Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 23710

1 Tuesday, 9 May 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.27 p.m.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we start, a few procedural matters.

6 First of all, I was informed that the Defence would like to

7 respond to the Prosecution's response to the -- well, let's say Rule 68

8 motion. The Chamber's inclined, has briefly discussed the matter, to

9 grant such a request if it would be made, but if the Prosecution would

10 strongly object against it, we'd like to hear it now. And when I say

11 "strongly object," that means that we'd prefer to -- but within certain

12 limits. That means, I take it, Mr. Josse, that going to the core of the

13 case and leaving out all the niceties and what the history is and what

14 again was the date of the filing. Just go to the qualification and be

15 done within three pages.

16 MR. JOSSE: Yes. The original motion wasn't very long, as Your

17 Honours probably observed.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Three pages would do?

19 MR. JOSSE: It would.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Would there be any objection against a

21 three-page response to the response?

22 MR. HARMON: No, Your Honour. We initially -- we do object, but

23 when you characterise it as whether we strongly object, of course we can't

24 frame it that way. We do obviously reserve, if there are no issues raised

25 in the course of the pleading by Defence counsel reserve the right to

Page 23711

1 respond to any new arguments that have not been raised previously.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I would not expect that, because of course we

3 would get into a tradition where a response to a response would introduce

4 all kind of new matters apart from perhaps some details. Then of course

5 the Chamber might be less disinclined next time to decline grant such

6 requests.

7 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, absolutely. And might I say in passing,

8 I was going to inquire as to what happened to the Prosecution's

9 application for an extension of one day under Rule 27 -- 127. I assume

10 that was granted by the Chamber.

11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We should -- perhaps we should have asked you,

12 but I think as a matter of fact -- I don't know whether it's assigned

13 already, but on these kind of matters we're trying to be practical just as

14 I am now being practical for you.

15 MR. JOSSE: Of course.

16 JUDGE ORIE: It takes more time to argue on whether these three

17 pages could be submitted, yes or no, and at the same time the parties have

18 some understanding on that this kind of, I would say, flexibility. I'm

19 not talking about generosity should not result in new issues to raise.

20 MR. JOSSE: We don't wish to take that technical point.

21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Fine. Thank you. Then what is not yet

22 requested is nevertheless granted.

23 MR. JOSSE: We are grateful.

24 JUDGE ORIE: That is, respond three pages. Then I do understand

25 that P1166, P1168, P1147, P1092 are ready to be submitted, at least the

Page 23712

1 translations are ready to be submitted.

2 MR. HARMON: That's correct, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Then as usual, the Defence has got one week to object

4 against these translations, and otherwise they are admitted into evidence,

5 and the provisional admissions of the original will become a final -- a

6 final admission.

7 Then I do understand that the five lines of the 1st of January,

8 1992 telephone conversation have been -- has been freshly translated. The

9 parties have received it. If there's -- they have not received that yet.

10 Then you'll receive it very soon, I take it. Yes. And once you've

11 received it, please let me know whether there's any further reason to --

12 to take up this issue. Again, if not, the original lines will be replaced

13 by these five -- I shouldn't say lines; it's boxes.

14 MR. JOSSE: Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: Then a final issue is the following: Mr. Krajisnik

16 received the -- the floppy disk that was seized at the time of his arrest

17 and which stayed in the hands of the Prosecution for quite some time.

18 Mr. Harmon, Mr. Krajisnik would like to provide to Defence counsel

19 the printout of the list of files appearing on that floppy disk. I take

20 it that since you've seized it and have used it for whatever

21 investigations you would like, that you are aware, at least, of what the

22 content of that floppy disk was and whether there is any problem if at

23 this stage of the proceedings Mr. Krajisnik would provide just a list of

24 files on the floppy disk to Defence counsel.

25 If you say I'd first like to check to know exactly whether what

Page 23713

1 was on it before you'd respond ...

2 MR. HARMON: Yeah, the correspondence. I had a correspondence

3 with Defence counsel about what had been seized from Mr. Krajisnik at the

4 time of his arrest. I frankly put that correspondence aside, and I

5 haven't refreshed my recollection with it, so I will do so after the first

6 break, and then I'll be in better position to inform the Chamber.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Then, Mr. Krajisnik, you've heard this, so let's wait

8 for at least a couple of hours to see whether the Prosecution would have

9 any objection against this. Would you mind if I provide a copy of what

10 you printed out to the Prosecution, because the Prosecution has had access

11 to the floppy disks for many, many years. So to say, well, they shouldn't

12 see it as perhaps -- even -- yes.

13 Mr. Harmon, perhaps that may assist you in choosing your position.

14 That's what Mr. Krajisnik would like to ...

15 So we'll hear from you on the matter. And then as soon as we have

16 heard from the Prosecution, Mr. Krajisnik, we'll decide whether you're

17 allowed to give this list Defence counsel.

18 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we seem to be in a rather odd position

19 now. The Prosecution have been given the list, and if they object now to

20 us having the list, they've had and we haven't. It seems a rather odd

21 result.

22 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not saying that you shouldn't have it, but then

23 of course the next issue would be that whether the fact that Mr. Krajisnik

24 got it back only now, I mean, the issue is whether it should be given to

25 you during the course of the examination.

Page 23714

1 MR. STEWART: Well, it's been given to the Prosecution now in the

2 course of the examination, Your Honour. I take it Mr. Harmon will say we

3 can just have it.

4 MR. HARMON: Your Honour, I'll make a copy of this, or if a copy

5 of this can be made, I'll just give this to Defence counsel.

6 JUDGE ORIE: No problem.

7 MR. HARMON: There's no problem.

8 JUDGE ORIE: It's just matter of communication, witness and

9 Defence counsel at this moment. But Mr. Harmon has already said that he

10 has no problem.

11 MR. STEWART: Problem solved, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE ORIE: It will be provided to you at this very moment by

13 Mr. Registrar.

14 MR. STEWART: Thank you.

15 JUDGE ORIE: So that matter has been resolved as well.

16 Then, Mr. Krajisnik, I'd like to remind you that you're still

17 bound by the solemn declaration you gave at the beginning of your

18 testimony, that you would speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but

19 the truth.


21 [Witness answered through interpreter]

22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart.

23 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Examination by Mr. Stewart [Continued]

25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just before the adjournment yesterday evening there

Page 23715

1 was mention of the Law on Internal Affairs. That has been previously

2 exhibited as P64, binder 21, tab 598.

3 I wonder if Mr. Krajisnik could have that, please. That's the

4 B/C/S number, and there's the point 1 number translation.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I take it you want to refer to P64A.

6 MR. STEWART: Did I not say that, Your Honour?

7 JUDGE ORIE: I think you said --

8 MR. STEWART: Oh, I might have done. Yes. It's P64A, Your

9 Honour, thank you. Binder 21, tab 598.

10 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, we can see it's the Law on Internal Affairs. We

11 should be able to save ourselves looking at the first 125 articles. If we

12 can go to very near the end and pick it up at Article 126. It will be in

13 the last couple of pages. It's on the very last page of your version in

14 your language.

15 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, Mr. Stewart may wish to move the lectern

16 away from the microphone.

17 MR. STEWART: I've done that. Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Do you see Article 126, Mr. Krajisnik? You'll follow it in your

19 own language. "Centres for public security services and public security

20 stations of the Ministry of the Interior of the Socialist Republic of

21 Bosnia and Herzegovina on the territory of the Republic of the Serb People

22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be closed from the day the present law

23 comes into force and shall resume their work as organising units of the

24 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in

25 accordance with the present law."

Page 23716

1 And then we should look at Article 127.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters request, we do not have the text of

3 the law and it's a bit awkward to interpret off-the-cuff the language of

4 the law. Maybe we could put it on the ELMO or something.

5 MR. STEWART: My apologies. Your Honour, I have a spare copy in

6 B/C/S myself.

7 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps you could put it on the ELMO so the last --

8 MR. STEWART: Last page I think.

9 JUDGE ORIE: -- five articles.

10 MR. STEWART: It's all on the last page in the Serbian, Your

11 Honour.

12 Q. You've still got your own printed copy, Mr. Krajisnik?

13 A. Yes, yes, I have it.

14 Q. Article 127 reads: "Serb employees, other employees from

15 administrations in the seat of the Ministry of the Interior of SRBiH who

16 express their wish and employees of the closed centres of public security

17 services and public security stations who were employed at these centres

18 on the day the present law came into force shall be transmitted to the

19 Ministry of the Interior of the Serb Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

20 I won't trouble with Article 28 [as interpreted], which could be

21 regarded as consequential, but it -- important but it's to do with the

22 transfer over of equipment, so it's consistent with those other

23 provisions.

24 Then Article 129, which we had looked at briefly

25 yesterday. "General acts on internal organisation of the ministry and the

Page 23717

1 public security services shall be enacted within 15 days from the day the

2 present law has entered into effect."

3 And 130: "The present law shall enter into effect eight days

4 after its publication in the Official Gazette of the Serb People in Bosnia

5 and Herzegovina."

6 And it's signed by you as president of the Assembly.

7 First of all, Mr. Krajisnik is it -- from that reading it's clear

8 to you what Article 126 and Article 127 together are purporting to do, is

9 it?

10 A. Yes, it's clear.

11 Q. The -- and Article 130, we can leave 129 for a minute, but

12 Article 130: "The present law shall enter into effect eight dates after

13 its publication in the Official Gazette."

14 We have checked this, Mr. Krajisnik. This was published in the

15 Official Gazette number 4 on the 23rd of March, 1992. So that simple

16 arithmetic in accordance with Article 130, the law was to enter into

17 effect on the 31st of March, 1992.

18 First of all, do you -- take it from me, Mr. Krajisnik, certainly

19 at least for the moment, that there was that publication on the 23rd of

20 March, 1992. Is there any reason to suppose that it was not then to come

21 into effect on the 31st of March as I've just summarised it?

22 A. I said yesterday that this dispatch was dispatched in an

23 unauthorised manner. The Ministry of the Interior has its minister, and

24 the minister, as you could see, was nominated and accepted by the

25 president of the government, that is by the prime minister, only on the

Page 23718

1 24th of March, the day after the promulgation.

2 This law could not have been implemented without the government,

3 because it wasn't adopted by the government. And you skipped Article 29

4 [sic], which states that both the rules of the procedure of the ministry

5 and the security service have to be adopted within 15 days of its entry

6 into force, and those rules are something that the minister has to endorse

7 based on a draft proposed by the government, and the government couldn't

8 have done that because it was only established on the 15th of May.

9 So the entire subject of the discussion was this dispatch. The

10 man who sent it testified here, and he said clearly that he was instructed

11 to make this dispatch by Mico Stanisic. Mico Stanisic was here in

12 The Hague. He's now on provisional release. He probably gave a statement

13 to the OTP, and he needs to confirm whether he indeed made such

14 instructions or this witness did it on his own initiative. All the more

15 so, because a reference here is made to Ugljevik, whereas I know for

16 certain that Bijeljina was in play. Nobody knew about it.

17 And just one more thing. While we were at the conference, prime

18 minister was at Pale. He was able to consult both the minister and others

19 about whether this dispatch needed to be sent.

20 I'm not sure about the minister of interior, though, because maybe

21 he was replaced by Delimustafic by that time. You can check all that in

22 the documentation. It's verifiable.

23 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, did you -- did you in March 1992 personally study

24 the details of this Law on Internal Affairs?

25 A. No way. It was only supposed to serve as political pressure,

Page 23719

1 because in the Cutileiro Plan, in the negotiations about the Cutileiro

2 Plan, it was envisaged that we have power over the Ministry of the

3 Interior. We had already agreed with the other side about that, and it

4 was supposed to send a message you cannot go back on this. I think I read

5 about it here in The Hague already when Witness Mandic testified, and even

6 then I didn't read all of this.

7 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, for the record, because it might cause

8 confusion later at page 8, line 12, it says Mr. Krajisnik did in fact say

9 Article 29, but it's plain that he meant 129.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Is that -- is that as plain -- could you please --

11 because Article 29 also deals with a --

12 MR. STEWART: Well, not -- Your Honour, it was -- I suggest it was

13 very plain from what he then went on to say that he meant --

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you meant 129, didn't you?

15 A. It was a slip of the tongue. I certainly meant 129, because

16 that's what I see on the screen.

17 MR. STEWART: Yes. The transcript's accurate, Your Honour. It

18 was a slip of the tongue by Mr. Krajisnik.

19 Q. The -- Mr. Krajisnik, given what you said yesterday about the

20 shock that came to those of you in Brussels when the piece of paper came

21 in indicating the step that had been taken by Mr. Mandic, was there then

22 any communication directly or indirectly subsequently from those who had

23 been in Brussels to Mr. Mandic in relation to what he'd just done?

