Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 932

1 Tuesday, 31 January 2006

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.


8 Cross-examination by Mr. Milovancevic: [Continued]

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

10 Q. Mr. Theunens, yesterday we reached page 72 of your expert report.

11 On that page, in discussing the change of the mission in Croatia, you

12 point to the order by General Kadijevic and on this page, on page 72, you

13 say, the changes that General Kadijevic discusses, which start from March

14 1991, meant a radical change of two constitutional tasks of the armed

15 forces against an external and internal aggression. Is that right,

16 Mr. Theunens?

17 A. Your Honours, on page 72, in my report, I don't point to a

18 specific order by General Kadijevic. I only mention what

19 General Kadijevic says in his book when he talks about the evolution of

20 the mission of the JNA starting mid-March 1991.

21 Q. Did the SFRY armed forces under the constitution of the SFRY,

22 Article 240, that's on page 4 of your expert report, have the obligation

23 to defend the country from the internal aggression which in fact the Croat

24 and Slovene illegal formations, secessionist formations, constituted?

25 A. Your Honours, the mission of the SFRY armed forces, as I mention

Page 933

1 it in my report covered four things, and I referred for that to Article 92

2 of the 1982 all people's Defence law. According to that Article 82, the

3 SFRY armed forces were to safeguard or to protect the independence,

4 sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social order of the SFRY.

5 Q. If the armed forces had the constitutional obligation to safeguard

6 the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, did this mean that the SFRY armed

7 forces had the constitutional obligation to prevent the secession of

8 Croatia and Slovenia by armed force?

9 A. Your Honours, I think this is more like a legal question because

10 the SFRY armed forces received their orders from the Supreme Command.

11 Supreme Command consisting of the Presidency, so a body which represents

12 all the six republics of the SFRY including the two autonomous regions,

13 and I would -- my answer would be that again, the constitutional mission

14 is one thing. We see that due to the developments within the SFRY, not

15 only in Slovenia and Croatia but also in other republics of the SFRY and

16 most importantly in Serbia in 1991, that there -- well, I would assume

17 that the Supreme Command would take the necessary measures in order to

18 implement the mission and if they want to adjust the mission, to adjust

19 the mission of the SFRY armed forces.

20 Q. Given that you cited the SFRY constitution provision which points

21 to the obligation of the armed forces to safeguard the territorial

22 integrity and inviolability of the territory of Yugoslavia, my question to

23 you is: Do the SFRY armed forces have the constitutional obligation to

24 prevent any part of Yugoslav territory from seceding, by force?

25 A. Your Honours, I think I answered that question in my reply to the

Page 934

1 previous question.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you want the witness to give

3 you an interpretation of the constitutional obligations as they are stated

4 in the constitution of this country or of the SFRY, or do you expect this

5 witness to give you expert opinion on what happened in the region based on

6 the constitution that was prevalent at the time?

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the second

8 question was put to the witness precisely in order for the expert to

9 answer the question from the perspective of what the SFRY constitution

10 stipulated and what obligations were in place for safeguarding the

11 territorial integrity of the country and that was the gist of my question

12 and rather than what was going on on the ground at the time. My question

13 was, was the -- in principle, was the obligation of the armed forces to

14 protect the integrity of the country.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Isn't that question a question appropriate for the

16 people who drafted the constitution, what they intended? He can only tell

17 us what it provides. He can't tell us what it was intended to mean, can

18 he?

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honours, I

20 asked the witness this question because he cited these provisions of the

21 constitution and he spoke of their violations. So my question was not

22 what was happening before or after that but, rather, what these provisions

23 provided, in terms of the protection of territorial integrity.

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well, then, Mr. Milovancevic. You may carry

25 on.

Page 935

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Theunens, on page 73 of your report, you identify by quoting

3 Mr. Kadijevic's book, two phases of the armed conflict in Croatia; is that

4 right?

5 A. Indeed, Your Honours, the two phases I have discussed in my report

6 between the pages 73 and 76 are based on the two phases General Kadijevic

7 identifies in his book.

8 Q. Did you indicate in your report that according to Mr. Kadijevic's

9 book, the first phase of the conflict in Croatia was characteristic in

10 terms of it starting with an attack against the Serbs in Krajina?

11 A. That is correct, Your Honours. Mr. Kadijevic identifies the start

12 of the first phase of the conflict by what he describes as the first

13 attacks on Serbs in the Serbian Krajina region.

14 Q. Do you know what General Kadijevic states in his book, which you

15 have been quoting quite a lot, about Croatia's preparations for a war and

16 about the implementation of this phase?

17 A. Your Honour, it is correct that I read the book by General

18 Kadijevic but I don't recall exactly what General Kadijevic stated about

19 what Mr. Milovancevic called Croatian preparations for a war. As I

20 mentioned in the beginning of my testimony, this report focuses on the TO

21 of the SAO Krajina and then RSK, and also the SVK and the relations

22 between these organisations and Milan Martic. Analysing or studying

23 Croatian or what is called Croatian war preparations or the establishment

24 of armed forces in Croatia was not part of -- is not part of the subject

25 of my report, and therefore I didn't mention it in my report.

Page 936

1 Q. Mr. Theunens, I was not the one discussing Croatia's preparations

2 but in view of the fact that you quoted Mr. Kadijevic's book and related

3 what he said about the first and the second phases and about what was

4 going on on the ground in Croatia and in view of the fact that his book

5 does relate something about these preparations, I asked you whether you

6 were familiar with this. You told me you were not, because you had told

7 me you were not.

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Could we see on the screen

9 Exhibit 24, that's General Kadijevic's book, on page 67 in the English

10 version, or rather page 125 in the B/C/S.

11 I apologise, page 68 in the English version. The title is, "The

12 war in Croatia." Or it may even be page 67.

13 Q. Mr. Theunens, could you please on page 67 below the heading, "War

14 in Croatia," read the first paragraph?

15 A. "The war in Croatia. After the Supreme Command meeting held from

16 March the 12th to the 15th 1991, when the SFRY Presidency rejected the

17 proposal of the Supreme Command's General Staff to impose a state of

18 emergency in the country and have the JNA disarm and disband paramilitary

19 formations in Yugoslavia, Croatia accelerated its political and military

20 preparations to secede from Yugoslavia and placed the Serb nation in

21 Croatia in a state of total unconditional subjugation. In the attempts to

22 achieve this the Croatian authorities resorted to all the Ustasha methods

23 known from the days of the fascist independent state of Croatia. Apart

24 from the protection of the Serb nation received" -- excuse me. "Apart

25 from the protection the Serb nation received from the JNA, Serbs in

Page 937

1 Croatia were compelled to organise themselves in defence of their homes,

2 their lives, and their national identity."

3 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Given that you refer to

4 General Kadijevic's statement about the first phase of the armed conflict

5 in Croatia, which lasted from July through to September 1991, do you

6 recall what General Kadijevic said about the objective that Croatia had in

7 the first phase of the armed conflict?

8 A. Your Honours, the -- General Kadijevic's interpretation of the

9 Croatian objectives are included in the paragraph I just read out on page

10 67, but I would make -- like to make a general comment about how I used

11 the book of Kadijevic because I think there is a misunderstanding about

12 the analytical process. In the analytical process it's very -- you try to

13 avoid to use only one source to describe the attitude or the activities of

14 your opponent. Now, as I mentioned yesterday, I used General Kadijevic's

15 book as one of several sources to explain the evolution of the goals of

16 the JNA during the time period that started more or less at the latest, I

17 mean, in summer 1991. I did include General Kadijevic's book from 1993

18 but I also included orders and statements General Kadijevic made when he

19 was still the federal secretary of people's defence. I also included

20 statements, official statements by General Adzic who was the chief of

21 General Staff at the time in 1991, as well as more specific orders from

22 JNA units. If I were to discuss or analyse the Croatian objectives in the

23 conflict, I may use the book by Kadijevic but I would also use -- try to

24 find other sources and more specifically official documents from the

25 Croatian forces as I did when I discussed the goals of the JNA. I think

Page 938

1 that is an essential principle of the work of analysis and that's

2 something I wanted to highlight now.

3 Q. Mr. Theunens, under section 3, you quoted General Kadijevic

4 repeatedly, drawing upon his book, and you quoted several sentences from

5 his book, which have their own context. You have taken them out of the

6 spatial and temporal context and you have taken them out of the contents

7 of the entire book, and used them to arrive at conclusions that were

8 completely different to what General Kadijevic was trying to show. I

9 simply wanted to establish whether you have properly quoted parts of his

10 book. That's why I'd like you to read one passage from his book on page

11 68, that's in the English version, and that's page 126 in the B/C/S.

12 A. Your Honours, I think that the comment Mr. Milovancevic just made

13 is an incorrect representation of my report. Because when you look at the

14 report, under the heading 3, evolution of the mission of the JNA during

15 the conflict in Croatia, there are several subheadings. It goes from A to

16 F. In subheading A, indeed, I discuss Kadijevic's book. However, on page

17 76, there is a subheading B, which mentions the declaration on the 1st of

18 October by the reduced SFRY Presidency of a state of imminent threat of

19 war.

20 Next I mention under the same heading I mention as I discussed

21 earlier today the statement General Kadijevic had published on the 3rd of

22 October 1991 in the issue number 35 of the bulletin of the information

23 service of the SSNO. When we continue in the subheading C I mention the

24 confidential letter number 6-83 that was issued by the SFRY armed forces

25 morale administration and which is attributed to General Adzic. In the

Page 939

1 subheading D, I discuss a strictly confidential order number 2256-1 by

2 General Kadijevic which dates from the 10th of December 1991 and which

3 specifically mentions the protection of the Serb population. In the

4 subparagraph E on page 83 of the English version, I quote from the report

5 on the combat readiness of the 2nd military district where the 9th Corps

6 provides its view of the -- how it accomplished the missions of the SFRY

7 armed forces.

8 So I don't think that I misquoted General Kadijevic somewhere or

9 that I took his comments out of context because the comments I used I took

10 from -- or the paragraphs I took from Mr. Kadijevic's book correspond with

11 orders and statements he made at the time of the events in 1991 as well as

12 orders and statements of General Adzic and subordinated units.

