1 Monday, 14 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
5 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Whiting, are you --
6 MR. WHITING: Good afternoon, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE PARKER: -- able to continue?
8 MR. WHITING: Before the witness is brought in, I just wanted to
9 put something on the record with respect to the documents that were
10 brought by the witness on Friday and taken possession of by the OTP. I
11 just wand to update the Court and I believe Defence counsel already know
12 this but just in case, to make it absolutely clear. Over the weekend,
13 the Prosecution was able to analyse those documents and translate certain
14 ones of them. Some of the documents are already in evidence and just so
15 the record is clear I'll set out which ones are already in evidence: A
16 document which is in P49, P049 at U008-1621 was provided by the witness.
17 A document which is in evidence in P48 at U003-8613 and 8614 is already
18 in evidence. And just to be clear, the witness provided an Albanian
19 version of that. What we have in evidence is the English version, but
20 it's the same political declaration, number 12. A document which appears
21 in P049 at U008-1630. And then finally a document which was admitted
22 into evidence on Friday as P139. It's U008-6944 and 6945.
23 Now, there are three documents which were provided by the witness
24 which are not in evidence and those three documents have been translated
25 and provided to the Defence and to the Court, and I will address those
1 with the witness. And just so the record is clear, they are a speech
2 dated 3, 4 March, and the year is written on the document as 1989, though
3 I suspect that's an error and it's 1998. But we'll clarify that with the
4 witness. A document dated 29 April, 1998, and a document dated 28 July
5 1998. As I said, I'll address those with the witness.
6 With that clarification, I think the witness can be brought in to
8 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We'll have the witness then.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 JUDGE PARKER: Good afternoon, Mr. Krasniqi. If I could remind
11 you --
12 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
13 JUDGE PARKER: -- of the affirmation you made at the beginning of
14 your evidence; it still applies. Mr. Whiting will now continue with his
15 questions. Thank you.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
17 WITNESS: JAKUP KRASNIQI [Resumed]
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Examined by Mr. Whiting: [Continued]
20 Q. Good afternoon, sir. Are you able to hear me clearly? You're
21 getting the translation okay?
22 A. Good afternoon. Yes. I hear you well.
23 Q. Over the weekend we were able to review the documents which you
24 provided on Friday. I can inform you that some of the documents that you
25 provided are already in the possession of the Court -- are in fact
1 already in evidence. But there were three documents that we did not have
2 until you provided them for us, and I'd like to put those documents
3 before you one at a time and ask you some questions about them.
4 MR. WHITING: And with the assistance of the usher if we could
5 put the first one, which is the document which is dated 3, 4 March, 1998.
6 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, do you see that document?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, in -- it's handwritten at the top of the document. There's
9 a date which appears to be 3, 4 March, 1989. Is that year correct or is
10 there an error in the year?
11 A. It's an error. It's 1998.
12 Q. Thank you. Can you tell us what this is, please.
13 A. This document represents a statement, a speech, that I held on
14 the occasion of the funeral of the victims who were massacred by the
15 Serbian police. It was held in the municipality of Drenoc, Skenderaj
16 during March 1998, 28th February, 1998 and 1 March 1998.
17 Q. I'd like to draw your attention to some paragraphs that are about
18 halfway through the document. I think it's the -- I believe it's the
19 second paragraph on page 2 of the Albanian version. In the English
20 version it's halfway down on the second page. And I'll read out the two
22 "We also warn all the international mechanisms -- the UN, the SC,
23 the USA, the EU, the EP, etc. -- to respect the Charters and documents,
24 which they have themselves drafted and signed, from the Atlantic one to
25 that of Helsinki and Paris.
1 "We are fully confident that in none of the mentioned valid
2 documents can the defending of one's national threshold and dignity be
3 assessed as a terrorist act. Not a single liberation war in any country
4 of the world has been qualified as a terrorist one, and our war is
5 nothing but a liberation one. If we chose to exercise terrorism we would
6 surely do it in Serbia and not in our homes. Serbia has a lot of purely
7 Serbian towns."
8 And then I think it's written in handwriting.
9 "Can a woman within the boundaries of her own house be called a
11 Now, was that part of the speech that you gave?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Do you have any comment on the -- what's addressed there with
14 respect to defending the movement of the KLA as not being a terrorist
16 A. Yes. Honourable Judges, this was a speech that I held at the
17 time when I was a leader of the LDK in Drenoc. The speech was held on
18 behalf of the two municipalities of Drenica, Skenderaj and Drenoc [as
19 interpreted] and in the name of all political bodies that at the time
20 were active in Drenoc and Skenderaj. The massacre was mainly aimed at
21 civilian population, unarmed population, and only because after the armed
22 crash between the KLA and police -- Serbian police in which the Serb
23 forces were defeated. And the then-regime sent to Drenoc in the villages
24 of Qirez and Likoshan a combat machinery consisting of policemen,
25 paramilitaries, who were all under one command which was the command to
1 exercise terror and genocide over the civilian population.
2 On this day, meaning on the day this speech was held, I don't
3 remember exactly but I think it was 3rd or 4th of March, 1998, on the
4 occasion of the funeral of 40 victims, 11 of which were civilians, people
5 who were taken from their homes. This funeral was attended by over
6 200.000 citizens from all over Kosova and from abroad. In this time we
7 asked from the international community to impose to Serbia, to impose the
8 then-Belgrade regime to respect the international conventions, not to use
9 and exercise terror and violence over the unarmed population. And of
10 course, to ask from Serbia and its supporters who at the time called the
11 KLA terrorists -- the KLA even in other documents by the Prosecution is
12 viewed as a criminal enterprise. I would here stress again that the KLA
13 was supported by all the population in Kosovo and by the diaspora in the
14 western Europe and in the United States, all over the world, wherever
15 there were Albanians. So how can it be to call an organisation a
16 terrorist enterprise when such an organisation enjoyed the support of all
17 its people and international support as well? And thanks to this
18 support, the Albanian population, the Albanian people in Kosova, now live
19 without that violence that at that time was exercised by that Serb police
20 and army.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krasniqi.
22 MR. WHITING: I'd ask that this be given a number, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, it will be received.
24 THE REGISTRAR: This document is P141.
25 MR. WHITING:
1 Q. Now, with the assistance of the usher I'd like to put before you,
2 sir, another document which you provided to us on Friday. It's a
3 communique which is dated 29 April, 1998, and appears to be published in
4 Bujku. And if you could just take a moment to look at that. Was this
5 communique issued by the General Staff?
6 A. Yes. In fact, it is a Political Statement Number 2 of the Kosova
7 Liberation Army.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. I want to draw your
9 attention to point number 3 where it reads --
10 MR. WHITING: And this also appears on the Sanction.
11 Q. Where it reads: "The KLA condemns terrorism and other forms of
12 violation over the civilian population and those held captive. The KLA
13 recognises and respects the international acts of the United Nations and
14 the Conventions on war."
15 My question is: Was that true? Did the KLA recognise and
16 respect the Conventions on war and the international acts of the United
18 A. This is true that if the KLA did not respect all these documents
19 and norms, it would not have enjoyed the international support.
20 Q. I'd like to draw your attention now to point number 6 and it
21 reads: "We are in a state of war! We appeal to the Albanian factor to
22 review their attitudes towards the current situation, and make a real
23 judgement. We appeal to the liberation forces to join us at the war
24 front against the enemy. The frustrated and cowardly who try to
25 completely throw our people into defeatism and anarchy should leave as
1 soon as possible. We appeal to the government of Kosovo to unblock the
2 funds collected for the national liberation."
3 My question with respect to this paragraph is: Did you in fact
4 believe that you were in a state of war?
5 A. We were in a state of war even earlier. Now the war had already
6 begun and it was known to all the public opinion in Kosovo and abroad,
7 the international opinion.
8 Q. If I could now draw your attention to point 8 in this document
9 where it reads: "We appeal to the Albanian media for an objective
10 presentation of the reality in war. The KLA does not need public
11 promotion and publications for beneficiary aims, nor does it need the
12 denial and distortion of its war."
13 Could you tell us briefly what you -- what is meant by that?
14 A. Yes. In Kosova -- Kosova was occupied by Belgrade and in fact
15 there were media in Albanian in Kosova, both electronic and press, but
16 the media were scared to reflect the reality in Kosovo due to the
17 violence and police monitoring of these media. We didn't have any other
18 media, therefore we appealed as we appealed to all the people, we
19 appealed to those who led the media to inform correctly about the
20 political and military developments in Kosova at that time, and this was
21 a legitimate right of the KLA political and military leaders. In other
22 words, we appealed in order for them to inform the public correctly about
23 what was happening in Kosova, about the terror and genocide that the
24 Belgrade regime was exercising in Kosova.
25 Q. Did you also by this sentence or these sentences seek accurate
1 reporting in the Albanian media about the KLA?
2 A. We appealed for them to inform not only for the KLA, but for all
3 the political and military developments in Kosova because the public
4 opinion in the country and abroad was not getting informed properly.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. WHITING: I'd ask that this document be given a number,
8 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
9 THE REGISTRAR: This document will be P142.
10 MR. WHITING:
11 Q. Finally, sir, I want to put before you the last document which
12 you provided to us and which we did not have before you provided it to
13 us, which is -- it is a statement by you dated -- published in Bujku on
14 the 28th of July, 1998. And -- it's two pages. And my first question
15 is: Is this an accurate account of the statement that you made on that
16 date or shortly before that date? And I -- just so we're clear, it's --
17 appears to be Political Statement Number 5 of the KLA General Staff.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And did this come from the General Staff?
20 A. Yes. It was issued by the General Staff.
21 Q. I want to draw your attention to the beginning of the declaration
22 where it states: "As of mid-July, the Belgrade occupying forces have
23 undertaken one of their major offensives after the Second World War in
24 the wider region of Kosovo, with the aim of eliminating the Kosovo
25 Liberation Army from the political scene and submit them to the so-called
1 moderate elements, and to impose an insignificant and defeatist solution
2 on the Albanian people in general, especially the Albanians of Kosovo."
3 Is this a reference to the offensive, the Serb offensive which
4 started at some point in July of 1998?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. And then I'd like to just draw your attention to the end of the
7 document where it states -- it's on the last page of the English
8 translation and on the second page, near the end, in the Albanian:
9 "We appeal to the international community to seriously, not
10 declaratively, warn Belgrade not to harm the civilian population, to
11 support the just liberation war, which is protected by all international
12 conventions of peace and war, while at the same time condemning the
13 fascist Belgrade regime, which only understands the language of force."
14 My only question is this, what I've just read is: Did you in
15 fact believe that war was protected by all international conventions of
16 peace and war?
17 A. If you could repeat the question. It's not clear to me.
18 Q. Well, in the declaration you state that the "just liberation war
19 is protected by all international conventions of peace and war." Do you
20 see that in the document?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Could you tell us what you mean -- what is meant by that.
23 A. Yes. The majority of people of Europe and of the world in
24 general have gone through the process of liberation wars. This was
25 nothing new or extraordinary for the citizens of Kosova. We were at that
1 time and even today convinced that our war was just, that our war was
2 waged against a regime that now is tried by this Tribunal as well. This
3 was a regime that the international community punished even militarily
4 during the bombing that lasted for 72 days from April till 10th of June,
5 1999. In this case, the international community defended a nation from
6 extermination, defended a nation from a regime that exercised genocide,
7 the regime of Milosevic, and the Albanian nation is grateful to all the
8 NATO nations who accelerated the process of freedom for the citizens of
9 Kosova and put an end to the most barbaric and violate regime in Europe
10 after that of Hitler in Germany during the Second World War.
11 Q. Thank you, sir.
12 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this document be given a
13 number, please.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
15 THE REGISTRAR: This document is P143.
16 MR. WHITING:
17 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, when we broke on Friday we were going through
18 some public statements that you made in your capacity as spokesman of the
19 Kosovo Liberation Army. And I'd ask now that we turn to -- in the
20 English it's tab 1, 8580. And in the Albanian it's tab 2, 1603 to 1606.
21 And we have the large format for the witness.
22 MR. WHITING: And for the record this is an interview published
23 in Koha Ditore with Mr. Krasniqi on the 11th of July, 1998, on pages 8
24 and 9, and then following on the 12th of July on page 4.
25 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, is -- did you in fact give an interview to
1 Koha Ditore at this time?
2 A. Yes, I did.
3 Q. And the account of the interview that is published here and in
4 the Albanian it's 16 -- U008-1603 to 1606, published over a period -- two
5 different days.
