Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 4736

1 Tuesday, 11 July 2000

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.46 a.m.

6 JUDGE MUMBA: Good morning. The registrar, please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Case number IT-96-23-T and

8 IT-96-23/1-T, the Prosecutor versus Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and

9 Zoran Vukovic.

10 JUDGE MUMBA: Thank you. Cross-examination continues.

11 The Prosecution, please.

12 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.


14 [Witness answered through interpreter]

15 Cross-examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff: [Continued]

16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Kunarac. Yesterday afternoon we had started to

17 talk about the 2nd of August, 1992 and the Rogoj Pass; right? That's

18 where we ended yesterday. I have some questions about the Rogoj Pass.

19 Mr. Kunarac, the Rogoj Pass is of special strategic importance;

20 right?

21 A. Yes. It is a pass that is on the communication between

22 Foca-Sarajevo. Who had this pass under his control could also keep under

23 his control the area behind the pass, depending on which side you look at

24 it from.

25 Q. The Muslim forces had captured it and the Serb forces had

Page 4737

1 recaptured it; right?

2 A. Yes. The Muslim forces had launched an attack on all of Trnovo,

3 and the Rogoj Pass, they took it on the 31st. That's when we found out

4 that Trnovo and Rogoj had been taken. We had recaptured it on the 2nd of

5 August.

6 Q. Given the importance of this pass road, wouldn't it be highly

7 likely that the Muslims would attack again after the 2nd of August?

8 A. At any rate, that is what we expected. However, I said that from

9 the 31st until the 2nd of August I was at Rogoj, and the artillery that

10 they had taken from our forces, the howitzers and the mortars that were at

11 Rogoj, absolutely nothing had been touched.

12 When we recaptured Rogoj on the 2nd of August, we continued a

13 continuation of the attack on the Muslim forces. However, due to a lack

14 of forces at Rogoj Pass itself, there were very few troops there. It was

15 easy for us to recapture it. We expected an attack from the other side,

16 from the direction of Grebak via Jabuka, and that we would be attacked

17 from Gorazde. In Kalinovik they expected an attack from Ljuta or via

18 Treskavica but not from the direction of Rogoj.

19 So we recaptured Rogoj when we realised that there weren't any

20 strong enemy forces at Rogoj. The fighting went on until the early

21 evening hours, and they were trying to recapture Rogoj with strong forces

22 themselves. At the very moment when we were taking Rogoj, then we, that

23 is to say, our command, passed an order stating that we should urgently

24 return to Foca because we were expecting an attack from the direction of

25 Grebak. Because before that, on the 23rd of July, an attack had taken

Page 4738

1 place against Jabuka and those villages, but not against our defence line

2 itself. So we expected an attack in that area. That is why we withdrew

3 in the early evening hours of the 2nd.

4 The Trnovo Battalion that had been broken before, that had taken

5 it, they took it out on Jabuka. The next day Rogoj had been attacked

6 again. The Muslim forces took Rogoj again. However, from the direction

7 of Rogoj, from the Rogoj Pass itself, they did not attack further either

8 towards Dobro Polje, that is, the first settlement after Rogoj, but they

9 continued their entrenchment there.

10 That led to our assumption that an attack would follow from

11 another direction, which indeed did happen but only in the forthcoming

12 period.

13 Q. So that means it was not only highly likely that an attack would

14 occur at Rogoj Pass again from the Muslims, but it actually did happen.

15 A. Yes. The next day they attacked Rogoj again.

16 May I just say one thing here. We were following via radiolink

17 their communications. In the early evening hours, when the fighting was

18 abating, we received information that they intercepted some of their radio

19 messages stating that they didn't have the necessary troops. They were

20 trying to recapture Rogoj, and then we were told by our communications

21 people that they had intercepted their radio messages stating that they

22 did not have sufficient troops to launch a counterattack then. We had

23 assumed that they had already regrouped their forces because they had held

24 Rogoj for two days already.

25 When I came on the 31st to Rogoj and when I saw their forces at

Page 4739

1 Rogoj, I followed them the entire day; that is to say, the afternoon of

2 the 31st, the night between the 31st and 1st, and the night between the

3 1st and 2nd, and all day on the 1st, their forces were there. They did

4 not move their artillery pieces, the artillery pieces that were there,

5 rather. They did not assume that they would use this from Rogoj to attack

6 another area.

7 However, on the 2nd of August, in the morning, around the

8 howitzers and the mortars, there was a maximum of 40 men at Rogoj Pass

9 itself, by the howitzers, and that was not sufficient even to man the

10 howitzers and mortars let alone to launch a serious attack. I returned

11 and that is what I reported, and then it is on that basis that we carried

12 out a counterattack on the 2nd of August.

13 At noon we --

14 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you do not have to repeat all this. You have

15 explained your attacks and what happened afterwards.

16 You said that --

17 JUDGE MUMBA: Also please remember that the interpreters have to

18 follow. Sometimes, Mr. Kunarac, you are a bit too fast.


20 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you have explained to us that the Muslims, after

21 capturing the Rogoj Pass, did not move their artillery at all; they didn't

22 even turn it around aiming at the Serb side. The Serbs, after their

23 counterattack, could simply have taken back their positions and used the

24 artillery as before; right?

25 A. We recaptured the Rogoj Pass itself; however, I said that in this

Page 4740

1 attack, the first attack that they carried out, all of Trnovo had been

2 attacked. And the Serb lines that were lost then were about seven or

3 eight kilometres behind Trnovo towards Godrinje and Treskavica. That is

4 where the defence lines were, the infantry defence lines. The artillery

5 pieces that were at Rogoj were in the rear.

6 So then when we recaptured Rogoj on the 2nd of August, we did not

7 have the strength to go on. Our main task for that day, our main

8 objective was to recapture Rogoj and the lost artillery pieces, and that

9 is indeed what we did accomplish on that day.

10 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you actually do not deny that on 2nd of August, you

11 were in Foca. You actually said that you were driving that you were on

12 the Velecevo-Foca road when the Aladza mosque was blown up, right?

13 A. Yes. I said that around 2100 hours I had departed from Dobro

14 Polje. A column had been set up, and we went to Foca, and I arrived at

15 Foca around 2300 hours with these people who had come from Foca on that

16 day and who had taken part in this fighting at Rogoj.

17 Q. You said that after the explosion you drove around town, and you

18 checked and you found out what had happened, right?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And you saw a lot of damage in town due to this heavy explosion,

21 right?

22 A. I said what I had seen. I saw quite a bit of glass on the road,

23 and also the surrounding houses that were near the mosque were roofless.

24 The roofs were shattered. This explosion had caused quite a bit of

25 damage.

Page 4741

1 Q. While checking at the mosque itself, you were near the house Ulica

2 Osmana Djikica 16, right?

3 A. From the bridge, from the other side behind the park, I went

4 straight towards the mosque. That is the street that goes by the Cehotina

5 River. Upstream on the right-hand side, that is where the mosque is,

6 about 70 or 80 metres away from that bridge. That is the road that I had

7 taken.

8 I went about 30 metres. I could not continue because there were

9 big rocks on the road, that is, parts of the mosque were on the road. So

10 then when one goes towards the mosque and turns to the left, that is where

11 the street of Osmana Djikica is, and then towards the end of that street

12 is house number 16. That is to say, that at the moment when I stopped

13 there and when I saw what had happened, I was about 350 metres away from

14 that house.

15 Q. But driving to Velecevo afterwards, that takes you right away

16 across the house, right? You come across the house, don't you?

17 A. Yes, I did, but I did not stop. When I saw what had happened, I

18 went back to the bridge. I went to the health centre and drove straight

19 to Velecevo along the main road, but after that I did not stop anywhere

20 before Velecevo.

21 Q. It means also the houses were close to the explosion. You did not

22 check which damage was caused to the house, right?

23 A. I said that when I was coming from Velecevo after the explosion of

24 the mosque, that from this first building, the buildings and houses in

25 that area, there had been no electricity. People were running out into

Page 4742

1 the street, like, all over town, and at that moment absolutely no one knew

2 what had happened. There was panic in the streets. There were women and

3 children in night-gowns because this was after 11.30 p.m. for sure, even up

4 to 2400 hours. So as I was passing, there were people in the street.

5 They themselves were saying that there was shelling, there was panic.

6 When I saw what happened, I went straight back to Velecevo. At

7 that moment I did not stop, and I did not check on any specific house. I

8 went directly to the command. I said that I was using a car then that was

9 from the brigade headquarters that had been handed over to me so that I

10 could go back in it.

11 I thought it was important for me to return the car immediately

12 because I expected someone from the command to come to the scene itself to

13 see what had happened, so I did not check anything further. It was

14 sufficient for me to have seen what I did see in town and in that area

15 where I was. I personally thought that there must have been casualties,

16 that there must have been people killed, wounded.

17 Q. You did not check on your own men, either, although they were very

18 close. They could be dead, couldn't they?

19 A. You keep underlining "my own men". All the people of Foca were my

20 people; all the Serb people were my people.

21 Q. But you didn't answer my question. You didn't check on the men

22 you went into field with, although they were very close and could have

23 been killed, right?

24 A. They could have. I told you what I saw. There were houses that

25 were much closer than that house. I did not go to these houses that were

Page 4743

1 practically next door to the mosque where there was a far greater

2 probability of someone having lost his life, rather than 250 metres away.

3 So I said in my testimony here that I did not go out of the car.

4 Around the mosque in this neighbourhood there are quite a few houses.

5 There was such a lot of screaming, moaning, lots of people in the street,

6 and I immediately took the car to hand the car over and to report on what

7 I had seen. I did not deem it necessary to run from one house to another

8 there, even the closest ones. There was a group of people who had lived

9 behind the motorists' society; I saw them there. There were one or two

10 children and people, probably their parents. I did not go in, and I did

11 not check on anything.

12 Q. You did not visit your parents after the explosion, neither to

13 assure them that you were okay, nor to look if they were, did you?

14 A. As regards my parents' house, my parents' house is across the

15 Cehotina River. As the crow flies, it is at least 800 to 1.000 metres

16 from Aladza mosque, that is to say, from the church also that is on the

17 Cehotina. So at that moment I thought it was necessary to report at the

18 command, and that's what I did.

19 Q. You actually said your main idea was to return the car, right?

20 A. My idea was to return the car and to say what had happened, to see

21 what would be done afterwards. When I came to the command, I told you who

22 I found there, and then the commander of the brigade sent the security

23 officer to the scene itself, and a few policemen, to go and see what had

24 happened. I remained at Velecevo then.

25 Q. But you just told us that you did not check carefully on the

Page 4744

1 houses and the damages and the possible casualties. You said you went

2 there immediately to return the car.

3 A. I went there to say what had happened. I am a plain soldier. At

4 that moment, I was driving a car that belonged to brigade headquarters.

5 At that moment, there were only three or four cars available for the

6 command itself. And that evening when we brought the 3-barreled gun and

7 when we left that vehicle up there, the commander of the brigade himself,

8 when I told him what had happened in Rogoj in the briefest possible terms

9 because I was tired because I had not slept two nights before that because

10 the fighting at Rogoj was rather heavy, he said that I could take his car

11 because he had no intention of going anywhere that night, and that by 7.00

12 at the latest I should be back. And it is with that intention in mind

13 that I went to my parents' house.

14 When I saw that the mosque had been demolished, I expected the

15 commander of the brigade, too, to come to the scene, that he would need

16 his car. I did go directly up there.

17 Q. But you could have asked the commander on the radio if they needed

18 this particular car you were with, couldn't you?

19 A. When he gave me the car, he said that I could go and, of course,

20 in case of any kind of problem, I should come back, if there was an

21 emergency, if sirens went off, et cetera.

22 I personally was shocked by all of the damage that had been

23 caused, and I had assumed there were many casualties as well. At that

24 moment, I did not find any better solution, any better decision than to go

25 back to headquarters and return the car.

Page 4745

1 Q. Let's move on to another matter. Mr. Kunarac, you went to

2 Karaman's House and met DB and Witness 87 there, right?

3 A. Yes, after the funeral. I don't know the exact date. At any

4 rate, it was before the 23rd of September because on the 23rd of September

5 my wife gave birth. It could have been the 21st or the 22nd of September.

6 I went to the funeral because the day before that on the road

7 between Kalinovik and Foca there had been an ambush, and 42 persons had

8 been killed. There were quite a few persons from Miljevina, and I think

9 the day of -- that day of the funeral, 27 or 28 persons were buried at

10 Miljevina.

11 As I had said before that, the day before that I came to Foca

12 because on the 18th I talked to my brother on the telephone. The

13 telephone lines with Foca had been broken off, but he came to Pluzine, the

14 first settlement in Montenegro that had a post office, and he called to

15 check whether my wife had given birth. And then he said that he also

16 called our sister who was in Germany, her birthday was on the 19th of

17 September, and then he told me that he should go to Kalinovik those days,

18 and he should remain at Kalinovik.

19 Q. Mr. Kunarac, Mr. Kunarac, don't let us get distracted from the

20 issue that you visited Karaman's House. The other details you have

21 already given us, right?

22 A. No, no, no, I won't. I said that when I found out about what had

23 happened, I thought that my brother got killed there. I came to Foca, and

24 the next day transportation was organised to Miljevina in order to attend

25 this funeral. That's when I went to the funeral, and that is the first

Page 4746

1 time that I went to Miljevina after Gaga was wounded, and Gaga had been

2 wounded on the 11th of August.

3 When I went up there, I attended the funeral, and on that occasion

4 at the funeral indeed (redacted) did walk up to me -- oh, I beg your

5 pardon. I haven't got that list.

6 Q. Yes, Mr. Kunarac.

7 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: The Prosecution has compiled one sheet with

8 all the, with all the pseudonyms and so that we wouldn't have to use two

9 sheets, so I would like to enter this into evidence as a new exhibit.

10 It's with all eight names and all eight pseudonyms.

11 A. May I have a copy, please.

12 Q. You will get one. Wait a second.

13 JUDGE MUMBA: Can we have the formal numbering, please.

14 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] This is Exhibit 234 of the

15 Prosecutor. It is protected under seal.


17 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you went to Karaman's House with DP3; right? If you

18 would please check.

19 A. Yes. DP3 walked up to me at the funeral then and he did tell me

20 that I should make my peace with the people who shot at Gaga. I said that

21 I did not go to Miljevina after his wounding. I knew the name of the man

22 who had wounded him. He was also there present at the funeral, but I did

23 not communicate with him at all before that.

24 I accepted this invitation; I went with him. I didn't even know

25 where we were going and he took me to Karaman's House. And then there

Page 4747

1 were at least ten men at the house, who went straight to that house

2 together with us from the funeral.

3 Q. At the house you were told by soldiers in Karaman's House to pick

4 from the girls and take advantage of them; right?

5 A. No, nobody said that to me. I only saw DB then and Witness 87.

6 When I saw DB there, it was only then that I realised that she had not

7 gone with the rest and that she had remained there. I wanted to talk to

8 her. However, the presence of these other men there, and the men who were

9 present there were present during Gaga's wounding, together with DP3 who

10 had actually wounded Gaga.

11 So I wanted to use this opportunity to talk to them and to DB;

12 however, at that moment DB was preparing coffee there and she was busy

13 with this work. So I did go outside then and I gave a sign to Witness 87

14 to come along with me, and she did.

15 As she followed me, she started off going upstairs. I wanted to

16 go outside with her but she went upstairs. And then I followed her

17 upstairs. We went to the first room on the left. I tried to talk to her

18 then. I asked her how come she was there and she said that she had been

19 brought there. She was lost completely. As I said during my first and

20 second interviews, she looked like a vegetable. She didn't even answer

21 questions. She was totally depressed.

22 She did tell me that they were taking all sorts of things out on

23 her, that people were doing whatever they wanted to do to her there, and

24 she said that she did not expect me to take her aside for a conversation

25 but she expected me to do what the others were doing to her. She lay on

Page 4748

1 the bed and I sat next to her. I tried to talk to her and I did tell her

2 to unbutton a few buttons. She was wearing a shirt or something like

3 that. Her breasts were not revealed, though.

4 I was afraid that some of these men who were present there could

5 come in and that something might happen, because I never found out the

6 details about Gaga's wounding. But when I saw DB there and when I saw 87

7 there, I thought that Gaga might have been killed because of them.

8 Because when I talked to him after his wounding, on the 13th or 14th, he

9 just begged me not to interfere, not to lose my head, to be careful. He

10 did not want to say what had happened. He said, "It's my fault. I made a

11 mistake. Please think of those children."

12 So I spent five or ten minutes at the most in that room with

13 Witness 87 but I absolutely had nothing physical with her. I did not even

14 touch her hand. As I said, I tried to talk to her but she absolutely was

15 not capable of any kind of conversation.

16 I went back, and then I walked out and sat on the terrace. In

17 this house, in the other big room, there is a terrace that is on the back

18 of the house. I sat on the terrace. Now, how much time did I spend

19 there? At that time DB -- sorry, DB was preparing coffee, and when I

20 was back, she was serving coffee. She was preparing coffee before I left,

21 and then she was serving coffee. I asked her to come out on the terrace

22 because I absolutely could not talk to her in front of all of those people

23 who were there because I was afraid that I would go through Gaga's fate.

24 Q. Mr. Kunarac, let me cite from your previous statement, Exhibit 71,

25 page 13: "Somebody said, 'Just pick anyone and take advantage of her.'"

