1 Tuesday, 31 January 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.
7 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
8 Cross-examination by Mr. Milovancevic: [Continued]
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. Theunens, yesterday we reached page 72 of your expert report.
11 On that page, in discussing the change of the mission in Croatia, you
12 point to the order by General Kadijevic and on this page, on page 72, you
13 say, the changes that General Kadijevic discusses, which start from March
14 1991, meant a radical change of two constitutional tasks of the armed
15 forces against an external and internal aggression. Is that right,
16 Mr. Theunens?
17 A. Your Honours, on page 72, in my report, I don't point to a
18 specific order by General Kadijevic. I only mention what
19 General Kadijevic says in his book when he talks about the evolution of
20 the mission of the JNA starting mid-March 1991.
21 Q. Did the SFRY armed forces under the constitution of the SFRY,
22 Article 240, that's on page 4 of your expert report, have the obligation
23 to defend the country from the internal aggression which in fact the Croat
24 and Slovene illegal formations, secessionist formations, constituted?
25 A. Your Honours, the mission of the SFRY armed forces, as I mention
1 it in my report covered four things, and I referred for that to Article 92
2 of the 1982 all people's Defence law. According to that Article 82, the
3 SFRY armed forces were to safeguard or to protect the independence,
4 sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social order of the SFRY.
5 Q. If the armed forces had the constitutional obligation to safeguard
6 the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, did this mean that the SFRY armed
7 forces had the constitutional obligation to prevent the secession of
8 Croatia and Slovenia by armed force?
9 A. Your Honours, I think this is more like a legal question because
10 the SFRY armed forces received their orders from the Supreme Command.
11 Supreme Command consisting of the Presidency, so a body which represents
12 all the six republics of the SFRY including the two autonomous regions,
13 and I would -- my answer would be that again, the constitutional mission
14 is one thing. We see that due to the developments within the SFRY, not
15 only in Slovenia and Croatia but also in other republics of the SFRY and
16 most importantly in Serbia in 1991, that there -- well, I would assume
17 that the Supreme Command would take the necessary measures in order to
18 implement the mission and if they want to adjust the mission, to adjust
19 the mission of the SFRY armed forces.
20 Q. Given that you cited the SFRY constitution provision which points
21 to the obligation of the armed forces to safeguard the territorial
22 integrity and inviolability of the territory of Yugoslavia, my question to
23 you is: Do the SFRY armed forces have the constitutional obligation to
24 prevent any part of Yugoslav territory from seceding, by force?
25 A. Your Honours, I think I answered that question in my reply to the
1 previous question.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you want the witness to give
3 you an interpretation of the constitutional obligations as they are stated
4 in the constitution of this country or of the SFRY, or do you expect this
5 witness to give you expert opinion on what happened in the region based on
6 the constitution that was prevalent at the time?
7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the second
8 question was put to the witness precisely in order for the expert to
9 answer the question from the perspective of what the SFRY constitution
10 stipulated and what obligations were in place for safeguarding the
11 territorial integrity of the country and that was the gist of my question
12 and rather than what was going on on the ground at the time. My question
13 was, was the -- in principle, was the obligation of the armed forces to
14 protect the integrity of the country.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Isn't that question a question appropriate for the
16 people who drafted the constitution, what they intended? He can only tell
17 us what it provides. He can't tell us what it was intended to mean, can
19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honours, I
20 asked the witness this question because he cited these provisions of the
21 constitution and he spoke of their violations. So my question was not
22 what was happening before or after that but, rather, what these provisions
23 provided, in terms of the protection of territorial integrity.
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well, then, Mr. Milovancevic. You may carry
1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, on page 73 of your report, you identify by quoting
3 Mr. Kadijevic's book, two phases of the armed conflict in Croatia; is that
5 A. Indeed, Your Honours, the two phases I have discussed in my report
6 between the pages 73 and 76 are based on the two phases General Kadijevic
7 identifies in his book.
8 Q. Did you indicate in your report that according to Mr. Kadijevic's
9 book, the first phase of the conflict in Croatia was characteristic in
10 terms of it starting with an attack against the Serbs in Krajina?
11 A. That is correct, Your Honours. Mr. Kadijevic identifies the start
12 of the first phase of the conflict by what he describes as the first
13 attacks on Serbs in the Serbian Krajina region.
14 Q. Do you know what General Kadijevic states in his book, which you
15 have been quoting quite a lot, about Croatia's preparations for a war and
16 about the implementation of this phase?
17 A. Your Honour, it is correct that I read the book by General
18 Kadijevic but I don't recall exactly what General Kadijevic stated about
19 what Mr. Milovancevic called Croatian preparations for a war. As I
20 mentioned in the beginning of my testimony, this report focuses on the TO
21 of the SAO Krajina and then RSK, and also the SVK and the relations
22 between these organisations and Milan Martic. Analysing or studying
23 Croatian or what is called Croatian war preparations or the establishment
24 of armed forces in Croatia was not part of -- is not part of the subject
25 of my report, and therefore I didn't mention it in my report.
1 Q. Mr. Theunens, I was not the one discussing Croatia's preparations
2 but in view of the fact that you quoted Mr. Kadijevic's book and related
3 what he said about the first and the second phases and about what was
4 going on on the ground in Croatia and in view of the fact that his book
5 does relate something about these preparations, I asked you whether you
6 were familiar with this. You told me you were not, because you had told
7 me you were not.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we see on the screen
9 Exhibit 24, that's General Kadijevic's book, on page 67 in the English
10 version, or rather page 125 in the B/C/S.
11 I apologise, page 68 in the English version. The title is, "The
12 war in Croatia." Or it may even be page 67.
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, could you please on page 67 below the heading, "War
14 in Croatia," read the first paragraph?
15 A. "The war in Croatia. After the Supreme Command meeting held from
16 March the 12th to the 15th 1991, when the SFRY Presidency rejected the
17 proposal of the Supreme Command's General Staff to impose a state of
18 emergency in the country and have the JNA disarm and disband paramilitary
19 formations in Yugoslavia, Croatia accelerated its political and military
20 preparations to secede from Yugoslavia and placed the Serb nation in
21 Croatia in a state of total unconditional subjugation. In the attempts to
22 achieve this the Croatian authorities resorted to all the Ustasha methods
23 known from the days of the fascist independent state of Croatia. Apart
24 from the protection of the Serb nation received" -- excuse me. "Apart
25 from the protection the Serb nation received from the JNA, Serbs in
1 Croatia were compelled to organise themselves in defence of their homes,
2 their lives, and their national identity."
3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Given that you refer to
4 General Kadijevic's statement about the first phase of the armed conflict
5 in Croatia, which lasted from July through to September 1991, do you
6 recall what General Kadijevic said about the objective that Croatia had in
7 the first phase of the armed conflict?
8 A. Your Honours, the -- General Kadijevic's interpretation of the
9 Croatian objectives are included in the paragraph I just read out on page
10 67, but I would make -- like to make a general comment about how I used
11 the book of Kadijevic because I think there is a misunderstanding about
12 the analytical process. In the analytical process it's very -- you try to
13 avoid to use only one source to describe the attitude or the activities of
14 your opponent. Now, as I mentioned yesterday, I used General Kadijevic's
15 book as one of several sources to explain the evolution of the goals of
16 the JNA during the time period that started more or less at the latest, I
17 mean, in summer 1991. I did include General Kadijevic's book from 1993
18 but I also included orders and statements General Kadijevic made when he
19 was still the federal secretary of people's defence. I also included
20 statements, official statements by General Adzic who was the chief of
21 General Staff at the time in 1991, as well as more specific orders from
22 JNA units. If I were to discuss or analyse the Croatian objectives in the
23 conflict, I may use the book by Kadijevic but I would also use -- try to
24 find other sources and more specifically official documents from the
25 Croatian forces as I did when I discussed the goals of the JNA. I think
1 that is an essential principle of the work of analysis and that's
2 something I wanted to highlight now.
3 Q. Mr. Theunens, under section 3, you quoted General Kadijevic
4 repeatedly, drawing upon his book, and you quoted several sentences from
5 his book, which have their own context. You have taken them out of the
6 spatial and temporal context and you have taken them out of the contents
7 of the entire book, and used them to arrive at conclusions that were
8 completely different to what General Kadijevic was trying to show. I
9 simply wanted to establish whether you have properly quoted parts of his
10 book. That's why I'd like you to read one passage from his book on page
11 68, that's in the English version, and that's page 126 in the B/C/S.
12 A. Your Honours, I think that the comment Mr. Milovancevic just made
13 is an incorrect representation of my report. Because when you look at the
14 report, under the heading 3, evolution of the mission of the JNA during
15 the conflict in Croatia, there are several subheadings. It goes from A to
16 F. In subheading A, indeed, I discuss Kadijevic's book. However, on page
17 76, there is a subheading B, which mentions the declaration on the 1st of
18 October by the reduced SFRY Presidency of a state of imminent threat of
20 Next I mention under the same heading I mention as I discussed
21 earlier today the statement General Kadijevic had published on the 3rd of
22 October 1991 in the issue number 35 of the bulletin of the information
23 service of the SSNO. When we continue in the subheading C I mention the
24 confidential letter number 6-83 that was issued by the SFRY armed forces
25 morale administration and which is attributed to General Adzic. In the
1 subheading D, I discuss a strictly confidential order number 2256-1 by
2 General Kadijevic which dates from the 10th of December 1991 and which
3 specifically mentions the protection of the Serb population. In the
4 subparagraph E on page 83 of the English version, I quote from the report
5 on the combat readiness of the 2nd military district where the 9th Corps
6 provides its view of the -- how it accomplished the missions of the SFRY
7 armed forces.
8 So I don't think that I misquoted General Kadijevic somewhere or
9 that I took his comments out of context because the comments I used I took
10 from -- or the paragraphs I took from Mr. Kadijevic's book correspond with
11 orders and statements he made at the time of the events in 1991 as well as
12 orders and statements of General Adzic and subordinated units.
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm not trying to interpret your report in an
14 incorrect way. I'm just trying to verify two issues. One is how you're
15 quoting Mr. Kadijevic. We are just checking this to see whether you quote
16 his words accurately or whether perhaps some of his thoughts are taken out
17 of context. The Defence does not believe that what Mr. Kadijevic wrote is
18 the holy Bible, that is not subject to any analysis and inspection. What
19 we are trying to do is establish whether what you quoted was quoted
20 correctly, whether it was -- it reflected accurately the spirit in which
21 it was written, and we are also trying to establish what actually happened
22 on the ground. Therefore I would like to kindly ask you not to evade
23 answering my question.
24 I would like to ask you to do the same thing you did when
25 answering the questions of the OTP. So would you now please read passage
1 2 of General Kadijevic's text on page 68 concerning the two phases of the
2 war, what happened in phase one in Croatia and what actually happened on
3 the ground.
4 [Microphone not activated]
5 My apologies. Would you please read the third paragraph from the
6 top? It starts with the words, "In this phase, Croatia's aim."
7 A. "In this first phase Croatia's aim was to use the police and army
8 to establish control over Serb regions in Croatia and break down any Serb
9 resistance. This was seen as a necessary stage in achieving the general
10 goal of a sovereign Croatian state which apart from all the territory
11 lying within the administrative borders of the existing Republic of
12 Croatia would in the later stage of Yugoslavia's dismemberment also
13 encompass other territories with a majority Croatian population,
14 i.e. territories to which for one reason or another the leadership of the
15 Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, aspired."
16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
17 As you have mentioned the words of Mr. Kadijevic to the effect
18 that the conflict in Croatia unfolded in two phases and we are now
19 discussing the first phase, can you tell us what Mr. Kadijevic's thoughts
20 are in the book about the strategy and tactics of Croatia in implementing
21 this first phase?
22 MR. BLACK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I apologise for interrupting.
23 I was expecting a question whether about whether there was out of context
24 because we heard a couple of speeches from the Defence saying that he was
25 worried about Mr. Theunens taking passages out of context. It seems to me
1 the procedure would be to point him at passages and then ask him questions
2 about that. What's happening instead is that he asked Mr. Theunens to
3 read out a passage and then no question follows and it appears we are
4 moving on to a new subject. I would ask that the counsel put questions to
5 the witness rather than simply read passages to him.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you have an answer to that, Mr. Milovancevic?