6 Is -- have you had a chance -- have you had an opportunity to
7 read the account of the interview published in Koha Ditore on those two
9 A. I gave the interview and it was published later; there was no
10 need for me to read it.
11 Q. Well, have you had a chance to read it to determine if it's
12 accurate, if it's an accurate account of what you said during the
14 A. Everything that I said in the interview which was published in
15 Koha Ditore newspaper is accurate.
16 Q. If you could first look at the second page of the Albanian, which
17 is 1604, U008-1604. There's a picture of you seated and there's two
18 individuals standing. Could you tell us first, who are those two people?
19 And --
20 A. These two persons are Shukri Buja and Nazmi Brahimaj.
21 Q. Now, if I could draw your attention to -- in the Albanian it's
22 the second column on the first page. If you could go back to the first
23 page, 1603, it may be -- and in the second column on the Albanian almost
24 at the bottom, it's the end of your response in the second column. And
25 in the English it's at the top of 8581. And it states -- it states:
1 "The UCK is a liberation army and a regular military formation.
2 It is not an organisation or group that goes in for small-scale actions.
3 Our operations are rather larger, and bear greater resemblance to those
4 of a regular army."
5 Do you see where it says that, Mr. Krasniqi? It's the bottom of
6 the second column in the Albanian.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. My question for you is: Was that true, what you said there?
9 A. Even during the last session I stated that this material is a
10 material that is part of the materials used for propaganda purposes.
11 It's something meant to communicate with the public and has appealed to
12 the public. By means of this material, we sought to convey the idea even
13 though sometimes we exaggerated the reality, but the purpose was to win
14 over the support of the citizens of Kosova, to win over the support of
15 the entire Albanian public as well as that of the international public.
16 So as I said, this is a material which aimed at presenting the level of
17 organisation of the KLA at a higher level, which was not the case in
18 reality. That's why I said earlier and will repeat it now that this
19 material aimed at presenting a higher level of organisation for the KLA
20 to enhance the confidence of the members themselves, their trust in
21 victory, as well as the trust of the citizens of Kosova in this victory
22 who were fed up with robbery. So they could no longer put up with the
23 reality. So, Distinguished Judges, I would kindly ask you to look at
24 this interview as well as many other statements issued by the KLA General
25 Staff in this light.
1 Q. Thank you for that answer. So is it then your testimony that
2 what is stated here, that the UCK bears a greater resemblance to those of
3 the -- or rather, the actions, the operations, of the UCK bear greater
4 resemblance to those of a regular army, is it your testimony that that
5 was not true and that that was just propaganda?
6 A. In fact what is being presented here was not the will of the
7 General Staff of the KLA, because until March and April of 1998 the KLA
8 was a guerrilla army. And from this state it was transformed into a
9 broader formation because the Serb military and police were taking
10 revenge on the civilian population. Therefore, the KLA was forced to
11 give up the guerrilla warfare and take up positions to protect the
12 civilian population. If you look at it from this point of view, if you
13 look at the actions it carried out on the ground in its clashes with the
14 Serb army and police, they were more similar to the war waged by a
15 regular army.
16 At this time the KLA was in fact a voluntary army, because for an
17 army to be transformed from a guerrilla army into a regular army with the
18 standards required to -- of a regular army was impossible because at this
19 time we were developing horizontally as the KLA with the participation of
20 several categories of people, people - as I said earlier but I need to
21 repeat it again - people who were trained -- prepared to fight against
22 the Serb army and police.
23 After March and April, people joined the KLA to show their
24 solidarity to fight the enemy. At this time we see that the villagers
25 began to be armed even with hunting guns to stay guard in their own
1 villages, and the KLA General Staff started to negotiate, to talk, with
2 all these groups and formations that voluntarily and sometimes out of
3 fear joined the KLA. So the General Staff which was -- had a limited
4 number of persons tried to organise this large mass of people who were
5 willing to fight the Serb army and police and to wage the war so that the
6 Serbian police and army were not fighting against the civilian
7 population. This was very dangerous situation for the General Staff to
8 be able to channel the support of the armed people into the right
9 direction so that their commitment and struggle were not in vain. It was
10 not an easy task.
11 I want to compare it with the situation now. We have the Kosova
12 Protection Corps. For six years now, Kosova is living in new
13 circumstances. Please, I have one more explanation. For six years,
14 despite the attempts of the international community, despite the
15 investments by the donors, the training given to the Kosova Protection
16 Corps, they still have not managed to attain the required standards
17 despite this support and be considered a regular army as required by the
18 international community and the EU. That's why I think that the
19 Honourable Judges should look at the efforts made to transform the KLA
20 into an army typical of the other developed countries in a very peculiar
21 way, because after all I think that at that time we are talking the KLA
22 were the most regular and most disciplined army with the necessary
23 hierarchy, but it was impossible in those circumstances of war to do
24 that, in the circumstances when the army -- the Serb army and police in
25 Kosova had over 50.000 troops.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, on the -- just after the beginning of the third
2 column on the Albanian, I'm going to draw your attention to another
3 sentence and it's about a quarter of the way down on the English 8581.
4 It says:
5 "The UCK General Staff had its say before the elections in
6 Kosova, and firmly took the view that the elections should not be held in
7 time of war, because a part of Kosova was in flames."
8 And I have a specific question with respect to this sentence and
9 that is: What elections are being referred to here? When were elections
10 held that the KLA said should not be held?
11 A. They were the elections held in Kosova in March after the
12 massacre committed in Likoshan, Qirez on 28th of February and the 1st of
13 March and after the war waged in Prekaz on the 5th, 6th, and 8th March,
14 1998. So it's about seven, eight days after these massacres perpetrated
15 by the Serb police and army that elections, free elections, were held in
16 Kosova, which in fact were not free. But even as they were, they were
17 not held all over the territory of Kosova because at that time Serbia had
18 established an iron encirclement in Kosova. So these elections were not
19 held to resolve the Kosova question; they were held to legitimise the
20 Belgrade -- terrorist Belgrade regime. And the KLA, of course, was
21 convinced that nothing new would come of these elections that no
22 parliament would be construed, and that no institutions would be built as
23 the case is even -- as the case was in reality.
24 So we appealed to the population not to be deceived and taken in
25 by such election which could not be held under the boots under the Serb
1 occupiers who were killing innocent people. And we appealed to the
2 people, telling them that such elections should be held because nothing
3 good would come of them, which in fact happened.
4 Q. Thank you.
5 MR. GUY-SMITH: Excuse me. I'm sorry, Mr. Whiting. I've just
6 been alerted that with regard to an answer that was had on the previous
7 page there may be a question about the translation, and specifically page
8 14, line 12. And it's my understanding that Mr. Krasniqi said that he
9 wished that it were the KLA was the most disciplined army. I'm just
10 alerting everybody to this point so that we'll have the transcript
11 double-checked to make sure about this particular issue.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.
13 THE INTERPRETER: It's an interpreter's mistake. The counsel is
14 right. He said "I wish it were."
15 MR. GUY-SMITH: I'd like to thank the interpreter for the
17 MR. WHITING: And me, too. Thanks.
18 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, if I could just draw your attention. In this
19 article there are a number of statements that are made about Mr. Rugova
20 and I'm just going to point them out and then I think we've heard
21 statements like this in other documents but I just want to go through
22 them quickly.
23 On page 8582 of the English -- and it's the bottom of the fifth
24 column on the Albanian it says: "One thing must be made clear: We call
25 him a president even though in many ways he did not deserve the name."
1 And I believe from the question you're referring there to President
3 And then in the next column at the bottom where your last answer
4 and the next column begins. In the English it's about two-thirds of the
5 way down the wage you say: "We consider that Ibrahim Rugova has
6 committed a series of political mistakes to the detriment of national
7 cause, starting from the agreement on education, which came to nothing."
8 And then shortly after that it states: "He is the main divisive factor."
9 And then turning to the next page, 8583 of the English and on the
10 Albanian it's on the next page, 1604. It's on the second page of the
11 article, Mr. Krasniqi, if you just want to see where it is.
12 The bottom of the first column in Albanian says: "Rugova is a
13 pacifist, and he is often said to believe in 'Gandhism.' He is not a
14 pacifist but a doormat. Rugova will not allow resistance but only
15 subservience, letting yourself be trampled underfoot. We have lost our
16 dignity as individuals, families, and a nation. This is true of one-half
17 of the nation. The philosophy of the UCK is to restore to this people
18 their human, family, and national dignity, and to respond to the enemy's
19 barbaric violence with a liberation struggle."
20 And then at the bottom of 8583 and in the Albanian it's the
21 fourth column of 1604 it says: "The UCK expected that Rugova's peaceful
22 policy with the help of the international community, would produce its
23 own results. We've been waiting for 17 years. During this time, the
24 Albanian people have carried out peaceful resistance. But neither
25 Belgrade nor the international community has listened to this voice of
1 the Albanians. Our people have now taken up arms to fight."
2 Now, we've had considerable testimony already from you about Mr.
3 Rugova. My only question is: Do these statements that I have read out
4 and pointed out to you, do they accurately reflect your views of -- about
5 Mr. Rugova's policies at that time?
6 A. Your Honours, whatever was read here I think is meant to present
7 not a realistic picture of the situation that prevailed at that time in
8 Kosova. It is a great truth that then and now Ibrahim Rugova has been an
9 opponent, our political opponent, then and now. I have never reconciled
10 and will never reconcile to the policy of subservience and to the
11 Belgrade regime that was pursued then. I want to explain this,
12 Honourable Chamber, that the Kosova Liberation Army was not formed to
13 fight the policy of Ibrahim Rugova. We are political opponents and we
14 are in the same parliament composed of the ruling parties and the
15 opposition. And we do not intend to remove Ibrahim Rugova by force from
17 The KLA has waged the war against the traditional policy of
18 Belgrade occupiers in Kosova. We have not seen the Serbs in Kosova as an
19 obstacle to Kosova. To the KLA all the citizens -- all the violent
20 apparatus of Belgrade met -- established in Kosova -- By means of this I
21 want to say that at no time has the KLA armed itself to take the power,
22 the fictitious power from Rugova's hands because there has never been any
23 other kind of power in Kosova. Therefore, the tendency to present the
24 character of the KLA -- the liberation struggle in Kosova as a struggle
25 between Albanians is unjust. And I think that no citizen in Kosova can
1 accept this and cannot oppose it.
2 I said even during the last session that the Prosecutor is
3 playing up too much the question of the enemy. We didn't fight against
4 that category even though for reasons that are well-known many people
5 have worked in Serb trials, in Serb prosecutors' office in the Serb
6 administration. And even -- they have worked until the June of 1999. We
7 have never dealt with such citizens because most of them -- there are
8 many prosecutors and courts that condemn you twice. They have levelled
9 charges against me. You can see them -- and they still work today in
10 Kosova courts because they are Kosova citizens. Now they work in new
12 With this new category of people who were -- and were in the
13 service of that policy, we do not deal with them. They are many. We
14 didn't deal with them during the war either. We in Kosova during the
15 entire period of the liberation war, we fought against the violent
16 apparatus of the Milosevic regime and all those who served that regime in
17 the secret police who have caused harm to the population and who are
18 well-known to the people for what they are done to Kosovo and its
20 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to turn now to the second day of the
21 interview and to the last page that you have before you which should be
22 1606 at the top. And in the English it -- the second day is at 8586 to
23 8589. And I'd like to turn to 8589. And, Mr. Krasniqi, I want to ask
24 you about a question and answer which appears. It's not the lasts
25 question and answer but it's the one right before the last question and
1 answer on that last page and I'll just read it out.
2 The question that is put to you by the newspaper is: "The
3 international community has criticised the violation of human rights of
4 Serbian and Montenegrin civilians. What can you say about this?"
5 And your response in the newspaper is: "It does indeed seem to us
6 ridiculous to equate the operations of the UCK with those of the Serb
7 occupier, which are notorious throughout the world. On this it seems to
8 me that the international community is not respecting its conventions,
9 starting with the UN charter, et cetera, because the UCK has never dealt
10 with civilians, or only if they have been in the service of the army and
11 police and done serious harm to the people and the Albanian national
12 cause. There have been cases in which they have been kidnapped, but in
13 this event they have been handed over to international organisations, of
14 course when they have been innocent. First of all, all Serbian forces,
15 whether the police, the military, or armed civilians, are our enemy.