Page 4749

1 That's what you said. That's how the women in Karaman's House were

2 abused; right? Pick and take advantage.

3 A. Well, when we walked into the house, I said there were about ten

4 of us there. These men were behaving very comfortable there. There was

5 joking, all sorts of things. But at one moment one of them did say

6 something like -- well, not directly -- well, literally, yes, he said that

7 not only I, but anybody could do whatever he wanted to do and he can

8 choose any one of them and take advantage of them, in that context.

9 Q. Mr. Kunarac, and you understand, when someone says, "Pick anyone

10 and take advantage," you understood that it was an invitation for rape;

11 right?

12 A. Yes. At any rate, I did understand that they kept those girls

13 there, and the conversation with the girls itself confirmed to me that

14 that is what was happening to them.

15 Q. And you did choose 87 and you went with her to a separate room;

16 right?

17 A. I said that I went with her because the very presence of DB and

18 her. I already said that when I returned to Partizan on the second

19 occasion, DB told me that she was not there, that she had been taken

20 away. And then later Gaga was wounded and then they met there again,

21 after about a month or so. It is only then that I put the pieces of the

22 mosaic together in my head, and I realised that the persons who had taken

23 them out of Partizan before that were perhaps the men who I was sitting

24 with then.

25 So the reason why I took this girl out was to see who had brought

Page 4750

1 her there. I did not bring her to Miljevina. I did not find her in

2 Partizan that morning. But I said that she was not capable of any kind of

3 conversation. I spent a very short period of time with her, and after

4 that I talked to D.B. on the terrace of that same house shortly after

5 that but without the presence of anyone else.

6 Oh, I'm sorry. Did I say the name again?

7 Q. Yes, but we will take care of this. Nevertheless you took 87 to a

8 separate room and you unbuttoned her blouse; right? You unbuttoned her

9 blouse.

10 A. No. I told her to unbutton her blouse. She unbuttoned two

11 buttons. I did tell her to unbutton a few buttons because I was afraid at

12 that moment, when I went upstairs and when I saw her and DB there and when

13 I saw these men there. As I said, these were the men who had wounded

14 Gaga.

15 Throughout his life, while he was still alive, Gaga was warning me

16 and telling me that I should not go through the same things that he did.

17 I saw that what was happening in that house was happening. I went with

18 that girl to see who had brought her there, how come she was there, so

19 that I could find out how come she was there. Because then I realised

20 that DB was not returned, and she confirmed to me afterwards.

21 Q. Mr. Kunarac, let me cite from your first statement, Exhibit 67,

22 tape 2, side A, page 9: "When I brought her to this room, when I entered,

23 I unbuttoned because I wanted to make sure that if somebody came in that

24 it would look ..." and you continue.

25 So you unbuttoned. That's what you said during your first

Page 4751

1 statement. So you changed this statement.

2 A. Well, look, I maintain that I told her to unbutton her blouse.

3 When we walked in there, she lay down. She was probably used to that, and

4 she lay down and she wanted to undress even. She was wearing jeans and

5 she even started unbuttoning her jeans, and I said, "No, just unbutton a

6 few buttons if somebody walked in." So if somebody walked in, then they

7 would not catch me talking to her only, because I did not want to end up

8 with a bullet in my head or in my stomach like Gaga Vukovic.

9 Then if I said -- well, I did tell her to unbutton a few buttons

10 but I did not unbutton them with my own hands. I said at that moment what

11 the physical and mental condition of this girl was. Had I had God knows

12 what kind of urge for sex, I could not have had anything with her.

13 Also, the presence of these men there who had wounded Gaga

14 Vukovic, the very fact that this was the first time I was seeing them

15 there, and I was sure that they had left for Montenegro on the 12th when

16 all the rest had left. At that moment, absolutely, as I said, I did not

17 think of sex let alone have anything with this person. That, I maintain.

18 We stayed in that room for a maximum of five minutes; including

19 the time we spent coming and going, ten minutes at the most, the amount of

20 time one needs to prepare some coffee.

21 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you repeatedly said that you wanted to help the girls

22 out of Miljevina, but they didn't go out; right?

23 A. I went out to the terrace after that and DB brought me coffee onto

24 the terrace. I did ask her then how come she was there. She said to me,

25 "Well, that day when you took me I was brought here, and since then I've

Page 4752

1 been here." I did ask her what was going on over there. Then she did

2 tell me, "I am with a man," his name is not here, "and I know what I'm

3 doing." I said that it was not my wish or intention for her to remain

4 there and that if she wished I could try to help and take them out of

5 there. She said, "No, it's better this way. I know what I'm doing."

6 She was aware of the situation. She knew who these men were,

7 these few men who were there, and what kind of men they were, and she

8 probably knew about everything that had happened to Gaga and everything

9 else. Had she told me then that she wanted to leave from there, I would

10 have, in some way, tried -- how should I put it -- to steal her and the

11 other one away from there.

12 When I found out what happened on the 3rd of August, I said that I

13 had an unclear conscience, and I told her then on the terrace that what

14 had happened on the 3rd was not my wish or intention. She said that it

15 was not important at all, including that which had happened on the 3rd of

16 August. She said herself then that she knew what she was doing and that

17 there was no need for me to do anything.

18 After that this person took her to Montenegro and --

19 Q. Mr. Kunarac, let me interrupt you here. DB's choice was either to

20 stay there or to go with you; right?

21 A. At that moment, when I told her that if she wished I could take

22 her away from there, she said to me, "I know what I'm doing. I'll stay

23 here."

24 Q. Those were her choices, and she chose not to go with you; right?

25 A. She decided to stay there.

Page 4753

1 Q. Yes, exactly. Let's move on to another group of women. You said

2 that seven girls were taken out together from Kalinovik school on 2nd

3 August 1992 by soldiers; right?

4 A. I learned that later. I learned that in my conversations with

5 Witness 191. I talked to Witness 191 in Trnovace and that's when I found

6 out.

7 Q. We'll come to this later on. It's just you knew that this had

8 happened. Among them were the Witnesses 186, 190, 191, 205, and JG;

9 right? Do you need the names? Do you need help? I can --

10 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, please, it would be much easier for the accused

11 to remember.

12 A. No. No, the names do not mean anything to me. I knew Witnesses

13 191 and 186 personally, and briefly I saw Witness 205, but -- except for

14 the name and last name of 191 which I know and the last name of Witness

15 186 which I know, I don't even know the names of the others. They mean

16 nothing to me so we can simply talk about the numbers that you mentioned.

17 Witness 191, when I talked to her on the 10th of August, in the

18 morning, told me --

19 Q. Mr. Kunarac, let me interrupt you. We'll come to this. We'll

20 come to your conversation with 191. Just wait a minute.

21 A. I'm only telling you when I found out that they had been taken

22 out.

23 Q. We'll come to this. It's only the question here, you found out

24 and you knew that six of these girls that were taken out of the school

25 ended up in Foca, right, that same night, that is, the 2nd of August?

Page 4754

1 A. What I found out in this respect, what I knew was from their

2 witness statements which I was given here. And in my conversation with

3 Witness 191 I learned that one of those girls had gone somewhere before

4 and that JG and she and 186 had been brought to Trnovace. She didn't know

5 where the others were at that time. And I myself knew only what she had

6 told me, that there had been seven of them, that one of them had been

7 taken out before and that after that she, JG, and 186 had been taken by

8 Gaga and DP6 to that house.

9 Q. That same night; right?

10 A. After their arrival, it was a very brief period of time that they

11 spent in a house. Whether it was in Omer Djikica Street 16 or another

12 house, I really don't know. They stayed in a house very briefly, and

13 after that the three of them were taken to Trnovace on the 2nd of August.

14 In any case -- I apologise. In any case, I did ask when, and she

15 herself said when she testified here that before the explosion she was

16 taken away from Foca.

17 Q. Mr. Kunarac, today you claim that Gaga, Kontic, and if you look

18 onto the sheet, DP7 took them out of the school. You did not mention that

19 before in your interviews, did you?

20 A. I was told this by her. She knew Gaga. She knew Gaga because

21 Gaga was there. She told me that there were two other men with him.

22 Afterwards when I talked to Gaga, he told me who had been with him.

23 Q. Two of the men you blame now for taking the girls out are

24 conveniently dead, right; and the other one is not available, right?

25 A. DB7, who was mentioned by Witness 190, and she described him and

Page 4755

1 everything that happened to her, that's what the witness said also.

2 Q. You heard the witnesses 186, 191, 190, and 205, testify that Zaga

3 took them out of the school, and they even identified you during their

4 testimony, right?

5 A. All the identifications here in the courtroom are -- well, I can't

6 say they are ridiculous, but I am certain that if you brought in anyone to

7 point to any one of us three here in the courtroom, they would not have

8 any problems with this, because in the area we come from, our pictures

9 appear on the television screens every week, and they appear on television

10 screens all over the world, so it's no problem to point to us.

11 And it's true that two of these witnesses said that I had taken

12 them out, but it's not true that I was in the school or that I took them

13 out. I don't know whether she said this in order to make sure that she

14 would stay where she is now or for some other reason, but I assert that I

15 was not present when these persons were taken out.

16 Q. When you say "she," whom do you mean?

17 A. I mean Witness 191, among others.

18 Q. But in your previous statement, in your second statement, Exhibit

19 71, page 36, you actually conceded that 191 and 192 knew you, and that's

20 not an issue of mistaken identity in regard of these two.

21 A. If you remember that interview -- I remember very well -- I got to

22 the second amended indictment, but I had not had an opportunity to read

23 their statements. It's true that they could have known me because I

24 talked to 191 four or five times in Trnovace, and I talked to witness 192

25 also when I brought her the letter from her sister -- sorry, I mean her

Page 4756

1 daughter, when she wrote a letter to her daughter when I gave her my

2 telephone number, identified myself, told her who I was, showed her my

3 identity card. So those witnesses of course could know me and recognise

4 me. That is a fact, and that's what I said then.

5 Q. Nevertheless, you met 186, 191, and 190 in the house in Trnovace,

6 right?

7 A. No, 191 was not in Trnovace when I went to Trnovace on the 9th of

8 August after the funeral of Dragan Krnojelac. Then, only 191 and 186 were

9 in the house. There were no other girls in the house at that time.

10 Q. So you probably have just make a little mistake, you will say --

11 you want to say that you did not meet 190, right? You said -- you did not

12 meet 191, but you mean 190?

13 A. Yes, yes. 190, maybe it was an error. 191 and 186 were in the

14 house and no other girls, neither JG nor any of the other girls who said

15 here that they were in Trnovace when I was there.

16 Q. So you did not meet 190 in the house when she came there with DP1?

17 A. No, no, no. I'm sure of it.

18 Q. And you did not --

19 A. Let me tell you, from what I learned later from her testimony, she

20 was taken from Karaman's House after that. I think it was on the 11th

21 when there was the showdown -- the shootout among the people there and

22 Gaga was killed. When I got there on the 9th, I am sure that there were

23 no other girls there, and I said with whom I came to that house. It was

24 Gaga, then there was DP6, and the person whose name I wrote down during my

25 testimony and is not on the list.

Page 4757

1 Q. So you did not meet Witness 175 and RK from Miljevina in the

2 house?

3 A. No, I'm sure those persons were not in the house. I didn't meet

4 them there, nor did I meet them anywhere at any time.

5 Sorry, it was only when I went to Karaman's House that one day, I

6 don't know whether they were somewhere in that house, and I didn't see

7 them or near the house, and then they could have seen me; but I personally

8 never saw those persons, either in Karaman's House or in the house in

9 Trnovace or in any other place.

10 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you heard the witnesses 186, 190, 191, and 175

11 testify that you were present in the house in Trnovace, that they saw you,

12 and that you in fact raped the Witness 190 over a period of weeks, right?

13 A. You mean Witness 190?

14 Q. These witnesses testified that you were in the house, and you saw

15 them in the house, and that you raped 191?

16 A. Yes, then I heard wrong, but in the transcript it says that you

17 said I raped Witness 190. I assert I never saw Witness 190.

18 Q. I didn't say that, I said --

19 A. Page 21, 13.10.24, it says Witness 190.

20 Q. I think I said 191.

21 JUDGE HUNT: No, you said 190.

22 A. And that's what I heard in the translation into my language as

23 well, 190.


25 Q. We're talking about the rape of 191.

Page 4758

1 A. Okay. I assert that I talked to Witness 191 four or five times,

2 and I assert that I never abused her in any way or mistreated her in any

3 way, and especially I did not rape her. And her testimony about the

4 alleged rape, she says allegedly that on the first night I tried to rape

5 her, but that she, as she said, was very tense, and I couldn't. And then

6 she said that I did have sexual intercourse with her, that she was a

7 virgin at the time, that she did not bleed. I don't know, others will

8 decide, but I assert I never sexually abused that witness because when I

9 met her for the first time on the 9th of August, I had two broken ribs,

10 and I was barely able to sit up, let alone have -- let alone to be able to

11 do anything else, and I assert that never had any kind of intercourse with

12 that witness.

13 And when she was married, I saw her up to the last day and her

14 departure where she went -- to where she went after I came here, in my

15 view, is probably the reason why she's saying what she said in order to

16 make sure that she will be able to stay where she's living now.

17 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you said when you went there for the first time on

18 the 9th of August, you wanted to question her about what she knew about

19 the strength of the Muslim forces on Zelengora, right?

20 A. I said that at the funeral in the village where Dragan Krnojelac

21 was buried that I had a conversation with Witness DP6 whom I met there,

22 and he told me that he had had a conversation with a person who knew very

23 well where the Muslim forces in Zelengora are, but that he did not know

24 the names of the villages where they were. And then I told him that as a

25 child from the age of 12 or 13, I had spent nearly every summer in

Page 4759

1 Zelengora where there is a resort, a holiday resort, and I knew the area

2 very well. And then he suggested I should talk to that person so that she

3 could describe the places she had described to him so that we could draw

4 some conclusions as to where the villages she had mentioned were.

5 And in the conversations I had with her, well, that's how I

6 behaved. It was an interview, a very correct one, without any coercion

7 or -- she did tell me what she had seen, the routes they had taken. And

8 I promised her that if she told me the truth, if it turned out to be the

9 truth, I would take her to stay with my wife and my child in Tivat.

10 Q. Mr. Kunarac, the witness fled through the area of Zelengora in

11 June 1992, so you couldn't get any current, any current information,

12 right, not from this witness?

13 A. It's true that they passed there in late June or early July, but

14 up till then we had no other information whatsoever, or any better

15 information.

16 After the mine exploded on Tjentiste on the 22nd of June, the army

17 and the people withdrew from the Tjentiste valley. And then a line was

18 established in Pregl, which is some distance away in the direction of

19 Foca, and that's where a line was. And further on towards Zelengora,

20 Velecevo, and so on, we had absolutely no information as to the strengths

21 of the enemy or the positions of the enemy at that time.

22 Throughout June and July, we were preoccupied with the strength of

23 the Muslim forces in the direction of Gorazde because that's where the

24 strongest forces were on our side, and on the Grebak we had very strong

25 forces. And there was always a threat of their forces joining the forces

Page 4760

1 from Gorazde.

2 So that's what we were worried about, and that's where our forces

3 were. So the information she gave us then in early August was, as far as

4 I and DP6 are concerned, that was the first information we got about the

5 forces on Zelengora, so it was not outdated or uninteresting information.

6 Q. Month-old information about an area where fierce fighting had

7 taken place, at least in the surroundings, can't be useful, Mr. Kunarac.

8 You cannot argue this.

9 A. No, let me tell you, in the area of Zelengora there had been no

10 fighting as regards Zelengora itself and Tjentiste. It was only in late

11 September or early October that our forces managed to join the forces in

12 Herzegovina in Gacko. Before that in the area of Zelengora, at least the

13 part that was interesting to us, Trebova and so on, there was absolutely

14 no fighting then. And she talked about entrenched lines, and trenches do

15 not move every day. They move only if they are pushed back from those

16 lines or if they advance to new lines further on.

17 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you testified that on the 9th of August you talked

18 only briefly to the girls, and afterwards you slept alone on the ground

19 floor in the house, and you only talked with the witness 191 in details

20 the following day. Right?

21 A. That they on the 9th when we came from the funeral, I was with all

22 of them together in the living room upstairs. There was DP6 and Gaga and

23 the third man who came and those two girls. At that moment I was

24 physically in very poor condition. I had barely been able to go through

25 the funeral. And then I went downstairs to lie down, and very soon I fell

Page 4761

1 asleep. That evening I did not talk to anyone, including that girl.

2 On the following day I did talk to Witness 191 that was on the

3 10th of August in the morning when I got up. I will not repeat myself.

4 As I said, the others were not there, so I went upstairs and I talked to

5 her and to Witness 186.

6 Q. I'll cite from your previous statement, Exhibit 71, page 29.

7 "Actually, during the first contact there were all of us, all four of us,

8 who were speaking. Both of them were speaking. And then we moved away

9 because the others didn't know the area. They just disturbed, they just

10 disturbed us while we were talking about that. She needed to describe the

11 area for me."

12 You are talking about this first evening, and you continue on page

13 24. "The night I spoke to that woman for the first time, it was on a

14 ground floor in a kitchen and in a small living room. She mentioned her

15 diary she kept along the way, and she said her mother was at Kalinovik,

16 and that she knew where it," the diary, "was. I promised her," and so

17 on.

