1. 1 Wednesday, 29th September, 1999

    2 [Open session]

    3 [The accused entered court]

    4 [The witness entered court]

    5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.

    6 THE REGISTRAR: Case IT-95-16-T,

    7 the Prosecutor versus Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan

    8 Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic,

    9 Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic.

    10 JUDGE CASSESE: Mr. Blaxill.

    11 MR. BLAXILL: Good morning, Mr. President;

    12 good morning, Your Honours; fellow counsellors; good

    13 morning, Brigadier. Before I recommence with my

    14 examination-in-chief, we have this morning supplied to

    15 the Chamber some translations of extracts of the report

    16 document. I went through the document with a language

    17 assistant yesterday afternoon. It was a very hurried

    18 exercise, but we tried to identify points that were

    19 perhaps amplifying what was in the original statement

    20 and have those specifically translated whilst the

    21 translators work on the full document to provide it to

    22 Your Honours at the earliest opportunity.

    23 As I say, my learned friends for the Defence

    24 have the full document in their own language anyway.

    25 Thank you, sir.

  2. 1JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you.


    3 Examined by Mr. Blaxill:

    4 Q. Brigadier, good morning, sir.

    5 A. Good morning.

    6 Q. Yesterday we had shown you a few documents in

    7 relation to the questioning regarding general matters

    8 of military strategy, military conduct, and the actions

    9 and obligations of commanders. I would like you to

    10 look, indeed, at the documents attached to your

    11 statement again, sir, and, in fact, pick document

    12 number AD1.

    13 MR. BLAXILL: Just for the record, Your

    14 Honours, I understand this is not a controversial

    15 document in terms of ever being before any Chamber

    16 before. It is a fresh document. That is obviously

    17 conceded, but I think that's its status.

    18 Q. Sir, would you look at that document, and

    19 could you tell me what that conveys to you as regards a

    20 military communication? What is it, and from what

    21 level of person does it pass, and to what level of

    22 person does it go to?

    23 A. Good morning, everybody, to begin with.

    24 AD1 is the example of a report. The commander of a

    25 company sends his report to the commander of the

  3. 1military police, and this document is correct in all

    2 its aspects.

    3 The only thing that is not correct,

    4 militarily speaking, is that one step had been

    5 skipped. He should have sent it to the battalion

    6 commander, and then the battalion commander should then

    7 send it on to the commander of the military police. So

    8 one rung had been skipped. We do not have a battalion

    9 commander here.

    10 Q. Brigadier, does the document, on the face of

    11 it, indicate what company issued that report?

    12 A. Yes. In my analysis, I also quoted a

    13 example; what reports, orders, and everything else

    14 should look like and what they should contain.

    15 Reports and orders do not have to include all

    16 the basic points, but they must comply with the

    17 principal point; that is, the name of the unit or the

    18 institution issuing the report, the reference number,

    19 the filing number, date, and the addressee. These are

    20 the principal elements. Then, of course, the signature

    21 of the person who has written the report, and the

    22 seal. These are the most important elements of both

    23 orders and reports. Of course, the contents may vary

    24 and may include the elements which are expected to be

    25 included in every report and every order.

  4. 1Q. And so just looking at the document, does

    2 that tell you, on the face of the document, from whom

    3 it was sent? Who sent it?

    4 A. It was sent by a company commander, and it is

    5 addressed to the military police command. That is

    6 quite clear.

    7 Q. Which company is that? Does it say, on the

    8 face of it, which company he is the commander of?

    9 A. It is correct here. The 1st Active Company

    10 of the military police, 4th Battalion. So the heading

    11 says that it is a unit which is called 1st Active

    12 Company, part of the 4th Battalion of the military

    13 police.

    14 Q. Again, sir, as to the identity of that

    15 company commander -- clearly you'd not previously seen

    16 this document -- I appreciate that fact; you don't know

    17 its contents -- but what appears to be the name of the

    18 company commander on that report?

    19 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Pavkovic?

    20 MR. PAVKOVIC: Good morning, Your Honours.

    21 We object to this. It is not true that the witness did

    22 not see this report. The witness did see this report.

    23 That is my yesterday's objection to the documents

    24 presented to this witness earlier without having been

    25 authenticated in this court as authentic documents.

  5. 1Now questions take all this information about the

    2 company person, who might have written this, and so on

    3 and so forth.

    4 So do I not really think that what my learned

    5 friend said is correct, that the witness did not see

    6 this. Yes, he did see these documents, and he supplied

    7 his answer in an earlier document.

    8 JUDGE CASSESE: It's not an objection to your

    9 question, but the way you phrased your question.

    10 Counsel Pavkovic is correct in saying that the witness

    11 did see the report.

    12 MR. BLAXILL: What I was trying to get to, in

    13 a simple way -- and I think I made a mess of it, Your

    14 Honour -- is simply that this man is not the author of

    15 the document, and I'm trying to express that he,

    16 obviously, is not able to speak as to the truth of its

    17 contents or indeed the fact of it being signed by

    18 whoever it purports. I'm just dealing with the face of

    19 the document: "As an expert looking at it, does it

    20 look like a military document, and what do you see

    21 there?" and it bears no more weight than that, but I

    22 suggest it is admissible and appropriate.

    23 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes, it is.

    24 MR. BLAXILL: Thank you.

    25 Q. So, yes, Brigadier, again I would just ask

  6. 1you to confirm. You see a signature block on that

    2 document. I'm just asking you to say that on the face

    3 of it, of that document that you saw, who appears to be

    4 the signatory?

    5 A. The commander of that company. I do not know

    6 that individual, but what it says is "company

    7 commander," and then typed "Vladimir Santic." Of

    8 course, I cannot claim this is his signature. That is

    9 only what it says here.

    10 Q. Thank you, Brigadier. I would like you to

    11 turn now to documents AD2, 3, and 4.

    12 MR. BLAXILL: These are contentious documents

    13 in some measure, Your Honours. I'm wondering whether,

    14 out of an abundance of caution -- although hopefully my

    15 questions will not create a problem -- that we would

    16 have private session for about five minutes, just to be

    17 absolutely sure.

    18 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes.

    19 [Private session]

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 [Open session]

    11 MR. BLAXILL:

    12 Q. Then next, if you please, Brigadier, would

    13 you be so kind as to look at your documents AD5 and 6.

    14 Now, looking at document AD5, Brigadier,

    15 could you please again -- please do not necessarily

    16 refer to any names in it; that's not relevant to us --

    17 but can you tell us what the nature of document AD5 is?

    18 A. Document AD5 is basically an order, a short

    19 one, because the preamble says: Pursuant to the order

    20 of the commander of the 4th military police battalion

    21 number such-and-such of 2nd April, I order or

    22 designate. So it is a form, a type of a short order.

    23 Q. Would an order of that nature -- firstly, may

    24 I ask you -- sorry, sir. Does that order appear to be

    25 drawn up in a proper military fashion, according to

  10. 1your knowledge of these things?

    2 A. Well, I have said it. In principle, there is

    3 a pattern for orders, for decisions, for reports and

    4 what they should contain, in principle, all these

    5 orders and reports and decisions. But I also mentioned

    6 yesterday, if you remember, that an order may be in one

    7 sentence only if circumstances so require. So it may

    8 depend on the situation. What is important is that

    9 they contain all these elements: who it is addressed

    10 to, who it is sent by, and the date and the number.

    11 And, of course, the contents may vary depending on the

    12 circumstances, on the conditions, so that there may be

    13 only one item, there may be various items, but, I mean,

    14 whatever is necessary for the task to be then carried

    15 out. But in this specific case, I believe this

    16 suffices if it only means that certain soldiers are

    17 assigned as assistants.

    18 So it is a list of soldiers, and that

    19 suffices for the task for the order to be carried out

    20 properly.

    21 Q. This order assigning these various people,

    22 again, can you say from which company or battalion that

    23 is coming, and who is to be the signatory?

    24 A. This order, too, comes from the 1st Active

    25 Company of the military police in Vitez, and it is

  11. 1signed by a commander. Or, rather, the order was

    2 written here, the principle of the chain of command was

    3 complied with, so it is the commander of the 4th

    4 Military Police Battalion.

    5 Q. And who is the signatory to this?

    6 A. The signatory is the company commander.

    7 Q. And the name you see on that document, the

    8 signatory?

    9 A. Vladimir Santic is what is typed here, and

    10 the signature itself, Santic, whether that is his

    11 signature, that is something that I cannot say. But in

    12 typed letters it is Vladimir Santic.

    13 Q. Document AD6, sir. Again, would you just

    14 tell us what is that document? Is that an order or

    15 some other form of document? And what does it instruct

    16 people to do, or what does it report upon?

    17 A. This is a typical order, or a short order,

    18 and it was written pursuant to the order issued by the

    19 commander of the 4th Military Police Battalion, so that

    20 this chain of command principle was complied with in

    21 this case too.

    22 Here this designates -- there is units of the

    23 1st Company which are sent out to carry out a specific

    24 mission.

    25 In the second -- the second item, then,

  12. 1specifies that the AT Platoon will be ensuring the

    2 safety of persons and premises according to the

    3 instructions of the commander of the company, and I

    4 can't really read this properly.

    5 So the second item, it says that: AT Platoon

    6 members shall provide the safety for the personnel and

    7 the facilities under the instructions of the commander

    8 of the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion. So the AT

    9 Platoon is to provide security for persons on the basis

    10 of the instructions of the commander of the 2nd

    11 Company. So the AT Platoon of the 1st Company was, in

    12 this particular case, assigned to the commander of the

    13 2nd Company to then provide the security for individual

    14 persons under his instructions.

    15 And the important thing here, in the fifth

    16 item, after the order has been complied with, men

    17 should be transferred to the seat of the unit in an

    18 organised manner. This is a logical order, both as

    19 regards the addressee and the signature; that is, the

    20 commander of the 4th Battalion, and there is -- then

    21 the commander of the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion,

    22 the commander of the AT platoon, and one for the

    23 files.

    24 So the specific thing is the commander of

    25 2nd Company is here charged with providing the security

  13. 1according to the instructions of the commander of the

    2 2nd Company. So this is a type of an attachment of the

    3 AT Platoon to the commander of the 2nd Company.

    4 Q. Sir, using the expression "attachment," do

    5 you see from this whether it is a long-term duty or a

    6 short-term duty, the attachment of these people?

    7 A. Here we have the date and the day when the

    8 AT Platoon is placed at the disposal of the 2nd Company

    9 commander of the 2nd Company of the military police.

