Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 6398

1 Thursday, 26 May 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 2.25 p.m.

6 JUDGE PARKER: It appears the technical problems have been

7 remedied and we are now able to start.

8 Mr. Churcher, if I could remind you of the affirmation you made

9 at the beginning of your evidence, which is still applicable.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Yes, Mr. Nicholls.

12 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honours.


14 Cross-examined by Mr. Nicholls: [Continued]

15 Q. Mr. Churcher, I've been asked -- it's my fault, not yours -- to

16 ensure that we have a gap between questions and answers so that the

17 translators and the recording can keep up with us. So let's try to

18 remember that. Okay?

19 A. All right, sir.

20 Q. This one point from yesterday, I want to make sure I have it

21 clear. When you were working in Tanzania on the indigenous miners

22 project, is the name of the company you were employed by Tanzania

23 company, KK?

24 A. It was a Kenyan company, KK. KK Security.

25 Q. All right. When we left off, we were just talking, and I just

Page 6399

1 have a few more questions about how you prepared your report in this

2 case. And we were talking about drafts. How many drafts were there?

3 A. 16.

4 Q. So that's the one we have, is the sixteenth draft.

5 A. Yes, version 16.

6 Q. When you sent drafts to the Defence, did they comment on the

7 drafts you provided them?

8 A. I think I only sent one draft to the Defence. The rest were for

9 my own internal use to track changes. And after that we had a telephone

10 conference, but it wasn't directly about the report, only that they

11 wished me to continue and to expand, and that was in about January.

12 Q. Okay. And --

13 A. You asked me yesterday, by the way, about what reports I'd

14 received, and of course in fact they are on the back of the -- the

15 reports I'd received in effect are all listed here at the back of the

16 report, because if I received something, I'd commented on it. So largely

17 it was Mr. Coo's report, which I was commenting on, and one or two

18 others.

19 Q. I see. So there's not a list on the back of your report but all

20 of the reports and transcripts you received, you've commented on in the

21 body of the report.

22 A. All that I received before I wrote version 16, I commented on in

23 the body of the report.

24 Q. All right. Thank you.

25 A. All -- specifically actually the back of the report, as you'll

Page 6400

1 see, under various headings.

2 Q. That's clear, then. Thank you.

3 And just if you know, did you receive complete transcripts and

4 statements, or partial copies?

5 A. I'm afraid I don't know, but I assume that the majority of them

6 were complete. But some were in different formats. Some were translated

7 formats. Some were direct.

8 Q. And when you got those, were you directed to any portions which

9 the Defence thought were particularly relevant?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Then when you speak on page 6 - it's paragraph 1 of your report -

12 you probably don't need to look at it for this question. You say: "In

13 reading the papers of the Fatmir Limaj case." Is that referring to all

14 the documentation sent to you by the Defence?

15 A. That would be referring to everything I'd seen, yes.

16 Q. Well, from the Defence?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. I hadn't seen anything from anyone else.

20 Q. Okay. Just one quick question: Before their arrest, had you met

21 any of the three accused?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Okay. And the Defence asked as a courtesy --

24 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, you should have a packet of possible

25 new documents. And this packet was provided to the witness at the end of

Page 6401

1 his testimony yesterday.

2 Q. Is that right, sir?

3 A. It is.

4 Q. And have you had a chance to look through the documents?

5 A. I have. Thank you.

6 Q. What I want to ask you about first is your relationship, if any,

7 to Shirley DioGuardi. Do you know that woman?

8 A. Yes. I've met her twice, talked on the telephone with her

9 perhaps three or four times over a period of many years, and she forwards

10 me e-mails occasionally with articles of interest.

11 Q. And she is one of the directors, I suppose you would call it, of

12 the Albanian American Civic League in the United States.

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. When did you first meet her?

15 A. We first met briefly at Heathrow sometime in the late 1990s, but

16 I -- I'm afraid I couldn't say which year. I didn't meet her again for

17 some very long time.

18 Q. And did you have any type of professional relationship with her,

19 or is this just a social relationship because you're both interested in

20 Kosovo Albanians?

21 A. The latter would describe it exactly.

22 Q. Are you still in contact with her?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And what about her husband, Joseph?

25 A. I've met him on the same occasions that I met her, but on both

Page 6402

1 occasions they were not for any form of substantive talks. We said

2 hello, had a coffee, nice to meet, and that was it.

3 Q. All right. And are you generally in accord with their position

4 towards the problem, I'll call it, in Kosovo?

5 A. I'm afraid I wouldn't describe myself as "generally in accord,"

6 no. As you know, there are other organisations interested in Kosovo, and

7 I remain in contact with many people, but I wouldn't describe myself as

8 "in accord," although I haven't opposed her on anything particular that I

9 can think of.

10 Q. I want to ask you about the document which is behind tab 2, the

11 record of hearings before the Committee on International Relations in the

12 House of Representatives, and these hearings were chaired by Congressman

13 Henry Hyde.

14 If we go to page 52. This is testimony by Shirley DioGuardi.

15 And she states on the record: "And by the way, for the record, with your

16 permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a statement from Bob

17 Churcher, who works for the British Foreign Ministry, formerly head of

18 the international crisis group in Pristina on this very issue. His

19 contention is that most Serbs will actually not return except to sell

20 their homes and leave."

21 And then it continues. And on the following page, we have a

22 short report or letter by you entitled "The Solution for Kosovo

23 Independence." And --

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. All right. Now, when did Ms. DioGuardi ask you to provide this

Page 6403

1 information?

2 A. Judging from the date on the letter, I assume it was sometime in

3 April, but I'm afraid I don't know particularly. This letter is simply a

4 slight rewrite of something I'd done probably two years before for the

5 International Crisis Group following the publication of a small book by

6 the Swedish committee on independence for Kosovo, Conditional

7 Independence. She asked whether she could use something and I said yeah,

8 I'll redo that for you.

9 Q. Okay. And I should say these hearings were on May 21st, 2003,

10 and your letter is dated May 4th, 2003.

11 I just have a couple questions about your letter. In the first

12 paragraph, towards the middle of the first paragraph you state: "The cry

13 of the United Nations and Europe has been 'standards before status.'

14 This has really been interpreted as more rights for the remaining Serbs

15 in the province. However, this is unlikely to happen yet when those

16 Serbs were recently both dictators and oppressors and might well be so

17 again if the province is returned to Serbian rule."

18 Do you still stand by that statement?

19 A. In that, I'm reflecting the views of Kosovars, not my personal

20 view.

21 Q. Well, the statement says flat out these Serbs were recently

22 dictators and oppressors. It doesn't say "in the view of Kosovar

23 Albanians."

24 A. No, possibly I should have included that.

25 Q. Right.

Page 6404

1 A. But you can see the political thought there, that if people don't

2 like being ruled by somebody else, they're likely to try and push them

3 out so they don't get ruled again.

4 Q. So you didn't mean to say that the ordinary Serbs living there,

5 many of whom are now refugees, were all dictators and oppressors, I hope.

6 A. As you know, towards the end of the Kosovo war, almost all

7 Serbian adult males of military age were engaged in the security forces

8 in one way or another, and that of course was likely to cause problems

9 with their Kosovar neighbours when they came home again.

10 Q. Did you mean to say by this what it says in the plain meaning,

11 that these Serbs -- the Serbs living in Kosovo, which is what it's

12 talking about, were recently dictators and oppressors, or did you not

13 mean that?

14 A. What I meant to say is that their Kosovo neighbours, or many of

15 them, probably a majority, would view it that way. We're talking about

16 how to enable Serbs to come home here, not my personal opinion of who

17 Serbs are. I've got a number of Serb friends, including Serbs from the

18 government.

19 Q. But isn't that -- you say perhaps you should have written it

20 differently. Isn't it a bit reckless to put a statement like this in

21 something which is going towards congressional hearings on Kosovo which

22 states that the remaining Serbs were dictators and oppressors?

23 A. Looking back there, I think you're -- you're bringing out one

24 interpretation which is not one that I meant.

25 Q. Let's turn the page, the top of page 54. "The sensible way to

Page 6405

1 solve this problem is to make Kosovo independent, perhaps all by strong

2 safeguards for minority rights."

3 Now, "perhaps"? Do you think that's optional, strong safeguards

4 for minority rights?

5 A. Now, that's steering a balance between the Conditional

6 Independence book and Kosovars' demands for immediate independence, and

7 you have to read this paper in context for the context at the time it was

8 written. And I assume that a number of people would understand exactly

9 what I was talking about.

10 Q. I'm sorry, I don't completely understand your answer. What

11 balance is there where strong safeguards for minority rights are not

12 important?

13 A. I could also equally have said "of course with strong

14 safeguards." I'm afraid I wasn't necessarily choosing that precise word

15 "perhaps," anything other than as a conjunctive.

16 Q. So --

17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters would please ask Mr. Churcher

18 to stand closer to the microphone.

19 MR. NICHOLLS: [Previous translation continues] ...

20 THE WITNESS: My personal opinion is that there should be strong

21 safeguards while I was writing a piece.

22 Q. Mr. Churcher, could you please -- and maybe the usher could

23 assist. I want you to be comfortable -- the microphones need to be

24 closer to you in order for the recording to pick up.

25 At the bottom of this page, you write: "There might seem to be

Page 6406

1 an obvious solution by exchange of creating two real states, Serbia and

2 Kosova, where people actually want to live together, but Europe is of

3 course utterly against any form of border changes."

4 Now, that sounds quite strongly as though you're advocating

5 ethnically pure states.

6 A. Now, I'm advocating mixed states where people feel secure because

7 they know who rules them. We've seen conflicts in the area of what is

8 now Kosova since 1913, on and off roughly every decade, and I think it's

9 about time we found a solution.

10 Q. That's right. But Ms. DioGuardi introduced your report for the

11 proposition that the Serbs don't really want to live in Kosovo.

12 A. At the moment, regrettably not of course after the events of 1998

13 and 1999. No Serb can make a living there. There simply aren't jobs for

14 anybody, Kosovars, yet alone Serbs.

15 Q. Right. So your position, then, is that no Serbs want to live in

16 Kosovo.

17 A. Not -- not at all. No, I certainly haven't said that anywhere.

18 What I was inferring there is that Serbs of working class age who need

19 jobs and want to bring up families and send their children to school have

20 considerable difficulties. And so far UNHCR's experience has been that

21 returning Serbs have sold the houses they've been given and moved off.

22 Q. Have you spent any time talking to Serb refugees from the war?

23 A. I've spent a great deal of time talking to Serb leaders and Serb

24 refugees inside Kosovo.

25 Q. You haven't heard them talking about their only wish is to go

Page 6407

1 back to their houses, farms, place where is their families have been for

2 generations in Kosovo?

3 A. Particularly older people, yes.

4 Q. Further down page 55 -- let me just continue with the sentence

5 and I'll let you explain it, the next sentence: "It has gone so far --"

6 speaking of Europe, "as to use enormous pressure and threats to keep

7 Serbia and Montenegro together, despite it being obvious that there was a

8 majority of Montenegrins who wished to separate and quite a number of

9 Serbs who would be happy to see them go."

10 A. And ...?

11 Q. And your meaning there is --

12 A. Sorry. You'll have to phrase that question more carefully.

13 Q. What exactly do you mean by this sentence?

14 A. I'm talking in the context here of the European Union idea that

15 if Montenegro and Serbia would separate, that would automatically create

16 the conditions for Kosovo to become independent. That's not actually a

17 view that legally I would share but it is a view and you would possibly

18 be familiar with the phrase "Selanija" which refers to the idea of

19 keeping Montenegro and Serbia together as some sort of Yugoslav entity.

20 I was saying there that my experience in Montenegro and in

21 talking to Montenegrins at the time, the government there, was that they

22 wished to separate.

23 Q. And the Serbs would be happy to see them go; that's your

24 position?

25 A. Many Serbs would because of the economic burden of keeping

Page 6408

1 Montenegro.

2 Q. In the next paragraph you state - I'll slow down - "UN agencies

3 are of course well known for exaggerating numbers elsewhere in the world,

4 since more numbers mean more resources and more money for the UN."

5 Well, when you were working in Timor, did you exaggerate numbers,

6 exaggerate problems to get more money?

7 A. I wasn't working on numbers in Timor, to I wouldn't have needed

8 to. But it's a continuing source of conflict between WFP and UNHCR as to

9 registrations, and registrations have always been an extremely difficult

10 problem, which rather naturally people doing the registration tend to err

11 on the high side because to say no to somebody is much more dangerous

12 than saying yes.

13 Q. Right. But again, isn't this a rather recklessly broad statement

14 that UN agencies exaggerate for more resources for more money? Isn't

15 that a bit irresponsible to put in this type of document?

16 A. No. It's true.

17 Q. And then in the next paragraph: "Most Serbs who are thinking of

18 returning to Kosovo" -- in context -- "are planning to coming" -- it

19 should be "planning to come back to get grants to rebuild their houses in

20 order to sell up and leave. Those who remain are the social cases."

21 A. If you've travelled widely in Kosovo, you would of course observe

22 that, as a matter of fact, on the ground.

23 Q. All right.

24 A. Outside the traditional enclaves such as Srpska where a viable

25 community remains, in other areas people have left. It's not viable for

Page 6409

1 them to return.

2 Q. All right. And the whole point of this document is to help Ms.

3 DioGuardi convince the Congress that the Serbs don't really want to live

4 in Kosovo, they don't really want to return there, they're just coming

5 back to try to rip off the system.

6 A. "Rip off the system" is far stronger than I would have intended

7 to say, but if you wanted to follow that up, there have been a number of

8 papers published recently which have confirmed that. The Lausanne

9 principle, for instance, the recent paper on the subject.

10 Q. And the only people who want to remain are social cases; there

11 aren't any people who want to remain because that's where their families

12 are from and that's where they were born?

13 A. I said "most," not "any."

14 Q. All right. The next document I want to show you is behind tab 1.

15 MR. NICHOLLS: Which starts off, Your Honours -- I found this on

16 the website over the last weekend, so the first pages you see are the

17 cover on the Albanian American Civic League website. The last three

18 pages are the letter posted there. And the link can be shown on the

19 cover pages.

20 Q. You read -- did you read this article last night --

21 A. I did.

22 Q. -- by Shirley -- let me finish the question, please, Shirley

23 DioGuardi, "Kosova: Breaking the Silence"?

24 A. Yes, I did.

25 Q. This is dated March 11, 2003, so that's round about a month

Page 6410

1 before you provide her with your report to provide to the Congress;

2 right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You need to speak up a bit. Sorry.

5 A. Sorry.

6 Q. And I won't go through this entire article, but it's really an

7 editorial, isn't it, commemorating and reflecting on the fifth-year

8 anniversary of the terrible events in Prekaz and the Jashari family.

9 A. It is.

10 Q. What I want to look at is the second-to-last paragraph. It's on

11 page 2, where Ms. DioGuardi writes: "If we are to keep faith with the

12 Albanian heroes like Adem Jashari, then we have to vigorously oppose all

13 attempts to misrepresent Kosova on the world stage as a pretext for

14 carving it up and I think there is no better place to begin than to

15 impose the criminalisation of the UCK and the recent indictment of Fatmir

16 Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu by the War Crimes Tribunal in The

17 Hague. These men have been charged with crimes allegedly committed

18 before the war. Bowing to pressure from Serbia and its allies, The Hague

19 is creating a false parody between the UCK freedom fighters struggling

20 for the liberation of a people and a Serbian war -- and Serbian war

21 criminals who committed state-sponsored terrorism, occupation, and

22 genocide. We must educate the west about this travesty of justice and we

23 must also expose the Albanians who have collaborated in these arrests."

24 Now, isn't that a disturbing statement?

25 A. It is. I haven't read this piece before. I looked at it and

Page 6411

1 thought, This is probably some sort of fund-raising speech in the

2 American style, trying to exaggerate for the sake of emphasis to get

3 money. But it's certainly not something that I would have agreed with.

4 And that's all I can say about it. I didn't write it. It's not part of

5 my opinion.

6 Q. And the term "collaborator" has got a very grave and special

7 meaning in Kosovo, doesn't it, in the Albanian community?

8 A. It certainly does in the propaganda of the time, yes.

9 Q. And you didn't feel the need to check a little more into Ms.

10 DioGuardi's views published on the website at this same time that you're

11 providing documentation for her to use in her advocacy?

12 A. As I explained initially, that document is a rerun of something I

13 did while I was in the International Crisis Group, supporting a

14 particular publication of the Swedish committee, and no, I didn't see any

15 problem in publishing that publicly.

16 Q. But I'm talking about a problem of you acting through this person

17 as an advocate for the Albanian cause at the same time that she's calling

18 for exposing collaborators who led to the arrest of the accused in this

19 case.

20 A. Personally I don't see that supplying documents to the United

21 States Congress is acting in collaboration with anybody.

22 Q. That's not what I was saying. I'm just --

23 A. I'm sorry, I misunderstood you then.

24 Q. -- suggesting that you have advocated -- you have act as an

25 advocate for the Albanian Kosovar cause in this way, providing something

Page 6412

1 to Ms. DioGuardi that you know she's going to use to try to persuade

2 Congress to follow the views of the Albanian American Civic League. You

3 know that that's what the document you are giving her is for.

