Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7885

1 Tuesday, 5 December 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.22 a.m.

5 [The accused entered court]

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Good morning, ladies and

7 gentlemen. Good morning to the technical booth and interpreters. Good

8 morning to the Office of the Prosecutor; I see that you're all there. The

9 Defence counsel and the Judges are here, too.

10 Good morning, Professor. Good morning, Witness. We shall be

11 taking up your testimony where we left off. Let me remind you that you

12 will be continuing under oath in answering questions put to you by

13 Mr. Visnjic.

14 Please proceed, Mr. Visnjic. Your witness.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.


17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Examined by Mr. Visnjic: [Continued]

19 Q. [Interpretation] General Radinovic, we're going to continue from

20 where we left off.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And to do that, I should like to ask

22 the usher to give us Defence Exhibit 426, and to prepare documents -- 425,

23 and to prepare documents 426 and 427. So the next exhibit is Exhibit 425.

24 Could the usher turn to page -- to paragraph 4, which is page 6 on

25 the Serbo-Croatian version.

Page 7886

1 Q. General Radinovic, yesterday you talked to us about a large number

2 of operations which are mentioned in the directives and many of which were

3 not actually implemented. On the basis of this decision of the Supreme

4 Commander, can you -- of the army of Republika Srpska, can you explain to

5 the Trial Chamber what this -- how this applies to document 7?

6 A. In point 4, according to doctrine, this conceptual part, the

7 concept of a decision, and as I said, in point 4 in the documents for

8 command, the basic idea or concept is set out by -- that is to say, the

9 command document sets this out.

10 In paragraph 4 of the directive of the Supreme Commander, the

11 operations to be carried out are implemented -- are noted, and they are in

12 this section here. They are set out in this paragraph here. They mention

13 the strategic operation in 1995, Prozor, Spreca, and so on. That is an

14 operation at the operational level. But none of those operations listed

15 here were carried out. They were not planned, and they were not executed.

16 Q. I should now like to ask you to look at page 8 of the directive,

17 the section which refers to the Drina Corps. Have you found it? That is

18 the English version.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please find that

20 part of the document and place it on the ELMO. It is page 10 of the

21 English version, and page 11 as well later on. Page 10 now and page 11

22 later.

23 A. Yes, I've found it. This section relating to the Drina Corps --

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could you turn the page over,

25 please.

Page 7887

1 A. On the following page within the directive which relates to the

2 Drina Corps, we see all the points that -- that is to say, operations that

3 could come under that Corps and operations such as Spreca, Zvijezda 95,

4 Spreca 95 are mentioned. None of those operations were in fact planned or

5 executed.

6 As I said yesterday, in documents of this kind which provide a

7 conceptual plan and indicate the possible activities in the ensuing period

8 or in the coming year, and they therefore provide an analysis of the

9 strategic situation, they assess the intentions of the two parties -- of

10 the parties, and they set out a sort of reliable forecasting, as far as

11 that is possible, for the coming year.

12 Having set out -- having drafted documents of principle of this

13 kind, the Supreme Command in stages, in a concrete -- for a concrete

14 period of time, in keeping with the conditions prevailing on the theatre

15 of operation, they order the execution of individual operations. That

16 comes later. And as I studied the documents for the Krivaja 95 operation,

17 I have become convinced that Krivaja 95 was not founded upon documents of

18 this kind; that is to say, it was not -- it did not directly emerge from

19 these documents. Of course, this directive was conceived in such a way

20 and devised in such a way to be an overall framework for most of the

21 activities taking place in the theatre of operation, and that is why it is

22 not a concrete document and cannot be a direct operative link to Operation

23 Krivaja 95. And when I myself tried to find an answer to the question of

24 what was the basis and foundation for the execution of that particular

25 operation -- because, of course, the Corps Commander cannot decide himself

Page 7888

1 to plan an operation. Operations must be tied into a uniform, strategic

2 system on the battleground under the control of the Supreme Command, which

3 means the civilian and state political powers that be.

4 In the preamble to this directive, we -- that is to say, in the

5 preamble of the order of the Drina Corps commander for active action,

6 there is a sentence which might lead us to an answer to this question,

7 that is to say, what served as the basis and foundation and groundwork for

8 the execution of this particular operation, and I hope we'll come to that

9 in due course. But I think that it is quite certain that the operation

10 was executed on the basis of the concrete situation, the prevailing

11 situation at that time, and the concrete situation related to the Drina

12 Corps was that the -- where the activities of the Muslim forces from the

13 enclaves within the framework of the sabotage operation named Skakavac or

14 Grasshopper.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Would the usher now place on the

16 ELMO Exhibit -- Prosecution Exhibit 426. We need page 3.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just have an additional document

18 here, not the main one. I just have the attachment to the basic

19 document. I haven't got the basic document, if it is directive 7/1 that

20 we're talking about.

21 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The exhibit number was 426. It is directive 7/1, issued by the

23 Main Staff of the VRS. I haven't got a copy myself now, but could you

24 find the section which refers to the Drina Corps. I think it is on page 3

25 or 4.

Page 7889

1 A. It is page 3.4, which relates to the conceptual part and where the

2 Supreme Command decides what actions should be taken.

3 Q. Could you wait for it to be placed on the ELMO, please. Thank

4 you.

5 A. In this point, point 4, for the Drina Corps, it is expressly --

6 the following is expressly stated: The forces of the East Bosnian Corps

7 and the Drina Corps, with reinforcements from the Herzegovina and

8 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps - and I stress - should, as soon as possible,

9 realise the tasks from the Spreca operation, Operation Spreca 95, cut off

10 and destroy enemy forces east of the Vis-Stolica line, and in this way

11 create conditions for continuing the attack towards Tuzla and Zivinice,

12 that is to say, completely outside the zone of responsibility and any of

13 the enclaves. It is that point up there, north-west of Zvornik.

14 So there's no mention made at all in this directive, in directive

15 7/1, which should be the concretisation of the directive from the Supreme

16 Commander, and with tasks specified, and the tasks that should be

17 considered operative. However, as we see in this directive, there is

18 nothing at all which could lead us to the Krivaja 95 operation.

19 Q. Could you now look at a separate paragraph which relates to the

20 Drina Corps itself.

21 A. We come to the tasks of the units and the Drina Corps, one of

22 them. It is point 5.3, paragraph 5.3. And it is the task of the Drina

23 Corps under paragraph 5.3 to defend and exert active combat activity in

24 the north-western part of the battlefield and to prevent the breakthrough

25 of the enemy on the tactical axes, and demonstratively and with the

Page 7890

1 application of measures, operative measures, that is to say, active forms,

2 to link up forces. And this is defence, not offence; a defensive action

3 and not an offensive action.

4 And with the IBK or East Bosnian Corps to realise the tasks from

5 the Spreca 95 operation as soon as possible. And this is not an operation

6 that I know of. It was never executed, nor do we know what it applied to,

7 what it actually meant. Perhaps those who -- I'm sure that those who

8 devised this did know, but I myself did not learn what this meant because

9 the operation was not planned and not executed.

10 So in the first stage of that operation, the aim was to break

11 through to the Vis-Kalesija line, that is, towards Tuzla, and then to

12 regroup forces. And then in the second and third phases of the operation

13 by an appropriate manoeuvre, infiltrating strong groups into the enemy

14 rear and introducing strong-armoured mechanised forces to execute an

15 attack in the direction of Kalesija-Tuzla, that is to say, quite outside

16 the context in which Operation Krivaja 95 was positioned and everything

17 that occurred in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps from the

18 beginning of July up until the end.

19 Q. General Radinovic, in the previous document, directive 7, there is

20 a sentence which mentions -- which makes mention of the enclaves. It is

21 the portion where the Drina Corps comes. However, in directive 7/1, in

22 the portion which relates to the Drina Corps, the enclaves are no longer

23 mentioned.

24 Bearing in mind the relationship of the directives, and you said

25 that 7/1 should be an elaboration of directive 7, how do you explain that?

Page 7891

1 A. Well, I explain that in -- I have several explanations. First,

2 what I stressed yesterday when I was talking about the organisational

3 structure of the VRS and about Supreme Command and commanding, and if you

4 recall, I said yesterday that the positioning of the Main Staff as a

5 parallel Supreme Command by giving it command responsibility - not staff

6 and professional responsibility which is the practice in all armies of the

7 world - this in a certain sense and in a certain way and under certain

8 conditions and in certain situations can give birth to certain forms of

9 dual authority and parallel Supreme Command. For example, these two

10 directives clearly bear that out. They clearly confirm that.

11 So, and let's see how it reflects on the Drina Corps, the most

12 important thing for the operative situation in the zone of responsibility

13 of the Drina Corps is the conduct of the armed forces of the BiH army in

14 the enclaves and their activity vis-a-vis the VRS. In directive number 7

15 issued by the Supreme Commander, that is to say, the president of the

16 Republika Srpska, there is one sentence which refers to the enclaves. Of

17 course, I would not have written it. I would not have written it, and I

18 do not think that he should have written it either. But there is not a

19 single letter in directive 7/1 referring to that sentence, the sentence

20 which referred to the Drina Corps. Therefore, the commander of the Main

21 Staff of the VRS and the military system considered that there is -- that

22 they were not -- that the realisation of this idea contained in that

23 sentence need not be realised, and in directive 7/1 that sentence, indeed,

24 does not exist. It is not there. I personally as an officer am very

25 pleased to see that that sentence does not exist here.

Page 7892

1 Second, and this is another important point, the directive of the

2 president, or rather, the Supreme Commander of the civilian head of state

3 is a more generalised directive, and the directive of a -- of the Main

4 Staff commander must be more precise with respect to the subordinates who

5 are to carry it out. And this directive issued by the commander of the

6 Main Staff, directive 7/1, is indeed shorter. It is an abridged version,

7 a more concise, precise version, without the descriptions that exist in

8 the previous one. There is no assessment and analysis, but goes straight

9 to the essential points, points which could be essential.

10 Therefore, if we want to take the order of realisation in turn,

11 the commander of the Drina Corps realises the tasks sent to him by the

12 commander of the Main Staff. The commander of the Main Staff is

13 responsible to the Supreme Commander for his own conduct and for the

14 conduct of his army. And when we spoke about at the very beginning of my

15 testimony yesterday of how orders are carried out, then we said that they

16 are not -- orders are not carried out which imply a violation of law or

17 violation of the principles of humanitarian law, and the commander of the

18 Main Staff in his own directive did not take over a text which could imply

19 that kind of behaviour.

20 Q. General Radinovic, how long -- how much time is necessary for an

21 operation to be well planned and organised?

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And I should like to ask the usher

23 to prepare Prosecution Exhibit 427 in the meantime.

24 A. In answer to that question, I can say the following, that is to

25 say, I would say the same thing that General Dannatt said in his expert

Page 7893












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Page 7894

1 report, and I completely agree that for this level of operation, for an

2 operation of this level, it is -- 72 hours would be quite sufficient for

3 its planning.

4 According to our standards, the time given for timely preparation

5 and all-around -- for preparing an operation well is three to five days,

6 depending on whether the command system is in charge of the situation, is

7 in control of the situation in the area where the operation is to take

8 place, or whether you are planning to send forces to a terrain which is

9 not well known to you, and where you have an operational situation which

10 is not well known. And this occurs in in-depth manoeuvres when the

11 activities are to take place outside the zone of responsibility.

12 In this concrete case, we're talking about the zone of

13 responsibility which the command system of the Drina Corps is well

14 acquainted with. I would say that it is quite enough to have three to

15 five days for the preparation of that kind of operation.

16 Q. General Radinovic, you have before you Prosecution Exhibit 427.

17 It is a preparatory order number one dated the 2nd of July, 1995. In the

18 context of the time necessary for planning, which is otherwise stated in

19 the last paragraph of this order, how can you comment, the time which was

20 spent for the planning and preparation of Operation Krivaja 95?

21 A. In the last paragraph of this document, the last point on page 2,

22 and that's this here, this last paragraph, the commander of the Corps

23 orders that all the forthcoming activities with regard to the planning of

24 combat activities in all variations, and the drawing up of all necessary

25 combat documents be completed by the 3rd of July, 1995, and the documents

Page 7895

1 to be delivered to the units performing active operations should be done

2 only following his orders.

3 If we go back to page 1 of this document, when the document was

4 dated, that is to say, in the upper left-hand corner, the date is the 2nd

5 of July, 1995. That means that for all the preparations necessary and

6 planning necessary for the organisation necessary, bringing in the units,

7 reconnaissance work, and so on and so forth, that was -- only one day was

8 allowed by the Corps Commander for all that to be done.

9 It is my personal view that that is an extremely short space of

10 time and insufficient for any serious planning of the operation to be done

11 within it. So that I myself would say that this operation, Operation

12 Krivaja 95, with only that fact, bearing that fact in mind, I would rank

13 it among the groups -- that is to say, with the groups of operations which

14 are speedily, hastily prepared, and they hasty -- extorted, if I can use

15 that term, operation. And you know that anything done in haste is not

16 done very well, and you can -- there can be many things that are not

17 well-thought out in the haste given.

18 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] May the witness now be given

19 Prosecution Exhibit 428 to look at.

20 Q. General Radinovic, what are the objectives of the Operation

21 Krivaja 95, that is, the objective of the order for combat action?

22 A. I'm sorry, I don't have the document.

23 Q. Let us wait for the document, then.

24 A. Yes. May I? On page 2, this is the B/C/S version, in paragraph

25 4, we have the same conceptual part of the decision, that is, the concept

Page 7896

1 which was made by the commander whereby he decided to use the main force,

2 and I stress that, the main force of the Drina Corps, that they should

3 continue a resolute and active defence, and only to separate the enclaves

4 of Zepa/Srebrenica with the part of the free forces. So there is no

5 mention of that in the conceptual part of the decision. No mention is

6 made of the takeover of Srebrenica in the conceptual part.

7 Operations have their stages, according to the military doctrine,

8 and tactical activities have immediate and long-term tasks, long-term

9 tasks not having to be necessarily completed. So the immediate task was

10 to reach out the line, which I will have to indicate on the map if that

11 hasn't been indicated so far in the proceedings.

12 Q. I believe it has. The Chamber is familiar with the geography.

13 A. So the line in question was Predol, Divljakinja, Banja Guber,

14 Zivkovo Brdo, Alibegovac, Kak. So that was the immediate task. And the

15 next task was to reach the line going along Bojna and Siljato Brdo.

16 So no mention is made in this part, which refers to the objectives

17 of the operation by the Drina Corps commander, of the attack on the town

18 itself. What is stated here is that they should reach certain features,

19 certain lines, which will, militarily speaking, deactivate the enclave and

20 which will enable them to prevent all military activities which were being

21 launched from the Muslim army from the enclave of Srebrenica throughout

22 the period when the area functioned as a protected area, which was

23 especially -- which became especially obvious during the Grasshopper

24 operation.

25 The objective is further on articulated in paragraph 3, where it

Page 7897

1 is stated as follows: "By a surprise attack, to separate and reduce in

2 size the Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves." That is, not to take them over

3 but to reduce them in size. And further on: "To improve the tactical

4 position of the forces in the depth of the area and to create conditions

5 for the elimination of the enclaves."

6 I should like to comment on this portion of the text, if I may.

7 The very fact that the task was to reach and to take control of the

8 features stated in this portion of the order, so by this fact the

9 commander enabled -- wanted to enable strategical and tactical conditions

10 for the elimination of the enclaves, in military terms, if that should

11 become necessary. However, the sentence that is stated here, that you can

12 read here, cannot be interpreted as an attack on urban areas of the town.

