Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 10431

1 Monday, 14 March 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, will you

6 please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Case number IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus

8 Momcilo Krajisnik.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Madam Registrar.

10 Good morning, I see that we have not a new team but at least a

11 different team. For the record, Mr. Harmon, this morning the OTP

12 appearances.

13 MR. HARMON: Yes, Your Honour, good morning, Mr. President, Your

14 Honour, counsel, Mr. Margetts is appearing with me today and we are

15 assisted by Mrs. Javier. Mr. Margetts will take the next witness, Your

16 Honour.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. May I take it you're ready to call your

18 next witness, no protective measures in place. Madam Registrar, thank

19 you.

20 Madam Usher, will you please escort the witness into the courtroom

21 and perhaps meanwhile the office of the Prosecutor could inform us whether

22 there's any wish to respond to the request for a certificate for an appeal

23 on the decision on the motion for adjournment.

24 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, it is not our intention to file a

25 response to that.

Page 10432

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and not to order -- or respond either.

2 MR. HARMON: Correct.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas.

4 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. Prior to the witness

5 coming into court, there is just a few matters I need to update from the

6 housekeeping session late on Friday evening.


8 MS. LOUKAS: I don't know if Your Honour would like me to go

9 through those matters now or at a subsequent time. I'm just placing that

10 on the record firstly that there are some matters that need to be dealt

11 with.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps if the witness enters the courtroom, we would

13 rather pay attention to him than to -- how much time would you need to

14 address these matters?

15 MS. LOUKAS: Oh, Your Honour, I would submit something around five

16 minutes.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then we'll find five minutes somewhere today.

18 MS. LOUKAS: There is one other matter that I wish to place on the

19 record prior to the witness giving his evidence, Your Honour, and he

20 really should not be in court for this.

21 JUDGE ORIE: It should be done before? Yes, okay. Then Witness,

22 could you wait for one second outside since.

23 [The witness withdrew]

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Ms. Loukas.

25 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honours. It's just that Your

Page 10433

1 Honour didn't ask me prior to ask asking for the witness to come in

2 whether or not I had any matters just inquired of the Prosecution.

3 Now, Your Honour, in relation to this witness, I can indicate that

4 I will not be in a position to cross-examine this witness when he finishes

5 giving his evidence in chief. I can indicate that I've received quite

6 some material from Mr. Krajisnik in relation to this witness and there's a

7 great wealth of documents and I certainly do not wish to go through the

8 matters relating to the adjournment motion of which Your Honours have made

9 a decision and I cannot cavil with that. We've applied for certification

10 and there it lies, but nevertheless, in relation to this witness, Your

11 Honour, I would submit that he would complete his evidence in chief and

12 that he would return for cross-examination at a later stage at which stage

13 the Defence will be properly prepared, particularly in relation to the

14 wealth of material as I've indicated that I've received from Mr. Krajisnik

15 and this certainly matters for which need further conferences with Mr.

16 Krajisnik. I've indicated that I've organised for two conferences, one

17 this afternoon and another one tomorrow afternoon but it's just not going

18 to be adequate for the purposes.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas, just a question, this is material not

20 disclosed by the Prosecution but material you received from the accused?

21 MS. LOUKAS: Correct, Your Honour, yes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: May I just inquire, has this witness -- since when is

23 this witness on the list of witnesses? Since when could the Defence and

24 could the -- could Mr. Krajisnik expect this witness to testify and when

25 have the statements been disclosed?

Page 10434

1 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, the statements were disclosed in

2 January 2004, January last year.


4 MR. MARGETTS: This witness was scheduled to immediately follow

5 the evidence of Mr. Andic.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but he was on the list as a witness since --

7 from the beginning.

8 MR. MARGETTS: Since January 2004, the material was disclosed and

9 I don't have the specific date that he was added to the list.

10 JUDGE ORIE: But there's not a recent change in scheduling and --

11 which, of course, raises an issue, Ms. Loukas, which I'll not at this

12 moment deal with but -- and that is why any material received from Mr.

13 Krajisnik you received it not one year ago but only recently.

14 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, that answer -- that question is

15 easily answered in the sense that the material, of course, is received in

16 B/C/S and it has to be translated and Your Honours, in relation to that,

17 we've not had the opportunity to have that material translated in terms of

18 the fact that we deal with our witnesses on a pretty much firefighting ad

19 hoc as they come up basis while we're trying to balance the rest of the

20 priorities of our case.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's -- you say it's easily answered. That does

22 not yet mean that the answer would justify any delay. The Chamber will

23 consider the matter and see whether an opportunity will be given to --

24 well, certainly an opportunity will be given to the Defence to

25 cross-examine the witness and if the Defence is not ready to do that, what

Page 10435

1 the consequences would be the Chamber will consider that.

2 Mr. Margetts.

3 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, on issue of scheduling, should this

4 witness not proceed for cross-examination, of course, we wouldn't be in a

5 position to call another witness to replace that court time.

6 Secondly, if this application is to be maintained, in light of the

7 circumstance of this witness, prior to him commencing his evidence here,

8 we'd like the opportunity to speak with him and put to the Chamber the

9 proposition that Ms. Loukas has presented to the Court and see what

10 concerns he may have in relation to his evidence being partially completed

11 and him returning to Bosnia. He is, again, an insider and there are

12 certain issues that may be relevant to this decision.


14 I do understand, Ms. Loukas, that meeting has been scheduled for

15 this afternoon or for tomorrow with Mr. Krajisnik; is that correct?

16 MS. LOUKAS: That's correct, Your Honour. I have a conference

17 with him this afternoon and tomorrow afternoon.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I also take it that you will need two days,

19 Mr. Margetts, to -- for the examination in chief.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Your Honour.

21 [Trial Chamber confers]

22 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber at this moment does not consider

23 that there's any reason to discuss what to do if the witness had to be

24 sent home and come back again. At this moment, the Chamber invites the

25 Prosecution to examine the witness in chief. It expects that it will take

Page 10436

1 two days and after that, an opportunity will be given to the defence to

2 cross-examine the witness.

3 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into

5 the courtroom.

6 [The witness entered court]

7 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning. I take it, Mr. Djokanovic, can you

8 hear me in a language which you understand?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, I can and I wish you a very good morning

10 too.

11 JUDGE ORIE: First of all, apologies for asking you in and then

12 asking you to leave again. We are now about to start with your testimony

13 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn

14 declaration that you will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

15 the truth. May I invite you to make that declaration.


17 [The witness answered through interpreter]

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

19 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated. You will first be

21 examined by Mr. Margetts, counsel for the Prosecution.

22 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, there's just one matter with the ELMO,

23 it's obstructing the vision between counsel and the witness.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you remove the ELMO -- I guess,

25 put it in such a position that Mr. Margetts still can see the witness.

Page 10437

1 Yes, that's better.

2 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, you we won't be needing the ELMO.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps, Madam Registrar, if you move it even a bit

4 more so that it doesn't bother anyone.

5 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Examined by Mr. Margetts:

7 Q. Good morning, Dr. Djokanovic?

8 A. Good morning, Mr. Margetts.

9 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, could you state your full name for the Court?

10 A. My name is Dragan Djokanovic.

11 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, you were born in the Trnovo municipality in Bosnia

12 on the 25th of April, 1958; is that correct?

13 A. I was born on the 20th of April, 1958 at Trnovo.

14 Q. You are a qualified medical practitioner and your specialty is

15 pediatrics; is that correct?

16 A. Yes, I'm a pediatrician.

17 Q. In the early 1980s, were you a member of the Yugoslav national

18 gymnastics team?

19 A. I played for the youth and the senior representation of

20 Yugoslavia.

21 Q. From 1990 to 1996, were you involved in politics in Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina?

23 A. I was in politics in that period, yes.

24 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, I'm just going to list to you various activities

25 that you were involved in from May 1990 to 1994, and when I list these

Page 10438

1 activities, if you could affirm whether or not how I've described these

2 involvements is correct.

3 In May 1990, you formed the Workers Democratic Party of

4 Federalists and you became the president of this party.

5 A. That's correct. On the 2nd May of 1990, you were right. It was

6 called the Workers Democratic Party of Federalists, that's what it was

7 called at the time.

8 Q. And the name of this party was changed to the Democratic

9 Federalist Party; is that correct?

10 A. In the summer of 1991, the party was renamed Democratic Federalist

11 Party.

12 Q. From 1991 -- were you involved in activities relating to the

13 preservation of the federal state of Yugoslavia and between late '91 and

14 February 1992, were you instrumental in convening the convention on

15 Yugoslavia?

16 A. My entire political activity in 1990 and 1991 was a political

17 struggle for the preservation of Yugoslavia. Perhaps as we move on, we

18 will discuss the specific political goals but in 1990, yes, it was a

19 struggle for the preservation of Yugoslavia and in late 1990 and in 1991,

20 I was one of the initiators of this activity for a convention that was

21 later on negotiated and discussed in Belgrade.

22 Q. Yes, Dr. Djokanovic, we'll go into detail in relation to each of

23 these engagement that you had. I just wanted to go through the listing of

24 your activities to give the Court as to some indications of what your

25 general involvements were in 1991, 1992. In May 1992, did you schedule

Page 10439

1 the press conference in Belgrade on the convention on Yugoslavia and the

2 constitution of Yugoslavia?

3 A. This was the last press conference at the International Press

4 Centre by the coordinating body that was drafting the convention for

5 Yugoslavia, yes.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, preparing the

7 conference on Yugoslavia.


9 Q. From the founding Assembly of Serbian People of Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina which was on the 24th of October, 1991, did you attend

11 sessions of the assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina

12 and did you continue to attend those sessions until the summer of 1994?

13 A. I was mostly -- yes, for the most time, I was present at the

14 sessions of the assembly of Republika Srpska.

15 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to present to the witness,

16 the first nine exhibits in the order that they appear in the exhibit

17 listing. These documents are various appointments that the witness had

18 during 1992.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please do so.

20 Mr. Margetts, could you have them as a bundle, it takes enormous

21 time to get them all separated, distribute them. If you offer them, all

22 nine of them, then ...

23 MR. MARGETTS: My apologies, Your Honour, we will attempt to

24 rectify that on the next occasion.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you assign numbers. The first

Page 10440

1 one is a list of employees that would have number P --

2 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit P532.

3 JUDGE ORIE: The next one is a appointment of a war commission

4 members for the Zvornik municipality by Dragan Djokanovic will be P --

5 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, just so we can ensure that we have the

6 right exhibit. Does Your Honour have the ERN number for that one?

7 JUDGE ORIE: I have got -- the ERN number is 8672.

8 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The next one would be the decision stamped and

10 signed by Karadzic 17th of June 1992, that will be P534, I take it Madam

11 Registrar?

12 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ORIE: The next one would be document number 6792 dated 16th

14 of June, appointment of a War Commission members Vlasenica would P --

15 MS. LOUKAS: Sorry, Your Honour, it would be useful as Your Honour

16 goes through these particular exhibits just to have the ERN number because

17 there's -- there are two on the 17th of June 1992 both signed by Dr.

18 Karadzic.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's why I gave the numbers of the decision as

20 well, not just the date, but the last one is 8675.

21 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour, I'm much obliged.

22 JUDGE ORIE: The next exhibit would be the document with the

23 number 046021 dated the 16th of June, appointment of War Commission

24 members, that would be P536.

25 The next one would be the document 01/13692, 16th of June,

Page 10441

1 appointment of a War Commission and now about Bratunac. That would be

2 P537, yes.

3 The next one --

4 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, the next one in order is in fact one

5 from the binder P64A of Pat Treanor, that's the document with the ERN

6 00903135.


8 MR. MARGETTS: And then the next one in order is dated 21 July

9 1992 is also from that binder, P64A, that's the one 00903119.

10 JUDGE ORIE: So they do not need any numbers to be assigned

11 because they are admitted into evidence already.

12 The same would be true then for the third one, isn't it?

13 MR. MARGETTS: Yes, Your Honour.

14 JUDGE ORIE: So now the whole numbering -- that's what happens,

15 Madam Registrar, if I want to proceed quickly.

16 The number P534 I just assigned will now be given to the document

17 I gave number 535, so that becomes 534. 536 will then become 535. 537

18 will then be 536. The next document is a decision of the -- with the

19 number 018092 will not be assigned a number, it's admitted already into

20 evidence.

21 The next one, decision numbered or confirmation number 0133492 is

22 admitted into evidence already. Then the last one is a decision by which

23 Mr. Djokanovic is appointed as an advisor to the Republika Srpska

24 Presidency and that will receive number P537.

25 Please proceed. If this goes in a more orderly way, it really

Page 10442

1 saves time.

2 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour, and I apologise for the

3 inconvenience and we will attempt to rectify that.

4 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you have before you the nine documents that

5 have just been assigned exhibit numbers?

6 A. Yes, I do all the nine documents.

7 Q. Could you refer to the first document in chronological order and

8 that is the document dated April 1992 where your name is listed ninth on

9 that table and could you confirm that this document correctly records that

10 you were a physician stationed at the Vrace police academy in Sarajevo in

11 April 1992?

12 A. Yes, that is correct, but the signature is not mine.

13 Q. Thank you, Dr. Djokanovic.

14 Could you refer to the next document, which is the appointment of

15 the War Commission for Zvornik and could you confirm that on the 13th of

16 June, 1992 you were appointed to the War Commission of Zvornik and I'm

17 referring to the exhibit which is P533.

18 A. This is a document which actually is a proposal from Zvornik for

19 the members of the War Commission for that particular municipality.

20 Q. Yes, and could I refer you to the next document which is dated 17

21 June 1992 and again records that you were proposed as a member of the War

22 Commission of Zvornik. Could you just observe to the Trial Chamber what

23 the difference is in the constitution of the membership of the War

24 Commission referred to in the 13 June document and the 17 June document

25 and that 17 June document is the document which was previously marked

Page 10443

1 P529.

2 A. The proposal which I received in Zvornik does not contain the name

3 of Branislav Grujic but this document which was signed by Dr. Karadzic

4 does contain the name of Branislav Grujic in number three.

5 Q. Could we refer to the next document which is P534 and is the

6 listing of the members of the War Commission of Vlasenica. Can you

7 confirm that you were a member of the War Commission of Vlasenica?

8 A. This is a proposal for the members of the War Commission which I

9 received in Vlasenica, that is correct.

10 Q. Referring to the next document which is P535 and this is a

11 proposal in respect to the members of the War Commission of the

12 municipality of Skelani. Again, could you confirm that you were proposed

13 as a member of the War Commission of Skelani?

14 A. This is a proposal for the members of the War Commission for the

15 municipality of Skelani.

16 Q. The same question again in respect of the next document, which is

17 P536 and that's in regard to the municipality of Bratunac.

18 A. That is correct. This is also a proposal for the members of the

19 War Commission for the municipality of Bratunac.

20 Q. Referring to the next document which is previous Prosecution

21 Exhibit P64A, binder 26, tab 27, and that's in regard to the appointments

22 to the municipality of Sekovici, can you again confirm that you were

23 proposed as a member of the War Commission of Sekovici.

24 A. Yes, this is the final appointment of members of the War

25 Commission for the municipality of Sekovici signed by Dr. Radovan

Page 10444

1 Karadzic.

2 Q. Can you confirm that following these proposals for memberships to

3 these War Commissions, you were in fact appointed to each of these War

4 Commissions for these municipalities?

5 A. Yes. After all these nominations were made, Dr. Karadzic

6 appointed me a member of this commission, in fact, the presiding member.

7 Q. I'm going to refer to the next document which is from the previous

8 Prosecution Exhibit P64A binder 26, tab 9, and it's dated 21 July 1992 and

9 it is the appointment -- it's the confirmation of the appointment of the

10 members of the War Commission for Novo Sarajevo and can you confirm that

11 the reference at point 1 to the republican commissioner is a reference to

12 yourself?

13 A. Yes, this was signed by Dr. Karadzic, the appointment of members

14 of the commission and number one does refer to me, yes.

