Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 19956

1 Wednesday, 18 January 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.

7 Mr. Josse, I do understand that you would like to raise two

8 issues, one very brief procedural one, another one taking a bit more time

9 and necessarily raised in private session. Would you agree if we do that

10 after the first break?

11 MR. JOSSE: Certainly, Your Honour. In fact. . That would suit

12 Mr. Harmon, who needs to be present for at least one of those issues.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then let's do it after the first break. But I

14 had forgotten to ask the registrar to call the case.

15 Mr. Registrar, would you --

16 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

17 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik. Thank you.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much, Mr. Registrar. So therefore at

19 this moment we could continue the examination-in-chief of Mr. Kapetina.

20 Mr. Kapetina, I'd like to remind you that you are still bound by

21 the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony

22 that you'll speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23 Mr. Josse, would you please proceed.


25 [Witness answered through interpreter]

Page 19957

1 Examined by Mr. Josse: [Continued]

2 Q. Mr. Kapetina, the first thing I want to ask you about this

3 morning -- or this afternoon, more to the point, relates to international

4 law and your role in advising the army to respect, for an example, the

5 Geneva Convention. What personally did you do in that regard?

6 A. I said that after the National Assembly session on the 12th of May

7 in Banja Luka was held, we started drafting the regulations and provisions

8 with regard to respect for international war law. And within the

9 frameworks of that activity the ministry prepared three provisions, the

10 first of which was an order on the application of the provisions on the

11 international war law with the president of the republic of the head of

12 the country, and also two further instructions and guidelines by the

13 president of the republic about conduct on prisoners of war and

14 instructions with respect to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

15 And I took part, of course, in the elaboration of these provisions. All

16 the provisions were passed by the end of June that same year.

17 Q. Are you able to help at all as to how, if at all, these provisions

18 were disseminated among the army?

19 A. Yes. Those provisions were urgently distributed right up to the

20 level of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska, and the duty

21 everybody had was that the commander -- or rather, the commander of the

22 Main Staff had the obligation of issuing orders that those provisions

23 reach every man down the chain of command to the lower formations and

24 units. This set of instructions - they weren't long instructions, they

25 covered just one or two pages - that they should reach each and every

Page 19958

1 member of the Army of Republika Srpska, and that's what was done.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, may I seek, in order to better understand

3 the testimony of the witness, some clarification.

4 You used the words "international war law" several times in one of

5 your answers, and you referred to the Geneva Conventions and the

6 applicability of the Geneva Conventions. Is it your testimony that

7 because the armed conflict ongoing was of an international character that

8 the Geneva Conventions would apply, or would they apply for any other

9 reasons, apart from the character of the armed conflict? Could you be a

10 bit more specific in that respect before we continue with how these

11 decisions and how these regulations were conveyed to the troops.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We did not pass those provisions

13 because the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had the character of an

14 international conflict; it was in fact a war conflict and the rules, and

15 regulations of international war law provide for conduct within a war and

16 the conflicts in war. So that's why we incorporated that law into the

17 conflict that we had. It wasn't of an international character, but

18 nonetheless the international war law does provide for and prescribe for

19 conduct in conflicts generally. So we decided to apply those provisions

20 to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I'm afraid it has not fully clarified my

22 question, because again you are talking about international war law, which

23 seems to be a reference to the law applicable in international war. Or

24 would you say the international law applicable in domestic or in armed

25 conflicts of a non-international character? Because there, of course, the

Page 19959

1 international law -- at least the Geneva Conventions would not fully

2 apply.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I said that we otherwise in

4 our army, in the Yugoslav People's Army, that is, respected the special

5 rules governing conduct in a war conflict. We had special manuals with

6 these rules written down, and from the conventions I mentioned we took

7 over the sections dealing with conduct towards prisoners of war and

8 civilians and the rights of civilians during a war and the rights of

9 civilian protection during a war. So we incorporated all that, took them

10 into account, and drafted our own provisions and instructions for the

11 army's behaviour and conduct, which means that we didn't take over the

12 entire code of the international war law, but just what could be

13 applicable to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We took that over and

14 incorporated them into the three provisions that I spoke about earlier on.

15 Perhaps there was something additional, but I can't think of that at the

16 moment.

17 They weren't any broad provisions; they were very succinct ones

18 and fitted in the space of two pages, the instructions and provisions, so

19 that they could be used as a pocket edition, if I could put it that way,

20 which every soldier could carry in his pocket. And the basic premises of

21 war law and how soldiers behave towards civilians, towards prisoners of

22 war, towards the members of the civilian protection, civil defence system,

23 and so on and so forth, towards international organisations or

24 representatives thereof. And I think I've clarified that now.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Well, whether it has been fully clarified is another

Page 19960

1 matter, but I'll -- I'll refrain from asking further opinion. You have

2 not been called as an expert on legal matters, and apart from that there's

3 an old Latin saying "ius curia novia," which means the Court knows the

4 law.

5 Judge Hanoteau.

6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Maybe you've already said this

7 earlier yesterday but I forgot, who took the initiative to write down this

8 regulation and who took the initiative of circulating it? Maybe you're

9 going to repeat what you said already, but I don't remember what you said.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think I mentioned it. I

11 don't know where the basic idea came from, who it came from, but I do know

12 that the task was set by the minister of defence, who was Bogdan Subotic.

13 So most probably it was his idea or whether it was perhaps suggested to

14 him by somebody else, I really can't say.

15 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, but could you tell us

16 exactly. You said that you weren't many in the ministry, maybe two only,

17 two people. So how were you asked to do it? Were you called? Did you

18 get a written instruction to do it? Or did you just talk with the

19 minister, you know? Could you please elaborate on this, if you remember,

20 of course.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I said was that the minister

22 said that we should urgently undertake the preparation of these

23 provisions. Of course we had very scant literature on the subject at

24 Pale.

25 However, as I say, from the previous systems, that is to say, the

Page 19961

1 system on -- in the Yugoslav People's Army, those rules and regulations

2 did exist. Provisions about international war law, the Geneva

3 Conventions, and so on. So with the scant literature that we had at our

4 disposal at that time, we undertook to prepare those three provisions with

5 the material we had at hand. I think that at that time we had a number of

6 people in the ministry, five to ten people, who were engaged in the

7 implementation of the provisions, but they worked in Sarajevo in the

8 ministry there, like I did myself.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] So there was no need for the

10 Assembly to intervene; it was just circular letters that were sent,

11 regulations, and it was under the mandate of the ministry, right, it was

12 their competence?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. It was the Ministry of

14 Defence that had the duty of preparing the regulations. The first order

15 was signed, as I said, by the president of the republic, Mr. Karadzic, and

16 then we distributed all those regulations up to the level of the Main

17 Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. And the commander of the Main

18 Staff further issued orders for the distribution to call units lower down,

19 and to each and every rank-and-file soldier. I think those regulations

20 exist. I don't think they've been lost. And you can see all the

21 provisions and regulations.

22 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


25 Q. Perhaps you should make this clear, Mr. Kapetina. You've already

Page 19962

1 told the Chamber that you are a political scientist by training. Is that

2 correct?

3 A. Yes. I graduated from the faculty of political science in the

4 department for defence.

5 Q. You've had no formal legal training. Is that right?

6 A. I did not have any formal training, but I was included in the

7 drafting of provisions, both at federal and republican level, mostly

8 provisions within the field of planning.

9 Q. And it's also clear from your evidence that you have spent the

10 whole of your professional life working as a civil servant in the field of

11 defence?

12 A. Precisely. For almost 20 years I worked in the state

13 administration, and all my work -- years of work I devoted to matters of

14 defence.

15 Q. Now, you have given some evidence a few moments ago about the

16 drafting of various documents and directives in relation to international

17 law. I now want to ask you about what information came to your knowledge,

18 and indeed the knowledge of the ministry, in 1992 about crimes being

19 committed by soldiers in the field?

20 A. In that whole year of 1992, you had different periods and

21 different situations in which the state administration of the Serb

22 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had to work, and the Bosnian

23 Herzegovinian government and Serbian republic thereof. For example, the

24 period of May, when I came to Pale, and perhaps until the end of July or

25 perhaps even the end of August, the territory on which the government --

Page 19963

1 in which the government worked and its departments of the Serb Republic of

2 Bosnia and Herzegovina was to all intents and purposes cut off from the

3 other parts which were under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska.

4 I, of course, am not in a position to demonstrate this to you on the map,

5 but I'll try and do my best to explain it to you. The government from

6 Pale controlled practically the entire area up to the Sokolac municipality

7 and Vlasenica as well. The Serbian municipality in Sarajevo could not be

8 controlled because they were cut off. The roads had been cut off, and

9 there was a by-road that was being built. But Podrinje and all this area

10 was cut off, and you had to -- could only reach those municipalities via

11 Serbia and Montenegro.

12 Now, as to the municipalities in the Banja Luka region,

13 Banja Luka, Prijedor, Doboj, that general area, you could only communicate

14 with that area when the corridor was broken through at Brcko. So that was

15 the period, May, June, July 1992.

16 And I spoke about the communication road network. I said that all

17 the other communications were down as well, all the other means of

18 communication, so that the government during that period of time did not

19 have a complete insight into the situation on the ground, nor did any

20 reports come in on any regular basis about the situation in the areas

21 under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska so that the government

22 didn't know, in fact, about many of the events and crimes that had been

23 committed. It was just not informed about those things. When I say "the

24 government," of course I mean that in addition to the government and its

25 departments at Pale, there was also the Presidency that was located at

Page 19964

1 Pale and the president of the National Assembly.

2 So as I say, that was the objective situation that reigned during

3 those three or four months; of course later on the situation improved.

4 But throughout the year of 1992 that was how it was. For example, the

5 government didn't have any links in connection with Herzegovina at all

6 during that time. There was no road communication; you couldn't reach the

7 area by road. You couldn't get to the municipalities in the Herzegovina

8 region. As I say, the situation improved later on by the end of 1992 and

9 especially in 1993 when there was a greater compactness in the area under

10 the control of the Army of Republika Srpska.

11 Q. And you've given a long - the Chamber will think - useful

12 background to communication problems. How did that impact on knowledge of

13 what was going on in the field? Perhaps I should be a bit more specific.

14 So far as crimes are concerned?

15 A. Well, I forgot to mention in my answer to your question the fact

16 that the army was actually being created in the second half of June and in

17 the month of July. It was under creation, so that the army wasn't fully

18 organised yet either. It didn't have all the formations and units that

19 the law provided for --

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kapetina, I'm going to stop you. You spent a

21 very, very long answer by giving all kind of circumstances which might

22 have prevented information to reach Pale. The question was whether any

23 information reached. You made a distinction between what roads were

24 closed, what routes to go, et cetera. You told us that in June -- May,

25 June, July the situation was different; and then you said later on that

Page 19965

1 it remained the same during the rest of the year.

2 The question is quite simple: What information was received about

3 crimes committed? And perhaps, since you made the distinction, what

4 information was received in May, June, July? Any information, yes or no?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm going to speak in concrete

6 terms. Throughout 1992, from May when I started working in the ministry

7 until the end of 1992, not a single piece of information reached the

8 ministry about war crimes committed in the field, not one single piece of

9 information. We had certain instructions, of course --

10 JUDGE ORIE: I was not asking about instructions. I was, at this

11 moment, seeking to find out whether any information reached you. You

12 said: "It did not reach the ministry."

13 Are you aware of any such information reaching the government,

14 apart from specifically the ministry you worked in?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I know is that there was a

16 problem with the government as well because the government had no

17 information --

18 JUDGE ORIE: No --

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- on the ground.