    10 I do not see really for how long they are

    11 assigned to him, and I can't see that. Perhaps it does

    12 say somewhere, but I don't remember seeing it, how long

    13 they are assigned to that particular mission. Perhaps

    14 there is somewhere else, but it doesn't say here

    15 clearly. There is no time frame. One doesn't know for

    16 how long this AT Platoon will be at the disposal of the

    17 2nd Company commander.

    18 All we see here is that after the mission has

    19 been accomplished, the men of the platoon should be

    20 transferred to the headquarters of the unit, but how

    21 long the task is to take, it doesn't say here.

    22 Q. Well, finally, in respect to those documents,

    23 again, Brigadier, can you say from which company

    24 those -- or within which those orders were made and who

    25 made those orders? Who was the signatory?

  14. 1A. The order was drawn up by the 1st Active

    2 Company of the 4th Battalion of the military police,

    3 and the order was signed by the company commander.

    4 Q. Thank you very much. Can you say the name

    5 that appears on the piece of paper just appears to be

    6 the commander?

    7 A. "Company commander," and then it is typed

    8 "Vladimir Santic."

    9 Q. Thank you, sir. Brigadier, have you, in the

    10 course of your military duties in around the time, made

    11 any study of the events that occurred in Ahmici, in the

    12 Lasva Valley, on the 16th of April, 1993?

    13 A. On the 16th of April, 1993, more specifically

    14 I was the head of the staff of the 1st Corps in

    15 Sarajevo, and my -- and that particular area of

    16 responsibility was not part of my terms of reference;

    17 that is, it was not an area of responsibility of the

    18 1st Corps.

    19 But since -- as of August 1993, the general

    20 headquarters of the then-army of the Republic of

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is the present commander

    22 Army of the Federation, at that time I was the head of

    23 the planning administration; that is, the operative

    24 administration.

    25 At that administration we received all the

  15. 1reports, both from our unit -- that is, units directly

    2 subordinate to us of the army of the Republic of

    3 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and the reports which were --

    4 which presented some interest to us from the military

    5 point of view, and we were receiving them from other

    6 units, from all the other areas of responsibility, so

    7 that I can say that I was conversant with the situation

    8 because of that.

    9 And with my HVO colleagues, I always

    10 discussed those matters, because we both attended

    11 various meetings; and during the negotiations, while

    12 the conflict was under way, we often attended various

    13 training meetings, drills, courses, et cetera, et

    14 cetera, and soldiers just naturally always discussed

    15 such areas as Ahmici and other areas which are of

    16 interest to us.

    17 So for that reason, I do know the situation

    18 in that area and throughout the Bosnia-Herzegovina

    19 theatre of war, because I had all the information in

    20 one place, both in relation to the army of the

    21 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HVO and the BH army, so that

    22 I can really say that I'm conversant with the

    23 situation -- that I was conversant with the situation

    24 as much as it was possible at the time.

    25 Q. So, Brigadier, could you offer, from your

  16. 1knowledge of what you say you believe happened in

    2 Ahmici -- would you, firstly, indicate what forces you

    3 think were involved?

    4 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Pavkovic?

    5 MR. PAVKOVIC: Your Honours, I wish to

    6 apologise for having to speak -- to take the floor once

    7 again. This witness was called in to testify as an

    8 expert witness. The witness has no experience or

    9 direct knowledge of what happened in Ahmici.

    10 Now, this information the witness is

    11 referring to, the experience and everything else, to my

    12 mind, it goes beyond an expert testimony, and I object

    13 to this. I do not think that the examination should go

    14 on in this direction.

    15 MR. BLAXILL: I'll explain the purpose of the

    16 next few questions. It's virtually the last element of

    17 my examination-in-chief.

    18 As I understand the role of the expert, it

    19 would be a position, Your Honours, that we would -- an

    20 expert receives information and, upon the information,

    21 is then able to form, one hopes, with the expertise

    22 they profess, an opinion to offer.

    23 Now, clearly, I feel it appropriate, if I'm

    24 going to ask matters which are generally about the

    25 organisational requirements and the level of

  17. 1coordination and so forth required in an operation such

    2 as the 16th of April, it would be appropriate,

    3 obviously, to see what perception the expert has,

    4 because then Your Honours will know the factual basis

    5 upon which he bases his opinion. If his facts are

    6 wrong, then you know what weight to give his opinion.

    7 If his facts are right, then, likewise, you'll know the

    8 foundation upon which he makes those opinions.

    9 [Trial Chamber deliberates]

    10 JUDGE CASSESE: We uphold the objection of

    11 Counsel Pavkovic. I think Counsel Pavkovic is right.

    12 He's going to guess. He can't guess, the witness. So

    13 I wonder whether you could move on.

    14 MR. BLAXILL: Yes. Just give me a moment;

    15 I'll cull my questioning.

    16 Q. Very well. Just now to deal with one final

    17 theoretical matter, Brigadier, not related to any

    18 specific actual event, but if, if a company was to be

    19 deployed in the field in a combat operation and

    20 involves three or four platoons and maybe other units

    21 of an army, what kind of level of planning and

    22 coordination is required of the commanders,

    23 particularly at company level? Please, you can be as

    24 brief as possible, because the general principles

    25 you've already covered.

  18. 1A. What can a company commander do if he gets a

    2 concrete task and if he has three or four platoons or

    3 squads available? Well, yesterday I explained a few

    4 elements.

    5 Specifically, a company commander calls in

    6 his commanders; that is to say, platoon commanders. He

    7 familiarises them with the task that lies ahead, he

    8 points out which are the really important elements for

    9 carrying out this task, and then, if the conditions are

    10 right, he goes out to the ground to specifically

    11 outline the tasks he gave on the ground.

    12 I already explained that this can be done

    13 from one location if the specific situation permits

    14 this and all the commanders can be present. However,

    15 if this is a wider area, then he can use his own

    16 judgement, his own assessment, to see which unit should

    17 be used where, and then he can show each and every

    18 commander what he should do.

    19 So these are the tactics that are usually

    20 applied. We always point out, in military theory and

    21 practice, that the best thing is to issue tasks on the

    22 ground, because maps, written documents, in general,

    23 have their shortcomings when compared to a concrete

    24 situation that can be directly seen.

    25 Therefore, the best thing is to issue

  19. 1assignments on the ground. In military practice, it is

    2 very well known that this is the best way of issuing

    3 orders and having them carried out.

    4 In this connection, it is important to

    5 coordinate activities with regard to all elements, in

    6 terms of logistics; communications; carrying out the

    7 task itself, whether it will be carried out in one

    8 stage, in two stages, in several stages; et cetera.

    9 That is to say that a commander is kept very busy. He

    10 has many activities related to carrying out such a

    11 task.

    12 Finally, when all of that is coordinated,

    13 when every one of his subordinates gets a specific

    14 assignment, then the company commander is engaged,

    15 together with his team, in elaborating certain combat

    16 documents.

    17 Combat documents are made so that everyone

    18 would know, for several reasons, what each and every

    19 unit does, what kind of activity it is engaged in.

    20 This is done for the sake of history, for the sake of

    21 archives. So it is envisaged, for each and every

    22 combat action, to have these combat documents made.

    23 Usually, at company level, a decision is made

    24 as to how a specific assignment will be carried out. A

    25 schematic is made, and then one can see how each and

  20. 1every unit will be deployed, the depth and the breadth

    2 of every task can seen on the map. Then one can see

    3 whether this unit can carry out that particular

    4 assignment independently or whether it seeks artillery

    5 support or the support of some other unit.

    6 In most cases concerning specific tasks, not

    7 a single unit has, within its own organic composition,

    8 all the elements that would make it possible for it to

    9 carry out such a task. Then a commander can ask his

    10 superior to have an entire artillery, engineering, et

    11 cetera, unit attached to him, or part of such a unit,

    12 in order to carry out a specific task.

    13 In this connection, the commander carries out

    14 all these activities I mentioned, and then, if at all

    15 possible, he goes to check out, in practice, how his

    16 order or decision is carried out on the ground; that

    17 is, before combat operations begin.

    18 But I pointed out yesterday that when combat

    19 operations begin, the company commander should be at

    20 such a location that makes it possible for him to have

    21 the best conditions possible for monitoring the

    22 situation so that he can change, correct, if necessary,

    23 alter his decisions, depending on the situation on the

    24 ground, what the new elements may be that he was

    25 unfamiliar with and what the problems are that he could

  21. 1not have forecast before that.

    2 When doing that, he does this in certain time

    3 intervals and then provides reports to his superior

    4 officers on everything he's done.

    5 MR. BLAXILL: That concludes my questions.

    6 Thank you very much, Your Honours.

    7 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you. Counsel

    8 Pavkovic?

    9 MR. BLAXILL: Sorry to pre-empt my friend for

    10 a second. I would like to, in fact, formally to

    11 tender, in due course, the statement and the report

    12 prepared. I advise Your Honours in advance of that.

    13 Obviously, the full report with translation will be in

    14 your hands -- we have part of the translation submitted

    15 this morning -- just lest I forget at a later point in

    16 time.

    17 JUDGE CASSESE: Any objection, Counsel

    18 Pavkovic?

    19 MR. PAVKOVIC: If I understood the Prosecutor

    20 correctly, he is going to offer a statement; that is to

    21 say, he is going to tender the statement that I spoke

    22 about yesterday and the report I spoke about

    23 yesterday.

    24 Did I understand you correctly? Oh, I did.

    25 Well, I have certain objection with regard to

  22. 1the first document, and I think it should not be

    2 included because the expert had documents made

    3 available to him by the Prosecutor, and they would not

    4 have been accessible to this expert had the Prosecutor

    5 not disclosed this to him.

    6 However, I do not have any objections with

    7 regard to the second document that was mentioned

    8 yesterday.

    9 [Trial Chamber deliberates]

    10 JUDGE CASSESE: Our ruling is that both

    11 documents should be admitted into evidence, both the

    12 statement with the annexes and the document which will

    13 be circulated in English, in extenso, maybe tomorrow.

    14 MR. BLAXILL: Yes. We hope to have that

    15 ready tomorrow, Your Honours.

    16 My only other observation at this point would

    17 be an abundance of caution, now, after Your Honours'

    18 observations of yesterday, and that is, perhaps should

    19 that document, because of the annexures, be filed as

    20 confidential or something. Just particularly I'm

    21 thinking AD2 to 4, where I think that is particularly

    22 relevant, if that's the case.

    23 JUDGE CASSESE: So they will be

    24 confidential. Thank you.

