Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 21174

1 Monday, 13 March 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in the courtroom and around

6 the courtroom.

7 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case number

9 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

11 There are a few procedural matters I understood the parties wanted

12 to raise. Mr. Stewart.

13 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. If -- I only raise the question

14 of where we are as far as witnesses are concerned. Mr. Josse is going to

15 deal with one or two other matters, if he may.


17 MR. STEWART: As far as witnesses are concerned, I have informed

18 the Trial Chamber, but this brings Mr. Krajisnik immediately up-to-date as

19 well, Your Honour, if I may, because I haven't had a chance to discuss it

20 with him. Happily, Mr. Lakic is able to travel tomorrow.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we were informed about that, that the withdrawal

22 of his visa was cancelled.

23 MR. STEWART: Yes, as you were, so that's good with Mr. Lakic.

24 The other piece of encouraging news, Your Honour, is that

25 Mr. Maricic, the next witness, is able to travel on Saturday. All the

Page 21175

1 technicalities have been taken care of, it's been confirmed that he will

2 travel.

3 Your Honour, if I may just look ahead to indicate a problem that

4 may arise but might not, and just to flag it. Mr. Maricic arriving on

5 Saturday, the Court is sitting on Monday morning next week. Your Honour,

6 depending on what happens with other witnesses, Your Honours can see

7 straight away that the only opportunity -- or the first opportunity we

8 would have to go and see Mr. Krajisnik with Mr. Maricic would be Monday

9 morning. It is quite impossible to go over the weekend, Your Honour.

10 Just in case there was any chance, I've checked that and have been told

11 unequivocally that's not possible. But, Your Honour, whether that in fact

12 creates a difficulty will depend on the progress we make with this next

13 witness, Mr. Radojko, and then the progress we make with Mr. Lakic.


15 MR. STEWART: May I mention one other thing, Your Honour?

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time already, explore the

17 possibility of not sitting in the morning of Tuesday, the 22nd [sic] of

18 March. But as you know, Friday afternoon and Monday morning are not the

19 most attractive --

20 MR. STEWART: I recognise that, Your Honour, yes.

21 JUDGE ORIE: But we already inquire into possibilities.

22 MR. STEWART: Yes. Your Honour, may I just mention this as well,

23 looking ahead, that perhaps we might bear in mind that Mr. Lakic, though

24 as far as we know in good health, is quite an elderly man, Your Honour,

25 and he's perhaps not -- not able to undertake the same sort of programme

Page 21176

1 that sometimes we do undertake with witnesses; fairly heavy meetings and

2 schedules when they arrive.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think information received -- this

4 information already came to the Chamber when earlier he was expected to

5 arrive. So that's understood.

6 MR. STEWART: Yes. I'm obliged, Your Honour, I'm never quite sure

7 exactly what information has reached everybody in all this, but there it

8 is. And Mr. Maricic is of a similar age, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that, Mr. Stewart.

10 Then there is a motion pending pursuant to Rule 90 bis. It has

11 been filed on the 10th of March. It's an urgent motion. I do not know

12 whether the time up until the 23rd of March, and then, I take it,

13 preferably one or two days before that date, will be enough. I see on

14 your schedule that the Defence would like to have the witness, at latest,

15 at Tuesday, the 21st of March. The only thing I can say is that to file a

16 motion 11 days in advance is not a guarantee for success.

17 Mr. Harmon.

18 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, it is the position of the Prosecutor's

19 Office that we will not file a written reply to this motion.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Can we deal with the matter in open court?

21 MR. HARMON: Yes.

22 JUDGE ORIE: But before I give you an opportunity to respond,

23 Mr. Harmon - and I apologise for interrupting you - Mr. Stewart, I hope

24 you'll forgive me that I do not know all the criminal codes by heart. 211

25 and 226 of the Criminal Code of Republika Srpska deal with what type of

Page 21177

1 crimes?

2 MR. STEWART: I have -- I have no more idea than Your Honour, but

3 Mr. Josse may have slightly more idea than both of us, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE ORIE: But I take it that at least what the Defence would

5 have done in respect of a Defence witness, to see whether there is any

6 overlap with the questions to be put to the witness in the present case,

7 because if the witness would come and would tell us only that by answering

8 questions he would incriminate himself -- I've got no idea what this is.

9 Is this economic crimes, are these war crimes, are these crimes against --

10 crimes against humanity? I've got no idea, and I think it's relevant for

11 the Defence to know in advance.

12 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, two things: First of all, I'm

13 quite confident Mr. Josse can tell you more than I can straight away, Your

14 Honour, but also we have in mind that, even if there is an overlap, the

15 Court, in the usual way, as it has done previously in this case, can

16 direct a witness to answer on the basis that his answers are not to be

17 used against him.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You will understand - and I think that's a

19 matter that has been raised before - that of course we could check with

20 the Prosecution in this court, and perhaps the Prosecution is aware of

21 what type of charges were brought against -- against the witness, but --

22 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, Mr. Josse knows. Should I just hand

23 straight on to him, Your Honour?


25 MR. STEWART: Because we're proceeding on the basis of something

Page 21178

1 neither Your Honour nor I know about and we have someone in court who

2 does.

3 MR. JOSSE: First of all may I say, Your Honour, we did not find

4 it very easy obtaining this information. The source is not as reliable

5 as, frankly, I might have hoped. That is one of the reasons we delayed

6 submitting the motion. But eventually the time arrived where we took the

7 decision that we could wait no longer.

8 JUDGE ORIE: May I interrupt you. When you say "the information

9 was not easy to obtain," are you talking about the content of the articles

10 of the criminal code?

11 MR. JOSSE: Not the contents of the code, as such, but exactly -

12 and I mean exactly - what this gentleman is doing in prison.


14 MR. JOSSE: But, Your Honour, I can tell you that it has nothing

15 to do with alleged war crimes; it's to do with an alleged fraud that

16 occurred after the war had ended.


18 MR. STEWART: Indeed, the matter has been reported on the Tribunet

19 briefly, and has been widely reported in the media in the Republika

20 Srpska. So I'm fairly confident about that. Your Honour, for what it's

21 worth, his co-accused, who's also in custody in the Republika Srpska, is

22 Momcilo Mandic. So --

23 JUDGE ORIE: Well, now at least the Chamber can understand that on

24 the basis of the charges brought against this witness at this moment in

25 Republika Srpska that we do not have to fear that more than you could, in

Page 21179

1 general terms, expect with witnesses, that he would -- he would refrain

2 from answering questions for -- out of fear of self-incrimination, apart

3 from the general fear, perhaps, that exists, but that usually is dealt

4 with this OTP, whereas of course what happens in Republika Srpska is a

5 different matter.

6 MR. JOSSE: Could I say Your Honour is very wise with respect to

7 use the word "general" because I suspect this witness might have general

8 concerns, from what I understand. But these matters have got nothing to

9 do with those general concerns.

10 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear.

11 MR. JOSSE: I understand that he was in a prison in the Sarajevo

12 area. He's been moved out of that prison for logistical reasons, so I am

13 told. He has made a relatively recent contact with connections of ours in

14 the Republika Srpska from his prison cell, as I understand it - this is at

15 least second-hand hearsay, let me make it absolutely plain, not least

16 because of the language difficulties - has again expressed his willingness

17 to come to this court and give evidence, subject to physically being able

18 to and being brought here, and I hope that assists a little bit more.


20 MR. JOSSE: There's a little bit more information I may have if

21 Your Honour has any specific questions, but I can't promise to be terribly

22 helpful, and could I emphasise that really the information I'm relaying to

23 the Court, of course I'm doing it genuinely, but it's based on pretty

24 limited sources of information despite the best efforts of one member of

25 our team in particular.

Page 21180

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's understood and accepted.

2 Mr. Harmon, response to the motion orally.

3 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, we will not file a written response to

4 the motion. I direct the Court's attention to paragraph 4, relief sought;

5 paragraph 8 subpart (ii), we fully subscribe to that portion and we would

6 request that when he arrives here that he not be in contact in the prison

7 with the accused.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The request 8(ii) says more, and says:

9 "Protected from inference by other persons." That would be a bit

10 broader. I mean, would it be sufficient for you if he would be not in

11 contact with the accused in the Detention Unit, or would you like to have

12 him separated from others in that Detention Unit as well?

13 MR. HARMON: Well, our preference is to have him separated from

14 others in the Detention Unit.


16 Mr. Josse.

17 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, we couldn't object to this gentleman

18 being separated from our client or, indeed, anyone else in the prison, but

19 I am sure that in the normal course of events we would ask that he see

20 Mr. Krajisnik in the presence of one of us, as per any other witnesses.

21 MR. HARMON: We have no objection to that.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. That's then clear. The Chamber will then deal

23 with the matter at a -- as quickly as possible.

24 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]

25 JUDGE ORIE: I apologise for having to confer for a second. Yes,

Page 21181

1 the Chamber will give a decision as soon as possible.

2 Then I think we still -- we have a few other matters. First of

3 all, I think, Mr. Josse, that you would still need five minutes to respond

4 to the Prosecution's submissions in relation to the Savkic exhibits?

5 MR. JOSSE: Well, yes, I hope I'll be very much less than that.

6 I'm very grateful to Your Honour's opportunity to return to this subject

7 because we have considered the matter further. I have discussed it, in

8 particular, with Mr. Stewart, who wasn't in court when the matter was last

9 debated, so to speak.

10 So far as P1055 is concerned, we have changed our stance. Having

11 considered very carefully Your Honour's observations, so far as my

12 submissions are concerned, we are now of the view that that document

13 should be admitted into evidence. We accept that it would be, frankly,

14 nonsensical to not admit it into evidence, bearing in mind it purports to

15 come from the witness. And we accept that the issue as to whether or not

16 it's a forgery has nothing to do with its admission into evidence. I

17 repeat, in a sentence, of course the Court is going to need to decide

18 whether it is a forgery. I've made my submissions as to where the burden

19 of proof relies in relation to that, where the standard of proof lies in

20 relation to that, and my submissions have not changed at all as far as

21 that is concerned. But notwithstanding that, whether the Court finds it

22 is a forgery, it isn't a forgery, isn't sure it's a forgery, we do accept

23 it should be admitted into evidence so that the matter can be considered

24 properly by the Chamber.

25 Your Honour, in a further sentence, we do invite the Court to

Page 21182

1 treat that completely differently to our main grounds for objection in

2 relation to documents which contain second- or third-hand hearsay which

3 are put to the witness and which the witness then completely refutes,

4 because in effect that's trying to get 92 bis-type evidence in through the

5 book door. This document, 1055, doesn't fall into that category, and we

6 withdraw our objection to its admission.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, Mr. Josse, this Chamber has

8 accepted, to some extent, what we called contextual exhibits. And if a

9 witness doesn't recognise the document, that would not automatically

10 exclude that exhibit from being relevant and being admissible as a

11 contextual exhibit, but perhaps we should clearly separate that and see

12 that if a witness says "I don't know that document," that it could not be

13 admitted through that witness, which does not, under all circumstances,

14 would exclude the exhibit to be admitted as a contextual exhibit. That's

15 -- this is just a thought, this is not a decision, but a --

16 MR. JOSSE: Well, you can see, Mr. Stewart is anxious to try and

17 discuss the matter with me further, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Take your time, it's not urgent.

19 MR. JOSSE: Thank you very much. We're grateful.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Then I think these were --

21 Mr. Harmon.

22 MR. HARMON: There was one additional matter, Your Honour, and

23 that is the request by the Prosecution to have relief from the deadline --


25 MR. HARMON: -- for an item that is found in the Court's 2nd of

Page 21183

1 March, 2006, omnibus order on the admission of exhibits and related

2 requests. I refer specifically to page 3 of that decision dealing with

3 contracts and other material relating to Prosecution Exhibit 340. And in

4 that, this was an exhibit, Your Honour, that dealt with the relinquishment

5 of property on allegedly a voluntary basis in order to leave

6 municipalities. The Court had ordered the Prosecution to provide the

7 requested documents to the Chamber and the Defence within two weeks of

8 this order. As I mentioned earlier, I had a limited number of such

9 documents. I had been in contact through my investigator with an agency

10 in Bosnia that said that they had a large number of these documents. My

11 investigator went to that agency, was informed that the agency had neither

12 the time nor resources to comply with the Court's order, and we couldn't

13 get them in time. They suggested, instead, that we go to the various

14 municipalities in the ARK where such repositories of such documents

15 existed.

16 Now, I have at this point in time directed my investigator to do

17 just that, subject to a Court's decision giving me some relief from the

18 deadline of this for compliance, which is the 16th of March. What I

19 propose, Your Honour, is the Court put -- grant my request for additional

20 relief, additional time. I will then send my investigator to 11

21 municipalities within the ARK, those 11 being the municipalities that have

22 been touched upon in the evidence before the Court, as opposed to 21

23 municipalities, some of which have never been touched upon, and my

24 investigator will then collect representative samples as the Court has

25 requested. He cannot do that by the 16th of March.

Page 21184

1 JUDGE ORIE: How much time does he need?

2 MR. HARMON: I need to be in touch with him. I would say two

3 weeks.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Two weeks more.

5 MR. HARMON: Two weeks more from the --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, any objection to granting an additional

7 two weeks?

8 MR. STEWART: No, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, your request is granted, Mr. Harmon.

10 MR. HARMON: Thank you, Your Honour.

11 MR. JOSSE: I've got two other matters. One I alluded to on

12 Friday, that is the issue to do with D14.


14 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour originally gave us to today and then very

15 kindly granted an extension. The position is this: I have a person --

16 bearing in mind it was me he was effectively referring to in the course of

17 his evidence -- we'll assume it was me when he talked about Defence

18 counsel because I was the Defence counsel who dealt with it. I have a

19 limited recollection of this. The member of our team who is responsible

20 for these matters is away for another week. I would request two weeks.

21 In that time, I will speak, of course, to the member of the team when he

22 returns, instruct him to try and find the document, and if he doesn't,

23 then to try and contact D14. We would like to be as cooperative as we can

24 about the matter.


Page 21185

1 Mr. Harmon, you were given 14 days, now you are asked 14 days.

2 MR. HARMON: Yes, we do not object, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.

4 Granted, Mr. Josse.

5 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. The next matter, Your Honour, are the

6 exhibits related to Mr. Poplasen. I am not yet in a position to tell the

7 Court which I wish to argue and which I don't, but it may be, for

8 Mr. Harmon's benefit, the Court would like to fix a date for him to return

9 here, bearing in mind I think he is not dealing with the next witness, for

10 that argument to take place. The vast majority I am not going to argue, I

11 can already tell the Court.