24 A. I certainly didn't contact Mr. Mandic. I wasn't in touch with

25 him. I don't remember what Mr. Karadzic did, but I know he was upset and

Page 23720

1 anxious, and he wanted to check with somebody whether it was really an

2 authentic facsimile, an authentic dispatch or a forgery. All participants

3 can confirm what I'm saying, because this dispatch caused us great trouble

4 in the negotiations as I said yesterday.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm still a bit wondering about when a

6 law takes effect when government have to adopt or -- I don't know exactly

7 what Mr. Krajisnik said, but that the government would have to -- let me

8 just check what he literally said.

9 MR. STEWART: It's -- well, it's just after that reference to

10 Article 29 or that -- that -- that --

11 JUDGE ORIE: If you guide me to the line.

12 MR. STEWART: Oh, yes, I'm sorry. It's line 12 on page 8.


14 MR. STEWART: I'm adding to the confusion if I say Article 29

15 because of course I mean Article 129 as was intended. Yes, and it's

16 Rules, not "rusle" obviously.

17 JUDGE ORIE: On page 8, line 13, you say this law could not have

18 been implemented without the government because it wasn't adopted by the

19 government. Please correct me when I'm wrong. I always understood the

20 legislative procedure to be that the government or minister would send the

21 proposal to the Assembly, that Assembly would then adopt that, and that

22 Rules would be made for when such a law would take effect.

23 Now, I see, if I'm well informed, but otherwise we should perhaps

24 look at what we find on the 23rd of March.

25 Could Madam Usher give us the top of this document on the ELMO so

Page 23721

1 that this, prior to 1, the very beginning of the document, where it

2 starts. Yes. Yes.

3 I understood this to be that in the Official Gazette of the

4 23rd of March, effect was given was to a law of which the text had been

5 adopted on the 28th of February. But perhaps we'll first invite the

6 interpreters to translate everything that's on the heading so that we know

7 at least what it says. Could we have the translation starting under

8 number 28. Perhaps English first. I don't -- do you have it on the

9 screen? Has the booth --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Are we expected to do an on-site translation

11 now?

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course I could ask someone to read it and

13 then you would translate it. Perhaps Mr. Krajisnik, if you would slowly

14 read what this text says.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And later I would like to explain

16 something. I think I can be of great assistance in clarifying this entire

17 problem. And now I'm going to read.

18 "Pursuant to Article 80, paragraph 4 of the constitution of the

19 Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in connection with

20 Article -- Article not stated, paragraph 2 of the constitutional law for

21 the implementation of the constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia

22 and Herzegovina, acting presidents of the Republic hereby adopt this

23 decree proclaiming the Law on Internal Affairs. The Law on Internal

24 Affairs enacted by the National Assembly at its session of the 28th of

25 February, 1992, is here by promulgated. Number 02-100/92. 28 February

Page 23722

1 1992. Sarajevo. Acting presidents of the Republic, Dr. Biljana Plavsic,

2 in her own hand; Dr. Nikola Koljevic, in his own hand."

3 That is the first part that you wanted me to read and that you can

4 see on the screen.

5 JUDGE ORIE: So therefore it's not clear to me yet that where the

6 law is promulgated a couple of weeks after it has been adopted, where the

7 law gives a clear indication of when it will take effect, that's eight

8 days after publication, being on the 23rd of March, that you say

9 there's -- nevertheless, it has to be accepted by the government. And the

10 basis for that is not entirely clear. And since we'd like to fully

11 understand your answer in that respect, I invite you to give the

12 explanation that you announced you were able to give.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you could just look

14 at Article 25. It is linked with -- it is related to Article 29. I can

15 read this Article 25 if you are interested.

16 JUDGE ORIE: We have the English translation of Article 25. And

17 on the P64A, tab 5, 198, the heading was not reflected in English,

18 although I think in one of the other versions of the same document it was.

19 But here 25 is translated on paper. So there's no need to -- to read it

20 aloud. We can see in front of us what it says.

21 Perhaps 25 should remain on the ELMO. Yes.

22 We have the English translation in front of us, Mr. Krajisnik.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says in Article 29 that: "Within

24 not more than 15 days from the entry into force of that law, general

25 enactments shall be passed --"

Page 23723

1 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, we keep getting these references, to 29

2 when it should be 129. It's going to be -- Your Honour, once again, it's

3 clear. I take Your Honour's point. It's clear from what Mr. Krajisnik

4 has just said that he is meaning 129. It's going to cause a lot of

5 confusion if we don't get that straight.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm saying 129.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters beg to differ.

8 MR. STEWART: That's my point.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Then there is a mistake. And where earlier you

10 said -- because -- I wouldn't say there is of course the famous play the

11 comedy of errors, but this of course is not a comedy. You referred --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot understand that I can be

13 mistaken all this time. 129 is what I mean.

14 It says there that the Rules of Procedure shall be adopted within

15 15 days. That's Article 29. And Article 25 says that that -- those Rules

16 of Procedure shall be adopted by the minister at the proposal of the

17 government, whereas the government didn't exist at that moment. It wasn't

18 only formed on the 15th of May. Particularly in view of the fact that

19 there was a political reason behind all this. It was not the intention

20 for an unauthorised person to send -- to send a dispatch.

21 There are other things wrong with this as well. You will find

22 security centres here. In the -- in the law it's Ugljevik, and in the

23 dispatch -- in the law it's Bijeljina, and in the dispatch it's Ugljevik.

24 I really don't know why the man sent it the way he did, but this

25 law could not have been put into practice without the government, without

Page 23724

1 the minister. And this man could not have overridden the entire

2 organisation. All of this had to be endorsed by the government so that

3 the entire organisation be valid. And it was later indeed adopted by the

4 government once the government was established.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So if I understand you well, you say Article 25

6 tells us that the -- at least and I'm quoting the text, that internal

7 structure of the national security services, that they should be

8 determined by special ordinance and that it should be the minister who

9 shall enact the aforementioned ordinance with the government's consent.

10 So there we find in Article 25, first and second paragraph, we find,

11 and -- yes.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Other rules cannot be adopted

13 without the government either. Everything is said in the dispatch. The

14 organisation is there, security, everything. And it was not carried out

15 in accordance with the dispatch, so what happened was just a great deal of

16 confusion.

17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, just because I might have forgotten, then

18 at a later stage this was enacted? You tell us. Do you remember when

19 approximately this was? And I don't know whether it's in evidence yet,

20 but ...

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the beginning of April. Three

22 or four days later, the war broke out. There was chaos then, and there

23 was no effect involved whatsoever, positive or negative. Peace

24 conferences were held, and then --

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then you say as far as the content is

Page 23725

1 concerned, that -- that ordinance was of a different character compared is

2 to what we find in the dispatch sent by Mr. Mandic.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Ugljevik instead of Bijeljina.

4 That's what he put. He mentioned a centre which does not exist.

5 Your Honours, just one small matter by your leave. The official

6 minister, Mr. Delimustafic, immediately sent a dispatch to all the

7 centres, and he said that this was invalid, and he sent a dispatch stating

8 that Mr. Mandic had been removed from office. But for two or three days,

9 this went all over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then compare -- I don't know to what

11 extent all this is in evidence, but we'll try to fine the relevant

12 documents and -- so as to better understand your testimony.

13 Mr. Stewart, please proceed.

14 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour. Your Honour, we can go straight

15 to that very document that Mr. Krajisnik was referring to, which is

16 already in evidence as P421.



19 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, well, first of all, can you glance at that and say

20 is that the document that you were referring to a moment ago?

21 A. I know that we had this document when Mr. Mandic testified. But

22 even then I hadn't read it in detail. If it's necessary for me to read it

23 in detail, then I need time. However, I know that that document was there

24 at the time. I think it was the Prosecution that presented it to

25 Mr. Mandic. I'm not sure, but I think that it was the Prosecution that

Page 23726

1 presented it.

2 Q. Well, you're right about that, Mr. Krajisnik. And we probably

3 don't need to look at every line of it, but it's 31st of March, 1992,

4 addressed to MUP administrations or SDB security service, CSB security

5 services centre, chief Sarajevo SUP, secretariat of the interior, SJB

6 public security station. It's all chief police stations, all commander.

7 It may be not exactly the same, but similarly to Mr. Mandic's document

8 it's been given very wide circulation within the MUP and related are

9 began.

10 It says: "In very complex security conditions in the Republic in

11 which there is a need to secure the unity and coordinated action of the

12 state organs, especially the MUP, we have witnessed various attempts to

13 break the unity of the ministry and even workers in charge succumbing to

14 various foreign influences and daily politics. How destructive this is to

15 the unity of the MUP is testified to by the dispatch sent to you by the

16 UZSK crime prevention administration, number given, 31 March, 1992, which

17 was signed by assistant minister Momcilo Mandic. One hardly need say

18 anything about the contents of the dispatch in view of the existing legal

19 system taking into consideration all the current dilemmas pointed out in

20 the dispatch to workers of the MUP of a certain nationality, I am unable

21 to dwell more closely with the --" the next word appears to be illegible,

22 Mr. Krajisnik. It says, the something. It quotes. I don't know whether

23 you're able to decipher that word.

24 A. I read on, so I wasn't really following what you were reading.

25 Could you just tell me what part of the text you're referring to?

Page 23727

1 Q. After the reference to Mr. Mandic. It's a just a couple of

2 sentences on. It says: "I am unable to dwell more closely with the --"

3 and then can you read the next few words, Mr. Krajisnik?

4 A. It should say, "regulations that it invokes," but a letter is

5 missing, P. It should be "propisje," regulations that it invokes. The

6 reference is to the dispatch.

7 What I have here in Serbian is just the letter P, but the meaning

8 should be "propisje," regulations.

9 Q. "Because they are unknown to any of the professional services in

10 the MUP nor were they presented to me by anyone, not even by the workers

11 in charge whose names are mentioned in the dispatch. Unfortunately, they

12 are my advisor and assistant. Obviously these are problems in the

13 leadership and, therefore, I appeal to all ministry workers to stay out of

14 and above them and to continue," and if you're there, Mr. Krajisnik, what

15 are the next few words, please?

16 A. It should be "izvrsavanja." Probably "expression." No, it should

17 be "izvrsavanja," which means carrying out very responsible and honourable

18 duties. So it just said "is" and it should be "izvrsavanja." The entire

19 word should be there and only the first two letters are there.

20 Q. And then continues: "Very responsible and honourable work and

21 tasks entrusted to them in the existing organisation of the MUP. Finally,

22 I would like to take this opportunity to again express my belief that the

23 greatest number of MUP workers wish to work in a united MUP and that they

24 find any segregation, especially on a national basis, difficult. Do not

25 allow anyone to separate you from your work colleagues, because there are

Page 23728

1 countless examples of mutual solidarity and sacrifice for others in

2 carrying out security tasks even in conditions in which their execution

3 endangers one's own life. I believe the problems are current and the

4 fruit of manipulation by the ill intentioned because there are no

5 difficulties approximately 10.000 of us workers cannot resolve

6 successfully through unified, professional, and lawful work. Inform all

7 MUP workers of the contents of the dispatch. Minister of the Interior,

8 Alija Delimustafic."

9 And I won't for the moment, Mr. Krajisnik, unless somebody

10 insists I do, I won't read the -- what appears to be the attachment which

11 doesn't carry the central points any further for immediate purposes.

12 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, did you become aware of the existence of this

13 document at or very shortly after the time it was apparently circulated?

14 A. Well, together we tried to deal with the misunderstandings. When

15 I say "we," I mean the two sides. But reasons were put forth by both

16 sides.

17 This is a demagogic approach on the part of Mr. Alija

18 Delimustafic, the minister. Because irrespective of the dispatch that was

19 sent without authorisation, in the Ministry of the Interior there were

20 problems all the time that Serb personnel complained about, his behaviour

21 in terms of his own appointment and that of his associates. So there was

22 already disunity in the MUP. There was bitterness, too, that not a single

23 proposal could come through easily, whereas some could not come through at

24 all, although it had been agreed upon previously what kind of distribution

25 of posts should exist.

Page 23729

1 I would like to remind the Trial Chamber of the witness who came

2 from Vogosca. If you remember what kind of appointment they wanted and

3 that the municipality complained because they didn't want that

4 appointment, and this Mandic, because he was in charge, went to the

5 municipality to try to resolve the matter.

6 So there was no unity in the MUP. On the contrary. The MUP was

7 completely disunited for these reasons that went on and on throughout the

8 year.

9 I knew about this. I knew about that the dispatch had been sent,

10 and I knew that Mr. Delimustafic later removed Mr. Mandic from office and

11 that a document was sent to that effect. That was a day or two before the

12 war broke out.

13 Q. So you -- you knew about Mr. Mandic's document in the way that

14 you've described. You knew about Mr. Delimustafic's document as well,

15 right?

16 A. Yes. I found out about Mr. Mandic's document in Brussels. And as

17 for this, I learned about it later. Now, was it in Brussels? Was it

18 Sarajevo? I don't remember, but I knew about this document.

19 Q. Did you personally take any steps whatever to speak to anybody or

20 do anything yourself in relation to this issue?