4 A. Trying to persuade Congress of something is a perfectly proper

5 and legal activity. I don't have any difficulty with it.

6 Q. And you don't have any problem being associated with people who

7 write that type of article, that type of editorial?

8 A. I'm not associated with that person at all, in any way.

9 Absolutely no association whatsoever. She introduced something I wrote

10 to Congress. Anybody can do that. I don't have any difficulty with that

11 at all.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. I didn't get paid for it, I might add.

14 Q. Okay. The next document briefly. Let me just ask you this,

15 talking about, finally, this topic of the document which you provided

16 which was introduced in these hearings: "Do you agree with your source

17 that you cite, Stacy Sullivan, that in the 1980s and 1970s there was a

18 concerted but unstated effort to drive Serbs out of Kosovo?

19 A. I'm sorry, I don't recall citing that.

20 Q. You didn't cite that. You cite -- you list the book as a source,

21 the Stacy Sullivan book.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. "Be Not Afraid." Do you agree with that source that she makes on

24 pages 40 to 41?

25 A. I don't recall that statement, but I wouldn't have agreed with

Page 6413

1 that, no.

2 Q. There wasn't a concerted campaign?

3 A. Not that I'm aware of, no.

4 Q. Okay. Let me just go to tab 3 briefly. This is an ECMM report,

5 "Kosovo, Current Trends in Kosovar Politics." Do you recognise this

6 document?

7 A. I looked at it last night and, judging by the time and some of

8 the phrases, I think I do -- though there's no signature block on it.

9 Q. Yeah. Do you think you wrote it?

10 A. I think I did because I can't think of anybody else who was

11 present at the time in the mission, and as I said, it contains some

12 phrases which are familiar to me. But I couldn't say that for certain.

13 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honour, could we, I'm sorry, go into private

14 session for one moment?

15 JUDGE PARKER: Private session.

16 [Private session]

17 (redacted)

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 6414

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 [Open session]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.

14 MR. NICHOLLS: -- the copies.

15 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

16 MR. NICHOLLS: And could we provide one to the witness, please.

17 And I should say for the record that what we're looking at is R0057722

18 through 24, an ECMM report from January 1995.

19 Q. Could you look at the last page, sir, and can I just ask you if

20 that's your signature.

21 A. That is, yes.

22 Q. Okay. Do you remember writing this report?

23 A. I didn't, no. If I'd remembered it, I'd have told you so

24 immediately.

25 Q. Okay. I mean now do you remember, now that you see your

Page 6415

1 signature?

2 A. I certainly accept that I wrote it. I mean, I don't remember

3 writing it, but I accept that I wrote it.

4 Q. Okay. Just two questions: At this time, in 1995 - if you'd look

5 at the last page, Section E - you're of the same view, aren't you?

6 "E: Lastly comes a possibility" -- and here you're forecasting

7 possible future events -- "which comes in most conflicts of the FRY

8 realising that it simply cannot afford the cost of police and army

9 repression in Kosovo and that basic facilities like new schools and

10 hospitals are lacking due to the cost of holding a province where few, if

11 any, Serbs actually want to live."

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And that was your view, then, in 1995. Here it's not most; it's

14 few, if any, actually want to live.

15 A. If you look at the census figures, 1971, 1981, 1991, if you watch

16 the declining trend, most Serbs moving out of Kosovo. It was a fact at

17 the time.

18 Q. But, again, don't you think that's just a bit -- a bit of a broad

19 brush for the topic, a bit reckless to say "few, if any, actually want to

20 live" when in fact there were thousands and thousands of people who

21 wanted to live there, who still want to live there, who happen to be of a

22 Serbian or Serb ethnicity?

23 A. Yes. But as a percentage of the total that was dropping at all

24 time. Old people were staying and unfortunately younger people were

25 moving out to get jobs.

Page 6416












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6417

1 Q. All right. And that wasn't, again, because of any concerted

2 campaign to drive them out in the 1970s and 1980s. You disagree with

3 Stacy Sullivan on that point.

4 A. Didn't see any concerted campaign. I never believed in one.

5 It's the normal economic pressures of moving through rural areas to

6 cities, jobs and factories weren't being created. There wasn't the money

7 to do it. Yugoslavia was collapsing after Tito's time. It was a trend.

8 Q. I want to ask you now some questions about your views on the

9 KLA's structure -- military structure in 1998. On page 4 of your report,

10 you describe in the summary section: "The KLA of the late 1990s as being

11 composed of disparate groups with different sources of support, different

12 political opinions, differing allegiances, although perhaps with shared

13 aspirations, but without any coherent or effective command in the

14 military sense until perhaps rather tenuously after the war." And "after

15 the war" means what, June 1999?

16 A. After June 1999.

17 Q. All right. Okay. And you address the General Staff in your

18 report. On page 5 you say "it is perfectly possible to see more than one

19 General Staff." On page 6, paragraph 3, you state: "There is no

20 concrete evidence of the existence of such a group or of the location of

21 it."

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And on page 27, you state: "If there was a General Staff in

24 reality, as distinct from a series of disconnected numbered individuals

25 and a mythical title."

Page 6418

1 You cite the Selimi interview on page 27 of your report. Now,

2 are you aware that he testified that he was on the General Staff?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And you cite Krasniqi on page 30. You've read his testimony.

5 You know that he says he was on the General Staff.

6 I'm just letting them catch up.

7 And you realise that both of these men and all the other

8 testimony in the case and probably all the documentation that was

9 provided to you by the Defence says that there was a General Staff and

10 there was only one General Staff; right?

11 A. I do. Would you allow me to explain that?

12 Q. In a minute. There's been evidence that the General Staff in

13 this case has been based for a time in Divjak. Are you aware of that?

14 A. I am, yes.

15 Q. And there's been evidence that the General Staff moved around for

16 its own security.

17 A. There is, yes.

18 Q. And Mr. Limaj has testified that he was a member of the General

19 Staff.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. He probably knows a bit more about the General Staff than you do.

22 A. I'm sure he does.

23 Q. Now, you can explain, I think it's fair --if you've written

24 several times "no General Staff" or "several General Staffs" or -- yeah,

25 I guess that's it. There's either none or several. You can explain what

Page 6419

1 you meant by that.

2 A. General Staff back in 1998, certainly to an outsider, was not at

3 all clear. Later on it became apparent that there might be various -- I

4 can't really describe it well in English -- but circles within the

5 General Staff. But the General Staff was a political organisation along

6 the lines of a Politbureau. It was not a military command structure in

7 the way that you or I would understand a military command structure.

8 Certainly in 1998, it consisted of a number of individuals.

9 As you will also see from Limaj's testimony, which wasn't

10 available to me at this time, he didn't distinguish between

11 representatives of the General Staff and members of the General Staff.

12 He himself, as quite an important person, didn't know what was going on

13 on the ground at the time. In that sense, it's difficult to see a

14 General Staff in what people interpret as the meaning of the word, which

15 is some sort of all-encompassing military command structure. What you've

16 got is a series of individuals in different places at different times who

17 come together in groups of two or three; a number of them set up in

18 Divjak, and that is actually unknown even to the people in the area

19 immediately around them, 10 kilometres way in Klecka. Well, that's not a

20 military command structure. Nobody knows who's in the headquarters;

21 nobody knows where it is.

22 So the General Staff remains a mythical concept, as I said,

23 comprised of individuals moving around with a political direction to

24 start a guerilla insurgency, not to provide a military command in the way

25 that people interpret a General Staff would.

Page 6420

1 Sorry, does that answer ...?

2 Q. That's fine. I want you to be able to explain where you need to.

3 That's an interesting explanation.

4 I want to -- since you brought it up as well, talk a little bit

5 about what Mr. Limaj said on Day 69, here. Mr. Mansfield asked him --

6 "We were in June at the moment, and" -- I'm sorry, I don't have the -- I

7 have the page reference of page 43, so this would be on the 43rd page of

8 the LiveNote, although it's a different number in the official.

9 Mr. Mansfield asked his client the question: "We were in June at

10 the moment. What other developments in June so far as you are concerned

11 and the KLA are concerned, what other things happened in June that you

12 can recall of significance?"

13 And Mr. Limaj answered - and it's a very long answer, so I won't

14 read the entire answer - "As I said earlier, the meeting with Mr.

15 Krasniqi came as a result of the concerns from what was seen in the

16 terrain and what was going on in the terrain. The people began to come

17 with the request to join the KLA. And they wanted to get weapons and

18 join the ranks and they came in great numbers."

19 Now I'm going to skip ahead a bit: "Secondly, as Mr. Krasniqi

20 told me, almost the entire General Staff had engaged in procuring weapons

21 because of the question of weapons was a number one question. So they

22 were all interested in getting as much weapons as possible and arming

23 people who wanted to get armed."

24 That describes the General Staff engaging in a military function,

25 providing weapons for the KLA, doesn't it?

Page 6421

1 A. It describes General Staff as apparently doing nothing except

2 trying to procure weapons for the KLA. It doesn't describe a military

3 command structure in the way that many people here have interpreted the

4 phrase "the General Staff." It implies a whole series of individuals all

5 trying to acquire weapons. That doesn't amount to any sort of meaningful

6 command.

7 Q. Well, it was an answer to a specific question about what Mr.

8 Limaj remembered from events in June. I'm not asking Mr. Limaj to give a

9 treatise on the General Staff. My question to you was very simple: If

10 the General Staff is engaged, as he said, in trying to get weapons to

11 distribute to all these people who want to join the KLA, that's a strong

12 military function, isn't it?

13 A. That's one of many military functions.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 A. A staff should be capable of carrying out many more functions

16 than that to be an effective staff.

17 Q. We may not need to go through this topic too much, but you agree

18 that in the -- throughout late 1997 into 1998, the KLA was an

19 organisation with a great deal of secrecy?

20 A. Yes. Although, I would distinguish between the periods of 1997

21 and 1998.

22 Q. But in both of those periods - let's talk about 1998, then - KLA

23 members and the KLA structure tried to maintain a great deal of secrecy.

24 A. Particularly before the Jashari massacre. I think you should see

25 March 1998 as the turning point.

Page 6422

1 Q. And there were very good reasons to maintain that secrecy.

2 A. There were at the time, of course, because it was an entirely

3 different idea -- a political idea by different groups of how they would

4 rebel.

5 Q. And that's why KLA members wore masks.

6 A. I presume they wore masks for secrecy, but I'm certainly -- I

7 can't answer that question.

8 Q. Well, I believe it was Ramadan Behluli testified here that they

9 took off their mask -- that they felt they could take off their masks in

10 June 1998?

11 A. I've heard that, yes.

12 Q. Because at that point they began to feel more secure.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And you also realise and have heard that KLA members used

15 pseudonyms rather than their real names.

16 A. They did.

17 Q. And the evidence in this trial has been that many KLA soldiers

18 didn't know each other's real names until late or even after the war.

19 A. That I've heard.

20 Q. Which made it difficult for the MUP and Serb forces to know who

21 was in the KLA.

22 A. I'm not entirely sure that statement is correct, but it was

23 possibly the intention.

24 Q. That was the intention. You -- you're not sure that's correct,

25 that it -- you think the MUP and the VJ knew exactly who was in the KLA?

Page 6423

1 A. No. No, I don't. I don't necessarily see the connection between

2 those things, but there's something.

3 Q. And that also makes it difficult during the time period for

4 outsiders to know who was in the KLA.

5 A. Yes, because, as I said, at that particular time there wasn't one

6 KLA. There was a whole series of armed groups all calling themselves the

7 KLA.

8 Q. In which particular time is that?

9 A. That period between March and June 1998.

10 Q. Well, we'll -- we'll talk about that in a moment. You talk about

11 that actually at page 9, paragraph 15. That's where you're talking about

12 this point. You state: "They were making their own uniforms and

13 travelling to Albania to buy their own weapons, yet these groups had no

14 command structure outside of their own informal and consensual

15 arrangements, and even then what they call orders were first discussed.

16 Indeed, in the main they were mostly unable or unwilling to leave their

17 own villages to help anybody else unless pushed out by organised Serb

18 military or paramilitary forces. Despite their enthusiasm, they had no

19 command structure."

20 A. Yes. I think that's been clear from the evidence so far in this

21 case.

22 Q. You state similarly - and I'll just run through it - on page 14,

23 in paragraph 33: "They were little localised groups incapable of

24 supporting each other and not in any form of military command structure."

25 A. That's correct. And as I said, I think the evidence which has

Page 6424

1 come out in this case reinforces my view, although I wrote that before

2 I'd heard that.

3 Q. Now, you're not suggesting that first -- in that first paragraph

4 15 that individual KLA members travelled to Albania to buy weapons, came

5 back with a rifle -- or a couple of rifles just for their village and

6 that was the extent of the way the KLA was armed, are you?

7 A. No. As I said, a number of groups operating in different ways.

8 Q. But what you appear to be saying in that paragraph is that these

9 different groups all went to Albania just individually to buy their own

10 weapons.

11 A. That's certainly what you can see in Northern Albania. There

12 were literally arms bazaars with villagers coming across the border and

13 starting to haggle about the price of a Kalashnikov.

14 Q. Yeah. And one of the books you cite is, again the Stacy Sullivan

15 book, about Florin Krasniqi.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay. On page 6 she talks about how he raised personally 30

18 million dollars for military supplies and weapons for the KLA.

19 A. I think you should take both Stacy Sullivan and Florin Krasniqi

20 with a pinch of salt on those sort of figures. Again, it's an American

21 book published for an American public.

22 Q. Then why do you cite it in your report as good for -- as -- I'll

23 try to find your words -- as worth reading about the build-up of the KLA?

24 A. Because of the way it indicated diverse supply lines with one

25 group being supplied by its own chain of supply, in the same way that

Page 6425

1 other groups in Dukagjini maintained entirely separate lines of funding

2 back to Switzerland. There were a whole series of different lines of

3 supply into Kosovo, not one line which then found out.

4 Q. That's my point, is that there was an organised shipping of

5 millions of dollars of weapons into Kosovo. It wasn't just villagers

6 crossing the border coming back with their own personal weapon.

7 A. If you read Stacy Sullivan's book completely, you'd see that in

8 actual fact, although they talk about those figures the numbers of

9 weapons they talk about shipping is actually very small. And whether any

10 of those weapons actually reached the front lines and were used would be

11 another question entirely.

12 Q. So when she talks on page 6 about how this individual smuggled

13 tens of thousands of weapons across the border into Kosovo, you don't

14 consider that a large number of weapons? That's a very small number?

15 A. I didn't consider that that was true. If you actually read his

16 statements within the book, he's talking about individual weapons, buying

17 two or three here, 15 there. She's writing for an audience. You don't

18 have to take everything in these books as serious.

19 Q. And there's no caveat in your report about that, is there?

20 A. I'm not talking about that particular thing in my report. I was

21 talking about the precise part reinforcing the idea that each group had

22 its own line going back.

23 Q. All right. And those groups smuggled in weapons for

24 distribution.

25 A. To what extent that happened or what extent they smuggled in

Page 6426

1 weapons for their own members, I'm not clear. But I think the latter is

2 mostly the case. People knew who those weapons were going to as they

3 brought them in. It was much too dangerous an activity simply to be

4 taking weapons in for general distribution.

5 Q. And, again, page 6, para 3: "In terms of time, there was never

6 any effective command structure in any military sense during any part of

7 the Kosovo conflict," in your view.

8 A. That's my view. That's precisely why NATO or the American

9 government or whoever we would like to suggest did it, brought in, again,

10 Agim Ceku towards the end to try and get some kind of command structure.

11 If you look at General Ralston's comments to Wesley Clark, they were

12 having enormous difficulties in getting anybody on the ground to produce

13 any coherent answers about targeting. They couldn't do it.

14 Q. Okay. My question was whether that was your view, and you've

15 answered that.

16 Do you know which brigade Fatmir Limaj commanded?

17 A. I've heard the number, I'm afraid, but I haven't -- I don't

18 recall it.

19 Q. Okay. Do you know when he became brigade commander?

20 A. I don't know.

21 Q. Do you know which zone he commanded?

22 A. I don't believe he commanded --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down for interpretation, please.

24 THE WITNESS: He was one of the leaders in the area of Klecka,

25 which is on the boundary of about three zones or subzones. But as you'll

Page 6427

1 know, the zone terminology changed during the war because it reflected

2 one particular political party's political intentions.


4 Q. Well, let me tell you what Fatmir Limaj said in this courtroom on

5 the 24th of May. He was asked: "And you never gave orders to Luan?

6 That's your testimony?" And his answer was -- this is Day 72, line 64:

7 "With Luan it's something different. When the brigade was set up, it was

8 established in August, I was his brigade commander, and from August I

9 issued orders to him."