20 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not asking whether there was a problem for the

21 government. I wanted -- I asked you whether your answer specifying that

22 the Ministry of Defence in May, June, July did not receive any

23 information; whether, as far as you know, the same is true for the

24 government as a whole.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I know, this related to

Page 19966

1 the whole government.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Now we go to the remainder of the year. We are now

3 in August up till December. Was any concrete information received by your

4 ministry, to start with, about crimes committed in the field?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Ministry of Defence to the end

6 of 1992 didn't receive a single piece of information coming into it from

7 the field about any crimes having been committed nor about any prisons.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Now, same question as far as the whole of the

9 government is concerned. August and following months, 1992. Any

10 information received on crimes committed or, as you said, prisons? And if

11 I could extend that to camps as well. Any information for the whole of

12 the government?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I remember, when the

14 Ministry of Justice was formed of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina, and when a man was put in charge of penitentiaries and

16 supervising penitentiaries, he did submit a report to the government. And

17 that's when that question started to be debated at government meetings.

18 So this assistant in the Ministry of Justice compiled a report, which I

19 didn't read, I'm afraid, on the situation in penitentiaries and

20 correctional centres. And then the government was informed about such

21 things for the first time, about the situation in those facilities, in

22 prisons, the existence of prisons, and so on. But I didn't have that

23 information to hand. And I don't know which period this applied to.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And would this information not reach the

25 ministry in which you worked, apart from you personally?

Page 19967

1 MR. JOSSE: Can I interrupt, Your Honour. Does Your Honour mean

2 and did this information or should it have done -- would this

3 information --

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps --

5 MR. JOSSE: It's not clear in that respect.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I should be more specific.

7 Are you aware of this information you just talked about, which was

8 then, as you said, subject of debate, did that reach your ministry as

9 well, apart from whether it reached you personally at that moment?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If the information was prepared and

11 a report was prepared for a government meeting and was on its agenda, then

12 my minister would have had an information of that kind because he attended

13 government meetings. I, myself, could not ask to be given that material,

14 material from government meetings, and as the minister offered to give

15 them to me myself. So I didn't have an insight about it and I didn't read

16 the report, but I did hear that it was up before a government meeting.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So where you earlier said that the Ministry of

18 Defence to the end of 1992 didn't receive a single piece of information

19 coming into it from the field about any crimes having been committed nor

20 about any prisons, then that would not necessarily include information

21 that came through this report. Is that correct?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

24 Judge Hanoteau has a question for you.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] What I don't understand in your

Page 19968

1 testimony is the following: The ministry you were working for, what

2 connection was there between the -- your ministry and the army? You said

3 there was no information provided on the crimes that were committed or on

4 the prisons that existed. However, was there any regular contact between

5 your ministry and the army in those areas where it was difficult to

6 communicate? In other words, let me be more specific. Does this mean

7 that the military was totally cut off from the field and cut off from

8 their men in the field, or was nonetheless one way of communicating or

9 another?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Ministry of Defence was not in

11 the chain of command of the military, so the minister of defence did not

12 make any decisions relating to command in the army. The ministry did have

13 a relationship with the army as far as logistics was concerned, and also

14 there was some relations in the army that were under the authority of the

15 Ministry of Defence.

16 I don't think that the commander of the Main Staff informed the

17 defence ministry about everything. Some things they probably informed the

18 president of the republic directly. So we did not receive all the reports

19 from the Main Staff commander; the minister of defence did not receive

20 them. We had reports from his assistants regarding logistics requirements

21 in the army, also perhaps some things relating to promotions, appointment

22 to certain posts, and so on and so forth. So we were not cut off from the

23 army. We did communicate on these matters, but we were not authorised to

24 command. That was in the jurisdiction of the president of the republic,

25 but we did have duties in regard to the logistics matters and supplying

Page 19969

1 the army.

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Which means you did not

3 communicate over any such matters as combat operations or military

4 assignments that were -- or military operations that were unfolding at

5 that time. In other words, the Ministry of Defence did not receive any

6 such reports?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely. We did not receive any

8 reports about operations, about battles. And under the law, the army was

9 not obliged to give us these reports. There was no General Staff section

10 within the Ministry of Defence; that section was in the Main Staff. And

11 that section was directly responsible to the president of the republic.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, I apologise, but I'd like to ask a

14 question related to this to the witness.

15 Witness, you extensively explained to us that no reports about

16 what happened in the field as far as crimes are concerned were received,

17 and you explained extensively that that was because of communications and

18 transportation problems. You also told us that the instructions as how to

19 behave in the conduct of warfare were disseminated up to the lowest

20 levels. What I do not fully understand yet is that communication seems to

21 be working, at least -- and if you give these instructions that it

22 reach -- that it reaches the lower levels, whereas the communication in

23 the other direction would be totally blocked, as -- from what I

24 understand. Could you explain -- so apart from whether you had any

25 authority in -- in the operational sense why instructions could be

Page 19970

1 communicated to the lowest levels and why there was no way of receiving

2 any information, whatever that information would have been, from the lower

3 levels up again.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I will try to explain.

5 Instructions that I spoke about, which you mentioned, were sent only up to

6 the Main Staff, and the Main Staff was at Han Pijesak and the

7 communications went to Han Pijesak. So those regulations or those

8 instructions, we would copy them, multiply them, and then send them to the

9 Main Staff. And then the Main Staff was supposed to distribute that using

10 its own lines down to the corps, and then the corps was going to pass that

11 on to the lower-ranking units and so on and so forth.

12 The Main Staff was obliged to send it to seven points, which is

13 where the corps were. And then the corps was supposed to pass them on to

14 lower-ranking units. This wasn't a perfect system. There were problems

15 there, but the army had helicopters, other means; the state did not. I

16 know that all the communications that we had with Herzegovina were carried

17 out by choppers via Montenegro and not through Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 That's how these communications proceeded.

19 I would like to explain something else, too. In peace nobody

20 commits a crime publicly; crimes are always concealed. That's why we

21 didn't have any information about these crimes. Nobody publicly committed

22 any crime and then announced that through the media. Crimes were

23 generally committed covertly. Nobody publicised that. If we knew about

24 such problems, we would -- had we known that, we would have informed the

25 military prosecutor's office and the military courts, and then we would

Page 19971

1 have been --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. In your explanation you now give a totally

3 different reason for not receiving that information, because, as you say,

4 it was concealed. Earlier you said that the instructions were signed by

5 Mr. Karadzic, and then we distributed all those regulations up to the

6 level of the Main Staff of the army. And the commander of the Main Staff

7 further issued orders for the distribution to call units lower down, every

8 rank and soldier.

9 When I asked why messages would not go up through the same

10 communication channels, I now understand your testimony to be - but please

11 correct me if I'm wrong - that it was not that there were no communication

12 channels, but people would -- that those who may have been committed

13 crimes would have concealed those crimes, and that for that reason it did

14 not go up in the same communication channels. Is that a correct

15 understanding?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that we didn't have

17 information about crimes until the end of 1992. I assume why this

18 information was not reaching us. It's an assumption. We practically did

19 not have a single piece of information or any insight about what was going

20 on in the field regarding crimes or any camps; that is the truth. I

21 assume why information, specifically about crimes, were not reaching the

22 ministry or the organs of power.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's be clear that assumptions should be known

24 as such, because you came up with the assumption first that communication

25 channels and road transportation would have prevented these -- this

Page 19972

1 information to reach the other levels, whereas now we have a totally

2 different assumption, and that is that the -- those who were committing

3 those crimes would have concealed them. I'm not saying that either of

4 them is true or not true, but let's not forget that these now are

5 assumptions and should not be confused with facts.

6 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


8 Q. I want to ask you about one specific area in this regard, and this

9 might be outside of 1992. Do you have any knowledge of Mr. Subotic

10 visiting Bratunac at any time during the war?

11 A. I really don't have the information that Minister Subotic visited

12 the Bratunac municipality, so I really cannot talk about the time frame

13 either. I don't have that information. I don't know that he visited the

14 Bratunac municipality.

15 Q. Well, did he ever discuss with you the fact that he had been

16 there and been shown at least one Muslim grave?

17 A. Minister Subotic never told me about his visit to Bratunac or any

18 details relating to that.

19 Q. And what about him visiting Muslim graves in general? Can you

20 help about that at all?

21 A. I don't have any information about that.

22 Q. I asked you yesterday about an expanded Presidency, and you told

23 us what you knew of the Presidency of the republic through 1992. I want

24 to ask you how, as far as you understand it, Mr. Djeric fitted in to the

25 scenario, and in particular the expanded Presidency, if at all.

Page 19973

1 A. Branko Djeric was the prime minister. He wasn't a member of any

2 expanded Presidency, neither the regular Presidency or the expanded

3 Presidency. He was simply the prime minister.

4 Q. Could you be given the bundle, please, and turn to tab 8. This is

5 the decision on establishment of the supreme command of the RS army. It's

6 dated the 30th [realtime transcript read in error: "13th"] of November of

7 1992 and signed by Dr. Karadzic. It's being exhibited in this case as

8 P64A.

9 Firstly, Mr. Kapetina, what was the supreme command as you

10 understood it? What -- by that I mean the supreme command set up by this

11 document.

12 A. The supreme command established with this document was an advisory

13 body of the president of the republic or presidents of the Presidency at

14 the time. So it advised the president of the Presidency relating to

15 command matters and the army. So the command is exclusively an advisory

16 body of the president or the president of the Presidency.

17 Q. What makes you say that it was purely an advisory body?

18 A. I say that because it was not authorised to make any command

19 decisions. According to the law, it was an advisory organ of the

20 presidents of the Presidency. After the supreme command there was a

21 supreme council that was established that also had an advisory function.

22 Q. This political command structure was set up for what reason?

23 A. It was established for the purposes of consultations and advice to

24 the Presidency and the president of the Presidency so that we would be

25 able to make decisions relating to army command. Although I never

Page 19974

1 attended a supreme command session, but I did attend sessions of the

2 Supreme Defence Council and mostly some topical issues were discussed.

3 The question of command was discussed least of all. Matters that were

4 discussed were some civilian matters, relations between the civilian and

5 the military parts, and so on. Any decisions that were in the sphere of

6 command were never discussed at the sessions which I attended.

7 Q. I'm not quite clear there. You were talking about the sessions of

8 the Supreme Defence Council that you attended. Is that right?

9 A. That's correct. I did not attend sessions of the supreme command,

10 but I think in 1993 it was when the Supreme Defence Council was formed.

11 And whenever I attended these sessions, I know that questions relating to

12 military command were never discussed.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would like to ask a question.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes. I'm a little bit lost,

15 Mr. Josse. I would need some further explanation.

16 This Supreme Defence Council was established in what year and who

17 were the people or the members of this defence council?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know exactly when, but

19 during the war, during the conflict, instead of the supreme command, the

20 Supreme Defence Council was established. It was more or less of the same

21 composition as the supreme command. Occasionally I attended those Supreme

22 Defence Council meetings, and I said that at the meetings there was never

23 any discussion about command of the military. The supreme command was

24 practically not functioning. This was a very brief period. Later the

25 president of the republic took over the command of the military.

Page 19975

1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I'm not totally convinced by this

2 answer. Mr. Josse gave us -- submitted a document which is dated 12th of

3 November, 1992. Is that correct? Tab 8.

4 MR. JOSSE: 13th of November, Your Honour. The transcript's just

5 said "13th," I said "30th," 3-0.

6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Very well. So this body is

7 called "the supreme command of the RS army." Is that correct?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [In English] Of the RS army -- [Interpretation]

10 There was another body and a similar body which was established. I think

11 that's what you were saying, wasn't it?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the end of the conflict the

13 supreme command grew into the Supreme Defence Council; this is what I

14 wanted to say. And the Supreme Defence Council had the same function as

15 the supreme command. In item 5 of this decision, it says what the role of

16 the supreme command is.