15 Q. And the final document in this series is a document dated 9

16 October, 1992, Prosecution Exhibit P537, and can you confirm that you were

17 appointed as an advisor to the Presidency of Republika Srpska in respect

18 of humanitarian and information issues?

19 A. This is a decision on the appointment of advisers to the

20 Presidency signed by the late Professor Nikola Koljevic, it was duly

21 recorded in the Presidency but I don't think that it was ever published in

22 the official gazette.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts, may I make one observation. If you

24 would have asked the witness some 12 or 13 minutes ago, Mr. Djokanovic,

25 have you been appointed this, this, this, this, have you recently seen

Page 10445

1 copies of the appointment decisions in the hands of the Prosecution then

2 of course the Defence could have easily contested that, it would have

3 taken us approximately 40 seconds. We are now 12, 15 minutes later. I do

4 understand that this is the traditional way of introducing information,

5 unless, Ms. Loukas, the Defence is contesting the appointments.

6 MS. LOUKAS: No, Your Honour, I'm not contesting.

7 JUDGE ORIE: You spent a quarter of an hour in Court on matters if

8 the witness says, "I was appointed," if the witness confirms that he has

9 seen copies of, then I think the Defence is fully aware if there's

10 anything to be said about it, they can just show the document and ask

11 further questions. That would have been -- that's already -- that's some

12 35 per cent of the time we used in court today. Please proceed, Mr.

13 Margetts.

14 MR. MARGETTS: Apologies, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Apologies, yes, if you find a way of doing these

16 matters more efficiently, that would certainly help both the Prosecution's

17 office itself and the Court and the Defence. Please proceed.

18 MR. MARGETTS: Yes, Your Honour. We will proceed in that manner

19 and we will attempt to liaise with the Defence to ascertain in advance

20 what it is they contest and what they do not contest.

21 Q. Dr. Djokanovic from July 1992 to January 1993, did you advise the

22 Presidency of Republika Srpska in relation to effectively the

23 establishment of Republika Srpska and the relationship between the various

24 organs in that republic?

25 A. In that period, I was practically working in the Presidency of the

Page 10446

1 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with all these decisions based

2 on all these decisions, the appointment to the War Commissions, chairman,

3 and also my appointment to the -- as advisor to the Presidency.

4 Q. From January 1993 to spring 1994, were you the minister of war

5 veterans' affairs in Republika Srpska?

6 A. [No interpretation]

7 THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry, I did translate.

8 A. I was the minister for war veterans and civilian victims of war in

9 the government of Republika Srpska.

10 JUDGE ORIE: We now received the translation. Please proceed, Mr.

11 Margetts.

12 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, when you formed the Workers Democratic Party of

14 Federalists, what was your political platform and can you describe that

15 political platform to the Court?

16 A. In principle, this was a democratic party of modern orientation

17 and the two designations in its titles, workers and federalists were the

18 two main objectives of the party workers party because in the future after

19 the privatisation of socially-owned property, it was committed to the

20 giving of shares of such companies to workers and the other designation

21 actually showed that the federalist designation that we actually called

22 for the remaining of Bosnia and Herzegovina in a democratic federation.

23 We wanted the constituting of a multiparty federal parliament in a federal

24 future Yugoslavia. That was the main objective.

25 Q. What was your party's position in relation to an independent

Page 10447

1 Bosnia and Herzegovina?

2 A. We were against the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Q. What did you think the Serbs would face in an independent Bosnia?

4 A. This entire path to the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was

5 paved with difficult problems and in my view in the end it had to result

6 in war and in an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs lost what

7 they had in the federal republic of Yugoslavia and namely that they were a

8 part of the entire Serbian people in Yugoslavia, they were constituent

9 nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina with federal ties with other nations --

10 with other parts of the Serbian nation in the other parts of Yugoslavia.

11 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to present the next exhibit

12 to Dr. Djokanovic which is the next exhibit in order, Exhibit 10.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, that would be number?

14 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecution Exhibit number P538.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.


17 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, you have before you a press article and on the

18 first page, there is an interview with Alija Izetbegovic and on the second

19 page there is an interview with Adil Zulfikarpasic. I would like to refer

20 you to a section that has been highlighted by yourself, I believe, and

21 underlined where there's a reference to comments that Mr. Izetbegovic made

22 in Krajina and Mr. Zulfikarpasic says that without consulting him,

23 Izetbegovic said that if Slovenia and Croatia were to leave Yugoslavia, we

24 would declare independence for Bosnia and that the Muslims would defend it

25 with arms. Is that how you understood the position of the Croats and the

Page 10448

1 Muslims to be?

2 A. What you have now quoted is from Mr. Zulfikarpasic's interview but

3 it was not he who said that we would declare an independent Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina. He stated that it was Mr. Izetbegovic that had stated that

5 without consulting him, without consulting Mr. Zulfikarpasic, he had said

6 so in Krajina. He said that we, and he meant the Muslims, the Bosniaks,

7 if Slovenia and Croatia left Yugoslavia we would declare an independent

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina so this was what Mr. Izetbegovic had said.

9 Q. What was the date of this statement from Mr. Izetbegovic?

10 A. I don't know what exact date it was but it was at the rally in the

11 Krajina that was 1990, that was the pre-election period in Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina. This is the main reason why Mr. Zulfikarpasic separated from

13 them because even though he was one of the founders of the SDA, he was man

14 number two in that party and this is -- these are the reasons that Mr.

15 Zulfikarpasic gives as to why he actually parted ways with Mr.

16 Izetbegovic.

17 Q. In your efforts to maintain a federal Yugoslavia, what formula did

18 you offer to the Muslims and the Croats?

19 A. Whom do you mean specifically?

20 Q. Specifically, your party and you as president of the party, what

21 was your position as to the level of power that the Serbs and the Croats

22 and the Muslims would have at the Bosnian republic level and the federal

23 level?

24 A. We worked for a democratisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina for

25 multiparty elections to be held in Bosnia and Herzegovina for none of the

Page 10449

1 three constituent peoples in the Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the

2 Muslims, the Croats and the Bosniaks, the three equal peoples that are

3 three constituent peoples. We wanted to retain a democratic Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina after the elections with equal three peoples, and for that

5 Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain equal republic in Yugoslavia. We wanted

6 a chamber of peoples to be introduced in the assembly instead of the

7 existing chamber of municipalities where the key decisions would be

8 accepted by consensus because we thought that that would be a guarantee

9 for reserving peace and the territorial integrity of Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina. So full equality for the three nations and full equality of

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina within a democratic Yugoslavia.

12 Q. If the Muslims and Croats rejected this option as at early

13 February 1991, what did you consider the consequences would be?

14 A. I'm afraid I do not understand the question. If they had rejected

15 what? They did reject what I'm talking about.

16 Q. Yes. As at early 1991, when you were putting these positions in

17 relation to the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina staying within

18 Yugoslavia, if the Muslims and the Croats rejected this proposition that

19 Bosnia stayed within Yugoslavia, what did you think the consequences would

20 be?

21 A. The activities to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina within Yugoslavia in

22 1991 actually started in the beginning of March of that year when I called

23 a meeting of all parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties in Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina so that we could discuss the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25 The Serbian democratic party immediately joined in this initiative

Page 10450

1 and we were practically the joint organisers of this meeting which was not

2 attended by representatives of these Party of Democratic Action and the

3 Croatian Democratic Union, so from the very beginning they not want to

4 talk at all about Bosnia remaining a part of the federal Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Did your party establish a close relationship with the SDS?

6 A. Yes, in the second half of 1990, especially after the elections,

7 meaning from the end of 1990 and in the course of 1991, we practically

8 worked together on all political initiatives.

9 Q. In February 1991, was there a meeting of the SDA in the region of

10 Bihac and was there a rally where Izetbegovic made a speech?

11 A. Yes, in the mentioned period there was a huge rally in the Cazin

12 Krajina at which Mr. Izetbegovic spoke and for the first time, the broader

13 public could see the flags of the Muslim Croat flags tied up together,

14 balled up together, namely the flags of the followers of the SDA and the

15 CDU. After this meeting in Krajina, I gave an interview to the -- to Mr.

16 Zivkovic who was a journalist of Oslobodjenje from Sarajevo and there I

17 said that such a policy of Mr. Izetbegovic has actually led to a

18 disruption of the there to quite harmonious relations in Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina.

20 Q. Did you tell the journalist that the actions of Izetbegovic were a

21 route towards war?

22 A. Yes, I did.

23 Q. After you gave that interview, did your relationships with the SDS

24 -- did your relationship with the SDS become closer?

25 A. At any rate, during 1990, this sort of curve of our relations was

Page 10451

1 an upward one. Our relations were better and better and grew friendlier

2 and friendlier.

3 Q. In respect of the issue of the preservation of Yugoslavia, were

4 the politics of Slobodan Milosevic's SPS party similar to the politics of

5 your party?

6 A. As officially stated in the programme of the Socialist Party of

7 Serbia, what is officially stated there is practically identical to that

8 of the Bosnian Federalist Party as regards the equality of citizens and

9 the equality of the republics in the former SFRY.

10 Q. Did you receive full support from Milosevic?

11 A. In 1990, Milosevic came to Sarajevo twice in his capacity of

12 president of Serbia. These were the official meetings of the presidents

13 of the republics with members of the state Presidency and after those

14 meetings, Milosevic would meet with a number of people who were prominent

15 politicians in the Serbian community and once I was invited by Dr.

16 Karadzic. Allegedly, Mr. Milosevic had said that he wanted to see me at

17 one of those meetings although I had never seen him before and he said

18 that he had noticed the activities of me and my party and that is why I

19 was invited to that meeting.

20 Q. Did that meeting take place in February 1991, and if so, can you

21 describe where it took place and who attended that meeting?

22 A. I think the meeting was held on exactly the 14th of February,

23 1991. It was held in a building which, before the democratic elections

24 had been club of the delegates of the deputies to the former assembly of

25 the former Bosnia and Herzegovina but after the elections, it became the

Page 10452

1 seat of the Serbian Democratic Party and currently, it is the building of

2 the US embassy in Sarajevo.

3 At this meeting was attended by the president of the SDS, Dr.

4 Radovan Karadzic, by members of the Presidency, Biljana Plavsic. I think

5 that Professor Koljevic was away, that he was in the USA. The president

6 of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik was also

7 there. Two prominent members of the academy of arts and sciences, Mr.

8 Leovac, and Mr. Rajlovac were also there and other figures as well. I

9 cannot remember all of them.

10 Q. Can you tell the Court what the purpose of the meeting was and

11 what Slobodan Milosevic told you?

12 A. The purpose of the meeting was to familiarise all of us from

13 Bosnia and Herzegovina with the course of the formal meeting between the

14 presidents of the republics and the Presidency of the SFRY and President

15 Milosevic actually briefed us on what had transpired at that meeting

16 between the presidents of the republics and the state Presidency and he

17 more specifically spoke about the political positions of the individual

18 presidents, primarily, what affected us the most, the presidents of

19 Croatia and president of Slovenia, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Kucan. Mr.

20 Milosevic told us that they were not in favour of a federation, that Kucan

21 was rejecting any discussions of the subjects all together, that Mr.

22 Tudjman wanted some sort of an asymmetrical federation and the president

23 of the Presidency of the state Presidency -- Mr. -- of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina Macedonia, of Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Gligorov were in favour

25 of a four-member federation, asymmetrical federation which would have some

Page 10453

1 ties with Croatia and Slovenia, so this four-member federation which would

2 have asymmetrical ties with the republic of Croatia and the republic of

3 Slovenia.

4 Q. Did Milosevic mention to you the guarantees that were inherent in

5 the federal constitution?

6 A. Well, at this meeting we certainly did speak about the SFRY

7 constitution which guaranteed equality to the republics. Milosevic was

8 quite satisfied -- I'm trying to remember, of course, with some

9 precision. He was quite happy with particularly the statement of

10 Mr. Izetbegovic that Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain in a four-member

11 federation, and that was a great relief for both him and us because we

12 thought that something would come out of it after all and that we would

13 preserve peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

14 I do not remember that anyone was skeptical about it. It was only

15 in the evening after Mr. Milosevic had left Sarajevo that we had an

16 unpleasant surprise which we saw in the 19.30 newsreel on Sarajevo TV,

17 when Mr. Izetbegovic actually stated that he could not support Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina's remaining -- such a federation, so that everything returned

19 to what it was, which is to say a lot of uncertainty and fear set in. A

20 part -- a number of Muslim politicians gave very radical statements during

21 that afternoon, attacking Mr. Izetbegovic for wanting to keep the Bosnian

22 Muslims in this four-member federation which they called Greater Serbia.

23 And in the forefront of such attacks was the academician Dr. Filipovic

24 that afternoon.

25 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, we'll move to the comments of Izetbegovic. I just

Page 10454

1 want to return you to the question in relation to Milosevic's comments in

2 respect to the federal constitution. You mentioned that he referred to

3 the equality of the republics. Did he also refer to the right of

4 self-determination that is expressed in the constitution?

5 A. We did not specifically discuss the right of self-determination.

6 At one point - I don't remember whether it was one of the participants in

7 the meeting who put a question - but Mr. Milosevic stated that it was very

8 unlikely that the Knin railway track would be a border dividing Serbs in

9 Croatia from the rest of Croatia and that this was something that the

10 Serbs in that area could accept with great difficulty.

11 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to refer to the next exhibit,

12 which is number 11 in the order on the exhibit list.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, that would be number ...

14 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 539.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas.

16 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you. Just before we move on to this next

17 exhibit, I just notice in the second-last answer at page 23, line 17 it

18 seems to refer to a 1930 newsreel. And I -- I don't believe that's

19 correct in context. Perhaps that might be clarified with the witness

20 before we move on.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. When you said, "an unpleasant surprise which we

22 saw on the newsreel of Sarajevo to be" -- what year did you have in mind,

23 1990?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's the time, 19.30 hours or,

25 rather, 7.30 p.m.

Page 10455

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I now do understand. It's 7.30 p.m., yes.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was the -- that's the main

3 newscast of the day. Time.

4 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, together with the press article which

5 is number 11 on the list, I'd like to also present the next document,

6 which is number 12 on the list as well.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, that would be P540, I take it?

8 THE REGISTRAR: No, Your Honour. It's P64A.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Oh, yes, yes. It doesn't need a number. Yes.

10 Whenever I try to do it myself, it's ...


12 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you have the press article before you? It's a

13 press article from Oslobodjenje from the 23rd of February, 1991. It's

14 headed "Courtesy visit Slobodan Milosevic at the BHSDS headquarters."

15 Does this press article refer to the meeting that we have just discussed?

16 A. Yes. Yes, this article relates to the meeting held with

17 Mr. Milosevic at the head office of the Serbian Democratic Party.

18 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, I'd like to refer you to the second-last paragraph

19 in this article wherein there is a substantial quotation from Mr. Karadzic

20 recorded, and I'd like to invite your comment on that quotation. I'll

21 just read that quotation into the record and then I'll invite your comment

22 on it.

23 The quotation is as follows: "Asked by journalists whether there

24 were any further discussions about Serbs living only in a common state,

25 Karadzic replied, 'We don't see a need to talk about it. Just as it is

Page 10456












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 10457

1 natural for it to rain, it is also completely natural for the Serbs to

2 live in the same state. Thus, it is not possible to break up Yugoslavia;

3 it is only possible to leave it. We are at peace in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina because of the federative status we have. Whoever wants

5 anything different will have to fight for it. We are for an integral BH

6 which would be sovereign in a future community. No more and no less so

7 than Serbia.'"

8 Do you recall Mr. Karadzic making that statement and can you

9 comment on the statement and any effect that that statement may have had?