7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The aim of
8 this type of examination is to finally reach an answer to the thesis
9 presented by the expert witness, namely whether, in the first and the
10 second phase of the conflict in Croatia, any changes occurred in the
11 constitutional role of the JNA and whether this was in conformity with the
12 constitution, in order to reach an answer to this major question, the
13 witness first needs to answer some minor questions. Perhaps this is not
14 in the order that is clearly visible or clearly obvious but I'm first
15 asking the witness whether he knows something about the tactics and the
16 strategy, in order for us to be able to assess the goals of both sides.
17 The expert witness spoke only about the goals of one side, and we need to
18 see what an eyewitness to the events, namely General Kadijevic, thinks
19 about the events. Based on the quotations of General Kadijevic in the
20 expert report, one can gain a completely different impression than what
21 Mr. Kadijevic actually intended with his book. That's what I'm trying to
22 point out.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, you know, the whole morning and
24 perhaps even yesterday, you have been engaging in argument with the
25 witness. Your questions are very argumentative. And I was counting the
1 lines on a previous page now of your question to this witness. Your
2 question goes beyond 15 lines. You have made an allegation against this
3 witness that he's quoting the book out of context, and in the light of
4 that allegation, you made the witness read a passage from the book. And
5 we are all waiting to see you point out how he quoted Kadijevic out of
6 context. Now, point that out. Don't leave it and go to the next point
7 and then say that the aim is to see how Kadijevic's views were on the
8 other side of that -- the struggle. You got to tell us how this witness,
9 before you go to how Kadijevic views the struggle, tell us how this
10 witness quotes the author out of context. And do so by putting questions
11 to him, not by giving speeches to him and then expecting him to comment.
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
13 Q. Could you tell us, Mr. Theunens, bearing in mind the two
14 paragraphs that you have read out, was the conduct of federal armed forces
15 on the ground in specific circumstances a reaction to the conduct of the
16 opposing side, namely the Croatian side?
17 A. Your Honours, I have to repeat the goal of the aim of my report.
18 My report aims -- studies, my report studies the SAO Krajina and then the
19 RSK TO and SVK and relations between these organisations and Milan Martic.
20 Whether or not the activities of the JNA during the conflict in Croatia
21 were a reaction on activities from the Croatian forces is something I did
22 not investigate, so it's impossible for me to answer that question. I
23 don't think it would be correct from an analytical point of view to just
24 use one source, i.e. the book of Kadijevic, in order to assess the
25 intentions of the Croatian forces and/or the way how whether the JNA acted
1 or reacted in certain circumstances, whether the initiative came from the
2 Croats or from the JNA and local Serbs. That was not the subject of my
4 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. You wrote, and also gave evidence here in the
5 courtroom, about not having studied the Croatian forces. However, you
6 used General Kadijevic's book, and when General Kadijevic writes that at
7 one point in time the armed forces protected the Serb population, you
8 interpret that as a change of the constitutional role of the armed forces.
9 This is why I'm asking you now, and I ask kindly, that you answer me to
10 the extent you are able to as a military officer, namely, in the first
11 phase, and you refer to General Kadijevic's words about Croatian forces
12 attacking the Serb population, under those circumstances, was it possible
13 for the JNA not to protect the Serb population?
14 A. Your Honours, I would like to draw your attention to page 12 of
15 the English version of my report, where I quoted when I was discussing the
16 mission of the SFRY armed forces, I first mentioned the article 92 of the
17 1982 all people's Defence law and then I also quoted from a 1983 manual
18 from the federal Secretariat for People's Defence, a manual called
19 strategy of armed conflict. And in that manual, in chapter 4, it is
20 mentioned, and I will read from my report, "SFRY armed forces together
21 with other forces of all people's Defence and social self-protection,
22 protect the interests of all nations and nationalities and all working
23 people and citizens of the socialist, self-managing, and non-aligned
24 Yugoslavia and are the expression of their readiness and determination to
25 successfully defend themselves against any aggression."
1 Q. Since you quoted the legislative provision, specifically stating
2 that the obligation of the armed forces is to protect all of the
3 population, do you believe, as a military expert, that the JNA and the
4 armed forces had no obligation to protect the Serb population which was at
5 risk during this first phase?
6 A. Your Honours, based on the text I quoted from this 1983 military
7 manual, the JNA as well as the other components of the SFRY armed forces
8 had to protect all nations and nationalities. Now, Mr. Milovancevic
9 claims that the Serb population was at risk. We see in Kadijevic's book
10 that he mentions indeed that the Serb population is at risk but I think if
11 you would have put Mr. Spegelj's book here he would have said that the
12 Croatian population was at risk. So again, I keep on repeating myself but
13 I think it is dangerous to use one single source to try to draw
14 conclusions on the activities or the behaviour of the other side or the
15 opposing side.
16 Q. Since right now we are not discussing the threat to the Croatian
17 population, and you in your expert report mention Kadijevic's words about
18 the Serb population being fiercely attacked during the first phase, my
19 question was whether the tactics of the Croatian armed forces mentioned by
20 Mr. Kadijevic in his book, namely to group armed formations in Krajina, to
21 spread fear by constantly issuing threats, mostly directed at the Knin
22 Krajina, to occasionally attack appropriately selected populated
23 settlements and to use these tactics in order to break down the Serb
24 morale and prepare an all-out attack against Serbian Krajina in its
25 entirety or partially; bearing this in mind, bearing in mind the situation
1 that existed at the time, in your view was it appropriate, in view of the
2 constitutional role of the armed forces of the federation to protect the
3 Serb population?
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you really hope to get an
5 answer to this question? You've been asking this question in different
6 forms for the last 15 minutes. The witness has given you what he says is
7 his answer. What do you want -- do you want to beat him into saying what
8 you want him to say? You don't want to accept what he's telling you?
9 Because now you're asking the same question over and over again, in
10 different forms, and we are not making progress. If you think that this
11 witness is not answering your questions, it's for you to argue at the end
12 of the case that the witness did not answer your questions and -- but to
13 try and browbeat him now is not going to make progress. It's not going to
14 give you the answer you want. He's giving you the answers as he
15 understands them and that's how he's answering you. He's been telling you
16 that he can't use one source to analyse. He's got to use several sources.
17 He's given you this answer many times. What do you expect from this
19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for
20 this caution. I'm expecting the witness to give an answer to the
21 following question: Is defending the civilian population something that
22 is in conformity with the constitutional role of the armed forces? This
23 witness quotes General Kadijevic and General Kadijevic says that it was
24 the constitutional role of the armed forces, and then the witness draws a
25 conclusion that this reflected a radical change of the constitutional role
1 of the armed forces. I will not, however, insist any longer on this
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, if you allow me, I think we move from
4 protecting the Serb population to defending the civilian population, and
5 again it is not me who states or who concludes that there is a radical
6 change. The word "radical" is a direct quotation from the book of
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed that's what I wanted to say to
9 Mr. Milovancevic. Thank you very much, Mr. Theunens. Mr. Milovancevic,
10 if you look at page 72, where -- of the report, you will see under
11 paragraph 2, paragraph 2 under the heading evolution of the mission of the
12 JNA during the conflict in Croatia, that he -- the witness there says,
13 this implied, according to Kadijevic, that the two constitutionally
14 defined tasks of the SFRY armed forces, including the JNA, defence against
15 an external and internal aggression, were, "radically" changed into. He's
16 quoting. It's not his conclusion. It's not this witness's conclusion.
17 This witness is quoting.
18 So please, as you attack him for quoting the book out of context,
19 don't misquote him, too. You were asking him the question -- you were
20 asking him the question is defending the civilian population something
21 that is in conformity with the constitutional role of the armed forces.
22 Mr. Theunens, will you answer that question, please?
23 THE WITNESS: As such, Your Honour, indeed that was part of the
24 constitutional mission of the SFRY armed forces.
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not asking you what part it was. The question
1 is, is defending a civilian population in conformity with the
2 constitutional obligation? Your answer should be yes or no.
3 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour, yes.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may ask the next
5 question, Mr. Milovancevic.
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
7 Q. On page 74 of your report, you say that in the second phase of the
8 armed conflict in Croatia, the JNA had two tasks. Prior to that, on page
9 73, you say that the second phase began in late summer of 1991 with the
10 attacks of the Croats against military units and garrisons in Croatia, and
11 that this phase continued until the Vance Plan was accepted; is that
13 A. Your Honour, it's General Kadijevic who identifies these phases in
14 his book and who defines the events that mark the start and the end of the
15 different phase. It's not me who did that.
16 Q. While preparing your expert report, did you come across some
17 information indicating that such armed attacks against the JNA units and
18 garrison in Croatia from September of 1991 until the implementation of the
19 Vance Plan existed?
20 A. Indeed, Your Honours, I've come across information from various
21 sources, open sources, JNA situation reports and even witness statements,
22 if I recall well, that indicate that from September 1991 onwards, a number
23 of JNA barracks and garrisons in Croatia were blocked and in some cases
24 even the term "besieged" was used.
25 Q. Did you hear about the Brioni memorandum from July of 1991,
1 Mr. Theunens?
2 A. Yes, Your Honours, I heard of the Brioni memorandum or Brioni
3 agreement of July 1991.
4 Q. Does the Brioni memorandum represent an agreement drafted with the
5 facilitation provided by the European Community, and was it aimed to delay
6 or postpone the secession of Slovenia and Croatia by three months?
7 A. Your Honours, I remember that the postponement of the declaration
8 of independence was one of the points of the Brioni agreement but I don't
9 know whether that was a, or the, specific goal, nor am I familiar with the
10 other goals or points of the Brioni agreement, and I should add the
11 postponement of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia to
12 complete my answer.
13 Q. Have you seen that document at all, the Brioni agreement,
14 mandating this moratorium?
15 A. I believe I've seen the Brioni agreement prior to coming to the
16 ICTY, but I don't recall seeing it during my professional activities at
17 the ICTY.
18 Q. Since you say that you have seen the agreement and you know in
19 general terms that it provided for the postponement of the declaration of
20 independence of Slovenia and Croatia by three months, does this mean that
21 the second phase of the armed conflict in Croatia began during this
22 three-months' moratorium, since second phase, as you say, started in
24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you refer us to where the witness mentioned
25 three months, Mr. Milovancevic, on the text, on the transcript?
1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm not saying
2 that the witness mentioned it. It is simply a general provision contained
3 in the Brioni memorandum.
4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, your question is -- since you
5 said that you have seen the -- your question is, since you say that you
6 have seen the agreement and you know in general terms that it provided for
7 the postponement of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and
8 Croatia by three months; this is what you say he says. You are
9 attributing words to him that he has never mentioned now you're saying you
10 didn't attribute those words.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my question
12 contained two sentences; perhaps based on which one could have gained such
13 an impression. It wasn't my intention to put words in the witness's
14 mouth. Let me clarify, please, in order to ensure that it is clear to
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just put a question, one question, don't make two
17 questions. Put one question to the witness.
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that the Brioni memorandum dated 7th of
20 July 1991 contained a provision about a moratorium which would last for
21 three months?
22 A. Your Honours, I remember that the Brioni agreement or memorandum
23 contained a provision for the postponement of the declaration of
24 independence of Slovenia and Croatia but I don't recall exactly how many
25 months this postponement was supposed to last.
1 Q. A while ago you said that you came across some information which
2 indicated that during the so-called second phase of the armed conflict in
3 Croatia, the Croatian forces launched attacks on the JNA units and
4 garrisons in Croatia. These JNA units and garrisons, were they present in
5 Croatia prior to this happening for many years?
6 A. Your Honours, it would be more correct to say that I did come
7 across information that according to which, from the beginning of
8 September onwards or from end of August, Croats started to block and in
9 some cases even besiege certain barracks and garrisons of the JNA in
10 Croatia. I didn't analyse that aspect in detail because it is outside the
11 framework of my report, so I'm not in a position which force or which
12 units were exactly involved in or which individuals were exactly involved
13 in blocking or even besieging JNA barracks, nor am I in a position to say
14 which barracks were being blocked or besieged and for how long time.