13 If you inform Mr. Harmon when you are ready and inform the Chamber

14 at the same time, then we will find a suitable moment to deal with them.

15 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Let's wait until that moment for all exhibits

17 introduced through Mr. Poplasen.

18 MR. JOSSE: And the last matter relates to the next witness and

19 it's not really a procedural matter, it relates to his testimony, so I'll

20 turn to that when the Court is ready.

21 JUDGE ORIE: There -- the last witness --

22 MR. JOSSE: Did I say the last witness? Yes, I beg your pardon,

23 the next witness. I'm sorry.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Next witness.

25 MR. JOSSE: Next witness, I beg your pardon. It relates to

Page 21186

1 Mr. Radojko. It's introduction, so to speak, a preliminary

2 observation-cum-submission that I wish to make before he commences his

3 evidence.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and I take it that you want to make that

5 observation in his absence?

6 MR. JOSSE: Correct.

7 JUDGE ORIE: And there's no other procedural matter to be raised,

8 so therefore, Mr. Harmon and Mr. Margetts, I see that you're about to

9 leave, so you're excused.

10 Mr. Josse, please proceed.

11 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, before the flurry of e-mails this morning

12 between the Chamber, Mr. Tieger, and Mr. Stewart, I was aware of a

13 potential difficulty so far as the transcript of this witness's evidence

14 in the Brdjanin trial. I personally didn't deal with the matter this

15 morning because I was in the UNDU, seeing Mr. Krajisnik. The difficulty

16 that I was aware of was this: Mr. Radojko was originally due to give live

17 evidence at this court in April of 2004. There is no dispute that he came

18 to The Hague, he waited for about five days, he didn't get on, and he was

19 sent home.

20 Thereafter, as I understand it, the Prosecution sought to have his

21 evidence in Brdjanin, which lasted about four days, admitted pursuant to

22 92 bis. I assume that two members of this Chamber read those transcripts

23 and one did not, simply because of the time-span involved because Judge

24 Hanoteau wasn't a member of the Bench at that particular juncture.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Let me see in -- you would -- why do you think that

Page 21187

1 the two other Judges would have read those transcripts?

2 MR. JOSSE: Because, Your Honour, I was under the impression that

3 if a piece of evidence is going to be admitted 92 bis, then the Judges

4 would have had to have read it in order, one, to decide if it can be

5 admitted, and, two, then to decide if it should be admitted subject to

6 cross-examination. So that's why I make that assumption.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I was confused when you said the person who you

8 sought to have his evidence in Brdjanin admitted pursuant to 92 bis.

9 That's fine, but none of these Judges have -- we are not -- now I do

10 understand, yes, and I misread you, admission not in Brdjanin under 92

11 bis, but the transcript of his Brdjanin testimony to be admitted under

12 Rule 92 bis in this case.

13 MR. JOSSE: Absolutely. Precisely. So I'm assuming that that's,

14 albeit a long time ago - almost two years ago - these four days of

15 evidence was read by two of the present members of the Bench.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At least there's a fair chance that if we have

17 not seen every letter of it, then at least we have seen quite some of it,

18 yes.

19 MR. JOSSE: Thereafter, the Court, as I've already said, ordered

20 that Mr. Radojko attend for cross-examination; and thereafter that, the

21 Prosecution decided to drop him as a witness, I accept, on grounds of time

22 and expediency. If I'm wrong about that, Mr. Tieger will correct me, but

23 he and I have discussed the matter briefly this morning and I'm sure that

24 is correct. So the Prosecution, having to make ruthless decisions about

25 time, decided not to call Mr. Radojko in those circumstances.

Page 21188

1 So my first observation prior to Mr. Tieger's e-mail of this

2 morning was there's a certain imbalance, because two members of the Court

3 have read, at least if not in whole, part of the evidence and the other

4 has not.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Well, the last assumption is not a correct one.

6 Judge Hanoteau has familiarised himself with the case and that does not

7 say that he has only read transcripts and -- so therefore -- I mean, I

8 hope that you were not under the impression that whatever happened before

9 the arrival of Judge Hanoteau was unknown to him.

10 MR. JOSSE: Well, I wasn't --

11 JUDGE ORIE: For weeks and weeks he worked hard to get acquainted,

12 but of course I would not know whether -- I would not even know for myself

13 how -- if I read it all, but I have the habit of reading things very

14 intensive, but I could not say, of course, the same for Judge Hanoteau,

15 and I think it's not a matter to -- it's not a question to be answered in

16 detail at this moment.

17 MR. JOSSE: No.

18 JUDGE ORIE: But your assumption that two of the Judges would be

19 familiar with the material and the third would not be is an assumption

20 that I cannot at this moment accept as a correct assumption.

21 MR. JOSSE: Moving on from that, and frankly I don't think it

22 matters a great deal, the Defence position is that we're not relying on

23 the transcripts in Brdjanin and we don't wish to have those admitted under

24 92 bis. And I simply want to be clear that that is the present procedure.

25 I, of course, accept that Mr. Tieger is able to cross-examine the

Page 21189

1 witness with any proper material that he can use, and that obviously

2 includes the transcripts from a previous trial. That's obviously material

3 that can be used in the course of cross-examination, but I simply want and

4 need to be clear that this transcript, four-day transcript, is not part of

5 the evidence as we stand at the moment.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger.

7 MR. TIEGER: I never understood anything to the contrary, Your

8 Honour, and I am not aware of any communication between the parties or to

9 the Court that would have suggested otherwise.

10 JUDGE ORIE: To be quite honest, I don't remember exactly what

11 happened two years ago. I take it that you have submitted for admission

12 92 bis material from Mr. Radojko, that we may have decided that you would

13 have -- that that material was admitted into evidence but that Mr. Radojko

14 should be called for cross-examination. Is that -- that you then said:

15 We're not going to call Mr. Radojko. And I'm not certain anymore whether

16 we then took a decision that you withdraw that 92 bis material because you

17 couldn't meet the condition set by the Chamber or whether the Chamber

18 decided that it was not any longer in evidence.

19 MR. TIEGER: Irrespective of the precise procedural background,

20 Your Honour, it is not the Prosecution's impression or position that those

21 transcripts are in evidence or that the Defence has sought to tender them

22 into evidence.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.

24 MR. TIEGER: So I -- and as I say, I don't know if there was a

25 misimpression to that effect, but I hope that clarifies it.

Page 21190

1 JUDGE ORIE: We'll -- of course we'll check -- for the Chamber

2 it's important to know exactly what the procedural steps have been that

3 were taken, and my memory just doesn't serve me at this moment, which at

4 least means, Mr. Josse, that this Chamber has not prepared itself by

5 studying these -- these transcripts. So therefore, we'll check it during

6 the first break, but we start the examination of Mr. Radojko on the basis

7 that nothing of any written statement -- of any written statement is in

8 evidence at this moment.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, could I just add this because, since I

10 was here at that time - I have been always here, Your Honour; Mr. Josse

11 wasn't - it was always the assumption on the Defence side that where

12 material had been admitted under 92 bis subject to the witness being

13 produced for cross-examination, that if the witness then were not produced

14 for cross-examination, that 92 bis -- that would automatically lapse, that

15 it simply would fall out of evidence without any further technical step

16 being taken, but the practical result may be the same, however, exactly.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I just wanted to know whether we took any

18 practical steps or whether it's on the basis of what you just said that

19 this material is not in evidence.

20 Mr. Josse, are you ready to call Mr. Radojko?

21 MR. JOSSE: Yes, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Madam Usher, could you please.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 [The witness entered court]

25 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Radojko. Can you hear me in a

Page 21191

1 language you understand?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon. I do hear you in a

3 language I understand.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Radojko, before you give evidence in this court,

5 the Rules of Procedure and Evidence require you to make a solemn

6 declaration that you speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

7 truth. May I invite you to make that solemn declaration, of which the

8 text is now handed out to you by Madam Usher.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I shall

10 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Radojko. Please be seated.

12 For those who listened on the English channel, I heard "... that I

13 shall speak ..." It reads "... I will speak ..." I take it that in the

14 original language it's "will" and not "shall," which, of course, is a

15 different -- I take it that you solemnly declare that you will speak the

16 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, Mr. Radojko?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. There was a translation issue.

19 Mr. Josse, please proceed.


21 [Witness answered through interpreter]

22 Examination by Mr. Josse:

23 Q. What's your name, please?

24 A. My name is Jovo Radojko.

25 Q. You were born in the municipality of Bosanski Petrovac?

Page 21192

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And it's right you, in fact, went to higher --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... school in Zagreb in about

5 1981?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You then went to the political science faculty in Zagreb,

8 intending to become a journalist. You didn't complete that and went,

9 instead, to law school?

10 A. Yes. Afterwards I decided to switch over to the law school.

11 Q. You received your diploma from Zagreb University law school in

12 1987 and worked in Zagreb in 1990, until you passed the bar exam?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. You worked for a time in Croatia, but due to ethnic difficulties,

15 you took a job that you were offered in Petrovac in the same year?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. At the end of 1990 you were appointed secretary of the Executive

18 Committee of the Municipal Assembly in Petrovac?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. So far as your political involvement is concerned, you were a

21 member of the Croatian SDS party, which you had joined in 1990?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then you remained a member of the SDS when you moved to

24 Petrovac?

25 A. Yes.

Page 21193

1 Q. The job of secretary of the Executive Committee you remained in

2 until September of 1995?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You then went with your family to Derventa and you were a judge

5 there for approximately 10 years?

6 A. Nine years.

7 Q. In fact, in 2004 you were not re-appointed a judge in Petrovac due

8 to issues involving ethnic quotas, and you've done various things since

9 then and you're presently trying to qualify as a notary. Is that all

10 correct?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. During the war, as we've heard, you were secretary of the

13 Executive Committee. You were also -- you also saw active service in the

14 VRS?

15 A. On a number of occasions, I had been mobilised into the armed

16 forces. I wasn't an active officer; I'm a reservist.

17 Q. And it's right that, as you've said, on occasions you were

18 mobilised to a unit and then you would return and continue your job as

19 secretary to the Executive Committee?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I want at this point to this deal with this matter in real

22 outline, but it is right, isn't it, that after the Second World War there

23 was a great deal of ill feeling by Serbs towards Muslims and Croats as a

24 result of what had gone on during that war?

25 A. Yes.

Page 21194

1 Q. In communist times, were those feelings curtailed or contained in

2 any real and serious way?

3 A. Well, there was constant mistrust amongst the population and a

4 lack of sufferance, but the communist system and the communist regime was

5 relentless in trying to discourage it. They were aware of the risk of all

6 that.

7 Q. It may be important for some of your subsequent answers: Though

8 you've just gone your history, you were away from Petrovac for a long

9 period of time. We know you came back in 1990. When in fact did you

10 leave the municipality?

11 A. I had never actually lived in Petrovac until 1990. My family had

12 land on the territory of the municipality of Kljuc and only a part of what

13 we had, some land and a flat, were in the municipality of Petrovac. I

14 went to school in Kljuc, and I left there to go to Zagreb in 1974, and

15 after 16 years, due to the circumstances, I arrived in Petrovac.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, just to clarify a matter. One of your

17 previous questions was about ill feelings, and the witness in his answer

18 referred to mistrust, and then at the end of his answer he says: "They

19 were aware of the risk of all that." I take it that the witness meant to

20 say that the risk of the events experienced during the Second World War

21 would repeat itself. Is that how I have to understand the risk?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I suppose you have

23 understood me well. What I meant to say was the communist leadership was

24 aware of the risk involved in even discussing these issues, and they

25 wanted to suppress them in every way possible, and that's what they did.

Page 21195

1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.


3 Q. The president of the Municipal Assembly was a gentleman called

4 Mr. Novakovic. Is that right?

5 A. Up until the end of 1992.

6 Q. When he was killed in the conflict?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I know this is a generalisation, but as far as you could see, what

9 sort of president was he? Did he do the job well?

10 A. Well, under the circumstances, he did it to the best of his

11 ability.

12 Q. And was he a member of the SDS?

13 A. He was. He was one of the leading SDS members within the

14 municipality.

15 Q. I want to ask you immediately about the growth of criminal gangs

16 in the municipality. When did it become apparent that there were criminal

17 gangs operating in Petrovac?

18 A. I cannot give you an exact date, nor was this a phenomenon which

19 came about all of a sudden. It is something that developed and started

20 escalating gradually. Basically, as the war was spreading on the area of

21 the former Yugoslavia, a certain number of people joined military units.

22 Certain people because they were conscripted or mobilised, and others were

23 volunteers. Amongst volunteers there were people who did not have an

24 acceptable goal, so to say. There were people who went, donned uniforms,

25 picked up arms, and when time came for them to take leave, because

Page 21196

1 everybody would get leave in between periods of time spent on the front

2 lines, they would go home but they would keep their weapons and their

3 ammunition, and at least those people who had less-than noble intentions

4 used a pretty simple method. The next time around, they wouldn't join the

5 unit that they came from but another unit, and then they would take

6 weapons there as well, and they kept quiet about their previous unit.

7 Since the system was in a total disarray, they were able to do so;

8 otherwise, under normal circumstances, they wouldn't have been able to get

9 away with it. So in the end they didn't even go to war, as such, but

10 those were people who were criminals or who had criminal intentions or

11 tendencies, even before the war. So they declared themselves to be some

12 kind of protection force of the people or whatever, but gradually they

13 starting using this apparent participation and membership of the armed

14 forces as an excuse in the public eye in order to avoid any pressure being

15 brought to bear in the sense that they should be arrested, and they

16 started using those weapons for less-than noble goals.

17 For example, if they were arrested by the civilian police and they

18 asked them for their IDs, they would be able to prove that they were

19 members of the military, so they couldn't do anything about them. So they

20 would turn to the military police, but in most cases they were too far

21 away - in this particular case, in Croatia - and when the feedback came

22 back, it would again be time for them to join the unit and that would be

23 it.

24 Q. I'm going to stop you there. That's quite a lot of information

25 there. It's quite important perhaps to and define some sort of period.

Page 21197

1 Help us, if you can, with when you say these gangs started to emerge in

2 your municipality. If you don't know, say so.

3 A. In our area, at some point in the first half of 1992 was the first

4 time that this was noticed as far as I can remember, and this was the

5 first time that there was intervention on the part of the then-member of

6 the National Assembly. He first initiated this and he asked for them to

7 be stopped. I don't know whether at the time it was the Crisis Staff or

8 the War Presidency, because they tended to change their name quite

9 frequently, but I seem to remember that they asked the police

10 administration to arrest those people because -- I mean, they couldn't

11 actually order the police to do so, they could only ask them to do so.

