1 Tuesday, 2 May 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The Accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.09 a.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone.
6 Mr. Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case number
8 IT-00-39-T, the Prosecutor versus Momcilo Krajisnik.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
10 Mr. Stewart, are you ready to continue the examination-in-chief of
11 Mr. Krajisnik?
12 MR. STEWART: Yes, except that the first topic this morning,
13 intercepts, is going to be handled by Mr. Josse, Your Honour. But yes, we
14 are ready.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then before I invite Mr. Josse to continue,
16 Mr. Krajisnik, again you're reminded that you're bound by the solemn
17 declaration you've given at the beginning of your testimony.
18 WITNESS: MOMCILO KRAJISNIK [Resumed]
19 [Witness answered through interpreter]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, please proceed.
21 MR. JOSSE: Just before I begin, Your Honour, could I introduce a
22 new member of our team. It's a barrister from Australia sitting two to
23 the left of me Ms. Julie Condon. It also serves as an opportunity to
24 introduce her through the Court to Mr. Krajisnik because of the obvious
25 practical difficulties involved with his giving evidence. He too hasn't
1 met her.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Welcome in court. Coming from such a distance,
3 from Australia, but -- you'll stay for a long time or how long will you be
4 on the team? Two months? So we'll have the opportunity to -- have the
5 pleasure to know that the Defence team is assisted by you for this period
6 of time. Thank you.
7 Mr. Josse. Thank you for introducing your new team member and
8 please proceed.
9 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, on Friday, we handed out a mini bundle of
10 exhibits. I hope everyone, including the interpreters, have brought them
11 from courtroom number 1. I assume they have been brought through. So
12 there is no confusion about this, Mr. Krajisnik, I can see from here, has
13 his own copy of these which I, as I think Your Honour is aware, handed to
14 him via a security officer as soon as the Court had risen. I better just
15 check that Mr. Krajisnik hasn't marked that bundle because otherwise it
16 may be of some concern to my learned friends.
17 Examination by Mr. Josse:
18 Q. Can I ask you, Mr. Krajisnik, is that bundle marked?
19 A. There are minor notes that I made in the margin, maybe underlined
20 a few things. You can have a look.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Any problem with the markings, I take it if
22 Mr. Krajisnik made his own reminders and observations on it, perhaps then
23 another copy should be tendered.
24 MR. JOSSE: Yes, I would be anxious Mr. Krajisnik keep the marked
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
2 MR. JOSSE: We are prepared to have it copied in due course, if my
3 learned friends want to check those markings.
4 MR. TIEGER: That's fine, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. So Mr. Krajisnik, you can use your own marks
6 but if the document would be tendered as evidence then, of course, we
7 should take a clean copy.
8 MR. JOSSE: We'll provide that.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Please proceed.
10 MR. JOSSE: The first exhibit in fact is not there, Mr. Krajisnik.
11 It's the only one that is not there and we are going to refer to it very
12 briefly; puts another one of these intercepts into context. It's P292 KD
13 30403 which the Court had a number of copies of on Friday. And perhaps
14 that could be put up on the screen. It's tab 42 in our --
15 MR. TIEGER: The date would be helpful.
16 MR. JOSSE: The date is the 2nd of September 1991. It's an
17 intercept between this witness and Dr. Karadzic.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I can help you with this to some extent. This
19 intercept was exhibited through Mr. Kljuic. It was played to the Court on
20 the 28th of September 2004 and Mr. Kljuic said of it that we can use this
21 to explain the power that the SDS had in its propaganda machine by the
22 illegitimate media and that media in Bosnia was all important. And I
23 suspect that he was referring in particular to the name that we see at the
24 top of this intercept, Mr. Nedjo Miljanovic. First of all, who was
1 A. Nedjo Miljanovic. Actually there are two men with the last name
2 of Miljanovic. This one should be the director of Radio-Television
3 Sarajevo at the time. There is another Miljanovic, however, and maybe
4 from the context I could find out exactly which one this is but I think
5 it's the director of television Sarajevo.
6 Q. I think you're right about that. And this intercept was used, if
7 I can paraphrase what I've already said, by Mr. Kljuic to illustrate the
8 control that your party had over this man and over Sarajevo television.
9 Before I ask you specifically about that subject, perhaps we could
10 all turn to tab 50 in the mini bundle that we've got. This is an
11 intercept between again yourself and Mr. Karadzic on the 18th of September
13 MR. JOSSE: This, Your Honour, has not been previously exhibited.
14 I don't intends to play it but it does need a number of some sort.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D180, Your Honour.
17 MR. JOSSE: In the English, on the second page, we see about
18 halfway down the page, it's a third of the way down the page.
19 Dr. Karadzic says and I'll read this slowly:
20 "Look, Momo, we really have to finish that for the television
21 today. People from the television told me that it's a disaster. First of
22 all you saw that rotten television where they made a comment on Kljuic's
23 every word; second of all, all that cynicism and everything; third of all
24 they are kicking Zoric out now."
25 "You say kicking him out?"
1 Karadzic: "From the position of news editor they are offering him
2 to go to advertising and such silly things. Second of all, I mean, it is
3 complete humiliation and we won't -- we will ask and demand that a
4 resignation be handed in and that some sort of parity be established there
5 and that" --
6 Krajisnik: "Listen to me for a second please. Give Milicevic a
8 Karadzic: "He can't do anything. Which Milicevic?"
9 Krajisnik: "Wait a second. No, Miljanovic, what's his name
11 Karadzic: "He's a cunt he won't --
12 Krajisnik: "I know, but to see what's going on to make it but
13 easier for ourselves."
14 Karadzic: "No, I mean there's no use of him, there is no use of
15 him because he's a cunt. Man, he's allowing for not a single Serb to be
16 there. Well, that's" -- .
17 Krajisnik: "Yes, but look at it this way, why wouldn't we take
18 advantage of that? That I don't understand."
19 Is this a reference to the same Mr. Miljanovic, Mr. Krajisnik?
20 A. Yes. It's the reference to the same Miljanovic.
21 Q. Not to put too fine a point on it, why is Dr. Karadzic calling
22 Mr. Miljanovic a cunt in this intercept?
23 A. First of all because he's vulgar in this conversation, just as I
24 am, and he's calling people bad names. But the underlying thing is that
25 he was a very easily scared man, an apparatchuk a man of the regime from
1 before the elections, when people were getting appointments according to
2 the so-called key of proportionate representation, not because of their
3 competences or on some ethical grounds. Mr. Karadzic at least had that
4 opinion. My opinion was a bit different but the truth lay somewhere in
5 between probably.
6 Q. What do you say to Mr. Kljuic's assertion that Miljanovic was
7 someone who was a patsy of the SDS?
8 A. Mr. Kljuic used the language that was accepted at the time. If
9 somebody was a Muslim he was necessarily a member of the SDA. If somebody
10 was a Croat he belonged to the HDZ and if a Serb then he was SDS. Which
11 wasn't true. Mr. Miljanovic was -- I'm going to try to explain --
12 director of the television but the editor-in-chief, the programming
13 editor, was a Croat. And they were not allowing a change that would
14 enable parties to place people they wanted appointed instead, appointments
15 were made on a different basis so that people could say, look, you have a
16 Serb there and he's working for the SDS.
17 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, excuse me. Before counsel continues
18 just very briefly there have been two references to Mr. Kljuic's
19 testimony. If possible I would appreciate a citation to the specific page
20 and also, if the witness -- this will be true for forthcoming questions as
21 well, if there is reference to the witness's testimony, if we could know
22 whether it's a direct quotation or a paraphrase that would be helpful as
24 MR. JOSSE: Yes, first of all the reference is to transcript page
25 6254 to 6256. And it was a very slight paraphrase on my part.
1 Q. Just before we leave this passage, Mr. Krajisnik, I want to ask
2 you about the first part of this extract that I read out which was
3 Dr. Karadzic's part where he said, look, Momo we really have to finish
4 that for the television today. Later on in that same passage he says
5 first of all you saw that rotten television where they made a comment on
6 Kljuic's every word. What's that a reference to and what does he mean?
7 A. I think I mentioned a few days ago that the radio and television
8 and all the other media but radio and television especially was a constant
9 subject of disagreement between the two sides, between the Serb side and
10 the newly formed coalition of Muslims and Croats. In this specific case,
11 the subject of the argument is the programming policy. As I said the
12 programming editor was a Croat, Nenad Pejic, and I think it was
13 Dr. Karadzic who said that in the programming policy, the anchor who was
14 asking questions of Mr. Kljuic did not satisfy himself with getting
15 Mr. Kljuic to present his position but the anchor on top made a commentary
16 of what Mr. Kljuic had said the previous evening in a lopsided and biased
17 way. And Mr. Karadzic was making these comments from the view point of
18 the fact that it was the assembly that charted the programming policy of
19 the radio and television, the television was under the assembly, and they
20 had a problem with the reporting of the television, and he made specific
21 reference to the appearance of Mr. Kljuic on television on the previous
22 night, which was accompanied by such a commentary. That was unacceptable
23 to the Serb side from the viewpoint of their policy.
24 Q. I'd like to move on, please, to tab 48, which is the first
25 intercept in the small bundle. This is an intercept between you and
1 Dr. Karadzic on the 9th of September of 1991. It's relatively short and I
2 think I am going to ask Mr. Sladojevic to play it, please.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Before we do so, si there now agreement? We had some
4 difficulties in the translation, especially with the French channel, that
5 one of the French interpreters will follow the original text and see
6 whether what is said in English is a translation of it and the other
7 interpreter taking time -- and also checking whether the English
8 translation is what he hears at that moment and the other interpreter
9 taking sufficient time to translate so that we have everything on the
10 record. I'm just thinking about technicalities, Mr. Josse, so we have a
11 complete transcript also in French.
12 MR. JOSSE: Thank you. I will allow the technicians 30 seconds,
13 Your Honour. If he's unable to fix the problem, I'll deal with it another
15 I will, if I may, Your Honour, deal with it another way.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to read to you a passage about halfway
17 down the first page of this particular intercept, where you begin talking
18 about someone called Zepinic is going there.
19 "I'll call Cengic now and tell him. I see they are taking it very
20 seriously, and here too" --
21 MR. JOSSE: I think, Your Honour, Mr. Sladojevic has got it to
22 work in which case I haven't --
23 JUDGE ORIE: I do hear something but it's not loud enough to --
24 MR. JOSSE: I am going to leave it, if I could give that
25 instruction that I'm happy to deal with it this other way.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, okay.
2 MR. JOSSE:
3 Q. "I see they are taking it very seriously, and here too. What
4 could that mean but they are only bullies who believe that Bosanska Krupa
5 is managed by those people. Do you understand?"
6 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
7 Krajisnik: And I see the SDA leaders here really want peace and
8 they feel these -- this big problem turns in the direction those guys
9 want. Do you understand?"
10 Answer: "Yes, yes."
11 Krajisnik: "Which we must admit is possible in any location."
12 THE INTERPRETER: Can the speaker please slow down? Thank you
13 very much.
14 MR. JOSSE:
15 Q. "And probably on our side too there are those who want to be a
16 local political leaders."
17 Karadzic: "It is, but is this -- if this is a comprehensive part
18 of the SDA's policy then we must react."
19 Krajisnik: "It isn't. I could see Mahmutcehajic. That it is not
20 and he said, 'Please, I completely agree and we are against this.' Now,
21 what I'll do I'll see what Cengic says and in that case we'll do it
22 because after all, you know for God's sake, some small village wants to
23 pursue politics."
24 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
25 Krajisnik: "Of course, it's completely unfounded. It is -- it is
1 wrong, then we'll have to make a war for ourselves."
2 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
3 Krajisnik: "No way. I can only suppose what that would mean. Do
4 you understand me, you know?"
5 Karadzic: "Yes, yes. Good."
6 Krajisnik: "Look here, I'll see with Cengic and we'll work it
7 out. We can be there at 3, right." My question to you --
8 MR. TIEGER: Sorry, Your Honour, a small point I don't think it
9 makes any difference but probably useful to note that there are some small
10 distinctions I noted, I'm sure it happens when people read, between what
11 Mr. Josse read out and the actual language of the translation. None that
12 I saw that were particularly significant. The most distinctive of which
13 occurred when he said, "Of course, it's completely unfounded it is, it is
14 wrong," and then Mr. Josse read out, "Then we'll have to make a war for
15 ourselves." The transcript itself says, "Then we'll have made a war for
17 Again, I don't think any of those were particularly significant.
18 It may have been hard for him to not that, though, so I -- I put that on
19 the record in case it becomes for some reason significant.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 Mr. Josse?
22 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: You're working for from a different copy.
24 MR. JOSSE: I'm not.
25 JUDGE ORIE: You're not? Just misread?
1 MR. JOSSE: Misread. Absolutely.
2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, my question about this passage is, what is this all
4 A. It is about an incident that happened in Bosanska Krupa. This
5 Court has heard the interpretation of an intercept between Mr. Vjestica
6 and Dr. Karadzic concerning the destruction of the monument to Branko
7 Copic, a Serb poet. He is a Serb but he is somewhat of an institution for
8 the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was a witness from Krupa who spoke
9 about this here. I think he was president of the municipal assembly, who
10 was explaining why that monument should not have been in the park but in
11 another location. That's the incident concerned.
12 Q. And what stance are you taking in the course of your conversation
13 with Dr. Karadzic?