13 Q. Mr. Theunens, I'm not trying to interpret your report in an

14 incorrect way. I'm just trying to verify two issues. One is how you're

15 quoting Mr. Kadijevic. We are just checking this to see whether you quote

16 his words accurately or whether perhaps some of his thoughts are taken out

17 of context. The Defence does not believe that what Mr. Kadijevic wrote is

18 the holy Bible, that is not subject to any analysis and inspection. What

19 we are trying to do is establish whether what you quoted was quoted

20 correctly, whether it was -- it reflected accurately the spirit in which

21 it was written, and we are also trying to establish what actually happened

22 on the ground. Therefore I would like to kindly ask you not to evade

23 answering my question.

24 I would like to ask you to do the same thing you did when

25 answering the questions of the OTP. So would you now please read passage

Page 940

1 2 of General Kadijevic's text on page 68 concerning the two phases of the

2 war, what happened in phase one in Croatia and what actually happened on

3 the ground.

4 [Microphone not activated]

5 My apologies. Would you please read the third paragraph from the

6 top? It starts with the words, "In this phase, Croatia's aim."

7 A. "In this first phase Croatia's aim was to use the police and army

8 to establish control over Serb regions in Croatia and break down any Serb

9 resistance. This was seen as a necessary stage in achieving the general

10 goal of a sovereign Croatian state which apart from all the territory

11 lying within the administrative borders of the existing Republic of

12 Croatia would in the later stage of Yugoslavia's dismemberment also

13 encompass other territories with a majority Croatian population,

14 i.e. territories to which for one reason or another the leadership of the

15 Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, aspired."

16 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

17 As you have mentioned the words of Mr. Kadijevic to the effect

18 that the conflict in Croatia unfolded in two phases and we are now

19 discussing the first phase, can you tell us what Mr. Kadijevic's thoughts

20 are in the book about the strategy and tactics of Croatia in implementing

21 this first phase?

22 MR. BLACK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I apologise for interrupting.

23 I was expecting a question whether about whether there was out of context

24 because we heard a couple of speeches from the Defence saying that he was

25 worried about Mr. Theunens taking passages out of context. It seems to me

Page 941

1 the procedure would be to point him at passages and then ask him questions

2 about that. What's happening instead is that he asked Mr. Theunens to

3 read out a passage and then no question follows and it appears we are

4 moving on to a new subject. I would ask that the counsel put questions to

5 the witness rather than simply read passages to him.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Do you have an answer to that, Mr. Milovancevic?

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. The aim of

8 this type of examination is to finally reach an answer to the thesis

9 presented by the expert witness, namely whether, in the first and the

10 second phase of the conflict in Croatia, any changes occurred in the

11 constitutional role of the JNA and whether this was in conformity with the

12 constitution, in order to reach an answer to this major question, the

13 witness first needs to answer some minor questions. Perhaps this is not

14 in the order that is clearly visible or clearly obvious but I'm first

15 asking the witness whether he knows something about the tactics and the

16 strategy, in order for us to be able to assess the goals of both sides.

17 The expert witness spoke only about the goals of one side, and we need to

18 see what an eyewitness to the events, namely General Kadijevic, thinks

19 about the events. Based on the quotations of General Kadijevic in the

20 expert report, one can gain a completely different impression than what

21 Mr. Kadijevic actually intended with his book. That's what I'm trying to

22 point out.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, you know, the whole morning and

24 perhaps even yesterday, you have been engaging in argument with the

25 witness. Your questions are very argumentative. And I was counting the

Page 942

1 lines on a previous page now of your question to this witness. Your

2 question goes beyond 15 lines. You have made an allegation against this

3 witness that he's quoting the book out of context, and in the light of

4 that allegation, you made the witness read a passage from the book. And

5 we are all waiting to see you point out how he quoted Kadijevic out of

6 context. Now, point that out. Don't leave it and go to the next point

7 and then say that the aim is to see how Kadijevic's views were on the

8 other side of that -- the struggle. You got to tell us how this witness,

9 before you go to how Kadijevic views the struggle, tell us how this

10 witness quotes the author out of context. And do so by putting questions

11 to him, not by giving speeches to him and then expecting him to comment.

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. Could you tell us, Mr. Theunens, bearing in mind the two

14 paragraphs that you have read out, was the conduct of federal armed forces

15 on the ground in specific circumstances a reaction to the conduct of the

16 opposing side, namely the Croatian side?

17 A. Your Honours, I have to repeat the goal of the aim of my report.

18 My report aims -- studies, my report studies the SAO Krajina and then the

19 RSK TO and SVK and relations between these organisations and Milan Martic.

20 Whether or not the activities of the JNA during the conflict in Croatia

21 were a reaction on activities from the Croatian forces is something I did

22 not investigate, so it's impossible for me to answer that question. I

23 don't think it would be correct from an analytical point of view to just

24 use one source, i.e. the book of Kadijevic, in order to assess the

25 intentions of the Croatian forces and/or the way how whether the JNA acted

Page 943

1 or reacted in certain circumstances, whether the initiative came from the

2 Croats or from the JNA and local Serbs. That was not the subject of my

3 report.

4 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. You wrote, and also gave evidence here in the

5 courtroom, about not having studied the Croatian forces. However, you

6 used General Kadijevic's book, and when General Kadijevic writes that at

7 one point in time the armed forces protected the Serb population, you

8 interpret that as a change of the constitutional role of the armed forces.

9 This is why I'm asking you now, and I ask kindly, that you answer me to

10 the extent you are able to as a military officer, namely, in the first

11 phase, and you refer to General Kadijevic's words about Croatian forces

12 attacking the Serb population, under those circumstances, was it possible

13 for the JNA not to protect the Serb population?

14 A. Your Honours, I would like to draw your attention to page 12 of

15 the English version of my report, where I quoted when I was discussing the

16 mission of the SFRY armed forces, I first mentioned the article 92 of the

17 1982 all people's Defence law and then I also quoted from a 1983 manual

18 from the federal Secretariat for People's Defence, a manual called

19 strategy of armed conflict. And in that manual, in chapter 4, it is

20 mentioned, and I will read from my report, "SFRY armed forces together

21 with other forces of all people's Defence and social self-protection,

22 protect the interests of all nations and nationalities and all working

23 people and citizens of the socialist, self-managing, and non-aligned

24 Yugoslavia and are the expression of their readiness and determination to

25 successfully defend themselves against any aggression."

Page 944

1 Q. Since you quoted the legislative provision, specifically stating

2 that the obligation of the armed forces is to protect all of the

3 population, do you believe, as a military expert, that the JNA and the

4 armed forces had no obligation to protect the Serb population which was at

5 risk during this first phase?

6 A. Your Honours, based on the text I quoted from this 1983 military

7 manual, the JNA as well as the other components of the SFRY armed forces

8 had to protect all nations and nationalities. Now, Mr. Milovancevic

9 claims that the Serb population was at risk. We see in Kadijevic's book

10 that he mentions indeed that the Serb population is at risk but I think if

11 you would have put Mr. Spegelj's book here he would have said that the

12 Croatian population was at risk. So again, I keep on repeating myself but

13 I think it is dangerous to use one single source to try to draw

14 conclusions on the activities or the behaviour of the other side or the

15 opposing side.

16 Q. Since right now we are not discussing the threat to the Croatian

17 population, and you in your expert report mention Kadijevic's words about

18 the Serb population being fiercely attacked during the first phase, my

19 question was whether the tactics of the Croatian armed forces mentioned by

20 Mr. Kadijevic in his book, namely to group armed formations in Krajina, to

21 spread fear by constantly issuing threats, mostly directed at the Knin

22 Krajina, to occasionally attack appropriately selected populated

23 settlements and to use these tactics in order to break down the Serb

24 morale and prepare an all-out attack against Serbian Krajina in its

25 entirety or partially; bearing this in mind, bearing in mind the situation

Page 945

1 that existed at the time, in your view was it appropriate, in view of the

2 constitutional role of the armed forces of the federation to protect the

3 Serb population?

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you really hope to get an

5 answer to this question? You've been asking this question in different

6 forms for the last 15 minutes. The witness has given you what he says is

7 his answer. What do you want -- do you want to beat him into saying what

8 you want him to say? You don't want to accept what he's telling you?

9 Because now you're asking the same question over and over again, in

10 different forms, and we are not making progress. If you think that this

11 witness is not answering your questions, it's for you to argue at the end

12 of the case that the witness did not answer your questions and -- but to

13 try and browbeat him now is not going to make progress. It's not going to

14 give you the answer you want. He's giving you the answers as he

15 understands them and that's how he's answering you. He's been telling you

16 that he can't use one source to analyse. He's got to use several sources.

17 He's given you this answer many times. What do you expect from this

18 witness?

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for

20 this caution. I'm expecting the witness to give an answer to the

21 following question: Is defending the civilian population something that

22 is in conformity with the constitutional role of the armed forces? This

23 witness quotes General Kadijevic and General Kadijevic says that it was

24 the constitutional role of the armed forces, and then the witness draws a

25 conclusion that this reflected a radical change of the constitutional role

Page 946

1 of the armed forces. I will not, however, insist any longer on this

2 question.

3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, if you allow me, I think we move from

4 protecting the Serb population to defending the civilian population, and

5 again it is not me who states or who concludes that there is a radical

6 change. The word "radical" is a direct quotation from the book of

7 Kadijevic.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Indeed that's what I wanted to say to

9 Mr. Milovancevic. Thank you very much, Mr. Theunens. Mr. Milovancevic,

10 if you look at page 72, where -- of the report, you will see under

11 paragraph 2, paragraph 2 under the heading evolution of the mission of the

12 JNA during the conflict in Croatia, that he -- the witness there says,

13 this implied, according to Kadijevic, that the two constitutionally

14 defined tasks of the SFRY armed forces, including the JNA, defence against

15 an external and internal aggression, were, "radically" changed into. He's

16 quoting. It's not his conclusion. It's not this witness's conclusion.

17 This witness is quoting.

18 So please, as you attack him for quoting the book out of context,

19 don't misquote him, too. You were asking him the question -- you were

20 asking him the question is defending the civilian population something

21 that is in conformity with the constitutional role of the armed forces.

22 Mr. Theunens, will you answer that question, please?

23 THE WITNESS: As such, Your Honour, indeed that was part of the

24 constitutional mission of the SFRY armed forces.

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not asking you what part it was. The question

Page 947

1 is, is defending a civilian population in conformity with the

2 constitutional obligation? Your answer should be yes or no.

3 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honour, yes.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much. You may ask the next

5 question, Mr. Milovancevic.

