuming, and I would ask to be permitted to conduct

13 the examination in the manner that I think is appropriate and has been

14 conducted appropriately.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, there's some merit in what Mr. Stewart

16 says, and at the same time I leave it to you to examine the witness as

17 you wish. But please keep in mind that to hear the witness tell us what

18 is already in the text of the intercept does not under all circumstances

19 add very much to what the Chamber should know. Please proceed.

20 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

21 Q. Now, if I can direct your attention, Mr. Kljuic, to another

22 passage.

23 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, this is found on page 3 of the English

24 text. It is -- it starts from the bottom, the fourth Karadzic from the

25 bottom.

1 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me read this portion to you: "And the professor

2 has just seen the paper you delivered there" -- I'm sorry. Let me start

3 again. This is Lukic.

4 Lukic: And the professor has just seen the paper you delivered

5 there, and he's not very happy with the fact that Bosnia and its present

6 borders is being presented upon."

7 Karadzic: No, I want to -- we may have perhaps a little --

8 Lukic: Well, he thinks that perhaps that should have been passed

9 over in silence. But there you are.

10 Karadzic: That's right. He's quite right. He's quite right

11 because we might make some changes with the Croats.

12 Lukic: Yes, yes.

13 Karadzic: That's correct. That's correct. I thought we should

14 meet the general requirements. They keep asking us to --

15 Lukic: To preserve it?

16 Karadzic: Yes, yes.

17 Can you tell us on the 13th of February in respect of the passage

18 "we might make some changes with the Croats," can you expand on your

19 understanding of that.

20 A. Since they didn't wish to have a Bosnia-Herzegovina within its

21 borders and frameworks as Lukic says here, "then we will preserve

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina" or something, they tried in different ways to find

23 partners for the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And one of the ways of

24 doing that was to achieve a historical agreement with the representatives

25 of the Muslims. However, they did that with politicians who did not have

1 the mandate to represent their nation, that ethnic group, and so the

2 attempt proved abortive.

3 Karadzic and his men tried for days to talk to me and establish

4 contacts of that kind; that is to say, to shatter Bosnia-Herzegovina in

5 that way. When they failed with me, they were to do so with other Croat

6 representatives, especially since on the 2nd of February 1992, I handed

7 in my resignation to the post of president of the HDZ precisely because

8 of the rifts in the party with respect to the policy to be waged in

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And I was the forerunner of the legal stance for a

10 sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina whereas there were others who wanted Western

11 Herzegovina to secede. And so before that and after that, there were to

12 be agreements between Boban and Karadzic and so on and so forth.

13 Q. And very briefly, who is Boban that you refer to?

14 A. Legitimately speaking, Boban was my vice-president in the party

15 and representative in parliament in legal terms. But because of his

16 close ties with Zagreb and the change in Zagreb's policy towards

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, he in fact represented a strong separatist stream

18 within the HDZ which considered that Bosnia-Herzegovina should not be

19 preserved as a state, but rather that a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

20 including the native village of Mr. Boban himself, should be attached to

21 the State of Croatia.

22 Q. We can turn to the next intercept. It is at -- there's the KID

23 number 31205. It's dated the 21st of April 1992.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Please let us know, Mr. Kljuic, once you've

25 acquainted yourself.

1 MR. HARMON:

2 Q. Mr. Kljuic, there's a reference on the first page of the

3 intercept "headquarters in Vraca." First of all, can you tell us where

4 Vraca is.

5 A. It's in -- on the fringes of the town, on the left bank of the

6 Miljacka River, but very close to the inner city, the centre of town.

7 It's just a five-minutes walk to Marin Dvor. And it's that part of town

8 where it was well-known there was a police training school there during

9 the former Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Let me direct your attention to two passages. The first is on

11 page 1 of the English translation, towards the bottom.

12 Momcilo Krajisnik: This is Momcilo Krajisnik here. What's going

13 on down there?

14 Radomir Ninkovic: Well, Karisik would explain what's going on

15 better -- or this, hmm.

16 On the next page of the intercept, we have a passage toward the

17 top of page 2 of the English.

18 Momcilo Krajisnik: Tell me, what's the situation like down

19 there? I'm here. There's chaos there.

20 Milenko Karisik: "Well, there's a lot of shooting down there.

21 The members of the TO are engaged."

22 First of all, do you know who Mr. Karisik is?

23 A. Karisik is mentioned quite a lot as being one of the policemen

24 before the war and afterwards. I don't know what post he held in actual

25 fact in the Serb police force.

1 Q. Very, very briefly, Mr. Kljuic, on the 21st of April, what was

2 happening in Sarajevo?

3 A. Since the police school was also a strategic point because it is

4 at an elevation from which you can control quite a lot of the town. And

5 in that school, there were all the children attending that school, the

6 young people attending the school, and they took the children into

7 custody and took them off to Pale.

8 Q. Was there fighting in Sarajevo on the 21st of April 1992?

9 A. Not every day, but there was still sporadic -- there were still

10 sporadic gunfire. It wasn't a full-fledged conflict. That was to begin

11 on the 2nd of May. But there was fighting in the streets in different

12 parts of town.

13 Q. Okay. If we can turn to the next intercept, which will be KID

14 Number 31422. It is dated the 27th of May 1992, conversation with

15 General Boskovic and an unknown general.

16 A. Yes, you can go ahead.

17 Q. Do you know General Boskovic?

18 A. For many years, quite by chance, from 1960 to 1964 we happened to

19 be neighbours, lived next to one another. And then in 1992, we met up

20 again because he came as a special -- anyway, he came from Belgrade, and

21 I was a Presidency member. And throughout the month of May, I was

22 engaged in negotiations under the sponsorship of UNPROFOR and General

23 MacKenzie, that is to say, there were negotiations between the Republic

24 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb rebels and the representatives of the

25 Yugoslav People's Army. And the subject they were discussing was the

1 evacuation of the soldiers from the barracks. There were a number of

2 those, and they had quite a lot of weapons. Those negotiations lasted

3 for quite a long time. They were not successful. And then Milosevic

4 decided to send General Boskovic from Belgrade. Before that, there was

5 General Aksentijevic and some others, Simonovic. But then General

6 Boskovic arrived on the scene to negotiate about the soldiers. And then

7 they asked to take the weapons and materiel out of the barracks. We

8 didn't allow them to do, that but we did allow the soldiers to leave the

9 barracks.

10 Q. To orient everybody in terms of this particular intercept, on

11 page 1 of the English translation, it says, and I quote: "(General

12 Boskovic is on the phone.)"

13 And then Boskovic says:

14 Boskovic: Hello.

15 Unknown person, male person 1: Hello, General.

16 Boskovic: Hello.

17 Unknown male person: You're on the line. Karadzic is also with

18 the general.

19 So we have a conversation taking place with General Boskovic who

20 was in the Sarajevo -- in Sarajevo, and we have a conversation with --

21 the other party is a general who is present with Karadzic. Is that the

22 correct interpretation?

23 A. Yes, it is, but neither you nor I know who that other general is.

24 Q. Correct. Now if I could turn your attention to page 2 of the

25 English translation, I will read part of this intercept.

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and

13 French transcripts correspond

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1 Unknown male person: Yes, Nidjo.

2 Boskovic: I've just arrived, Cadjo. Jankovic and I have just

3 come back from the negotiations. Well, they haven't changed their

4 opinion, and half of the weapons according to their specifications, has

5 to, they said, to take these two barracks or keep all the weapons in the

6 barracks and to relocate the barracks safely which they guarantee. Well,

7 since General Mladic doesn't agree with the -- well, options --

8 Unknown male person: He can't. Mladic is not the boss there.

9 Boskovic: Let me tell you --

10 Unknown male person: Call this one. Krajisnik.

11 Boskovic: General, I'm coming to see you now, now when --

12 Unknown male person: Yes.

13 Boskovic: I'm coming up there, and I'll tell you about it... So

14 Krajisnik also stuck to his version last time. He won't give in. Not to

15 give them a single tank any more.

16 Unknown male person 1: Then do it this way.

17 Boskovic: Yes.

18 Unknown male person 1: If Krajisnik doesn't agree, then Mladic

19 won't agree, and nobody will want to sign these contracts, agreements

20 that we have signed.

21 Boskovic: Yes.

22 Unknown male person: Then what have we got left?

23 Boskovic: They tell us...

24 Unknown person 1: To tell the parents we are not able to take

25 the children out of there."

1 Can you -- I'd like to focus your observations on what this

2 intercept says about the authority and the power of Mr. Krajisnik.

3 A. Firstly, two matters are at stake here. First there's

4 Milosevic's interest in Belgrade to have the soldiers taken out of the

5 barracks, and then there is the interest of Krajisnik and Mladic, which

6 is not to have JNA weapons left in the barracks for the local people. As

7 I was involved in those negotiations on a daily basis, we quite simply

8 requested that the soldiers be allowed to leave in safety and that they

9 leave us half of the weapons because it was a joint army. When they said

10 that half of the weapons should be given to us, they said that half

11 should be given to the Serbian forces, too. This is something they did

12 not accept.

13 General Boskovic came on behalf of Milosevic from Belgrade and

14 his primary task was to save the soldiers. He wasn't at all interested

15 in whom the weapons would be given to. He generously said "You take it,

16 or the Bosnians take it. Give me the soldiers." However, in Lukavica,

17 which is where the military headquarters was located at the time, he

18 wasn't able to obtain the support of General Mladic.

19 As to the seriousness of the situation, this can be shown by the

20 fact that General Boskovic was left in the Presidency where I was. He

21 couldn't go to sleep over in Lukavica.

22 Q. And Mr. Kljuic, what does this say or suggest in respect of Mr.

23 Krajisnik's authority in the absence of Mr. Karadzic?

24 A. Well, it's certain that Karadzic transferred that authority to

25 Mr. Krajisnik because that's how it was set up in terms of the

1 establishment. But Mr. Krajisnik, I must say, did not take part in those

2 negotiations.

3 Q. If we can turn to another intercept, then, it will be the

4 intercept found at KID tab 31425 --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, could I ask for a clarification,

6 Mr. Harmon.

7 If you look at the first page of the intercept we just saw, I

8 think you told us that Karadzic was with the unknown male person. Is

9 that the correct understanding.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are you asking me?

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I'm asking you, yes.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As it says in the intercept here,

13 as Mr. Harmon said.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then may I ask you, where the unknown male

15 person says "You're on the line. Karadzic is also with the General,"

16 well, we know that two generals are having this conversation. Wouldn't

17 it be true that if someone is with me, that one would say "you're on the

18 line. Karadzic is also with me," instead of "with the General"? Apart

19 from several generals being involved.

20 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may we comment, this transcript does

21 look a little bit disconcerting. The fact -- I appreciate Your Honour's

22 questions, and the same questions arise. We've got the in brackets

23 General Boskovic is on the phone, and then not in brackets we've got this

24 passage Karadzic is also with the general. It does at least seem to be

25 some serious doubt as to whether this does accurately set out the content

1 of the conversation. This could be an example of where we really ought

2 to play this particular intercept to get it straight.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Your suggestion is to play this intercept because it

4 raises some questions.

5 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'm more than happy to do that. I

6 would have to locate it.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Let's continue at this moment, and we'll come back

8 to that. And you're aware that there are some questions in relation to

9 who actually is speaking, whether it's just one male person or more male

10 persons.

11 MR. HARMON: Let me see if I can first of all get through the

12 remainder of these intercepts --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Otherwise, when I come with it at a later

14 stage, you might not be prepared to have it played.

15 MR. HARMON:

16 Q. Let's go to the next intercept. We'll clarify where Mr. Karadzic

17 is in a few minutes, Mr. Kljuic. Let's go to the next intercept, and

18 that is 31425. Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Kljuic?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And this is dated the 27th of May 1992. It's a conversation

21 between Mr. Krajisnik and Radivoje Grkovic. There are only two small

22 passages I want to refer you to, Mr. Kljuic. The first is found on page

23 1 toward the top of the English translation. Of course, we'll start at

24 the top.

25 Grkovic: Yes.

1 Unidentified female: Hello.

2 Grkovic: Yes.

3 Unidentified female: Is this Nedzarici?

4 Grkovic: Yes. What can I do for you?

5 Unidentified female: Good evening. I'm calling from Mr.

6 Krajisnik's office. Could you hold the line please. Excuse me, who am I

7 talking to?

8 Grkovic: You're talking to Grkovic, Nedzarici battalion

9 commander.

10 And then if we turn to page 2 of the English translation, I'll

11 read you a related passage.

12 Krajisnik: Good evening.

13 Grkovic: How are you, Mr. President?

14 Krajisnik: I'm well. Who is this?

15 Grkovic: It's Radivoje Grkovic, Nedzarici Battalion commander.

16 Krajisnik: Listen, Grkovic.

17 Grkovic: Yes?

18 What's the situation in Halilovici? Can you give a --

19 Grkovic: You know what, I cannot give much information on the

20 phone. It's being tapped.

21 Krajisnik: I know. Tell me.

22 Grkovic: The latest information I have from the brigade command

23 is that 66 vehicles --

24 Krajisnik: Is the barracks under attack?

25 Grkovic: That barracks was to be evacuated tonight.

1 Unfortunately it was to be today but --

2 Krajisnik: Evacuated? But is it under attack?

3 Grkovic: At the moment, no. It's not under attack.

4 Krajisnik: Come again?

5 Grkovic: It's not under attack.

6 Krajisnik: It's not?

7 Grkovic: Who would attack it now when it's empty?

8 Krajisnik: It's not empty.

9 Grkovic: What do you mean it's not empty?

10 Krajisnik: There's lots of artillery left there and other stuff.

11 Grkovic: Well, I was in contact with their commander every day.

12 Krajisnik: Okay. Let me tell you.

13 And that's where I will end my reading. What does this

14 intercept -- first of all, Nedzarici, is that in metropolitan Sarajevo?

15 A. Yes. And it's in the centre of the new part of Sarajevo.

16 Q. And when there's a reference to Halilovici, is that in Novo

17 Sarajevo?

18 A. That's from Nedzarici to the right. That's where a barracks was

19 located. That's an area that is also very near to Nedzarici. But it's

20 about 1 kilometre away, as the crow flies.

21 Q. And in respect of this intercept, I'd like you to comment on the

22 ability of Mr. Krajisnik to be informed of the situation on the ground.

23 Can you give us your observations on that particular point.

24 A. Well, quite clearly, the gentleman was asking for information

25 from the field, and the barracks -- the soldiers were removed from the

1 barracks as agreed by the commissions under General MacKenzie. Whereas

2 Belgrade tried to save the people through General Boskovic, the local

3 people, the local Serbs, especially the lower-ranking officers, didn't

4 allow them to leave the barracks without the weapons and for the weapons

5 to be left for the Territorial Defence. This was in their interest

6 because if they assumed that if the Territorial Defence obtained the

7 weapons, the balance of the combat forces in the field would change.

8 That meant that the strength of the Territorial Defence would be

9 increased.

10 Q. Let's turn to another intercept then, Mr. Kljuic. It's found at

11 KID 30289, and it is an intercept of July the 8th, 1991. It should be

12 approximately six tabs, 30289. It would be --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, it's the sixth one. The sixth tab.

14 MR. HARMON: The sixth tab from the one that we were on. I'll be

15 directing Your Honours' attention at the passages of the first three

16 speakers of that intercept.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Did you find it, Madam Usher?

18 MR. HARMON:

19 Q. Let me read you the first passages of this intercept, because

20 that's where I want to direct your attention, Mr. Kljuic. Starting at

21 the top, this is a conversation on July the 8th 1991 between Karadzic and

22 Vitomir Zepinic.

23 Radovan Karadzic: ... meet every morning and have it sorted out.

24 I was with Izetbegovic and Zulfikarpasic last night, and I told them

25 openly we would form a parallel government. We would form a parallel

1 police. If they exclude our people and government, then they will still

2 have to pay for them. We would exclude all our people who are armed. We

3 would form completely a parallel state if you continue to fuck us around.

4 And he only stated -- stared at me and winked because he knew that we

5 would do it. God could not stop us in that because they started to fuck

6 around with us, and there is no doubt their -- we would do it in a week.