14 A. Sorry, just one thing, Mr. Karadzic was upset because he had
15 received information directly from Krupa, from Serb representatives,
16 whereas I heard the same report and I tried to sort of dissipate the
17 tension, and I was telling Karadzic, think of the Croats and Muslims. We
18 will have a war if we react to every little thing somebody does on the
19 ground because I had the impression that Muslim representatives on the
20 republic level had a position not unlike mine. They condemned what
21 happened in Krupa, and I thought we should try to play that down and avoid
22 a war, rather than react to every incident. I thought we should clear
23 things up and try to redress the situation. And that can be understood
24 from the rest of this conversation.
25 Q. And who was excuse me pronunciation, Mr. Mahmutcehajic?
1 A. Mahmutcehajic was either one of the Deputy Prime Ministers in the
2 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on behalf of the SDA. I think he was
3 deputy minister for science or something like that. Dr. Mahmutcehajic.
4 Q. And?
5 A. Rusmir was his first name.
6 Q. You say, look here, I'll see with Cengic and we'll work it out.
7 Why did you say that and what made you feel that you could work it out
8 with Mr. Cengic?
9 A. Mr. Cengic was also Deputy Prime Minister, also on behalf of the
10 SDA, and he held a very high position in the SDA. This was state
11 business, not party business, and Mr. Cengic had shown goodwill. So I
12 thought I would call him up and try to deal with this situation because I
13 knew that he was well intentioned, and Serbs had a lot of sympathy for
14 him. Even when he spoke out against us, we didn't hold it against him.
15 We thought he was sincere and a man of goodwill, and I thought he would
16 sincerely try to help and redress the problem.
17 MR. JOSSE: I'd like to go to the next -- that needs a number,
18 Your Honour, the one that I have just read out?
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Registrar?
20 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D181, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
22 MR. JOSSE: If we could go to the next intercept in the bundle and
23 perhaps that could have a number. That's tab 49, the 10th of September.
24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D182, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
1 MR. JOSSE: It's the same two protagonists, Your Honour. I don't
2 wish that to be played. I want to turn to the second page in the English.
3 There is a longish response towards the top of that page from
4 Mr. Krajisnik which I'm going to read out. Mr. Krajisnik says, "'Why did
5 you schedule it?' And he said he told him, help me, tell me what his name
6 is. That's Izetbegovic. So, he said 'he told me,' he said. So I said,
7 so why did you schedule it, I said. 'But I couldn't,' he says, 'wait any
8 more.' I went down there, then I said gallantly like this, 'Do you know
9 what? Please, let no one ever dream of scheduling a session again. It
10 happened now but never again, you know, without me.' And then I said, 'Do
11 you know what? We simply have to sit down tomorrow. This is a specific
12 republic. It's different from others. We have to say clearly that we
13 have different options, that we have differences, that we are a team, that
14 we must solve problems peacefully, et cetera.'" .
15 It may be, Mr. Krajisnik, that you'll need to look at the exchange
16 between you and Mr. Karadzic immediately above the passage that I have
17 just read out, but who are you referring to in the course of that
18 conversation that you were repeating to Mr. Karadzic?
19 A. I am recounting the conversation between late Professor Abdulah
20 Konjicija and myself. He was president of the citizens council on behalf
21 of the SDA. And going beyond his powers, he convened a session of the
22 assembly or rather started a session of the assembly without my approval
23 and when I arrived I found complete chaos there because women had entered
24 the parliament and it was a very unpleasant scene. They came in to
25 protest the mobilisation of conscripts. I asked if it was Mr. Maksimovic
1 who convened the session. They told me no. They said Konjicija did it,
2 and I asked him why. And his reply was, Izetbegovic told me to. So I
3 said we have a session on the 11th. That session was indeed held. And
4 that's where we are going to discuss all our differences. And we did.
5 On the 11th of September, let me remind this Court, we endorsed a
6 conclusion proposed by Mr. Izetbegovic so the effect that nobody was going
7 to impose any solutions on anybody else. We had different visions of the
8 future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and we were going to arrive at a peaceful
9 solution, a mutually agreed one. And this irregularly convened session
10 was a rather unpleasant event and I didn't want it to sour the atmosphere
11 on the eve of the regular session scheduled for the next day. I have the
12 minutes from that session.
13 Q. Later on, in the same intercept, two pages on in the English, you
14 say, "And then say everything that is not good about the second item in
15 carefully chosen words."
16 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
17 Krajisnik: "One can't dwell on it. One shouldn't get hysterical
18 about it, you know."
19 Again, Mr. Krajisnik, it may be that you want to look at the
20 exchange immediately above the passage that I have just read out but what
21 are you saying that one needs to use carefully chosen words about?
22 A. I have to be quite honest. I haven't found the text. And the
23 interpreters didn't manage to find it either. But I can give you an
24 answer just off the cuff but I wish I could read it. Could you just
25 assist me with the actual passage? Where is it? Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: I think in English we find it on page 4, and the
2 upper part, but in the B/C/S version I have not yet located it.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I've been assisted by the
4 interpreter. 8690 are the last digits on that page.
5 Sorry, maybe I -- maybe you need to find it yourselves?
6 JUDGE ORIE: We found it in English at upper part of page 4.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This follows the sequence of what I
8 said a few minutes ago. I'm saying, "No, no, no, listen, I don't know
9 who's interest it is whether it should or should not be set on fire." I'm
10 trying to say that it was not in my interest that we have any tensions on
11 the 10th of September if we are going to have an assembly meeting on the
12 11th of September where one of the most important points should be
13 debated, and that is our differences. Of course, there are other points
14 there as well. Objections made vis-a-vis the foreign minister and then
15 the Martic case and so on and that's why I'm saying one shouldn't get
16 hysterical about it, you know, and things like that.
17 We had meetings of clubs of the presidents of clubs,
18 Mr. Izetbegovic was there too. I think that others were there as well. I
19 can't really remember exactly who it was, and we came to the conclusion
20 that on the 11th we should come up with a conclusion that would be
21 pacifying for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed we did, at the
22 proposal of Mr. Izetbegovic. So that was the effort I made on that day on
23 account of Bosanska Krupa to try to pacify the situation and not to create
24 any further commotion.
25 Q. I'd like to go to the next intercept in the bundle. That's our
1 reference tab 62, between you and Dr. Karadzic dated the 4th of October
2 1991. I'm told it's not possible to play this at the moment so again I'll
3 read out --
4 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, we can check to see if that's available
5 on Sanction in our database. We mentioned earlier to the Defence that
6 might be possible so we are looking now and if Mr. Josse can wait a
7 moment, we'll give him an answer. Apparently that can be played.
8 JUDGE ORIE: If you would like it to be played --
9 MR. JOSSE: I'll take that option, if I may.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You'll play the whole of it or just a portion?
11 MR. JOSSE: No. The whole of it, please.
12 JUDGE ORIE: The whole of it.
13 [Audiotape played]
14 "Serbs always make mistakes, what? They always call when they
15 don't have and they don't call when they should. All right, what's up?
16 Everything's fine. We've just arrived. When did you arrive? I arrived
17 just now and heard on the radio that they want some meeting and so is
18 there a meeting tonight? I was at the meeting there, you know, uh-huh,
19 but maybe this shouldn't -- maybe we should meet but I don't know when,
20 connected with this Trebinje business and the rest. Uh-huh. Is that for
21 tonight or for tomorrow? Well it's not, we can do it tomorrow. Well,
22 what did they want? It's all under the JNA command. There is no need.
23 What about Trebinje? It doesn't matter. Please, it doesn't matter to me
24 when we'll talk to him. Yes, yes. I think that it can -- I called. I
25 could not find. I, stammering, dictated a statement yesterday which he
1 should -- well, I think you should see what it's about. Obviously,
2 obviously everything should be all right, you know. Yes. They -- they
3 are using it. I told him I dictated the statement and they dictated it to
4 him but I don't know whether he's made it public. See here, Radovan, yes,
5 I spoke this evening, everything regarding peace, unity, everything is
6 fine. It can't be paramilitary. It must be -- no, under no
7 circumstances, well, yes, we don't uphold that. No, under no
8 circumstances, we have and I have told Biljana to say that we do not
9 uphold the idea at all of civilian authorities dealing with military
10 matters. No, I have -- except to, except to help the JNA. Yes, yes, what
11 I want to say is I think that tonight I got a very good impression, you
12 know. Really? At that meeting I don't think there is a single thing
13 we'll do which will be against Bosnia, unity, or peace, and so on. No,
14 no, of course, not. Today I hit on Bogicevic a bit. Really? I made a
15 statement to Vecernje Novosti and the former Politika. Uh-huh. I said
16 all principled he can't establish that it was just a suggestion. Not even
17 the Presidency has the right up there in the assembly. Yes. I mean go
18 away, go fuck your mother, who are you sucking up to? It's easy for you,
19 spread that around. Achieved good and I think that it's in any case all
20 that should be regular under some kind of order and all and not have
21 someone waging a private paramilitary war. It's under no circumstances,
22 no, I only think that our people rush in but it's all under the command of
23 the JNA. It's -- I want to tell you, please, you're tired now and I've
24 just arrived, if I'd known that he would come earlier I would have dropped
25 by. I've just come at this very minute. Yes, really. Yes, yes. Well,
1 about that I must do it right, set it straight. Yes. I even thought of
2 holding a meeting tonight. I told them something. Please, we will never
3 support anything which might ignite the situation in Bosnia. At this
4 moment, we, what happened down there, the army, that's one thing, and we
5 are something else, you know. Yes, yes. I mean, I know we are on the
6 same wave length and he said oh, come on, in fact, they, other important
7 things, and that they see to what extent we are ready for it and to what
8 extent we are not, yes, yes. I said we don't want to do anything rash
9 without checking, attack someone now and I don't know what else. Yes,
10 yes. But want to see if it's all -- what it's all about and whatever is
11 right do it properly. Agreed. I think you know that I know as it was
12 said and we, he and I, sat for a while last night and he was at a meeting,
13 Alija was on television, and that's where we were. Uh-huh, all right.
14 But it is all right. I saw that they all want peace. Well, yes. All
15 right, but what of Stipe? Does Stipe want peace? I'll tell you that when
16 we see each other tomorrow. Agreed. Look here, when you get a good rest,
17 we'll be in touch and meet somehow to work it out. Agreed. It's Saturday
18 but we'll meet, if you want. Yes. We have time. I'll drop by the house.
19 But -- agreed. This thing today for me was very -- I saw it very
20 positively. Excellent. How was it up there? Good, good. Basically
21 good. I see that those results in The Hague are excellent. I'm really
22 satisfied. Excellent, excellent. Excellent, excellent. Many other
23 things are moving in that direction. There are conditions to stop the
24 blood shed and establish peace but now it all depends. The one who
25 doesn't want that will be fucked. Well, yes. The one who doesn't want
1 that will be fucked. There can be no more. The whole world know that is
2 whoever stirs up trouble is finished. That's when what I said when we
3 were at the meeting this evening. Please, just so that you know, that's
4 our stand. Don't accidentally but there is nothing what we say now, Momo
5 speaks to Njegos in the room to pick up the other line. We won't attack
6 any of our people for that, for publicity. We must check to see what it's
7 about. Everything must be according to the rules. We won't budge from
8 any of our stands. Yes, yes, yes. It's different when it's hearsay but
9 what has now happened down here, there is, for sure, while we investigate
10 it, look into it, we'll give it all. Good agreed, agreed. Good. See you
11 tomorrow. Agreed. Okay. Go get some rest. You must be tired.
12 Okay." [as read].
13 MR. JOSSE:
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --
15 THE INTERPRETER: There are some minor corrections to the existing
16 translation if you want them.
17 MR. JOSSE: I'm sure we do, Madam Interpreter, yes, please.
18 THE INTERPRETER: There is one point approximately one page down
19 where there is a reference to the former Politika. It's not former
20 Politika. It's a newspaper called Politika Ekspres or Ekspres Politika.
21 We'll try to give you the exact page.
22 MR. JOSSE: It's at the top of page 2.
23 THE INTERPRETER: It's the beginning of page 2. Then three lines
24 down, there is -- just a second. "All that should be regular." It should
25 read, "All that should be by the book." And at the very end, where there
1 is reference to "don't accidentally." That should be "don't even think
2 about or don't even think about it." That's all.
3 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
4 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, fairly near the beginning of this conversation, you
5 say, "It can't be paramilitary." What are you referring to, please?
6 A. Well, as far as I can remember, and I think that my memory serves
7 me well -- well, first of all, let me give an answer to your question. I
8 think that our policy, that is to say the Serb policy, has to be that
9 paramilitaries should not be tolerated and cannot be tolerated. That's an
10 answer to your question. If you need a further explanation of that, I'm
11 prepared to provide it.
12 Q. I think you should put it into the context of this particular
13 conversation and the events of October 1991. Yes, please.
14 A. The first incident or one of the first incidents in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the damaged party so to speak were the Croats,
16 that is the village of Ravno near Trebinje, as far as I know, as far as I
17 managed to find out, a group of citizens of Croat ethnicity stopped the
18 army, the army gave an ultimatum and there were even casualties,
19 fatalities there, and so on. We had a meeting then, we the top people of
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say the Presidency and the president of the
21 assembly and the Prime Minister, I don't know who else -- well, that's
22 what it probably was. So party and state influences were intertwined
23 there. Mr. Kljuic and Mr. Izetbegovic and others also represented their
24 parties. The accusation was that some paramilitary units under civilian
25 authority participated in that incident. I am saying this in connection
1 with Ravno. Now, I am conveying what I said there, and what our position
2 was. They were levelling accusations. Mr. Kljuic was accusing the
3 president of the municipal assembly in Trebinje, Vucurevic, that he had a
4 unit that did that and so on. And then I said here, "Our position is
5 certainly that we are against paramilitary formations, we are going to
6 investigate the matter, and if we establish that that's the way it was,
7 everyone should be punished because we don't want to do anything that
8 would contribute to harming the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina." I was
9 pleased that Mr. Karadzic confirmed all of that and we were supposed to
10 have a meeting which would certainly be attended by Mr. Karadzic as
11 president of the party. It should have been a different kind of meeting
12 so that we would have a more detailed discussion about this.