    25 Counsel Pavkovic?

  23. 1MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I will be the

    2 first to examine the witness, and then after that it

    3 will be Ranko Radovic, Luka Susak, and Petar

    4 Puliselic.

    5 THE REGISTRAR: The statement of the witness

    6 will be 310, Prosecution evidence; and the report 311,

    7 also Prosecution evidence.

    8 Cross-examined by Mr. Pavkovic:

    9 Q. Good day, Witness. My name is Petar

    10 Pavkovic, Attorney at Law. Yesterday and today you

    11 expressed a very fair assessment of military doctrine,

    12 the chain of command, and other doctrinary matters, and

    13 I thank you for having helped me to put my questions

    14 today perhaps in a better way, thanks to your

    15 testimony. However, I would like you to clarify

    16 certain matters to me a bit.

    17 First of all, you're a Brigadier, from what

    18 I've been able to see, but you are a Brigadier-General

    19 in terms of the formation post that you hold. Is my

    20 understanding correct?

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Do you have any wartime experience? In this

    23 last war, I mean, this last war that was waged in the

    24 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

    25 A. Well, I mentioned the initial period; that is

  24. 1to say, April 1992. I was in the republican -- rather,

    2 I received instructions from the territory of defence

    3 headquarters in Sarajevo to help the establishment of

    4 the Territorial Defence in Konjic, because this was the

    5 very inception of the Territorial Defence in Bosnia and

    6 Herzegovina, generally speaking, and it was also the

    7 very inception of this new army.

    8 My first task or, rather, my first experience

    9 was in the area of Visoko, when, in the month of June,

    10 we tried -- that's the way I have to put it -- to

    11 deblockade a certain area that led to Sarajevo via

    12 Visoko and Vares, and then I was commander of the

    13 tactical group of Visoko, of Vares. That's what it was

    14 called.

    15 Q. You are talking about June; is that right?

    16 Which year?

    17 A. That was 1992. And then in August 1992, I

    18 was head of the staff in the temporary command of South

    19 92. That is also an operation which was planned for

    20 the purposes of deblockading Sarajevo, because the

    21 general purpose was always this deblockade. I don't

    22 want anybody to be confused by this. And how realistic

    23 this was is another matter. But this was this other

    24 operation where I was chief of staff from the broader

    25 area of Igman. That's where the deblockade of Sarajevo

  25. 1was supposed to be carried out.

    2 And then as chief of staff of the 1st

    3 Sarajevo Corps, I had a series of wartime experience in

    4 the units of the 1st Corps. So that is where I was

    5 directly engaged in the operations; that is to say, I

    6 was directly engaged as an officer according to the

    7 post I held.

    8 Later, as chief of administration for

    9 operations and planning, I was not in a position to be

    10 directly engaged in these operations, to directly

    11 participate, because this was not the post I held. But

    12 often I went to Vlasic, Igman, Treskavica, Kupres.

    13 Also the areas of Prenj, Bjelasnica, et cetera; that is

    14 to say, those areas that were accessible at the time,

    15 and those units as well. Because that was my duty,

    16 after all.

    17 This element of control was necessary, in

    18 terms of our planned activities. So I was actually

    19 checking up on these planned activities that we had

    20 envisaged.

    21 Q. Thank you very much. You took part in this

    22 as a member of the TO or, rather, the Army of

    23 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

    24 A. Yes.

    25 Q. Who were you fighting against?

  26. 1A. At that time, in 1992 -- that is to say,

    2 until the conflict with the HVO broke out -- we had one

    3 enemy only, and that was the Army of Republika Srpska.

    4 Q. Let's be more concise. Did you take part in

    5 the fighting against the HVO?

    6 A. No. No. Not directly. Not directly. I was

    7 not directly in such a position. I was in such a

    8 position only in terms of taking up on certain planned

    9 activities. When I came to Kakanj, where our general

    10 staff had been transferred at the time -- you are

    11 probably familiar with that -- that was January 1994,

    12 and in that period I carried out planned activities in

    13 the territory of Central Bosnia and in other

    14 territories that were accessible.

    15 Q. So one may infer that in a certain way, in

    16 accordance with the position you held in the chain of

    17 command in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you did take

    18 part in operations in respect of the HVO?

    19 A. You can't put it that way. I pointed this

    20 out at the very outset. My direct participation was

    21 when I was commander or, rather, chief of staff. And

    22 when I became, in 1993, the chief of administration for

    23 operative planning, I did not have anything directly to

    24 do with combat activity; that is to say, I wrote and

    25 drew things. So perhaps this makes it clearer to you.

  27. 1That is to say that we, from the general

    2 staff, from the highest level of command, we issued

    3 appropriate orders and commands. It was only normal.

    4 And that was my function in that respect, not direct

    5 participation in a unit that was engaged in fighting.

    6 We have to make a distinction between the two; that is

    7 to say, not only I, but the function of the general

    8 staff as a general staff is such.

    9 So the general staff of the Army of

    10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, as it was called at the time, did

    11 not directly participate in any such thing at all.

    12 That was the function of all other staffs, not only the

    13 army staff.

    14 Q. If we treat only the rank-and-file soldiers

    15 as direct participants, then of course you did not take

    16 part in any combat activities. But you will agree with

    17 me that military planning, the issuing of orders, is

    18 also part of overall combat activity that is carried

    19 out vis-a-vis the other side. And the lower units, as

    20 you explained to us yesterday, did not carry out their

    21 own tasks, but the tasks given to them by higher levels

    22 of command. So, in accordance with the principles of

    23 command that you explained to us yesterday, you

    24 nevertheless, in a way which is compliant with your

    25 role, did take part in the operations that took place

  28. 1in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Croatian Defence

    2 Council units?

    3 Please, could you briefly give me a "yes" or

    4 a "no" answer, but we really have to move on.

    5 A. The function of a staff and the function of a

    6 commander are very, very different functions. Only a

    7 commander -- and that's the way it is everywhere -- has

    8 the right to command; that is to say, the commander,

    9 who is a person -- or rather, a person who is called a

    10 commander has the right to issue commands. And he is

    11 responsible. He is the only one who is responsible for

    12 everything that happens. Rasim Delic, at that time

    13 commander of the general staff, was responsible for the

    14 entire army. The commander of the corps was

    15 responsible for the entire corps, but not people from

    16 the staff too. That is to say that I cannot sign an

    17 order, I cannot have responsibility as chief of

    18 administration. It is only the commander that signs a

    19 command.

    20 Q. Witness, witness --

    21 MR. VRDOLYAK: I'm sorry, there is a mistake

    22 in the transcript. Instead of "headquarters," it says

    23 "staff." It should be the function of the

    24 headquarters.

    25 JUDGE CASSESE: All right. We'll get it

  29. 1straight.

    2 May I ask the witness to be concise and

    3 specific, not to indulge in generalities. Thank you.


    5 Q. Mr. Witness, perhaps you misunderstood me.

    6 It is not my intention to establish your responsibility

    7 or something. I just wanted to see where your position

    8 was, and I am satisfied with the answer you've given so

    9 far. So let us move a step forward.

    10 MR. VRDOLYAK: I'm sorry, again there is a

    11 mistake here. Instead of "staff," it should say

    12 "headquarters." The word "staff" can mean both staff

    13 and headquarters.

    14 THE INTERPRETER: It's either a building or

    15 people, says the interpreter.

    16 JUDGE CASSESE: There is the explanation from

    17 the interpreters. Yes.

    18 MR. PAVKOVIC:

    19 Q. Yesterday you explained to us the chain of

    20 command, you explained subordination to us, you

    21 explained the unity of command. You spoke of the chain

    22 of command and you said that lower units or, rather,

    23 the commanders of lower-level units, had a certain

    24 degree of freedom and initiative, but that this freedom

    25 of theirs has to move within the fundamental ideas of

  30. 1the commander. So if an attack order was issued from a

    2 higher level, it can never be understood as a defence

    3 order, if one strictly respects hierarchy.

    4 A. Would you like me to answer?

    5 Q. Please say whether I understood you well and

    6 whether I said this correctly.

    7 A. You did understand me correctly, but it's not

    8 only lower-level unit commanders. Every subordinate

    9 officer has initiative within those boundaries that you

    10 have referred to; that is to say, to formulate certain

    11 ideas that do not deviate from the general objective.

    12 However, if he does this, he has to inform his superior

    13 officer that he assessed the situation, that he has

    14 more information, and that he believes that the order

    15 can be carried out in a different way. But basically

    16 that's it.

    17 Q. Thank you. Do you agree with me, when we

    18 speak about combat activities, that combat activities

    19 are a series of activities that can be divided,

    20 essentially, into attack activities and defence

    21 activities?

    22 A. According to strategy, there is a strategic

    23 offensive -- that's the expert word for it -- and

    24 strategic defence. And within strategic defence there

    25 are all forms of attack and attack activities; and

  31. 1within defence, strategic defence, all forms of

    2 defensive activities.

    3 Q. Do you agree with me that within defence

    4 activities or defence, strategically speaking, certain

    5 activities can have the characteristics of offensive

    6 activities? What is active defence, in your opinion?

    7 A. That is also one of the principles. And

    8 there is a term "active defence." That means that part

    9 of a unit is used exclusively for defence, and another

    10 part of the unit is used for offensive activities, for

    11 various attacks, ambushes, et cetera.

    12 When we say that within strategic defence --

    13 if we look at the highest level, what is the

    14 determining factor, whether this is an attack or a

    15 defence, or offensive or defensive, it is the number of

    16 units engaged.

    17 If the predominant number of units in that

    18 zone are engaged in defence activities, then it is

    19 defence, but if the predominant number of units in that

    20 zone is engaged in attack in that zone, and according

    21 to that task, then it is offensive. But in the context

    22 of offensive and defensive activities, there can be

    23 both kinds, and the determining factor is whether a

    24 larger number is involved in defence or attack. And if

    25 most are engaged in attack, then it's a typical attack,

  32. 1and if a larger number of units are in defence, then

    2 it's typical defence.

    3 Q. And that I can also see from relevant

    4 documents for an attack and for a defence, because

    5 those who are assessing the strength of a particular

    6 unit will also decide whether it will go into an attack

    7 or a defence, or whether they will be engaged in some

    8 other form of operations. So that documents also allow

    9 us to see what kind of operations are addressed there,

    10 unless they have personal experience in this.

    11 A. Yes. If a corps commander is organising the

    12 defence by the whole unit, then the whole unit are only

    13 -- all the units or only parts of the corps may go

    14 into it. So within the general task, within the

    15 overall task, the strength or either the number of the

    16 -- of units of men and equipment will determine

    17 whether something will be a defence action or an

    18 offensive action.