13 It merely refers to the creation of appropriate conditions to eliminate

14 the enclaves should the development of the military situation require so.

15 In this manner, the scope of the Operation Krivaja 95 is finished; that

16 is, the objective of the operation is accomplished once those features are

17 taken possession of.

18 There are other elements of the order here but which are not

19 particularly relevant for our case here.

20 Q. So we have talked about the main concept and the plan for the

21 Krivaja 95 operation.

22 General, let me ask my question. I would like to know which

23 planning documents, which supporting documents you came across during your

24 studies, during your analysis.

25 A. Well, I found this planning document which is called the

Page 7898

1 preparatory order for combat activities. This is something very common

2 when one should move over to the following stage. If the stage involving

3 active operations should be started, then this document of this kind is

4 drafted, and this is what I had. And I also had the order of the Corps

5 Commander for active combat and certain elements of the plan for

6 communications support. I didn't have the actual plan for communications

7 which would indicate the communications between the command post and other

8 participants in the overall command and control of the operation. I just

9 had access to certain planning documents concerning radio links. So those

10 are two documents which I had access to.

11 There is a whole range of documents which are lacking. For

12 example, there is no plan for -- explicit plan for artillery support, for

13 logistics support, for quartermaster support, and so on and so forth.

14 Q. What can you -- what is the conclusion that you can make on the

15 basis of that?

16 A. Well, this is the consequence of the fact, which is beyond dispute

17 for me, that this operation was extorted by the Grasshopper operation, so

18 an operation which was not a result of a long-term planning but an

19 operation which was an immediate response to the situation and the

20 developments that were taking place in the spring of 1995, and that is why

21 they were allocated only one day for planning that operation. So they

22 were not able to make a quality overall plan for the operation,

23 which -- the fact which must have affected the operation itself.

24 Q. Bearing in mind what we have discussed so far, could you tell us

25 what were the specific events that actually provoked, that entailed the

Page 7899

1 planning of the Krivaja 95 operation.

2 A. I believe I have already answered that question in part when I

3 said that the events were numerous, the events that were taking place

4 during the last ten days of the month of June; namely, the terrorist

5 activities and the incursions of Muslim forces into the rear of the VRS, a

6 huge amount of losses inflicted to the VRS, according to the documents and

7 testimonies from the Muslim side. On the 15th and the 16th of June, for

8 example, a whole brigade was infiltrated into the rear of the 1st Podrinje

9 Brigade, which resulted in the killing of 40 troops.

10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please prepare D67

11 for the witness, please.

12 A. May I continue, please?

13 Q. Please do, General.

14 A. So if you link that with the events which were taking place in the

15 immediate vicinity of the enclave of Srebrenica, and from the enclave of

16 Srebrenica, one can conclude that the Operation Krivaja 95 was planned as

17 a response to such events and that the objective was to prevent such

18 incidents from reoccurring.

19 In this document here we can see a report of the commander of the

20 28th Division, which was addressed to the commander of the 2nd Corps. The

21 report was written on the 30th of June, 1995. In this report the

22 commander of the 28th Division is informing his commander of the

23 activities of his units and formations in the immediate vicinity, that is,

24 in the rear of the Serbian positions around the enclave.

25 Q. General Radinovic, the Trial Chamber is familiar with the contents

Page 7900

1 of this document because it was entered into evidence some time ago. My

2 question in relation to this document would be as follows: In this

3 document, in a document like this, D67, can we find a brief overview of

4 all of the activities of the 28th Division outside the boundaries of the

5 protected areas of Srebrenica and Zepa?

6 A. Yes. This is precisely such a document. It speaks about that.

7 Q. I should now like you to link this document with the orders, if

8 you can remember, issued by the VRS, and which we discussed yesterday, D88

9 and D153, orders of the Drina Corps, signed by General Zivanovic,

10 concerning the inspection of troops and the order issued to the Milici

11 Brigade, and so on and so forth.

12 A. Yes, I remember that document. In his order, to achieve better

13 quality control over the area, General Zivanovic orders visits of all of

14 the units and he orders the responsible individuals to report to them by

15 the 25th of June. In his document he makes mention of an incident

16 involving an incursion of the brigade, of a Muslim brigade, into the rear

17 of the 1st Podrinje and the 5th Podrinje Brigade. And he requests his

18 commanders to carry out an inspection of their troops, inspection of the

19 positions, and to see if the line is properly fortified and so on, and to

20 report to him about such visits by the 25th of June. And indeed, he was

21 briefed about what has been accomplished to that effect by the 24th of

22 June, by one of his commanders, and the same was probably done by other

23 commanders, but that was the kind of report that I had access to.

24 Q. During -- while you were preparing your analysis, did you come

25 across any indications that active combat operations were being prepared

Page 7901

1 by the end of June 1995 concerning the enclave of Srebrenica? Was there

2 any mention made, any indications, any documents, any signs which would

3 indicate that such activities were undergoing preparations by the VRS,

4 that is, the preparation of offensive combat activities prior to the 1st

5 of July, 1995?

6 A. You should bear in mind one particular fact which is of the

7 essence for every single army in the world. Every army, by definition,

8 are in the best state of preparation when they carry out offensive

9 activities. Nobody likes defensive activities, because it implies

10 relinquishing the initiative to the enemy, and this does not -- nobody

11 likes that.

12 But I must say that I haven't come across any single piece of

13 evidence, any single indication, neither in the documents nor through the

14 conversations with the people who were involved in one way or the other in

15 this operation, which would indicate that by the end of June 1995, anybody

16 had any thoughts about executing such an operation. There were no

17 conditions whatsoever to launch an operation of that kind. The situation

18 at the front line was very difficult, and especially in the area of

19 responsibility of the Drina Corps. So there was no talk whatsoever about

20 the possibility of launching such an offensive.

21 JUDGE RIAD: General, you just -- if I understood rightly, you

22 said there was no way, neither in the documents, there was nothing

23 indicated -- I'm sorry, I want to read it, that by the end of June 1993 --

24 1995, anybody had any thoughts about executing an operation of that kind

25 by one -- from one way or -- with the people who were involved in one way

Page 7902












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Page 7903

1 or the other. "Involved in one way or the other," do you mean the two,

2 the two fighting sides? You mean the VRS and the Muslims, one way or the

3 other, people involved in one way or the other? Who are they?

4 A. I'm afraid I have been misinterpreted. My response was to the

5 question whether throughout my preparations for this testimony and while I

6 was studying this matter, whether I had come across any indication to the

7 effect that the VRS, that is, the Drina Corps, was preparing an offensive

8 operation around the enclaves. That was the question that I was

9 responding to. And I said, that was part of my answer, that the nature of

10 every army is to be offensive, not to wait, because armies like to have

11 initiative. Soldiers do not like defensive approach. However, in the

12 month of June, 1995, the VRS was in a defensive position, and I didn't

13 come across any single document which would indicate that offensive combat

14 activities were being prepared.

15 Second, I said that neither in the conversations with people who

16 were involved in the operation did I come across such indication. And

17 yesterday I told you that I had spoken with the people who had been

18 involved in the operation on the Serb side, unfortunately. I did not have

19 an opportunity to discuss it with the people who were involved in the

20 operation on the other side, but that was not possible, unfortunately. So

21 from the conversations with those individuals I made a very firm

22 conclusion that there was no talk at the time about launching an operation

23 of that kind.

24 So that was the essence of my answer. I don't know whether it has

25 come across this time.

Page 7904

1 JUDGE RIAD: So you're speaking only of the -- you're speaking

2 only of the VRS when you say one people --

3 A. Yes.

4 JUDGE RIAD: -- involved [Realtime transcript read in error

5 "going"] in one way or the other, only of the VRS? Thank you.

6 A. Yes.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. General Radinovic, I don't know whether you have exhibit number

9 P428, the order for combat activities.

10 JUDGE RIAD: Excuse me, I want to correct the transcript of what I

11 said. I didn't say "going" one way or the other; I said, "people involved

12 in one way or the other." Thank you.

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. General, in the order for active combat activities, a provision

15 was made for a forward command post?

16 A. If you will allow me before you proceed with your question,

17 because I didn't fully answer your previous question regarding objectives.

18 In paragraph 5 of the order issued by the commander when setting

19 out the objectives, he said the objective of the units which -- involving

20 the separation of the enclaves and the shrinking of the territory of the

21 enclaves. So you have this specific mention made in the title, that is,

22 the reduction, to reduce the territory, to reduce them in size. So that

23 is something that should be taken into account while assessing the

24 objectives of the operation.

25 Q. Mention is made of the forward command post at Pribicevac in this

Page 7905

1 order. What is the customary role of a forward command post in the

2 execution of an operation? How do you divide them? How do you take

3 possession of them? What kind of protection do they require?

4 A. Command posts refer both to the actual space, the actual location,

5 and the facility from which command and control is executed over the units

6 involved in combat operations. These facilities include facilities for

7 work, for rest and recuperation, and some support buildings, as well as

8 facilities intended to provide protection for the command post.

9 Command posts can be divided into the basic command post, the rear

10 command post, the forward command post, and reserve command posts. The

11 command post in itself is the most developed one in the sense of the

12 quality of the facilities that it has. It has to be on such a location in

13 terms of space and have such conditions to be able to provide quality and

14 relatively comfortable conditions for work of the command on the execution

15 of their tasks. So that is the basic idea of a command post.

16 In order to accomplish that task, groups of commanding officers

17 are assigned to a specific command post. We have the command group, the

18 support group, and then the protection unit, and other necessary elements.

19 Of course, the command group is the most important one. It also includes

20 the operational part, that is, the operation room, where all the necessary

21 information is being gathered and collated, where the creative part of the

22 operation is taking place, where necessary supporting orders are being

23 drafted, and all other activities undertaken that have to ensure a good

24 execution of an operation.

25 We have the commander there, assistant commander for intelligence,

Page 7906

1 for security, and the Chief of Staff of course, and the basic staff which

2 provide relevant assistance to the commander. And we also have service

3 chiefs, and there has to be someone from the logistics branch as part of

4 the command group as well.

5 As regards the rear command post, it is used for the purposes of

6 conducting logistical work, logistical support, and forward [as

7 interpreted] command posts are determined -- are realised when one cannot

8 conduct military operations from the basic command post. So it should be

9 situated on an appropriate location from where one can have adequate

10 insight into what is going on in the field and from which adequate

11 communication with the units in the field can be ensured, in a timely

12 fashion, of course.

13 As regards the Drina Corps in particular, and VRS corps in

14 general, we have something that is perhaps contrary to some basic

15 doctrinary principles when it comes to command posts; that is to say,

16 corps have their appropriate areas of responsibility. In their areas of

17 responsibility they have their headquarters, the corps headquarters, where

18 the command is located. In the case of the Drina Corps, this was in

19 Vlasenica.

20 When it comes to the communicational aspect of command, the Drina

21 Corps designated Vlasenica as its command post, which would mean that that

22 was their basic command post. However, the basic command post is always

23 determined for operations. However, there are peacetime command posts,

24 and there are also command posts where commands are relocated in cases of

25 combat activities.

Page 7907

1 In this case, the location was renamed a basic command post, that

2 is, the location in Vlasenica was the basic command post for the Drina

3 Corps. So this was somehow contrary to the military doctrine, but the

4 reason for that was the fact that the Drina Corps had a relatively

5 permanent area of responsibility, and it was possible to ensure proper

6 functioning of basic command and functions from the headquarters in

7 Vlasenica.

8 The Corps command availed themselves of the possibility of

9 creating forward command posts for certain military activities, and it did

10 so in the case of the Operation Srebrenica when they relocated their

11 command post at Pribicevac, and also in the case of Zepa where they had

12 their forward command post in the place called Krivace.

13 The Corps Commander goes to the forward command post together with

14 his Chief of Staff and the necessary number of staff officers who have to

15 be there, who are required to be there. There are no very strict

16 regulations for that; however, there is a very strict requirement that the

17 commander should be located at the forward command post because that is

18 the very reason why the command is being relocated because it is so that

19 the commander can have a more efficient control over his troops from the

20 forward command post.

21 Q. Which parts of the command of the Drina Corps were at the forward

22 command post of Pribicevac?

23 A. You mean the command? The command of the Drina Corps, you mean.

24 At the forward command post of the Drina Corps, there was the

25 Corps Commander; the Chief of Staff of the Corps; the assistant for the

Page 7908

1 Chief of Staff for operative affairs; the assistant for intelligence, but

2 he wasn't there all the time, he would go back to the basic command post

3 from time to time; the head of communications, which is always there. So

4 those are the organs that I was interested in. I didn't focus on the

5 others, but that is quite enough for the effective functioning of a

6 forward command post.

7 Q. Did the commander of the Drina Corps during the Krivaja operation,

8 was he at the forward command post all the time?

9 A. I did not study that problem for the simple reason that it is up

10 to the personal assessment of a commander whether he's going to spend all

11 his time at the forward command post or whether he's going to make

12 periodical tours of the units in combat, to the logistics portion, or

13 whether he's going to be at the basic command post or in the region of the

14 units who are the main forces of the Corps to carry out defensive

15 operations towards Tuzla and Kladanj.

16 So the Corps Commander need not be at the forward command post all

17 the time, but what is most important is that the command functions. And

18 when the commander isn't on the spot, he has his Chief of Staff who

19 replaces him, and this is an automatic mechanism. When the commander is

20 absent, the Chief of Staff de facto takes over the command so there are no

21 breaks or pauses in the system of command, regardless of whether the

22 command is at the forward command post or is absent from it. It is

23 important to know that the forward command post is the spot from which the

24 units are commanded, the units in the operation are being commanded, for

25 which the forward command post was established in the first place.

Page 7909

1 Q. General Radinovic, what portion of the overall forces were

2 engaged - and I'm thinking of the Drina Corps, the overall Drina

3 Corps - how many of their men were engaged in the Krivaja 95 operation,

4 involved there?

5 A. In the order of the commander, in point 4 of that order, the

6 conceptual part that we commented in response to your previous question,

7 is it explicitly says that the main forces of the corps should continue to

8 exert defensive action at the outer areas of the zone of responsibility

9 towards Tuzla and Kladanj, and those are the main forces, the bulk of the

10 troops. And only part of the free forces should execute the Krivaja 95

11 operation, and not even all those free forces, but a portion of them.

12 In the order we saw that it was explicitly stated which these

13 forces were. It was a combat group from the Zvornik Brigade, in fact,

14 which went along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica axis and was active there.

15 It is the combat group from the 2nd Romanija and Bratunac Brigades as

16 well, and the Milici Brigade. And the Bratunac Brigade, the Milici

17 Brigade link up forces but don't actually take part in the operation, so

18 they link up the forces and engage forces of the 28th Division.

19 So in the Krivaja 95, to all practical terms, it was forces below

20 the number of a brigade, which means two and a half battalions perhaps,

21 two and a half battalions took part. The equivalent would be about three

22 battalions, which is far below the equivalent of a serious brigade.

23 So in answer to your question, I can say, in summing up, that they

24 were very restricted forces, just part of the free forces and in our

25 doctrine these are called auxiliary forces.

Page 7910

1 Q. What was the operative position of the forces engaged in the

2 Krivaja 95 operation, both on the Muslim side and the -- that is to say,

3 the BH army side and the VRS side?

4 A. Well, the forces of the 28th Division, at their positions, at the

5 positions they were at, were there for a long time. They held those

6 positions for a long time, that is to say, from May 1993 -- of course,

7 those forces -- not all the forces were there in 1993 that were there in

8 1995. They grew in number. But they were there from 1993, to all

9 practical purposes, so they were there for two whole years in those

10 positions, regardless of whether they were there throughout or whether

11 they came later on.