17 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] And did it include the same

18 members?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Supreme Defence Council and the

20 supreme command, completely identical.

21 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.


23 Q. Up till the 30th of November of 1992 when the supreme command was

24 established, who had jurisdiction over operational matters within the

25 armed forces of the Republika Srpska?

Page 19976

1 A. The supreme commander of the military until the adoption of this

2 decision and on the adoption of this decision was the president of the

3 republic.

4 Q. And to clarify that. When you say "on the decision," you mean

5 after the decision the position was the same. Is that right or have I

6 misunderstood you?

7 A. That's correct. Until the adoption of this decision and after the

8 decision was adopted, the supreme commander was the president of the

9 republic, one person. And of course this applied throughout the whole

10 conflict.

11 Q. Are you able to comment on the power and influence the president

12 of the republic had over operational matters in the field?

13 A. I wasn't in the president's cabinet, so I assume that he did

14 receive reports from the Main Staff commander. And then based on those

15 reports, he was probably able to and had an overview of the situation in

16 the field, the situation in the army, what was going on at the front, and

17 so on. These reports were not sent to the defence minister, however.

18 Q. What power did the Assembly of the republic have over its armed

19 forces?

20 A. The republican Assembly didn't have any power over the military,

21 the Army of Republika Srpska. The only thing it did was to adopt the law

22 on the army and the defence. It did not have any direct competencies over

23 the Army of Republika Srpska.

24 Q. What about the president of that Assembly? What power did he have

25 over the armed forces?

Page 19977

1 A. The president of the Assembly also did not have any competencies

2 or power in relation to the Army of Republika Srpska. He was simply a

3 part of the Assembly, and he presided over the Assembly. The Assembly and

4 the president of the Assembly had the same competencies. So as president

5 of the Assembly, he didn't have any authority over the Army of

6 Republika Srpska. The function of the Assembly was purely legislative.

7 Q. Specifically I want to ask you about what involvement, if any,

8 Mr. Krajisnik had in the passing of the law on defence that you were, for

9 the most part, responsible for writing?

10 A. The Assembly -- or the deputies had no influence over the law

11 during its drafting stages. The draft laws were submitted by the

12 government. The government was proposing them. The Assembly simply

13 adopted them. I wasn't at the Assembly sessions to know what the debate

14 was like. I know that there were amendments to this law, but in the

15 drafting stage I know that the Assembly had no input at all on these two

16 bills.

17 Q. Well, my question relates specifically to Mr. Krajisnik. Is the

18 position the same for him as the answer you've just given?

19 A. Of course the president of the Assembly and also the deputies.

20 None of the deputies took part in the drafting stages of this law. The

21 Assembly receives a draft for its consideration, and they can also submit

22 or propose amendments to this draft.

23 Q. A number of specific questions about Mr. Krajisnik. Did you have

24 any personal dealings with him prior to your arrival in Pale in 1992?

25 A. No, we didn't have any person dealings.

Page 19978

1 Q. After your arrival in Pale, did you have any dealings with him,

2 again personally, in 1992?

3 A. No, I did not. I had no personal or official dealings with

4 Mr. Krajisnik. My first contact with him was - I don't know exactly what

5 period this was - was when the Assembly concluded that it was necessary to

6 adopt an urgent law on military courts and military prosecutors.

7 Q. Tell us about that, please.

8 A. As I said, I don't know the time period, but I know that I was

9 invited to President Krajisnik's office and that I was told that there

10 were these conclusions, that we needed to quickly adopt laws on the

11 military courts and military prosecutor's office, that this was a matter

12 that had to be brought urgently before the Assembly. There were already

13 some questions about competencies in relation to military personnel and

14 soldiers. So this needed to be done as soon as possible. What the

15 competencies were of military courts and prosecutor's offices and what

16 were the competencies of civilian-such organs, this had to be done

17 together with the justice ministry. The draft proposals for these two

18 laws had to be done very urgently.

19 Q. What about dealings that Mr. Krajisnik had with the Ministry of

20 Defence in general in Pale in 1992, rather than with you specifically?

21 Can you help us about that, please?

22 A. Well, I don't know of any dealings or specific relations between

23 the president of the National Assembly with the ministry. I think that he

24 did not have any dealings or special relations vis-a-vis the defence

25 ministry. I even know that Minister Subotic told me that he had some

Page 19979

1 relationships and was being invited by President Krajisnik. And if we --

2 actually, if we received invitations, they were from the president of the

3 republic to deal with the situation in the army. And I and Mr. Subotic

4 never said they were invited by Mr. Krajisnik, the president of the

5 National Assembly, whether they were called by him to discuss any

6 problems. So that was -- he -- they were not called --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I had nothing to do with

9 dealings with the ministry of the army.


11 Q. Well, similar to the correction, you just quoted to saying: "I

12 even know that Minister Subotic told me that he had some relationships and

13 was being invited by Mr. Krajisnik."

14 Is that what you just said, please?

15 A. I didn't understand your question.

16 Q. Well, you are quoted in English as having just said, and I

17 quote: "I even know that Minister Subotic told me that he had some

18 relationships and was being invited by President Krajisnik."

19 Did you just say that?

20 A. I did not say that. I said that Minister Subotic never told me

21 that he was called by President Krajisnik. And I said that the ministry

22 had no relationships and dealings with the president of the National

23 Assembly.

24 MR. JOSSE: Well, Your Honour, that's what I had -- that's how I

25 have been so advised, that's why -- obviously why I asked the question.

Page 19980

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's perfectly clear, Mr. Josse.

2 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

3 Q. In short, in 1992 what power did Momcilo Krajisnik have over the

4 Army of Republika Srpska?

5 A. No authorisations, no power.

6 Q. I want to ask you briefly, if I may, about what happened at the

7 time of the Dayton Accords and the departure of the Serbs from Sarajevo.

8 Were you involved in a commission at that time dealing with this issue?

9 A. Yes. On behalf of the Ministry of Defence I was a member of the

10 board for the implementation of the Dayton Accords for the Sarajevo

11 region.

12 Q. And you liaised, among others, with Mr. Krajisnik in that regard?

13 A. Yes. Well, I don't know what function. Possibly President

14 Krajisnik was in that board or -- well, he was either a member of it or

15 a -- the president of it. I don't know what his post was. I, myself, was

16 a member.

17 Q. What stance did you personally take on the Serbs' departure from

18 Sarajevo? Specifically, did you try and persuade Serbs to leave?

19 A. Do you mean my personal attitude?

20 Q. Yes. I'm, first of all, asking you about your personal attitude.

21 A. Well, I know what the attitude of the board was, what stance it

22 took. I could have any separate stance with regard to the board.

23 Q. Fine. What stance did the board take, please?

24 A. The board's stance was that all avenues be explored and see if the

25 people couldn't be kept in the Sarajevo area.

Page 19981

1 Q. And what, as far as you are aware, was Mr. Krajisnik's stance on

2 this issue?

3 A. Well, precisely the same as the board, to exhaust all

4 possibilities and to keep the Serb people in Sarajevo or, rather, in the

5 municipalities in the area of Sarajevo and Serb Sarajevo.

6 MR. JOSSE: Would Your Honour give me a moment, please?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Take your time, Mr. Josse.

8 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

9 MR. JOSSE: That concludes my examination. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

11 Mr. Tieger, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?

12 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I hope it won't be seen as too

13 lawyer-like if my answer is yes and no. And to give you a full response,

14 I would ask to address the Court briefly in the absence of the witness.


16 Mr. Kapetina, Mr. Tieger would like to address the Court in your

17 absence. It must be some kind of a procedural matter, I take it. May I

18 invite you to follow the usher but to remain standing by until we have

19 heard what Mr. Tieger tells us.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you.

21 [The witness stands down]

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 I raise again the issue of the 65 ter summaries. Let me say this

25 in brief. With respect to those matters brought to our attention through

Page 19982

1 the 65 ter summary or through subsequent e-mails, indeed, no matter how

2 terse or non-detailed, I'm prepared to proceed and intend to do.

3 With respect to the issue raised in this session, in particular

4 about communications and knowledge of crimes, to the best of my

5 recollection and re-confirmed to the extent that I could by a review of

6 the 65 ter summary and any subsequent e-mails, that matter was not brought

7 to our attention. For that reason, I want to reserve the right to review,

8 at least overnight, the testimony and prepare for any appropriate

9 cross-examination on those subjects.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse.

11 MR. JOSSE: Well --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Let's perhaps first establish, does the information

13 about crimes committed in the field is included anywhere, in your view, in

14 the 65 ter?

15 MR. JOSSE: No, I'm going to concede that.

16 My only observation is that I do contend -- it's slightly bizarre

17 that the Prosecution are not in a position to cross-examine a witness

18 about an issue as central as that in a case such as this.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Mr. Josse tempts me to say it's slightly bizarre

21 to hear a witness like this come in and deny any knowledge of crimes. It

22 takes a considerable amount of effort to amass the materials that are

23 available to cross-examine properly on that subject.

24 JUDGE ORIE: If I would have asked you, Mr. Tieger, whether you

25 were ready to start cross-examining the witness, the answer would have

Page 19983

1 been yes, I take it. Let's be very practical at this. Let's start the

2 cross-examination. Let's see how far it brings us, and let's see whether

3 nature resolves the problem.

4 MR. JOSSE: Could I assist in --


6 MR. JOSSE: -- one regard. This probably isn't assistance at all

7 to anyone. But the next witness will not be in this building today. In

8 other words, I won't be in a position to call him until tomorrow. He will

9 be available to begin his evidence tomorrow afternoon but not today.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That makes it even more serious in terms of

11 waste of time, Mr. Josse. Because if Mr. Tieger would finish his

12 cross-examination on all the other subjects, we would be forced to wait

13 until tomorrow before we could continue, if the Chamber would grant the

14 request by Mr. Tieger.

15 But at the same time, Mr. Tieger is invited to consider how solid

16 the information was on whether or not information was received either by

17 the Ministry of Defence or by the government, as a whole. I mean the

18 following: That if you would confront the witness with information that

19 has reached, well, let's say the government or whatever document, the

20 witness said, as far as he knows -- and one could not expect a witness to

21 know everything that happens in the Ministry of Defence, although it was

22 small, neither to know everything that happened in the government.

23 But please think it over. Let's get started with the

24 cross-examination for the first ten minutes, and let's then see whether

25 your request still stands, whether the matter is resolved already by time,

Page 19984

1 and the Chamber will then give a decision.

2 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Of course.

3 MR. JOSSE: Could I --


5 MR. JOSSE: Could I just ask. Would Your Honour like arrangements

6 to be made for the next witness to be brought to this building?

7 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I couldn't say anything without knowing what

8 Mr. -- how much time Mr. Tieger thinks he would need.

9 MR. JOSSE: Could I say, Your Honour, I would much rather call him

10 tomorrow, but I'm determined, we're determined, not to lose any more time.


12 MR. JOSSE: Our time is extremely precious, and if need be, I will

13 get him here. Or arrange for him to be brought here, I think is a better

14 way of putting it.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, we will need some time for the procedural

16 issues after the first break. How much time do you think you would need

17 for the cross-examination of this witness?

18 MR. TIEGER: It's a bit difficult to say, Your Honour, but

19 certainly a session.


21 MR. TIEGER: And --

22 JUDGE ORIE: If it's a session, that would fit -- if I would look

23 at what's not a rule, but the 60 per cent guidance, that would bring you

24 to approximately two hours, that's a little bit over one session. Then

25 noting that we would have another -- we'll have another -- let me just

Page 19985

1 see. We'll have two -- another two and a half hours. You might need some

2 time for the procedural issues.