10 Now, your contention is that throughout any period, any time,

11 there was no structure, no orders given, Fatmir Limaj never gave an order

12 to Luan as his subordinate in the brigade?

13 A. No, the ability to give orders to one individual is not

14 representative of a command structure. A command structure, to be an

15 effective command structure, in the meaning of what we're talking about,

16 requires many more things than that. The ability of one individual on

17 the ground to tell somebody else to go and make the coffee or whatever is

18 -- is not indicative of a military command system in the sense of what

19 we're trying to establish here.

20 Q. All right. But if it's not one person asking somebody else to

21 get them a cup of coffee but a brigade commander talking to a unit

22 commander ordering him and his unit to carry out tasks, that is a form of

23 military command.

24 A. If it was, then that would be one form of military command in a

25 very small limited area of both space and time. You need a whole system

Page 6428

1 right across the whole thing.

2 Q. Well, let me stop you there because you don't know the space,

3 time, and area of Fatmir Limaj's command, do you?

4 A. I'm aware of the general point. You asked me which zones. Well,

5 it's on the border of three zones, isn't it?

6 Q. Well, you don't -- you don't know the time he was commander, you

7 don't know the name of the zone he was commander of, and you don't know

8 the area under his command; right?

9 A. No. But I'm saying that across the whole of the KLA, to have a

10 functioning military system and a military command system would require

11 much more than one individual giving orders to another individual in one

12 place.

13 MR. MANSFIELD: I wonder if -- I wonder if Mr. Nicholls would be

14 kind enough to name the zone, please, in which Mr. Limaj was the

15 commander of.

16 MR. NICHOLLS: The Pashtrik zone.

17 MR. MANSFIELD: He was the commander of that zone, was he? Is

18 that the Prosecution case?

19 MR. NICHOLLS: He was the commander I'm sorry, I should say of

20 the brigade, of the 121 Brigade.

21 THE WITNESS: Which was located across the boundaries of three

22 zones.


24 Q. And do you know the AOR of the 121 Brigade?

25 MR. MANSFIELD: I would ask -- I would ask for very great care if

Page 6429

1 the cross-examination is going to be at this level of detail that the

2 detail is right, please.

3 THE WITNESS: If you could produce a map, I can give you what I

4 understand roughly to be that area, but I'm not an expert on Mr. Limaj's

5 brigade or his area of operations. I'm talking about the general command

6 structure or lack of it of the KLA, overall.


8 Q. You've read General Selimi's transcript, of his testimony here.

9 A. I have, yes, but not recently. I didn't reread it last night.

10 Q. You're aware, then, that he testified that before he was a

11 commander in his area at the Drenica region, Adem Jashari was a

12 commander.

13 A. I would certainly accept that.

14 Q. Selimi was appointed commander of the 1st Operational Zone

15 Drenica in May 1998 by the General Staff.

16 A. If you say so. I'm -- I'm not aware of that, but I was -- I am

17 aware that he became the commander in Drenica for a time, yes.

18 Q. Well --

19 A. I would point out, of course, that Adem Jashari was not in any

20 way a military commander, had no command of anything other than his own

21 farmhouse, which he lost in a valiant battle for a political principle.

22 Q. All right.

23 A. Or misguided attempt, depending on your view.

24 Q. I --

25 A. I would also point out that Sultan, Sulejman, a young man, no

Page 6430

1 previous military understanding or knowledge, trying to assume a position

2 which he knows nothing about. He has no idea about what a commander is

3 supposed to do. He has no idea of military command systems. It was not

4 until Ceku [sic] came in that anybody explained to him what a staff was

5 supposed to do.

6 You can't simply say that by assuming a title or indeed calling a

7 disparate group of fighters a brigade makes it a brigade in the military

8 sense.

9 Q. Well, actually Selimi did have one year of military training.

10 I'm not sure if you're aware of that.

11 A. You may well be right, yes. He may well have done a

12 conscription. But conscription as a private soldier in the Yugoslav Army

13 is hardly likely to prepare you for a military command system.

14 Q. I agree. And that is the fact in many insurgent, colonial wars

15 for liberation. Not all of the people who form up to resist have formal

16 military training. In some cases they do, but not in all cases.

17 A. In most cases, probably not. That's why they don't have command

18 systems.

19 Q. And you make the point in your report - and Selimi testified

20 that - there was no intermediate body between the General Staff and the

21 zone commanders.

22 A. That's correct.

23 Q. And you're aware that General Selimi was considered a good

24 commander, an effective commander during the Kosovo conflict.

25 A. I'm also aware that he was replaced.

Page 6431

1 Q. You're aware he had that reputation?

2 A. Yes. A good fighter. It doesn't mean a good commander.

3 Q. After his --

4 A. A good fighter.

5 Q. After his appointment as zone commander in May 1998, Selimi

6 testified that he immediately began to consolidate the points into

7 brigades and he appointed commanders, i.e., he gave -- he appointed

8 commanders to the 112, 113, 114 Brigades. Are you aware of that?

9 A. Yes. I'm certainly aware of the way they started to try and

10 impose order and impose a system. But trying to do something and

11 establishing it in times of wartime when there's fighting all around you,

12 they were just about to lose most of the ground that they thought they

13 had taken. Of course, there simply weren't any Serbs to take it from.

14 And the whole thing was complete chaos. Again, they didn't succeed in

15 establishing a command system simply by appointing people to positions.

16 Q. No, but in May --

17 A. They had no means of communicating with each other.

18 MR. NICHOLLS: In May 1998 --

19 [B/C/S interpretation on English Channel]

20 MR. NICHOLLS: I think there's a problem with the interpretation.

21 THE INTERPRETER: It should be okay now.


23 Q. Now, in May Selimi testified that when he wasn't present, his

24 subordinate chief of staff could sign orders for him when he was

25 unavailable.

Page 6432

1 A. That's correct. But they had no means of distributing those

2 signed orders.

3 Q. Well, that's not what Mr. Selimi testified to, and I think he

4 probably knows more about it than you.

5 A. No, I would say that Mr. Selimi very reasonably as a young man

6 wished to put a good gloss on what they'd been trying to do, which was a

7 constant threat throughout this conflict that the KLA would like to have

8 become something that at the time it didn't have the time to become.

9 MR. MANSFIELD: And perhaps the means could be specified, please.

10 MR. NICHOLLS: He said he was -- well, you can look at the

11 reference and do that on redirect. It's on page 22:31. Mr. Selimi did

12 not recall exactly how but that all unit commanders would be notified of

13 his written orders.

14 A. But he couldn't recall exactly how.

15 Q. Well, whether they were delivered, sent. That's right.

16 Ramiz Qeriqi testified at the end of May. He was asked a question:

17 "Q. You've testified in May 1998 that Shukri Buja came and that

18 he was commander of the area. At that time, there was a higher commander

19 above you and Shukri Buja.

20 "Of course there was. We weren't there without having people

21 above us. I said from the beginning when I came there, I came from

22 Albania, I met with Asim Syla, who was above all of us, Rexhep Selimi, I

23 went to Klecka with Fatmir. I went to Kroimire every time. In war this

24 is how it is. Not everybody can do what he likes. There is a chain of

25 command. People are not appointed at will."

Page 6433

1 A. And yet all the evidence we've seen is that people in effect

2 appointed themselves in most cases. The whole situation is totally

3 confused --

4 Q. Which evidence are you referring to?

5 A. The evidence you've heard so far, that "I went there. Nobody

6 told me to go." "We discussed the orders to see whether they were good."

7 Q. And you're completely discounting Selimi stating that the General

8 Staff appointed him and approved his appointment.

9 A. No. I think it's entirely true. What I'm saying is that he

10 couldn't, having done that, having been appointed, he couldn't exercise

11 command in a military way. He couldn't run a military command system.

12 He didn't have the staff, the knowledge, communications, the

13 transportation, or anything else.

14 Q. And that is based on, again, material just that you've received

15 in this case.

16 A. No. That was -- as you saw, I wrote that report before I

17 received the majority of this material. That was based on my knowledge

18 of how the campaign was being conducted, the huge difficulty that NATO

19 had in finding anybody to talk to, the huge difficulty that ICRC had in

20 finding anybody to talk to.

21 Q. I'm talking specifically now about General Selimi and his

22 position in May. There's nothing in your report, in the body of your

23 report, about General Selimi --

24 A. No, I discounted it, because being appointed to a position

25 doesn't mean that you're actually producing effective military command

Page 6434

1 out of that appointment. You've got a title. And it's great. You've --

2 you now feel on top of the world. You're really feeling important. But

3 it doesn't mean you can command.

4 Q. But if you have men under your command, organised in units,

5 you're appointing their leaders, you're issuing orders, they're carrying

6 out those decisions, you are effecting command.

7 A. If you can get as far as those men, if you can get more --

8 further than the immediate group around you, if you can distribute those

9 orders and see them effectively obeyed. And I've not seen and didn't see

10 anywhere in the Kosovo war any examples of effective tactical command in

11 the movement of units.

12 Q. All right. And when you've seen, again, you're not talking about

13 any personal observations but something you learned later after coming

14 back from Tanzania.

15 A. No. I'm talking about -- if you remember, I was there on -- at a

16 time on the ground in June.

17 Q. And in --

18 A. And listening to people coming back into in Tirana and sitting on

19 the cafe on the boulevard, talking about it coming backwards and

20 forwards, people going up north, coming back; myself going up north,

21 talking to people, talking to friends about what was going on. We were

22 very concerned, of course.

23 Q. Yes. This is when you're catching up, learning things on the

24 cafe at the boulevard.

25 I want to talk to you now about something else that Mr. Limaj

Page 6435












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6436

1 said on Day 69 at line 46: "Either on the way going to Drenica, both

2 during July or June. Now, I just remembered an incident which is

3 important and can be linked with what will be said. During that time for

4 the first time I was able to see official officers, professional ones.

5 It was a group of three or five officers -- maybe there were more of

6 them, but personally I see three of them, officer who is had completed

7 the military academy, who had come from abroad and joined the KLA, and

8 with -- via the General Staff they were observing the terrain. And if I

9 can say, they were in a way surveilling the terrain and every unit."

10 He continues to describe that: "We were very happy to see the

11 presence of these officers. I know that Agim Qelaj from that small

12 training centre that I mentioned, since Agim Qelaj was specialised in

13 military training, he took three or four of my soldiers. He was inspired

14 to create an intervention unit, so he took three or four soldiers from my

15 unit and some soldiers from other units -- this was by the end of June.

16 So he prepared them, trained them, and sent them to Negrovce village

17 somewhere at the Vucjak gorge, there is a place between Negrovce and" --

18 it's mispronounced here, "Turiqevc village which is suitable for such

19 activities."

20 This is Mr. Limaj talking about an event he observed in June

21 1998.

22 A. In June 1998?

23 Q. Yes, the General Staff is present with professional --

24 representatives of the General Staff are present with professional

25 militarily trained officers from abroad."

Page 6437

1 A. Three of them.

2 Q. That's right.

3 A. And somebody trained three or four soldiers as an intervention

4 unit, which implies, of course -- that's the first intervention unit that

5 anybody has thought of or heard of. Three or four soldiers.

6 Q. Excuse me. Stop. How do you get that that's the first

7 intervention unit?

8 A. By the tone of your voice in describing that sentence. They

9 don't appear to have had one before. This seems to be something new, by

10 implication.

11 Q. They're surveilling the entire territory.

12 A. And this also seems to be a new event. It doesn't amount to a

13 structure, does it?

14 Q. They're visiting every unit.

15 A. Three people, trying to get round Kosovo visiting every unit?

16 They're -- I mean, I know what they are. They're probably returning

17 officers from the Croatian conflict, but they don't have time to start

18 organising things.

19 Q. And you can tell all of that from the passage I've just read?

20 That they didn't have time?

21 A. From the -- from the -- of course you can. You know how

22 difficult it was to move around at the time, how much time it took you --

23 if nothing else, you've read those descriptions.

24 Q. Well --

25 A. Moving by night, having to stay in houses before you found a

Page 6438

1 guide to move on.

2 Q. Well, we'll get to --

3 A. They weren't moving -- they weren't using maps, for a start.

4 Q. We'll get to ECMM's assessment of moving around at that time.

5 They're selecting soldiers for an intervention unit and taking them

6 somewhere else to train them; right?

7 A. Three or four soldiers, he said.

8 Q. And some from another area. So my point is this is not as you

9 describe in your report villagers simply taking up arms to defend their

10 individual villages, which you say.

11 A. No. I would say this was exactly what I was describing. And by

12 June somebody is saying, Hang on, we ought to try and reinforce somewhere

13 if they get attacked. There's take three or four soldiers and try and

14 train them to move forwards as reinforcements. That's the way these

15 things develop. But it doesn't mean that you've got a coherent military

16 structure capable of enforcing orders and discipline and so forth. Is

17 just the very embryonic beginnings of an army which never had time to

18 develop.

19 Q. We've also looked at it, and you've stated a couple of times in

20 your report that "The KLA did not support each other."

21 A. "But units were unable to support each other."

22 Q. Right.

23 A. They didn't have any transport. They didn't have any

24 communications. They didn't know how to move from place to place. What

25 happened was various groups converged on the sound of firing and saw

Page 6439

1 whether they could intervene or not. That, again, is not military

2 command or military operations.

3 Q. That is not an unwillingness to assist other people from villages

4 either.

5 A. I didn't say they were unwilling. I said they were unable.

6 Q. Okay. Look at page 9, paragraph 15: "Indeed, in the main, they

7 were mostly unable or unwilling to leave their own villages to help

8 anyone else."

9 A. Unable or unwilling. I mean obviously some people didn't want to

10 move from their village. Some people didn't know where to go.

11 Q. Now, you've just gone back on that a bit, that they were willing

12 to say -- to assist, you say now, if they knew there was an attack or --

13 A. I said some were.

14 Q. And you've seen that in this case. You've read Ramadan Behluli's

15 testimony.

16 A. I'm afraid I don't recall the testimony precisely, but ...

17 Q. Do you remember him testifying that soldiers would come to assist

18 wherever there was fighting at Carraleve or Kroimire?

19 A. I don't. But certainly I've heard similar statements on a number

20 of actions. But, of course, coming to assist, when they're coming from

21 different directions, nobody's got any idea of where the firing points

22 are or how --

23 Q. I'm focussing --

24 A. -- how to do it.

25 Q. -- now on your assertion that KLA soldiers were "unable or

Page 6440

1 unwilling to leave their own villages to help anyone else." Now, that --

2 "unless pushed out by the Serbian military." Now, that's just not true,

3 is it?

4 A. Some groups, of course -- I didn't -- I didn't in any way dispute

5 that, as I've just said. Some groups went to help. But going to help is

6 not the same as military direction. It's not the same as military

7 orders. Nobody actually knew where the firing was coming from. Nobody

8 knew what was actually going on. They came to the top of the hill and

9 looked down. Then they left somebody at the top of the hill and four of

10 them went down the hill to see what they could do. That's extremely

11 noble, very brave, and so forth. People got killed doing it. But it's

12 not a military system.

13 Q. Is it an example of military command from a unit is sent to

14 assist another unit?

15 A. If it happened in a sustained way over a period of time, then

16 yes. If it happens on an individual occasion, well, I'm afraid that can

17 just be chance.

18 Q. All right. Now, there's a witness - we have to use the number

19 for him -

20 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm sorry, Your Honour, when are we taking the

21 break? It's normally now but should we go a little bit longer because of

22 the ...?

23 JUDGE PARKER: You've got at the most about two minutes.

24 MR. NICHOLLS: I'll come back then.

25 JUDGE PARKER: We will have the first break now and resume at

Page 6441

1 five past 4.00.

2 --- Recess taken at 3.44 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.

4 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Nicholls.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Mr. Churcher, during the break I was asked again if we could both

7 slow down a little bit.

8 A. I'm sorry. I'll try.

9 Q. Just a couple more questions about your assertion that the

10 villagers were unable or unwilling to assist in other villages.

11 A witness here, L-95, testified that he was sent - this is page

12 49, 4207 - to another -- to assist another unit because that territory

13 was in jeopardy, and he stated that he was sent, his special unit, when

14 the need was for interventions. He was asked to go and assist Celiku

15 because the territory there was in jeopardy, and he explained that "in.

16 Jeopardy" meant that they were likely to be attacked by the Serb forces.

17 And the witness also testified that when he was there, he was under

18 Celiku's command. So there we have a unit of men being sent to another

19 area where there was a danger of combat being subordinated to the local

20 commander.

21 That is no evidence of any command structure in any sense to you?

22 A. I think that might well be evidence of an embryonic start to

23 something. I noticed you used the words "he was asked to go and assist."

24 Not that he was ordered to proceed to point X and take part in the

25 defence of. So -- and in your previous remarks you said they took three

Page 6442

1 or four people to start an intervention unit.

2 Well, here we can all see efforts at ideas on militarily

3 supporting each other, but my position would remain that we have a group

4 of young men here without any substantive military experience, no

5 knowledge of command structures, no methods of command, no method of

6 communication, or no workable method of communication in an emergency.