7 So let there be war so we'll have it finished once.

8 Zepinic: There's no words that follow that particular block.

9 And then Karadzic says:

10 Karadzic: We'll finish it once... Us on small con... We are

11 now before signing a very important document with them, with Muslims.

12 But I will not sign it before these things, these things are finished.

13 It's horrible. I will go to Devedlaka now to make sure that no one will

14 ever dare to propose something privately that is not verified in the

15 party.

16 Now, can you give us your observations about these particular

17 comments by Mr. Karadzic. And this is July, again, of 1991.

18 A. This is a period during which there weren't any incidents in

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina itself. But in Croatia, war was raging, and there

20 were many victims. That was the time when -- that was an occasion when

21 Karadzic first attempted to reach an agreement with the Muslims. He

22 wanted to withdraw them from the block of those fighting for an

23 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. He wanted to reach a separate agreement,

24 a historical agreement between the Serbs and the Muslims. And by doing

25 this, regardless of the fact that they denied this, they would have been

1 against the Croats. Because if they had unified, if they had united on a

2 political level, the Muslims and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in such

3 a case the Croats would have had no possibility of surviving, naturally.

4 Uniting in such a manner and that historical agreement meant that the

5 Croats would be given a province, the province of Western Herzegovina

6 which would be annexed to Croatia. And this is something that they had

7 been preparing for a long time. There were the discussions with

8 Zulfikarpasic. Apart from that, they also spoke to Izetbegovic and

9 suggested he be the president of the assembly in the rump Yugoslavia

10 because Karadzic wanted to break up a unified defence mechanism in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state. It is quite clear that they did not want

12 a Bosnia and Herzegovina which would be organised on democratic

13 principles.

14 We were always in favour of a Belgian or a Swiss system.

15 However, when Izetbegovic didn't agree to this, he got involved with

16 someone else called Zulfikarpasic. But he had no political influence and

17 wasn't respected by the Muslims and as a result was not able to carry out

18 that task. So while war was being waged in Croatia, they observed what

19 was happening in Croatia and in a certain sense threatened the Muslims

20 and said this will happen to you, too, so let's try and reach a

21 historical agreement to help you avoid such a situation. And all

22 negotiations were accompanied by Karadzic's ultimatums, and that can be

23 seen from this part of the discussion because he said "we'll make our own

24 state, our own police force, our own army," et cetera, et cetera.

25 Q. And he also in this particular first passage says, "Let there be

1 war so we'll have it finished once." You mentioned in your testimony on

2 Monday that there was always a threat that was coming to you and to the

3 Bosniaks in respect of war. This is consistent with that approach that

4 you described on Monday, is it not?

5 A. Well, they never suggested a suggestion on what the democratic

6 the Bosnia-Herzegovina should look like. They would only appear in these

7 discussions, but they never really accepted to discuss matters of common

8 concern. All they did was say that there would be a war, and they were

9 quite aware of the fact that they were going into a war. Since they had

10 the force and the support of Mr. Milosevic, they were quite certain that

11 they would win the war. But they could never win the war. They could

12 commit crimes. They could take territory. They could expel people.

13 They could destroy property. And they did destroy towns. You know, in

14 Sarajevo, they even shelled maternity wards and nursery schools. They

15 could do all that, but they couldn't destroy the State of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's a historical entity that has suffered, but it

17 will survive. That's for sure. And it will be a multi-ethnic state

18 because that's a modus vivendi in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this,

19 however, demonstrates they did not want discussions that would be based

20 on the way the institutions within the system functioned, and that would

21 be based -- or that would strive to develop legal norms for the joint

22 life.

23 Q. Let's turn to the next intercept. It's at 305, tab 77. It

24 should be the next intercept.

25 MR. HARMON: It's the intercept, Counsel, September the 3rd,

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1 1991, a conversation between Deronjic and Krajisnik.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, would you, in view of the last answer,

3 it goes very much through general programme statements rather than an

4 explanation of what the exhibit says. So would you please keep a bit

5 more control over --

6 MR. HARMON: Yes, I will. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I don't know whether it's -- the next

8 one ends with 511 and not 577.

9 MR. HARMON: I haven illegible tab number written on mine.

10 That's why I tried to identify it as the intercept of September 3rd,

11 1991, the conversation between Karadzic and Krajisnik.

12 JUDGE ORIE: The last three digits being 511.

13 MR. HARMON: Thank you.

14 MR. STEWART: The transcript has it September the 3rd, but I

15 think Mr. Harmon said 23rd quite correctly.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that has been corrected.

17 MR. HARMON:

18 Q. I want to direct your attention to a passage in this, Mr. Kljuic,

19 that's found on page 1 of the intercept toward the middle of the English

20 version. It starts with Mr. Krajisnik saying:

21 Krajisnik: What's up?

22 Karadzic: Well, our people are incapable of doing anything.

23 Hmm, Alija is trying to mobilise... to create an army through

24 expansion... the unlimited expansion of part of the reserve force.

25 Krajisnik: Protection, right?

1 Karadzic: Mobilising the reserve force. We would have to call

2 him urgently, urgently, hmm, the two of us to sit down with him and tell

3 him that's -- that that's civil war.

4 Now, I want to be very precise in this question. Can you tell

5 me, Mr. Kljuic, what does this suggest in relation to the relationship,

6 the collaborative relationship between Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic, a

7 subject about which you testified on Monday?

8 A. It's quite clear that they had positions that they shared contact

9 on a daily basis. That's not at all unusual. But it doesn't say that

10 they were mobilising the reserve police force here. After the JNA had

11 taken the weapons of the Territorial Defence, the State of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina was only left with the possibility of mobilising 60.000

13 reserve policemen. That would have meant that the Croats and Muslims

14 together would have 40.000 guns and the Serbs would have had 20.000 guns.

15 That was the balance of power in the field.

16 If there were 60.000 guns, then the territory couldn't have been

17 taken in such a way. This was the only possibility of resisting the

18 aggression. However, sabotage was committed on the 30th of March. That

19 police force was disbanded. It's obvious that Karadzic and Krajisnik

20 were afraid of the reserve police force being mobilised because they

21 would have resisted the aggression and diminished their chances of

22 carrying out a rapid strike in a vast stretch of land.

23 Q. Let's turn to the next intercept, it's 30630. It's the very next

24 intercept, Mr. Kljuic, in your binder. This is a conversation of the

25 13th of October 1991, the conversation between Radovan Karadzic and Momo.

1 And in this intercept, I believe you have identified the voice of Momo as

2 Momo, Momcilo Mandic.

3 Let me read then --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Can you tell me who Mr. Mandic was.

6 A. Mandic was one of the leaders of the joint police force in the

7 prewar Bosnia-Herzegovina. And during the war, he occupied the post of

8 minister of justice I believe or something similar in the Government of

9 Republika Srpska. But as he's a professional policeman, he was always

10 involved in all police operations.

11 Q. Now let me read a passage that's found on page 2 of the English

12 translation, and I will read starting from a part of what Radovan

13 Karadzic says. I'll be reading mid-passage.

14 Karadzic: ... because that is a mechanism which was used to

15 manipulate us and the Serb members of parliament are fed up with all

16 those attempts to proclaim independence. Alija Izetbegovic admitted to

17 us...

18 Mandic: I heard.

19 Karadzic: ... that this sovereignty means independence.

20 Mandic: Yes.

21 Karadzic: And that is the way Croatia took, and we know what is

22 going to happen here. That has nothing to do with Karadzic's or anyone

23 else's decision. We know exactly what is going to happen. There is

24 no --

25 Mandic: Definitely. That is clear to the people in Belgrade.

1 Karadzic: In just a couple of days, Sarajevo will be gone, and

2 there would be 500.000 dead. In one month, Muslims be annihilated in

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Numbers of Serbs will be reduced, and Croats

4 will be the only ones to profit because they will keep their

5 municipalities.

6 This is on the 13th of October 1991. Can you -- and this was

7 shortly before, was it not, the speech that we saw a video clip of when

8 Mr. Karadzic in the parliament said that the Bosnian nation would

9 disappear? Is that correct?

10 A. Yes. For the evil that was done, this is very early. And this

11 speaks to the fact that this obsession with an aggression that they would

12 destroy, kill, devastate is a sick idea. And I must say that Karadzic --

13 well, let me say that this was an intercept, but he did exploit this kind

14 of thing a great deal, especially when speaking tete-a-tete. He would

15 say, "We'll destroy you, we'll kill you." And all this was geared

16 towards instilling fear because, you see, he says if they will take the

17 road that Croatia took and this other man says "Well, the people in

18 Belgrade know what that means."

19 So I would impress upon you one point all the time, that what was

20 done in Bosnia was no new idea, nor is it a separate programme. It is

21 just part of the general programme in Milosevic's plan which was encoded

22 and encrypted under the name of RAM, R-A-M. So you can imagine how the

23 negotiations were conducted, faced with the situation in which Karadzic

24 and the Serb leadership behaved in this way.

25 Q. Let me turn to the next intercept, Mr. Kljuic. It is found --

1 should be found three tabs down. It is intercept 31086. It is dated

2 March 1st, 1992. It's a conversation between Radovan Karadzic and Rajko

3 Djukic. It's a very short intercept. Just cast your eye on it.

4 Let me direct your attention to a passage on -- it's found on page 1 of

5 the English. It's Radovan Karadzic, toward the bottom, Your Honours.

6 Radovan Karadzic: Get them. Get them to rise up and have things

7 prepared. They should close everything tonight.

8 Djukic: Erm...

9 Karadzic: All the exits.

10 Djukic: There is no other way, my friend.

11 Karadzic: Have them close all the exits.

12 Very, very briefly, Mr. Kljuic, can you tell us what this

13 intercept -- what these people are talking about.

14 A. Rajko Djukic was a high-ranking functionary of the SDS. And

15 during this period of time, he was in charge of the blockades. On two of

16 the occasions, they blocked Sarajevo, and their aim was to see whether

17 they could cut across the town.

18 You will remember that I mentioned a part of town called

19 Pofalici, and that was a strategically very important because, the most

20 important strategy point because if they cut us off there, the old town,

21 all the institutions and organisational systems, would be left isolated.

22 So when Karadzic says that all exits and entrances into town should be

23 closed, then that is tantamount to a threat because Sarajevo is a city in

24 a valley, situated in a valley, in a depression. And when you close off

25 the approaches into town and the entrances and exits, then the danger is

1 that there will be no food, no water. And that was supposed to be a

2 psychological shock in the form of a barter so that they give up in the

3 negotiations the idea of independence.

4 And it was done on the very day that the results of the

5 referendum were made public. So this was Karadzic's response to the

6 64 per cent or more of the citizens' votes in favour of independence.

7 This process was to be repeated over the next few days.

8 Q. Let's turn to another intercept, Mr. Kljuic. It is an intercept

9 with the KID ID number of 31208, a conversation between Vojislav Seselj

10 and Branislav Gavrilovic in April 1992.

11 A. Yes, go ahead.

12 Q. Very briefly, can you identify Vojislav Seselj for the record,

13 who he is and what role he had in the events in Bosnia. Very briefly.

14 A. Vojislav Seselj was a Communist Youths member and he had

15 political problems in Sarajevo. He was even arrested on one occasion,

16 and then he went to Belgrade where he became one of the leading

17 nationalists. He absolutely denied the right of the citizens of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina to a state of their own. He was the president of the

19 radical party, and I think he still is today. And he had many

20 paramilitary formations which he sent to the battlefield in Bosnia, and

21 more especially to Sarajevo. And the greatest crimes in Sarajevo were

22 committed by the so-called "White Eagles."

23 Q. Were the White Eagles his particular paramilitary formation? Or

24 do you know what relationship he had to the White Eagles?

25 A. Please, at that time, four paramilitary formations were most

1 noticeable. There was a certain Jovic, there was Arkan, there was

2 Seselj, and there was Captain Dragan.

3 Q. All right. Let me read this passage of the intercept. I'm

4 mistaken. I gave you the -- I asked you a question, and my information

5 that was the basis of that question was incorrect.

6 So let me ask you this question: In respect of this intercept, I

7 will read from the bottom of the page.

8 Seselj: Look, I have just called Pale. I can't find Radovan,

9 and nobody can find him.

10 Radoslav Gavrilovic: Yeah.

11 Seselj: But I have left a message that if they don't get our men

12 out, we'll withdraw our men from the front lines, and we'll never deploy

13 them again.

14 Gavrilovic: All right.

15 Can you comment on that, please.

16 A. Obviously out of all the paramilitary formations, Seselj had the

17 largest number. However, this is one of his groups which had entered the

18 centre of town and was probably in the encirclement. And as far as

19 Karadzic is concerned and his relationship towards Seselj, he was not

20 sincere. Karadzic was just interested in Seselj to the extent to which

21 he was able to supply paramilitaries to commit crimes.

22 So from this dialogue, we can see that Karadzic in fact didn't

23 mind too much about Seselj's people who was surrounded and in an

24 encirclement, but Seselj for his part put an ultimatum. So they were

25 heterogenous, in actual fact. But they were together working on this

1 project, and we can even say they were some sort of rivals, they were

2 rivals of sorts, because both men had pretensions of being the overall

3 Serb leaders. Karadzic thought once the job was done and once all Serb

4 lands were united, that he would be the one who had united them and not

5 Milosevic. And his ambitions were to be the leader of all Serbs in the

6 former Yugoslavia.

7 So Seselj says here unless you save my men, I'm not going to

8 supply you with any more soldiers. So that would be a great handicap and

9 drawback to Karadzic and his policy he wanted to further.

10 Q. We'll proceed with KID number 31272. It's two tabs later. It's

11 an intercept of the 5th of May 1992, and it is a conversation between

12 many, many people, including Momo Mandic, Brane Kvesic, Bruno Stojic and

13 Mico Stanisic.

14 A. Kvesic.

15 Q. Kvesic. Thank you. Can you take a look at this very quickly.

16 A. I've already read the document. I know all the people concerned.

17 Q. Let me then direct your attention, Mr. Kljuic, to certain

18 passages in this intercept. We can turn to, Your Honours, page 4 of the

19 English translation. This is a conversation between Kvesic and Mandic.

20 First of all, can you identify who Mr. Kvesic is.

21 A. Branko Kvesic was the head of the Bosnian Herzegovinian

22 intelligence service. That is to say, he was one of the assistants to

23 the minister of the interior. He was a Croat from Western Herzegovina.

24 Q. Let me -- this is Kvesic:

25 Kvesic: So you are right there in Pale, are you?

1 Mandic: Well, we are not. We came down to the city.

2 Kvesic: Yes, yes.

3 Mandic: We came down and cleaned Grbavica...

4 Kvesic: Is that so?

5 Mandic: ...There, we hold Ilidza, Dobrinja and Nedzarici all the

6 way to the student campus and so on.

7 Kvesic: Please tell me the number of dead. They said something

8 about it on the television. Are those lies or...

9 Does this describe fighting in Sarajevo, Mr. Kljuic? This is the

10 5th of May 1992.

11 A. Yes. Yes. And already then Mandic is reporting and saying that

12 Grbavica is being cleared and the greatest crime was committed at

13 Grbavica which was otherwise an multiethnic settlement. But when they

14 took control of the school at Vraca which we mentioned a moment ago, the

15 police school when they took that over, then they were able to control

16 the entire terrain from a centrally located bridge. And it's a very

17 densely populated area, and when he says -- when Momo Mandic says that

18 they have cleaned Grbavica, that means that they have -- that they took

19 away many people. Some they killed. Some went in for an exchange. So

20 that Grbavica already at that period of time, when this conversation took

21 place in May, actually it had already been ethnically cleaned, cleansed.

22 And he is bragging to Kvesic about this.

23 Q. Let me turn to page 5 of the English translation, toward the

24 bottom, Your Honours. There's a colloquy between Mandic and Kvesic.

25 Mandic says:

1 M: Well, we are holding the Turks under siege. We'll starve

2 them a bit, you know.