15 Q. Mr. Theunens, were these barracks and garrisons that were blocked
16 part of an infrastructure that was present not only in Croatia, which was
17 one of the federal units of Yugoslavia but in other parts of Yugoslavia as
18 well, for quite a long time?
19 A. Your Honours, for the few examples I remember, the answer would be
20 affirmative, but again, if -- I cannot give an answer without having
21 studied the entire situation.
22 Q. Do you have any knowledge of the fact that the units and garrisons
23 that were blocked and under attack mostly located in towns in the Republic
24 of Croatia because that was the way the barracks were spread out in the
25 former Yugoslavia?
1 A. Your Honours, the examples I recall indeed some of the barracks
2 were located in cities. Now, I wouldn't want to expand that answer for
3 all the JNA barracks and garrisons because I haven't studied that aspect
4 of the conflict in detail.
5 Q. In many parts of your report, you talk of the constitutional
6 position of the armed forces of the SFRY, including who issued orders on
7 the engagement of this armed force. Wasn't the SFRY Presidency the one
8 that ordered the engagement of units under the SFRY legislation and
9 constitution? And I have the year 1991 in mind.
10 A. Your Honours, it is correct that according to the SFRY
11 constitution, it was up to the SFRY Presidency as it was the Supreme
12 Command, to issue orders to the SFRY armed forces. However, as I've also
13 attempted to point out in the section of the report we are discussing at
14 the moment, there are indications, and one source for that is the book by
15 Borisav Jovic, last days of the SFRY, that in the course of 1991, some
16 kind of parallel command structure became active which did not include all
17 the members of the SFRY Presidency. And this is for example mentioned on
18 page 69, subparagraph 3, where I refer to the published diary of Borisav
20 Q. According to the strict provisions of the SFRY constitution and
21 the law on the armed forces, could anyone apart from the SFRY Presidency
22 order the engagement of the SFRY armed forces and their involvement in
24 A. Your Honours, I think I've answered that question in the
25 previous -- my previous answer.
1 Q. Does this answer of yours mean that under the constitution there
2 wasn't any other body apart from the SFRY Presidency that could order the
3 engagement the SFRY armed forces? And please answer with a yes or no.
4 A. According to the constitution, the answer would be yes.
5 Q. Do you know who ordered the blockade of the JNA garrisons and the
6 launching of attacks on the JNA units and garrisons in Croatia which
7 lasted from August through to the implementation of the Vance Plan in
9 A. Your Honours, I think I will again repeat myself but the few
10 examples I do recall, there I think it was a combination of maybe local
11 authorities on the Croatian level who ordered such a blockade, as well as
12 spontaneous movements of certain people in Croatia who believed that it
13 was useful to blockade certain JNA barracks or garrisons. Now, this is
14 obviously not authoritative answer because I have not studied the block or
15 the blockade of JNA barracks and garrisons in Croatia in detail so I don't
16 know which command structures, if any, were behind these blockades.
17 Q. You say that the local authorities or the population themselves
18 decided to block the JNA units and garrisons and attack them. Would not
19 this, in your terminology, in military terminology, mean that an armed
20 rebellion occurred?
21 A. Maybe I was incomplete in my previous answer because I seem to
22 recall now that there were media statements at the time by
23 President Tudjman, the president of Croatia, where he called or announced
24 blockades of barracks, and I think that was in September 1991. Now, to
25 answer your question, blockades can also be carried out by peaceful means
1 so it doesn't have to be an armed rebellion.
2 Q. Since the blockade, whatever its character was, turned into armed
3 attacks that lasted until the Vance Plan came into force, were these armed
4 attacks, in fact, an armed rebellion or not, in military terminology?
5 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure whether the blockades lasted until the
6 coming into effect or the coming into force of the Vance Plan. The Vance
7 Plan was agreed upon on the second of January but its implementation
8 started later and was a gradual process. And because I didn't study the
9 blockades as such, I cannot draw a conclusion on whether it was an armed
10 rebellion or whether it was rebellion or whether it was something else.
11 And I apologise but I add that it was the 2nd of January 1992 for the
12 signing of the Vance Plan.
13 Q. Do you know the Geneva agreement which was signed on the 23rd
14 November 1991, by -- which was facilitated by a special envoy of the
15 United Nations, Mr. Vance, and the then-president of the Republic of
16 Croatia, Mr. Tudjman, then the president of Serbia, Milosevic, and
17 General Kadijevic, the chief of the General Staff of the JNA?
18 A. Your Honours, at that time, General Kadijevic was the federal
19 Secretary for People's Defence and because a state of imminent threat of
20 war had been declared, Kadijevic also carried out the duties of the Chief
21 of Staff of the staff of the Supreme Command. I did mention the
22 November -- 23rd of November 1991 cease-fire agreement in my report
23 without, however, going into details as to the various aspects of the
24 cease-fire agreement..
25 Q. If the special envoy of the UN General secretary Mr. Vance
1 interceded on behalf of the UN for a cessation of the conflict on the
2 ground, did this thus -- did it not mean that there were armed conflicts
3 on the ground at the time and not just merely blockades?
4 A. Indeed, Your Honours, but, and that's also visible through the
5 report. In addition, I mean blockades were only one aspect of the
6 conflict. The operations that took place in areas that were considered
7 Serb, and I'm quoting now actually Mr. Kadijevic, he mentions the Serbian
8 regions in Croatia. There were in many areas combat operations between
9 local Serbs according to documents I have seen often supported by JNA or
10 at least JNA and local Serb TO working together under single command as
11 well as Croatian forces on the other side, or even operations led by JNA,
12 including also local Serb TO and SAO Krajina MUP, in order to establish
13 Serbian control over certain areas considered Serbian, Kijevo being one of
14 the examples. So the blockade is only one aspect of the conflict.
15 Q. You mentioned a while ago that President Tudjman had called on the
16 population to block the barracks. Wasn't such conduct by the president of
17 the state an invitation to a rebellion?
18 A. Your Honours, I think this is a political question which is
19 outside the framework of my report and which -- for which I'm unqualified
20 to provide an authoritative answer.
21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps this may
22 be the appropriate time for a break, if you agree.
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic. We will
24 adjourn and come back at quarter to.
25 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.
3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Q. Before the break, Mr. Theunens, we discussed the president of
5 Croatia, Tudjman's call on the population to mount the blockade of the JNA
6 barracks and units. And that is what we will pursue.
7 You mentioned the Geneva agreement of 23rd November 1991, which
8 was reached with the facilitation of Mr. Vance. I'd like to know whether
9 this agreement was an interlude to the peacekeeping operation of the UN in
10 Yugoslavia, in your opinion?
11 A. That is correct, Your Honours. The 23rd of November 1991 Geneva
12 cease-fire agreement was considered a prelude or a precursor to the
13 signing of the Vance Plan which regulated the peacekeeping operation in
14 Croatia and -- okay.
15 Q. You said that the Vance Plan regulated the peacekeeping operations
16 in Croatia. Doesn't the Vance Plan provide for the peacekeeping operation
17 in Yugoslavia, in fact, that's what it was called, rather than in Croatia
19 A. It is correct, Your Honours, that the aim of the Vance Plan was to
20 create the conditions, peace and security, that would allow a peaceful
21 solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia, as it is officially called. Now,
22 if I remember well, when it comes to the implementation of the Vance Plan
23 and the deployment of peacekeeping forces, most of these forces were
24 deployed in Croatia. I mean by this that the UNPAs, the UN-protected
25 areas covered only territory -- that was part of the Republic of Croatia.
1 Q. Where the UN forces are deployed is one matter, whereas the title
2 of the peace operation in a country is a different matter. Wasn't the
3 official title of the peace operation the peace operation in Yugoslavia,
4 yes or no?
5 A. Yes, Your Honours, I meant -- I replied to the previous question
6 that the aim of the Vance Plan was to create conditions with regard to
7 peace and security, to allow a political solution or to allow negotiations
8 for a political solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Mr. Theunens, you seem to be evading the answer. You said that
10 the UN peace plan provided for the peace operation in Croatia, whereas my
11 question to you is: Isn't the UN peace plan -- wasn't the UN peace plan
12 put in place to conduct peace operations in Yugoslavia?
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, I think just the question above
14 this one, the answer above this question that you've asked says, "Yes,
15 Your Honours, I meant -- I replied to the previous question that the aim
16 of the Vance Plan was to create conditions with regard to peace and
17 security, to allow a political solution or to allow negotiations for a
18 political solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia." How is he evading
19 your question? He's agreed with you that it was Yugoslavia indeed.
20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, respectfully, the
21 witness always answers my questions with "yes, but," so I'm never really
22 sure whether the yes part or the but part prevails. I merely asked the
23 witness to answer with a yes or no, rather than provide a detailed
24 explanation. That is why I insisted that the witness answer with a yes or
25 no or I don't know, and if he knows the answer, then he should tell us
1 what it is that he knows.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: There was no "but" in the answer that he gave,
3 Mr. Milovancevic.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honour, he
5 provided an explanation in addition to his affirmative answer, which has
6 the overall undertone of a "but". However, we can proceed.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Page 119 of your expert report, and on two occasions during your
10 testimony you stated that the Vance Plan was concluded on the 2nd of
11 January 1992 by Tudjman and Milosevic. Do you know that these persons did
12 not sign any sort of agreement or pact on that day?
13 A. The information I included in the report, Your Honours, reflects
14 the information I saw when compiling this report.
15 Q. Can you refer us to any document which would indicate what you
16 said, that Tudjman and Milosevic signed the Vance Plan on the 2nd of
17 January 1992?
18 A. Your Honours, it is correct that I didn't include a specific
19 footnote to substantiate the first sentence on page 119, but if I recall
20 well, it comes from the NIOD chronology I've used and other occasions in
21 the report. I don't have the exact 65 ter number but the NIOD,
22 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation -- it should actually be
23 NIOD -- compiled a chronology of the conflict between 1991 and 1995,
24 referring mainly to open and press sources. Now, it may well be that
25 Tudjman and Milosevic didn't sign the agreement but at least one way or
1 the other they agreed to it because otherwise, I don't think that there
2 would be a UN mission in Croatia. Now, if they agreed verbally, that's
3 fine with me too.
4 Q. Mr. Theunens, the report of NIOD is incorrect because Ambassador
5 Okun, a witness of the Prosecution in Milosevic trial on transcript page
6 19650 to 19651 stated that what is usually considered the Vance Plan is
7 actually a document containing four documents, one being the Geneva
8 Convention, signed on the 23rd of December 1991. The second document is a
9 cease-fire agreement reached between Raseta and Susak on the 2nd of
10 February 1992. These two documents established the situation on the
11 ground and end of hostilities. The third document is a concept for peace
12 operations dated the 3rd of December 1991, and it established technical
13 details, it defined technical details about the location of UNPA zones and
14 so on. The fourth document is a resolution of the Security Council of the
15 United Nations, number 743, dated the 21st of February 1992, which created
16 the peace operation. Are you familiar with these documents, Mr. Theunens?
17 A. Your Honours, I would like to thank Mr. Milovancevic for this
18 clarification. I'm familiar with a number of these documents, in
19 particular the United Nations Security Council resolution 743. Now, again
20 I leave it to Your Honours whether the difference between what I wrote in
21 my report and what Mr. Milovancevic explained has a significant impact for
22 the -- on the subject of my report. I would also like to draw your
23 attention to the Exhibit number 65 ter number 917, which was the source I
24 consulted or the main source I consulted to describe the Vance Plan, 65
25 ter number 917 are the international conference on the former Yugoslavia
1 official papers dating from 1997, and you can find them under the English
2 ERN 01145409, 01145415.
3 Q. Mr. Theunens, I put to you that all documents that exist, and all
4 exhibits that exist, point to the fact that there was no meeting between
5 Milosevic and Tudjman on the 2nd of January 1992, that no kind of
6 agreement, either verbal or written one, was concluded on that date.