6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. On page 74 of your report, you say that in the second phase of the

8 armed conflict in Croatia, the JNA had two tasks. Prior to that, on page

9 73, you say that the second phase began in late summer of 1991 with the

10 attacks of the Croats against military units and garrisons in Croatia, and

11 that this phase continued until the Vance Plan was accepted; is that

12 correct?

13 A. Your Honour, it's General Kadijevic who identifies these phases in

14 his book and who defines the events that mark the start and the end of the

15 different phase. It's not me who did that.

16 Q. While preparing your expert report, did you come across some

17 information indicating that such armed attacks against the JNA units and

18 garrison in Croatia from September of 1991 until the implementation of the

19 Vance Plan existed?

20 A. Indeed, Your Honours, I've come across information from various

21 sources, open sources, JNA situation reports and even witness statements,

22 if I recall well, that indicate that from September 1991 onwards, a number

23 of JNA barracks and garrisons in Croatia were blocked and in some cases

24 even the term "besieged" was used.

25 Q. Did you hear about the Brioni memorandum from July of 1991,

Page 948

1 Mr. Theunens?

2 A. Yes, Your Honours, I heard of the Brioni memorandum or Brioni

3 agreement of July 1991.

4 Q. Does the Brioni memorandum represent an agreement drafted with the

5 facilitation provided by the European Community, and was it aimed to delay

6 or postpone the secession of Slovenia and Croatia by three months?

7 A. Your Honours, I remember that the postponement of the declaration

8 of independence was one of the points of the Brioni agreement but I don't

9 know whether that was a, or the, specific goal, nor am I familiar with the

10 other goals or points of the Brioni agreement, and I should add the

11 postponement of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia to

12 complete my answer.

13 Q. Have you seen that document at all, the Brioni agreement,

14 mandating this moratorium?

15 A. I believe I've seen the Brioni agreement prior to coming to the

16 ICTY, but I don't recall seeing it during my professional activities at

17 the ICTY.

18 Q. Since you say that you have seen the agreement and you know in

19 general terms that it provided for the postponement of the declaration of

20 independence of Slovenia and Croatia by three months, does this mean that

21 the second phase of the armed conflict in Croatia began during this

22 three-months' moratorium, since second phase, as you say, started in

23 September?

24 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can you refer us to where the witness mentioned

25 three months, Mr. Milovancevic, on the text, on the transcript?

Page 949

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm not saying

2 that the witness mentioned it. It is simply a general provision contained

3 in the Brioni memorandum.

4 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, your question is -- since you

5 said that you have seen the -- your question is, since you say that you

6 have seen the agreement and you know in general terms that it provided for

7 the postponement of the declaration of independence of Slovenia and

8 Croatia by three months; this is what you say he says. You are

9 attributing words to him that he has never mentioned now you're saying you

10 didn't attribute those words.

11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my question

12 contained two sentences; perhaps based on which one could have gained such

13 an impression. It wasn't my intention to put words in the witness's

14 mouth. Let me clarify, please, in order to ensure that it is clear to

15 everyone.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Just put a question, one question, don't make two

17 questions. Put one question to the witness.

18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.

19 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that the Brioni memorandum dated 7th of

20 July 1991 contained a provision about a moratorium which would last for

21 three months?

22 A. Your Honours, I remember that the Brioni agreement or memorandum

23 contained a provision for the postponement of the declaration of

24 independence of Slovenia and Croatia but I don't recall exactly how many

25 months this postponement was supposed to last.

Page 950

1 Q. A while ago you said that you came across some information which

2 indicated that during the so-called second phase of the armed conflict in

3 Croatia, the Croatian forces launched attacks on the JNA units and

4 garrisons in Croatia. These JNA units and garrisons, were they present in

5 Croatia prior to this happening for many years?

6 A. Your Honours, it would be more correct to say that I did come

7 across information that according to which, from the beginning of

8 September onwards or from end of August, Croats started to block and in

9 some cases even besiege certain barracks and garrisons of the JNA in

10 Croatia. I didn't analyse that aspect in detail because it is outside the

11 framework of my report, so I'm not in a position which force or which

12 units were exactly involved in or which individuals were exactly involved

13 in blocking or even besieging JNA barracks, nor am I in a position to say

14 which barracks were being blocked or besieged and for how long time.

15 Q. Mr. Theunens, were these barracks and garrisons that were blocked

16 part of an infrastructure that was present not only in Croatia, which was

17 one of the federal units of Yugoslavia but in other parts of Yugoslavia as

18 well, for quite a long time?

19 A. Your Honours, for the few examples I remember, the answer would be

20 affirmative, but again, if -- I cannot give an answer without having

21 studied the entire situation.

22 Q. Do you have any knowledge of the fact that the units and garrisons

23 that were blocked and under attack mostly located in towns in the Republic

24 of Croatia because that was the way the barracks were spread out in the

25 former Yugoslavia?

Page 951

1 A. Your Honours, the examples I recall indeed some of the barracks

2 were located in cities. Now, I wouldn't want to expand that answer for

3 all the JNA barracks and garrisons because I haven't studied that aspect

4 of the conflict in detail.

5 Q. In many parts of your report, you talk of the constitutional

6 position of the armed forces of the SFRY, including who issued orders on

7 the engagement of this armed force. Wasn't the SFRY Presidency the one

8 that ordered the engagement of units under the SFRY legislation and

9 constitution? And I have the year 1991 in mind.

10 A. Your Honours, it is correct that according to the SFRY

11 constitution, it was up to the SFRY Presidency as it was the Supreme

12 Command, to issue orders to the SFRY armed forces. However, as I've also

13 attempted to point out in the section of the report we are discussing at

14 the moment, there are indications, and one source for that is the book by

15 Borisav Jovic, last days of the SFRY, that in the course of 1991, some

16 kind of parallel command structure became active which did not include all

17 the members of the SFRY Presidency. And this is for example mentioned on

18 page 69, subparagraph 3, where I refer to the published diary of Borisav

19 Jovic.

20 Q. According to the strict provisions of the SFRY constitution and

21 the law on the armed forces, could anyone apart from the SFRY Presidency

22 order the engagement of the SFRY armed forces and their involvement in

23 combat?

24 A. Your Honours, I think I've answered that question in the

25 previous -- my previous answer.

Page 952

1 Q. Does this answer of yours mean that under the constitution there

2 wasn't any other body apart from the SFRY Presidency that could order the

3 engagement the SFRY armed forces? And please answer with a yes or no.

4 A. According to the constitution, the answer would be yes.

5 Q. Do you know who ordered the blockade of the JNA garrisons and the

6 launching of attacks on the JNA units and garrisons in Croatia which

7 lasted from August through to the implementation of the Vance Plan in

8 1991?

9 A. Your Honours, I think I will again repeat myself but the few

10 examples I do recall, there I think it was a combination of maybe local

11 authorities on the Croatian level who ordered such a blockade, as well as

12 spontaneous movements of certain people in Croatia who believed that it

13 was useful to blockade certain JNA barracks or garrisons. Now, this is

14 obviously not authoritative answer because I have not studied the block or

15 the blockade of JNA barracks and garrisons in Croatia in detail so I don't

16 know which command structures, if any, were behind these blockades.

17 Q. You say that the local authorities or the population themselves

18 decided to block the JNA units and garrisons and attack them. Would not

19 this, in your terminology, in military terminology, mean that an armed

20 rebellion occurred?

21 A. Maybe I was incomplete in my previous answer because I seem to

22 recall now that there were media statements at the time by

23 President Tudjman, the president of Croatia, where he called or announced

24 blockades of barracks, and I think that was in September 1991. Now, to

25 answer your question, blockades can also be carried out by peaceful means

Page 953

1 so it doesn't have to be an armed rebellion.

2 Q. Since the blockade, whatever its character was, turned into armed

3 attacks that lasted until the Vance Plan came into force, were these armed

4 attacks, in fact, an armed rebellion or not, in military terminology?

5 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure whether the blockades lasted until the

6 coming into effect or the coming into force of the Vance Plan. The Vance

7 Plan was agreed upon on the second of January but its implementation

8 started later and was a gradual process. And because I didn't study the

9 blockades as such, I cannot draw a conclusion on whether it was an armed

10 rebellion or whether it was rebellion or whether it was something else.

11 And I apologise but I add that it was the 2nd of January 1992 for the

12 signing of the Vance Plan.

13 Q. Do you know the Geneva agreement which was signed on the 23rd

14 November 1991, by -- which was facilitated by a special envoy of the

15 United Nations, Mr. Vance, and the then-president of the Republic of

16 Croatia, Mr. Tudjman, then the president of Serbia, Milosevic, and

17 General Kadijevic, the chief of the General Staff of the JNA?

18 A. Your Honours, at that time, General Kadijevic was the federal

19 Secretary for People's Defence and because a state of imminent threat of

20 war had been declared, Kadijevic also carried out the duties of the Chief

21 of Staff of the staff of the Supreme Command. I did mention the

22 November -- 23rd of November 1991 cease-fire agreement in my report

23 without, however, going into details as to the various aspects of the

24 cease-fire agreement..

25 Q. If the special envoy of the UN General secretary Mr. Vance

Page 954

1 interceded on behalf of the UN for a cessation of the conflict on the

2 ground, did this thus -- did it not mean that there were armed conflicts

3 on the ground at the time and not just merely blockades?

4 A. Indeed, Your Honours, but, and that's also visible through the

5 report. In addition, I mean blockades were only one aspect of the

6 conflict. The operations that took place in areas that were considered

7 Serb, and I'm quoting now actually Mr. Kadijevic, he mentions the Serbian

8 regions in Croatia. There were in many areas combat operations between

9 local Serbs according to documents I have seen often supported by JNA or

10 at least JNA and local Serb TO working together under single command as

11 well as Croatian forces on the other side, or even operations led by JNA,

12 including also local Serb TO and SAO Krajina MUP, in order to establish

13 Serbian control over certain areas considered Serbian, Kijevo being one of

14 the examples. So the blockade is only one aspect of the conflict.

15 Q. You mentioned a while ago that President Tudjman had called on the

16 population to block the barracks. Wasn't such conduct by the president of

17 the state an invitation to a rebellion?

18 A. Your Honours, I think this is a political question which is

19 outside the framework of my report and which -- for which I'm unqualified

20 to provide an authoritative answer.