3 Kvesic: Are you?

4 Mandic: And then we'll give them everything from the Eternal

5 Flame to Vratnik. Everything up there.

6 And then both of them are laughing.

7 Very briefly, can you interpret that for us, please.

8 A. For all normal people reading this conversation, they will be

9 struck by the brutality of this conversation, in view of the fact that

10 these were highly placed policemen in Bosnia and Herzegovina speaking.

11 The identification of our Muslims and equating them to Turks, referring

12 to them as Turks, was part of Serb propaganda. And you'll see on one of

13 the pictures Mladic entering Srebrenica, and he says, "We have taken our

14 revenge on the Turks."

15 However, at that time in Sarajevo, there were over 150.000

16 citizens who were not Muslims. On the other hand, they say that they

17 will give us the area from the Eternal Flame to Vratnik, which is just

18 the old part of town, exclusively the old part of town. And I must say

19 I'm very proud of that part of town because per square kilometre you have

20 two Orthodox churches, five mosques, two Catholic churches, and one

21 synagogue. So that is the nucleus, the centre of the multi-ethnic city

22 of Sarajevo. It is 500 years old, and they say -- they tell us that

23 they're going to leave us that and then start laughing arrogantly.

24 Now, if you just look at the conversation without knowing who the

25 people speaking are, you can imagine what the project itself was like and

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1 who the protagonists of the project are, who put it into practice.

2 Q. Let me turn to page 7, starting at the top. This is a

3 conversation between Momcilo Mandic and Bruno Stojic. First of all, can

4 you identify Bruno Stojic.

5 A. Bruno Stojic was one of the assistants to the minister of the

6 interior. For all intents and purposes, he was head of the financial

7 department of the police force. Later on, he was to become the minister

8 of defence of the so-called Herceg Bosna state.

9 Q. He was a Bosnian Croat, is that correct?

10 A. He was a Bosnian Croat, like Kvesic, as well.

11 Q. Let me read the passage:

12 Mandic: Hi.

13 Stojic: Where have you been, my Serb brother?

14 Mandic: Where have you been, my free Croat brother?

15 Then there's laughter.

16 Stojic: What is this that you are doing, you motherfucker?

17 Mandic: We want to build a new and nice Sarajevo.

18 Stojic: New and nice Sarajevo?

19 Mandic: Yes. We don't like this old synagogues and mosques. We

20 have to change architecture and everything.

21 Your comments, please.

22 A. For all those who wished to learn the truth, this statement is

23 perhaps sufficient, the one made by Momo Mandic, to illustrate the

24 essence of that Fascism, the kind that wanted to change the architecture

25 of Sarajevo. The architecture of Sarajevo -- and I explained it a moment

1 ago -- what you will find on just one square metre of the centre of town

2 cannot be changed because it is made up of the structure of people. You

3 can harm it, you can devastate it, but you cannot eliminate all the

4 factors that make up Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina for good.

5 However, the brutality and the simplifications that took place in

6 putting into effect the programme that Mandic is bragging about, is

7 boasting of, speak of the lowest type of mental makeup of the people in

8 question.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I invited you to keep control over the

10 witness answering the question instead of making these kind of

11 statements. Please proceed.

12 MR. HARMON:

13 Q. Mr. Kljuic, let me direct your attention to another portion of

14 this intercept. It's found on page 10 of the English version, three

15 lines up from the bottom. This is a continuing conversation between

16 Stojic and Mandic. And Mandic says, and I quote: "We don't want the

17 Neretva, we want the left bank of the Neretva."

18 Now, this is the 5th of May, and we saw in Exhibit 47 the

19 strategic objectives of the Serbian people that were announced in the

20 Bosnian Serb Assembly on the 12th of May. You testified that the

21 strategic objectives were not an epiphany on the 12th of May, that they

22 were known in advance of the 12th of May. Does this confirm, this

23 comment by Mr. Mandic confirm your previous testimony in that respect?

24 A. Mr. Mandic exactly confirms the borders envisaged for a Greater

25 Serbia, referring to the left bank of the Neretva River.

1 Q. Let me turn to, then, two passages, additional passages. Again,

2 this is actually a new conversation -- new conversants. This is Bruno

3 Stojic and Mico Stanisic. First of all, can you identify Mico Stanisic.

4 MR. HARMON: This is on page 13. I'm going to be referring to

5 two parts of this, Your Honour. They will be found at about halfway

6 through on page 13 of the English and the top of page 15.

7 Q. Can you identify Mr. Stanisic, Mico Stanisic.

8 A. He is also a prewar high-ranking police officer, and before the

9 war he had a leading police role at Ilidza.

10 Q. Okay. Referring to page 13 of the English, Mico Stanisic:

11 Stanisic: Hello.

12 Stojic: Where are you, Minister?

13 Stanisic: Where are you, man, what are you doing?

14 Stojic: What is this? Are you out of your fucking minds?

15 Stanisic: Well, fuck, what can you do?

16 Stojic: How can you fight us, man?

17 Stanisic: Fight who?

18 Stojic: Well, us here, what's wrong with you?

19 Stanisic: We are not fighting you.

20 Stojic: You are. Not you and Momo, but Karadzic and the rest

21 are fighting us.

22 Stanisic: Come on, man, let's sit down and make an agreement.

23 And then if we go over to page 15 at the top of the English

24 translation, the conversation which continues, Stanisic said:

25 Stanisic: "We'll give you all this that is here, Visoko, Vares,

1 Kakanj."

2 Stojic: Who are you giving us anything?

3 Stanisic: We'll give you also Zenica.

4 Stojic: Let me tell, you, man.

5 Stanisic: Well give you fucking Zenica too.

6 Stojic: That is the autonomous Banovina of Croatia of 1939. We

7 need what is ours. Don't fucking give us that.

8 Can you give us your comments on this conversation that relate to

9 a solicitation to make an agreement.

10 A. First of all, from this conversation, you can see apart from the

11 fact that they're boasting, that is to say Stanisic and Mandic, about

12 what they had done in Sarajevo, that Bruno Stojic as more serious than

13 Brane Kvesic is criticising them for the fighting that is going on in

14 Herzegovina, and you have to know that at the time the JNA was in control

15 of Mostar, and that they had this General Perisic there, and that they

16 shot at the Croatian lands.

17 Apart from the stories about Neretva and the border that the

18 Serbs were putting forward as proposals not being accepted by these two

19 Croats, there's this conversation now as to why you're shooting at us, as

20 they say. Bruno Stojic is asking "why are you shooting at us?" Because

21 we're not fighting you, because it was only the Muslims or Territorial

22 Defence which was multi-ethnic at the time that was engaged in the

23 fighting. And since they did not have the necessary competence, these

24 two high-ranking Serb policemen, in fact, wanted to strike an agreement

25 or to have an agreement between the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats so

1 as to be able to focus on Sarajevo.

2 Excuse me. On that occasion, Bruno Stojic is putting forward

3 Croatia's demands dating back to 1939 which was the Banovina of Croatia,

4 which was an administrative division within the frameworks of the Kingdom

5 of Yugoslavia which never came into effect and was never really

6 implemented, in reality.

7 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Kljuic. We have the intercept.

8 MR. HARMON: We could play that now, Your Honour. I see from the

9 transcript it's a short transcript. I can't tell you how long the

10 intercept itself is.

11 JUDGE ORIE: That's KID 31423?

12 MR. HARMON: That's correct. That's the one about which

13 questions were raised.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

15 Mr. Harmon, of course, we do not know how much time this will

16 take. Would you have -- how much time would you need after we've

17 clarified this?

18 MR. HARMON: Then I'm finished. I have to tender some exhibits

19 that weren't tendered yesterday and I'm finished.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. No further questions. Then it might be wise

21 to finish this before our first break.

22 MR. HARMON: I mean, if it generates some issues --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Then of course, we would have a break.

24 MR. HARMON: Let me just coordinate this to make sure the

25 intercept is ready.

1 Your Honour, the intercept about which there are questions is

2 31422. If I said 31423. I see that both you and said 23, and it should

3 be for the record 31422.

4 JUDGE ORIE: They were all of the 27th of May.

5 MR. HARMON: Yes.

6 JUDGE ORIE: My questions are about...

7 MR. HARMON: The issue of General Boskovic and where Karadzic is.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's 422, yes.

9 MR. HARMON: We can play that now, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, I made the mistake, Mr. Harmon.

11 [Intercept played]

12 Unknown male person 1: Yes.

13 Unknown male person 2: Hello.

14 Unknown male person 1: Hey, Nidjo.

15 Pardon?

16 Unknown male person 1: Is Nidjo there.

17 Unknown male person 2: Yes, he is.

18 Unknown male person 1: Your boss wants to speak to him.

19 Unknown male person 2: That's why I'm calling.

20 Unknown male person 1: Okay, put him through.

21 Unknown male person 2: Here you are.

22 Boskovic: Hello.

23 Unknown male person 1: Hello, General.

24 Boskovic: Hello.

25 Unknown male person 1: You're on the line. Karadzic is also

1 with the General.

2 Boskovic: Uh-huh.

3 Unknown male person 1: You're on the line.

4 Boskovic: Put the General on the line.

5 Unknown male person 1: That one is not here, you know.

6 Boskovic: No, I won't be long.

7 Unknown male person 1: Okay.

8 Boskovic: But he has to pick up the phone. Tell him to pick up

9 the receiver.

10 Unknown male person 1: Yes, yes.

11 Boskovic: There you go.

12 Unknown male person 1: Hello?

13 Boskovic: Hey, General.

14 Unknown male person 1: Yes, Nidjo.

15 Boskovic: I've just arrived. Cadjo, Jankovic and I have come

16 back from the negotiations. Well, they haven't changed their opinion and

17 half of the weapons according to their specifications has to ... they

18 said ... to take these two barracks or to keep all the weapons in the

19 barracks and to relocate the barracks safely, which they guarantee.

20 Well, since General Mladic doesn't agree with the... well, options.

21 Unknown male person 1: He can't. Mladic not the boss there.

22 Boskovic: Let me tell you...

23 Unknown male person 1: Call this one... Krajisnik.

24 Boskovic: General, I'm coming to see you now. Now, when it...

25 Unknown male person 1: Yes?

1 Boskovic: I'm coming up there and I'll tell you about it... So

2 Krajisnik also stuck to his version last time. He won't give in, not to

3 give them a single tank any more.

4 Unknown male person 1: Then do it this way.

5 Boskovic: Yes.

6 Unknown male person 1: If Krajisnik doesn't agree, then Mladic

7 won't agree and nobody will want to sign these agreements that we have

8 signed.

9 Boskovic: Yes.

10 Unknown male person 1: Then what have we got left?

11 Boskovic: They tell us ...

12 Unknown male person 1: To tell the parents that we are not able

13 to get the children out of there.

14 Boskovic: Yes, I'll come there tonight, General, and we'll talk

15 about it because they demand -- they say they are... that we are an equal

16 partner... party in negotiations, and Republika Srpska isn't because

17 they say that the army concluded this agreement and not the Republika

18 Srpska... They say this...

19 Unknown male person 1: Well, we... those are not their weapons,

20 they're ours.

21 Boskovic: Yes, but regarding the ... I mean the barracks, they

22 say those are your units, your armed forces members.

23 Unknown male person 1: Well, that's true, they're ours. That's

24 correct.

25 Boskovic: However, this... Mladic says that it's their territory

1 now. He doesn't agree. He told me this morning that he would only

2 settle for relocation.

3 Unknown male person 1: Let me ask you once again. Will he give

4 that half of the weapons down there or not?

5 Boskovic: Okay.

6 Unknown male person 1: If he won't, we are leaving the weapons

7 to them and bailing the kids out of there.

8 Boskovic: I see and I'll come to see him tonight.

9 Unknown male person 1: Tell them so and you come here to make

10 arrangements.

11 Boskovic: Yes, yes.

12 Unknown male person 1: You will go back if necessary.

13 Boskovic: Yes, sir.

14 Unknown male person 1: Izetbegovic has just called me.

15 Boskovic: What did he say?

16 Unknown male person 1: He says that you should stay until you

17 finish the job.

18 Boskovic: And then I get sacrificed. I'll be sacrificed if I

19 have to be, but only for the truth, justice and honesty. I won't be

20 sacrificed for slander, insults and intrigues. That's the point.

21 Unknown male person 1: Then come over here.

22 Boskovic: I'll come over there, General.

23 Unknown male person 1: Okay, then. And you'll go back tomorrow

24 if you have to.

25 Boskovic: Okay, General.

1 Unknown male person 1: Good-bye, then.

2 Boskovic: Good-bye.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, would you consider the possibility that

4 the unknown person 1 is not the same on the bottom of page 1 and then the

5 unknown male person appearing on the top of page 2? Because it becomes

6 totally illogic if the person who says "hello," the fourth entry on

7 page 2, would be the same person unknown male person as we find under

8 bottom of the second half of page 1.

9 MR. HARMON: Yes, I'll listen to this very carefully. But I

10 would consider there are a number of possibilities.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, okay. I'm just pointing at one. I only asked

12 you to consider that, to see whether there was any...

13 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I have some exhibits from yesterday

14 that I would like to tender so the record is complete. We played a video

15 clip of Mrs. Plavsic kissing Arkan. We would like that to be tender as

16 an exhibit, given an exhibit number.

17 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number P300.

18 MR. HARMON: And we would tender a CD with all of the intercepts

19 that are contained in this binder as an exhibit.

20 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit Number P292.A.

21 MR. HARMON: And yesterday, we tried valiantly to play the

22 portion of the 34th Bosnian Serb Assembly session. I ended up reading a

23 transcript from that session. I have the video, and I would like to

24 tender that and the transcript from the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb

25 Assembly.

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1 THE REGISTRAR: The video will be marked Prosecution Exhibit

2 Number P301. And the transcript P301.A.

3 MR. HARMON: And that concludes, Your Honour, my...

4 [Prosecution counsel confer]

5 MR. HARMON: That concludes, Your Honour, my direct examination

6 of Mr. Kljuic.

7 Mr. Kljuic, thank you very much for your patience and

8 cooperation.

9 JUDGE ORIE: One second.

10 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, we are aware that you have to leave

12 tomorrow morning. Through the Victims and Witness section, we also know

13 that if need would be, and it's very likely that we might not finish

14 today, that you would be willing to come back to The Hague to finish your

15 examination. Is that correct?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for making yourself available even beyond

18 these few days.

19 We'll now first have a break until 11.00, and then Mr. Stewart,

20 the Chamber would like to you to start cross-examination. And then we'll

21 see where we come. We'll adjourn until 11.00.

22 --- Recess taken at 10.37 a.m.

23 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Harmon, I was informed that in the B/C/S version

25 of 31422, it appears that the -- there's a third unknown person which

1 appears approximately at the place I indicated. There's one unknown

2 person 1, there's an unknown person 2, but there's also an unknown person

3 without a number which appears to be the general. So if this would

4 assist you...

5 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, can I say that we consider that Your

6 Honour is 100 per cent right about that. Ms. Cmeric, of course, is

7 really our reliable source on this.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

9 MR. STEWART: It goes exactly with Your Honour's description.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then you're ready to start the

11 cross-examination.

12 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Madam Usher, could you please escort Mr.

14 Kljuic to the courtroom.

15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, if probably doesn't make the slightest

16 difference to the witness as far as his plans are concerned, Your Honour

17 indicated to him that we might not finish with him today. If it's at all

18 helpful to the witness, he could be told that there is no prospect that

19 we will finish with him today.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I think he's aware of that.

21 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.

22 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr.

24 Stewart, the counsel for the Defence. You may proceed, Mr. Stewart.

25 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Cross-examined by Mr. Stewart:

2 Q. Mr. Kljuic, you were asked a number of questions, and you

3 described in outline at least various contacts you had had with various

4 individuals. First of all, Mr. Karadzic, or Dr. Radovan Karadzic. You

5 said that you had known Dr. Karadzic for about 25 to 30 years. And then

6 you said that at the time when political parties, national political

7 parties came into being, "our contacts took place on almost on a daily

8 basis until April 1992." Now, the time when political parties or

9 national political parties came into being, we're talking about the

10 middle or second half of 1990, aren't we?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So through from 1990 until April 1992, that's the period in which

13 you were saying you had contact with him almost on a daily basis.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Was that true of the early part of that period, so that for the

16 second half of 1990 and early 1991, was the pattern of your meetings or

17 contacts with Dr. Karadzic broadly the same as it was through the later

18 period of second half of 1991 and early 1992?