21 A. Although that was not within the scope of my authority, but since

22 I was nearby, near the Executive Council building, Mr. Izetbegovic came to

23 my office, and a man came from the government too. I think it was

24 Mr. Pelivan, perhaps, the prime minister himself, but I'm not sure. And

25 Mr. Delimustafic came. And I don't know who came from among the Serb

Page 23730

1 appointees. We talked about the problem of the MUP which had culminated.

2 We wanted to deal with these problems irrespective of the dispatch on

3 which we all agreed. We all thought that it was not regular. But we

4 discussed these problems, and Mr. Delimustafic was there at the time, and

5 at one moment I even thought that he'd get a heart attack because he was

6 so upset, because he was being criticised. They were saying that he was

7 not taking timely action, and also that his associates were sabotaging his

8 efforts.

9 But this was just a meeting by way of consultations. It was a

10 government problem, but we talked about it as people from the Republic of

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina because, of course, we wanted to avoid a crisis. It

12 was a state affair.

13 Q. Did you know at the time somebody called Bakir Alispahic?

14 A. I didn't know Mr. Alispahic directly. I know the family, though.

15 They are from Ahatovici. Perhaps I know him directly too. That's in the

16 area of Rajlovac. That's where his family hailed from. But I had no

17 contact with him while he held this position in the MUP, or at least I

18 don't remember that.

19 Q. And what -- did you know at the time whether he was in any way

20 involved in this issue about Mr. Mandic's instruction and then

21 Mr. Delimustafic's communication that we saw a few moments ago?

22 A. I cannot say with any degree of certainty. I knew of the problem

23 in general terms. At that time, perhaps I even knew the details, but now

24 I cannot recall the details.

25 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, just going back to that Law on Internal Affairs --

Page 23731

1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, could I just try to put one question so

2 that -- to see whether I fully understand.

3 MR. STEWART: Yes, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Krajisnik, I heard your testimony, and I

5 understood the following, and please correct me when I'm wrong, because

6 I'm really trying to understand as good as I can.

7 The law was adopted. The law was promulgated. Then the

8 constitution was promulgated as well, and then Mr. Mandic comes with a

9 dispatch of which you say it was not correct because the government had

10 not yet done what it should have done under Article 25 of that law, so

11 therefore Mr. Mandic was not in a position nor were the formalities met

12 which could lead to the implementation of that law.

13 And then you have drawn our attention to a message sent by

14 Mr. Delimustafic -- Delimustafic, in which he says that the MUP should be

15 united, should not be split up. Forget about a dispatch. That's not

16 something we -- you should obey.

17 Now, I do understand that Mr. Delimustafic was minister of the MUP

18 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not the Republic of the Serbian People of

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 It doesn't come to me as a surprise that where, I would say, the

21 whole exercise of creating a new constitution, adopting new laws,

22 et cetera, et cetera, was not something that had any support, in general

23 terms, I would say, of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because it

24 was a kind of -- well, parallel structure for Serbs. And then

25 Mr. Delimustafic sends a message to the MUPs and says stay united. So he

Page 23732

1 tries to undermine whatever effect this dispatch of Mr. Mandic would have

2 had.

3 Now, I can imagine that if you have two competing units, that one

4 is the -- well, let's say, at that time the Republic of Bosnia and

5 Herzegovina and the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina, if this was considered to be illegal in the view of those

7 responsible for the Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina, I would have expected that not only the -- I would say the

9 other government would have criticised the dispatch but that the Republic

10 of the Serb People of Bosnia-Herzegovina would also have taken distance,

11 because I can imagine that in view of the relation between the one

12 government and the other that Serbs might not that much be impressed by a

13 message which says ignore what has been sent to you by Mr. Mandic, but

14 that if you really want to take distance, that you would not leave it to

15 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina but that the Republic of the Serbian

16 People of Bosnia and Herzegovina would also have clearly expressed its own

17 view.

18 Therefore, first of all, I'm seeking confirmation of whether I

19 well understood your testimony, and I added to that a rather long question

20 about what I would expect under those circumstances.

21 Could you please, first of all, confirm that my understanding of

22 your testimony was right, and then second, comment on what appears to me

23 not immediately logical; that is, that only Delimustafic criticised it and

24 not anyone from within the Serbian -- from the Republic of the Serbian

25 People of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 23733

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Judge is always right. I wish I

2 could say you were right, but there are some small corrections that need

3 to be made, and they are important.

4 Mr. President, the constitution of the Serb Republic of

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the 28th of -- was not adopted on the 28th of

6 February. It was not promulgated on the 28th of February. It was

7 promulgated on the 27th of March, 1992.

8 JUDGE ORIE: That was a slip of -- yes, yes. It was between the

9 publication of the Law on Internal Affairs and the dispatch of Mr. Mandic.

10 Yes. I misspoke.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This promulgation of this law, you

12 can see that the two acting appointees did what they did. They said, "We

13 are promulgating this law. And even that was unlawful.

14 Another thing that I wish to say why we did not refute this,

15 because that is what you find the most important, Mr. Delimustafic first

16 derogated Mr. Mandic's dispatch. In my statement I said that he did not

17 have the right, according to the constitution or any other act, or

18 according to the law, Mr. Mandic did not have the right to do that. That

19 is one thing.

20 Secondly, as for the leadership of Republika Srpska, why didn't

21 they send the same kind of dispatch? I've already said, first of all,

22 there wasn't enough time. And secondly, also we had already reached

23 agreement on the MUP being within the jurisdiction of the Republic of the

24 Serb People. And that is what our constitution says towards the end, that

25 that constitution would fit into the results of the conference on

Page 23734

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So it is not an independent state.

2 That was the core of the matter. We did not want to refute.

3 Well, we didn't even have any time. We didn't want to do what

4 Mr. Delimustafic did because we would have created a great deal of

5 confusion. We wanted to resolve the actual causes which led to the chaos

6 in the MUP on the ground.

7 Mr. Mandic acted quite unconstitutionally. He did not have the

8 powers to do this. However, this is the constitution of the 27th of

9 March. It is only on the basis of this constitution that laws could be

10 passed. All of this was done clumsily, if I could put it that way, and it

11 was unfounded. So a great deal of effort had to be made in order to

12 rectify all the mistakes.

13 Now, what you are asking about and what is a sensitive issue is

14 the following: The Serb side was not against the future solution of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina envisaging a MUP of its own, of the Serb side. On the

16 contrary, we advocated that. But this was to be done through agreement by

17 all three sides, and this agreement was indeed reached by all three sides.

18 So it wasn't Mandic who he had the right -- who had the right to say that.

19 It should have been the parliament or the government, but we

20 didn't have a parliament or government. So with all due respect to the

21 entire context, this is not just one problem. There are a lot of

22 irregularities involved.

23 We could not say no, we do not want a MUP of our own. No. On the

24 contrary. We wanted the Republika Srpska to have a MUP of its own because

25 that had been agreed upon.

Page 23735

1 Now, we didn't have time. We had redressed the problems of the

2 MUP, do you understand that, regarding appointments and everything else,

3 all of this that led to this rift. There was very little time, because on

4 the ground there were constant divisions on appointments. That was

5 criticism. We were not dealing with this dispatch which was probably an

6 effect of that but in an inappropriate way.

7 I don't know if I managed to give you an explanation. Perhaps I

8 complicated things even further, but this is a very complex matter, and I

9 try to tell you about it in as pithy a way as possible.

10 JUDGE ORIE: I think I now better understand.

11 Judge Hanoteau also has a question.

12 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] I would like to know if we agree

13 on the fact that this law was published in the Official Gazette on the

14 23rd of March, 1992. Do we agree on that?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We agree on that, yes.

16 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] The Official Gazette was then

17 sent throughout the country, wasn't it?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. Maybe not. I will

19 tell you, Your Honour. If you remember, there was a trial going on here,

20 and Mr. Treanor testified, and he said that what they did was an

21 improvisation because there were no documents on the ground. They had not

22 been distributed. I don't know whether this one distributed or not. It

23 might well not have been because the time was very short. And when it is

24 published on the 23rd, it takes a couple of days to print it.

25 JUDGE HANOTEAU: [Interpretation] Thank you.

Page 23736

1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.


3 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, is this right: What you -- what you seem to be

4 saying is that the -- the legal and constitutional arrangements at that

5 time were got into some sort of tangle and that errors were made.

6 A. I'm sorry, I didn't hear you quite well, and it seems important.

7 If you mean that it was very confused, that it was complicated by a

8 hundred different interventions, then you're right. But I didn't hear all

9 of your question.

10 Q. Yes. Mr. Krajisnik, I was putting it to you that what you have

11 been saying, among other things, is that the legal and constitutional

12 arrangements at that time for the Republika Srpska or the Serb republic

13 were got into some sort of tangle and that errors were made.

14 A. You could put it that way, although it was actually done

15 deliberately that way. We wanted things done stage by stage, and we

16 wanted to have the constitution proclaimed to have certain arguments and

17 to send a message to the other side, "Look, we are taking this path and

18 let us agree on this." That's why on the 25th or -- I don't know which

19 date in February the constitution was passed, and we postponed its

20 promulgation. It wouldn't have been promulgated even on the 27th had it

21 not been for the fact that we were going to that conference, and they then

22 made this statement that they wanted independence at all costs, and they

23 were not going to negotiate about that. They will have a unitary state.

24 And then we decided to do this, leaving a hand outstretched to

25 them promulgating this constitution that was to be built into the

Page 23737

1 constitution of Republika Srpska.

2 It does look confused, as Mr. Stewart says, but certain laws were

3 indeed adopted deliberately because of political needs, for political

4 considerations. However, when a certain move is made without thinking it

5 through very carefully, like this one was made, it can have very grave

6 consequences.

7 Let me just remind you that on the 24th of March, one MP from

8 Pale, Veselinovic, or maybe it was the 18th of March, he told me at the

9 Assembly, "We want to bring up the question of MUP at the Assembly

10 session," and I told him, "Leave it until the 27th," because we were

11 dealing with a lot of grave problems. The reserve force people getting

12 armed. And that's why this story of Mr. Delimustafic was sham. It was

13 sham when he said that there were no problems, that they were united,

14 et cetera. Every day a new problem arose. Maybe not every day but

15 almost.

16 Q. The analysis which you offered a little while ago this afternoon

17 based on looking at Article 25 together with Article 129 of the Law of

18 Internal Affairs, is this, Mr. Krajisnik, an analysis which you have only

19 done since you were brought to The Hague but never did before that?

20 A. I have to say you're right. But even during the war I was aware

21 that nothing can be done. It's illogical, I know, but I had enough time

22 here in The Hague, and I was able to analyse this and compare it all,

23 especially after the testimony of Mr. Mandic.

24 Q. Yes. The reason I say that, Mr. Krajisnik, and perhaps I'll say

25 this for you and in effect with respect to the Trial Chamber and everybody

Page 23738

1 else, is that I have not called you, and you have not been called for the

2 Defence as an expert legal witness, Mr. Krajisnik. You are the defendant,

3 and you are a witness of fact. So there are limits to what I wish to

4 explore with you in the light of that answer.

5 But if we look at -- nevertheless, at Article 126 again, and could

6 you just -- could you have that in front you and focus on that for the

7 purposes of this next question.

8 A. 126?

9 Q. You're being handed it again, Mr. Krajisnik.

10 Now, Mr. Krajisnik, if -- if the government of the Serb republic,

11 Republika Srpska, took no steps to implement Article 126, and if

12 Mr. Mandic and any of his colleagues when he was within the government

13 took no steps to implement this Article and no steps of the sort that

14 Mr. Mandic didn't take, based on this Article 126, what would have

15 happened on the day that this law came into effect, on the day that

16 Article 126 said that the centres for public security services and public

17 security stations of the MUP on the territory of the Serb people of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina should be closed? In real life, what would have happened

19 on that day?

20 A. I'm not a lawyer, and I didn't write this law, but I know what it

21 looks like in practice. There was no government. No matter how many laws

22 you had, they couldn't begin to be enforced without the enforcers, without

23 the ministers, without the government, and without this and that. This

24 was not put into practice because nobody obeyed this dispatch. Nobody

25 complied with the dispatch written by Mr. Mandic in those two days. And

Page 23739

1 later on, the war started. And when the war started, the situation

2 changed completely.

3 Unfortunately, we have an overlap between wars of force majure and

4 this law that was supposed to come into force. Had it not been for the

5 war, the government would have been established, the minister appointed.

6 The minister would have approved this law and sent it to technical

7 services. He would have appointed secretaries and assistants and then it

8 would have started to function.

9 You cannot do some thing without letters of appointment,

10 without -- I don't know what. This was impracticable at that moment. It

11 would have been practicable once you had a government and all the other

12 prerequisites.

13 The war brought with it a new set of facts, but the dispatch of

14 Mr. Mandic didn't. The situation changed due to other forces and not this

15 law.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, I'm moving to another topic now, so I

17 see where the clock is.