13 I managed to convey the atmosphere of this meeting here. It was
14 encouraging. All said that peace was in our interest and that it would be
15 a good thing to resolve such conflicts as soon as they crop up. Not once
16 they take an undesired course, if I can put it that way.
17 Q. One other thing on this that might help. At the bottom of page 2
18 in the English, there is a reference to someone called Stipe. That was a
19 Mr. Mesic; is that correct?
20 A. I'm not sure. Maybe Mr. Karadzic said this because -- well,
21 Stjepan, you know, Stjepan Kljuic is also Stipe for short and he was also
22 perhaps referring to Stipe Mesic. At that time I knew who it was that he
23 meant but now I can't be sure. If -- well, I mean, he could have meant
24 either one of the two. I believe that perhaps, I'm saying perhaps, he
25 meant Kljuic here. Maybe he was using a nickname here in the case of
1 Mr. Kljuic, because the nickname for Stjepan is Stipe. Maybe he did mean
2 Stjepan Mesic too but I'm not sure, really.
3 Q. Either way it was a reference to a Croatian leader; is that
5 A. Yes, yes. He certainly meant the Croatian side, perhaps I should
6 put it that way, if that is an explanation. He meant the Croatian side,
7 whether it's at the level of Bosnia or at the level of Croatia or
8 Yugoslavia. I think at that time Mr. Stjepan Mesic was the president of
9 the Presidency of Yugoslavia. I think he still was at the time.
10 Q. I'm not sure if I asked for a number for that. I don't think I
11 did, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Don't think you did. Mr. Registrar?
13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D183, Your Honours.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
15 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 62.
16 MR. JOSSE: I'd next like to go to tab 66. I have to apologise to
17 the Court. This has previously been exhibited as part of P292. I don't
18 have the precise number, and will need some assistance as far as that's
20 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you proceed while the OTP is trying to assist
22 MR. JOSSE: My apologies. In fact, it's only a small part of this
23 that I wish to ask you about, Mr. Krajisnik. It was adduced during the
24 evidence of Mr. Babic. I think Mr. Tieger can help.
25 JUDGE ORIE: It seems.
1 MR. TIEGER: I can't unless I have the date. We don't have the
2 tab numbers.
3 MR. JOSSE: 16th of October of 1991.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Krajisnik, Karadzic, and Koljevic.
5 MR. JOSSE: That's right, Your Honour. And as I've already said,
6 it was adduced. I don't even know, I'm afraid, whether it was played but
7 it was adduced during the evidence of Mr. Kljuic. I beg your pardon,
8 Mr. Babic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
10 MR. JOSSE:
11 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to read a passage of this very slowly so
12 the interpreters can find the right part. It's at the very bottom of the
13 second page in the English where it talks about 1200 hours. And Mr.
14 Koljevic says, "Well, tomorrow, early in the morning, we can do today in
15 the afternoon any way."
16 Karadzic: "Today in the afternoon, I have to go."
17 Koljevic: "Okay. Okay. Fine."
18 Karadzic: "I have to do something else tomorrow morning."
19 Koljevic: "You have to even a second meeting."
20 Karadzic: "Yes."
21 Koljevic: "Well, I can arrive in the morning at 700 hours at the
22 conference. It is all the same for me. We are losing ourselves in
24 Karadzic: "Fine, fine, fine."
25 Koljevic: "Please, there is also another reason for which I
1 have -- for which I would have to -- you would have to mention that you --
2 there were questions last night regarding that sentence."
3 Karadzic: "I will quote Filipovic."
4 Koljevic: "Quote him, well, nothing else, I quoted him."
5 Karadzic: "Yes, yes."
6 What is this a reference to, please, Mr. Krajisnik?
7 A. They are saying that Mr. Karadzic should go to a press conference.
8 The most important thing here are the last lines that you read out, when
9 Mr. Koljevic suggests to Mr. Karadzic that he should certainly explain
10 that sentence, and the sentence, if you remember, was referred to several
11 times here. That Karadzic threatened that Muslims would disappear.
12 Karadzic is saying here, "I am just going to quote Mr. Filipovic."
13 Actually, I have evidence here from this press conference where he
14 said at this press conference, what I said is the same thing that
15 Mr. Filipovic said from this rostrum. If we do not reach agreement we are
16 going to disappear as a people. That is the meaning of this explanation,
17 why Mr. Karadzic takes into account this statement which is much longer
18 than what has been interpreted here and has a completely different
19 connotation, that is the reason why Mr. Karadzic presented this at the
20 assembly. He explained it at the press conference and Mr. Koljevic here
21 is telling him that it caused anxiety among the public and that he should
22 explain it at a press conference.
23 There is a newspaper article pertaining to that press conference
24 where you can see that Karadzic explained this. If necessary, it can be
1 Q. Do you have that?
2 A. Yes. I have it in my archives. I can present it to the Trial
3 Chamber if necessary. Perhaps I even have it here right now.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Josse, if you're interested to hear and see it,
5 we could invite Mr. Krajisnik to present it.
6 MR. JOSSE:
7 Q. If you've got it here now, Mr. Krajisnik.
8 A. I underlined it here. There are two copies. Mr. Josse can get
9 one and you can too. The underlined section is the one that you can
10 perhaps place on the ELMO.
11 JUDGE ORIE: I see that there are two copies. Perhaps we could
12 put that on the ELMO, have it read so that it then becomes part of the
13 record. It seems to be a -- from -- taken from Politika at the 17th of
14 October 1991. Could it be put on the ELMO, Madam Usher?
15 MR. TIEGER: And, Your Honour, while that's happening I should
16 indicate that that intercept was previously exhibited as P292, KID 30656.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's then on the record as well. Could we
18 then just look on what's on the ELMO at this moment? Don't see anything
19 on our screens. Is there any problem to reproduce what's on the ELMO?
20 I'm looking at the technicians. No, that's not on the ELMO at this
21 moment. Could someone explain to me -- could the technicians explain to
22 me what's the problem to have the ELMO reproduced at this moment? Yes,
23 there we are. Yes. Madam Usher, perhaps we first go to the top of that
24 page to identify what exactly it is. Yes. I see that it's taken from
25 Politika, 17th of October 1991. Mr. Krajisnik, the underlined portion, is
1 that the one in yellow on the right-hand side or is it further down to the
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both. But first the lower part
4 should be shown.
5 MR. JOSSE: May I make a suggestion?
6 JUDGE ORIE: So could we zoom in so that at least Mr. Krajisnik
7 is --
8 MR. JOSSE: Yes, that's fine.
9 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine. I take it that you start where it
10 reads, "Radovan --
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. It was ascribed to Radovan
12 Karadzic that he said something about the victimisation of the Muslim
13 people. If you want, I can continue reading this.
14 JUDGE ORIE: If you read all the yellow highlighted portion, then
15 we could then move to the second part you wanted to draw our attention to.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Then this is a quotation, "I
17 quoted Mr. Muhamed Filipovic who at the same rostrum said, if" -- could
18 you please move it to the other part now? "If we do not reach agreement
19 but if some other options are chosen [a forceful division of Bosnia] then
20 that is the beginning of the end of the Muslim people. That, added
21 Karadzic, does not have to be the beginning of the end of his people only
22 in a physical sense but also in the sense that the existence of the
23 national being of the Muslims. I said with the best of intentions that
24 Karadzic once again highlighted what Mr. Filipovic had said." Dr.
25 Karadzic put forth a request that all parties state their views on the
1 fact that the meeting was illegal. That is what I wish to indicate here.
2 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.
3 Your Honour, could that have a number, please?
4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D184, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then someone has to give at least one copy,
6 preferably a clean copy, I saw Mr. --
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a clear copy on a CD. I can
8 bring it tomorrow. Both of the ones I have here today are marked but I
9 can get a clear copy from the CD and I also have the original.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Let's just see what you would like, Mr. Josse,
11 I wouldn't mind, I mean, marking here means the portions read so therefore
12 it doesn't disturb me that much. But the Prosecution? No problem. So we
13 could work on the basis of this copy so if one of them could be then
14 tendered and be given to the Registrar.
15 MR. JOSSE: Does the Chamber wish to have the whole article
16 translated by the CLSS?
17 JUDGE ORIE: I would -- as a matter of fact I would rather delay
18 the decision until the Prosecution has had an opportunity to read the
19 remainder of it and have it perhaps by language assistant explained to it
20 and then see whether they insist on having it translated so if one copy
21 could be given to the Registrar.
22 MR. JOSSE: Perhaps the other copy could be given to my learned
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, then Mr. Krajisnik said he still had the
25 original and a copy so then we could work on the basis of this.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could they just return the annex to
2 me that one -- the one that goes with it?
3 JUDGE ORIE: There was another document attached to it and that
4 will be separated and the other part will be returned to you,
5 Mr. Krajisnik.
6 Madam Usher, yes, this is one.
7 MR. JOSSE: Perhaps I can move on while --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. One copy goes to -- Madam Usher, the other copy
9 goes to the Prosecution and then what remains in the hands of
10 Mr. Krajisnik.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note, could Mr. Tieger's
12 microphone be adjusted because the interpreters have trouble hearing him.
13 Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: He immediately followed you.
15 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you, thank you.
16 MR. TIEGER: It was a welcome introduction by the interpreter.
17 If my learned friend is going on to a different matter I just have
18 one point on that.
19 MR. JOSSE: I am moving on to a different interpret. That is
21 MR. TIEGER: Simply to not that, as before, there were some minor
22 discrepancies between what was actually read out and what appears in the
23 text. Again I don't anticipate it will create a problem but in case
24 someone was relying on the transcript rather than the document itself, the
25 most notable -- nevertheless small -- discrepancy was found at the top of
1 page 3 of the English, where Dr. Koljevic -- Professor Koljevic is
2 speaking. The text of the intercept reads, "Please there is also another
3 reason for which you to have to -- you would have to mention that," and it
4 was read out as "for which I would have to -- I would have to mention."
5 JUDGE ORIE: As a matter of fact, that's how it reads in English.
6 For me. "Which I would have to." That's fourth line of page 3 of the
7 English, it reads, "I." Could we have perhaps then that there are two
8 different versions again?
9 MR. TIEGER: Apparently so. I am relying on --
10 JUDGE ORIE: If you look at the last three, the -- it is English
11 translation, 02079164, up until 9167, in my copy.
12 MR. TIEGER: Mine too. That's quite --
13 JUDGE ORIE: That's surprising. I wonder whether same documents
14 would have different -- could I have a look at it, at your version,
15 Mr. Tieger, so that I can check what -- because usually there are
16 different versions, whereas -- yes. There seem to be under the same
17 number, different versions, which -- I mean, different numbers different
18 versions is something we have seen before, but here, although it's a
19 minor -- no, perhaps this is not a minor matter but both the layout and in
20 this respect we see that there are different versions. I'd like to -- the
21 Registrar to find out what is the one that is in evidence so that at least
22 we know on which one to focus. It worries me. It really worries me that
23 even under the same number, different versions appear. Just --
24 MR. JOSSE: What I'm going to say I suspect isn't very helpful but
25 as I observed the other day, Mr. Stewart and I are finding this really all
1 the time, Your Honour, particularly as we've been working on our client's
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, under the same number as well. I mean different
4 versions are, I would say, a -- well known; two translations sometimes be
5 made of the same document, but here we find differences within same
7 MR. JOSSE: I'd be lying if I was able to verify that.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what is mainly worrying me.
9 Mr. Tieger, the Chamber very much would like to -- you to find out
10 what caused this to happen and perhaps to make a full comparison
11 because -- to see whether the electronic version is the one or the other,
12 and because this is really worrying us more than any identifiable,
13 different versions, because here, it's almost impossible to detect this,
14 but you yourself were the one who detected it.
15 Mr. Josse, would it be agreeable for you that once Mr. Tieger has
16 done this job and when you have been able to look at P292 KID 30656 to see
17 whether we need a new number for this alternative version of the same
18 document? Josse I'm more than happy to liaise with my learned friend who
19 I am sure will guide me.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll hear from you soon. Please proceed.
21 MR. JOSSE:
22 Q. One last intercept in this batch, please, Mr. Krajisnik. It's the
23 last one in the bundle, which is 115.
24 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, this hasn't previously been exhibited.
25 In fact, I'm only going to refer to a very short part of it but it does
1 need a number.
2 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D185, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you and if I may add to the previous one, what
4 seems to be in evidence is not your version but seems to be Mr. Tieger's
5 version. So the request is now to both parties to find out why you're
6 using a different one although the other one seems to have been admitted
7 into evidence and what could cause these different versions to exist.
8 Could it be that these are text documents rather than image documents?
9 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, I would be hesitant to speculate about
10 any of that at this point but certainly we will do our best to get to the
11 bottom of it. With respect to D185, if we could have the date, please? I
12 presume that's December.
13 MR. JOSSE: 21st of December, 1991. Your Honour will see in fact
14 in the bundle there are two intercepts for that date. One is 114 which
15 I'm not going to deal with now. And the other is 115. As the Chamber is
16 aware, on that day an assembly session took place; Mr. Stewart is going to
17 deal with that assembly session very shortly. But this intercept,
18 Mr. Krajisnik, really relates to a discrete point. About halfway down the
19 page in the English, and about two-thirds of the way down the first page
20 in the B/C/S, we see that Mr. Koljevic is addressing you and says, "So am
21 I -- I'm also very satisfied, Momo. I've just spoken to Radovan." What
22 form of address did Mr. Koljevic generally use when he was speaking to
23 you, Mr. Krajisnik?