7 It doesn't amount to a military command structure in the way that one

8 would understand it for operations. It certainly doesn't compare to the

9 military command structure that the Serbs had.

10 Q. Or the British Army. I take that point. It was not as

11 sophisticated as the commander structure you were in or the VJ. But

12 those are typical aspects of command, units assisting other units when

13 there is an elevated risk.

14 A. If it happens on a sustained basis in protracted operations, then

15 yes.

16 Q. Thank you.

17 A. If it happens on an individual occasion, that's a one-off. It

18 doesn't amount to a military command structure.

19 Q. You say on page 14 of your report - this is paragraph 32 -

20 talking about the Racak incident up there, speaking of the KLA soldiers

21 and how they failed to defend -- to win that battle: "All they had were

22 weapons and a determination to defend their village. But that did not

23 constitute a military operation."

24 Are you suggesting that Racak was defended just by the villagers

25 of Racak? That's what your paragraph implies.

Page 6443

1 A. No. I'm -- I'm aware that -- or I understand that some other

2 people came and went and had a look at that. I'm afraid, like much of

3 your evidence, I was relying on a Serbian account here of this particular

4 conflict and in particular the way the sentries were smoking, there were

5 insufficient weapons between people they found, and so forth. It again

6 was the military operation, some villagers ending up getting killed

7 because two sentries were smoking and nobody else was standing to.

8 Q. Just so I'm clear, you're talking there about Serb newspaper

9 accounts; correct?

10 A. I'm talking about what was billed as a first hand account by one

11 of the police participants subsequently published in a Serb newspaper.

12 Q. Briefly, let me tell you what Fatmir Limaj said about that day,

13 18th of July. He says -- this is Day 69, line 67 -- "On the first part

14 of the next day, the 18th," setting the time, "on that occasion I met

15 with Agim Qelaj and with Rexhep Selimi and Muse Jashari, who had arrived

16 there at an hour earlier at the entrance of Rahovec. And at that time

17 the representatives" -- I'm moving ahead -- "of the General Staff, Rexhep

18 Selimi and Byslym Zyropi and Muse, they told me that they had heard for

19 the first time about the events in Rahovec this morning. And in a hurry

20 they came in order to see what the situation [sic]and to find the way

21 that would take us out from the position that the KLA was in and to avoid

22 the danger which the population was exposed."

23 MR. NICHOLLS: Is there a problem with the transcript?

24 MR. MANSFIELD: I think I can answer that one.

25 I'm sorry to intervene, but looking at the record, there are two

Page 6444

1 different places and different times being mentioned here. On the

2 record, it's Racak at the start and then Rahovec further down.


4 MR. MANSFIELD: Could the Prosecution please clarify with the

5 witness which place and which time they're dealing with. And they're

6 different years even, yes.

7 THE WITNESS: I think you've confused Rahovec and Racak, which --

8 MR. NICHOLLS: I'm talking now about Rahovec.

9 Q. Let's stick now to -- well, Rahovec, 18th July: "And the General

10 Staff, Byslym Zyropi and Sokol Bashota, they decided that Agim Qelaj

11 should become an operations commander for Rahovec and Agim became a kind

12 of coordination point for all those who were there."

13 Now, that is the General Staff involved in military matters, not

14 just political matters; right?

15 A. Just to clarify, this has nothing to do with page 14 or Racak.

16 Q. Fine.

17 A. And I haven't written about it. But I think your statement,

18 again, picks out exactly what I'm talking about.

19 "Became a kind of coordination point"? That's not a military

20 operation. "A kind of coordination point"? You can certainly see what

21 they were trying to do, but they didn't know what they were supposed to

22 do. They didn't have that sort of military experience. They didn't have

23 that sort of military command system. They should have taken charge, of

24 course, of Rahovec before it ever started. Rahovec was the classic

25 problem of a number of people accidentally going to visit their families,

Page 6445

1 kicking off a battle which nobody meant to be involved in, causing great

2 concern to everybody, and nobody knowing what to do and various people

3 getting injured or killed as a result.

4 Q. And --

5 A. It was a military disaster. It had nothing to do with a

6 military command system.

7 Q. And appointing an operations commander, is that not a military

8 function?

9 A. After the event? It's a little unusual, isn't it? You usual

10 usually do that before the event.

11 Q. Is appointing an operations commander a military function?

12 A. Appointing an operations officer is part of the staff.

13 Appointing somebody to command an operation is also a military term. But

14 Rahovec was the classic example of the KLA's failure to have a military

15 command structure capable of controlling its troops. They failed to stop

16 Rahovec from happening, they failed to reinforce it, and they failed to

17 sort it out. It was extremely damaging. Various people were rather

18 upset about it. But it wasn't a military operation, and there was no

19 military command in the sense that we should understand it involved.

20 Attempting to appoint an operations commander was a good first step, but

21 it doesn't amount to producing a military system.

22 Q. And, again, this is based on your impressions, what you gathered,

23 in Albania and then on the evidence you've heard in this case.

24 A. Rahovec was very widely discussed as to why it happened. We were

25 all initially alarmed that the KLA should try and take a town which

Page 6446

1 clearly they couldn't hold. Before it fell, people like myself

2 understood that it couldn't be held, that it wasn't in a position to be

3 held. It's -- again, as I said, it's a classic example of the failure of

4 the fact that they didn't have a military command system.

5 Q. I want to talk now about your report on page 27. Do you remember

6 there you're commenting on the interview with Sultan, Mr. Selimi?

7 A. Mm-hm. Sorry, yes. So I haven't found page 27.

8 MR. NICHOLLS: The interview is at tab 6, Your Honour.

9 Q. Now, referring to page 22 of the interview. Are you with me?

10 A. I'm not yet, I'm afraid. My page has only been partially printed

11 at the bottom and I've got the numbering ...

12 I'm with you.

13 Q. Okay. This is the part that you focussed on, Mr. Lehtinen's

14 comment about the lack of military structure and Sulejman Selimi

15 describing here that the General Staff was on top of it, there wasn't a

16 middle step. That's towards the bottom of page 22.

17 You state: "Comment: This seems to confirm the nature of the

18 General Staff -- that this General Staff was not a military structure.

19 It appears to be well established that if there was a General Staff in

20 reality" -- we've gone through this part -- "as distinct from a series of

21 disconnected numbered individuals, it certainly wasn't providing

22 effective military command in the sense of this indictment.

23 "Overall comment: Sulejman Selimi's interview is probably the

24 best record of how the KLA built up. In particular, the reference to

25 boundaries imposing themselves, i.e., not being directed, to the

Page 6447

1 establishment of units being reported to the General Staff, as distinct

2 from being directed or more properly ordered by them, of the lack of

3 arrests of prisons on the ground that there wasn't time and a democratic,

4 committee way of making appointments as late as post-war in a totally

5 unmilitarily way."

6 Now, we've already discussed that Selimi was fighting Serb forces

7 in May, June, and July 1998; correct?

8 A. Correct.

9 Q. I want to direct your attention now to page 32 and 33 of this

10 interview. Tell me when you get there.

11 A. I've got to page 32.

12 Q. Okay. At the bottom of the page:

13 "Mr. Lehtinen: Did you have cooperation with any other of the

14 Celiku units there, the ones that were along the tarmac road, like in

15 Lapusnik?"

16 And Limaj responds: "They communicated with each other, for

17 example, the 113 Brigade, which went -- was -- which was -- which was

18 there. They coordinated.

19 "Q. But did you as commander, did you have direct communication

20 with Fatmir Limaj about these issues, about the gorge in Lapusnik?"

21 "No. We would usually get our orders from the general -- from

22 the General Staff. They issued our orders. But normally it was

23 communication from both sides of Lapusnik pass and there was fighting on

24 both sides -- were taking part in it, because of course he was not

25 obliged to give any information and I was not obliged to give him

Page 6448

1 information. But there was a commanding structure that gave us our

2 tasks."

3 That's what it states; right?

4 A. Right.

5 Q. Now, you select the one portion from this document which we

6 looked at before on page 22. You put that in your report. You tell the

7 Trial Chamber this is the best record of the interview and it show there

8 is was no command structure because there was no middle step. And you

9 leave out this passage where General Selimi says "There was a commanding

10 structure which gave us our tasks."

11 Isn't it misleading to select just that part of the interview

12 which supports what you want to say and leave out the rest?

13 A. There are many parts of the interview which would support what I

14 want to say, including the investigator prefacing his remarks by saying,

15 "I know there was no military system." But this particular point

16 reinforces what I said. He's talking about, "We got our orders from the

17 General Staff," but the General Staff wasn't capable of producing orders

18 across the whole of Kosovo. It once again says there isn't a military

19 system. You have to have intermediate command levels which are capable

20 of coordinating at the local level. You can't just say, We got orders

21 from the General Staff.

22 Q. So when Selimi is saying that on both sides of this road he and

23 the commander on the other side received their orders through the command

24 structure from the General Staff, that means that there's no command

25 structure and the General Staff is not engaged in command there?

Page 6449

1 A. He couldn't possibly get orders about tactical events on the

2 ground for coordinating with each other from the General Staff in any

3 relevant time to have any tactical input. It isn't possible, is it?

4 Q. Well, how do you know that it was impossible? You state in your

5 report that radios are not the key to communication, and you -- how do

6 you know that the General Staff was unable to receive reports in time for

7 it to react to any situation?

8 A. It's a constant thread through everything which is written about

9 this year, the period. And you know they described at one point fairly

10 carefully the radios they had, which we all knew about anyway. They were

11 commercial Motorolas. They have a range which is strictly dictated by

12 line of sight. Normally it goes between 3 and 5 kilometres. If you get

13 up on a hill, you may get better at times. But it's likely to come

14 through broken.

15 Q. All right.

16 A. And therefore it's not a means of communication which can provide

17 an effective command structure capable of transmitting orders, imposing

18 discipline, and so forth.

19 Q. If -- sorry, my question was not about radios. My question is:

20 Even in the absence of radios, there is other ways to convey messages

21 within the area under the control of a rebel insurgency.

22 A. But not if you've got to go back to the General Staff and down

23 again. You would need an intermediate level of command to do it through.

24 You would need a level of command which is much closer to the site of

25 your action, just a kilometre or so behind it so you can have runners,

Page 6450

1 similar to Napoleon, who did it very well with men on horseback. But

2 you've got to have that system established.

3 Q. All right. You need --

4 A. And they didn't.

5 Q. Really you need a system to communicate with the commanding

6 level, but Selimi's point is that he received his orders on his side, the

7 commander on the other side received his orders from the same command

8 level. That is a commanding structure giving tasks to different units,

9 different commanders who have people in turn under their command.

10 A. Selimi here is clearly from the tone of the whole interview

11 trying to be helpful. Oh, yes, well, we got our orders from the General

12 Staff; but in reality that's a meaningless statement. You might get

13 orders that you're going to be a commander from the General Staff. It

14 can't amount to a military command system capable of controlling

15 operations at a tactical level.

16 Q. And yet you've called this the best record of the build-up.

17 A. In general. Sulejman's account of how things built up and how

18 disorganised it was, I think, is an excellent record.

19 Q. And the parts where he does talk about some organisation or

20 command you assume he's trying to be lying and not to be honest.

21 A. I certainly didn't say he was trying to be lying. I said he was

22 trying to be helpful. You have to explain to someone what a military

23 command system means and I'm not really sure that he fully understood it

24 at that time.

25 Q. And at that time, of course, you personally had no contact --

Page 6451

1 A. No. Although I knew him personally after the war.

2 Q. Okay. When was that?

3 A. When I was director of the International Crisis Group in

4 Pristina.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Your Honours, I would propose to admit the Selimi

6 interview, simply because the witness calls it the best source of the

7 build-up, something he relied on. It was provided to him by the Defence

8 and he cites it. And not for the truth of the matter in the interview

9 but simply for the Court to ascertain the way things were chosen to be

10 included or not included in the report. But if there's not any objection

11 to that, I don't -- I don't press it.

12 JUDGE PARKER: Do you distinguish it from what was put to us

13 yesterday?

14 MR. NICHOLLS: Yes. Because the witness was here. He testified.

15 He was cross-examined on this report -- on this interview. And it's been

16 used as a source. But I -- I don't press it. I just think it might be

17 useful. If the Defence doesn't want it in then -- then that's fine.

18 JUDGE PARKER: I'm looking to see whether there's any agitation.

19 MR. MANSFIELD: No. No. No agitation at all. Just mild

20 amusement.

21 I'm happy for a fair approach to this. Could it be marked for

22 identification?

23 JUDGE PARKER: It will be marked for identification.

24 THE REGISTRAR: That will be P246, MFI.

25 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me one moment, Your Honour. I want to see

Page 6452

1 if something is available on Sanction.

2 [Prosecution counsel confer]


4 Q. I'd like to show you now, sir, an ECMM report.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: This is -- was included, Your Honours, in Phil

6 Coo's report and has been referred to by the witness in his report.

7 Q. Now, again, we talked about ECMM yesterday. You were in ECMM.

8 ECMM works on the ground, travelling through areas of conflict; correct?

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. This report is from the 22nd of June, and I think you remember

11 reviewing this report as part of your report to this Court.

12 A. I'm sorry? I didn't understand that.

13 Q. You've seen this report before. You refer to it in your report.

14 A. Right.

15 Q. Yes. This is an assessment of the UCK; correct? Do you see that

16 in the heading? Can you read what's on the screen in front of you?

17 A. I can only read the area which has been blown up, I'm afraid. I

18 can't read the whole report.

19 Q. All right. Well, let's -- let's go to the blown-up area.

20 MR. MANSFIELD: If there's a copy of the whole document, could

21 that be given?

22 MR. NICHOLLS: It's -- it's in evidence. I don't have a -- a

23 clean extra copy for the witness.

24 MR. MANSFIELD: I don't mind an unclean copy for the witness.

25 THE WITNESS: I'm quite happy to accept what you tell me about

Page 6453

1 it.

2 MR. NICHOLLS: I'll blow up the portions. This is one of the

3 annexed documents. It may -- Mr. Hasan will find -- Mr. Younis will find

4 a copy for you.

5 Q. Now, in the introduction, which you can read, the reporter

6 states: "We have encountered UCK on numerous occasions and I personally

7 have been somewhat startled by the extent of their control." And then he

8 issues a caution: "The following is, however, the product of only one

9 week of monitoring, and our impressions must therefore be seen as

10 essentially limited." Correct?

11 A. Yes, although I'm sure you understand the meaning of "control"

12 here in the sense that this is the area of territory on which they've

13 found armed Kosovars who say they're members of the KLA. That doesn't

14 imply control in any military sense.

15 Q. You agree that at this time the KLA was controlling a large area

16 of Kosovo, 30 per cent? And I'm talking about 22nd of June.

17 A. I would agree that the KLA was present. I would think you would

18 have to be very careful about the word "control" since you might put

19 implications into it which ECMM would not have meant.

20 Q. All right.

21 A. "Control" means literally finding people in the villages, as

22 distinct from finding Serbian police in the village.

23 MR. NICHOLLS: I think we've got a paper copy for the witness.

24 Q. Now, the second heading --

25 JUDGE PARKER: Could you indicate the number, Mr. Nicholls.

Page 6454












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6455

1 MR. NICHOLLS: The ERN number?

2 JUDGE PARKER: Is it not an exhibit?

3 MR. NICHOLLS: It is an exhibit, but it's --

4 JUDGE PARKER: Can we have the exhibit number.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: It's -- the exhibit is -- I'm trying to remember.

6 It's Phil Coo's exhibit, which I think -- report, which is 220 or it's

7 230, I believe.



10 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: Is the print on the paper large enough for you to

12 read?

13 A. Yeah. Yeah. That's okay.

14 Q. In the next paragraph the observer states:

15 "UCK territory. Significant swaths of the central regions of

16 Kosovo west of Pristina are now in UCK control with Serb forces now

17 limited to one very vulnerable main supply route south from Pristina to

18 Prizren. Where once areas of concern such as Drenica were seen in

19 isolation, we are close to being able to see the vast majority of an area

20 west of Pristina as a whole. The UCK appear to control an area west of

21 Pristina that connects Drenica to the area immediately south, centred on

22 the town of Malisevo. Control by the UCK of the central section of the

23 main road west from Pristina to Peja has been the key to this linkage in

24 an area between Komorane and Kijeve which both remain in Serb police

25 control," and I don't need to continue there.

Page 6456

1 Further down at the bottom of that paragraph: "By far the most

2 extraordinary area is situated north-east of Orahovac with the central

3 town of Malisevo the focus of a so-called liberated territory that

4 virtually scrapes the edge of the main peripheral road. The Serbs MSR,

5 especially at Suva Reka."

6 The next paragraph, "Road infrastructure."

7 "The most striking aspect to much of the UCK-held territory

8 described is the extent to which the UCK have utilised and improved the

9 local infrastructure, with small roads now being used to ensure a wholly

10 integrated territory that can aid swift movement between areas. In

11 essence, it appears that much thought and probably more strategy has gone

12 into the taking of this territory than most observers felt was likely."