    19 Q. Thank you. Yesterday you spoke about the

    20 command, leadership in the Yugoslav People's Army, with

    21 which you spent a major part of your career, and you

    22 tried to draw a comparison or, rather, to juxtapose the

    23 principles of leadership and command in there and in

    24 the armies which came about in Bosnia-Herzegovina

    25 entities. And you asserted that these principles were

  33. 1embraced, more or less successfully, in all the three

    2 armies; that is, the Army of the Republika Srpska, HVO

    3 and Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You also indicated

    4 certain differences between them and you told us why

    5 did these differences exist.

    6 Could you tell us now if these principles

    7 which were adopted not only by the former JNA and quite

    8 a number of the armies we went over, was it all that

    9 simple to adopt them and put them through in the newly

    10 established armies, in view of the shortage of, shall I

    11 say, properly qualified officer cadres and other

    12 personnel?

    13 A. Listen. I mean, the principles are such as

    14 you have just said, and that applies to all the armies

    15 in the world; all of them are governed by these

    16 principles. And, yes, we did embrace that. I mean,

    17 all the three armies. But it was easiest for the Army

    18 of the Republika Srpska because the available

    19 equipment, armament, literature, war plans and

    20 everything else went to one people. So it was easiest

    21 for the Army of the Republika Srpska to accept it or

    22 take it over and reorganise.

    23 And then -- because in Croatia, what

    24 happened, it was the next -- easier for the HVO,

    25 because they were receiving some assistance from

  34. 1Croatia, as was only natural. And it was least easy

    2 for the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it had the

    3 least equipment and other material and everything else,

    4 which of course affects this.

    5 The question of the qualified personnel,

    6 qualified commanding personnel, is of crucial

    7 importance. And that applied to all three armies

    8 regarding the organisation and formation of all armies,

    9 especially at the initial stage in 1992.

    10 It was difficult to apply the system of

    11 leadership and command, but it was applied because it

    12 cannot be any other way. In spite of the differences,

    13 it was difficult to apply in those cases where the

    14 commanders, for some reason, a justified reason, were

    15 designated. And the commander may be a civilian as

    16 well, if somebody appointed him to that particular

    17 duty.

    18 Q. Thank you. Now, if we look at the theory,

    19 then the HVO rules at that time, if we juxtapose them

    20 to JNA rules, also upheld the same standards, but in

    21 practice these principles could not be upheld at the

    22 same level, because on the one hand we had an army

    23 which was developing its structure, which had been

    24 developing its structure for 40 years, and the latter

    25 had been in existence for only one year.

  35. 1A. Yes, that's quite true. But we were all

    2 faced with problems of that kind, that we appointed

    3 commanders by their full name, even if they were not

    4 professional officers or soldiers until that time.

    5 But in all these organisations and formations

    6 that we had, there were also career soldiers,

    7 professional soldiers, who lent a hand to these

    8 people. And schools and courses began shortly

    9 afterwards through the HVO, the Army of BH and

    10 elsewhere; that is, courses to train such people. That

    11 was the process and that was quite a natural

    12 operation.

    13 So that is true; it is quite true that it was

    14 difficult to apply in practice the leadership and

    15 command system as it is postulated by theory. But our

    16 rules also say, and I can see that it was everywhere,

    17 that ignorance does not relieve your responsibility.

    18 That is the certain rules. It does not relieve you of

    19 responsibility, regardless of what he is talking

    20 about. In our practice, we often said that. Somebody

    21 says, "I'm not a lawyer. I didn't know this or that."

    22 Q. Excuse me. Witness, I must ask you, and I

    23 will try to cut my questions short, and I should also

    24 like you -- to ask you to be concise. I do not wish to

    25 interrupt you, but, still, could you please take care?

  36. 1Yesterday you spoke about your personal

    2 experience as regards the military police. You are an

    3 infantryman, aren't you?

    4 A. Yes.

    5 Q. What do you know about the military police,

    6 in theory?

    7 A. In practice, our unit often included the

    8 military police unit.

    9 Q. Were you a commander?

    10 A. No. I was the commander of the brigade

    11 staff, but within my personnel we also had a military

    12 police unit.

    13 Q. Yesterday you said, and I quote:

    14 "The military police reluctantly conducts

    15 defence operations."

    16 You presented that as your personal

    17 experience.

    18 A. Yes.

    19 Q. So was the military police or any other

    20 unit -- does the military police or any other unit do

    21 what it likes or what it is ordered to do?

    22 A. Well, they do what they're ordered to do, but

    23 they're special units: reconnaissance, military

    24 police, subversive, and so on and so forth.

    25 In principle they were treated as units which

  37. 1could do -- which was beyond some other units. In that

    2 sense they were some special units, and, therefore,

    3 they did what --

    4 Q. But, otherwise, they are also subjected and

    5 bound to comply with the orders they're issued?

    6 A. Yes, of course.

    7 Q. And is it within the terms of reference of

    8 the military police in wartime -- and in peacetime as

    9 well, but in wartime perhaps more -- providing security

    10 of the command post? Is that an important task of the

    11 military police; that is, are they there to provide the

    12 security for documents, for the records, and the

    13 commander? Briefly.

    14 A. Yes, it is one of its duties.

    15 Q. I went through the rules that you submitted,

    16 and I could see it says, on page 33 of the document:

    17 "Military police in wartime carries out the

    18 tasks as follows: (A) ..."

    19 First it says:

    20 "Directly provide the security the command

    21 post, the commander of the military unit, and

    22 institution in -- at its seat or when -- or on the

    23 move, and military couriers who carry military

    24 documents of the highest confidentiality."

    25 Is that it?

  38. 1A. Yes, of course, but I did not really list all

    2 the tasks, but I think I say somewhere -- and all the

    3 other orders issued it. That, I think, go for all the

    4 armies in the world.

    5 Q. But regardless of its other activities, this

    6 is also one of the very important tasks of the military

    7 police, which cannot --

    8 A. Yes. Yes, it is one of the regular tasks of

    9 the military police.

    10 Q. Witness, you enclosed with your expert

    11 opinion an example of an order for -- of an attack

    12 order, and I believe you have it with you, a fragment

    13 of it.

    14 A. Yes. Yes, a fragment.

    15 Q. So could you please help me to briefly go

    16 through these general principles of an attack order?

    17 Witness, tell me -- it is page 216 of your document?

    18 A. Yes, it is.

    19 Q. Here you give us a fragment and you begin

    20 with item 4 of such an attack order.

    21 Now, according to these definitions -- that

    22 is, which forces, which directions, which objectives --

    23 and we recognise that this is an attack order, even if

    24 we did not have a heading which said that.

    25 A. Absolutely.

  39. 1Q. So it is quite true what it says here, that

    2 it is an attack on main forces and so on and so forth?

    3 A. Yes. I tried to show what a specific combat

    4 order would look like.

    5 Q. Then item 5. Item 5, you also say what this

    6 particular mission of the 1st Company looks like.

    7 A. Yes.

    8 Q. Then item 6 for the 2nd Company; and item 7,

    9 3rd company.

    10 A. Yes.

    11 Q. And we see the objective of the attack,

    12 because we have directions of their movement?

    13 A. Yes. It is a complete pattern, model of what

    14 an order should look like.

    15 Q. Now, my question is: Why didn't you also

    16 show us a defence order?

    17 A. Well, because it is identical. This thing is

    18 quite identical.

    19 Q. But what is the difference?

    20 A. Well, the only difference is that it says

    21 "defence" instead of "attack." So here he says -- and

    22 the defence order here says the area of attack, and it

    23 will say area of attack, and it will say the area of

    24 defence. So that would be the only distinction. And

    25 just as the combat operations, the role and place of

  40. 1the commander, they're always the same, regardless of

    2 whether it's attack or defence.

    3 Q. So could you briefly explain what would a

    4 defence order look like?

    5 A. Well, if you have them here, I can go through

    6 all these items -- there's seven -- if you like. So

    7 instead of "armoured unit in the area of attack," it

    8 will say the same unit in the area of defence, the

    9 depth, the width of the front, and the mission.

    10 Q. And what does it mean when an order says

    11 preparedness at such-and-such hour on a particular

    12 date?

    13 A. It means, in all cases, in all instances,

    14 that a unit must be prepared for that task at a given

    15 time, but it may happen that this particular mission

    16 begins later. But that is a set time by which I, as a

    17 commander, must prepare my unit so that it can set off

    18 to carry out its mission. But whether we shall set off

    19 to conduct that mission, that may be changed by my

    20 superior, and, say, instead of 6.00, it will start at

    21 7.00, or for some reason, objective reasons, it will

    22 start earlier. But that, of course, you transmit that

    23 change down the chain of command.

    24 Q. So in other words, all the combat -- all the

    25 things have to be completed and the unit must be fully

  41. 1combat-prepared and waiting for the sign to go into an

    2 operation.

    3 A. Yes. That is what is done by professional

    4 soldiers, and they know that. Sometimes they do not

    5 even write down the preparedness, and that is not a

    6 mistake, but that is basically what preparedness

    7 means.

    8 MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I should only

    9 briefly like to go through documents we were shown

    10 yesterday. So could you please -- could we go into

    11 private session, please, for a short while?

    12 [Private session]

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

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    2 (redacted)

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    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 [Open session]

    12 MR. PAVKOVIC:

    13 Q. Today, Witness, when asked by the

    14 Prosecution, you analysed documents in Annex A and

    15 marked as AD1 to AD6, and you said that you were

    16 reading there the signature of the commander, and you

    17 mentioned his name. You do not know if that is the

    18 signature of the person indicated here as the commander

    19 of that company?

    20 A. Quite true. I have never seen that person.

    21 I've never seen his signature.

    22 Q. You said that these documents AD2, AD3, and

    23 AD4, that these were not combat orders?

    24 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters are sorry;

    25 they could not hear the witness's answer.

  47. 1JUDGE CASSESE: Could you please answer this

    2 question?

    3 A. Yes, yes. Perhaps you did not hear it. I

    4 apologise. The first three documents -- these first

    5 documents are not combat orders; they are orders

    6 relative to disciplinary responsibility.


    8 Q. And the document AD5, even if it says that it

    9 is minutes, you established -- you asserted that it was

    10 an order?

    11 A. Quite right. It cannot be minutes of

    12 anything. So this is an example. As soon as you

    13 see -- as soon as you see the words "odredjujem" or

    14 "odlucujem," it means, "I thereby determine, or order,

    15 or I decide." As soon as you have these three words,

    16 "I command, I order, I decide," then it is an order.