24 A. Mr. Koljevic and I were on last name terms, but still we called
25 each other Momo and Nikola. Otherwise, we called each other Professor and
1 president but sometimes in jest we called teach other Momo and Nikola
2 although we were usually on second name terms.
3 Q. And when he called you "president," was that a reflection on your
4 power in any real sense?
5 A. Whenever he told me "president" or "speaker," I knew he was going
6 to tease me. It was that jocular tone he used sometimes. It was far from
7 a relationship of superiority or inferiority in terms of power. It
8 couldn't have meant that. Mr. Koljevic actually occupied a higher
9 position than I so that's completely out of the question. I mean in
11 Q. Well that's a subject which either Mr. Stewart or I will return to
12 a little later on in your evidence.
13 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, that concludes the questions I've got to
14 ask about these intercepts. Mr. Stewart tells me he is happy to proceed.
15 This may be a convenient moment.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, I'm looking at the clock and
17 perhaps it's a good moment to have a break as well.
18 We will adjourn until five minutes to 11.
19 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.
20 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Stewart, there seems to be a
22 rather practical matter I would like to deal with very briefly.
23 Mr. Krajisnik, I -- the Chamber was informed that you received by
24 now the DVDs of your testimony, but that there is one -- and that it also
25 that you are able to review it on your computer. At the same time, there
1 seems still to be a question about the 25th of April. You started your
2 testimony only not at the very beginning of that day but at a later stage.
3 I do understand that you've been provided with a DVD of your testimony, so
4 on from that moment, from the 25th of April, but that you would like to
5 have the remainder of the day on DVD as well?
6 That takes quite some effort to digitalise the whole of the
7 session so therefore I'm just inquiring into where the ruling was that you
8 would receive DVDs of your testimony and not of the whole of the
9 procedure, whether it would assist you if you received the audio of the
10 remainder of that day instead of the -- if that would help, that would
11 certainly alleviate the burden on the shoulders of our technicians. If
12 that would do, then you have it at least available but only in audio. Is
13 that -- would that resolve your problem?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really appreciate it, Your Honour.
15 But I would really be grateful if they could give me that first part as a
16 video, never mind when. That would be very useful to me. I only have
17 footage from the moment when I started to testify. But I don't have the
18 passage while I was still sitting over there and was unable to write. So
19 I would really like to have that on video even if I have to wait.
20 However, if it's not possible ...
21 JUDGE ORIE: We'll consider the matter, and it might take some
22 more time. I'm not promising you anything but the audio you could receive
23 very quickly.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
1 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, we are going
2 now to the session of the Serb assembly held on the 21st of December.
3 It's the fourth session. The exhibit number of that, Your Honour, is --
4 the B/C/S is P64(A) so it's Mr. Treanor's stuff, at tab 543, which is
5 found in binder 19. And if he hasn't already got it, Your Honour, Mr.
6 Krajisnik, in the usual way, needs to have the margin-numbered copy of
7 this particular document. It's on its way to him right now.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 Examination by Mr. Stewart: [Continued]
10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if you could go, please, to margin number 1 which
11 is at the very top of page 3, it's also at the very -- well, pretty much
12 at the very top of page 3 of the English at the moment, Your Honours. And
13 we got Mr. Ostojic speaking. Do you see that, Mr. Krajisnik?
14 A. Yes, I found that.
15 Q. The second paragraph, just a light introduction, and then he
16 says, "I would like to thank Novi Sad television and Belgrade television
17 for making it possible for the Serbian people in Yugoslavia to watch this
18 session. It means that this session is being broadcast live to the
19 Serbian people in Serbia and Montenegro and in Serbian Krajina as well as
20 to other citizens. I appeal to Sarajevo television to join in with Novi
21 Sad television so that the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina can
22 watch this session, although Sarajevo television has ignored the plea from
23 the president of the simply of the Serbian people, nevertheless I ask you
24 to support this call. We expect Sarajevo television to tune in to the
25 broadcast by Serbian television so that Serbian people in BiH can watch
1 this session."
2 Mr. Krajisnik, had you, as president of the assembly, had you made
3 any representations in relation to television coverage of this particular
5 A. It's evident from this that I did, although I can't recall it at
6 the moment. I did appeal on the Sarajevo television to broadcast it, but
7 I can only trust the minutes at this time because I don't have a memory of
9 Q. Anyway, you personally supported as wide publicity as possible for
10 the assembly session, did you?
11 A. The answer is yes, but it's also because I wanted others to be
12 informed about what the Assembly of the Serbian People was doing to avoid
13 any ambiguity and any speculation. It had a double purpose, therefore.
14 Q. When you say others, you mean -- you mean non-Serbs, do you?
15 A. It's not nice to call them non-Serbs, it doesn't sound good. But
16 I really meant all the citizens of the then Bosnia-Herzegovina, all the
17 others, not only Serbs. It doesn't sound so good when you call them
18 non-Serbs or Muslims or this or that. It grates on my ears a bit when you
19 say non-Serbs. I meant all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than
20 Serbs only.
21 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, I will have to attach a general apology to
22 any use of that phrase because it's not intended pejoratively by me, of
23 course, but sometimes it's going to be necessary for purely descriptive
24 purposes. Otherwise it gets very convoluted.
25 Mr. Krajisnik, if we can go we can skip number 2 --
1 A. I'm sorry, I didn't mean to really object to the use of that term.
2 I'm just saying that it sounds a bit awkward to our ears, to people over
4 Q. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Krajisnik. I took no offence. The -- nor
5 meant any.
6 Let's skip number 2 and go to margin note number 3, which in the
7 Serbian is on page 7, about the middle of page 7, and in the English is
8 page 5, and it's quite a way into a contribution by Mr. Buha.
9 Mr. Krajisnik, before we look at what Mr. Buha says here, I wonder if --
10 well, please, could you describe what Mr. Buha's role and level of
11 activity was in the politics as at 21st December 1991?
12 A. Mr. Buha was a deputy, a MP, only that. I'm not aware that he was
13 a member of some body within the party. He was a very renowned professor
14 at the university and he was a very renowned MP, consequently. It had --
15 his words had more weight than those of another MP as a consequence. I am
16 sure that he wasn't a member of the ministerial council because the
17 ministerial council comprised only ministers, and he wasn't one.
18 Q. Now, he on this -- in this contribution here, a few paragraphs
19 down, he says, it's a couple of paragraphs down from the letter 3, "At
20 this truly historical moment," you see that? I should read the previous
21 paragraph; it doesn't make so much sense. "Today it is essential" --
22 against the number 3, the paragraph "today it is essential for the very
23 survival of the Serbian nation ..." Do you see that, Mr. Krajisnik?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. "... and its cultural, economic and civil prosperity, although it
1 is well known what the Serbian people in BiH and the Serbian people in
2 general stand for in historical, national, and constitutional sense, its
3 reputation in the eyes of European bullies does not seem to be very high
4 at the moment. We suspect that it will not be too long before the
5 criteria for measuring its value and strength that are now being used
6 secretly start being used openly." And just to put this in context, it --
7 this assembly meeting was taking place in circumstances where the European
8 Community had given the strongest indication to the -- to Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina that it was inviting proposals with a view to independence of
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, wasn't it?
11 A. Yes. I have that document here as well. It was published in the
12 newspapers. On the 15th of December the European Community sent a query
13 to all the former republics of Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina, to let them know whether they wished to become independent
15 states, and if so, to make their applications. So this was said in light
16 of that query by the European Community and the reply sent by our
17 government. And I can elaborate on that if that's necessary.
18 Q. Well, Mr. Krajisnik, it's -- the -- for present purposes, the
19 simple position was this, wasn't it, that that -- that invitation from the
20 European Community was receiving from the government of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina a response indicating clearly that, yes, they did wish to move
22 towards independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina? That's the correct
23 summary of the position, isn't it?
24 A. Yes. With the proviso. Both the Presidency before the Serb
25 representatives and the government, without the Serb representatives, had
1 made a decision to respond to that invitation by saying that, yes, Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina wanted independence, and it was going to apply to the
3 European Community for recognition. And it was concerning these two
4 decisions that were made without a consensus that this session was held,
5 and the immediate reason for convening the session was that invitation of
6 the European Community.
7 Q. So then, Mr. Buha continues, "At this truly historical moment the
8 Muslim and Croatian people ought to, for their part, answer to these
9 questions. For if they have decided that it is in their national interest
10 to leave Yugoslavia, the Serbian people will not be opposed to any lawful
11 move that would lead to the realisation of that interest. The only
12 condition is that they accept the decision of the Serbian people to keep
13 its territory within the remains of Yugoslavia. I suggest that the
14 assembly adopt a constitutional document in this respect. The Assembly of
15 the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina should demand that the right
16 to remain within Yugoslavia is realised through the institutions at the
17 republican and federal level on the basis of an agreement on succession
18 and the acceptance of international arbitration. The fact remains that
19 the representatives of the Serbian people in the assembly of BiH have
20 constantly insisted that the Croatian people in BiH are constituent.
21 Sadly, it did not instigate a single word from the representatives of the
22 Croatian people in the same house on the analogous status of the Serbian
23 people in Croatia, although it would have been well founded. In the same
24 way that the Croatian ethnic community is autoktonis [phoen] and sovereign
25 on its ethnic and historical territories in BiH, so is the Serbian ethnic
1 community on its ethnic and historical territories in Croatia, even in
2 terms of their populations, despite the horrendous genocide against the
3 Serbs during the NDH, Independent State of Croatia. These two communities
4 are almost of equal size which means that even that condition for equal
5 treatment exists."
6 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I want to concentrate on that phrase, "ethnic
7 and historical territories," and then look at the next
8 paragraph, "Naturally, we cannot insist on what is self-evident but we can
9 demand that the process of territorial division should be based on ethnic,
10 historical, and territorial principles as well as a clause that the number
11 of the members of the people erecting the border who are left behind the
12 border should be as few as possible and in that respect there should be a
14 Mr. Krajisnik, the phrase "ethnic and historical territories," did
15 it allow a clear and specific definition or was it a more fluid term?
16 A. In this case, a specific area was concerned, the area of Krajina.
17 You know that a part of what used to be called military Krajina was in
18 Croatia, whereas another part containing the majority of Serbs was in
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ethnic Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
20 that area had been brought by the Ottomans to defend the border against
21 Croatia whereas on the other side of the border, the ethnic Serbs there
22 had been brought by the Austro-Hungarian empire to defend the border
23 against the Turks. And it is said in a book that that area was always
24 under the control of Vienna, not Zagreb, and it was referred to as a
25 historically ethnic area, when we speak of Serbs in Krajina. Of course,
1 on the other bank of the Una River, the Bosnian Krajina is also an ethnic
2 area but it has a different political dimension.
3 Ottomans had brought Turks from Anatolia, to the Cazin Krajina and
4 they formed the basis of the Muslim population there but those are the
5 historical facts.
6 When Mr. Buha speaks of historical entitlement, before the
7 multi-party elections, Serbs used to be a constituent people along with
8 the Croats, and with the arrival into power of the new government, Serbs
9 were deprived of that status, and that's what Mr. Buha was referring to.
10 Q. Mr. Buha, what you have said, Mr. Krajisnik, about the ability to
11 identify or define those territories in that part of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina and that part of Croatia, did that apply more generally in
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina to ethnic and historical territories?
14 A. There existed certain historical and ethnic territories with a
15 majority Serb, Croat and Muslim populations respectively. I can show you
16 that on the map of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can point out the exact
17 regions where Croats were historically a majority, where Serbs were
18 historically a majority, and where Muslims were historically a majority.
19 And there were again other areas in which no community had a majority.
20 But it was impossible to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina in clearly divided
21 ethnic areas, areas where one ethnic community would be a clear majority.
22 Q. Who was, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Simovic? We see him, if you find
23 point 6, we can go on --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, would you allow me to ask one clarifying
1 MR. STEWART: Yes, but of course, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, in the beginning of the speech of
3 Professor Buha, in the B/C/S, it's on page 4, the semi-last paragraph, he
4 says, "Despite a unanimous decision of the assembly of BiH from 16th of
5 October 1991, that no constituent people would be pressurised into
6 accepting the will of the other two, our partners could not live up to
7 their commitment even for a month."
8 Now, earlier today, your testimony, was, "On the 11th of
9 September, let me remind this Court, we endorsed a conclusion proposed by
10 Mr. Izetbegovic so to the effect that nobody was going to impose any
11 solutions on anybody else."
12 Do you consider this a mistake by Professor Buha? Because what
13 you described to have happened on the 11th of September very much
14 resembles what Mr. Buha here describes as what happened on the 16th of
15 October and from what we know of the 16th of October, it was quite a
16 different matter than what he describes here. Do you consider there to be
17 a mistake or -- so we should understand that as a reference to the 11th of
18 September? And then "not even a month" means already in October they
19 violated this commonly adopted decision? Is that a correct understanding?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, it is a
21 mistake. On the 11th of September, a meeting of the assembly was held and
22 we have a document here where conclusions were adopted on the basis of
23 Mr. Izetbegovic's proposals. Mr. Buha made a mistake here. It's
24 illogical because --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what I thought when I tried to verify it
1 with you.