13 Now, that's the assessment on the people who were there on the

14 ground at the time.

15 A. That's the assessment of two monitors, and I think the key to

16 this, of course, is the phrase "than most observers felt likely." Most

17 observers thought that this was villagers improving tracks between

18 villages in the same way that villagers were giving their machinery out

19 and digging trenches in highly unsuitable places. There had

20 unfortunately been no direction to it, as was proved when the whole thing

21 collapsed like a pack of cards the next month. There was actually no

22 strategic ability to manage this territory. And as you saw, it collapsed

23 completely in the VJ offence of July, which swept everything before it.

24 This was a spontaneous rebellion of a whole series of villages who, as

25 you say, or as they say here, linked themselves with these dirt roads.

Page 6457

1 And then the whole thing collapsed in days.

2 And once again, it almost proves that this was not a

3 well-thought-out military operation, and indeed I from Mr. Limaj's

4 testimony the other day he had great concerns about the so-called

5 liberation of Malisevo, which again was shared by other observers. It

6 was once again -- it was certainly our opinion that they weren't going to

7 be able to hold this territory.

8 Q. So what's happened here is at this point in time in June the KLA,

9 according to these observers who were there on the ground, has been able

10 to link a large area of territory -- is at this point before the July

11 offensive keeping these Serb forces out of that territory, and have

12 developed a way of quickly moving through the area by developing the

13 roads. So it may not -- you may consider it an imperfect military

14 operation, but they have found that strategy and thought has gone into

15 creating this territory.

16 A. I wouldn't describe it as "an imperfect military operation." I

17 wouldn't describe it as "a military operation" at all. I would describe

18 it as a series of villagers getting out their hunting rifle, send ago few

19 of the boys back to Kukes or to Bajram Curi to try and buy an AK-47 and,

20 in tremendous euphoria, celebrating the fact they've achieved victory

21 only to see the whole thing collapse before their eyes at the first

22 movement of Serb forces.

23 We're not talking about expelling Serb forces here. We're

24 talking about expelling village policemen who had already retreated to

25 their police stations and were not patrolling very much in 1996 or 1997

Page 6458

1 either.

2 Q. Well, the police fighting for the MUP, the Serb forces, those

3 weren't just village policemen.

4 A. The police before the offensive were largely village policemen.

5 That was the MUP's problem. The MUP was driven out of just about

6 everywhere because the MUP did not want to take risks and did not want to

7 confront things. They were good at arresting people but they were not

8 good at fighting for the control of territory.

9 And you'll also see that from senior VJ generals complaining

10 about the performance and behaviour of the MUP.

11 Q. And -- and asking that the VJ be given a greater role in taking

12 back control of the territory.

13 A. And they were. And that was a military operation. We saw the

14 results of it.

15 Q. And the other thing this observer notes when moving through the

16 territory: "In two recent instances, the team has been escorted by UCK

17 through the area of southern Drenica and in one instance was provided a

18 relayed escort through territory that has become a network of connecting

19 tracks and roads that have been upgraded through a recent local effort.

20 What was perhaps even more significant was a level of communication

21 between escorts that seemed to have expected our imminent arrival."

22 A. In the unit. I've never disputed that there was communication at

23 the local level. What there wasn't was an effective intermediary level

24 of command or series of intermediary -- there should have been a whole

25 series of nodes of command extending down from a central command which

Page 6459

1 was responsible to some sort of political authority up through brigade

2 commands, battalion commands, and so on down. The ability to liaise or

3 coordinate, as the KLA was so fond of describing itself, between units at

4 ground level, which did exist at times - after all, one little boy can

5 run to another little boy - is not indicative of a military command

6 system.

7 Q. No, but it shows that --

8 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask the speakers to

9 slow down, please.


11 Q. [Previous translation continues]... the KLA were able to

12 communicate rapidly with each other when necessary.

13 A. I didn't think it showed anything more than one village knows

14 people in the next village.

15 Q. That's all the ECMM reporters are reporting there, that the

16 villagers in adjacent villages know each other.

17 A. Could I tell you what I would see would have been a command

18 system, then? If the night before ECMM had been able to contact a

19 headquarters and arrange an itinerary going from village to village, that

20 would amount to some form of command system. But simply being able to

21 liaise neighbour to neighbour doesn't constitute one.

22 Q. Now, there have been other ECMM reports in this case. And I can

23 show it to you if you want -- which talk about the kidnappings of four

24 Serbs. And I can give the reference. That's R 254-4282, part of Mr.

25 Coo's report. Including two refugees from Croatia. These were the

Page 6460

1 Bakrac men. Have you heard before at all about that particular

2 kidnapping?

3 A. I've heard about that particular incident, yes.

4 Q. You've also -- no doubt recall Mr. Krasniqi testifying in this

5 courtroom that he remembered that incident and that those men were in

6 fact released by the KLA to the International Red Cross.

7 A. Yes. Although, I -- in general, I would not give much weight to

8 Mr. Krasniqi's statements at the time which were by his own admission

9 largely propaganda.

10 Q. If you could look at P48.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: This is the Koha Ditore article from 12 July.

12 U003-8586. That should come up on Sanction, the last page.

13 Q. And we don't need to go through this whole document, which has

14 been seen by the Chamber before. But here Mr. Krasniqi stated: "First

15 of all, the Serbian forces, whether the police, the military, or armed

16 civilians, are our enemy. From the start, we have had our own internal

17 rules for our operations. These clearly lay down that the UCK recognises

18 the Geneva Conventions and the conventions governing the conduct of war,

19 even though it has not been offered the chance of signing them, as it

20 would have done. We do not go in for kidnapping. Even if some people

21 have suffered, these have been more Albanian collaborators than Serb

22 civilians. We do not deal with civilians and we return those whom we

23 take as prisoners of war. A few days ago we hand over two Serbs

24 originating from Croatia to the International Red Cross. Those we have

25 kidnapped are either announced on a list or reported to be executed, but

Page 6461

1 we do not behave in a base fashion like Serbia."

2 Mr. Krasniqi stated that on the 12th of July, 1998. He stated in

3 this courtroom that it was correct about those two civilians being

4 released. So you accept that that was not propaganda that the KLA had

5 released those two men?

6 A. In the sense of that precise line that those two people were

7 released; I certainly accept that they were released in general. Mr.

8 Krasniqi's statements by his own admission were part of a propaganda war,

9 which was normal in many conflicts.

10 Q. And that corroborates the ECMM report of these men being

11 kidnapped at a KLA checkpoint.

12 A. I'm sure it does, yes.

13 Q. And yet you rely on the Selimi interview to state on page 27:

14 "The interview shows that there were no arrests or prisons because there

15 wasn't time." That's your analysis.

16 A. I deal with kidnappings at the moment in Afghanistan. It

17 doesn't mean there was any precedents. We've simply got a case of

18 criminal kidnap. And this doesn't mean there's anything different here.

19 The very fact that it took several days for someone to negotiate their

20 release again shows the difficulty of finding a competent headquarters

21 with a capability of controlling or issuing orders or imposing

22 discipline. We are talking about a straightforward kidnap, as we deal

23 with in Afghanistan.

24 Q. This is confirmation of persons being arrested, detained, and

25 then released through negotiation; correct? Regardless -- you can call

Page 6462

1 it a prison -- let's just call it somewhere where people are detained.

2 A. Kidnap is a criminal offence anywhere in the world, and

3 "kidnapping" was the phrase that you used initially, not "detained" or

4 "arrested."

5 Q. "Kidnapping" is a phrase Mr. Krasniqi used. "Kidnapping" is a

6 phrase the ECMM used.

7 A. It seems to be very reasonable.

8 Q. Yes.

9 A. I have no objection to that. Again, I don't see that it in any

10 way implies a coordinated, functioning military command system which was

11 capable of recognising the fact that people had been arrested or capable

12 of organising their release in a timely manner.

13 Q. That wasn't my question. My question was why you put in your

14 report that the Selimi article is indicative of the lack of arrests or

15 prisons on the grounds, that there wouldn't have been time for that. You

16 don't think that's a recklessly broad statement?

17 A. I've continued to make the distinction between kidnaps and

18 arrests. I said I deal with kidnaps in Afghanistan.

19 Q. And on page 20, you state that "ECMM reports were largely staffed

20 by seconded or retired military officers and that they tried to impose

21 military order in their reports." Do you really think you can dismiss

22 the bulk of the ECMM documentation just on that basis?

23 A. I haven't said anywhere that I dismissed it. I'm indicating

24 that, as with all types of reporting, you need to look at the origins of

25 the people doing the reporting and you need to understand their strengths

Page 6463

1 and limitations. Therefore, you need to treat such reports with caution

2 if you don't know who the authors are personally.

3 Q. So in general, then, you would give credit to ECMM reports which

4 are corroborated by other evidence.

5 A. In general, I would give credit to ECMM reports dealing with

6 events on the ground. I wouldn't necessarily give a great deal of credit

7 to conclusions drawn from that.

8 Q. Now, your position, as you've stated, again is no command

9 structure, no conflict until sometime after the war.

10 A. That's my position, yes. No effective military command

11 structure.

12 Q. Let me ask you to look at tab 5 in your bundle. That's the

13 report that you did on Kresevo. And just to be clear, this is your

14 report; correct?

15 A. That's absolutely right.

16 Q. From 2002?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Could you just tell us quickly: There's a map on page 5.

19 Kresevo is this small area at the borders of Kosovo, Macedonia, and

20 Serbia; is that right?

21 A. It is, yes.

22 Q. Now, the paragraph I just want to ask you about is just on page 1

23 at the bottom, where you state: "The Albanian rebels in Kresevo were and

24 are not a unified movement. Both the Kosova and Macedonian rebellions by

25 Albanians against Slav rule, or misrule as they saw it, were reasonably

Page 6464

1 unified. Both had only one large and one small organisation involved in

2 commanding parts of the armed rebellion."

3 Now, you're referring there to the Albanian rebellions in Kosovo

4 that we're talking about as well as later in 2001 in Macedonia; correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. You distribute it here as "reasonably unified"; correct? The

7 Albanian KLA?

8 A. I didn't say here "militarily unified" or "militarily commanded."

9 There was one KLA by the end of the Kosovo conflict in which by and large

10 all believed they were part of the KLA. And I'm making a distinction

11 here that the UCPMB had an even-less organised structure. If we wanted

12 to go further and compare an Albanian rebellion which had a more

13 organised structure than militarily, the Macedonia conflict demonstrated

14 an effective chain of command on at least two occasions which was

15 commented on. Whereas the Kosovo conflict in my view never demonstrated

16 that chain of command.

17 Q. All right. You describe the Kosovo KLA rebellion as "reasonably

18 unified." You're not talking about people here, you specifically state:

19 "The Kosovo and Macedonia rebellions by Albanians were reasonably

20 unified. Both had one large and one small organisation involved in

21 commanding." What were the large and small organisations you were

22 referring to involved in commanding the Kosovo Albanian rebellion?

23 A. I'm referring to the fact that Dukagjini did not really ever come

24 under any form of agreement with the General Staff, although there use no

25 open conflict but they didn't actually really recognise the General Staff

Page 6465

1 in many ways. Although that's a very unclear area politically. But

2 we're talking about political recognition here. We're not talking about

3 a military command system.

4 Q. No, but you're talking about armed rebellions in this section,

5 aren't you?

6 A. I'm talking about the political intent behind those armed

7 rebellions and who started them off and who came together, not any system

8 of military command or control. I haven't used those words anywhere

9 there that I can see, and certainly didn't mean to.

10 Q. Well, you do. You say "were reasonably unified. Both had one

11 large and one small organisation in commanding parts of the armed

12 rebellion." Why didn't you just say in Kresevo the situation was the

13 same as in Kosovo; there was no command structure whatsoever, if that's

14 what you meant?

15 A. I wasn't talking about command structures here. I'm talking

16 about the political direction or incentive behind the creation of groups.

17 Q. That's what you mean by "commanding the armed rebellion"?

18 A. And you'll notice that I haven't used the phrase "military

19 command" and I've very carefully said "armed rebellion." And I haven't

20 suggested this is a force. I wouldn't have agreed with that.

21 Q. Let me move on now to discuss discipline. You say on page 5 of

22 your report: "There was no system of military discipline." On page 9,

23 para 16 you say: "There wasn't any form of military discipline."

24 A. Sorry, I was working on the wrong document. Page ...?

25 Q. The first reference was on page 5, and the second is in paragraph

Page 6466

1 16 on page 9.

2 A. Yeah, I think if you read that paragraph as a whole you can see

3 exactly what I meant.

4 Q. All right. You're aware that Sulejman Selimi testified that "If

5 soldiers misbehaved, their uniforms could be taken away, their weapons

6 could be taken away, and they could be kicked out of the KLA"; correct?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And that's true, isn't it?

9 A. I certainly think that's true, yes. I don't regard being

10 dismissed from an organisation in that way as an effective system of

11 imposing military discipline.

12 Q. And you may have read in his interview at page 45 in addition

13 that he would tell them that they could never be in the KLA again.

14 A. Yes. I think I commented on that, that the ability to dismiss

15 somebody from a unit, whilst again, possibly, an embryonic - and these

16 are my words now - possibly an embryonic start to some form of

17 disciplinary system, it doesn't amount to an effective system of military

18 discipline.

19 Q. Now, you also talk about the Kacak [phoen] tradition. And you

20 agree with me in -- for Kosovar Albanians in these rural areas, honour is

21 a very important thing. Defending one's honour, protecting one's honour,

22 and not offending anybody else's honour?

23 A. I would agree with that, yes.

24 Q. Okay. It's also - and this may be in your report. I don't

25 remember - it's what might be called "a gun culture." Gun, weapons are

Page 6467

1 important.

2 A. I don't think that's in my report.

3 Q. But would you agree with that statement?

4 A. And I wouldn't agree with that statement particularly strongly,

5 but I would agree there are elements of truth within it.

6 Q. Now, my uncle was an RAF gunner in World War II. That was a

7 popular war, like the KLA rebellion and war was a popular war with the

8 Kosovar Albanians; correct? By "popular" I mean it was supported by the

9 populace.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Under those situations - let's just say it's England - if a young

12 man is joined up, and is kicked out and given a dishonourable discharge,

13 we call it in the US, goes home to a small village, people say, "What are

14 you doing here? I was kicked out of the KLA. They took my gun and my

15 uniform and told me I could never come back." How is that seen in the

16 village?

17 A. Obviously and socially that's going to be difficult, but I don't

18 imagine social difficulties are part of a system of military discipline.

19 Q. Isn't being thrown out of the military a -- a form of punishment

20 in different professional militaries around the world?

21 A. It's not normally a form of punishment until after punishment has

22 been carried out.

23 Q. Well, let me just -- the only thing I've found, quickly, is from

24 the Canadian Forces, the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian

25 Forces, Volume 2, Chapter 104, "Punishments." And one of the punishments

Page 6468

1 listed is "dismissal with disgrace." That's a punishment.

2 A. In my experience, that only comes on top of other punishments.

3 It means that no one wishes to retain this person in the service because

4 of what else they've done and because of the way they've been punished

5 for it. Obviously the -- the difficulty otherwise with soldiers that any

6 soldier who wants to leave the army simply misbehaves and would get

7 thrown out. And you very rapidly have no army left if you can't be

8 careful.

9 MR. MANSFIELD: And to follow that, could the Prosecutor please

10 describe the system of discipline employed in the Canadian army.

11 MR. NICHOLLS: I can't describe that and you can do that on your

12 redirect, if you like. I can provide you with a copy of the Code,

13 104.08, which describes Section 141 of the National Defence Act,

14 dismissal with disgrace as a form of punishment.

15 Q. Now, did you read the testimony of Fadil Kastrati in this case?

16 A. I'm afraid I'm not sure.

17 Q. Do you remember reading -- this is at 226, 17 to 18 [sic], about

18 how Commander Celiku took his weapon away from him?

19 A. Oh, the beer incident?

20 Q. No.

21 A. I'm just read you a particle of it then.

22 Q. "To my misfortune Mr. Commander Celiku came and he asked me are

23 you Fadil Kastrati? I replied, Yes, that's me. He said to me, You, sir,

24 have to be unarmed. It was very difficult for me when I heard these

25 words. I was very sorry. I was very cross with him. But now I'm

Page 6469

1 convinced that he was right and I have a deep respect for him and for any

2 other soldier of the KLA. I asked him, is it possible for you,

3 Commander, not to unarm me? Because I took this weapon with a great will

4 and wish."

5 I'll skip a sentence. He said to me, It's not up to you to

6 speak. I know when I should arm you or when I should disarm you or when

7 I should not unarm you. You disturbed the order in the village and the

8 discipline here. I said to him, No, I did not cause a disturbance but I

9 just reminded that person that he should not speak too loudly because it

10 can be -- it can harm our soldiers. Commander Celiku said to me, You

11 have to be unarmed because there are regulations and discipline in the

12 ranks of the KLA and for that discipline we have to act this way. And if

13 we allow the smallest mistakes to take place, it's better that you don't

14 have a weapon. And this was it."