16 From the start, we had our own internal rules for operations. These
17 clearly lay down that the UCK recognises the Geneva Convention [sic] and
18 the conventions governing the conduct of war, even though it has not been
19 offered the chance of signing them, as it would have done. We do not go
20 in for kidnapping. Even if some people have suffered, these have been
21 more Albanian collaborators than Serbian civilians. We do not deal with
22 civilians, and we return those whom we take as prisoners of war. A few
23 days ago we handed over two Serbs originating from Croatia to the
24 International Red Cross. Those we have kidnapped are either announced in
25 a list or reported to be executed, but we do not behave in a base fashion
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 like Serbia."
2 First of all I want to ask you about what you say in this answer
3 about the "internal rules for our operations," which "clearly lay down
4 that the UCK recognises the Geneva Convention and the conventions
5 governing the conduct of war." Were those rules written down at this
6 time? Did you have written rules that you're referring to here?
7 A. Yes. The International Red Cross has sent us some concrete
8 documents which the KLA should respect these Conventions. It was a
9 document that we circulated at that time; that's why we say here that the
10 KLA has not dealt with civilians. The civilians who have been seized by
11 the KLA have been handed over to the International Red Cross and the
12 representatives of the Red Cross that were present in Kosova at that time
13 might prove what I'm saying better.
14 Q. The documents that were provided to the KLA from the
15 International Red Cross, were these then converted into a document from
16 the UCK and then circulated or did you just circulate the documents that
17 you had received from the International Red Cross?
18 A. We circulated the documents and respected them. I think that all
19 international mechanisms that were present in Kosova at that time, be
20 them of the humanitarian area like Red Cross or political and diplomatic
21 area which were in Kosova then, they -- We had frequent contacts with the
22 representatives of the international community and because we respected
23 the international documents on citizens, we were supported by the
24 international community. Because as KLA, as armed people, we could have
25 organised attacks on Serb population and villages in many parts of
1 Kosova, but all over the time -- during all the time of the war, this has
2 never happened, even in a single instance.
3 Q. To whom did you circulate these documents? Who received them?
4 A. The International Red Cross has distributed these documents on
5 the grass roots. It's not that we have always managed to maintain
6 regular links with all the units, because the presence of the Serb police
7 and army was so great that we couldn't. And the areas controlled by the
8 KLA were limited or were not many at that time.
9 Q. Were soldiers -- was there some mechanism for soldiers in the KLA
10 to be made aware -- either given these documents or made aware of what
11 was said in these documents?
12 A. Maybe it's difficult for the Trial Chamber to imagine how the KLA
13 was organised at that time, how spread out it was. Also because of the
14 fact that the Serb police and army attacks were almost daily. In these
15 circumstances, for us it was not possible to send these documents to
16 every single soldier. So the people were informed through statements,
17 through communiques. As I said, we didn't have the possibilities to
18 write and distribute them in a written form because that was the time
19 when we didn't have even a single PC.
20 Q. Now, there is a reference at the end of the passage that I read
21 to you. It says: "A few days ago we handed over two Serbs originating
22 from Croatia to the International Red Cross."
23 Do you know who that's referring to?
24 A. I had information -- I don't know who they were, but I had
25 information that two Serbs who were captured, and they were from Croatia,
1 were handed over to the International Red Cross. I was unable to be in
2 every spot when people who were captured were released.
3 Q. Do you remember who gave you that information?
4 A. Now I don't remember it.
5 Q. Do you remember -- do you remember anything -- hearing anything
6 about Ivan and Vojko Bakrac being turned over to the Red Cross on July
7 6th, 1998, four days before this interview? Do you remember hearing
8 anything about that?
9 A. As I said, I remember that they were handed over, but those names
10 that you mentioned I had the opportunity to see them only as witnesses of
11 the Prosecution here.
12 Q. So you don't remember those names from the time?
13 A. No.
14 Q. If we could turn now, please, to tab 7 in the binder.
15 MR. WHITING: And I'll ask the assistance of the usher for the
16 witness. For the record, this is an article dated 2 September 1998 which
17 is -- the head line, at least in the English version is: "Demaqi Speaks
18 on Position of Liberation Army."
19 The English version is from FBIS, it's two pages long. It's
20 Albanian version is U008-6947.
21 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I would draw your attention to the article there at
22 the top of the page by Bardh Rugova. I think it's been provided in an
23 easier-to-read format now.
24 Mr. Krasniqi, at this time in September of 1998 can you tell us
25 who Adem Demaqi was?
1 A. Adem Demaqi was the political representative of the KLA in
2 Pristina. His duty was to unite the leaders of the political bodies that
3 were active in Pristina in order to unite them and create a national
4 assembly which would take responsibility to lead institutionally the war
5 and the political processes that were going on at the time in Kosova.
6 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to -- I think it's the fifth
7 paragraph or so. It states -- at least in the English it is. It states:
8 "The UCK's political representative," referring to Adem Demaqi, "also
9 talked about his meeting at the Supreme Staff of the UCK with its
10 spokesman Jakup Krasniqi." And then quoting from Mr. Demaqi: "'I
11 discussed with him a list drawn up of the International Red Cross of
12 people considered lost, knowing that the Supreme Staff is against actions
13 of this kind. They (the UCK) promised that they would distribute the
14 list for investigation by the local staffs, because desperate people may
15 have lost all feeling and acted against this basic standpoint.'"
16 And that's the end of the quotation and the article continues:
17 "Demaqi added that he did not rule out such a thing having happened."
18 Mr. Krasniqi, do you recall this thing happening, Mr. Demaqi
19 meeting with you and giving you a list from the International Red Cross?
20 A. Maybe it would have been better to ask Demaqi about this, but to
21 my recollection of course during the war I had contacts with Adem Demaqi,
22 since he was the political representative in Pristina, with the duty that
23 I mentioned earlier. He did bring a list to the General Staff, and we
24 distributed that list in the zones of the Kosova Liberation Army.
25 However, it was not stated on that list the place or time when and where
1 those people were taken. Due to the bad communication that we had with
2 certain parts of the KLA, we were not able to determine that these people
3 were captured by organised units of the KLA. And of course I told him
4 that these names did not exist and that the KLA had no knowledge of these
6 Here I would like to clarify and explain another thing. I am
7 convinced that the Belgrade regime had infiltrated within its ranks
8 unarmed people as well. And these people of course might have gotten
9 killed during combat between the KLA and the Serb armed forces. And for
10 the Serbian regime of Milosevic to justify its victims before their
11 families, the regime would call these people missing or killed. This was
12 the morale [as interpreted] of that regime.
13 Q. When you say that you distributed the list in the zones of the
14 Kosovo Liberation Army, can you tell us more specifically what you did to
15 distribute the list. Did you distribute it to zone commanders, to
16 brigade commanders, battalion commanders? How did you distribute the
18 A. The list was distributed through the couriers that existed within
19 the ranks of the KLA, designated persons who were to deliver the post.
20 There was no other way to do it.
21 Q. I understand. But who received the list to your knowledge? In
22 other words, who was the list sent to? You said it was distributed in
23 the zone --
24 A. The lists were usually sent to the zones and the zones then were
25 to convey those lists to its units.
1 Q. And is it your testimony that you didn't -- you received no
2 information back from the zones about the people who were identified on
3 the list. Is that your testimony?
4 A. This is what I said.
5 Q. I understand.
6 MR. WHITING: I would ask that this document be given a number,
8 JUDGE PARKER: It will be received.
9 THE REGISTRAR: P144.
10 MR. WHITING:
11 Q. I'd ask to turn, please, to tab 8 in the binder.
12 MR. WHITING: And in the -- And in the -- this is an article --
13 an interview with Jakup Krasniqi in Koha Ditore published on the 2nd of
14 September, 1998, on page 3. The English translation is from FBIS and is
15 four pages. And the Albanian is ERN U008-6946.
16 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, do you see that interview?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you give this interview to Koha Ditore?
19 A. Yes, I gave this interview.
20 Q. I want to draw your attention to a passage which in the English
21 is on the third page of the translation, and it's the -- in the Albanian
22 it's not the last answer that you give, Mr. Krasniqi, in the interview,
23 but it's the one right before the last answer. So I think it's -- well,
24 I'll read it and see if you're able to find it.
25 "We do not know anything about the imprisonment or" -- this is
1 you speaking.
2 "We do not know anything about the imprisonment of any kidnapping
3 of any Serbian journalists or citizens. The UCK has not taken up weapons
4 to fight against Serbian journalists and citizens, but to fight against
5 Serbian soldiers and terrorists that have reduced Kosova to ashes. After
6 all the terror and devastation that have been seen in Kosova, it is
7 impossible to keep under control the feelings of hatred and vengeance
8 that the enemy himself has inspired. Despite our insistence that the
9 Albanians' struggle must not resemble the barbarism practiced by the
11 Do you see that answer in the interview, Mr. Krasniqi? Are you
12 able to find that?
13 A. I think that what you just read differs a lot from that what is
14 in Albanian. So I will try to read it in Albanian.
15 "We don't know anything about the imprisonment or kidnapping of
16 any Serbian journalist or citizen. The KLA has not taken up arms to
17 fight against Serbian journalists and citizens but to fight against
18 Serbian soldiers and terrorists that have reduced Kosova to ashes. After
19 all the terror and devastation seen in Kosova, it is impossible to keep
20 under control the feelings of hatred and vengeance that the enemy himself
21 has inspired. Despite our insistence that our struggle must not resemble
22 the barbarism practiced by the enemy."
23 Q. Thank you. My only question is: What did you mean when you said
24 "it is impossible to keep under control the feelings of hatred and
25 vengeance that the enemy himself has inspired"?
1 A. Yes. So we are speaking of a time when we could freely say that
2 the offensive undertaken by the Serb police and army was coming to an
3 end. The Serb forces had undertaken an offensive throughout the
4 territory of Kosova and particularly in the Drenica municipalities in the
5 Pastrik municipalities and in the major part of the Dukagjini zone. The
6 entire Kosova was in flames and we were defending. We were defending the
7 population, the civilian population, which was a continuous target for
8 the Serbian police and army. Villages were in flames. As I said in the
9 previous session, during this offensive over 450 settlements, Albanian
10 settlements, came out burnt and devastated. And despite all this terror,
11 devastation, and burning to the ground that the Serbian forces exercised,
12 I am honoured to say that the KLA never took revenge on the Serbian
13 civilians. And there is no -- nothing that could argue this fact. This
14 is what I wanted to say: that perhaps individual deeds by members who
15 were not members of the KLA, these people might have not controlled their
16 own feelings; and we had no knowledge of these acts, not at that time and
17 not even today.
18 Q. Is it your testimony then that during the war not a single member
19 of the KLA committed a single crime?
20 A. I want to say that to the knowledge of the political and military
21 leaders of the KLA, it did not happen. This is what I want to say and I
22 say this with full responsibility.
23 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this document be given a
24 number, please.
25 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
1 THE REGISTRAR: P145.
2 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, is it a convenient time to break?
3 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We will resume at 4.00.
4 --- Recess taken at 3.39 p.m.
5 --- On resuming at 4.03 p.m.
6 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Whiting.
7 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I just have one more article to ask you about and
9 it's at tab 9. And it's from Koha Ditore and I'll need the assistance of
10 the usher, please. At tab 9 it's -- perhaps the witness has already
11 found it. It is an article from Koha Ditore from the 4th of November,
12 1998, on page 7. The Albanian is U008-6943. And on the Albanian -- Mr.
13 Krasniqi, we'll provide a large copy of it; that should be easier to
14 read. In the Albanian I would draw your attention to the middle of the
15 page on the left. Do you see that? It's a statement from the Military
16 Police Directorate and I think it's number 4. And I'd just like to --
17 I'll just read out -- it's a brief statement and I'll just read it out --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Excuse me. The interpreters have a very small
19 print copy and they can't read it in Albanian. I'm sorry.
20 MR. WHITING: We have another big version of it that we can
21 provide to the interpreters with the assistance of the usher.
22 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.
23 MR. WHITING: It says: "Statement issued by the Military Police
24 Directorate of the Kosovo Liberation Army in Pristina on 1 November.
25 "On 30 October, the Military Police of the Operational Subzone of
1 Pastrik arrested Jakup Kastrati of the village of Turjake near Malisheve
2 [Malisevo], the chairman of the Malisheve Branch of the Democratic League
3 in Kosova [LDK], and Cen Desku from the village of Siceve, resident in
4 Malisheve, the LDK branch's deputy chairman. The directorate of the UCK
5 Intelligence Service possesses data about their activity against the
6 UCK's liberation struggle. These persons have spread propaganda for the
7 surrender of weapons in collusion with the collaborationists Selman
8 Binici from the village of Baje and Ramiz Hoxha from Bellanice, who have
9 been both been executed by the UCK, and are in ongoing cooperation with
10 the LDK Presidium Member Agim Krasniqi, known to the UCK Intelligence
11 Service as an agent of covert operations against the UCK and the
12 initiator of a kind of policy of autonomy for Kosova.