12 And that was the system back then.

13 And I know there were some serious attempts as banning them from

14 the area, even though they were not brought to trial. I know they were

15 arrested. Some of them had been released, by force, by their own

16 colleagues, so to say, and so on.

17 Q. Now, I have used the word "criminal gang" deliberately. By

18 "criminal gang" -- let me start that again. In your mind, does "criminal

19 gang" equate with paramilitary or are they different concepts and

20 entities?

21 A. I'm going to give you my own personal opinion. I do know exactly

22 what the distinction is and what the classification is, rather. I really

23 do believe that there were criminal gangs, criminal groups, whatever you

24 want to call them. There were several such groups appearing in our area.

25 Some were chased away straight away; others dwelt a bit longer. The

Page 21198

1 biggest problem was represented by those who originally came from the area

2 because you couldn't chase them anywhere. Why do I think that they're not

3 paramilitary units? In our area, there were no paramilitary units or

4 formations because all those who were soldiers had their specific and

5 well-determined affiliation. Paramilitary formations do have some kind of

6 system of command and all that. I mean, this group normally exists in the

7 shape and form of a military unit, even though it may not be within the

8 framework of the official armed forces. But that's not who they were.

9 They would don their uniforms, pick up their weapons, strut around town,

10 and then go in to rob someone, and then they would go back to a cafe or to

11 a bar and spend the money.

12 Q. Can you help at all as to any definition of these groups; how many

13 were there, how many people were in them, do you know the names of their

14 leaders? That type of thing.

15 A. In the area of our municipality, as far as I heard from members of

16 the Crisis Staff and the police chief, when he used to come, having been

17 invited by the Crisis Staff in order to intervene, two, possibly three,

18 groups had been identified. They had relatively few members, permanent

19 members, let's say. Three to four, they might have had other associates,

20 but leading members were very few in number. One of the group was led by

21 someone called Topalovic. As to whether he was the actual boss ... But I

22 think they were more or less equals. You couldn't really say that one

23 person was bossing everybody else about. Perhaps he was slightly more of

24 a leader than the others. And that group was arrested on the occasion of

25 that intervention that I referred to earlier on. And since there were the

Page 21199

1 four of them and they were arrested, and then another group came along and

2 they released them, they made it possible for them to get out of prison.

3 They threatened the police chief with weapons, they pointed guns at him

4 and they threatened everybody else, and so I suppose that there must have

5 been more than four in the gang. And the chief of police, I suppose, did

6 not dare give us any more details when he came to report on the situation

7 at the War Presidency.

8 I was present because I myself spotted one of those people in the

9 street and I was quite frightened and I came to tell them, and they made

10 jokes at my expense, telling me that I was scared of everything, but then

11 when they received the information from the police chief, they realised

12 how serious the situation is.

13 There was a second group, I think a young guy was a member, but

14 I'm not sure because I only arrived there a couple months earlier and I

15 was more involved in my own work and I didn't really visit the bars or

16 cafes and I didn't really know that many locals, but I know that people

17 would point to others who were involved in such shady dealings.

18 And there was another group, as I said. They had a white Golf

19 vehicle. They had Sarajevo licence plates. They might have stolen the

20 car, I don't know, but apparently they were originally from Petrovac and I

21 know one of them was killed in a car accident.

22 And there were rumours about another group which apparently came

23 from the outside. On occasion they would come and rest, so to say, in

24 Petrovac, about four to five people, and I know that somebody called Caric

25 was a member of that group, and at a later stage he was arrested by the

Page 21200

1 military police. What actually happened to him afterwards, I don't know,

2 but the leadership had told me that he was taken to prison at Kamenica

3 near Drvar, apparently due to some criminal activity on his part. What

4 exactly that criminal activity was I never found out, but when I did ask

5 questions, I was told it wasn't a good idea to ask too many questions

6 about these things.

7 So I know that there were at least three of those groups. As I

8 said, there were not too many people there, but obviously they must have

9 had associates, supporters, and people who may have participated in the

10 division of the booty. There wasn't all that much of it, I suppose,

11 because what could they have found in people's houses? There were not too

12 many wealthy people there --

13 Q. I'm going to stop you again. I'm going to stop you because I'd

14 like to be a little bit more specific. You discussed or mentioned the

15 fact that they robbed people, went into people's homes and stole booty.

16 What other source of crimes did these groups commit?

17 A. As far as I know, some of the robbers at the time - that is to say

18 the first half of 1992 - killed a man whom I knew by sight. He was an

19 attendant at the petrol station and he was killed in armed robbery, and

20 Mr. Jovica Sepa told me about it, and he knew about it because this guy

21 who had been killed was a close friend of his family.

22 Q. Stop there, please. What was the ethnicity of the man who was

23 killed at the petrol station, please?

24 A. He was a Muslim.

25 Q. So there was a robbery, there was some murder. Was robbery and

Page 21201

1 this killing directed at people because they were Muslims or was the

2 criminal activity random?

3 A. Look, I wouldn't say that those were accidental crimes. Those

4 people were guilty of a succession of crimes. They would run into

5 somebody in the street and relieve them of their car, for example. But

6 the truth is also something else. They normally picked on Muslims because

7 they expected that perhaps this made it less likely for them to be

8 prosecuted. They must have been very surprised when they were arrested,

9 but they robbed anyone. And I think one of the MPs, the one who

10 complained, I think -- well, he had an agricultural holding and some of

11 his flock of animals and -- were taken away and his shepherd was killed as

12 well, and I think they did it out of revenge at a later stage, probably

13 because he was the one who asked for those people to be brought to trial.

14 I don't have any hard and fast facts or information about it, but that was

15 the conclusion drawn across town.

16 Q. You have already mentioned in the course of one of your earlier

17 answers the inability of the authorities to deal with these people --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, may I first ask a clarifying question to

19 the witness.

20 Mr. Radojko, you said, "They normally picked on Muslims because

21 they expected that perhaps this made it less likely for them to be

22 prosecuted."

23 Could you explain why it was less likely for them to be prosecuted

24 if they would choose Muslims?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that time the conflict on the

Page 21202

1 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina had already started. The Croatian

2 armed forces had crossed over to Brod and a part of the territory was

3 taken all the way to river Ukrina in Derventa. In Herzegovina as well

4 some units had cropped up and started military action. And so there was a

5 great deal of tension. Tensions were mounting and there was a lot of

6 animosity and resentment in the media, through the radio programmes, et

7 cetera. So it was an ongoing thing, and I suppose that, in their frame of

8 mind, that must have concluded that they were allowed to do that, entitled

9 to do that. I don't know what else to say. But at any rate, the reason

10 I'm saying this is that they used to engage in attacks and plundering of

11 Muslim inhabitants rather than Serbs, and Serbs are in the overwhelming

12 majority in the area, so that led me to conclude this.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Could you be a bit more specific as far as the

14 time of that specific incident you mentioned is concerned. Until now you

15 said "beginning of 1992." You now said at that time the conflict had

16 already started. Could you tell us when in the first half of 1992 this

17 incident took place.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know a somewhat broader story

19 about this, but it would take up too much time. But I suppose it must

20 have been in June, July, I don't know. At any rate, it was by the middle

21 of the year. I found out about it from that guy who was a member of the

22 Executive Board, and he said that he was sorry that he hadn't done

23 anything himself because he felt that he might have been able to save that

24 man. In other words, that man had offered -- or rather, asked him to take

25 the property that had been looted and keep it at his house, and he said

Page 21203

1 that he couldn't because of the job he had and that everybody would say

2 that he took advantage of Muslims. And he refused them, even though they

3 were friends. And he said, "Had I taken this property, they wouldn't have

4 come and taken it because they wouldn't have had anything." So that's my

5 conclusion.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


8 Q. You have already mentioned in the course of one of your earlier

9 answers about the inability of the authorities to deal with these gangs.

10 Firstly, what did the police try and do?

11 A. Well, the authorities were pretty powerless, not altogether

12 powerless. They did have some potential which they did use to some

13 extent, but it was inefficient because those regulations had been

14 inherited from the previous regime and the police administration or the

15 police chief would be at the regional level and the local police was

16 accountable to the regional administration. And that's who gave them

17 their orders, on the basis of which orders they could then act. And there

18 was never anything they had to decide, as such, at the local level. And

19 it was a pretty rigid system which made any efficient and swift reaction

20 impossible.

21 Secondly, as to the armed forces, which had already descended upon

22 Petrovac in large numbers, because there are four regional routes crossing

23 Petrovac in all directions, so it was an area of transit for all military

24 and paramilitary forces, and very often it would happen that, for example,

25 the paramilitaries would enter the town and they would stay at the hotel

Page 21204

1 and they expected to be given everything, full hospitality, and they would

2 pay nothing because they were, so to say, going to war to defend Serbdom.

3 So they had no actual command structure, as such. I knew that the

4 municipal leadership complained because I myself was drafting these

5 documents and these requests addressed to the military command, and the

6 military command would write back saying they were people who had nothing

7 to do with them, and they actually had nothing to do with the actual armed

8 forces. They were the conscripts of the devil. They would join the unit

9 that they picked. They were these paramilitaries. They had some kind of

10 internal command with these smaller groups, but they were not within the

11 framework of the actual system. Sometimes, in order to avoid prosecution,

12 they would declare themselves to be a member of a certain unit and by the

13 time you found out they were not part of that unit, they had disappeared

14 and there was no trace of them, they're at the other end of the country.

15 They were stopped to a certain extent only as late as the end of 1992.

16 Not quite, but to a considerable extent.

17 Q. So you've mentioned the police, the army. What about the

18 municipal authorities which you were part of? Why didn't you do more to

19 control them?

20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, before you continue, I'm totally lost by

21 the previous answer of the witness. You asked him about the inability of

22 the authorities to deal with criminal gangs. First part of the answer the

23 witness explains the ineffective command structures of the police. The

24 second part of his answer is about the presence of military and

25 paramilitary forces and how these paramilitary forces behaved and -- well,

Page 21205

1 a lot more command structures. It's totally unclear what in this respect

2 these -- first of all, from paramilitary forces I would not expect much in

3 investigating criminal gangs. But it's totally unclear how the second

4 part of the answer deals with your question. The first part is clear.

5 Could you please try to clarify it.


7 Q. Well, Mr. Radojko, you've just mentioned paramilitaries in

8 relation to my question which related to control by the authorities of the

9 gangs. First follow-up question is: What have paramilitaries got to do

10 with control of the gangs?

11 A. Based on my knowledge, they were not subordinated to anyone nor

12 could anyone control them. These gangs had taken up the efforts of the

13 few police forces there were, whereas on the other hand the

14 paramilitaries, by the fact that they had passed through the town and

15 acted as they did, they incited the local thieves and local criminals, so

16 to speak, to even engage more in their misconduct. But I wanted to draw

17 your attention to the fact that they -- they were there only temporarily.

18 Most of the local men were on the front line and nobody could have stood

19 up to these people, even if they wanted to.

20 Q. What about the legitimate or regularised and mobilised armed

21 forces; what could they do about it?

22 A. As a rule, the mobilised forces were on the front line; however, a

23 good many members of these units were given to abandoning their positions

24 which would, under normal circumstances, be called desertion and would

25 incur criminal responsibility. However, I have to point out that in

Page 21206

1 Bosnia at the time there was no army. These were armed persons who simply

2 joined units. Even those who had not served or had not gone through

3 military service for whatever disability they had, even they joined units.

4 It was only when the situation became too difficult and complicated that

5 they suddenly invoked their disabilities.

6 The local authorities that I worked for had for many times sought,

7 both verbally and in writing, from the military commands that they do

8 something to discipline the soldiers, to prevent the soldiers from taking

9 weapons into town, because there had been victims as a result of members

10 of the army who would appear armed in town, intoxicated, and embark on

11 plundering enterprises, which only added to tensions, escalating them, and

12 nurturing total absence of the rule of law. That was as far as these

13 regular forces could have intervened.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, again, time-frame. The witness said: "I

15 have to point out in Bosnia at the time there was no army."

16 What time-frame do we have in mind? Because earlier, talking

17 about the incident, we're talking about June. The witness has testified

18 that there were no military force -- no paramilitary units or -- there. I

19 now do understand that sometimes paramilitary units were there and even

20 encouraged criminal gangs. It's becoming more and more confusing to me.

21 When you said: "At that time there was no army in Bosnia," which

22 moment did you have exactly in mind?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was not my intention

24 to confuse anyone. I simply tried to explain a state of affairs. I used

25 to be a member of an elite military unit and I know what the army looks

Page 21207

1 like. What we Muslims, Serbs, and Croats had was a sort of army which did

2 not really have any command structures, where soldiers could do whatever

3 they wanted. However, officially speaking, these persons were indeed

4 members of the army but they did not behave as such, nor did the command

5 structure have any effective control of them in the sense which a military

6 command structure is, because this person was free to join the unit or

7 leave at leisure. In my opinion and under the then-valid legislation,

8 such conduct should have been punished. Such a situation only served to

9 produce further disorder and lack of discipline.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

11 MR. JOSSE: Well, yes. How -- could --

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Judge Hanoteau would have a question.

13 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I just would like to understand

14 whether this was only for a time or whether this continued for a longer

15 time and whether this was the general situation. Was there a point in

16 time when this army suddenly became regular and became structured and

17 actually became consistent, you know, actually behaved like what you could

18 expect out of an army? Or you say throughout the conflict it was ongoing

19 and it was always like that, to have this disorganised and disbanded army

20 where everybody was doing whatever they wanted. So what exactly do you

21 mean?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this situation

23 persisted throughout the war practically; however, the worst situation in

24 those terms was the one in 1992. Back in 1992, nobody knew what they were

25 supposed to do. The officers who had stayed behind, who had not been

Page 21208

1 accepted by the JNA in Belgrade, were felt abandoned and deceived. They

2 were not able to find their way in -- under a new system, whereas there

3 were new members of the army who refused obedience to what they thought

4 were communist officers. It was only after the war that order could be

5 brought to the army. Throughout the war, everyone knew that a unit of a

6 light brigade strength, which was perhaps a battalion of more strength,

7 could simply abandon their positions and go home because they were

8 dissatisfied with the situation. Of course, information about this was

9 suppressed because it was very dangerous for the other side, the enemy

10 side, to know what the situation was like.

11 Now, as far as robberies and general disorder in town was

12 concerned, this showed that the local authorities had no power. Everybody

13 was afraid. Nobody dared to enter a cafe or to try to intervene in any

14 such situation. This is what the situation was like in 1992.