19 A. At the beginning, we were on better terms because we all wanted

20 the regime to be changed, and we wanted a democratic society to replace

21 the communist one. However, as matters grew increasingly complex with

22 regard to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we continued to have

23 frequent contact but we were on far more official terms. The

24 relationship was far more official.

25 Q. So let's take that first phase, then, of the second half of 1990

1 and perhaps through to, say, April 1991. Let's take that period. What

2 would -- at that time, what was the nature of your -- you used the word

3 contacts as it came out in English. What's the nature of your contacts

4 with Dr. Karadzic at that time? Type of contact, frequency of contact.

5 A. That was the period during the pre-election campaign. We had

6 certain joint positions, all three nationalist parties had certain

7 positions that they held in common. There was the issue of the

8 elections, of how the elections would be conducted, et cetera. And there

9 was even a dilemma as to how the people would be represented or how the

10 peoples would be represented in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In

11 the socialist period, there were two Serbs, two Croats, and two Muslims

12 in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And there was one person who

13 was a representative of other citizens who had identified themselves as

14 Yugoslavs. All this had to do with certain ethnic minorities or people

15 who did not have an ethnic identity of any kind.

16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, perhaps I can say that of course I don't suggest that

17 the issues don't tie in with the question of the contacts and the

18 meetings because clearly there is a point at which they do, but primarily

19 I'm inviting you to describe the nature and frequency of contacts and

20 give us only the minimum, please, of the underlying issues and background

21 which assist an understanding of your answer to that question.

22 So if we can focus, please, on my question which was the type and

23 frequency of the contacts with Dr. Karadzic during that period.

24 A. The type of contact was very correct. We had a certain number of

25 meetings because there were certain public discussions, et cetera. We

1 had the number of meetings that was possible at the time. And we would

2 meet as often as was necessary given the daily policies. If we had

3 something that was a matter of common interest, then Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr.

4 Karadzic and myself would see each other twice a day. If there was

5 nothing we were at all interested in, then we wouldn't see each other so

6 frequently. But after the elections in November 1990, because of the

7 agreement about how to form government and how to represent the various

8 peoples, we would have frequent working meetings. And as a result, we

9 were more frequently in contact with each other.

10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, it's really -- what I'm trying to pin down really is

11 that you were there, we weren't. Words like "frequent" and "as often as

12 necessary," that's in a sense, that's the problem. I need you, please,

13 to tell the Trial Chamber as clearly as you can what you mean by that.

14 So over that -- let's forget about pre-election. Let's not worry too

15 much about that. But post-November 1990 elections, say, for the next six

16 months, let's take that time period. I'd like you to give the Trial

17 Chamber a picture of over that period how often you saw Dr. Karadzic and

18 what type of contact it was, whether it was casual in passing, whether it

19 was one-to-one meetings, whether it was larger meetings. Just some

20 clearer idea.

21 A. These were official discussions between the leaders of three

22 nationalist parties. These meetings took place very frequently. We also

23 appeared together at certain public gatherings. We had some friends in

24 common; for example, the lawyer, Dr. Karadzic. And we also had certain

25 tete-a-tetes.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, you were specifically asked to specify

2 words as "frequently." So you said "official discussions between the

3 leaders of the parties. These meetings took place very frequently." Was

4 that once a week, once a month, two times a day? Tell us how frequent on

5 average.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, at least three times a week.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: The witness said

8 meetings with the -- Mr. Karadzic's lawyers.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This took place during the first

10 six months.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You were talking about -- I'm a bit confused

12 now. If you say "official discussions," did you mean together with Mr.

13 Karadzic's lawyers?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I meant those lawyers, these

15 were private meetings held in the -- there were dinners. They were such

16 meetings. But when I say party meetings --

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- as I said, two or three times a

19 week for practical reasons.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now the private meetings. Now the private

21 meetings, such as dinners. How often?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Not very frequently, but Sarajevo

23 is a small town. And at the time, it was not a problem to go to the main

24 hotel and to meet there, not just Mr. Karadzic and myself. But this was

25 the case for many people.

1 JUDGE ORIE: I do understand that. You say not very frequently.

2 Once a month? Once every two months? On average.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the first six months, it was

4 very frequent. It was only when the war started in Croatia that

5 relations cooled down.

6 JUDGE ORIE: The question was the first six months after the

7 elections, private meetings such as dinners, how frequent?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was not that frequent. Perhaps

9 once in a month or once every two weeks. But there were official

10 discussions that took place quite frequently.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now the third category was just exchange of a

12 few words in passing. How often did that happen?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there were -- these meetings

14 were more frequent than the dinners that were had because Mr. Karadzic

15 was also a literary man. We would meet at literary evenings and in the

16 theatre. Dr. Karadzic --

17 JUDGE ORIE: The question is about how frequent. Would that

18 happen twice a week or once every two weeks or... ?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I couldn't say.

20 Sometimes it was five times a week and sometimes it was only once a week,

21 and sometimes not at all. It depended on the situation. But there's

22 absolutely no doubt about the fact that it was frequent.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I went through this exercise also to make

24 clear to you that careful listening to the question will give you a clue

25 on what the answer should be about. It was the type of meetings. We've

1 now identified three types -- If there's another one, please tell us --

2 and frequency. Not all the rest, maybe of great importance, but it was

3 not asked to you at this moment. And if the backgrounds and whether Dr.

4 Karadzic was a literary man or not is not at this moment the subject of

5 the question. If Mr. Stewart would like to know that, he'll certainly

6 ask you as one of his follow-up questions. May I invite you again to

7 carefully listen what exactly the question is about.

8 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

9 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. And Mr. Kljuic, may I simply once again observe that if you could

11 please, please try to avoid using phrases like "frequent" or "very

12 frequent" or "not very frequent" without any explanation because really

13 that's what I'm asking you give precise information about.

14 Can we take it that that last category, the meeting in the

15 theatre or at some literary society and so on, that all those meetings

16 would have been of a fairly incidental social nature. You might just say

17 hello in passing or exchange some conversation about the time of day or

18 something. Is that a fair summary of that category?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You did mention a few minutes ago tete-a-tete meetings with Mr.

21 Karadzic by which I understand you to mean meetings where it was just Mr.

22 Karadzic and just you, or just the two of you. Is it correct that

23 during -- let's take that same six-month period to start with, from

24 November 1990 through to April 1991. Is it correct that you did have at

25 least some such meetings with Mr. Karadzic where only the two of you were

1 present?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And how -- as best you can do now, how many such meetings do you

4 say that you had with Dr. Karadzic during that six-month period? Of

5 course, I'm not asking you to be precise to the exact number, but how

6 many do you say that you've had?

7 A. I had four or five very open and confidential meetings at which

8 only Mr. Karadzic and I were present.

9 Q. And could you put as accurate a time as -- date as you can on

10 what the first of those meetings would have been post-November 1990

11 elections.

12 A. There was one in December for sure. This had to do with our

13 discussion on the idea of how to divide power. In order to understand

14 the nature of this task, you should be aware of the fact that after the

15 elections, three national parties --

16 Q. Mr. Kljuic, may I say straightaway and following exactly what His

17 Honour said, I hope, if I then wish to ask you about the subject of the

18 meeting -- well, I may very well do on occasion -- if I wish to ask you

19 about the subject of the meeting, I will do that. If we take the

20 questions in little bite-sized chunks, if I ask you the date of the

21 meeting, that's what I wish you to answer. If I then want to know about

22 the content of the meeting, I will ask you another question. If we

23 follow that process as outlined by His Honour, we'll get on famously, Mr.

24 Kljuic.

25 So you had the first meeting with Dr. Karadzic. The question I

1 want to ask you is this: Did you keep -- when you went to that meeting,

2 for example, with Dr. Karadzic, did you keep a notebook? Did you make

3 notes during the meeting? Did you keep any sort of agenda, diary, record

4 of such meetings?

5 A. I didn't keep a diary. But I did take notes of a certain kind.

6 I would record the positions of the SDS; that is to say, of Mr. Karadzic

7 and the positions of the SDA, that is to say of Alija Izetbegovic because

8 that was essential. So that at meetings of my party leadership, I could

9 state what our partners wanted and what they demanded of us.

10 Q. Mr. Kljuic, thank you. I think we can see probably fairly

11 straightforwardly what the purpose of keeping those notes would be. Did

12 you keep those notes in a notebook of some sort?

13 A. No, I wrote them down on sheets of paper that I had on me when I

14 needed them.

15 Q. And we'll come on to subsequent meetings. But can we take it the

16 four or five meetings that you had with Dr. Karadzic during that period,

17 that every time you took notes in some form or another in the way that

18 you've described?

19 A. Yes, one could say so, too.

20 Q. Did you retain those notes and do you retain those notes up to

21 the present day?

22 A. Well, I'm writing a book about Bosnia and I use a lot of

23 documents, including the notes that I took at the time.

24 Q. So they are physically in Sarajevo, are they, those notes, at the

25 moment?

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1 A. Well, yes, they're in my flat.

2 Q. Mr. Kljuic, would you have any objection, first of all, to

3 bringing such notes with you when you return to The Hague to give

4 evidence before this Tribunal?

5 A. No. This is my right as an author. These are my positions. And

6 I'll be expressing what I wrote down in public. I wrote down what

7 Karadzic said. I wrote down what he wanted. And then I relayed this

8 information at an HDZ meeting --

9 Q. Mr. Kljuic, at the moment I'm simply asking you that single

10 question which you very helpfully answered that you don't object to

11 bringing that material with you. A supplementary question in that area

12 is: Would you have any objection if it can be arranged as a practical

13 matter to forwarding through whatever channels are appropriate to The

14 Hague in advance of your returning to The Hague, photocopies of any such

15 notes?

16 A. First of all, you haven't understood me correctly. I said that I

17 wouldn't provide you with this. These are things that I want to have

18 published in my book.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It seems that there was -- the question, I do

20 agree with you, Mr. Stewart, the question was whether Mr. Kljuic would

21 have any objection. And his answer was no. But from what follows, it

22 appears that "no" rather stands for I'm not willing to bring it with me.

23 And that's now confirmed by Mr. Kljuic.

24 MR. STEWART: That's clear now, Your Honour. I must say, I had

25 not understood. I mean, it's just my misunderstanding. I had not

1 understood the second half of the answer as contradicting. We see now

2 that, apparently.

3 Q. Mr. Kljuic, can we get it clear. You are saying you do object,

4 and if it's simply a voluntary matter, you're saying you will refuse to

5 bring such material to The Hague with you, are you?

6 A. Why should I provide you with my notes?

7 Q. Answer my question, please, Mr. Kljuic. I want to get it clear.

8 I'm not going to answer your questions, with respect. Answer my

9 question, please.

10 Is it that you are actually saying you will refuse, unless some

11 compulsion is brought to bear, you will refuse to bring this material

12 with you to The Hague, will you? Take a moment to think about it, Mr.

13 Kljuic. I do wish to have your clear answer on this.

14 A. Look, these notes, which is the case for all the other documents,

15 too, constitute material that I'm working with now that I'm writing my

16 book. And I don't want to provide it to anyone before it's published.

17 This is the right of every author. And in addition, I don't think that

18 other witnesses --

19 Q. So the answer is clear, Mr. Kljuic: Unless compelled, you are

20 saying you do refuse to bring this material with you. That's correct?

21 A. I don't know how I could be compelled to provide them. This is

22 my private property.

23 Q. Mr. Kljuic, that is another issue altogether. I think we have

24 it.

25 I'll take it, Mr. Kljuic, that you are saying no, unless somebody

1 compels me -- another question altogether -- I will not bring this stuff

2 to The Hague. I'm going to take it that's your position.

3 JUDGE ORIE: I'll first interfere for one second, Mr. Stewart.

4 Mr. Kljuic, you said I'm not willing, and your explanation mainly

5 is you would rather first publish what you're preparing. And do I

6 understand you well that you say Well, if I bring this material, my

7 position as an author would be endangered because everyone could use it.

8 Is that your fear? Because we then could try to see whether any solution

9 could be found for that.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know what, I lived in the

11 communist regime where people could come to your house and seize your

12 property. I don't think that that would happen today. But a second

13 point is that this isn't the kind of document that the Prosecution has

14 with dates, et cetera, et cetera. I have been a journalist for many

15 years. These are a part of my observations, my personal records, things

16 I noted down. So it is only I who can find my way in those notes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Kljuic, the issue is, first of all, that

18 diaries or notebooks have assisted this Chamber in understanding the

19 events at those times. We see many witnesses who are willing to make

20 their notes or their diaries available. And of course, whether what the

21 use of it is something that can be considered at a later stage, perhaps

22 without your help we could not understand most of it; that's possible.

23 And when you say that these notes are not available to the Prosecution,

24 it almost goes without saying that if you would bring them or if you

25 would provide copies in advance, then of course the Prosecution would

1 have them as well. The parties are in that respect equal, and if it's

2 relevant material it should be disclosed to the other party especially

3 when questions will be put to you in respect of those notes.

4 I do understand your fears in respect of other people using it

5 when you're still preparing your publications. On the other hand, these

6 notes, of course I have no idea yet how important they could be, but

7 could assist us in finding the truth. It's for certain that what's

8 written down at the time sometimes reflects in more detail or reflects

9 with more position what at those times was observed by the author of the

10 notes. Sometimes it helps to -- well, to remember things that would not

11 be easily remembered without this, as the French say it, aide memoire.

12 So therefore, it is for Mr. Stewart and for this Court, and I take it

13 it's the same for the Prosecution, it's just a matter of not ignoring

14 material that could eventually assist us in finding the truth. That's

15 the issue.

16 Therefore, I'd like you to perhaps consider this issue and,

17 again, perhaps after the next break that we would get a final answer of

18 you on whether you would be willing to bring them to The Hague on a

19 voluntary basis or to provide copies. But I just explained this in a bit

20 more detail to you because that's what it is about.

21 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. The English said aide memoire as

22 well. We like to mine the richness of the French language.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you would like to respond to what I just

24 said.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, these are my private notes.

1 They have no official status whatsoever. If you want me to, I could

2 recount a detail that I took note of from the one-on-one meeting I had

3 with Mr. Karadzic. May I?

4 JUDGE ORIE: Well, no. At this moment, I'm not asking you for

5 further details of your meeting with Karadzic because that's -- these are

6 questions to be put to you by Mr. Stewart. But I was just addressing you

7 in general terms. Even if these notes as usual have no official status

8 and even if they are private notes -- of course, if there were private

9 matters in it sometimes that you would say, well, this is not something

10 to be made public, then of course it could always be considered. But

11 just the question is whether by providing these notes, perhaps under

12 conditions further to be considered, whether you would be willing to give

13 them voluntarily or not.

14 But think it over. I'm not urging you to answer it immediately.

15 But what I wanted to make clear to you, that it's not intrusion in your

16 private life; it's not to give them any official status, but not to

17 ignore material that could possibly be of assistance in finding the

18 truth.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, thank you for that. And I also,

20 although there are lots and lots of comments that spring to mind, I won't

21 make them at the moment. May I simply make this observation, Your

22 Honour, when Your Honour refers contingently to conditions, it may be -

23 and Your Honour has only said that at this point - that none of us really

24 says anything more about that at this stage.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Of course. Conditions, of course, could never go

1 against, I would say, fundamental procedural issues. That's, of course,

2 clear. But if I would have -- if I would write a diary and if I would

3 have some quite irrelevant personal matters in it, then, of course, I

4 could say if this and this is not going to be made public, then I'm

5 willing to give it to you. Otherwise, I have some reservations.

6 MR. STEWART: I think that's standard practice in all

7 jurisdictions that entirely personal stuff unrelated to the case is held

8 back from anybody that has no right to see it.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

10 MR. STEWART:

11 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I won't go any more into that because it's a bit

12 abstract, then, unless and until we see some of this material.

13 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it also though follows as a practical

14 matter that I would reserve exploration of some of the content of these

15 meetings and discussions pending consideration of this particular issue.