3 MR. JOSSE: We will need to fully explore one of the procedural

4 issues before the next witness begins, commences his evidence.


6 MR. JOSSE: That becomes a certainty.

7 JUDGE ORIE: There's little chance -- I take it that there's a

8 fair chance that you would approximately finish this witness, even having

9 heard the procedural issues, by today.

10 Let's proceed for this moment. And, Mr. Josse, the Chamber does

11 not require you to take any additional measures at this moment for the

12 next witness to arrive in this building.

13 MR. JOSSE: Very helpful, thank you.


15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, just so the Court is aware, I'll try to

16 make an assessment at the end of the next session or at any relevant point

17 during that about how much progress I'm making in light of the --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

19 MR. TIEGER: -- issues intended to cover as well as an ongoing

20 assessment of the need for additional time related to the issue I

21 discussed.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And the parties are invited both to intervene

23 when a witness seems to dwell on a lot of subjects, apart from the

24 subjects that is the core of the question. I did it a couple of times,

25 Mr. Josse. I think that there have been moments where you might have

Page 19986

1 considered to do it yourself.

2 MR. JOSSE: I'll try harder.


4 Then we'll --

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Usher, could you please escort the witness into

7 the courtroom.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 [The witness entered court]

10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kapetina, thank you for your patience.

11 Mr. Tieger, counsel for the Prosecution, will start his cross-examination.

12 Mr. Tieger, please proceed.

13 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Tieger:

15 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Kapetina.

16 A. Good afternoon.

17 Q. Yesterday you described in response to questions by Mr. Josse the

18 problems that you say you encountered at the Ministry of Defence in 1991,

19 and specifically with the minister of defence. And you indicated in your

20 testimony that as a result you decided to go public with that -- with

21 those problems and those issues. Is that right?

22 A. I said that I wrote a written warning for the Presidency and

23 cautioned the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the government of

24 Republika Srpska --

25 Q. Excuse me. I'm not asking you, I apologise if I was misunderstood

Page 19987

1 to recount your testimony again, simply to confirm with a yes or no

2 whether that summary was correct.

3 I would note for the record that at page 27 of the transcript

4 yesterday you indicated that you decided to go public with that

5 information, as I understood it, in the fashion you just began to

6 describe. Is that essentially right?

7 A. I don't think I said it was my aim to inform the public about it

8 all, but that the public did attend my warning. Yes, it did.

9 Q. In any event, you indicated to the Court yesterday that you did so

10 because of your concern as a professional, that you did so independent of

11 others without being told to do so or pressure to do so by others. Is

12 that correct?

13 A. Precisely.

14 Q. And in fact, it seemed that you wanted to stress that

15 professionalism and independence as a way of assuring the Tribunal about

16 the accuracy of your assessment of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

17 at that time. Is that also accurate?

18 A. May I ask you to repeat that comment of yours, please?

19 Q. I'll move on in the interests of time. We really are getting very

20 close to the break.

21 Mr. Kapetina, isn't the real fact of the matter that it was not

22 your idea to send the letter, but it was the idea of the SDS and SDS

23 officials?

24 A. No. The real truth of the matter is that it was my initiative and

25 my letter. I just held consultations with the vice-premier Dr. Simovic.

Page 19988

1 Q. Isn't it also a fact, Mr. Kapetina, that you were effectively

2 activated by the party in 1991 and thereafter followed party instructions

3 and engaged in performing tasks for the party?

4 A. No, that's not true that I was activated by the party in 1991 and

5 that I performed any tasks for the party. And pursuant to instructions

6 from the party in 1991, I was not a member of the party, that is to say,

7 of the Serbian Democratic Party.

8 Q. Well, membership of the party, Mr. Kapetina, and activities in

9 pursuit of party objectives can be two different things, as we shall be

10 discussing after the break.

11 And finally, Mr. Kapetina, isn't it also a fact that you have not

12 been fully accurate in describing to the Court the circumstances

13 surrounding the mobilisation and recruitment issues that prompted -- that

14 were the subject of your letter in 1991 or the circumstances that prompted

15 the decisions by the Bosnian government in connection with mobilisation

16 and recruitment in 1991?

17 A. I don't think that I did explain that to the Trial Chamber

18 yesterday. I didn't enter into the substance of the warning, and I didn't

19 deal with questions of mobilisation and recruitment -- I didn't only deal

20 with questions of mobilisation and recruitment in the warning, and I

21 didn't explain that to the Court yesterday. I didn't even wish to comment

22 the comments made in the journal Narodne Novine either.

23 Q. We'll talk about that shortly, but let me just before the break

24 recall your testimony yesterday.

25 You testified at length about your discussions with Minister Doko,

Page 19989

1 or at least the discussions you say you had with Minister Doko in 1991.

2 You testified at length about your alleged submission of inspection plans

3 and his rejection or refusal to act on those plans. And then you said,

4 again at page 27 of the transcript, that you decided to go public with

5 this information by sending a letter and so on. Correct? I see you

6 nodding, so I assume that that's a fair summary.

7 A. Let me warn you again. Maybe I said that yesterday, although I

8 don't remember saying it, I didn't want to go public. I wanted state --

9 to caution state institutions about the implementation of the law. Now,

10 the fact that this gained publicity is another thing. I personally didn't

11 provide it to the media, to any of the media.

12 Q. Let's not quibble in that case about the term "going public."

13 We'll let the record speak for itself, along with your explanation now.

14 Irrespective of that, what I've just recounted is essentially how you

15 related the background to your letter. Isn't that right?

16 A. Well, it's like this, you see: The situation in Bosnia and

17 Herzegovina at that time in the field of defence was far worse than I

18 depicted it in my letter. It was much worse.

19 Q. I'm not talking about the substance of your letter. I just want

20 to ask you whether or not it's correct that in describing the

21 circumstances that gave rise to your letter, that is what you explained to

22 the Court, that it was fundamentally your discussions with Minister Doko

23 that triggered your determination to send a warning letter to the organs

24 of government you described, that they were acting illegally.

25 A. Of course. And my conversation with Mr. Doko and the overall

Page 19990

1 situation in the field of totally national defence motivated me to write

2 this letter to the Presidency and government because they were the most

3 responsible organs for defence matters.

4 MR. TIEGER: And when we return after the break --

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes --

6 MR. TIEGER: -- we will explore our submission that that's a

7 fundamentally misleading characterisation of the circumstances.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, Mr. Tieger, before we have a

9 break, would it not be fair to -- if you confront the witness with the

10 reasons he gave to write the letter, that he gave two reasons, the one

11 being the unlawful and unconstitutional behaviour of -- of his minister,

12 who said that he would not respect the laws; and at the same time he also

13 told us that he -- the witness feared that he might end up having problems

14 if he did not inform the highest republican organs that there was no

15 inspection in the republic, which is not exactly the same as that his

16 personal problems that would result from that. Would it be fair to put

17 that to the witness as the two reasons he gave?

18 MR. TIEGER: By all means, Your Honour, and I think the witness

19 heard what the Court said and is certainly in a position to confirm or

20 reject that.

21 JUDGE ORIE: These are the two reasons you gave, yes, because

22 that's more complete than what you've confronted him with.

23 We'll have a break, and we'll restart at a quarter past 4.00, but

24 not for you.

25 Mr. Kapetina, we, again, need some time for procedural issues. So

Page 19991

1 the break presumably will take at least 10 to 15 minutes, if not even a

2 bit more for you.

3 We stand adjourned until quarter past 4.00.

4 --- Recess taken at 3.51 p.m.

5 [The witness stands down]

6 --- On resuming at 4.20 p.m.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, if we would start with the one-minute

8 issue, that could be done in open session?

9 MR. JOSSE: Yes please.

10 I've had a chance to talk to Mr. Stewart about the general

11 procedural remarks in terms of where the Defence case is going that Your

12 Honour made yesterday. He's anxious for an opportunity to respond in

13 person. He would invite the Court to set aside a short period of time at

14 the beginning of proceedings on Friday, if that meets with the approval of

15 the Court. That is my request.

16 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider the matter and we'll let you know, or

17 would you need an answer right away?

18 MR. JOSSE: I don't need an answer right away.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then you'll hear from us -- unless there's

20 you'd like to add.

21 MR. JOSSE: Say if there is another time that is more convenient

22 to the Chamber, then of course Mr. Stewart will make himself available,

23 but he is anxious to address the Court orally on the subject.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll consider it. If we would choose for

25 another time, we will not do so without consulting Mr. Stewart first.

Page 19992

1 MR. JOSSE: Thank you very much.

2 Could I mention one other matter in open session --


4 MR. JOSSE: -- to some extent that has arisen during the break

5 and it relates to scheduling in one sense.

6 The witness after next, not Mr. Kapetina, not the witness

7 thereafter, but the witness after that who is not seeking protection, and

8 I am not going to mention him by name for reasons that will be clear in a

9 moment. He is in The Hague. We were aware that he had bouts of ill

10 health. That had made his attendance a little bit uncertain. He's

11 arrived here, mentions health problems to us. A member of our team was

12 speaking to him at some length today, broke that meeting off so that the

13 witness could have a break, which was thought necessary. The victims and

14 witness service have contacted -- well, me personally during the break to

15 say that he is no longer fit for further proofing today. They have said

16 that he is sufficiently unwell, if I can put it like that.


18 MR. JOSSE: That may have some affect on the schedule. He'll

19 undoubtedly need more breaks than normal when he gives his evidence; I had

20 already been advised of that. That's all I can say. I don't suppose it's

21 very helpful, but at least I'm forewarning the Court.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, it goes without saying that -- and even

23 with full respect for the privacy of the witness, of course the Chamber is

24 more inclined to be very flexible if it knows a bit about the background,

25 about the source, if there's any objective support for what is presented

Page 19993

1 as a -- not feeling well. I'm not saying that we could not accept that,

2 but of course it's better for us to assess to what extent we should take

3 that into consideration if we have more information about it.

4 MR. JOSSE: We will work on that. The reason I mention it is

5 because the information is coming in one sense from an objective source,

6 namely the witness assistant who has been looking after him for the last

7 couple of hours.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although perhaps not medically trained, but

9 being a human being.

10 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

11 JUDGE ORIE: And if there's -- I take it that if there's any need

12 for medical assistance, that the Victims and Witnesses Unit will provide

13 that or at least to --

14 MR. JOSSE: In my limited experience, Your Honour can rest assured

15 about that.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It's good to have that re-affirmed in court.

17 Then we turn into private session.

18 [Private session]

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 19994











11 Pages 19994-20010 redacted. Private session.















Page 20011

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 [Open session]

11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

13 Mr. Tieger, once the witness has entered the courtroom and has

14 taken his seat, you may continue.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 [The witness entered court]

17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kapetina, as I feared, it took a little bit

18 longer. Again, thank you for your patience.

19 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

20 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

21 Q. Mr. Kapetina, let's begin by taking a look at the intercepted

22 telephone conversation that you listened to yesterday, the one involving

23 Dr. Karadzic and yourself on July 1st, 1991. That's found at tab 4 of

24 the Defence binder.

25 Mr. Kapetina, before I direct your attention to any particular

Page 20012

1 portion of that conversation, let me ask you: That was not the --

2 yesterday was not the first time you had a chance to see the transcript of

3 this conversation. Correct?

4 A. Yes, it wasn't the first time. I saw it when I had the interview

5 with the investigators of this Tribunal.