15 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, but are you just talking

16 about the geographical area that you were in or the entire territory?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was general disarray in the

18 entire territory. There was no possibility of restoring order. In Banja

19 Luka there was a general unrest, a rebellion. A tank entered the town,

20 and of course the information about this was suppressed because they were

21 afraid the enemy side would find out about it. But in fact there was a

22 putsch effected there.

23 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.


25 Q. It's right, Mr. Radojko, that at least one, if not more, prominent

Page 21209

1 gang members were arrested by the police.

2 A. After the intervention by the MP Milanovic, who went to the

3 municipal building and told the president of the municipality, Novakovic,

4 that he was going to be the first one to move out of town unless the

5 situation is changed, thereupon Mr. Novakovic invited me to keep the

6 minutes of the meeting, and the chiefs of both the military and the

7 civilian police were invited. The public prosecutor was there as well, as

8 were probably some members of the Crisis Staff. Conclusions were adopted

9 at this meeting which were more of a declarative nature, I believe, to the

10 effect that all those responsible should immediately arrest the

11 perpetrators and that the prosecutor should immediately proceed to produce

12 an indictment against them, because the identities of the most prominent

13 gang members were known. I remained by the phone as the duty person

14 throughout the afternoon and the evening. Then the public prosecutor, who

15 could not reach Mr. Novakovic, informed me of the arrest of these persons.

16 I congratulated him on this.

17 The next morning, as I was on my way to work, I saw one of the men

18 leaning against a kiosk there, holding an M-84 machine-gun with ammunition

19 belts, and as I saw him I was shocked and frightened because I was afraid

20 that he would open fire at me. I recognised him. I tried to pass by him

21 inconspicuously because I thought he was going to perhaps recognise me. I

22 knew that this was a dangerous person, and I informed the officials in the

23 municipality that I had seen him, and they were laughing at the fact that

24 I was frightened.

25 Then I asked Mr. Latinovic, the president of the Executive

Page 21210

1 Committee, to call the police chief to double check what the situation

2 was. The police chief said he was going to come over to the municipality

3 building rather than talk over the phone. As he reached the municipal

4 building, he told us that he did not wish to speak over the phone because

5 he believed the phones were tapped. He threw his police cap on the desk

6 as a protest and said that he was no longer going to discharge the duty

7 because they had threatened him with a gun, pointed a gun, put a gun into

8 his mouth. That was the end of that part of the story.

9 The public prosecutor was no longer able to activate the

10 indictment he had written the night before because he did not dare to.

11 There was no police chief anymore, and of course this meant that at that

12 point in time the police would not have been able to act upon the

13 indictment.

14 However, this incident did yield some positive results because

15 later on Mr. Novakovic used his offices to intervene everywhere, including

16 Banja Luka. Mr. Milanovic, who had been thus frightened, and rightly so

17 because later on they had robbed him of his flock of stock and had killed

18 his shepherd, he himself, when he went to the municipal building, said

19 that they had probably done so out of revenge. Still, these gangs seemed

20 to have gone a bit quiet because the -- some of their members had been

21 arrested, after all, and so they lay low for a while.

22 Q. I just want to clarify -- I'll repeat that. I just want to

23 clarify when this occurred that they were arrested and effectively

24 immediately released.

25 A. This might have been in June, July 1992. I'm not sure. I know

Page 21211

1 that the Muslim population was still there, the majority of them, at any

2 rate. A group of them might have asked to go to Bihac. It was in this

3 period of time. Because of -- and this was because -- exactly because of

4 this criminal conduct expressed in robberies which were done simply

5 because these people thought that they needed these items that they

6 robbed. This was the rule of the Wild West, where the sheriff was

7 powerless in the face of these men.

8 Q. And I just want to be clear about one other thing, and if this

9 leading is unacceptable, I'll be stopped. You're saying in effect that

10 the chief of police --

11 MR. TIEGER: That is, I'm afraid, clearly an attempt to sum up the

12 witness's testimony.

13 MR. JOSSE: All right. I have no problem, Your Honour. As you

14 know -- as Your Honour knows, with respect, I've got no difficulty about

15 not leading, it just takes an awfully long time. That's the first

16 attempt, and if that's going to be the reaction, I'm going to be a long

17 time. I've got no difficulty with this, let me make that clear.

18 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I mean, that's extremely unfair.

19 Mr. Josse has asked a number of leading questions in the course of this

20 session and this is the first time I've objected. And after the witness

21 has -- only after the witness has been asked, in essence, to encapsulate

22 or summarise a fairly long explanation, and I think it should come from

23 the witness.


25 Mr. Josse, I understand that you accept the objection.

Page 21212

1 MR. JOSSE: I do.

2 JUDGE ORIE: At the same time, it should not be understood as an

3 invitation by Mr. Tieger to -- not to put leading questions to the witness

4 to the extent he -- as the objection stood, and you'll find out by doing

5 it, as you did before, where the limits approximately are. Please

6 proceed.

7 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

8 Q. I'd like you to clarify again, Mr. Radojko, what you were told by

9 the chief of police as to why the men that he was -- that he arrested were

10 -- was released -- were released, perhaps I should say.

11 A. He did not tell me that, he told the leadership. He did not tell

12 me that they were released, but rather that they had been kidnapped from

13 the detention unit in the police station, or rather, that they had been

14 freed by force.

15 Q. And any idea how long they were in detention of the police before

16 they were freed by force?

17 A. To the best of my recollection, which is not really reliable -

18 it's difficult to remember these things - at any rate it was already

19 getting dark when I managed to send the copies of the minutes to everyone

20 which stated what they were expected to do. It must have been around 9.00

21 or 10.00 in the evening. I don't know when it was exactly that they had

22 been freed. Probably during the night or in the early morning hours. I

23 don't know how long it took their associates to get organised for such an

24 action. We did not have a detention unit downtown, and they were supposed

25 to be transferred to Banja Luka directly from the police station.

Page 21213

1 Probably this was why this action ensued so soon, because it is very

2 difficult to pull anyone out of the detention in Banja Luka -- out of the

3 prison facility in Banja Luka.

4 MR. JOSSE: Would that be a convenient moment, Your Honour?

5 JUDGE ORIE: It is, Mr. Josse. We'll have a break until quarter

6 past.

7 --- Recess taken at 3.52 p.m.

8 --- On resuming at 4.22 p.m.

9 JUDGE ORIE: The 90 bis decision has been signed and perhaps even

10 already been filed, but if not then it will be filed this afternoon.

11 Then as far as the transcript, the 92 bis transcript of

12 Mr. Radojko is concerned, it was admitted into evidence by a decision

13 dated the 7th of April, 2004, and I read: "... are admitted into

14 evidence, provided that the witness appears for cross-examination."

15 Then we have a decision of this Chamber which is called "Order

16 relating to Prosecution's applications to admit evidence pursuant to Rule

17 92 bis," which is a decision of the 19th of July, 2004. On the third page

18 it reads: "Considering that the Chamber ..." et cetera, "... has

19 gradually come to the conclusion that the 33 Rule 92 bis witnesses

20 admitted thus far (five of them with cross-examination 6)." Footnote 6

21 reads: "Another 92 bis witness, Jovica Radojko, who was admitted on the

22 condition that he be cross-examined, was withdrawn by the Prosecution."

23 That means it is in footnote 6 on the record that the witness was

24 withdrawn, which means that no evidence under Rule 92 bis is at this

25 moment before this Chamber.

Page 21214

1 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.

2 MR. JOSSE: For what it's worth, it's on that basis and with that

3 knowledge that I had made the assumption that I had alluded to earlier.

4 JUDGE ORIE: It's now on the record again where we find it and

5 what procedural course it took.

6 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.


9 Q. Mr. Radojko, I next want to turn to the issue of the departure of

10 the Muslims from your municipality. It might be helpful if I summarise

11 the position with a short leading question. There were three convoys of

12 Muslims that departed; two in 1992 and one in 1993. Is that right?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. The first convoy went in the direction of Bihac?

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. Via, in fact -- by crossing the Croatian border?

17 A. Correct.

18 Q. Which month in 1992 did that convoy leave?

19 A. I can't remember. I only remember that I was accompanying the

20 convoy as a negotiator, and there was at least one representative of the

21 Muslims with me. These were people who had long been asking to go to

22 Bihac. I remember that the weather was pinching cold, although I can't

23 date it, really. There are documents somewhere about it. We were

24 assisted by the CzechBat of UNPROFOR. They provided logistics support.

25 There was some exchange involved here as well because the president saw

Page 21215

1 the possibility to allow a certain number of Muslims to leave for Bihac,

2 including -- there were some also inmates who were held in Drnis but some

3 of them had fled. And however, there were the families of these persons

4 who were left behind.

5 Q. I'm stopping you because I think we can simplify this a little

6 bit. First of all, the Muslims that departed from your municipality,

7 where were they living immediately prior to their departure?

8 A. In Petrovac.

9 Q. And were they living freely or were they detained? That's really

10 what I meant.

11 A. Up until that point, there was no violence, nobody was being

12 detained or anything of the sort. There weren't even tensions, really,

13 not any to speak of.

14 Q. How many people departed in that first convoy?

15 A. Only some of them left, those who wanted to. Based on some lists

16 that were drawn up by the Muslim leadership in Bihac and in the general

17 region and by our representatives, there were about 130 to 150 Serbs, some

18 of whom came from this camp near Cazin. The village is there. And some

19 of them were from Bihac town who wanted to cross over to the Serb

20 territory. In order to justify the fact that the Muslims were allowed to

21 leave for Bihac, the president allowed also that some of these people be

22 transferred over there. He also promised that everybody else who wanted

23 to leave would eventually be allowed to do so.

24 Q. In this convoy of people from your municipality, to what extent

25 did the group include prominent members of the Muslim community?

Page 21216

1 A. If you mean their leadership, their leaders, as far as I'm

2 concerned, left in secret and they crossed over with the help of

3 Mr. Milanovic and I believe Mr. Ivanic, either in their own cars or I

4 don't know, but they helped them cross over to Bihac. These people, I

5 mean these were normal citizens, and I remember one was an entrepreneur

6 because he, together with my president of the Executive Board, had a

7 private deal which involved the exchange of their property. So they each

8 minded the other's property in Bihac and Petrovac respectively. I only

9 met him a couple of times in my whole life, so I can't remember his name.

10 But at any rate, those were just normal, common citizens. But they had

11 seen that there was risk of further escalation of conflict, and at that

12 stage they asked to be allowed to go. They were probably scared to be

13 found in the wrong place at the wrong time when they might be threatened,

14 and probably they -- most of them wanted to go but our armed forces didn't

15 let them because in the direction, on the road to Bihac, there was a unit

16 made up of Serbs who had already left Bihac. And there was no way you

17 could take that route because they would have shot anyone, and that's why

18 we found a round-about way, going through Croatia, through the

19 then-Republika Srpska Krajina, because the president asked them to

20 cooperate and not make any trouble for us and help that population get

21 out. And since UNPROFOR was there already, they -- I believe -- I don't

22 know who -- what their leadership or our president, they coordinated

23 things with UNPROFOR and made sure they would help them cross the border

24 from the west to the east. And there was this exchange which took place

25 at an area which was manned by the Czech Battalion, and the place is

Page 21217

1 called the Japanese curve. That's where it is, and it is in the area

2 which is now called --

3 THE INTERPRETER: And the interpreter didn't hear what it's called

4 now.


6 Q. What is that area now called please, Mr. Radojko? The interpreter

7 didn't pick up what you said.

8 A. The area is called the Japanese curve because there is a curve

9 there on the road, a bend, at which there was a car accident and a number

10 of Japanese businessmen were killed there in the accident, and that's why

11 it's called like that. It was the first time I heard the name and I had

12 never heard of it before, even though I travelled down that road pretty

13 often when I was coming back from Zagreb.

14 Q. And how many Serbs did your municipality receive in exchange for

15 the Muslims that left?

16 A. Well, approximately as the number of Muslims that left, even more

17 Muslims wanted to leave but the president and the other members of the

18 leadership, because of the pressure that was being brought to bear by

19 those on the front lines, could not allow them to go because the military

20 kept complaining that this was making things more difficult for them, this

21 sort of behaviour.

22 Q. There was a second, much larger, convoy in September of 1992. Is

23 that correct?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. At that point in time it was -- the situation in your municipality

Page 21218

1 became extremely difficult and dangerous for Muslims. You would accept

2 that, wouldn't you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Why -- let me rephrase that. What had led to the increase in

5 tensions so that the situation became extremely difficult for them?

6 A. I explained this, and it can be found in the transcript. After

7 the first convoy, there were supposed to be --

8 Q. Can I stop you there. I think "by the transcript" you mean your

9 interview with investigators and lawyers from the Office of the Prosecutor

10 that was held in Banja Luka in the summer of -- June of 19 -- June of

11 2003, I beg your pardon.

12 A. I mean that too, but I also mean the part of my statement that

13 I've gave before the Court in that same case. But briefly, after that

14 first convoy, since Muslims wanted to go to Bihac, we have to understand

15 the fact that they had family ties to Muslims living in Bihac. And they

16 would have felt safer, since they were more numerous and many of them had

17 property, houses, families there. And in relatively large numbers, I

18 don't know how many, but at any rate many more people than the number of

19 people who managed to cross over wanted to go, even back then, and the

20 president, as far as I know, promised them they would be able to do it but

21 at a later stage when the conditions were more propitious and when there

22 was a little bit less tension with regard to the military. However, the

23 way things developed meant that the military became even worse because the

24 fighting was ever more severe.

25 And I think there was somebody either from the War Presidency or

Page 21219

1 the Crisis Staff - I keep calling it the War Presidency because I don't

2 know at what period of time they had what name - but at any rate, there

3 was this man who was a member of that body, the Crisis Staff or whatever

4 you want to call it, and he said in so many words that there's no

5 possibility of allowing them to go to Bihac, that it couldn't be done.

6 And that's why that kind of transfer was stopped, and so they remained in

7 Petrovac. And so there was this constant threat. The president sent me

8 on a number of occasions to talk to representatives of UNPROFOR and

9 International Red Cross at Lapac, Licko/Petrovo Selo, and Knin, and to ask

10 them to send those people to Split, if possible, if indeed we couldn't

11 send them to Bihac. Initially they accepted, and then afterwards they

12 didn't quite dare go ahead with it and so everything was suspended.