7 Additionally, there is no way to tie that date with the Vance Plan, as you
8 did it. What do you say to that?
9 A. Your Honours, based on my information, the Vance Plan was accepted
10 on the 2nd of January. Now, if that information is correct I'm willing to
11 accept that. Still, I want to emphasise that if there had been no
12 agreement from Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Milosevic with the Vance Plan, it would
13 have been very hard to establish the UN peacekeeping mission in
15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, the witness has not answered the
16 issue as to whether or not there was a meeting, for what it's worth.
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the information in my report on the
18 top of page 119 is that Tudjman and Milosevic signed the plan. Now, maybe
19 they didn't sign at the same time so I don't imply that there was a
20 meeting. And again, if that is not entirely correct, I'm willing to
21 accept the points made by Mr. Milovancevic but I don't think that has an
22 impact on the essence, on actually the subject matter, where what is
23 really -- which is really important for this -- in this context.
24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. The essence that I'm trying to highlight, Mr. Theunens, is that
1 the peace operation of the UN in Yugoslavia, known as the Vance Plan, is
2 not some kind of a document signed by Milosevic and Tudjman. Rather, it's
3 a UN Security Council resolution. Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?
4 A. It is correct that United Nations Security Council resolution 743
5 deals with the Vance Plan and there is also a second, or there are at
6 least two other resolutions that deal with the deployment of the
7 peacekeeping forces.
8 Q. Given that you have said that the Vance Plan, let us call it that,
9 could not have been accepted had it not been given approval by Milosevic
10 and Tudjman on the 2nd of January 1992, so the 2nd of January 1992. Do
11 you know that the peace operation defined by the resolution 743 of the UN
12 Security Council of the 21st of February 1992, was adopted after the
13 Secretary-General of the UN, in his report dated the 15th of February
14 1992, gave recommendations for the peace operation to be put in place?
15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, Mr. Milovancevic, you have lost me.
16 Could you rephrase that question, make it a bit more direct and condense
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my question was
19 whether Mr. Theunens knew that the UN peace operation was not put into
20 place until the recommendation was given by the Secretary-General to
21 implement the operation? And he gave that recommendation on the 15th of
22 February 1992. That was the gist of my question.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I have read the report the
24 Secretary-General drafted for the Security Council on the 21st of February
25 1992, and I do remember that in that report, reference is made to meetings
1 Mr. Marek Goulding, if I'm correct, he was the chief of the department for
2 peacekeeping operations, also known as DPKO at the UN so the meetings
3 Marek Goulding had with Tudjman, Milosevic, Jovic -- I'm not sure whether
4 it was Kadijevic or Adzic, and when I say meetings, I mean separate
5 meetings and that all these political and military leaders expressed their
6 support to the implementation of the Vance Plan and the deployment of a UN
7 peacekeeping force.
8 Q. Do you know that precisely in that document that you just
9 remembered, Mr. Theunens, it is clearly stated that the Secretary-General
10 gave the recommendation only after seeing the letters dating the 6th of
11 February 1992 and the 11th of February 1992 in which President Tudjman
12 accepted such a mission, and after Borisav Jovic, president of the
13 committee for the cooperation between Yugoslavia and the UN, informed him
14 on the 11th of February 1992, that the assembly of the Republic of Serbian
15 Krajina consented to the plan?
16 A. Your Honours, if Mr. Milovancevic is reading from the report, and
17 then I believe him, I don't recall the exact dates but otherwise I
18 mentioned already in my reply to the previous question that there it was
19 an agreement of Tudjman, Milosevic, Jovic, and then also Adzic or
20 Kadijevic, I'm not sure who of the two Marek Goulding saw in his visits to
21 Croatia and Serbia.
22 Q. I'm putting these questions to you, Mr. Theunens, precisely
23 because you said that Milosevic and Tudjman accepted the Vance Plan. The
24 Secretary-General of the UN in his written report given to the Security
25 Council states that in fact this agreement was accepted by Mr. Tudjman and
1 Mr. Jovic in writing. Are these two different things, Mr. Theunens?
2 A. These are indeed two different things, Your Honours, but again as
3 we discussed earlier today we spoke about the --
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That's quite all right. I apologise for
5 interrupting you. The important thing is to establish that these are two
6 different things. I think we understood each other.
7 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I would just ask that the witness be
8 given a chance to explain. He was in the middle of explaining when he was
9 interrupted. I think he should be allowed to continue, please.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Theunens, can you finish your answer, please?
11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. What I wanted to add is
12 that even though these are different things, they are intimately related
13 to each other because without the cease-fire agreement of the 23rd of
14 November 1991, which was agreed by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic
15 during which Milosevic also gave certain guarantees to Okun that Serbian
16 volunteers and paramilitaries would abide by the agreement, without that
17 cease-fire agreement, there would have been no agreement on the Vance Plan
18 in February, as it is pointed out here.
19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. You said that the UN troops were
21 deployed to certain areas which were defined as zones and sectors. Can
22 you tell us more about these areas and how they were defined in the UN
23 peace operations plan?
24 A. Indeed, Your Honours, this is discussed on page 119 of the English
25 version of my report. In the Vance Plan, three UNPAs - UNPA stands for
1 United Nations protected area - were defined, which covered four sectors,
2 sector south, sector north, sector west and sector east. UNPAs were areas
3 or were parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia where according
4 to the UN Secretary-General, special arrangements were required during an
5 interim period in order to ensure a lasting cease-fire or the maintaining
6 of a lasting cease-fire. I've also seen descriptions for the UNPAs or
7 further detailing of these areas where it is mentioned that these are
8 areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a substantial minority prior to
9 the conflict or as a result of the conflict. And where according or as a
10 result of the conflict, armed or as part of the tensions between the
11 people, armed conflicts had erupted in recent past.
12 The document which is visible on 65 ter -- excuse, me on the
13 e-court, 65 ter number 917, also mentions that the special arrangement in
14 these UNPAs would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the
15 outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the
16 Yugoslav crisis.
17 Q. Does the Vance Plan explicitly provide that the UN troops ought
18 to be deployed to the areas where the Serb population constitutes a
19 majority or a substantial minority and in which intercommunal tensions
20 have caused a conflict to erupt?
21 A. The Vance Plan states that the UN troops are to be deployed in the
22 UNPAs and I've given the definition of the UNPAs. Now, I want to add, and
23 that's not included in the document, that the boundaries of these UNPAs
24 were the result of negotiations between Croats, Serbs and UN because, of
25 course, each party had its own views on the limits of these UNPAs,
1 geographic limits, and these had to be negotiated and that happened
2 between November and February 1992.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say that, Mr. Theunens, between November
4 and February 1992, or is it between November 1991 and February 1992.
5 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honours, November 1991 and February
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Can you refer us to a document, Mr. Theunens, where the UN troops
10 or, based on which the UN troops were deployed to areas where the Serb
11 population constitutes a majority or a substantial minority as a result of
12 an armed conflict, as you have put it? That is not stipulated in the UN
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, once again, Mr. Milovancevic, you
15 introduced a question of substantial majorities. You said -- you asked
16 the question, "Does the Vance Plan explicitly provide that the UN troops
17 ought to be deployed to the areas where the Serb population constitutes a
18 majority or a substantial minority." Now you're attributing that
19 statement to the witness or has he said it at some other stage?
20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the provision of
21 the Vance Plan pertains precisely to the areas where the Serbs constituted
22 a majority or a substantial minority. I am now putting to the witness --
23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. But the witness has
24 been saying that the Vance Plan applied in the UNPAs areas. He didn't say
25 the UNPAs areas were areas that were either -- which either had the
1 majority of Serbs or a substantial minority of Serbs. He just said it was
2 on an agreement between the three gentlemen.
3 Now, you are now saying to him that he said that those areas were
4 areas where the population of Serbs was in the majority or a substantial
5 minority. I'm just asking you if -- is that what the witness said? If it
6 is what you are proposing to him, tell him that's what you're proposing to
7 him. Don't say that's what he said.
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, line 8, page 32,
9 of the transcript contains the witness's answer to my question about where
10 the UN troops were deployed.
11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we get line 8, please?
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, line 8 and 9
13 reflects the answer of the witness to my question, where he states that
14 the UN troops were deployed to areas, and then he goes on to quote the UN
15 plan, namely the words "where the Serbs constituted a majority or a
16 substantial minority" and then he adds something that is not contained in
17 the UN plan, namely that they became that as a result of an armed
18 conflict. This is the bit that cannot be found in the Vance Plan. This
19 is what I'm putting to the witness.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm asking for page 32, line 8 to be shown, please.
21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm recognising you, but before I ask you to speak,
23 I would like to see page 32, line 8, Mr. Milovancevic, please, where you
24 say this is what the witness said.
25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is page 32
1 of the transcript, as far as I can see, line 8 and 9.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah but my screen doesn't show me page 32. I'm
3 asking to be shown page 32, line 8, Mr. Milovancevic. That's all I'm
4 asking, and if the Court officers are able to help us, they can help us.
5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honours -- if --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Black?
8 MR. BLACK: If it's helpful, Your Honour, I've been able to get it
9 on my screen I would be happy to read the sentence.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you may, please, it might just help us save
12 MR. BLACK: I think it's important to read just exactly what the
13 witness said because it's slightly different from what Mr. Milovancevic
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do so.
16 MR. BLACK: I believe the sentence at issue is, "I've also seen
17 descriptions for the UNPAs or further detailing of these areas, where it
18 is mentioned that these are areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a
19 substantial minority, prior to the conflict or as a result of the
20 conflict." I believe that's the sentence at issue.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I've also seen what?
22 MR. BLACK: I've also seen descriptions for the UNPAs, the
23 protected areas, or further detailing of these areas "where it is
24 mentioned that these are areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a
25 substantial minority prior to the conflict or as a result of the
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's not the testimony of the witness. That's a
3 quotation that the witness says --
4 MR. BLACK: Sorry, that's what the witness said. I was quoting
5 the witness.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh, you were quoting him. Thank you, Mr. Black.
7 Is that what you were referring to, Mr. Milovancevic?
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I had in
9 mind, Your Honour. Now I'm referring you to paragraph 8 of the UN
10 Security Council resolution defining the protected areas and stating there
11 would be areas in which Serbs constitute [In English] "Majority or
12 substantial minority of the population and where intercommunal tensions
13 have led to armed conflict in the recent past." [Interpretation]
14 Therefore, Your Honour, I asked the witness about the provisions of the
15 Vance Plan. I didn't ask him about what he read in other documents,
16 comments, and so on. This was the basis for my question.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, I think that the definition I
18 gave for the UNPAs corresponded with what is mentioned in the resolution.
19 Now the reason why I mentioned -- why I added that areas where Serbs
20 constitute a majority or substantial minority prior to the conflict, the
21 only reason why I did that is that when I compare during the preparation
22 of my report the territory covered by the UNPAs with maps depicting the
23 1991 census, there were areas covered by the UNPAs, for example, the
24 municipality of Slunj, where there was a Croatian majority prior to the
25 conflict, and if I recall well, I think it was 60 per cent or more than 60
1 per cent of Croats and something less than 40 per cent of Serbs, and then
2 as a result of the conflict, the Croatian or largest part of the Croatian
3 population of Slunj was removed or left. So that was the only reason why
4 I added in my reply to the question of Mr. Milovancevic the section on "as
5 a result of the conflict." It is correct that as a result of the
6 conflict, that small passage, is not mentioned in the Vance Plan nor the
7 Security Council resolution.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Did you study the statistics and statistical analysis of the
11 population in Croatia while preparing your expert report?
12 A. The results of the 1991 census, which I also include in the atlas
13 that was introduced in the beginning of my testimony, is one of the
14 informations I came across while preparing for this report, for this
15 report, but I didn't include any specific data as such in my report.