10 A. Yes, I do recall this statement. I do not have a personal copy of

11 the press clippings from Oslobodjenje. I have from another newspaper, and

12 I remember this statement by Mr. Karadzic.

13 This meeting was a follow-up meeting to that earlier meeting

14 between the Presidency members and presidents of the states. This

15 statement as it was reported here could have been an object of

16 manipulation for the mass media and I do recall this statement as a very

17 improper one because Mr. Milosevic having come there, did not deserve to

18 hear such statements that might allude to some sort of political plans

19 being forged between us representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and

20 Milosevic, on the other side.

21 Q. What effect did this statement of Karadzic have, in particular his

22 statement that "Just as it is natural to rain, it's also completely

23 natural for the Serbs to live in the same state"? What effect did that

24 have in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25 A. The mass media in Bosnia and Herzegovina interpreted this

Page 10458

1 statement to show that the Serb politicians and President Milosevic have

2 identical views on the Serb people remaining in Yugoslavia; just as it was

3 therefore natural for it to rain, it was equally so natural for us to

4 remain there -- or rather, we all hold the same views in that regard.

5 Q. You mentioned earlier that Mr. Izetbegovic made some

6 pronouncements in the media after this meeting. Did his pronouncements

7 follow the comments of Karadzic, and could they be seen as a response to

8 it?

9 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, there's been quite a lot of leading. I,

10 because it's not in areas that are subject to any dispute or what have

11 you, I let it go, but really, that's not an appropriate way to elicit that

12 sort of evidence, particularly that last question.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts.

14 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I accept --

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Will you rephrase your question. Please

16 proceed.


18 Q. Was there any response from Mr. Izetbegovic to the comments of

19 Karadzic?

20 A. This statement by Mr. Karadzic which was reported by the mass

21 media the following day, the day after the meeting, did not have any

22 impact on the statements by Mr. Izetbegovic during that afternoon. It

23 was -- and this change of mind with Mr. Izetbegovic took place that very

24 same day in the course of that afternoon, and this was reported by the

25 electronic media; whereas, Mr. Karadzic's statement was only published the

Page 10459

1 following day, midday or afternoon or evening. So it could not have had

2 any impact on what Mr. Izetbegovic was to say. It could only take place

3 at a later stage, that some speculations could be read in some mass media;

4 although, I cannot recall any of them specifically and I could not tell

5 you really who it was who used this statement malevolently.

6 Q. At this time in early 1991, did Slovenia and Croatia propose a

7 confederation? And if so, can you describe what was proposed to the

8 Court.

9 A. In relation to the official policy in Croatia and Slovenia in --

10 at the end of 1990 there, they talked about a federation. It was -- as

11 time moved on that federation was there mentioned less frequently. So

12 they started mentioning a confederation, which for us Serbs in Bosnia

13 meant that there would no longer be a federal government and a federal

14 army that we perceived as an institution that could protect us in future.

15 Q. Can you describe to the Court why it was you considered that the

16 federal army would protect you in the future.

17 A. When I say that, and whenever the Bosnian Serbs talk about this,

18 they remember the experiences from World War I and World War II, when the

19 peoples who we had lived with together in the same state for 50 years were

20 the enemy in World War I and World War II. Therefore, the Yugoslav

21 Peoples' Army was supposed to protect all the nations and under the SFRY

22 constitution, it was supposed to preserve Yugoslavia as a whole but the

23 individual peoples as well.

24 In that particular period, especially in 1991 in

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had already seen the electoral campaign and

Page 10460

1 rallies in Croatia, specifically in Split, where some 50,000 people

2 gathered, allegedly, who were praising the Ustasas from World War II

3 followed by the demolition of different monuments in praise of the victims

4 of World War II, this all affected Serbs, who felt that if uncertain times

5 were ahead, again Croats and Muslims would become allies which became

6 true. As a matter of fact in the Cazinska Krajina, where the flags of

7 Muslims and Croats were bound together and of course the constitution

8 guaranteed protection for all the peoples, the Yugoslav constitution, that

9 is why the Serbian people wished to remain within Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Did you consider that those who supported Yugoslavia should be

11 protected by the Yugoslav Army?

12 A. That's not what I specifically had in mind. I remember the

13 interview for Sarajevo Oslobodjenje that I said that between -- if a force

14 between a civil war and military rule, I would opt for the military rule

15 because it would preserve not only the state but would protect the

16 citizens of the state. But if we speak of the Serbian people only, yes, I

17 believed that the JNA was supposed to protect the citizens who wished to

18 remain in Yugoslavia because it was, after all, an army of Yugoslavia.

19 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, you have on the table before you, a document that

20 is headed "Serbian Democratic Party" and marked "confidential." Could you

21 refer to that document, and that's Exhibit P64A. It's the document headed

22 "Steps to be Undertaken by Municipalities if Republican Organs Cease to

23 Function."

24 A. Yes, I see the document. The document is before me. It was shown

25 to me on several occasions while I was talking to the investigators but I

Page 10461

1 had never seen it before it was shown to me by the OTP investigators. My

2 party was an ally of the Serbian democratic party. We cooperated very

3 closely but we did not interfere into internal political matters of each

4 party so I'm not really privy to these issues. But I suppose had I asked

5 from this document from Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic or

6 Mrs. Plavsic, that they would have given me a copy.

7 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, could you refer to the opening paragraphs of this

8 document wherein a detailed study of the SRBH and SFRY constitution is set

9 out. In particular, I refer you to the first two paragraphs.

10 The first paragraph setting out the equal rights of peoples of

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the second paragraph stating that Bosnia is an

12 integral part of federal Yugoslavia.

13 Did you agree with those principles that are set out in those

14 first two paragraphs?

15 A. Absolutely so.

16 Q. Following on, there's a further detailed constitutional analysis

17 which you have previously had the opportunity to read. I'd like you to

18 comment on it so if you could take your time to read it now or if you're

19 satisfied you recall it, if you could comment as to whether you consider

20 this constitutional analysis to be accurate and whether this was in

21 accordance with your understanding of the relations between municipalities

22 and federal organs.

23 A. I believe that this is a proper analysis of the constitution of

24 Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the constitution of the SFRY.

25 Q. If either of the first two paragraphs were not followed, that is,

Page 10462

1 that Bosnia and Herzegovina didn't remain an integral part of Yugoslavia,

2 what did you think the consequence would be?

3 A. In this period, I was always saying that all the different

4 provisions in the constitution may change except for the fact that

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina is a part of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

6 Equally so, anything could have changed in the constitution of Yugoslavia

7 save for the provision providing for Yugoslavia to be a federation of

8 those four republics and autonomous provinces. All the other solutions

9 would inevitably lead to a war. That was my opinion and that's how -- and

10 that's the course of events.

11 Q. I refer to the last paragraph of this document and this paragraph

12 contemplates the situation that would arise if, as the document describes

13 it, republican organs ceased to function, that is, the republican

14 government no longer had either authority or control. And it refers to

15 support that may be available to those who support Yugoslavia.

16 Can you refer to that paragraph and can you tell me whether you

17 agree with it?

18 A. In view of the time period when this was drafted, I fully endorse

19 this. And when I say the time when it was drafted, that was at the time

20 when Bosnia-Herzegovina was still part of the SFRY and that throughout the

21 territory of the of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SFRY constitution was

22 applicable. And in any case, it was of an earlier date than the BiH

23 constitution.

24 Q. I'll just refer you to the third-last paragraph and I'll just

25 quote that to you as follows: It says, "In order to provide for the

Page 10463

1 obstructed functioning of the municipality in such a situation as well as

2 for the exercise of the aforementioned rights and obligations, the

3 municipality must pass an appropriate document or decision by which it

4 would proclaim that from the moment when such a document is passed, the

5 municipality's territory is an integral and indivisible part of Yugoslavia

6 that in its area only federal laws adapted to this situation have legal

7 effect, that it recognises the exclusive authority of the federal organs,

8 that's the SFRY assembly, the SFRY Presidency, the Federal Executive

9 Council, the JNA security services, judiciary organs and so on in the area

10 it covers.

11 It says "this action would suspend the implementation of

12 republican regulations in the areas of municipalities where such a

13 document was passed. At the same time, it would give legitimacy to the

14 activities and measures undertaken by the federal organs."

15 Did you understand that to be correct that if the municipalities

16 declared that they were a part of Yugoslavia, then the federal organs as

17 listed in the final paragraph, the Yugoslav people's army, the federal

18 secretariat for national defence and the federal secretariat for the

19 interior and judiciary organs could be engaged to support those that

20 declared allegiance to the federal state?

21 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, just in relation to that, if

22 Mr. Margetts seeks an opinion from this witness, I think it would be

23 better if the witness just read it and was asked if he agreed with the

24 sentiments there expressed rather than the paraphrase that Mr. Margetts

25 gives it which has its own nuances. And in my submission, that's a much

Page 10464

1 more correct way of dealing with the document.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts.

3 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I've done my best to both quote large

4 sections as to not provide for any nuances and also to facilitate an

5 expeditious inquiry in relation to this document.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Let's ask the witness: Have you read the last two

7 paragraphs of this document?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Do you have any comment on it or do you agree with

10 what's said in it?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Firstly, I believe that this mark on

12 the cover page stating strictly confidential isn't necessary. It was

13 placed here for political purposes. It was a proper analysis of the SFRY

14 constitution and there's no need for this to be strictly classified. I

15 believe that those who drafted the document had some sort of a political

16 agenda.

17 JUDGE ORIE: My question was not whether the classification was

18 justified or not but my question was whether you would agree or have any

19 comments on the content of the last two paragraphs.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last two paragraphs reflect the

21 actual reality of the time which means that those who analyzed the

22 constitution, in this case these were officials of the Serbian Democratic

23 Party, they sent a message to their coalition partners, the SDA and the

24 HDZ as to what their position at the time was. They wanted a

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia, the SFRY constitution was valid

Page 10465

1 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and it provided the Serbian side with the

2 possibility to invoke the federal laws and that this could be done in

3 those municipalities where they were in a majority, where they were in

4 power and in this way, they were able to take decisions.

5 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask one question in that respect? Was

6 there any constitutional provision that provided for, say, ignoring the

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina legislation if you disagreed with it and if you were a

8 Serbian majority in your municipality?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At any rate, there were those in the

10 majority Serbian municipalities who had different views whereas the

11 government in Bosnia-Herzegovina had the possibility to interpret the BiH

12 constitution this way.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I'm afraid I do not fully follow your answer. To

14 interpret the BiH constitution in what way, that it allowed municipalities

15 to ...

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm talking about the SFRY

17 constitution that one of the ruling parties in this case, the SDS, could

18 have in this way interpreted the SFRY constitution and adapted it to its

19 current political interests and to come out with a political agenda as it

20 did and that it could warn its coalition partners of the position that it

21 held which was the position basically presented in this document. Of

22 course the other two ruling parties, the SDA and HDZ, were probably

23 thinking about other such provisions that they could rely upon within the

24 BiH constitution because for their political agendas, they had no

25 foundation whatsoever in the SFRY constitution.

Page 10466

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is it true that the political aims of the two

2 sides, that is, the Serbs on the one hand and Muslims and -- in a

3 coalition with the Croats on the other hand, that the aims were

4 irreconcilable and that similarly the interpretation of the constitution

5 whether we have the BiH constitution or the federal constitution that the

6 way this was approached was just as irreconcilable and therefore did not

7 give a way out?

8 A. At the time which was in the second half of 1991, their views did

9 become irreconcilable and I felt this and in October, I wrote an article

10 for the Sarajevo Oslobodjenje which was the most read daily newspaper sold

11 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina where I cautioned about this situation that

12 if there were not to be a compromise if one party did not understand the

13 other, if not, all the arguments are placed on the table, if not all the

14 cards are placed on the table if the realities are not understood, that is

15 the existence of a state and the existence of the constitution and the

16 existence of national interests, that if they don't do so, they will lead

17 their nations into a disastrous war that we had already experienced and I

18 was trying to send a message to them to find a compromise to avoid such a

19 scenario.

20 JUDGE ORIE: By saying that you send a message to them to find a

21 compromise to avoid this scenario, you mean that this was true for both

22 sides if the one would not compromise, it would lead to war; if the other

23 one would not compromise, it would lead to war as well.

24 A. Yes, yes, yes.

25 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm looking at the clock

Page 10467

1 and it may be time for a break.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is time for a break. We'll have a break

3 until five minutes to 11.00. The valid clock is the clock in this

4 courtroom.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts, you may proceed, and at the same time,

8 Mr. Harmon, you have not been present when we discussed the clocks in this

9 building so therefore you might not have been fully aware that this is the

10 binding clock from now on.

11 MR. HARMON: Mr. President, I wanted to inform you and the Chamber

12 and counsel that in respect of the schedule that we have today, we have a

13 witness scheduled for Thursday and Friday. That witness will not be able

14 to attend these proceedings. I was informed during the break that the

15 witness is in hospital and cannot attend. I am going to be dealing with

16 that issue during the next break and I intend to deal with it fully at

17 2.15 this afternoon with my staff but -- so Your Honours are aware and

18 counsel is aware the witness that is scheduled will not be in attendance.

19 Likewise, we have a witness that has been identified to testify on

20 Monday. That witness has problems that are quite serious and will be

21 unable to attend. I can articulate more completely those issues. I will

22 be attempting also during the break and this afternoon to try and fill the

23 void that has been created by the absence of that witness.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, what would be, in your view, if everything goes

25 as you wish, what would then be the first day you would present a witness

Page 10468

1 again, would that be still this week or in the beginning of next week?

2 MR. HARMON: It's impossible, I'm told, to present a witness this

3 week after the conclusion of the testimony of Dr. Djokanovic, simply

4 because VWU needs a number of days to get witnesses here.

5 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore we have a few idle days this week.

6 Ms. Loukas, I'm now addressing you. Before the Chamber was

7 informed about this, we discussed whether or not any further delay will be

8 granted for the cross-examination of Mr. Djokanovic. The Chamber

9 unanimously and without many discussions decided that it would give an

10 opportunity for the Defence to cross-examine the witness immediately after

11 the examination in chief had been concluded. It seems that the Chamber at

12 the same time does not consider it appropriate where such a request is

13 pending and if there are a few idle days and if the witness could wait for

14 one or one and a half days to be cross-examined, just for the matter of

15 principle to deny it to you, so therefore we'll ask the witness. Could I

16 ask you, if your cross-examination would start not immediately, rather,

17 let's say on Wednesday morning but would start on Thursday or later on

18 Thursday, would that cause you any problems if you could leave The Hague

19 by Friday, Mr. Djokanovic?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That would not cause me any problems

21 and I would gladly stay, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, Ms. Loukas, then, you have some guidance

23 of what to expect and I don't know how they call in this boxing, is this

24 saved by the bell or -- but consider it that way. I want to be -- there

25 should be no misunderstanding that the Chamber would not have the trial to

Page 10469

1 be disrupted and to recall the witness later for cross-examination for the

2 reasons you had given. So let's be happy with this at least for this

3 witness, happy, I think.

4 Please proceed, Mr. Margetts.

5 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, Your Honour, just prior to that if I might just

6 make a comment, I'm sure that in view of this recent development, what

7 Your Honour has referred to as idle days will certainly not be idle for me

8 but thank you for that, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: No, of course. No, we are not sitting there and

10 waiting until the next day comes, we are all busy enough, yes.

11 MS. LOUKAS: And I can indicate, Your Honour, I think I referred

12 to having a conference at 3.00 this afternoon with Mr. Krajisnik,

13 apparently it's not until 6.00 p.m. this evening and -- but in any event,

14 we can deal with the situation.


16 Please proceed, Mr. Margetts.

17 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Your Honour, I'd like to present the witness to the next exhibit

19 in order, it's number 13 on the list and it's an article dated 26 February

20 1991.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

22 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecution Exhibit P540.


24 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, the document before you is an interview that was

25 published in BORBA publication on the 26th of February, 1991. Do you

Page 10470

1 recall reading this interview with Mr. Karadzic at the time that it was

2 published?