13 "The Investigation Department of the UCK Military Police
14 Directorate are conducting investigations of the arrested men Jakup
15 Kastrati and Cen Desku in Remand Prison No. 3."
16 Now, this does not purport to the a communique from the General
17 Staff or a statement by you, but in your capacity as spokesman of the
18 KLA, were you aware of this statement from the Military Police
19 Directorate of the UCK?
20 A. No, I did not know that.
21 Q. You did not see this statement at the time it was issued?
22 A. No, I did not see this at the time it was issued.
23 Q. Did you hear anything at that time? Did you receive any
24 information at that time about the arrest of Jakup Kastrati and Cen
1 A. I would like to clarify something.
2 Q. If you could first answer the question and then you -- I welcome
3 your clarification, but if you could first answer: Did you hear anything
4 at the time about the arrest of Jakup Kastrati and Cen Desku?
5 MR. WHITING: I would note that one microphone of the witness is
6 turned off.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know more about their release
8 than their arrest.
9 MR. WHITING:
10 Q. Please explain.
11 A. Special war was mentioned here. It is true that at that time
12 special war was waged by certain individuals and not only those people
13 who are armed -- who had joined the army, but there were civilians as
14 well because there were even in the KLA there were former officers of the
15 Yugoslav army who had been part of the Secret Service of the Yugoslav
16 army. There were people who had been punished or charged with criminal
17 offences. And I would say like to say that after the summer offensive
18 these people, they were -- they handed over to the enemy 5.000 or 6.000
19 weapons. It is well-known, for example, the instance when weapons were
20 handed over in the Dukagjini area by Tahir Zema. This handing over of
21 weapons continued at a smaller scale in the Istog municipality in the
22 Therande municipality. And there were people who asked for handing over
23 -- the handing over of guns in Malisevo. And this was done by Januz
24 Kastrati and Cen Desku. And in the beginning it was suspected that these
25 had made an appeal to several soldiers to hand over their weapons.
1 Speaking to them about the lack of prospect of this war. And of course,
2 the soldiers of the KLA apprehended these individuals, kept them in
3 prison, I don't know for how long, but I know that from the 25th to the
4 27th of November they were kept in prison. And then at the request of
5 diplomatic representatives in Kosovo with whom we communicated, more
6 concretely with the American ambassador in Skopje, Chris Hill, and the EU
7 ambassador. And these two people together with two Serb journalists who
8 were captured in the area between Goles and Fushtice, a village in the
9 municipality of Drenoc. So these four people were handed over to the
10 international representatives in the presence of the International Red
11 Cross. But it could be around the 25th or the 27th of November, 1998.
12 I'm not very sure about the date, but it must have been those dates.
13 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, who in the KLA was involved in either the arrest or
14 the release of these individuals, if you know?
15 A. From what I know -- I said all I know about it. I can't add
16 anything else to what I said.
17 Q. The article also refers to the execution of Selman Benici from
18 Baje and Ramiz Hoxha from Bellanice. Did you hear anything about that
19 happening at the time? Were you informed about that as KLA spokesman and
20 member of the General Staff?
21 A. I think the word "execution" here has been used in another sense
22 of the word. They must have been killed according to the information I
23 had, but they were -- they were giving information to the force -- to the
24 Serbian forces in Malisheve.
25 Q. And --
1 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I'd ask that this document be given a
3 JUDGE PARKER: Yes.
4 THE REGISTRAR: P146.
5 MR. WHITING:
6 Q. Now, you made a reference in your last answer or one of your last
7 answers to Tahir Zema. Where, if you know, did Tahir Zema operate in
9 A. Yes. Tahir Zema operated in the operational zone of Dukagjini,
10 zone number 3.
11 Q. During the months of May, June, and July of 1998, do you know who
12 the commander of the Drenica zone was?
13 A. Maybe you mean the Dukagjini zone?
14 Q. No. I'm changing subjects. I meant the Drenica zone. Who was
15 the commander of the Drenica zone?
16 A. Sulejman Selimi.
17 Q. I'm going to change subjects again and go back to your first
18 declaration, first public declaration as spokesman of the KLA and I'm
19 going to ask for the assistance of Mr. Younis. I'm going to show you a
20 clip from a video that's in evidence in this case. It's from P034, and
21 it's clip -- our clip number 5. I just ask you, Mr. Krasniqi, to watch
22 the computer and I'm going to pause it at a certain moment.
23 [Videotape played]
24 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "At this time Shala family's kulla
25 was the headquarters of the KLA General Staff."
1 MR. WHITING:
2 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, do you see the image in front of you, yourself and
3 two men standing on either side of you?
4 A. Although it's a poor image, I can see that it's a picture of me
5 and two of me comrades, co-fighters.
6 Q. And the date on the image there is 14 June 1998, which from your
7 earlier testimony I believe is the date that you made your first public
8 declaration as spokesman of the KLA. Is that right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And is this in fact an image of you making that declaration?
11 A. Yes.
12 MR. WHITING: And I'd ask the usher, please, if you can ensure
13 that computer evidence is pressed on his monitor. It is. Just --
14 because there will be a clearer image and the witness has suggested that
15 it's not very clear. Okay.
16 Q. Sir, can you tell us who the people are standing on either side
17 of you, on the right and on the left.
18 A. Yes. One of them is Fatmir Limaj and the other one is Ferat
20 Q. And it's Fatmir Limaj on the right in the image?
21 A. Yes, as I see it. It's on -- he is on my right, yes.
22 Q. Well, to be clear, he's on the right of the image. As you look
23 at the screen, he's on the right of the image you see. Is that right?
24 A. He's on my right in the picture.
25 Q. It's a little unclear and it may be a translation problem. Who
1 is standing closest to the flag?
2 A. Ferat Shala.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 Now, can you tell us where this was filmed?
5 A. This was filmed in Klecka.
6 Q. And just so the record is clear, the image is, as I said, from
7 P034 and it's -- on the timing, it's at 16:55:1, 16 minutes, 55 seconds.
8 And I think we can take that down.
9 At this time --
10 MR. WHITING: You can take it off the screen.
11 Q. At this time on the 14th of June of 1998, where was the General
12 Staff located?
13 A. I clarified this in the previous session, but I will repeat it.
14 At this time the General Staff did not have a given headquarters.
15 Because of the war situation and for security reasons, we moved from one
16 place to another. And this image that was taken in Klecka, in fact we
17 went there -- we went to the Berisa Mountains where the village is, for
18 security reasons, only to make this video, and then we left -- we went to
19 other areas. And every time we had these videos made, some of them were
20 made in this kulla, in this place in Klecka. So I repeat, we did them
21 there for security reasons, not because Klecka was the headquarters of
22 the General Staff of the KLA.
23 Q. You said the General Staff would move from village to village for
24 security reasons. What other villages would this -- the General Staff
25 move to during this time period in June of 1998?
1 A. Yes. In -- during this period the General Staff went from my
2 village to Malisheve in some cases, to Divjake, and we went to other
3 villages as well, villages of Drenica, to Vrboc and to Lladroc, and in
4 the villages around the mountainous area -- the mountainous area of
5 Berisa, such as Kroimire and other villages.
6 Q. At that time this statement was made by you on the 14th of June,
7 1998, what was Fatmir Limaj's pseudonym?
8 A. Yes. It was Celiku.
9 Q. Were any fighting units named after him?
10 A. From what I know it was the unit that Fatmir led in Klecka.
11 Q. The unit in Klecka to your knowledge was called the Celiku unit?
12 A. Yes. And to your knowledge it was named the Celiku unit after
14 MR. KHAN: Well, Your Honour, there must be a point when leading
15 questions stop --
16 MR. WHITING: I'm --
17 MR. KHAN: I haven't objected so far today. Perhaps it's about
18 time I do.
19 MR. WHITING: Your Honour, I would submit that he's just -- I'm
20 clarifying his answer. He's already answered that question, but I'm just
21 clarifying it. He said yes. And to your knowledge it was --
22 JUDGE PARKER: I think the position is one where the precise form
23 of your question is on the wrong side of the line, but you're certainly
24 properly entitled to clarify. If you could try it with a question that
25 isn't leading that would be the way to go, Mr. Whiting.
1 MR. WHITING:
2 Q. The Celiku unit that -- the Celiku unit in Klecka that was led by
3 Fatmir Limaj, do you know how it got its name?
4 A. I don't know. At that time all the units operated under
5 different names, various names. So I could not have known why a certain
6 unit got this name or that name, and that was not my responsibility in
7 the long run. This was something that up to the operational segment.
8 Q. Well, I think you've answered the question. At that time on the
9 14th of June, 1998, what was -- do you know what Fatmir Limaj's position
11 A. No.
12 Q. Well, you've told us that he led this Celiku unit in Klecka. Was
13 he the highest commander in Klecka, to your knowledge?
14 A. At that time I just knew him, Fatmir I mean. And that because of
15 this public appearance that I had to make from Klecka at the time. I
16 just knew him. I did not have any other contact with him.
17 Q. Did -- you've told us that he was commander of a unit called the
18 Celiku unit in Klecka. Was there a -- do you know if there was any
19 commander above him in Klecka or was he the highest commander in Klecka?
20 A. In Klecka, Ismet Jashari was another one who had a commanding
21 position as well, but I did not know at the time who of these two had the
22 highest position.
23 Q. After the statement on the 14th of June, 1998, do you know where
24 Fatmir Limaj went in the following days after that?
25 A. It was wartime and people would not want to know where they went
1 or we did not want to know where other people went.
2 Q. So is it your answer that you did not know where he went in the
3 days after the 14th of June, 1998?
4 A. I would like to say that, yes. But also another thing, that I
5 never wanted other people to know where I was going so I never asked
6 other people where they were going because, as I said, it was wartime and
7 unpleasant things could happen.
8 Q. During the months of -- well, let me ask you this first: On the
9 14th of June, 1998, was this the first time that you had seen Fatmir
10 Limaj in Kosovo?
11 A. As far as I can remember, it was the first time I met him. And
12 we did not speak at length to each other, but we had thought that in my
13 first public appearance there should be two soldiers and they are Fatmir
14 Limaj, who was based in Klecka with his unit, his military unit, and on
15 the other side, close to the flag, was Ferat Shala from the Pellumbi
16 unit. He's from the other side of the Lapusnik village.
17 Q. When you say "the other side of the Lapusnik village," is that
18 the other side of the Peja-Pristina road?
19 A. On the right side of the Pristina-Peja road.
20 Q. On the right side going in which direction, towards Peja or
21 towards Pristina?
22 A. Towards Peja.
23 Q. Now, during the months -- after the 14th of June, 1998, until the
24 end of July 1998, did you ever see Fatmir Limaj in Malisevo?
25 A. I met him in Malisheve -- I have seen him there, but we did not
1 have time to have a conversation with each other because of the tasks we
2 had -- each of us had to fulfil within the KLA.
3 Q. During that time period, how many times did you see him in
5 A. I can't remember how many times I saw him in Malisheve, but I
6 remember one other meeting with European Union representatives in Klecka.
7 I can't remember whether it was July or August. I'm not sure.
8 Q. I'm going to ask you about that meeting in just a moment, but
9 before I do -- can you remember approximately how many times you saw him
10 in Malisevo between June 14th and the end of July 1998?
11 A. No, I can't remember. I can't say how many times.
12 Q. No idea? No approximate -- you can't approximate at all? Three?
13 Five? Ten? 20?
14 A. I can't remember. When I say I can't remember, I can't say
15 whether it was once or three times.
16 Q. Do you remember any specific -- any one specific occasion you saw
17 him in Malisevo?
18 A. No.
19 Q. During that time period did you see him in any other village?
20 A. Mainly in Klecka.
21 Q. How many times did you see him in Klecka, again during the time
22 period of from the 14th of June, 1998, to the end of July 1998?
23 A. It could be three or four. I did not take the number down, but
24 it was not very often that I met him because each of us had their own
25 tasks to fulfil within the KLA.
1 Q. Aside from Malisheve and Klecka, did you see him in any other
2 village during that time period?
3 A. I don't remember.
4 Q. During May, June, and July of 1998, did you yourself ever go to
6 A. No.
7 Q. During those months, do you know who the commander of -- who the
8 commander was in Lapusnik?
9 A. I don't know.
10 Q. Now, you made reference to a meeting you had in Klecka either in
11 July or August of 1998 with the European Union. Do you remember who it
12 is you met with?