16 Q. Mr. Theunens, in your report, you mentioned that the SFRY
17 Presidency declared a state of imminent threat of war in the SFRY on the
18 1st of October 1991; is that correct?
19 A. That is correct, Your Honours. I was just locating the source. I
20 think it's the Official Gazette of the 18th of October, the SFRY Official
21 Gazette of the 18th of October. And this has the 65 ter number 1245.
22 Q. In your report on pages 76 and 77, you say that in connection with
23 this Presidency decision or, rather, after this Presidency decision, the
24 army General Veljko Kadijevic issued a public statement to the citizens of
25 Yugoslavia on the 3rd of October. Is that correct?
1 A. That is correct, Your Honours. This is 65 ter number 65, although
2 it is not a statement specifically to the citizens of Yugoslavia. It is a
3 statement also intended for the international public opinion and the
4 international community because it was also published immediately in
5 English in the English version of The Bilten, i.e. The bulletin.
6 Q. When I said that Mr. Kadijevic gave a statement addressing the
7 citizens of Yugoslavia on the 3rd of October 1991, I literally quoted the
8 name, the title of the statement, which was published in the bulletin,
9 Bilten of the SSNO and the first sentence of this statement. Does the
10 first statement read, "Citizens of Yugoslavia, members of the armed forces
11 of Yugoslavia"?
12 A. Your Honours, there is no dispute about that. It's obvious. But
13 all I wanted to add is that the statement, for example, the Office of the
14 Prosecutor -- Office of the Prosecution has only an English version of the
15 statement because we have a number of issues of the bulletin and the
16 bulletin was specifically intended to provide what the SSNO called
17 themselves the truth about the events in the former Yugoslavia and as it
18 is in English I assume that it is intended for the international community
19 and the international media, even though the statement as such, of course,
20 has in the title, "Citizens of Yugoslavia."
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Could you please read the second
22 paragraph of the statement? That's on page 77, the statement of the
23 federal secretary, the second paragraph.
24 A. Do you mean the second I have quoted in my report or the second
25 from the statement? Because I didn't include the entire statement in my
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, I mentioned the second paragraph as you indicated it
3 on page 77. Therefore, October 1991, citizens of Yugoslavia and then
4 there is one paragraph but I meant the following paragraph or, rather, on
5 page 77 that would be the fourth paragraph from the top.
6 A. Do you mean the paragraph that starts with, what is in force?
7 Q. "We have." It starts with the words, "We have."
8 A. It is second, then.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. "We have been left without a state and from what was seen and
11 heard last night about the March sessions of the Supreme Command, you
12 could also have seen once again in an obvious way what kind of Supreme
13 Commander we have. Some members of the SFRY Presidency continuously
14 prevented the making of decisions with a clear goal of breaking up
15 Yugoslavia by hindering and breaking the army. The federal Prime Minister
16 has joined them with his perfidious deceit. Such an attitude of the
17 Supreme Commander and the Prime Minister towards their own army is not
18 known anywhere else in the world."
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Does this paragraph show which session
20 of the Presidency Mr. Kadijevic has in mind? He speaks of the March
21 session and he says that the citizens had the opportunity, the previous
22 night, to view this particular Presidency session -- the March session of
23 the Presidency; is that correct?
24 A. That is correct, Your Honours, but I would like to add that my
25 paragraph B which starts on the bottom of page 66, the word "following" is
1 only intended as a kind of -- to show the chronology. I didn't imply -- I
2 didn't necessarily imply a causal link between the first of October
3 decision and the 3rd of October statement. Maybe there is a link, maybe
4 not, but I didn't analyse any causal effect between both events.
5 MR. BLACK: Your Honour that was a little confusing the witness
6 mentioned page 66. I wonder if he meant page 76.
7 THE WITNESS: I will correct. It was the bottom of page 76 where
8 I used the word "following" to make the link between the 1st of October
9 SFRY Presidency decision and then the 3rd of October Kadijevic statement.
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Black.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Theunens, at this point we are only discussing this paragraph
13 of Kadijevic's statement of the 3rd of October 1991, and my question did
14 not aim to tie up with any other events. Can one see on the basis of this
15 paragraph that General Kadijevic is addressing the citizens of Yugoslavia
16 and that he is referring to the March sessions of the Presidency of
17 Yugoslavia? I believe your answer was an affirmative one.
18 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, but I've tried to explain because the
19 statement is in English it's also addressed for the international
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That is beyond dispute.
22 When mentioning the March Presidency session, the Presidency
23 session from March 1991 when some proposals were rejected, does
24 General Kadijevic have in mind the session held on -- between the 12th and
25 the 15th of March, when the Presidency rejected the declaration of a state
1 of emergency?
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: How is this witness supposed to answer that
3 question? How is he supposed to know what is in the mind of Mr. Kadijevic
4 at this stage, if Mr. Kadijevic doesn't give a date in March himself?
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness does
6 not have to answer the question. He can say that he does not know. My
7 question to him was whether he knew or did not know about it, that the
8 statement has certain context.
9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness has been asked whether he knows what
10 Mr. Kadijevic had in mind. How is he here -- how is he supposed to know
11 what Mr. Kadijevic had in mind?
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honour, in
13 his statement, Mr. Kadijevic is referring to the session of the Presidency
14 at which some members of the Presidency made it impossible to take some
15 decisions that were to prevent the break-up of the country and backed some
16 proposals that were supposed to lead to the dissolution of the country.
17 And he links it to Ante Markovic and that's why I asked the witness
18 whether he knew that this was the particular session of the Presidency,
19 that's to say in March 1991.
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, all what you are saying has
21 nothing to do with my remarks. My remarks have to do with your
22 questioning the witness whether he knows what Mr. Kadijevic had in mind
23 when he made certain statements. I'm saying, how is this witness supposed
24 to know what is in the mind of anybody else when that person makes a
25 particular statement?
1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I
2 understand what you're saying.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Mr. Theunens, in March 1991, did the Presidency session take place
6 which we have been mentioning here at which the proposal for the
7 introduction of a state of emergency was rejected?
8 A. Your Honours, we have discussed this topic already yesterday. My
9 answer yesterday was that I remember that there has been a SFRY Presidency
10 session in March 1991 where the proposal of Kadijevic to declare a state
11 of emergency, I think it was, was rejected by the members, but I think I
12 added yesterday that I didn't analyse the minutes or other reports of SFRY
13 Presidency sessions, so I cannot go beyond the answer I gave yesterday.
14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. In the paragraph you have just read out,
15 which is Kadijevic's statement addressing the public, does Mr. Kadijevic
16 mention any other member of the SFRY Presidency in addition to the Prime
17 Minister, Ante Markovic, who, as he puts it, "prevented the making of
18 decisions with a clear goal of breaking up Yugoslavia by hindering and
19 breaking the army"? Did he mention anybody else?
20 A. Your Honours, in this particular paragraph, Mr. Kadijevic or
21 General Kadijevic speaks about the Supreme Commander we have, and then he
22 also mentions federal Prime Minister. Now, I think I was also asked
23 questions about this by Mr. Black during my examination, and the only
24 thing I could conclude from my point of view as a military analyst was
25 that the situation is very serious when the most senior military person in
1 a country expresses such views about his political Supreme Commander,
2 especially when he does that in public.
3 Q. I agree with you, Mr. Theunens, that this was indeed a serious
4 matter. However, when Mr. Kadijevic in his public statement accuses the
5 Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, and the president of the Presidency, we
6 shall not mention his name, of treason, both of the country and the army,
7 is that correct?
8 A. Your Honours, if you wish me to comment on this, I don't see the
9 word treason in the paragraph. I only see -- I mean, one can conclude
10 from reading the paragraph that General Kadijevic has very negative views
11 on his political Supreme Commander.
12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite -- I don't understand what is meant
13 by, "Is that correct?" What do you want this witness to say,
14 Mr. Milovancevic? Mr. Kadijevic said what he said. Is it for this
15 witness to come and tell us whether it was correct or not correct to say
16 what he said? Where are you going with that question?
17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The goal of my question
18 aimed -- was the conclusion of the witness, who presented this particular
19 conclusion after having quoted Mr. Kadijevic's statement and it's to be
20 found on page 78 of the report. It's at the top of the page, right below
21 the statement by Mr. Kadijevic, where the expert states, "This statement
22 not only clarified the views of the SSNO on the objectives of the JNA in
23 the conflict." The end of the sentence or rather the conclusion by
24 Mr. Theunens is, "Kadijevic did not recognise their authority and attacked
25 them in public."
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: He says nothing about correct or incorrect.
2 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure what you're saying,
4 Mr. Milovancevic. You referred us to this paragraph because you're saying
5 he said somewhere that it is correct or incorrect. I don't know.
6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The essence of my question is
7 the following, Your Honour: That the expert in this particular sentence
8 states that the Kadijevic's statement expresses the views of the SSNO in
9 relation to the objectives of the JNA. The expert quotes
10 General Kadijevic, who stated that the tasks and the role of the JNA and
11 the armed forces changed in the conflict that erupted, and explains the
12 underlying reasons. My question aimed at the following: Such a public
13 statement by General Kadijevic, is it the result of the fact that the
14 president of the state and the Prime Minister disagreed with the changing
15 of the role of the armed forces or is Mr. Kadijevic's statement in fact a
16 reaction to the conduct displayed by the president of the state and
17 Prime Minister Markovic, whom Mr. Kadijevic accuses of treason? The
18 question was rather -- was a rather long one, but that was the drift of my
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: There is just the problem, Mr. Milovancevic. I
21 still don't know what the question is after all this long statement. I'm
22 just talking about asking the witness to state whether it is correct or
23 incorrect for Kadijevic to make certain statements and I'm saying, where
24 are we going with that question? That's the essence of my query. It has
25 nothing to do with this long explanation that you've just given because I
1 do not think it takes this case anywhere for this witness to say whether
2 Kadijevic was correct or incorrect. He's only told us what Kadijevic
3 said; that's all.
4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in all respect,
5 expert witness Mr. Theunens ties up the lack of respect that Mr. Kadijevic
6 shows vis-a-vis the Prime Minister and the president of the Presidency
7 with the attempt at changing the role of the armed forces. This is the
8 link that the expert makes in his report, because at the beginning he says
9 that this statement serves to explain not only the objectives of the JNA
10 but also that Kadijevic did not recognise the authority and publicly
11 attacked the Prime Minister and head of state. My question to the expert
12 was: This public display by General Kadijevic, did it have as its goal an
13 attempt to change the role of the armed forces, or was it something else?
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Put it that way. Don't ask him whether it is
15 correct or not correct. Ask him just what you said.
16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Theunens, the attack and the lack of respect that you mention,
18 which Mr. Kadijevic, as you put it, expressed vis-a-vis the president of
19 the Presidency and the Prime Minister, did they have, as their goal, the
20 change -- the changing of the constitutional role of the armed forces?
21 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure whether I understand the question, but
22 when we stick with this statement here, 65 ter number 1850, at the bottom
23 of page 77 in my report, so in the English version, I quote the following
24 paragraph from General Kadijevic's statement. "The army now wants nothing
25 more but to restore control in the crisis areas, to protect the Serbian
1 population from persecution and annihilation and to liberate the army
2 personnel and members of their families. The condition for this is to
3 defeat the Ustasha forces." This to me seems like Kadijevic expressing a
4 mission for the armed forces, for the SFRY armed forces, and this mission
5 is not included in the constitutional missions we addressed earlier today
6 and also during my examination.
7 Q. Can you explain, Mr. Theunens, what the restoration of control in
8 the crisis area, protection of the Serbian population from persecution and
9 the liberation of the army personnel you've been mentioning, have to do
10 with the personal relations between General Kadijevic, Prime Minister
11 Markovic, and the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia?
12 A. Your Honours, I don't think I ever suggested in my report that the
13 nature of the relations between Kadijevic and the federal Prime Minister,
14 Markovic, and the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, had or were
15 the causes of the change in the mission of the JNA. The reason why I read
16 out this paragraph is the fact that it's included in the same public
17 statement Kadijevic made on the 3rd of October 1991. So if anyone -- if
18 anybody is making a link, well, from this document, it can only be
19 Kadijevic, because in one paragraph in the beginning of the report, he
20 criticises his Supreme Commander and then later on in a later paragraph in
21 his statement from the 3rd of October, he describes his views on the role
22 or what the JNA -- what the army should be doing.