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If we are moving to another subject, perhaps we

19 first will have the break.

20 We'll have a break until ten minutes past 4.00.

21 --- Recess taken at 3.41 p.m.

22 --- On resuming at 4.16 p.m.

23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, you may proceed.

24 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Your Honour, I want to go to the 10th Assembly Session of the Serb

Page 23740

1 Assembly, which was on the 11th of March. And, Your Honour, I believe

2 that we are all going to be working from the same version of the English.

3 It was exhibited as P65, binder 9A, tab 107.

4 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, I'm going to give you page references as we go

5 along. You should in most cases have the familiar by now numbering as

6 well.

7 Can we go to page 4 of the English please, the foot of page 4.

8 This should be on page 5 probably of the -- your version, Mr. Krajisnik,

9 but it's got the margin number 1. Do you see that?

10 A. Yes, I've found it.

11 Q. And --

12 A. It's 00816439, if I can help the interpreters.

13 Q. The very same, I think, Mr. Krajisnik.

14 The paragraph begins: "Europe has --" it's Dr. Karadzic speaking.

15 He says: "Europe has realised and accepted --" no, I better read the

16 couple of sentences in the previous paragraph otherwise it doesn't make

17 much sense.

18 From the middle of the previous paragraph: "We have decided on a

19 compromise," and he's talking it becomes quite clear about these Cutileiro

20 discussions. "We have decide on a compromise to the effect that if the

21 Muslim and Croat --"

22 A. Excuse me. Is that before the 1?

23 Q. Yes, it is. It's just before.

24 A. I got it.

25 Q. Beg your pardon. Going back to the previous paragraph. "We have

Page 23741

1 decided --"

2 JUDGE HANOTEAU: I'm sorry, Mr. Stewart.

3 MR. STEWART: So sorry, Your Honour.

4 JUDGE HANOTEAU: We have not found it.

5 MR. STEWART: I beg your pardon. It's on page 4 and it's the --

6 about 20 lines up, the paragraph beginning "We have not pleaded for." And

7 then it's in the middle of that paragraph, Your Honour. I can pick it up

8 in the middle, "We have decided."

9 JUDGE HANOTEAU: Thank you very much.

10 MR. STEWART: It's my fault, Your Honour, I was going a bit quick

11 there.

12 "We have decided upon a compromise to the effect that if the

13 Muslim and Croat ethnic communities do," and that "not" seems to be quite

14 wrong, Mr. Krajisnik. It should read: "Ethnic communities do wish to

15 leave Yugoslavia and the Serbian community does not wish to leave

16 Yugoslavia, i.e., does not want to lose its state for that state is

17 Yugoslavia, the whole BH could exist even then within the current borders.

18 It could change its position vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, without the Serbian

19 people changing their position, namely without falling under the

20 domination of the majority people, that is the Muslim ethnic community,

21 within the current BH borders.

22 "Europe has realised and accepted this in part, and at the first

23 meeting in Lisbon, we were already offered a document envisaging

24 constituent states in BH, which were, in Izetbegovic's case, interpreted

25 as constituent units rather than constituent states, set up on ethnic

Page 23742

1 principles. The other side stated that this would also include economic,

2 geographical and other criteria, which we find fully acceptable, because

3 it is not our intention to create something meaningless in terms of

4 economy and geography, something that does not guarantee viability."

5 And, Mr. Krajisnik, there, and it may not be necessary for us to

6 take time to go back to the documents at this point. But there

7 Dr. Karadzic is referring, isn't he, to a change which was made between

8 the two versions of the agreement or proposed agreement that we looked at

9 the other day, the second version, which is D5 in our exhibits as opposed

10 to D6, the second version introduced, didn't it, an extra element to the

11 definition of territory of the constituent units to take into account

12 economic, geographical and other criteria?

13 A. Yes, certainly.

14 Q. We could look at the documents, Mr. Krajisnik, but at the moment

15 I'm not suggesting that we need to.

16 The -- and that in -- that proposal came from the Muslims, but it

17 was not resisted by your team of negotiators, was it?

18 A. Yes. We did not resist. On the contrary. All the four sides

19 agreed. That was a consensus on that. Between Muslims, Croats, Serbs,

20 and the European Community.

21 Q. And then Dr. Karadzic continues, and it's against point 2 in the

22 margin of your copy. It's at the top of page 5 in English: "The talks in

23 Sarajevo, after Lisbon, nevertheless ended in a fiasco, because

24 Mr. Izetbegovic, having returned from Lisbon immediately tried to play

25 down and devaluate had been achieved there."

Page 23743

1 And, Mr. Krajisnik, was it the position that at the time that you

2 were holding this Assembly meeting on the 11th of March there had been no

3 further change of Mr. Izetbegovic's position? He was expressing himself

4 rather negatively in relation to -- to this proposed agreement?

5 A. This was a preliminary paper that the three sides had not agreed

6 on yet, and you will see nobody either rejected or accepted it. It was

7 still only a working paper. And the Serb side would later have

8 reservations concerning this paper. Yes, that's the 11th Session --

9 sorry, the 11th, and on the 18th accepted.

10 Q. Now, then, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps we can look at -- we don't need

11 look at both documents but if we could look again at D5.

12 Now, you -- the document in front of you, you have this document

13 in English there, do you, Mr. Krajisnik?

14 A. I have it in Serbian or maybe Croatian. It doesn't matter.

15 Q. The -- the document -- this is the document which bears the date

16 at the end, Sarajevo, 18 March, 1992, but at this point, 11th of March,

17 when you were having the Assembly session, was the latest form of document

18 that had emerged from the Cutileiro talks in the form of this draft which

19 came to be in some way adopted or in some way approved on the 18th of

20 March, or was it -- was the document in a different earlier state?

21 A. If you give me both the documents, I will tell you which version

22 is the first and which is the second, because this is the second version

23 that I'm holding now. On the first version, there are years, '71, '81

24 and '91. So this is the Sarajevo agreement, whereas the other one is the

25 first version of the Lisbon Agreement that was discussed on this session

Page 23744

1 on the 11th of March.

2 Q. We don't need to worry about that. It's already from your

3 evidence and general it's already been clearly established that the

4 document that we have at D6 came before the document that you're looking

5 at now. My question -- if you -- if you don't remember --

6 A. Yes, yes.

7 Q. I'm not quite sure if you -- it's still clear what question you're

8 answering yes to, Mr. Krajisnik. My -- my question --

9 A. I'm saying that this is the second version, whereas the other one,

10 D6, is in fact the first version that was on the table in Lisbon.

11 Q. Yes. My question is this, Mr. Krajisnik: The latest version of

12 the document as you had it at the time of this Assembly meeting on the

13 11th of March, was it changed the following week on the 18th of March or

14 did the document, as far as you remember, remain in the same state?

15 A. On the 18th of March, there were amendments and additions and

16 corrections to the document that was discussed in Lisbon and that was also

17 the subject of debate on the 11th of March.

18 Q. All right. Let's go to the point 4A, which is at the top of

19 page 7 in the English, and it's on page 8 of the Serbian.

20 A. We have it on page 7, 4A, if you said 4A, right.

21 Q. Well, it doesn't matter. If you've got 4A, Mr. Krajisnik. A

22 paragraph that begins "Pursuant to item 2." Do you see that?

23 A. Yes, yes, I see it.

24 Q. "Pursuant to item 2, we are required to confirm that neither the

25 governments nor the Assemblies of the national states will support or

Page 23745

1 encourage any request for any part of their territories to be annexed to

2 neighbouring states."

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. "We never had any ambitions or ideas to join a part of BH to

5 Serbia, but we had ambitions to exercise our rights to statehood and

6 sovereignty here where we live."

7 Is -- is that correct where Dr. Karadzic says, "We never had any

8 ambitions or ideas to join a part of BH to Serbia"?

9 A. That is correct. Either the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina was to

10 be a part of Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state

11 was to be transformed. And we didn't ask in those negotiations for our

12 part to be joined to Serbia. So this statement is completely accurate,

13 and you can see that from all the documents.

14 Q. Is it accurate as a statement of your, the Bosnian Serbs, position

15 in those Cutileiro negotiations but also as a statement of what your own

16 private policy had been?

17 A. That's correct. And I have said here before that we were pursuing

18 a realistic policy. We knew what was possibly. And we no longer dwelled

19 on any private different opinions of ours. We took a realistic position

20 that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be independent and we would have a

21 constituent unit in it. We accepted that we wouldn't be in Yugoslavia.

22 We accepted that there would be an independent Bosnia, and in exchange we

23 would get a transformed Bosnia with three constituent nation-based units

24 with all respect of all the cultural, economic, and other autonomy

25 principles.

Page 23746

1 That was the deal. It was a trade-off. They had to abandon the

2 idea of their unitary Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we had to give up the

3 idea of being within Yugoslavia.

4 Q. Could you go to page -- well, it's page 11 of the -- page 15 of

5 your version, page 11 of the English. It's actually over the page,

6 page 16 of your version, Mr. Krajisnik. You've got a marginal number 6B,

7 and it's the bottom paragraph on page 11 of the English. The paragraph

8 beginning "During my stay there." Do you see that?

9 A. Yes, I found it. I have.

10 Q. For the context there is England in that case. "During my stay

11 there I was invited to attend a debate on Yugoslavia --" sorry, I should

12 have said it's Dr. Koljevic talking here.

13 "I was invited to attend a debate on Yugoslavia in the British

14 Parliament, and heard four very interesting things on which both the

15 Conservatives and the representatives of the Labour Party insisted. I

16 have a facsimile summary thereof which I got from journalists. For our

17 orientation, this was a highly interesting presentation of our truths.

18 And you know how poorly the Serbs performed in the media world and if it

19 were not for that there would have been no demands on our part from TV

20 Sarajevo which is not an independent television but a centre of power.

21 The most interesting thing is that in the discussion they criticised the

22 EC for the following," and then he goes on to certain matters.

23 Mr. Krajisnik, was it -- from what you could see at that time, was

24 it your view that the Serbs had performed poorly in the media world?

25 A. To be quite honest, I was not involved in that area if I can put

Page 23747

1 it that way. I was not involved in such issues. But I heard from people

2 who know more about it, that the media promotion of Serb interests was at

3 a low level and that we did perform poorly there. So I agree with what

4 the late Mr. Koljevic says here.

5 Q. Who were your main spokespeople so far as the international

6 community was concerned at this time?

7 A. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Koljevic.

8 Q. And they were, each of them, very well equipped to conduct

9 interviews in English, for example, weren't they?

10 A. Yes. Well, when I said "spokesperson," I meant them because they

11 could address the public in English, but we did not have a particular

12 person who was at a lower level and who would speak on behalf of all of

13 us. Perhaps from time to time there would be someone, but for the most

14 part it was the two of them who spoke. Well, they were not exactly people

15 who played the role of a spokesperson, so that's why I said they presented

16 our views.

17 Q. Now, you speak, Mr. Krajisnik, at page 19 of your version, the

18 very foot of page 13 of the English. "Chairman: Thank you,

19 Mr. Koljevic." And then it says -- well it says: "Mr. Krajisnik has the

20 floor." But you were the chairman, Mr. Krajisnik, weren't you, at this

21 meeting?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you say at the top of page 14 of the English, at the beginning

24 of that: "I shall not try to repeat what my predecessors have said," and

25 so on.

Page 23748

1 And then the next paragraph: "Lest I, perhaps, forget at the end,

2 I would like to suggest something imputed by the EC: Namely, that the

3 three of us," and the three of you -- the three negotiators meant you,

4 Dr. Karadzic, Mr. Koljevic and you, didn't it?

5 A. Yes, yes.

6 Q. "The three of us would try to talk you into not accepting this

7 document, but rather that this session of the Assembly is being held to

8 explain how it should not be done. That is why I would like to ask you

9 not to allow the discussion to be conducted as if the three of us were

10 intimating this was something damaging for the Serbian people but rather

11 with the aim of determining what is to the benefit or in the interest of

12 the Serbian people, and what is not to the detriment of others."

13 In saying, Mr. Krajisnik, that it had been imputed by the EC, are

14 you able to say who specifically in the course of those talks had

15 suggested that the three of you would try to dissuade the Serb Assembly

16 from accepting the document?

17 A. I said that this paper that was here, this Assembly, was more or

18 less fully unacceptable for all three sides. Our side had some

19 reservations, too, because there had been a change in the position

20 compared to what we had agreed upon previously.

21 When this paper was finalised, if I can put it that way, then

22 someone, I don't know who, that's my answer, I don't know who, I cannot

23 say whether it was Mr. Cutileiro, but -- well, you see, we were not

24 negotiating directly. We were in three different rooms and then he walked

25 around. It was a kind of shuttle diplomacy. Then it was imputed to us

Page 23749

1 that it was not true that the Assembly disagreed with this but that we

2 would explain to the Assembly that something said here was wrong. And

3 then I asked the chairman to chair the Assembly session while I spoke so

4 that this would not be -- and then I asked him to chair the entire session

5 so that they would not impute to me that I was doing something that was

6 not right.