3 A. No, I did not read it when it was published. I actually read it

4 in my interview with the Tribunal's investigators.

5 Q. In this article, Dr. Djokanovic, there are various references to

6 the themes that we've been discussing this morning and I'd just like to

7 refer you to them. And I'd like to invite your comment on the positions

8 that Dr. Karadzic enunciated. The first paragraph I'd like to refer you

9 to is the third paragraph in the article and Karadzic states, keeping in

10 mind this is 26 February, 1991, at the fourth sentence in, "We are now in

11 a position to make a just division of territories and demarcation and to

12 enable the peoples to create the states that they desire and then to

13 achieve good-neighborly relations between them."

14 He continues on, there's a question put, an answer to that

15 question, then another question put in regard to the Sarajevo summit. In

16 the course of his answer to this question relating to the summit, he is

17 asked about present borders and he says "The present borders were not laid

18 down either demographically or with the consent of the people. Those

19 borders simply must be revised. It is most sensible to apply the ethnic

20 principle. I think that we should expect the entire world to understand

21 us in that regard. It would simply be impossible to apply the historical

22 principle because everybody would stick to the stage in history that best

23 suited him. Besides, the ethnic principle is the only possible way to

24 draw new borders between the republics peacefully."

25 Now, as of February 1991, did you regard those comments as being

Page 10471

1 appropriate comments?

2 A. At that period, this Karadzic's comment was not appropriate. It

3 was, in principle, along the lines of the policy advocated by

4 Mr. Izetbegovic at the rally in Bihac. The only extenuating circumstances

5 that Mr. Izetbegovic spoke of his own accord at the rally and Dr. Karadzic

6 spoke this in response to what Mr. Izetbegovic had said, namely he had

7 said that -- clearly and loudly that he wanted a civil republic.

8 Q. What was it about the comments of Mr. Karadzic that you regarded

9 as inappropriate?

10 A. There were only hints at that time given in -- about the

11 declaration of -- on an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was not

12 assembly material at that time. As yet the federal constitution was in

13 force, the Bosnia and Herzegovina constitution was in force so at that

14 time he should not have spoken about this matter at all. He should not

15 have referred to territorial demarcation at all because the time was

16 totally inopportune and the comment on the part of a man who was playing

17 this role in Bosnia and Herzegovina and advocating and representing the

18 interests of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina was totally inappropriate

19 and irresponsible.

20 Q. Did you meet again with Slobodan Milosevic in Sarajevo in June

21 1991 and, if so, who attended that meeting and what was discussed?

22 A. [No interpretation]

23 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, unfortunately, that answer -- the

24 translation did not come through.

25 THE INTERPRETER: I'm terribly sorry. I forgot to turn the mic

Page 10472

1 on. That is because we are having great difficulty with the witness, and

2 I'm turning up and down the volume. If you could please ask the witness

3 to slow down a bit.

4 JUDGE ORIE: The interpreters ask you to slow down a bit because

5 they have some difficulties in following you and perhaps you also try to

6 keep at the same distance from the microphones so that they don't have to

7 adjust their earphones. But by saying this I kept you off from giving the

8 translation. If you'd like the witness to repeat his answer, I'll invite

9 him to do so. This is a question for the interpreters.

10 THE INTERPRETER: If that would be possible, yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: The question put to you was: Did you meet again with

12 Slobodan Milosevic in Sarajevo in June 1991 and if so, who attended that

13 meeting and what was discussed? Could you please just repeat your answer

14 to that question since it was not translated to us.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, in June 1991, I also met with

16 Mr. Milosevic. He played the same role that -- he was in the same role as

17 president of Serbia at the meeting between the presidents of the republics

18 and the state Presidency of the SFRY. We met at the Vila Stojcevac at

19 this final meeting a somewhat narrower circle of people than at the

20 February meeting. There were the members of the Presidency, the president

21 of the assembly, the president of the Serbian Democratic Party, I myself

22 was there, and a couple of other people. I cannot recall exactly who.

23 The president of the -- Serbia told us about the course of that previous

24 meeting and at that time, the war which was raging in Croatia was the

25 topical issue. We talked about the possibility of the war spilling over

Page 10473

1 to Bosnia and Herzegovina from Croatia. And this he said in response to a

2 question directly put to him by Dr. Karadzic. He said, "Our people are

3 afraid that the war from Croatia might spill over to Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina." And Milosevic said, "As things stand now and given the

5 political initiatives that we have now, there are slim chances that this

6 will indeed happen and the war will spill over to Bosnia and Herzegovina

7 from Croatia."

8 When Mr. Izetbegovic is in, Kiro Gligorov's initiatives were

9 launched about loose, more loose status of the republics, of these four

10 republics relative to Serbia and Montenegro.

11 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Dr. Djokanovic.

12 Your Honour, I'd now like to play a telephone intercept to the

13 witness and that's the next marked exhibit which is Exhibit 14 on the list

14 and it's dated 13 August, 1991.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

16 MR. MARGETTS: And Your Honour, the CD will be tendered later.

17 THE REGISTRAR: The CD will be Prosecution Exhibit P541 and the

18 transcript will be P541A.

19 JUDGE ORIE: And then the translation to English, 541A.1, I take

20 it, Madam Registrar.

21 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.

23 Perhaps it was unnecessary to add this because all the other

24 documents, of course, as a general rule .1 is the translation from the

25 original language.

Page 10474

1 [Interpreter reads].

2 Dragan Djokanovic: I'll hold. Just tell him that Drago

3 Djokanovic would like to speak to him.

4 Unidentified Women's voice: All right.

5 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

6 Dragan Djokanovic: Good morning.

7 Radovan Karadzic: Good morning.

8 Dragan Djokanovic: I'm Dragan Djokanovic.

9 Radovan Karadzic: Oh, good morning. Where are you calling from?

10 Dragan Djokanovic: From Zvornik, from the office of the chairman

11 of the executive committee of your SDS.

12 Radovan Karadzic: Uh-huh.

13 Dragan Djokanovic: How are you?

14 Radovan Karadzic: Well, fine. I was on duty so ...

15 Dragan Djokanovic: I wanted to tell you that your men are

16 proposing a change of venue of the form that the -- from the cinema to the

17 sports hall.

18 Radovan Karadzic: If there will be that many people then change

19 it.

20 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes.

21 Radovan Karadzic: Are they expecting a large turnout?

22 Dragan Djokanovic: They are expecting a large turnout because all

23 local Serbian boards have been informed and representatives of the Muslim

24 Bosniak organisation were here yesterday. They are influential. They

25 have an influential board here.

Page 10475

1 Radovan Karadzic: Uh-huh.

2 Dragan Djokanovic: Well, they believe that the cinema would not

3 be able to fit everyone who is interested.

4 Radovan Karadzic: There's ...

5 Dragan Djokanovic:

6 Radovan Karadzic: No problem. They can change it.

7 Dragan Djokanovic: All right. About the security around Tuzla, we

8 just have to warn them, right.

9 Radovan Karadzic: Well, we'll see to it that as well have ...

10 Dragan Djokanovic: All right.

11 Radovan Karadzic: And they should be provided by the party.

12 Dragan Djokanovic: The party should provide them?

13 Radovan Karadzic: The party should provide 20 to 30 young men

14 to stand around and all that.

15 Dragan Djokanovic: All right. So it is at 1900 hours tomorrow at

16 the sports hall.

17 Radovan Karadzic: Fine.

18 Dragan Djokanovic: Well, then we are expecting you.

19 Radovan Karadzic: Fine. Thank you.

20 Dragan Djokanovic: I'd like to ask you, when do you expect to be

21 here?

22 Radovan Karadzic: Well, I don't know, at around 6.30.

23 Dragan Djokanovic: Oh that's great. Your executive committee

24 chairman would like to have a word with you.

25 Radovan Karadzic: Put him through.

Page 10476

1 Dragan Djokanovic: All right, then. Bye.

2 Radovan Karadzic: All the best.

3 Jovo Ivanovic: Hello.

4 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

5 Jovo Ivanovic: Hello, Mr. President. My flame is Jovo Ivanovic

6 and I'm the executive council chairman ...

7 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

8 Jovo Ivanovic: ... municipality.

9 Radovan Karadzic: Good afternoon. How do you do.

10 Jovo Ivanovic: Well we are here, the core members and Dragan and

11 we are getting things ready for tomorrow night. I don't want to discuss

12 that. You probably know how long the forum will take. It's very

13 difficult to say, about an hour or two; is that right?

14 Radovan Karadzic: Around an hour or and a half to two, that's

15 right.

16 Jovo Ivanovic: Right. And what we wanted to ask is, will you and

17 the others who come we'll of course include the MBO in this and so on will

18 there.

19 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

20 Jovo Ivanovic: Would you have time and would you be in the mood

21 for a dinner party?

22 Radovan Karadzic: I really don't know. Believe me, I don't think

23 it should be anything special.

24 Jovo Ivanovic: Well, it doesn't have to be special, just a few of

25 us at some ... it could be at our hotel in Zvornik, I mean it doesn't have

Page 10477

1 to ...

2 Radovan Karadzic: I really don't know. You be the judge and

3 then we can decide ...

4 Jovo Ivanovic: Yes.

5 Radovan Karadzic: Nothing special. You book a table but they

6 shouldn't prepare anything special and then we'll see. It depends on the

7 atmosphere, the number of the people and so on.

8 Jovo Ivanovic: All right, fine.

9 Radovan Karadzic: Fine.

10 Jovo Ivanovic: That would be all.

11 Radovan Karadzic: Good. See you tomorrow.

12 Jovo Ivanovic: Right. Fine. Good-bye.

13 Radovan Karadzic: All the best.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the written transcript has been

15 compared with the written spoken and whenever there is any comment, please

16 let me know. Please proceed, Mr. Margetts.


18 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you recognise the voices on this tape?

19 A. Yes this is a telephone conversation between myself and

20 Dr. Karadzic.

21 Q. Is there a third speaker on this tape?

22 A. Yes, Jovo Mijatovic, the chairman of the executive board of the

23 Serbian Democratic Party and the municipality of Zvornik also participated

24 at the talk. Jovo Ivanovic, that is.

25 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, where were you calling Mr. Karadzic from and where

Page 10478

1 was Mr. Karadzic?

2 A. Karadzic was in Sarajevo, probably at the office of the SDS seeing

3 that the secretary, a female voice responded from the office of the SDS

4 and I called in from the offices of the SDS Board in Zvornik, municipal

5 board in Zvornik.

6 Q. Do you recall having this conversation with Dr. Karadzic?

7 A. I do recall the conversation itself and the cause for the

8 conversation.

9 Q. Could you describe to the Court what the cause for the

10 conversation was and what it was you were organising in Zvornik?

11 A. This was the summer of 1992, the second half of summer. From the

12 beginning of 1992 and in 1991, the political situation in Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina kept exacerbating daily. So I thought that we could perhaps

14 dampen these tensions by conducting talks on a compromise or

15 compromise-based talks between the representatives of the Serbian

16 political echelons and those of the Bosnian political echelons in Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina, namely representatives of the Muslim Bosniak Organisation

18 that had been founded by Mr. Zulfikarpasic who had been the first

19 vice-president of the Party of Democratic Action, who we have already

20 mentioned at the beginning of our talk today. And its president was the

21 academician Mohammed Filipovic. So they supported this initiative on

22 talks about the Serbian and side on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

23 And I used this opportunity of being in Zvornik where I worked as a doctor

24 to get -- and was able to liaise with many honourable and renowned people,

25 Serbs and Muslims in this city. Zvornik in fact is a city which is known

Page 10479

1 as a Muslim Serbian city because it is at the very border with Serbia. So

2 I thought if we could strike a compromise there, reach an agreement there,

3 this could sort of spill over to the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 What we heard in the telephone conversation were agreements about

5 meetings, so I called Karadzic to confirm that he would attend the cinema

6 hall -- rather sports hall that we were preparing in Zvornik for our

7 guests.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Djokanovic, may I invite you to look at the

9 screen and wait until the text stops moving because you are speaking at a

10 speech when the interpreters cannot follow. So you see it's moving. If

11 you now and then, especially if there are longer answers, wait and then

12 you'll see that it stops moving and then continue.

13 Please proceed.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the witness

15 what he means exactly when he talks about the political situation in

16 Bosnia, B and H. What exactly does the witness mean when he says that?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they were worsening, as I

18 said, by the day. I have already referred in my previous statements that

19 from the rally in Cazin Krajina where Mr. Izetbegovic advocated for a

20 civil republic and where there had been the tied-up flags of the SDA and

21 the HDZ. And after that we saw Mr. Karadzic talking about territorial

22 delineation, demarcation. So this was the daily dynamics that we had.

23 We had one party advocating independence of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina, a civic state without the quality [as interpreted] of the

25 people being emphasised, whereas the Serbian side said that this would not

Page 10480

1 at all be carried out smoothly, that we will be identifying our

2 territories, that we have a fulcrum in the constitution of the SFRY et

3 cetera. So all of this taken together looked as something that could

4 indeed lead to disastrous consequences. And that is why in 1991 I worked

5 hard in order to avert the war if at all possible. And this meeting in

6 Zvornik was actually called with that in mind.

7 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Were these discussions actually

8 held between politicians at a higher level of the political world or were

9 they discussions that were discussions exacerbated by the situation?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A lot of it was the product of the

11 situation that obtained by the politicians were following closely what was

12 transpiring in the field and they really tried hard to respond to the

13 exigencies of the times. So I also had the meeting, a panel discussion

14 held in Sarajevo, in the centre of the city attended by Dr. Karadzic and

15 Professor Koljevic, Mr. Krajisnik as guests. Also with the objective of

16 warning the citizens in Sarajevo of the possible outcome of such an

17 aggravated political situation or such harsh politics, rather.

18 Dr. Karadzic spoke at this discussion that saying that he was

19 afraid that the Muslim side was trying to push through the assembly, the

20 declaration on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a document

21 that marked the whole first half of 1991 and we, the more benevolent ones

22 were warning, were actually saying that Bosnia and Herzegovina had its own

23 constitution that also stressed its indivisibility, territorial integrity

24 and the right of the peoples to equality. So what was happening was along

25 these lines with events actually succeeding one another.

Page 10481

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Thank you.

2 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, sorry. Before the questioning proceeds, just in

3 relation to line -- page 47, line 15, what's in the transcript there is

4 "quality of the people" I think it should be "equality of the people."

5 JUDGE ORIE: You know the transcript will be worked over in the

6 evening.

7 Mr. Margetts, please proceed.


9 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, at this meeting in Zvornik, did you make any

10 progress in your discussion with Zulfikarpasic in relation to your idea of

11 Bosnia staying within federal borders?

12 A. This rally, this meeting was -- very many people turned out at

13 this meeting. The cinema hall was full in Zvornik. Karadzic and Koljevic

14 and Zulfikarpasic were met with applause on the part of the audience. It

15 all passed very calmly. The talk there was sincere. After the meeting we

16 did not remain in Zvornik but the three of us stayed in a place called

17 Tisce, stayed overnight in Tisce, which is a place in the direction of

18 Kladanj and we discussed everything in some detail.

19 I believe that Mr. Zulfikarpasic, actually, was very subtle in his

20 understanding of the situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and had he -- had

21 we been fortunate enough for him to have been the leading politician of

22 the Muslim party and conducting the Muslim policies at that time in Bosnia

23 and Herzegovina, that war would have been indeed averted.

24 Q. Was Slobodan Milosevic made aware of the results of your

25 discussions with Zulfikarpasic and did he support the proposals that you

Page 10482












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 10483

1 were putting to the MBO?

2 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honours, I --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas.

4 MS. LOUKAS: I will make a general observation in relation to the

5 style of questioning of Mr. Margetts of which this is but one example. It

6 really would be better just to ask a question. We do have a lot of these

7 double-barreled questions and in my view, it's inappropriate to roll the

8 questions up in this way.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps, Mr. Margetts, perhaps it's better to

10 split it up. The first question is whether Milosevic was informed about

11 it and then what his attitude was towards that. I think that's more

12 appropriate way of dealing with it and of course -- yes, I think that

13 would satisfy the Defence and the Chamber to frame this in an appropriate

14 way of proceeding.