2 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
5 Q. Yes, we were going to look just above marginal note 6 on your
6 copy, Mr. Krajisnik, so that will be -- in fact it's on page 16 of the --
7 of your version, and it's on page 9 of the English, in each case towards
8 the top of the page we see Mr. Simovic starting to talk and his -- it
9 was -- was he -- just a deputy but was he a deputy only or did he have
10 some other role or function?
11 A. Mr. Miodrag Simovic was not a deputy. He was Deputy Prime
12 Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who had been nominated by the Serbian
13 democratic party. You see that he was saying here what had happened at
14 the government meeting in connection with the letter sent by the European
15 Community. Since he is speaking before the assembly, that creates a bit
16 of confusion, as if he were a MP, but no, he is actually Deputy Prime
17 Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I don't know whether he was here at
18 the same time as president of the ministerial council, I don't know.
19 Q. So among other things he speaks up here, doesn't he, to report
20 the -- quite fully the decision that the government of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina had adopted the previous day?
22 A. Yes, you're right. You're right.
23 Q. And if we just go back about a page into the contribution of
24 Professor Koljevic, this will be two or three paragraphs after the margin
25 note 5 appears on your document, so it probably is going to be very near
1 to the top of page 14 on your copy, Mr. Krajisnik, and about halfway down
2 page 8 in the English, a paragraph beginning, "One day historians may be
3 able to draw some interesting conclusions from yesterday's meeting of the
4 Presidency but I must tell you one thing. The joint position of Nikola
5 Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic in relation to the second item on the agenda
6 was not included in the statement of the Presidency, not a single sentence
7 was included, not even one sentence that I insisted be included, so I
8 would like to inform you and the Yugoslav public about our position in
9 relation to the second item on the agenda at yesterday's meeting, that is
10 our response to the European office -- offer for independence. This is
11 the text of our position, that we submitted to the Presidency
12 yesterday, 'We are opposed to Bosnia and Herzegovina submitting an
13 application for independence with the European Community in accordance
14 with the right to self determination under the declaration on the
15 guidelines for recognition of new states and many other international
16 treaties, the Serbian people exercising that right is vehemently opposed
17 to the request in question and holds that it has the right to remain
18 within Yugoslavia.'"
19 Mr. Krajisnik, was the concern expressed here by Professor
20 Koljevic that his and Mrs. Plavsic's position should be known, was that to
21 yours and Mr. Ostojic's expressed wish that there should be as wide
22 television coverage as possible?
23 A. You're right. But there is something I would like to add. This
24 is a document -- just like the government passed a decision, the
25 Presidency passed a decision too. But in that decision for
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina to apply for independence, there was an annex as well,
2 the statement made by Mr. Koljevic and Mrs. Plavsic. And that was
3 supposed possible made public because they were opposed to it. They had a
4 different view. And that was not the case. And now he is saying since
5 the television crews are there, I want the public to know what was dropped
6 from this press release. Now I'm talking on behalf of the late Mr.
7 Koljevic. That is what he and Mrs. Plavsic stated in terms of their own
8 views, and he wanted it to be made public.
9 Q. Going back to Mr. Simovic's contribution, if you would find the
10 margin note 7 on your copy, Mr. Krajisnik, that would be on page 19, about
11 a third of the way down, and on the English it's in the middle of page 10.
12 A. Yes, I've found number 7.
13 Q. I'll go just above 7, paragraph beginning, "We expressed our
14 position in relation to this decision in a separate statement entitled,
15 'Black Friday for Bosnia and Herzegovina.'" As far as I'm aware, it has
16 not been published in the media so, please, let me read it out. In
17 response -- quotes in response to today's --
18 A. Mr. Stewart, the interpreters have trouble finding the reference
19 and they should read this out. So could you please --
20 Q. Yes. It's on page 19 of the B/C/S. I think it's actual will he
21 at the very foot of page 18 probably. "Nase," is that a word that makes
22 sense, as I say it, "Nase stavove"? Is that the right paragraph? In
23 English, "We expressed our position." Does that help?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, we found it, thank you.
25 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I found it and I think they
2 have too.
3 MR. STEWART:
4 Q. They have, Mr. Krajisnik.
5 "We expressed our position in relation to this position in a
6 separate statement entitled, black Friday for Bosnia and Herzegovina. As
7 far as I am aware it has not been published in the media so please let me
8 read it out. Quotes, in response to today's session of the government of
9 BiH which adopted by a majority vote the decision to send a request to the
10 EC to recognise the sovereignty, autonomy and independence of Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, the members of the government of BiH representing the Serbian
12 people consider this act as a flagrant violation of the constitution of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, SRBiH, and the statute of the government of SRBiH.
14 For the Serbian people in BiH who have expressed their will to live in
15 Yugoslavia, the EC declaration on the possibility of recognition of
16 Yugoslav republics is completely irrelevant, which makes the decision of
17 the government of BiH meaningless. The Serbian people in BiH will never,
18 under any circumstances, accept to be subordinated to anybody and
19 especially will not accept the status of a minority in their own state, a
20 state they will defend and promote using all means and in a manner that
21 they have always been doing. Therefore, Serbian people are defending
22 their existing right and its unity and all they want is peaceful
23 coexistence with other peoples who want the same. The Serbian people in
24 Bosnia, together with other sections of the Serbian people in Yugoslavia
25 will never accept the humiliation of having their state created and
1 recognised by others and especially its destruction by a stroke of pen at
2 a conference table by those who have not created it. Serbian people
3 accept only the principles of the Charter of the UN and the CSCE that
4 embody truth and justice and, in particular, the right of people to
5 self-determination." And he says, "That was our statement."
6 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, Mr. Simovic says in the course of that
7 statement, says, in the course of it, as far as the Serbian people are
8 concerned, all they want is peaceful coexistence with other peoples who
9 want the same. At that point, was the statement in line with your own
10 position, with the SDS position at this time?
11 A. Absolutely, yes.
12 Q. However, is -- would it have been a correct understanding of what
13 Mr. Simovic was saying there, that if coexistence with other peoples could
14 not be achieved peacefully, then the Serbian people in Bosnia and
15 Herzegovina would fight? And when I say "fight", I mean fight a war.
16 A. Well, I don't know. I mean, I didn't notice it here, but probably
17 Mr. Simovic said this because he felt revolted because he is a very
18 refined intellectual, a member of the Academy of Sciences and Arts, and
19 he's even a member of the Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it
20 doesn't sound like him but it was probably an expression of revolt. If we
21 can't do it peacefully we are going to wage war. I didn't really notice
22 while you were reading it out but if he said it, he's saying we are
23 proposing to resolve it by peaceful means now, now what is the opposite of
24 peace? It is war. So it is something that no one wanted. So perhaps it
25 was just for propaganda purposes, a bit of propaganda, but we wanted to
1 find a solution at all costs, a peaceful solution, for several reasons.
2 First of all, war would not help anyone achieve anything, and also, we
3 were a third of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and in every war in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbs were major victims of any war. We were
5 afraid of war. And the other two peoples were too. I have to be fair
6 about that. No one wanted war. People were all afraid of war, actually.
7 Q. If we go on to number 8 in the margin, which is at page 23 of your
8 copy, your version, Mr. Krajisnik, and page 12 of the English, it's near
9 the top of the page in each case, do you see, about -- a paragraph that
10 begins, "During the election campaign, not a single party ..."?
11 A. Yes, I see it.
12 Q. "During the election campaign, not a single party that entered the
13 elections had in its programme the destruction of Yugoslavia, not even the
14 parties that have won the elections and formed the government, because had
15 they done so, they would not have won a significant number of votes from
16 any of the peoples. This is confirmed by the fact that Serbian people in
17 BiH expressed its will to live with other peoples in Yugoslavia in its
18 referendum and their will to live in Yugoslavia expressed other nations
19 and nationalities too." I suspect that it flows better, the language, in
20 Serbian than it does in English but the meaning is nevertheless clear.
21 By adopting the decision to request formal recognition for BiH as
22 an independent and self-governed state, the government of BiH is gambling
23 with the civil order in our republic because this decision seriously
24 undermines the constitutional and statutory position of this republic,
25 bearing in mind the results of the referendum of the Serbian people and
1 given that the Serbian people are one of the constituent peoples in this
2 republic, it is clear that they are not going to accept this decision and
3 it could have unimaginable consequences. This is precisely what I said at
4 yesterday's session."
5 Mr. Krajisnik, looking at that now, does it appear to you, if
6 anything, rather clearer in this passage than in the previous passage that
7 Mr. Simovic is warning that if such a decision is sought to be imposed on
8 the Serbian people, that there is going to be a civil war?
9 A. The answer is yes, but with a small addition. Historically, we
10 considered Bosnia to be a three-pronged chair, a chair with three legs,
11 and we thought that without the consent of any one of the three peoples,
12 and in this case it was the Serb people, if anything were to be imposed on
13 them, anything they did not want, then that would be not right. This had
14 to do with a violation of the constitution at the expense of the Serb
15 people and the same could be done if you were to place any one of the
16 other two peoples in the same context. If unconstitutionally the will of
17 others was imposed on them. Constitutional procedure was different.
18 Q. And if we go then to number 9 in the margin which is at the very
19 top of page 25 in your version, Mr. Krajisnik, and right near the very top
20 of page 13 in the English, we have Mr. Kantaliga [phoen] Milovanovic. He
21 is putting forward a proposed text, isn't he, for a message to be sent
22 from this assembly to Lord Carrington, who at that time was chairing the
23 EC conference? Correct?
24 A. Yes, yes. Yes. I found it. That's right. Lord Carrington was
25 the chairman of that conference.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not going to take time to read out all
2 that, which would take ages. It's there to be read, Your Honours, and
3 Mr. Krajisnik, you will have seen it before. But if I may go to what in
4 the English is towards the top of page 14, and I should imagine it's
5 somewhere in the middle of page 26 in your version, Mr. Krajisnik, the
6 reasons for such a decision of the Serbian people. Do you see that?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. It's actually page 27 of your version. It's the first complete
9 paragraph on page 27. "The reasons for such a decision of the Serbian
10 people --" and the decision is to remain within united Yugoslavia. That's
11 the familiar, just to get the context clear, it's the familiar, consistent
12 stance being adopted by the Serbian people in Bosnia and
13 Herzegovina. "The reasons for such a decision of the Serbian people are
14 strong and convincing. Without the framework of a united Yugoslavia, it
15 would undoubtedly find itself in the position of national minority,
16 vulnerable to brutal attacks from the Muslim-Croatian majority. Our
17 experience so far justifies this fear. It was demonstrated again
18 yesterday, through the unauthorised request for recognition of
19 independence, a move that was opposed by all Serbian representatives who
20 used their veto and strongly reminded the Muslim-Croat coalition majority
21 that neither the Presidency, nor the government, are authorised to make
22 decisions in relation to this issue, and that the decision on such an
23 issue could only be made by the Assembly of BiH on the basis of consensus
24 of all three national communities. Submission of the request for
25 recognition of independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the will of
1 the Serbian people is a flagrant violation of the principle of national
2 equality and a brutal violation of the Serbian people's right to
3 self-determination which can only lead to the deepening of the crises and
4 its culmination in unimaginable and tragic consequences. In the interests
5 of the democratic and peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crises, the
6 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina expect that their position will
7 be treated seriously and respectfully in the course of continuing
8 activities of the council of ministers of the EEC and the peace conference
9 on Yugoslavia," and then there is applause and a comment from -- thanks
10 from you, and then long applause, and then all delegates stand up and
11 vigorously applaud, from which it's absolutely clear, isn't it,
12 Mr. Krajisnik, that that was adopted?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And it follows, does it, Mr. Krajisnik, that it reflected
15 accurately views which you and other leading figures in the SDS held at
16 that time?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. So it was in the same way, was it, that Mr. Simovic's certainly
19 later comment we referred to was to be understood, it was intended to be,
20 was it, a clear message to the European community that you wanted to
21 resolve the matter peacefully but that if you didn't, they should
22 understand that there would be war?
23 A. Well, the basic message to the European Community was that these
24 decisions of the Presidency and of the government were not constitutional,
25 were not legitimate, and were not legal. Now we are saying, if you accept
1 these unconstitutional decisions, you will lead to an even greater crisis
2 or even war, heaven forbid. We are trying to show that this was
3 completely differently regulated in our constitution. You're quite right,
4 any unconstitutional decision leads to a crisis or, heaven forbid, to a
5 culmination that produces the worst of all which is war especially because
6 we saw what was going on in Croatia. We didn't have to be very smart to
7 realise that a war could break out.
8 Q. That leads on to my very next question, Mr. Krajisnik, happily.
9 Which is this: You didn't -- you say you didn't have to be very smart to
10 realise that there could be war. Or war could break out. As best you can
11 answer it, Mr. Krajisnik, at this time, December 21st 1991, can you say
12 what was your assessment of the probability of war breaking out?
13 A. I shall be sincere. Up to the very last moment, I did not believe
14 that there would be a war. I even thought that somehow we would find a
15 solution. Even when people were killed I thought we would find a solution
16 because there was never a civil war when Bosnia-Herzegovina was deciding
17 on its own. So there was a hope that I had which was based on reality, up
18 to the very last moment, until the 3rd or the 4th I was in the assembly
19 building. I was working. And that day when the war broke out, I went to
20 work, because when you have this huge desire, you don't know what reality
21 is and what your wish is. So I kept convincing myself that there would be
22 no war and everything was speaking in favour of it actually happening.