    17 Q. That is from your point of view?

    18 A. No. That is from the point of view of

    19 everybody.

    20 Q. You mean from the point of view of the

    21 doctrine?

    22 A. Yes. Once again, every soldier will do

    23 that.

    24 Q. Yes, but other people --

    25 A. Yes, with that, of course, a reservation. I

  48. 1mean -- but a soldier would know that.

    2 Q. Yes, but a person who is not a professional

    3 soldier may do that out of sheer ignorance?

    4 A. I already told you -- I mean, it may -- it

    5 may happen so, and even in mathematics, sometimes the

    6 solution is not correct but it gives you the best

    7 result. But what it says here, this is an order,

    8 because it says "designate here," and this was in how

    9 many -- with the order of the commander of the

    10 4th Battalion. So he could not do anything else.

    11 So this is an order really, because it does

    12 say here, "Pursuant to the order of the commander."

    13 You told me to carry out this particular task, and then

    14 I contact the immediate executors and tell them to do

    15 that.

    16 Q. Right. But it, nevertheless, says here that

    17 it is nothing but a list.

    18 A. The list is only a preamble, but we see where

    19 these soldiers are going to. So this list is -- the

    20 list could have been an annex to the document. The

    21 list could have been an annex to the order; that is,

    22 the order could have come down to only the sentence.

    23 "The soldiers are going to reinforce Travnik," and

    24 that could have been the order, the whole of the order,

    25 and then attached to it could have been the list of

  49. 1these people here.

    2 Q. I have only one question more. Will you

    3 please look at the document under A6, and that is the

    4 document of the 8th of April, 1993.

    5 Could you please confirm it for us that this

    6 document does not show how long will this unit be

    7 attached to the commander of the 2nd Company?

    8 A. I believe I did confirm that I could not see

    9 that period of time. One sees when it is to be -- when

    10 it is being attached to the commander of the

    11 2nd Company, but I could not read anywhere for how long

    12 it would be attached to it. It does not appear here.

    13 Q. Will you tell us, please, when was this order

    14 issued?

    15 A. On the 8th of April, 1993. And on the 8th of

    16 April. So it should have been before 12.00. Before

    17 12.00, sometime in the morning hours, so that this

    18 company -- so that this unit could carry out this task;

    19 that is, the unit must be prepared to carry out its

    20 task on this day when the order is issued.

    21 Q. Thank you very much.

    22 MR. PAVKOVIC: Mr. President, I have no

    23 further questions for this witness.

    24 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Pavkovic.

    25 So we now take the usual 30-minute break, and then we

  50. 1resume with Counsel Radovic, Susak, and Puliselic.

    2 We'll adjourn now.

    3 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.

    4 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

    5 JUDGE CASSESE: We will resume with Counsel

    6 Radovic. May I ask Counsel Radovic, Counsel Susak and

    7 Counsel Puliselic to try to be as brief as possible,

    8 because we would like to start with the next witness,

    9 if possible. And then at the end of this testimony we

    10 will do some planning for the future, and you will see

    11 why we are keen to move on quickly.

    12 Counsel Radovic.

    13 MR. RADOVIC: Thank you, Mr. President.

    14 Cross-examined by Mr. Radovic:

    15 Q. My name is Ranko Radovic. I am one of the

    16 Defence counsel of the accused Zoran Kupreskic, as the

    17 first defendant. I will first start with the documents

    18 that the Prosecutor showed you, and I would like to ask

    19 you to have a look at AD8. We are talking about the

    20 order issued on the 15th of April at 10.00.

    21 A. Yes.

    22 Q. Have you found it?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. In the upper left-hand corner it says where

    25 this order came from. So could you please give us the

  51. 1place that this order came from?

    2 A. The command headquarters of the operative

    3 zone of Central Bosnia forward, the command post -- oh,

    4 forward command post. Yes, forward command post.

    5 Q. Thank you.

    6 A. Forward command post, Vitez.

    7 Q. Tell me, operative zone, that's in the HVO.

    8 Which formation was that? Was it like a corps?

    9 A. It was a formation similar to a corps; a

    10 division, a corps, approximately that rank, that

    11 level.

    12 Q. But it was below the level of operative --

    13 what was below the level of operative zone?

    14 A. It was battalions and brigades.

    15 Q. Please look at the right-hand side -- in the

    16 upper right-hand corner, "defence military secret."

    17 A. "Strictly confidential."

    18 Q. What does it mean when it says "defence

    19 military secret, strictly confidential" on a document?

    20 A. That means that that document is handed over

    21 only to persons who are in charge. That is to say that

    22 only persons who are in charge within the chain of

    23 command are supposed to familiarise themselves with

    24 it.

    25 Q. Could you please explain this. It starts

  52. 1from the command of the operative zone or a corps, and

    2 then who would be the person in charge who would get

    3 this order?

    4 A. Well, it says here who it was addressed to.

    5 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please stop

    6 overlapping the witness, says the interpreter.

    7 A. It is customary that it is sent from the

    8 operative zone to the brigade, and from the brigade to

    9 the battalion; that is, within the operative brigade.

    10 But it can also go independently to an independent

    11 battalion.

    12 Q. Very well. To which level of command would

    13 this first order go?

    14 A. This first order should go to the first

    15 level. That is the principle. That should be received

    16 by the commander of the brigade and commander of the

    17 independent battalion.

    18 Q. What about this first order? Would the

    19 brigade commander give it further to battalions, or

    20 not, or can you not give a definite answer to this?

    21 A. In principle, in principle, this order in

    22 this form would not go further from brigade commander.

    23 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. President, mea culpa. I

    24 did not ask for a private session and I started with

    25 this document.

  53. 1JUDGE CASSESE: I was aware of that, but I

    2 thought that you would not mention specifics of this

    3 document.

    4 MR. RADOVIC: I repent.

    5 JUDGE CASSESE: All right. So you wish us to

    6 go into private session?

    7 MR. RADOVIC: Yes.

    8 [Private session]

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

    14 (redacted)

    15 (redacted)

    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 (redacted)

    24 (redacted)

    25 (redacted)

  54. 1












    13 pages 12229-12242 redacted private session













  1. 1(redacted)

    2 [Open session]

    3 MR. RADOVIC:

    4 Q. You said that you worked for the general

    5 headquarters and that you were always kept abreast of

    6 all the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if I understood

    7 you properly.

    8 A. Yes. It was as of September 1993 -- or,

    9 rather, 16th of August, 1993.

    10 Q. But right at the beginning of the war, would

    11 you know what was the position of Croat units or, say,

    12 HVO, in the Vitez area? Or perhaps a direct question:

    13 Were these units encircled, surrounded at some point?

    14 A. By whom?

    15 Q. Encircled by Muslim armed forces.

    16 A. In early 1992, in the beginning of 1992,

    17 there was no need to analyse whether they were

    18 surrounded by anyone.

    19 Q. No. But let's just talk about the end of

    20 1992.

    21 A. We can only talk about the time of the

    22 conflict.

    23 Q. Right. Tell us.

    24 A. Well, on the ground and in the maps, some

    25 units of both were partly surrounded; that is, a part

  2. 1of Vitez, a part of Busovaca, a part of Kiseljak. But

    2 likewise, both of them -- or, rather, they were

    3 alternatively semi-encircled or encircled. Now, I

    4 would have to show you --

    5 Q. Right, right. But a British officer said

    6 that in Old Vitez, Muslim forces were surrounded;

    7 around them was the HVO, and the HVO was also

    8 surrounded, so that it all looked like that shooting

    9 target?

    10 A. Yes. And there were very many cases of that,

    11 in Zepce, in --

    12 Q. Right. But what I'm interested in is Vitez.

    13 Is that correct? Was that British officer correct?

    14 A. Well, they were all semi-surrounded.

    15 Q. But tell us, the concentration of HVO troops,

    16 apart from Vitez, was there one at Kiseljak?

    17 A. The HVOs, you mean?

    18 Q. Yes.

    19 A. Yes, there was.

    20 Q. And will you now, please, look at this large

    21 map and show us Vitez and Kiseljak and their location?

    22 A. Kiseljak is right here [indicates].

    23 Q. It doesn't seem to be --

    24 A. No, this is the larger -- this is an aerial

    25 photograph and enlargement, so perhaps it's not here.

  3. 1Q. All right. All right. Never mind, then.

    2 Excuse me.

    3 So these two places where we had

    4 concentrations of HVO forces, was there a road

    5 communication between them?

    6 A. Yes.

    7 Q. And then this road which linked the two

    8 groupings of HVO forces, if I can put that way, was of

    9 strategic importance for the HVO?

    10 A. Well, it depends how you look at it. Yes, it

    11 was of strategic importance, and no, it wasn't. But

    12 yes, rather.

    13 Q. On the basis of the military tactics or,

    14 rather, strategy, is the separation of enemy forces and

    15 then the destruction of individual groups, thus the

    16 separating?

    17 A. Yes. So you see how my Bilic [phoen]

    18 training, education is still very active. Well, I

    19 spent there ten years, and you learn the tactics quite

    20 well.

    21 Q. Right. But let us move on to another

    22 question. You did give us an answer to that, but I

    23 should like to really lay stress on it, because we saw

    24 a film, and your answer -- your response to it will be

    25 different than the author's.

  4. 1At the time of the SFRY and the JNA, a

    2 reservist took his weapons back home with him.

    3 THE INTERPRETER: The witness nods.

    4 MR. RADOVIC:

    5 Q. Are you quite sure about that?

    6 A. I'm sure about it, and I was with the JNA

    7 until 1992.

    8 Q. I'm asking you this because one of the

    9 witnesses for the Prosecution, who made a film and told

    10 us that people with weapons were issued with those

    11 weapons as reservists and went back with them home?

    12 A. Now -- but you have to distinguish --

    13 Q. I'm referring to the JNA period.

    14 A. Yes. The Serbs were issued them, that is

    15 true. I was the head of the brigade staff, and I know

    16 that that is true. So I know that this -- I know this

    17 to be the truth. But it wasn't the case before 1990.

    18 Q. And the Muslims, the reservists, did they

    19 ever -- were they ever issued with weapons?

    20 A. No. No, never, and we agree on this point.

    21 Q. Croats were issued with those weapons after

    22 the war in Croatia?

    23 A. No. That is another matter.

    24 Q. I'm asking whether Muslims reservists were

    25 issued that.

  5. 1A. No.

    2 Q. Right. So only the Serbs went back home with

    3 their weapons and the others did not?