23 Q. You said that you heard of the statement by President Mesic upon
24 leaving the SFRY Presidency as having said, "I've accomplished my mission.
25 Yugoslavia is no more." Do you know that Ante Markovic abandoned the
1 Yugoslav government in December 1991?
2 A. Your Honours, my report focuses on the SAO Krajina and RSK TO and
3 SVK and relations between these organisations and Milan Martic. Analysing
4 or studying developments within the SFRY executive -- federal executive
5 council, of which Ante Markovic was chief, as Prime Minister, was not part
6 or is not part of my report.
7 Q. Mr. Theunens, your task as an expert was to analyse the
8 Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina and the RSK. You seem to be
9 invoking this task of yours only when you find it inconvenient to answer a
10 question that may gainsay what you state in your thesis.
11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this is
12 an appropriate time for a break.
13 JUDGE MOLOTO: We've got two more minutes, Mr. -- unless you're
14 saying that the -- it's convenient for you. Is it a convenient time,
15 Mr. Milovancevic?
16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe so, Your Honour,
17 thank you.
18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well. We will adjourn and come back at half
19 past 12. Court adjourned.
20 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.
22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.
23 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Mr. Theunens, we've mentioned the Geneva agreement on the 23rd of
25 November 1991 signed by Mr. Kadijevic, Tudjman, Milosevic -- and Milosevic
1 in the presence of Cyrus Vance. Did this agreement provide for an urgent
3 A. Your Honours, if my recollection is correct, this agreement signed
4 in Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991 provided for a cease-fire as well
5 as included -- it included also modalities for the lifting of the
6 blockades of barracks of the JNA that were still under blockade in
8 Q. Did this agreement say what was going to happen to the blocked
9 barracks after the siege was lifted?
10 A. Your Honours, I don't recall the specific aspects of the
11 agreement. I would have to see the agreement in order to be able to
12 discuss those.
13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. On page 80 of your report, you include a
14 directive issued by the army general, Veljko Kadijevic, on the 10th of
15 December 1991. You also testified about this directive. The title of
16 this document is, "The directive on the use of the armed forces for the
17 preparation and performance of combat operations in the forthcoming
18 period." Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?
19 A. Indeed, Your Honours, that's correct.
20 Q. Mr. Theunens, would you please read out paragraph 2 of this
21 directive? It can be found on page 81 of your report.
22 A. Yes, Your Honours, and I can add that this is 65 ter number 1277.
23 So I read out the second paragraph. "In the foregoing period, the armed
24 forces of the Republic of Croatia apart from the -- increasing their
25 numbers and organisation have suffered heavy losses along the entire front
1 line especially following the fall of Vukovar which has had a significant
2 influence on the development of events at the political level. However,
3 despite this, the opponent is striving to recover parts of its lost
4 territory by constant combat activity. Therefore we must expect that in
5 the forthcoming period by means of armed strikes, attacks, and actions.
6 It will try to maintain the state of conflict with the intention of
7 causing losses to our armed forces, improving its position on the front
8 line, and influencing the political resolution of the Yugoslav crisis,
9 above all via the institutions of the EC and the UN Security Council.
10 This points to the conclusion that the war may continue for longer."
11 Q. In this directive, did Mr. Kadijevic speak about the final goals
12 of the war?
13 A. Indeed, Your Honours. Under the heading, Roman II, which follows
14 paragraph 3, at the beginning, Kadijevic says, and I will read it
15 out, "Our armed forces are entering this a new period of exceptional
16 significance for accomplishing the ultimate aims of the war, protection of
17 the Serb population, a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and the
18 creation of conditions in which Yugoslavia may be preserved for those
19 people that wish to live in it." And the paragraph continues but I think
20 that we mentioned the most relevant parts.
21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That's correct. That's precisely what I
22 had in mind.
23 Does General Kadijevic, after this, specify the tasks enumerating
24 them in items 1 through 6? You bring that on page 82 and 83 of your
25 report. Does General Kadijevic then give direct instructions to the armed
1 forces as to what needs to be done in order to raise combat readiness in
2 response to the anticipated moves of the enemy?
3 A. Your Honours, it is correct that General Kadijevic gives a number
4 of tasks. I think there are 12 -- 13 of them but I'm not sure whether
5 they are entirely in response to what he perceives as the outlook or what
6 he perceives as the probable Croatian course of action. It would be
7 logical to link what Kadijevic sees as the Croatian intentions to the
8 tasks he gives to the SFRY armed forces in order to act or pre-empt these
9 Croatian intentions, to act against or pre-empt.
10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Can you explain to us what your
11 conclusion then means, your conclusion which follows immediately the
12 quoted text of the directive, on page 83, where you state, I'm
13 paraphrasing now, that such a directive was issued by Mr. Kadijevic at the
14 time when the international community was making efforts aimed at finding
15 a peaceful settlement or a resolution?
16 A. Your Honours, the text that follows in the top of page 83, so that
17 follows the quotation from Kadijevic's directive is in my view not a
18 conclusion but it's just an observation, and the only link -- if I wanted
19 to establish a link, the only link I want to establish is that on the 10th
20 of December, Kadijevic issues this directive, whereas on the 23rd of
21 November 1991, a cease-fire agreement had been concluded. I don't think
22 you will find additional conclusions from my side on whether there is a
23 link between both and what this link then may well be.
24 Q. By presenting such a comment, do you attribute to Mr. Kadijevic
25 some war goals which would be beyond the UN peace efforts?
1 A. Your Honours, I don't understand the question. I mean the answer
2 is no. But I didn't suggest any link between both things so it's
3 difficult for me to attribute something then.
4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
5 A. If I can add, Kadijevic himself more or less states that the
6 ultimate aims of the war or more or less accomplished. He doesn't say
7 that in such strong terms in this directive but when we refer back to his
8 book, it is quite obvious that by then, what he calls the second stage or
9 the second phase of the operations in Croatia has been finalised.
10 Q. Are you trying to say that at the time when the Geneva agreement
11 was signed, the phase of the war with the goals described by Mr. Kadijevic
12 was already finalised? I didn't quite understand you.
13 A. Kadijevic in his book, when he talks about the second stage of the
14 second phase, he doesn't mention the November 1991 cease-fire agreement.
15 However, when we look at the developments of the military situation after
16 the 23rd of November until the acceptance of the Vance Plan, with the
17 exception of the Dubrovnik area, the most significant operations -- JNA
18 operations had been concluded.
19 Q. Do you believe that the JNA's obligation stemming from the Vance
20 Plan to withdraw its troops from the territory of Croatia is a significant
21 JNA operation? Is that what you believe?
22 A. Your Honours, any withdrawal operation that concerns forces of the
23 size the JNA still had in Croatia before the acceptance of the Vance Plan
24 is indeed a significant operation, no matter what significance you give to
25 the word "significant" or which meaning you give to the
1 word "significant".
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that the cease-fire agreement from
3 Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991 was the 13th cease-fire agreement
4 since the eruption of the conflict in August of 1991? Or perhaps even the
5 14th, chronologically. I'm trying to say that there were many of them.
6 A. Your Honours, there were indeed many cease-fire agreements prior
7 to the one that was signed in Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991.
8 Q. Do you know that many of such cease-fire agreements were signed
9 precisely at the insistence of the international community, the European
10 Community, and the United States?
11 A. Your Honours, even though I didn't analyse the cease-fire
12 agreements and the motives for them and the organisations or people who
13 brokered them, it is indeed obvious that the international community tried
14 to achieve a peaceful solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia and, of
15 course, in order to create the conditions to achieve such a peaceful
16 solution, a cease-fire agreement is one of the requirements.
17 Q. Did you tell us that based on the book of General Kadijevic, the
18 purpose of the second phase of the armed conflict was to defeat the
19 Croatian armed forces? Wasn't that one of the goals?
20 A. Your Honours, based on what Kadijevic writes in -- on page
21 00362709 in the English translation of his book, the task of the JNA
22 during the second phase was to, and I quote, "Protect the Serb population
23 in Croatia in such a way that all regions with a majority Serb population
24 would be completely freed from the presence of the Croatian army and the
25 Croatian authorities." Then he adds, "To pull the JNA out of Croatia by
1 first ensuring that the above task was completed." And third aspect, "To
2 carry out the continued country-wide transformation of the JNA into the
3 army of the future Yugoslavia, focusing on its internal, national, and
4 organisational structure and its territorial location." And, of course,
5 when he then details, and that's in the following pages in his book, more
6 specifically 00362710, Kadijevic specifies the missions during the two
7 stages he distinguishes in what he calls the second phase of the conflict
8 in Croatia.
9 Q. On the basis of your experience as a military expert and as a
10 military person, 13 interruptions of a mission can represent an obstacle
11 for attaining a military goal.
12 A. Your Honours, I mean, I can give a general answer but it all
13 depends on the mission and the kind of interruption. It's obvious that if
14 you try to achieve something, whatever you do, whether it's a military
15 goal or you pursue a political goal or another goal, if you're
16 interrupted, then it hinders you in achieving that goal, that's correct.
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. We said that on the 23rd of November
18 1991, in Geneva, the foundation was created for the UN peace operation.
19 That was the preparation for the Vance Plan. Would you agree with that?
20 A. Yes, I agree with that, Your Honours.
21 Q. Are you familiar with the UN Secretary-General's report submitted
22 to the Security Council, number S-23280, dated the 11th of December 1991?
23 In this report, the Secretary-General warns the Security Council of the
24 dangers that the UN peace mission could encounter in the form of premature
25 recognition of seceding republics?
1 A. Your Honours I may have seen this specific report of the UN
2 Secretary-General to the Security Council before coming to the ICTY but I
3 don't recall seeing it while working at the ICTY. I am familiar with the
4 reports from February 1992 as well as the one I think from 28th of
5 September 1992 which is quoted in my report and also one from November
6 1992 which is also mentioned in my report.
7 Q. Since you followed these reports in relation to your work, may I
8 remind you that on the 11th of December 1991, the UN Secretary-General
9 informs the Security Council of the information he received from Cyrus
10 Vance, the UN special envoy, about the fact that the premature recognition
11 of republics which want to secede would represent a disaster for the
13 A. If you say so, I assume it's correct, but it would be helpful for
14 me to see the report and to also see in which context Mr. Vance makes
15 these comments and look at the other parts of the report.
16 Q. We have an e-court system here. Defence has a minor technical
17 problem and we will attempt to resolve it later on and show you this
18 document, which is report S-23280 of the UN Secretary-General dated the
19 11th of December 1991. In that report, Mr. Theunens, the
20 Secretary-General not only warns the Security Council of the dangers
21 associated with premature recognition but also writes a letter to the
22 presiding chairman of the European council, Mr. van den Broek, warning him
23 of this danger and asking him not to recognise any of the republics prior
24 to finding an overall solution to the crisis. Are you familiar with this
1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I interrupt, Mr. Milovancevic? Is there any
2 way the officials can help with the technical problem you have?
3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have in front of
4 me the report. However, it's been underlined, and I don't think it is
5 suitable to show it to the witness in this form. Therefore I propose that
6 we do it later. I have no --
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. So it's not a technical problem. You
8 may proceed.
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Do you know when Vatican recognised the independence of Slovenia
11 and Croatia?
12 A. Your Honours, I do not know when the Vatican recognised the
13 independence of Slovenia and Croatia.
14 Q. If I were to tell you that the Vatican recognised Croatia or
15 rather Slovenia as an independent country on the 13th of January 1992,
16 whereas Germany and some other European countries did that on the 15th of
17 January 1992, would you say that was reasonable?
18 A. Your Honours, I think that that is correct, that these are the
19 dates when certain countries, including Germany, recognised Slovenia and
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, when we discussed the acceptance of the Vance Plan
22 or rather the UN Security Council resolution 743 from February 1992, did
23 we conclude that the peace operation in Yugoslavia was created in February
24 of 1992 pursuant to a Security Council resolution?