21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, perhaps this may

22 be the appropriate time for a break, if you agree.

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic. We will

24 adjourn and come back at quarter to.

25 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

Page 955

1 --- On resuming at 10.51 a.m.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Milovancevic.

3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

4 Q. Before the break, Mr. Theunens, we discussed the president of

5 Croatia, Tudjman's call on the population to mount the blockade of the JNA

6 barracks and units. And that is what we will pursue.

7 You mentioned the Geneva agreement of 23rd November 1991, which

8 was reached with the facilitation of Mr. Vance. I'd like to know whether

9 this agreement was an interlude to the peacekeeping operation of the UN in

10 Yugoslavia, in your opinion?

11 A. That is correct, Your Honours. The 23rd of November 1991 Geneva

12 cease-fire agreement was considered a prelude or a precursor to the

13 signing of the Vance Plan which regulated the peacekeeping operation in

14 Croatia and -- okay.

15 Q. You said that the Vance Plan regulated the peacekeeping operations

16 in Croatia. Doesn't the Vance Plan provide for the peacekeeping operation

17 in Yugoslavia, in fact, that's what it was called, rather than in Croatia

18 only?

19 A. It is correct, Your Honours, that the aim of the Vance Plan was to

20 create the conditions, peace and security, that would allow a peaceful

21 solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia, as it is officially called. Now,

22 if I remember well, when it comes to the implementation of the Vance Plan

23 and the deployment of peacekeeping forces, most of these forces were

24 deployed in Croatia. I mean by this that the UNPAs, the UN-protected

25 areas covered only territory -- that was part of the Republic of Croatia.

Page 956

1 Q. Where the UN forces are deployed is one matter, whereas the title

2 of the peace operation in a country is a different matter. Wasn't the

3 official title of the peace operation the peace operation in Yugoslavia,

4 yes or no?

5 A. Yes, Your Honours, I meant -- I replied to the previous question

6 that the aim of the Vance Plan was to create conditions with regard to

7 peace and security, to allow a political solution or to allow negotiations

8 for a political solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia.

9 Q. Mr. Theunens, you seem to be evading the answer. You said that

10 the UN peace plan provided for the peace operation in Croatia, whereas my

11 question to you is: Isn't the UN peace plan -- wasn't the UN peace plan

12 put in place to conduct peace operations in Yugoslavia?

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, I think just the question above

14 this one, the answer above this question that you've asked says, "Yes,

15 Your Honours, I meant -- I replied to the previous question that the aim

16 of the Vance Plan was to create conditions with regard to peace and

17 security, to allow a political solution or to allow negotiations for a

18 political solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia." How is he evading

19 your question? He's agreed with you that it was Yugoslavia indeed.

20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, respectfully, the

21 witness always answers my questions with "yes, but," so I'm never really

22 sure whether the yes part or the but part prevails. I merely asked the

23 witness to answer with a yes or no, rather than provide a detailed

24 explanation. That is why I insisted that the witness answer with a yes or

25 no or I don't know, and if he knows the answer, then he should tell us

Page 957

1 what it is that he knows.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: There was no "but" in the answer that he gave,

3 Mr. Milovancevic.

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honour, he

5 provided an explanation in addition to his affirmative answer, which has

6 the overall undertone of a "but". However, we can proceed.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do.

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Page 119 of your expert report, and on two occasions during your

10 testimony you stated that the Vance Plan was concluded on the 2nd of

11 January 1992 by Tudjman and Milosevic. Do you know that these persons did

12 not sign any sort of agreement or pact on that day?

13 A. The information I included in the report, Your Honours, reflects

14 the information I saw when compiling this report.

15 Q. Can you refer us to any document which would indicate what you

16 said, that Tudjman and Milosevic signed the Vance Plan on the 2nd of

17 January 1992?

18 A. Your Honours, it is correct that I didn't include a specific

19 footnote to substantiate the first sentence on page 119, but if I recall

20 well, it comes from the NIOD chronology I've used and other occasions in

21 the report. I don't have the exact 65 ter number but the NIOD,

22 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation -- it should actually be

23 NIOD -- compiled a chronology of the conflict between 1991 and 1995,

24 referring mainly to open and press sources. Now, it may well be that

25 Tudjman and Milosevic didn't sign the agreement but at least one way or

Page 958

1 the other they agreed to it because otherwise, I don't think that there

2 would be a UN mission in Croatia. Now, if they agreed verbally, that's

3 fine with me too.

4 Q. Mr. Theunens, the report of NIOD is incorrect because Ambassador

5 Okun, a witness of the Prosecution in Milosevic trial on transcript page

6 19650 to 19651 stated that what is usually considered the Vance Plan is

7 actually a document containing four documents, one being the Geneva

8 Convention, signed on the 23rd of December 1991. The second document is a

9 cease-fire agreement reached between Raseta and Susak on the 2nd of

10 February 1992. These two documents established the situation on the

11 ground and end of hostilities. The third document is a concept for peace

12 operations dated the 3rd of December 1991, and it established technical

13 details, it defined technical details about the location of UNPA zones and

14 so on. The fourth document is a resolution of the Security Council of the

15 United Nations, number 743, dated the 21st of February 1992, which created

16 the peace operation. Are you familiar with these documents, Mr. Theunens?

17 A. Your Honours, I would like to thank Mr. Milovancevic for this

18 clarification. I'm familiar with a number of these documents, in

19 particular the United Nations Security Council resolution 743. Now, again

20 I leave it to Your Honours whether the difference between what I wrote in

21 my report and what Mr. Milovancevic explained has a significant impact for

22 the -- on the subject of my report. I would also like to draw your

23 attention to the Exhibit number 65 ter number 917, which was the source I

24 consulted or the main source I consulted to describe the Vance Plan, 65

25 ter number 917 are the international conference on the former Yugoslavia

Page 959

1 official papers dating from 1997, and you can find them under the English

2 ERN 01145409, 01145415.

3 Q. Mr. Theunens, I put to you that all documents that exist, and all

4 exhibits that exist, point to the fact that there was no meeting between

5 Milosevic and Tudjman on the 2nd of January 1992, that no kind of

6 agreement, either verbal or written one, was concluded on that date.

7 Additionally, there is no way to tie that date with the Vance Plan, as you

8 did it. What do you say to that?

9 A. Your Honours, based on my information, the Vance Plan was accepted

10 on the 2nd of January. Now, if that information is correct I'm willing to

11 accept that. Still, I want to emphasise that if there had been no

12 agreement from Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Milosevic with the Vance Plan, it would

13 have been very hard to establish the UN peacekeeping mission in

14 Yugoslavia.

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, the witness has not answered the

16 issue as to whether or not there was a meeting, for what it's worth.

17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the information in my report on the

18 top of page 119 is that Tudjman and Milosevic signed the plan. Now, maybe

19 they didn't sign at the same time so I don't imply that there was a

20 meeting. And again, if that is not entirely correct, I'm willing to

21 accept the points made by Mr. Milovancevic but I don't think that has an

22 impact on the essence, on actually the subject matter, where what is

23 really -- which is really important for this -- in this context.

24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. The essence that I'm trying to highlight, Mr. Theunens, is that

Page 960

1 the peace operation of the UN in Yugoslavia, known as the Vance Plan, is

2 not some kind of a document signed by Milosevic and Tudjman. Rather, it's

3 a UN Security Council resolution. Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?

4 A. It is correct that United Nations Security Council resolution 743

5 deals with the Vance Plan and there is also a second, or there are at

6 least two other resolutions that deal with the deployment of the

7 peacekeeping forces.

8 Q. Given that you have said that the Vance Plan, let us call it that,

9 could not have been accepted had it not been given approval by Milosevic

10 and Tudjman on the 2nd of January 1992, so the 2nd of January 1992. Do

11 you know that the peace operation defined by the resolution 743 of the UN

12 Security Council of the 21st of February 1992, was adopted after the

13 Secretary-General of the UN, in his report dated the 15th of February

14 1992, gave recommendations for the peace operation to be put in place?

15 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: I'm sorry, Mr. Milovancevic, you have lost me.

16 Could you rephrase that question, make it a bit more direct and condense

17 it?

18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my question was

19 whether Mr. Theunens knew that the UN peace operation was not put into

20 place until the recommendation was given by the Secretary-General to

21 implement the operation? And he gave that recommendation on the 15th of

22 February 1992. That was the gist of my question.

23 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I have read the report the

24 Secretary-General drafted for the Security Council on the 21st of February

25 1992, and I do remember that in that report, reference is made to meetings

Page 961

1 Mr. Marek Goulding, if I'm correct, he was the chief of the department for

2 peacekeeping operations, also known as DPKO at the UN so the meetings

3 Marek Goulding had with Tudjman, Milosevic, Jovic -- I'm not sure whether

4 it was Kadijevic or Adzic, and when I say meetings, I mean separate

5 meetings and that all these political and military leaders expressed their

6 support to the implementation of the Vance Plan and the deployment of a UN

7 peacekeeping force.

8 Q. Do you know that precisely in that document that you just

9 remembered, Mr. Theunens, it is clearly stated that the Secretary-General

10 gave the recommendation only after seeing the letters dating the 6th of

11 February 1992 and the 11th of February 1992 in which President Tudjman

12 accepted such a mission, and after Borisav Jovic, president of the

13 committee for the cooperation between Yugoslavia and the UN, informed him

14 on the 11th of February 1992, that the assembly of the Republic of Serbian

15 Krajina consented to the plan?

16 A. Your Honours, if Mr. Milovancevic is reading from the report, and

17 then I believe him, I don't recall the exact dates but otherwise I

18 mentioned already in my reply to the previous question that there it was

19 an agreement of Tudjman, Milosevic, Jovic, and then also Adzic or

20 Kadijevic, I'm not sure who of the two Marek Goulding saw in his visits to

21 Croatia and Serbia.

22 Q. I'm putting these questions to you, Mr. Theunens, precisely

23 because you said that Milosevic and Tudjman accepted the Vance Plan. The

24 Secretary-General of the UN in his written report given to the Security

25 Council states that in fact this agreement was accepted by Mr. Tudjman and

Page 962

1 Mr. Jovic in writing. Are these two different things, Mr. Theunens?

2 A. These are indeed two different things, Your Honours, but again as

3 we discussed earlier today we spoke about the --

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That's quite all right. I apologise for

5 interrupting you. The important thing is to establish that these are two

6 different things. I think we understood each other.