    4 A. I did write something about this, which were

    5 the strategic activities at the territorial-defence

    6 level, and I wrote it down, who was issued with what

    7 weapons.

    8 Q. Yes, I heard, that, but we heard it from a

    9 witness, and he was supposed to be an objective witness

    10 and yet he presented us with an unobjective fact.

    11 Now, as regards the military tactic. Is surprise one

    12 of the permissible methods of warfare?

    13 A. Yes, it is. That is one of the principles.

    14 The higher degree of surprise, the effect, the results

    15 are better. That is natural in combat operations. And

    16 everybody tried to do that. Who managed to catch the

    17 enemy by surprise, he achieved results.

    18 Q. And that is probably part of the history of

    19 warfare, isn't it, because the history of warfare, you

    20 also learn about successful surprise tactics that are

    21 taught. For instance, the attack of Normandy was one

    22 of such cases. And you must have learned?

    23 A. Yes, those examples of catching the enemy

    24 unawares. Something which is a possible example of

    25 tactics.

  6. 1Q. In your analysis you also dealt on the system

    2 of recruitment, of reserve system and the mobilisation

    3 system. Could you please tell us: After the military

    4 service, after the regular military service, one became

    5 a reservist. Now, at the moment when one becomes a

    6 reservist, as of that moment that person is a civilian

    7 or a military?

    8 A. That person is a civilian doing his whatever,

    9 regular civilian job.

    10 Q. Until?

    11 A. Until he is called to join his unit.

    12 Q. So we agree on that point too. And now, as

    13 regards the mobilisation. Very briefly, tell us the

    14 types of mobilisation, but very briefly, and then I

    15 will give you an example and ask you whether

    16 mobilisation is possible in that way.

    17 A. Well, right. There is the secret and public

    18 mobilisation, so that was the classification, and that

    19 is according to one classification. And there is also

    20 regular or surprise mobilisation, in part or in whole.

    21 I said yesterday how people are called up may vary.

    22 Q. Right. We don't have to go into that. I

    23 will give you an example, and that example is from the

    24 Bosnia conflict. That is not in a stable -- not from a

    25 stable state, which has existed for years; it is

  7. 1summons in an unstable situation for an army which is

    2 in the making yet. And is it possible for the military

    3 police, if I -- if I seem to be leading, do, please,

    4 interrupt me, but perhaps this is the simplest way and

    5 we can waste least time. Is it possible that two or

    6 three military policemen come to somebody's home, just

    7 pick people up and take them to the front line?

    8 A. Yes, that is a possible solution if a soldier

    9 were -- received a summons and failed to respond. So

    10 if I got this summons and, however, did not respond,

    11 did not report to my unit, and the military police is

    12 bound, or whatever is the authority, to come and take

    13 me to the -- to my unit.

    14 Q. But you are referring to the regular state of

    15 affairs. But if there was no summons in writing, can

    16 then the military police come and pick up people?

    17 A. Well, that can happen also, but the scope of

    18 it and how often it happened, I really don't know. But

    19 in practice that is of course possible, simply because

    20 in the beginning there was a lot of arbitrariness

    21 about.

    22 Q. So we agree on all the points that we talk

    23 about. Very well.

    24 Now, I should like the usher to show the

    25 witness P135.

  8. 1I have the text in Croatian -- rather, in

    2 Bosniak. You see, do you have the Croatian or, rather,

    3 the Bosniak text in front you? Well, no, it is

    4 Croatian, because of what the document is. It is the

    5 Croatian Defence Council.

    6 So this is the replenishment of the Vitez

    7 Brigade. That is what it is about. What I should like

    8 to know is what conclusions would you draw from item 3,

    9 3, which reads: "Between the 16th of April to the 28th

    10 of April they were mobilised --" I shall begin at the

    11 beginning. "Between the 16th of April until the 28th

    12 of April, '93, they mobilised 498 conscripts as a whole

    13 and they were actively included in HVO units in

    14 addition to the regular personnel of the Vitez

    15 Brigade."

    16 And now we shall do a full stop here and

    17 interpret this sentence. Do you agree that this text

    18 seems to indicate that there was a regular crew, if I

    19 may call it that, of Vitez Brigade, without people

    20 mobilised, and when the war broke out, that this

    21 brigade was replenished with reservists? Is that what

    22 transpires from this sentence?

    23 A. I could interpret it in two ways. I have

    24 nothing against it. I am giving you my

    25 interpretation. Well, one way is that the structure of

  9. 1the brigade, in terms of organisation, was below the

    2 number of soldiers who were at that point with a

    3 brigade. That is, that there were more soldiers in the

    4 brigade than would be warranted by its structure.

    5 And another interpretation is -- now, what

    6 this term was supposed to mean, one would really have

    7 to look into that.

    8 Q. As it says here -- you have the next passage,

    9 which perhaps may expand on this. The next sentence

    10 says: "The largest number of military conscripts

    11 mobilised after the first day of the conflict were

    12 immediately included in the first line of defence.

    13 They are used as replacements on the lines after the

    14 first assault; that is, they are gradually included as

    15 replacements for the soldiers from the mobile

    16 personnel."

    17 Now, could you tell me, does it transpire,

    18 clearly from this text, which was -- which part of the

    19 army participated in the first strike?

    20 A. It was the members, the brigade numbers.

    21 Q. No, but it doesn't say brigade here. It says

    22 "replacement for soldiers from the mobile personnel."

    23 So is that active? In the former JNA, were they all

    24 soldiers under contract, or who were they?

    25 A. Well, now, I cannot really say whether those

  10. 1were soldiers under contract, as it says here, because

    2 we did not have any professional men in the former JNA,

    3 except for that particular category -- a few soldiers

    4 are under contract -- and towards the end I believe it

    5 was first implemented in practice sometime in 1990 or

    6 end of 1990. But now we do not have that particular

    7 category of persons and the brigade could not be

    8 replenished with those men at that time.

    9 I simply think that this was a brigade in the

    10 making on the basis of a particular structure or

    11 pattern, and it had its subordinate units, which were

    12 replenished. But there was a mobilisation; additional

    13 mobilisation was carried out because of the situation

    14 on the ground.

    15 Q. Yeah, right. So we agree. And now, will you

    16 please tell me -- I mean, these are your conjectures,

    17 as a matter of fact, because you did not really keep

    18 abreast of that --

    19 A. No, I didn't. Really, I do know some things,

    20 but --

    21 Q. And now let us move onto the Territorial

    22 Defence. When was the system of -- when was the chain

    23 of command established in the Territorial Defence?

    24 Could you give us the time frame?

    25 A. I don't understand you. What do you mean

  11. 1from below up?

    2 Q. What was the Territorial Defence -- that is,

    3 the commanding and the commanded, did they exist in the

    4 Territorial Defence? Was there a chain of command

    5 established in the Territorial Defence?

    6 A. Well, as soon as a wartime unit is mobilised

    7 -- and TO units were mostly wartime units, so some of

    8 the TO units only had their offices. That is a part of

    9 the command which existed in peacetime already, and all

    10 the rest were reservists; that is, either reserve

    11 soldiers and reserve officers or NCOs. Until the unit

    12 -- until such time as when the unit was mobilised,

    13 that it fully formed the reserve officer, the reserve

    14 had no commanding authority. And after a unit was

    15 formed, then there was -- then all this disappeared

    16 between an active reserve soldier or an active reserve

    17 officer and an active officer or an active duty

    18 soldier.

    19 Q. So TO units which then grew into the BH army,

    20 were they formed on the basis of the territorial

    21 principle; that is, all the inhabitants of a village in

    22 one unit?

    23 A. Why, yes. Those units were also formed on

    24 the basis of the territorial principle.

    25 Q. So, right. We know what the territorial

  12. 1principle is. I only wanted this to be confirmed. And

    2 those units which were formed on the basis of the

    3 territorial principle -- that is, one village, one

    4 unit, never mind which -- those soldiers or militia men

    5 or home guards were put up in special building

    6 facilities; that is, barracks with training grounds and

    7 whatnot, or did everybody go back home every time?

    8 A. Well, specifically, I did have an opportunity

    9 to see that. And with the HVO in Konjic or Fojnica and

    10 other places, Mr. Something, I don't know what his name

    11 was, they were using the schools, and as a rule those

    12 units would be put up in those schools. Or perhaps

    13 some business premises, such as warehouses, those units

    14 would be there.

    15 But until then, the largest part of the units

    16 were at home, that is, at home. But by mid '93 they

    17 began to set up branches -- began to set up something

    18 else. Well, barracks. Not always proper, true

    19 barracks such as in Kiseljak. But there were no

    20 barracks. They were at home. As a rule, in schools,

    21 or warehouses or in barracks.

    22 Q. But they were also at home, weren't they?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Now, what I should like to know next is you

    25 said the BH army had considerable trouble with

  13. 1supplies. And this trouble -- did these supplies also

    2 cover uniforms?

    3 A. Yes, all the material, resources.

    4 Q. But I am interested in uniforms, because

    5 uniforms are very important in this regard. I should

    6 repeat my question. Was there a shortage of uniforms?

    7 A. Yes, sir, there was a shortage of uniforms

    8 too.

    9 Q. Were there such instances when BH army

    10 members would wear civilian clothes on front line

    11 towards the Serbs?

    12 A. In the beginning, yes.

    13 MR. RADOVIC: Mr. President, thank you very

    14 much for your patience. I have no further questions.

    15 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Counsel Susak.

    16 Cross-examined by Mr. Susak:

    17 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

    18 Mr. Dzambasovic?

    19 A. Dzambasovic.

    20 Q. All right, Dzambasovic. I am the Defence

    21 counsel for Drago Josipovic. Since we were in the same

    22 military formation while doing our military service at

    23 Tomoglavac, I think we are going to understand each

    24 other better. You talked about attack in your

    25 expertise, and you say an attack can be carried out

  14. 1from a circular or semi-circular base. Could you

    2 please tell me what that means?

    3 A. There are different forms of attack. Frontal

    4 attack means that an attack is carried frontally. Then

    5 an attack from the flanks, that is the attack comes

    6 from either the right or the left flank, and it can be

    7 either the east or the west in relation to a particular

    8 facility. So that's on the flanks. Then also an

    9 attack can come from the rear -- well, depending on the

    10 situation. If the positions of your unit are such that

    11 you can from -- you can carry out an attack from

    12 several different points, then that is better.

    13 So then if you create an overall picture, you

    14 see whether it's a circular or semi-circular base. So

    15 you've encircled someone and then from that

    16 encirclement you carry out, you launch an attack.