12 But we can say quite certainly that they had enough time to

13 prepare their defence positions very well. That means to become

14 entrenched, a high degree of fortification and protection; to protect the

15 facilities, the existing facilities, and adapt them as protection against

16 fire power. They had enough time to do all the reconnoitring they needed,

17 to study the methods and dynamics of defence, to study all these things.

18 They had enough time to do this very well, if they wanted to, of course.

19 Whether they did so or did not, I don't know, but with regard to the

20 persistence that they defended Srebrenica, I do not think they did avail

21 themselves of all that.

22 They were engaged in their defence in a circular system. They

23 were in an encirclement, which is an unfavourable indicator of their

24 condition, this encirclement. The fact that they were in an encirclement

25 means that they were at a disadvantageous position.

Page 7911












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Page 7912

1 The presence of UNPROFOR, or rather the Dutch Battalion, was a

2 positive factor in the operational position of the forces of the 28th

3 Division. Constant activity on the part of the units of the 2nd Corps,

4 the Muslim army, on the external axes from Kladanj and Tuzla, and constant

5 pressure that was exerted on the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps

6 made it binding on the forces of the corps to hold their main forces at

7 defensive positions and defensive deployment towards the external

8 boundaries of the zone of responsibility. And that was an additional

9 factor advantageous to the position of the forces in the enclave, although

10 let me repeat once again: When forces are found in an encirclement, taken

11 as a whole their position is considered to be disadvantageous.

12 As far as the position of the Drina Corps forces is concerned, I

13 would like to stress -- of course, we can stress some positive elements,

14 but there are negative ones as well. The positive ones was that the

15 forces were on the external edges of the enclave and held the forces of

16 the 28th Division in an encirclement. The space between the enclaves was

17 not controlled by the VRS, and that was a disadvantageous fact for the

18 operational position of the Drina Corps forces which held the enclaves.

19 Another unfavourable fact for the VRS was that it did not -- that

20 is to say, the Drina Corps was, quite simply -- it did not have any free

21 forces for manoeuvring and for taking over offensive actions. All the

22 forces were engaged in defending the external reaches.

23 Q. What would be the overall ratio of forces between the BH army and

24 the 28th Division on the one side and the others taking part in the

25 Krivaja 95 operation?

Page 7913

1 A. I analysed the ratio of forces in Srebrenica. I have analysed

2 that. And if we take -- although the numerical situation, as borne out by

3 the documents, they vary; the numbers vary from one document to another.

4 Some documents say that the 28th Division had about 8.000 men; other

5 documents quote different figures. These are assessments rather than

6 precise data, precise facts and figures as to how many troops there were.

7 There is intelligence information which was used in the system of

8 communication in the Drina Corps as well, for example, and you can draw

9 conclusions from Muslim documents which speak of four organisational

10 formations in Srebrenica from the autumn of 1993 up to the middle of 1995,

11 or rather April 1995. And if I weigh all those facts and figures up, then

12 it would appear that the 28th Division in Srebrenica had about 10.000 men,

13 in formation terms, and perhaps 8.000 armed men. So those were forces

14 which far surpassed, numerically far surpassed the numbers of men in the

15 units engaged around Srebrenica.

16 And if we talk about the directly confronted parties on the two

17 sides, the two sides in Srebrenica in the Krivaja 95 operation, then my

18 calculations would be as follows: The ratio of forces was 2.8:1 to the

19 advantage of the 28th Division, 2.8:1 to the advantage of the 28th

20 Division, which meant that they were numerically superior.

21 You must, of course, relativise that ratio in the sense that the

22 VRS was better equipped, better armed, it had better fire power support,

23 whereas the Muslim forces were weaker in that respect. But at any rate,

24 that ratio of forces would still be to the advantage of the Muslim side,

25 regardless of that.

Page 7914

1 Q. Do any standards exist in military theory with respect to the

2 ratio of forces in attacks on settlements, inhabited areas, and attacks on

3 positions outside inhabited areas?

4 A. Yes, there are standards. They exist generally in war doctrine,

5 and we have a doctrine about that too. In latter-day doctrine, attacks on

6 inhabited areas are to be avoided, for two reasons: First, because

7 settlements are prepared for long-term defence and they rely on buildings

8 and basements and cellars, which can be well adapted to provide defence

9 and protection. So populated areas are resistance points of the first

10 order, and in principle they are not attacked.

11 Let me remind you of the Israeli aggression on Lebanon in 1982.

12 Israel blocked Beirut but did not attack Beirut. Of course, not only for

13 those reasons, but it never entered anybody's mind to attack Beirut.

14 So in principle, towns are not attacked, and latter-day doctrine

15 states this, because they are very strong fortification and can be used

16 for long-term resistance. That is the first reason.

17 The second more important reason is that by attacking towns with

18 highly destructive systems and weaponry, there would be heavy losses

19 sustained in human lives on the side of the defenders, and this could

20 never be justified through the principle of military effectiveness.

21 So that is one serious reason why towns are not attacked. But if

22 towns were to come under attack, then the ratio of forces between the

23 attacker, they must be -- the attacker must be more superior, 7 to 10

24 times more -- 7 to 10 times stronger, because it is very difficult to take

25 control of a town, so you would have to be far stronger. Well-fortified

Page 7915

1 defence positions outside inhabited areas on open ground, in open space,

2 if we're talking about what we call manoeuvring territory, where the

3 defenders do not have facilities and features which are dominant and which

4 rise up above the area of attack, then the ratio of forces is usually 3:1

5 or 5:1 on the attacker's side. But for a well-prepared defence on a

6 difficult terrain, inaccessible terrain, which enables the defender to

7 organise a firm defence, then the ratio of forces goes up to 7:1, to the

8 advantage of the attacker. Without that numerical superiority, they would

9 have no chance of gaining control of the area.

10 Q. And this brings me to my last question before the break. The

11 existing ratio of forces, did it guarantee success of the attack on

12 Srebrenica or was the takeover of Srebrenica planned at all, in view of

13 the existing ratio of forces?

14 A. In the existing ratio of forces, it was absolutely not realistic

15 to plan the takeover of Srebrenica. Nobody in the command system of the

16 Drina Corps could have had this, may I use the term, "mad plan" of taking

17 over Srebrenica. No, it would have not entered anybody's mind because an

18 attack on Srebrenica was absolutely not feasible in view of the forces

19 that existed on the 6th of July, 1995.

20 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, may I suggest a break

21 at this point?

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, that is a good proposal.

23 We shall reconvene at 11.00.

24 --- Recess taken at 10.39 a.m.

25 --- Upon resuming at 11.01 a.m.

Page 7916

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, let us continue,

2 and I think we should be working until 10 minutes past 12.

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

4 Q. General Radinovic, could you give us just a brief description,

5 because the Chamber has heard a lot of evidence to that effect, of the

6 main course of the events and the developments during the Operation

7 Krivaja 95, bearing in mind the internal structure of the combat

8 activities; and also if you can give us your definition of the operation

9 in question.

10 A. Pursuant to the order of the Drina Corps Commander, the main axis

11 of attack was along the Zeleni Jadar-Srebrenica line, so that was the main

12 axis of combat operation. The main feature that needed to be taken

13 possession of was Zivkovo Brdo, which was on the route of advance of the

14 2nd Combat Group from the 2nd Romanija and Birac Brigades. In response to

15 one of your questions I said Bratunac Brigade. No, they were from the

16 Birac Brigade. The main feature that had to be occupied was Alibegovac,

17 and also the Kak feature which was also on the route of advance of those

18 units.

19 The attack started in the morning hours of the 6th, and the

20 weather conditions were very bad. It was raining all the time, so

21 practically speaking there were no specific actions. Some reconnaissance

22 work was still being done on certain locations, some regrouping of

23 forces.

24 My apologies to the interpreters. I tend to get carried away.

25 So one can say that the dynamics, that the rhythm of advance was

Page 7917

1 very slow indeed on the first day; that is, on the 6th of July they didn't

2 make any significant gains at all. But it is important to give an

3 assessment of the situation here rather than to engage into detailed

4 description of the events themselves.

5 As early as on the 9th, objectively speaking, the units of the

6 Drina Corps accomplished the objectives of the operation between the 9th

7 and the 10th of July. By reaching the Kak and Zivkovo Brdo features, the

8 main objective of the operation was achieved. The enclave was reduced in

9 size, and it was made impossible for any military communication to be

10 conducted between the two enclaves, and that objective was accomplished in

11 the night between the 9th and the 10th of July.

12 As regards further developments concerning the Operation

13 Srebrenica, pursuant to the order of the Corps Commander, the actual

14 operation came to an end. That was the end of it at that time. Whatever

15 happened later on happened pursuant to the decision to enter the town of

16 Srebrenica for which the Corps Commander needed a new mandate from his

17 superior command.

18 As regards the intensity of the activities, I would place this

19 operation in the group of operations with very low intensity. On the

20 basis of what? Well, I can make that conclusion on the basis of the

21 dynamics of advancing because we are talking about several kilometres per

22 day. That is a very slow rate of advance.

23 Second, there were very few losses, very few casualties on both

24 sides. In the documents that I had a chance to study, I didn't come

25 across any such data, any data to the effect that there would be any

Page 7918

1 serious losses on both warring sides, talking about the Operation

2 Srebrenica.

3 Third, there was very little destruction throughout that time

4 which speaks to the fact that the fire support and the equipment used to

5 provide fire support was very limited, very restricted. It is obvious

6 that the Corps artillery did not take part in the activities. Had the

7 Drina Corps had the intention to capture the town of Srebrenica, they

8 would have used the Corps artillery support. However, this artillery was

9 not present here, and their support was not used.

10 I came across various data concerning the number of rounds that

11 were fired as part of the fire support to the operation. Some sources

12 claim that over 200 artillery shells were falling every day. If we were

13 to talk about, really talk about 200 artillery shells per day, the

14 destruction would be quite serious and quite extensive.

15 On the video footage showing the entry of the VRS units into the

16 town of Srebrenica I was not able to notice, to observe, such a level of

17 destruction which would justify the number of rounds fired. But I must

18 say that these are the data that I read in the documents and the reports

19 which were sent by the UN military observers. They were probably located

20 inside their facilities; they didn't go out into the field. They were not

21 able to verify for themselves that information, so they probably received

22 that data from the local Muslim population which was, of course, afraid,

23 and which led them to exaggerate the number. Again, the destruction would

24 be far more extensive if that number of rounds were fired.

25 The reports of the Dutch Battalion are more accurate, and the

Page 7919

1 number that they give, the number of shells that were fired during the

2 operation, was much lower. In view of the structure of the operation, one

3 can say that we are talking about an operation with restricted objective

4 and a low intensity operation.

5 Certain elements which characterise each operation are lacking

6 here. When preparing for an attack on a fortified position, and one can

7 expect that the positions of the 28th Division were very well fortified,

8 because they had two years to prepare themselves, and in such conditions

9 the preparation for fire support for the operation usually takes longer.

10 That element of the operation Krivaja 95 is lacking here. Of

11 course, there were some -- there was a certain amount of support, but I

12 think that that support was provided by the battalion forces who were

13 actually taking part in the combat activities, and probably the support

14 given by tanks. But I don't think that there can be any talk about large

15 artillery -- large-calibre artillery. So this element of serious

16 artillery preparation is lacking. Not a single offensive operation can be

17 carried out with any serious objective in mind without extensive artillery

18 preparations.

19 Furthermore, there were no major clashes along the confrontation

20 line. There were no deep advances, there were no flank attacks. So there

21 is a certain dynamics which is lacking in this particular operation, and

22 such dynamics is always characteristic for major military operations, and

23 that leads me to conclude that the operation in question was one with a

24 restricted objective, and, structurally speaking, it was a simplified

25 operation in view of the elements that it contained.

Page 7920

1 Q. General Radinovic, if we compare the attack on Srebrenica, that

2 is, the attack of the VRS which took place in 1993, when the objective was

3 to take over Srebrenica and the Krivaja 95 operation, what kind of

4 conclusion can we draw from that comparison?

5 A. Well, the only conclusion that one can draw is the one which would

6 confirm what I have just said about the scope and the intensity of the

7 operation. In the Srebrenica Operation 1995, the forces that were

8 committed were below the level of a brigade, whereas in 1993 the forces

9 that were deployed were those of the strength of four brigades.

10 Let me just remind you that there were two guard brigades at that

11 time: The 1st Guards Brigade from Bijeljina, with the code-name Mauzer,

12 and one of the Protection Regiment, forces of the Milici Brigade. All

13 those forces were deployed for the purposes of that operation, and they

14 can -- they were in the strength of four brigades at that time. That

15 number of troops was necessary in order for the town of Srebrenica to be

16 occupied, and that is the ratio of the forces that I spoke about,

17 7 to 10:1.

18 Srebrenica was the objective of the attack in 1993. The VRS had

19 the intention to take control of the town of Srebrenica, thereby gaining

20 the control of the overall area of central Podrinje. Yesterday we spoke

21 about the reasons why that operation was never completed, and in response

22 to your question here, I can just say that those forces were such that it

23 was possible for them to take possession of the town, whereas the forces

24 that were committed for the purposes of the Krivaja 95 operation were not

25 such as to guarantee the success of the takeover of the town. And from

Page 7921

1 that perspective, the only conclusion I can draw was that there was no

2 intention whatsoever to take control of the town, and such conclusion can

3 be made also on the basis of the documents which were drafted for the

4 purposes of this operation, in particular, the order for combat

5 activities.

6 Q. General Radinovic, the 28th Division, how persistent was it in its

7 defence of the town of Srebrenica?

8 A. Well, that's a different story. I don't think that they were very

9 persistent in their defence. There were, I think, operational and

10 tactical possibilities for the town of Srebrenica to be fiercely

11 defended. I am familiar with certain relevant testimonies to that effect,

12 and I am familiar with the document issued by the UN Secretary-General

13 where he stated that the forces of the 28th Division were not able to put

14 up a fierce defence of the town of Srebrenica for a long time period. I

15 cannot agree with that, and I have a number of data which can support my

16 conclusion. I know that the Secretary-General based himself on the report

17 submitted to him by his soldiers, but when I spoke about the ways a town

18 can defend itself, I wanted to say that Srebrenica was able to prepare

19 adequate defence with its forces despite the fact that the area was

20 restricted and despite the fact that their combat readiness was not at the

21 highest level.

22 For the purposes for the defence of town of Srebrenica, it was

23 quite enough -- what the 28th Division had at their disposal was quite

24 enough, including mine and ordnance equipment, adequate ammunition and

25 weapons, because such operations were low-intensity operations, without

Page 7922

1 air support or artillery support. We're talking about minor clashes which

2 are of very low intensity, with the use of -- with the restricted use of

3 equipment. And I'm quite sure that the resources of the 28th Division

4 were such that it was able to defend the town of Srebrenica so long as the

5 forces of the International Community didn't meddle in the defence, that

6 is, the forces of the United Nations, which would prevent any further

7 exacerbation of the conflict.

8 And if I may at this point, I have to address a certain amount of

9 blame for what happened there to the system of command of Srebrenica. Had

10 they put up a more persistent defence in the town of Srebrenica, I'm sure

11 that the members of UNPROFOR would have intervened and they would have

12 helped them. But I think the way things were happening, it was a fait

13 accompli.

14 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I make an objection?

15 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Cayley.