16 Q. But Mr. Kljuic, let's go back to what we were talking about. At

17 the moment I'm primarily interested in establishing the frequency and the

18 nature of the meetings you had, rather than getting into the depth of

19 discussions at this point.

20 Dr. Karadzic, we're talking about. We were talking about up to

21 April 1991. I'd like now, please, to take - it's convenient to take the

22 next six-month period. Let's take from April to October. I think that

23 would be April to October 1991. During that period, again, being as

24 specific as you can, Mr. Kljuic, to help the Trial Chamber, what was the

25 nature and the frequency of your meetings, contacts with Dr. Karadzic

1 during that six-month period?

2 A. During that period of time, we see the start of the aggression

3 against Croatia. The situation became complicated. The meetings no

4 longer had the warmth that they had previously.

5 Q. Mr. Kljuic, start with the question, and then we'll see whether

6 there's a follow-up.

7 MR. HARMON: Excuse me, Your Honour, I think Mr. Kljuic was

8 answering the question. The question was what was the nature, frequency

9 of the visits. There are two questions in that, and Mr. Kljuic is

10 entitled to respond to the nature of the visits and put into context the

11 visits because he was specifically asked about that.

12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it isn't really. When the witness

13 talks about the start of the aggression against Croatia, it's just not

14 necessary. I'm trying to help, Your Honour, to speed it along

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, if you would perhaps say this is the

16 first part of my question and this is the second part of my question. If

17 you do that, I certainly think that you'll get the answers you want.

18 It's not incomprehensible how the witness responded to your last

19 question.

20 MR. STEWART: It's not incomprehensible. It just wasn't an

21 answer. I'll do what Your Honour says, of course.

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, how many times do you -- leaving aside those

23 incidental, social type of contacts that you referred to, that category

24 of meetings at the theatre, literary societies, put those totally on one

25 side. Leaving those aside, how many times do you say you were in contact

1 with Dr. Karadzic during that six-month period, April 1991 to October

2 1991?

3 A. Very often, not as frequently as before. And the talks had an

4 exclusively political character. They were political dialogues because

5 of the events in Croatia, because of what was going on in

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. So when you talk about --

8 A. And --

9 Q. When you say "the talks," then, you are referring to something

10 which can sensibly be described as a meeting where you and both Dr.

11 Karadzic were present at which, for example, you both sat down? Is that

12 a fair description?

13 A. Partially. For instance, there were meetings in parliament,

14 meetings of parliament, of the government, of the leadership of the

15 assembly, meetings between the three parties. And I'd like to tell you,

16 Mr. Stewart, also, that I am a man that speaks very clearly. I'm a

17 professor. I'm a journalist. And I'm very surprised that you're

18 interrupting me when I'm trying to tell you what the nature of my

19 meetings was during the second six months.

20 During the first six months, neither Radovan Karadzic nor the SDS

21 nor Milosevic, indeed, during that period of time had set out their

22 projects. They had not implemented it either. It was only when the

23 conflicts happened --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, let me again stop you. Mr. Stewart

25 would like to know how often in that period of time you met Mr. Karadzic.

1 Whether you are surprised that Mr. Stewart interrupted you where, as I

2 see it, you more or less depicted the atmosphere rather than the type of

3 meeting -- you were talking about not the same warmth -- is not something

4 we should further discuss at this moment.

5 But Mr. Stewart would like to know how often in this second

6 six-month period you met with Dr. Karadzic in a meeting where you really

7 talked to each other, which is usually done when you sit down but not

8 necessarily.

9 Could you tell us: During this six months, was that 20 times a

10 month? Was it 10 times a month? What was it, approximately?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the first six months, as I said,

12 we met about three times a week.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I asked you about the second six months.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. And I had four or five

15 intimate conversations with him, just the two of us, tete-a-tete. Now,

16 during the second six months, we certainly met once in ten days. And

17 during those six months, we had two conversations alone without any third

18 party attending, just the two of us.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Those are clear answers to the questions.

20 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

21 MR. STEWART: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, during that six-month period, two meetings at which

23 just you and Dr. Karadzic were present. Were there other sit-down

24 meetings at which you and Dr. Karadzic and other people were present?

25 A. Yes, there were.

1 Q. And leaving aside assembly meetings, how many such meetings do

2 you say there were during that six-month period? By such meetings, the

3 meetings at which you and Dr. Karadzic were present but not just the two

4 of you.

5 A. Perhaps four or five, and they were meetings of the leaders of

6 all the political parties who had their representatives in parliament.

7 And they discussed the relationship towards the Yugoslav People's Army,

8 the constitutional setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth.

9 Q. And in the same way, I don't want to explore the broader issues,

10 but just specifically on the question of whether you did or you didn't,

11 did you take notes of all those meetings during that period? That's to

12 say, the tete-a-tetes between you and Dr. Karadzic and those other

13 meetings at which there were some other people present.

14 A. I did not take notes, but I did write down the basic positions

15 assumed not only by Dr. Karadzic but the representatives of other

16 political parties as well. That was my duty, for me to be able to report

17 on this at the meetings of the HDZ leadership.

18 Q. When you say you didn't take notes, there wasn't any change in

19 your practice between the first six-month period that we asked about up

20 to April 1991 and the next six months so far as note-taking was

21 concerned, was there?

22 A. No, I just noted down the thesis, the most important details

23 which were characteristic. As to the atmosphere and general mood that

24 prevailed and all the rest, I'm not a shorthand typist. I don't take

25 down everything word for word, just the basic premises.

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1 Q. I don't want to explore for the moment certainly the extent or

2 nature of the notes in any detail, Mr. Kljuic. But you took some such

3 notes of those other meetings at which there were other people present in

4 addition to you and Dr. Karadzic. Is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And then it would be convenient perhaps to take the next

7 six-month period, then. We'll keep it in chunks of six months. So from

8 October 1991 through to April 1992, first of all, how many, if any,

9 tete-a-tete meetings do you say you had with Dr. Karadzic during that

10 six-month period?

11 A. One. Just one.

12 Q. Can you date that meeting?

13 A. I can't give you an exact date. I don't remember. But it took

14 place in the premises of the SDS.

15 Q. Could you put a rough date on it? It is a six-month period. Can

16 you put it somewhere within that six-month period?

17 A. Towards the end of November, the beginning of December. At the

18 insistence of Dr. Karadzic through one of my representatives whose name

19 was Pasko Vukoje. And if need be, he can come and testify and say that

20 the meeting did indeed come about.

21 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I didn't ask you that. So please, again, just answer

22 the questions.

23 Mr. Kljuic, how much of that other category of meeting, that's to

24 say where you and Dr. Karadzic and at least one or more other persons

25 were present, did you have during that six-month period, from October

1 1991 to April 1992?

2 A. There were several such meetings.

3 Q. And "several" is a fairly elastic term, Mr. Kljuic. Can you be

4 more specific about what "several" is.

5 A. Yes, I can. Between 10 and 15, let's say, during those six

6 months.

7 Q. Did your note-taking practice remain consistently the same as it

8 had been during those previous two periods of six months each?

9 A. No. Because the meetings resembled each other. Karadzic would

10 set the same ultimatums on different occasions, so they were more or less

11 the same.

12 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Kljuic, is it this, that your practice didn't

13 change, but actually there were simply less need to write stuff down

14 because Mr. Karadzic was repeating the same position?

15 A. That's precisely it.

16 Q. The during that -- those same periods, and I would like to try

17 and take this next bit as quick and succinctly as we can, Mr. Kljuic,

18 that applies to everything, but particularly here. I want to ask you

19 particularly about Mrs. Plavsic. Let's take the same six-month periods,

20 so from October 1990 to April 1991, did you have any tete-a-tete meetings

21 with Mrs. Plavsic?

22 A. I did have, when she was in the company of her brother. We had

23 been friends for many years. It wasn't a political meeting, it was a

24 private meeting. And I would sit next to Mrs. Plavsic in the Presidency,

25 so we would see each other every day.

1 Q. All right, Mr. Kljuic. I'll try and short-circuit this, then.

2 If we leave aside any meetings at which there was -- if such meetings

3 took place, no political discussion at all, if that's realistic, over the

4 whole period, from November 1990 through to April 1992, did you have any

5 tete-a-tete meetings with Biljana Plavsic?

6 A. No.

7 Q. Similarly, Mr. Koljevic, again, if we leave aside, if it's

8 realistically possible, any meetings at which you and he might not

9 discuss anything political at all. Did you have any tete-a-tete meetings

10 with Mr. Koljevic during the whole of that period, November 1990 to April

11 1992?

12 A. Yes, I did. Because professor Koljevic was the president of the

13 board for foreign policy of the Presidency, just as Mrs. --

14 Q. Yes, Mr. Kljuic. I apologise for interrupting you, except the

15 answer "yes" to that question is enough. And then I can ask you further

16 questions.

17 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I think it's appropriate for the

18 witness to give a brief explanation as to why he did have the meetings.

19 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, it isn't. I'm sorry, Your Honour, I

20 beg your pardon for interrupting Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, if the witness thinks that something was

22 really missing. But we have a different experience. So therefore, under

23 the present circumstances, if there's anything which is beyond the

24 question which you think is of such importance that we should know, you

25 may address me. But first -- it could well that be the next question

1 exactly asks you what you're saying. So first answer the questions of

2 Mr. Stewart. And if at the end there would be something you say, well,

3 this really gives a wrong impression of what happened, then you can

4 address me, and you'll be allowed to add a few things. But try to stick

5 to the questions to start with.

6 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, may I observe, of course I a

7 hundred per cent agree with Your Honour's observation that any answer

8 which would be misleading or wrong in some way without a qualification,

9 the qualification is entirely legitimate. That's not an example. But

10 may I say, Your Honour, if I do, as I'm trying to do, loyally follow Your

11 Honour's suggestion that I should break the questions down specifically

12 it's only fair then the witness doesn't himself decide which questions

13 he's going to answer because that's my decision as Defence counsel.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I think that's clear. Mr. Harmon, we all are aware

15 that getting the answers close to what the questions were is not the

16 easiest thing over these last couple of days. And on the one hand, as

17 the parties know, I usually allow some elaborations on issues close to

18 the question, and the parties are wise enough not to object against such

19 answers to be given. But I think we are a bit in a special situation.

20 It's like a referee in the beginning of a football match, Mr. Harmon.

21 You know what his task is.

22 MR. HARMON: Yes, I understand that, Your Honour. The question

23 was did you have these kind of meetings with Mr. Koljevic. And the

24 witness answered yes, he did, because he was the president of the board,

25 of the foreign policy board. I think that's a perfectly appropriate

1 expansion on the answer "yes." And therefore, I would ask, Your Honour,

2 having been in the courtroom these past three days, I understand the

3 position Your Honour is referring to, but I don't want to have the

4 witness to be put in such a straightjacket that he feels he can only give

5 a brief and uninformative answer. I think it is important when we touch

6 upon the nature of this that we don't limit Mr. Kljuic to giving

7 reasonable and brief expansions on the questions that are asked.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, let's try not to spend all of our time

9 on this procedural debate. As you may have noticed, the Chamber supports

10 your approach.

11 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: On the other hand, if it becomes too rigid, finally,

13 it might not serve its purpose any more. So if the one line would be

14 added, then it takes less time to let that happen than to start

15 procedural debates on that. So you would keep in mind that strictness

16 sometimes allows for some flexibility.

17 And then at the same time I'm asking the witness to very

18 carefully listen to the questions put to you and first start answering

19 them. Sometimes you might elaborate on issues which this Chamber has

20 heard already five or ten times, for example, what positions people held,

21 et cetera, is well known to this Chamber.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

23 MR. STEWART:

24 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I'm now trying to remember exactly where we were. We

25 had established that you did have meetings with Mr. Koljevic, that you

1 did have tete-a-tete meetings with Mr. Koljevic. I think I was asking

2 you about the first six-month period, but that's what I'm going to do

3 anyway. November 1990 to April 1991, how many tete-a-tete meetings, if

4 any, during that period did you have with Professor Koljevic?

5 A. First of all, yes, we did meet. You needn't doubt that. Second,

6 we were members of the Presidency. We had our offices next to one

7 another. And thirdly, Mr. Koljevic was the president of the foreign

8 policy board of the Presidency of which I was a member. So we compiled a

9 proposal for the foreign policy strategies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I

10 can say that I met him several times, a number of times, in the

11 Presidency and less as an SDS official.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, how many times?

13 MR. STEWART: Exactly, Your Honour, my question.

14 JUDGE ORIE: You have now explained to us. I instruct you: If

15 you're asked how many times, first to tell us how many times. Because

16 you used now five or six or seven lines, and we still do not know the

17 answer to the question. How often did you have these tete-a-tete

18 meetings with Dr. Koljevic during the first six-month period?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Four to five official meetings.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

21 MR. STEWART:

22 Q. You put in a qualification "official meetings." And I invited

23 you to discard entirely social meetings. When you say official meetings,

24 can we be clear, leaving aside any incidental social meetings at which

25 there was no political discussion at all, the number of meetings you

1 describe as being official meetings, that is the number of meetings,

2 overall, tete-a-tete that you had with Mr. Koljevic. Is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. And during that six-month period, November 1990 to

5 April 1991, how many -- the same type of meeting did you have but at

6 which there was somebody other than you and Professor Koljevic present?

7 A. Several meetings, because the three of us were members of the

8 delegation in the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And they had

9 meetings with all the other leaderships from the other republics in

10 Yugoslavia.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, you were invited first to say

12 approximately several. Could be 2, could be 10, could be 20. How many?

13 Approximately; if you remember.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not a statistics

15 expert. We had five official meetings with five other republics.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Can you tell us in numbers how many, approximately.

17 If you can't, tell us.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We had five meetings for sure

19 because Bosnia and Herzegovina held five official meetings with five

20 other republics. Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Koljevic, and myself were part of

21 the delegation. That means that we travelled together. We stayed in

22 Belgrade, in Zagreb, in Titograd, and the Slovenians and Macedonians came

23 to see us so we held discussion, et cetera.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Apart from those meetings you just mentioned, those

25 five, were there any others?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There were various meetings of an

2 operational kind. As members of the Presidency, we were constantly

3 together.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. How many approximately?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I couldn't say. That was so

6 frequent. That was a six-month period, and we would go to work every

7 day.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, frequent means every day? Approximately, on

9 the average?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, perhaps not every day but

11 very frequently because as members of the Presidency, we would receive

12 various ambassadors, EU delegations, NATO delegations, American

13 mediators. This was a very intense political life.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Three times a week? Would that be a fair

15 assessment?

16 THE WITNESS: Official.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.

18 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. Mr. Kljuic, what I'm trying to do -- just so that you know, it

20 might be helpful as a background to the question. I'm trying, so far as

21 possible, to put on one side contacts which were not really meetings. So

22 let me just give you an example which I hope will help. If you and

23 Professor Koljevic are there on the same occasion when there's some

24 visiting dignitary or visiting politician or somebody important in town

25 and you're there on the same occasion, whether it's a lunch or a drink or

1 something like that, but your contact with Professor Koljevic is

2 incidental, you may be introduced at the same time, you may have just a

3 brief conversation in passing or something, I'm not asking you about

4 those because, may I say, Mr. Kljuic, I understand that where you worked

5 and the nature of your work, there might be lots and lots and lots of

6 those.

7 I'm wanting particularly to ask you about two categories of

8 meeting. One is when I'm asking about is a particular person,

9 tete-a-tete meetings with that person; and the other category is meetings

10 with that person at which there were -- there's at least one other person

11 present, so it wasn't tete-a-tete, but which was a meeting at which there

12 was discussion, and you and that person were participants in the

13 discussion. Is that a clear -- is that a clear description, a clear

14 categorisation for you, Mr. Kljuic?

15 A. It is.

16 Q. Thank you. So we call those, please, categories A and B, if you

17 like. A is tete-a-tete, and B is the other type. I want to get through

18 this as quickly as possible, this background basic stuff.