    17 Q. And now in relation to this I am going to put

    18 another question to you. Can defence be organised or

    19 carried out from a circular or semi-circular basis?

    20 A. Yes. If you are encircled and then the

    21 combat operation that should follow is a breakthrough

    22 through that encirclement.

    23 Q. When a circular or semi-circular space is

    24 used for an attack or a defence, can diversionary units

    25 be brought in as well?

  15. 1A. If the conditions are right, this can be done

    2 in any situation.

    3 Q. Well, now we've reached the following point:

    4 How is a semi-circular line established of attack or of

    5 defence?

    6 A. If I could get a piece of paper, I could draw

    7 it for you and then everybody could see it. Could I

    8 please get a piece of paper? I could draw a diagram

    9 for you.

    10 What you see on your monitors now is the

    11 following: If this is the enemy in the green square,

    12 that would be a semi-circular base attack,

    13 approximately. If we were now to add the following,

    14 that an attack could be carried out from this side too,

    15 or from some other side too, then that is an attack

    16 from a circular base.

    17 Q. Mr. Witness, could you please look at the

    18 diagram you drew for us once again.

    19 A. Very well.

    20 Q. Wait a minute. I have a question for you. I

    21 can't see the diagram yet. Fine. Look at this arrow

    22 that is closer to you. Yes, that's the south. What

    23 does this line mean -- no, not south; the arrow down

    24 there closer to you. What does this line that you drew

    25 denote?

  16. 1A. That means the direction.

    2 Q. And this is the unit. And this semi-circular

    3 line, is that a semi-circular or a circular line?

    4 A. That is the deployment of units on the

    5 ground, and it may differ.

    6 Q. All right. Now, I am going to give you an

    7 example and you are going to help me understand this.

    8 There is a conflict in a village, and this conflict

    9 moved one kilometre to the north, for example. And

    10 where it originally broke out, this conflict, there

    11 were houses, houses that were scattered around, only a

    12 few Muslim and Croat houses. Where the Muslim and

    13 Croat houses were, those that were scattered about,

    14 they are adjacent to a territory where there was no

    15 war, no conflict, and then the conflict extends

    16 further. How do you interpret this, that not a single

    17 Muslim was killed, not a single Croat was killed, and

    18 there were even some officers of Bosnia-Herzegovina

    19 there; they all remained alive and they were

    20 military-aged men? How do you explain this: that in

    21 one corner of the village these houses remained intact

    22 and that there was no conflict? Is it because of the

    23 distance involved? Or if we look at the scattered

    24 houses and then on the other part of the -- in the

    25 other part of the village where there are many more

  17. 1houses, there is a clearing between the two. So what

    2 is your opinion? How did this happen or why did this

    3 happen?

    4 A. It is very difficult to answer. Everything

    5 you said can be true, and, on the other hand, it need

    6 not be true. This can be outside the zone of

    7 responsibility. That is one possibility. Then it may

    8 be that it was not important, in terms of the

    9 assignment, because it is not a significant target. It

    10 may be that somebody reached an agreement and said, "We

    11 are not going to do anything. Let us go," et cetera,

    12 et cetera. So there are several possibilities and

    13 every one of them can either be true or untrue.

    14 Q. But I am laying special emphasis on the fact

    15 that nobody got killed, nobody got hurt, nobody was

    16 shot on that day from any ethnic group, no houses were

    17 torched, nothing happened there.

    18 A. If this was within the zone of

    19 responsibility, it is strange, but if it is outside the

    20 zone of responsibility, it's natural. But now I really

    21 don't know.

    22 Q. Could you interpret it as follows: that

    23 there was less interest involved, less importance, that

    24 there should be no conflict there?

    25 A. Whatever you say in this case can be either

  18. 1true or untrue.

    2 Q. Very well. Now, I am going to move on to

    3 another question.

    4 As for civilian defence, since the rules were

    5 taken over from the former JNA, you said here that

    6 civilian protection, civilian defence, was organised in

    7 headquarters, units and special representatives. Who

    8 was the special representative?

    9 A. A special representative was in the local

    10 community, this lowest social political community. He

    11 was in charge of these particular matters; that is to

    12 say, if there was a natural disaster, an earthquake, et

    13 cetera, he should mobilise people; that is, that

    14 individual who was called in different ways and

    15 different places. But this was the lowest level of

    16 setting up this civilian protection.

    17 Q. So you are saying that that's the lowest

    18 level of civilian protection?

    19 A. Yes.

    20 Q. What are the tasks of the representative for

    21 civilian protection?

    22 A. So we are talking about the lowest level;

    23 that is to say, two or three villages. So if, from his

    24 superior, he receives an order to engage a civilian

    25 defence unit, to act as follows: that is to say, to

  19. 1give call-up papers to civilian protection unit members

    2 and to set up a unit within this area of civilian

    3 protection, and then he should act in accordance with

    4 the tasks that he received. So that will be his

    5 authority, because that is this lowest level. But then

    6 it went further on upwards, towards the municipality,

    7 et cetera. There were different levels.

    8 Q. Just one more question. This representative

    9 refers to the civilian authorities in the

    10 municipality. For example, does he refer to the

    11 defence department of Vitez, for example? I mean, in

    12 view of the organisation.

    13 A. No, he is not attached to the defence

    14 department of Vitez, this representative of the

    15 civilian defence. However, civilian defence units

    16 carried out tasks for defence purposes, those that were

    17 not of a combat nature.

    18 Q. Very well. Could you please tell me now: In

    19 war, or immediately after war, what are the obligations

    20 of civilian defence? In the immediate aftermath of a

    21 war or, for example, during a war, is one of the tasks

    22 to take care of the situation on the ground?

    23 A. Yes.

    24 Q. Could you please tell us something more about

    25 that?

  20. 1A. Civilian defence units are used for the

    2 consolidation of the front line and the terrain. This

    3 is an expert notion that is used, an expert term. That

    4 is to say, to prevent the outbreak of contagious

    5 diseases. And as for the front line, it means taking

    6 care of the wounded, of the dead, of persons and

    7 animals and buildings. That is to say that if a

    8 building was destroyed --

    9 Q. So one of the tasks is to take care of all

    10 the dead bodies that are in that area?

    11 A. Yes.

    12 Q. Do you agree with that?

    13 A. Yes, yes. That's part of their task, yes.

    14 Q. Very well. Can this be considered to be

    15 humane work, since the war had stopped much earlier?

    16 If it's no longer a battleground, can this be

    17 considered to be a very humane effort? For example,

    18 taking care of dead bodies, removing dead bodies, all

    19 the things that you mentioned, can this be considered

    20 to be a humane effort?

    21 A. Well, it's certainly a humane effort if none

    22 of this has been taken care of. If there are

    23 authorities that are in charge of that, then it's a

    24 different matter altogether.

    25 Q. Very well. Thank you. Now, let's move on.

  21. 1I'm going to ask you something about war, if there is a

    2 conflict, and if one side in a war loses.

    3 The side that lost the war, does it surrender

    4 its weapons or not, or can an agreement be reached in

    5 this respect, how arms would be surrendered?

    6 A. Perhaps I did not fully understand you, but

    7 I'll try to tell you the following: When combat

    8 operations cease, or when a war ends, we believe that

    9 one side was defeated, for example. Now, whether it's

    10 going to surrender its weapons or not, that depends on

    11 international agreements if international factors are

    12 involved.

    13 So, for example, there is this latest example

    14 of Kosovo. KFOR gave a deadline for the Kosovo army to

    15 disarm, so that is one way of doing it, how one acts

    16 after combat activities cease.

    17 If international factors are not involved in

    18 the process of peace or of building the peace, then it

    19 depends on the internal situation; that is to say, how

    20 the military and political leadership is going to act.

    21 That's what it depends on, whether somebody is going to

    22 hand over their weapons or not.

    23 Q. So it depends on the decisions that will be

    24 reached by the two conflicting parties; is that right?

    25 A. Yes, that's right.

  22. 1Q. Very well. Now, my last question would be:

    2 Do you know anything about exchanges, either of

    3 population, either of one ethnic group or another, at

    4 what level this was carried out? Was this done at the

    5 level of the military authorities or civilian

    6 authorities? And could you tell us at which levels

    7 these things were done, the exchange of prisoners of

    8 war, civilians, et cetera?

    9 A. Well, that was organised from the top; that

    10 is to say, from the level of the state. There were

    11 official authorities that were involved in such

    12 matters. In practice, in the practice that prevailed,

    13 I don't know whether it went to the municipal level or

    14 whether specifically -- I don't want to make a

    15 mistake. I don't know whether it was the municipal

    16 level or lower than that, but there were exchanges that

    17 were carried out within units too.

    18 For example, you and I reach an agreement,

    19 and we do something that we agreed upon. So --

    20 Q. And could agreements be reached at the level

    21 of municipalities?

    22 A. Well, yes, I think so. I don't know any

    23 specific examples now, but I think they did it.

    24 Q. All right. So, for example, the

    25 municipalities of Vitez and Zenica, do you know

  23. 1anything about this?

    2 A. Well, I cannot give you a specific example.

    3 I don't know about this. I know that in Blaskic, for

    4 example, that somebody from Travnik was in charge of

    5 this exchange, but as for this particular case that you

    6 mentioned, I cannot give you an answer, because I'm not

    7 familiar with it.

    8 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dzambasovic.

    9 MR. SUSAK: Thank you. I have no further

    10 questions.

    11 JUDGE CASSESE: Counsel Puliselic?

    12 MR. PULISELIC: Mr. President, I have no

    13 further questions because they have been exhausted.

    14 Thank you.

    15 JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you.

    16 Counsel Slokovic-Glumac?

    17 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Thank you,

    18 Mr. President. I only wanted to draw your attention to

    19 this map which was already tendered. This is a map

    20 that was admitted as D9/2, and, therefore, I think it

    21 will be unnecessary for us to call in any other experts

    22 with this regard. And it's going to be very brief.

    23 Since this is the only copy that is here in

    24 the courtroom right now, I would like to ask the usher

    25 to show the witness this map. And we got this map from

  24. 1the Office of the Prosecutor right now. That is to say

    2 that the map that was tendered is not in here right now

    3 because it's being photocopied.

    4 Cross-examined by Ms. Slokovic-Glumac:

    5 Q. Mr. Witness, please, could you have a look at

    6 this? This is the deployment of forces.