16 MR. CAYLEY: I make this objection before we get on to matters

17 which are really more germane, more material to the case. The General is

18 making very sweeping, broad statements about matters. He's giving his

19 opinion. And he makes statements in such a fashion - I'll give you an

20 example in a moment - without any specific basis for that opinion.

21 He said to us earlier on, I think yesterday in his testimony, that

22 he's relied on documents and speaking to a number of people and

23 Prosecution exhibits; but a statement that he's just made where he states

24 the 28th Division had sufficient equipment, sufficient ammunition to

25 defend the enclave, could he identify for the Prosecution how he actually

Page 7923

1 comes to that conclusion - here is Exhibit D57, here is Prosecutor's

2 Exhibit such - rather than just making these very sweeping statements with

3 some kind of broad bases of which we have absolutely know idea about at

4 all. Because unless he was there and he actually counted all the

5 ammunition and the weapons that the Muslims had, I really don't see how he

6 could make these kind of comments. That would be my point.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, you have heard this

8 request for clarification. I should also like you to try and streamline

9 the answers of your witness and to have him tell us the sources for his

10 conclusions, and tell us if he reached his conclusions after the events.

11 It is very easy to draw conclusions later on, post facto; however, we have

12 to try and place ourselves in the relevant situation in space and time.

13 We need to hear very clear opinions of this witness, including the

14 foundations for his answers, because after all, he is an expert witness,

15 and we have to know what the bases for his answers is.

16 I hope that I was clear enough, Mr. Visnjic, and the witness has

17 also heard me, I hope.

18 Is that all, Mr. Cayley, that you wanted to object to?

19 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. I think you've been very clear.

20 It's just a specific basis for what the witness is saying, as Mr. Butler

21 did. He would come forward to you with a conclusion, and then he would

22 produce a document to actually support his conclusion. So that's all I'm

23 asking for, thank you.

24 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead, Mr. Visnjic.

25 Please continue.

Page 7924

1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if you will allow me

2 just a brief response to my learned colleague Mr. Cayley.

3 I cannot answer instead of the witness. I know that the Defence

4 has provided the witness with a number of documents which speak about the

5 army -- of the arming of the BiH army inside the protected area of

6 Srebrenica, so I assume that those documents are one of the sources and

7 bases for his conclusions. On the other hand, I know that at the time the

8 General was preparing his report, we had a number of difficulties because

9 we had to work parallelly on certain documents that were already tendered

10 here into evidence, and the General had some other documents at his

11 disposal. So that is perhaps the reason for this misunderstanding.

12 As regards the issue of arming, one portion of the relevant

13 documents hasn't yet been tendered into evidence. It has been handed

14 over, but it is still not in evidence, and those are the documents that

15 the witness used during the preparation of his report, and I think he will

16 mention them in due time.

17 Q. General Radinovic, did the forces and positions of UNPROFOR, were

18 they the object of an attack target? No, I withdraw that question.

19 Could you tell us more specifically the sources which allowed you

20 to make the conclusions you have been making about the weapons and fire

21 power of the forces of the 28th Division?

22 A. Well, first, I did not -- let me say that I did not base my

23 conclusions only on the documents that I studied for this particular

24 occasion alone. There is something that we call a standard when an army

25 is being established. We know the standards. We know what a detachment,

Page 7925












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Page 7926

1 a platoon, a company, a battalion, a brigade, a division has, how many men

2 and so on, and what type of weaponry, and what units have what kind of

3 weapons at their disposal if somebody, a soldier, under arms, that is to

4 say, carrying arms, in the armed formations.

5 Then it is quite certain that these armed soldiers have their own

6 personal weapons which means that they have rifles. Whether it is an M-48

7 rifle or an automatic rifle or semi-automatic rifle, that is another

8 matter. That is the subject for additional analysis. But they would have

9 had a rifle.

10 It is quite certain that a brigade in the organisational and

11 formational sense has fire support. It had its brigade firing groups. It

12 had mortars of the lowest calibre. So that materiel, coupled with mines

13 and explosives because they had that too, and I say that had they only

14 used that basic equipment, the basic equipment that each soldier has and

15 the mines and explosives, Srebrenica could have been defended in the

16 encirclement for as long as it took the International Community to

17 interfere and bring the conflict to an end.

18 The testimony on the basis of that document does not have any

19 great specific weight, but in the book about Srebrenica, and I quote it in

20 my expert report, there is a photograph from which we can see the type of

21 uniform and type of weapons carried and worn by the Muslim soldiers in

22 Srebrenica. And believe me when I say that not even the VRS had weapons

23 of that kind. They were modern automatic rifles and special flack jackets

24 and so on. I don't say all these soldiers in Srebrenica were equipped in

25 this way, but it does tend to show that they were a force to be reckoned

Page 7927

1 with, to inspire confidence.

2 Q. Were the forces of UNPROFOR targets of the VRS?

3 A. No, they were not. And in the documents that I have had occasion

4 to study and see and consult for this expert opinion, the positions -- the

5 UNPROFOR positions were not the target of attack. And the documents of

6 the superior command with the Drina Corps, it is explicitly stated that

7 the UNPROFOR forces must not be the target of attack. And that they were

8 not the target of attack, indeed, is borne out by the fact that most of

9 the UNPROFOR forces passed through the front lines of the Drina Corps and

10 behind them -- they were behind them in the rear, and losses were

11 prevented in this way.

12 And we know that a member of the Dutch Battalion unfortunately was

13 killed by the Muslims in Srebrenica, unhappily. But luckily, we do not

14 have any data, and I think that is true, that we did not sustain any --

15 that the Dutch Battalion did not sustain any casualties from the Serbian

16 side.

17 Q. How do you assess the efficiency and effectiveness of UNPROFOR

18 with respect to the combat activities in and around Srebrenica?

19 A. UNPROFOR did not have any combat, did not undertake any combat

20 activities. That is a fact, and there is no need to go into that. It did

21 not act against the forces of the Drina Corps which attacked towards

22 Srebrenica. However, I think that we must stress the fact at this point

23 that the other UNPROFOR forces were not active either, in the sense of

24 preventing - I say preventing - a serious operational crisis around

25 Srebrenica.

Page 7928

1 I personally feel that the UNPROFOR system should have reacted

2 when it came to the Krivaja 95 operation and its execution, and they

3 should have at all costs prevented its further advance; that is to say, it

4 should have unleashed the mechanism which it had at its disposal and

5 compel the belligerents to respect the safe area, both the Serb side and

6 the Muslim side. But that is a story apart; that is post festum, as the

7 President has so aptly said. It is an assessment made after the fact,

8 after the events, but I think that UNPROFOR did have the necessary

9 materiel at its disposal to be able to prevent that operation, and it

10 would have had to have done so.

11 Q. What was the relationship of the BiH army towards UNPROFOR, that

12 is to say, what were the -- what was the 28th Division's relationship

13 towards UNPROFOR, its attitude towards UNPROFOR?

14 A. Well, it had a dual attitude, twofold. First of all, whether

15 rightly or not, they expected UNPROFOR to protect them fully, completely,

16 and they were not concerned about the fact that they themselves were

17 launching sabotage and divisionary action in the rear of the Drina Corps

18 forces which directly led to the Krivaja 95 operation as a response. It

19 was the direct consequence of the sabotage and diversionary groups from

20 the enclave and their activities. Had that not happened, the operation

21 would have not happened because all the documents point to the fact that

22 that was the main reason, and that unleashed the idea of having the

23 operation.

24 Second, when the activities had been undertaken, then the Muslim

25 forces of the 28th Division expected the arms controlled in the hands of

Page 7929

1 UNPROFOR to be handed over to them, probably. In assessing the

2 relationship between the Muslim forces and UNPROFOR, the attitude they had

3 towards UNPROFOR, we must bear in mind the fact that those forces expected

4 more from UNPROFOR than UNPROFOR was able to give and that this led to a

5 certain amount of frustration on the Muslim side.

6 I wish to believe that that was the consequence and that it was

7 due to this force of circumstances which led to the death of one member of

8 the Dutch Battalion, but it also indicates the negative attitude of the

9 28th Division vis-a-vis UNPROFOR. There are indications of that, and

10 there are documents which state that the Muslims seized weapons from the

11 Dutch Battalion as well.

12 So in a word, we could say in summing up that the attitude of the

13 28th Division towards UNPROFOR, that their relationships were not as might

14 have been expected in this safe area, protected area. Nor did the members

15 of the 28th Division respect the regime; neither did UNPROFOR compel them

16 to respect it on its part.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Cayley.

18 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I'm sorry to interrupt. I think you

19 know the objection I'm going to make.

20 Here the witness is talking about the relationship between the

21 Dutch and the 28th Division. He's saying that the Muslims expected to be

22 protected, and that the relationship was not what it should have been.

23 Could he please identify what is his foundation for saying that? Can he

24 identify the testimony that's been heard by the Court, the documents, the

25 specific documents that indicate this.

Page 7930

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. Professor Radinovic, we

2 are now at a different level of analysis and conclusion. A conclusion

3 supposes an analysis behind it. So could you specify, please, what

4 documents, what facts, or what results of your observations or

5 conversations that you have had allow you to draw those conclusions.

6 A. The killing of the member of the Dutch Battalion is a fact which

7 testifies and speaks of the unacceptable relationship of the 28th Division

8 towards members of the Dutch Battalion, for example. That is a fact which

9 illustrates that most directly. I don't know what else would be stronger,

10 which argument would be stronger than the death of an innocent soldier who

11 was there to protect the safe area and not there to lose his life or to

12 put his life in jeopardy.

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, Witness, but the bad

14 relationships that you spoke about between the 28th Division and the

15 UNPROFOR forces existed before the death of that soldier. Did they -- was

16 it because of those relations that the soldier lost his life or was it

17 because of the soldier's loss of life that the relationships were poor?

18 You must see this line of reasoning. So in order to say that relations

19 were bad between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR, or if you say that they

20 weren't good, at any rate, you must have reasons for saying so, reasons to

21 back this up, and that is what Mr. Cayley is asking you: What is the

22 foundation for you to make that conclusion? The death of that particular

23 soldier, as I have demonstrated, does not show that, because your answer

24 does not establish a relationship before the killing and after the

25 killing, cause and effect.

Page 7931

1 Mr. Cayley is still on his feet, I see, so please proceed,

2 Mr. Cayley. Any more objections?

3 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, you've actually articulated my

4 thoughts, so I have nothing to add.

5 JUDGE RODRIGUES: I'm so sorry. [Interpretation] I do apologise

6 for doing your work for you.

7 Witness, you have heard the line our discussion has taken. What

8 do you have to say in response?

9 A. It is the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, as a

10 part of the UNPROFOR mechanism, to ensure the regime of a safe area in

11 Srebrenica. The principal responsibility of the 28th Division was to

12 respect that regime. The 28th Division, as we have seen on the basis of a

13 series of documents, did not respect that regime, and for me that is the

14 most important pointer to unacceptable behaviour on the part of the 28th

15 Division and the principal responsibility of the Dutch Battalion, which

16 was to ensure that the safe area be respected. That is to say that from

17 the safe area, from Srebrenica, no combat activities were allowed towards

18 the VRS. So that is the main indicator. Whether they had any emotional

19 relationship towards the Dutch Battalion, that is not a subject of

20 discussion here; it is not important for what we're discussing. But their

21 conduct was not proper. They did not respect the regime of the safe area,

22 which they signed in the agreement of April and May 1993 and pledged

23 themselves to do so.

24 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I shall now attempt

25 to help the witness respond to that question with a few documents, and

Page 7932

1 later on I should like to give a brief explanation to the Trial Chamber.

2 Q. One of the documents, General Radinovic, that you based your

3 report on, was it the report based on debriefing in Srebrenica of the

4 Dutch Defence Ministry? Was that one of your basic documents?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Now, in that document, and I have the Serbian version -- that is

7 to say, does the document speak of the relationship of the BH army towards

8 the Dutch Battalion, if you happen to remember?

9 A. Yes, it does.

10 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I can quote from the

11 document which has already been introduced into evidence as a Prosecution

12 Exhibit. Just by way of example of what Mr. Cayley is asking

13 Mr. Radinovic to do: Mr. Butler was a very good witness in that respect.

14 He had a lot of facts and figures in his head. I talked to General

15 Radinovic in preparation for his testimony, and there are two reasons for

16 which he cannot fulfil Mr. Cayley's demands. The first is that he does

17 not have all the sources with him at the moment, all the sources he used.

18 And the second reason is that he can't remember; relying on his memory, he

19 can't sometimes remember all those documents. Now, if the Prosecution

20 insists upon having each assertion backed up by its source and foundation,

21 I propose that we do this later on in writing, and then the assertions

22 could be supported by these written materials or it can remain open as an

23 assertion without the corresponding foundation or support, if I can use

24 that term.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I would like to open up

Page 7933

1 this -- I don't want to open up a full discussion, but I would like to ask

2 Mr. Cayley's position on this point: That is to say, if the witness

3 expresses his opinion and then tells us the steps which he took to make

4 that conclusion, and next we will have the cross-examination by the

5 Prosecution, which will take up more time elucidating those points. But

6 at any rate, I would like to hear Mr. Cayley's response to the proposal

7 just made by Defence counsel.

8 MR. CAYLEY: I've had the opportunity, Mr. President, of

9 consulting with Mr. Harmon, so the Prosecution speaks with one voice. The

10 reason that I ask this is not to be difficult but is simply, as I think

11 you already understand, to facilitate an efficient cross-examination of

12 the witness. Because unless we are aware of the foundation on which the

13 witness bases his opinion, it makes it exceptionally hard to cross-examine

14 him, because we simply have to kind of look up into the sky to try to

15 fathom out how he's come to a particular conclusion.

16 Our view would be that that is not an acceptable way of presenting

17 this kind of evidence, that the witness comes here, he testifies, he's

18 cross-examined, and then subsequently the Defence produce some kind of

19 written document which supports every written assertion he makes by

20 reference to a particular document. That is what he should be doing here

21 and now as a witness, otherwise it makes the whole process ridiculous; it

22 doesn't make it a proper kind of examination and cross-examination at all.

23 JUDGE WALD: I would like to just add to this. I think we have to

24 allow a certain amount of flexibility in expert opinion. As you know, in

25 some jurisdictions, including our own, the expert does not always have to

Page 7934

1 specify and give the exact line of his reasoning or all his documents

2 behind it. Certainly I understand your position that you need to have

3 some notion of where it's coming from in order to conduct the

4 cross-examination, but as I recall, and I have to do this from memory,

5 even Mr. Butler and others, they sometimes gave opinions in which they

6 didn't give a source. I can remember a specific instance or two, because

7 we asked them a question and they gave an opinion without saying, "I am

8 basing this on this document." It was their opinion based upon the

9 overall investigation that they had done. And certainly Mr. Ruez did a

10 certain amount of that in his testimony.

11 So while I sympathise with your general notion, I do think that we

12 have to allow an amount of flexibility, and I think the credibility of the

13 expert's opinion will be assessed by us to some degree on the amount of

14 specification he can give to pass it up, to follow it up, and that I know

15 you will bring out adeptly on cross-examination. So I'm finding it just a

16 little bit -- I won't use the word "irritating," but I'm finding it a

17 little bit disconcerting to have the notion that every time he says a

18 sentence, given that we do have his report and we know what it's based on,

19 that he's expected to produce the exact document. I would like to,

20 frankly, hear the narrative and get on with this expert opinion on this.