6 Q. And at that time, before they -- the investigators showed you the

7 intercept, they asked you about contact you had with the SDS leadership in

8 connection with the issue of the letter you sent, and you indicated to

9 them, did you not, that you had not had contact with the SDS leadership in

10 1991 in connection with the letter you ultimately sent about the

11 illegal -- allegedly illegal action of the Bosnian government?

12 A. Yes. That's what I said. I said I didn't have any contacts with

13 the leadership of the SDS.

14 Q. Turn to the intercept itself now, and if I can direct your

15 attention to page 3 of the transcript. And I believe that's both in

16 the -- in the B/C/S version and the English.

17 After a discussion, introductory discussion, between you and

18 Dr. Karadzic, you were explaining a little bit about the implementation of

19 the ministry's function and so on. Dr. Karadzic says: "So I'm asking you

20 to write an official record, that is, a report right now in your capacity

21 as in inspector to the prime minister, to write a report, et cetera,

22 et cetera."

23 You point out that you can only address the government, that your

24 competence only covers the government.

25 And he says: "Look, please write this and send copies to the

Page 20013

1 corps commander and the commander of the TO."

2 And you say: "Well, I thought we should ask for an urgent meeting

3 with the minister this morning and then he could put forward the concept

4 and we would be informed of what he's doing."

5 And Dr. Karadzic says: "You know very well what he's doing and

6 the whole ministry knows -- or every ministry knows what he is doing."

7 Mr. Kapetina, wasn't it the case that it was Dr. Karadzic who

8 raised and insisted on the issuance by you of a formal protest or letter

9 or record and that your idea at the time was just simply to call for a

10 meeting?

11 A. No, that's not correct that the initiative was for me to write the

12 warning -- that the initiative came from Mr. Karadzic. That's not

13 correct.

14 If you will allow me to say this. I proposed -- well, I didn't

15 put the proposal to Mr. Karadzic, but I proposed that a meeting be held of

16 the staff of the ministry, because -- so that all of us could present our

17 views to the defence minister.

18 Q. And Dr. Karadzic goes on in the course of that intercept, and if

19 you look now at the bottom of page -- toward the bottom of page 3, he

20 addresses your concerns about the extent of your competence and says to

21 act instead according to your conscience urgently regardless of how far

22 your competence reaches and tells you that you have the right to send a

23 copy of your report to the government, et cetera, to the president of the

24 council for national defence, the corps commander, the commander of the

25 TO, as we see on page 4.

Page 20014

1 And you say: "All right."

2 And then he continues by saying: "Otherwise you'll be

3 responsible," insisting that you carry out your function.

4 And you say: "Agreed."

5 That was the substance of that conversation, was it not,

6 Mr. Kapetina, at least as it was recorded on July 1st, 1991?

7 A. First of all, Mr. Karadzic asks of me to write an official memo or

8 report, which I didn't do. I didn't write an official note. I issued a

9 written caution to the Presidency of the government on the fact that the

10 constitution and law was not being adhered to, and that's quite different

11 from an official note. An official note would have been to say that I

12 wasn't doing my job and what the situation was like in the ministry. I

13 did not write that.

14 Secondly, I didn't accept the suggestion made by Mr. Karadzic that

15 I send a copy to the commander of the Main Staff and the other people

16 mentioned there, because I saw that Mr. Karadzic doesn't understand my

17 position in the Ministry of Defence, and that is why I asked for a meeting

18 with Simovic, who knew full well what my competence and authority was,

19 what position I held and whom I could address.

20 Q. And after talking with Mr. Simovic, you did send a letter to all

21 the parties mentioned by -- at least you sent a letter that went to

22 Mr. Izetbegovic and you copied it to all the parties mentioned by

23 Dr. Karadzic?

24 A. I only sent a caution to the government and the Presidency of

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, no one else. I didn't send it to anybody else.

Page 20015

1 Q. Are you sure about that, Mr. Kapetina, or is it possible that you

2 did send copies to the other parties? Because that's what you indicated

3 in your interview. You weren't sure; it may have happened.

4 A. I did not -- I wasn't asked that question during the interview.

5 The question I was asked, whether other sides had it. I don't know. I

6 said yesterday that everybody was a member of the council for national

7 defence, and the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina received my letter along

8 with an invitation to attend a meeting. And they received it from the

9 secretary of the council, along with an invitation to attend the meeting

10 with the meeting's agenda. And I categorically state that I did not send

11 my letter of warning to anybody else but the institutions. I didn't send

12 it to the media either.

13 Q. Well, I'm not going to dwell on this point, but I would note that

14 at page 14 of the interview conducted on July 13th, 2004, you were asked

15 specifically: "Did you send an identical report to the prime minister,

16 the corps commander, and the TO commander?"

17 And your answer was: "I don't think so. And if I did send them,

18 if I did send something to them, then it was just an information because I

19 didn't really cooperate with them. They were not under me."

20 Is that a fair answer? Sorry, that's not a good question.

21 Is that what you said and does that more accurately reflect your

22 recollection of what was sent?

23 A. I'm not sure that that's the way I put it, but you can see from

24 that that I did not send anything to the institutions that you are

25 insisting on.

Page 20016

1 Q. Well --

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, may I take it that there's an

3 audio-recording of this interview if -- if the parties would feel that

4 it's of such importance to verify the words of the witness?

5 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour, there is.

6 JUDGE ORIE: -- during the interview.

7 Mr. Kapetina, there is an audio-recording of that interview. So

8 if you -- I don't know, the Chamber might not take any action

9 proprio motu, but at least there is a possibility to verify this. And if

10 you feel uncomfortable with the matter, or if one of the parties would

11 feel uncomfortable with the matter being not verified, there's an

12 opportunity to do so. I just inform you about this so that you know that

13 there is a technical possibility.

14 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

15 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

16 Q. At tab 2 of the Prosecution's exhibits, there's a conversation of

17 a -- a conversation that took place between Mr. Simovic and Mr. Karadzic.

18 It may not be necessary to direct your attention to particular portions

19 of that, Mr. Kapetina. Mr. Simovic indicates in that conversation to Dr.

20 Karadzic that a meeting was scheduled with the Council for All People's

21 Defence because of certain initiatives regarding recruits, particularly

22 the public warning by you, which he describes as "quite a good job."

23 Does that conform with your own recollection that your written

24 warning triggered a meeting of the Council for All People's Defence?

25 A. No. The meeting was not organised or scheduled because of my

Page 20017

1 warning. My warning was just one item on the agenda. The meeting had a

2 much broader significance and there was several items on the agenda.

3 Q. So in any event, your public warning was at least part of the

4 agenda for that meeting and part of the impetus for that meeting?

5 A. It was part of the agenda, but it was not the reason that the

6 meeting was held. It could also have happened for it not to be on the

7 agenda at all.

8 Q. Let's move on, if we can, quickly to the circumstances that were

9 extant at the time of these conversations, July and August of 1991.

10 Now -- and before I address that, let me turn quickly back to your

11 conversation --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, number 2 of the exhibits has not been

13 assigned an exhibit number.

14 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar, that would be --

16 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 2 would be P1036, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

18 Please proceed.


20 Q. Now, if I understood your testimony correctly yesterday, you

21 indicated or testified that Minister Doko told you that he wanted to or

22 hoped to effectively destroy the JNA in Bosnia by preventing or

23 forestalling your inspections. Is that right?

24 A. I didn't say that Doko told me that the JNA would be destroyed if

25 the inspections were not held. I said that there was a certain task and a

Page 20018

1 plan. My personal feeling was that within that plan there was a way to do

2 it, but not through inspections.

3 Q. So the issue of your inspections and whether or not they were

4 conducted had no impact on this plan you're alluding to. Is that right?

5 A. Of course it did. I said what I found later out about Minister

6 Doko's plan. I could have prevented that plan from being implemented, had

7 I gone and toured about 20 different facilities, if I had 20 inspectors to

8 take with me. In this way many other plans could be thwarted as well.

9 Q. Let's be as clear on this as we can. You were not responsible for

10 inspecting the combat-readiness or preparation of the JNA, were you?

11 A. That's correct.

12 Q. And you were not responsible for inspecting the combat-readiness

13 or preparation of the Territorial Defence?

14 A. That's correct.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, have you -- done with Exhibit 2?

16 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Looking at tab 2, which is P1036, Mr. Kapetina,

18 Mr. Tieger confronted you with a portion of that telephone conversation,

19 but I'd like to invite you to also comment to another portion of that

20 conversation. I think it's third box from the bottom in B/C/S of page 1,

21 and in English it is page 1, the seventh box from the bottom. Where when

22 Mr. Simovic had informed Mr. Karadzic about the meeting of the Council for

23 All People's Defence, Mr. Simovic says: "This inspector, Kapetina, I told

24 him to do something," which, at least from the language, suggests that he

25 instructed you to do something. Could you help us out whether you have

Page 20019

1 any recollection of any instruction received from Mr. Simovic, and if so,

2 what that instruction was about?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I suggested to Simovic -- or

4 actually, I informed him of what I was intending to do, and all I wanted

5 from him was his opinion, whether he agreed with this, in the sense of:

6 Would I have protection but not whether I would do that. However, the

7 vice-president told me: Mr. Kapetina, whatever you do, you will be held

8 responsible for it. There's nobody in this state who could protect you.

9 The government cannot protect you, the ministers from the government

10 cannot protect you. Whatever you do, you will be the one who will bear

11 the responsibility for it.

12 So I just informed them about what I wanted to do, and I was told:

13 This is something that you're doing at your own initiative because you

14 will not have the protection of the ministers, the Serbian ministers, in

15 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 JUDGE ORIE: So this portion of the intercept -- and in this

17 portion of the intercept, Mr. Simovic does not adequately inform

18 Mr. Karadzic on your conversation. Is that a correct understanding?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He did not convey the conversation

20 accurately.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

22 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

23 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour. Sorry, Your Honour, just one

24 moment.

25 Q. Mr. Kapetina, I told you I wanted to turn to the question of the

Page 20020

1 circumstances that existed at the time and that were part of the decisions

2 being made about mobilisation and recruitment at that time.

3 First of all, this was all taking place in the context of both the

4 discussions of independence concerning Croatia and Slovenia and the

5 concern about imminent conflict in both of those republics. Is that

6 right?

7 A. I know that changes to the military service law were carried out

8 in 1990. I did not deal with political with issues.

9 Q. Okay. Well, I'm going to tell you then that at this time many

10 people were aware of the fact that Croatia and Slovenia were threatening

11 to leave former Yugoslavia and that there was great concern about conflict

12 between the JNA and those republics, among many of the people in Bosnia

13 and Herzegovina. Did that escape your attention?

14 A. I was also concerned.

15 Q. There were also concerns among many people in Bosnia and

16 Herzegovina and in other republics about new recruits, that is young

17 recruits, not reservists, being sent outside of their republics to fight

18 in either Slovenia or Croatia. Isn't that also correct?

19 A. I don't know if that is so. I was not conducting the policy of

20 the Yugoslav People's Army, nor did I monitor activities in the JNA or the

21 TO.

22 Q. Well, it's odd that you say you don't know about that, because I

23 could have sworn that yesterday I heard you mention a conversation with

24 Minister Doko where he spoke about demonstrations and protests to you. I

25 didn't realise as you were giving your testimony that you had no idea what

Page 20021

1 Minister Doko was talking about.

2 A. I told you what he talked about. He mentioned the protests of

3 mothers who did not want to have recruits sent to serve their military

4 term, and he asked me -- I already said that. I don't want to repeat it.

5 If you wish, I can explain who these mothers were who were

6 protesting in front of the building. This is information from the Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina state security. None of them had a son in the army or

8 even had a male child to send to the JNA; they were paid. They were doing

9 this for money, which was also offered to me.