    7 MR. BLAXILL: Excuse my interruption for just

    8 a moment. Excuse my interruption. I have been advised

    9 that this may well have been a document that was

    10 introduced or tendered in the course of perhaps closed

    11 testimony of a protected witness. In view of, you

    12 know, our endeavours to ensure confidentiality in that

    13 regard, I'd perhaps just remind my learned friend, and

    14 perhaps we could make sure it's handled appropriately

    15 now. Sorry to interrupt you.

    16 JUDGE CASSESE: All right.

    17 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: It was admitted in open

    18 session in the Aleksovski case, and now I cannot

    19 remember whether it was in open or closed session in

    20 this case, but at any rate, we can move into closed

    21 session in this part.

    22 JUDGE CASSESE: Private session. Private

    23 session, yes.

    24 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Thank you very much.

    25 [Private session]

  25. 1












    13 pages 12267-12272 redacted private session













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    2 (redacted)

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    4 (redacted)

    5 (redacted)

    6 (redacted)

    7 (redacted)

    8 (redacted)

    9 (redacted)

    10 (redacted)

    11 (redacted)

    12 (redacted)

    13 (redacted)

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    16 (redacted)

    17 (redacted)

    18 (redacted)

    19 (redacted)

    20 (redacted)

    21 (redacted)

    22 (redacted)

    23 [Open session]

    24 MR. BLAXILL:

    25 Q. Just a test. Can you hear me now, Brigadier,

  2. 1or can you hear the translation?

    2 A. Yes, it's fine now.

    3 Q. Yes, sir. In answer to my learned friend

    4 Mr. Radovic you made a remark about the issue of

    5 weapons to Croats after the war in Croatia. I would

    6 ask you just three questions on that.

    7 One, is on what knowledge you base that

    8 comment; two, if you know how extensive was that arming

    9 of obviously non-active Croat persons; and thirdly, do

    10 you know when that happened?

    11 A. Right. Thank you. When the war broke out

    12 and ended in Croatia, on the basis of the agreement

    13 concluded by the republics, a part of the armaments was

    14 left behind in the barracks in the Republic of Croatia;

    15 that is, part of equipment and armament and Varistine

    16 [phoen] and all the other barracks where the conditions

    17 were all right. And those armaments and equipment were

    18 used to equip the Croatian army and the HVO - that's no

    19 secret -- and also the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina; that

    20 is, all three of them.

    21 The weapons, now, how they came by it, I -- I

    22 never dealt with logistics in my life, in my

    23 professional career, so I don't know. Some were

    24 purchased, some papers were seen, and all of the

    25 manners -- how did the logistics people manage? I

  3. 1don't know.

    2 So that was the beginning and the end of the

    3 war in Croatia, and so far then, the Croatian army or,

    4 rather, the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, before

    5 the Bosniak Muslims and later on the Muslims, also used

    6 some of these armaments and equipment from Croatia.

    7 Q. And I think just the last item I asked you

    8 is: Do you recall, in terms of the date, when that

    9 happened? Can you say in months or weeks as to when

    10 that happened?

    11 A. I know specifically when I was in Konjic,

    12 from -- HVO command being Dinko Zebic, Ivica Azinovic

    13 who cooperated with me. We cooperated closely. They

    14 were issuing some papers to individuals who were

    15 involved in the purchase or procurement of these

    16 weapons. But how they did it in the territorial

    17 Republic of Croatia, I really don't know, but I know it

    18 was April/May 1992. At that time armaments were

    19 arriving from the Republic of Croatia.

    20 How, in that way specifically, I really never

    21 learned that, but, you know that -- it was a regular

    22 occurrence and that was no secret.

    23 Q. Brigadier, thank you very much.

    24 MR. BLAXILL: And I'm obliged to you, Your

    25 Honours.

  4. 1JUDGE CASSESE: Thank you, Mr. Blaxill. We

    2 don't have any questions for the witness.

    3 Brigadier Dzambasovic, thank you so much for

    4 testifying as an expert witness. You may now be

    5 released.

    6 THE WITNESS: Thank you too.

    7 [The witness withdrew]

    8 JUDGE CASSESE: Before we move on to our next

    9 witness, I would like to tell you how we intend to plan

    10 for our future sittings. We very much hope that by

    11 Thursday of next week we may finish with the evidence,

    12 both the rebuttal witnesses and any rejoinder

    13 witnesses, as you know. Then closing arguments will be

    14 held in November, the 8th, the 9th, and the 10th of

    15 November.

    16 You also know that we have already set

    17 deadlines for the submissions of written briefs. You

    18 may submit either, say, an outline of your closing

    19 arguments with references to relevant parts of

    20 transcripts or, if you wish, you may submit a

    21 fully-fledged written brief on both legal and factual

    22 issues.

    23 As for the oral arguments, we thought that we

    24 would allocate 3 hours and 45 minutes to the

    25 Prosecution -- this would be Monday, the 8th of

  5. 1November -- an hour and a half to each Defence counsel,

    2 except for the Defence counsel of Dragan Papic.

    3 There's only Count 1, and he would be allocated one

    4 hour. So 1 hour and 30 minutes for all the Defence

    5 counsel, for a total of 8 hours and 30 minutes.

    6 Of course, Defence Counsel Slokovic-Glumac

    7 and Radovic, they can decide how to share the 3 hours.

    8 You have together 3 hours. It's for you to decide

    9 whether each of you will use an hour and a half or

    10 otherwise.

    11 But that means that for that purpose, we

    12 would have to sit on the 9th and the 10th of November

    13 from 8.30 in the morning to 1.30. From 8.30 to 1.30.

    14 Only in this way could we have 8 hours and 30 minutes

    15 available for Defence counsel. I hope these

    16 arrangements are suitable.

    17 What about the Prosecution? So you would

    18 have three -- all of Monday morning, for a total of 3

    19 hours and 45 minutes, because we exclude the breaks,

    20 two breaks, one 30-minute break and one 15-minute

    21 break.

    22 MR. TERRIER: I have no comments, Your

    23 Honour.

    24 JUDGE CASSESE: And Defence counsel? I see

    25 you don't have any objection.

  6. 1Of course, it is a maximum. If you speak for

    2 less than an hour and a half, it's even better. More

    3 so because there's no point in repeating what you may

    4 have already put on paper in your written briefs.

    5 So we plan, therefore, to finish on the 10th

    6 of November by 1.30, and then we will start

    7 deliberations. We very much hope to deliver our

    8 judgement in January.

    9 If you are not too tired, we could now move

    10 on and call the next witness. Do you want a 10-minute

    11 break? Would you prefer a 10-minute break? No break.

    12 Let's go on. Depending on the interpreters because, of

    13 course -- I hope the interpreters --

    14 MR. TERRIER: It might be good to have a

    15 break. It's extremely hot in this courtroom.

    16 JUDGE CASSESE: We have already complained

    17 twice against the warmth, but the technicians don't

    18 seem to pay any attention to our requests. So let's

    19 have a 10-minute break. So we resume at quarter to one

    20 and go on until 1.30.

    21 --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

    22 --- On resuming at 12.50 p.m.

    23 THE REGISTRAR: The expert witness's

    24 testimony will be D41/4.

    25 MR. TERRIER: Mr. President, the following

  7. 1witness asked for protective measures, which would be a

    2 closed session and the granting of a pseudonym, and the

    3 defence has no objection.

    4 JUDGE CASSESE: All right, then, the blinds

    5 should be drawn.

    6 MR. TERRIER: Mr. President, could I take

    7 advantage of the time needed to bring the witness in to

    8 present the Prosecution's position about the documents

    9 that Mrs. Slokovic-Glumac suggested on Monday? I am

    10 talking about documents which -- affidavits which

    11 reveal the personality of the accused, Kupreskic, and

    12 which were given the number D29/1. The Prosecution has

    13 no objections at all to those documents being submitted

    14 as evidence.

    15 But, as regards those documents which were

    16 numbered D31/1, I would make the following comment: In

    17 the documents, we find in the first place there are

    18 documents which relate to incidents that -- incidents

    19 of the witness Sakib Ahmic's particular life, and in

    20 particular incidents which occurred in '71 and in '79.

    21 The Prosecution has no objection to those documents

    22 which relate to the professional life of the witness

    23 Sakib Ahmic be tendered as evidence for the Tribunal.

    24 But the other evidence relate to divorce

    25 proceedings which took place in 1985 and which was

  8. 1granted in 1986 by a judgement for which we do not have

    2 a translation.

    3 As regards those documents which deal with

    4 the divorce proceedings, I refer to the -- to Rule 75

    5 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, protect the

    6 privacy of a witness, and the documents which relate

    7 to the divorce proceedings have absolutely no

    8 relationship --

    9 JUDGE CASSESE: We agree with you.

    10 MR. TERRIER: Thank you, Mr. President.

    11 MS. SLOKOVIC-GLUMAC: Mr. President, may I

    12 just say something? This document was not included in

    13 our proposals because it is a private document, but

    14 it's not the only reason. The witness, on several

    15 occasions, in response to the questions related to the

    16 divorce, it is obvious that there were problems between

    17 him and his wife, and that alcohol was the problem and

    18 that there were beatings, et cetera. So, in response

    19 to direct questions, this is related to medical

    20 documents that were submitted, whether this witness

    21 knew why he was beaten up and why he spent 17 days in

    22 hospital. He said that he did not know. But it is

    23 obvious from these records that he was beaten up by his

    24 sons.

    25 It is not that we want to go into the private

  9. 1life of the witness, but in response to the direct

    2 questions put by the defence, he gave false answers.

    3 So that is the only reason why we are questioning his

    4 credibility.

    5 JUDGE CASSESE: Yes. Thank you. Counsel

    6 Susak?

    7 MR. SUSAK: Mr. President, I would like the

    8 sketch that the previous witness made to be admitted

    9 into evidence. That is the sketch relating to attack

    10 and defence.

    11 JUDGE CASSESE: It has already been admitted

    12 into evidence. There's even a number.

    13 THE REGISTRAR: The document was tendered.

    14 It's D41/4.

    15 JUDGE CASSESE: We consider that those

    16 documents relating to the proceedings of Mr. Sakib

    17 Ahmic are not relevant, so they will not be admitted

    18 into evidence. The other ones will be admitted into

    19 evidence.

    20 I see your point, Counsel Slokovic-Glumac;

    21 however, we feel that it's -- they are not relevant.

    22 So we can move on to -- so closed session and the

    23 witness.

    24 [Closed session]

    25 (redacted)

  10. 1












    13 pages 12282-12298 redacted closed session





    18 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned

    19 at 1.30 p.m., to be reconvened on

    20 Thursday, the 30th day of September,

    21 1999 at 9.00 a.m.