21 I think we gave you a fair amount of flexibility with some of the

22 Prosecution's expert witnesses in this regard.

23 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, can I add, can I add some -- perhaps what

24 Judge Wald said. Of course, sweeping statements have got their weight

25 before this Court or anywhere, and they are worth what they are worth, and

Page 7935












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Page 7936

1 it might be difficult for you to cross-examine a sweeping statement except

2 by a sweeping statement. But if then we might need support of the

3 sweeping statement if it's not available now. It's in the interests of

4 justice to have it. In that case you are entitled, in fact, since you

5 have not been able to cross-examine it, you are entitled to ask that the

6 witness comes back to be examined on this if you are really challenging

7 the supporting material, if that suits you.

8 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could respond to what Her

9 Honour --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Judge Rodrigues, please.

11 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I apologise. I was saying that

12 you spoke the same language and the interpreters have difficulties

13 following you. If you don't make pauses between your interventions, we

14 will have problems. I apologise, Mr. Cayley, for this interruption.

15 Please continue.

16 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.

17 If I could respond, Your Honour, to the comments that you made.

18 I'm not suggesting for one moment that every single assertion that he

19 makes has to be supported by a particular document or by reference to oral

20 testimony, but I think - and I'm objecting now before we get on to matters

21 which we all know are going to be really material to this case - that

22 where he does come out with assertions, with propositions which go right

23 to the heart of the indictment, I think it's not unreasonable for him in

24 those particular instances to actually give evidential support for that

25 particular statement.

Page 7937

1 Moreover, in respect of the report itself, Your Honour, there are,

2 I think, in total about 30 footnotes, and I think if you look at

3 Mr. Butler's report, there are literally hundreds and hundreds and

4 hundreds of footnotes actually supporting assertions that he makes. So

5 whilst I don't wish to irritate anybody in the courtroom by making these

6 objections, I do believe and I do maintain my position that for

7 fundamental assertions which are important to this case, the witness has

8 to give some kind of foundation. Otherwise he can simply say, "I am

9 making an inference." If he's not basing it on something specific he can

10 say, "I'm making an inference." And in fact, when he was questioned about

11 the 28th Division relationship, it was apparent that it was an inference

12 based on one single fact, that he made a global statement about the

13 relationship between the 28th Division and the Dutch Battalion.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] I think that we have just heard

15 a very important argument from Mr. Cayley. I think that we are now coming

16 to the core of this issue. So far we have been discussing the framework.

17 We have to make a distinction: Either the witness is giving his personal

18 opinion or his opinion as an expert. He has to tell us about the

19 documents that he saw, and he has to tell us specifically on the basis of

20 which documents he has come to that conclusion, the conclusion that he

21 makes as an expert witness, otherwise I think that we will be allowing the

22 Prosecutor to interrupt the Defence constantly. This is the basic

23 requirement for his cross-examination. He needs to have some sources on

24 the basis of which he can conduct his examination.

25 I don't want the witness to think that we are now discussing his

Page 7938

1 credibility. This is just a technical aspect of the hearing of evidence.

2 It is not a personal question. It has nothing to do with you personally.

3 Mr. Visnjic, I think that we can see certain similarities here

4 with the issue of leading questions. It is possible to lead the witness

5 towards certain aspects which are not really at the heart of the matter,

6 but we cannot do that when we are discussing core issues. I should like

7 to appeal to Mr. Visnjic to lead to a certain extent his witness in the

8 extent that he should go to the important questions, really pertinent

9 questions, and streamline him in his answers. Because if you let him

10 speak at length, then the witness will be tempted to give his personal

11 opinions without quoting sources which he used as the basis for his

12 conclusions. So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to intervene a little

13 more, once we have reached the heart of the matter, and you can also ask

14 the witness specific questions as regards his sources, the documents on

15 which he based himself, and in that way we will avoid very frequent

16 objections.

17 And Mr. Cayley, your objections, let me tell you, are never

18 irritating; on the other hand, they are quite welcome.

19 So Mr. Visnjic, if you can bear this guideline in mind and lead

20 your witness a little more in his testimony.

21 JUDGE WALD: I feel compelled to add one thing more. I think we

22 have to keep in mind the difference between a fact witness and an expert

23 witness. A fact witness gives you a lot of documentation. An expert

24 witness is called as an expert witness precisely because he is thought to

25 have the experience and the academic training which allow him to give a

Page 7939

1 particular lens or a particular viewpoint to it. I agree, he has to let

2 you know if that's happened, but suppose, just suppose he were to say,

3 "Based upon the events which happened in Srebrenica prior to the takeover

4 in Srebrenica, just based upon those events, it is my expert opinion,

5 having studied the military organisations and battles of the world, that

6 that signifies a bad relationship between them." We might not agree with

7 him, but I think that would be a perfectly credible statement or a

8 perfectly legitimate statement for an expert witness to have rather than

9 to have to put in ten documents showing us.

10 MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you.

11 JUDGE WALD: Okay.

12 MR. CAYLEY: I agree with you on that.

13 JUDGE WALD: I just wanted to draw that -- I'm not irritated, but

14 I wanted to draw that distinction so we keep it in mind.

15 MR. CAYLEY: That is exactly what -- I'm sorry, because the

16 interpretation has got to catch up.

17 Your Honour, what is exactly the point that I make, and if the

18 witness had said that, I would never have jumped to my feet and caused all

19 this delay. If he says, "I'm a Lieutenant General. Based on all my

20 experience over the years, I can't point to any particular document, but I

21 can tell you as a professional soldier, this is my opinion" that's all I

22 ask for.

23 JUDGE RIAD: Mr. Cayley, I would like to reassure you that -- to

24 trust the good judgement of the Bench, and when certain things are just an

25 inference, we know it's an inference. When he says, for instance, the

Page 7940

1 28th Division was hostile to the DutchBat because one DutchBat soldier was

2 killed, we know what it means. We know that it's an inference, as you

3 know -- draw the same thing. So let him do the inferences, and leave the

4 other job to us.

5 MR. CAYLEY: I apologise, Your Honour, if you think I'm doing your

6 job, but that fact was actually drawn out by the President. The actual

7 fact of the death of the soldier was brought out by the President on the

8 questioning of the witness. Prior to that it was based on apparently

9 nothing at all.

10 JUDGE RIAD: We can draw the same conclusions, so don't you worry.

11 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, if you will allow me

13 to -- in reply to this issue that was broached by Mr. Cayley very briefly.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, we have to bear in

15 mind that we are in front of an expert witness, what my colleague Judge

16 Wald has just pointed out, and the objective of this testimony is not fact

17 but the evaluation of the facts made by this witness, which is implied by

18 the very concept of expert witnesses. Very often it is very difficult to

19 speak about evaluations without having adequate facts attached to it.

20 I think we can find a compromise solution here. Once we get to

21 the most important aspects of the case, we have to know if there are -- if

22 the opinion in question is a personal opinion or if it's an expert

23 opinion. Since we are here to judge the facts, one has to support those

24 facts with evaluations and opinions.

25 So I should like to ask Mr. Visnjic to bear that in mind while

Page 7941

1 examining his witness. I think we have about ten minutes to see if it is

2 going to work.

3 Mr. Visnjic, please continue.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. But

5 if you will allow me to expose a very brief aspect that I think is

6 important and should be taken into account while assessing the value of

7 testimony of Mr. Radinovic. I'm glad that Mr. Cayley mentioned a

8 comparison of this testimony with the testimony of Mr. Butler and

9 Mr. Dannatt, although Mr. Dannatt's testimony was not as detailed as

10 Mr. Butler's.

11 It was allowed for the witness to have 60 hours to deal with this

12 issue, but believe me, in view of the quantity of documentation and in

13 view of the nature of -- I'm sorry, my colleague has just corrected me:

14 80 hours. In view of the quality of the documents and in view of the pace

15 with which the documents -- the witness received the documents, this

16 precise analysis which was carried out by Mr. Dannatt and Mr. Butler, we

17 would need an additional two or three months in order to comply with the

18 requests of the Prosecutor.

19 Bearing in mind our very restricted resources -- and I must say

20 that I do understand the situation of my learned colleagues from the

21 Prosecution, but they also have to put themselves in our shoes. Bearing

22 in mind our restricted resources, the very little amount of time, and the

23 nature of the subject matter, it is my opinion that this witness has put a

24 huge amount of effort in order to comply with the conditions and

25 requirements which were posed by the Chamber in respect to his testimony.

Page 7942

1 I do not wish to discuss his capacity, his ability to provide you

2 instantly with his sources, and that was precisely the reason for my

3 proposal. If something is really very important and very relevant, and if

4 we cannot have the relevant source right away, we will make additional

5 effort to provide the Chamber and the Prosecution with the relevant

6 sources in due time.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, I really think we

8 need a break at this point. It is 12.00. It is high noon, and we're

9 going to have a break now, and when we come back we will take up the issue

10 once again.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours, can you

12 just allow me two sentences?

13 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] After the break, General. After

14 the break.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe it would be more useful for

16 you to hear it now, if you will allow me.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] No, I'm sorry, General. After

18 the break.

19 We will come back at 1.00.

20 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.01 p.m.

21 --- On resuming at 1.03 p.m.

22 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Professor Radinovic, you wanted

23 to say a few words. I apologise for not allowing you to do so before the

24 pause, but I had some urgent business to attend to. I agree that for

25 purposes of economy, that might have been better, but would you like to

Page 7943

1 add anything to the discussion we were having before the break?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. President. To avoid

3 repetition of situations of this kind, may I explain how I have understood

4 my role in this trial to be, what I have understood it to be like? And

5 perhaps this explanation would be useful.

6 I'm a military expert dealing in military strategic synthesis. Of

7 course, I do not do this arbitrarily. I do not devise strategic synthesis

8 arbitrarily but on the basis of analyses, comparative analyses, study of

9 documents, but of course also basing it on my experience and the great

10 knowledge and experience that I have gained in the many years that I have

11 worked in the field, in my professional field.

12 I am not the type of witness of Mr. Butler. I have enormous

13 respect for Mr. Butler and the enormous effort that he made in writing his

14 expert report, but I am not that type of analytical witness. I am a

15 witness of the type of General Dannatt, and that is how I understood my

16 role. So for all of my assertions, I, of course, do have arguments to

17 back them up as foundation, but in the kind of synthesis that I make, it

18 is absolutely not possible to say each and every time which source I base

19 my assertion on.

20 I have been -- I have said here that I gained the impression that

21 the relationships between the 28th Division and UNPROFOR in Srebrenica

22 were not good relations. I assumed that that was sufficient -- that it

23 was sufficient to illustrate that. And I, of course, have arguments to

24 back my opinion up. I have the plan of attack, the document of the plan

25 of attack on the UNPROFOR camp devised by the Muslim command in November

Page 7944

1 1994.

2 Furthermore, I have the whole chapter on debriefing, which speaks

3 about the poor relations that existed between the 28th Division and the

4 Dutch Battalion of UNPROFOR.

5 I also have the testimonies of the Dutch officers themselves about

6 the fact that they did not know which forces existed in Srebrenica, what

7 their structure was, what the command composition was, what kind of

8 weaponry they had. And when there are two armies on the same territory,

9 in the same region, you don't know what they have by way of materiel and

10 equipment, then the conclusion is clear. It means that they have not

11 exchanged information of that kind, which means that their relations are

12 poor.

13 So I want to tell you of the way in which I draw my conclusions

14 and make my assertions and what they are founded upon. The method of

15 work, the methodology of my work, is different from what it was with some

16 of the other participants in these legal proceedings, and so -- and I

17 would not have accepted -- I do not accept Mr. Visnjic's defence. I did

18 not -- I am not lacking -- I did not lack -- not do something because of

19 the -- I didn't have enough hours at any disposal. I don't accept that

20 defence. Even if I had two hours, I would have made my expert -- given my

21 expert opinion with all validity. So the problem was not that I didn't

22 have enough hours at my disposal, as Mr. Visnjic implied; it was quite

23 something else, that I did my best with all the knowledge and experience

24 that I have as a professional and expert.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Professor Radinovic, thank you

Page 7945

1 for your explanations. We have heard them and we'll try to function in

2 accordance with what you have presented. Yes, it is true that you did not

3 have as much time as you might have liked and the Registry did not pay you

4 for all the time that you did invest.

5 But Mr. Visnjic, was there something that --

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, perhaps we did

7 not understand each other. It wasn't a question of payment or

8 reimbursement.

9 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Let us move forward. What is

10 the problem now? If it wasn't a problem of reimbursement, then let's move

11 on. I was just trying to -- right, you say that it wasn't a matter of

12 payment. Very well, very well.

13 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No, Mr. President, that is not what

14 I meant. The remark was with respect to the time necessary. That was how

15 I understood the problem, but the General put me right there. He knows

16 what he meant, so he presented his view.

17 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, what we're going to

18 do now is the following: You are going to continue your examination of

19 the witness, your examination-in-chief of this witness. Try to explain to

20 us the foundation for his opinions, and do not lose from sight that the

21 object of the testimony is for the Trial Chamber to assess matters, and

22 the Prosecution will be able to cross-examine on the basis of the

23 foundation presented. But for the Prosecution to be able to do that and

24 to have the minimum -- the minimum must be furnished so that the

25 Prosecution knows where it stands and can use that information during the

Page 7946

1 cross-examination.

2 JUDGE RIAD: I have a comment, Mr. President.

3 General Radinovic, you are a professor, and you can apply, of

4 course, the method -- I'm going to say it's not anything you don't apply.

5 When we listen to you, we'd like to know, to make things easier for us, to

6 differentiate between facts and between your personal inferences.

7 For instance, you can say -- tell us that the 28th Division was

8 well armed. You know it's a fact; you know about it. When you told us,

9 for instance, that the 28th Division was hostile to the UNPROFOR, I took

10 it as a fact. Then when Mr. Visnjic asked you to develop it and to give

11 the reason, you said because they killed one man. That's not fact any

12 more, it is your own inference. I accept it, too, but if you just tell

13 us, "This is my inference," we don't even need to ask you why. That's

14 your conclusion, and then you can proceed and know what is your conclusion

15 as an expert, but -- and what are the facts which don't require -- the way

16 you do when you teach. Thank you.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General Radinovic, when did the forces of the Drina Corps succeed

19 in their planned targets?

20 A. The Drina Corps forces achieved the goals of their Operation

21 Krivaja 95 when they reached the line Kak-Alibegovac-Zivkovo Brdo, when

22 they took possession of those dominant heights above the enclave. And

23 that I say on the basis of the documents and what happened between the 9th

24 and 10th of July.

25 Q. When was the decision taken to extend -- expand the objectives of

Page 7947

1 the operation, that is to say, to launch a new operation for taking

2 control of Srebrenica? And who made that decision?

3 A. That decision was made by the sole person authorised to do so,

4 that is to say, the Supreme Commander, the president of Republika Srpska

5 in his role as Supreme Commander.

6 Q. On the basis of what?

7 A. On the basis of documents, documents which at the command post of

8 the Drina Corps were sent by one of the assistants of the Main Staff of

9 the VRS informing them that the president of the republic agreed, was in

10 agreement, that the activities continue, and that they enter Srebrenica.

11 That is the document dated the 9th of July, the evening of the 9th of

12 July, and it came from the Main Staff and was dispatched to the Drina

13 Corps command. Do you want me to produce the document?

14 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] It is Prosecution Exhibit 423 for

15 the benefit of my learned colleagues for the Prosecution.

16 Q. General Radinovic, what forces of the VRS entered Srebrenica? How

17 many troops, and what do you know about that?

18 A. I was not able to ascertain exactly how many soldiers entered

19 Srebrenica; however, I did have occasion to see a videotape when the

20 commander of the Main Staff, together with some of his commanding

21 officers, entered Srebrenica. There was a very limited number of soldiers

22 there, and quite simply, you can't see soldiers moving in file. You don't

23 see the combat weapons; combat formation isn't seen. And as I don't know

24 these facts, I can conclude that there were not many soldiers. Several

25 dozens.