18 Actually, you said that you got all this information on the first

19 night on the ground floor, while you now claim you were sleeping alone

20 there; and you also mentioned the diary, the diary that was captured

21 actually by the Serb side.

22 A. Yes. I think I mentioned that I told her that I myself had had

23 the opportunity of seeing that diary and reading it, although I hadn't, in

24 order to find out what was in it, because DP6 had mentioned the diary to

25 me in our conversation. I was certain that on the day Gaga told me what

Page 4762

1 had happened on the 3rd of August, that on that day I was angry because of

2 everything he had done, and he left on that day he was wounded. As far as

3 I can remember, I believe that that was the 10th. But he was wounded on

4 the 11th. I know that the first night when that girl was downstairs, I

5 talked to her alone, and before that I had talked to her upstairs. I

6 assert that what I have said here is true.

7 On the night when we came back from the funeral, I sat there very

8 briefly and we all talked together. Then I went to get some rest, and on

9 the following day I talked to that girl alone, and on the following night

10 I also talked to her alone. At that time she did describe the route they

11 had taken, what they had done. She told me where her mother was, and I

12 did promise her that I would take her. I told her about my family, about

13 my daughter, about my wife, who was then eight months pregnant. And I

14 told her I would take her there.

15 Q. Mr. Kunarac, let me interrupt you. You have already given us

16 these details; it's not necessary to repeat it here twice today.

17 However, Mr. Kunarac, Witness 191 said that you did not question

18 her that first night but you raped her. Why would she lie?

19 A. I really don't know. I had the sincerest wish to help that

20 witness then. She herself confirmed that she had seen the passes I had

21 got for her with her name, and I took a letter from her to her mother and

22 I identified myself to her mother. I gave her my wife's telephone

23 number. I showed her my identity card. I told her where she could find

24 her daughter, where her daughter would be. If I had had anything to do

25 with her daughter, I certainly would not have gone to her mother and given

Page 4763

1 her my telephone number, introduced myself, if I had mistreated that

2 person in any way.

3 I assert that I certainly never at any moment hurt that person in

4 any way, nor did I sexually harass her or rape her in any way. I heard

5 her testimony. But I state that that person, throughout the time I was in

6 Foca, we lived there. Our children went to kindergarten together; her

7 children were younger than mine. I saw her every day, and the day before

8 I gave myself up I saw her, and it was only after I had given myself up

9 that she decided -- a few months later she decided to divorce her husband,

10 to go where she is now --

11 Q. Mr. Kunarac, we don't need to go into these details. You have

12 done that already.

13 Mr. Kunarac, she didn't only say that you raped her, she also said

14 that during that night, that first night, she saw your dog tags, right?

15 And soldiers wear their dog tags on their skin and not over their

16 clothing; right?

17 After your conversation -- do you want to answer?

18 A. Let me tell you, she saw my tag, which I did wear, she was able to

19 see it. I said in an interview, I don't know which one, at a certain

20 moment, I think it might have been on the 11th when Jadranka came to that

21 house with the person I mentioned -- with whom she came, that on that day

22 I went to take a shower and I changed the bandages I was wearing around my

23 body. It was August, and my shirt was unbuttoned. The top button or two

24 buttons were unbuttoned, so she could have seen the tag even when I was

25 dressed.

Page 4764

1 But I said that I did not rape that witness, nor did I have

2 anything to do with her. I assert that had I had anything to do with her,

3 I certainly would not have gone to her mother and shown her my identity

4 card and given her the telephone number of my wife and child.

5 Q. Mr. Kunarac, you testified that you went to the Kalinovik school

6 on the 14th of August, 1992, after Gaga had been wounded; right?

7 A. Yes. I think it was the 14th or the 15th of August. But in any

8 case, it was Gaga Vukovic -- Gaga was taken to the hospital on the

9 16th. So I think that I was in Kalinovik school on the 14th, because on

10 the 15th I reported, by way of ham radio operator, asking whether

11 Podgorica would accept Gaga in that state, and that was the reason why I

12 went to Montenegro. He was taken there on the 16th, in the morning. So

13 on the 14th, I was in the school in Kalinovik and talked to her mother.

14 On the 14th I was also in the Foca SUP, where I got a certificate

15 from the then chief of police, the late Dragan Gagovic, bearing the name

16 and last name of person 191, and another one for person 186. I said I

17 wanted to take them there because they had told me they wanted that. And

18 when I came to Trnovace and when I showed these certificates to both of

19 the witnesses, Witness 191 said to me that she wanted to ask what her

20 mother thought about it and to see whether her mother, sister, and

21 brother, who were in the school in Kalinovik, could also go.

22 I told her then to write a letter to her mother. She wrote it.

23 Both of them wrote letters. Then I went with Witness DP6 to the school in

24 Kalinovik, and when we arrived, I asked the guard there for her mother

25 because she had given me her mother's nickname; not her real name but her

Page 4765

1 nickname. I knew the last name. The guard went in and looked for her,

2 and at first she did not want to respond because he didn't say her real

3 name. Then she did respond, and then I did talk to her mother, in the

4 presence of her sister and her brother, in a room which I think was a

5 changing room because it was in front of the gym.

6 Then I gave her her daughter's letter which she read, and in that

7 letter her daughter told her that she could leave, that she could go there

8 with me. Then I showed her my identity card; I gave her my telephone

9 number, which she wrote down; I told her what my nickname was. Because

10 when I came to Kalinovik, I went to the SUP and I talked to a person in

11 the SUP and they said that they were going to have an exchange very soon.

12 So I said that when she went she could ring up that telephone number, that

13 her daughter would be there, that it's my telephone number where my wife

14 lived and that she could talk to her daughter then.

15 Q. Mr. Kunarac, Witness 191 said that you were there earlier in the

16 school and Gaga was with you.

17 A. No. DP6 was with me. DP6 was with me and DP6 talked to the

18 mother of Witness 186 on that occasion. Whether someone else had come to

19 the school before and talked to them, I really don't know. But I was

20 there only once, it was on that occasion, and not again after that.

21 Q. Mr. Kunarac, Witness 205 ended up in a flat in Foca, didn't she?

22 The flat of Gica Vasiljevic in Brod, to be exact; right?

23 A. I learned that later. I don't know the exact time when it

24 happened, but I knew that that person I talked to in Kalinovik, when I

25 told her of those two persons and showed her the two certificates I had

Page 4766

1 got from the chief of police in Foca, and when I said that those persons

2 would go home with me to Montenegro, that nothing would happen to them and

3 that then they would be free to go wherever they wished, in that

4 conversation he told me that there were other girls missing.

5 Then I said to him that I knew that Witness JG, because I was told

6 this by Witness 191, had been taken back to Kalinovik, and then he told me

7 that she had never been brought back. He also told me that he needed the

8 other girls. I didn't know anything about the others.

9 After that, I think it was after my second accident when my arm

10 was broken, this man came to Foca and he told me that he had learned that

11 one of the girls was with Gica, and as for the others, he had heard they

12 were dead. I asserted that 186 and 191 were not dead because I knew they

13 were in Trnovace. I told him I had not taken them away before but that I

14 had the intention of going back in the next few days and that I would take

15 them. I didn't know about the others. He told me that Witness 186 and

16 Witness 191 were not on the list of persons who were supposed to go to

17 Sarajevo because their mothers, with whom we had talked, had agreed that

18 they should go to Montenegro. Her mother said, "It's better for her to go

19 there. I don't know where we will go from here." Then he told me that

20 that person, the witness was with Gica.

21 I went with him to Brod where Gica's parents were, and he was with

22 me. That girl was in that house. Gica's mother and other members of his

23 family were there. And then she said she didn't want to leave. The

24 person who was with me said that if she wanted to stay there and live with

25 him, she should go to the place where the exchange was to be carried out,

Page 4767

1 and if she didn't want to be exchanged, she could say so and she would be

2 free to come back.

3 It was only then that I saw Witness 205, and I never saw her at

4 any other time. The other witnesses, Witness 190 and I can't remember the

5 number of the witness who remained, they say she went out in Miljevina,

6 and then all the others, JG and all the others, I did not have occasion to

7 meet those witnesses ever, nor did I ever know where they were. I didn't

8 know that at the time they were with Witness DP1. I had no idea that

9 witness was with him, nor did I ever come to visit him. That witness may

10 have seen me around town. Witness DP1 could have pointed me out and said

11 that, "This is Zaga." But I never had occasion to meet that person or

12 talk to her at any time.

13 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: I see what time it is. I have a few more

14 questions.

15 JUDGE MUMBA: We'll break off now and continue at 1130 hours.

16 --- Recess taken at 11.02 a.m.

17 --- On resuming at 11.31 a.m.

18 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, we proceed with cross-examination.

19 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.

20 Q. Mr. Kunarac, I actually have only one more question left. You

21 have described your brave and successful attacks in various places,

22 especially in Rogoj and Preljuca; however, you were never promoted during

23 the war as such, were you?

24 A. During the war, on several occasions I was commended and several

25 times received medals and things like that, but I was not promoted, no,

Page 4768

1 because at that time in the course of the war itself, it was only in 1994

2 and 1995 that they began to give ranks and promotions. However, as my

3 work was to do with reconnaissance and reconnoitring, I was never

4 interested in rank, nor did I have any ambitions in that direction. I

5 wanted everything to be over as quickly as possible so that I could go

6 back to living a normal family life with my family.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: No more questions.

9 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes. Any reexamination?

10 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

11 I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to say that we

12 now have General Radinovic, the expert witness, according to our agenda, I

13 believe.

14 JUDGE MUMBA: Thank you, Mr. Kunarac, for your evidence. You are

15 free now to leave the witness box and return to your seat.

16 [The witness withdrew]

17 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, you may call your next witness.

18 [The witness entered court]

19 JUDGE MUMBA: Good morning. Please make your solemn declaration.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will

21 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.


23 [Witness answered through interpreter]

24 JUDGE MUMBA: Thank you. Please sit down.

25 Yes, Mr. Prodanovic.

Page 4769

1 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Examined by Mr. Prodanovic:

3 Q. Good morning, Mr. Radinovic. I should like at the outset to give

4 you a warning, that is to say, we speak the same language, but please make

5 pauses between questions and answers, try and speak as slowly as possible

6 for the benefit of the interpreters so that we can facilitate

7 interpretation.

8 A. Yes, I understand. Thank you.

9 Q. Could you please tell us in a few words basic data from your life,

10 that is to say, your profession biography and particulars?

11 A. My name is Radovan Radinovic. I am a retired general. I was born

12 on the 11th of September, 1939, in Podgorica which is Montenegro, the

13 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I went to secondary school in Podgorica

14 and graduated in 1956, and the military academy -- attended the military

15 academy and graduated in 1959 when I became a lieutenant of the engineers

16 of the ground forces of the Yugoslav People's Army. I have graduated from

17 the highest military schools and attended all forms of professional and

18 specialist training of the highest order for officers of the Yugoslav

19 People's Army, the foreign languages school and Russian in 1964, the

20 school for engineering officers in 1968, the command and staff academy in

21 1972, and the war school in 1978.

22 Parallel to that, I graduated from the Faculty of Political

23 Sciences in Belgrade in 1970. I did an MA in political sciences and

24 specialised in political sociology. My MA was received in 1976, and my

25 topic was the notion and structure of political ideology. I received my

Page 4770

1 PhD in 1982, and the subject of my thesis was the method of war skills.

2 My professional involvement is as follows: From 1959 up until

3 1970, I was a troops officer. From command platoon, I became commander of

4 a company and went right up to the commander of a battalion. As I was an

5 engineers officer, I dealt with civil engineering. I built the Dubrovnik

6 airport; I helped construct the Cemerno-Kalinovik road in the Foca area,

7 as well as facilities in the port of Ploca, construction work on Karlobag

8 Gospic road, the road across Pag and the bridge between Zadar and Pag, and

9 ports and ship docks along the Adriatic coast.

10 From 1973 up until 1981, I was professor of methodology and

11 military sciences and research at the centre of the high schools of the

12 Yugoslav People's Army. From 1982 to 1986, I was the head -- that is to

13 say, from 1982 to 1986, yes, I was head of the department for military

14 doctrine and the development of the army in the operative management of

15 the general staff of the Yugoslav People's Army. From 1986 until 1989, I

16 was the chief of the department for strategy and professor for strategy at

17 the war school of the Yugoslav People's Army.

18 From 1989 until 1990 I was the head of the war school of the

19 Yugoslav People's Army. From 1990 up until 1992, I was the director of

20 the Institute For Strategic Research attached to the general staff of the

21 Yugoslav People's Army. In 1992 to 1993, in addition to my regular

22 duties, I was a military expert attached to the Yugoslav state delegation

23 which attended the Geneva negotiations, Geneva talks. From 1992 to 1994,

24 I was Assistant Federal Defence Minister and also head of the Department

25 For Strategic Studies and Department of Defence.

Page 4771

1 I retired on the 1st of January, 1994, and I retired as a

2 Lieutenant General to staff. From 1994 to 1997, that is to say, after my

3 retirement, I worked in the Centre for Military, Economic, and Strategic

4 Research at the Economic Institute in Belgrade. From 1997, I have been

5 the director of research in Institute for Geopolitical Studies in

6 Belgrade.

7 I was appointed expert of the Federal Ministry for Science

8 Technology and Development of the Yugoslav government for review of

9 project studies, programmes, from scientific regions related to political

10 sociology, strategics of defence and security.

11 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, unless there is anything which was

12 outside his CV which was filed, which, if you wish, can be admitted into

13 evidence, we don't need him to go through everything that is already on

14 paper.

15 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have just -- that

16 is to say, I was just going to interrupt our expert witness and go on with

17 the next question, which is the following:

18 Q. Can you tell us whether you are a scientific worker, and if so and

19 if you have delved in this area, what is your field of activity?

20 A. For most of my working life, I have engaged in scientific research

21 and teaching. In view of my -- and as to my credibility as a witness, I

22 would like to say something that is not in the document that has been

23 submitted, and that refers to my operative work in general staff

24 institutions.

25 Over the past 20 years, I was highly involved in the elaboration

Page 4772

1 of doctrinairy documents related to the armed forces of Yugoslavia, and

2 from 1980 up until the moment I retired, I was directly involved in

3 elaborating the development plans of the armed forces.

4 Within the frameworks of that work, I consider that my most

5 complex and complete task was the vast reorganisation of the armed forces

6 of Yugoslavia, and it was known under the code name "Unity," and the

7 elaboration of strategic models of operation for the training of officers

8 for the highest positions of the armed forces of Yugoslavia.

9 Q. I should just like to ask you, in answering the questions, to

10 address the Trial Chamber regardless of the fact that I am the one putting

11 the questions to you.

12 A. I do apologise, but I haven't had occasion to be in a court like

13 this before so I didn't know. Thank you.

14 Q. I should like to tell you that the Defence received the ruling of

15 the Trial Chamber by which part of your expert testimony will not be used

16 because it is not relevant and is not connected with the indictment of

17 Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic. So I won't be putting questions to you

18 related to that portion of your expert report.

19 If you have the report in front of you, we will start on page 81

20 in the B/C/S, and I think that on the English version it is page 98.

21 Bearing in mind --

22 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, can we just have the curriculum

23 vitae admitted into evidence, if you so wish, because there are things

24 which the witness has not gone through. Just the CV.

25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly request a copy of the

Page 4773

1 document, please.

2 JUDGE MUMBA: Okay. It's Registry pages 4832 up to 4838. The

3 witness isn't going to go through it. It's just a question of whether or

4 not you would like it to be admitted into evidence.

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, Your Honour; that

6 is to say, I was going to put the question to the witness, whether he

7 stands by the report, and if so I should like to tender it into evidence.

8 JUDGE MUMBA: No, no, no, not the report, because you have already

9 correctly said that, according to the Trial Chamber's order, certain

10 portions of the report are excluded. So that report will not be tendered

11 into evidence. You will direct your witness according to the order. You

12 will follow what is relevant and you will direct your witness

13 accordingly.

14 What we are discussing is just the curriculum vitae, stating the

15 name of the witness, the particulars, his qualifications, what he has

16 published, and things like that. That's all.

17 Any objection?

18 MR. RYNEVELD: No, thank you, Your Honour. We have no

19 difficulty. I don't know whether my friend understands "CV" to be the

20 biography.


22 MR. RYNEVELD: I just thought perhaps that might clarify.

23 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, thank you.

24 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

25 JUDGE MUMBA: Can we have a formal numbering for the biography,

Page 4774

1 please, from the registrar.

2 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The CV of the witness Radinovic

3 will be numbered D89, Defence Exhibit.

4 JUDGE MUMBA: Thank you. You may proceed, Mr. Prodanovic.

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Bearing in mind the position of the Trial Chamber and the fact

7 that the Defence has presented evidence in that direction, could you

8 explain to us the geographic features of Gornje Podrinje as part of the

9 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

10 A. Gornje Podrinje is a region of Bosnia-Herzegovina which was once

11 called Stara Hercegovina, or Old Herzegovina. It is a region which stems

12 from the confluence of the Piva and Trava which make up the River Drina,

13 and stretches downstream -- there is a mistake in the text -- so

14 downstream from the triangle of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro,

15 that border, up until the estuary of the River Lima into the Drina; that

16 is to say, the northern boundary of the Gorazde municipality as the

17 northernmost municipality in Gornje Podrinje.