7 This was a good foundation. The paper just needed a bit more

8 work. But for the MPs, this was a turnaround. They expected a great deal

9 more, but mercifully the conclusion was a positive one ultimately, but it

10 could have been rejected outright.

11 Perhaps I could say that it was Mr. Cutileiro, but well, I don't

12 know. I don't know who it was. But this objection was voiced to us that

13 we would now be against it because there were changes as compared to the

14 talks that we had had previously.

15 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik. My apologies. I think I had missed the fact

16 that you had had handed over the chair to Mr. Milanovic at some point

17 earlier in the meeting, hadn't you?

18 A. Yes, yes. Well, I didn't notice that. It is Professor Dr. Milan

19 Milovanovic, vice-president of the Assembly. There were two

20 vice-presidents. He was the one who chaired the Assembly meeting at this

21 point. I think that he chaired the meeting later, too, so that the

22 president of the Assembly could not influence the MPs in some way.

23 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we see that at page 9 the English. I

24 think Mr. Milovanovic not only mispronounced by me but lost a syllable in

25 his name as well, but that's where it happens.

Page 23750

1 Q. The -- at where we -- we --

2 A. His name is Milanovic, Milanovic, but there is also a person

3 called Milovanovic, but the vice-president is Milovan Milanovic.

4 Q. Good. Mr. Krajisnik, we were looking at page -- now page 20,

5 please, of your version. This is page 14 of the English. And it's you

6 still speaking. You say: "Another point I wish to make is that if we

7 cannot find a common arrangement for joint life, then this people and this

8 Assembly must be asked whether they accept something contrary to the will

9 of the people, the will of the people explicitly voiced at the plebiscite.

10 I think that none of the possibilities underlying our policy and the

11 policy upheld by the Serbian people has been exhausted, but that is own --

12 it is only necessary to choose the most realistic one at the given moment,

13 the one most adjustable to the times. And despite the fact that I might

14 be misunderstood by some, I personally cannot give up on the idea of the

15 Serbian people living in one state or accept that Yugoslavia is an

16 exhausted option irrespective of the fact that these two things should be

17 given careful consideration."

18 Mr. Krajisnik, what you say there about not giving up on the idea

19 of the Serbian people living in one state or that Yugoslavia is an

20 exhausted option, was that public politics you were adopting there, or was

21 it genuinely your private view that you still retained some hope that one

22 or -- of those matters might be brought about?

23 A. Thank you for having put this question. We are presenting a

24 concept which is contrary to the decision of the plebiscite of the Serb

25 people; namely, to remain in Yugoslavia. I am saying that I personally

Page 23751

1 can never give up on that, that all of us live in Yugoslavia together, all

2 Serbs, all Croats, all Muslims. Here I was talking only about Serbs. But

3 then I said we have to decide whether we want to pursue a realistic

4 policy, or are we going to go on discussing something which at this point

5 in time shows that the position of the international community is

6 different.

7 At that time, every Serb, including me, wanted Bosnia to be with

8 Yugoslavia, but if we have this realistic option that Bosnia will be

9 Bosnia, then we -- well, actually we worked in Lisbon on an option that

10 was contrary to the plebiscite.

11 So this entire discussion is, well, along the lines of yes,

12 perhaps we all agree on this, but we have to look at the actual balance of

13 power, and that is the meaning of my words. If Serbs were to be

14 interviewed today, whether they wanted live this way or that way, the

15 result would probably be the same. But many things are based on a

16 compromise. You do not resolve your problems on your own. It depends on

17 others too. So that's the point. You can see that on the basis of what I

18 said briefly and what I said later.

19 Your Honours, I'm sorry, but I just need a bit more time. We were

20 being told all the time what is this? At the plebiscite we said that we

21 are in favour of Yugoslavia. Who was it that betrayed us? Why are we not

22 staying in Yugoslavia? What kind of Bosnia is this now? And then of

23 course you say, well, this is a reality. And as for what you're saying,

24 yes, that is the view that was expressed, but then other things changed.

25 This was an expression of views to see what people's positions were, but

Page 23752

1 this was not a final decision. It would be as if somebody was bargaining

2 with themselves and then if you have two other people who have an interest

3 involved in that particular matter.

4 So there was this bitter fight with the MPs so that they

5 understand that the situation changed. To this day, some people have not

6 forgiven us. They cannot understand why we gave up on Yugoslavia. We

7 didn't give up. That's what the situation was. And people cannot

8 understand that.

9 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, I'm not always the best person to give this advice.

10 I guess from the speed at which the interpreters are needing to go that it

11 would be in your interest to slow down a bit.

12 Mr. Krajisnik --

13 A. I thank you. I thank you all if you caution me this way. I don't

14 understand that as an objection. I know it's really difficult when people

15 speak this fast. It's a question of temperament. I speak that way. But

16 anyway, whoever cautions me, the only thing I can do is say thank you.

17 Q. The next paragraph, Mr. Krajisnik, you say: "Allow me, thanking

18 again. Allow me to thank you for the confidence placed in me by the

19 Serbian people and you ladies and gentlemen deputies both in the Assembly

20 and as a representative of the Serbian people to this delegation. I think

21 that it would be rational, useful and good to refresh the negotiating

22 team. I suggest that someone among those present here be nominated to

23 replace me so that something new might be introduced, because it is

24 evident that certain things must be adjusted to the situation we have

25 found ourselves in. I would recommend that it be a jurist or another

Page 23753

1 professor, a member of the Presidency. I will not nominate anyone now."

2 Mr. Krajisnik, whose idea was it that you would make this

3 suggestion?

4 A. It was imputed that Momcilo Krajisnik was powerful because these

5 negotiations were one of our most important tasks. And at the club of

6 deputies, there were several people who wanted to be on that delegation

7 because they thought they would handle it better or they wanted to be

8 important or whatever. You are not doing your best for the option of

9 Yugoslavia. Something else would be better. Why did you give this

10 territory? And so on and so forth.

11 Quite simply - how should I put this - the people who were there

12 did not understand why the whole model was being changed. Then I said

13 what I said previously. Well, perhaps I would have liked that just like

14 you, but I don't have the right not to pursue a realistic policy. So they

15 did not raise these objections vis-a-vis me but vis-a-vis all three of us.

16 I said, well, it's not about me. Choose whoever you want except for me.

17 Let me just digress a bit. On the 25th of July, I made the same

18 proposal and a few other times, because I did not want to be the subject

19 of this discussion as to whether I could do more or not. And all

20 negotiations are difficult when people work on that.

21 After the club of deputies, well, this came from the government

22 and from Mrs. Plavsic and so on, and I said, well, propose whoever you

23 want. Just replace me. Especially because I had personal problems of my

24 own, family problems that I've already emphasised.

25 Q. And then a little -- well, two paragraphs further on. That will

Page 23754

1 be at page 21 of your document, Mr. Krajisnik, at the top of page 15 of

2 the English, or nearly at the top. The paragraph beginning: "The third

3 thing I wanted to ask you is to bear in mind in today's debate that there

4 is a very serious problem, namely that it is not only the interests of our

5 two partners which are opposed to us but that objectively a much greater

6 power than these two sides is opposed to us, notably the interests of

7 Europe."

8 Where did you see the main conflict between the interests of

9 Europe and the interest of you, the Bosnian Serbs?

10 A. Europe, and when I say "Europe" it was the European Community that

11 was the mediator, when they come, then the Muslims say one thing, the

12 Croats say another thing, and the Serbs say yet a third thing, and it's

13 not possible to find a solution. So then we try to reach a compromise.

14 Nobody likes that compromise very much but the representatives of Europe

15 say we are not going to support you in your maximalist interests. And

16 that was Yugoslavia. We are not going to support you in having a unitary

17 Bosnia, and so on and so forth.

18 Now, what am I saying? You have to understand that the objective

19 of Europe is to find a solution. Now, they shaped their proposal on the

20 basis of our interests. Well, our proposals. So, yes, we have the

21 Muslims and the Croats against us, but we also have Europe there too. We

22 could hardly wait for Europe to come because we could not reach an

23 agreement amongst ourselves, and that was true. And then I pointed out

24 that there were four sides, because if somebody came to help, he's not

25 going to side with one side only, of course.

Page 23755

1 Perhaps I'm not putting this very nicely if I say interest, but

2 then there is a proposal. There is a position.

3 Q. Then, Mr. Krajisnik, we can perhaps just note that it's at the

4 foot of page 15 of the English that Mr. Koljevic makes a short

5 contribution, and he does support your proposal that you should stand down

6 and be replaced as a member of the negotiating team, doesn't he?

7 A. No, no. No. Mr. Koljevic is saying here that he supports me, and

8 I think that it would have to say here that he said that he was prepared

9 to see other people brought in, and he includes himself there, because it

10 wasn't I who was criticised. The delegation was criticised.

11 Perhaps you'd like me to read this. Perhaps the team should be

12 refreshed, in a way, and you will see later that he is suggesting that

13 even he should be replaced, because before that people criticised us

14 saying that our delegation had not done very much and could have done much

15 more. I'm not sure whether that is what it says here or -- but, anyway,

16 he supports me here in terms of these changes in the delegation or this

17 refreshment.

18 Q. Was there any suggestion --

19 A. Sorry. Of course we think that the head of the delegation must

20 remain, but then new results might be obtained by introducing new players

21 into the game. Well, that's what he's saying. This is how this should be

22 understood. Change the two of us and find somebody.

23 Sorry for having interrupted you.

24 Q. So did anyone ever suggest that Dr. Karadzic might cease to be the

25 leader of the negotiating team?

Page 23756

1 A. I have pointed out that there were objections vis-a-vis the

2 delegation. Mr. Koljevic put this very well. If the three of us are the

3 delegation, then, he says, it would be a good thing if the head of the

4 delegation were to remain. And I support Krajisnik in terms of refreshing

5 the delegation, and, of course, if it's the two of us, then replace one of

6 the two of us. Then since I had proposed that I should be replaced --

7 well, I wasn't talking about him. I didn't propose a replacement for

8 Karadzic. No one made any proposals to the effect that Mr. Karadzic

9 should be replaced. On the contrary.

10 Q. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Krajisnik, could you go on then, please, to

11 page 42, which is page 28 of the English. And it's -- it's towards the

12 end of a contribution by Mr. Buha, Aleksa Buha. And he says about -- just

13 going a little way up from where you see the 8C in the margin. There are

14 a couple of bullet points or points with dashes, and he says: "I believe

15 that we should insist on the following."

16 Do you see that introduction? It's about three or four paragraphs

17 from the end of his contribution.

18 A. I see that, but the beginning is probably different. Could you

19 just give me the actual sentence, please?

20 Q. Yes. "I believe that we should insist on the following," and then

21 it goes down a couple of lines, " - this shy quasi-language must be

22 abandoned ..."

23 A. Yes. Yes. I found it.

24 Q. " ... must be abandoned and things called by their real names.

25 "The first real name to be expressed is that this Bosnia and

Page 23757

1 Herzegovina in its present borders can only be a union of independent

2 ethnic republics of the Serbian, Croatian and Muslim peoples.

3 "When this option is formulated, and I think the document

4 contains elements for something along these lines, things will take a much

5 easier and more favourable turn for all the three peoples in BH.

6 "We should therefore insist that as far as the Serbian people in

7 BH is concerned there can exist only independent ethnic republics,

8 individually, and at the level of the entire BH, a union of independent

9 republics or states, ethnic ones, in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

10 So just to invite you to make it clear, Mr. Krajisnik, was this to

11 be understood as Dr. -- Mr. Buha opposing what was under consideration in

12 the Cutileiro talks and wishing to go for a stronger position that this

13 should be a fully sovereign, independent Serb republic carved out of the

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina territory?

15 A. Mr. Buha was a member of the delegation. He must have been a

16 member of the delegation here as well. He was trying to sell his model to

17 the MPs. He's trying here to exaggerate the complexity of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina, and he is painting this alliance of independent states a bit

19 thick. There's no longer any talk of Yugoslavia. There's only talk about

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

21 The discussion continued, never ceased whether it would be a

22 federation or a union or whatever.

23 I just want to draw the attention of the Trial Chamber to this:

24 The Dayton Accords refer only to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It doesn't

25 specify in the Dayton Accords whether it's a union or a federation or a

Page 23758

1 republic, because we couldn't agree what to call it. It just says Bosnia

2 and Herzegovina. So that later during the negotiations we came to the

3 union of three republics, et cetera, et cetera.

4 This complexity, we didn't want to separate it from what we had

5 earlier agreed. Whatever we call it, it has to be one Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina and one chair in the United Nations. That was beyond debate.