10 Q. Mr. Kapetina, is that your perception of what was happening in

11 July and August of 1991, that not one parent whose mobilisation or

12 recruitment-eligible child was at risk of being sent to fight in another

13 republic in a clash they disagreed with protested or demonstrated against

14 it? That everybody who participated in the demonstration was a fraud who

15 was paid? Is that essentially your perception of what was going on at the

16 time?

17 A. That's not how I see things. Many parents were concerned; quite

18 rightly so. All I said was that information about the mothers who were

19 protesting publicly in front of the National Assembly of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina -- actually, that information that I mentioned just now is not

21 something that comes from me, but it's the information that comes from the

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina state security service.

23 Q. Let's not quibble about that, Mr. Kapetina. The fact is that part

24 of the context is that many people were concerned that protests were

25 happening. Correct?

Page 20022

1 A. At the time there were no mass protests.

2 Q. Now, in addition there had been a conference at Brioni in which --

3 and at least an agreement in principle was reached concerning the

4 threatened conflicts. And that was another factor that was cited by the

5 Bosnian government in its decisions about whether or not mobilisation and

6 recruitment should be implemented on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Isn't that right?

8 A. To be quite clear, at that time there was no mobilisation being

9 carried out on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because serving

10 one's military term of duty does not mean being mobilised.

11 Right now I don't know what kind of meeting was held at Brioni or

12 the outcome or the agreements stemming from that meeting. Probably at the

13 time I did know, but right now I really cannot remember.

14 Q. Mr. Kapetina, you are also aware that the Bosnian government

15 asserted that the mobilisation was unlawful for a number of reasons,

16 including the fact that it was not legitimately directed at determining

17 combat-readiness and including the fact that it had not been ordered by

18 the SFRY Presidency. You knew that at the time, didn't you? That was

19 part of this ongoing discussion and dispute.

20 A. I was not implementing policy at the defence of ministry -- the

21 defence ministry; I was implementing laws. If something was agreed on the

22 political side, then they should have informed the government and all the

23 relevant departments, as you say, to selectively apply the law, what

24 should have been done and what should not have been done. But this kind

25 of information was not something that we had access to.

Page 20023

1 Q. Mr. Kapetina, the whole public had access to it because this was

2 being written about in the media. It's of great interest to the people of

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina and newspapers were writing about it. Isn't that

4 right?

5 A. I don't know that the whole media wrote about it. I was not

6 obliged to listen to the media or the public in my job; I was obliged to

7 implement laws.

8 Q. Mr. Kapetina, I'm not suggesting to you that the whole media was

9 writing about it; that's a characterisation I think you put on it. What I

10 am suggesting to you is that enough of the media was writing about it so

11 that you were very much aware of it at the time. And those are all

12 factors you chose to ignore in painting a very misleading picture to the

13 Court about what was happening at that time.

14 Now, let me address just a couple more issues.

15 First of all, did you know at the time who the prime minister of

16 the federal government was?

17 A. Of course I knew.

18 Q. And did you know that the Federal Executive Council in early

19 August took the position that TO units were being engaged in certain parts

20 of Bosnia and Herzegovina arbitrarily and outside the authorities of the

21 republic and the federation?

22 A. I was not duty-bound to implement decisions of the Federal

23 Executive Council. That's what the inspections at the federal ministry of

24 defence at the Yugoslav level was supposed to do. So that's why we did

25 not do that. You said just now that that was a question of Territorial

Page 20024

1 Defence.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Kapetina, no one asked you whether you were

3 duty-bound to implement the decisions of the Federal Executive Council.

4 The question was whether you were aware of the position explained by

5 Mr. Tieger taken by that council. So please concentrate on the questions.

6 Let me give you another example where you really tend to, at least

7 confuse me. A little bit earlier you were asked about whether many people

8 in Bosnia were concerned about young recruits, et cetera, and then you

9 said you don't know if that's -- and some 20 lines later you say: Parents

10 were concerned, and rightly so.

11 So do you understand that it's -- could confuse me if you on the

12 one hand say: Well, I don't know; and the other hand, 20 lines later say:

13 Yes, parents were rightly concerned about this situation? And here again

14 you're responding to a question which is not put to you. You don't have

15 to defend yourself here from knowing what -- you're just asked to tell us

16 what you know. It may be that you knew about it, that you felt no

17 responsibility, or that you even strongly disagreed with the position, and

18 perhaps rightly so. I don't know. But please concentrate on what is

19 asked and answer those questions.

20 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

21 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. Can we turn to tab 37 of the Prosecution binder, and can that be

23 given a number, please.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

25 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 37, Your Honours, will be P1037.

Page 20025


2 Q. Now, Mr. Kapetina, I want to direct your attention to two portions

3 of tab 37 which contains an article by -- an article of -- an issue,

4 excuse me, of Oslobodjenje in July 1991. And first I want to turn your

5 attention to the reproduction of the letter of the BH Presidency to the

6 Federal Executive Board on the mobilisation in Bosnian Krajina listing

7 eight reasons against, I think is part of the heading.

8 Do you see that portion of the issue?

9 Now, in it a number of reasons are listed by the BH Presidency for

10 ending the mobilisation effort, and those include the following: That the

11 mobilisation was not ordered by the SFRY Presidency; that the mobilisation

12 obviously does not aim to check combat-readiness; is that the BH

13 authorities were not informed of it happening in a timely fashion; that it

14 has harmful political consequences and contributes to the deterioration of

15 inter-ethnic relations; creates or deepens mistrust for the JNA; it's in

16 contradiction of the provisions of the OEBS; it's in contradiction with

17 the declaration adopted during talks with the representatives in Brioni;

18 and it causes great financial expense and is not in compliance with the

19 present financial situation.

20 Did those reasons, whether you agree with them or not, given by

21 the -- publicised by the Bosnian government escape your attention in 1991?

22 A. I wasn't informed about this letter that was sent probably to the

23 SFRY Presidency, but from this attachment here I cannot really read

24 anything here in this title, eight reasons. It's so small, the print is

25 so small, that I really cannot -- but very well. You've told me all the

Page 20026

1 reasons.

2 MR. JOSSE: I'm going to intercede. If he can't read them, then

3 my learned friend should put them to him one by one because he can't be

4 expected to remember all eight.

5 MR. TIEGER: I just listed those --

6 JUDGE ORIE: The issue is not whether he remembers all of these

7 reasons.

8 The clear issue is the following: Mr. Tieger asked you whether it

9 escaped your attention that it was published that the Federal - what was

10 it? - Executive Council, I think, took strong position, whether it's 8 or

11 7 or 6, were you aware of such a position taken by this body, or were you

12 aware of a publication in which this is referred to?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've said before that it wasn't my

14 job to cover the Yugoslav People's Army and the Territorial Defence. This

15 information --

16 JUDGE ORIE: I did not ask you whether it was your job. I didn't

17 ask you whether you were informed about it. Did you, at that time, learn

18 about it, yes or no?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was following all the events, and

20 I cannot tell you anything specific about whether I knew something at the

21 time or not. But I was following all of the political and social events.

22 It's hard after 15 years to say now whether I knew that at the time or

23 not. I don't remember.

24 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, it was an issue which, in view of

25 your letter, the legality of this activity was one of the subjects that

Page 20027

1 was of interest to you, wasn't it? I mean, that's how I understood your

2 concerns about illegal activity, that this was something you were very

3 much interested in.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've just said that. I really

5 cannot talk about individual meetings, conclusions, or decisions of the

6 federal organs. I probably did follow all of those things, but I cannot

7 give you a certain answer about that particular piece of information and

8 the eight conditions. The Presidency probably gave other conditions and

9 sought other agreements which were not respected. I didn't point to them

10 because I didn't think that they were relevant.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Well, this is at least an answer to the

12 question which was put in different ways several times to you.

13 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.


15 Q. Two matters before we break.

16 The same issue of Oslobodjenje indicates -- reports something from

17 the Tanjug, I believe, from July 12th, that is that: "At today's meeting

18 the Federal Executive Council discussed the situation in the country and

19 the measures to halt armed conflicts, which is in the country's essential

20 interest, the Federal Executive Council also estimates that TO units are

21 being engaged in certain parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina arbitrarily and

22 outside the areas of the republic and the federation."

23 The Federal Executive Council, Mr. Kapetina, was headed by Ante

24 Markovic. Is that correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 20028

1 Q. Let me also quickly ask you to turn to tab 26.

2 MR. TIEGER: And I would ask that that be given a number as well,

3 Your Honour.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Registrar, 26 would be --

5 THE REGISTRAR: P1038, Your Honours.


7 Q. P1038, tab 26, contains the recording, the transcript recording,

8 of a news conference held by Stipe Mesic, who at that time was the

9 president of the SFRY and Presidency. Is that right, sir?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And in the first paragraph in which he speaks, Mr. Mesic

12 says: "As far as the mobilisation is concerned, you know that the

13 Presidency was not constituted, in other words, the supreme command was

14 not functioning, and that what was done was done outside the supreme

15 command."

16 So were you also aware at the time of the events we've been

17 discussing that the president of the Presidency, Stipe Mesic, also

18 asserted that the -- as did the Bosnian government, that the mobilisation

19 was outside the -- was done outside the proper channels?

20 A. I don't know about that. What's given to me here is just a

21 statement by one of the members of the Presidency, Mr. Mesic. Does that

22 necessarily mean that it's true?

23 JUDGE ORIE: You were asked whether you know about it. The answer

24 is no, yes?

25 Please proceed.

Page 20029

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't know.


3 Q. Were you aware or unaware that there was at least a debate or

4 dispute or conflict about the legality and propriety and potential

5 consequences of the mobilisation and recruitment efforts during that

6 period of time and at the time you wrote your warning letter? Whether

7 you're aware of these specifics, all the specifics we just discussed, were

8 you aware of the dispute and debate generally?

9 A. I was not aware that there was a general debate. If you are using

10 newspaper articles for that, I must say that Oslobodjenje at the time was

11 quite partial as well as other media. There was a general propaganda

12 campaign so that the writing of the media in this case doesn't mean much.

13 I can remind you of another statement of Mr. Mesic when he

14 completed his term of office when he said: I have completed my task.

15 Yugoslavia is no more.

16 JUDGE ORIE: I'm going to stop you again. If you say:

17 Oslobodjenje at that time was quite partial, did you read these reports,

18 whether true or not, in Oslobodjenje?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course I read it.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So do I understand your testimony to be that

21 you were aware that for good reasons or perfectly wrong reasons, that the

22 issue was raised in the media, the issue of the legality of this

23 recruitment and the matters we are talking about?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those issues should be discussed in

25 the institutions of the system and not in the public or in the media.

Page 20030

1 JUDGE ORIE: I didn't ask you what should have been done. I asked

2 you whether I understood your testimony well, that for good or bad reasons

3 that the issue was raised in the media. Even if you consider that to be a

4 totally wrong thing to do, were you aware of the matter being raised in

5 the media?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All the topical matters were also

7 covered by the media, so that question was probably covered, too.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Probably? Was it covered, yes or no?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That question did figure, to an

10 extent, in the media.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

12 Mr. Tieger, I think it's time for a break. We're late already.

13 We'll have a break of 20 minutes until quarter past 6.00.

14 And, Mr. Kapetina, may I really urge you again to answer to the

15 questions. This is not a place to -- I'm not saying that what you want to

16 tell us is not important and is not true, but it's very often not an

17 answer to the question. And I urge you again, because I think you came

18 here to testify, you were requested to testify by the Defence in this

19 case, and if you do not answer the questions that might -- might, to some

20 extent, invalidate your own testimony because the Chamber does not hear

21 what you know about the matters you were asked about, if you again and

22 again turn away from the questions.