7 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I would just ask that the witness be

8 given a chance to explain. He was in the middle of explaining when he was

9 interrupted. I think he should be allowed to continue, please.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Theunens, can you finish your answer, please?

11 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. What I wanted to add is

12 that even though these are different things, they are intimately related

13 to each other because without the cease-fire agreement of the 23rd of

14 November 1991, which was agreed by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic

15 during which Milosevic also gave certain guarantees to Okun that Serbian

16 volunteers and paramilitaries would abide by the agreement, without that

17 cease-fire agreement, there would have been no agreement on the Vance Plan

18 in February, as it is pointed out here.

19 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. You said that the UN troops were

21 deployed to certain areas which were defined as zones and sectors. Can

22 you tell us more about these areas and how they were defined in the UN

23 peace operations plan?

24 A. Indeed, Your Honours, this is discussed on page 119 of the English

25 version of my report. In the Vance Plan, three UNPAs - UNPA stands for

Page 963

1 United Nations protected area - were defined, which covered four sectors,

2 sector south, sector north, sector west and sector east. UNPAs were areas

3 or were parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia where according

4 to the UN Secretary-General, special arrangements were required during an

5 interim period in order to ensure a lasting cease-fire or the maintaining

6 of a lasting cease-fire. I've also seen descriptions for the UNPAs or

7 further detailing of these areas where it is mentioned that these are

8 areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a substantial minority prior to

9 the conflict or as a result of the conflict. And where according or as a

10 result of the conflict, armed or as part of the tensions between the

11 people, armed conflicts had erupted in recent past.

12 The document which is visible on 65 ter -- excuse, me on the

13 e-court, 65 ter number 917, also mentions that the special arrangement in

14 these UNPAs would be of an interim nature and would not prejudge the

15 outcome of political negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of the

16 Yugoslav crisis.

17 Q. Does the Vance Plan explicitly provide that the UN troops ought

18 to be deployed to the areas where the Serb population constitutes a

19 majority or a substantial minority and in which intercommunal tensions

20 have caused a conflict to erupt?

21 A. The Vance Plan states that the UN troops are to be deployed in the

22 UNPAs and I've given the definition of the UNPAs. Now, I want to add, and

23 that's not included in the document, that the boundaries of these UNPAs

24 were the result of negotiations between Croats, Serbs and UN because, of

25 course, each party had its own views on the limits of these UNPAs,

Page 964

1 geographic limits, and these had to be negotiated and that happened

2 between November and February 1992.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: When you say that, Mr. Theunens, between November

4 and February 1992, or is it between November 1991 and February 1992.

5 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, Your Honours, November 1991 and February

6 1992.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Can you refer us to a document, Mr. Theunens, where the UN troops

10 or, based on which the UN troops were deployed to areas where the Serb

11 population constitutes a majority or a substantial minority as a result of

12 an armed conflict, as you have put it? That is not stipulated in the UN

13 plan.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm sorry, once again, Mr. Milovancevic, you

15 introduced a question of substantial majorities. You said -- you asked

16 the question, "Does the Vance Plan explicitly provide that the UN troops

17 ought to be deployed to the areas where the Serb population constitutes a

18 majority or a substantial minority." Now you're attributing that

19 statement to the witness or has he said it at some other stage?

20 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the provision of

21 the Vance Plan pertains precisely to the areas where the Serbs constituted

22 a majority or a substantial minority. I am now putting to the witness --

23 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. But the witness has

24 been saying that the Vance Plan applied in the UNPAs areas. He didn't say

25 the UNPAs areas were areas that were either -- which either had the

Page 965

1 majority of Serbs or a substantial minority of Serbs. He just said it was

2 on an agreement between the three gentlemen.

3 Now, you are now saying to him that he said that those areas were

4 areas where the population of Serbs was in the majority or a substantial

5 minority. I'm just asking you if -- is that what the witness said? If it

6 is what you are proposing to him, tell him that's what you're proposing to

7 him. Don't say that's what he said.

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, line 8, page 32,

9 of the transcript contains the witness's answer to my question about where

10 the UN troops were deployed.

11 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we get line 8, please?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, line 8 and 9

13 reflects the answer of the witness to my question, where he states that

14 the UN troops were deployed to areas, and then he goes on to quote the UN

15 plan, namely the words "where the Serbs constituted a majority or a

16 substantial minority" and then he adds something that is not contained in

17 the UN plan, namely that they became that as a result of an armed

18 conflict. This is the bit that cannot be found in the Vance Plan. This

19 is what I'm putting to the witness.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm asking for page 32, line 8 to be shown, please.

21 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm recognising you, but before I ask you to speak,

23 I would like to see page 32, line 8, Mr. Milovancevic, please, where you

24 say this is what the witness said.

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this is page 32

Page 966

1 of the transcript, as far as I can see, line 8 and 9.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yeah but my screen doesn't show me page 32. I'm

3 asking to be shown page 32, line 8, Mr. Milovancevic. That's all I'm

4 asking, and if the Court officers are able to help us, they can help us.

5 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]

6 THE WITNESS: Your Honours -- if --

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Yes, Mr. Black?

8 MR. BLACK: If it's helpful, Your Honour, I've been able to get it

9 on my screen I would be happy to read the sentence.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: If you may, please, it might just help us save

11 time.

12 MR. BLACK: I think it's important to read just exactly what the

13 witness said because it's slightly different from what Mr. Milovancevic

14 said.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: Please do so.

16 MR. BLACK: I believe the sentence at issue is, "I've also seen

17 descriptions for the UNPAs or further detailing of these areas, where it

18 is mentioned that these are areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a

19 substantial minority, prior to the conflict or as a result of the

20 conflict." I believe that's the sentence at issue.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: I've also seen what?

22 MR. BLACK: I've also seen descriptions for the UNPAs, the

23 protected areas, or further detailing of these areas "where it is

24 mentioned that these are areas where Serbs constitute a majority or a

25 substantial minority prior to the conflict or as a result of the

Page 967

1 conflict."

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: That's not the testimony of the witness. That's a

3 quotation that the witness says --

4 MR. BLACK: Sorry, that's what the witness said. I was quoting

5 the witness.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Oh, you were quoting him. Thank you, Mr. Black.

7 Is that what you were referring to, Mr. Milovancevic?

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] That's precisely what I had in

9 mind, Your Honour. Now I'm referring you to paragraph 8 of the UN

10 Security Council resolution defining the protected areas and stating there

11 would be areas in which Serbs constitute [In English] "Majority or

12 substantial minority of the population and where intercommunal tensions

13 have led to armed conflict in the recent past." [Interpretation]

14 Therefore, Your Honour, I asked the witness about the provisions of the

15 Vance Plan. I didn't ask him about what he read in other documents,

16 comments, and so on. This was the basis for my question.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, I think that the definition I

18 gave for the UNPAs corresponded with what is mentioned in the resolution.

19 Now the reason why I mentioned -- why I added that areas where Serbs

20 constitute a majority or substantial minority prior to the conflict, the

21 only reason why I did that is that when I compare during the preparation

22 of my report the territory covered by the UNPAs with maps depicting the

23 1991 census, there were areas covered by the UNPAs, for example, the

24 municipality of Slunj, where there was a Croatian majority prior to the

25 conflict, and if I recall well, I think it was 60 per cent or more than 60

Page 968

1 per cent of Croats and something less than 40 per cent of Serbs, and then

2 as a result of the conflict, the Croatian or largest part of the Croatian

3 population of Slunj was removed or left. So that was the only reason why

4 I added in my reply to the question of Mr. Milovancevic the section on "as

5 a result of the conflict." It is correct that as a result of the

6 conflict, that small passage, is not mentioned in the Vance Plan nor the

7 Security Council resolution.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Did you study the statistics and statistical analysis of the

11 population in Croatia while preparing your expert report?

12 A. The results of the 1991 census, which I also include in the atlas

13 that was introduced in the beginning of my testimony, is one of the

14 informations I came across while preparing for this report, for this

15 report, but I didn't include any specific data as such in my report.

16 Q. Mr. Theunens, in your report, you mentioned that the SFRY

17 Presidency declared a state of imminent threat of war in the SFRY on the

18 1st of October 1991; is that correct?

19 A. That is correct, Your Honours. I was just locating the source. I

20 think it's the Official Gazette of the 18th of October, the SFRY Official

21 Gazette of the 18th of October. And this has the 65 ter number 1245.

22 Q. In your report on pages 76 and 77, you say that in connection with

23 this Presidency decision or, rather, after this Presidency decision, the

24 army General Veljko Kadijevic issued a public statement to the citizens of

25 Yugoslavia on the 3rd of October. Is that correct?

Page 969

1 A. That is correct, Your Honours. This is 65 ter number 65, although

2 it is not a statement specifically to the citizens of Yugoslavia. It is a

3 statement also intended for the international public opinion and the

4 international community because it was also published immediately in

5 English in the English version of The Bilten, i.e. The bulletin.

6 Q. When I said that Mr. Kadijevic gave a statement addressing the

7 citizens of Yugoslavia on the 3rd of October 1991, I literally quoted the

8 name, the title of the statement, which was published in the bulletin,

9 Bilten of the SSNO and the first sentence of this statement. Does the

10 first statement read, "Citizens of Yugoslavia, members of the armed forces

11 of Yugoslavia"?

12 A. Your Honours, there is no dispute about that. It's obvious. But

13 all I wanted to add is that the statement, for example, the Office of the

14 Prosecutor -- Office of the Prosecution has only an English version of the

15 statement because we have a number of issues of the bulletin and the

16 bulletin was specifically intended to provide what the SSNO called

17 themselves the truth about the events in the former Yugoslavia and as it

18 is in English I assume that it is intended for the international community

19 and the international media, even though the statement as such, of course,

20 has in the title, "Citizens of Yugoslavia."

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Could you please read the second

22 paragraph of the statement? That's on page 77, the statement of the

23 federal secretary, the second paragraph.

24 A. Do you mean the second I have quoted in my report or the second

25 from the statement? Because I didn't include the entire statement in my

Page 970

1 report.

2 Q. Mr. Theunens, I mentioned the second paragraph as you indicated it

3 on page 77. Therefore, October 1991, citizens of Yugoslavia and then

4 there is one paragraph but I meant the following paragraph or, rather, on

5 page 77 that would be the fourth paragraph from the top.