7 That was indisputable.

8 So when Mr. Buha was saying this, mentioning this alliance and the

9 confederation, that, too, would be one entity in the United Nations. Of

10 course, even this contribution of his, acceptable as it is, was not

11 endorsed by the deputies because the deputies kept thinking that things

12 could be much better still. They couldn't get over Yugoslavia.

13 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, what do you say the deputies would have understood

14 Mr. Buha to be saying by the use of the word "independent" in the

15 phrase "independent ethnic republics"?

16 A. In the terminology that prevailed in our former system, we used

17 the term "internal independence," "external independence," "independence

18 transferred powers," et cetera, et cetera. Mr. Buha was a wise man. He's

19 playing up to the deputies by using terms pleasing to their ears. He's

20 saying, "We will define what Bosnia will be, because a state is a state,

21 and the complex state union is a complex thing." And even this is remote

22 from the idea, the concept, and even that was not acceptable. The time

23 wasn't ripe. In six -- six, seven days later, things changed completely.

24 Although it may seem that way, Mr. Buha never advocated anything

25 unrealistic in terms of policy, although very often during negotiations in

Page 23759

1 order to obtain an optimal solution we said we will ask for independence,

2 et cetera. We were pulling the rope to our side in that tug-of-war,

3 because you have to start with -- with the more maximalist option so that

4 the eventual compromise doesn't water down your -- your original objective

5 too much.

6 Q. The -- Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the deputies at this Assembly, they

7 had copies of the latest form of the document under discussion in the

8 Cutileiro talks in front of them, didn't they?

9 A. I'm afraid there might be a misunderstanding. They had the first

10 version from Lisbon. They didn't have the Sarajevo agreement. The

11 Sarajevo agreement was the final version, after we agreed. If I remember

12 correctly, it's 6B here. It came -- or, rather, the version that was

13 discussed by the MPs at that moment came before the Sarajevo agreement.

14 Q. Mr. Krajisnik --

15 A. That's the misunderstanding I'm afraid of.

16 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, it's always possible that something creeps in in

17 the interpretation. When I put it to you that you had copies of the

18 latest form of the document, that was intended to convey the latest that

19 was in existence at the time of this meeting and not the ultimate last one

20 that lay in the future but the most up-to-date version of the document is

21 what they had; correct?

22 A. Yes. Yes. That's -- that's all right. We're on the same

23 wavelength now.

24 Q. Yes. And the reason I was suggesting that just for the reference

25 is it's apparent in bits of this transcript that we went over that there's

Page 23760

1 quite detailed reference by Dr. Karadzic, isn't there, to provisions of

2 the document which would have been incomprehensible to anybody who didn't

3 have it in front of them.

4 Mr. Krajisnik, it's -- the reference is to around page 7 in the

5 English. I think we can move on safely from there.

6 We get Mr. Nikola Perisin. I think we've seen him before. He

7 picks up at the bottom of page 28 in the English, and that will be

8 probably page 43 or so of the Serbian. But I want to move on a bit in his

9 contribution a couple of pages to -- it would be page 45, possibly at the

10 foot of page 44 of the Serbian, and it's at page 30 of the English. And

11 he says -- there's a paragraph beginning: "We have absolute Croatian rule

12 in Brod."

13 Do you see that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. "This is occupation by a foreign state, a foreign army, to which

16 we are regrettably not reacting with sufficient arguments and clarity, not

17 to mention the legal organs of the still legitimate authorities of BH.

18 This is a taking of our pulse and a test of patience. The next phase is

19 certainly the area of Posavina, i.e., the taking of positions in Derventa,

20 Modrica after which they will have only a very small number of unoccupied

21 territories, for instance Rudan near Doboj. They have publicly stated

22 this to be their objective. I expect that if we really patiently and

23 passively watch what is taking place that they will occupy their territory

24 in the next 10 to 15 days. There is no more dilemma in that respect. In

25 addition to their political activities, they have really manifested their

Page 23761

1 intentions in the purely military domain."

2 Mr. Krajisnik, when Mr. Perisin was saying he expected that they

3 will occupy their territory in the next 10 to 15 days, who did you

4 understand he was saying would occupy what territory? Was it -- what --

5 was it -- no, I'll leave it in that bare form. Who was going to occupy

6 what territory?

7 A. This is about Nikola Perisic, not Perisin. Perisin is a mistake.

8 But let me explain -- although it does say "Perisin" in the

9 original, but I know exactly who this person is. He was the president of

10 a municipality, and I believe he held some other post as well.

11 Let me explain what these questions mean. Regardless of Serb

12 territories in Posavina, Croats were saying that the entire Posavina

13 belonged to them. Modrica, Derventa, and all the rest. And when he says

14 that he would take all their territories, he means those territories that

15 they are drawing for themselves in their own map.

16 Perisic is not protesting against them taking ethnic Croat areas,

17 because Croats were not alone in the population of Brod. I even believe

18 Serbs were a majority, and the same is true of Modrica and Derventa.

19 The underlying meaning of all his contribution is that regular

20 Croat forces helped install a fully Croat government in Brod, although it

21 was supposed to be divided between the three sides. And if you remember

22 this conversation between Mr. Koljevic and me when he says I had been to

23 Slavonski Brod on the other side of the Sava River, this ties in with that

24 conversation. Later there were conflicts and visits from -- visits by the

25 delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Page 23762

1 That's part of their territory. It's what they consider to be

2 their territory. It has a historical dimension as well. It used to be a

3 part of the Croatian banovina, and even though the situation had changed,

4 the Croats wanted all of Posavina to be Croat territory without any regard

5 to any other people who may populate it.

6 That's the meaning of what Mr. Perisic was saying.

7 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, you -- you mentioned in that answer that you

8 believe that the Serbs were a majority in Brod and the same was true of

9 Modrica and Derventa. On the map, P211, that large coloured map that we

10 looked at the other day, it's -- Bosanski Brod is shown with a relative

11 Croat majority, 41 per cent; Serbs, 34 per cent. Since that is the

12 information on the map based on the 1991 census, it doesn't take you

13 particularly by surprise to find that your supposition that the Serbs were

14 in a majority is in fact wrong, does it?

15 A. Yes, yes. I'm wrong. I just said it like that because I know

16 there is a certain part of Serb territories. But just like you are wrong

17 in looking constantly on that map, just as Mr. Okun did, when the map is

18 completely wrong for the purposes of our discussion. You should look at

19 the other map that is divided into smaller areas, that shows

20 municipalities. It was the other map that was the basis for our

21 discussions, whereas this map that you are holding only created confusion.

22 However, as far as percentages are concerned, you are completely

23 right. I don't really have the figures in my head. Nobody had absolute

24 majority, and I take your word for it.

25 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that there's -- that it's a mistake

Page 23763

1 where it say -- where you said, Mr. Krajisnik, you should look at the

2 other map that is divided into smaller areas that shows municipalities. I

3 take it that you wanted to refer to smaller entities than municipalities,

4 like local communes, or at least divided up more precisely. Yes.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As always, you are right. Smaller

6 parts of municipalities, like communes, et cetera. The one that

7 Mr. Stewart is holding shows municipalities.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you.

9 MR. STEWART: I'm holding several at the moment, Your Honour. The

10 one that Mr. Krajisnik was mentioning a moment ago and which Your Honour

11 just corrected that particular point about the terminology is P293. It's

12 somewhere else as well but it's P293.

13 Q. And, Mr. Krajisnik, perhaps I should just mention that the map

14 P211, the one that you didn't like a moment ago, it does confirm and we

15 see that -- that the Serbs were in the majority in the other two

16 municipalities mentioned, Derventa and Modrica. That's clear on the

17 figures.

18 So, Mr. Perisic here, he's said to the meeting what he "predicts

19 or expects will happen if we really patiently and passively watch." And

20 he says: "And what have we been doing? Truth to tell, we are relying on

21 the army. We have endorsed such support here, and it is clear to me that

22 we are relying on the army, which, frankly speaking, is absolutely not a

23 reliable support. We are relying on an army which has been absolutely

24 beheaded in ideological terms, an army without a state, an army which is

25 in my opinion, and regrettably, trying to come out of this difficult

Page 23764

1 situation in BH intact and with the clearest and best possible personal

2 positions. An army declaring itself a neutral force which will separate

3 the conflicting sides. It is clear that we can do nothing but rely on the

4 army."

5 Mr. Krajisnik, how nearly or otherwise would you at that time have

6 supported the views being put forward there by Mr. Perisic?

7 A. The truth lies somewhere in between Mr. Perisic's opinion and

8 mine. I was almost in love with the army. I -- I like the military

9 profession as a vocation. And at that time, many people saw the army as

10 communists and totally unprepared, although in fact the army was in a

11 difficult position. It was equidistant from the sides involved and from

12 the parties involved, and I thought that was perfectly all right.

13 So if there was any truth in assertions that there was no strong

14 entity behind the state, behind the army, no state behind it, no command

15 in Belgrade, it is also true that the army was in trouble because

16 conscripts were not answering call-ups, and there were many other

17 problems.

18 Mr. Perisic did not go into the deeper reasons for those problems

19 in the army. He just criticised the army. He's saying we have no other

20 army. We have no paramilitary formations. And the army that we have is

21 weak, so what are we relying on in fact?

22 Q. Mr. Perisic, from right up in the north of Bosnia and Herzegovina

23 on the border with Croatia, his concerns being expressed here specifically

24 relate to Croats, don't they?

25 A. Yes. He's from Teslic originally. But he spoke about that

Page 23765

1 region.

2 Q. Did you understand all that he was saying here? Did he understand

3 it to relate only to issues between Serbs and Croats?

4 A. I understood him to be talking about Posavina, only about problems

5 between Croats and Serbs as far as Posavina is concerned. And as for the

6 Yugoslav People's Army, it's a completely different issue. You probably

7 meant this former issue. Because in Posavina, the overall population was

8 more or less evenly divided, or there were more Croats. I think most of

9 these municipalities had a Croat majority. In some municipalities they

10 may even have had absolute majority.

11 Q. Now, he continues by saying, "We have no parallel formations," a

12 point which you just alluded to a moment ago, Mr. Krajisnik. Then he

13 says, "At every meeting and talks with the army, our position was that we

14 would disarm paramilitary formations if any appeared apart from the army.

15 We have, regrettably, done so."

16 But, Mr. Krajisnik, did you know anything about such meetings and

17 talks with the army as were being referred to there by Mr. Perisic?

18 A. The answer is no, I don't know anything about it. But I'm afraid

19 that you may be interpreting this not quite correctly.

20 Mr. Perisic says, "We have no paramilitary formations." And then

21 he says, "In our talks with the army," and I'm interpreting this now, "the

22 army stated that it was against all paramilitary units and would disarm

23 them all." And then he goes on to say that's why we don't have any. All

24 of our men are in the army. That is the meaning of his contribution.

25 When he said this, he meant that the Yugoslav People's Army would

Page 23766

1 disarm all paramilitary units. They did not allow Serbs to have any

2 paramilitary units, and we can hardly rely on the Yugoslav People's Army.

3 That is the actual meaning of what he said here, and I'm afraid it can

4 easily lend itself to misinterpretation.

5 And they had on their territory various units, barracks, corps.

6 They must have had some talks. Everybody held talks on the local level.

7 When I say "everybody," I don't know really, but such contacts did take

8 place.

9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I notice that you were reading a line

10 as "we have no parallel formations," whereas Mr. Krajisnik quoted

11 Mr. Perisic as saying, "We have no paramilitary formations." Could we

12 please -- I haven't got the B/C/S in front of me. Could we just clarify

13 what that is?

14 MR. STEWART: Yes. That would be a good idea, Your Honour.

15 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, do you see the paragraph? It's the previous

16 paragraph that ends, and we needn't go there again. The previous

17 paragraph ends: "It is clear that we can do nothing but rely on the

18 army."

19 You see that sentence, do you?

20 A. I see it.

21 Q. Could you please then just read out loud from the beginning of the

22 immediately following paragraph.

23 A. "We have no parallel formations. And at every meeting we had --"

24 JUDGE ORIE: I think that's already. The word seems to be, even

25 from what I understood in the B/C/S, being "parallel" and not

Page 23767

1 "paramilitary."

2 Please proceed.

3 MR. STEWART: Well, I must say it was a pretty fair speculation on

4 Your Honour's part, but we got the answer anyway.

5 Q. So, Mr. Krajisnik, had you been involved by this time, it's the

6 11th of March, had you personally been involved in any discussions at all

7 anywhere concerning the -- any difficulties relating to paramilitary

8 formations, any questions of disarming paramilitaries, any issues about

9 absorbing them into the regular army?

10 A. I can only tell you about what I know. I didn't take part in

11 that. What I know is that the Supreme Command of the Yugoslav People's

12 Army, on several occasions issued orders through General Kadijevic to

13 disarm all paramilitary units starting with Croatia and continuing. I

14 mean, starting from Croatia mostly, the war, there. But as for the

15 disarming of any paramilitary formations, I didn't discuss that with

16 anybody. I told you what meetings I had. That was on the level of Bosnia

17 and Herzegovina with members of the General Staff of the JNA. And once, I

18 think, I had a semi-private meeting with Mr. Kukanjac because he was

19 speaking with the leaders in Sarajevo, but we didn't discuss those issues.