15 And then he describes how his weapon was actually taken away for

16 15 days. He eventually got it back after 9 days, and he said, "When I

17 got my weapon back, I just don't know how to describe this event. It was

18 a great thing for me."

19 You don't see anywhere in that any form of discipline?

20 A. As I said before, I see the start in being able to dismiss

21 someone or take their weapon away of an embryonic system of discipline.

22 But without a system of control, without a system of confirming sentence,

23 without a system of a whole hierarchy, I don't see that as anything other

24 than isolated incidents which would not prevent someone from doing

25 something that they should not do.

Page 6470

1 I mean, let's say you're proposing to shoot somebody in an

2 illegal way. Do you think that having your weapon taken off you

3 afterwards is going to influence that decision?

4 Q. And that's what you mean by no -- not any system of discipline?

5 A. I don't know exactly, no.

6 Q. You also talk about --

7 MR. NICHOLLS: And this is P156, Your Honours, the KLA

8 Provisional Regulations For the Organisation of the Army's Internal Life,

9 which you describe as being like a boy scout manual or scouting guide.

10 A. I did, yes.

11 Q. Yes. And you stated that you didn't find anything. Well, you

12 weren't aware of that until it was provided to you for this case; right?

13 A. I wasn't, no.

14 Q. And you stated in your report: "Nowhere in it did I find any

15 reference to the laws of war or to any form of court-martial nor any

16 means of enforcing any form of discipline."

17 A. Correct. In any meaningful way, we might add.

18 Q. Well, you'll -- I don't want to go through this whole document,

19 but do you recall reading from it that it talks about the need, for

20 example, for discipline and order, Chapter 5, 2, "Obedience, respect and

21 orders, strictly follow the Chamber chain of the military hierarchy."

22 A. They hadn't got a military hierarchy. And they're talking about

23 doing it. But nowhere is it laid down as to how it's to be done.

24 Q. We're talking about the manual, the manual --

25 A. We're talking about aspirations. We're talking about an army

Page 6471

1 which wants to be an army, desperately wants to be an army, but in the

2 time it's got available to itself can't turn itself into an army.

3 Q. Listen to the question. My point is that type of language

4 appears several times in the manual, the need for discipline. It talks

5 about iron discipline.

6 A. Aspirational language.

7 Q. That language appears in the manual.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. If you look at Chapter 8, it -- and I can give you a copy of it

10 or maybe we can -- sorry, it should be up on Sanction. I'll give you a

11 hard copy. It talks about the military police and its duties.

12 Point 3 states -- point 1 states, referring to the military

13 police: "It is organised and protect servicemen and civilians in the

14 territory of Kosovo, supervising and regulating traffic, pursuing and

15 detecting those who commit military and civilian criminal acts."

16 I'll give you a chance to read all this when it's brought to you.

17 Point 3: "The military police is organised in operational zones

18 and subzones to keep order and discipline in military units and bases in

19 inhabited areas and other facilities of special importance."

20 On the next page --

21 A. Sorry, which page are we on?

22 Q. These don't have page numbers. It's -- if you look towards --

23 it's the last two pages or so. It's Chapter 8.

24 A. My chapter 8 appears to be "Regulations for Health and Hygiene."

25 Q. Can I just see what you've been given?

Page 6472

1 A. Chapter 6, "Duties of Responsible Persons."

2 Q. I've got it for you here, sir. Okay. Do you have Chapter 8 now,

3 "The Military Police and Its Duties"?

4 A. Yes.

5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note that they do not have the

6 said document.


8 Q. If you could read the portions that I've read to you, which were

9 in Sections 1 and 3.

10 And then on the following page, among the duties of the police:

11 "To seize the documents and weapons of servicemen and soldiers who break

12 regulations and to escort them to the appointed place. All those who

13 commit crimes are sent to the relevant organs with general notes relating

14 to them."

15 Now, did you read that when you reviewed this document for your

16 report?

17 A. I did.

18 Q. And do you think that's consistent with your report that "this is

19 a boy scout for manuals [sic] without any means shown in it of enforcing

20 any form of discipline, no means at all of enforcing discipline?"

21 A. There's no means here, are there? This is an aspirational

22 document to be sent to the relevant organs. What are the relevant

23 organs? Where are they? Who commands them? Who controls them?

24 Q. Well, you don't say that in your report. What you say in your

25 report is that you're describing the manual. You describe the manual on

Page 6473












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6474

1 paragraph 36 as a "very nonmilitary manual. The manual seems mainly

2 devoted to form and to aspects of personal life and so on, very much

3 along the lines of a boy scouts manual. Nowhere in it did it find any

4 reference to the laws of war or to any form of court-martial nor any

5 means of enforcing any form of discipline."

6 A. And the lines you've just described to me have nothing to do with

7 enforcing discipline. It's an aspirational document that the military

8 police should do this in a well-ordered world.

9 Q. But we talked about -- you don't state that your report, this is

10 an aspirational document, that it has references to mechanisms of

11 enforcing discipline. Your report is not very accurate concerning this

12 document, is it?

13 A. I'm sorry, this -- this document I looked at and I thought, We've

14 no evidence to the distribution of this document. I've seen a claim that

15 it must have been read to people. Well, it would have taken an awful

16 long time to read to people. Outside of that, where does it come from?

17 Who had it? Who did it go to? I wasn't aware of it before and frankly I

18 didn't take I want very seriously. This is something which somebody

19 produced in Pristina, by the look of it, as -- as I said, an aspirational

20 document. It's all part of the same thing of wanting to become an army.

21 But what we're examining is whether they managed to be an army with these

22 functions in this time frame and to which my answer is no, they didn't,

23 unfortunately.

24 Q. Again, that is not what you're talking about in paragraph 36.

25 You're describing the manual. But I'll continue.

Page 6475

1 Just -- you would agree with me that disarming and arresting

2 persons who commit military crimes and sending them to the appropriate

3 organs is describing a way of enforcing discipline?

4 A. If we knew what the appropriate or relevant organ was, yes. But

5 as I said, this -- this starts with an idea, doesn't it? It's where we

6 would like to be and where we would like to go. But it is not describing

7 something which we know happened.

8 Q. You talked a little bit about your background yesterday and that

9 you didn't go to law school. I think you'd agree with me that somebody

10 educated at Stanford Law School, who was Stanford's public interest

11 lawyer of the year in 2004 and has spent his legal career working in the

12 field in human rights is more qualified than you to comment on legal,

13 jurisdictional issues. And there is an objection, so I --

14 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. I'm afraid I don't -- I do object to that.

15 That's not a proper question for an expert to comment on somebody's

16 ability or inability based on qualifications. So I don't see the

17 relevance of the question.

18 JUDGE PARKER: It's a matter for submission, if I might say, Mr.

19 Nicholls.

20 MR. NICHOLLS: All right.

21 [Prosecution counsel confer]

22 MR. NICHOLLS: Nothing further.

23 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Nicholls.

24 We have about 10 minutes, Mr. Mansfield. Would that be

25 profitable or would you think an early break better?

Page 6476

1 MR. MANSFIELD: I think it would be profitable. I can't finish

2 what I have to re-examine you about, but we can make a start on just a

3 few of the topics.

4 Re-examined by Mr. Mansfield:

5 Q. The first question I have for you -- and remembering the gaps,

6 so I'll go slowly. Having listened -- having listened to all the

7 questions and materials put to you, is there anything that has been put

8 to you or any question that's been put to you that has caused you in any

9 way to modify your opinion about the absence of an armed conflict in the

10 relevant period in 1998?

11 A. No, none whatsoever.

12 Q. On a number of occasions, you've indicated, dealing with the lack

13 of a command structure, that there was no effective structure in place.

14 Would you kindly in summary form indicate what the components would be of

15 a basic, not sophisticated -- of a basic, effective, military command

16 structure that would qualify as such.

17 A. Yes. I think to some extent at the very basic level you can see

18 that in the NLA in Macedonia, where you have some form of central command

19 structure, a commander, a deputy, a chief of staff who we know about

20 commanding a number of defined brigades who were visible from the start

21 of the conflict, who are in turn commanding sub-units. It doesn't really

22 matter whether they're termed "battalions" or something else because

23 these brigades, are actually only about the size of battalions. But --

24 commanding-defined sub-units, and with the clear ability to transmit

25 orders. And we saw that in Macedonia, which was after this conflict,

Page 6477

1 where the commander, Alija Ahmeti could order a withdrawal on two

2 occasions, one of which we know was opposed by his chief of staff but

3 nevertheless the withdrawals took place, and that was then in turn

4 confirmed by the international community. Those actions were in support

5 of a defined political objective and was using a military system of

6 command to support those political objectives.

7 Q. Now, within -- within that answer, you've indicated one factor,

8 the communication of orders. I just want to deal with other facets that

9 you've mentioned, some this afternoon: staffing levels, knowledge,

10 transportation. How are these to be considered within this structure?

11 A. A military command structure needs a staff because without a

12 staff you can't implement the commander's orders. And that started to

13 develop within the KLA right at the end, when Ceku [Realtime transcript

14 read in error: "Celiku"] came in and various subdivisions between

15 supplies or logistics -- one of the people who has to be appointed is

16 somebody in charge of military discipline, and there has to be a system

17 of transmitting knowledge out through which people have to be known what

18 they're supposed to be doing. You have to, as you said, you have to have

19 transportation of some sort in order to move things around or you have to

20 have an effective radio system.

21 In Macedonia they continued to use the mobile phone system, which

22 provided an excellent way of transmitting orders. And, of course,

23 overall you have to have a way of imposing discipline.

24 Q. I'm sorry to pause. I think there's been a misinterpretation.

25 It is at line -- page 74, line -- sorry, line 18. The word "Celiku" has

Page 6478

1 been mistakenly put in when, in fact, if you just read it, you were

2 not --

3 A. Ceku.

4 Q. Yes, Ceku. So if that could be changed in due course.

5 Now, in the context of that answer, how do you regard, as the

6 Prosecution finally conceded in their question, someone like Selimi

7 claiming that he didn't know how his orders were communicated?

8 A. I saw it as a desire. I'm afraid the whole context of that

9 interview at times was indicating a desire in some ways to please the

10 questioner. I think when he said he didn't know how his orders were

11 communicated, what he actually means is they weren't being communicated.

12 Otherwise, a commander would have to know how his orders were

13 communicated. Because one of the things he'd want to be absolutely

14 certain of was if his orders had been communicated, that they'd been

15 received, understood, and that somebody was going to comply with them.

16 If he didn't know that, then he wasn't issuing orders.

17 Q. Now, one final matter before the break, still concerned with Mr.

18 Selimi. This comes in the examination of this witness here by Mr.

19 Nicholls himself, dealing with the appointment of Mr. Selimi. And what

20 he said -- it is, in fact -- I'll give a day later, but I've got the page

21 number. It's 2173, at line 21. What he told Mr. Nicholls was that "When

22 the unit [Realtime transcript read in error: "community"] commanders were

23 rallied round himself, there was a member of the General Staff present

24 when they elected me as commander of the Drenica Operational Zone." What

25 do you say about that in the context of a command structure?

Page 6479

1 A. The election of people who were referred to as "commanders," as

2 although they didn't have command abilities or functions in my cases, was

3 common throughout the KLA, particularly in 1998 and indeed early 1999.

4 Commanders are supposed to be appointed because if a commander

5 can be elected, he can be unelected if he doesn't do very well, and that

6 doesn't lead to a military system. You haven't got a military system

7 when commanders are elected. It would result in a very difficult way,

8 again, of imposing discipline, which means in turn you can't really

9 impose discipline with elected commanders. So you've got a series of

10 groups fighting by common intent; but again, you haven't got a command

11 system.

12 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, would that be convenient?

13 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you. We will resume at ten minutes to 6.00.

14 --- Recess taken at 5.29 p.m.

15 --- On resuming at 5.52 p.m.

16 JUDGE PARKER: Mr. Mansfield.

17 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, just while the shutters are going

18 up, may I just indicate -- yes, it's line 25, page 75, where I quoted the

19 evidence of Mr. Selimi. I think there's one word wrong, and it's

20 probably my fault, and I will certainly take responsibility: "When

21 community commanders were rallied." In fact it's -- on the transcript it

22 reads: "When the unit commanders were rallied around himself, there was

23 a member of the General Staff." So I make that correction.

24 Q. Now, Mr. Churcher, in your last answer, you were dealing with

25 discipline and I want to ask a similar question as I did with regard to

Page 6480

1 the command structure. So far as you're concerned, what are the basic

2 elementary components of an effective system of military discipline?

3 Again, I'm not asking about a sophisticated system, just a basic

4 elementary system.

5 A. For a start, I think it's very difficult to have any form of

6 enforceable military system if you haven't got a state or a state-like

7 entity behind the command structure. But assuming that it might be

8 possible to have a system of military discipline by consent without any

9 form of legal basis, then at the top of the structure on the General

10 Staff or the General Command or whatever, you would need to have a person

11 who was responsible for disciplinary matters, and at every level of

12 command, even if somebody had joint responsibilities, somebody else would

13 have to be responsible for that. And you would have to have a laid-down

14 system of how you tried somebody, and at least in practice you would have

15 to see that. And you would have to have a system of graduated

16 punishments, so that if somebody did a little bit wrong, they would get

17 some sort of punishment and if somebody did something very wrong, they'd

18 get another sort of punishment. Without that, you're simply relying on

19 people's innate desire to be involved. But that doesn't amount to a

20 system of discipline.

21 Q. Now, you -- at the start of that answer, you had a caveat in the

22 form of referring to "a state or a state-like support entity behind the

23 command structure." Looking at the Balkans, did the situation in the --

24 in Kosovo differ markedly from the situation in other Balkan states in

25 relation to insurgency and armed conflict?

Page 6481

1 A. In the conflicts of the dissolution of Yugoslavia or however we

2 like to refer to those Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, every other

3 conflict had a state or a state-like entity, but I mean in fact state,

4 behind it. So when Bosnia decided to defend itself, it had a Bosnian

5 government. It utilised the Territorial Defence forces as the basis of

6 its defend even though they had been disarmed. There was a parallel

7 structure grew up but they managed to use a system of military discipline

8 to dissolve that power in Sarajevo at a later stage of the war. There

9 was a state. However embryonic, however insufficient, however broken up.

10 Whereas in Kosovo there was no state and there was no state-like entity.

11 The nearest thing there was to a state-like entity might have been the

12 structures of the LDK set up abroad. But the KLA did not relate to these

13 structures. Indeed, the KLA was opposed to those structures.

14 Q. Now, in that context, I'd like you to go back to a document is

15 that you were shown. I'm not sure whether you still have a hard copy in

16 front of you, but it links to that last answer. It is in fact the

17 Prosecution Exhibit 230. I think you were handed a hard copy. It's an

18 ECMM report which was cited to you.

19 A. I'm sorry, it's gone back again.

20 Q. Oh, I'll pause while it's brought back.

21 Now, I'm not going to go over the paragraphs which have already

22 been put to you, one entitled "UCK territory" and another "Road

23 infrastructure" but just looking down that page towards the bottom -- and

24 it may be -- if it could be brought up on a monitor so others can follow.

25 I just want to go through this paragraph, "UCK membership."

Page 6482

1 MR. MANSFIELD: I'm very grateful. It will just be slightly

2 easier this way since not everybody's got it. It's the last paragraph

3 entitled "UCK membership." I think that's legible.

4 Q. I think it may be quicker if I just read it and if you'd kindly

5 listen and then I'm obviously going to ask you for any further

6 observations in the light of the answers you've given. And I'll go

7 slowly, as it's being interpreted.

8 "UCK membership. Throughout the past week the team has

9 encountered probably more UCK" -- I think it should be "at checkpoints

10 than Serb, and has been greeted by all sorts of individuals from local

11 villagers carrying shotguns to masked UCK declaring themselves as

12 leaders. The gradation of UCK member that we had previously suspected

13 seems correct, with numerous villagers carrying weapons and even boys

14 helping with the construction of trenches. But uniformed membership

15 seems more substantial than first envisaged and is probably the result of

16 more recent recruiting following the expansion of UCK-held territory.

17 The hard core of" -- sorry -- "the hard core UCK membership appear almost

18 invariably to have emerged from the diaspora, with a significant number

19 from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. They are confident and driven

20 and occasionally nervous but nearly always courteous. It seems they are

21 not aware of ECMM and so far have not wished to take advantage of our

22 presence to communicate their wishes, indeed the overall impression is

23 that they care little for the international community whom they distrust.

24 And whilst NATO airstrikes might be convenient for them, they have no

25 intention of waiting for them. The larger family unit to [sic] which an

Page 6483

1 Albanian so often derives support is still the most plausible overall

2 structure onto which the UCK is attached and will remain their greatest

3 strength. In this way, membership of the UCK becomes unlimited."