13 A. Yes, I remember but maybe I'll get confused with the names.
14 Maybe if I could refer to the material.
15 Q. Can you tell us specifically what it is that you want to refer
17 A. I think I spoke about this in the first statement I made in
18 Pristina. I mentioned the names, but now I don't seem to remember their
19 names. I know that one of them was a witness here before this Tribunal.
20 I think Ditman [phoen] was either the name or the surname of this person.
21 Q. Let me see if I can assist you with this in helping you remember
22 the names. Okay. I draw your attention to paragraph 46 of your
23 statement and see if that refreshes your recollection with respect to the
25 A. Yes. There were three of them in fact. Jan Kickert, David
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Slinn, and the third one, Ditman. While on our side was me, Ram Buja,
2 and Mr. Fatmir Limaj.
3 Q. Does that refresh your recollection with respect to the date of
4 the meeting?
5 A. 30th of July, 1998.
6 Q. Okay. Thank you. You can put that away for now. Now, you've
7 said on your side it was Fatmir Limaj, yourself, and Ram Buja. Who was
8 Ram Buja at that time?
9 A. Ram Buja was the person responsible to organise the civil
10 authorities, the civil power, in the free areas. And after that, he
11 became a member of the General Staff of the KLA.
12 Q. And where were the free areas at that time? I mean, I know that
13 the offensive has just begun, but when you say he was responsible for
14 organising the civil authorities in the free areas, what areas are you
15 talking about?
16 A. In all the areas where the KLA was present.
17 Q. Is that all the areas where the KLA present all over Kosovo or in
18 only a certain part of Kosovo?
19 A. The majority of the -- of Kosovo -- I mean the areas where --
20 which were under the control of the KLA. For example, in Drenica; part
21 of Dukagjini; part of Pastrik; and between the municipality of Mitrovica
22 and Vushtrri, the area of Shala i Bajgora. But there were other areas as
23 well that were under KLA control.
24 Q. And at this time, the 30th of July, 1998, what was Fatmir Limaj's
1 A. I can't remember anything else except the fact that he was there
2 with his unit in Klecka.
3 Q. Well, why was he at this meeting?
4 A. I did not hear the question.
5 Q. I'll repeat it. Why was Fatmir Limaj at this meeting?
6 A. Yes. He was in this meeting because we had this meeting with
7 representatives of the Council of Europe and there were only two people
8 from the General Staff. So we needed, of course, to have other people in
9 that meeting. And at that moment, the person with a highest education
10 and professional preparation was Fatmir. So we asked him to be present
11 in that meeting; also because the situation was very serious. Enemy
12 attacks -- we were receiving enemy attacks from all sides. So that's why
13 we thought it necessary for him to be present in that meeting because the
14 meeting was also held in the area where Fatmir and his unit were based.
15 Q. At that time, on the 30th of July, 1998, was Malisevo still under
16 the control of the UCK or had it fallen to the Serb control, if you know?
17 A. I can't remember exactly the fall of Malisevo, when it happened,
18 but I thought it was after the Malisevo -- Malisevo fell.
19 Q. Do you remember what was discussed at this meeting with Jan
20 Kickert and David Slinn and the third person you've mentioned?
21 A. I remember something, not many concrete things about it, but I
22 think we discussed also about the creation of a delegation of Albanians
23 from Kosovo that would be made up of -- from various political subjects
24 and representatives of the KLA. This delegation would have to present to
25 the international factor its own demands in a coordinated way.
1 Q. Do you remember anything else that was discussed at the meeting?
2 A. This was the essence of this meeting.
3 Q. Would it further refresh your recollection about the meeting to
4 look again at the notes you referred to earlier, the paragraph 46 of your
6 A. I will look at them, but I don't think it will bring something
7 more to my recollection.
8 Q. I just ask you to read through the paragraph and see -- it's a
9 brief paragraph -- see if it refreshes your recollection.
10 A. Yes, yes. Of course we discussed and informed the
11 representatives of the European Council that the KLA recognises the
12 conventions, the international conventions of war and respects them.
13 Q. Do you recall Fatmir Limaj saying anything during the meeting?
14 A. It's been a long time now. Many things happened, this traumatic
15 things happened after that. But mainly it was I who spoke on that
17 Q. After the meeting, did you have any discussion with Fatmir Limaj?
18 A. We didn't have time to continue because of our duties, because, I
19 will say it again, it's a time when the Serb offensive was still ongoing.
20 Q. I want show you a photograph which is at tab 11 of the binder.
21 And it's -- for the record it's from Prosecution Exhibit P24. And it's
22 ERN U003-3240. You can either look on the photograph on the screen or
23 you can look at it in the binder in front of you, Mr. Krasniqi.
24 A. I can see both.
25 Q. Do you recognise the people in the photograph?
1 A. Yes, I do.
2 Q. From right to left can you tell us who they are?
3 A. Fatmir Limaj, Rexhep Selimi, and myself, Jakup Krasniqi.
4 Q. I think there was from left to right, but in any event. Do you
5 remember when this photograph was taken?
6 A. As I said, on the right on the photo.
7 Q. Well, I don't think there will be any confusion about this point,
8 but do you remember when this photograph was taken?
9 A. It's not easy for me to give the precise time; however, this
10 photograph was made after the summer offensive of 1998.
11 Q. Do you remember where it was taken?
12 A. I can't be precise about this either. It's either taken in Shati
13 Idri [phoen] or Novo Selo or in Lladroc.
14 Q. And the man in the middle, Rexhep Selimi, what was his position
15 at this time, if you know? At the time the photograph was taken, what
16 was his position?
17 A. I said before, he had the duty of general inspector.
18 Q. Can you explain a little bit more what was his duty as general
19 inspector. Was he a member of the General Staff?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And what was his responsibility as general inspector?
22 A. His responsibility was to visit more frequently the war zones and
23 to collect information about the situation in those zones.
24 Q. And do you remember at the time that this photograph was taken
25 what the position of Fatmir Limaj was within the KLA?
1 A. As I said, it is difficult for me to give the precise time when
2 this photograph was taken, but I know that it is in November between 11
3 and 13th of November a long meeting was held of the General Staff and in
4 that meeting Fatmir Limaj became a member of the General Staff. And of
5 course after this time our meetings were more frequent, perhaps even on a
6 daily basis.
7 Q. Now, I know you can't remember precisely when this photograph was
8 taken, but do you remember if it was before or after Fatmir Limaj became
9 a member of the General Staff?
10 A. I can't be precise about this either, but it should be around
11 this time, maybe after he became a member of the General Staff. But
12 again, I will stress it again, I don't know accurately.
13 Q. I understand.
14 MR. WHITING: I think we can take that off the screen how.
15 Q. I want to ask you about a different subject, Mr. Krasniqi, and
16 that is the responsibilities of KLA commanders at whatever level towards
17 the General Staff. And I want to focus for these questions on the time
18 period of June and July of 1998. Now, I know that you have testified
19 that to your knowledge no crimes were committed. My question though, is:
20 If a crime had been -- is a commander of an area learned of a crime being
21 committed by a KLA soldier within his area, did he have any duties to
22 report that crime to the General Staff?
23 A. Every leader of the operational units, which after September,
24 when we have the formation of the brigade units of the KLA, it was their
25 obligation to inform the General Staff about all the developments in
1 their areas of responsibility. As a General Staff, not in a single case
2 did we receive information that executions of captives were carried out
3 by members of the KLA. Such acts -- about such acts we heard only after
4 the arrest of Fatmir and his friends by the Tribunal and even earlier
5 from certain arrests that were made in Kosovo of former KLA members. I
6 will say it again that as General Staff we didn't have information that
7 someone committed the killing of detained persons.
8 It is true that the General Staff about all the arrests that were
9 made - and there were arrests both of soldiers and civilians - but all
10 these arrested persons were released. And maybe the most known case to
11 the international public was the capturing of eight Serbs in January 1998
12 in Shala i Bajgora. And later these soldiers after many discussions were
13 exchanged with nine soldiers who had been captured in Guznin [phoen] of
14 Prizren or Djakovica on 15 December 1998. There were other cases as well
15 when people were captured, mainly Serbs, who later, with the mediation of
16 the international factor, were released.
17 Q. Now, just to clarify you spoke of the release of eight Serbs. I
18 think we had a translation problem. Did that occur in January of 1998 or
19 January of 1999?
20 A. 1999.
21 Q. You said it was the obligation of every leader of the operational
22 units to inform the General Staff about all developments in their areas
23 of responsibility. Was that true in June and July of 1998?
24 A. I explained the organisational state in May, June, July of 1998.
25 If there is a need for additional explanation, I will do that.
1 Q. No. But my question is -- you have told us that there were unit
2 commanders and you've told us about a zone commander Sulejman Selimi in
3 Drenica during May, June, and July of 1998. My question is: At that
4 time, did those commanders have the obligation that you described to
5 inform the General Staff about everything that happened in their area of
7 A. In order to answer this question it is needed to make an
8 explanation that not in all zones where the KLA was operating, not all of
9 these zones were of a same organisational level. This differed from zone
10 to zone, and depended also on the expansion of the KLA in those relevant
11 zones. For example, in this time we're talking about, the Drenica zone
12 had a better organisation due to the fact that the fighting between the
13 KLA of this zone and the Serb police and military forces had started in
14 November 1997. So the level of organisation in this zone was of a better
15 quality. After the Drenica zone, of a better organisational level for
16 that time we were -- we are speaking about was the Dukagjini operational
17 zone. As for the other zones, including here the Pastrik zone, they
18 lagged behind in organisation. This will change later on and will become
19 of a better quality after the offensive, the summer offensive of 1998.
20 So the level of organisation arose also in Shale which included the
21 municipality of Mitrovica and Vushtrri and the preparation of the forces
22 in the Llap zone of Shala i Bajgora began in the autumn of 1998. A
23 weaker level of organisation in this time was evident in Nerodime zone,
24 while in the beginning of the organisation it was in Karadak zone. So
25 this was the situation at the organisational level of the KLA operational
2 Q. I understand that, Mr. Krasniqi, but that's an answer to a
3 different question I've put to you. The question I have asked you is:
4 During May, June, and July of 1998 did commanders in the KLA have an
5 obligation to inform the General Staff about everything that happened in
6 their area of responsibility?
7 A. This is how it was. However, I mentioned it in the earlier
8 session that in this time the growth of interest of the citizens to join
9 the KLA was very evident in this time and we here have the horizontal
10 layout without the vertical one. And at that time, we mainly dealt with
11 the systemisation of persons who had joined the ranks. We cannot say
12 that the level of responsibility was what you are asking here.
13 Q. I'm just asking questions, sir. I'm going to move to a different
14 topic and that is Rahovec. Are you aware of fighting that occurred in
15 Rahovec in July of 1998?
16 A. Yes. In July 1998 fighting was not going on solely in Rahovec.
17 There were two battle sites that I would like to explain and clarify. It
18 is the fighting in Rahovec and the fight in Bardhi i Madh for the Obiliq
20 Q. I'm just going to focus on Rahovec. Did --
21 A. They are interrelated, Rahovec and Bardhi i Madh, so I see a need
22 to explain here.
23 Q. Well, let me just ask you a few questions and maybe we can
24 explain that. Were you present for the fighting in Rahovec?
25 A. I wasn't present in the Rahovec fighting because I didn't have
1 the duty of a soldier or a commander.
2 Q. Do you remember how the fighting started in Rahovec?
3 A. This is what I wanted to explain, how the fighting started in
5 Q. Please explain, briefly if you can.
6 A. I would like to inform the Judges about the fighting in Rahovec
7 and in Bardhi i Madh. In both cases the fighting began without the
8 authorisation of the General Staff of the KLA, because we, being of an
9 organisational level, we were conscious of our own organisational means
10 in such circumstances and we did not authorise the attack of Rahovec and
11 Bardhi i Madh due to the fact that we lacked weapons that were necessary
12 for the liberation of these towns and we were lacking weapons to keep
13 under control a city of a size of Rahovec or a plain place as was Bardhi
14 i Madh.
15 When the fighting started, the engagement of the General Staff
16 was to help and put under control those military forces, our military
17 forces, that were not fully under the command of the General Staff. And
18 also members of the General Staff took part in the fighting in Rahovec.
19 Q. Which members of the General Staff took part in the fighting in
21 A. In the Rahovec fighting, the following took part: Kadri Veseli,
22 member of the General Staff, who in fact found himself encircled there
23 and had trouble in getting out.