15 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, was Slobodan Milosevic made aware of the

17 discussions that you had with Zulfikarpasic and the results of those

18 discussions?

19 A. Mr. Milosevic didn't know about this particular meeting in

20 Zvornik. It had been agreed between Mr. Karadzic, Mr. Zulfikarpasic and

21 me myself. And it was only the closest associates of Mr. Zulfikarpasic

22 and

23 Mr. Karadzic that knew about this meeting as well as, naturally, the

24 activists of the SDS in Zvornik who informed the citizens of Zvornik about

25 this meeting and the Municipal Board of the MBO in Zvornik. But I do

Page 10484

1 recall that the media in Serbia widely covered this meeting after its

2 holding [as interpreted] and it was obvious that Serbia was supporting

3 such an initiative.

4 Those days, Mr. Zulfikarpasic and Mr. Filipovic were guests

5 visiting Belgrade and as far as I know, the president of Serbia also

6 received then Mr. Milosevic and they spoke in detail, in fact, about some

7 things. Namely, they said that if the Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina

8 did not -- if they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, they opened wide the

9 door for every conceivable agreement between the Bosnian and Serbian

10 peoples so that something specific was also proposed to the Muslims and --

11 Muslim side. The proposal was to the extent you give power to the Serbs

12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina to that extent you will have like powers in

13 Belgrade. In fact, the president -- it was also proposed that the

14 president of the SDS, Mr. Izetbegovic, could be the president of the first

15 such assembly and that Mr. Zulfikarpasic could be one of the presidents of

16 the chambers of such an assembly.

17 So they also sought to inform the wide audience, the wide public

18 in Bosnia and Herzegovina that these were not behind-the-scenes actions

19 but that this was something which actually reflected the needs of the time

20 and it was in the joint interest.

21 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to move to the next exhibit

22 which is another intercept and I'd like to play that intercept. At the

23 same time I'd like to present the witness with a text from Oslobodjenje of

24 3 October 1991. They're Exhibits 15 and 16 on the list.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

Page 10485

1 THE REGISTRAR: Mr. Margetts, will you be providing a CD

2 additionally?

3 MR. MARGETTS: Yes, we will be providing a CD of the intercepts we

4 present today.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, all the intercepts on one CD, I do understand.



8 THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit will be P542. And the text

9 written by Dragan Djokanovic, P543.

10 [Interpreter voiceover]

11 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

12 Dragan Djokanovic: Good morning.

13 Radovan Karadzic: Good morning.

14 Dragan Djokanovic: Dragan Djokanovic on the line.

15 Radovan Karadzic: Oh, got morning. How are you?

16 Dragan Djokanovic: Tell me, are you all right?

17 Radovan Karadzic: I'm fine, thank you. What are you doing?

18 Dragan Djokanovic: Well, I was listening to the news for a while,

19 now I have some commitments.

20 Radovan Karadzic: Oh, is that so? They say ... The English say

21 there will be no military troops and also that the army will go on harder

22 in Croatia.

23 Dragan Djokanovic: That's true. That's true so ...

24 Radovan Karadzic: So well ...

25 Dragan Djokanovic: The government, the English government.

Page 10486

1 Radovan Karadzic: I beg your pardon?

2 Dragan Djokanovic: Oh yeah.

3 Radovan Karadzic: The English government. So, the army will get

4 a full rein.

5 Dragan Djokanovic: They already got it. Have you also heard it

6 stays, the Supreme Armed Forces Command, that they issued an

7 announcement?

8 Radovan Karadzic: No.

9 Dragan Djokanovic: They have sent an announcement to the

10 president of the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian government, that they

11 will, that they will respond on every attack on the barracks by destroying

12 objects of, of vital importance to that town and to the Republic of

13 Croatia.

14 Radovan Karadzic: All right. Excellent.

15 Dragan Djokanovic: That is excellent. It was time, finally, to

16 do such ...

17 Radovan Karadzic: Is it excellent? These men are coming back to

18 me, the hack, they don't feel like they are in the army at all. They come

19 there, they lay around ...

20 Dragan Djokanovic: Yeah.

21 Radovan Karadzic: ... There is no drill, no military conduct, the

22 command doesn't appeal to them. It is traitorous, somehow wimpy.

23 Dragan Djokanovic: Well, I was ... I have been mostly preoccupied

24 with the army these days, with the men ...

25 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

Page 10487

1 Dragan Djokanovic: If there was any discipline, there should have

2 been better responses to, to these, these provocations.

3 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, yes. That's right, that's right.

4 Dragan Djokanovic: But tell me, were there any discussions with

5 the SDA last night?

6 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, there were.

7 Dragan Djokanovic: So how is it going?

8 Radovan Karadzic: Well, it's going fine. I think it's going

9 fine.

10 Dragan Djokanovic: All right.

11 Radovan Karadzic: I think it's going fine. If we stick to what

12 we have said and so, I mean without ...

13 Dragan Djokanovic: Without any ... Our side is holding on it ...

14 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, we'll see.

15 Dragan Djokanovic: Nikola told me yesterday that you gave him the

16 paper they asked for.

17 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, yes, that's right.

18 Dragan Djokanovic: So now I need to get a written answer too.

19 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, they've ... Well maybe some experts should

20 be appointed to do that or something.

21 Dragan Djokanovic: But tell me the, that, what the other night

22 was ... Yutel, these papers that are circling, have they done any

23 damage?

24 Radovan Karadzic: I don't believe they have done any damage, I

25 think they have just contributed to, to hating Serbs more but that is ...

Page 10488

1 But those who want to hate, they hate anyways and those, those who do not

2 want to hate, they don't even believe in that. That is, those are

3 forgeries. That is ...

4 Dragan Djokanovic: Oh yeah. And are you okay otherwise?

5 Radovan Karadzic: I'm fine, thank God.

6 Dragan Djokanovic: Are you an optimist for -- regardless of all

7 of this that is.

8 Radovan Karadzic: Well, I think I am, I think I am. I think it is

9 going, that things will start taking some natural course or something.

10 Dragan Djokanovic: Right. Okay, Doctor. It was nice hearing

11 from you.

12 Radovan Karadzic: Thank you. Till soon.

13 Dragan Djokanovic: Thank you very much.

14 Radovan Karadzic: Have a nice day.

15 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'm informed that the -- that a better

16 way to proceed with these intercepts would be to provide individual CDs

17 and so with the leave of Your Honour, that's the way we will proceed with

18 these intercepts.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, as long as your case manager and the registrar

20 agree on the matter, we're only too glad to follow.

21 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you recognise the voices on that telephone

23 intercept?

24 A. This was a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and myself.

25 Q. At this time, Dr. Djokanovic, were you following closely the

Page 10489

1 events in Croatia?

2 A. I cannot recall whether I was following closely but I was

3 following, at any rate.

4 Q. After discussions of the events in Croatia, you and Dr. Karadzic

5 discuss a topic which is not entirely clear from the text of this

6 intercept. Do you recall specifically what discussions you were referring

7 to at that time?

8 A. At this point in time, I don't think if it was the supporters of

9 the Croatian policy or some individual parties, but they were launching

10 attacks against the JNA barracks, blocking any food supplies from being

11 delivered to them. I'm telling you what I knew from the mass media. And

12 we were all quite wondering at the JNA's behaviour that was quite soft, so

13 to say, they did not really protect their men or property, so that I

14 welcomed the press release issued by the JNA command in Belgrade that we

15 were going to protect and defend the JNA barracks. This was a press

16 release that was politically favorable for us in Bosnia and Herzegovina

17 because the public in Bosnia and Herzegovina had to understand that the

18 JNA was going to do its best to preserve the state of Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina, that it was not going to allow it to be dismantled that

20 easily.

21 I sent a letter to Mr. Karadzic, I'm trying to remember now what

22 it was all about, because at that point, we were preparing the plebescite

23 for the Serbian people. I believe it was an invitation for a multiparty

24 meeting to be held at Holiday Inn in Sarajevo just before the holding of

25 the Serbian plebiscite.

Page 10490

1 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, on the table before you is a text from

2 Oslobodjenje. In the course of one of your answers from the president's

3 questions, you mentioned a text that was published, is this the text that

4 you were referring to? I'm referring to Exhibit P543.

5 A. It is possible that this is the text. It is quite possible.

6 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, could you just take a moment to read that text and

7 then I'll take you to specific parts of it.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. In the text -- just to confirm, is that the text that you wrote

10 and was published in Oslobodjenje in October 1991?

11 A. Yes, this is the text that I wrote and which was published in the

12 Sarajevo Oslobodjenje on the 3rd of October, 1991.

13 Q. In this text, you write that the war that could break out could be

14 the most disastrous and catastrophic war, interethnic and interreligious.

15 In fact you say that "the BH could be engulfed by the most catastrophic

16 ethnic and religious war of the kind unknown in history to date."

17 Further on, you say that"Yugoslavia exists as a federal state and

18 that its constitution guarantees equality to the republics and the right

19 to self-determination to the people living in on its territory. Just by

20 proceeding from this fact, it is possible to coordinate the national

21 interests of Muslims, Serbs and Croats and resolve the political crisis in

22 BH in a peaceful and democratic way. If either one of these parties

23 decides to ignore this fact it risks drawing its people into the madness

24 of a fratricidal war."

25 As at October 1991, was it your view that if the Muslims and

Page 10491

1 Croats proceeded with their aim to establish an independent Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina the results you have detailed in this transcript may occur?

3 A. That's what I believed at the time and I wrote at the time. But

4 unfortunately, the events that followed showed us what actually -- what

5 course the events took. Nobody was prepared to strike a compromise. They

6 did not play with their cards on the table. They did not take into

7 account the future interests and a war broke out.

8 Q. In your view, were the Muslims informed of the position of the

9 Serbs openly and clearly?

10 A. Yes, they were. They were certainly aware because it was all done

11 openly.

12 Q. Was it clear to you at this time which group in this potential

13 conflict had the support from Serbia and from the federal institutions?

14 A. This isn't a difficult question. The Croatian people enjoyed the

15 support of Croatia. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina enjoyed the

16 support of the Serbs from Serbia, whereas the Bosnian Muslims could only

17 rely upon what they themselves did in Bosnia and Herzegovina and on their

18 self-organising they probably had the inclination of some of the countries

19 abroad.

20 Q. In light of that position, at this time when you produced this

21 text, what did you expect the Muslim response to be to this position?

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts, I would very much like to hear the

23 answer also to the second part of your question, that's of course what are

24 the consequences?

25 In your earlier question, you refer to support of the Serbs and of

Page 10492

1 the federal institutions. The witness answered that -- did not give an

2 answer in respect of the federal institutions. Could you please invite

3 him to do so?


5 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, His Honour has observed that the question related

6 to both Serbia and the federal institutions. In your answer, you've

7 referred to support from Croatia, support from Serbia. Could you tell the

8 Court who you thought would receive support from the federal institutions?

9 A. In this text, I did not tackle these issues. I only stated that

10 at that point in time, Yugoslavia existed as a state under the

11 international law, that all of its federal institutions were valid because

12 if it was a state under the international law, then all its institutions

13 were fully valid because the official policy of both Serbia and Montenegro

14 was to stay in Yugoslavia. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina were never

15 insecure about remaining within Yugoslavia which meant that the other two

16 sides, Serbs -- Croats and Muslims had to count with such a position. The

17 Serbs therefore had the friendly support of Montenegro and Serbia, they

18 could count on the official governments of Montenegro and Serbia as well

19 as of the federal institutions that were in existence.

20 Q. In light of the support of the states being behind either the

21 Croats or the Serbs, what did you anticipate the Muslims would seek in

22 their negotiations with you?

23 A. What was quite unclear to me and to many at the time was the

24 position of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina because they did not

25 speak their minds openly about the policies of Croatia and they did

Page 10493

1 support the SDA political agenda for an independent BiH. With this text,

2 I wanted to launch a discussion among the Croat intellectuals in Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina on this issue because if Croatia was seceding from

4 Yugoslavia and Croats were also a sovereign and constituent nation in

5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, what was their position on this? Did they support

6 the secession of Croatia? Did they want to remain within Bosnia and

7 Herzegovina? Did they want BiH to remain within Yugoslavia? Or what else

8 was on their mind?

9 JUDGE ORIE: I will ask you to slow down. Please proceed.

10 Was that the end of your answer? Of course, that didn't make much

11 sense to ask you to slow down.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I only had a couple more things to

13 say.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed. If you just look at the text, when

15 it stops moving, you continue. Yes.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Had we known the views of Croats in

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would have been much more easier to reconcile

18 the views of the other two peoples because this was the main bone of

19 contention in the earlier talks taking place in summer, like the

20 discussion with Zulfikarpasic, then an Belgrade initiative launched by the

21 Belgrade politicians supported by Mr. Krajisnik, president of the Assembly

22 which was at -- in any case a very positive initiative. That would be my

23 answer.


25 Q. You referred to support that the Serbs may gain from federal

Page 10494

1 institutions. Which federal institutions were you referring to?

2 A. I wasn't thinking about the support at the time the way you're

3 thinking now with hindsight, I was talking about the federal state, the

4 federal constitution that formed part of international law and could not

5 easily be dismantled. And if we choose to remain within Yugoslavia, then

6 that's the side we are on. I did not really think of a specific federal

7 organ that we could draw upon. But in any way, one knows which federal

8 institutions one can draw upon if one is faced with a specific problem.

9 Q. At this time in October 1991, was it clear to you what could

10 happen to the Muslims and their interests if they proceeded to declare an

11 independent state of Bosnia?

12 A. They were unable to proclaim an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina

13 on their own. They had to have a parliamentary majority comprising

14 deputies from the Muslim political parties and some other deputies either

15 from Serb or Croat parties. At that point, it was useless to expect the

16 Serbs to support them in the parliament but one could expect the support

17 of the HDZ.

18 There was this constant threat of this unprincipled parliamentary

19 majority forming.

20 Q. Were the Muslims able to protect themselves if war broke out?

21 A. At that point, I was only envisaging the possibility of this

22 catastrophe taking place, but I was not going into any details in that

23 relation. I just knew that we could be faced with catastrophe that we had

24 already seen recorded in history.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Margetts, I would normally not give any comment

Page 10495

1 to a question to you, especially not if the Defence had not raised any

2 objection. But it is implicit in your question: Were the Muslims able to

3 protect themselves in war broke out? That there was one party which had

4 to protect which suggests a lot which I think should not be implicit in

5 the question, especially not in chief.

6 Please proceed.

7 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour. I will rephrase that

8 question.

9 Q. In light of the relative strength of the state institutions behind

10 the Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims, what was the relative position in

11 terms of armaments of the Muslims?

12 MS. LOUKAS: Well, Your Honour, no foundation has been laid for a

13 question of that nature in terms of the witness's knowledge of the

14 position in terms of the ...

15 JUDGE ORIE: The witness, I think the witness's testimony on his

16 position would give a presumption of any knowledge. But if he doesn't

17 have any of it, then he'll certainly tell us.

18 Could you please answer the question put to you by Mr. Margetts,

19 that is: In light of the relative strength of the state institutions

20 behind the Croats, the Serbs, and the Muslims, what was the relative

21 position in terms of armaments of the Muslims?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the media, specifically from

23 the interview with Mr. Zulfikarpasic, we looked at it earlier on, I had

24 occasion to see that the Party of Democratic Action was getting armed.

25 What sort of armaments could those have been in relation to those held by

Page 10496

1 Croatia or by the federal state that had enormous military resources.

2 Whatever they were able to purchase and obtain was nothing in relation to

3 what in future Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro could have.