18 As can be seen from the name of the region itself, the central

19 geographic feature of Gornje Podrinje is the Drina River. Its upper

20 course, with all its geographical, geopolitical, geostrategic,

21 geoeconomic, geoecological and cultural civilisational features.

22 Gornje Podrinje is made up of five municipalities: Kalinovik; Foca

23 or Srbinje, that is the new name of Foca, Srbinje; then we have Gorazde;

24 Cajnice; and Rudo.

25 The overall surface area of this region is approximately 3.000

Page 4775

1 square kilometres, with about 103.000 inhabitants. In the overall

2 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this region comprises approximately 6 per

3 cent of the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And by virtue of the number of

4 inhabitants, that share is a little lower; the percentage is about 4 per

5 cent. On the basis of these facts and figures, we are able to conclude

6 that the population density per square kilometre of this region is below

7 the Bosnian-Herzegovinan average.

8 The smallest municipality is the Cajnice municipality with 257.000

9 kilometres, and the largest municipality is the municipality of Foca,

10 1.267 square kilometres. It is interesting to note that Foca is the most

11 widespread municipality in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 Looking at the number of inhabitants, the Kalinovik municipality

13 is the smallest, some 14.000, and Foca is the largest, about 40.500

14 inhabitants. Kalinovik is the least populated municipality and the

15 second, according to size, compared to these five municipalities. It is

16 732 square kilometres, and only 4.600 inhabitants live in it, which means

17 that it is sparsely populated -- the most sparsely populated region in

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina. This figure is very indicative in assessing the

19 overall level of development of the Kalinovik municipality.

20 These 103.000 inhabitants are divided up into 463 settlements, and

21 on the basis of those figures, we are able to conclude that it is a very

22 sparsely populated region with small settlements and hamlets, with the

23 exception of the larger towns.

24 The population of Gornje Podrinje is predominantly rural, and I

25 show this in table 1 of my report so I don't wish to repeat myself.

Page 4776

1 Gornje Podrinje is, for the most part, an underdeveloped area by virtue of

2 its economic power. Foca and Gorazde are the most developed although

3 their level of development falls below the average of the developed

4 municipalities.

5 Of the natural resources, I should like to mention its forests and

6 the water potential of the River Drina and the other rivers and small

7 rivers that are its confluence and belong to the region of Upper

8 Podrinje.

9 Up until the war in 1992 to 1995, Gornje Podrinje was considered

10 an ecological pearl in whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, we are

11 no longer able to give that qualification if we bear in mind the fact that

12 in 1994 and 1995 NATO bombed the area with projectiles containing depleted

13 uranium, and we cannot even foresee the ecological consequences of that

14 bombing.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honour, if I might just interrupt, I'm sure it

16 is of great interest to someone, but I wonder how relevant it may be to

17 the proceedings before this Chamber with respect to this indictment. I

18 think we're straying a little bit far from what I understood the Chamber's

19 ruling permitted questioning in this particular area.

20 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, you've heard the Prosecution's

21 complaint, please do stick to our ruling, and I do direct your witness to

22 not give unnecessary detail.

23 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I

24 understand your directions.

25 Q. General, could you tell us something about the national

Page 4777

1 composition of the population in the region?

2 A. The national composition of Gornje Podrinje is as follows: That

3 is to say, the state of affairs before the war, Serbs, 43.909 or below

4 42.6 per cent; 56.000 Muslims, approximately, or 54 per cent of the

5 population. Let me repeat, the national composition of the population

6 Gornje Podrinje is as follows: There are about 43.000 Serbs, or a little

7 under 42 per cent; there are about 56.000 Muslims or approximately 54 per

8 cent; Croats, under 1 per cent, which is, for this analysis, a negligible

9 amount; the rest making up the 100 per cent were made up of people who

10 declared themselves Yugoslavs and other ethnic groups.

11 Q. In your expert report you mentioned these facts and figures. Can

12 you tell us why you feel that this information is important in order to

13 look at further developments of events related to the armed conflict?

14 A. I am convinced and do believe that the presentation of exact data

15 on the national structure and the changes and dynamics of demographic

16 growth is essential in order to ascertain the following fact; that is to

17 say, whether in Gornje Podrinje or not there was a planned, all-out attack

18 on the Muslim population.

19 Q. General, in your view, when did the question of pan-Islamism

20 appear in Yugoslavia? What does it mean and how does it affect the

21 conduct of Muslims?

22 A. The question of pan-Islamism --

23 JUDGE HUNT: Excuse me. What is the relevance of this,

24 Mr. Prodanovic? You've got a ruling that we are not interested in that

25 particular part of the history. You've been told that throughout the

Page 4778

1 whole of this trial. You've now got a formal ruling in writing about it.

2 Now you are flying in the face of that decision by leading this evidence.

3 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it is my opinion and

4 the position of the Defence that the expert witness is best placed to

5 answer whether the attack was all-embracing or not if he presents the

6 facts and figures and information that will be presented to him. That is

7 the position of the Defence.

8 JUDGE HUNT: The witness is not here to tell us what is relevant.

9 We have told you what is relevant. Now, will you please restrict the

10 witness' evidence to that which we have said is relevant.

11 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation].

12 Q. General, what can you tell us about the armament of Muslims in

13 general?

14 A. I do apologise. Let me just get to that part of my findings.

15 As regards our armament and military organisation as well as the

16 preparation of Muslims in Foca and Gornje Podrinje for war and throughout

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were a few simultaneous processes. First of

18 all, the armed forces of the federal state were continually denied their

19 legitimacy. The party of the SDA in their official proclamations and

20 political activities proclaimed the Yugoslav People's Army as pro Serb and

21 aggressor; and the headquarters of the Territorial Defence of Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina, which they did not like, they quite illegally and without any

23 authorisation, they replaced it, and they proclaimed a military command of

24 their own.

25 They were calling upon soldiers and officers born in Bosnia and

Page 4779

1 Herzegovina to leave the JNA, and at the same time they prevented the

2 further recruitment of persons into the JNA for the Territorial Defence of

3 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4 With the leadership of Croatia, they were discussing the

5 confederal, a confederal arrangement between Croatia and Bosnia and

6 Herzegovina which intensified the fear of the Serb people from a new

7 genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

8 Fourthly, a patriotic paramilitary army of the SDA was established

9 called the Patriotic League of Nations. This league was first established

10 in June 1991, and the counter-intelligence of the Yugoslav People's Army

11 revealed its existence in September 1991. To that end, Main Staff of the

12 Patriotic League was established in Sarajevo with nine regional staffs

13 with an appropriate number of municipal and other staffs for smaller

14 territorial entities and also for Gornje Podrinje.

15 It is indicative for this that Alija Izetbegovic and his party

16 formed the 10th Regional Staff of the Patriotic League of peoples for

17 Sandzak, although the Sandzak is a territory outside the territory of

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina and an integral part of now the Federal Republic of

19 Yugoslavia. And then at the time when the Patriotic League of Nations was

20 being established, it was a territory that belonged to Serbian

21 Montenegro. It belongs to Serbian Montenegro until the present day.

22 Q. General, I have to interrupt you at this point.

23 MR. PRODANOVIC: The Defence wishes to show a cassette which is

24 very short. Senaid Memic, one of the activists of the SDA, is on this

25 cassette, and he says how the Muslims were armed through the SDA party.

Page 4780

1 Could the technical people please play tape number two.

2 JUDGE HUNT: Before you do that, can you tell me where -- from

3 what part of his report the witness is reading at the moment? It appears

4 to me generally to be around about registry number 4704. Is that correct?

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't have it here

6 with me. Ms. Lopicic has -- it is number 4706 -- 04, I'm sorry.

7 JUDGE HUNT: Yes, that's what I thought. That is one of the parts

8 of the report which we said was inadmissible. Now, are you going to have

9 some control over this witness, or are we going to have to stop him

10 ourselves?

11 We have given you a ruling which excludes in this particular part

12 of it pages 4725 to 4700, and here you are leading him through this

13 evidence which we have ruled to be inadmissible because it is irrelevant.

14 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, can you tell us something about the activity of the

16 Territorial Defence? What is that?

17 A. The Territorial Defence --

18 JUDGE HUNT: I'm sorry to interrupt again, but I think you're

19 going to have to tell us the page reference so that we can check this. It

20 took me about three or four minutes to find where the General was reading

21 from.

22 THE INTERPRETER: "Page 98," says the witness.

23 JUDGE HUNT: Sorry, I didn't hear that.

24 THE INTERPRETER: The witness said page 98.

25 A. Our version 98, page 98.

Page 4781

1 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, if we can have the registry pages

2 because that's what's contained in our order, so do assist us with that,

3 please.

4 JUDGE HUNT: And the English version doesn't have any page

5 numbers.

6 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] 4697, Your Honour, paragraph 4.

7 JUDGE HUNT: Thank you very much.

8 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, you may proceed, please.

9 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. So the question is the following: Can you tell us about the

11 activity of the Territorial Defence, and what is that?

12 A. Territorial Defence, according to the doctrine of the former

13 Yugoslavia, was an integral part of the united armed forces. Its

14 objective was to exercise combat control over the territory and to act in

15 concert with the Yugoslav People's Army in carrying out operations in the

16 field. It consisted of the manoeuvring component, that was about 20 per

17 cent in that element of the armed forces; and about 80 per cent were the

18 so-called territorial units that were aimed at covering the territory, so

19 they were planned exclusively for use in local territories.

20 As regards Territorial Defence in Gornje Podrinje, it was

21 organised as follows: In Gorazde, there was a district staff of the

22 Territorial Defence, and Lieutenant Colonel Bajro Murguz, a Muslim, was

23 its commander. Municipal Territorial Defence staffs in Gorazde, Foca,

24 Kalinovik, Cajnice, Rudo, and in Visegrad, although Visegrad doesn't

25 belong to the Gornje Podrinje, were also subordinated to this staff.

Page 4782

1 That is also in Gorazde where the headquarters of the 4th Brigade

2 of the Territorial Defence was, Rajko Pusonja, a Serb, was commander. The

3 brigade was subordinated to the municipal staff of Gorazde, and it

4 consisted of three battalions of Territorial Defence. One respectively

5 from Gorazde, Foca, and Nova revija. The commander of the municipal staff

6 of Territorial Defence in Gorazde was Hamid Risljanin, that is to say, a

7 Muslim; and in Foca, Sulejman Pilav, also a Muslim.

8 There were units that were attached to the Territorial Defence

9 staffs, but there were also six regional staffs that were subordinated to

10 them, each comprising four to -- three to five local communes, and one

11 staff of the Territorial Defence in the company of Maglic.

12 In the territory of the municipality, there were Territorial

13 Defence units of different structure, and also civilian defence units.

14 This is presented in table 7.

15 Q. General, can one speak about preparations for military

16 organisation of the territory of the municipality of Foca in 1991?

17 A. Yes, one may speak of that, that is to say, preparations for war

18 in Foca in 1991. As far back as 1991, certain officers, Muslims,

19 gradually started leaving the Yugoslav People's Army upon the invitation

20 of the SDA. They responded to this call of the party to organise a

21 national ethnic army. Major Zaim Besovic came to Foca, as well as Captain

22 Klinac, Lieutenant Colonel Buljubasic as well, in order to organise the

23 Muslim population of military age.

24 In Tjentiste, he was entrusted with the task of arming and

25 organising and training the Muslims, and in order to prevent possible

Page 4783

1 support of the Serbs from Herzegovina. In March 1992, all the

2 preparations for the war in Tjentiste were completed, and the unit was

3 registered as the Sutjeska battalion. Captain Klinac was given the

4 assignment to organise in the territory of Slatine, the training and

5 armament of, Muslims to establish contact with the neighbouring villages

6 in the Pljevlja area, to take Muslim volunteers from Sandzak, to link up

7 with the population of Oglecevo in the municipality of Gorazde, and to

8 establish the Slatine battalion.

9 Colonel Buljubasic was given the task of preparing the Muslims

10 from the town of Foca for a war. He trained them in Djindjevo, Sistet,

11 and Kozja Luka. These are settlements to the west of Gorazde. He relied

12 upon the previously-established units in Ustikolina, and he also linked up

13 with the Muslims from Ilovaca that were organised by Zaim Imamovic.

14 Battalions were organised into the Foca Muslim Brigade with around 1.860

15 soldiers.

16 Q. At that time did the Serbs request assistance from the JNA?

17 A. At that time in Foca, there were no units of the Yugoslav People's

18 Army. I'm referring to operative units. In Foca, there was a unit of the

19 Yugoslav People's Army sometime in the seventies. This was a construction

20 area giving support to the engineering units that were building roads,

21 including my own unit. That is what I mentioned in my CV.

22 In Ustikolina, there was part of the JNA, but this was a logistic

23 part, not combat unit. These were warehouses with a negligible number of

24 men who were securing the -- who were guarding the warehouse.

25 On the hill of Kmur to the west of Foca, there was a radio relay

Page 4784

1 unit, that is to say, that this is a signals unit. It is not a combat

2 unit. It covered the electronic security in terms of command for that

3 part of the territory. That is to say, there were no JNA units that could

4 help the Serb people in Foca upon this kind of call.

5 Political passions flared, and a political rally was organised in

6 Foca in support of the Yugoslav People's Army. I also said that the SDA

7 had proclaimed the JNA to be an aggressor.

8 I found a document stating that Serbs requested assistance from

9 the JNA; however, the JNA did not give this assistance. I personally know

10 when this was sought. The JNA did not come to the aid -- to their aid for

11 two reasons. The first is because they did not think that they were

12 supposed to get involved and to arbitrate in political conflicts, and

13 secondly because --

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Might I just interrupt?

15 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, Mr. --

16 MR. RYNEVELD: Maybe I'm having difficulty following, or maybe I'm

17 having -- having difficulty following the relevance between this evidence

18 and the issue now before the Court. Maybe, is this not talking about

19 international armed conflict? I'm having some difficulty and perhaps --

20 JUDGE HUNT: Well, are you objecting?

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, I am, thank you. That's why I'm on my feet.

22 JUDGE HUNT: What is the relevance of it, Mr. Prodanovic?

23 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we got this

24 information from the Prosecution. The president of the municipality of

25 Foca in the month of March, I believe, sought aid from the JNA. If this

Page 4785

1 were not relevant, then the Prosecutor probably would not have --

2 JUDGE HUNT: What is its relevance? Whether you were given it by

3 the Prosecution or not, what is its relevance to the issues which we have

4 to determine?

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] The question was put to the

6 expert as to whether the JNA had come to their assistance, whether

7 assistance was sought from the JNA. The Defence wishes to show, when the

8 main questions come, whether the attack was an all-out attack, the Defence

9 wishes to show through the expert what the situation was in terms of

10 armament on both sides, because we are supposed to ascertain whether it

11 was an all-out attack, whether the Muslims were caught by surprise by the

12 Serb attack, as is often mentioned by Prosecution witnesses.

13 Please, in this way, we wish to bring into question the

14 credibility of Prosecution witnesses who said here that Muslims did not

15 have any arms at all. That was my underlying idea.

16 JUDGE HUNT: So it's relevant only to the Prosecution's

17 witnesses's credit. That's the only basis upon which you can put it, is

18 it?

19 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Not only that, Your Honour. I

20 said why we are presenting things.

21 In my opinion, if the expert answers this question, whether the

22 attack was an all-out attack, he has to have argumentation to prove that.

23 And it is my understanding that these questions lead to that, that is, to

24 having the witness answer whether the attack was an all-out attack or

25 not.

Page 4786

1 JUDGE HUNT: So you give us your assurance, do you, that this is

2 going to lead to that and to that only, and we're not going to be asked to

3 determine who was at fault.

4 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, no, Your Honour.

5 JUDGE HUNT: Because that's the very impression which this

6 evidence is giving us at the moment. Now, perhaps you might ask some

7 specific questions of the witness so as to avoid any impression that that

8 is what you are attempting to do, so that we can get to the nature of the

9 attack. Then you'll stop all of the objections that are coming from the

10 Prosecution and from us.

11 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honour.

12 Q. I would like to put a concrete question to you. How did combat

13 operations start in Foca?

14 A. In Foca the Muslims took the KP Dom, the house of corrections.

15 They released the prisoners and they took weapons. In the upper part of

16 town, the Serbs erected barricades and a conflict was anticipated to break

17 out at any moment. The authorities in the Municipal Assembly adopted

18 proclamations and decisions in order to have passions abate. However, the

19 spontaneous processes made it impossible to have a peaceful outcome.

20 JUDGE HUNT: Mr. Prodanovic, this evidence that the witness is

21 giving is being read from Registry page 4692 at the moment, and that is

22 the beginning of the section headed "Preparations of Muslims for Taking

23 Over Foca," and that is the very passage which has been ruled to be

24 irrelevant. Now, could you direct him to where he takes up the story

25 after that section of his report concludes.

Page 4787

1 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. From now on I

2 will pass over all those questions. Before I put the question referring

3 to command responsibility, I will put two further questions which are not

4 relevant to the objections you have just raised.

5 Q. Can we talk about a general systematic attack on the Muslims in

6 the area of the Foca municipality?