24 Q. Any other members of the General Staff?
25 A. For the moment I can't remember. I do remember that there was
1 another military person who was appointed there to estimate -- assess the
2 level, the organisational level, of the KLA units there. He was killed
3 in Rahovec. His name is Agim Cela.
4 Q. Do you remember the date that the fighting started in Rahovec?
5 A. I don't remember the date.
6 Q. And did the fighting start with the KLA attacking or the Serbs
7 attacking or do you not know?
8 A. I don't know. It could be the town unit of Rahovec, but I don't
9 know precisely.
10 Q. Was the town under the control of the KLA for some time, some
11 period of days?
12 A. This control was very brief.
13 Q. How many days?
14 A. I can't speak in days, but it was a very short time. This is
15 what I know.
16 Q. Thank you. During -- from August 1998 onwards, did you hear
17 anything about detention camps being operated by members of the KLA in
18 the Llap zone, and specifically in Lapashtica, Majac and Potok, or
19 Bajgora, starting in August 1998. Did you hear anything about that?
20 A. No. At that time in the zones that you mentioned there were no
21 operational units of the KLA.
22 Q. You mean in the Llap zone there was no -- from August 1998 on
23 there were no operational units of the KLA?
24 A. The Llap units at that time were based in Shala Bajgora.
25 Q. And so -- is it -- just so we're clear about your testimony, is
1 it your testimony that you know nothing about detention camps being
2 operated by the KLA in the Llap zone from August 1998 onwards?
3 A. I don't know about that.
4 Q. During May, June, and July of 1998 did you ever meet Isak Musliu,
5 also known as Qerqiz?
6 A. No, I didn't meet him.
7 Q. How about Haradin Bala, also known as Shala? Did you meet him
8 during those months of 1998?
9 A. No, neither with him. No.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Krasniqi. I have no further questions.
11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Whiting.
12 I see, Mr. Topolski, you have volunteered once again.
13 MR. TOPOLSKI: Once again.
14 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Topolski will ask some questions of you now,
15 Mr. Krasniqi.
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Topolski:
17 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I do so on behalf of a man you've never met, Isak
18 Musliu, otherwise known as Qerqizi. Can I indicate to you, please, that
19 there are six areas I want to ask you about and I shall indicate what
20 they are. I want to ask you first of all about propaganda; I then want
21 to ask you about collaborators; then detention and arrests; fourthly,
22 structure; fifthly, territorial control or lack of it by the KLA; and
23 sixthly and finally, questions regarding Serbian state security. And I
24 suspect I may take the rest of the day to do it.
25 Mr. Krasniqi, I shall try as best I can to make my questions both
1 short and precise. We'll get along faster, sir, if you're able to make
2 your responses equally short and equally precise. Do you understand me?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Good. So let's start with propaganda. And can I please to begin
5 with venture a definition of propaganda. Propaganda, I suggest is an
6 organised programme of publicity or selected information used to
7 propagate a doctrine or a practice; an organised programme of publicity
8 or selected information used to propagate a doctrine or a practice.
9 Mr. Krasniqi, would you accept that as a working definition of
10 the word "propaganda"?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Good. Well, you've just agreed with the Oxford reference
13 dictionary, so that's a good start. More importantly, Mr. Krasniqi, may
14 I put this to you: That propaganda is an essential weapon in the armoury
15 of an organisation such as the KLA. Do you agree?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. That is particularly so where a volunteer army is involved, as
18 was the case here in Kosova in 1998. Do you agree with that proposition?
19 A. I agree and I did say this during my speech.
20 Q. The purpose of communiques perhaps could be said to have served
21 more than one purpose, but again, would you agree with the proposition
22 that for the most part their primary purpose was propaganda?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Let's look for a moment or two other purposes that propaganda may
25 serve in the situation that you and your colleagues, comrades, found
1 themselves. Propaganda would be important, would it not, regarding the
2 morale of the civilian population. Would you agree?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. It would serve the purpose also of encouraging recruitment into
5 the ranks of the KLA. Would you agree?
6 A. Of course. Due to the lack of other mobilisation means, the
7 communiques, the statements, and all other public statements were in this
8 purpose in the mobilisation of volunteers into the ranks of the KLA.
9 Q. Another purpose, I suggest, would be to talk up successes, talk
10 up military successes. Do you agree?
11 A. I agree -- I agree that we had to speak about success even when
12 there wasn't any success to speak about.
13 Q. That's an interesting answer that follows neatly, I hope, into my
14 next proposition, that another purpose of it was to talk down failures.
15 Do you agree with that?
16 A. We had taken up weapons and of course we wanted to speak about
17 victory and not about defeat.
18 Q. My next and final proposition regarding the purposes of
19 propaganda, Mr. Krasniqi, would be this: That it was an essential
20 element in psychological warfare. Would you agree with that proposition?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Now, let me move to what I suggest in reality was an example of
23 propaganda at work: The territorial control claimed by the KLA; that's
24 the topic. Could you go, please, to tab 5 of the file that Mr. Whiting
25 was taking you through last week and today.
1 Mr. Krasniqi, I hope this is backed by the Albanian translation
2 of this document which is in fact the text of the Der Speigel interview
3 given by you on the 6th of July. First of all, sir, do you agree that is
4 what we are looking at here?
5 MR. TOPOLSKI: Is there a larger copy of this for Mr. Krasniqi of
6 the Der Speigel interview?
7 MR. WHITING: This is one where we don't have the newspaper
8 version of it and it's -- the Albanian is ordinary size.
9 MR. TOPOLSKI:
10 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, the English should be backed by the Albanian in
11 your file there. Have you got the Albanian translation of it? In text
12 form, not in duplication-of-newspaper form? Is this it?
13 JUDGE PARKER: Is it Exhibit P140? I hear concurrence, as though
14 from your mouth, Mr. Topolski.
15 MR. TOPOLSKI: Of course I learned a long time ago to never agree
16 with somebody that comes from either beside one or behind one.
17 MR. WHITING: We have an extra copy of the translation that we
18 can provide to the usher.
19 MR. TOPOLSKI: I have mine, too.
20 MR. WHITING: Is it in there?
21 MR. TOPOLSKI: [Previous translation continues]... maybe Mr.
22 Whiting would be kind enough to provide -- thank you.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now I have it.
24 MR. TOPOLSKI:
25 Q. Good. Mr. Krasniqi, I will take you to a specific question that
1 I have for you regarding territorial claims of domination by the KLA, but
2 before we get there let's just look together at the first page of this
3 interview and indeed the very first question which reads, and would you
4 follow me, sir, in your own language to ensure that you're looking at an
5 accurate translation.
6 "Q. Mr. Krasniqi, your troops have just suffered a defeat in a
7 battle for the Belasevac coal mine. Nevertheless, you have announced
8 that you plan to conquer the provincial capital of Pristina soon. How
9 and when?"
10 Mr. Krasniqi, have I just read to you an accurate translation of
11 what you see in that document there in front of you?
12 A. Yes, the translation is accurate.
13 Q. Well, let's see if they have accurately translated your answer to
14 that question, suggesting that you had plans to conquer Pristina on the
15 6th of July of 1998. Your answer as translated:
16 "I am very serious about that. We already have a large number of
17 our fighters in place on the way to Pristina. They are just waiting for
18 our signal to attack."
19 Mr. Krasniqi, is there a word of truth in that answer in reality
20 as of the 6th of July, 1998? You know I ask the question, sir,
21 respectfully. Indeed, did you have a large number of fighters in place
22 waiting for your signal to attack Pristina or is that propaganda? You're
24 A. Of course my answer is -- was what is here in the interview. We
25 didn't take up weapons just to stay in the mountains of Kosovo. Our
1 purpose was to liberate Kosova. Although the means of organisation and
2 growth were limited, I had to say what I said at that time for the
3 opinion, public opinion, in Kosova. So the purpose was to bring some
4 hope within the population of Kosovo who were fed up with the Belgrade
6 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, in my country we have an expression, maybe in
7 yours, too: That there are lies, there are damned lies, and there are
8 statistics. May we add a fourth to that, there are lies, there are
9 damned lies, there are statistics, and then there's propaganda. Do you
11 A. I agree.
12 JUDGE PARKER: Is that a convenient time, Mr. Topolski?
13 MR. TOPOLSKI: I couldn't beat it, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE PARKER: 10 minutes to 6.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.28 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.53 p.m.
17 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Topolski.
18 MR. TOPOLSKI: May it please Your Honours.
19 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, could we please go to what in the English anyway is
20 the second page of that document. What I'm looking for is a Der Speigel
21 question that is about five or six questions after the one we've just
22 looked at and begins with the words "Aren't you overestimating your
23 troops' fighting strength?" Could you be good enough to find a question
24 that begins like that.
25 A. Yes, I found it.
1 Q. The question in full is, and would you be good enough to check
2 the translation as I read:
3 "Aren't you overestimating your troops' fighting strength? They
4 do not have a chance against the Yugoslav army."
5 And your response is this: "Nowadays we are getting enough
6 weapons and we also have antiaircraft missiles. We control 40 per cent
7 of the country. There are more than 5 million Albanians in the Balkans
8 who will help each other in the moment of danger."
9 Mr. Krasniqi, first of all are those words that I've just read in
10 English the same in the Albanian language?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. I want to ask you only about two, or I should say three,
13 actually, parts of that answer. Would you bear in mind that you are here
14 speaking to Der Speigel on the 6th of July, 1998. Were you "getting
15 enough weapons" in July 1998, Mr. Krasniqi?
16 A. At that time far from having sufficient or enough weapons, less
17 so did we have anti-aircraft missiles.
18 Q. Well, thank you for the composite answer to the question. You
19 anticipated my next question, so I'll just move on to the third. Mr.
20 Krasniqi, this is important because evidence this Tribunal has already
21 heard appears to accord with what you're saying to Der Speigel. "We
22 control 40 per cent of the country."
23 Again, Mr. Krasniqi, was that precise figure that you gave to Der
24 Speigel accurate as of the 6th of July, 1998?
25 A. Of course it was not accurate.
1 Q. When you were answering questions a short while ago this
2 afternoon from Mr. Whiting, you were being shown a document - and I'm not
3 going to take you to it but the reference ends 38589 - and it's a
4 document that is dated the 12th of July, communique I think. In speaking
5 about that document, Mr. Krasniqi, to us on your oath this afternoon you
6 describe the area controlled by the KLA as being limited; page 21, line
7 15 of the transcript. Assume, as I do of course, that that answer you
8 gave this afternoon is an accurate one and an honest one, it tends to
9 confirm, does it not, that you were doing nothing more than
10 propagandising when you were speaking to Der Speigel on the 6th of July,
11 1998. Do you agree?
12 A. Yes, I agree.
13 Q. I want to see if I can focus on that very same period of time
14 with you for a moment, please. And I appreciate that I'm not asking you
15 questions as a military man, but as a political man at the time of these
16 events. Do you remember an attack by the KLA on the town of, and forgive
17 my pronunciation, sir, I hope I'm right, Orahovac on the 18th of July,
18 1998? Do you recall that attack?
19 A. Yes, I recall it.
20 Q. Are you familiar with a paper written and produced by the ICG
21 called Kosovo's Long Hot Summer, a briefing on military, humanitarian,
22 and political developments in Kosovo? Do you recollect such a document?
23 A. No, I do not remember it.
24 Q. The KLA attacked Orahovac on the 18th of July, did it not, and I
25 suggest the case is the Serbian police re-established control of Orahovac
1 just four days later on the 22nd of July. Does that accord with your
2 recollection of these events, Mr. Krasniqi?
3 A. In my previous answers I said I don't remember the date -- the
4 dates, how many days. Because it wasn't long from the moment that
5 Rahovec was taken over by the KLA and the attacks by the Serb forces.
6 Maybe it was three, four, maximum five days; it was not a long time.
7 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, is Rahovec, spelled R-a-h-o-v-e-c, the same as a
8 place spelled O-r-a-h-o-v-a-c? Is that the same place?
9 A. Yes. Orahovac is in Serbian language; Rahovec is in Albanian.
10 Q. Is it right, as I suggest be the case, that after the fall of
11 Orahovac on or about the 22nd of July back into Serb control, they pushed
12 on, did the Serbs, and took the headquarters of the KLA in Malisevo on
13 the 29th of July. Do you agree?
14 A. It must be sometime by the end of July. I don't remember an
15 accurate time. Certainly the document you have in mind must show the
16 accurate date.