Page 7948

1 I read the book of the Commander-in-Chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

2 General Sefer Halilovic, who reacted. This was in reaction to the

3 situation in Srebrenica, and he made the assessment. What he said was

4 that there were less -- less Serbian soldiers entered Srebrenica than

5 there were in the security of -- providing security for General Delic at

6 the seminar or congress of the SDA party in Tuzla, and he said that not

7 even 200 soldiers entered. That is a statement from General Halilovic, a

8 quotation from him, and I assume that he would be well placed to know

9 those things.

10 Q. Who did the forces of the Drina Corps encounter when they entered

11 Srebrenica?

12 A. From that document, that is to say the videotape which I saw, I

13 was able to conclude that they did not come across anyone in Srebrenica,

14 that is to say that Srebrenica was empty.

15 Q. Where was the civilian population at that time, and where was the

16 28th Infantry Division; do you know about that?

17 A. The civilian population had been gathering in the Potocari

18 UNPROFOR base, and the members of the 28th Division in the region of these

19 villages of Susnjari and Jaglici, and that is in this region here. May I

20 get up to indicate it on the map? [Indicates].

21 Q. The withdrawal and grouping and formation of the retreating

22 members of the 28th Infantry Division, that is to say, what was the nature

23 of that withdrawal? I'm thinking of them going to the village of

24 Susnjari, and on what do you base your assessment?

25 A. I can conclude that the withdrawal of the forces of the 28th

Page 7949

1 Division from Srebrenica began much earlier than the 11th when they

2 appeared in the Susnjari and Jaglici region, which is where the blue

3 circle is and the arrow on the map. How do I -- what do I base that on?

4 The Trial Chamber and the Prosecution must believe me when I say

5 that I have studied things of this kind my whole life, and I know how this

6 is usually done. The confronting parties, for them to be separated and to

7 avoid the enemy continuing an attack from the rear and take control of

8 their own combat positions, they must organise lines of collection and

9 reception in the rear and so lose this combat contact and confrontation

10 line, and create conditions for them to become separated and to move

11 towards Susnjari and Jaglici. And this is an ongoing process. It lasts;

12 it has its duration. That is one fact.

13 The second relevant fact is that it is an area which from the

14 confrontation line up to Susnjari is about 10 kilometres. The contact

15 line from Susnjari is 10 kilometres away, at a distance of 10 kilometres.

16 It wasn't individual withdrawal, but units had to be established.

17 Furthermore, they were coming from different directions, from a

18 circular area, an encirclement, so they had to be gathered together and

19 collected up.

20 And another important fact for my assessment in saying that it

21 probably took place much earlier on was that no member of the 28th

22 Division was captured. Their members weren't captured around Srebrenica

23 or in Srebrenica. That means that the 28th Division spent one day or one

24 and a half days -- they started their withdrawal one and a half days

25 before. So quite certainly on the 10th -- they started withdrawing on the

Page 7950

1 10th. That is certain.

2 And there's another fact that leads me to draw that conclusion,

3 and I think it is an important fact; it is significant. On the 9th of

4 July we had the -- saw the first initiative on the part of the civilian

5 representatives of the population in Srebrenica, who sought contacts with

6 the VRS, the army of Republika Srpska, with regard to the departure of the

7 population. I don't think that the representatives of the civilian

8 authorities in Srebrenica would ask for having contact with the VRS if the

9 28th Division were in combat preparedness, full combat preparedness, and

10 had -- if they had persisted in the defence of the approaches to

11 Srebrenica.

12 Those are the facts on the basis of which I draw my conclusion.

13 Q. This withdrawal, could that have taken place on the day Srebrenica

14 was taken control of itself?

15 A. No, that couldn't have occurred on that same day, quite simply

16 because from that large circle and encirclement, had there not been within

17 the organisation of the 28th Division, had this not been agreed, then what

18 would have happened was that some portions of the 28th Division, that is

19 to say, the forces who were in the direct contact line, they would have

20 been encircled and captured or destroyed. As that did not happen, I

21 assume that this action of withdrawal was done in a planned fashion, in a

22 timely fashion, which means that it took place during the 10th.

23 So those are my analytical assessments on the basis of which I can

24 conclude that this whole withdrawal process lasted for a day to a day and

25 a half.

Page 7951

1 Q. General Radinovic, let us move on to a new area, still, of course,

2 following the chronology of the events. From the moment when the Drina

3 Corps units entered the town of Srebrenica, several operational

4 problems -- the parties were faced with several operational problems.

5 Could you tell us something about those operational problems that both

6 sides had at that moment?

7 A. For the Muslim side, the main problem was the pull-out of the

8 forces of the troops of the 28th Division, their regrouping; that is to

9 say, the troops had to be gathered at certain holding points, see what the

10 situation was, what kind of problems they were facing, and try to see what

11 they can do next, what would be their next step. The commanding officers

12 had to gather at one particular location where they were supposed to agree

13 on what to do next.

14 Now, whether it was possible to make an overall plan to that

15 effect, that remains unclear. However, there must have been a kind of

16 contact between the commander or whoever was in command at the time with

17 the subordinate brigade commanders, and the brigade commanders had to

18 contact their subordinates in turn in order to agree on the route that

19 needed to be taken and the kind of formation that would follow that route

20 for the purposes of the pull-out. So that was the main problem that the

21 Muslim side had to resolve after the entry of the Serb forces into the

22 town of Srebrenica.

23 There was an even more serious problem with which they were faced

24 at the time, and that was what to do with the civilian population that had

25 gathered around the UN base in Potocari or inside the base itself,

Page 7952

1 including all the humanitarian problems that are implied and the problems

2 which such an action would imply.

3 As regards the Serb side, their problem was, acting in accordance

4 with the requests of the representatives of the civilian authorities in

5 Srebrenica, how to organise and ensure the transfer of the population,

6 because such initiative was taken not only by the civilian population but

7 also by the representatives of the International Community. We have a

8 document by Mr. Akashi, a telegram which he sent to the United Nations

9 headquarters on the 11th and which concerns the problem of the pull-out of

10 the civilian population from Srebrenica. Likewise, the commander of the

11 Dutch Battalion, during the meeting which took place at the Fontana Hotel,

12 requested for the members -- for the representatives of the VRS for that

13 measure to be ensured. So that was one of the problems that they had,

14 that is, the civilian population, and what to do with them.

15 The second problem was, of course, the whereabouts of the 28th

16 Division and what the obligation of the Drina Corps was in respect of

17 those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, with whom they had

18 obviously lost contact.

19 Q. General Radinovic, the transfer of the population, was it

20 something that could be realistically expected in that operation?

21 A. In view of my insight of the situation, the moving out of the

22 population was not something that could be expected.

23 Q. Did it constitute a desirable military objective of the VRS?

24 A. No. The moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica

25 could by no means constitute a desirable objective of the VRS. Now, what

Page 7953

1 do I base my conclusion on? Every army, if they want to behave in a

2 rational way, would try to ensure with all accepted means to restrict the

3 demographic potential of the enemy, of the opposing side. That is to say,

4 the VRS didn't like the idea to have a new 10.000 combatants appearing on

5 the front lines. That was a more unrealistic situation for them. So the

6 most logical step for the VRS would be for the local population, for the

7 civilian population to remain in Srebrenica, but for them, for the

8 civilian population not to be active in the military sense. So the area

9 had to be deactivated in the military sense of the word. That was the

10 objective of the VRS.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Can we have 404, footnote 73,

12 presented to the witness, and can we also prepare Prosecution Exhibits 39A

13 and B.

14 Q. General Radinovic, to your knowledge, who first had the initiative

15 to move out the civilian population from the UN base in Potocari? Who was

16 the first person who came up with such an idea?

17 A. According to what I know, I think that the initiative for the

18 moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica came from the

19 president of the presidency, Osman Suljic, who signed a document to that

20 effect, that is, the presidency of the Srebrenica municipality. The

21 document in question is dated the 9th of July, 1995, and it was issued in

22 1900 hours.

23 President of the presidency, Mr. Osman Suljic, addresses

24 himself -- I'll try to paraphrase the document. "Since the aggressor

25 enemy entered the town of Srebrenica at 1800 hours from the direction of

Page 7954












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 7955

1 Zeleni Jadar, and since our military command is dissolving and the members

2 of the 28th Division are no longer able to do anything to prevent

3 aggressive forces from entering the town, chaos and panic prevail and the

4 civilian authorities are left with the least unpopular step to save the

5 population. And it is also stressed at the meeting at the level of the

6 state and military organs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with

7 the Serbian aggressors side, that a meeting should be organised as soon as

8 possible with the aim of finding the possibility to open a corridor for

9 the population to move to the nearest free territory of the Republic of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of international factors. We

11 need an urgent reply, at the latest by 2400 hours."

12 This document was signed by the president of the presidency of the

13 Srebrenica municipality.

14 Q. If we place this document in the context of the time, that is at

15 the time where the order was expanded to the effect that Srebrenica should

16 be attacked.

17 A. Yes, this document was issued before that, obviously, before it

18 was ordered for the troops to actually enter the town of Srebrenica.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please give to the

20 witness the Prosecution Exhibit 39, and to put the page 9 - I believe it

21 is the same page in both versions - on the ELMO.

22 Your Honours, the document in question is a transcript of a video

23 clip which we have seen on a number of occasions here during this trial.

24 It is a video footage of the first meeting between General Mladic and

25 Colonel Karremans.

Page 7956

1 Q. General Radinovic, I have just asked the usher to turn to page 9

2 of this document. We have a combined translation here, English and

3 Serbian. Page 9 or 8.

4 Could you give us a brief description of this conversation?

5 A. This conversation was conducted between Colonel Karremans and

6 General Mladic. Colonel Karremans speaks through an interpreter, and he

7 says that there is a lot of weapons. There's a huge amount of weapons in

8 the enclave, and that the weapons had been smuggled from outside of the

9 enclave. He goes further on to state that he had put that many times in

10 the information to the higher military authorities and nationals in Tuzla

11 and Sarajevo. The reason for that, says he, is because the Dutch

12 Battalion didn't -- was not able to defend the enclave and to have a full

13 control over its territory.

14 It's difficult for me to follow this because there are both

15 versions of the text here.

16 He refers at one point to a request which was made on behalf of

17 the civilian population, because he was not in a position to demand

18 anything. He says that the command in Sarajevo had said that the enclave

19 had been lost, which we can link up with this request for the moving out

20 of the civilian population that we have just seen, and Colonel Karremans

21 is asking for this to be ensured.

22 Q. General Radinovic, have you come across any document of the VRS,

23 or before the 11th of July did you come across any indication that the

24 moving out of the civilian population from Srebrenica had been planned,

25 anything that would speak to that effect?

Page 7957

1 A. No. I have never come across any such document, anything that

2 would indicate that anyone from the Drina Corps command or the VRS command

3 would expect that the population would be moved out.

4 Q. Had that been planned, would certain documents have surfaced to

5 that effect, the documents that were actually part of the overall planning

6 of the Krivaja 95 operation?

7 A. I fully agree with General Dannatt on this issue. This issue is

8 discussed in the portion of his report when he says that the moving out of

9 the civilian population is a very complex step to take, and that an

10 overall plan is necessary which would include provisions for the

11 accommodation and so on and so forth. So there should have been a number

12 of such documents, and I fully agree with his claim to that effect.

13 However, I must add one more thing. Such a comprehensive plan

14 could not be articulated or submitted to the Drina Corps for execution

15 without at least something of those documents being exposed to the

16 public. I don't think that such a document could be drafted without

17 necessarily making it public because it would involve a great number of

18 participants, and such a plan would not -- it wouldn't be possible to

19 conceal such a plan because there would have been a number of individuals

20 who would have to be familiar with such a plan.

21 So as regards the planning documents for the Krivaja 95 operation,

22 there should have been something which would speak to that effect, on

23 condition that such a plan had indeed existed. I didn't find anything of

24 that kind, and on the basis of that, I can conclude that those who were

25 involved in the planning of the Krivaja 95 operation, that is to say, the

Page 7958

1 Drina Corps command, did not envisage that consequence.

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I should like the usher to prepare

3 Defence Exhibit 154, OTP Exhibit 404, footnote 125, 126, and 127, and 128.

4 Q. General Radinovic, when was the first contact made, that is to

5 say, the first actions, the first steps that were taken to that respect,

6 that is, for the purposes of the moving out of the civilian population

7 from Potocari?

8 A. In view of what I had at my disposal, I first came across such

9 indicators in the documents which date from the evening hours of the 11th

10 of July, that is, the documents originating from the meeting that took

11 place in the Fontana Hotel between the representatives of the VRS and the

12 Dutch Battalion.

13 On the 12th of July, we see many more of such documents, and I'm

14 referring to the request of the Drina Corps Commander, for means of

15 transportation, for vehicles.

16 Q. I believe that the usher has just prepared some documents for you.

17 A. Yes. The Drina Corps command on the 12th of July, 1995, addresses

18 itself to its subordinate brigades - the 1st Zvornik, the 1st Bratunac

19 Brigades, the Romanija Motorised Brigade, the 1st Bratunac Light Infantry

20 Brigade, the 1st Birac Brigade, the 5th Podrinje Light Infantry Brigade -

21 whereby it requests or, rather, orders that all available buses and vans

22 in ownership -- which are property of the VRS units, that they should be

23 placed at the disposal of the Drina Corps command on the 12th of July,

24 1995.

25 The said buses are to be forwarded to Bratunac, the sports

Page 7959

1 stadium, on the 12th of July, 1995, not later than 1630. The buses

2 passing through Vlasenica were supposed to be filled up at the petrol

3 station in Vlasenica.

4 Q. I don't think we need to discuss the details of this document,

5 General Radinovic. The document 154 is actually the same document as

6 Prosecution Exhibit 404, footnote 125; it's just that it has come to us

7 from a different source.

8 As regards 404 and footnotes 125, 126, 127, and 128, it is

9 actually a range of documents which speak about the same issue, and I

10 should like to hear your very brief comment on that.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] And if we can have just one of those

12 documents placed on the ELMO so that we can see by way of illustration

13 what we are talking about.

14 A. I believe I have already read this document. This is the same

15 document. Yes, Major-General Zivanovic for the 12th of July. This is

16 exactly the same document.

17 Q. Can we just hear your comments of the remaining three documents,

18 OTP 404, footnotes 126, 127, and 128.

19 A. Secretariat for Defence in Zvornik, on the basis of a request

20 issued by the general staff of the VRS on the 12th of July for the

21 purposes of mobilising a certain number of buses, they request for such

22 buses to be placed at their disposal -- all of the buses from the

23 municipality, Zvornik, Visegrad, Vlasenica, Milici, and Bratunac and, if

24 necessary, from other municipalities as well. A request is being made

25 here that the vehicles, that is to say, the drivers of the vehicles should

Page 7960

1 immediately report at the stadium.

2 So this is a similar request. We have a request which was made by

3 the Drina Corps Commander and addressed to the commanders of his brigades,

4 that is for the buses which are property of the army to be placed at their

5 disposal. Then we have this same similar request issued to the municipal

6 authorities, and also we see that the mention is made of the general

7 request made by the general staff of the VRS.

8 So we can see that in the space of one day or one morning, a

9 request, an urgent request is made for buses and other vehicles to be

10 placed at their disposal for the purposes of moving out of the civilian

11 population as it had been agreed upon.