5 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, I understand that you attended the session of the

6 SRBiH assembly held on 15 October 1991, when the SDA placed the memorandum

7 of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the agenda. Could you relate

8 to the Court what your experience was on the evening of the 14th of

9 October, 1991 and during the course of that session on 15 October 1991.

10 A. In my opinion, this was the crucial ground breaking moment in

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina because for the earlier -- for the nine months

12 preceding this session, this declaration for an independent

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina was hanging above our heads. But we need an

14 introduction before answering this question, which is: Why did

15 Mr. Krajisnik become the president of the BiH Assembly. Perhaps not even

16 Mr. Krajisnik himself knows this.

17 Prior to the election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Karadzic and

18 I talked about the division of function in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

19 Dr. Karadzic told me that Izetbegovic had offered him to pick out a

20 function that the Serbs wanted, whether they wanted to have the function

21 of the president of the Presidency of BiH or whether they wanted the

22 function of the president of the assembly, which was second in power, or

23 the third in power which was the prime minister's function which belonged

24 to the third nation in BiH, that is the Croats. I was in favour of the

25 Serb being the president of the Presidency because in this capacity, he

Page 10497

1 represents the BiH and he is the final instance in the adoption of laws,

2 whereas Karadzic thought that whatever was to be passed at the expense of

3 the Serbs was going to be passed in the parliament and that therefore it

4 was much better for the Serbs to have the position of the president of the

5 assembly.

6 Now, the choice had to be made which Serb was to be chosen. I

7 know that I was nominated by the constituency in Foca. There, they wanted

8 Vojo Maksimovic who hailed from Foca to be president of the parliament;

9 however, I told -- and I offered this to Karadzic but he turned this down.

10 They said that they had Velibor Ostojic who was an official of the SDS who

11 was to be preferred for this position.

12 He told me in this talk, "Yes, I accepted this argumentation of

13 his that the man of ours in the parliament could help prevent the passage

14 of such an anti-constitutional and constitutional document." So talking

15 about Karadzic -- with Karadzic about Mr. Krajisnik as a possible speaker

16 of the assembly he knew that he knew him from before, that they were

17 similar in temperament and character. In fact their parents were alike.

18 Of course, I didn't know Mr. Krajisnik except by sight at that time. I

19 had only seen him at a panel discussion before the elections in Bosnia.

20 This was in Novo Sarajevo at a meeting in the Vaso Pelagic culture centre

21 and he was there on the working Presidency, the chair that had prepared

22 this panel discussion.

23 So Mr. Krajisnik was given the role of protecting the interests of

24 the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina through his position of president of

25 parliament and, indeed, throughout that period until that very night, he

Page 10498

1 kept warning at different meetings and publicly as well of the fact that

2 the declaration that was in the offing by the deputies of the SDS and was

3 being advocated by them as well as by the politicians, and it was being

4 referred to by politicians in the media that it was the danger and that

5 there was something which was cause for concern.

6 On the eve of this assembly, a Serbian friend of mine called me

7 and he told me that the top leadership of the Party of Democratic Action

8 had decided for the document to be adopted in the Assembly. In fact he

9 told me that the then minister of foreign affairs of Germany had directly

10 talked to Izetbegovic and had told him, "You just bring that paper to the

11 Hague." And the plan was made to the effect that the Assembly can last up

12 to 12 hours or rather to mid-day. This was the day when he travelled from

13 the Butmir airport in Sarajevo to The Hague.

14 That evening, I informed Dr. Karadzic of this. I called him by

15 telephone late at night and he told me, "We'll see each other in the

16 morning in my -- in Mr. Krajisnik's," rather, "office."

17 Early that morning, we did meet at Mr. Krajisnik's office and I

18 told them this. They were quite silent and without any comment. I gained

19 the impression that seeing that I had learned this from my own sources,

20 that they, too, seeing the influence that they wielded which was greater

21 than mine, had also learned of this and it was no surprise.

22 However, during that day as the time passed and the time passed

23 also in terms of what could realistically be done in my view, and my view

24 was that we had to make this information public, that we had to make this

25 known to both the Bosnia and the Yugoslav and the world public, namely

Page 10499

1 what was being prepared in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was, in fact, in favour

2 of inviting the people to take to the streets and demonstrate, seeing what

3 was in for them. But time was running out and I said -- in fact,

4 Mr. Krajisnik told me that morning, "Doctor, I have a remedy. I have a

5 drug for that." And I was quite relaxed that day. Then I finally asked

6 what kind of remedy are you talking about? He told me the rules of

7 procedure, according to the rules of procedure of the assembly, he was

8 entitled to adjourn in the session of the assembly and that according to

9 that same rule of the procedure of the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

10 no one had the right to reconvene the Assembly and have it continue its

11 work.

12 A. So I was consternated. I said look, they are not even observing

13 the constitution, why would they abide by the rules of procedure.

14 However, that's the way it was and that's the way it remained. Mr.

15 Krajisnik adjourned the Assembly session. We went to his office, Dr.

16 Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and I, that is, and then we watched the

17 continuation of that Assembly session on television. The vice president

18 of the Assembly, Mario Ljubic a Croatian deputy, actually unlawfully,

19 opened the Assembly session. They adopted this memorandum on the

20 independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the will of the Serbian

21 deputies. That was this defining moment, this turnabout which actually

22 paved the way to war.

23 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, can you describe the position of speaker of the

24 Bosnian parliament to the Court?

25 A. In the orders as we have in the book, the speaker of the Assembly

Page 10500

1 is the second in rank after the president of the state.

2 Q. In terms of effective power in the Bosnian state, what type of

3 power does the speaker of the Assembly have?

4 A. I could not say. I could not speak of -- in terms of these

5 categories or the extent of their respective powers because I'm not a

6 lawyer to be able to gauge that precisely. But in any case, that was the

7 position with quite a lot of political clout and access to the media as

8 well and in the particular case of Mr. Krajisnik, he very adroitly used

9 this position of speaker of parliament and he had this fantastic media

10 promotion, he was accepted by the Serbian people in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina. In fact, at a certain point in time, Mr. Milosevic at one of

12 these meetings of ours, I think it was in June, he said that Mr. Krajisnik

13 was the best president of Assembly in the area of the former Yugoslavia.

14 Q. When the Muslims introduced the memorandum to the agenda, what did

15 Mr. Krajisnik do?

16 A. I have already described all that.

17 Q. Sorry, Dr. Djokanovic, I understand that there was a meeting in

18 the morning at the office of Momcilo Krajisnik where you and Mr. Karadzic

19 and Mr. Krajisnik discussed the pending memorandum. I just want to be

20 entirely clear as to what occurred during the course of the day and the

21 sequence of events.

22 So if you could bear with me and just tell me, possibly again,

23 what Mr. Krajisnik did when the memorandum was introduced to the agenda?

24 A. When this memorandum was placed on the agenda, the only

25 possibility apart from what I was advocating, extra parliamentary

Page 10501

1 demonstrations, warnings to the foreign and domestic media, et cetera of

2 what might happen and would happen. The Serbian deputies did the only

3 thing they could at that moment which was to take the floor one by one to

4 keep warning of these things but this was calculated. This was reckoned

5 with, in fact, in advance, because it was the time allotted to each deputy

6 to take the floor which was something which was known.

7 So the Muslims and the Serbs, the Muslim and the Bosnian -- excuse

8 me, deputies did not take the floor at all and only waited for the vote so

9 Mr. Krajisnik knew that this would happen. I cannot recall with precision

10 what he said to them before the conclusion of the Assembly but I do

11 remember that he concluded the Assembly session in a quite legalistic

12 fashion.

13 Q. You said the Serbs took the floor, what did they say? What did

14 they tell the Muslims and the Croats?

15 A. Frankly speaking, I was so worried because I also knew some things

16 that the deputies didn't know and I did not exactly follow their speeches.

17 You can see that from the verbatim records of the proceedings. I cannot

18 tell you what they spoke about at this point.

19 Q. Do you recall whether or not Dr. Karadzic spoke?

20 A. It is impossible that Dr. Karadzic did not speak at that Assembly

21 and warned the deputies of these things.

22 Q. Do you recall that he did speak and, if so, do you recall what he

23 said?

24 A. I'm not quite sure what I'm going to say but I think that this was

25 it. Karadzic's warning was the kind of warning that was often circulated

Page 10502

1 in the media, namely, the sentence in the event of war between the Serbs

2 and the Croats, there will be no longer any Muslims, but I'm not quite

3 sure that this was so in that particular instance. I'm not quite sure

4 that that was at that meeting, at that session, it was either at that or

5 at some previous session.

6 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to move to the next exhibit

7 which is an intercept of telephone conversation.

8 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would just like to ask one

9 question.

10 Witness, if I understood correctly, you have told us that Mr.

11 Krajisnik had concluded the session and that after that, you went to his

12 office. With whom did you go to his office? Who was there?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Krajisnik, and I.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Also, if I understood correctly,

15 Mr. Krajisnik and yourself, you were able to follow over a television set

16 what was going on in the Assembly? And what did you notice, what were you

17 able to see? That the session continued? It was reconvened?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a live TV transmission so

19 that the public in Bosnia and Herzegovina could follow the session and of

20 course we, who were there where the TV set was, followed it to the end and

21 then we left the Assembly building, the three of us. Mr. Krajisnik

22 offered me a ride to my place but I walked home.

23 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] But my question was rather the

24 following: What was the reaction of Mr. Krajisnik when he saw that the

25 session was reconvened, that it was continuing? He had suspended the

Page 10503

1 session, and in his absence, the session had continued; is that correct?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We were simply consternated,

3 everything that we had done before, everything that we had tried to

4 impress before the people before by way of a warning was actually

5 happening. We knew that it would happen but we wanted it not to happen.

6 But simply all of the time we were aware that there could bestruck this

7 principle, the parliamentary majority coalition and that they would

8 actually accept and adopt whatever they felt like.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] [Previous translation continues]

10 ... able to react, to intern, because he was able to see what was going

11 on? Could he have gone back to the Assembly? Could he have said

12 something, done something?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, at that point, there was no

14 possibility for him to do anything at all. The mood in the Assembly was

15 such, they actually jumped at the opportunity when I say they, I mean the

16 Bosnian and the Croatian deputies. They were very happy when the Serbs

17 left the Assembly so that they were quite euphoric and adopted this. They

18 had decided to do that and that is why they did it as we would say, come

19 what may or come hill or high water.

20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] What was the atmosphere in Mr.

21 Krajisnik's office while you were watching this over the television? What

22 were the comments? What was said between the three of you?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we were defeated. We

24 abstained from any comments. We just wanted to get out of the Assembly.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, Witness.

Page 10504

1 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to move to the next exhibit

2 which is an intercepted telephone conversation. It's number 17 on the

3 exhibit list.

4 THE REGISTRAR: This CD will be Prosecution Exhibit P544 and the

5 transcript P544A.

6 MR. MARGETTS: This is the intercept dated 20 October, 1991.

7 Your Honour, unfortunately we're having a technical problem with

8 that intercept.

9 JUDGE ORIE: I see it. The two options are either you wait for it

10 after the break or you work on the basis of the written document at this

11 moment.

12 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, we're content to proceed without

13 playing this intercept. We'll proceed on the basis of the written

14 document.

15 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you have before you a transcript of a telephone

16 conversation between yourself and Dr. Karadzic?

17 A. I do.

18 Q. And just for identification purposes, at the top of that

19 transcript does it state CD-21-20-3/02/014?

20 A. Exactly.

21 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honours, I'll read this intercept into the

22 record or if it could be read into the record by the interpreters? I'll

23 proceed to read it in if Your Honour --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you need every single part of it so it should be

25 read in as a whole or you read the relevant parts because then we get all

Page 10505

1 the good evenings and all can I speak to the doctors with it.

2 MS. LOUKAS: Your Honour, I'm just wondering if it might be a

3 better idea to take the break and see if this issue can be resolved so

4 that we can deal with the intercept in the normal manner.

5 JUDGE ORIE: That is a suggestion, I take it, Mr. Margetts, you

6 would --

7 MR. MARGETTS: Yes, Your Honour, that's acceptable to us.


9 Mr. Djokanovic, we hope to resolve the technical problems in

10 respect of the next intercept during a break, a break which will last for

11 20 minutes. We'll resume at 20 minutes to 1.00 of this Court.

12 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 12.44 p.m.

14 JUDGE ORIE: I see yellow highlighted on my screen Mr. Margetts,

15 "a known person, good evening." That sounds promising.

16 MR. MARGETTS: Yes, Your Honour, it all looks very positive so

17 referring to Prosecution Exhibit P544 if we could play that intercept.

18 [Intercept played]

19 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]

20 Unidentified Speaker: Good evening.

21 Radovan Karadzic: Good evening.

22 Unidentified Speaker: Is that Karadzic residence.

23 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, it is.

24 Unidentified Speaker: Dragan Djokanovic wishes to speak to the

25 doctor.

Page 10506

1 Dragan Djokanovic: Hello.

2 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

3 Dragan Djokanovic: Good evening.

4 Radovan Karadzic: Good evening, how are you?

5 Dragan Djokanovic: Very well, thank you. And yourself?

6 Radovan Karadzic: The line is poor, just a moment.

7 Dragan Djokanovic: Hello.

8 Radovan Karadzic: Hello.

9 Dragan Djokanovic: Is it any better now?

10 Radovan Karadzic: It's better now.

11 Dragan Djokanovic: So you've returned today?

12 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, yes.

13 Dragan Djokanovic: Any success over there?

14 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, excellent.

15 Dragan Djokanovic: Excellent, I was worried how it would turn

16 out.

17 Radovan Karadzic: It was good, good, excellent.

18 Dragan Djokanovic: Good.

19 Radovan Karadzic: You see, Mi ... Milad has wrong ideas, but

20 we've dealt with it.

21 Dragan Djokanovic: Yeah, goodness knows I was afraid of this hot

22 temper of his.

23 Radovan Karadzic: Yeah, but we've dealt with it.

24 Dragan Djokanovic: Err ...

25 Radovan Karadzic: He doesn't have more than two or three persons

Page 10507

1 who support him, but we've managed to convince them as well.

2 Dragan Djokanovic: Great. So in the course of the next week your

3 ideas will have been implemented?

4 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, yes. Everything runs its course. We

5 won't start -- be the first to start with anything and whatever they offer

6 us we have to accept, there's no other way.

7 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes.

8 Radovan Karadzic: And you are ... Are you okay?

9 Dragan Djokanovic: Well, I am, I'm receiving somehow constantly

10 in expectation so one doesn't really know if he feels good or bad.

11 Radovan Karadzic: Don't worry, everything is going to be okay.

12 Dragan Djokanovic: They have to give in now. He has found

13 himself, particularly now after The Hague, he has found himself in a tight

14 corner, I think.

15 Radovan Karadzic: Who?

16 Dragan Djokanovic: Alija.

17 Radovan Karadzic: Well, ha ha ha, it's his fault. What did he

18 think, that he can make political crime and play games with Serbs, he ...

19 made a small trick. That's not the way. It's an embarrassment for him.

20 I told him there at the negotiations and I also said it publicly that it

21 was going to be embarrassing for him and it is embarrassing.

22 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes, yes.

23 Radovan Karadzic: But what's done, it's done, no way back, let

24 them do whatever they think is good for their people, good for them.

25 We'll help them fight for their people. But they cannot sacrifice our

Page 10508












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 10509

1 people for their people.

2 Dragan Djokanovic: Of course.

3 Radovan Karadzic: Nor shall we ask for them to make sacrifices

4 for us. Let -- we have news that Boras was up there in the Posavina

5 region and that he brought -- a decision was brought to unite that region

6 up there with Croatia.

7 Dragan Djokanovic: Uh-huh.

8 Radovan Karadzic: So, Croats are very busy with the

9 regionalisation. We are -- we know about it they have made maps and

10 rounded up the regions before we did.

11 Dragan Djokanovic: Of course. Of course. I expect a conflict

12 between SDA and HDZ one of these days.