6 A. Do you mean the paragraph that starts with, what is in force?

7 Q. "We have." It starts with the words, "We have."

8 A. It is second, then.

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. "We have been left without a state and from what was seen and

11 heard last night about the March sessions of the Supreme Command, you

12 could also have seen once again in an obvious way what kind of Supreme

13 Commander we have. Some members of the SFRY Presidency continuously

14 prevented the making of decisions with a clear goal of breaking up

15 Yugoslavia by hindering and breaking the army. The federal Prime Minister

16 has joined them with his perfidious deceit. Such an attitude of the

17 Supreme Commander and the Prime Minister towards their own army is not

18 known anywhere else in the world."

19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Does this paragraph show which session

20 of the Presidency Mr. Kadijevic has in mind? He speaks of the March

21 session and he says that the citizens had the opportunity, the previous

22 night, to view this particular Presidency session -- the March session of

23 the Presidency; is that correct?

24 A. That is correct, Your Honours, but I would like to add that my

25 paragraph B which starts on the bottom of page 66, the word "following" is

Page 971

1 only intended as a kind of -- to show the chronology. I didn't imply -- I

2 didn't necessarily imply a causal link between the first of October

3 decision and the 3rd of October statement. Maybe there is a link, maybe

4 not, but I didn't analyse any causal effect between both events.

5 MR. BLACK: Your Honour that was a little confusing the witness

6 mentioned page 66. I wonder if he meant page 76.

7 THE WITNESS: I will correct. It was the bottom of page 76 where

8 I used the word "following" to make the link between the 1st of October

9 SFRY Presidency decision and then the 3rd of October Kadijevic statement.

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Black.

11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Theunens, at this point we are only discussing this paragraph

13 of Kadijevic's statement of the 3rd of October 1991, and my question did

14 not aim to tie up with any other events. Can one see on the basis of this

15 paragraph that General Kadijevic is addressing the citizens of Yugoslavia

16 and that he is referring to the March sessions of the Presidency of

17 Yugoslavia? I believe your answer was an affirmative one.

18 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, but I've tried to explain because the

19 statement is in English it's also addressed for the international

20 community.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That is beyond dispute.

22 When mentioning the March Presidency session, the Presidency

23 session from March 1991 when some proposals were rejected, does

24 General Kadijevic have in mind the session held on -- between the 12th and

25 the 15th of March, when the Presidency rejected the declaration of a state

Page 972

1 of emergency?

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: How is this witness supposed to answer that

3 question? How is he supposed to know what is in the mind of Mr. Kadijevic

4 at this stage, if Mr. Kadijevic doesn't give a date in March himself?

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the witness does

6 not have to answer the question. He can say that he does not know. My

7 question to him was whether he knew or did not know about it, that the

8 statement has certain context.

9 JUDGE MOLOTO: The witness has been asked whether he knows what

10 Mr. Kadijevic had in mind. How is he here -- how is he supposed to know

11 what Mr. Kadijevic had in mind?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Respectfully, Your Honour, in

13 his statement, Mr. Kadijevic is referring to the session of the Presidency

14 at which some members of the Presidency made it impossible to take some

15 decisions that were to prevent the break-up of the country and backed some

16 proposals that were supposed to lead to the dissolution of the country.

17 And he links it to Ante Markovic and that's why I asked the witness

18 whether he knew that this was the particular session of the Presidency,

19 that's to say in March 1991.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, all what you are saying has

21 nothing to do with my remarks. My remarks have to do with your

22 questioning the witness whether he knows what Mr. Kadijevic had in mind

23 when he made certain statements. I'm saying, how is this witness supposed

24 to know what is in the mind of anybody else when that person makes a

25 particular statement?

Page 973

1 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I

2 understand what you're saying.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Theunens, in March 1991, did the Presidency session take place

6 which we have been mentioning here at which the proposal for the

7 introduction of a state of emergency was rejected?

8 A. Your Honours, we have discussed this topic already yesterday. My

9 answer yesterday was that I remember that there has been a SFRY Presidency

10 session in March 1991 where the proposal of Kadijevic to declare a state

11 of emergency, I think it was, was rejected by the members, but I think I

12 added yesterday that I didn't analyse the minutes or other reports of SFRY

13 Presidency sessions, so I cannot go beyond the answer I gave yesterday.

14 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. In the paragraph you have just read out,

15 which is Kadijevic's statement addressing the public, does Mr. Kadijevic

16 mention any other member of the SFRY Presidency in addition to the Prime

17 Minister, Ante Markovic, who, as he puts it, "prevented the making of

18 decisions with a clear goal of breaking up Yugoslavia by hindering and

19 breaking the army"? Did he mention anybody else?

20 A. Your Honours, in this particular paragraph, Mr. Kadijevic or

21 General Kadijevic speaks about the Supreme Commander we have, and then he

22 also mentions federal Prime Minister. Now, I think I was also asked

23 questions about this by Mr. Black during my examination, and the only

24 thing I could conclude from my point of view as a military analyst was

25 that the situation is very serious when the most senior military person in

Page 974

1 a country expresses such views about his political Supreme Commander,

2 especially when he does that in public.

3 Q. I agree with you, Mr. Theunens, that this was indeed a serious

4 matter. However, when Mr. Kadijevic in his public statement accuses the

5 Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, and the president of the Presidency, we

6 shall not mention his name, of treason, both of the country and the army,

7 is that correct?

8 A. Your Honours, if you wish me to comment on this, I don't see the

9 word treason in the paragraph. I only see -- I mean, one can conclude

10 from reading the paragraph that General Kadijevic has very negative views

11 on his political Supreme Commander.

12 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite -- I don't understand what is meant

13 by, "Is that correct?" What do you want this witness to say,

14 Mr. Milovancevic? Mr. Kadijevic said what he said. Is it for this

15 witness to come and tell us whether it was correct or not correct to say

16 what he said? Where are you going with that question?

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The goal of my question

18 aimed -- was the conclusion of the witness, who presented this particular

19 conclusion after having quoted Mr. Kadijevic's statement and it's to be

20 found on page 78 of the report. It's at the top of the page, right below

21 the statement by Mr. Kadijevic, where the expert states, "This statement

22 not only clarified the views of the SSNO on the objectives of the JNA in

23 the conflict." The end of the sentence or rather the conclusion by

24 Mr. Theunens is, "Kadijevic did not recognise their authority and attacked

25 them in public."

Page 975

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: He says nothing about correct or incorrect.

2 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] That's true, Your Honour.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: I'm not quite sure what you're saying,

4 Mr. Milovancevic. You referred us to this paragraph because you're saying

5 he said somewhere that it is correct or incorrect. I don't know.

6 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] The essence of my question is

7 the following, Your Honour: That the expert in this particular sentence

8 states that the Kadijevic's statement expresses the views of the SSNO in

9 relation to the objectives of the JNA. The expert quotes

10 General Kadijevic, who stated that the tasks and the role of the JNA and

11 the armed forces changed in the conflict that erupted, and explains the

12 underlying reasons. My question aimed at the following: Such a public

13 statement by General Kadijevic, is it the result of the fact that the

14 president of the state and the Prime Minister disagreed with the changing

15 of the role of the armed forces or is Mr. Kadijevic's statement in fact a

16 reaction to the conduct displayed by the president of the state and

17 Prime Minister Markovic, whom Mr. Kadijevic accuses of treason? The

18 question was rather -- was a rather long one, but that was the drift of my

19 question.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: There is just the problem, Mr. Milovancevic. I

21 still don't know what the question is after all this long statement. I'm

22 just talking about asking the witness to state whether it is correct or

23 incorrect for Kadijevic to make certain statements and I'm saying, where

24 are we going with that question? That's the essence of my query. It has

25 nothing to do with this long explanation that you've just given because I

Page 976

1 do not think it takes this case anywhere for this witness to say whether

2 Kadijevic was correct or incorrect. He's only told us what Kadijevic

3 said; that's all.

4 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, in all respect,

5 expert witness Mr. Theunens ties up the lack of respect that Mr. Kadijevic

6 shows vis-a-vis the Prime Minister and the president of the Presidency

7 with the attempt at changing the role of the armed forces. This is the

8 link that the expert makes in his report, because at the beginning he says

9 that this statement serves to explain not only the objectives of the JNA

10 but also that Kadijevic did not recognise the authority and publicly

11 attacked the Prime Minister and head of state. My question to the expert

12 was: This public display by General Kadijevic, did it have as its goal an

13 attempt to change the role of the armed forces, or was it something else?

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Put it that way. Don't ask him whether it is

15 correct or not correct. Ask him just what you said.

16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Theunens, the attack and the lack of respect that you mention,

18 which Mr. Kadijevic, as you put it, expressed vis-a-vis the president of

19 the Presidency and the Prime Minister, did they have, as their goal, the

20 change -- the changing of the constitutional role of the armed forces?

21 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure whether I understand the question, but

22 when we stick with this statement here, 65 ter number 1850, at the bottom

23 of page 77 in my report, so in the English version, I quote the following

24 paragraph from General Kadijevic's statement. "The army now wants nothing

25 more but to restore control in the crisis areas, to protect the Serbian

Page 977

1 population from persecution and annihilation and to liberate the army

2 personnel and members of their families. The condition for this is to

3 defeat the Ustasha forces." This to me seems like Kadijevic expressing a

4 mission for the armed forces, for the SFRY armed forces, and this mission

5 is not included in the constitutional missions we addressed earlier today

6 and also during my examination.

7 Q. Can you explain, Mr. Theunens, what the restoration of control in

8 the crisis area, protection of the Serbian population from persecution and

9 the liberation of the army personnel you've been mentioning, have to do

10 with the personal relations between General Kadijevic, Prime Minister

11 Markovic, and the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia?

12 A. Your Honours, I don't think I ever suggested in my report that the

13 nature of the relations between Kadijevic and the federal Prime Minister,

14 Markovic, and the president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, had or were

15 the causes of the change in the mission of the JNA. The reason why I read

16 out this paragraph is the fact that it's included in the same public

17 statement Kadijevic made on the 3rd of October 1991. So if anyone -- if

18 anybody is making a link, well, from this document, it can only be

19 Kadijevic, because in one paragraph in the beginning of the report, he

20 criticises his Supreme Commander and then later on in a later paragraph in

21 his statement from the 3rd of October, he describes his views on the role

22 or what the JNA -- what the army should be doing.