12 Q. When did that start, and how long did that operation last?

13 A. In accordance with the documents sent by General Zivanovic and the

14 Ministry of Defence, one can conclude that the moving out of the

15 population started on the 12th, in the afternoon hours of the 12th of

16 July, and on the basis of the documents that I had an opportunity to

17 study, the operation was completed on the 13th of July by half-past seven

18 p.m.

19 Q. What were the mechanisms that were employed to that effect, the

20 mechanisms of the United Nations, and what was their situation?

21 A. Well, the Dutch Battalion was in a very difficult situation

22 because they had received this very high number of people there. And in

23 view of the fact that its mission was to ensure protection of the safe

24 area, they had a very weighty responsibility to bear. I'm not going to

25 make any assessment as to how successful they were in accomplishing that

Page 7961

1 mission; I just want to stress that I know how difficult their position

2 was. However, I must say that they acted irresponsibly once they found

3 themselves in such a situation and faced with such a difficult problem. I

4 personally think that a mere telegram should not have sufficed, the

5 telegram that Mr. Akashi sent to the Security Council in New York. He had

6 to find means and transport himself to the location, well, if not

7 personally, then to send someone, his personal envoy, his personal

8 representative, to act pursuant to his instructions and to be there in

9 place.

10 Furthermore, I think that Mr. Bildt also should have been there at

11 the scene. The same applies to the UNPROFOR BH commander, General Smith.

12 I just cannot explain to myself why they never showed up, why the

13 commander never showed up at the location. Had the whole commanding

14 mechanism of UNPROFOR been actively involved in the situation, I believe

15 that the whole procedure, the whole operation, would have been carried out

16 without adverse consequences. At least, I believe that it would have been

17 carried out in a more orderly fashion and with much less serious

18 consequences.

19 Q. In the documentation that you studied, which relates to the period

20 immediately after the moving out of the population, did you come across

21 certain parts which stressed the irregularity of the moving out of the

22 population? And here I mean the documents of the United Nations or some

23 of its organs.

24 A. Yes, I did encounter some. In the Secretary-General's report it

25 talks about that, the UN Secretary-General's report, that there were

Page 7962

1 irregularities. And in the expert opinions they also speak about that,

2 the witnesses, Prosecution expert witnesses. And in all the studies that

3 I read through and studied for Srebrenica, the authors are Muslims, that

4 is to say, members of the Muslim nation. These authors speak about the

5 fact that there were irregularities, and I have no reason not to believe

6 that.

7 Q. General Radinovic, do you know of any other example where the

8 population moved out in the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Apart from

9 this instance in Srebrenica, was there any other example and occasion?

10 A. Well, unfortunately there were instances when the population moved

11 out, and this was something that was continuously apparent as the result

12 of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As soon as an army, one army or

13 the other had established control in certain parts of the territory, all

14 those who did not consider that army to belong to them, they left the

15 area; they moved out. So this moving out of the population is a regular

16 occurrence of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17 Let me give you some examples which confirm my thesis. For

18 example, the Neretva River Valley, including Mostar. Mostar is a large

19 town compared to the size of the former Yugoslavia. All the Serb

20 population left, from Capljina to Konjic; they all moved out. The Croats

21 from Central Bosnia, they were moved out and escorted by the VRS army, and

22 this moving out of Central Bosnia was the result of the Muslim activities

23 there, not the Serb activities. The Serb army helped the population to

24 shift and move out, without any serious repercussions.

25 There was an instance of moving out of the Muslim population in

Page 7963

1 1993 as well from Srebrenica. On that occasion 10.000 Muslims moved out.

2 As you know full well, from Sarajevo, at the end of the war, all the Serb

3 population, all the Serb inhabitants, left Sarajevo. So we can say and

4 make the conclusion that the moving out of the civilian population from

5 areas taken over by war is no specific feature of Srebrenica; it is

6 something that always accompanies civil wars. I repeat: Civil wars,

7 civil wars of the kind that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Q. And finally, General Radinovic, how would you assess the moving

9 out that took place on the 12th and the 13th of July, 1995 in Srebrenica?

10 How would you characterise it: as a planned operation, an operation

11 planned in advance, or as an ad hoc operation?

12 A. Looking at the initiatives that were taken to move the population

13 out, and when I look at the documents that I had at my disposal for

14 assessing this action, this occurrence - and all documents indicate that

15 the problem should be resolved and that this referred to the 12th, before

16 noon - I am adamant in my conclusion that it was an ad hoc problem which

17 occurred on the spur of the moment, completely an unplanned consequence of

18 the Operation Krivaja 95, an unplanned consequence of the Krivaja 95

19 operation, and that is why it could not have been planned in advance,

20 planned beforehand, elaborated beforehand, and agreed upon beforehand, and

21 all the necessary things secured for it to be implemented, precisely

22 because it was an ad hoc operation. It was carried out with serious

23 negative features which led to the consequences that are talked about in

24 the documents.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, in view of our

Page 7964

1 timetable yesterday, perhaps this would be a good moment for a break.

2 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes. We're going to split up

3 our afternoon work in two halves. We're going to have a 15-minute break

4 now.

5 --- Recess taken at 1.55 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 2.11 p.m.

7 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Mr. Visnjic, please proceed.

8 You have until 3.00.

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

10 Q. General Radinovic, before this Trial Chamber we have heard

11 numerous testimony, exhibits, videotapes, and other evidential material

12 speaking about the separation of military-abled men in Potocari on the

13 12th and 13th of July, 1995. Do you consider it legitimate to test the

14 identity of the military-abled men?

15 A. Yes, I do consider it legitimate to check up the identity of the

16 males, of the men. Now, why do I say that? Because in Srebrenica, the

17 28th Infantry Division was positioned at the BiH army, was based there,

18 and like any other army, it engaged in warfare.

19 Since the beginning of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, up until the

20 time of the Srebrenica operation, the VRS had data on a number of members

21 of the 28th Division who had committed crimes. The command of the

22 Bratunac Brigade had a list, had in its possession a list of people, that

23 is to say, members of the 28th Division, who had been suspected of

24 committing war crimes, and this list was handed over to the Main Staff,

25 the headquarters, that is to say, the command of the Drina Corps.

Page 7965

1 It was quite normal, therefore, to check out the people and to see

2 whether these members were not among the civilian population in Potocari

3 or around Potocari, to see whether any of those from that list of war

4 criminals were amongst the population and had mingled with the population.

5 Q. The representatives of UNPROFOR were informed about this on both

6 meetings, on the 11th and on the 12th. No, I'm sorry, on the 12th, the

7 evening of the 12th, and the following day.

8 A. Yes. The commander of the Main Staff at the meeting directly

9 imparted this information to the commander of the UNPROFOR battalion.

10 Q. General Radinovic, let us move on to another area now, and that is

11 the pulling out and withdrawal of the 28th Division and the breakthrough.

12 You said that the forces of the 28th Division had collected up in the

13 village of Susnjari, and the Trial Chamber has sufficient other evidence

14 about that, that this was on the 11th of July.

15 When these forces appeared on the periphery of the enclave, when

16 did that happen? When did they appear on the periphery of the enclave?

17 A. There are two facts which are relevant in establishing when they

18 appeared. On the 11th, it is incontestable that those forces were

19 concentrated in that area and that they were preparing for a breakthrough.

20 From the report of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade who sat in

21 for the brigade commander who was at Zepa, that report was dated the 13th

22 of July, the 13th of July, which means that on the 13th of July, the Chief

23 of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade, assuming the role of commander, sent to

24 the command of the Drina Corps a report in which he clearly states that he

25 knows that the column has started moving towards his zone of

Page 7966

1 responsibility. And that means, and from that document I'm able to

2 conclude, that for him to be able to send this, dispatch this report out

3 on the 13th, he must have known about it on the 12th. So the first

4 contacts were quite certainly on that day, and already on the 13th we have

5 combat contact.

6 Q. Do you have any information as to which forces of the 28th

7 Division were there, how long the column was, what kind of weapons they

8 had, and the composition of the column itself?

9 A. This differs from one source to another. Serb sources assess

10 this -- Serb sources say that the number is between 10.000 and 15.000 and

11 that a third were armed. In the testimony of Mr. Butler, the number of

12 armed persons was lower. But I don't think that we need say specific

13 numbers. The column was a numerous one and there was quite a considerable

14 number of armed men. According to my analysis, if you look at the overall

15 men that the 28th Division had, if we know that they were not captured or

16 did not surrender, then it would be quite certain that in that column

17 there would be between 7.000 and 10.000 members of the 28th Division.

18 Q. What operative formation were the forces of the 28th Division

19 moving in, and what, according to military doctrine, is that action they

20 took called? How do you refer to it? What is the term used to denote it?

21 A. According to some information and certain data that I found in the

22 documents of the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade and his reports to

23 the command of the Drina Corps of the 13th and 14th - and he stresses that

24 the first combat contacts with the members of the 28th Division took place

25 here, where you see the blue arrows, on the 13th - the bulk of the column

Page 7967












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 7968

1 from the Susnjari and Potocari region could not have, in such a short

2 space of time, crossed such a large area.

3 I now conclude, on the basis of that, that most probably the

4 command of the 28th Division had formed a forerunner, an advanced group

5 which started out earlier on. And in view of the fact that in the reports

6 and later documents I failed to find that any of the commanders had -- or

7 leaders of the units had fallen, had been casualties, except one, Major

8 Golic, Ejub Golic, I therefore conclude that in this advanced group or

9 party, that the whole commanding cadre of the 28th Division was in that

10 advanced group and that that advanced group pulled out before the main

11 fighting began in the zone of responsibility in the Drina Corps against

12 the forces of the 28th Division.

13 So this operative formation for withdrawal, for pulling out, had

14 an advanced group, it had the main column, without enough operative links

15 between the advanced group and the main column, and it would appear that

16 it was not the goal of the advanced column to allow the column to be able

17 to pull out but to reach the area controlled by the Muslims as fast as

18 possible.

19 Now, this action that the 28th Division performed, according to

20 military theory and doctrine, is called a breakthrough out of an

21 encirclement, that is to say, to break out of the encirclement. This

22 action also contains within itself elements of a military action which is

23 called a desist march, which implies a certain formation and order, which

24 means that they must be led by the -- for detachments which enter into

25 combat action with forces preventing the withdrawal, they break through

Page 7969

1 those ambushes and obstacles in order to prevent their withdrawal. They

2 expand this area, place security on their flanks, and the columns march

3 through these openings in their withdrawal. And this occurs at all of the

4 spots where positions are organised to prevent this from taking place, to

5 prevent this pulling out.

6 It is obvious that the command of the 28th Division did not do

7 that. It did not do that for the simple reason that according to data and

8 information and a portion of the testimony of Mr. Ruez, what happened was

9 that at individual places, the Muslim forces in retreat suffered heavy

10 losses.

11 Q. The VRS also took certain action prescribed in military doctrine

12 with respect to the combat formations of the 28th Division. What were

13 those actions?

14 A. The expected combat actions in situations of this kind is to

15 pursue the enemy. It is called "pursuing the enemy." And after losing

16 combat contact with the enemy, forces are established for pursuing,

17 pursuing forces. Pursuing columns, pursuing forces, pursuing detachments,

18 various pursuing formations are established and put into effect in

19 situations of that kind.

20 Now, what is the characteristic feature here? For this process

21 and for an assessment of this entire complex of activities, that is to

22 say, the withdrawal of the 28th Division and all the consequences that

23 arose from that, it is highly unusual that the command of the Drina Corps

24 did not organise the pursuing of the enemy, pursuit of the enemy. Why he

25 didn't do that, I cannot say. All I know is that he did not. Probably

Page 7970

1 because in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps, the forces

2 existed which were able to apply another method of preventing the forces

3 of the 28th Division from moving out of the zone of responsibility under

4 the Drina Corps, and the main reason was that immediately after the end of

5 the operation for Srebrenica, the Drina Corps was ordered to continue with

6 the Zepa operation.

7 It is not natural to begin a second operation until you have

8 completed, fully completed the first, with all the consequences that that

9 entailed, the consequences of the previous operation. But it is the right

10 of command to do so, and we have seen that, in fact, it was an operative

11 error that that was so.

12 Had it turned out that the Drina Corps after completing the

13 Srebrenica operation had gone in pursuit of the enemy which was

14 withdrawing, it is quite certain that the consequences to the 28th

15 Division would have been much more serious than they actually were.

16 Q. When was the first combat contact established of the 28th Division

17 and the VRS in the zone of responsibility of the Drina Corps? When did

18 this -- where did this happen, what were the conflicting, combatting

19 parties, and what were the consequences for the VRS and, of course, for

20 the 28th Division?

21 A. I will adhere to the testimony of Mr. Ruez here. At the tip of

22 this first arrow there is a place called Bare, and Mr. Ruez claims that on

23 the 13th of July, that that was where the first serious settling of

24 accounts took place between the force -- with the forces of the 28th

25 Division who were in retreat and the forces that were in control of that

Page 7971

1 territory.

2 According to Ruez's testimony, there were about 600 members of the

3 28th Division who were killed on the occasion. I personally think that

4 such heavy losses could have been expected in view of the fact -- in view

5 of the situation that the 28th Division found itself in, and bearing in

6 mind first and foremost the fact that it was not capacitated for such a

7 complicated and risky operation, this operation of retreat and

8 breakthrough, the encirclement in enemy territory which was more than a

9 hundred kilometres in depth. And if we know that it is not a straight

10 line, then they weren't moving in a straight line. And if we bear in mind

11 the fact that along that axis of movement, there had to have been

12 resistance and retreat through three or four -- through four or five lines

13 or positions.

14 Q. Let me give some additional information. It was Mr. Ruez's

15 testimony of the 14th of March, page 594 and 595, where he says that in

16 the zone that you yourself mentioned in 1996, about 600 bodies were found

17 when -- in the course of an operation conducted by, I think it was the

18 Finnish experts, not linked to the Prosecution's activities. So in that

19 zone, about 500 bodies were uncovered. It is assumed that they are Muslim

20 soldiers and that they died in battle because there were no other

21 indicators.

22 General Radinovic, could you tell the Trial Chamber what the depth

23 of the area was that the 28th Division had to overcome, and what time they

24 needed for that under the prevailing operative conditions?

25 A. In my reply to your previous question, towards the end of it when

Page 7972

1 I explained it was a risky business, it was a risky undertaking for these

2 forces to decide to break through, I said that the depth -- because it was

3 not linear movement, they weren't proper roads, they were paths, winding

4 paths, that this was between 80 and 100 kilometres in depth.

5 Now, during the fighting in combat, it is a route and a distance

6 which it is difficult to cross in less than eight to ten days, but the

7 28th Division did so in a shorter space of time, that is to say, quicker;

8 probably partially because the units along its path, along their path,

9 failed to do what they should have done in a situation of that kind and

10 had they put a stop to this retreat in the way that that should have been

11 done.

12 Q. General Radinovic, in response to my question you told and

13 explained to the Trial Chamber what the VRS failed to do and what it

14 should have done in pursuit of the enemy, but I think my question was what

15 action did the VRS take. Not what action it did not take, but what action

16 did it take. How did it deal with the 28th Division?

17 A. The army of Republika Srpska applied a method which was available

18 to it at the time, which was open to it -- in view of the fact that the

19 Drina Corps immediately after the Srebrenica operation received an

20 assignment to launch another operation for Zepa, they applied the method

21 of ambushes, ambushes at these lines, and they used the forces that were

22 available to them in the area.