13 Whenever I was travelled with a delegation I was accompanied by

14 two, three respectable Muslim citizens who were the representatives of

15 that Muslim community, and I was both the driver and was in charge of

16 information and talks and everything, so we travelled together as a group,

17 as a single delegation, single unit, as it were. And when that failed and

18 we have told them that there was this risk that in case of further

19 escalation of conflict, the local authorities would not be able to protect

20 the population, because that was the assessment on the part of the

21 president and everybody else. That was their own assessment and,

22 unfortunately, it came true. After an event happened on the battle-field,

23 there was total escalation of conflict and everybody grabbed their rifles

24 and arms and walked up and down town and fired their arms blindly, almost,

25 and they were victims.

Page 21220

1 Q. Stop there. It was that event on the battle-field that I was

2 specifically asking you about first of all. Was there an event which made

3 the situation particularly difficult? If so, describe that event briefly.

4 A. Yes, there was one such event in September 1992. Namely, a unit,

5 a Serb unit, mostly made up of people from Petrovac and the refugees from

6 Bihac who, together with their families, came to Petrovac. Well, a lorry

7 was caught in an ambush of a Muslim group, and they killed and massacred

8 people, because it was a swift attack from all sides. And 23 Serb

9 fighters were killed, and I think either 17 or 19 of them were actually

10 originally from Petrovac. It was an odd number and it was less than 20.

11 Anyway, they were taken to the local morgue, to the hospital, and some of

12 the wounded were taken to the hospital as well, because the fighting was

13 still going on. And already on that evening the situation became totally

14 horrible. I went to donate blood, and I was attacked by some people

15 there. According to them, the people from the municipality were

16 protecting the Muslims, so I had to flee because they were armed. And

17 mostly there were shots fired all over town. The president convened the

18 meeting on the same evening, tried to find a way out. He phoned everyone

19 left, right, and centre. He phoned the police, but the whole city was on

20 the boil, as it were.

21 And the police people were called. There were guards around

22 houses. To some extent it was successful, but there was simply no

23 possibility of protecting every single household. And so there was some

24 kind of spontaneous revenge underway. And under those circumstances, two

25 or three days later -- that is to say that as the day on the funeral. The

Page 21221

1 funerals probably took place on that evening. And respectable citizens

2 who were Muslims asked for a meeting with the president, and I know that

3 because I was manning the phones all the time. And he somehow, through

4 what channels I don't know, asked them to come at dusk so that they would

5 not be seen, in order to -- for their own safety. And at that stage they

6 found themselves in a very uncomfortable position, and they attended that

7 meeting, and the representative of the military security services from the

8 corps was invited, as well as the chief of police and the commander of the

9 Territorial Defence, and each and every one of them had to report on the

10 situation, and they did that. I know that the TO man complained that his

11 people were being shot at, that actually they were not shot at as such but

12 the shots were being fired in the air and they were being told that

13 everybody knew who they were and their families would be killed. And so

14 those people were a bit reluctant to engage in armed conflict with those

15 groups who were totally out of hand. They were not just robbers anymore

16 but it was a spontaneous kind of movement. There were people who were

17 seeking revenge for the death of their relatives, their brothers, and so

18 on.

19 And so they -- when they came to the meeting and I was taken -- in

20 charge of the minutes, and they turned to the president as some kind of

21 fellow citizen, friend, et cetera, and they called him by his first name.

22 And they said to him: Well, Rajko, brother, what's going on? What is

23 this? This is a shame. Are we meant to be killed in this way? And he

24 felt uncomfortable and he kept apologising. And he said that there was

25 nothing he could do, that he did all he could, but they could see for

Page 21222

1 themselves and they said they did see the guards and that was not

2 sufficient. And the two houses had been set on fire in one part of the

3 town. First they were plundered and then torched, and there were victims,

4 people who had been killed in town. I remember I didn't dare go out on my

5 lunch break on that day, I didn't dare go out of the building. And quite

6 a few people from the town hall felt the same way, because there were

7 shots being fired all over.

8 And somebody was spreading the rumour that Muslims had stayed

9 there thanks to the municipal leadership, and since I myself felt a part

10 of the team, as it were, and I never dared go out because I didn't know

11 that many people, I didn't know what they thought of me, at any rate the

12 news reached us that a woman and a 6-year-old girl were killed, and the

13 situation was horrible. It is simply very difficult for me to describe

14 the way things were and how people who were still in their right minds

15 felt, and especially those who were at the receiving end of all that.

16 Under such circumstances, the president said -- well, on occasion

17 they were involved and on occasion there were only the Crisis Staff

18 people. They were in the hall, outside this delegation, and they were

19 coming in and out, and on the other side there was this meeting of this

20 Serb leadership, and I was sitting at a side table and taking the minutes

21 of the meeting, and those minutes were done in an ad hoc way. I didn't

22 even have a proper notepad. I just had some paper that I had surrendered

23 to the Prosecution on the occasion of the last time that I gave evidence.

24 So basically there was no representative of the military, and in

25 my view, that was the key fact that they had to consider in terms of

Page 21223

1 deciding whether the Muslims could go or not. Because the military guy

2 was the one who was making threats all the time, and that evening he

3 couldn't make it to the meeting because he was somewhere on the

4 battle-field near Bosanska Krupa, together with his unit.

5 Q. All right. It might be a good idea just to pause for a moment.

6 There's a lot of information there, and no criticism at all, Mr. Radojko,

7 but you're moving around the issue from one aspect to another quite

8 quickly.

9 Let's go back, if we may, to the approach that you'd begun to

10 describe by various members of the Muslim community to the president of

11 the Municipal Assembly to leave. How did that proceed? How did those

12 negotiations proceed?

13 A. I'm certainly not going to be able to give you every single

14 detail. I do appeal to you for some understanding also because a great

15 deal of time has passed, but some things are still etched in my memory.

16 The president of the municipality and all those present from the Serb side

17 had a funny feeling. They were embarrassed, they felt uncomfortable

18 because these things were happening. In the end, I mean, these people

19 used to live together. I wasn't there before, but on the basis of my

20 previous contacts and on the basis of what I had heard, even when some of

21 them had left, some of them were friends, were very close, and in some way

22 the president felt uncomfortable on account of the fact that he could do

23 nothing for them. The only thing he managed to do was to -- well, he

24 simply stopped the meeting and he said we had to help them to get out and

25 that there was no question about it. And then he only asked from the

Page 21224

1 representatives of the military security services to provide guarantees

2 that the army would not attack them as they left and that they would offer

3 assistance. And they promised that they would do that and that they would

4 provide a battalion of military police, basically the entire military

5 police service of the entire corps, in order to ensure the safety of those

6 people when they gathered, to depart, and a part of the way.

7 And he asked the civilian police chief to get in touch with his

8 counterpart in Banja Luka and to explain to him what was happening and

9 that there was no excuse for ignoring it and that people would be held

10 accountable unless they provided proper safety for those people on that

11 morning when they were supposed to leave, because the curfew -- I had

12 forgotten about the curfew. It had already been introduced. They came at

13 dusk and they had to sneak into their own houses and get in touch with

14 their own -- with their own and tell people to try and gather their

15 belongings, et cetera, because there was a request -- for example, they

16 were not allowed to take any valuables with them, any money, any foreign

17 currency, or any jewels, or anything like that, any valuables in general

18 because they were saying, oh, they might provide funding for the war on

19 the basis of that. And then the president said that I would be in charge

20 of their escort and that I would make sure that they had a safe passage.

21 And I said to him that if people were going to be searched for money and

22 valuables, that I wouldn't be able to do that. Even if I had wanted to, I

23 wouldn't be able to do that. And we had to go through enemy territory.

24 Attacks had already taken place there, and one convoy narrowly escaped, et

25 cetera.

Page 21225

1 Q. I don't want to quite go on to the convoy yet. How many Muslims

2 left in that -- in the convoy that you're about to describe,

3 approximately?

4 A. I think between 2.000 and 2.500. Most probably 2.100 or 200.

5 There was no time to actually count them. There were problems with

6 transport -- there were millions of problems. It was extremely difficult.

7 Q. Okay. We're going to come to transport next. That's -- people

8 left in buses. Is that right?

9 A. On buses, but there were not enough buses. So some used local

10 trucks owned by the local haulier.

11 Q. And -- because it's 40, 50 vehicles; would that be right?

12 A. Believe me, I have no idea. I set off before everybody got on

13 because I had to go at the head of the convoy with the representatives of

14 the police and make sure that there were no ambushes.

15 Q. Could we come to that in one moment again. What efforts, if any,

16 were made to try and keep the departure of this convoy secret?

17 A. Well, everybody who attended that meeting, both the Serbs and the

18 Muslims, agreed that nobody would say a word to anyone, and that's the way

19 it stayed. Plus the Muslims, since they all lived in the same area, the

20 same neighbourhood, and they had to secretly inform their neighbours in

21 the course of the night in order to make it possible for them to prepare

22 for the journey, to get the clothes and valuables or whatever. And as to

23 Serbs, they had to keep silent about it, and that's the way it was. And a

24 sign was agreed on the basis of which we would gather very quickly so that

25 the local Serbs wouldn't find out about it in order to avoid anyone

Page 21226

1 deciding to attack them, because all that was the consequence of this

2 revenge. So it was agreed that at 6.00 in the morning the police car

3 would -- there would be the police call for people to gather. And that's

4 what happened, and within a short period of time they came to the agreed

5 spot. And the police was already there, the civilian police, and some

6 from the military police as well. And it's a rather large area, large

7 square, which is surrounded by more or less two rows of police officers,

8 soldiers, I don't know who else was there, they were fully armed, and they

9 kept guard. And --

10 Q. You went off, as you've already told us, at the front of this

11 convoy. How far in front of the first vehicle carrying these departing

12 people were you?

13 A. I don't know; a couple of hundred metres, 500 metres. At any

14 rate, we tried to keep some kind of visual control and contact so as for

15 the convoy to stay together.

16 Q. We haven't discussed and I haven't asked you about the direction

17 in which this convoy left. There's no dispute, I'm sure, it went towards

18 Travnik, in Central Bosnia. Why didn't it go to Bihac? Why did it go to

19 Travnik?

20 A. Precisely for the reasons I've already mentioned: Those people

21 didn't want to go to Travnik; they were made to go there because the

22 circumstances made it necessary for us to take them there. They wished to

23 go to Bihac, and afterwards, as far as I can tell since the fighting in

24 Bihac intensified and they would have been mobilised straight away and

25 sent into battle, when there was the possibility of talking to UNPROFOR,

Page 21227

1 they actually would have preferred to go to Split because they discovered

2 that from Split they would have been able to go to other Western countries

3 and escape the war. But it wasn't possible, due to the circumstances, so

4 they went there against their will because they were mobilised there as

5 well.

6 Q. At some point --

7 JUDGE ORIE: May I just ask one question.

8 You said they wanted to go in this direction, that direction was

9 all not possible. "... so they went there against their will because they

10 were mobilised there as well."

11 Why did they have to go there? Why couldn't they -- if they did

12 not want to go into the direction in which they were taken, why not leave

13 them where they were?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely for the reason that the

15 situation had become untenable. The president told them openly that he

16 was unable to guarantee their safety any longer, that he was doing all he

17 could, but there were those attacks still taking place and there were

18 victims. And for some time already prior to that he had tried to make it

19 possible for them to leave, but since in the direction of Split UNPROFOR

20 didn't allow for that, when I went together with the Muslim delegation, I

21 mean we went as a single delegation, to speak to them, they told us openly

22 when they gave up the idea of helping us with this journey. I don't

23 remember whether those people were from UNPROFOR or from the Red Cross,

24 but at any rate one of those people said that their head office considers

25 this type of departure of the population as ethnic cleansing. That was

Page 21228

1 the first time that I heard the term "ethnic cleansing." I didn't know, I

2 found out later what it was all about. And they said -- when I said that

3 the local authorities had no powers over the police and that they would

4 never have any powers over the military command and that we were

5 powerless, they said that it was our problem.

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let me stop you. And then did they say: We

7 want to go? Or did you say: There's no other way out than to go? I

8 mean, I asked you: Why not leave them where they were? And you said:

9 Well, the situation had become untenable and the president had told them

10 openly that he -- that's all -- did they then say: We, nevertheless, want

11 go? Or did they say: We'd like to stay in the cellars of our houses and

12 we'll see what happens? I mean, who finally said: Let's get on the bus

13 and let's move out? Who finally took that decision?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They came up with the request to

15 leave right at the start. They came with this request, and I mean the

16 respectable citizens representing the Muslim community. They had been

17 requesting to leave for months, but the president could not allow them to

18 leave because the other side had openly been threatening and saying that

19 nothing of the sort should be allowed. This is, of course, an

20 interpretation of mine. I'm afraid that this other side wanted them to

21 stay behind as sort of hostages, because they kept saying that women and

22 children were free to leave while the military-age men were to be left

23 behind. But something of the sort could not be allowed.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Why not? Why could women and children not leave as

25 they wished? Are they not -- are they not --

Page 21229

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That wasn't the way the people

2 wanted to leave. They stated openly that they did not wish to be

3 separated from their families. And I think that they were right in

4 insisting on this because there was a far greater danger in leaving the

5 able-bodied men behind because they would indeed be left as sort of

6 hostages.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Why would they be hostages?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because of all the things happening

9 on the front line and they were in an encirclement. Well, ultimately,

10 that was the way they felt, at any rate, and they stated that they did not

11 wish to stay behind. They said that if their families were leaving, they

12 would leave, too. You see, this was one of the options that the president

13 had presented them with at this meeting. It was solely on this request of

14 theirs that the meeting was held.

15 JUDGE ORIE: We'll go into further details perhaps at a later

16 stage.

17 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


19 Q. We've got to the point in time where the convoy departed. You

20 were at the front of it. You were with a police officer, is that

21 correct? A police commander, I think.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And when you arrived in Kljuc, you learnt that the convoy had been

24 attacked. Is that also correct?

25 A. Correct.

Page 21230

1 Q. What information did you learn in Kljuc about this attack and from

2 what source did you receive this information?

3 A. Directly from the people there. When we arrived in Kljuc, we

4 realised that our column, the column behind us, consisted of only three to

5 four buses. We realised this as we were passing a curve. That's why we

6 stopped at Kljuc, waiting for the others to come up. As the others were

7 coming up, somebody told us that the convoy had come under attack, the

8 latter part of the convoy. Shots were fired, and that perhaps there were

9 even people wounded. I went to the rear of the convoy, asking whether

10 anyone was wounded, and they told me that there was somebody wounded in a

11 truck somewhere. I later found out that a boy was, in fact, killed and

12 that several persons were wounded. I told them that they would be given

13 medical assistance. I got into a car and hurried to the hospital there

14 because I was in charge of logistics. I got some medical staff there and

15 an ambulance and went to that section of the convoy where the wounded

16 were. Unfortunately, the boy was already -- the young man was already

17 dead, but there were several wounded who -- in fact, one of them was taken

18 back to Petrovac and I don't know what happened to him later on.