23 Q. You said that you heard of the statement by President Mesic upon

24 leaving the SFRY Presidency as having said, "I've accomplished my mission.

25 Yugoslavia is no more." Do you know that Ante Markovic abandoned the

Page 978

1 Yugoslav government in December 1991?

2 A. Your Honours, my report focuses on the SAO Krajina and RSK TO and

3 SVK and relations between these organisations and Milan Martic. Analysing

4 or studying developments within the SFRY executive -- federal executive

5 council, of which Ante Markovic was chief, as Prime Minister, was not part

6 or is not part of my report.

7 Q. Mr. Theunens, your task as an expert was to analyse the

8 Territorial Defence of the SAO Krajina and the RSK. You seem to be

9 invoking this task of yours only when you find it inconvenient to answer a

10 question that may gainsay what you state in your thesis.

11 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe this is

12 an appropriate time for a break.

13 JUDGE MOLOTO: We've got two more minutes, Mr. -- unless you're

14 saying that the -- it's convenient for you. Is it a convenient time,

15 Mr. Milovancevic?

16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I believe so, Your Honour,

17 thank you.

18 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well. We will adjourn and come back at half

19 past 12. Court adjourned.

20 --- Recess taken at 11.59 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.

22 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic.

23 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

24 Q. Mr. Theunens, we've mentioned the Geneva agreement on the 23rd of

25 November 1991 signed by Mr. Kadijevic, Tudjman, Milosevic -- and Milosevic

Page 979

1 in the presence of Cyrus Vance. Did this agreement provide for an urgent

2 cease-fire?

3 A. Your Honours, if my recollection is correct, this agreement signed

4 in Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991 provided for a cease-fire as well

5 as included -- it included also modalities for the lifting of the

6 blockades of barracks of the JNA that were still under blockade in

7 Croatia.

8 Q. Did this agreement say what was going to happen to the blocked

9 barracks after the siege was lifted?

10 A. Your Honours, I don't recall the specific aspects of the

11 agreement. I would have to see the agreement in order to be able to

12 discuss those.

13 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. On page 80 of your report, you include a

14 directive issued by the army general, Veljko Kadijevic, on the 10th of

15 December 1991. You also testified about this directive. The title of

16 this document is, "The directive on the use of the armed forces for the

17 preparation and performance of combat operations in the forthcoming

18 period." Is that correct, Mr. Theunens?

19 A. Indeed, Your Honours, that's correct.

20 Q. Mr. Theunens, would you please read out paragraph 2 of this

21 directive? It can be found on page 81 of your report.

22 A. Yes, Your Honours, and I can add that this is 65 ter number 1277.

23 So I read out the second paragraph. "In the foregoing period, the armed

24 forces of the Republic of Croatia apart from the -- increasing their

25 numbers and organisation have suffered heavy losses along the entire front

Page 980

1 line especially following the fall of Vukovar which has had a significant

2 influence on the development of events at the political level. However,

3 despite this, the opponent is striving to recover parts of its lost

4 territory by constant combat activity. Therefore we must expect that in

5 the forthcoming period by means of armed strikes, attacks, and actions.

6 It will try to maintain the state of conflict with the intention of

7 causing losses to our armed forces, improving its position on the front

8 line, and influencing the political resolution of the Yugoslav crisis,

9 above all via the institutions of the EC and the UN Security Council.

10 This points to the conclusion that the war may continue for longer."

11 Q. In this directive, did Mr. Kadijevic speak about the final goals

12 of the war?

13 A. Indeed, Your Honours. Under the heading, Roman II, which follows

14 paragraph 3, at the beginning, Kadijevic says, and I will read it

15 out, "Our armed forces are entering this a new period of exceptional

16 significance for accomplishing the ultimate aims of the war, protection of

17 the Serb population, a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis, and the

18 creation of conditions in which Yugoslavia may be preserved for those

19 people that wish to live in it." And the paragraph continues but I think

20 that we mentioned the most relevant parts.

21 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. That's correct. That's precisely what I

22 had in mind.

23 Does General Kadijevic, after this, specify the tasks enumerating

24 them in items 1 through 6? You bring that on page 82 and 83 of your

25 report. Does General Kadijevic then give direct instructions to the armed

Page 981

1 forces as to what needs to be done in order to raise combat readiness in

2 response to the anticipated moves of the enemy?

3 A. Your Honours, it is correct that General Kadijevic gives a number

4 of tasks. I think there are 12 -- 13 of them but I'm not sure whether

5 they are entirely in response to what he perceives as the outlook or what

6 he perceives as the probable Croatian course of action. It would be

7 logical to link what Kadijevic sees as the Croatian intentions to the

8 tasks he gives to the SFRY armed forces in order to act or pre-empt these

9 Croatian intentions, to act against or pre-empt.

10 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Can you explain to us what your

11 conclusion then means, your conclusion which follows immediately the

12 quoted text of the directive, on page 83, where you state, I'm

13 paraphrasing now, that such a directive was issued by Mr. Kadijevic at the

14 time when the international community was making efforts aimed at finding

15 a peaceful settlement or a resolution?

16 A. Your Honours, the text that follows in the top of page 83, so that

17 follows the quotation from Kadijevic's directive is in my view not a

18 conclusion but it's just an observation, and the only link -- if I wanted

19 to establish a link, the only link I want to establish is that on the 10th

20 of December, Kadijevic issues this directive, whereas on the 23rd of

21 November 1991, a cease-fire agreement had been concluded. I don't think

22 you will find additional conclusions from my side on whether there is a

23 link between both and what this link then may well be.

24 Q. By presenting such a comment, do you attribute to Mr. Kadijevic

25 some war goals which would be beyond the UN peace efforts?

Page 982

1 A. Your Honours, I don't understand the question. I mean the answer

2 is no. But I didn't suggest any link between both things so it's

3 difficult for me to attribute something then.

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

5 A. If I can add, Kadijevic himself more or less states that the

6 ultimate aims of the war or more or less accomplished. He doesn't say

7 that in such strong terms in this directive but when we refer back to his

8 book, it is quite obvious that by then, what he calls the second stage or

9 the second phase of the operations in Croatia has been finalised.

10 Q. Are you trying to say that at the time when the Geneva agreement

11 was signed, the phase of the war with the goals described by Mr. Kadijevic

12 was already finalised? I didn't quite understand you.

13 A. Kadijevic in his book, when he talks about the second stage of the

14 second phase, he doesn't mention the November 1991 cease-fire agreement.

15 However, when we look at the developments of the military situation after

16 the 23rd of November until the acceptance of the Vance Plan, with the

17 exception of the Dubrovnik area, the most significant operations -- JNA

18 operations had been concluded.

19 Q. Do you believe that the JNA's obligation stemming from the Vance

20 Plan to withdraw its troops from the territory of Croatia is a significant

21 JNA operation? Is that what you believe?

22 A. Your Honours, any withdrawal operation that concerns forces of the

23 size the JNA still had in Croatia before the acceptance of the Vance Plan

24 is indeed a significant operation, no matter what significance you give to

25 the word "significant" or which meaning you give to the

Page 983

1 word "significant".

2 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you know that the cease-fire agreement from

3 Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991 was the 13th cease-fire agreement

4 since the eruption of the conflict in August of 1991? Or perhaps even the

5 14th, chronologically. I'm trying to say that there were many of them.

6 A. Your Honours, there were indeed many cease-fire agreements prior

7 to the one that was signed in Geneva on the 23rd of November 1991.

8 Q. Do you know that many of such cease-fire agreements were signed

9 precisely at the insistence of the international community, the European

10 Community, and the United States?

11 A. Your Honours, even though I didn't analyse the cease-fire

12 agreements and the motives for them and the organisations or people who

13 brokered them, it is indeed obvious that the international community tried

14 to achieve a peaceful solution for the conflict in Yugoslavia and, of

15 course, in order to create the conditions to achieve such a peaceful

16 solution, a cease-fire agreement is one of the requirements.

17 Q. Did you tell us that based on the book of General Kadijevic, the

18 purpose of the second phase of the armed conflict was to defeat the

19 Croatian armed forces? Wasn't that one of the goals?

20 A. Your Honours, based on what Kadijevic writes in -- on page

21 00362709 in the English translation of his book, the task of the JNA

22 during the second phase was to, and I quote, "Protect the Serb population

23 in Croatia in such a way that all regions with a majority Serb population

24 would be completely freed from the presence of the Croatian army and the

25 Croatian authorities." Then he adds, "To pull the JNA out of Croatia by

Page 984

1 first ensuring that the above task was completed." And third aspect, "To

2 carry out the continued country-wide transformation of the JNA into the

3 army of the future Yugoslavia, focusing on its internal, national, and

4 organisational structure and its territorial location." And, of course,

5 when he then details, and that's in the following pages in his book, more

6 specifically 00362710, Kadijevic specifies the missions during the two

7 stages he distinguishes in what he calls the second phase of the conflict

8 in Croatia.

9 Q. On the basis of your experience as a military expert and as a

10 military person, 13 interruptions of a mission can represent an obstacle

11 for attaining a military goal.

12 A. Your Honours, I mean, I can give a general answer but it all

13 depends on the mission and the kind of interruption. It's obvious that if

14 you try to achieve something, whatever you do, whether it's a military

15 goal or you pursue a political goal or another goal, if you're

16 interrupted, then it hinders you in achieving that goal, that's correct.

17 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. We said that on the 23rd of November

18 1991, in Geneva, the foundation was created for the UN peace operation.

19 That was the preparation for the Vance Plan. Would you agree with that?

20 A. Yes, I agree with that, Your Honours.

21 Q. Are you familiar with the UN Secretary-General's report submitted

22 to the Security Council, number S-23280, dated the 11th of December 1991?

23 In this report, the Secretary-General warns the Security Council of the

24 dangers that the UN peace mission could encounter in the form of premature

25 recognition of seceding republics?

Page 985

1 A. Your Honours I may have seen this specific report of the UN

2 Secretary-General to the Security Council before coming to the ICTY but I

3 don't recall seeing it while working at the ICTY. I am familiar with the

4 reports from February 1992 as well as the one I think from 28th of

5 September 1992 which is quoted in my report and also one from November

6 1992 which is also mentioned in my report.