4 Now, I've taken a little time to read that.

5 MR. NICHOLLS: Excuse me. No objection. I just believe the

6 first line states "more UCK checkpoints" but it's not a mistake, that it

7 should say "UCK at checkpoints." That make a difference --


9 MR. NICHOLLS: -- whether it's talking about the number of

10 soldiers or the number of checkpoints.

11 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes, I do understand that, and I'd misread it. I

12 thought it was "at checkpoints." Yes, I accept that. "Were UCK

13 checkpoints than Serb." Yes.

14 And having read that through, does that assist in the assessments

15 and opinions you've given or not?

16 A. I think that confirms what I was saying about the very diverse

17 nature of the KLA as it started up, which relied on people who knew each

18 other. And as you say, in particular, through the family connections,

19 because that was who they trusted. Trust at that time was very

20 difficult. There had been a number of false starts in the early 1990s

21 where people had been betrayed and they were deeply suspicious, and

22 therefore they returned to the wider family unit, to nephews and so

23 forth, for connections. But the whole point about this is once again

24 there's no military structure to it. There's a whole series of groups

25 with different relationships, different connections. They don't know who

Page 6484

1 each other are. People arrive in an area and start patrolling it only to

2 discover some weeks later that unknown to them there are actually a whole

3 series of self-appointed groups also patrolling the same area.

4 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you. We can remove it from the monitor and

5 pass to another topic.

6 Q. You will recall in the recent questioning there was confusion in

7 the questions between two places, Racak and Rahovec. And I want to deal

8 with the latter, Rahovec. And Mr. Limaj's evidence was quoted to you.

9 Do you remember that?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. This afternoon? Well, a little later -- in fact, it's a few

12 paragraphs later, from the passage which was quoted, which concerned the

13 fact that representatives of the General Staff were revealing that they'd

14 only heard for the first time about the events at 7.00 or 8.00 in the

15 morning, namely, at a much later -- well, at a later stage.

16 Now, what Fatmir Limaj went on to say about this is -- and so

17 it's clear, it's Day 69, and it's line 22, in which -- and it's page 68.

18 Page 68, line 22, Day 69. He's been talking about a makeshift hospital,

19 and then he says: "This happened in Rahovec. And if there is a mark

20 about this period regarding the KLA, I think it's -- if there is is black

21 stain, it's this because nobody knows how things really developed. This

22 is one of the reasons I wanted to mention this, because I know this

23 incident as a black stain that made the KLA pay a high price, both in

24 casualties in its ranks and waivered people's confidence. Rahovec states

25 or purely mirrors the way the KLA organised -- was organised at that

Page 6485

1 time. It's a concrete example."

2 Do you agree?

3 A. The only thing I would disagree with there is, of course, the KLA

4 was not organised, and that is precisely why Rahovec happened entirely

5 accidentally. As we now know, a number of young men went back into the

6 town carrying arms to visit their families. They collided with some

7 Serbs. Fighting developed. People went to assist. And before the KLA

8 knew it, they'd taken Rahovec, but they couldn't hold it. And "disaster"

9 is too strong a word, but it was certainly a series public relations

10 failure in the sense that the outside world thought they'd intended to

11 take a town and then thought that they'd lost it, whereas in fact of

12 course they hadn't intended to take it at all in the first place. And,

13 of course, it was a personal disaster for a number of young men and

14 villagers who went there to assist things and, I'm afraid, got killed.

15 Q. A further topic: If you could take up the bundle that you were

16 provided with overnight by the Prosecution, tab 2. Contained within tab

17 2 is the letter headed "Southern Balkan consultants" with your name at

18 the top. I just wanted -- if you'd just turn that up, headed "The

19 Solution for Kosovo Independence."

20 Could you indicate -- you've given a -- a brief context, why this

21 letter was written both in its original form and in this form.

22 A. In its original form, it was written whilst I was in ICG as a

23 support to a small book which was released suggesting conditional

24 independence as a way out of the Kosovo problem, which would have been

25 back in 2002. And then I was e-mailed, I think, by Shirley DioGuardi and

Page 6486

1 asked to provide testimony to Congress and I pulled out that particular

2 text, slightly revamped it, and sent it to her. I'm afraid that I didn't

3 actually know that it was going to be used in this form or -- or appear

4 in this form, but that was the intention behind it.

5 Q. And the book that -- to which it was lending support suggesting

6 conditional independence, the book was being written or produced by

7 people you knew or ...?

8 A. No. These were some pretty senior international political

9 figures, High Minister of Sweden and senior figures in the US

10 administration and so forth, who got together to suggest a course of

11 action as a way out of the fact that the UN administration appeared

12 likely to go on forever.

13 Q. Now, no more questions on -- on that document. I want, if I may,

14 just finally to confirm through you so that it's clear, because you were

15 asked about it yesterday, that you -- in order to compile the report, you

16 were provided with a number of documents at different stages. And in

17 particular, were you provided or have you been provided with transcripts

18 emanating from this Tribunal from time to time for you to consider?

19 A. I have been.

20 Q. Quite a large number.

21 A. Quite a large number, yes.

22 Q. And also have you been provided with a correlation, as far as

23 possible, of every single armed-conflict reference on transcript that

24 could be -- as well as those other transcripts of evidence, that could be

25 found?

Page 6487

1 A. Not very recently, but perhaps a month ago I was provided with

2 one.

3 Q. Now, finally this: I obviously would like, with Their Honours'

4 permission, to exhibit your report. But before I do, is there any other

5 matter that you feel you would like to add or subtract from anything that

6 you've said so far?

7 A. No. I need to emphasise what I've said so far that if somebody

8 is in difficulty about what could be regarded as effective military

9 command, then I think the NLA in the Macedonia conflict demonstrates some

10 aspects of that, a clear ability to transmit orders and to advance or

11 withdraw on a set plan and set of orders which I, with hindsight, should

12 have put in my own report but I was tending to look backwards for

13 comparisons, and not forwards. But otherwise, no; I believe my report

14 should stand as it is.

15 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honour, I wonder if, in fact, now I could

16 ask for his report to be exhibited. It would become DL12. I don't think

17 there's any objection to that. And attached to it marked for -- in the

18 way that -- the same way that has been done with other documents, that's

19 Mr. Thaqi's statement.

20 JUDGE PARKER: In fact, Mr. Mansfield, the investigator's notes

21 of Hashim Thaqi's interview --


23 JUDGE PARKER: -- of 2004 which were the subject of yesterday's

24 deliberations is marked for identification as DL12.

25 MR. MANSFIELD: I'm sorry, right.

Page 6488

1 JUDGE PARKER: I think we may not have allowed time for that to

2 be announced yesterday. So that this report will be received and marked

3 as Exhibit DL13, I think.

4 THE REGISTRAR: That will be DL13, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE PARKER: That includes the CV, does it, Mr. Mansfield?

6 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes, it does. Yes.

7 And it remains finally for me, if I may, just to thank Mr.

8 Churcher for his patience, for Prosecution for allowing us to interpose

9 him, and Your Honours also for allowing that slight deviation of the

10 usual procedure.

11 JUDGE PARKER: Thank you, Mr. Mansfield.

12 Questions?

13 Questioned by the Court:

14 JUDGE THELIN: Yes, Mr. Churcher. I wonder if you could clarify

15 a small matter for me. We've heard that you were the director of the

16 International Crisis Group, I believe, from September 2000 till August

17 2001.

18 A. I didn't actually become the director in --

19 JUDGE THELIN: I think that's what your CV says.

20 THE WITNESS: Yes, in title. I think I became the -- I was

21 there. I took over in November, as far as I remember. There was a

22 period of handover.

23 JUDGE THELIN: Okay. And we have noted in the report no

24 reference to any ICG report on the matter of KLA, its organisation, and

25 development. That's correct? There isn't any? That's my clarification.

Page 6489

1 A. Not in my report, no.

2 JUDGE THELIN: And is -- to your knowledge, has there after your

3 tenure, as it were, at the ICG been produced any ICG report on KLA?

4 A. No. There were reports produced before my tenure. As you're

5 possibly aware, ICG reports are anonymous. I was aware of who'd written

6 them. But with hindsight, they didn't really provide a very good

7 picture, in my opinion, although, as I said, that's with hindsight. At

8 the time, they were producing the best they could on very limited

9 information.

10 JUDGE THELIN: But there were -- were reports on KLA under the

11 label of ICG before --

12 A. Yes. Not on the KLA, no. They were reports on the whole Kosovo

13 situation.

14 JUDGE THELIN: Okay. Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE PARKER: You'll be pleased to know, Mr. Churcher, you may

16 now leave. And I know you're pressed for time and must be free this

17 evening, and we've managed to do that. Thank you for your assistance.

18 THE WITNESS: Thank you very much, sir.

19 [The witness withdrew]

20 JUDGE PARKER: I think if Mr. Limaj could now return to the

21 witness box.

22 [The accused Limaj takes the stand]


24 JUDGE PARKER: As you know, Mr. Limaj, the affirmation you took

25 at the beginning of your evidence still applies.

Page 6490

1 Mr. Whiting.

2 MR. WHITING: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Cross-examined by Mr. Whiting: [Continued]

4 Q. Mr. Limaj, I would like to take up where we left off yesterday.

5 When we -- when we stopped, I put to you the question about crimes in

6 Lapusnik. I'd like to put the question to you more broadly. The

7 question is this: To your knowledge, Mr. Limaj, during 1998 did the

8 KLA - and when I say "KLA" I mean any soldiers of the KLA - did the KLA

9 ever detain Serb civilians, to your knowledge, during 1998?

10 A. As I said, Mr. Prosecutor, there might have been such cases that

11 have happened in various areas of Kosovo, but you have to keep in mind

12 that information at the time was very limited and I couldn't follow all

13 the developments in all the areas. But such things could have happened,

14 things that have been done in the name of the KLA.

15 Q. Do you have any knowledge of any specific cases during 1998? Or

16 are you just speculating?

17 A. I spoke generally. There is a specific case, Your Honours. For

18 example, in my brigade, we stopped two journalists - this is a concrete

19 example that has to do with us - the two journalists that were stopped,

20 the Tanjug journalists.

21 Q. We're going to talk about that a little bit later. Can you think

22 of any other examples during 1998? Are you aware of any other examples?

23 A. Personally I don't know any concrete examples, but things have

24 been said and I have heard, especially after the developments in Rahovec.

25 Things were said about Serbs, especially the Serb media spoke about these

Page 6491

1 things. At that time, we could not follow all the developments because

2 the offensive was going on. But the Serbian citizens were speaking about

3 these things and the Serbian media. But except that case that I

4 mentioned to you that I knew directly, I did not know of any other

5 concrete examples. I can't say now. I can't speak now of any other

6 concrete examples.

7 Q. Did the Albanian media ever talk about such things?

8 A. To speak the truth, as I said, at that time it was almost

9 impossible to communicate with the media at the time because of the

10 situation. The media did not come. Sometimes Albanian media could

11 penetrate and come to us. But, in fact, there was a lot of propaganda

12 going on, both on the Albanian side and the Serb side. So I don't know

13 for sure. I can't tell you.

14 Q. Do you recall any instance -- you -- you specifically mentioned

15 the Serbian media talking about these things. Do you recall any specific

16 instance of the Albanian media talking about such things?

17 A. There could have been a media body that used that -- in fact,

18 only two newspapers existed at that time. Maybe they asked Albanians

19 about things or there was an interview. For example, maybe Mr. Krasniqi

20 spoke to the media about those things. But, Your Honours, if I'm not

21 mistaken, during that day --

22 Q. I'm sorry, aside from the example that you've just given of Mr.

23 Krasniqi talking about such things - and some of that is in evidence -

24 can you think of any other specific examples of the Albanian media

25 talking about such things?

Page 6492












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 6493

1 A. I can't remember any specific cases. It might be -- it could be

2 possible that there were reports, but I can't think of any now. I can

3 mention here a case. Maybe it's of interest?

4 Q. Well, I don't know what it is, so I can't say if it's of

5 interest.

6 A. When you asked about the information I had -- Your Honours, Mr.

7 Demaqi was appointed as a representative and also the International Red

8 Cross sent names of people -- of Serbs who had disappeared or people that

9 the Red Cross thought that they had disappeared. Maybe they communicated

10 with the media. So that's what I wanted to say. There were Serbs who

11 were -- were missing at the time.

12 Q. Mr. Limaj, I was going to ask about that later but I'll ask about

13 it now, since you've brought it up. I -- there's evidence in the case

14 that that list that you're referring to was provided by Mr. Demaqi to the

15 General Staff in 1998 and that it was then distributed by the General

16 Staff to zone commanders. Did you at that time -- according to your

17 testimony, you were the commander of the 121 Brigade. Was the list

18 distributed to you? Did you receive that list?

19 A. No. At that time, I did not see such a list. I mentioned Demaqi

20 because I heard it from the media that he had contacts with the

21 International Red Cross and the International Red Cross gave him such a

22 list. I think later this was discussed in January, I think.

23 Q. The -- the list, according to the evidence, was provided in

24 September of 1998. Did you hear about it in September of 1998 in the

25 media? I can show you the article that's in evidence, if that's ...

Page 6494

1 A. That's what I'm saying, Mr. Prosecutor, that I heard about this

2 meeting of Mr. Demaqi and the list that he had from the International Red

3 Cross, and this is what I heard from the media.

4 Q. My question is: When did you hear about it? Did you hear about

5 it when it took place in September of 1998?

6 A. Well, I don't know specifically. It could be September or

7 October, during that time.

8 Q. When you discovered -- was that the first time you heard that

9 there were Serbs missing in Kosovo, or had you heard that before?

10 A. Well, the Serbian media spoke about this every day, but there was

11 so much propaganda by the regime, so even if there were true things in

12 what they said, we had to take it with a grain of salt because we thought

13 it was all propaganda.

14 Q. Did you --

15 A. I heard it from the Serbian media before, yes.

16 Q. Did you think that the list provided by the ICRC was propaganda?

17 A. [No interpretation]

18 Q. Once you heard about that list and once you heard about the

19 missing Serbs, did you --

20 A. No. No.

21 Q. -- yourself, Mr. Limaj, to see if there was anything about

22 missing Serbs in your brigade?

23 A. Please, you have to separate these things. I was speaking about

24 Serb propaganda, which is one thing, and the ICRC list is another thing.

25 Q. Your answer was clear on that. My question now is -- though I

Page 6495

1 would note that the interpretation wasn't picked up, but your answer was

2 that you did not consider the ICRC list to be propaganda. My -- I moved

3 on to another question, which is: Once you -- when you heard about that

4 list of missing Serbs, did you in your brigade, Brigade 121, take any

5 steps to see if there was any information in your brigade about those

6 missing Serbs?

7 A. First of all, we did not know who these missing people were. We

8 heard about missing people, but we didn't know who specifically they

9 meant.

10 And secondly, the territory where my brigade was, it was Albanian

11 territory. There were no Serbs there. And we did not know the names of

12 the Serbs.

13 Q. By that time there, were no Serbs there; correct?

14 A. There were no Serbs even before in that territory, in that

15 region.

16 Q. During --

17 A. There were never Serbs there, living there.

18 Q. Did Serbs ever travel through that territory on the roads?

19 A. Well, gentlemen, I don't know who travelled through those roads,

20 whether they were Serbs or Albanians, but in the territory of my brigade

21 no Serbs were living there, not before the war, not -- nor during the

22 war, neither after the war. So our territory was Albanian. Outside the

23 area, yes; there were Albanians and Serbs living together in different

24 towns, but -- and they could have travelled through the territory. But I

25 don't know about that.

Page 6496

1 Q. You're not aware that Serbs would travel on the main roads to get

2 from one city to another, for example, to go to Pristina or to go to

3 Stimlje? You're not aware of that? I mean, you must have known that.

4 A. I don't know what you're after. Of course people travelled on

5 those roads, but I don't know who those people were. It was a main road.

6 But of course, you must remember that that road was under the Serb

7 control for most of the time, so I don't know how many people and who

8 those people were who travelled on that road.

9 Q. Well, the road, the Pristina-Peja road was under KLA control from

10 Lapusnik on in June and July of 1998; correct? That was under KLA

11 control. There's no dispute about that, is there?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. Okay. Now, just getting back to my question, I understand -- my

14 question about what, if anything, you did to find out about missing

15 Serbs. I understand your answer to be nothing.

16 A. [No interpretation]

17 Q. You've given us reasons for it, but you did not do anything. For

18 those reasons, you didn't do anything; correct? You said because --

19 because your territory was all Albanian and you didn't know the names,

20 you didn't do anything. Is that a fair summary of your testimony?

21 A. I said it, Mr. Prosecutor. First you're speaking about July --

22 June and July, and then about September and October. In June and July

23 there were -- there was no 121 Brigade. You must be clear about this.

24 Then in August and September the situation was completely different. If

25 you speak about June and July, the road was blocked in Lapusnik. If you

Page 6497

1 speak about August, it was open.

2 Q. My question is --

3 A. I need to explain this. It -- we have to be clear about this.

4 Q. My question -- I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about the dates. I

5 was going back to September or October 1998, when you learned about this

6 list. And my question had been: What, if anything, did you do about it?