20 Instead, he wanted to hear what we thought about how they could help

21 prevent a conflict. And I think he escorted me to my home once when there

22 was a conflict, a clash in Kupres, but I don't remember that I ever talked

23 about this issue. But it's quite understandable, generally speaking, that

24 the army was against paramilitary units. And later, the Serb army was

25 against all parallel structures. In their eyes, anything parallel to and

Page 23768

1 outside of the army was irregular.

2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, I'm looking at the clock. Would this be

3 a suitable moment?

4 MR. STEWART: Yes, I'm entirely in Your Honour's hands.

5 JUDGE ORIE: We will have a break until ten minutes to 6.00.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 6.10 p.m.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, please proceed. We need some time for a

9 few procedural matters, but I take it that they can be dealt with in ten

10 minutes. So if you'd keep that in the back of your mind.

11 MR. STEWART: Yes, of course, Your Honour.

12 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, up to this -- we're still at 11th of March, this

13 Assembly session. Up to that point had any of the Bosnian Serb leadership

14 to your knowledge or in your hearing expressed any concerns about the

15 activities of paramilitaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

16 A. Well, if you look at the sessions of the Assembly and you look at

17 what Mr. Stanisic said and what the representatives of the MUP said when

18 they expressed their concern over the arming of paramilitaries on the

19 other sides, that is to say, the Patriotic League and the Croat side. I'm

20 saying that information was coming in. I testified about that, that we

21 received information of that kind.

22 Once, I think it was on the 24th of March, Mr. Mica Stanisic said

23 something about that. That is to say, that we had information about

24 paramilitary formations going public on the other sides.

25 As for the Serb side, our position was that we should seek

Page 23769

1 protection with the Yugoslav People's Army.

2 Q. So you mentioned concerns about Patriotic League and the Croat

3 side and then going forward to the 24th of March, but as at the 11th of

4 March, then, had any of the Bosnian Serb leadership expressed concerns

5 about the activities of Serb paramilitaries?

6 A. I really do not remember information to that effect. I was not

7 aware of any paramilitary units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I knew about

8 volunteers who went to the Croatian theatre of war, but paramilitary

9 formations being active within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the Serb

10 people, I really did not know of any such thing, and I don't think that

11 any such thing existed.

12 Q. Now, Mr. Perisic continues, and if we go, please, to --

13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, may I ask for one clarification?

14 Mr. Krajisnik, if you're saying "volunteers," do I understand

15 correctly that you refer to volunteers as being members of regular army

16 units?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Yugoslav People's Army.


19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. Yes, that's what I men.

20 JUDGE ORIE: That's clear.

21 Please proceed, Mr. Stewart.


23 Q. Yes. Mr. Perisic -- if you go to page 47 on your copy. I think

24 the number may be very indistinct on the page, but page 47 and then 9A in

25 the margin. It's in the middle of page 31, or just below page 31 in the

Page 23770

1 English, Your Honours. He says, "I wanted to say this because perhaps

2 this Assembly is not aware of the actual state of affairs. It is, believe

3 me, on the verge of being unbearable. We had a seven-hour meeting of the

4 Crisis Staff yesterday, and our principal task was to calm down the

5 people, to tell the people from Ozren, Posavina, to wait, that perhaps the

6 time had not come. And each day they see that village after village,

7 position after position, is being lost."

8 He's talking distinctly there, is he, Mr. Krajisnik, about

9 continuing armed conflict in his area?

10 A. Well, the continuation of this discussion has to do with Posavina.

11 If you remember on the map near Ozren there is this blue enclave. I

12 showed that. They called it a mountain of sorts, and it was split up into

13 five municipalities. That's the map that's better, if I can put it that

14 way, than the other one.

15 So that's at -- that's near Posavina. It borders on Posavina.

16 Now he's saying I'm trying to pacify people. I'm telling them to calm

17 down, and they see these paramilitary units taking up military positions

18 in Posavina.

19 Q. Can we -- can we have the map that you regard as better,

20 Mr. Krajisnik, P293? Perhaps it would be most convenient to have it on

21 the ELMO.

22 Could you point out then, Mr. Krajisnik, what you wish to say?

23 A. People of Ozren, that's what he says. This is the area of Ozren.

24 And he says -- well, you see this. This is the area of Modrica and part

25 of Derventa. The blue line here is part of Brod. And then this up here

Page 23771

1 is order of Odzak. That's why I'm saying that the area can be seen much

2 better here.

3 The Croat side thought that all of this that used to be the

4 banovina should be the Croatian side. When I was saying about what they

5 considered to be their territory, this is the area where there's about

6 100.000 Serbs, and it's split up into several municipalities, five or six,

7 I think. That's why I said that you could see better here, because in

8 every one of these municipalities somebody can be a majority, because the

9 municipality is viewed as a whole rather than this smaller part.

10 There are other areas, too, where Serbs are a minority in a

11 municipality and the municipality is Croat or Serb. Now, that is what I

12 wanted to explain. And that can be seen very well here.

13 Q. So far as Mr. Perisic's area was concerned, Mr. Krajisnik, can you

14 say, had there been -- had there been more or less continuous fighting

15 there since the end of 1991 up to this time?

16 A. Well, by way of illustration, Derventa and Modrica, for

17 instance -- well, perhaps I'll exaggerate a bit now, were twice in Serb

18 hands and twice in Croat hands. Or I don't know how it was.

19 When he said people from Ozren and from Posavina, he was referring

20 to this, when he's talking about these people where the Serbs territories

21 are. So these are the people of Posavina where the Serbs are, and these

22 are the people of Ozren.

23 Q. Did the -- did the SDS leadership become or had -- over that

24 period, since the end of 1991, had the SDS leadership become in any way

25 actively involved in those continuing issues of conflict in Mr. Perisic's

Page 23772

1 area?

2 A. Well, it did not become involved. I've already explained. We

3 were supposed to rely on the Yugoslav People's Army. But in addition to

4 this that can be seen here, everyone was concerned, was worried in their

5 own municipalities. Well, maybe they had weapons, too, but I don't know

6 about that. They were worried about their own mini location. Now, will

7 somebody from Posavina take the Serb ethnic areas. From the Serb point of

8 view, that is what people thought. I don't know what the other side was

9 thinking. It was probably along similar lines but just the other way

10 around.

11 This is the Serb point of view, and that is how I interpret it.

12 But the Serb Democratic Party, apart from political support to stimulate

13 mobilisation, did not carry out any other activities. I don't know of

14 any, and I don't think that there were any. That can be analysed. On

15 several occasions that was confirmed.

16 Q. And when Mr. Perisic referred to a seven-hour meeting of the

17 Crisis Staff, had you known that there was a Crisis Staff there?

18 A. Well, I didn't know, but I assure you -- well, I've already

19 explained this. To establish a Crisis Staff was just like saying good

20 morning. If the situation was difficult, that is what people did at their

21 own initiative. Quite certainly there was no need on any side. This is

22 not to say that this was not encouraged by someone, that if somebody was

23 in a crisis they would establish a Crisis Staff. People would get

24 together and they'd elect some kind of leadership, and then they would see

25 what they would do. Well, this is part of our legacy, and in every crisis

Page 23773

1 that's what people would do. He mentions this Crisis Staff here, but

2 anybody could have mentioned it, and I wouldn't have reacted.

3 Q. Mr. Perisic continues, and it's in the middle of the penultimate

4 paragraph on page 31 of the English, page 47 of the Serbian, he

5 continues: "If we sit by and watch that, I frankly tell you I dare no

6 longer engage such politics. I am afraid, not so much of those who are my

7 enemies, but of what I will tell my own people, and what we will say if

8 tomorrow we find we have lost everything without having lifted a finger,

9 without having put up any resistance.

10 "If you are taking my words seriously, then I suggest that you sit

11 down with the command of the Second Army District and simply make it clear

12 to them: They can keep publicly proclaiming their neutrality, but let

13 them do what others are doing in the field. Let them get out of the

14 barracks, take strategic positions, relocate the weaponry. Let them

15 distribute arms to the people. Members of 70 per cent of the units still

16 have their weapons somewhere far away in the barracks. This is senseless

17 and absolutely incomprehensible for me."

18 Mr. Krajisnik, the Second Army District you've referred to, that

19 included Sarajevo, didn't it?

20 A. The Second Army District included Sarajevo and all of Bosnia, and

21 before that even part of Croatia, and Posavina and part of Knin. So was

22 not only for Bosnia.

23 In response to your question, yes, it did include Sarajevo, and

24 that is where their headquarters were.

25 Q. And General Kukanjac, whom you've mentioned on a number of

Page 23774

1 occasions, he was in command there, wasn't he?

2 A. Yes. Yes. He was commander. I don't know who was commander

3 before him, and I don't know when he came. I can't remember, actually.

4 Q. Had -- at the time of that Mr. Perisic was speaking here, had any

5 request been made by the SDS leadership to General Kukanjac that his men

6 should get out of the barracks, take strategic positions, relocate

7 weaponry or distribute arms?

8 A. As far as I know and remember, there was no such order and no such

9 thing was said. We did address the Assembly once saying that the Yugoslav

10 People's Army should protect the Serb people. Now, in what period of time

11 this was, I cannot remember.

12 But as for these words, that we sent that, it was not taken in a

13 compulsory sense. It was sort of an expression of panic and it never

14 crossed anybody's mind to dictate to the Yugoslav People's Army what they

15 would do.

16 Q. Now, in fact if we go on just -- he says a few more things,

17 Mr. Perisic. But then you speak, Mr. Krajisnik. That's page 32 of the

18 English, and it's 49 in your copy, Mr. Krajisnik.

19 President Momcilo Krajisnik: "I think that some clarification

20 would be in order: We should not depart from the agenda. It was useful

21 to hear about the major problems on the ground, but without any intention

22 or criticising we must stick to the agenda and hear what is related to the

23 relevant subject matter.

24 "I kindly ask that we do not expand the subject. And it would

25 not be good to have the army on the agenda now."

Page 23775

1 Mr. Krajisnik, it wasn't on the agenda as you made clear to start

2 with, but did you have any particular reason for resisting adding army

3 discussion to the business of this Assembly session?

4 A. Well, I was not chairing the session, although it looks that way

5 because it says "Chairman, Momcilo Krajisnik." I was sitting next to the

6 vice-president who was chairing the session, so then I probably asked for

7 the floor from that particular spot where three people sit.

8 What I'm trying to say is there is an agenda. That was the plan.

9 And then people want to talk and talk, and then they say things that were

10 not on the agenda. That happened often that people would digress from the

11 agenda and discuss matters that were also important, but that was supposed

12 to be an item on the agenda of another session, or somebody should have

13 asked for it to be included in the agenda at the very beginning of the

14 meeting.

15 We just complained to each other the way Mr. Perisic put it or

16 something like that, but we could not adopt any binding conclusions on the

17 Yugoslav People's Army. That is why I kept saying that we should stick to

18 the agenda, because this was not on the agenda.

19 Q. Was it -- was it in any way an uncomfortable or awkward issue that

20 the leadership would not have wished to be raised at this point?

21 A. I don't know. I don't know what kind of issue it would take for

22 the leadership to be unwilling to discuss it. I don't see any reason not

23 to discuss an issue at an Assembly session. It's just that we needed to

24 have an agenda and to stick to it. I don't remember that there was a

25 single item or an issue that we didn't want to discuss.

Page 23776

1 Q. And then the next speaker is -- is -- well, actually, the next

2 speaker is a Mr. Mijatovic, but I -- with no disrespect to him I was then

3 going to Ms. Plavsic, the middle of page 33 of the English. It's point 11

4 in the margin at page 50, Mr. Krajisnik. And she says: "I think we

5 should adopt the remarks of Mr. Aleksa Buha, namely to have the term

6 'confederation of states' be incorporated into the material at any cost.

7 Everything else should be derived therefrom."

8 Now, as a matter of fact, the passage we looked at, Dr. --

9 Professor Buha, I think he is, which is at page 42 of your version,

10 Mr. Krajisnik, and at pages 26 to 28, the particular passage being at 28

11 as it is at page 42 of yours, in the English I can't find a reference

12 to "confederation of states" in Mr. Buha's contribution, but,

13 nevertheless, Mr. Krajisnik, the question arises. Mrs. Plavsic was making

14 it clear here that she was supporting Mr. Buha, and she refers to

15 expressly to "confederation of states." Is it correct that what you have

16 used the term "confederation," you personally in the course of this

17 evidence, you have used it to mean a confederation of states that would be

18 internationally recognised, each of them, as separate sovereign states?