23 Q. My question is slightly different one, Mr. Krajisnik. If we
24 take -- take your answer as you've just given it to the Trial Chamber,
25 that you believed and hoped it wouldn't happen, nevertheless, as things
1 stood on the 21st of December, with all the obvious unpredictabilities
2 about exactly who might do this, who might do that, with all the people
3 involved, did you nevertheless have some sort of idea of what the risks
4 and probabilities were? Putting it more specifically, did you think it
5 was 10 per cent? Did you think it was 40 per cent? Did you think it was
6 on a knife edge as to whether there would be war? What was your
8 A. It's hard for me to admit this. I was naive and I thought that
9 the percentage was small. But now, when I look at the actual
10 developments, everything was indicating that there was a large percentage
11 involved in terms of those who wanted war and that war could break out.
12 I'm talking about an assessment of my own that was obviously wrong.
13 Realistically speaking, if you look at the path that the coalition took, a
14 war would be imported. When I say imported I have in mind a theory that a
15 war would have to be imported after Croatian people were saying that. You
16 don't need very many people to have a war. It spreads like a forest fire.
17 So in response to your question, it was realistically possible that if
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence were to be recognised there would be
19 a war but I had this false hope that there would be arbitration, that a
20 solution would be found, because Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia were at
21 war every 50 years, and the consequences were full of blood. So I kept
22 fooling myself while thinking that a war would not happen. If the
23 interpretation was good, I think that I responded to your question. I
24 think I spoke pretty fast but I did answer your question.
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, were there other senior figures in the SDS at that
1 time who took a different view of the probability of war from the one that
2 you have just described as your own view?
3 A. There are always different views. But when they presented them, I
4 thought that this was intimidation or that people were scared, but later I
5 realised that these people were basically right, because every unlawful
6 act constituted a step towards war. That is to say if someone were to
7 recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina unlawfully, then a people would be turned
8 into a national minority and then how would the conflict start? At local
9 level, after all that's how it started. There was a peace rally in
10 Sarajevo and it turned into chaos throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was
11 organised by the opposition. So the answer is that there were different
12 opinions among different people but it's as if I had shut my ears and
13 tried to persuade myself that we would somehow find a solution.
14 Q. So who, if you can say, among the senior figures in the SDS, who
15 at that time was taking a more pessimistic view than you?
16 A. I think the leadership, the Serb leadership, as the Prosecution
17 calls them, those 50 people, were divided in their opinion by nuances.
18 The prevailing opinion was that there would be no war. But to answer your
19 question, who was more pessimistic, I don't think I can point to anyone
20 from that circle, we mostly agreed in our opinion. We were wary of those
21 unlawful decisions and we spoke as we spoke, but we basically all hoped
22 that there would be no war. We were saying publicly that this is not a
23 good thing, this is a violation of the constitution. Each of us was
24 mentioning that there was a risk of war, but talking among ourselves, we
25 were convinced that at the last moment, a solution would be found, the
1 European Community would not allow it to happen, et cetera. When you are
2 seized by fear, then all sorts of things go through your head.
3 Q. Did you, and all the time I'm talking as specifically as can be
4 about the date of this assembly meeting so I'm talking about 21st December
5 1991, the exact date doesn't matter, Mr. Krajisnik, but that short period
6 of time; did you consider that the prospect of war was at least
7 sufficiently serious for it to be necessary to make some practical
8 preparations in the light of that possibility?
9 A. As I have said, the prevailing opinion, if you had polled
10 everyone, was that something would happen to avert the danger of war, a
11 solution would be found, the European Community, the international
12 community, would do something to prevent it, and the leadership basically
13 avoided being kidnapped into Holiday Inn at the last moment and I was
14 going to my job. We thought we would send our representatives to
15 negotiations, we would reach an agreement, there would be no war. Our
16 conviction that we would manage to avoid war was very deep, but we were
17 doing everything to point to that danger, to the risks.
18 Q. Was your conviction that you would manage to avoid war so deep
19 that you were making no practical preparations, taking no practical steps,
20 to prepare for that possibility?
21 A. Absolutely, you're completely right on that score. I never
22 thought for a moment that there could be a war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
23 an interview, even in December 1991, even in 1992, I was saying this
24 leadership would find a way, these people know what war means. If we have
25 to, we'll spend the next ten years talking, looking for a solution. But
1 there will be no war. But politically speaking, we thought it was wise to
2 insist on the risks, to sort of instill fear into the other side so that
3 they take it seriously, in order to find a solution. We thought that we
4 had every possibility to go on negotiating rather than go to war. But I
5 can also tell you what the SDA was doing and thinking. Their opinion was
6 not completely independent. They were instigated to apply for
7 independence. If they had been completely independent, I believe they
8 would have chosen the same option as we had. This was no game. This was
9 a very serious matter. So our entire side on the 21st December did
10 everything, and I believe there are some intercepts of my conversations
11 after that session, where I said, "I'm very happy with what has been done.
12 Our entire side was unanimous. Something will be done to avert this --
13 the risks involved in the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina." We were
14 absolutely determined to stick to the procedure. What was going on was
15 completely bypassing all procedures. Neither the government nor the
16 Presidency had the right to do what they were doing.
17 Q. You said that you could also tell the Trial Chamber what the SDA
18 was doing and thinking. Are you able to say what, if anything, the SDA
19 was doing by way of any -- I'll rephrase the question.
20 Were you aware of any steps being taken by the SDA to prepare for
21 the eventuality of war?
22 A. I know exactly what you mean but when I was talking a moment ago,
23 I meant something else. And with your leave, I can explain, although it's
24 not strictly related to your question. If you don't want me to then I'll
25 concentrate on the question.
1 Q. That's my preference, Mr. Krajisnik, for you to give me an answer
2 strictly related to my question, if that's not too old-fashioned.
3 A. Far from it. I'll try to answer. We had reports from a number of
4 sources that there is an armed Patriotic League, that arms were being
5 distributed. You actually tended to have more information about the other
6 side than about what was going on in your own ranks. There were people in
7 Sarajevo. Right now I found an article from the time, about which
8 Mrs. Hrvancanin was testifying, that there were armed citizens in Zenica.
9 In those times, we were receiving reports that the SDA was carrying out
10 specific operations and getting ready for war. The military intelligence
11 service also provided such information to various sides. I also have a
12 report here, given me by the Prosecution, that was submitted to the
13 president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Prime Minister, the president of the
14 Presidency, from which you can see exactly what was going on in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, paramilitary formations, distribution of
16 arms, convoys being intercepted. And especially a consignment of weapons
17 that was shipped from Visoko to Sarajevo. It was captured.
18 So as I said, we were aware of all the bad things the other side
19 was doing. However, and you have to believe me, I had absolutely no idea
20 of what the Serb side was doing, as if they were saints. We knew that the
21 Muslim side was not sitting on their hands, and whatever they were doing,
22 they were doing because they thought that once Bosnia and Herzegovina was
23 independent, they would have to go to war against somebody. And again I
24 have to say I had my suspicions about the reports we were receiving, I
25 thought God knows what these agents are doing. I thought they were
1 exaggerating but later on, of course, I realised that it was completely
2 justified that the information was absolutely correct.
3 And as far as the Croatian side was concerned, they were getting
4 armed, even Croatian units were already on our territory. They were
5 wearing Ustasha uniforms. In other words the Croatian side was doing the
6 same thing as the Muslim side, only in a much more open way.
7 Q. Would you excuse me, a moment? Would you excuse me, Your Honour?
8 I know Mr. Sladojevic wants to mention something to me.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
11 [Defence counsel confer]
12 MR. STEWART:
13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, there is a sentence in your -- in the English
14 version of your answer which I have some difficulty with. It's line 19 --
15 well starts at line 19 -- line 18, you say, "So as I said, we were aware
16 of all the bad things the other side was doing. However, and have to
17 believe me," it must be you have to believe me, "I had absolutely no idea
18 of what the Serb side was doing, as if they were saints."
19 It doesn't work terribly well in English, Mr. Krajisnik. Perhaps
20 could invite you specifically to explain specifically what you are saying
21 about whether or not you had any idea what the Serb side were doing?
22 A. First of all, I have so say this. The other day Mr. Sladojevic
23 said I was talking about the centre of Sarajevo. I said no but actually
24 he was right. I realised that once I reviewed the tape. The recording.
25 And I now wish to apologise to him. He was right when he said I had
1 mentioned the centre of Sarajevo.
2 Now, in this specific case, the question asked of me was how did
3 you know what the other side was doing? In this case, the other side was
4 Muslims, not Muslims in coalition with Croats, so I added one superfluous
5 sentence. I explained what reports we were getting and I then added
6 superfluously I had information about the Muslim side and even the Croat
7 side later, but I had no information about the Serb side. Although it
8 would have been logical to be better informed about your own side, who was
9 doing what, who was arming themselves, but we actually didn't. All the
10 information we were getting from intelligence services was about the other
11 sides. That was one superfluous sentence that was not relevant to the
12 question. But I did want to point it out because it was illogical but
14 Q. Who were the -- can you be specific, when you say intelligence
15 services, what and who were the intelligence services from whom you were
16 getting information about the other side?
17 A. Well, you see, I referred to one report that came from the
18 official service of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed by Kosarac the
19 Prosecution has that document, from which you can see that chaos reigned
20 in Bosnia-Herzegovina at all levels but what I was talking about does not
21 concern this official information. I said, for instance, that the
22 military intelligence service gave one of our people from the SDS some
23 information, not to me, and then that man shared the information with
24 others. We received other information, through some people in the MUP who
25 were linked with Serb and maybe foreign intelligence services, and we were
1 receiving this kind of semi-official information that I later realised was
2 completely true, especially when I was reading some memoirs much later.
3 That's the kind of information we had. The other sides, I assume, also
4 had their own sources through which they were getting their information.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Judge Hanoteau would like to ask a question.
6 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Mr. Krajisnik, could you please
7 clarify a point? Today, are you saying that maybe at the time, the Serbs
8 were also preparing for the war? Can you say that? In other words, do
9 you deny or you do not deny that the Muslims or the Croats, if they were
10 preparing for the -- for a war by arming themselves, can you agree with
11 the fact that the Serbs were also preparing for a war? Are you answering
12 yes or no? Because I see you nodding. What is your answer, please?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. All I meant was that I
14 understood your question, Your Honour. You see, Muslims and Croats were
15 separated from the Yugoslav People's Army, whereas Serbs were not getting
16 ready for war and they were not setting up paramilitary units because they
17 believed in the Yugoslav People's Army. That's the point on which our
18 positions differed. We thought we had the JNA and we don't need
19 paramilitary formations. However, if we had been in their shoes, maybe
20 that's why I am sort of amnestying them. They did not have any trust in
21 the Yugoslav People's Army. The JNA had become prevalently Serb, and
22 they -- and I sort of understand why they were doing what they were doing.
23 But as I emphasised, I did not have information at that time that the Serb
24 side was arming itself. Although I later learned that they were. They
25 had been arming themselves.
1 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you, sir.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Just for the parties, Mr. Krajisnik, a minute ago,
3 corrected one of his earlier answers. I understand that there is a
4 correction of what he said on the 27th of April when he was asked whether
5 he made some specific reference to the inner city in the course of his
6 answer, and that he then said, "I think I did not mention the inner city,
7 the centre of the city." I find that on page 86 of that day. I have not
8 the numbering as it is adopted at the later stage. It's at the relatively
9 at the end of that day, the whole of the transcript of that day taking 89
11 Please proceed.
12 I'd say this aloud in order to make sure that there is no
13 misunderstanding as to what portion of his evidence Mr. Krajisnik referred
14 to. If he would disagree or if any of the parties would disagree, I would
15 like to know, please proceed.
16 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour. That's very helpful.
17 Q. Mr. Sladojevic suggests here, Your Honour, that there was
18 something in Mr. Krajisnik's last answer which doesn't appear in the
19 translation, relating to the question of whether Muslims were actually
20 joining the Yugoslav People's Army at that point. Did you say something
21 in your answer, Mr. Krajisnik, about that? About membership of the JNA?
22 A. Yes. Yes, when I was answering the question of honourable
23 Judge Hanoteau, I said that the Muslims were no longer joining the JNA so
24 it was natural that they were setting up their own paramilitary units.
25 Mr. Sladojevic is right. If it doesn't feature in the transcript, then it
1 is an omission. I did provide that explanation.
2 In the future, I approve in advance whatever Mr. Sladojevic says.
3 I see that he is more on the ball than I am.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. STEWART: Yes, it usually works. It can be dangerous.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I would say, I'll make some risk assessment much
7 that approach, Mr. Krajisnik, but --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't really mean it. Of course,
9 I will check.
10 JUDGE ORIE: I do share your view, perhaps it's good to express,
11 that Mr. Sladojevic contributes considerably to the accuracy of the
12 transcript which is not anything against the transcribers or the
13 interpreters because no one is without mistakes, especially me not. If
14 one day after another you have to deal with many, many pages of which I
15 would say in general the quality is very, very, high.
16 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.
17 MR. STEWART:
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I share your confidence of Mr. Sladojevic but carte
19 blanche, as we say in English, is perhaps going a little far.
20 Mr. Krajisnik, did you, by this time, 21st December, had you been
21 given or had you assumed any responsibilities in relation to war
23 A. No absolutely not. When I say absolutely not, I mean to say that
24 I don't know whether the commission of the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 who was in charge, received some sort of plan or not, but if you mean the
1 Serb side or me in particular, I did not receive any plan.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm looking at the clock. It would be
3 approximately time for the next break.
4 MR. STEWART: I'm entirely in Your Honour's hands. Any moment is
5 as good as any other.
6 JUDGE ORIE: As good or as bad.
7 MR. STEWART: Or as bad, Your Honour, yes.
8 JUDGE ORIE: We will adjourn, then, for 20 minutes. We'll resume
9 at quarter to one.
10 --- Recess taken at 12.25 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed.