7 A. No. All my expertise and my expert opinion lead to the opposite

8 conclusion. It was the Muslims who carried out a widespread attack on the

9 Serbian population in the Foca region and on several occasions inflicted

10 serious losses on the Serbian populations. The Muslims were fully

11 prepared for a war; they had formed a paramilitary army. The Serbs in

12 Foca organised themselves spontaneously and only started to organise

13 themselves after they were attacked.

14 Q. Thank you, General. Can you say that the armed conflict, since

15 you say there was no attack, was aimed at ethnic cleansing?

16 A. No, ethnic cleansing did not take place. It was not planned, it

17 was not a policy, and it was not carried out.

18 Q. According to the information from the territory of the

19 municipality of Foca, a lot of people left for Novi Pazar in the Republic

20 of Serbia and Draza in Montenegro. Can you tell us what the ethnic

21 composition was in those villages and why the population went or fled to

22 those places from Foca?

23 A. Yes. Unfortunately, a part of the Muslim population left Foca and

24 went in the direction of Sandzak and Montenegro, in the Federal Republic

25 of Yugoslavia, and a part of them went in the direction of Gorazde. The

Page 4788

1 Muslims left for Sandzak and Novi Pazar where there is a majority Muslim

2 population, in Tutin, Senica and Novi Pazar municipalities which have a

3 Muslim majority, and some of them went to Rozaje in Montenegro where the

4 Muslims are also in the majority, and some of them went to Podgorica which

5 is a multi-ethnic town in the multi-ethnic Montenegro.

6 Had the ethnic cleansing of Muslims been a Serb programme, a

7 pan-Serb programme, I do not believe they would have sought refuge in

8 Yugoslavia.

9 Q. Can you tell us something about the concept and the essence of

10 command responsibility?

11 A. Well, this is an annex to my expert opinion; it's annex 1. I

12 think that in the English version it is on page 161.

13 Command responsibility is the responsibility of a superior for

14 acts carried out by his subordinates over which he has and exercises full

15 control. Responsibility takes effect if he has not done everything in his

16 power to prevent war crimes or crimes against humanity.

17 Responsibility for the failure to take measures can only exist

18 within the framework of command relations within a military hierarchy,

19 strictly interpreted. Military hierarchy or subordination, as the

20 fundamental principle of military organisation, is based on a system of

21 relations between superiors and subordinates. In such a strictly ordered

22 hierarchical system, explicitly and by means of rules, directives, laws and

23 orders, the obligations and duties of everyone in that chain of command is

24 strictly defined.

25 That is the essence of command responsibility as I understand it.

Page 4789

1 Q. The accused Dragoljub Kunarac, when doing his regular military

2 service, acquired the rank of lance corporal. Can you tell us what this

3 rank means?

4 A. The rank of lance corporal is a military rank. There is one lower

5 rank which is called private first class.

6 The rank of lance corporal in the JNA, in which Mr. Kunarac

7 acquired it, could be acquired in two ways: The first of these was if he

8 was selected to take a course to become a lance corporal, and apart from

9 the regular military training, those chosen for this course had additional

10 training specialising in certain a military speciality for which they were

11 trained. Lance corporals, after serving their military service, on their

12 military ID cards had the recommendation from their company leader who

13 proposed that a lance corporal, meeting the required conditions, could

14 become a lance corporal and serve in the army.

15 So the lance corporal who, at the military exercises, was not

16 promoted to rank of reserve sergeant carried the rank of lance corporal

17 simply as an honorary title showing that he had been a good soldier, that

18 he was well-trained, that he stood out in the way he carried out his

19 assignments. But it meant nothing more.

20 After completing their training for lance corporal, the best

21 soldiers in platoons and companies who had not taken the course could be

22 promoted to the rank of lance corporal just before ending their military

23 service as a recognition of the dedication with which they had carried out

24 their duties while serving their military service.

25 Q. General, as an expert before this Tribunal, Major Muhamed Nogo

Page 4790

1 also testified, and in connection with this question, I will read you the

2 question and answer, on page 3936 of the transcript, and I would like you

3 to comment on it.

4 To the question of my learned colleague who could be a commander

5 and whether a rank was required, the answer of expert Nogo was: "At the

6 beginning of the war, rank did not count. What counted was who was able

7 to lead men and to be in charge."

8 Do you agree with this?

9 A. Yes, I do agree with this. Before an army is established, ranks

10 have to be checked in practice because, practically, it's a new army.

11 Q. General, can you tell us about the nature of the command function

12 of Dragoljub Kunarac?

13 A. Dragoljub Kunarac was the leader of a reconnaissance group -- the

14 leader of a reconnaissance group. The nature of his command duty followed

15 from the nature and type of the men he was in charge of and whom he

16 commanded.

17 Checking all the documentation when I was writing this expert

18 opinion, in the units of the Foca Tactical Group of the Foca Brigade, I

19 did not find anywhere that in the establishment there was a permanent unit

20 as an element of the establishment structure. There was no reconnaissance

21 unit, there was only a reconnaissance group, and there is an essential

22 difference between a reconnaissance group and a reconnaissance unit.

23 According to what I was able to find, Dragoljub Kunarac was the

24 leader of a reconnaissance group. This was not a unit which was a

25 permanent part of the establishment of the Foca Tactical Group.

Page 4791

1 Q. Please, could you tell us the nature of the command responsibility

2 of Dragoljub Kunarac?

3 A. If you will -- with the Tribunal's permission, I expected you to

4 ask me what kind of a group a reconnaissance group is.

5 Q. Well, I was coming to that later, but since you mentioned the

6 reconnaissance group, please go on.

7 A. In all the doctrines in the world, from the West to the Far East,

8 there are units as permanent organic parts of the establishment from

9 squad, platoon, company, battery battalion, artillery battalion, regiment

10 brigade corps, army. In the Western doctrine there are no armies but

11 simply army corps, and in other places there are armies. In our doctrine,

12 the army is the highest strategic level of units.

13 Apart from the permanent establishment units, there are also

14 temporary units. One of those temporary units are groups, and these are

15 usually elements which are formed when combat organisations are set up,

16 when the elements of a combat order are being set up. And both in Western

17 doctrine and in Yugoslav doctrine, then there are various kinds of groups:

18 reconnaissance groups, observation groups, tactical groups, combat groups,

19 and of course higher level, temporary groups such as operational groups,

20 strategic groups, up to the highest level.

21 These groups function only for as long as they are carrying out

22 the tasks for which they have been formed. When the task is complete or

23 ceases to exist, then the groups are disbanded. The leaders commanding

24 and leading these groups only lead them for as long as they exist. When

25 the need for that group ceases, then the commanding officer is no longer

Page 4792

1 the commanding officer of that group.

2 So command responsibility follows from the command relationship.

3 The leaders and commanders of groups are the leaders and commanders of

4 temporary entities, and as such they set up and establish a temporary

5 command relation. Because this is a temporary relation, their

6 responsibility is also temporary. So these are ad hoc units and ad hoc

7 groups and not permanent ones.

8 Q. What was the position of the accused Dragoljub Kunarac within the

9 framework of the command structure of the army of Republika Srpska which

10 was later established?

11 A. Dragoljub Kunarac, as far as I was able to conclude in my expert

12 opinion, was the leader of a reconnaissance group. Because at that time

13 the army of Republika Srpska was being created, this was an ongoing

14 process, and in Foca this process lasts longer because there were no JNA

15 units there whose infrastructure, depots, command infrastructure,

16 barracks, and systems could be used by the emerging army of Republika

17 Srpska, and that is why this process took a little longer.

18 Dragoljub Kunarac was appointed leader of a reconnaissance group,

19 meaning that he was the first man to reconnoitre and to gather or collect

20 a group of people when he was given a reconnaissance task. This meant

21 that he was trained to reconnoitre, he was the best reconnaissance man,

22 and as such he was trusted to be capable. When he was sent out to

23 reconnoitre, he formed a group.

24 Since this was an ad hoc group, the composition of the group was

25 always different. It need not be 100 per cent different, but in principle

Page 4793

1 it was. It depended on the kind of reconnaissance task, the area where it

2 was to be carried out, and the military specialities that the task and the

3 group required.

4 The group could do general reconnaissance work, which meant

5 gathering data on the elements of the deployment of the enemy. They would

6 go 20, 30, 50 kilometres deep into enemy territory, and there could be

7 several groups in the same area each consisting of several reconnaissance

8 men, and the groups would carry out their tasks during a certain time.

9 Secondly, the group could be given the task of gathering

10 information on mines, minefields, and explosive obstacles in the areas

11 where their own units would be moving, and they could be given the task of

12 reconnoitring to discover the health situation, the epidemiological

13 situation. Then they would be completely -- the men required would be

14 offered different profiles. There would be people trained to test water,

15 for example. If it was mines and explosives, they would be people trained

16 to deal with mines, explosives, trained to discover the edges of

17 minefields. And unfortunately we know that they have led to tragic

18 consequences in the former Yugoslavia.

19 From the documentation I had available, I saw that Mr. Kunarac was

20 an engineers man and that he was trained to lay mines, to deactivate

21 mines, to clear minefields, to deal with explosives, and especially to

22 remove booby traps, and as such, he, of course, was assigned such tasks.

23 Very often in the terminology, this kind of job, that is, clearing mines

24 and booby traps, especially in abandoned buildings -- and such cases

25 occurred frequently -- this kind of task is called cleansing the

Page 4794

1 territory. In the doctrine of the JNA, "cleansing the terrain" meant

2 clearing mines, unexploded mines, unexploded shells, booby traps, and so

3 on.

4 Dragoljub Kunarac was trained to carry out all these reconnoitring

5 tasks, and it was for these tasks that he was given the job of forming a

6 reconnaissance group. After the task of the group was completed, when he

7 reported on his return to the commander who had sent him to reconnoitre,

8 the group would be disbanded, and from that moment on there was no command

9 responsibility of the leader over the group.

10 Of course, in his report, the leader of a reconnaissance group was

11 obliged to report if there had been any incidents. If members of his

12 group had behaved badly, he had to report on this, and that was the end of

13 his command responsibility over that group. Naturally, he would no longer

14 be held responsible for anything they did after they left the group.

15 The only thing Kunarac could have done would be not to select them

16 for his group again, and this would be punishment for them because he was

17 a braver soldier, he was held in high esteem, he had distinguished himself

18 in the fighting for Rogoj which was crucial for the whole Drina Valley,

19 and especially for Foca, and he was looked up to as a very brave man, and

20 of course men wanted to go with him.

21 In my interviews with people, studying the situation in the field

22 when carrying out this study of mine, I learned that he was held in high

23 esteem and that soldiers wanted to be chosen by him, and they would have

24 felt very bad if he had excluded them from a group of which he was the

25 leader.

Page 4795

1 Q. Could you tell us, please, General, something about the

2 formational and functional duties of Dragoljub Kunarac, whether they

3 coincide, whether they are different, or anything of that kind?

4 A. Well, they can be the same, the role can be the same, or the role

5 can be different of these formation establishment matters.

6 When they coincide, the command function, when it coincides with

7 formation and establishment in the regular units, then there is no

8 difference. That means the following: If the commander of the brigade

9 has been appointed by a colonel, for example, then his command

10 responsibility and his functional responsibility is the same. But if this

11 does not coincide, if the formation establishment position and the command

12 position do not coincide, then there is a difference between this

13 functional and command responsibility.

14 So in temporary command relationships, then there is, indeed, a

15 difference between these two types of responsibilities; that is to say, it

16 is not the same if somebody is a leader of a reconnaissance group as an ad

17 hoc formation or if he is the leader of a company within the formation of

18 an infantry artillery motorised unit or brigade. So there's a difference

19 there.

20 Q. Yes, I understand. Thank you. You said that there was an ad hoc

21 group. Can you explain what kind of ad hoc group within the Foca Brigade

22 existed?

23 A. I have already partially answered your question. So an ad hoc

24 group is a reconnaissance group which is formed each time an assignment

25 has to be carried out. When the need arose for the group to do

Page 4796

1 reconnaissance work, then a reconnaissance group would be formed. But for

2 every type of assignment and in every type of military activity, groups of

3 this kind need not be formed.

4 It is common knowledge that Dragoljub Kunarac is the potential

5 leader of such a group if ever the need arises for a group of that kind to

6 be formed and go on assignment, until the units were developed enough to

7 become permanent fixtures, so to speak.

8 Q. Can you explain to us, General, the following type of situation:

9 For example, a group is sent to the region, the area of the 1st or 2nd

10 Battalion area. Could you tell us under whose command that group is

11 placed?

12 A. In a case of that kind, a temporary command relationship is

13 established. The commander -- the leader of the group by decision of the

14 superior officer is sent out on assignment, but the assignment will take

15 place in the area of responsibility of the commander he is attached to;

16 and he has to report to that commander, the commander of the battalion,

17 and exercise tasks at his orders, so he is responsible to him. But once

18 he returns from his assignment, before he completely completes that

19 assignment, he must report to his commander.

20 Q. Can you tell us who in general terms was Dragoljub Kunarac'

21 superior?

22 A. The commander of the tactical group of Foca was the superior of

23 Dragoljub Kunarac and every time when he was not attached to another

24 commander. But even then, the commander of the tactical group does not

25 lose his command responsibility over him; he just delegates, if I can use

Page 4797

1 that term, his command responsibility to the other commander.

2 Q. These past few days, Dragoljub Kunarac was a witness here and

3 testified himself, and I notice that he very often said, "I sent a man to

4 bring such and such a thing, I went to the hospital to ensure the

5 transport of soldiers from Foca to Podgorica," and so forth and so forth.

6 He would often speak in those terms.

7 Could you tell us, please, whether that kind of behaviour can be

8 linked up to the function of command?

9 A. No, this kind of behaviour cannot be brought -- be linked up with

10 the function of command. In every collective, particularly in army

11 collectives, and more especially in situations during wartime,

12 personalities impose themselves by virtue of their capabilities and they

13 become leaders without any position, actual position in the command

14 system.

15 And Dragoljub Kunarac was probably considered capable, and he

16 considered himself to be capable with respect to the distinctions he

17 acquired during combat, and that he was held in high esteem. And he was

18 probably aware himself that he could solve complicated situations and did

19 so, took steps to do so. But this did not emanate from his position in

20 the chain of command, so it is not his a priori responsibility on the

21 basis of any formal position in the hierarchy of command and control,

22 chain of command.

23 Q. Do I understand you correctly, General, are we able to conclude,

24 according to what you have told us, that Dragoljub Kunarac cannot be

25 responsible for the acts of soldiers who took part with him during the

Page 4798

1 combat assignment for acts that they carry out outside their combat

2 assignment?

3 A. No, he cannot be held responsible for those acts, if any such acts

4 occurred, because Dragoljub Kunarac was not their leader. Dragoljub

5 Kunarac had command responsibility towards them exclusively from the time

6 the group was formed until the group returns from that particular

7 assignment for which he had received orders and was authorised. From that

8 moment on, he ceases his role of control over that group.

9 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, at this point the

10 Defence would like to show a tape, which lasts approximately two to three

11 minutes, which it received as exculpatory material from the Prosecution.

12 The tape is, in fact, an interview with the first wartime commander of

13 Foca where he mentions some commanders, and we shall see whether he

14 mentions the accused Kunarac, before I go on to ask the General some more

15 questions, that is to say, whether this position is borne out by the tape

16 itself.

17 For purposes of the technical group, that is the last tape that

18 the Defence team has handed in.

19 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, you can go ahead.

20 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] We have a translation of the

21 text. The text is very brief, so you'll be able to follow.

22 The General understands the language spoken. There's no need to

23 hand him a copy.

24 I should like to ask the technical booth -- just one moment

25 please. It is the last cassette that the Defence handed in.

Page 4799

1 THE INTERPRETER: "Also, I must mention here the first commandants

2 in war: Kunarac Lazar, Zoran Vukovic, Brana Cosovic, Slavko Todovic,

3 Dragan Nikolic, Nade Radovic, Zdravko Kovac, Ljubisa Dostic, Bora

4 Ivanovic, Gojko Jankovic, Pero Elez, Jovan Vukovic, Slavomir Zivanovic

5 Zuca and Radomir Pljevaljcic. There were others as well."

6 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, that is enough. Thank

7 you to the technical booth.

8 Q. You have heard the interview of the first wartime commander, and

9 you were able to note that he does not mention the name and surname of the

10 accused, Dragoljub Kunarac.

11 JUDGE MUMBA: Could we have the transcript and the tape also

12 numbered, please.

13 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, I did intend to

14 tender this into evidence a moment later, but it doesn't matter, I'm

15 willing to comply with the order.

16 THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] The tape will be marked D90,

17 Defence Exhibit, and the transcript will be numbered D90/1, Defence

18 Exhibit.

19 JUDGE MUMBA: Any objection?

20 MR. RYNEVELD: No, not an objection to the entry of the tape or to

21 the translation, but I'm advised that there's more to what was said than

22 merely these words on this piece of paper. I believe the words were "and

23 others as well." So in and by itself, this is not an exclusive list, as I

24 understand it. This is an enumerated list absent the words "and others as

25 well," and I think it may be of some significance to the next question my

Page 4800

1 friend is about to put.

2 JUDGE MUMBA: Let's hear the Defence.

3 JUDGE HUNT: That was the translation.

4 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] "And others who have left their

5 bones there," that means to say who were killed there. That is the full

6 text. That is the continuation of that sentence. We can listen to the

7 tape again if you wish.