13 Radovan Karadzic: There will be a conflict because they want to

14 take more.

15 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes.

16 Radovan Karadzic: Take Travnik, for example. Muslims make a

17 relative majority there, and Croats want Travnik for themselves.

18 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes. They say that Travnik is their

19 territory ...

20 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, based on the historical rights, because

21 there was this Banovina Hrvatska and -- so let them have it. And our

22 territories are quite ethnically clean and we'll easily agree with the

23 Muslims. There are our people at their territory and these other guys,

24 let them.

25 Dragan Djokanovic: I think that it would be wise to go public

Page 10510

1 with this idea that Serbs wish to compromise with Muslims.

2 Radovan Karadzic: No way. People would replace me immediately,

3 no way. They have spat on us. We have offered them brotherly love

4 hundreds of times, have offered them a hand of friendship.

5 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes, yes.

6 Radovan Karadzic: Like ...

7 Dragan Djokanovic: It's well known what they are like.

8 Radovan Karadzic: You saw how they behave at the club, they don't

9 allow me to even see Izetbegovic not so much as to talk to him.

10 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes I saw it but I thought that because of the

11 Muslims ...

12 Radovan Karadzic: I don't want to for Muslim's sake, let the

13 Muslims say no, let them say that they are against such policy and let

14 Alija say yes we were wrong, we want to go together with Serbs. But he

15 has to say it publicly.

16 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes, poor him now, now, he knows he has to say

17 it, but how is he going to say it.

18 Radovan Karadzic: No way, no way. I would be politically dead if

19 I offered him a hand now.

20 Dragan Djokanovic: You are right.

21 Radovan Karadzic: No way. There's not a single Serb that

22 would ... Bulatovic would loose power in Montenegro.

23 Dragan Djokanovic: Yes. Just look at what he has done over

24 there.

25 Radovan Karadzic: So I'm talking to my brother, I said we want to

Page 10511

1 spare him in our declaration not to touch him. He said no, don't spare

2 him. He and the government won't endure much longer.

3 Dragan Djokanovic: Have you heard how Kibarda attacked him

4 yesterday.

5 Radovan Karadzic: No, I haven't heard anything.

6 Dragan Djokanovic: He had a press conference in Herceg Novi.

7 Radovan Karadzic: Yes.

8 Dragan Djokanovic: And I said that it was a shame, horrible

9 shame.

10 Radovan Karadzic: Yes. Yes.

11 Dragan Djokanovic: Who was forcing him. He could have, if he

12 didn't know he could have restrained himself.

13 Radovan Karadzic: Look, brother, and just to think that the

14 Assembly authorised him, instructed him in fact, to act based on his own

15 estimates.

16 Dragan Djokanovic: And he ...

17 Radovan Karadzic: So the betrayal is his, it has nothing to do

18 with the Assembly.

19 Dragan Djokanovic: That's right. Okay. So you go with your plan

20 this week, right?

21 Radovan Karadzic: Yes, yes. Everything runs its course.

22 Dragan Djokanovic: Okay.

23 Radovan Karadzic: Good.

24 Dragan Djokanovic: It was good hearing from you. I'm glad that

25 everything went well in Banja Luka.

Page 10512

1 Radovan Karadzic: We invite you, on that day.

2 Dragan Djokanovic: Thank you ...

3 Radovan Karadzic: Okay.

4 Dragan Djokanovic: Good.

5 MR. MARGETTS: This intercept P544 has the date 20 October 1991.

6 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, do you recognise the voices in this intercept?

7 A. That's a conversation between Dr. Karadzic and myself.

8 Q. Do you recall having this conversation with Dr. Karadzic?

9 A. To tell you the truth, I don't.

10 Q. Can I refer you to the first page, there's an exchange between

11 yourself and Dr. Karadzic and you ask Dr. Karadzic whether he had any

12 success over there. Do you know where it is you're referring to and what

13 it is you're referring to?

14 A. The 20th of October, 1991, which means a couple of days after the

15 adoption of the declaration by the Assembly, the document was sent to

16 The Hague. I don't know if there was Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Karadzic who

17 were in The Hague or maybe it was Mr. Karadzic going to meet with

18 Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade, so they discussed these new developments but

19 that's it.

20 Q. And then there's a reference about five lines down where Karadzic

21 says, "You see, Milad has wrong ideas but we've dealt with it." Do you

22 recall who he is referring to when he refers to the name Milad and what

23 the ideas are that he's referring to?

24 A. I really don't recall the conversation or this name Milad. It

25 doesn't really sound like a name at all. It might have been Milosevic

Page 10513

1 being just a first few sounds of his name but as I say that I was afraid,

2 he might have been referring to Mr. Milosevic because I was really afraid

3 that he might react more furiously to the adoption of this declaration.

4 Q. Now, moving over the page, you state to -- Karadzic tells you not

5 to worry and then you say, "They have to give in now. He has found

6 himself, particularly now after The Hague, he has found himself in a tight

7 corner, I think," and then you tell Karadzic you are speaking about Alija.

8 Do you recall why it was you thought Alija would have -- well, first of

9 all, who is Alija, and secondly, do you recall why it was that thought he

10 would have to give in?

11 A. It refers to Mr. Izetbegovic. The euphoria that prevailed up

12 until the adoption of the declaration on the independence of the BiH

13 subsided because now that they adopted it, what next? The Serbs were

14 getting their ranks together, also in political terms, so what was going

15 to be their next step, especially because we still had to deal with the

16 preparations for the plebescite of the Serbian people to take place in

17 November and of course it was certain that our people were going to vote

18 in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia, but there might be other citizens of

19 other ethnicities voting for voting for staying within Yugoslavia, so

20 there was a possibility for that memorandum, for this declaration to

21 actually fall through as a result of such a vote.

22 These two parties that were forming this unprincipled political

23 coalition at the time were working on the ground organising at the grass

24 roots because Mr. Karadzic is mentioning Travnik.

25 Q. Now just before he mentions Travnik, he says, "So Croats are very

Page 10514

1 busy with the regionalisation. They've made maps and rounded up the

2 regions before we did."

3 What was the situation in Bosnia as regards regionalisation as at

4 October 1991?

5 A. I can't recall these matters specifically because these were

6 initiatives I did not take part in. I believe that the Serbian Democratic

7 Party had a document containing Serb proposals. It was also a

8 compromise-seeking document saying, Well this is the platform that we

9 could try to reach an agreement over. I was more preoccupied with the

10 plebescite at the time because my desire was to involve as many political

11 parties in this initiative as possible and I wanted to ensure that all the

12 citizens turned out to vote in favour of staying within Yugoslavia.

13 Q. The next point is where Travnik is mentioned. Karadzic

14 says, "There will be a conflict because they want to take more," and he

15 gives Travnik as an example. He says, "The Muslims make up a relative

16 majority there and Croats want Travnik for themselves."

17 What was your understanding in terms of the demographic, that is,

18 the relative majority or minority, and the potential for conflict?

19 A. As far as I know, this statement by Mr. Karadzic reflects the

20 truth, that traditionally, Croats deem Travnik to be their own while, in

21 actual fact, the Muslims had a majority there.

22 Q. Did you accept Mr. Karadzic's statement here there could be a

23 conflict in Travnik?

24 A. I wasn't focused on that part of our conversation because usually

25 when I spoke to Mr. Karadzic, I had some sort of a plan where I wanted to

Page 10515

1 get him involved. I tried to ensure through this conversation that we

2 launch another initiative that would seek a compromise with the Muslims,

3 because my point of view was somewhat different because we had different

4 states coming into existence and then disappearing: The Ottoman Empire,

5 the Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the state of the Slovenes, Croats and

6 Serbs. The only permanent eternal thing there was the people, so the

7 people are there and we should seek a certain solution.

8 However, the atmosphere within the SDS was apparently such that

9 Karadzic did not dare to even get involved into some sort of a discussion

10 of that sort, such a political adventure.

11 Q. That's clear from the conversation. Here you suggest a course of

12 action, in terms of going public, and Karadzic firmly rejects that

13 proposal.

14 Just prior to him rejecting that proposal, he says to you -- he

15 talks about historical rights and then he says, "And our territories are

16 quite ethnically clean and we'll easily agree with the Muslims."

17 Did you engage in discussions with Mr. Karadzic about those

18 topics, about whether or not particular territories were ethnically clean

19 and the effect that might have on agreements with Muslims?

20 A. All these ethnic parties that formed government in Bosnia and

21 Herzegovina that I myself had supported in a certain way in coming to

22 power in order for the communism to become part of history, they had all

23 lost themselves in history in these myths. I wasn't really following what

24 was going on because I wasn't specifically interested in these stories.

25 Because the Muslims wanted to have Bosnia-Herzegovina. They became great

Page 10516

1 patriots. Now -- whereas -- as the Serbs, genetically we perceived

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina as our own homeland, so how could they claim it to be

3 their own if we, ourselves, feel that it is ours.

4 The extremist Croat politics always envisaged to have Croatia up

5 until the Drina River, so all of these peoples loved Bosnia-Herzegovina,

6 yearned for it, and were on the lookout for a historical document that

7 would substantiate their claim that Bosnia-Herzegovina was only their own.

8 Q. So in answering my inquiries about this conversation, you

9 mentioned that when you were speaking to Karadzic you had in mind certain

10 programmes or plans that you wanted to discuss with him and these issues

11 of regionalisation and whether or not territories were ethnically clean

12 were other issues. Am I correct to say that these are not the issues that

13 you focused on in your discussions with Karadzic?

14 A. No. No, these were not the issues. I wanted his support for the

15 initiative that I was organising, namely the plebescite, where -- to which

16 we wanted to invite members of all the different ethnicities and our

17 preparation for the convention in Belgrade, because he had been in this

18 group of parties for half a year already in favour of remaining within

19 Yugoslavia. And that's what I had in mind -- that was the plan that I had

20 in mind when I was talking to him.

21 Q. Just to reiterate. We referred to the issue of regionalisation

22 and as far as you were concerned, was that a matter for the SDS party and

23 something you didn't involve yourself in?

24 A. On this issue, I wrote an article for Oslobodjenje where I said

25 that some of them would perceive regionalisation as their savior and

Page 10517

1 others would perceive it as an occupation and that was all that I could

2 have done to speak my mind on it. But let's face it; that's not really

3 much.

4 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, if we could refer back to Exhibit 543,

5 and if that could be presented to the witness.

6 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, I refer to the last three paragraphs of this

7 document, and that's the last portion of the third-last paragraph and the

8 last two paragraphs. Is this the article that you're referring to where

9 you referred to the setting up of autonomous regions? And in the

10 second-last paragraph, you say: "If the ruling parties fail to bring

11 their stance closer with regard to setting up autonomous regions and

12 constituting a chamber of peoples, I fear, given there is no consensus in

13 sight when between the SDA, SDS and HDZ on the fundamental issue,

14 Yugoslavia as a federal state, yes or no, that the autonomous regions

15 would be a life-saving solution for one nation, while for the other or

16 others this would mean occupation or reason for armed rebellion."

17 Then you proceed and say: "If this happens and if a war breaks out

18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, historic responsibility will be borne by all those

19 who unscrupulously participate in the breakup of Yugoslavia with its

20 millions of victims built into the state foundations."

21 Is that -- does that accurately set out your views on the

22 autonomous regions?

23 A. Exactly. Perhaps I could say something more on this issue. The

24 Chamber of Peoples is mentioned here. An opportunity for the Chamber of

25 Peoples to be introduced in the Assembly, which would make decisions by

Page 10518

1 consensus, was -- was something that the earlier government had because

2 they knew that they would lose -- they would be defeated in the multiparty

3 elections because it was already clear from the Croatian and Slovenian

4 examples that they would be defeated at the elections. So basically the

5 new government after the elections inherited this chaotic situation and

6 instead of putting it to order, just additionally made it more chaotic.

7 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'd like to refer to the next two

8 exhibits, which are sessions of the Assembly of the Serbian People. The

9 first one has previously been presented as P64 and P65, and that's the 24

10 October 1991 session. And the second one is the one which is 19 on the

11 list, which is the 21st December 1991 session.

12 JUDGE ORIE: And that does not appear anywhere else in the

13 evidence?

14 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, to be honest, that surprises me that

15 my records suggest it hasn't, and I'm assured that it hasn't previously

16 been presented in the evidence.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Madam Registrar, the shorthand record of the

18 4th Session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in BiH held on the 21st

19 of December 1991 ...

20 THE REGISTRAR: It will be Prosecution Exhibit P545.

21 JUDGE ORIE: May I just inquire: These stenographic notes, are

22 they -- they're different from the minutes, I take it? I remember that we

23 had a discussion earlier on what version would best reflect the ...

24 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

25 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'm informed that on some occasions we

Page 10519

1 have both the stenographic notes and the minutes, and that when we -- that

2 we may have presented previously the stenographic notes -- we may have

3 presented previously the minutes and now we're presenting the stenographic

4 notes.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Please proceed.


7 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, did you attend the first session of the Assembly

8 of the Serbian People on the 24th of October, 1991?

9 A. Yes, I did attend the Assembly session referred to.

10 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, can I refer you to page 51 of the minutes that are

11 before you and do you see set up there a transcript of the speech that you

12 delivered at this session?

13 A. Yes, pages 51, 52 and 53, I can see that.

14 MR. MARGETTS: And, Your Honour, I'm referring to page -- I'm not

15 entirely clear.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Page 54.

17 MR. MARGETTS: And page 27 of the English, that's page 51 and

18 continuing of the B/C/S.

19 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, is that an accurate record of a speech that you

20 delivered at that session?

21 A. Well, I will have to read it first to give you a definite answer.

22 Q. Yes, please do.

23 A. Shall I read it out aloud?

24 Q. No, just if you read it to yourself to refresh your memory.

25 A. Yes, this is indeed my speech delivered at that Assembly session.

Page 10520

1 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, in light of the discussions we've just had about

2 your activities regarding the plebescite, I refer you to the concluding

3 three paragraphs of your speech wherein you say the following and that

4 is: "The latest session of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Assembly has shown

5 clearly that in this republic too there are efforts to outvote the Serbian

6 people and push them into the margins, turn them into a national minority.

7 "The representatives of the Serbian people in this republic have

8 found an appropriate response: In a democratic manner, by a plebescite,

9 they will say that they want to save this republic, that they want to save

10 their shared state of Yugoslavia, and the Serbian Assembly should secure

11 the national sovereignty of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina

12 forever."

13 And you say, "Let us hope that the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

14 will not be forced to defend their legitimate rights with weapons like the

15 Serbs in Croatia."

16 Does that accurately portray your efforts as at 24 October 1991 to

17 find a solution to the problems in Bosnia?

18 A. Yes, but there is one correction, however. I state correctly here

19 the representatives of the Serbian people in this republic have found an

20 adequate reply by democratic way. By plebescite they will say that they

21 want to preserve also this republic which is Bosnia and Herzegovina and

22 their joint state, their shared state of Yugoslavia.

23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter was translating not reading.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So what we mean is to preserve both

25 Bosnia and Herzegovina and our joint state of Yugoslavia.

Page 10521


2 Q. Thank you. If you could move on to the next document that's being

3 presented, and that is the minutes of the Assembly of 21 December.

4 JUDGE ORIE: May I ask one question in between, Mr. Margetts. The

5 last line where you say "Let us hope that the Serbs of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina will not be forced to defend the legitimate rights with

7 weapons." How do I have to understand that? Is it to say that if others

8 would not respect the right of the Serbs, that is, to make their own

9 entity or to be in a federal structure with Serbia Montenegro that if this

10 would not have been decided in favour of those rights, that the use of

11 weapons would be the way to secure those rights?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was drawing a parallel between

13 circumstances in Bosnia and Herzegovina and those in Croatia. When the

14 Serbs who, throughout the period after the Second World War had been a

15 constituent nation in the Republic of Croatia, and according to all the

16 Croatian constitutions, Croatia was a federal unit within the SFRY and it

17 was a republic of the Serbian -- of the Croatian people and the Serbs in

18 Croatia. But when the Serbs were chucked out of the constitution in

19 Croatia, what happened there happened. I cannot say what exactly

20 transpired because I wasn't living there.