13 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, could you look at point 10, number 10 in the margin
15 of your copy, which is at page 28.
16 MR. STEWART: And, Your Honours, in the English it's at page 14.
17 THE WITNESS: I've got it.
18 MR. STEWART:
19 Q. It's Professor Maksimovic presenting for the assembly to seek its
20 approval, a decision on the establishment of the Republic of Serbian
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and number 1, that proposed decision is the
22 decision to commence preparations for the establishment of the Republic of
23 Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal unit within Yugoslavia, and
24 Mr. Krajisnik, we again we appear to see applause without dissent, so
25 we -- that was adopted, wasn't it?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. At this point, 21st of December, 1991, did you -- and I'm asking
3 specifically about you in the first place, Mr. Krajisnik -- did you have a
4 clear idea as to what would be the territorial extent of such a Republic
5 of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Go on to point 11, in the margin, which is at page 31, it's about
8 halfway down page 31, and in the English at page 16, Mr. Jovo Miskin is
9 speaking. Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, yes. I see that.
11 Q. And he says, "Ladies and gentlemen, my discussion is focused on
12 the internal boundaries, the internal boundaries in Yugoslavia should be
13 looked at from two aspects, the first is if Yugoslavia is to stay a
14 federal state, and the second if not. The peoples of Yugoslavia were
15 never consulted about the issue of internal borders. The people who lived
16 outside their domiciled republic considered them as administrative. They
17 did not present an obstacle to communication with people of other
18 republics, and their equal status with the majority nation within
19 republics was guaranteed by the federal government." I'm going to go
20 straight on about four paragraphs further on, four or five, where there is
21 a paragraph against the letter 12 on your copy beginning, "The exercise of
22 the right to leave Yugoslavia." Do you see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. "The exercise of the right to leave Yugoslavia and the right to
25 remain within Yugoslavia will result in new borders which should replace
1 the existing borders, the administrative borders that were established in
2 different circumstances and by a different regime cannot be transformed
3 into international borders. It is well known that they were decided upon
4 by individuals and small elites. Could it be that the communists have
5 done nothing right except the drawing of internal borders which should not
6 be changed now? If the nature of the regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
7 changed, and if that requires changing the nature of its borders, and each
8 of its three constituent peoples must be allowed to freely decide without
9 any pressure or force whether they want to remain within a transformed
10 Yugoslavia or whether they want to establish their own sovereign and
11 independent state, having made such a decision the new borders will evolve
13 Now, first, to try to make sure there is no misunderstanding,
14 where Mr. Miskin says, "Could it be that the communists have done nothing
15 right except the drawing of the internal borders, which should not be
16 changed now," is he saying, essentially, the communists got everything
17 wrong and there is no reason to suppose they got this one right, they got
18 this question of internal borders wrong as well? That's what he's saying,
19 isn't he?
20 A. Yes, yes. He is saying that those sides which today recognised
21 internal administrative boundaries as true state borders are invoking the
22 decision taken by the communists in saying that is good. As for all the
23 rest that the communists did, these same people, the primary reference is
24 Croatia and Slovenia, they say the communists did nothing right. Now,
25 what he's saying now is, isn't that right that what they are saying that
1 the only thing that is good are the internal boundaries, the only good
2 thing done by the communists? If that's not -- if all the rest is not
3 good, then that's not good either. Here, they are saying that that -- the
4 internal borders is a major achievement of communism and the only one, for
5 that matter, and that was not true. They were just administrative
7 Q. But is it accurate -- perhaps, to put it this way, Mr. Krajisnik,
8 he's saying if there are going to be changes, which there are, then this
9 would be also a very good time to be considering changing these particular
10 communist-imposed internal borders?
11 A. That's what Mr. Miskin is saying, the way you've just interpreted
12 it, but perhaps a small explanation was required. This preparation for
13 the proclamation of Republika Srpska, this preparation, it was a political
14 move. It's not that we said we are going to proclaim a Republika Srpska.
15 It was a preparation that it would accompany our own letter, and that we
16 would made this known politically that we do not agree that
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina should be an independent state, that this should be yet
18 another indicator which would reinforce our position that we want to
19 remain in Yugoslavia and that we want to resolve the crisis by way of
20 agreement not to have Bosnia-Herzegovina exist as a unitary state. So
21 that is a political move. The actual title says that it's a political
22 move. It's just a preparation. And Mr. Miskin sees this as if we were
23 already setting up a state. He is saying borders will be established and
24 so on and so forth.
25 Q. Could we go quite a long way on, Mr. Krajisnik? It's -- if you
1 find number 20, in the margin, I'll try and help to find that quickly.
2 That's actually on page 54. It's actually 56.
3 A. I've found it, thank you.
4 Q. I want you -- and also please, Your Honours, if I might ask to go
5 back from that. That's you talking. The previous speaker quite a short
6 contribution is Mr. Tosic but in the English we go to the foot of page 26,
7 in the Serbian we'll go back a couple of pages, Mr. Krajisnik, to where we
8 find Mr. Vukic speaking. I'll try and find the exact page for you. It's
9 top of page 54. Do you have that? Mr. Vukic is speaking, "Mr. Chairman,
10 dear brothers and sisters. This is a happy day." Do you see that?
11 A. Yes, I see it.
12 Q. And then going to the last paragraph of Mr. Vukic's contribution,
13 just before Mr. Tosic speaks, the very last paragraph he says, "The
14 Serbian people of Bosnian Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina," do you see
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. "The Serbian people of Bosnian Krajina and Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 as a whole are part of the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia and as a
19 constituent nation, they are not going to accept any decision on which
20 state they are going to live in without their consent, especially not this
21 majoritarian, illegal decision made by the other two nations. If the EC
22 goes on with its threat to recognise Bosnia and Herzegovina as an
23 independent state or as part of a future Independent State of Croatia or
24 the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there will be another
25 Serbian uprising and there will be massive bloodshed in which some nations
1 that have been subsequently created will disappear altogether."
2 What did you understand Mr. Vukic to be referring to when he
3 talked about some nations that have been subsequently created?
4 A. He meant the Muslims because the Muslims were constitutionally
5 recognised as a people, as a nation, at the latest stage. Perhaps he
6 meant someone else too but I think he primarily had the Muslims in mind.
7 Q. Was that expression of view by Mr. Vukic in that paragraph
8 something with which you could have associated yourself at that time?
9 A. Absolutely not. Mr. Vukic is a wonderful man, but also an
10 unpredictable man. He tends to radicalise things a bit but nobody really
11 took what he was saying seriously. He was probably trying to curry favour
12 with Mr. Karadzic here. He heard that he had said something similar along
13 those lines but then he didn't see his denial. But at any rate, it was
14 not correct and it was not right. But it's not serious either. He's not
15 quite serious when he speaks. He is just not serious, but he doesn't mean
16 anything bad.
17 Q. Was he taken seriously by anybody?
18 A. No one meant it seriously. Everybody just laughed when he talked.
19 Oh, there is probably applause here, yes, yes, it does say applause.
20 Well, it's applause when people laugh when somebody says something like
22 Q. Could you go, please, to the top of page 69? And Your Honours in
23 the English it's the foot of page 33.
24 A. Yes, I found it.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Beslac, who was he? He says,
1 as a guest. So it's not clear what he -- who he was.
2 A. I think that he's from Bihac, as far as I can remember, Stevan
3 Beslac. Because there is Stevan Medic, too, but no, this is probably
4 Stevan Beslac. It should be the representative of the SDS or the
5 municipality from Bihac. I don't know. He was not a member of
6 parliament, no.
7 Q. He says, after the first short paragraph, he says, "I think that
8 everything that has been heard here today is reasonable, 14th of January
9 is a reasonable deadline for matters of this sort." And that reflected
10 a -- in effect a deadline given to the Muslim side to resile from their
11 move towards seeking independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, didn't it?
12 A. Yes, that's correct. Although it says, before the Serb -- Serbian
13 new year, which is the 14th of January, so he put a time frame to this,
14 linked to the Serbian new year.
15 Q. Then he continues, "But the real issue here in my view is the
16 issue of the honourable Dr. Koljevic and Dr. Plavsic continuing their work
17 in the Presidency because it would be absurd if they continued with their
18 work in the Presidency, also related to this issue is the issue of
19 representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in international institutions."
20 Obviously it's the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina which is being
21 referred to there. Was it a matter of debate and discussion within the
22 senior membership of the SDS at this time as to whether or not
23 Dr. Koljevic and Dr. Plavsic should continue working in the Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina Presidency?
25 A. That was not in dispute. They were going to continue in the
1 Presidency. It's something else, namely the representation of Serbian
2 interests done by Mr. Izetbegovic on behalf of everybody. That was in
3 dispute. And on two occasions, that was defined in a different way. More
4 precisely, they took away Mr. Izetbegovic's right to do that. From the
5 institution of the Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
6 it was a principle that all the officials of Serb ethnicity and all the
7 officials from the ranks of the SDS were still going to continue on
8 working in other bodies to which they had been elected.
9 Q. Now, Mr. Krajisnik, about page -- well, it would be more in the
10 Serbian but at the foot of page 34 of the English, and it's page 70 of the
11 Serbian, possibly at the very top of page 71, I'm just asking for it to be
12 noted because it may become relevant, but the assembly accepts the
13 appointment of Mr. Jovan Cizmovic as the coordinator of the governments of
14 the Serbian autonomous regions with three abstentions [Realtime transcript
15 read in error "extensions"] from the Doboj region. Was that a new
16 position, coordinator of the governments of the Serbian autonomous
18 A. I cannot see the bit where it says about Doboj. What I see is the
19 phrase about an attorney from Banja Luka. Can you direct me?
20 Q. I'll do my best here, Mr. Krajisnik. Yes, it's at the top of page
21 71. Skupstina, something that's not even legible in the word, and then
22 there is a reference to Doboj, "glasa i Dobojske" something or other;
23 that's Doboj, isn't it?
24 A. It says, with three abstentions. Is that what you mean?
25 Q. Yes, that's it, Mr. Krajisnik. That's not a rather I think the
1 critical point, the Doboj point, but --
2 A. With three abstentions from the Doboj region. The assembly
3 accepted, et cetera. Meaning the three votes were against the election of
4 Mr. Cizmovic and those three votes came from Doboj. That's what it means.
5 Not that Mr. Cizmovic himself was from Doboj.
6 Q. We are maybe slightly at cross-purposes. It's three abstentions,
7 isn't it? It's three people from Doboj who did not vote for Mr. Cizmovic
8 but he otherwise was --
9 A. Exactly.
10 Q. Thank you?
11 A. Exactly.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, in order to avoid whatever
13 misunderstanding, page 68, line 18, reflects the word you read as
14 extensions rather than abstentions. It may be corrected overnight but --
15 JUDGE ORIE: It says three extensions and that's not --
16 MR. STEWART: Sorry, on the transcript today. So sorry,
17 Your Honour. I was looking at more than one piece of paper.
18 JUDGE ORIE: It must be a mistake. It should be read as
20 MR. STEWART: Yes, abstentions, Your Honour. Thank you for that.
21 Q. Then if we go on to page, in the Serbian at page 77, top of page
22 77, and in the English, page 37, we get a fairly long contribution from
23 Dr. Karadzic. And I want to go quite a long way into this particular
24 contribution. I'm looking for the paragraph that begins, in the
25 English, "We therefore suggest the establishment of Serbian, Croatian, and
1 Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina." Which is at the -- at page 81. It's the last
2 paragraph on page 81 in your version, and in the English it's at page 40.
3 You see that, Mr. Krajisnik?
4 A. Just a minute, please. You said at the bottom of page 78? Is
5 that it?
6 Q. I'm so sorry, 81. 81.
7 A. Oh, sorry.
8 Q. It starts, "We therefore suggest the establishment of Serbian,
9 Croatian, and Muslim Bosnia and Herzegovina." Do you see that?
10 A. Yes, yes, I found it.
11 Q. I'll carry on from there. "And also the existence of three
12 parliaments, apart from the Serbian parliament which is sitting here
13 today, we want to see the Croatian parliament as well as the Muslim
14 parliament. We want to see peaceful coexistence of three equal national
15 communities side by side, without causing any nuisance or trouble to each
16 another. If possible, we want them to set positive examples to each other
17 in the same way that good neighbours set examples to each other. If that
18 is not possible, we want them to at least be tolerant and fair among
19 themselves so that we can have some common functional institutions. At
20 the very beginning, when we were establishing the party, we said to the
21 Serbian people, everything that can be done more effectively together
22 should remain shared. On the other hand, everything that can be done more
23 effectively separately, like, for example, culture [this is why prozjeta
24 [phoen]," and there is a translator's note here, "the Cultural and
25 Educational Association of the Serbian people in Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina] was established and some other areas should developed
2 separately. We therefore suggest the establishment of three entities in
3 BiH which would not threaten or confront each other. On the contrary,
4 they should at most complement each other or at least be neutral and
5 impartial towards each other so that common institutions could be formed
6 at the level of BiH. That is the existing republic of BiH."
7 Just pausing there, Mr. Krajisnik, would there have been anything
8 in those three paragraphs that we've just been cited from Dr. Karadzic's
9 speech that you would not have supported and endorsed?