23 So these ambushes and obstacles were placed immediately after the

24 ring around Srebrenica. The next one was positioned at the

25 Kasaba-Konjevic Polje road, the following one is at Snagovo where the

Page 7973

1 arrows are, the two arrows, and the fourth was in the zone of

2 responsibility of the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade. Where it says

3 the 16th of July, that position there.

4 So that unit in retreat had to overcome several successive

5 ambushes and obstacles that the forces had placed in the zone of

6 responsibility of the Drina Corps.

7 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to ask the usher to prepare

8 Prosecution Exhibit 540 and 550, Exhibits 540 and 550.

9 Q. General Radinovic, in retreating from the zone of responsibility

10 from the Srebrenica zone, the 28th Division established combat contact

11 with part of the forces belonging to the Drina Corps, and they were the

12 forces of the Zvornik Brigade. What operative problems did the Chief of

13 Staff of the Zvornik Brigade have to solve from the 13th of July, and how

14 did he endeavour to solve the problems that arose?

15 A. I have a document that I've already mentioned dated the 13th of

16 July. It is the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade in the role of

17 commander, sending --

18 Q. I apologise, just one moment. It is Exhibit 540.

19 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Could the usher please place Exhibit

20 540 on the ELMO so as to facilitate the work of the Trial Chamber.

21 A. On the 13th, therefore, the command of the Zvornik Brigade, and

22 the Chief of Staff acting as commander, informs the command of the Drina

23 Corps that with the aim of blocking the groups retreating towards Tuzla

24 and -- from Srebrenica and Tuzla, and that the following measures were

25 undertaken: that a platoon of the military police had organised an ambush

Page 7974

1 at Dzafin Kamen, and that is here. That is this location here, Dzafin

2 Kamen. That was where the military police platoon was. And some

3 intervention platoons from the 5th Battalion and the 6th Battalion, they

4 organised an ambush here in this part. And it is the Snagovo region,

5 Snagovo.

6 Now, what am I able to deduce from that? I am able to deduce from

7 that that the commander - the Chief of Staff of the Zvornik Brigade acting

8 as commander, actually - did not assess the situation seriously enough,

9 nor was he conscious of the forces that he had to face, until he came face

10 to face with them in this area here. Only then, when he came up against

11 those forces, the forces of the 28th Division, and when they were able to

12 break the ambush that was set up, and when they moved -- started moving

13 towards Zvornik, from that time on, that is to say, from the 14th of July,

14 in actual fact, the Chief of Staff was -- asked the command of the brigade

15 to return - he was panic-stricken, if I can use that term - and parts of

16 the brigade at Zepa to deal with this serious operational situation which

17 occurred in the zone of responsibility of that brigade. And as a result

18 of his demands, the commander, the Corps Commander, orders the Zvornik

19 Brigade to return to the zone of responsibility. And already on the 15th

20 of July the commander of the Zvornik Brigade reached the zone of

21 responsibility with the men he had brought from Zepa, and that is when a

22 very serious settling of accounts began with the 28th Division. And that

23 was a life-and-death -- they fought to the death. It was a life-and-death

24 situation.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] May we have Prosecution Exhibit 550

Page 7975

1 placed on the ELMO now, please. It is a daily combat report, that is to

2 say, an extraordinary report of the Zvornik Brigade, an interim report, an

3 interim report which illustrates the position that the Zvornik Brigade

4 found itself in.

5 Q. General Radinovic, when did the commander of the Zvornik Brigade

6 return to his area of responsibility and what kind of steps did he take in

7 order to improve the situation in his area of responsibility?

8 A. This report also comes from the Chief of Staff acting as

9 commander. It is dated the 14th of July, 1995 and it is a consequence of

10 an ambush which took place in his area of responsibility. He is informing

11 the Drina Corps command that a group -- that is, that the column of

12 Muslims is 3 kilometres long and that he is expecting that they should

13 attempt to have contact with the forces of his brigade. He further on

14 states: "Try to find some means of bringing in more intervention forces

15 early in the morning," otherwise he would be unable to defend his area of

16 responsibility.

17 This is an appeal issued by the brigade commander, and the Drina

18 Corps command replied to his request by pulling out the forces of the

19 Zvornik Brigade from the Zepa area and sending those forces back to the

20 area of responsibility of that brigade. And the commander in question is

21 beginning to deal with the situation in his area of responsibility. This

22 turned out not to be enough, and what ensued was a very complex

23 operational situation which might have led to the separation -- to the

24 splitting of the area of responsibility of that brigade in two parts.

25 Q. How do you assess the situation in the area of the Zvornik Brigade

Page 7976

1 and what kind of consequences could be expected from the intensity of the

2 combat activities?

3 A. The intensity of the combat activities in the area of the Zvornik

4 Brigade from the 14th of July, then going on to the 15th, the 16th, and

5 the 17th of July, is something that I can qualify as very high intensity.

6 So the highest level of intensity took place in the area where we can read

7 the date, the 16th of July, 1995, at the tip of the arrow there, in that

8 particular area. Those activities were taking place at such an intensity

9 that it was -- it could be expected that the 28th Division would suffer

10 great losses. During those activities the Zvornik Brigade suffered losses

11 amongst their members. They had 39 killed in combat, 5 missing, who were

12 also probably killed, and over 200 men were placed en ordre de combat.

13 Let me give you an illustration to try to describe for you how

14 intense the attack was. It was the 4th Battalion of the Zvornik Brigade

15 who found itself in the most difficult situation, where this arrow is on

16 the map. The forces of the 28th Division managed to pierce through the

17 positions of the 4th Battalion and to take up control of three trenches

18 and to capture a Howitzer battery and three mortars, and practically

19 speaking they were faced with the possibility of being wiped out from that

20 particular area, the members of the 4th Battalion.

21 The brigade commander did something unusual. He opened up the

22 corridor for the members of the 28th Division to pass, and until the main

23 forces of the column had passed through, the corridor was not closed

24 again. The corridor would be closed again only on the 17th of July. And

25 one can say that by the 17th of July, the main forces of the 28th Division

Page 7977

1 left the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps and managed to reach

2 the area of Nezuk, which was their objective, that is, the territory which

3 was under the control of the forces of the 2nd Corps -- 2nd Tuzla Corps of

4 the BH army.

5 Q. General Radinovic, do you have any information as to the type of

6 losses of the 28th Division in the area of responsibility of the Zvornik

7 Brigade at that time?

8 A. From the documents that I had access to, from the material that I

9 studied, I was not able to establish the exact number of individuals

10 killed in action. However, in view of the intensity of activities and the

11 depth of the territory and the situation in which the members of the 28th

12 Division found themselves, it is perfectly realistic to expect such losses

13 to be very high. I would measure them in thousands, not in hundreds. But

14 I cannot refer you to any specific document to that effect.

15 As regards the books that I studied and the testimony of the

16 witnesses that took part in that pull-out, mention is made of very high

17 casualties at at least two locations: the village of Bare and also at the

18 location just above Snagovo, where you can again read this date, the 16th

19 of July, 1995. So at those two locations, according to what I was able to

20 see from the documents that I studied, the 28th Division suffered greatest

21 losses.

22 Q. General Radinovic, as regards the issuing of the order to break

23 through, what could the command of the 28th Division realistically expect

24 if there had been such a decision, that is, the decision to attempt a

25 breakthrough? What could they realistically expect?

Page 7978

1 A. Well, I think you would be best assisted in your question if I

2 tell you that it all depended on the individual who made such a decision,

3 and practically speaking I think that he sacrificed the 28th Division by

4 making such a decision. We have had numerous examples in history of

5 warfare of that kind. The Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the valley of

6 the Sutjeska River in 1943 sacrificed their 7th Banja Division in order to

7 defend themselves from -- in order to protect 4.000 wounded combatants

8 from the German troops. Practically speaking, that division was

9 destroyed. I don't know what were the objectives of the Supreme Command

10 of the BH army concerning the 28th Division. Why would they sacrifice

11 them? That was an operation that had been ordered by them to the 28th

12 Division, and in view of the conditions and circumstances for the

13 execution of such an operation, the objective was, practically speaking,

14 unrealistic and unfathomable. It is hard to imagine for a command who was

15 aware of the consequences that could ensue from such an operation to

16 actually order the execution of it.

17 Once again, I have to repeat that had the forces of the Drina

18 Corps had carried out a proper pursuit, there would be no members of the

19 28th Division any more, and they did not engage in that pursuit because

20 they were busy with the Zepa operations.

21 I cannot believe that the officers of the supreme command of the

22 BiH army were unable to foresee the consequences of their steps. They are

23 professional officers; they went to the same schools as I did; and they

24 were, in my opinion, perfectly aware of the consequences. As to why they

25 still went ahead with the decision, I really don't know.

Page 7979

1 Q. After the pullout of the members of the 28th Division, there was a

2 lot of discussion regarding the composition of that division, and members

3 who went across and managed to reach the territory under the BiH army

4 control. Could you tell us something about that?

5 A. I had an opportunity to read what General Sefer Halilovic said

6 about it who was the Commander-in-Chief before General Delic. I think

7 that he was actually right when he spoke about the behaviour and the

8 conduct of the commander of the 2nd Corps and the Supreme Command of the

9 BiH army.

10 The only permissible action when the 28th Division was ordered to

11 attempt a breakthrough, and actually the only justified and possible

12 method and approach was to find free forces and to have them launch an

13 attack from the area, from the direction of Tuzla, and to start moving

14 towards the forces of the 28th Division.

15 I know quite a few things about that matter, and I can say that if

16 that had not been ordered, and if the 28th Division had indeed been

17 ordered to attempt a breakthrough, the only thing that I can conclude is

18 that they were actually sacrificed. And it was -- they were lucky to the

19 extent that the Drina Corps forces were busy with the Zepa operation;

20 otherwise, had that not been the case, the consequences would be far

21 worse. They would be annihilated.

22 Q. General Radinovic, you already told us that it was impossible to

23 establish the accurate number of Muslim combatants who were killed during

24 the breakthrough. What happened with the terrain afterwards? Was a

25 proper clearing operation of the battlefield taken up? What is your

Page 7980

1 knowledge to that effect, and what can you tell us about that?

2 A. Well, I have to be very critical about the conduct of the forces

3 of the VRS and the units of the Drina Corps in that respect. There is an

4 obligation which is incumbent on the commanders of the local units which

5 consists of proper searches of the terrain with the objective to locate

6 and find the remaining groups of the enemy forces, and also for the

7 purposes of discovering all kinds of obstacles that can be expected in the

8 theatre of operations.

9 As part of that action, the searching of the terrain, there is

10 something that we call clearing up the battlefield. It is an action which

11 is designed to restore the terrain in question and to bring it back into

12 its former state. It also includes the location of bodies, first of all

13 bodies of people, and then corpses of cattle, and then it includes

14 subsequent burial of those bodies. Whether it was done or not I don't

15 know. I believe it was.

16 However, and this is quite important, that there is no -- there

17 are no documents, there are no reports which would with a certain amount

18 of certainty tell us something about that particular activity. I haven't

19 crossed -- I haven't come across any single report which would contain

20 data about the number of bodies collected and buried as a part of the

21 clearing up of the battlefield.

22 So that is a very serious obstacle when it comes to the need to

23 establish what happened in the area of responsibility of the Drina Corps,

24 in particular, in that part of the terrain where the members of the 28th

25 Division attempted a breakthrough.

Page 7981

1 Q. General Radinovic, while studying these materials, you have

2 probably come across a number of documents which indicate that during the

3 breakthrough of the 28th Division through the territory of the area of

4 responsibility of the Drina Corps, that there was a certain number of

5 Muslim prisoners of war at that time in that particular area.

6 A. I had an opportunity to study an interim combat report of the

7 commander of the Zvornik Brigade which was dated the 15th of July.

8 Q. We will spend some more time discussing this particular document,

9 if you can be brief and just tell me whether you know about it.

10 A. Yes, I know about the document, and I studied it.

11 Q. Could you tell us if it was in the interest of the VRS to

12 liquidate as many war prisoners as possible?

13 A. No.

14 Q. Why?

15 A. That would be completely contrary to the interests of the VRS.

16 I'm now not talking about humanitarian and legal considerations which are

17 self-implied and understood; I'm talking about the operational aspect of

18 the operation.

19 At the time of the capture of the members of the 28th Division,

20 the VRS had a number of prisoners at the Muslim side, prisoners of their

21 own. So the only factor which would force the Muslim side to accept an

22 exchange was the fact that there were as many war prisoners as possible on

23 the other side, so they needed to have enough people for an exchange.

24 So that would have been the main interest of the VRS, to have as

25 many of prisoners of war as possible for the purposes of an exchange and

Page 7982

1 not to liquidate all of them. Once again, I'm not talking about the legal

2 aspects of the -- that particular portion of the operation. That goes

3 without saying.

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I think that this

5 would be the convenient moment to adjourn for the day.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, Mr. Visnjic. We

7 will call it a day, but I have to ask you before we finish how much time

8 do you think you will still need to complete the examination-in-chief?

9 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I'm running a little

10 late, but I hope that we will be able to finish the examination-in-chief

11 tomorrow. At this point, I cannot tell you whether we'll be able to wind

12 up by 1.00 or 2.00, but we will do our best to complete, to finish the

13 examination-in-chief tomorrow.

14 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] We will see. Are you sure that

15 we will be able to finish this tomorrow this week, because if the

16 Prosecutor is going to dedicate the same amount of time as the Defence, I

17 don't think that we will be able to finish with this testimony by the end

18 of the week, but we will see about that tomorrow.

19 Mr. Cayley, do you have any ideas as regards to time that you

20 think you will need for your cross-examination?

21 MR. CAYLEY: Well, I have to say, Your Honour, based on practice,

22 at least as much time as the Defence has taken; but I hope to try and move

23 to some of the more fundamental issues that the witness has spoken about

24 rather than spending a lot of time on the periphery, but probably at least

25 three days.

Page 7983

1 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, because we have one more

2 witness for this week that was supposed to be heard on Monday, the one who

3 was supposed to arrive on Monday. Is he still travelling?

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I believe that

5 Mr. Petrusic has more information about that.

6 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Thank you. You know that we

7 always try to make a programme and not to be caught by surprise at the end

8 of the week.

9 MR. PETRUSIC: [Interpretation] Mr. President, the witness who was

10 supposed to arrive last week did not arrive on time because the flight was

11 cancelled; however, yesterday afternoon I was informed that even that

12 flight, due to weather conditions, had to be cancelled for today. So it

13 will be only tonight that I will have information as to when he will

14 arrive.

15 We will discuss the issue with the Prosecution. I don't know how

16 long they intend to cross-examine this witness and the following witness.

17 I don't know whether we should -- whether the whole matter will be -- will

18 go over, will spill over next week, but I'm afraid that I will be able

19 only tomorrow afternoon to inform you on the situation.

20 If we have only that witness next week, if he's the only witness

21 that we would have for next week, maybe it would be a better idea to bring

22 it back in January, but please allow me some time to try and find the

23 reasonable solution together with my colleagues from the Prosecution this

24 afternoon.

25 JUDGE RODRIGUES: [Interpretation] Yes, the reason I asked that

Page 7984

1 question was because I was hoping that we would be able to finish, and if

2 necessary, that we could sit tomorrow afternoon if we can hear both

3 witnesses. If that is not possible, we can, I don't know, call him in

4 January or perhaps on Monday. But I have imparted to you our concerns,

5 and I hope that you will be able to give us some information tomorrow.

6 We will continue tomorrow morning at 9.20. The hearing is

7 adjourned for the day.

8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3:02 p.m., to

9 be reconvened on Wednesday, the 6th day of December,

10 2000, at 9:20 a.m.