19 A. It says "alliance of states" here in the original, and that's what

20 Mr. Buha said in his prior contribution. Mr. Buha made representations in

21 order to make this project attractive to the deputies. And then

22 Mrs. Plavsic says, "We need to introduce the term 'alliance of states.'"

23 It can also be interpreted as "union of states."

24 I don't know what Mrs. Plavsic exactly meant. Did she mean a

25 union or alliance of independent states? But Mr. Buha certainly didn't

Page 23777

1 mean it to be a union of internationally recognised states. He spoken

2 instead of Bosnia and Herzegovina that should be called a union of Bosnian

3 states, in the same sense as we say United States of America. But it was

4 never the intention for this union of Bosnian states to have constituent

5 units that would be internationally recognised. Only Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina would be an internationally recognised subject.

7 When I said "union," I used the term that we -- or, rather, when I

8 spoke of the confederation of states, I was talking about the term that we

9 used in our discussions, but Mr. Buha here spoke about the union of

10 states.

11 Mrs. Plavsic is a bit more radical. She goes a bit further, but

12 even she did not mean that we should ask for an internationally recognised

13 Serbian Republic. Maybe in August she defended that position, but here

14 she just meant that it would be a union of entities, a union of states

15 rather than the unitary state we were so afraid of.

16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, Mr. Krajisnik started his answer by

17 saying that it should read "alliance of states" rather than anything else.

18 Could you please ask him to read the word and then --

19 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, what I've just been trying to do

20 is -- we've been, as quickly as we can, seeing if we can check which word

21 was used by Mr. Buha, which word used by --

22 JUDGE ORIE: I see on the English -- in the English on page 28,

23 that might be a clue, although it might not clarify the issue really,

24 because it reads --

25 MR. STEWART: I've just had the information, Your Honour, just

Page 23778

1 even as we've just been speaking, from Mr. Sladojevic, that the words in

2 the last paragraph at page 28 in the English, obviously I'm giving the

3 page in the English, but the word used in Serbian --

4 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. Always, Mr. Stewart, you know how I

5 appreciate the assistance of our interpreters, so if there is one word

6 which would need perhaps to correct then the translation, I would invite

7 Mr. Sladojevic to read that word and then have the translation by our

8 interpreters.

9 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, that's what I was going to do. Your

10 Honour, in fact, I wasn't even going to do that. What I was going to say,

11 Your Honour, was we've established it is the same word in each place in

12 Serbian, and we were going to stop there in accordance with Your Honour's

13 guidelines.


15 MR. STEWART: But, Your Honour, we can, then having mentioned

16 that, we could then of course in accordance with those guidelines hand it

17 over to the interpreters.

18 So it's the last sentence apart from the "thank you," it's the

19 last sentence at page 42 of the Serbian just before Mr. Milanovic, I hope

20 that is what he's called, speaks.


22 MR. STEWART: And then the other one is the first paragraph, short

23 paragraph, in what Mrs. Plavsic says at page 50 of the Serbian. Those are

24 the two passages, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that would be -- in English that would

Page 23779

1 be --

2 MR. STEWART: Sorry. In English it's 28, Your Honour.


4 MR. STEWART: Middle of 28 and the middle of 33.


6 MR. STEWART: It's more or less exactly in the middle on each of

7 those two pages.

8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that word would be, Mr. Sladojevic, if it's

9 the same?

10 MR. STEWART: He better say it, Your Honour.

11 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "Union of states."

12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Yes. So at least Mrs. Plavsic is referring to

13 the same word used by Mr. Buha.

14 MR. TIEGER: For what it's worth, I'm just noting that [B/C/S

15 spoken] is used by Mrs. Plavsic, and that's not precisely the formulation

16 used in Mr. Buha's remarks. I have no idea whether that's -- that makes a

17 difference, but it is a small distinction that may be worth noting. I

18 leave that to the interpreters.

19 JUDGE ORIE: You say it's not exactly the same but --

20 MR. STEWART: We could have the two very short passages done by

21 the interpreters, Your Honour. That will probably solve everything.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If Mr. Sladojevic would read the first line

23 where Mrs. Plavsic is speaking. Slowly read it, please, Mr. Sladojevic.

24 MR. SLADOJEVIC: Yes, Your Honour.

25 [Interpretation] "I think we should adopt the remarks of

Page 23780

1 Mr. Aleksa Buha, namely to introduce into the material at any cost the

2 term 'union of states.'"

3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then the last sentence spoken by Mr. Buha.

4 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "Therefore, we should insist that

5 as far as the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the

6 only possibilities -- the only possibility is to have national republics,

7 individually speaking, and at the level of the entire Bosnia and

8 Herzegovina a union of independent republics or states nation based or

9 national in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The matter has been clarified. And then I'd

11 also like to know whether the same words are used in the -- a couple of

12 lines upwards where the English starts: "The first real name to be

13 expressed." If you could find that, Mr. Sladojevic, because there we find

14 a similar expression.

15 MR. SLADOJEVIC: [Interpretation] "The first thing that should be

16 called by its real name is that this Bosnia and Herzegovina in its present

17 borders can only be a union of independent ethnic republics of the

18 Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim peoples."

19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Having verified this, please proceed,

20 Mr. Stewart.

21 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. And then, Mr. Krajisnik, if we go to page 51, and it's page 34 in

23 the English. Mr. Koljevic announces, "We just received an invitation from

24 Mr. Cutileiro to continue the conference on the coming Monday and

25 Tuesday," which is going to be the 16th and 17th of March, "and his appeal

Page 23781

1 to us contains the Declaration (American European) on the recognition of

2 the Yugoslav republics. I shall read the translation to you."

3 I'm not proposing to read all that out unless I'm asked to, but it

4 includes after the various numbered points in this context it concludes

5 the statement or request coming from the European Community: "In this

6 context all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina are invited to accept without

7 delay the EC's proposals on a constitutional order which will enable the

8 peaceful and harmonious development of this republic within its existing

9 borders.

10 "The EC and the USA have also agreed to oppose strongly any

11 efforts -- any effort endangering the stability and territorial integrity

12 of these two republics."

13 The -- there are a number of other points in between, but let's go

14 straight to -- from there, Mr. Krajisnik, to page 77, which is page 50 in

15 the English. And then Mr. Milanovic, as the -- formally the chairman,

16 it's clear, Mr. Krajisnik, in effect he's handing over the floor and the

17 effective chair to you. That really doesn't come from this text. He

18 says -- he hands it over to you and you say, "I should like to inform you

19 that the working group has drawn up a document which I shall read out and

20 then put to the vote.

21 "Let us try to do some conclusions.

22 "Conclusions. First, I should like to ask all the deputies to

23 vote on the EC's proposal entitled Statement of Principles for New

24 Constitutional Arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25 "Who is for?

Page 23782

1 "The Assembly unanimously rejected the document of the European

2 Community entitled Statement of Principles for New Constitutional

3 Arrangements In Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 "The deputies then adopted the proposal of the President of the

5 Assembly, Mr. Krajisnik, and individually declared themselves in respect

6 of this document. All were against (see list of names as annex.)"

7 Did that, by the end of this meeting then -- or near the end of

8 this meeting, Mr. Krajisnik, did that come as a surprise to you?

9 A. Well, you could see here on page 76 that the entire debate was led

10 by Mr. Milanovic, and the two of us swapped roles here. He asked me to

11 read out the conclusions of the working group that had been established,

12 and I read them out. And when you see this sentence, "Who is in favour of

13 this material," that's something that he said. And then he noted that

14 everybody was against.

15 To us this was a negative development, because if you reject a

16 certain paper, then how can you go to negotiate, whereas we had already

17 received announcement of continued negotiations. That's why I suggested

18 the following conclusion here below as the person sitting next to

19 Mr. Milanovic.

20 We're looking at minutes here, so it's difficult to establish who

21 proposed it for voting. I was not very happy with it. I wanted everybody

22 to vote individually. And then if everybody votes no, that means

23 everybody was against the peace plan.

24 If you want me to comment it any further, I can.

25 I intervened here as an assistant, as a helper to Mr. Milanovic,

Page 23783

1 because I wasn't chairing the Assembly.

2 Q. Mr. Krajisnik, the -- the point of my questions here is not really

3 who was technically or effectively chairing the Assembly, but that's -- so

4 bearing that in mind, you then, the president, Mr. Krajisnik, made the

5 following proposals: "To authorise the representatives previously

6 authorised by the Assembly of the Serbian People to continue negotiations

7 with the two other ethnic communities - the Muslims and the Croats - in

8 the presence of the EC, subject to the following restrictions:

9 "The minimum below which the negotiators must not go in

10 representing the interests of the Serbian people are the results of the

11 plebiscite or a confederal set-up of BH which entails three sovereign

12 national states which may be linked up on the confederal principle."

13 So, Mr. Krajisnik, you were -- is it correct that both limbs of

14 that proposal came from you here at this point, didn't they?

15 A. No. No. It's not correct. Those conclusions that were proposed

16 above were developed by the working group, and I was asked by the

17 chairman, I didn't chair the session, I was asked by the chairman to read

18 them out as he normally reads such conclusions when I chair the sessions,

19 and they were rejected.

20 Now, after they rejected the conclusions, I suggested this not as

21 the chairman but as the person sitting next to the chairman. And I had

22 made this suggestion to rescue the negotiations, to enable us to continue.

23 Maybe the interpretation is wrong, but it can be understood from this.

24 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, we clearly we haven't got to the

25 substance of this question, and bearing in mind what Your Honour said

Page 23784

1 earlier about the need for a little time at the end of the day.


3 MR. STEWART: The next question is bound to take a little time,

4 Your Honour.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Before doing so, perhaps, Mr. Krajisnik,

6 perhaps to think it over overnight. I see a little bit later in the same

7 minutes, I see that you're asking Mr. Ostojic to read something out which

8 seems to swap general the situation on who was presiding but it's perhaps

9 not that vital, but if there would be any explanation for that, please

10 give it to us tomorrow.

11 We have a few procedural issues -- yes?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you please, could

13 you just look at the previous page where Krajisnik takes the floor. "I

14 inform you that the working group has drafted the paper that I will read

15 out to you so that you can state your opinion whether we are going to

16 accept it."

17 So I'm talking about the working group and presenting their

18 conclusions when the chairman gives me the floor. And after the voting, I

19 did make another contribution. You're right on that.

20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then we now move to the procedural issues.

21 First of all, I'll just find them. Yes, some deadlines that are

22 expiring today. Double pension legislation. I do see that on the 25th of

23 April the parties agreed that they would get back on the 9th of May; and

24 we do know that the Defence has sent this legislation to the CLSS on the

25 27th of April. Therefore, I wonder what to expect.

Page 23785

1 MR. JOSSE: Your Honour, I know that the CLSS have submitted some

2 documents to us. A member of our team told me earlier he was having

3 trouble accessing their website, so I don't know the answer. I will find

4 out for tomorrow and I will report back, if I may.

5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll then hear from you.

6 Then the Neilsen source material. The material was submitted on

7 the 25th of April, and the Defence were supposed to come back with any

8 objections by May the 9th, which is today, and still the day is young,

9 Mr. --

10 MR. STEWART: Clearly I'm not, Your Honour, but day is. Your

11 Honour, we had appreciated, in fact we had mentioned we needed a couple of

12 minutes for precisely that point, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's clear, yes. As I said, the day is young.

14 MR. STEWART: Well, Your Honour, the day is young. What we were

15 going to ask, Your Honour, is that we might have until tomorrow to make

16 our filing on that. We had three members of the team working on it today,

17 Your Honour. We just haven't managed to --

18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any strong objections?

19 MR. TIEGER: Nothing too strong, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ORIE: You have until tomorrow, Mr. Stewart.

21 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 JUDGE ORIE: Then there's one issue I'd like to raise briefly in

23 private session.

24 Could we turn into private session for a second.

25 [Private session]

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11 Page 23786 redacted. Private session.















Page 23787

1 [Open session]

2 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session Your Honour.

3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Stewart, then you have the floor.

4 MR. STEWART: That took us by surprise. I thought it would take

5 until 7.00. The --

6 Q. Yes, Mr. Krajisnik. The two limbs the proposal which --

7 JUDGE ORIE: Let me just -- I thought you would like to raise an

8 issue I mentioned before. I said that there was -- whether there were any

9 objections against -- what was it? Oh, no, no. You said that Neilsen

10 source material you would like to have until tomorrow. Yes. You first

11 said that that is exactly what I would like to address later on.

12 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, took me by surprise. I wasn't

13 expecting to continue any cross-examination.

14 JUDGE ORIE: No, no. I thought that there was still something to

15 be raised. So it was the one-day extension.

16 MR. STEWART: Well, the day is young, Your Honour.


18 Mr. Krajisnik, we conclude for the day. I again remind you that

19 you should not speak with anyone about your testimony given or still to be

20 given, and we'll adjourn until tomorrow afternoon, courtroom II, quarter

21 past 2.00.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.59 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 10th day

24 of May, 2006, at 2.15 p.m.