19 In relation to the next two six-month periods, so that's April

20 1991 through to October 1991, and then October 1991 through to April

21 1992, all I really want from you at this stage as best you can do is a

22 number in category A and a number in category B. I just want to know in

23 the six-month period, first of all, April 1991 to October 1991, how many

24 meetings as best you can remember in category A, tete-a-tete?

25 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, again, are we referring to meetings

1 with Mr. Koljevic?

2 MR. STEWART: Yes, I'm sorry. Thank you for -- in case there was

3 any misunderstanding, we are with Professor Koljevic at the moment, yes.

4 A. There were between 10 and 15 meetings in category A.

5 Q. And in category B, where there were other people present?

6 A. There were a number of such meetings because we had sessions very

7 frequently, two or three times a week. There was a lot of diplomatic

8 action because in the Presidency we were all responsible for certain

9 fields. You should be aware of this fact.

10 Q. Please try to give a number. It's obviously not likely to be an

11 exact number, Mr. Kljuic. But please try to give a number in the way

12 that you did for category A?

13 MR. HARMON: He did respond "two or three times a week." That is

14 a number.

15 MR. STEWART: I'd invite Mr. Harmon to just let me pursue this

16 because -- well, I won't say because.

17 I'll put it a different way, then.

18 Q. Are you saying, Mr. Kljuic, then, that over that six-month

19 period, there were something between 50 and 70 meetings --

20 A. No.

21 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, QED.

22 Q. Mr. Kljuic, then, you're not saying that. So it's not two or

23 three times a week arithmetically. During that six-month period, April

24 1991 to October 1991, we're talking about Professor Koljevic, category B,

25 how many meetings do you say you had, Professor Koljevic, and at least

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1 one other person was present?

2 A. Perhaps between 20 and 30 such meetings.

3 I must say that I don't understand why you are insisting on this

4 number because these are statistics. If you want to know what the

5 relation was like, you can obtain this information in a different manner.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, it's up to Mr. Stewart whether he would

7 like to know the numbers. And we'll find out during his next questions

8 or in relation to other questions how he wants to establish the kind of

9 relationship you had. But the frequency also in numbers of meetings is

10 not necessarily irrelevant in that respect.

11 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

12 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. And again, Mr. Kljuic, then, following up to the next six-month

14 period from October 1991 through to April 1992, Professor Koljevic. How

15 many meetings in category A, tete-a-tete?

16 A. Perhaps one during that period.

17 Q. And how many meetings during that period in category B? That's

18 to say you, Professor Koljevic, and at least one other person present at

19 a meeting.

20 A. Between 10 and 20.

21 Q. And then Mr. Krajisnik. We'll go through the same sequence.

22 November 1991 -- I'm sorry. November 1990, correction. November 1990

23 through to April 1991, did you have any tete-a-tete meetings with Mr.

24 Krajisnik?

25 A. No.

1 Q. So category A is a nil return. Zero in category A.

2 Category B, meetings at which you, Mr. Krajisnik, and at least one other

3 person were present. How many of those do you say there were in the

4 six-month period November 1990 to April 1991?

5 A. There were a number of such meetings since Mr. Krajisnik was the

6 president of the assembly, and the Presidency always proposed an agenda,

7 or rather, they proposed items that the Presidency wanted to see

8 discussed at the assembly. And during that time, I attended meetings

9 with Mr. Krajisnik when the leaders of the HDZ, the SDS, and the SDA were

10 present and the HDZ and SDS had bilateral meetings.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Would you give that -- a number as well.

12 Approximately how many?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said between 10 and 20 such

14 meetings during that six-month period.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Well, that's, then, not on the record. You said

16 there were a number of such meetings. But I do understand that you count

17 them at anything between 10 and 20.

18 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

19 MR. STEWART:

20 Q. In the next six-month period then. We have got this echo back.

21 Never mind. In the next six-month period, April 1991 through to October

22 1991, do you say that you had any tete-a-tete meetings, that's category

23 A, with Mr. Krajisnik?

24 A. No.

25 Q. And as far as the category B meetings are concerned, you, Mr.

1 Krajisnik, and at least one other person at a meeting?

2 A. Perhaps 20 meetings or perhaps more. I'm including the

3 parliament and the Presidency meetings, governmental meetings, et cetera.

4 Q. You say -- I know it's difficult to draw perhaps absolutely clear

5 distinctions, Mr. Kljuic. I'd acknowledge that. But I was rather

6 inviting to you exclude the parliament. So if you take out Assembly

7 sessions, what's your answer, category B, period April 1991 to October

8 1991?

9 A. Well, you can't exclude the assembly period, the assembly,

10 because --

11 Q. Mr. Kljuic, with respect, I can exclude them because I can and

12 have excluded them from my question. So you would focus on my question,

13 from which the assembly sessions are excluded. Please answer; the number

14 of meetings in category 2 from your recollection during that period April

15 1991 to October 1991.

16 A. I must say that I was interested in Mr. Krajisnik as the

17 president of the assembly and as one of the main leaders of the SDS.

18 Whenever we had contact, this was the subject that was discussed. If you

19 are interested in this fact, we weren't very close to each other. I was

20 a lot closer to Mrs. Plavsic, to Koljevic, and even to Karadzic. I was

21 much closer to them than even to Mr. Krajisnik, if that's what you want

22 to hear. But at that time, I was a member of the --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, again. What Mr. Stewart wants to know:

24 How many of those approximately 20 you mentioned were assembly meetings?

25 That means official assembly meetings.

1 MR. STEWART: With respect, Your Honour --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, let me go for one second.

3 Mr. Kljuic, you said there were 20 meetings or perhaps more. How

4 many would be approximately official assembly meetings, so the assembly

5 convening as such.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You can divide this. Half of them

7 had to do with the assembly and were in the assembly, and half of the

8 other political meetings were held outside of the assembly.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.

10 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

11 Your Honour, could I say that this echo which has come back is

12 really quite terrible. Of course, I can carry on, but I don't know if

13 anybody else has got it. But I would appreciate it if it could be worked

14 on. I don't know whether other people have got it.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We have no echoes on ours.

16 MR. STEWART: I really do, Your Honour. And I've replugged into

17 the next place here as well, and I get the same. It comes and goes --

18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, it has happened to me in the past as

19 well, and I think it has to be with a button that has been pushed or

20 moved on the top. I'm not an expert, but I know it can be regulated

21 fairly quickly. But I'm not an expert, and I don't know which particular

22 button it is. It might be a knob on the top.

23 MR. STEWART: I appreciate Mr. Harmon's help. The day that Mr.

24 Harmon and I give each other advice on technical matters, then everybody

25 has a problem.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is becoming any better?

2 MR. STEWART: Well, I have to say something to see whether --

3 yes, Your Honour, it's better. Thank you very much, whoever -- thank

4 you. Yes, that's much better. Thank you.

5 Excuse me one second, Your Honour.

6 Q. So yes, by one route or another, we've got to the broad

7 conclusion that during that six-month period, October 1991 to April

8 1992 -- excuse me one moment.

9 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, I had just lost track of

10 whether I had asked him about the last six-month period, October 1991 to

11 April 1992.

12 JUDGE ORIE: I think the last question was about April 1991 until

13 October 1991. You find that on page 66 on line 16.

14 MR. STEWART: I'm obliged, Your Honour, that was my concern. I

15 didn't want to go over the same ground again.

16 Q. So far as that six-month period from April to October 1991 is

17 concerned, I think we've got to this position that the category B

18 meetings, leaving aside assembly, so the meetings at which Mr. Krajisnik,

19 you, and at least one other person were present, something like about 10

20 or something like that. Is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. So moving on to the next six-month period, October 1991 to April

23 1992. Do you say that you and Mr. Krajisnik had any tete-a-tete

24 meetings?

25 A. Not outside of the institutions. But in the assembly, I would

1 have personal contact with Mr. Krajisnik.

2 Q. Well, Mr. Kljuic, let's try and be as unambiguous about this as

3 we can. What I had understood you to mean by a tete-a-tete meeting --

4 but to be clear what I am meaning by the question of a tete-a-tete

5 meeting is a meeting where you and Mr. Krajisnik, just the two of you,

6 had at least some serious discussion about some political, in the broader

7 sense, some political matter. Is that a clear enough description of the

8 category of the type of meeting? Do you understand that description

9 sufficiently clearly?

10 A. Well, your description is clear to me, you know. But you don't

11 understand how we lived and worked. Five minutes in the assembly in such

12 a tense atmosphere when the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina is at

13 stake can result in far more than a 12-hour long meeting at which coffee

14 and mineral water is provided.

15 Q. Mr. Kljuic, I don't want to debate with you that sort of

16 understanding or misunderstanding. As a starting point, you confirmed

17 very helpfully that my description of the kind of meeting I was going to

18 ask you about was sufficiently clear for your purposes. So that type of

19 tete-a-tete meeting with Mr. Krajisnik, did you have any of those during

20 the period October 1991 to April 1992?

21 A. That type of meeting, a meeting that was arranged through a

22 secretary, a meeting at which we sat down, we didn't have such meetings,

23 but we did have tete-a-tete meetings in institutions.

24 But you must understand me. Krajisnik wasn't a partner of mine.

25 Mr. Krajisnik's partner in the HDZ was Mariofil Ljubic who was at a lower

1 rank. Karadzic and Izetbegovic were my partners.

2 Q. Who exactly was Mariofil Ljubic?

3 A. The vice-president of the parliament. A Croat.

4 Q. Just so summarise, when you say that Mr. Krajisnik's partner in

5 the HDZ was Mariofil Ljubic, you mean effectively that he was Mr.

6 Krajisnik's opposite number?

7 A. He was the second by rank in the assembly. He wasn't his

8 opposite number because Mr. Krajisnik had a far more important rank.

9 Q. That's -- I'm just trying to clarify that. And it's translation

10 questions here as well. But when you say "partner," they're in different

11 parties -- Let me try it another way, Mr. Kljuic. You seem to have been

12 saying that when you had a meeting, then the appropriate person for you

13 to meet would have been Dr. --

14 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just try to cut this short. Did you intend

15 to say that if you would meet representatives of the other party, that

16 you would meet with the party leaders, Izetbegovic and Karadzic?

17 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, the problem I have at the moment is I

18 distinctly remember the witness -- yes, exactly. Where is it? I

19 distinctly remember the witness referring to Dr. Karadzic and Mr.

20 Izetbegovic, and I can't find it.

21 JUDGE ORIE: The witness now confirmed that, and I put it to him.

22 MR. STEWART: It is solved now because it has got dropped from

23 the transcript in the moment. No doubt it will be put back in that.

24 That was my confusion. I had a clear recollection of that, Your Honour,

25 but couldn't see it on the screen. Thank you, Your Honour.

1 Q. So what you were saying in summary, yes, just supplementing His

2 Honour's question then. The appropriate persons for you to meet were

3 Izetbegovic and Karadzic; the appropriate person for your colleague, I

4 think Mr. Ljubic, your colleague, to meet was Mr. Krajisnik.

5 A. What's at stake were the problems we were dealing with in the

6 parliament. Mr. Krajisnik as a Serb was the president, and the Croat

7 Mario Ljubic, was the vice-president. They worked on problems that had

8 to do with parliamentary procedure, on the contents of the parliament's

9 work, and on the function of the parliament in order to create a new

10 society.

11 As far as meetings at which decisions could be obtained are

12 concerned or at which agreements could be reached, then this concerned

13 Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Karadzic and myself. However, there were a lot of

14 combined meetings which were attended by two or three or five people from

15 each party.

16 Q. And just be clear, then, Mr. Kljuic. Category B, we're talking

17 about meetings at which you and -- we're now talking about Mr. Krajisnik.

18 You, Mr. Krajisnik, and other persons or at least one other person were

19 present. During that six-month period, October 1991 to April 1992, how

20 many such meetings do you say that there were? And I'm excluding,

21 please, assembly meetings.

22 A. There were over ten.

23 Q. Just over ten, just to be clear. Do you say of the order of 10

24 or 12? Something like that? Is that what you're saying?

25 A. Ten to twelve.

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we're quite close to 12.30, if that

3 weren't an inconvenient point for the Trial Chamber.

4 JUDGE ORIE: At this moment, we'll adjourn until 10 minutes to

5 1.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at resume 12.54 p.m.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you escort the witness into the

9 courtroom.

10 Mr. Stewart, of course, the Chamber has given it some thought on

11 what happens. And if it would assist you that sometimes rather than

12 going back right to the beginning and going through the same problems

13 again might not always be the most efficient solution, whereas picking up

14 what is in the answer in order to further develop that. I refer you to

15 the matter of 20 inclusive or exclusive. If you take up the answer and

16 try to find what you want instead of going back saying that the question

17 has been misunderstood, that might -- it's just a suggestion, because

18 we're all facing the same problem.

19 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

20 MR. STEWART: I'll do my best, as usual, Your Honour.

21 Q. Mr. Kljuic, then you say in your evidence, and this -- you have

22 said in your evidence in this case, and that was at page 18, for the

23 record of Monday's transcript, 27th September, you said you met Mr.

24 Krajisnik in 1990 during the election campaign. "Later, when he was

25 president of the parliament we had a series of contacts, all the more so

1 because as a member of the Presidency, I attended every parliament

2 session. And in addition to that, in all major negotiations between the

3 party, the SDS was mostly represented by Karadzic and Krajisnik whereas I

4 at the time was a leading representative of the HDZ. Apart from that, I

5 spoke to Mr. Krajisnik several times in the course of official talks

6 between the HDZ and the SDS."

7 And Mr. Kljuic, we can confirm, can we, it logically follows, but

8 I want to be clear so there's no misunderstanding, when you say you spoke

9 to Mr. Krajisnik several times in the course of official talks, that was

10 always in the company of at least one other person, and in practice

11 several people?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And when you talk about official talks between the HDZ and the

14 SDS, not all of the category B meetings that you have described, those

15 are not the tete-a-tete meetings but the ones where there were other

16 people present, not all of those are what you would describe as official

17 talks between the HDZ and the SDS, are they?

18 A. At those official meetings, there were breaks, or rather pauses.

19 Sometimes people would speak at once.

20 Q. Mr. Kljuic -- [Previous interpretation continues] ... what's

21 happening now.

22 Mr. Kljuic, could you answer my question, please. Do you agree

23 that not all of the category B meetings, that's the ones where there were

24 other people present but you and Mr. Krajisnik were there -- not all of

25 those meetings were what you have described as official talks between the

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1 HDZ and the SDS?

2 A. That's right.

3 Q. And I think you were going on then to talk about breaks. I'm

4 going to invite you. What were you going to explain about the breaks in

5 these meetings?

6 A. Well, there were a number of open questions on certain issues,

7 and individuals on both sides would sometimes address other individuals

8 whom they felt could -- whom they felt they could achieve an agreement

9 with and that this would not detract from the overall negotiations. And

10 this was particularly true of the first stage of the constitution of

11 power and authority.

12 Q. Mr. Kljuic, it sounds, tell me whether this is wrong it. It

13 sounds as if what you're describing as far as the meetings are concerned

14 is really a normal dynamic of a meeting, that if you have a number of

15 people around the room, of course depending on their particular

16 positions, it may be that anybody at the meeting might address anybody

17 else at the meeting. Do you confirm what you're talking about is

18 actually relatively normal dynamics of a group meeting?

19 A. In principle, yes, but no, not everybody could address anybody

20 else.

21 Q. We don't need to go further into that, Your Honour.

22 You talked about Mr. Milosevic in your evidence. You said it was

23 evident that Slobodan Milosevic, and this is page 18 of Monday's

24 transcript, was the vehicle implementing a project that had been

25 developed by the intellectual circles in the Serbian Academy of Sciences.

1 Now, are you talking about a project that has commonly gone under the

2 label of "Greater Serbia"?

3 A. Yes. However, that project of a Greater Serbia and the

4 memorandum had a practical aspect which was known under the code name of

5 RAM, R-A-M.

6 Q. So are you drawing a distinction between -- this is a memorandum

7 produced by a group of intellectuals. Is that correct?

8 A. Yes. Based on the traditions of Serbian policies and politics of

9 the 19th century.

10 Q. And you're saying, are you -- are you saying there was

11 distinction between the content of that memorandum and the RAM plan, or

12 that the RAM plan was simply a development of that memorandum?