17 Q. But they pushed on and re-took KLA headquarters in Likovac on the
18 6th of August and Junik on the 15th of August, otherwise known as the
19 Serb offensive. Do you agree with the dates I put to you?
20 A. Yes. That is the time of the highest peak of the Serb offensive,
21 and I may agree with the date, but I cannot remember the accurate dates
22 because the situation was very grave at that time. As I mentioned
23 earlier, many villages were in flames, they were being shelled with all
24 sorts of weapons, artillery and otherwise, by the Serb forces. So it's
25 hard for me to remember the accurate dates. But it is a time when one
1 after the other that the seats of the KLA, like Malisheve, Likovc, and
2 then Junik fell.
3 Q. We'll come back to look together at one or two other aspects of
4 territorial control, as I indicated to you at the outset a little later,
5 but can I move on still under the heading of propaganda. Mr. Krasniqi,
6 at the time you were appointed to become spokesman of the KLA, had you
7 any media experience? Do you understand what I mean by the question?
8 A. Yes, I do. Even before I became the spokesperson, I had
9 experience only in writing for the media but not appearing before the
10 media outlets, especially the electronic media, and I didn't give
11 interviews in the past. So in a few words I would say I didn't have
12 experience of working with the media.
13 MR. TOPOLSKI: I don't know if it matters but the witness's other
14 microphone is not switched on. I don't know if that matters or not, but
15 I will point it out. Thank you, Mr. Krasniqi. I think this helps for
16 your voice to be heard by all interpreters.
17 Q. The writing that you did for the media, was that of a political
18 nature, of an academic nature, of an entertainment nature or what? What
19 was the writing that you had done before your appointment as spokesman?
20 A. I wrote some articles. Also I wrote about academic issues since
21 at that time I was doing post-university studies at Pristina University.
22 Q. Do I understand your evidence correctly and accurately to be that
23 you have always been - and I'm of course speaking for the purposes of
24 this question throughout the war - you have always been part of the
25 political wing of the KLA as distinct from the military wing. Have I
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 understood your evidence correctly, Mr. Krasniqi, about that?
2 A. Yes, you have.
3 Q. You know, sir, I do not mean the question rudely, but does it
4 mean that literally you did not bear arms at all throughout the war but
5 you performed other very important functions? Is that the case?
6 A. Mainly I was a spokesperson for the KLA and I was a person in
7 charge for meetings with the Western politicians and diplomats who used
8 to come and meet and to discuss with the KLA representatives.
9 Q. Again I want to be clear. Does it follow from that that you did
10 not and did not participate in any actual fighting? Is that the case?
11 A. I did not take part in fighting; I declared that earlier. I was
12 not a soldier; I was a political representative to convey to the media,
13 to the public, the voice of the KLA.
14 Q. And so that we understand the general principles that you applied
15 to that job, as I think you indicated to us last Thursday, you saw your
16 job as representing and publicising the policy of the General Staff of
17 the KLA. Is that right?
18 A. Yes, that's right.
19 Q. Does it follow from your answers over the last few moments that
20 you were alone in performing this job as spokesperson or did you have any
21 assistants, colleagues, to help you?
22 A. In Kosova I was alone. I was the only one responsible for
23 presenting -- publicising the policy of the KLA to the West and Germany,
24 Switzerland, and other European countries. For these countries it was
25 Bardhyl Mahmuti.
1 Q. That means, then, does it, sir, that you are the writer, the
2 author, of the various communiques that we have seen? Is that the case?
3 A. Not all of them, because the communiques usually were about the
4 operational -- operations in the zones. I was responsible for the
5 political statements and such documents.
6 Q. Where we have seen, for example, a mixture of content in some of
7 those communiques which I think could fairly be separated out between as
8 operational and political, you would be responsible for the political
9 input, others for the military. Is that the case?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Could I ask you to look, please, at the three documents that we
12 had translated over the -- Mr. Whiting had translated. I can't claim
13 credit for something I haven't done - over the weekend for which we are
14 grateful. Can you have in front of you P141, P142, and P143, and you'll
15 need these in the Albanian of course. P141 first of all is the text of a
16 speech that you gave. You've given us detailed evidence to the
17 circumstances on the 3rd or 4th of March of 1998. Have you got that one
18 there in front of you?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Again, I don't know if it's the same on the Albanian, but I'm
21 looking at the second page of the English and I'm looking at a paragraph
22 that begins: "We are fully confident that in none of the mentioned valid
23 documents can the defending of one's national threshold and dignity be
24 assessed as a terrorist act."
25 Do you see that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What you're referring to there, Mr. Krasniqi, it seems, are
3 things that are dealt with in the preceding paragraph, United Nations
4 Charters and the like stretching from the Atlantic through Helsinki down
5 to Paris. I want to ask you about the second sentence of that next
7 "Not a single liberation war in any country of the world has been
8 qualified as a terrorist one, and our war is nothing but a liberation
10 Are they your words, Mr. Krasniqi?
11 A. Yes, they are. The entire text is mine.
12 Q. Is it right that not a single liberation war in any country of
13 the world has been called a terrorist one? May I give you two examples:
14 the Kenyan uprising in the 1950s and the formation of the state of Israel
15 in 1948. Weren't they terrorist wars?
16 A. I don't know them as being terrorist wars. It depends who has
17 said this and what were the underlying motives of those who have
18 described liberation wars as terrorist wars. Of course those who are
19 occupiers find it difficult to call a liberation war otherwise.
20 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, do you not know that Menachem Begin, before he
21 became prime minister of Israel, was convicted of terrorist offences in
22 the 1940s war of liberation the Israelis fought against the English? Did
23 you not know that?
24 A. No, I didn't.
25 Q. Can you go, please, to P142, the Political Statement Number 2 of
1 April 1998 and I want to ask you about something Mr. Whiting asked you
2 about. Again, was this communique written in its entirety by you?
3 A. This communique -- the largest part of it has been written by me,
4 but we have cooperated or there have been other people who have written
5 about the political situation, people who have been outside of Kosova.
6 The text was written by me. It was -- that part that was written by
7 others. The text was sent to comrades outside of Kosova; they revised it
8 and sent it back to us. In fact, it was a production of the KLA General
9 Staff I would say.
10 Q. Right. Mr. Krasniqi, were any of the comrades to whom this
11 document was shown in draft form or any of the comrades who contributed
12 to this document lawyers, as far as you can remember?
13 A. It may -- it was possible at that time to consult lawyers, people
14 who were versed in political issues and -- as well as the military ones.
15 Q. I'm sure it was possible and I can assure you, sir, I hope I have
16 good reason for asking you specific questions. Before this document was
17 circulated, this communique, as far as you can recollect were lawyers
18 consulted either within or outside Kosovo?
19 A. Outside Kosova.
20 Q. And were these lawyers familiar with international treaties and
21 the like as far as you know?
22 A. At that time I didn't know them.
23 Q. Who wrote the line, the second sentence of the document: "The
24 KLA recognises and respects the international treaties of the United
25 Nations and the Conventions on war"? Did you write that?
1 A. It is possible that I have written it even though a long time has
2 passed since then.
3 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, we recognise that and I know the Tribunal will take
4 that very much into account and I also recognise that textual analysis is
5 difficult after all this time. But you see, these are words I suspect
6 that we're going to hear much more as this case unfolds after you leave
7 us, Mr. Krasniqi. I want to focus on "The KLA recognises and respects
8 the international treaties of the United Nations and the Conventions on
10 Had you read the international treaties of the UN and Conventions
11 on war before the 29th of April, 1998?
12 A. I am a historian by profession. I possess sufficient information
13 on international documents which have been issued earlier, especially
14 after the Second World War. I'm talking about historical aspect of such
15 documents because I'm not a lawyer myself.
16 Q. The phrase "international treaties of the United Nations" has for
17 lawyers and I'm sure historians a precise meaning, Mr. Krasniqi. My
18 question, sir, is this: Had you read or received legal advice about the
19 international treaties of the UN with regards to war before issuing this
21 A. I'm repeating it. I didn't look at such issues from the point of
22 view of a lawyer and I never broke down each and every word of such
23 sentences. I looked at them from the historian and politician's point of
24 view and not that of a lawyer.
25 Q. Do you understand what is meant in lawyers' language as armed
1 conflict, Mr. Krasniqi?
2 A. A war is an armed conflict.
3 Q. Do you understand or don't you armed conflict to have a special
4 particular and important meaning for this Tribunal? Do you know that or
6 A. I don't know about the Tribunal, but in the political -- Oxford
7 Political Dictionary, it is said that war is an armed conflict.
8 Q. Well, I deserved that. I didn't know the library here ran to the
9 Oxford dictionary.
10 Let's look over the page to page 6, shall we please, Mr.
11 Krasniqi. And it really follows on from what we've just been talking
12 about. And please forgive me for a close textual analysis. This is
13 important, I assure you. Under the heading "The Homeland is Calling!",
14 paragraph 6 begins with the exclamation: "We are in a state of war!"
15 Did you write that?
16 A. It doesn't matter who wrote it. I said that the document is
17 issued by the General Staff. I may have written something. I have
18 claimed paternity to it.
19 Q. Well, if you would be good enough, Mr. Krasniqi, to bear with me.
20 I think I shall decide what matters or not for the purposes of my
21 questions, so if you would be good to answer it. Did you write the words
22 "we are in a state or war," or can't you remember?
23 A. I have written such sentences often; this might be one of them.
24 It was a wartime for us -- actually, it was a war.
25 Q. Well, I was going to make a suggestion and it's this: Should
1 this Tribunal read that declaration as being from you as father of it,
2 simply a statement of the reality of the situation, that you were indeed
3 in a state of war as of April 1998 fighting the Serbs? Is that what you
4 were seeking to express or something more meaningful?
5 A. Political dictionaries say that the war is a continuation of
6 politics with arms of -- firearms. And this is what was happening in
7 Kosova. Politics was exhausted -- political means were exhausted and
8 what was being used were the firearms.
9 Q. Thank you. Could you turn to the last of the documents in that
10 little bundle, P143, please, which I think is Political Statement Number
11 5. Mr. Krasniqi, we've moved on in time now. We're now 28th of July of
12 1998. And again, may we assume you are the author of this document or at
13 least as you put it --
14 A. This is a document of the General Staff. It's Statement Number
15 5. I may be the author of this statement or to say it in fewer words,
16 I'm the author that has been approved and atoned by the General Staff.
17 Q. I wonder if you could go to the last page, or rather the last
18 paragraph. I'm looking for a sentence that begins "We appeal to the
19 international community." Could you let us know when you've found that,
20 please, Mr. Krasniqi.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Thank you.
23 "We appeal to the international community to seriously not
24 declaratively warn Belgrade, to support the just liberation war, which is
25 protected by all international conventions of peace and war, while at the
1 same time condemning the fascist Belgrade regime, which only understands
2 the language of force."
3 Again, really, it's the same question that related to the first
4 of these three. "Protected by all international conventions of peace and
5 war," was that your understanding as a historian or your advice you
6 received from lawyers in the KLA? Or was it just a piece of journalism?
7 A. We did not consult with lawyers of course, but it might be both
8 political and historic, even journalistic.
9 Q. Thank you. That's all I ask you on those documents. Thank you
10 very much, Mr. Krasniqi, you can put those away now.
11 MR. TOPOLSKI: Perhaps they can be taken from you so -- 141, 142,
12 and 143, if you can -- thank you very much.
13 Q. I'd like, please, to move on if I may to deal with the second
14 area I wanted to ask you about, and that is collaborators. Can I begin
15 with an attempt at a definition again, Mr. Krasniqi, as a working
16 definition. A collaborator, I suggest, is one who cooperates
17 traitorously with an enemy.
18 Do you agree?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. When you are speaking about of collaborators, and you mention it
21 in a number of different contexts in your evidence last week and I'm
22 going to ask you about some of them, I wonder if we should attempt to
23 draw a distinction. May I suggest one for your consideration, please. A
24 distinction between civilians, or the modern phrase "noncombatants," on
25 the one hand and people who could be properly described as collaborators
1 on the one.
2 Mr. Krasniqi, is that a distinction you recognise?
3 A. I recognise it, but I need to explain something here. I
4 mentioned this last week as well. The word "collaborator" is not an
5 Albanian word. It is a foreign word that has entered Albanian
6 dictionaries and its origin is in the Second World War and onwards. As
7 to how we use it, it is possible that we have used it maybe not properly
8 because we didn't have time to deal -- to refine words, but with us the
9 collaborators were mentioned in context of those who were recruited by
10 the Serb Security Service and who served the violent apparatus in Kosova.