8 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, let's have it. Let's hear it again so we can

9 all listen to the translation and see whether or not that is correct.

10 THE INTERPRETER: "First commandants in war: Kunarac Lazar, Zoran

11 Vukovic, Brana Cosovic, Slavko Todovic, Dragan Nikolic, Nade Radovic,

12 Zdravko Kovac, Ljubisa Dostic, Bora Ivanovic, Gojko Jankovic, Pero Elez,

13 Jovan Vukovic, Slavomir Zivanovic, Zuca and Radomir Pljevaljcic.

14 "There were other heroes who left their bones or who are now

15 commanding. And unfortunately, amongst the ones I have enumerated, some

16 of them are not alive, and I don't want to mention their names, but for

17 the Serbian people, for Serbia and for me myself, they will always remain

18 wartime commandants for me."

19 I'm afraid the tape is too fast and indistinct after this.

20 Interpreter's note.

21 JUDGE MUMBA: So you only want it up to where, after the word

22 "bones"?

23 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the individual who

24 was speaking, the last commander was "and Radomir Pljevaljcic," and that

25 is full stop. He says there were other heroes who left their bones, and

Page 4801

1 so on and so forth as the text proceeds.

2 JUDGE HUNT: And the text as translated "and who are now

3 commanding".

4 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, that was my point. And it goes on to say,

5 "Some of them are not alive."

6 By stopping where it does, it leaves the impression that's it.

7 And even my friend's assurances that the ones who have left their bones

8 behind, I just think you can't take an excerpt like this and stop it where

9 he did and leave perhaps incorrect impression.

10 JUDGE HUNT: But we've now got a translation on the transcript, so

11 that's sufficient, is it not? Exhibit D90/1 is of very little value, but

12 if we look at what is now page 62 of today's transcript, whatever number

13 that becomes, we'll see the whole translation of it.

14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would like to suggest that it

15 be double-checked because the tone and speed was such that we cannot

16 guarantee whether that was actually the whole thing that was on the tape.

17 JUDGE HUNT: I agree.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: The only point that I wanted to make, and Your

19 Honour is quite right, we now have something. I just didn't want to leave

20 it where my friend suggested that it ought to be left, that's all.

21 JUDGE HUNT: It also refers to first commandants, Mr. Prodanovic.

22 But anyway, we'll have the whole lot of it checked.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, Mr. Prodanovic. Yes, the Trial Chamber will

25 have it from the quotation on D90/1 up to the end of the translation,

Page 4802

1 we'll have that double-checked because the translators-- the interpreters

2 did say it was going a bit too fast for them, so it's only up to the end

3 of where the interpreters tried to run with it.

4 JUDGE HUNT: As I understand it, it would have to include the

5 passage which they said was travelling too quickly. It's been played to

6 us, and we should have the translation of what was played to us. So the

7 amount that was played to us should be checked by the translators.

8 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Have I understood you correctly?

9 Has this been admitted into evidence as an exhibit?


11 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. Perhaps

12 this is the proper moment to take a break.

13 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, we'll break for now until 1430 hours this

14 afternoon.

15 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.01 p.m.











Page 4803

1 --- On resuming at 2.31 p.m.

2 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes. We are continuing with the

3 examination-in-chief, please.

4 Mr. Prodanovic.

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Mr. Radinovic, I already told you that an expert witness was

7 already heard concerning these matters, Mr. Nogo, and his line of thinking

8 differs from yours. I would like to put a few questions to you that were

9 put to him and the answers that he gave, and I would like to ask you for

10 your position on this.

11 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] In order to facilitate matters,

12 for my colleagues from the Prosecution and for the Honourable Judges, this

13 question is on page 37.

14 Q. When my colleague asked: "If you have a group of soldiers among

15 whom some do not have a rank and among them is a squad leader, a corporal,

16 who would be in charge?" Mr. Nogo's answer is "A corporal, a squad

17 leader." Do you share Mr. Nogo's opinion?

18 A. No. He might, but by definition it is not so, because the command

19 responsibility does not come from the lance corporal's position in the

20 unit. A lance corporal is a military rank, and in order to command, he

21 has to qualify in the practice of command, that is to say, that he has to

22 assert himself in fighting, in the unit, and then he can only qualify to

23 become leader.

24 Q. "If you have a group of soldiers and you do not have a single one

25 who has the official rank of lance corporal, who would be in charge of

Page 4804

1 that group of soldiers?" that was the question, and the answer is: "That

2 man who is most capable --"

3 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Prodanovic please slow down. The

4 interpreters do not have this text.

5 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, please do slow down for the

6 interpreters.

7 A. Yes, but under the following proviso. Somebody can become leader

8 of a group exclusively on the decision of and on the recommendation of his

9 superiors.

10 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] In order to make it easier to

11 follow, these questions are on page 3938.

12 Q. "If someone takes control," this is the next question, "and if

13 someone is subordinated, if someone gives instructions, gives orders, can

14 that person be considered a commander, a leader?" The answer of Mr. Nogo

15 is: "That person that issues orders is considered to be a leader,

16 commander."

17 A. My answer is that this is not possible on the basis of these

18 assumptions. In order to give orders, one has to have a certain rank

19 within the establishment, within the permanent setup of units. If that is

20 not the case, as is the case in this particular case, somebody has to

21 authorise him to do so. It is not that someone can consider himself to be

22 a leader or that someone may consider himself to be a leader and he can

23 take over command. No. Explicitly, the superior has to appoint such a

24 person leader.

25 Q. Furthermore, the question is as follows: "If you have a leader,

Page 4805

1 how far do his powers go? Is it during the military task only or between

2 assignments?" That's the question. The answer: "At any point in time, a

3 leader is a leader of his unit." Can you agree with such a position?

4 A. No. If this person were to be taking an exam in my classroom, I

5 would have flunked him, because there has to be a unit for someone to be a

6 commander of a unit. That is an elementary situation.

7 So if there is a unit, then the commander of that unit is always

8 the commander of that unit, when they are on assignment and when they're

9 off. However, if there is not a unit, if we're only talking about a

10 temporary setup, then the commander, on the basis of his superiors,

11 commands this temporary structure for as long as the assignment lasts.

12 When the assignment is over, then his task is over.

13 Q. So you have answered this question.

14 Page 3940 --

15 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic, those pages of the transcript, which

16 document? We just want to be clear.

17 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The

18 transcript.

19 JUDGE MUMBA: Thank you, thank you.

20 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] The transcript.

21 Q. In response to the question, "Can a reconnaissance unit be under

22 the command of someone who holds a low rank like lance corporal," the

23 answer is, "Yes, it is feasible."

24 A. No, it is not feasible. A reconnaissance unit cannot be under a

25 lance corporal's command. A group can, but not a reconnaissance unit by

Page 4806

1 no means. A reconnaissance platoon, a reconnaissance company, that is

2 what persons who are commissioned officers can do only, not even

3 non-commissioned officers, and certainly not persons with the rank of

4 private.

5 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, question on page

6 3941.

7 Q. In response to the following question: "Is there any difference

8 as far as the authority of command or the chain of command if the

9 commander is included as a lance corporal instead of an officer?" That

10 was the question. The answer of Mr. Nogo is, "Responsibility is

11 responsibility. It is the same for all. Every rank bears its own

12 responsibility. If somebody is the commander of a certain unit, then he

13 is responsible for that unit."

14 Is that your position, too?

15 A. Regrettably, no. I have already answered that question in my

16 previous answer. So in order to have someone become commander of a unit,

17 there has to be a unit in the first place. There is no unit here; there

18 is no responsibility of that sort. There is only functional

19 responsibility and also command responsibility while the task is still

20 on.

21 When the assignment is over, the group is disbanded, and the

22 leader of that group submits a report, and that is the end of that

23 particular group's responsibility.

24 Q. The question on page 3942, the last paragraph: "Let us assume

25 according to this hypothesis that there is a group of, for example, of 12

Page 4807

1 or more persons, or more persons that this person can choose. And let us

2 assume that he selects three or four persons for a particular assignment

3 with whom he will go into battle. What would you say about his

4 responsibility for a group of about eight persons?" If I'm not mistaken,

5 those who have remained behind -- that was the question.

6 The answer of Mr. Nogo: "After the task is completed, when he

7 returns to the group or when they return, eight or any number of persons

8 you mentioned, the persons who remained behind have to say whether there

9 were any problems, and they have to report to their superior whether there

10 were any problems and to inform about the accomplishment of the task in

11 question."

12 You have already answered --

13 A. The question implies, a priori, that there is a unit, but that is

14 not acceptable, I think, so in the question itself there is the inception

15 of a wrong answer.

16 Q. Question: "Could this person ask the military police to

17 intervene, help, or detain, for example, certain persons?" That was the

18 question, please, and this is page 3944. Answer: "Yes, he can through

19 his superior officer ask for the military police to be engaged and to

20 detain certain persons."

21 A. He cannot request any sanctions against persons who are not under

22 his command responsibility, and therefore he does not have command

23 responsibility vis-à-vis these persons. If somebody from the previous

24 group remained outside the group that was formed subsequently again, an ad

25 hoc group, then he has no responsibility vis-à-vis those persons who

Page 4808

1 remained outside the group, and therefore no obligations or

2 responsibilities in terms of seeking sanctions.

3 Q. Further on page 3945: "Well, that means that he could spend some

4 time visiting certain places and then go to visit other places that would

5 still be part of his men under his command." Answer: "These persons are

6 certainly within the zone of responsibility of the unit under whose

7 command they are, and he can come to visit them on these different

8 places." You have already --

9 A. A group that is formed ad hoc does not have a zone of

10 responsibility. Only units that are of a permanent nature have their zone

11 of responsibility. Ad hoc groups do not, except for a particular

12 assignment for which they are formed. When the assignment is over, then

13 they have no further responsibility.

14 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] That would be my last question,

15 Your Honours. I'd like to thank Mr. Radinovic.

16 Mr. Kolesar has the intention of putting a few questions.

17 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, Mr. Kolesar.

18 Examined by Mr. Kolesar:

19 Q. Good day, General.

20 A. Good day.

21 Q. During your testimony today, you explained the importance and

22 essence of the Territorial Defence. Can you tell us what the difference

23 is between Territorial Defence units and units that belong to the reserve

24 force, if there is a difference?

25 A. Of course there is a difference. Members of the reserve force are

Page 4809

1 members of the Yugoslav People's Army, that is to say, those who belong to

2 its war force, that is to say, military-age men up to the age of 60,

3 according to our law and according to the law on the armed forces.

4 Members of the Territorial Defence are deployed in the Territorial

5 Defence, and they are always outside the force. They are activated only

6 when there is an imminent threat of war and a state of war, so they are

7 only on paper deployed in the Territorial Defence, and they function only

8 in wartime.

9 Members of the reserve force are asked to come for military

10 exercises, and this is compulsory. This is exactly prescribed, what kind

11 of exercises they have to go through, and also the methodology for this is

12 prescribed, so there is a difference.

13 There is also a difference in terms of the quality of the persons

14 on the force priority when taking into account the demographic mass in

15 terms of quality, professional qualifications. Priority is given to the

16 reserve force of the operative army, and only when this has been

17 completed, then the Territorial Defence gets its membership.

18 Q. According to military doctrine and according to what happened in

19 practice, what about the members of the Territorial Defence and the

20 members of the reserve force in peacetime? Are they issued some military

21 equipment; if so, what kind of military equipment?

22 A. Yes, there is a difference there. Members of the Territorial

23 Defence are not issued with equipment. Equipment is in warehouses, and

24 when Territorial Defence units are activated, then equipment is

25 distributed; whereas members of the reserve force are issued this in

Page 4810

1 advance, that is, footwear, uniform, clothing, and weapons remain in

2 warehouses, and there is no difference in that respect between the

3 Territorial Defence and reserve force.

4 Q. Persons who did not do their compulsory military service -- I do

5 apologise, I do apologise.

6 Persons who did not do their military service, can they become

7 members of reserve force units or TO units?

8 A. No, they cannot. The Territorial Defence and the Yugoslav

9 People's Army are part of the single armed forces, so we're talking about

10 a member of the armed forces.

11 For someone to become a member of the armed forces, he or she has

12 to undergo military training, has to train for basic military duties. You

13 must bear in mind the difference between a member of the Territorial

14 Defence and a military conscript. A military conscript is a broader

15 notion than that of member of the armed forces. All young men from the

16 age of 16 onwards, that is to say, up to the age of 60, are military

17 conscripts, so all of them are military conscripts; whereas members of the

18 force have to be trained first and foremost, and only then can they go

19 into the force.

20 Q. And a question that builds up onto this, that is to say, persons

21 who did not do their military service, can they hold any kind of command

22 post, either in war or in peace, or can they command any military unit,

23 either in peace or in war, peacetime, for example, during military

24 exercises?

25 A. They cannot hold any command post vis-à-vis units of the armed

Page 4811

1 forces.

2 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Ryneveld.

3 MR. RYNEVELD: Might I just interject at this point. I take it

4 this is going somewhere, but at the moment I question its relevance. The

5 only evidence with respect to Mr. Kunarac is that he had received military

6 training, and we've had no evidence with respect to Mr. Kovac or

7 Mr. Vukovic. So I'm just wondering where this is going.

8 JUDGE MUMBA: So you're objecting?

9 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry. Yes, I object on the basis of

10 relevance, and I ought say that when I stand up. I assume that by

11 standing I'm indicating my objection. I'm sorry.

12 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Kolesar, where are those questions leading to?

13 Can you show us the relevance?

14 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honour, during these

15 proceedings there has often been mention of the Territorial Defence and

16 reservists, and my questions are introductory questions because I will now

17 ask about the organisation of the army of the Republika Srpska, and then I

18 will ask for a comment connected to the order of the commander of the Foca

19 Group of the 7th of July which was commented on by Major Nogo.

20 I think that we could talk about what is in the order, and in the

21 view of the Defence, it's relevant for Kovac's Defence. In order to do

22 this, we had to have an introduction, so I believe that all my questions

23 are relevant.

24 JUDGE HUNT: Mr. Kolesar, how does it relate to your client? I

25 think that's the objection that's been taken.

Page 4812

1 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honour, to introduce the expert

2 to the questions that are to follow connected to the responsibility of the

3 commander of a tactical group and the order of the 7th of July, I believe

4 that I had to put a few introductory questions to introduce him to the

5 topics I'm about to question him on.

6 JUDGE HUNT: The objection, as I understood it, was that it didn't

7 relate in any way to your client. When you actually get to the point you

8 want to get the comment on, how does it relate to your client? That's the

9 objection. If you can tell us, you can get on with it.

10 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] In relation to my client, the

11 relevance is the following: In the indictment it says that Kovac was the

12 deputy of the leader of a paramilitary unit and the deputy of the leader

13 of a parapolice unit and that he also was a member of a certain

14 detachment. This detachment is mentioned in the order of the 7th of the

15 July, and I believe that this is very relevant for my client.

16 JUDGE HUNT: Thank you.

17 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes. Proceed.

18 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation]

19 Q. My next question relates to my request that you explain to us the

20 organisational structure of the army of Republika Srpska, the way it was

21 organised. What we are most interested in is the year 1992.

22 A. The year 1992 was the year when the army of Republika Srpska was

23 created. It had its Main Staff, which was an expert organ, to set up an

24 army. It also had corps commands as its immediately subordinated

25 operative commands. Within the corps there were brigades and independent

Page 4813

1 units, and depending on whether there were infantry or artillery units,

2 battalions and regiments had companies, companies had platoons, and

3 platoons had squads.

4 This is the organisational structure of the army of Republika

5 Srpska, which is very similar to any military organisation anywhere in the

6 world and any army. There are no essential differences. There were

7 differences, of course, but only with respect to the degree to which the

8 army had been built up at the time that you are asking about.

9 This is the time when the army was being set up, when it existed

10 more on paper, establishment documents with boxes in which to ascribe the

11 names of units, but to a lesser extent actually on the ground. In fact,

12 later on the units were much better organised, and if we were talking

13 about 1995 we would not be in any doubt.

14 Q. Very well. If I understood you correctly, when you were talking

15 about the organisational structure, you started from the highest level and

16 then went down to the lowest level.

17 A. Yes. I am a General so I start from the top.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] I would now like to ask the usher to

20 show the witness Prosecution Exhibit 2, which is an order of the 7th of

21 July, 1992, in the Serbian language.

22 Q. You have received a copy of the order. Do you know about this

23 order?

24 A. Yes. When I was preparing my expert opinion, I saw this order.

25 Q. Very well, then. We can begin.

Page 4814

1 On page 4 of the Serbian version, which corresponds to page 3 of

2 the version in English, there is mention of an independent detachment, the

3 Dragan Nikolic Detachment. So how come there is mention of an independent

4 detachment, and what is an independent detachment as a military unit?

5 A. Detachments are mentioned, of course, in this order, and I am

6 almost certain that this is a tradition from the partisan army. In the

7 kind of army that the JNA was and the armed forces of the second

8 Yugoslavia, they inherited much of their tradition from the national

9 liberation struggle in World War II, and that is why detachments were part

10 of the JNA establishment.