25 A. Do you mean the UN peace operation? Because there were other
1 peace efforts ongoing --
2 Q. My apologies. Yes. I mean the UN peace operation.
3 A. Yes. You could phrase it like that. I mean, if you take UN
4 Security Council resolution 743 as the basis, then it would be correct.
5 Q. You said that one of the goals and objectives for deployment of
6 the peace forces throughout Yugoslavia pursuant to that resolution was to
7 create conditions for peace in order to achieve an overall settlement of
8 the Yugoslav crisis; is that correct?
9 A. That is correct, Your Honours. But now that I see the transcript,
10 the deployment of peace forces was mainly in Croatia. The UNPROFOR
11 headquarters initially was located in Sarajevo, but I'm not aware of any
12 significant deployment of UN peace forces in -- at that stage in other
13 republics of the former Yugoslavia, and I'm mainly thinking of Slovenia or
15 Q. Does the Vance Plan provide for the UN peace operation in
16 Yugoslavia and does it specify all of the goals that are to be achieved in
17 the course of that operation?
18 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, the Vance Plan as I mentioned during my
19 examination consists of three phases and the things that had to be
20 achieved during these three phases could be considered the goals of the
21 Vance Plan as well as the goals that were to be pursued at a later stage.
22 Q. Do you know that the decision to send the UN peace mission to
23 Yugoslavia and to establish UNPROFOR was to find a peaceful settlement of
24 the crisis and of the conflict without prejudging its outcome? Do you
25 remember that something to that effect was stated in the text?
1 A. Indeed, the Vance Plan mentions that more specifically in relation
2 to the UNPAs, that the arrangements are of an interim nature and that they
3 are intended to create conditions of peace and security in order to allow
4 negotiations for political solution, and also that this deployment does
5 not prejudge the outcome of these negotiations for a comprehensive
7 Q. Since the Vance Plan emphasises that it does not wish to prejudge
8 the political negotiations for the comprehensive settlement of the crisis
9 does not the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by some
10 countries prejudge the outcome of the negotiations, in your opinion?
11 A. Your Honours, I think this is a political question, but I can
12 mention that I can add that the resolutions, UN -- United Nations Security
13 Council resolutions that were adopted in 1992 and that deal specifically
14 with the situation in Croatia emphasise the territorial integrity of the
15 Republic of Croatia.
16 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. However, the UN peace operation was intended
17 for Yugoslavia. All at once, there is discussion of an independent
18 Croatia. Does not this -- does this not constitute a prejudging of the
19 situation even by the Security Council?
20 A. Your Honours, I don't think that I'm the appropriate person to
21 answer that question. I can give a personal comment on it but I wonder to
22 what extent I'm qualified to do so. All I can say is that the -- as I
23 mentioned already, that the resolution that concern the deployment of
24 UNPROFOR and subsequent resolution that -- resolutions that deal with the
25 extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR mention the territorial integrity of
1 the Republic of Croatia.
2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. We shall briefly go back to page 83 of
3 your report, where, following the quotation of parts of the directive by
4 Mr. Kadijevic and the order by General Adzic, under paragraph F on page
5 83, you say, "The instructions from what remained of the SFRY Presidency,
6 Kadijevic's analysis and Adzic's order, indicate that the JNA moved
7 towards ceasing to be the SFRY army and instead gradually developed into a
8 mainly Serb force serving Serbian goals." Is that correct?
9 A. I would like to add, Your Honours, that this -- in this
10 subparagraph F, it says that at least in Croatia, the JNA moved towards
11 ceasing to be the SFRY army and instead gradually developed into a mainly
12 Serb force. I think that's a significant aspect of the conclusion I draw
13 here because I only look at the mission and the way how the JNA is
14 implementing that in Croatia, not in the other parts of the former
16 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. That's precisely my question. Can you tell us
17 which were these Serb goals that the JNA served in Croatia and that you
18 mention here?
19 A. Your Honours, I think we have -- I've discussed them but again,
20 let's go back to the book of Kadijevic. Kadijevic and more specifically
21 we don't have to go to each phase in detail but when we go to the second
22 phase, he talks about, and I'm reading now from page 73, subparagraph B
23 between brackets, "The task of the JNA was to protect the Serb people in
24 Croatia in such a way that all regions with a majority Serb population
25 would be completely freed from the presence of the Croatian army and the
1 Croatian authorities."
2 It clearly mentions Serb population. It doesn't mention what is
3 to happen with the non-Serbs because, again, and that's maybe outside of
4 the scope of my report but when the Kadijevic says that regions with a
5 majority Serb population would be completely present -- completely freed
6 from the presence of the Croatian army and the Croatian authorities, now,
7 the question that then can be raised is what is to happen with non-Serbs
8 who live in these areas and who want to stay in an area that is controlled
9 by the Croatian authorities? Kadijevic doesn't address that.
10 Now, we can continue when we look at the next pages, and when
11 Kadijevic specifies the missions during the second phase, he talks about
12 the first stage, which I discuss on page 74 in my report, English version,
13 subparagraph D, first stage, "the operations focused primarily on
14 tactically important counterattacks until Croatian aggression came fully
15 to fore, while at the same time intensively organising and preparing Serb
16 in Croatia." He specifies that further. I'm not going to read that out
17 in detail. It can be found in my report.
18 When coming then to the second stage of the second phase, which is
19 mentioned -- which is explained - excuse me - on page 76 of the English
20 version of my report, Kadijevic mentions "the main tasks, of the modified
21 plan," I can only mention -- I can mention the two of them. First one,
22 "in close coordination with the Serb insurgents, all subregions in
23 Croatia except for a part in Western Slavonia were liberated and he states
24 that this corresponds with approximately one third of the territory of the
25 Republic of Croatia," and then second task, "the future army of the
1 Serbian Krajina was actually built up in the course of fighting and
2 equipped by the JNA with corresponding arms and materials." I think that
3 Kadijevic is much better placed than me to identify these goals, these
4 Serbian goals, that are mentioned.
5 Q. Your answer was rather long, but failed to give an answer to my
6 question. I did not ask you about what General Kadijevic had to say about
7 the goals but, rather, about your conclusion on page 93 that -- or rather,
8 83, that the JNA's role changed in the direction of merely serving the
9 Serb goals. My question to you was: Which were these Serb goals?
10 A. Your Honours, if you have the most senior person in a country
11 identify in great detail goals the armed forces of that country had to
12 pursue, who am I to have doubts about these goals? I can only repeat what
13 Kadijevic said. Why should I try to conclude something else? I think
14 Kadijevic is very clear, as well as the orders and statements that
15 Kadijevic and Adzic issued during the latter half of 1991. There is no
16 reason for me to draw additional conclusions from that.
17 Q. Mr. Theunens, this is your military expert report. In addition to
18 General Kadijevic's book, you cited a number of documents on the basis of
19 an analysis of all these documents, you state here that the JNA served the
20 Serb goals whereas General Kadijevic and Adzic speak of the protection of
21 the Serb population. Can you remember see the difference there?
22 A. Your Honours, Kadijevic and Adzic indeed mention the protection of
23 the Serb population but Kadijevic also, as I just read out, mentions the
24 liberation of Serb regions. Now, Serb regions as such were not defined in
25 Croatia, as far as my research allows me to conclude. There were of
1 course areas with a significant Serb presence, Serb majority and already
2 for centuries. There is no doubt about that. But in these areas there
3 were also non-Serbs. Now, when you read Kadijevic's book, actually the
4 goal there, he understands or he sees liberating these areas as removing
5 Croatian military and Croatian authority. Now, I think the goal there is
6 pretty obvious. The organising of the future army of the Serbian Krajina
7 I think that is also quite clear as a goal. So I don't -- I really don't
8 know what I can add to that.
9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I will not insist on this
10 matter any further, Your Honour, but I believe that the witness did not
11 answer my question as to what the Serb goals were. He spoke of the JNA's
12 withdrawal of the forces, a blockade of the barracks, the creation of the
13 forces of the RSK, all these are goals that General Kadijevic mentions,
14 who, I should say in passing, was born to one of whose parents were Croat.
15 I have no further questions, thank you.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic.
17 Any re-examination?
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. I meant in relation to
19 this topic, Your Honour. I apologise. I only wish to say that I will not
20 pursue the matter of the Serbian goals any longer. Thank you.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic.
22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was just
23 informed that we do have the UN report which is number 65 ter number 813
24 on e-court. This is the report dated 11 December 1991. When I said that
25 we had some technical difficulties, I meant the Defence had technical
1 difficulties rather than that we were not offered enough assistance by
2 court officers.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. You are now better
5 MR. BLACK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I don't have any objection to
6 looking at this document but it does raise a procedural point which I
7 think should be addressed now. I have not -- I was not aware that this
8 document was going to be used. It's on our 65 ter list. I don't have any
9 problem with it being used but ordinarily the practice at this Tribunal is
10 at the beginning of cross-examination, we are provided with a documents
11 that the Defence intends to use during cross-examination. They can be
12 released to e-court, in fact is I believe how the process was explained to
13 me. That was not done in this case. It's not a problem with there
14 document but I can imagine at sometimes documents that come up a that I
15 haven't seen and I might have to ask for a delay in order to prepare. I
16 can see no reason beyond simple surprise why these kind of documents
17 couldn't be released or identified to me at the beginning of
18 cross-examination rather than piecemeal as we go through the
20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you have any response?
21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the practice
22 indicated by my learned colleague from the OTP may prevail before some of
23 the Trial Chambers but I believe that such a burden placed on the Defence
24 would prejudice its cross-examination, on the one side. Only after the
25 Prosecutor completes his examination-in-chief can the Defence decide which
1 documents it will use during cross-examination. I don't think that such
2 obligations placed on the Defence can be realised. Besides, this is an
3 exhibit from the Prosecution's 65 ter list. We did experience some
4 technical difficulties. However, since the witness himself stated that it
5 would be good for him to see the document, the Defence did it -- its
6 utmost to make sure that the document was presented both to the witness
7 and the Trial Chamber.
8 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I'm sorry, one thing just to clarify, I'm
9 certainly not suggesting that if during the course of direct examination
10 or particularly during the course of cross-examination it becomes apparent
11 that Defence counsel needs to refer to some other document that was not on
12 his list, they would certainly be free to do that. I'm not suggesting
13 that their hands be tied by any list that they provide to us. But if this
14 was -- again I'm not objecting to this particular document but all such
15 documents as could reasonably be identified at the beginning of
16 cross-examination should be provided to us. We, of course, provide a list
17 of documents to the Defence before we start our direct examination, and
18 while I'm not suggesting either that they have to do that in advance, as
19 we do, certainly at the beginning of cross seems like the reasonable time,
20 Your Honour. That's my request, going into the future.
21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Black, do you have any Rule of the Tribunal on
22 which you rely for that position?
23 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, as far as I'm aware, this does not appear
24 in the Rules of Evidence and Procedure. I'm relying on my experience in
25 the Limaj trial which was included last year and also in the Brdjanin
1 trial which concluded a couple of years ago. I'm not aware of any case
2 that it was done differently although certainly that may have happened on
3 cases in which I did not participate. I can try to collect jurisprudence,
4 Your Honour, but I don't think there will be any written decisions on this
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Black.
7 Mr. Milovancevic, do you have any other documents that you intend
8 using during the cross-examination of this witness that you have not shown
9 to the Prosecution?
10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at this time the
11 Defence does not have a single document before it which does not come from
12 the 65 ter list. This issue has been raised just now. I would not wish
13 to give you an incomplete answer. However, based on the experience so far
14 in cross-examination, we have no such other documents.