13 A. There was no difference, no distinction. However, the memorandum

14 and the idea of a Greater Serbia, they did not designate how this was to

15 be implemented. But the RAM plan understood the implementation of that

16 project.

17 Q. How would you -- well, when did you first hear of the RAM plan?

18 A. I first heard about it in the summer of 1991, having heard a

19 secret conversation between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic, and I went

20 public with that information at a conference of the HDZ.

21 Q. And how did you come to hear a secret conversation between Mr.

22 Milosevic and Mr. Karadzic?

23 A. Thanks to certain police services, the Minister of the Interior

24 told me of this tape, of the recording. I just listened to it. I wasn't

25 able to have it in my possession.

1 Q. What did you do? You went to the police station, did you, and

2 this person played it to you?

3 A. No, no, no. The Minister brought it to me to my office, to my

4 cabinet.

5 Q. And so what was the RAM plan? Was the content of the RAM plan

6 discussed in that conversation between Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic?

7 A. Mr. Karadzic and Milosevic, not Krajisnik.

8 Q. If I said Mr. Krajisnik, I apologise then. It has been

9 corrected. So was the content of the RAM plan discussed in that

10 conversation between Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic?

11 A. Yes. And Karadzic modified the concept of RAM, which had a

12 completely different meaning, into a Muslim name, RAM or RAMO. And that

13 was supposed to detract anybody listening in from what it actually was.

14 But quite obviously, they were dealing with the implementation of the

15 Greater Serbia project where it is precisely stated that they should go

16 to General Uzelac in Banja Luka, that they would get weapons, that he had

17 already secured certain areas and so on. And many other things. So that

18 was the first time that we actually learned of the existence of a project

19 like that.

20 Q. Can you recall what were -- did you learn the essential features

21 of the RAM plan from that conversation?

22 A. Well, of course -- and I've said this a number of times, that the

23 Bosnian Serbs were in charge of a part of the general project which was

24 led by Milosevic, so for the realisation of something that was to have

25 been put into practice on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina along with

1 subordination and using the forces of the Croatian Serbs in Knin and

2 Eastern Slavonia. Since Banja Luka was, in a certain sense, the centre

3 of the region, and General Uselac was the commander with broad

4 competencies and authority and even greater materiel potential, Karadzic

5 and Milosevic were discussing how Uselac would go about putting his task

6 into practice.

7 JUDGE ORIE: May I just seek clarification. Was this an

8 intercept of a telephone conversation or of a -- let's say, live meeting,

9 or don't you know?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I listened to the tape, a recording

11 of a telephone conversation between Karadzic and Milosevic. That was it.

12 MR. STEWART:

13 Q. And those features which you described in your last answer before

14 that one, those were matters that you learned, did you, from listening to

15 the tape of that telephone conversation?

16 A. Yes. Although we knew before that there was a project in

17 existence. But this was very concrete and specific. Certain facts were

18 mentioned.

19 Q. What would you say were the -- at the time when you heard this,

20 what were the essential features of the plan?

21 A. Well, the essential features were these: In Croatia, for

22 example, there was already a conflict along those lines. The external

23 western borders, for example, of the territory that Milosevic wished to

24 unite. So the Serbs of Croatia held those positions already, which were

25 to represent the western borders of a Serbian state, but the problem of

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina remained unsolved. What had to be now done was to

2 undertake preparations and arming so that when the time was ripe, the

3 territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be taken over which would be kept

4 within that new state as provided for by the RAM plan or operation. So

5 that is 70 per cent or 75 per cent, roughly speaking, of today's

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That would be it.

7 Q. You talked about your political contacts with Mr. Milosevic.

8 Again, page 18 of Monday's transcript, 27th September. You said -- well,

9 I'll ask you about the same -- well, first of all, have you ever had any

10 tete-a-tete meeting with Mr. Milosevic?

11 A. Since you're asking me to say, I have never been with Milosevic.

12 But I faced him eye to eye during a luncheon in Belgrade where he took me

13 to one side and explained to me that he supported the departure of

14 Western Herzegovina which was populated almost exclusively by Croats,

15 that it should move to a Croatian state. In this entire process, they

16 tried to separate Western Herzegovina out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, away

17 from Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that idea was very much present in the

18 minds of certain Croats; that is to say, that these should finally join

19 up with the Croatian state. However, this would mean breaking up

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state; and secondly, I was not an advocate of

21 this type of political view. I was a Bosnian-Herzegovinian integralist,

22 and I said to Milosevic on that particular occasion that we don't

23 understand each other when we -- when it comes to what Western

24 Herzegovina actually is. And then he said quite clearly that it was the

25 right bank of the River Neretva, and that the left bank belonged to the

1 Serbs which was the same thing that Momo Mandic had said to Bruno Stojic

2 and Branko Kvesic.

3 Q. When was this luncheon, Mr. Kljuic?

4 A. In the autumn of 1991, he was in Belgrade. But I met Milosevic

5 briefly once in Sarajevo.

6 Q. Yes. So when you say in the autumn of 1991 he was in Belgrade,

7 you're saying that was the occasion of that luncheon. Is that right?

8 A. Yes, yes.

9 Q. And you say you met him briefly once in Sarajevo. What were the

10 circumstances -- first of all, when was that occasion in Sarajevo?

11 A. Also in autumn 1991. The leadership of all six republics of

12 Bosnia-Herzegovina had a series of meetings and sessions in all the

13 capital cities of the republics. And one of those meetings was organised

14 in Sarajevo at Stojcevac, and that's when I had a meeting with Mr.

15 Tudjman as well. But in the meantime, since the two of them had

16 contacts, I joined in and, of course, Milosevic welcomed me, said hello.

17 He encouraged me and so on. But I didn't meddle and interfere in the

18 conversation. What I did was I listened to what Mr. Tudjman and Mr.

19 Milosevic were saying. That was another break in those meetings.

20 Q. Was the Sarajevo occasion before or after the Belgrade lunch that

21 you mentioned?

22 A. The event in Sarajevo came afterwards, but they're well-known

23 dates and you can check them up and establish them very easily. There

24 are documents to bear them out.

25 Q. Yes, not all lunches are documented, Mr. Kljuic. The occasion of

1 the luncheon, that's documented under what label or description of the

2 event?

3 A. Well, we had an official meeting of the delegations of Serbian

4 Bosnia-Herzegovina first, and Mr. Milosevic was in the Serbian

5 delegation. The president of the assembly was Trifunovic, and the prime

6 minister was Unkovic. And in the Bosnian BH delegation, there were three

7 members of the Presidency. Izetbegovic chaired the meeting, Mr. Koljevic

8 and myself. It was a working day the entire day. We just took a break

9 for lunch, and it might have lasted for, say, two hours. And it was

10 during that luncheon that I was placed to Mr. Milosevic so that we talked

11 throughout lunch.

12 Q. The -- have you ever had telephone conversations with Mr.

13 Milosevic?

14 A. No, but I was present when Mr. Izetbegovic and Milosevic were

15 engaged in a conversation. And on that occasion, Mr. Izetbegovic said

16 "Mr. Kljuic is here with us; he's listening in."

17 Q. And you were listening in to both sides of the conversation, were

18 you?

19 A. Well, yes. You could do that on the telephone apparatus. You

20 could put the volume up and hear.

21 Q. Yes. And when was that?

22 A. That was also in the autumn of 1991.

23 Q. And what was the topic or content of that telephone conversation?

24 A. Well, because of the war in Croatia at the time, we had a change

25 in the attitude taken by the population towards the JNA. Parents were

1 hiding their children. They were sending them off abroad. They were

2 smuggling them out of the country. In simple terms, the citizens did not

3 want their children to go to the war in Croatia as part of the JNA. And

4 I have to say that that was not characteristic only of the Croats and

5 Muslims, but a large number of Serbs didn't allow their children to join

6 up and go to the army.

7 So during this period of time through the media and in other

8 ways, attempts were made to lend support to the Yugoslav People's Army.

9 And Milosevic at that point in time told Mr. Izetbegovic, he said to him,

10 "You know that the Yugoslav People's Army is the sole, official army

11 belonging to all our nations and nationalities or ethnicities."

12 Q. Now, apart from the conversation which you had with Mr. Milosevic

13 at that lunch in Belgrade, how many times in your lives do you say that

14 you have had a conversation with Mr. Milosevic which touched upon the

15 division of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

16 A. I was -- I had occasion to say hello to Mr. Milosevic on several

17 occasions, but the only detailed conversation and discussion about the

18 division of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the meeting we had in Belgrade, or

19 rather the encounter when in a pause during lunch, he took me to one side

20 and said -- or rather, and told me what I've already told you, that he

21 wanted Western Herzegovina to be joined to Croatia, et cetera. And later

22 on, he dictated all the places which he considered belonged to the Croats

23 in that division of the country.

24 Q. So when earlier this week at page 18, for other people's record,

25 of Monday, 27th September transcript, when you said, referring to Mr.

1 Milosevic, "the subject of our conversations concentrated on efforts to

2 divide Bosnia-Herzegovina," in fact we're talking about a single

3 conversation, that one in Belgrade at that lunch.

4 A. Well, we didn't discuss that at other places, and I wasn't the

5 opposite number of Mr. Milosevic, whereas Mr. Izetbegovic, Mr. Tudjman,

6 Mr. Kiro Gligorov were. They were on a par at the same level. But let

7 me explain, during that luncheon, it wasn't a discussion at lunch, during

8 lunch. We went to a separate part of the hall because it was a large

9 hall and discussed this matter for 15 or 20 minutes.

10 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kljuic.

11 And you said in your evidence, same page reference in the

12 transcript, following your reference to that, you said, "however, to his

13 great regret," and that's Mr. Milosevic, "I," Mr. Kljuic, "was not a good

14 partner for that kind of agreement." That's relating to, obviously, from

15 what you said to Western Herzegovina. From what you've said, Mr. Kljuic,

16 it sounds as if -- would you agree, you weren't the person with whom Mr.

17 Milosevic could and would have thought to reach such an agreement because

18 you were not his opposite number?

19 A. You could put it that way, too. But I promoted the political

20 programme of the Bosnian Croats, which was totally in opposition to the

21 idea of a division. I was legally elected, not only at the elections

22 where I received the relative majority of votes, although the Croatian

23 ticket was the smallest, but at the party convention on the 23rd and 24th

24 of March 1991, I was given plebiscitory support of 258 delegates,

25 deputies of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of a

1 plebiscite.

2 Q. Mr. Kljuic, then you said that -- this is page 19 of that same

3 transcript - "as for the policy of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic relative to

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina, he did not hide his plans; on the contrary." You

5 said, "He tried to find in me a partner for that sort of thing." And can

6 we take it that "that sort of thing," by that you meant the incorporation

7 of Western Herzegovina in Croatia?

8 A. As you saw earlier, there were three options which the Serbs from

9 Belgrade were interested in. And they were, first of all, a Greater

10 Serbia; then secondly, the complete Bosnia-Herzegovina within the

11 composition of the so-called Yugoslavia minus Croatia and Slovenia; and

12 thirdly, what actually happened. That is to say, a war, and then a

13 free-for-all to take as much as we can. I was not at all in favour of

14 such a division, and I was especially not in favour of having all

15 Croatian interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina being boiled down and reduced to

16 the area in Western Herzegovina, for example.

17 Q. Mr. Kljuic --

18 A. [In English] just a moment, please, Mr. Stewart.

19 [Interpretation] -- which was inhabited by barely 17 per cent of

20 Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So all those who accepted western

21 Herzegovina to be the sole thing that the Croats had, they would be

22 forfeiting 73 per cent of the population.

23 Q. I'm just trying to focus the questions so that when we have a

24 phrase like "that sort of thing" we try to be ask specific as we can

25 about what that means.

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1 You listed the three options. Now, clearly, you would agree the

2 third of those options, I think as you put it, which was that there would

3 be a war and a free-for-all, if option is the apt label. Nobody was

4 seeking to find in you a partner for war, were they? You would agree

5 that's absurd?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. So just moving away from the whole range of options. Let's be

8 clear, please, Mr. Kljuic, when you say Mr. Milosevic was trying to find

9 in you a partner for "that sort of thing," did that primarily mean the

10 carving off of Western Herzegovina?

11 A. Yes. First, that would have satisfied the loudest portion of

12 Croats from Western Herzegovina; secondly, cutting off just one part of

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina would have disrupted the entire construction of the

14 state itself.

15 Q. Yes. And then what you said, Mr. Kljuic, in your evidence, and

16 this is again specifically at page 19 of Monday, 27th September

17 transcript, the complete sentence was "he tried" - Mr. Milosevic that was

18 - "he tried to find in me a partner for that sort of thing, as did

19 Karadzic." When did Dr. Karadzic first make an attempt to find in you,

20 Mr. Kljuic, a partner for "that sort of thing," as you've described it?

21 A. After the aggression against Croatia, and that was May, the month

22 of May 1991, Karadzic said that he was sorry that the conflict had come

23 about, but that the separation -- that separation and delineation was the

24 sole outcome that the Serbs wanted. He also said to me, "You take what

25 is yours, and we'll take ours. And if there's something left over for

1 the Muslims, a small portion of the territory, perhaps they'll be

2 satisfied with what they get."

3 Q. Do you recall the specific occasion on which Dr. Karadzic first

4 made that suggestion to you?

5 A. Dr. Karadzic never hid his views. He presented them many times.

6 But if you want me to quote one such specific occasion, and a

7 conversation that we had at the headquarters of the SDS, for example,

8 then it went as follows --

9 Q. Mr. Kljuic, just for a moment, please. What I particularly asked

10 you about, if you are able to answer this, what I was particularly asking

11 you about what to identify, if you can, the first occasion on which Dr.

12 Karadzic ever made that suggestion to you.

13 A. First occasion was in May of 1991, and then the occasion was

14 repeated five times over the next month or two as the front in Croatia

15 developed.

16 Q. So what was the nature of that first occasion, by which I mean

17 what sort of meeting was it and who was there?

18 A. The meeting was between the two of us, tete-a-tete, nobody else

19 was in the room. Karadzic said quite clearly that the Serbs would take

20 all the areas which they considered to belong to them.

21 Q. Where did that meeting take place?

22 A. The meeting took place at the headquarters of Karadzic's party,

23 the SDS.

24 Q. At whose instigation or invitation?

25 A. A common friend of ours who was related to a businessman called

1 Ostojic. You've got to make a distinction between the businessman called

2 Ostojic and the minister called Ostojic.

3 He was asked to arrange for a discussion.

4 Q. Mr. Kljuic, excuse me, there's a simple distinction between the

5 minister called Ostojic and the businessman called Ostojic, to give their

6 first names. What was the name of the businessman called Ostojic?

7 A. I think it was Branko. I'm not sure. But he was a very

8 influential businessman. And he asked a Croatian deputy in the

9 parliament, his name is Pasko Vukoje, and the two of them married either

10 two sisters or two cousins, I'm not quite sure. But their wives were

11 related. And the reason was that these people were fighting in Croatia.

12 Let's not fight in Bosnia. You representatives of the Serbs and Croats

13 try to reach an agreement. You're on good terms. Let's try and prevent

14 shooting from breaking out.

15 What I always insisted on was that the Serbian leadership in

16 Bosnia should condemn the crimes committed by the JNA and by the Serbs in

17 Croatia in Croatia itself. And this is something that they never did.

18 On the other hand, Karadzic said publicly, this was a very loud

19 and severe speech, he said that the Serbs would take everything that they

20 considered to be their own. Since this was heard in other rooms, too,

21 this deputy of mine in the parliament, when he heard this loud

22 discussion, he left. He left me. At that point, I told Karadzic, "Take

23 everything that you can, but Bosnia and Herzegovina will survive."

24 And later, this discussion frequently resumed. Things would cool

25 down, and you would start talking normal again and in a friendly way, et

1 cetera. But Karadzic complained to Milosevic and said that I wasn't a

2 good person to talk to. He also said that I had been bought by the

3 Muslims, and they went to Zagreb with these accusations.

4 And one day, President Tudjman said "Stjepan, the Bosnian Serbs

5 complain and say that you don't want to talk to them. This is

6 pointless." I said, "That's not true. But if it's necessary, we can

7 start talking tomorrow." I promised President Tudjman that we would

8 start talking to each other.