11 By analogy with partisan detachments, detachments were not part of

12 the operative establishment of the JNA but they were part of the

13 Territorial Defence. So I am referring to a detachment as a unit that

14 existed in the establishment. The JNA did have detachments but they were

15 not formal elements. They were established ad hoc in combat to block

16 roads, to clear the terrain, to clear communications, and so on. But they

17 only existed in the establishment of the Territorial Defence in its

18 territorial structure which was intended to be active in the local area,

19 hometown area. They consisted of companies. Many of them consisted only

20 of platoons which means they were even smaller.

21 In 1992 it was more likely to be a platoon-sized unit than a

22 company-sized unit, because most of these detachments came into being as a

23 form of spontaneous military organisation in the field. Because we know

24 that in Foca there were no JNA units, and the Territorial Defence was

25 mostly under the command of officers who were ethnic Muslims, so there was

Page 4815

1 a dissolution of the Territorial Defence and the Serbian villages created

2 their own territorial detachments in certain villages and local areas.

3 Q. So according to you, detachments can be at platoon, company, or

4 battalion level?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. I'm interested in the leader of such a unit. How many men would

7 he have under his command?

8 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Kolesar, please remember to wait after your

9 witness has answered.

10 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Yes, I will.

11 A. If we know that a platoon has 30 men -- all platoons everywhere

12 have between 25 and 30 men, apart from independent platoons which can be

13 more numerous -- if a company has from 90 to 120 men, except for

14 independent companies which are more numerous, then if we are talking

15 about a platoon size, it can have 50 to 60 men, and the next one can have

16 200 to 300 men at the most.

17 Q. In the order it says "Independent Detachment."

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is it subordinated to a certain command, and does anyone, and who,

20 issues commands to it?

21 A. From this order it follows that this was a detachment that was

22 directly subordinated to the commander of the Foca Tactical Group.

23 Otherwise, he would not have given them a task but his superior officer

24 would have done so.

25 The detachment is independent. According to the doctrine, some

Page 4816

1 units are independent units when it is desired to link them to the highest

2 level of command. It means that they are independent of every other level

3 of command except for the commander of the tactical group. So they are

4 directly subordinated to the commander of the tactical group.

5 The question might arise, why would the commander of a tactical

6 group link such a small unit to himself? Well, because it was there. It

7 was in the process of being created, and until its establishment and

8 organisation was regulated, the commander of the tactical group linked it

9 to himself and called it an independent detachment. But when they were

10 carrying out a task, he attached them to his units. He attached them to

11 the 1st Battalion. So obviously this was a lower level unit than a

12 battalion unit, and they were carrying out tasks within the scope of that

13 battalion.

14 Q. A question that is connected to this is: Can the commander of a

15 tactical group attach an independent detachment to another unit within the

16 tactical group and at the same time transfer the command authority to the

17 commander of that unit to which the independent detachment is attached?

18 A. Yes, he can attach a unit directly subordinated to him to wherever

19 he believes it is most necessary. He believed they were most needed by

20 the 1st Battalion, so he attached it to the commander of the 1st Battalion

21 thus establishing a temporary command relationship between the commander

22 of the 1st Battalion and the unit that was attached to him.

23 Until the task for which this kind of setup was created was

24 finished, the Independent Dragan Nikolic Detachment was under the

25 immediate command of the battalion to which it was attached. And when the

Page 4817

1 tactical operation is finished, the independent detachment is again

2 withdrawn from his command automatically.

3 Q. Would you agree with me that these independent detachments,

4 according to this establishment and according to the order as it stands,

5 represent some kind of intervention and highly moral unit?

6 A. They certainly have a high degree of confidence. They enjoy a

7 high degree of confidence with their commander. If they did not have this

8 kind of reputation, the commander would disband the unit, and he would

9 distribute the men among his other subordinated units. And unsuccessful

10 units are usually disbanded, and the men were distributed among other

11 units to preserve the order.

12 Q. In combat operations, can an independent detachment act

13 independently of the command of the commander of the tactical group or the

14 commander of the unit to which they are attached?

15 A. The term "independent" does not refer to their being separated

16 from the chain of command of the tactical group; it simply means that in

17 the first degree, they're subordinated to the commander of the tactical

18 group on an equal footing with battalions and other units. It does not

19 act autonomously but within the framework within the tactical group, and

20 they are directly supervised by the commander of the tactical group,

21 except when he attaches them to one of his other units, in this case, the

22 1st Battalion.

23 Q. On page 4 of the Serbian text and the third page in the English

24 text it says that, "He participated in the liberation and clearing of the

25 villages of Ilovaca and further on."

Page 4818

1 You mentioned the term cleansing. Could you explain to us in

2 greater detail what is meant by liberating and cleansing an inhabited

3 place?

4 A. This -- well, liberation means liberation from enemy units. This

5 means either breaking up the enemy units or taking them prisoner or

6 expelling them, making them retreat and hand over the territory because

7 they are forced to by the fighting, and setting up military control over

8 the area. That is what the term liberation means.

9 The term cleansing in our doctrine implies the removal of mines

10 and explosive devices, which means minefields which are documented or

11 not. If they are documented, the minefields are de-mined on the basis of

12 the documentation. The documentation is compared to the terrain. If

13 there is no documentation, then a reconnaissance is carried out, and we

14 have already discussed this. So that is what de-mining is.

15 Then the removal of booby traps of when there is fighting in

16 built-up areas and an enemy is withdrawing from the area, they can leave

17 various booby traps, these are various devices, sabotage devices. And to

18 prevent unnecessary casualties, these booby traps have to be found and

19 removed. This is a very risky procedure, and those that do it have to be

20 very well trained and very brave.

21 Cleansing further implies the removal and destruction of

22 unexploded artillery grenades, bombs, rockets, shells, and so on;

23 furthermore, the removal of explosives which are a combination of

24 trenches. When there is a hole dug in the ground and it is filled with

25 explosives and pieces of stones and other materials, and to prevent an

Page 4819

1 explosion and casualties, this kind of obstacle has to be removed. Either

2 it has to be destroyed or deactivated. That is what cleansing means in

3 the doctrine.

4 Q. I'm interested in something else. What happens to the civilian

5 population which stays behind for various reasons in the combat zone?

6 A. In wars of this kind, in civil wars, the civilian population as a

7 rule does not stay behind, but even if they do, this absolutely does not,

8 does not refer to the civilian population. And this is regulated by

9 international law, and every soldier and officer is obliged to comply with

10 the international law. Military doctrine does not have the right to

11 regulate this.

12 Q. Would you now please look at page 5 of the Serbian text, page 4 of

13 the English text, the chapter on military security -- on combat security.

14 It says, "To prevent mutual conflicts on the left flank, every soldier

15 will carry -- on his shoulder will put three-colour ribbon." Why is this

16 done?

17 A. In wars such as civil wars and like the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina

18 in which the fighting parties are trifold, there are three parties, and

19 between people who speak the similar language, I would say identical

20 language, you can tell by the -- you cannot tell the difference very often

21 by syntax, grammar, and so on.

22 Now, if the fighters have identical uniforms and you cannot

23 distinguish the insignia on caps, then for safety purposes, the leaders

24 and commanders prescribe the type of insignia that their soldiers should

25 wear so that they are not mixed up with the enemy and to avoid all this

Page 4820

1 kind of thing, and that is legitimate. It is the legitimate right of the

2 leader and commander how he is going to -- what provisions he's going to

3 make his soldiers wear, what insignia.

4 Q. As a military expert, could you tell us from the professional

5 side, could you comment on this order from the professional side? I

6 should like to say in this regard that Major Nogo who, by virtue of his

7 rank and his professional training, is of a far lower rank than you

8 yourself, and he assessed this particular order as a weak order,

9 especially because it does not contain the time when the combat activities

10 ceased.

11 A. I do not know why the gentleman assessed that order as such. In

12 my professional view, and I hope I shall not be immodest in saying this

13 because I taught officers in military schools how to write combat orders,

14 this order has all the elements which are indispensable for a professional

15 act of command. First of all, an assessment of the enemy; second, an

16 assessment of one's own forces; third, the neighbour; fifth [sic], the

17 basic concept or decision of the commander or the leader. The fifth point

18 would be specific assignments and the tasks of the subordinate units; and

19 the other points would be prescribing all the duties to ensure security,

20 which includes security, political, legal, logistical, artillery support,

21 and so on and so forth; and finally, command links communications and the

22 sending in of combat reports. All that would be included in an order of

23 this kind.

24 I have not been able to identify combat, the combat orders of

25 subordinate leaders and commanders which -- who executed this order.

Page 4821

1 There are two possibilities for this. Either they are not professional

2 enough and did not have the necessary knowledge, which is not very likely

3 because they were professionally-trained officers; or this order was

4 disbanded, that is to say, the situation had changed and this order had to

5 be forgotten, and it is this second solution that is more probable because

6 there is not a single report.

7 The comment made by the military expert Mr. Nogo that this order

8 does not contain a report, that is not indispensable. On the contrary,

9 that is not something that a combat order would contain because reports

10 are sent in after the assignment has been accomplished. So this order

11 binds the subordinates to send reports later on, which are sent regularly

12 on a daily basis, usually at the end of each day, but in extraordinary

13 circumstances they can be sent as the need arises. But the order would

14 have had to have been carried out, and then the reporting take place, but

15 it is not a component part of a combat order.

16 Q. I'm not sure that we understood each other in this final point.

17 We are talking about the fact that in the combat order, the combat order

18 does not say how long the combat operations were lost. Is this something

19 that a combat order must contain?

20 A. Some combat orders do contain this in large-scale operations, then

21 the stages of the individual combat operations are set, what each stage

22 should contain, the first stage, second stage, third stage, et cetera.

23 But in orders of this type, they determine the next most important

24 assignments, the immediate assignments, and usually the next immediate

25 assignment is determined and described in terms of space, locality, and

Page 4822

1 targets, the targets to be achieved, not in terms of time.

2 Time is determined in principal for large-scale operations which

3 might go on for days, whereas short-term operations cannot be limited in

4 this way because the circumstances on the battlefield are subject to

5 speedy change or the time is extended one hour or two hours for individual

6 combat operations.

7 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I take a minute to

8 confer with my colleagues, please?

9 JUDGE MUMBA: Yes, please. Yes, you may proceed.

10 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I should like to put

11 right an error that is part of the expert finding that has been accepted.

12 We failed to tender it into evidence, so may we put right that omission?

13 JUDGE MUMBA: For which document? What did you not --

14 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] The written report by the expert

15 presented to the Trial Chamber and the Prosecution, part of it has been

16 accepted, the other part has not, and I'd like to tender it into evidence.

17 JUDGE MUMBA: We'd like to hear from the Prosecution because the

18 order of the Trial Chamber is clear.

19 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm not sure what my friend is saying. If what

20 he's saying is they would like to formally enter those portions of the

21 tendered report of Professor Radinovic into evidence, those that have been

22 permitted by your order, then I have no objections. If he's trying to put

23 in something other than what -- he wants to correct something other than

24 what we've been given, then I would have some concerns because I don't

25 know what the corrections are. I'm not quite clear on what he's asking to

Page 4823

1 do.

2 JUDGE HUNT: I don't think he wanted to correct the report; he

3 wanted to correct the omission to tender it. But when you say that those

4 parts of the report which we have permitted, we haven't dealt with the

5 whole report, we dealt only with the Prosecution's objections to it, and

6 we upheld some and we rejected some. We were not asked to deal with the

7 remainder of the report. That's why we want to hear it from you about the

8 report generally. If it was to be tendered, of course those passages

9 which have been rejected would not be evidence.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Now, I take it -- perhaps this ought to be

11 directed to my friends. Are they tendering the admissible portion of the

12 report with annexes, or simply the report -- I don't know. I have no

13 objection to the report being tendered and marked as an exhibit provided

14 that it refers only to those portions that you've ruled upon.

15 JUDGE HUNT: No, no, I'm sorry, you still don't seem to have

16 understood what I've said.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps not, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE HUNT: You took an objection to certain passages of the

19 report but not to all of them. You didn't specify anything in relation to

20 the many annexes --


22 JUDGE HUNT: -- as we pointed out in the decision which was

23 given.


25 JUDGE HUNT: We have upheld your objection to certain passages of

Page 4824

1 the report. We rejected your objection to other certain passages, but no

2 where have we dealt with the report as a whole. Now, if they want to

3 tender the report, I assume they want to tender the lot of it. I would

4 agree with you that those passages that we have already rejected cannot go

5 into evidence.


7 JUDGE HUNT: What about the remainder of it? That would include

8 everything that's attached to it, I would have thought.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Might I just confer with my colleagues.

10 JUDGE HUNT: Yes, certainly.

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

12 [Prosecution counsel confer]

13 MR. RYNEVELD: We have no difficulty with the report but we do

14 object to the admissibility of the annexes.

15 JUDGE HUNT: Well, Mr. Kolesar, what do you say about the

16 annexes?

17 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I asked, as an

18 exhibit, to be tendered -- the part to be tendered which has been

19 admitted; that is to say, where the objection of the Prosecutor has been

20 rejected. Now I see that the annex is being contested as well, so the

21 Defence will leave the annex out as well.

22 [Trial Chamber confers]

23 JUDGE HUNT: Mr. Kolesar, can I suggest this: that between you,

24 you and the Prosecution, with one of your English speaking colleagues, you

25 sort out between you the particular passages that you want to have

Page 4825

1 tendered and any particular annex that you want to have tendered, let them

2 sort out with you what their objection to it is, and we can deal with it

3 tomorrow. The witness doesn't have to be here for that.

4 But I myself am not clear what you're tendering, and I'm not clear

5 what the Prosecution is objecting to because of the very general way in

6 which the objections were originally taken. It would be very difficult

7 for us to sort it out here in court. So would you be able to discuss this

8 with the Prosecution after 4.00?

9 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do thank you for

10 that very useful suggestion, and we shall proceed along those lines.

11 JUDGE HUNT: Now, before you finish, I'd just like to ask you:

12 When you sought to justify your questioning, you told us that the

13 indictment says that your client was the member of a certain detachment

14 and this detachment is mentioned in the order of the 7th of July.

15 Now, the only detachment, if it is a detachment, to which your

16 client is said to be related is in paragraph 11.3 of the indictment. I'm

17 not sure that I'll get the pronunciation correctly but it talks of the

18 "Brane Cosovic Group, the same group to which Radomir Kovac belonged."

19 Now, so far as I can see, that's the only reference to any group, unit, or

20 otherwise to which your client is said to belong and, so far as I can see,

21 this order doesn't refer to that group at all.

22 So could you just help me? Where is it that you say your client

23 is referred to in the indictment to something which is mentioned in this

24 order?

25 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Just one moment, if I may, Your

Page 4826

1 Honour.


3 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] In the amended indictment and

4 supplemented indictment, in the particulars for the accused Kovac,

5 paragraph 2.2 -- I'm speaking of the B/C/S version, of course, which is on

6 page 4, and in the English version it is also on page 4 -- it says that he

7 was one of the subcommanders of the military police and a paramilitary

8 leader in Foca. As far as the Independent Dragan Nikolic Detachment is

9 concerned, it is practically identical with that formation of Cosa's,

10 because that so-called Cosa was the commander for a time of a unit and it

11 was either -- the official title was the Independent Detachment -- the

12 Dragan Nikolic Independent Detachment; other people called it, referred to

13 it as Cosa's Detachment.

14 JUDGE HUNT: Well, then, my next question is: Where is that named

15 in this order? I'm just trying to link up your client to --

16 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Yes. That does not exist in the

17 order. In the order we have the official title of the detachment. Now,

18 whether my client was a member of Cosa's Group or a member of the

19 Independent Detachment Dragan Nikolic, that remains to be proved and the

20 Defence will show that in due course, because it was evident he was within

21 the Dragan Nikolic formation.

22 JUDGE HUNT: Thank you very much for helping me out.

23 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] Before I conclude, Your Honours, in

24 view of the fact that it will be the cross-examination next, I assume, may

25 the Defence have contact with the witness after this, the expert witness,

Page 4827

1 or are we still prohibited contact with the witness?

2 JUDGE MUMBA: We will decide that later. So you are through with

3 the questions for this witness?

4 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] I am, Your Honour. Thank you very

5 much.

6 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Jovanovic, any questions?

7 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour. The Defence of

8 Mr. Vukovic has no questions for this witness.

9 JUDGE MUMBA: Cross-examination?

10 Cross-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

11 Q. Would you not agree, Professor Radinovic, that there was fighting

12 all over Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serb and Muslim forces, and it wasn't

13 just in the Foca, Gacko, or Kalinovik areas in 1992 and 1993? It was all

14 over Bosnia.

15 A. I would not agree with you fully, because there are parts of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina where the Serb and Muslim units did not clash, or the

17 ethnic communities for that matter, but where Muslim and Croat units and

18 ethnic communities clashed, and that is Central Bosnia and parts of

19 Herzegovina; that is to say, around Travnik, around Vakuf, around Zenica,

20 around Capljina, around Siroki Brijeg, Tomislavgrad, et cetera. Around

21 Kupres, Jablanica, that is where Croat and Muslim forces clashed.

22 Q. Would you also agree with me, sir, that through a wide portion of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina there were clashes between armed forces of the Serbs

24 and the Muslim forces, not just in these municipalities of Foca or Gacko

25 or Kalinovik?