19 At this stage, I didn't know whether there were any other persons

20 injured. I was told that there were none, but they told me that there was

21 one truck, the tires of which had been punctured, and it stayed somewhere

22 behind. Since the column had stopped at a curve, I said that we should

23 move on because it was a dangerous position, and I said that we should

24 keep on moving until we went past Kljuc at a point where we would meet

25 again. When we met up there, I went down the convoy and realised that

Page 21231

1 there were more people wounded.

2 I agreed with the commander, the police commander, that several

3 police officers were to go to a cafe in a village nearby to simply see

4 whether there was any danger lurking there, as a sort of reconnaissance.

5 As soon as they returned, they told us to leave the place immediately, and

6 we asked why. They said that once the people in the cafe found out that

7 we were heading from Petrovac, that they said that they were going to take

8 up arms. That's why the convoy started moving again, and this police

9 commander, who was in fact an ad hoc commander, had two cars of police

10 officers. One of the police cars went at the rear of the column to wait

11 for the truck that had been left behind, dragging behind, and the column

12 proceeded, whereas I went to the hospital to make sure that the wounded

13 were medically treated.

14 So the other police car was at the head of the column. We agreed

15 at which location near Mrkonjic we would stop which was appropriate.

16 There, as we reached this particular site, we met up with a medical

17 vehicle who had come to take care of the wounded. However, the Muslims

18 who were in these vehicles told us that the wounded did not wish to stay

19 in the Mrkonjic hospital, but rather that they only wished medical

20 supplies -- to be given medical supplies, because apparently there were

21 some medical staff among them. The ambulance that was there gave them

22 whatever medical supplies they had, and they said that this was enough for

23 them and that we could resume our journey. We continued the journey up

24 until Knezevo where the army took over. The army took over from there.

25 Q. And as far as you know from information you subsequently received,

Page 21232

1 the convoy then did proceed without further attack into Muslim-held

2 territory?

3 A. Yes. There were no further attacks. We hurried through the

4 territory -- across the territory, and I don't believe anybody was aware

5 of us passing through there.

6 Q. And let's just be clear about this in relation to the questions

7 that the learned Presiding Judge asked you: There was no international

8 assistance whatsoever in relation to this particular exodus.

9 A. There was none.

10 Q. The third convoy was in the early part of 1993. Is that correct?

11 A. As far as I remember, yes, that's correct. It was wintertime. I

12 believe it was in February 1993.

13 Q. And very brief questions about that. How many people were in that

14 convoy?

15 A. Perhaps 150, 200, 240. Let's say from 150 to 240. I can't give

16 you the exact number. I wasn't escorting the vehicles or anything of the

17 sort, so I don't know how many had been ordered. I was only tasked with

18 making sure that they reach their destination and to negotiate with the

19 authorities there on behalf of the municipality that we would take care of

20 food and -- or rather, that we would cover the expenses entailed by the

21 food and accommodation given to them, and that they not be attacked.

22 Q. In which direction did this convoy go?

23 A. It went to Bihac.

24 Q. And do you know why these 150 or so Muslims left at that

25 particular point in time?

Page 21233

1 A. I do. Because of the fact that this second convoy had departed so

2 suddenly and these people resided in rural areas, not in towns, it was

3 impossible to organise their departure swiftly. And in order to make sure

4 that the bulk of the people leave, they -- these people were not even

5 informed of the convoy. And the -- these persons lived in mixed villages,

6 where there were both Serbs and Muslims residing, and they had their

7 village guards which kept them safe. There were no attacks against them.

8 In order not to jeopardise the departure of this other large group of

9 people, for whom there was risk of attack, these other people were not

10 even notified of the possibility for departure, as far as I know.

11 Q. I want to briefly return to the second convoy, the one that you've

12 described in some detail. I forgot to ask you about what happened to the

13 homes and property of the departing Muslims. Please tell the Chamber

14 about that.

15 A. Their houses and property were left behind. When it was agreed

16 that they should leave, and I had already relayed the views presented by

17 the Red Cross and UNPROFOR to the president, who had known of these

18 positions even before from his own contacts, I told him that the

19 municipality was in charge of the property of all these people and that

20 these people had -- were entitled to indemnity in case their property was

21 damaged. That's why I told them to tell the people at the meeting that

22 whoever wanted to leave should lock up their homes and outbuildings and to

23 hand the keys over to the municipal officials before their departure in

24 order to make up a list of the properties and in order for these

25 properties to be listed. The following morning -- and for the property to

Page 21234

1 be sealed.

2 The next morning the municipal officials were collecting the keys,

3 and in cases where the keys were not brought over to them, they were told

4 that the keys were waiting for them at the property themselves. After

5 that, they started touring these properties and making up lists of all the

6 items left and sealing all these houses. They itemised all the belongings

7 in order for everyone to know what had been left behind and to prevent the

8 indemnities being asked for items that had not been, in fact, left behind.

9 Since refugees had been streaming into the area from all sides, some of

10 the properties were given to them to be used.

11 Q. Are you able to assist with what percentage were used and what

12 percentage remained sealed and unused?

13 A. In the beginning, all the properties were sealed. At a later

14 stage, a certain percentage -- or rather, almost all of them were given

15 over to the refugees because 4 to 5.000 refugees came from Bihac. They

16 were staying at their relatives' or at their friends'. They were even put

17 up in some public buildings, and most of these properties were given to

18 these refugees. There were other refugees from Central Bosnia that

19 streamed into the area. Several houses were occupied by the local

20 residents, who were not entitled to do that, and I know that there were

21 some difficulties with them, that there were cases when these people were

22 evicted from such houses. I was not, myself, involved directly in the

23 paperwork but I know of such instances. Therefore, it was refugees, for

24 the most part, who occupied these properties.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, isn't it true that one of the core issues

Page 21235

1 in this respect would be whether proper care was taken of the property,

2 immovable and movable, of those who left or whether a different course of

3 action was taken, such a course of action as, for example, described in

4 Prosecution Exhibits 748, tab 9? I mean, isn't that the core of the

5 issue, and whether the keys were given in the morning or the afternoon,

6 isn't it true that why the keys were given is the core issue? We hear a

7 lot of evidence, a lot of details, which is rather irrelevant if the core

8 issue has not been dealt with. I'm using these words and I'm referring to

9 this exhibit because I think I can do that in the presence of the witness

10 who might not know all the P exhibit numbers by heart, but I take it that

11 you understand what I mean.

12 MR. JOSSE: I do, but I'm unable to take this matter any further

13 at this stage. Would Your Honour give me one moment?


15 [Defence counsel confer]

16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 MR. JOSSE: Well, I'm -- I'm going to move on. If Your Honour

18 wishes to pursue that matter, then of course it's a matter --

19 JUDGE ORIE: Well, perhaps it will be done in cross-examination.

20 I -- I mean, it's part of the evidence that is in front of us. But we

21 spent a lot of time where the core issue is not dealt with, and,

22 Mr. Josse, if the core issue, on the basis of the information we get, goes

23 to the favour of those who left -- in favour of what could have asked in

24 two or three questions, which is: Those who left, did they still own

25 their property? What was done with it? And then let's forgot about keys

Page 21236

1 to be given in the morning or the afternoon or what else do we have on

2 whether there were even a few people who illegally occupied that other --

3 I mean, this case is not about whether some individuals may have taken

4 some of the -- may have occupied some of the property at a certain moment.

5 The core issue is before that.

6 MR. JOSSE: Well, I've already gone this far. I'm not able to

7 cross-examine my own witness.

8 JUDGE ORIE: No, I do understand. I do understand. And at the

9 same time, of course, that's the question that the Chamber finds at the

10 core of -- of this matter. If you say: Let's then wait, what happens,

11 but spend not too much time on details which are irrelevant if the core

12 issue is not clear. I'm not saying that they could be relevant once we

13 have a better view on the core issue, but the main questions are not yet

14 put to the witness, and perhaps we should then wait, Mr. Josse, perhaps in

15 re-examination that you would deal with the matter further to that extent

16 at that moment relevant.

17 Please proceed.


19 Q. I want to move to a different topic altogether, please,

20 Mr. Radojko, and that relates to the degree to which you recall the

21 municipality complaining to the republican government in Pale about the

22 activities of these gangs. Did you communicate with Pale in any way?

23 A. At that time, the communications with Pale went mostly through

24 MPs, people who went over there, and in writing. The telephone lines were

25 functioning on occasion. I know that the president of the municipality

Page 21237

1 would use the lines whenever possible, but then one or two or three days

2 would pass with the lines being down. That's why we could not rely on the

3 telephone lines and neither could they.

4 On several occasions in this period of time and later, some

5 documents were dispatched, mostly to Banja Luka because that's where the

6 security centre of the police was located, and requests were sent to the

7 2nd Corps command which was, in actual fact, located in our area. All of

8 us at the municipality felt, as citizens, that there was a lack of order

9 in many aspects and the local leadership oftentimes made decisions asking

10 that certain shortcomings or deficiencies be rectified, that the police or

11 the military command, depending on whose members were wreaking havoc

12 throughout town, that they take these matters into their hands. I

13 remember that a member of the Assembly himself asked that something be

14 done by -- about the fact that armed people were entering town, that the

15 military commands take care of this. I recall, for instance, that

16 soldiers would go to the cafes in the town because their unit was deployed

17 near, and they also drove up in a tank once. They would open fire from

18 their arms indiscriminately.

19 There were such requests put forth, and as a result of these

20 requests, steps were taken and the situation was rectified, although there

21 was disorder in this particular point in time. We used a round-about way

22 to ask from the police station, which is only 1 kilometre from the

23 municipal building -- so we could not ask anything from them directly. We

24 had to go through Banja Luka to send any requests we had, and it took a

25 day, whereas it should have taken an hour. The president would sometimes

Page 21238

1 phone the police chief, who was a professional police officer, and I know

2 that he himself had to deal with any order that the police administration

3 had.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, time-frame for question and answer, could

5 you assist me, together with the witness?

6 MR. JOSSE: Well, yes, I clearly need to break this down in a

7 number of ways, if I may?

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps it's time for a break anyhow, so that

9 gives you some time to further -- if there are -- if there's anything

10 else, I would like to have a break to start within the next two to seven

11 minutes. I'm certain that you'll find a suitable moment.

12 MR. JOSSE: Yes.

13 Q. I'd like to be a little bit more specific about this, if we may,

14 Mr. Radojko. Did you personally write any memos or letters to the

15 republican leadership?

16 A. I did.

17 Q. About how many and at what period of time did you do that?

18 A. Throughout the time period I spent there as a civil servant, I

19 recall that I wrote 30 to 40 different memos to the superior bodies, and

20 this is in this four- to five-years period. These were official letters

21 sent to competent bodies in a given field, be it education, health care,

22 army, administration ministry, ministry of the police. Some letters were

23 sent to the then-president of Republika Srpska. We mostly sent different

24 requests to him.

25 Q. In 1992, how did these communications get to Pale? How were they

Page 21239

1 sent there?

2 A. I don't recall that it was possible to send letters by mail. It

3 had to be taken by a courier or, rather, whoever was going to Pale, a

4 functionary, an MP, they would take letters along. If there was someone

5 headed for Banja Luka, then this person would take whatever mail was there

6 for Banja Luka. Or, it would be sent through coded mail by the

7 communications centre. I don't recall anything being sent by ordinary

8 mail, as is done in peacetime.

9 MR. JOSSE: Yes, that would be a convenient moment, thank you,

10 Your Honour.

11 JUDGE ORIE: We'll have a break until ten minutes to 6.00.

12 --- Recess taken at 5.30 p.m.

13 --- On resuming at 5.59 p.m.

14 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


16 Q. You've just told us about how you communicated in 1992 with Pale.

17 Did you ever get a response in that year?

18 A. Well, in relation to these events there wasn't much communications

19 with Pale. We mostly addressed the Banja Luka centre and the military

20 command, which was initially in Drvar and later on in Sibelj [phoen]. In

21 the later period, there weren't any responses or reactions, really, from

22 Pale that would have been helpful.

23 Q. I think --

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, I think when we are talking about

25 communication responses, whether they're helpful or not, a really totally

Page 21240

1 different subject.

2 Do you understand my problem with your answer? The answer is

3 about whether you could communicate with Pale -- I take it at least,

4 Mr. Josse, that you're talking about the technical possibility of

5 communicating, or were you asking about the content of the communications?

6 MR. JOSSE: Well, I was content with the answer, but if Your

7 Honour is not, I understand, and Your Honour can pursue the matter.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But --

9 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour looks at me to pursue it, but --

10 JUDGE ORIE: No, no, I'm trying to understand what you want to

11 learn from the witness. Is this about what the communications, as far as

12 subject is concerned, were about or whether there was a possibility to

13 communicate? On one of the earlier questions that was questioned just

14 before the break, the witness said to us that 30 to 40 communications in

15 writing in five years, so that's an average of six to eight a year, on

16 many subjects. When I heard the answer and when I heard the question, I

17 thought: Are we going to learn anything about what was in this

18 communication or are you seeking to establish whether there was technical

19 possibilities for communications at all?

20 Now your question was: Did you get a response? There again, are

21 you seeking to know what the response is? Then of course we would know

22 what the question had been so that we are talking about the content of the

23 communication, or were you interested to know whether it was at all

24 possible to give a response? And then the witness says that he mainly

25 addressed Banja Luka but in the later period there weren't any responses

Page 21241

1 or reactions. We still don't know whether from Pale -- oh, yes, he says

2 from Pale. But there were no responses or reactions that would be been

3 helpful. That leaves a complete mystery of why it was not helpful. If it

4 was about medical care, whether they could not provide any additional

5 beds. It's totally -- I don't know what to do with it.

6 MR. JOSSE: I don't want to spend any more time on the issue.

7 JUDGE ORIE: I want to let you know why I'm puzzled, both by

8 answers and the questions.

9 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. Thank you for so informing me.

10 Q. Mr. Radojko, I want to ask you some specific matters. Really two

11 issues. The first is the unlawfulness and the picture that you painted of

12 the Wild West in Petrovac. Did you or any of your colleagues inform Pale

13 of the situation in that regard?