7 And I understand your answer to be because your territory was all

8 Albanian and because you did not know the names, you did not do anything.

9 Is that your answer?

10 A. My answer, Mr. Prosecutor, is that I heard about missing Serbs,

11 that the ICRC had a list. Second, with regard to my actions, in my

12 brigade there was no Serb family living in the territory before the war,

13 during the war, and after the war. My -- there might have been people

14 who went missing, but I did not have any such information. Practically I

15 did not have that information. It's a different thing when you say you

16 did nothing and another thing when you say we did not have information.

17 I am telling you the situation was such that we did not receive

18 information.

19 Q. Mr. Limaj, the -- when we started off, I put the question to you

20 with respect to Serb civilians, and now I will put the question to you --

21 a different question to you, similar but different, which is: To your

22 knowledge, during 1998 did the KLA - meaning KLA soldiers - ever mistreat

23 or torture prisoners held by the KLA?

24 A. Mr. Prosecutor and Your Honours, I never heard such a thing at

25 that time, that a soldier -- a KLA soldier has done such things.

Page 6498

1 Personally I never heard about something like that. I am not excluding

2 the possibility that such a thing might have happened, but I personally

3 did not hear of any such cases.

4 Q. Finally, to your knowledge, did -- during 1998, did the KLA -

5 meaning soldiers of the KLA - ever murder prisoners held by the KLA?

6 A. As far as I remember, you should take into consideration I am

7 talking only about the territory where I was -- such things never

8 happened in the part where I was working. I have not heard about that.

9 As to what the KLA may have done, the KLA was operating all over Kosova.

10 They were -- it was impossible to communicate among us. There were many

11 things which we found out after the war, even with respect to

12 organisation. Everything was difficult for us to learn, especially after

13 the August offensive. Here I am talking only about myself and the place

14 where I served. Such things did not happen.

15 Q. Do you have any knowledge of it happening elsewhere, outside of

16 the place you say you served?

17 A. It is possible they may have occurred in some place, but I cannot

18 give you any concrete example. There are [indiscernible] developments in

19 1998, but I cannot give you anything in real terms. I didn't see

20 anything, didn't hear anything, because of our very limited possibilities

21 to communicate. For a long time one brigade couldn't communicate to the

22 adjacent brigade, 121 to 122, because of the forces, of the Serb forces.

23 Let alone about other zones.

24 Q. Mr. Limaj, during the summer of 1998, June and July of 1998, one

25 of the pseudonyms that Shukri Buja used was Sokoli; is that correct?

Page 6499

1 Sometimes referred to as Sokoli?

2 A. No. His pseudonym was Gazetari. His unit was called Sokoli. I

3 know that his pseudonym was Gazetari. His unit was called Sokoli.

4 Q. When, then, was Commander Sokoli?

5 A. If you are talking about the same person -- because there were

6 many pseudonyms, such -- similar pseudonyms. There is a Sokol who was in

7 the Lapusnik gorge on the other side of the road when you go to Likovc,

8 at the junction that we said. There is a unit there not at the Lapusnik

9 gorge but in Krajkove. You pass Lapusnik and there is a neighbourhood

10 when you go to Likovc. There was a Sokol there. He was killed in

11 October or November, I think. I don't know his last name. Maybe his

12 name was Sokoli, I don't know. But he had his own unit there.

13 Q. Was he a commander?

14 A. Well, to say, I was -- I passed through Likovc once because to go

15 to Likovc you had to pass through his unit. He was as a sort of -- a

16 unit commander with maybe about 20 soldiers under his command. And I

17 think, if I'm not mistaken, he was killed in Poklek in September.

18 Q. Aside from that occasion you just described when you passed

19 through his area on the way to Likovc, did you have any other occasion to

20 see him during June and July of 1998, this person that you have

21 described?

22 A. Each time I went to Likovc, I had necessarily to go through his

23 area. There was no other way. The road passed through the village where

24 he was located. You couldn't go to Likovc from any other way.

25 Q. Aside from going through his village, did you have during June

Page 6500

1 and July 1998, did you have any other interactions with him, dealings

2 with him?

3 A. I don't know what you mean by "interaction," but every time I

4 passed by, I stopped. I stayed for some time there. I remember an

5 occasion when myself and someone else were going to Likovc to get some

6 uniforms and on the way to Likovc there were lined-up soldiers taking an

7 oath. Now I remember, Sokol. It was on the central road that goes to

8 Likovc. The soldiers were lined up on the side of the road when they

9 were taking an oath. It's an interesting fact that the oath that they

10 had obtained in a written form, because they didn't have a written rule,

11 one of the soldiers had written it on a notebook and he was trying to

12 read it out to 20, 30 soldiers that were there. I had the rules with me

13 in my car and I stopped there and I stayed there until they finished the

14 oath ceremony and I gave a speech. Since I happened to be there, they

15 asked me to say a few words, and that I did. And I continued on my way

16 to Likovc. This happened on the way to Obrinje-Drenice area. I think

17 that is one of these occasions. But as I said, I have stopped there to

18 have a coffee or to smoke a cigarette. If he or someone else happened to

19 be there -- if I had time, of course, on the way to.

20 Q. Mr. Limaj, is -- the part of Drenica which is to the north of the

21 Peja-Pristina road sometimes referred to as lower Drenica and the part

22 that is south that starts with the Berisha Mountains, is that sometimes

23 referred to as "upper Drenica"?

24 A. As far as I know, yes. But there is not any explicitly divided

25 border. It depends how you look at it. Someone [as interpreted]

Page 6501

1 includes the entire Lapusnik and the area near Baince, Krajkove,

2 Kroimire, Damanek, Lapusnik is the upper Drenice, and the area from the

3 railway, from -- that divides Obrinje, they call it lower Drenice. From

4 Krajkove, Damanek, Vukovc, Lapusnik, this part is seen as the upper

5 Drenica. But I cannot tell you for certain because it's an

6 unconventional division, I would say. It's a popular division. There is

7 a railway which divides the area and they say on that part of the railway

8 and on this part of the railway. The railway passes through Obrinje to

9 Drenoc and Logovc [as interpreted] and continues to Kosova plain. This

10 must be it. They -- some people refer to the asphalt road. Some refer

11 to the railway. It depends. I personally, I can't give you a very clear

12 description of it because it is not a geographical division, as I said,

13 or an administrative one.

14 Q. Mr. Limaj, I'm going to show you -- I'm going to show you

15 Prosecution Exhibit P37. No, I'm sorry, it's P39.

16 Mr. Limaj, this is a newspaper article in Bujku from 4th of July

17 1998 and it describes an oath ceremony and Commander Sokoli reported on

18 the units and Commander Celiku reviewed the troops. And it's in Drenica

19 e Eperme.

20 Now, this is referring to an oath ceremony with Shukri Buja,

21 isn't it?

22 A. To tell you the truth, I don't know. It may be the Sokoli I am

23 talking about. It may be the Shukri. I don't know. I know that

24 Shukri's pseudonym was Gazetari. But to rid you of your dilemma, I know

25 that I was and visited this Shukri. Maybe it is about the other Sokoli.

Page 6502

1 I am telling you that I visited Shukri and together with the Jakup

2 Krasniqi, who at the time was staying in Kroimire, Mr. Prosecutor, as a

3 representative of the General Staff because his wife had a problem with

4 her pregnancy.

5 So, Your Honours, his wife had just given birth --

6 Q. You're getting a little bit far afield from the question. My

7 question was: Is this -- is this oath ceremony with Shukri Buja, and I

8 understand your answer to be it could be, you're not sure. Is that your

9 answer?

10 A. I am trying to clarify things. This interview is possible to

11 refer to the Sokoli I mentioned or to the other person, but I am telling

12 you that Shukri's pseudonym was Gazetari. But to make things clear, I

13 have attended ceremonies also at Shukrija. But this case that you're

14 referring to me, I don't know.

15 Q. I think you've answered the question.

16 MR. WHITING: And the -- we can take the document back.

17 Q. Mr. Limaj, do you -- speaking of Shukri Buja, do you remember

18 meeting up with him a few days after the Lapusnik gorge fell on the 26th

19 of July, 1998? Do you recall seeing him?

20 A. Mr. Prosecutor, following the Lapusnik gorge, we met Shukri Buja

21 on a daily basis because there was no other place you could go other than

22 in Klecke or any other.

23 Q. You've answered my question.

24 A. So we met daily.

25 Q. Do you recall him telling you that he had released a group of men

Page 6503

1 from Lapusnik or he had allowed -- he had stopped them and allowed -- and

2 then allowed them to continue on their way? Do you recall him telling

3 you that?

4 A. No, I don't remember it, and I think what you are saying, it's

5 not true at all. The population used to move from one place to another,

6 but what you are putting to me is not true. He's never told me that.

7 Q. I'm not -- I'm just asking you questions. So you're -- are you

8 saying that -- that you don't remember him talking to you about people

9 coming from Lapusnik -- wait till I've finished the question. You don't

10 remember it or it did not happen, that conversation?

11 A. Mr. Prosecutor, the population moved all about, from one place to

12 another. Find accommodation. They went from one gorge to another, from

13 one village to another. In this context, he may have said this.

14 Q. Okay. But I -- I thought you were going off on a long answer

15 again. If you can focus on the question. Do you remember having the

16 conversation -- or are you saying that you didn't have the conversation

17 or you don't remember having the conversation about men from Lapusnik

18 with Shukri Buja?

19 A. I'm trying to be brief. Such topics of people's movements were a

20 common topic. But as to what you are asking me, I don't remember Shukri

21 Buja to have told me anything about that.

22 Q. Well, this conversation, just to press on a little bit further

23 with this conversation, this conversation may have stood out because he

24 indicated he was concerned about whether he had done the right thing in

25 letting these people continue, which might have seemed out of the

Page 6504

1 ordinary with respect to the context that you have described of refugees.

2 Does that help you remember the conversation, the fact that he was

3 concerned about having allowed these men from Lapusnik to continue?

4 A. [No audible response]

5 Q. You're shaking your head. You still don't remember?

6 A. No. No. There were no such conversations. No, not the ones

7 that you are referring to. With me, never.

8 Q. Mr. Limaj, I'm going to move on to another topic, which is

9 Rahovec. Now, as I understand your testimony, you arrived to a

10 crossroads outside of -- of Rahovec at approximately 11.30 on July 17th,

11 11.30 at night. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes. Yes, I think so. Yes.

13 Q. You stayed there through the night, through the day on the 18th,

14 into the night of the 18th. At approximately 4.00 in the morning on the

15 morning of the 19th, you had an encounter with a Serb soldier. You

16 bumped into a Serb soldier. You then slept for approximately an hour and

17 a half; you then woke up and went to get some coffee, and then you

18 fainted. Is that -- is that your testimony? I'm just trying to fix the

19 time you were there.

20 A. Just to clarify something. I didn't bump into a Serb soldier. I

21 said that we didn't know that the Serbs had taken a position there. The

22 soldiers told me later when the attack started, the soldier told me that

23 the Serbs had been positioned in that place. It's not that I had seen it

24 with my eyes.

25 Q. I'm just --

Page 6505

1 A. The others are as you said.

2 Q. So is it fair to say that you -- when you fainted, it's

3 approximately 6.00 in the morning on the 19th?

4 A. No. No.

5 Q. What time -- what time do you think it was in the morning? Can

6 you give your best approximation of what time it was in the morning when

7 you fainted on the 19th?

8 A. Approximately? I am trying to explain and to be brief. In the

9 morning of the 19th, it may have been 5.00, 6.00, or 7.00, when the dawn

10 came, I went to the juncture that you mentioned and I saw Byslym and the

11 other representatives of the General Staff. I returned again, Mr.

12 Prosecutor, to that point, to the place I was before. And there I had a

13 coffee. After I had a coffee, I went again back to consult with Agim

14 about something. When I went there, there I fainted. This is more or

15 less 8.00 or 9.00. I may not be exact about the time, but it was not

16 6.00. I'm certain about that. It might have been either 8.00 or 9.00.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Or less. You have to take it approximately.

19 Q. When did you see Isak Musliu?

20 A. I think I have already told you and told his lawyer as well in

21 that -- at that time I -- in this early morning, I was interested to see

22 what was going on. He might have been there. But when I went there, I

23 was very tired that morning, at 6.00 or 7.00 in the morning.

24 Q. So are you saying -- are you saying now --

25 A. My point is that I was interested to talk with the

Page 6506

1 representatives of the General Staff. Isak and many other members might

2 have been there, but I don't remember. On the second time, when I went

3 there he must have been with a group of soldiers because then I fainted

4 and I don't have a clear recollection of what happened. That's why I am

5 telling that I am not certain about that.

6 Q. Okay. Is it -- is it fair to say, then, that Isak Musliu -- you

7 might have seen Isak Musliu in Rahovec on that day, on the 19th, but

8 you're not certain about it, you don't have a clear recollection about

9 it? Is that fair to say?

10 A. Yes. I think that I was focussed on those people of the General

11 Staff, and then I fainted. He may have been there, but I am not certain.

12 Q. And aside from that moment when you fainted and he might have

13 been there, did you see him at any other time in Rahovec after you

14 arrived there at approximately 11.30 on the night of the 17th? Or is it

15 -- is it the same answer, that you cannot recall?

16 A. Are you talking about the 17th?

17 Q. I'll rephrase my question. As I understand your testimony now,

18 that you may have seen him on the morning of the 19th but you're not --

19 you don't have a clear recollection of it. Before the morning of the

20 19th, did you see him at Rahovec? Or is it the same --

21 A. No. No, I didn't see him.

22 Q. Okay. Now, you testified - and it's been referred to by your

23 lawyer again today - that Rahovec was a black stain. And what you said

24 is, "It's a black stain that made the KLA pay a high price both in

25 casualties in its ranks and in -- and waivered people's confidence." Do

Page 6507

1 you recall that testimony, Mr. Limaj?

2 A. [No audible response]

3 Q. Yes? You nodded your head but you didn't say anything.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Okay. Was Rahovec a black stain for another reason, Mr. Limaj?

6 Is it a black stain for another reason?

7 A. Yes, certainly. The consequences were very major. The black

8 stain applies to all respects.

9 Q. In what other respects was it a black stain -- is it a black

10 stain?

11 A. In addition to what I already stated, that various units of the

12 KLA had -- had been involved in that adventure, in my opinion, a serious

13 adventure which led to deaths of the members of the KLA and some

14 civilians as well, there were -- I can't say hundreds. Maybe now I can't

15 speculate with the numbers, but there were many civilians. They were

16 saying thousands at that time. They were alleging there were thousands

17 of civilians who are killed, violated, a bloodshed was committed there.

18 This is what they were saying after the Serb forces entered.

19 When things became clearer, it appeared that in addition to

20 hundreds of Albanians there were Serb civilians killed as well or

21 kidnapped, as the Serbs alleged. So for these too Rahovec is a black

22 stain. There is no dilemma about that.

23 Q. Mr. Limaj, you finally at the end of that long answer made

24 reference to Serb civilians who were killed as well or kidnapped, and

25 then you add "as the Serbs alleged." Do you have any doubt, Mr. Limaj,

Page 6508

1 that more than 40 Serb civilians were kidnapped from Rahovec during that

2 weekend and have never been seen again? Do you have any doubt about

3 that?

4 A. No, sir. You don't have in front of you a person who can behave

5 towards the victims in this way. You are misinterpreting my answer. I

6 do not be linked [as interpreted] to a people that can do such things.

7 If you ask me questions, don't misinterpret my answers or don't give

8 answers instead of myself. I can give the answers.

9 Q. But I'm asking you to give the answers, and I give you every

10 opportunity to give the answer. Do you have any doubt that -- about

11 that, Mr. Limaj? Because you said "as Serbs alleged." You added that.

12 Do you have any doubt about it in your mind, that that happened?

13 A. I tried to explain to Their Honours that thousands of people said

14 that a bloodshed was committed, that thousands of Albanians were killed,

15 but in fact there were not thousands who were killed. I'm talking both

16 about Albanians and Serbs. This rumour spread that thousands of people

17 were killed and that Rahovec was a bloodbath. But when things became

18 clearer, when the Albanians found out their victims, the Serbs on their

19 part - now I am referring to Serbian formation - they said that there are

20 Serbs who were killed.

21 Now, if you're asking me whether you are doubting that there were

22 Serbs who were killed or kidnapped, I don't have doubts because these

23 were informations that were certified later on by the International Red

24 Cross and other information. I could doubt -- I could question

25 Serb-provided information, but I couldn't doubt information certified by

Page 6509

1 other international organisations. I am not Dragan Jasevic, who says

2 that there were no massacres committed in Likoshan.

3 MR. WHITING: I'll have more questions about this tomorrow, but

4 it's 7.00.

5 JUDGE PARKER: We'll resume tomorrow at 9.00 in the morning.

6 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

7 to be reconvened on Friday, the 27th day of

8 May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.