Page 4828

1 A. I can agree, of course.

2 Q. Prijedor, Srebrenica, just to name a couple.

3 A. Yes, but that is outside this particular context.

4 Q. I understand that. I'm just talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 During the period of the armed conflict, and especially in 1992 and 1993,

6 you agree that this fight was not limited to these three municipalities

7 that I've just mentioned?

8 A. Yes, I agree.

9 Q. This fighting to which I've referred, sir, would you agree that

10 that was part of the larger armed conflict that prevailed between these

11 parties in the BH?

12 A. It's part of a civil war that was waged between three ethnic

13 communities that were also the warring parties in order to attain those

14 political and military objectives that their strategies had conceived and

15 formulated.

16 It depends on who saw his political entity and how. The Muslim

17 entity saw all of Bosnia-Herzegovina as their entity; the Croats also saw

18 all of Bosnia, that is to say, all the way up to the Drina River, but

19 during the first stage, only Western Herzegovina; the Serb entity had as

20 their political strategy 64 per cent of the land owned in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina as their entity. And at that moment when the Serb army

22 stood at those borders, they had an absolute defensive doctrine and

23 strategy. There is not a single document on the basis of which one could

24 assert that the Serb command had an offensive strategy.

25 Q. My question was, quite simply, if this fighting that we're talking

Page 4829

1 about was part of the larger armed conflict between the parties. I take

2 it that your answer to my question in a roundabout away is yes.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Sir, would you also agree with me that during the course of this

5 armed conflict, regardless of what parties were involved, that the

6 civilian population in the affected areas, these various communities and

7 villages, were affected by the advancing warring parties depending on

8 their respective ethnicities? The civilians got in the way.

9 A. Yes, that is a case in any war. It is simply a matter that is

10 understood. In wars, especially in many wars, civilians are more

11 threatened than the military. They are not trained; there are the young

12 and the infirm. So the answer is easily understandable.

13 Q. Yes. Sir, in your former capacity as a General and in your

14 subsequent role as a professor, you're aware, I take it, today of the

15 reports that soldiers from the respective parties to this armed conflict

16 would attack a town or a village and arrest the inhabitants, capture the

17 people who were attempting to flee, use force in the process of doing

18 so -- sometimes lethal -- round up the civilian inhabitants, separate the

19 men from the women and detain them in separate detention facilities.

20 You're aware of those reports, are you not, sir?

21 A. No, I'm not aware of that. My expertise does not pertain to the

22 kind of problems and questions that you are talking about. That is not

23 what I had investigated.

24 I investigated, explored, a particular case, that is to say, of

25 Foca, of Gornje Podrinje. To the best of my knowledge, there were no

Page 4830

1 camps there; there were no bestial attacks against settled areas. Of

2 course in December 1992, the Muslim forces did attack Serb villages at

3 Osanice, and on St. Nicholas Day, on the 19th of December, 1992, they

4 killed 55 old men, women, and children when they were celebrating their

5 patron saint's day. That is undeniable.

6 Q. So do I understand you correctly to be telling this Chamber, sir,

7 that you are aware of reports of Muslims attacking Serb villages but

8 you're not aware of reports of Serbs attacking Muslim villages? Is that

9 what you're telling us today?

10 A. No, I don't know that they attacked Muslim villages. I know that

11 throughout 1992 they defended themselves from Muslim attacks, and also

12 that they were defending themselves while encircled. Foca was defending

13 itself while encircled.

14 Q. I wasn't restricting my question, sir, to Foca town itself. I'm

15 asking you, sir, as -- I take it you're here as an independent expert, are

16 you?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And you're going to give us your objective opinion?

19 A. Yes. But if the question goes beyond this particular case, then

20 you would have to give me time to investigate the matter, if you are

21 putting a very concrete question to me.

22 Q. Well, sir, let me give you a concrete question. Are you telling

23 this Court today that, to your knowledge, you've received no reports of

24 Serb forces attacking Muslim villages in the municipalities of Foca,

25 Gacko, or Kalinovik?

Page 4831

1 A. No, because I studied the documentation of the army of Republika

2 Srpska. I did not study the documentation of the army of

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina or of the HVO because these documents are inaccessible

4 to me.

5 Q. So these allegations, then, would come as a complete surprise to

6 you today?

7 A. No. I know that there has been talk of that in the media and the

8 newspapers and publications, but that is not relevant substance for me. I

9 am a researcher, and I research documents.

10 Q. So then, sir, do I understand your answer to be that because

11 you've seen no documents and you've just heard of media reports, that you

12 have dismissed the reports that there were such attacks on Muslim villages

13 and its inhabitants being treated in the way I suggested earlier? You've

14 just dismissed that?

15 A. Well, I don't know what purpose this question serves. Are you

16 asking me about Foca, or are you asking about all of Bosnia? If that

17 pertains to Foca, the answer is no; but if you're asking me about all of

18 Bosnia, then you'll have to wait for me to research the matter, and then

19 I'll answer.

20 Q. I'll make it easy for you, sir. Let's restrict my question to the

21 three communities of Foca, Gacko, and Kalinovik, okay? Not the

22 communities, but the opstinas, those municipalities. Are you suggesting

23 to this Court in response to my earlier questions that you are unaware of

24 reports that Serb forces attacked Muslim villages in those three opstinas

25 or municipalities?

Page 4832

1 A. Kalinovik -- or rather, Gacko does not belong to Gornja Podrinje,

2 so I did not study it in this particular case. Kalinovik and Foca do

3 belong to that particular area. As I studied documents that are relevant

4 to this particular expertise, I did not come across combat reports,

5 military police documents, political documents speaking about the -- about

6 any attacks of the Serb military against any kind of civilians or

7 settlements.

8 Q. Are you suggesting to us, sir, that reports of another nature,

9 such as media reports or other information, didn't come to your attention

10 making those allegations?

11 A. Obviously you are interpreting me in a way that I'm not speaking.

12 I said that I did hear about this in the media, that I read the newspapers

13 from the Muslim side, from the Croat side, foreign media. I read about

14 that. But for me as a researcher, what is relevant are documents. You

15 know that in wars, lots of things are said, even those that are not true.

16 The media have there own vision and --

17 JUDGE MUMBA: Sorry. I see you, Mr. Jovanovic.

18 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The Defence

19 does have an objection to this line of questioning. Our learned colleague

20 has for the past few minutes now been trying to lead the witness to say

21 what he would suggest to this Trial Chamber. We believe that the witness,

22 the expert witness, has been called here to express his expert opinion

23 which he did submit to this Trial Chamber. We believe that media reports

24 and things like that are not relevant to these proceedings.

25 JUDGE HUNT: This is clearly relevant to his credit,

Page 4833

1 Mr. Jovanovic, and on that basis it must be allowed.

2 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 JUDGE MUMBA: Please proceed.


5 Q. These reports and documents, sir, were they exclusively from

6 Serbian-held information bases, the ones that you say you did study?

7 A. Not Serbian information sources but from the operative commands of

8 the army of Republika Srpska. These are documents of the Main Staff of

9 the army of Republika Srpska, the documentation of the Herzegovina corps,

10 and of the tactical group Foca. That was quite relevant for me, and I

11 gave my expertise upon the request that was put forth and on the basis of

12 the professional knowledge I gained during my schooling and education.

13 Q. Thank you, Professor. I just -- I should follow up on that.

14 These documents that you say from the Republika Srpska and from the

15 various military departments, would you not agree with me that those were

16 documents that were in the hands of Serbian forces. The army of Republika

17 Srpska, is that not Serbian in nature, sir? Am I wrong about that?

18 A. Of course you're not wrong. It is Serb, but I don't know what

19 that means for you.

20 Q. Well, sir, with the greatest of respect, the purpose or the

21 ultimate purpose of my question may not be immediately clear to you, but

22 as long as my question is clear to you, I would ask that you answer my

23 question. And perhaps if the Court is concerned about the ultimate

24 purpose on my friends are, they'll deal with that issue. At the meantime,

25 I'm going to ask you to simply answer my question without trying to figure

Page 4834

1 out why I'm asking it. Is that fair? Thank you.

2 So, sir, you have admitted that there were other reports in the

3 media, but you did not take those into account in arriving at your opinion

4 today; is that correct? You've discounted those?

5 A. I did not discount them, but they do not have the same degree of

6 relevance as operative documents do, of appropriate operative commands

7 that directly pertain to operations around Foca and Gornja Podrinje.

8 Q. Let me ask my question again, then. Apart from these military

9 documents from which you have almost solely based your opinion, as I

10 understand it, you have, I take it, however, heard these other reports of

11 which -- to which I refer of Muslim villages being attacked and its

12 civilian inhabitants treated in the way that I outlined earlier. You've

13 heard those reports?

14 A. No, I have not heard those reports directly, but I do allow for

15 the possibility of this having happened and that all sorts of things were

16 reported in the media. All sorts of things are reported in the media. If

17 you would have the opportunity of reading media from the territory of the

18 former Yugoslavia, you could see all sorts of things there, and you could

19 put all kinds of pictures together.

20 Q. Let me be more specific, sir. Do you know of incidents where

21 advancing Serb forces would approach a Muslim village and ask that the

22 inhabitants of the village first surrender their weapons? Are you aware

23 of that being part of the legitimate military strategy?

24 A. As part of a legitimate military strategy, yes, I am aware of

25 that. If there are armed Muslims in a particular area, since there is a

Page 4835

1 war going on, then the other party has the legitimate right to ask for

2 these weapons to be surrendered and to have this actually carried out;

3 otherwise, the weapons would be turned against them.

4 Q. So it would not seem unreasonable or unfeasible to you that there

5 are reports that that's exactly what happened: Serb forces would approach

6 a Muslim village, and the inhabitants of the village would be required to

7 surrender their weapons, hunting rifles or whatever they had? That would

8 be something that you could expect and allow would be a feasible thing to

9 happen?

10 A. It is possible, but I did not write about that. I did not come

11 across this in documents. As a military expert, I could not have

12 responded to something that I did not make the subject of my very own

13 research.

14 Q. So, sir, am I then safe in assuming that your research into what

15 went on in these three municipalities did not include any reports upon

16 which you relied that indicated that the inhabitants of the villages were

17 required to surrender their weapons; you have no information available to

18 you of that occurring?

19 A. I do not have concrete information, but this is action that is

20 quite legitimate. That is a war that is being waged for territory as

21 well, so it is quite legitimate to ask for armed men to surrender their

22 arms and to keep weapons under one's control. That is quite legitimate.

23 Q. But just so we're clear about where we are on this issue, you

24 didn't hear about it, but if it happened, you would say that would be

25 quite legitimate. Am I correct in that?

Page 4836

1 A. It would be legitimate.

2 Q. But you didn't hear about it or know about it in your research?

3 A. No, I did not come across operative documents of that kind, but it

4 is quite understandable to me that this would have happened because

5 control over territory means that the other side does not have weapons,

6 that the other side is disarmed. And that it is only the military that

7 can wear weapons, and there cannot be two armies in one territory.

8 Q. I see you approve the logic, you just didn't hear that it

9 occurred; is that right?

10 A. No, I did not hear that having taken place.

11 Q. Do I take it, sir, that you also then received or read no reports

12 during your research about what occurred in these three opstinas about

13 later, after the surrender of weapons, that armed forces would come in,

14 approach the village, and capture it? You didn't hear about those things

15 happening, either?

16 A. You cannot enslave a village. You can take a village; you can

17 capture a village; you establish control over a village.

18 I'm sorry. I'm sorry for interrupting you, but since these are

19 mixed communities, mixed communities, every control of territory means

20 that the other side is disarmed; otherwise, there would be an eternal war

21 of all against all.

22 Q. All right. Let's put a hypothetical. If, for the sake of

23 hypothesis, a Serb force wanted to take an ethnically-mixed village, are

24 you with me so far?

25 A. Yes, yes.

Page 4837

1 Q. You would disarm the inhabitants of the opposing side, in this

2 case the Muslims; is that correct?

3 A. Exactly, just as the Muslims would disarm the Serbs, or the

4 Germans the French, or the French the Germans.

5 Q. No issue about that, and this is the hypothetical, sir. And then

6 how, sir, would you capture that village later? You say you can't -- I'm

7 sorry, you indicated you can't enslave a village. How would one take

8 control of a village? It would be with force of arms, would it not, sir?

9 A. Arms are used only if when the army moves towards a certain area,

10 there is resistance, that is to say, if there are operations taking place

11 from a particular area. That is when arms have to be used in order to

12 neutralise the other side; otherwise, arms do not have to be used.

13 One enters the area, one asks the representatives of the village,

14 and one knows who the representatives of the village are, that weapons

15 that exist be piled up and handed over, and control is established over

16 these weapons. This is legitimate action. In that way, the uncontrolled

17 use of weapons is prevented, and that could only promote further fighting.

18 Q. In your research in the preparation of your report, did you find

19 out, sir, of instances that Serb forces attacked Muslim villages, set fire

20 to houses, and captured the Muslim inhabitants of the village?

21 A. No. I studied the documents in Gornja Podrinje. All the

22 documents I had made available to me speak of the suffering of Serb

23 villages. The first torchings in Foca were of the elementary school, and

24 they were done by Muslim forces that had already been established in and

25 around Foca.

Page 4838

1 The first conflicts, the first fighting were started by the Muslim

2 forces. I was not allowed today to present on a map how the operations

3 went from day to day which would show the dynamics of what had happened.

4 But in this part perhaps I could say that, that on the 4th of April --

5 Q. No, sir, no, no. In response to my question, I don't want this to

6 be for an opportunity for you to do in cross what you weren't allowed to

7 do by the Chamber in chief.

8 My answer [sic] to my question was, did you hear reports about

9 Serb forces attacking Muslim villages, burning their houses? The answer

10 to that I take it is "no," correct?

11 A. No, I saw the reverse, that Muslim forces were attacking, burning,

12 and killing Serb, the Serb infirm.

13 Q. Thank you so much, sir. Let's move on to a different topic,

14 slightly related, but would you agree with me, at least, that on this --

15 you're familiar with the area? I mean, you've looked at many maps of the

16 Foca, Kalinovik, Gorazde, Gacko area? You're aware of the ethnic

17 composition, for example, of the various communities in those opstinas;

18 isn't that correct? And that's based on the 1991 census?

19 A. My knowledge is not only based on the 1991 census. I built the

20 road from Trnovo to Kalinovik via the lake of Borac. I served in

21 Trebinje, so I know Foca from my own experience. I also got married to a

22 non-Serb.

23 Q. But the figures that you provided to the Court in terms of square

24 footage or mileage and the number of inhabitants, those figures, just so

25 that I'm clear, were those the figures that came from the 1991 census or

Page 4839

1 some later or earlier census?

2 A. No, 1991, the census of 1991.

3 Q. All right. And it's clear, if you just even look at the lists or

4 the census, or if you look at a map, that it's clear that there were

5 dozens, maybe even hundreds, of villages and hamlets in the Foca

6 municipality that were either predominately Muslim or had a substantial

7 Muslim population. Isn't that true?

8 A. Yes, yes, yes.

9 Q. And in the zone that you say that the Serbs had -- I think you

10 said 64 per cent or something is what the Serbs wanted to claim, would you

11 agree that many of these villages and hamlets that were --

12 A. No, they had it. They owned 64 per cent of the land according to

13 the registry books. That was private ownership.

14 Q. Would you agree that the zone of the armed conflict in the zone of

15 fighting between Serbs and Muslim forces in these municipalities, that

16 many of these Muslim villages were in that zone?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And in this zone that they were fighting about, the Serbs wanted

19 to win that fight just like the Muslims did; isn't that right? They were

20 fighting for control, otherwise there would be no need to fight.

21 A. Yes. Yes.

22 Q. So this may not be from research, but just from logic, would you

23 not agree, sir, that in this area of fighting, the inhabitants of these

24 Muslim villages would have been affected by the fighting?

25 A. Of course, yes.

Page 4840

1 Q. But there were no reports in the documents that you saw that would

2 suggest that its inhabitants were captured, separated, and detained.

3 A. The inhabitants were not being captured, it was members of the

4 Muslim armed forces that were being captured. And you will allow that

5 there is a difference between the two.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: Just one question, if I may, before we break.

7 Q. Sir, do you know what use the KP Dom was put to during 1992/1993?

8 A. The KP Dom, in 1992 and in 1993, served the same purpose that

9 prisons usually do serve, serve as --

10 JUDGE MUMBA: Mr. Prodanovic.

11 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] We object, Your Honour, to this

12 question. The accused are not being related to the KP Dom in any way

13 whatsoever, and I don't know how this question is being put.

14 JUDGE HUNT: It's being put to his credit, Mr. Prodanovic, and

15 it's very clearly relevant to it. So far as I'm concerned, the question

16 is an admissible one.

17 MR. PRODANOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: I take it we're now at the 4.00 hour. I can break

19 at any time. Is this a convenient time, or would you like me to

20 continue?

21 JUDGE HUNT: Mr. Kolesar, because the cross-examination is still

22 under way, do you still want to have a word with this witness overnight?

23 MR. KOLESAR: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE MUMBA: It's just past 1600 hours. We will adjourn and will

25 continue the proceedings tomorrow morning at 0930 hours.

Page 4841

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

2 4.03 p.m., to be reconvened on Wednesday,

3 the 12th day of July, 2000, at 9.30 a.m.