11 Q. Yes. To cooperate traitorously with an enemy, contains, does it
12 not, two distinct aspects: Cooperation and traitorously. It would not
13 be a traitorous cooperation to be seen speaking to a Serb, would it, Mr.
15 A. Of course not.
16 Q. It wouldn't necessarily be seen as a traitorous cooperation to
17 sell bread to a Serb, would it, Mr. Krasniqi?
18 A. Of course I think I have explained this in the first part of this
20 Q. Don't worry about that. Just answer my questions, if you would
21 be good enough. It's not traitorous cooperation to sell wood to a Serb,
22 is it, Mr. Krasniqi?
23 A. Of course it's not. And we never mixed those who were recruited
24 by Serbian Secret Service with those civilians who lived in Kosova.
25 Q. On the 10th of February when you were giving evidence here last
1 week you attempted a definition in answer to Mr. Whiting's question of
2 what a collaborator is. And at page 40, line 19 to be exact, you said
3 that they were in the service of the violent Serb regime. And you went
4 on to give us, you may recollect, Mr. Krasniqi, a memorable concrete
5 example, as you described it, of the Dr. Hafir Shala. You remember
6 telling us all this last week? I see you nodding your head.
7 A. Yes, yes.
8 Q. Once war had broken out - and I mean the word in the looser
9 sense, Mr. Krasniqi - in April 1998 which lasted up to and included and a
10 little later on including the bombing by NATO the following year, as far
11 as ordinary law and order is concerned in your country, in Kosova, at
12 that time, would I be right in suggesting, Mr. Krasniqi, that ordinary
13 law and order had effectively been suspended during that period of the
15 A. In Kosova, law and order did not exist since spring 1981.
16 Q. Well, I'm sure there are many who would sit in that chair and
17 disagree with that proposition, but nonetheless I'm not going to go all
18 the way back to 1981. It was, was it not, in the autumn of 1998, I
19 suggest, that the KLA formed the military police. Do you agree?
20 A. I agree.
21 Q. Part of their purpose it might be said, might it not, was to
22 represent in part, I underline, a functioning police force as best as one
23 could, given the war. Would you agree with that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. I want to see if I can understand the process that led to the
1 execution of a collaborator, Mr. Krasniqi. First of all, given the
2 answers to the questions you've just given us, it would follow, would it,
3 that in the ordinary sense a police investigation, an arrest, an
4 interrogation, a trial, a sentence was not what was happening. Do you
6 A. That's how it was.
7 Q. For a human life to be taken of a collaborator, is this Tribunal
8 to assume that it was not something that was done lightly and for fun but
9 seriously, for what was believed to be good purpose? What was the
10 position, Mr. Krasniqi?
11 A. I would like to explain here the aim of our war was not to take
12 human lives but to liberate Kosova.
13 Q. I asked you whether the taking of a life of someone believed to
14 be a collaborator was done lightly or seriously. What was the position,
16 A. We did not play with human lives. I will say it again. Our aim
17 was not to take lives. Our aim was to liberate Kosova and we were in a
18 war with the occupier, with Belgrade, and with the police and military
19 forces of Belgrade as well as other forces who were serving this violent
20 apparatus. And I don't see anything that I can add to this. Our
21 purpose, our goal, was life, not death. Serbia was the one that was
22 encouraging death everywhere in Kosova, in every village.
23 Q. In communique number 43 from the 4th of March of 1998, I want to
24 draw your attention only to a ringing line to Mr. Whiting drew your
25 attention to "Death to enemies and traitors!"
1 Did you write that line?
2 A. It is not important who wrote that line.
3 Q. Don't worry about what's important; the Court will decide that.
4 Please answer my question: Did you write the line: "Death to enemies
5 and traitors!"
6 A. I didn't write it.
7 Q. Do you agree with it as a concept?
8 A. I was and I am.
9 Q. Does it in any sense in your mind, Mr. Krasniqi, detract or
10 deflect from the very serious purpose of ending the life of someone
11 believed to be a collaborator, a someone who cooperates traitorously with
12 the enemy? Does such a line deflect from that purpose or not, in your
14 A. A legal principle says that law should not deal with minor
15 things, and that's why I think that at times this Court is trying to
16 evade the main purpose. I will repeat what I've already said several
17 times during this evidence. Our war was directed against the Serb
18 occupier, against the Serb police and military forces and the violent
19 apparatus that served it. We shouldn't deal here with terms.
20 Q. I wonder if I can attempt a conclusion to this aspect of these
21 questions regarding collaborators, Mr. Krasniqi, trying to distil
22 everything you've been saying to us over the last two days. As I
23 understand your evidence it seems to come to this, see if you agree with
24 me: That it was no part of KLA political or military policy to kidnap,
25 torture, still less murder innocent civilians or noncombatants, call them
1 what you will. Now, that's my attempt to distil your evidence. Would
2 you agree with it or not?
3 A. I agree, yes.
4 Q. Now, we can't leave it there, Mr. Krasniqi, of course. We have
5 to go on to the next step, and it's this: If, and I underline the word
6 "if," this Tribunal were to come to the conclusion that such things
7 happened it would follow, wouldn't it, that if that happened it could
8 only have occurred at the hands of what I'll call rogue elements. Do you
10 A. I agree, and I have said this before.
11 Q. My phrase, not yours, but you've adopted it so I'll go on. Rogue
12 elements, I suggest, that would have had to have been acting without the
13 support, without the knowledge, or without the encouragement of anyone in
14 authority or command. Do you agree?
15 A. I agree.
16 Q. Now, there's another component that we have to feed into all of
17 this, Mr. Krasniqi, and I'd like you please for it to go to tab 8 of the
18 file that Mr. Whiting provided you with. And this is an interview with
19 Koha Ditore of the 2nd of September of 1998. And I think what you have
20 with this is a newspaper article itself.
21 MR. TOPOLSKI: Is there a larger version for Mr. Krasniqi? P144.
22 Mr. Powles tells me it's P145. Thank you.
23 Sorry, I didn't mean to trouble, Mr. Younis -- oh, Mr. Younis has
24 a larger copy. Thank you very much.
25 Q. Mr. Krasniqi, I'm sorry to make you have to do this, but you're
1 going to have to look for an answer of yours quite a way into this
2 interview. It's the one that Mr. Whiting took you to: "We do not know
3 anything about the imprisonment or kidnapping of any Serbian journalist
4 or citizen."
5 MR. TOPOLSKI: Your Honours, it's page 3 of 4.
6 Q. Do you have that paragraph, Mr. Krasniqi: "We do not know
7 anything of the kidnapping or imprisonment of any Serb citizens or
9 This is your response?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Good. Can we just read that paragraph together, please.
12 "The UCK has not taken up weapons to fight against Serbian
13 journalists and citizens, but to fight against Serbian soldiers and
14 terrorists that have reduced Kosova to ashes. After all the terror and
15 devastation that have been seen in Kosova, it is impossible to keep under
16 control the feelings of hatred and vengeance that the enemy himself has
17 inspired. Despite our insistence that the Albanians' struggle must not
18 resemble the barbarism practiced by the enemy."
19 Mr. Krasniqi, as I say, this was, as it were, the next component
20 on from the propositions that you and I were just discussing.
21 A. I have given answer for this issue. Now I don't know, why should
22 I give an answer to an answer.
23 Q. Because I'm about to ask -- because I'm about to ask you a
25 A. My answer was very clear.
1 Q. Well, it may have been but I want to ask you a different question
2 to the one that was asked you before, so be patient with me, please. If
3 -- if -- kidnapping, torture, murder occurred by the rogue elements I've
4 talked about, then what cannot be discounted, can it, Mr. Krasniqi, is
5 the possibility that that was occurring by individuals carrying out acts
6 of revenge or vengeance to settle old scores. Do you agree with that?
7 A. I agree. Such things could have happened. I spoke of the Kosova
8 Liberation Army, about its programme and its aims.
9 Q. You spoke of it as an army, as a force never taking revenge. Of
10 course what you could not legislate for, could you, as a command
11 structure was individual acts of barbarism. That you couldn't legislate
12 for, could you? If they occurred.
13 A. We did not support such acts even during the war and not today.
14 And we will never support such acts. We would never even exercise such
15 acts, acts that resembled the acts of the police and military -- Serb
16 police and military forces.
17 Q. Just two more things I want to ask you about under the heading of
18 collaborators before the rising of the court today, Mr. Krasniqi. The
19 first is this: International support for the cause of the KLA was vital,
20 was it not, from an early stage of the war and before it?
21 A. Of course it was and is still today.
22 Q. I suppose one could say that the largest, perhaps, ever example
23 of the obtaining of international support by a liberation movement was
24 the NATO bombing that began in early 1999. Would you agree with that?
25 A. I agree.
1 Q. So it would appear therefore, wouldn't it, from those two
2 propositions that the international community's support for the KLA and
3 to avert a humanitarian disaster was sought and was obtained during 1998.
4 And you played your part in that, did you not?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Did you at any stage have any contact with the Kosovo
7 Verification Mission for Human Rights, the OSCE, in late 1998?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Did you ever meet with a woman by the name of Susan Ringaard
10 Pedersen who worked for that organisation?
11 A. I don't remember.
12 Q. Are you familiar with a book produced by the OSCE entitled "As
13 Seen, As Told" regarding the work of that organisation in Kosova during
14 and after the war?
15 A. I don't remember.
16 Q. I want to read you a paragraph from a statement made by Susan
17 Ringaard Pedersen from that organisation. It's a statement made to this
18 Tribunal, paragraph 28 to be exact. And it might be a convenient moment
19 at which to finish this evening, if Their Honours permit. What she says
20 is this, Mr. Krasniqi: "Based on reports or complaints we received and
21 information we gathered, the main reason for these abductions," and she's
22 talking about abduction of civilians, "was collaboration with the enemy.
23 I received information that the KLA kidnapped Kosovar Albanians and Romas
24 only because they had a Serbian friend or were employed by a Serb. That
25 seemed reason enough to be accused as a collaborator."
1 And it goes on: "We also got the impression that the abductions
2 or arrests committed by the KLA were systematic, preplanned, and
3 organised. We had the impression that the KLA was really trying to pull
4 the community apart."
5 Now, Mr. Krasniqi, you've dealt with a good deal of that already.
6 I wonder if you might be good enough to focus your response to that
7 paragraph on the suggestion, the impression, that this was systematic,
8 preplanned, and organised attempt to pull the community apart, that is to
9 say the taking, torturing, and no doubt killing of innocent civilians.
10 What do you say to that?
11 A. I'm convinced that unfortunately this paragraph as it is is taken
12 from a person who did not have good intentions about the citizens of
13 Kosova and about the just war of the KLA. I know that there were such
14 reports which said little about the main cause of the war and the
15 situation in Kosova. I know that there have been attempts to blame the
16 KLA as well, but myself, as its political representative, I am convinced
17 that this was not the KLA policy and not even its aim. It wasn't its
18 policy and aim to kidnap civilians and to call them collaborators, to
19 call those people who had no other means to live but to get employed by
20 Serbs or others.
21 I'm convinced that not a single citizen of Kosova, regardless of
22 whether he is Albanian or something else, did not become a victim of the
23 KLA except for those who were recruited within the ranks of the Serb
24 forces, military and police forces. Therefore, I cannot agree with a
25 thing like that which to me is not true. The war was not incited by the
1 KLA and its soldiers; the war came to Kosova as a consequence -- as a
2 political consequence of Serbia, in order to exercise violence and
3 genocide in Kosova. And this was supported by the well-known document of
4 the Belgrade Academy of Science and Art. This was a systematic Serb
5 policy which in several of its programmes aimed at making the Albanians
6 of Kosova flee Kosova and making it impossible for the Albanians in
7 Kosova to live --
8 Q. Can I --
9 A. -- and forcing them to leave Kosova. And from 1981 to 1997, in
10 these 10 or 15 years more than 400.000 Albanians, mainly youth, left
11 Kosova and went to different European countries. And I know that each
12 and every country of Europe knows how much these figures grew in France,
13 in Switzerland, in Germany, throughout Europe, and in the United States.
14 I know that both the European Union and the international community know
15 that the Milosevic regime had a traditional policy to change the
16 structure of Kosova and not its own citizens.
17 Q. Now, Mr. Krasniqi, I'm going to stop you and not least because
18 it's 7.00 and about halfway through that we got several miles away from
19 the question I asked you.
20 MR. TOPOLSKI: But that might be a convenient moment to ...
21 JUDGE PARKER: Very well. We will adjourn for the night and
22 continue tomorrow at 2.15.
23 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,
24 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of
25 February, 2005, at 2.15 p.m.