21 Now, I'm drawing -- this parallel situation in Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina was similar. There was an unprincipled parliamentary majority

23 formed that adopted a key document for the future of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina against the will of the Serbian deputies in the Bosnian

25 parliament. So what I'm doing in this paragraph is drawing this

Page 10522

1 parallel. Will the Serbs have to react in the same fashion as they had

2 reacted in Croatia. This is just an analysis of the situation and a

3 warning upon that analysis.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I do understand you make the comparison with

5 Croatia where at least the position of the Serbs and the constitution

6 had -- had changed.

7 Was there any -- at that moment was there any indication apart

8 from that Bosnia, at least, there was a wish among Muslims and Croats to

9 make Bosnia and Herzegovina and independent state, but was there any

10 proposal at that time to make the Serbs not any longer a constituent

11 people or constituent nation of that independent republic, if it would

12 come to that?

13 THE WITNESS: Interpretation after the adoption of the memorandum

14 on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina there were no initiatives

15 within the parliament to that effect, nor did I have any indication the

16 effect that the war was on the horizon. But everything that was happening

17 before that and what was happening at that particular moment actually

18 induced me to think that war indeed was in store and I thought that the

19 Serbs have been brought into a situation where they would, indeed, rise up

20 in arms as they had in Croatia. It wasn't that it was just a political

21 consideration that actually occurred to me.

22 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time you say that, Let's hope that the

23 Serbs will not be forced, immediately after you've told what should

24 happen, that is, a plebescite, that they want to stay in Yugoslavia and

25 that the Serbian Assembly should secure the national sovereignty of the

Page 10523

1 Serb people so it sounds as if in the next line where you say "If this is

2 not achieved, then the only way to defend these rights is to use arms."

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, actually, if you observe this

4 discussion in an isolated way, you can interpret it. But this was a few

5 days after this unfortunate memorandum on the independence of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina was adopted, so I gave the public release and I said there was

7 the -- we had an instance of terror of this Assembly majority against

8 Assembly minority and I was afraid that this could be translated in the

9 field into terror of two peoples against a third people and that is how it

10 could be seen.

11 And another thing, it was quite sure that if, indeed, the Bosnia

12 and Herzegovina was declared an independent state and internationally

13 recognised, the situation in the field was such that it took only a little

14 spark for a really wide-ranging conflagration because rage had sent in.

15 On the one hand there was euphoria and on the other hand, there was rage.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Although it's not really an answer to my question, it

17 gives at least some context.

18 Let's move on, Mr. Margetts.


20 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, if I can refer you to the other document that we

21 provided to you, which is the minutes of the session of the Assembly of

22 the Serbian People of 21 December 1991, were you in attendance at that

23 session?

24 A. I believe that I attended all these Assembly sessions until the

25 proclamation of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so

Page 10524

1 probably I also attended this one.

2 Q. I refer you to page 61 of this session and I invite you to read

3 the speech that is accredited to you from page 61 through to page 65 and

4 in the English, that is at page 30 through to page 31.

5 A. Yes, this is my speech at that Assembly.

6 Q. Again, Dr. Djokanovic, could I refer you to the closing three

7 paragraphs of this speech as well, and in these closing paragraphs you

8 refer to Mr. Izetbegovic and you say that you "knew very well that the

9 fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina fortunately or unfortunately, whether somebody

10 likes it or not, is intrinsically linked to the fate of Yugoslavia. Yet

11 he, for reasons that are only known to him, attacked Yugoslavia and Bosnia

12 and Herzegovina yesterday. This is what the citizens of Bosnia and

13 Herzegovina have to realise unless they are biased, unless they want to

14 dominate the Serbian people, by this I mean citizens who are not Serbs.

15 The only objection that can be put to the Serbian people is that they are

16 defending themselves. Only if the Serbian people have not got the right

17 to self defence then they are wrong. In that case, this Assembly of the

18 Serbian People should not have been established nor should the Serbian

19 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina have been established. If the Serbian

20 people have not got the right to defend themselves, the decision that have

21 been made" - probably should read "has been made today" - and it says "are

22 not legitimate." Maybe the decisions that have been made today are not

23 legitimate. Thank you very much.

24 JUDGE ORIE: What about looking at the original rather than to the

25 English translation, Mr. Margetts. Do we have a -- apparently for reasons

Page 10525

1 of shortage of originals, I haven't got the original but perhaps it could

2 be put on the ELMO so the interpreters could see where the mistake it.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honour, it's in plural, "decisions."

4 JUDGE ORIE: That has been done.


6 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, does that accurately set out your idea as to the

7 right of the Serbian people to defend themselves?

8 A. This entire presentation is in this context. I'm talking about

9 the political struggle, needless to say.

10 Q. And can you provide a brief comment to the Court as to how the

11 Assembly of the Serbian People was intended to defend the Serbian people?

12 A. At this moment, we can only talk about what actually happened and

13 that is that the Serbian Assembly was proclaimed after which we organised

14 the plebescite of the Serbian people.

15 Throughout 1990, I actually called for a referendum of the

16 citizens to state their views on the future of Yugoslavia. First, there

17 should have been a referendum within Bosnia and Herzegovina to see whether

18 all the people were in favour of Yugoslavia. This was in early 1991. But

19 the Serbian deputies had no other option, having been elected by the

20 people and having been elected in the second half of 1990 when the

21 political situation in Croatia had already become quite critical, had

22 entered a quite critical stage and already smacked of war. So here, we

23 had people electing their deputies not just like at any regular elections

24 but in some sort of historic elections in order for the deputies to

25 protect their interests.

Page 10526

1 Now, we had the representatives of two peoples in contravention of

2 the constitution and the laws and the rules of procedure of the Assembly

3 of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopting such a document as

4 their basis which was contrary to all these pieces of legislation. So it

5 was only normal for the deputies to organise themselves to protect the

6 interests of the Serbian people. So they first established the Serbian

7 people's Assembly which, having been fortunate enough, could have grown

8 into a chamber of peoples during that period. So this intent of the Serbs

9 to form a Serbian Assembly should have been interpreted by them as the

10 Serbs wish to protect their interests and they should have said let's

11 translate it into a chamber of peoples and then let us take all our future

12 decisions by consensus but this is not the way it happened. This did not

13 sit well with the Muslim side. At the time it was best not to be a Serb

14 at all and not to have any political opinions and they said, We will

15 declare Bosnia and Herzegovina independent and we shall then take proper

16 care of you. And Alija Izetbegovic, in effect, said things which were

17 patronising. He could not have said things to the Serbs, he could not

18 have told the Serbs he would be protecting their interests in that way

19 that he would be the protector of their interests in the future just as it

20 would be illusory for Mr. Karadzic to have said at that particular point

21 in time that he would be taking care and looking after the Muslims'

22 interests because that was an unrealistic policy.

23 So everything that was done was in my view the establishment of a

24 good starting point, a position for the Serb people and the Serbian

25 politicians for future negotiations, especially if we know that the

Page 10527

1 conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina took place shortly thereafter.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Could I remind you of your speed of speech.

3 Please continue.


5 Q. So at the time you delivered that speech, which was December 1991,

6 am I understanding your answer correctly to be that you saw the

7 possibility for the Assembly of the Serbian People to, in some manner,

8 unite with the continuing Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina rather than

9 to establish an independent authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

10 A. To politically proclaim the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina, if you do that, then of course you're not thinking of the

12 other solution because I told you that the Serbs had perceived

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina as their own state. They have so for a very long time.

14 But then suddenly you are faced with this wave of patriotism on the side

15 of the Muslims, even today, the Serbs are peaceful and calm and do not

16 speak against Bosnia and Herzegovina, they do perceive it as their own but

17 they do not wish to raise the issue of equality or of a nation every ten

18 years.

19 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, if I could move to the next exhibit,

20 and I am actually going out of order here. That's now moving to Exhibit

21 25 which is the Assembly session of 18 March, 1992. And it's P64 and P65.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Margetts, since we promised Ms. Loukas to

23 give her five minutes, could you find a suitable moment to stop in

24 approximately seven minutes from now.

25 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I actually timed this particular topic

Page 10528

1 and hadn't been mindful of the time that was assigned to Ms. Loukas, so if

2 -- I can proceed but I'll need to proceed differently if I don't have

3 until a quarter to which I'm quite happy to do.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Let's say use your next seven minutes in the way you

5 find best.

6 MR. MARGETTS: Okay. All right. Well, Your Honour, if we could

7 move then to the series of intercepts which are the next in order, on the

8 exhibit list. I don't see the necessity to play these intercepts into

9 court, I'll just refer the witness to the transcripts.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.

11 THE REGISTRAR: The CD of the intercept dated 26/12/1991 will be

12 P546. The transcript will be P546A.

13 The CD dated 29/12/1991 will be P547 and the transcript P547A.

14 The CD dated 29 December 1991 between Radovan Karadzic and Dragan

15 Djokanovic --

16 JUDGE ORIE: The problem is that both of the 29th of December are

17 the same interlocutors.

18 THE REGISTRAR: Bearing ERN number 0324-443424437 will be P548 and

19 the transcript P548A.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.


22 Q. Dr. Djokanovic, you have before you transcripts of intercepts that

23 purport to be intercepts of conversations between yourself and Radovan

24 Karadzic. If you could cast your eye over those transcripts and inform

25 the Court as to whether or not you recall having these discussions with

Page 10529

1 Radovan Karadzic and if you don't recall the precise conversations,

2 whether or not you recall having conversations of this nature with Radovan

3 Karadzic during the end of -- toward the end of 1991.

4 A. This is specifically 26th of December, it is the end of the year,

5 but it's the 26th of December and that's important because that was the

6 date when we, from Bosnia and Herzegovina, were in the federal Presidency,

7 we discussed the confirmation and upon our -- the conference and upon our

8 return to Sarajevo, we were discussing the way this meeting with the

9 Presidency was covered and what the Muslim representatives who were at

10 that meeting in Belgrade called -- were called. They were called

11 political apparitions in such terms.

12 Q. So can I first of all refer you to this conversation of 26

13 December 1991 and to the final page where you organise with Dr. Karadzic

14 when you'll meet him the next time and you say -- he says to you: "We

15 should start offensively. Call Momo and start offensively from the

16 Assembly." And you said, "All right. I've spoken to Momo so I thought we

17 would get together tomorrow with regard to this convention." Who is the

18 Momo who is being referred to by you and Dr. Karadzic?

19 A. We're referring to Mr. Krajisnik, the president of the Assembly of

20 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 Q. And at that time, in terms of the organisation of the convention

22 on Yugoslavia and the other matters that you're discussing in this

23 intercept, did you have conversations with both Mr. Karadzic and Mr.

24 Krajisnik?

25 A. At this point, we returned to Sarajevo from the meeting with the

Page 10530

1 Presidency of the SFRY. Thanks to the president, Mr. Krajisnik, we were

2 given premises within the Assembly building to work on the proposal of --

3 for the draft convention of Yugoslavia and what Mr. Karadzic and I are

4 talking about is the preparation of this meeting that we should meet in

5 the premises of the Assembly building to work on the text.

6 He thought it good to discuss these matters within the Assembly

7 meeting -- the building, that it should be the Assembly building from

8 where such initiatives are given support.

9 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, I'm mindful of the time and I'll

10 continue these questions tomorrow.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Djokanovic, we'll stop for the day. I'd

12 like to instruct you not to speak to anyone about your testimony that

13 you've given until now, that you're still about to give in the coming

14 days. We'd like to see you back at 9.00 tomorrow morning in this same

15 courtroom.

16 Madam Usher, could you escort Mr. Djokanovic out.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

18 [The witness withdrew]

19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Loukas.

20 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. Just in relation to

21 those housekeeping matters I referred to earlier today. Firstly in

22 relation to the issue of P231, that revised translation has been received

23 and reviewed and we have no objection to it.

24 JUDGE ORIE: So P231 is in its revised edition now and admitted

25 into evidence, yes.

Page 10531

1 MS. LOUKAS: Yes. Secondly in relation to the issue of Mr.

2 Bjelobrk, Your Honour has granted two weeks starting from the 7th of March

3 and that's an issue that Mr. Stewart will deal with upon his return. Also

4 thirdly, so that we don't have to go into private session to deal with

5 that matter, that matter that involves private sessions is another matter

6 that Mr. Stewart will deal with upon his return.


8 MS. LOUKAS: In relation to the Exhibits D34 and D35, our case

9 manager has sent an e-mail to the Prosecution's case manager as there is

10 some outstanding issues in relation to the audios there.

11 The last matter, Your Honour, is the issue of the translation of

12 P292.1/KID 31469. The Defence still has outstanding translation issues in

13 relation to that particular exhibit and I will be forwarding those further

14 -- a copy of -- a marked-up copy of those particular translation issues.

15 For example, one of the issues was actually corrected on the

16 transcript but it was not corrected in the translation so that,

17 unfortunately, that particular exhibit we cannot put to rest at this

18 stage.

19 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that the parties will continue to

20 communicate with it and if there's any remaining issue, the Chamber will

21 have to decide on -- we'll hear and then do so.

22 MS. LOUKAS: Thank you, Your Honour.


24 MS. LOUKAS: There is one matter I should alert the Trial Chamber

25 to, and that is the fact that we're having enormous problems to find an

Page 10532

1 interpreter for my conference with Mr. Krajisnik this afternoon at 6.00

2 but hopefully we can sort that out, but just to alert the Trial Chamber to

3 the continuing problems of the Defence.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that to the extent the registry is in

5 a position to assist, that it will and if you, for whatever reasons, need

6 to recruit an interpreter from somewhere else, then I hope you will be

7 successful.

8 MS. LOUKAS: Yes, thank you, Your Honour. The registry always

9 tries to be very helpful in this regard and hopefully in some way we'll

10 able to sort out this issue.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Is there anything else you'd like to raise?

12 MR. HARMON: Nothing on behalf of the Prosecution, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then I've got a question for you, Mr. Margetts. This

14 witness was scheduled for eight hours. I notice that we are now at

15 approximately the 26th of December, 1991. We heard a lot about

16 alternative courses politicians might have taken and what alternatives

17 there were that would have avoided a war to break out. Until now, apart

18 from the appointment, we have hardly heard anything about his role as --

19 of this witness as a commissioner, the functioning of the Presidency when

20 he was nearby, how people were appointed, how people would report.

21 Well, from the impression we get, from the statement of the

22 witness, there is still a lot to be done. We are halfway and we are not

23 yet at the beginning of the armed conflict itself. Do you think you can

24 manage to finish within the eight hours set?

25 MR. MARGETTS: Your Honour, prior to your summation of where we

Page 10533

1 stand, I was confident that we would. In terms of volume of material,

2 we're exactly at the halfway point in terms of exhibits and my notes of

3 this examination, and I've taken that that was a good indicator so I would

4 expect that we'd be finished by the end of the third session tomorrow.

5 There is a possibility that we may require the first session on Wednesday.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's good to hear that you're confident that

7 you can still finish within the time limit you had set for yourself. At

8 the same time, I take it that you also heard some of the

9 in-between-the-lines observations on the relevance of what courses could

10 have been taken which would have avoided war and of course it's never bad

11 to establish that another cause would have been possible and that a war

12 would not have broken, but sometimes it goes very much in detail and this

13 is just one of the issues where you might get the impression that the

14 political context is at the core of the case as to what happened at the

15 war.

16 MR. MARGETTS: Thank you, Your Honour, for those observations and

17 we'll bear that in mind in the continuing examination of this witness and

18 others.

19 JUDGE ORIE: We'll adjourn until tomorrow morning 9.00, same

20 courtroom.

21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

22 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of March,

23 2005, at 9.00 a.m.