14 A. I myself was not authorised to do so, and had I tried to do that

15 it would have been considered as overstepping my authority. That was not

16 part of my duties; however, I do not know that MP Milanovic talked about

17 the unlawfulness in the circles he frequented, and certain steps were

18 taken both by the army and the police. The situation gradually was

19 brought under control because I know that some of the groups that had

20 initially been wreaking havoc in town were, in fact, mobilised. I don't

21 know whether it was forcibly or not --

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Radojko, the question was whether you informed

23 Pale or whether one of your colleagues did so. The answer, apparently,

24 is: No, I didn't. Whether you think you couldn't, that's another matter.

25 And what I understand, you do not know whether Mr. Milanovic, I took that

Page 21242

1 for an answer that you did not know whether any other person --

2 MR. JOSSE: Yes, I didn't entirely understand that, frankly, and I

3 assume it should read "I do not know whether MP Milanovic --"

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's how I understood it. It could have been

5 clarified. We could have interrupted it.

6 Then you start talking about whether the situation improved. The

7 issue at this moment is communication with Pale on the problems. So let's

8 keep it to that.

9 And, Mr. Josse, you're invited also to keep strict control that as

10 soon as we move out of where -- what apparently the relevance of your

11 questions is, let's try to focus entirely on it.

12 MR. JOSSE: That, with respect, I entirely agree with.

13 Q. And, Mr. Radojko, these are very specific issues I'm asking about.

14 You state you didn't contact the republican authorities because it wasn't

15 within your remit. Were you aware as to whether anyone else did?

16 A. As far as I know, Milanovic relayed Mr. Novakovic's requests on

17 these matters. I know this from the conversations the two of them had.

18 In what form the request was in fact relayed and what its substance was, I

19 don't know.

20 Q. Specifically I now want to ask you about the convoys that

21 departed, and in particular the second convoy of in excess of 2.000

22 people. As far as you are aware, was there any communication with Pale

23 about that departure?

24 A. Not on the departure -- or rather, at the point of departure.

25 When we returned to Petrovac after having escorted the convoy part way,

Page 21243

1 Mr. Novakovic told me that the then-President Karadzic had contacted him

2 on this issue. He told me that the conversation had taken place at the

3 time we were roughly in Knezevo and that Karadzic had raised his voice at

4 him, that he had criticised him strongly for the fact the people were

5 relocated and that Novakovic replied by saying that he could do nothing

6 more about it, that he could not protect the population adequately. I

7 don't know whether this was the motive why they had contacted each other,

8 but as I -- as far as I was told, this was what they talked about.

9 Q. Have you any idea why Mr. Karadzic took the stance that he did?

10 A. As far as I was able to understand Novakovic's reaction, his -- he

11 reacted negatively because already at the time there were stories of

12 ethnic cleansing going on and he wished to put a stop to that.

13 Q. In general, were there communications that you were aware of

14 between Mr. Novakovic and Mr. Karadzic?

15 A. There were exchanges of information, although I don't know of what

16 nature. I know that whenever Mr. Novakovic was able to get hold of him

17 over the phone when the lines were on, he talked to him. I don't know

18 what they discussed. I sometimes happened to be in the office when they

19 spoke over the phone, but I would then leave the room out of discretion.

20 I know that they had contacts but I don't know what on exactly.

21 Novakovic did not hesitate to contact him, although he was a

22 person of authority. But he did not feel any reservations in getting in

23 touch with him.

24 Q. There was a general story, or joke, in circulation about Pale and

25 the type of ministers who were accepted into the government in Pale and

Page 21244

1 the distance of Pale from the rest of the Republika Srpska. Perhaps you

2 could tell the Chamber that joke or that story.

3 A. Yes, I can. In our contacts with the government at Pale, we

4 realised that they were more confused than we were and were unable to

5 understand our problems. I told this as a joke to a circle of persons I

6 was able to tell that at the time. I told them that the government was at

7 a military check-point between Sarajevo and Pale and that people who were

8 felt to have the necessary professional qualifications were invited to

9 become members of the government as they were fleeing Sarajevo. We simply

10 did not receive the instructions or assistance of the kind one would

11 expect to receive from ministers.

12 Q. What would -- do you say, Mr. Radojko, to the suggestion that the

13 lawlessness in your municipality that you have described was inspired by

14 the Pale administration?

15 A. Well, perhaps this would, to a certain extent, clear the faces of

16 our municipal authorities if this were indeed the case; however, not even

17 at the beginning or later on, when the situation improved, did the

18 municipal authorities have any impact on the events. They wanted to have

19 a positive impact on the situation but could not even have impact on the

20 negative -- on escalating the negative impact. They could not have the

21 police arrest the perpetrators. They could not make the prosecutor's

22 office prosecute those that were arrested by the police. There was the

23 general inertia of the state authorities. They did do something. I

24 remember the Crisis Staff asked that the police make a list of all the

25 persons who were known to steal the property of the Muslims. I believe

Page 21245

1 that some of the names were listed and such reports can be found in the

2 Petrovac files. So they were doing something but -- for instance, if you

3 found a person stealing someone's property, they would be taken into

4 custody, but the prosecutor's office would not issue an indictment.

5 Q. I've stopped you because you have just described --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

7 MR. JOSSE: I'm sorry.

8 Q. I've stopped you because you have just described what was wrong

9 with the local administration. What I was asking you about was the Pale

10 administration. It's the Prosecution case, Mr. Radojko, that the violence

11 that you have described was inspired by people in Pale. What do you say

12 to that proposition?

13 A. It was not inspired by them because they were unable to control

14 the situation back in their court. I can give you a few examples. They

15 appointed completely incompetent persons to some positions, like the

16 general director of the commodity reserve agency, where in, my contacts

17 with him, I realised that the man was a wall painter by profession. I

18 also recall instances when the property from Tas was seized. The story

19 went around that whoever wanted to get hold of the property there would

20 simply go over there and take what they liked. Well -- and you can judge

21 what they were able to do by taking a look at what they were able to

22 assist us with. Many people liked the fact that they were able to

23 formally hold high positions but were in fact lacking any qualifications

24 for the job they did. I recall that many of the ministers had not even

25 passed the official state exam.

Page 21246

1 Q. The Prosecution for that position is that the lawlessness you've

2 described was condoned by the authorities in Pale. What do you say to

3 that proposition?

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, Mr. Tieger.

5 MR. TIEGER: I think Mr. Josse can ask questions to the witness

6 without attempting to characterise the Prosecution's position one way or

7 another.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think he could do that at the same time. I

9 do not hear you say that he's presenting -- he may have carefully listened

10 to the Prosecution's position falsely, and it certainly speeds up.

11 MR. TIEGER: No, I have no objection to the questions. It's just

12 that I want to --

13 JUDGE ORIE: But at the same time, Mr. Josse, if you phrase the

14 question: If someone would say ... and then you exactly formulate the

15 Prosecution's position, then the matter's clear enough and the witness is

16 not confronted with the fact that this is the Prosecution's position.

17 Please proceed.


19 Q. Mr. Radojko, did the Pale administration condone the lawlessness

20 that you have described in such detail?

21 A. When I think back about that period, I don't think that they

22 condoned what was happening. I know that we were asking them to rectify

23 the situation, and eventually they did. I'm simply telling you that they

24 did not have quality mechanisms enabling them to react swiftly. Rather,

25 the -- it took a long time for the information to reach a point; it would

Page 21247

1 always take a round-about way. And the situation we found ourselves in

2 was difficult. In short, no, they did not lend any support to such

3 behaviour. Rather, they supported the requests that we put forth to them,

4 and this is something you can see for yourselves from correspondence.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I haven't seen any specific correspondence. If

6 there's any, the Chamber, of course, is very much interested because in

7 this testimony no document whatsoever, whereas there seem to exist a lot,

8 has been presented.

9 MR. JOSSE: There are a lot of documents in existence.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. But not presented yet through this witness.

11 MR. JOSSE: I have presented none through this witness; that is

12 correct.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would have a question for the witness.

14 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] In your reply, sir, you mentioned

15 you were not inspired of them because they were able to control the

16 situation back in their court.

17 [In English] "I can give you a few examples. They appointed

18 completely incompetent persons to some positions, like the general

19 director," and so on.

20 [Interpretation] What is your explanation of this state of

21 affairs? Why -- how can you explain this -- managed so badly --

22 administration so bad. Why were there appointments of incompetent persons

23 made? When you say "they appointed --" "they appointed incompetent

24 persons." When you say that, what do you mean? Who were these persons

25 who were appointed? Who were in charge of these appointments, and for

Page 21248

1 what reason -- why was their administration so bad?

2 MR. JOSSE: Perhaps we should check, Your Honour. There's clearly

3 a problem there. We were getting -- the translators were translating in

4 the alternative one after the other. The learned Judge, Judge Hanoteau,

5 wouldn't know that because clearly he was speaking in French. Perhaps we

6 can just check what was happening. That's very clear on the English

7 channel.

8 JUDGE ORIE: It's not entirely clear to me, but if there's any

9 confusion, perhaps you can repeat the question, Judge Hanoteau, although

10 it was a long one.

11 MR. JOSSE: Save for the fact of course I assume in B/C/S it

12 wasn't a problem.

13 JUDGE ORIE: I listen with one ear in French, and with the other I

14 listen to the English translation. I did not hear, apart from always

15 minor choices interpreters have to make, I did hear any major problem.

16 MR. TIEGER: For what it's worth, I had the impression that the

17 interpreters were assisting or supplementing each other. Maybe speaking

18 with them would clarify that that was or was not the case.

19 MR. JOSSE: Okay. Thank you. I'm sorry for interrupting.

20 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Did the witness understand my

21 question? That's the most important thing. Did you understand my

22 question, Mr. Witness?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Please, Your Honour. If you allow

24 me, I'd like to try and answer. It is the Assembly that is responsible

25 for the appointment of the ministers; however, for the appointment of all

Page 21249

1 the other staff charged with operative duties, it is the government or

2 individual ministries who are responsible for appointing them. The same

3 situation exists today. Now, I'll give you my opinion why they were felt

4 to be incompetent.

5 First of all, they were completely isolated up there at Pale in

6 all the different senses. Most of the people over there never visited our

7 areas, never came to ask us directly what sort of problems we were

8 experiencing and how they could be remedied. They seemed to be operating

9 as an end unto themselves.

10 As for the staffing issue, they simply appointed persons who were

11 within reach. As these persons were not familiar with the operation of

12 the state administration and the government, they tried to recruit other

13 people from other areas of the country who had the necessary expertise. A

14 large percentage of the government at the time was made up of physicians

15 who, of course, have no knowledge of how a government should operate in

16 wartime. It started out chaotically and continued so. In -- under such

17 circumstances in the absence of qualified persons who would take positions

18 and steps, the chaos spread out into the lower institutions as well.

19 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, but within these incompetent

20 persons, do you include the accused and Mr. Karadzic?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not saying the accused was

22 incompetent, because the way he presided over the Assembly at the time

23 when it was still a joint Assembly, and later on, was professional, as far

24 as I was able to glean by watching Assembly sessions on TV. He -- his

25 name was never raised in these discussions that I'm dealing with just now.

Page 21250

1 Nobody mentioned his name or his role. Up until 1994 or 1995, he was the

2 president of the Assembly, nothing more. He had no special authority nor

3 was mentioned as a person of particular significance back in our area.

4 Only in 1994 when Serbia introduced a blockade on the import of some goods

5 did he start saying, as far as I recall - and I'm talking about the

6 accused - that we should try to obtain some of the staple food that we

7 lacked in our area through the accused. It was only in this context that

8 he was mentioned.

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, but you were saying that the

10 Assembly was in charge of appointing the ministers and the -- and if I

11 understood you right, you said that the ministers were not competent. So

12 Mr. Krajisnik being the president of that Assembly, did you think that he

13 was involved somehow in the appointment of these incompetent persons?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have understood your

15 question. You probably are drawing the conclusion that the speaker of the

16 Assembly can't be competent if the ministers are incompetent. Let me

17 explain. As the speaker, he had the same role as the speaker in the UK

18 parliament, for example, and as such, he had one vote. In that Assembly

19 where, I don't know, except for one or two members, everybody else was

20 from the SDS party. And there were lots of rival groupings within the SDS

21 itself. It was not a fully developed party with a fully developed party

22 structure; it was just a movement. Many people, even in that period of

23 time, had to be thrown out of the party because of their dishonourable

24 behaviour, at least in our area, and basically because they were

25 criminals. And for these reasons, on the basis of what I saw on

Page 21251

1 television, those broadcasts which were live broadcasts, I'm drawing the

2 conclusion that he as a person, as an engineer or an economist, I don't

3 know, that he's -- he was pretty skilled at his job. But as to ministers,

4 very often different factions would support their man and very many of

5 them were totally incompetent.

6 If I think back, for example, very often key ministers were being

7 switched. The minister for police and army matters was switched in the

8 middle of the war. On the other hand, I myself participated in -- in a

9 meeting at which the defence minister attended and the military

10 representatives wouldn't even say hello to him. So that was the

11 situation. It was all kept hidden in order to prevent people from getting

12 too frightened and running away, as it were. But everybody else, the

13 people who were in the know, as it were, knew about it. There was a great

14 deal of intolerance amongst different factions. I'm not going to say it

15 was outright hatred, but it wasn't good.

16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] One last question, if I may.

17 When you were in your municipality during this war period, if there had

18 been a competent government, what would you have expected from a competent

19 government? How could things have turned out otherwise had the government

20 been competent?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At that period of time it was very

22 difficult to improve the situation. The state was falling apart and the

23 professional members of the military were not in favour of anyone in the

24 beginning. Obviously they had sympathies for their own ethnic groups and

25 that's how they joined their national armies, but most of them, the

Page 21252

1 overwhelming majority, who were honourable men, the never allowed for

2 crimes to happen. I do remember at the beginning of the war I saw a

3 soldier who actually stole somebody's TV set, and he was shot on the spot.

4 I saw his dead body; I was passing by. Unfortunately, those officers as

5 well were scattered all over the place wherein many of them were from

6 Serbia and other republics, and they went back home. And those who

7 remained were not very numerous and many of them felt that they were in

8 some way condemned to stay there and they were unhappy that they had

9 nowhere else to go.

10 On the other hand, the civilian authorities did not really accept

11 them as such, did not really have any understanding for them. They were

12 deprived of their property, of their real estate, of their flats that they

13 had back in Slovenia, in Croatia or whatever, so there was a general state

14 of disorderliness and a lot of ignorance. Supposedly, probably,

15 presumably something could have been changed --

16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Yes, but in your municipality,

17 what did you expect from the Pale government had it been competent?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We, to be honest, did not expect a

19 great deal. We made do as we best could, but it would have been realistic

20 to expect for the police powers to function at the local level, the

21 immediate level, because we had difficulty even communicating with Banja

22 Luka at the time, let alone Pale. It would have been realistic to expect

23 that there would be a minister who would have been able to understand that

24 police had to react on the spot.