23 We stand adjourned until quarter past 6.00.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.

25 --- Recess taken at 5.56 p.m.

Page 20031

1 --- On resuming at 6.25 p.m.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.

3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. May I ask the Witness and the Court to turn to tab 4, and may that

5 item be given a number, please.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 4, Your Honours, will be P1039.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.


10 Q. Mr. Kapetina, I see you have been looking over P1039 while the

11 logistical procedure has been implemented. That's a conversation between

12 Dr. Karadzic and Mr. Simovic on August 27th, 1991. And as you may already

13 have seen on the first page Mr. Simovic advises Dr. Karadzic that he wants

14 to inform him briefly about a letter by our chief inspector warning about

15 unlawful acts.

16 As we continue on to page 2 after a brief discussion about a

17 second issue, Dr. Karadzic says: "This thing with the inspector is

18 certain. Everybody should do his own job, and we'll see who in the end

19 will be responsible."

20 Mr. Simovic -- and Dr. Karadzic continues. "But I want to move

21 through this quickly."

22 Mr. Simovic says: "That's the best. We have officially addressed

23 the president of the Presidency, president of the government, president of

24 the Assembly, and the press, at the government session, 15 minutes in

25 detail."

Page 20032

1 Dr. Karadzic asks: "Who is the inspector?"

2 Mr. Simovic says: "Our guy, Kapetina."

3 Dr. Karadzic says: "I see."

4 And Mr. Simovic says: "We have activated him. He does his part

5 of work fully. Doko is almost seeking his life. However, we shall

6 protect him. He is doing what he is supposed to do in accordance with

7 law."

8 And Dr. Karadzic says: "Yes, yes, good, good."

9 I had asked you earlier, Mr. Kapetina, about whether or not you

10 had been activated by the SDS, whether or not you had been doing your part

11 of work for the SDS, and let me ask you again if Mr. Simovic's remarks to

12 Dr. Karadzic reflect the fact that at that point and thereafter, you were

13 pursuing tasks for the SDS of various sorts.

14 A. That's not correct. I wasn't activated by the SDS.

15 Q. Well, we're -- again, I noticed before we had some smallish

16 debates, if you will, about the nuances of questions. So let me -- let's

17 not get hung up on the meaning of "activate" or "not activate." Let me

18 simply ask you if at this point and thereafter you were given tasks by the

19 SDS and performed those tasks?

20 A. No, I wasn't assigned tasks, not then, not to the end of 1991 or

21 the end of 1992 -- or rather, while I worked in the ministry I received

22 not one single task from the SDS.

23 Q. Let me turn next to --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, I don't think it really assists the

25 Chamber very much to hear whether the witness received a task from the

Page 20033

1 SDS, not having identified what you consider to be the SDS. Would that be

2 SDS officials? Would that be SDS party organs?

3 But perhaps I put it to you, Mr. Kapetina. You were just asked

4 about whether you received tasks from the SDS. You said: "No, I never

5 did receive tasks, I never performed tasks."

6 Would that include -- well, let's say, SDS members with important

7 positions or SDS organs because it's --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's --

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It would refer to both

11 individuals and SDS organs. I didn't receive tasks from anybody, and by

12 the same token, I didn't carry any tasks out.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Then I have one other question for you. It seems on

14 the basis of this intercept that Mr. Simovic has a rather different

15 perception of the interactions you had. You said: "I consulted him once

16 on that letter I intended to write," whereas Mr. Simovic seems to have a

17 totally different impression.

18 Do you have any explanation for the difference of perception of

19 what happened at that time between you and Mr. Simovic?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know what you're

21 referring to when you said that Simovic seems to have different views.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Well, it's -- it seems that Mr. Simovic, at least if

23 we read the intercept, "I will want to inform you briefly. I will send

24 you a letter by our chief inspector warning about unlawful acts."

25 And Mr. Simovic calls you "our guy." Mr. Simovic says: "We have

Page 20034

1 activated him. He does his part of work fully."

2 Would you agree with me that that's at least a different

3 perception from the interaction you had with him, if we compare it to your

4 perception, just having consulted him once to seek protection? You say:

5 "He couldn't tell me that he would protect me." Mr. Simovic saying: "We

6 shall protect him."

7 I mean, it's a totally different story, the story you tell us and

8 the story Mr. Simovic seems to present in this telephone conversation to

9 Mr. Karadzic. So therefore my question is: Do you have any explanation

10 for that? Could you know -- do you know any reason for such a difference

11 in perception?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't wish to enter into the

13 opinion presented by Mr. Simovic in his conversation with Mr. Karadzic,

14 but Miodrag Simovic told me that the government can relieve me of my

15 duties and that they could not protect me because they would be outvoted

16 at the government meeting. That's the point. Now, how else could he

17 protect me? I don't know, and I didn't ask him to do so either.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So I do understand that you have no

19 explanation, apart from drawing our attention to the illogic statement

20 that he could protect you.

21 Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to add something,

23 please, Your Honour?

24 Miodrag Simovic was the vice-premier of the government, and to all

25 intents and purposes he refers to all the cadres in the government

Page 20035

1 as "ours" because he's speaking on behalf of the government. So that's

2 the jargon. He says "ours," "our guy," because everybody in the

3 government is his -- an employee of his, a worker of his, and that's the

4 jargon he uses in his conversation. But I don't belong to anybody nor can

5 anybody appropriate me.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Tieger.


8 Q. Let's turn to tab 6, please, and I'd like that given a number.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Registrar.

10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P1040, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, for practical reasons if a number is asked, if I

12 do not object against it, then you may immediately give a number,

13 Mr. Registrar.

14 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you, Your Honours.


16 Q. Mr. Kapetina, P1040 are notes from the meeting of officials and

17 top-ranking personnel of republican state organs, members of the SDS,

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina dated September 12th, 1991, notes from that meeting.

19 And if we turn to page 4 of the English, item number 11, the notes

20 indicate the following:

21 "Propose the establishment of a system of duty shifts to monitor

22 the activities and execution of tasks in the operations of state organs.

23 Resolution of existing problems in the various fields and maintaining

24 contacts with the SDS. Ljubisav Terzic and Dragan Kapetina are entrusted

25 with this and a development of means of communication between SDS and SDS

Page 20036

1 personnel in republican state organs with the municipalities."

2 Mr. Kapetina, isn't this one of the reflections of Mr. Simovic's

3 indications to Dr. Karadzic, that you would be -- that you were working

4 well for SDS, that you had been activated and would be performing tasks?

5 Isn't this one of the tasks that you were given and undertook?

6 A. No. Do you wish further explanation? At the meeting I most

7 probably was not present myself. Perhaps the first man there, Ljubisav

8 Terzic, might have attended that meeting who was appointed by the Serbian

9 Democratic Party as vice-secretary in the ministry.

10 Now, the fact that somebody had put me in there, perhaps they did

11 because they knew that I could -- that I was capable of doing that kind of

12 work, that kind of job.

13 Q. So what does that mean --

14 A. I don't know about being entrusted with anything like this.

15 Q. You have no recollection of ever being entrusted with this

16 assignment or any similar kind of assignment, one that relied upon your

17 expertise and that was given to you by SDS officials or SDS members or

18 important people who were affiliated with SDS in pursuit of basic Bosnian

19 Serb and SDS objectives? Any recollection of anything like that, type of

20 thing that Mr. Simovic had been referring to?

21 A. Well, you see, I don't know anything about who followed SDS

22 objectives. I can't recognise somebody as being a person following SDS

23 objectives.

24 And another thing, at that point in time the SDS, for me, was a

25 political party just like any other political party in Bosnia and

Page 20037

1 Herzegovina. Let me inform you that the vice-premier at each meeting held

2 talks with Muslim cadres in the Assembly, Mr. Cengic that is, from the

3 very first day, and I had nothing against that.

4 Q. You know very well that is not the issue here, Mr. Kapetina. The

5 issue is whether or not you were somebody who was working --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, the witness has answered the question.

7 He has said that he did not know about it, that he was never tasked with

8 this. If we look at the language, then we see that the following

9 conclusions were drawn and then quite some activities are mentioned,

10 facilitate, prepare, facilitate, and a couple of times we find the

11 word "propose." And sometimes who is proposed to do this -- proposed that

12 the SDS or proposed to the SDS, and here it just says "proposed." The

13 witness has answered the question by saying that it never reached him.

14 Let's please proceed.

15 MR. TIEGER: Let's turn next then to an item already in evidence,

16 and that's the stenographic record of the third session of the Assembly of

17 the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina held on December 11th, 1991.

18 I don't know if that's been distributed or not.

19 JUDGE ORIE: Is that under ...

20 Mr. Tieger, could you further provide the witness where to start?

21 MR. TIEGER: Yes, Your Honour.

22 Q. First at this third session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly we see at

23 pages 29 to 30 of the English and pages 47 through 48, I believe, of the

24 B/C/S, Mr. Krajisnik calls for the reports of the presidents of the

25 commissions and other working bodies on the discharge of duties and tasks.

Page 20038

1 And he indicates at page 31 of the English the order in which the relevant

2 speakers will address the Assembly, beginning with Mr. Miskin, and then

3 followed by Mr. Skoko, and ending with Mr. Mikic, and then yourself,

4 Dragan Kapetina.

5 Just moving through that very quickly, we see at page 32 of the

6 English, which is approximately page 56 of the B/C/S -- excuse me,

7 approximately page 54 of the B/C/S, Mr. Miskin discusses regionalisation,

8 that is if Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be divided into regions and if

9 it were to cease to exist as a single republic, the autonomous regions

10 would comprise the territories. And he calls on page 34 of the English

11 for an election of the council of ministers as soon as possible to carry

12 out the activities.

13 On pages 48 through 49 of the English -- and excuse me, let me

14 also note page 45 of the English by Mr. Miskin, which is page 57 of the

15 B/C/S, he notes: "Given the conditions of war in the country and the very

16 precarious situation in BiH" --

17 JUDGE ORIE: In the B/C/S you said "page 57," seems not to be

18 reproduced. There is more general terms, Mr. Tieger, only portions are

19 reproduced in B/C/S, whereas the whole seems to be tendered in English.

20 MR. TIEGER: Well, if I may, Your Honour, let me quickly complete

21 that citation. It's, I believe, the comments by the witness are

22 duplicated in full. These are -- provide the appropriate context, I

23 think, for the Court. If it turns out, in fact, that the witness has --

24 was present at the meeting, has any particular concerns about the portion

25 cited of other speakers, we can certainly find them.

Page 20039

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Tieger, whenever you want to confront the

2 witness with certain portions of this document, he should at least have an

3 opportunity to read the relevant portion of it. And I noticed that 57 is

4 not among the B/C/S portions, unless you very slowly read the whole of the

5 passage that you would like to confront him with, and even then it's not

6 how it should be done.

7 MR. TIEGER: No. You're -- I agree, Your Honour, and I had

8 intended for that passage to be duplicated in B/C/S, and I apologise both

9 to the Court and the witness for that oversight.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.

11 MR. TIEGER: But I, as indicated, I think we can manage in the

12 fashion the Court just described.

13 Q. And just to complete that comment by Mr. Miskin, it was: "Given

14 the conditions of war in the country and the very precarious situation in

15 BiH" --

16 JUDGE ORIE: Could you assist me. Where are we exactly now in the

17 English version?

18 MR. TIEGER: Page 35, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ORIE: 35, yes.

20 MR. TIEGER: "We believe that in all the regions and in the entire

21 BH, detailed contingency plans should be elaborated in the event" --

22 JUDGE ORIE: I have not found it yet. Could you guide us to the

23 relevant paragraph or the relevant ...