9 Later on, it was found out that Tudjman and Milosevic had some

10 sort of a red telephone line. When I arrived in Sarajevo in the morning,

11 I phoned Karadzic and I said, "Should we see each other?" He said, "Yes,

12 I know we should." And that's when that famous meeting in the Assembly

13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held. It was held in Mr. Krajisnik's office,

14 and this meeting was attended on the Croatian side by --

15 Q. Mr. Kljuic, Mr. Kljuic. Don't worry, we are going to coming on

16 to that meeting. It probably won't be today, but the famous meeting you

17 describe, can we come to it, largely, at a moment of my choosing, please.

18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we've got 10 minutes to go to the

19 normal time, and we did leave over certain issues, some of which won't

20 directly involve Mr. Kljuic as the witness but in relation to the

21 question of documents that he may have in Sarajevo. I don't wish the

22 witness to leave The Hague without us taking whatever advantage is

23 appropriate of his presence to explore such matters.

24 JUDGE ORIE: I think we could deal with that in approximately

25 five minutes, if you would stop in five minutes.

1 MR. STEWART: I'm obliged, Your Honour. Thank you.

2 Q. Then, Mr. Kljuic, you made it clear, this is -- your evidence is

3 perfectly clear on this, you made it clear to Dr. Karadzic that you did

4 not agree with his proposal. That's absolutely clear, isn't it.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And you said that you had been the first man -- this is, again,

7 page 19 of Monday, the 27th September transcript. You were the first man

8 to public the national programme of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina and

9 you said the most important thing in that programme was for Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina to remain a sovereign republic; that is, to have the same

11 status of the other former republics of Yugoslavia, a stand that was to

12 be confirmed by the Badinter Commission.

13 Mr. Kljuic, I just want to see whether you clearly agree with

14 this: When you talk about "the most important thing in that programme

15 being for Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a sovereign republic," you

16 were not talking about maintaining the status quo, were you?

17 A. I don't know what you mean by "status quo."

18 Q. Well, you were not talking about maintaining the position

19 precisely as it was.

20 A. In what respect?

21 Q. It's the phrase "the most important thing was that

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina should remain a sovereign republic." I'll put it more

23 clearly and directly, then.

24 To remain a sovereign republic with the same status as the other

25 former republics of Yugoslavia, in fact, involved the highly significant

1 change that Bosnia and Herzegovina would become a separate, independent

2 sovereign state and leave the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That's

3 right, isn't it?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So in your terminology, it would remain a sovereign republic, but

6 then that's because you -- is this right? You regarded it as being a

7 sovereign republic even when it was within Yugoslavia.

8 A. All the republics according to the constitution of 1974 were

9 practically states. We didn't break up Yugoslavia. It's not important

10 to know who did. But when Croatia and Slovenia left Yugoslavia,

11 Yugoslavia could no longer survive with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Why? The system of governing Yugoslavia was based on a

13 Presidency with eight members, and there were representatives of

14 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and

15 Macedonia. In the course of 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, Milosevic

16 had already withdrawn autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, two autonomous

17 provinces. And those representatives, one of which was an Albanian, were

18 replaced by those people. So he had four votes in the Presidency. He

19 only needed one more vote in order, for example, to introduce a military

20 dictatorship. Once Slovenia and Croatia left such a Yugoslavia, then

21 there were six votes left in the Presidency, and Milosevic had four of

22 them. As a result, he had absolute power. That is why we couldn't

23 remain in such a Yugoslavia.

24 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Mr. Kljuic.

25 Your Honour, I notice it is now 20 minutes to 2.00.

1 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

2 Mr. Kljuic, before the break, we discussed before the break

3 whether you would be willing to bring your notes. Have you given it some

4 further consideration?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Having thought about it a little,

6 Your Honours, I don't think that they would be of much value to you.

7 These are my personal observations that I wrote down in notebooks. The

8 pages are torn out, put aside, what is important is information that I

9 related at HDZ meetings or at Presidency meetings. But what is of

10 particular interest for my book, for example, my book with Karadzic when

11 I told him that Bosnia-Herzegovina will survive in one way or another,

12 this is something that you have already heard. There are two or three

13 examples of that. These notes haven't been sorted out. They don't have

14 the form of a diary, of organised documents. Many of them don't even a

15 have date. In some cases, you only have the initials of the

16 participants. So I don't see what the value of these documents would be

17 for you.

18 If it is really necessary, I will bring two or three examples

19 here to show you what they look like. It was written down rapidly. They

20 are personal notes of mine, and they don't really have any value as

21 documents that would be of interest for this Trial Chamber.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Would you be willing to give us an opportunity to

23 see whether we share your view, not just by examples? It might be that

24 the parties and this Trial Chamber have other views on what is most

25 relevant or less relevant or not relevant at all. It could be just a

1 name; it could be just an expression which sounds familiar to us. My

2 question, therefore, again, is would you be willing to bring them all or

3 even to copy them and to send them to the Trial Chamber so that we are

4 able -- I mean, if there are of no help, don't be afraid that we'll have

5 used them.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't have any secrets, you

7 know. Throughout my lifetime, I have fought for certain ideals. And I

8 have stated this quite clearly. I will provide you with two or three

9 examples. I will send them to see whether they are of interest to you.

10 I'm not sure you will be able to read anything because I have been using

11 a typewriter for years so my handwriting is not very clear. I will send

12 you two or three examples through a representative in Sarajevo. He can

13 come to see me in about 15 days. I will send them to you and you can

14 evaluate them.

15 JUDGE ORIE: If you can please send them all. And I assure you

16 if we can't read your handwriting, then of course it's of no use for us

17 to continue to read. If the material is irrelevant or if the material

18 cannot be understood, then of course we would go just further. So if it

19 would be possible to hand over the full set of the notes you have, we'll

20 then be at least in a position to see whether it's...

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that's a huge amount

22 of paper. And I'm writing a book that consists of 14 chapters. The

23 first one deals with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The last one dealings

24 with the Hague Tribunal. And once I have dealt with one field the papers

25 that I prepared are destroyed, the text remains. I can provide you with

1 a number of typed-out chapters that have been prepared for the book so

2 you can see what my positions were. But as far as the matters that

3 concern, the people who are mentioned here at the Tribunal are concerned,

4 these were short notes for a meeting, things that I wrote down so that I

5 could talk to my people in the HDZ about this, or that so that I could

6 address the Presidency and tell them whether it was true that there was a

7 desire to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina. These were things to enable us

8 to adopt a position, et cetera, et cetera. I could provide you with a

9 number of chapters that are already completed and ready to be published

10 if you're interested in them.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Of course, you would provide us with your

12 interpretation of the facts, which, of course we heard something about

13 that. This Chamber and the parties are mainly interested in the direct

14 sources.

15 Would it be possible for you -- the number of pages that would

16 cover 1991, 1992, how many would that be approximately? I'm again asking

17 for numbers. Approximately. Would that be 200 pages, 300 pages?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There will be about 360 A4 pages

19 for the book. Right now, I probably have about 70 or 80 pages that are

20 prepared for printing, about a quarter of the book. Everything else has

21 been handwritten.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm talking about your notes of that time.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, these papers -- I'll

24 have to go through them, separate them, and whatever is recorded I will

25 provide you with that. Not only for the period that you are interested,

1 but also for other periods. I will photocopy them and I will provide you

2 with them. As to how useful they will be to you, believe me, I don't

3 know. I have difficulty in finding me way around these papers too. But

4 if this is your wish, not the wish of the Prosecution or of the Defence,

5 I will provide you with these papers.

6 I must tell you, though, that as soon as I return to Sarajevo

7 tomorrow, I will be leaving for Germany where I'll spend 15 days at the

8 Book Fair in Cologne because one of my books on Bosnia-Herzegovina will

9 be promoted at that fair. It doesn't have any political content, though.

10 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber very much appreciates your willingness

11 to bring your personal notes. I do understand that you need some time to

12 prepare because, well, if I'm preparing something in writing, it

13 sometimes is also not all well organised. But would you be willing to

14 see persons to assist you in copying? If you prepare the personal notes,

15 as you explained that to us, just the writing down of positions taken by

16 certain parties, et cetera, et cetera, so those person notes, not the

17 preparatory works for your book, but especially those personal notes that

18 you made at that time, then we'll ask the Victims and Witness section

19 because it is at this moment not appropriate for the parties to speak

20 with you. We'll ask, then, the Victims and Witness section, to assist

21 you in having it copied, and then it will be sent to The Hague prior to

22 you being recalled, because as you are now aware of, the

23 cross-examination has not yet been concluded. Although I also appreciate

24 that the latter part, I think the understanding between the examining

25 party you as a witness became better, so we very much appreciate if you

1 would, with this assistance, copy your personal notes. You can limit it

2 to 1991, 1992 for the time being. We'll then look at it, and the parties

3 will assist the Chamber in looking at whether they're of any use at all

4 or whether we just send them back.

5 If, however, you would bring the originals when you come back,

6 but already give copies to the representative of the Victims and Witness

7 unit. Yes? Thank you very much for your cooperation, Mr. Kljuic.

8 MR. HARMON: Am I to understand, Your Honour, that these notes,

9 then, that Mr. Kljuic produces to the Chamber are not to be disseminated

10 to anyone else outside of the parties themselves? That might give Mr.

11 Kljuic some reassurance.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I think the first thing we will do is

13 to inspect them to see whether they are relevant or of any use to us in

14 these proceedings. And of course it might be that at some later stage

15 then in due course, maybe some elements will be dealt with in open

16 session, but even then we could consider to deal with them in closed

17 session. So if you send them to the Tribunal, I take it you agree with

18 that for the time being.

19 MR. STEWART: As a matter of physical sending, they get sent to

20 the Tribunal, yes.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Kljuic, the parties will be instructed that

22 if they assist the Chamber in seeing whether it's relevant or not, it's

23 not something to be made public. We'll first look at it, and if some

24 parts support your evidence or perhaps at a later stage during

25 cross-examination reference might be made to that, even if the material

1 is such that you wish it be dealt with in closed session, we'll consider

2 that. So if you send it to us, it will not be public material right

3 away. It would be confidential, at least for the whole bunch, to start

4 with.

5 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour, could I observe that, yes,

6 indeed, I had assumed and do confirm that of course we would expect to

7 keep such material confidential. After all, we're only asking to see it

8 in order to see whether it might form the subject of cross-examination.

9 And then the question -- well, then, normally, it would simply be in open

10 court, then.

11 Your Honour, there is one, possibly two, further short

12 observations, but they are more appropriately made after the witness has

13 left Court.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Then Mr. Kljuic, you'll receive an invitation to

15 appear again in this Tribunal in order to be further cross-examined. And

16 perhaps the Judges have questions for you as well at the very end. Could

17 you tell us anything about your availability in time. Are there certain

18 periods? Well, perhaps, if you inform the Victims and Witness section,

19 those who are accompanying you during your stay here in The Hague, if

20 there are certain periods where you're certainly not available, that at

21 least the Tribunal and then also the Office of the Prosecutor will know

22 when you're not available. Yes?

23 MR. STEWART: My apologies, Your Honour, of course it occurs to

24 me there is one matter which I ought to specifically raise before the

25 witness leaves, and this is this: I wonder if through the Trial Chamber

1 may I ask whether Mr. Kljuic would either be willing or be directed to

2 deal with the matter in this way, that any questions transmitted to him

3 while he is away from The Hague in this interim period as to what

4 material he actually has gone, that he should answer those. Because Your

5 Honour will see the difficulty if we're not able to in the interim while

6 he's away from The Hague to explore that issue, the whole thing could be

7 a complete mess when he comes back to The Hague. So can we be clear that

8 any questions directed to Mr. Kljuic, which would go in writing, of

9 course, as to what material he has, he would give that information.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Harmon, would it be a good idea that if

11 there's any written communication with Mr. Kljuic when he's away

12 concerning this material - I limit it to that - that it can be sent to

13 him in writing with a copy to the Trial Chamber so that the Trial

14 Chamber, and perhaps before sending the letter first send a copy of the

15 letter intended to be sent to Mr. Kljuic to the Trial Chamber with a

16 pause of one or two days so the Chamber at least keeps some control over

17 the communication.

18 MR. HARMON: I think it should be sent in advance to the Trial

19 Chamber and to us, if we have an issue on it, we can raise it with the

20 Chamber before --

21 MR. STEWART: I certainly had that in mind, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.

23 Mr. Kljuic, you have a question.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I would just like to

25 say, don't be mistaken about these documents of mine. These are private

1 documents, very brief. I think that you might consider them to be a very

2 good source of information. But these are some of my thoughts about what

3 was happening and perhaps some thoughts about private conversations.

4 Secondly, if you send me questions in order to save time, I will

5 provide you with written responses to those questions. And thirdly, it's

6 only around mid-November that I could come to The Hague for a few days.

7 I can't come next month, but in mid-November it would be possible for me

8 to come here and spend another two or three days or how long is necessary

9 in order to testify here.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kljuic, usually the parties are not allowed to

11 contact you once your examination has started. The Chamber now allow the

12 parties, if they have specific questions to you in relation to the

13 material you're going to send to the Tribunal, that first the Chamber

14 gets a copy of the letter they intend to send to you. And would you

15 please, if you respond to those letters, send a copy to the Trial Chamber

16 so that the Chamber is aware of what kind of contacts are there, since

17 you have not concluded your cross-examination.

18 I very much thank you for coming to The Hague, at least this

19 first time. I thank you for your cooperation as far as the notes are

20 concerned. And we'll see you back then most likely somewhere in

21 November. Thank you. Madam Usher, you may escort the witness

22 out of the courtroom.

23 [The witness stands down]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, there's one other issue, I believe.

25 And I am aware that I forgot to thank the interpreters the last

1 time, that I'm too often -- I should have stopped at five minutes past,

2 half past two instead of saying that we had another five minutes.

3 MR. STEWART: Our thanks as well, Your Honour. It's only this,

4 that we do agree that if Mr. Kljuic is actually sending material, that it

5 should be sent, when I say to the Tribunal, I presume to the Trial

6 Chamber would be appropriate as the forwarding. But we take it that when

7 that material arrives, then the -- of course the Prosecution and Defence,

8 both of us, the Trial Chamber, Prosecution, and Defence will all have the

9 opportunity of considering that material.

10 JUDGE ORIE: That's how you could understand my words, that the

11 parties were assisting the Chamber in -- they couldn't do that without

12 having access to that material.

13 MR. STEWART: I'm obliged, Your Honour. That's very clear.

14 Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE ORIE: If there are no further issues to be raised at this

16 moment, Madam Registrar, tomorrow morning at 9.00 we resume in this same

17 courtroom. We adjourn --

18 MR. STEWART: I'm sorry, Your Honour, there is another issue.

19 I'm reminded very helpfully by Ms. Loukas. We're having -- we're getting

20 -- we're being given as much help as we can, but we do have all kinds of

21 issues always about the transmission of material between us and Mr.

22 Krajisnik and through the UN DU and so on. The position we're faced with

23 at the moment is we have a CD which contains material germane to

24 tomorrow's witness, and we are unclear, and it's often very difficult for

25 us to get clear -- we are unclear whether we are permitted to hand it to

1 Mr. Krajisnik --

2 JUDGE ORIE: I think he's not allowed to receive it from you at

3 this moment. But I think it could be delivered, with all the risk of

4 falling out of baskets, et cetera. If there's any need for assistance,

5 I'll be there to see what I can do. But I don't think that he's allowed

6 to bring them with him himself. That has got something to do also with

7 transportation. But let's not --

8 MR. STEWART: That's the difficulty we're having, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: If there are any specific questions, I'm available

10 and you can address Ms. Philpott.

11 MR. STEWART: I'm obliged, Your Honour. It's obviously urgent;

12 it's for tomorrow's witness. It's clear.

13 JUDGE ORIE: We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning, 9.00.

14 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.59 p.m.,

15 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 30th day of

16 September, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.

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