15 JUDGE MOLOTO: No such what documents?
16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] We don't have, for the time
17 being, any plans to introduce or to tender documents that are not
18 contained on the OTP 65 ter list. Therefore, all these are documents
19 contained in the Prosecutor's list. We have not had the obligation to
20 deliver such a list in advance because there was no such decision taken by
21 the Trial Chamber, and there was no such proposal on the part of the
22 Prosecution. If I may, Your Honour, I'd like to address you on another
24 In --
25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we finalise this matter first before you
1 address me on another matter? My question to you had been: Do you have
2 any other documents, irrespective of where they come from, whether they
3 come from the 65 ter list or from anywhere else, do you have any other
4 documents that you intend tendering into evidence during your
5 cross-examination of this particular witness? If you have them, say yes.
6 If you don't have them, say no. Apart from the one that you --
7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, yes.
8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you in a position to indicate to the
9 Prosecution what those documents are?
10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber should
11 decide that we are duty bound to do so, then we will comply. I wanted to
12 refer you to the cases before the Tribunal, Naletilic, Martinovic,
13 Halilovic case, then the Vukovar case, Blagojevic/Jokic case. In none of
14 these cases was there an obligation in place for the Defence to provide
15 the Prosecution with a list of documents in advance of their examination.
16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well, then. Mr. Black has no objection to
17 your tendering this document that you're about to tender. You are
18 referring to cases that you say there was no such obligation. He has
19 referred to cases where he says that such lists were tendered. However,
20 Mr. Black does also say that there is no Rule of the Tribunal that forces
21 you to do so. So I will make no ruling on the issue on this matter,
22 unless somebody makes -- submits a motion for a ruling.
23 You may proceed, Mr. Milovancevic.
24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I wish
25 to briefly point out that the Defence will do its utmost to proceed
1 correctly in this case, and to avoid creating any difficulties for the OTP
2 or informing them of some matters on short notice.
3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much for that undertaking,
4 Mr. Milovancevic. The Court appreciates that.
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MOLOTO: You wanted to go to another matter. Can you go to
7 that matter?
8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the document I
9 requested on the monitor, please?
10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you asking the legal -- the Court officials to
11 help, Mr. Milovancevic?
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I requested that the Registry
13 show us the 65 ter Exhibit 813, place on the e-court.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.
15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the entire first
16 page, please?
17 Q. Mr. Theunens, before you is the document by the Security Council,
18 S-23280, dated 11 December 1991. In the paragraphs 1, 3, and 4, on page
19 1, do you see that the Security Council speaks of a peace operation in
21 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, it's mentioned at the end of paragraph
22 4. It talks about the possible establishment of United Nations
23 peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia.
24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please be shown
1 paragraph 25? That's on page 8 of the report, for the Registry.
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, can you please read out paragraph 25?
3 A. Paragraph 25, "A soundly based and effective cease-fire would
4 further open the way for constructive negotiations between the
5 representatives of the republics. In this respect, the conference on
6 Yugoslavia under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington enjoys the full
7 support of the Security Council as reflected in resolution 713 of 1991.
8 The conference has been adjourned since 5 November, although Lord
9 Carrington held an informal stock taking session with the presidents of
10 Yugoslavia's six republics on 9 December. The conference, it will be
11 recalled, is guided by a number of considerations, including those set
12 forth in the declaration issued by the 12 member states of the European
13 Community at Rome on 8 November 1991," then between brackets S/23203,
14 "that declaration stated inter alia that, 'The prospect of recognition of
15 the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in
16 the framework of an overall settlement.'" End of quotation. "The
17 conference has also, with the agreement of its participants, ruled out any
18 changes in external or internal borders by means of force. I believe that
19 any selective uncoordinated departure from those principles could hold
20 very serious dangers not only for the republics of Yugoslavia but for all
21 of her peoples and indeed for the maintenance of peace and security in" --
22 and I--
23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. In addition to the report, there is
24 annex 4, in view of the fact that at the end of paragraph 25, UN
25 Secretary-General said that on the 10th of December 1991, he had -- he
1 sent a letter to the presiding chairman of the European community, Mr. van
2 den Broek.
3 THE INTERPRETER: Or rather of the European council.
4 Interpreter's correction.
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Could we please be shown annex 4 on the screen?
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honours? If you allow me, when I was asked
8 earlier questions about the risks, recognition or premature recognition
9 would entail, I asked to see the report. And when we see now the
10 paragraph 24, it mentions not only the risks of premature recognition as a
11 potential factor for -- cause for trouble in the future but also the
12 changes into internal or external borders. So I think we need to be
13 complete when we address these issues. In this paragraph 24, the
14 Secretary-General talks about two principles that need to be respected,
15 the principle of non-premature recognition and the principle of
16 inchangeability of the borders, internal and external.
17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Theunens, can you tell us, did the Republic of Croatia change
19 the state borders of Yugoslavia by using armed force?
20 A. Your Honours, I would -- I mean, again this is a question which is
21 outside my qualifications. I can only refer to the report we have been
22 looking at now that says in paragraph 24 that one of the two principles
23 that need to be respected is the principle of the inviolability of
24 internal and external borders.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, would you please read out the last sentence of
1 paragraph 25? The last sentence of paragraph 25.
2 A. "I addressed a letter to the current president of the council of
3 ministers of the European Community, foreign minister van den Broek of the
4 Kingdom of the Netherlands, the text of which is reproduced as annex 4 to
5 the present report."
6 Q. Does this mean that despite these warnings, there was a de facto
7 recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January of 1992?
8 A. Your Honours, I don't think I have the required background to be
9 able to make an authoritative statement on the fact whether it was a de
10 facto or any other recognition.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.
12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into
13 evidence, Your Honours, as Defence exhibit.
14 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document may be -- admitted into evidence. May
15 it please be given an exhibit number.
16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit number 104, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.
18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, we will now turn to another section of your expert
20 report. This is the topic known as the TO of the SAO Krajina. It starts
21 on page 84 of your expert report.
22 In paragraph 1, which is an introduction, you say that already
23 prior to the eruption of hostilities in Croatia, the police and TO of the
24 Republic of Croatia were divided into Croatian and Serb structures. Can
25 you tell us who implemented this division or split?
1 A. Your Honours, it may be a translation issue but I didn't phrase
2 the -- that paragraph exactly as it has been put here. What I wrote, and
3 I will read it out, is that "already prior to the eruption of hostilities
4 in Croatia, the police and TO of the Republic of Croatia gradually split
5 into Croatian and local Serb structures." So I want to emphasise it was a
6 gradual process. Based on the documents I reviewed, there are several
7 situations in, on one hand, you can see that on the local level, in
8 particular in areas with a Serb majority or a significant minority, local
9 Serbs create their own structure. But I've also seen that the
10 documents -- the issue I'm discussing now, these documents are not
11 included in the report, that in some cases the Croats say that they don't
12 want to be part of the TO any more or don't want to be part of the police
13 any more and they create their own structures. There are also examples
14 where from the Knin level, from the SAO Krajina level, instructions are
15 given to create local Serb TO forces in a number of areas with a
16 significant Serb minority or a Serb majority and the latter is also
17 happening with assistance of the JNA or as we have seen in -- as is
18 visible in a number of examples the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of
19 Serbia. And this is a process that takes place more or less between
20 January and December 1991 but becomes more intensified after summer 1991.
21 And that's what I've attempted to describe in this section from the
23 Q. You speak about gradual division of the police and Territorial
24 Defence into Serbian and Croatian component. Did these two processes
25 evolve simultaneously or did one start before the other? Can you tell us
1 something about that?
2 A. Your Honours, I apologise, I didn't look at the process that
3 resulted in the Croatian -- of local Serb police forces so I can't really
4 say whether the TO was created prior to the police or the police prior to
5 the TO. From a document we discussed during examination, that spoke about
6 the situation in Benkovac, and that was 65 ter number 1851, there it
7 appears, at least in the Benkovac area that the local Serb police started
8 to be organised at an earlier stage than the local Serb TO, and as a
9 result was better equipped and better organised.
10 And 1851 is mentioned on the top of page 86.
11 Q. Continuing this sentence in paragraph 1, you say that the areas
12 where local Serbs had a majority or a significant minority were the areas
13 where they took over existing structures, and that they remained loyal to
14 what remained of the SFRY and Serbia. Is that true, Mr. Theunens?
15 A. Your Honour, maybe again it's a translation issue but the phrase
16 that was put was in areas where the Serbs had a majority or significant
17 minority they took over existing structures. At least in my understanding
18 this sentence does not suggest that in all areas where local Serbs had a
19 majority or significant minority they took over existing structures or
20 created their own TOs. Otherwise, Mr. Milovancevic is correct in what he
22 Q. You said that this process commenced in 1991, roughly in January
23 1991. What is this concept of what remained of Yugoslavia that you are
24 talking about then, when Slovenia and Croatia did not secede until much
25 later, end of June 1991?
1 A. Your Honour, in the subtitle "historical background" on page 84,
2 it has the heading, A, which is under the heading 4, SAO Krajina TO, it
3 says January to December 1991. So the text that follows below is, of
4 course, a reflection or applies to the entire time period between January
5 and December 1991. So it also includes the latter half of 1991.
6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. What do you say about the conduct of
7 non-Serbs in that period of time, which is the next sentence after the one
8 talking about Serbs taking over existing structures? What can you tell us
9 about the conduct of non-Serbs?
10 A. Your Honours, based on the documents I looked at, the documents I
11 looked at to try to understand and then describe the creation of a local
12 Serb SAO Krajina TO, it appeared that non-Serbs in some areas, they left,
13 or they were encouraged to leave, or they didn't recognise the SFRY any
14 more and they ceased their cooperation with the JNA. It's hard for me now
15 to come up with specific documents on specific situations that I related
16 to specific areas but when you look at these various documents and they
17 will follow when -- also on page 85 I discuss the evolution, these things
18 I have mentioned on the actions undertaken by the non-Serbs are visible.
19 Q. Based on what you wrote in the first paragraph that we just
20 quoted, Mr. Theunens, could we say that in that period of time, gradually,
21 police and Territorial Defence in Croatia split into the Croatian and Serb
22 component and that the Serb component remained loyal to the SFRY, whereas
23 the Croatian component refused to comply?
24 A. Your Honours, I don't think that that reflects what this paragraph
25 says. What I say in this paragraph goes beyond the fact that, of
1 course --
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, I apologise for interrupting you. I didn't say that
3 this is what you wrote in your paragraph. My question was could we say,
4 based on everything you testified about, that the situation was as I have
5 described it? You can certainly answer on the basis of the sources that
6 you are familiar with. So I'm not asking you about the meaning of the
7 text that you wrote here. I'm simply asking you whether such a conclusion
8 can be drawn.
9 A. Your Honours, I wish that my reply reflects my report, which is
10 then based on sources I reviewed. I don't think I put it the way as
11 Mr. Milovancevic puts it. I don't think I wrote it that way in my report,
12 because, as we know, Territorial Defence was a republican organisation and
13 they were answerable for a number of issues, combat readiness, training,
14 and related issues, to the republican authorities. It is correct that
15 they were subordinated to the SFRY Supreme Command. Now, the Territorial
16 Defence in the Republic of Croatia was a republican structure which
17 covered the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia and we see that,
18 as I tried to describe, a gradual split occurs whereby local Serb
19 structures are set up in areas with a significant Serb presence. Now,
20 these local Serb structures, they see that the goals they are pursuing are
21 also being pursued by the JNA, so it's quite logical that these local Serb
22 structures remained loyal to the SFRY and that Croatian structures
23 preferred to be loyal to the government of the Republic of Croatia. So I
24 don't think it is correct to state, as Mr. Milovancevic stated, that the
25 Croatian structures were not complying with SFRY structures -- with SFRY
1 leadership any more.
2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, I don't mean to interrupt you.
3 I'll ask that we stop at quarter to because of other engagements that the
4 Chamber has to do, to attend to. We are left with about half a minute.
5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I was
6 about to propose that we adjourn for the day. We will continue tomorrow.
7 JUDGE MOLOTO: The Chamber is very grateful to you for that.
8 The matter then stands postponed to the 3rd of February at 9.00 in
9 the morning in Courtroom II. Court adjourned.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Friday, the 3rd day of February
12 2006, at 9.00 a.m.