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 MR. TIEGER: I'm not surprised that the Court couldn't find it,

Page 20040

1 and again I'm obliged to apologise to the Court. That is on page 36 in

2 approximately the very middle. That would be about --

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I've found it. "Given the conditions ..."

4 MR. TIEGER: Yes. "Given the conditions of war in the country and

5 the very precarious situation in BH, we believe that in all the regions

6 and in the entire BH, detailed contingency plans" --

7 MR. JOSSE: We've got the normal problem, Your Honour. The

8 witness is looking for the passage. He's therefore not concentrating on

9 what's being put to him. What's being put to him he cannot find because

10 it's not there --


12 Q. Mr. Kapetina, can I have your attention for just a moment. I

13 thought the Court's explanation would have been understood, but if I could

14 just explain it quickly again. The passage I'm citing now is a comment by

15 Mr. Miskin before you spoke at the session. It has not been duplicated in

16 the B/C/S, and so it's no wonder you're unable to find it. My apologies

17 for that.

18 I'm going to try to read it slowly so that you can hear it. If

19 there's any particular reason why you would want to see it in the writing

20 in the B/C/S, you're more than free to let us know and we can do so.

21 Thereafter, I'll be turning my attention --

22 A. There's no need.

23 Q. So although I started it a number of times, I'll attempt to read

24 it through now.

25 "Given the conditions of war in the country and the very

Page 20041

1 precarious situation in BH, we believe that in all the regions and in the

2 entire BH, detailed contingency plans should be elaborated in the event

3 the Serbian people has to defend itself against various enemies."

4 Let me move directly now, Mr. Kapetina, to your own remarks which

5 are found at pages 57 through 60 of the English.


7 MR. TIEGER: And 98 to 102 of the B/C/S, which you should have in

8 front of you, Mr. Kapetina.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We see Mr. Kapetina starts speaking on page 58.

10 So someone may have worked from a different copy. I think we will find

11 our way.

12 Please proceed, Mr. --

13 MR. TIEGER: Okay.

14 Q. Now, Mr. Kapetina is -- you begin by noting that the -- you

15 have -- you and the ministry of national defence have drafted a paper

16 entitled "organisational and functional principles of the system of

17 defence in BH. Naturally, from the aspect of the interests of the Serbian

18 people and tasks in terms of decentralisation of relations in this field."

19 And in the interest of time, let me attempt to focus your

20 attention on two particular aspects of this without necessarily quoting

21 them directly, since you have them in front of you. You propose two

22 solutions, it seems, in your comments. After explaining how in your view

23 the Muslims are planning for a sovereign state with all the attributes of

24 statehood and sovereignty. For that you say: "We have proposed two

25 solutions. The first in the event that a sovereign BH is indeed created,"

Page 20042

1 and in that case you explain autonomous regions would be formed to protect

2 the interests of the Serbian people, and for that variant you've devised

3 the establishment of an ectogenous, what I understand indigenous system of

4 defence at the level of the autonomous regions. That's at page 58 of the

5 English. I'll let the excerpt speak for itself.

6 And the second model proposed by you is in the event that Bosnia

7 and Herzegovina remains within a federal state, and in that case you

8 note: "We insist on an even stronger centralisation of the system of

9 defence and don't want dual armed forces."

10 Now, Mr. Kapetina, although we went through a lot of discussion

11 about tasks that -- the question of whether or not you were assigned tasks

12 and performed tasks, isn't this an example of precisely that, that it

13 doesn't leave any doubt about whether or not you received that assignment

14 and whether or not you performed it?

15 A. No, I did not receive tasks and I didn't carry tasks out. This is

16 a task of the vice-premier, and it wasn't only I myself who worked on this

17 concept but a group in the Ministry of Defence.

18 So the vice-premier, Miodrag Simovic, I don't know whether already

19 at that time he was president of the ministerial council, I'm not sure

20 whether he was or not, but we received a task from the vice-premier, so

21 these were just possible variations. Of course my views on the ministry

22 and the problems in the system of defence and so on.

23 Q. Conducted, as I believe you indicated in the first sentence of

24 your remarks: "naturally from the aspects of the interests of the Serbian

25 people" --

Page 20043

1 A. Of course. That's the kind of task we were issued from the

2 vice-premier. Do you mean to say that the Serbian people did not exist in

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina and that it wasn't a constituent peoples? Did I

4 perhaps say that I wasn't a Serb, that I denied being a Serb here?

5 Q. Let's move on, Mr. Kapetina.

6 I'd like you to turn next to tab 9, which is a previously marked

7 exhibit as P64, P65; Treanor, tab 78. That's the minutes of the first

8 meeting of the ministerial council of the Serbian people. You may recall

9 Mr. Miskin's call at the third session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly for

10 the establishment of a council of ministers to implement the tasks

11 outlined by the groups that were reporting at that session of the Bosnian

12 Serb Assembly. And in particular, in his concern, to implement

13 regionalisation.

14 This is the first meeting of the ministerial council, and if I can

15 ask you to turn your attention to the conclusions found at page 3 of the

16 English, and specifically to conclusion number 3 which states: "The

17 issues regarding cooperation with JNA organs and commands should be

18 treated in the rules of procedure of the ministerial council. Ljubisav

19 Terzic, Dragan Mirkovic, and Dragan Kapetina are entrusted with this

20 task."

21 Mr. Kapetina, isn't this yet another example of you being tasked

22 with responsibilities in connection with pursuing the SDS programme or by

23 SDS high-ranking officials and, in this case in particular, in connection

24 with coordination and cooperation with the JNA?

25 A. No. As far as I'm concerned, this isn't an SDS organ. The

Page 20044

1 ministerial council is a group of ministers from the government of Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina, and we -- Terzic, myself, and Dragan Mirkovic were tasked

3 and we were assistants in the Ministry of Defence. So as far as I'm

4 concerned, this is a state task.

5 Q. Mr. Kapetina, we're almost out of time, so let me ask you one or

6 two quick questions.

7 Are you suggesting that you are not aware now and were not aware

8 then that the ministerial council was composed of members of the

9 government who were SDS members or representatives or who were affiliated

10 with SDS in contrast to a multi-ethnic body?

11 A. Do you mean to say that I should not have recognised the

12 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of cadres of the SDS, SDA,

13 and HDZ? Is that what you want me to do? I knew that it was composed of

14 those three parties and the representatives of those three ethnic groups;

15 of course I knew that. As far as I was concerned, it was the government

16 of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Just --


19 Q. It's quite the contrary, Mr. Kapetina. This meeting of the

20 ministerial council, this first meeting of the ministerial council on

21 July 11th [sic] is the ministerial council of the Assembly of the Serbian

22 People of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not a multi-party, multi-ethnic

23 body, is it, or was it?

24 A. As far as I am concerned it is not a party body. As far as I am

25 concerned, the ministers in the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina are

Page 20045

1 part of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2 Q. Mr. Kapetina, we're out of time for the day, but I submit to you

3 that you knew precisely what the nature of these questions were. In fact,

4 His Honour Judge Orie clarified it for you, and that you have attempted

5 purposefully to evade your work on behalf of these Serbian bodies until

6 confronted with them, and when confronted them, attempt to recharacterise

7 the questions. Isn't that, in fact, what's happening here?

8 A. No, that's not true.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Mr. Tieger, I take it that you misspoke when

10 you said "the first meeting on the 11th of July," where it gives the 11th

11 of January as the date?

12 MR. TIEGER: That's correct, thank you.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Before we finish, Mr. Kapetina, I specifically asked

14 you about ever receiving tasks of the SDS. I also spoke about individuals

15 who held -- SDS members who held high positions. And I do not know

16 whether there's any confusion in this respect, but you said: Should I not

17 have recognised the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina? The documents

18 you were confronted with, the minutes of this first meeting of ministerial

19 council, is not of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. Is there any

20 misunderstanding about that? Or same for the 11th of December, third

21 session of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 These were Serb organs or Serb institutions, and not anymore of the whole

23 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Or do I not understand the meaning of these

24 documents?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In my answers I stated quite

Page 20046

1 categorically that I had never received a task from the functionaries of

2 the Serbian Democratic Party, organs of the Serbian Democratic Party in

3 1991, and that's the truth. And I state that quite categorically, as far

4 as I'm concerned, the vice-premier of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or any

5 minister for that matter, not only functionaries of the Serbian Democratic

6 Party, but the government itself.

7 Now I'm asking the question: Are the rest of the members of the

8 government the legitimate members of the government of Bosnia and

9 Herzegovina? And why they would be legitimate. The constitution and the

10 law is being implemented now, but when I insisted it was not being

11 implemented. So that's that selective approach.

12 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just re-read your answer.

13 So let's -- let me try to understand you. Is it your position

14 that you say since Mr. Simovic was the vice-premier of Bosnia and

15 Herzegovina, whatever --

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Government --

17 JUDGE ORIE: -- whatever -- yes, vice-premier of the government of

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina, that whatever tasks I received, I received them

19 from a member of the legitimate government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At

20 the same time - and that seems to be the issue Mr. Tieger is raising - is

21 that tasking you with these kind of matters is at least discussed in

22 organs that were at that time predominantly, if I may say so, Serb organs

23 and not organs created by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. So we now

24 see Mr. Simovic appearing in two different contexts, two different

25 environments; one being -- I would say constitutionally BiH, and the other

Page 20047

1 one, to say at least, not provided for in the constitution of Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina but predominantly Serb.

3 Do I understand your testimony well that you say: Well, whatever

4 task I got, I always got it from someone who held an official

5 constitutional position in BiH, and it's of no importance that these tasks

6 and the performance of these tasks were discussed in totally different

7 contexts, predominantly Serb contexts, as well? Is that ...

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely. I didn't know about the

9 conversations between Simovic and Karadzic, and I wasn't interested in

10 that or any other conversation. I received this task. I didn't receive

11 any particular tasks that year anyway, but I received that task from the

12 vice-premier, Miodrag Simovic. And I would just like to make one --

13 JUDGE ORIE: If I may ask one additional question before you add

14 something to that.

15 You were working in the Ministry of Defence, weren't you?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's correct.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Isn't it true that civil servants in a Ministry

18 of Defence receive their tasks usually from their superiors in that same

19 ministry?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Now, could you explain how the vice-premier gave you

22 tasks? Directly, indirectly, through your minister? I do not know.

23 Could you please explain this for us, and then -- this is for the

24 interpreters, then I will stop.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that yesterday I said in

Page 20048

1 answer to questions by the Defence, that Minister Doko himself called

2 vice-premier Simovic and told him: Kapetina is available for you as of

3 today. He will not be receiving tasks from me. If I recall, I think that

4 that is what I said.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's what you said. So you said you received

6 these instructions by the vice-premier on the basis of Mr. Doko having

7 told him that you were available for him. Yes. Do you know --

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course. Of course.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's then finish for the day, and that at

10 least clarifies a few matters.

11 We'd like to see you back tomorrow at a quarter past 2.00 in this

12 same courtroom, and we hope then to finish tomorrow in the afternoon. May

13 I again instruct you not to speak with anyone about your testimony and --

14 already given or testimony still to be given.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would just like to

16 make one remark. These comments are very detailed. I cannot follow such

17 complicated details or subjective assessments. It's difficult to tell

18 what the actual questions are. Perhaps the comments could be cut short,

19 if possible.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll try to do the same as what we expect you

21 to do, is to be as much focussing on what's the core of the question, and

22 then you focus on the core of the answer to that question.

23 We stand adjourned until tomorrow, quarter past 2.00, with, again,

24 the appreciation of the Chamber for the interpreters and technicians.

25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.11 p.m.,

Page 20049

1 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day of

2 January, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.