25 Secondly, something else that would have been useful had it been

Page 21253

1 done back then: For the military commanders, for some kind of regulation

2 to have been passed, in order for the people who had been caught stealing

3 to be arrested and to do forced labour or have a penitentiary unit or

4 whatever and that they would not be allowed to go home until the end of

5 the war.

6 So those things were the things that we asked for, requested them,

7 very firmly. I know the president asked for it very firmly. I don't know

8 whether he did it in writing or not. I suppose there must have been

9 something in writing. I don't know whether he used exactly the same

10 language as I'm using now, but we tried to choose the best possible way of

11 putting this to the leadership, et cetera. But had these two things been

12 done on time, presumably all the bad things would have been less.

13 Unfortunately, for example, the armed forces -- I mean, we had

14 understanding for those reasons as well, but the armed forces wanted to

15 direct and manage everything during the war. They asked for the command

16 posts to be created in our area. They came in and they asked for it, but

17 legally speaking it was impossible. It wasn't a place that they had freed

18 or liberated in any way, and it wasn't a place where there were no

19 authorities either, but the president didn't allow for that to happen and

20 I said that I would personally run away from any place which was managed

21 and governed by the army. And that's when the first conflicts started to

22 happen between the local authorities and the military command, and this

23 kind of conflict went on until the end of the war.

24 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.


Page 21254

1 Q. Mr. Radojko, did you in 1992 receive any order from Mr. Krajisnik?

2 A. No.

3 Q. In fact, did you receive any communication from him?

4 A. No.

5 Q. And are you aware of any communication from him to any other

6 member of the municipal authority?

7 A. No, not at that time. He had no communication with our

8 representatives. Perhaps with Milanovic when they met at the Assembly.

9 Q. I'd like to turn briefly, please, to the departure of the Serbs

10 from your municipality. When did the Serbs leave Petrovac?

11 A. In September 1995, on the 14th of September.

12 Q. Why did they leave?

13 A. Well, they fled. They fled before the Muslim army.

14 Q. And as far as you're aware, have many -- any Serbs returned once

15 peace was established?

16 A. I don't know how many exactly returned. Quite a few people

17 registered because they wanted to regulate property matters, et cetera,

18 and they got their IDs, local IDs for that reason. But those people don't

19 actually live there. They live on the territory of the Republika Srpska.

20 Most of them live in Republika Srpska, in Banja Luka and its surroundings,

21 and some of them in Derventa and other places. Some of them returned to

22 that area of the municipality, Petrovac, that went to the Republika

23 Srpska, and that's the area towards which many people gravitate.

24 Q. I'd like to take you back in time and ask you about something that

25 I failed to deal with much earlier. Could you have a look at this

Page 21255

1 document, please.

2 MR. JOSSE: The Variant A and B document, Your Honour.



5 Q. Just before you look at that -- leave that to one side, please,

6 would you.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Radojko -- Mr. Radojko, Mr. Josse is asking you

8 to put the document, for a minute, aside.


10 Q. I should have asked you this: When the Serbs left Petrovac, did

11 all the Serbs leave?

12 A. All those who managed to flee did so. A certain number of them

13 had not managed to do that, either because they were elderly or disabled

14 or lived in out-of-the-way places and nobody informed them that they

15 should leave, so they stayed.

16 Q. And what happened to those Serbs who remained?

17 A. Well, all Serbs who remained were either killed, and mostly

18 massacred, even though we're talking about the elderly or those who were

19 psychiatric patients, so they didn't even know what was going on. And

20 some of them who lived in outlying villages were either killed or were

21 brought to the prison in Petrovac and they were exchanged as war prisoners

22 in 1996. That was a smallish group of people.

23 Q. All right. Thank you.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, is there any documentation about this, as

25 we have lots of documentations about other massacres or mass killings, so

Page 21256

1 that we get an impression of the numbers we are talking about?

2 And I'm also addressing the Prosecution to ask whether there is

3 any documentation which would then be exculpatory material? That's a

4 thing for --

5 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour, I'm --

6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The witness testified about a later period in

7 time where Serbs had to flee the municipality, or at least major part of

8 the municipality, and that those who remained were either killed and

9 mostly massacred. Is there any documentation on -- well, reports on

10 numbers or --

11 MR. TIEGER: There may be, Your Honour, but it's not something to

12 which the Prosecution has directed its attention to my knowledge, and I

13 certainly can't -- you mention exculpatory information, and I can't see

14 any way in which that would be -- have an exculpatory component in the

15 context of this case. I -- I didn't object --

16 JUDGE ORIE: On the whole of the balance --

17 MR. TIEGER: I didn't object to the questions because the Defence

18 has previously said that they were interested in eliciting some forms as

19 contextual or background information, and I leave that to them in that

20 context.

21 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not blaming you for not having focussed. I just

22 wonder -- first of all, I address Mr. Josse because he put the question to

23 the witness, but Mr. Josse might not have exactly the same resources, and

24 if such material would be there --

25 Mr. Josse, have you --

Page 21257

1 MR. JOSSE: No, I have got no material in relation to this

2 whatsoever. The best the Chamber can do is to ask the witness. I ask

3 Your Honour to do that.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, we could ask you. Mr. Radojko, you told us

5 about those who had remained in the municipalities where most of the Serbs

6 had fled at a later stage, that they were killed and that -- massacred.

7 Is there any report known to you about this specific -- was it at one day?

8 Was it during a couple of weeks? Was it -- how many victims were there?

9 Were there 20? Were there 200? Were there 2.000? Are you aware of any

10 such specific report on your municipality? Not general reports, but ...

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our municipality no longer exists.

12 There's nobody doing any official research on this, but I talked to people

13 from those parts. My aunt was taken prisoner and she was exchanged, and

14 she was 78 years old at the time, and she was not very mobile, to be

15 honest, but she was exchanged as a POW. I talked to a man who was from

16 the same village as my father-in-law. He had been tortured, his feet were

17 smashed, and he was made to stand barefoot and then his toes were broken

18 by a rifle-butt, and he was taken a month after Petrovac was taken by the

19 other side. And his name was Niko something. I can't remember his family

20 name. He's from the village of Risovac. And apart from that, talking to

21 people in Banja Luka, I obtained information that through those

22 associations and organisations of the families of the missing, et cetera.

23 They obtained data about several dozens of people killed in that way, and

24 there were not many more. There were not too many people there. The

25 entire municipality of Petrovac must have had about 15.000 people, and

Page 21258

1 basically all those who were left behind -- I mean, they were not allowed

2 to stay at home. They were either killed or deported to prisons or camps,

3 and basically they were deported. For this reason, the rest of the

4 population was basically on the run, because there's a very negative

5 overall context when those self-same Muslims perpetrated genocide in that

6 area. I don't know whether you're aware of it, but in the area of the

7 Kladusa municipality, according to the census from 1991, there was 80 per

8 cent of Serbs, 40 per cent in Bihac, Bosanska Krupa 70-something per cent,

9 and Sasin was the only area in which Muslims were in the majority because

10 they were about 40 to 42 per cent of Serbs. After World War II, Serbs

11 were either in the minority or didn't exist in that area. According to

12 the census from 1991, there are also no Serbs in Kladusa or Sasin and it

13 is a municipality of 60.000 inhabitants, and so on and so forth, and this

14 is the reasons why these people were on the run.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That was not my question, but nevertheless

16 could you please -- you referred to the earlier census, where you said the

17 area of Kladusa, 80 per cent Serbs, and then you referred to 1991, but

18 that must be a mistake, I take it, because later on you referred to the

19 1991 census. Could you tell us, what was the first census you referred

20 to, what year?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do apologise, Your Honour, perhaps

22 I didn't quite make myself clear. The first census where there is a clear

23 Serb majority was before World War II. After the genocide which took

24 place in World War II, and then there is the other set of data where there

25 are next to no Serbs, and it is for this reason that those tensions

Page 21259

1 existed --

2 JUDGE ORIE: No, I just asked you to correct what reads as "1991."

3 Now you say it's the census from before the Second World War. You've

4 answered my question.


6 Q. 1931, is that right, Mr. Radojko, rather than 1991? Is that

7 right, Mr. Radojko?

8 A. I apologise, I still haven't made myself clear, I suppose. The

9 first set of data refers --

10 JUDGE ORIE: No, Mr. Radojko, you have made yourself perfectly

11 clear. The first set of data was before the Second World War, and whether

12 that was 1931 or 1935 is not of great importance at this moment.

13 Please proceed, Mr. Josse.


15 Q. I want now to turn to the document that you have in front of you,

16 please, Mr. Radojko. That is the document known in this court as the

17 Variant A and B document. I'll be stopped if there's any objection to my

18 leading on this. When you were interviewed by investigators and lawyers

19 -- yes.

20 MR. TIEGER: Well, I was just anticipating, but since counsel's

21 already stopped, I think he's about to -- this is clearly about to be a

22 leading question and I don't think leading in this area is appropriate,

23 and he can proceed to ask the questions, in my judgement.

24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse.


Page 21260

1 Q. When did you first see the document, Mr. Radojko?

2 A. As far as I can remember, I saw it on the occasion of giving

3 evidence in another case, I believe 2003. I said on that occasion that

4 notwithstanding the fact that I was only seeing the document at that

5 stage, I did remember references to that, but most of it had never been

6 implemented. I do remember that case. I'm not going to go through this

7 in any great details so as not to waste anyone's time.

8 Q. That would suffice for my purposes.

9 MR. JOSSE: Could Your Honour give me a moment?

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, please take your time.

11 [Defence counsel and accused confer]

12 MR. JOSSE: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour, I have nothing else.

13 [Trial Chamber confers]

14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Tieger, unless you would think that the first of

15 your series of questions could not be completed in the next seven minutes,

16 I would like to invite you to start your cross-examination.

17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I'm going to be hard-pressed to be

18 prepared to begin tomorrow, in light of a number of factors that I've

19 brought to the attention of the Defence, particularly the quality of the

20 65 ter, an issue that's been raised time and time again. I anticipate I

21 will be ready, I'm making every effort to do so, but this would not be an

22 appropriate time to begin.


24 From my question you may have understood that even six or seven

25 minutes count for the Chamber, but under the circumstances, you'll be

Page 21261

1 allowed to start to cross-examine the witness tomorrow.

2 Mr. Radojko, may I first instruct you not to speak with anyone

3 about the evidence you have given and the evidence you are still about to

4 give. And we'd like to see you back tomorrow, when you'll be

5 cross-examined by counsel for the Prosecution. That would be tomorrow

6 afternoon, quarter past 2.00, in this same courtroom.

7 Madam Usher, would you please escort Mr. Radojko out of the

8 courtroom.

9 [The witness stands down]

10 JUDGE ORIE: I would nevertheless like to use the remaining couple

11 of minutes and see and hear from the parties, who are all well-trained

12 common-law practitioners. Let me just put a scenario in front of you.

13 Let's just assume that in a case the Prosecution has presented a bank

14 transfer of 100.000 German marks with something written to it like: "For

15 services provided." Now, the Defence calls a witness and starts examining

16 him on how many bank accounts he has, on whether the maximum -- what would

17 have been the maximum balance on any of his bank accounts ever, whether he

18 would usually make his transfers through internet or whether he would

19 write them down on paper, whether, if he would write them down on paper,

20 whether he would put them in the mail box in branch office X or in branch

21 office Y. But finally, Defence counsel would not tell the witness -- or

22 ask the witness whether it ever happened to him that he made a bank

23 transfer of 100.000 Deutschmarks with described that it was for services

24 provided.

25 I think there are two possibilities. Either if this would have

Page 21262

1 been put to the witness, he would have said: Oh, yes, of course, I fully

2 understand. This was a mistake by the bank. Two weeks later you find the

3 bank transfer where the bank corrects their mistake, so that explains

4 everything.

5 Under those circumstances, I would not have need to know how many

6 bank accounts the person would have had. The maximum balance at any other

7 time would be totally irrelevant. If, of course, the core of the case

8 would be about the transfer of 100.000 marks, I would not even want to

9 know whether he usually makes his transfer through internet or whether he

10 does it in writing and what branch office he needs.

11 Now the other possibility: That witness starts rushing a bit and

12 says: 100.000 marks, well, that's what happened often with my bank, that

13 they make a mistake. They often write "100.000," where it's actually

14 10.000. But that's administration of the bank. Although it's

15 computerised, it's a very bad administration. Then of course the next

16 question would be: Could you give me one or two other examples where they

17 missed one nil on their bank transfers? At least we would rapidly come to

18 what the problem is. Either it's a mistake, either the bank is very

19 sloppy, what would certainly need further -- should be further explored

20 because most of the banks do not every week leave out a nil.

21 I hope you understand what my question is. How do those

22 experienced in the common-law tradition prevent that we have to hear

23 evidence for a long period of time which, for one reason or another

24 reason, may be totally irrelevant. Because if the witness later says: It

25 was a mistake by the bank, it has been corrected two weeks afterwards,

Page 21263

1 then of course the matter has been clarified sufficiently without all the

2 other information. If, however, he says that the bank always makes this

3 mistake with the nils or that -- he could have said: Well, my brother has

4 a bank account. He has got the same first name, and so therefore it's

5 explained this way, then of course we could start investigating on whether

6 he has a brother, whether he has the same -- at least that becomes

7 relevant, not anymore whether he transferred by wire, whether he

8 transferred on paper, whether he used branch office A, whether he used

9 branch office B.

10 I am inviting the parties to assist this Chamber in seeing whether

11 we could get the relevant information on the core issues in such a way

12 that we do not spend much time on matters that most likely at the very end

13 will be irrelevant.

14 I don't know -- I said I would use the five minutes. I'm not

15 going to ask the interpreters to stay any longer. My reputation is

16 already bad in this respect. I would invite the parties to -- to give it

17 one or two nights of sleep - of good sleep, I hope - and then perhaps take

18 five minutes at lunch to see whether, even in this tradition where the

19 truth comes to the surface quickly and -- how they would consider that --

20 first of all, whether you would agree with my analysis of this

21 hypothetical case; and second, how, Mr. Josse, you would resolve the

22 matter if you were a Prosecutor in this case or in the case of the bank

23 account, and how you, Mr. Tieger, would resolve the matter if you were

24 defending in the case of the transfer of 100.000 Deutschmarks.

25 We'll adjourn until tomorrow, quarter past 2.00, same courtroom.

Page 21264

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.01 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 14th day of

3 March, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.