10 A. No. I would support this. But perhaps a small explanation is
11 required. Close to this date, we organised a plebiscite even and we kept
12 saying that we wanted to remain within Yugoslavia, all of Bosnia should
13 remain in Yugoslavia, all of those who wished to, and so on. Around this
14 date we received information from the late Slobodan Milosevic
15 specifically, that -- and from Mr. Bulatovic too, that they wanted to set
16 up a Yugoslavia of their own and that the international community was
17 offering a project to us, that we accept Bosnia-Herzegovina as an
18 independent state and that in return, we would get a constituent unit of
19 our own. Now, Mr. Karadzic is addressing a gathering that had voted
20 through a plebiscite in favour of Yugoslavia a month previously, and he's
21 preparing them for a new reserve option which is more realistic because
22 obviously Yugoslavia will not be able to come through.
23 So this is just Mr. Karadzic's interpretation of what the
24 international representatives said too, via Mr. Milosevic, what their
25 message was to us in Bosnia-Herzegovina, what they could have there. That
1 is why all of this was a political move. That we wanted a transform
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we wanted to carry out preparations for
3 Republika Srpska, not for it to be an independent state, and so on. So
4 this is the model that Mr. Karadzic disclosed then. He didn't say it
5 clearly but later it was elaborated together with Mr. Cutileiro.
6 Q. You say that you received information from Mr. Milosevic and
7 Mr. Bulatovic. So which we can equate here with Serbia and Montenegro.
8 That's right, isn't it?
9 A. We got it directly from Mr. Milosevic. As to whether we got
10 information to Mr. Bulatovic, but he conveyed to us that they were
11 compelled to form a second Yugoslavia and that the international community
12 was proposing this reserve option of ours that we kept on hold all the
13 time that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be transformed and that we have a
14 constituent unit of our own. So it was this reserve option that came into
15 play. Not Yugoslavia as it was before but an independent
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina with constituent units. And what is very important, we
17 could not immediately deny the plebiscite publicly. So for a long time,
18 citizens and MPs were dissatisfied because we had given up on Yugoslavia.
19 Because you could not faithfully portray at that moment why all of that
20 was being done. The international community, Serbia and Montenegro and a
21 lot of other things and also a realistic policy. So a period of preparing
22 the citizens was required for this reserve option to turn into the main
23 one. My answer is that I fully supported, at the time, what Mr. Karadzic
24 said. I mean this text that you have just read out.
25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, when you said that you received information from
1 Mr. Milosevic, your answer was we received information from the late
2 Slobodan Milosevic specifically that and from Mr. Bulatovic too that they
3 wanted to set up a Yugoslavia of their own. So Mr. Krajisnik, was it --
4 was it understood by you that Mr. Milosevic was saying, yes, he wanted,
5 with Mr. Bulatovic, to set up a Yugoslavia of their own?
6 A. Yes. They had opted for establishing a Yugoslavia because that,
7 through the talks with the international community, proved to be something
8 that was inevitable. We learned this directly from Milosevic, only not
9 from Bulatovic too but the two of them had discussed this previously or
10 whatever. So let me clarify that. It was a shock for us when we first
11 heard about it but then -- oh, yes, and another thing, sorry, Mr. Karadzic
12 is saying here that the Serb entity would have links with Serbia. It was
13 said additionally, all the time, that they were saying, your entity will
14 be in a position to establish special parallel links with Yugoslavia. And
15 everything that does not hinder Bosnia-Herzegovina is something that you
16 will have the right to bring together with Yugoslavia. That was the
17 point. And that is why Mr. Karadzic referred to it here.
18 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just to get it clear, what -- was it -- did the
19 information received as you have described from Milosevic -- from Mr.
20 Milosevic, make it clear to you what territory was intended to be included
21 in this Yugoslavia to be set up as Mr. Milosevic wanted?
22 A. Yugoslavia would consist of Montenegro and Serbia, this Yugoslavia
23 that they wanted to establish. That's the Yugoslavia that they wanted to
24 establish. And that is what they did establish later. A few months later
25 they adopted a constitution and so on.
1 Q. Were you aware of any particular political reasons at that time
2 why Mr. Milosevic would have wanted that result?
3 A. Our understanding was, and in our heart of hearts, we justified
4 this too, were the sanctions against Yugoslavia, sanctions meant opting
5 for a different solution. That is to say, a new Yugoslavia being
6 established, consisting of two republics, and that would reinforce
7 pressures against Serbia by way of sanctions. What I'm trying to say is
8 that the sanctions were the crucial point and the pressure of the public
9 in Serbia is that it was because of the Serbs outside Serbia that Serbia
10 and Montenegro were suffering, and we think that that is what led the late
11 Mr. Milosevic to bring about this total turn around, if I can say,
12 although we relied more on our own resources than on him.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, just to verify part of the answer
14 Mr. Krajisnik gave, when you said "so for a long time citizens and MPs
15 were dissatisfied because we had given up on Yugoslavia," in that
16 sentence, you used Yugoslavia in a wider sense, including, if not all at
17 least parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that a correct understanding?
18 That you had given up about that Yugoslavia which was wider than just
19 Serbia and Montenegro?
20 MR. STEWART: Sorry, could Your Honour give me the --
21 JUDGE ORIE: 72.
22 MR. STEWART: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: 72, it's line -- I started reading on line 19, at the
25 MR. STEWART: Sorry, Your Honour, I was looking for the answer
1 about the dissatisfaction.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Dissatisfied, line 20. Perhaps you have a
3 different --
4 MR. STEWART: That is always unfortunately possible, Your Honour.
5 The time is -- well, my computer time will be different as well and I'm
6 not able to reset it. I'm not allowed to.
7 JUDGE ORIE: If you search for a word, "Dissatisfied."
8 MR. STEWART: Yes, I've got it, Your Honour. Yes, thank you very
9 much. Yes, thank you, I have it.
10 JUDGE ORIE: So my question was, Mr. Krajisnik, is whether when
11 you said we had given up on Yugoslavia, that was the Yugoslavia which was
12 larger than just Serbia-Montenegro but would include, I think in your
13 position, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a -- as a republic in the
14 Yugoslav federation or at least part of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Is that a
15 correct understanding?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the question at the
17 plebiscite was put to the Serb people, that is, primarily, do you want us
18 to remain in Yugoslavia? Now, what Yugoslavia will that be, consisting of
19 those who want to remain within it? At that moment, it was Montenegro and
20 Serbia before the Serb Krajina, Baranja, perhaps Macedonia too, I don't
21 know. We wanted our idea, our plan, to be to remain in Yugoslavia,
22 together. Now, will all of Bosnia stay? That's a different matter. When
23 we are told that we were leaving Yugoslavia, then there were objections.
24 We said that we wanted to be in Yugoslavia and how big that Yugoslavia
25 would be is a different question altogether.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The matter is clear to me. Thank you. Please
3 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Q. You said that it was a shock for you when you first heard about
5 it, this proposal from Mr. Milosevic. When did you first hear about it?
6 A. I cannot say exactly when it was that we heard about it. But I
7 can answer your second question, why shock. But when we heard about it, I
8 really cannot say. I think it was around that time. The preparation was
9 psychological too. You know, sometimes you hear something from someone,
10 things like that. It was on one day that we heard about it specifically,
11 but it was around the 21st of December, that is to say before the end of
12 the year, before the end of 1991.
13 Q. Perhaps, Mr. Krajisnik, you might be able to answer this: Had
14 that -- had that proposal or that news come through since the previous
15 meeting of the Serb Assembly, which had been 10 days before this one? Are
16 you able to say whether that's so?
17 A. You've helped me beautifully. It was before the 21st of December,
18 and the session was on the 11th. So it was probably between the two.
19 Actually, when I attended this meeting, I saw that everybody knew except
20 for me. Perhaps somebody knew about it even before the 11th of December,
21 but I learned about it between the 11th and the 21st. It was precisely
22 around then. Wonderful. You've helped me pinpoint it more specifically.
23 Q. We aim to please, Mr. Krajisnik.
24 The -- you -- well, you hinted at a question which I wasn't
25 necessarily going to ask but you clearly wanted -- wish to tell the Trial
1 Chamber why it was a shock. So please do.
2 A. These are my intimate thoughts. Please, I'm -- please excuse me
3 for using these words but I was a great Yugoslav. I loved my country, in
4 football, on all other scores. From Sezana all the way down to Macedonia,
5 it was very painful for me when it was breaking up. But I was hoping that
6 at least there would be a smaller type of Yugoslavia because I'm a real
7 Serb too and I loved my Bosnia as well. All of this existed alongside
8 each other. And now, when something is happening before your very own
9 eyes, when you get something like a verdict, then it is like a shock. To
10 this day, it is hard for me that Yugoslavia fell apart, and I always hoped
11 that something would happen. Well, it's been a while now but that is what
12 I felt at that point, as something unpleasant, but life went on, no doubt
13 about that.
14 I don't want to conceal this. I was a Yugoslav then. I loved
15 Yugoslavia. And that's the way it was.
16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, if we -- I don't think you need to go back to
17 what's a very short passage but Your Honours would find it at the very top
18 of page 15 of the English, point 1 in the decision on the establishment of
19 the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina was a decision to commence
20 preparations for the establishment of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina as a federal unit within Yugoslavia.
22 Now, was that element of that decision consistent with what you
23 were being told by Mr. Milosevic, he wanted?
24 A. No. It wasn't consistent. The fact that a new Yugoslavia would
25 be formed is something we wanted to hold back from our partners in
1 negotiations. We did not tell them that we were going to form Republika
2 Srpska as a state, but as a federal unit, and we wanted to annex whatever
3 we were going to establish to something else, and it was a federal unit
4 within Bosnia-Herzegovina. So we set a deadline of the 14th of January so
5 that the other side would listen to reason and decide to sit down and talk
6 to us, because they were probably under some sort of deadline themselves,
7 imposed by the European community. They must have been given some
8 preconditions for independence. And we thought this was a good way of
9 getting them to sit down and talk, to find a solution.
10 Q. Did the information that you received from Mr. Milosevic give you
11 a clear idea as to whether a Serb republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina would
12 be accepted by Mr. Milosevic as a federal unit within this newly-
13 structured Yugoslavia?
14 A. No, no, absolutely not. He told us in no uncertain terms that we
15 had to find a solution within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He
16 told us that we could get a constituent unit, that's probably the most
17 that the European Community, the international community, would grant us,
18 and we were clear that that's what we had to work on. He clearly wrote
19 off the Bosnian Serbs from this Yugoslav option. He dismissed that
20 possibility as such, and Mr. Cutileiro, when he arrived, he repeated what
21 Mr. Milosevic had said almost word for word. Actually, it was Mr. Vance
22 who came the first, followed by Mr. Cutileiro.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could I ask for one clarification?
24 Mr. Krajisnik, you said that you wanted to hold back from your
25 partners in negotiations that a new Yugoslavia would be formed. Then you
1 said, "We did not tell them that we were going to form a Republika Srpska
2 as a state but as a federal unit and we wanted to annex whatever we were
3 going to establish to something else, and it was a federal unit within
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina." The language is not entirely clear to me. When you
5 said a federal unit within Bosnia and Herzegovina, was not that what you
6 intended? And then what would be the federation of which this would be a
7 federal unit? Would that be a federal Bosnia and Herzegovina or would it
8 be a Yugoslav federation in whatever form?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, at that point we were
10 facing two problems. One, that our partners in negotiations should not be
11 aware of our tactics. But we also had to deal with the MPs, who had had
12 the plebiscite about Yugoslavia the previous day, and we had to find a
13 solution for the period that followed. What you just mentioned as a
14 federal unit was supposed to be a constituent unit of an internationally
15 recognised Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was no longer an option to talk
16 about Yugoslavia because we were informed that this new Yugoslavia would
17 be established in a different way. And we were informed, we were told
18 that we had to find a place for ourselves within the framework of
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether it would be a federation or something else, it
20 didn't matter. We would have to be a constituent unit without -- within
21 that state. And you will -- it is evident, you will see, from the
22 transcripts, that we were doing everything we could to improve our
23 position within that framework. Of course, we had to maximise our demands
24 in order to be successful in the negotiations.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Nevertheless, the decision that was just read to you
1 and that perhaps has created my confusion, unless it's not accurately
2 translated in the written text, says, "Preparation for the establishment
3 of the Republic of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal unit within
4 Yugoslavia," not within Bosnia and Herzegovina, but within Yugoslavia,
5 which seems to hint at a Yugoslav federation rather than a federal Bosnia
6 and Herzegovina.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You read the decision completely
8 correctly because we had to go on saying at that time, because we were --
9 that we were going to establish Republika Srpska as a part of Yugoslavia
10 because the plebiscite had been held the previous day. But we were really
11 looking to intimidate our partners a little, to encourage them by these
12 tactics to sit down and talk. Of course, we would have been the happiest
13 to stay within Yugoslavia but by that time it was no longer a possibility.
14 JUDGE ORIE: So if I understand well, I'm trying to summarise, is
15 that although you would have preferred to stay with Bosnia-Herzegovina
16 within a federation with Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, well,
17 whatever, that once you were confronted with the situation that that would
18 not be possible, that although you wanted to be in a federation within
19 Bosnia, as a tactical approach you said that you would rather be, but only
20 the Serb part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you would rather be within a
21 federation with Yugoslavia still hoping that a Bosnian federation would be
22 the final result?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. We knew that we had to stay in
24 Bosnia. We were told that in no uncertain terms, unequivocally, but
25 publicly, in the negotiations, we were saying that we were going to
1 establish our own little unit to remain within Yugoslavia. That was for
2 negotiating purposes. Of course, even then we would have wanted Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina, all of it, to stay within Yugoslavia but by that time it
4 was no longer a possibility because the other two sides were against it.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That's clear to me.
6 Looking at the clock we have to finish for the day.
7 We will adjourn until tomorrow, Wednesday, the 3rd of May, 9.00,
8 Courtroom II.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of May,
11 2006, at 9.00 a.m.