7 Q. Since you followed these reports in relation to your work, may I

8 remind you that on the 11th of December 1991, the UN Secretary-General

9 informs the Security Council of the information he received from Cyrus

10 Vance, the UN special envoy, about the fact that the premature recognition

11 of republics which want to secede would represent a disaster for the

12 region?

13 A. If you say so, I assume it's correct, but it would be helpful for

14 me to see the report and to also see in which context Mr. Vance makes

15 these comments and look at the other parts of the report.

16 Q. We have an e-court system here. Defence has a minor technical

17 problem and we will attempt to resolve it later on and show you this

18 document, which is report S-23280 of the UN Secretary-General dated the

19 11th of December 1991. In that report, Mr. Theunens, the

20 Secretary-General not only warns the Security Council of the dangers

21 associated with premature recognition but also writes a letter to the

22 presiding chairman of the European council, Mr. van den Broek, warning him

23 of this danger and asking him not to recognise any of the republics prior

24 to finding an overall solution to the crisis. Are you familiar with this

25 text?

Page 986

1 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can I interrupt, Mr. Milovancevic? Is there any

2 way the officials can help with the technical problem you have?

3 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have in front of

4 me the report. However, it's been underlined, and I don't think it is

5 suitable to show it to the witness in this form. Therefore I propose that

6 we do it later. I have no --

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you. So it's not a technical problem. You

8 may proceed.

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Do you know when Vatican recognised the independence of Slovenia

11 and Croatia?

12 A. Your Honours, I do not know when the Vatican recognised the

13 independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

14 Q. If I were to tell you that the Vatican recognised Croatia or

15 rather Slovenia as an independent country on the 13th of January 1992,

16 whereas Germany and some other European countries did that on the 15th of

17 January 1992, would you say that was reasonable?

18 A. Your Honours, I think that that is correct, that these are the

19 dates when certain countries, including Germany, recognised Slovenia and

20 Croatia.

21 Q. Mr. Theunens, when we discussed the acceptance of the Vance Plan

22 or rather the UN Security Council resolution 743 from February 1992, did

23 we conclude that the peace operation in Yugoslavia was created in February

24 of 1992 pursuant to a Security Council resolution?

25 A. Do you mean the UN peace operation? Because there were other

Page 987

1 peace efforts ongoing --

2 Q. My apologies. Yes. I mean the UN peace operation.

3 A. Yes. You could phrase it like that. I mean, if you take UN

4 Security Council resolution 743 as the basis, then it would be correct.

5 Q. You said that one of the goals and objectives for deployment of

6 the peace forces throughout Yugoslavia pursuant to that resolution was to

7 create conditions for peace in order to achieve an overall settlement of

8 the Yugoslav crisis; is that correct?

9 A. That is correct, Your Honours. But now that I see the transcript,

10 the deployment of peace forces was mainly in Croatia. The UNPROFOR

11 headquarters initially was located in Sarajevo, but I'm not aware of any

12 significant deployment of UN peace forces in -- at that stage in other

13 republics of the former Yugoslavia, and I'm mainly thinking of Slovenia or

14 Serbia-Montenegro.

15 Q. Does the Vance Plan provide for the UN peace operation in

16 Yugoslavia and does it specify all of the goals that are to be achieved in

17 the course of that operation?

18 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, the Vance Plan as I mentioned during my

19 examination consists of three phases and the things that had to be

20 achieved during these three phases could be considered the goals of the

21 Vance Plan as well as the goals that were to be pursued at a later stage.

22 Q. Do you know that the decision to send the UN peace mission to

23 Yugoslavia and to establish UNPROFOR was to find a peaceful settlement of

24 the crisis and of the conflict without prejudging its outcome? Do you

25 remember that something to that effect was stated in the text?

Page 988

1 A. Indeed, the Vance Plan mentions that more specifically in relation

2 to the UNPAs, that the arrangements are of an interim nature and that they

3 are intended to create conditions of peace and security in order to allow

4 negotiations for political solution, and also that this deployment does

5 not prejudge the outcome of these negotiations for a comprehensive

6 settlement.

7 Q. Since the Vance Plan emphasises that it does not wish to prejudge

8 the political negotiations for the comprehensive settlement of the crisis

9 does not the premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by some

10 countries prejudge the outcome of the negotiations, in your opinion?

11 A. Your Honours, I think this is a political question, but I can

12 mention that I can add that the resolutions, UN -- United Nations Security

13 Council resolutions that were adopted in 1992 and that deal specifically

14 with the situation in Croatia emphasise the territorial integrity of the

15 Republic of Croatia.

16 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. However, the UN peace operation was intended

17 for Yugoslavia. All at once, there is discussion of an independent

18 Croatia. Does not this -- does this not constitute a prejudging of the

19 situation even by the Security Council?

20 A. Your Honours, I don't think that I'm the appropriate person to

21 answer that question. I can give a personal comment on it but I wonder to

22 what extent I'm qualified to do so. All I can say is that the -- as I

23 mentioned already, that the resolution that concern the deployment of

24 UNPROFOR and subsequent resolution that -- resolutions that deal with the

25 extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR mention the territorial integrity of

Page 989

1 the Republic of Croatia.

2 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. We shall briefly go back to page 83 of

3 your report, where, following the quotation of parts of the directive by

4 Mr. Kadijevic and the order by General Adzic, under paragraph F on page

5 83, you say, "The instructions from what remained of the SFRY Presidency,

6 Kadijevic's analysis and Adzic's order, indicate that the JNA moved

7 towards ceasing to be the SFRY army and instead gradually developed into a

8 mainly Serb force serving Serbian goals." Is that correct?

9 A. I would like to add, Your Honours, that this -- in this

10 subparagraph F, it says that at least in Croatia, the JNA moved towards

11 ceasing to be the SFRY army and instead gradually developed into a mainly

12 Serb force. I think that's a significant aspect of the conclusion I draw

13 here because I only look at the mission and the way how the JNA is

14 implementing that in Croatia, not in the other parts of the former

15 Yugoslavia.

16 Q. Yes, Mr. Theunens. That's precisely my question. Can you tell us

17 which were these Serb goals that the JNA served in Croatia and that you

18 mention here?

19 A. Your Honours, I think we have -- I've discussed them but again,

20 let's go back to the book of Kadijevic. Kadijevic and more specifically

21 we don't have to go to each phase in detail but when we go to the second

22 phase, he talks about, and I'm reading now from page 73, subparagraph B

23 between brackets, "The task of the JNA was to protect the Serb people in

24 Croatia in such a way that all regions with a majority Serb population

25 would be completely freed from the presence of the Croatian army and the

Page 990

1 Croatian authorities."

2 It clearly mentions Serb population. It doesn't mention what is

3 to happen with the non-Serbs because, again, and that's maybe outside of

4 the scope of my report but when the Kadijevic says that regions with a

5 majority Serb population would be completely present -- completely freed

6 from the presence of the Croatian army and the Croatian authorities, now,

7 the question that then can be raised is what is to happen with non-Serbs

8 who live in these areas and who want to stay in an area that is controlled

9 by the Croatian authorities? Kadijevic doesn't address that.

10 Now, we can continue when we look at the next pages, and when

11 Kadijevic specifies the missions during the second phase, he talks about

12 the first stage, which I discuss on page 74 in my report, English version,

13 subparagraph D, first stage, "the operations focused primarily on

14 tactically important counterattacks until Croatian aggression came fully

15 to fore, while at the same time intensively organising and preparing Serb

16 in Croatia." He specifies that further. I'm not going to read that out

17 in detail. It can be found in my report.

18 When coming then to the second stage of the second phase, which is

19 mentioned -- which is explained - excuse me - on page 76 of the English

20 version of my report, Kadijevic mentions "the main tasks, of the modified

21 plan," I can only mention -- I can mention the two of them. First one,

22 "in close coordination with the Serb insurgents, all subregions in

23 Croatia except for a part in Western Slavonia were liberated and he states

24 that this corresponds with approximately one third of the territory of the

25 Republic of Croatia," and then second task, "the future army of the

Page 991

1 Serbian Krajina was actually built up in the course of fighting and

2 equipped by the JNA with corresponding arms and materials." I think that

3 Kadijevic is much better placed than me to identify these goals, these

4 Serbian goals, that are mentioned.

5 Q. Your answer was rather long, but failed to give an answer to my

6 question. I did not ask you about what General Kadijevic had to say about

7 the goals but, rather, about your conclusion on page 93 that -- or rather,

8 83, that the JNA's role changed in the direction of merely serving the

9 Serb goals. My question to you was: Which were these Serb goals?

10 A. Your Honours, if you have the most senior person in a country

11 identify in great detail goals the armed forces of that country had to

12 pursue, who am I to have doubts about these goals? I can only repeat what

13 Kadijevic said. Why should I try to conclude something else? I think

14 Kadijevic is very clear, as well as the orders and statements that

15 Kadijevic and Adzic issued during the latter half of 1991. There is no

16 reason for me to draw additional conclusions from that.

17 Q. Mr. Theunens, this is your military expert report. In addition to

18 General Kadijevic's book, you cited a number of documents on the basis of

19 an analysis of all these documents, you state here that the JNA served the

20 Serb goals whereas General Kadijevic and Adzic speak of the protection of

21 the Serb population. Can you remember see the difference there?

22 A. Your Honours, Kadijevic and Adzic indeed mention the protection of

23 the Serb population but Kadijevic also, as I just read out, mentions the

24 liberation of Serb regions. Now, Serb regions as such were not defined in

25 Croatia, as far as my research allows me to conclude. There were of

Page 992

1 course areas with a significant Serb presence, Serb majority and already

2 for centuries. There is no doubt about that. But in these areas there

3 were also non-Serbs. Now, when you read Kadijevic's book, actually the

4 goal there, he understands or he sees liberating these areas as removing

5 Croatian military and Croatian authority. Now, I think the goal there is

6 pretty obvious. The organising of the future army of the Serbian Krajina

7 I think that is also quite clear as a goal. So I don't -- I really don't

8 know what I can add to that.

9 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I will not insist on this

10 matter any further, Your Honour, but I believe that the witness did not

11 answer my question as to what the Serb goals were. He spoke of the JNA's

12 withdrawal of the forces, a blockade of the barracks, the creation of the

13 forces of the RSK, all these are goals that General Kadijevic mentions,

14 who, I should say in passing, was born to one of whose parents were Croat.

15 I have no further questions, thank you.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much, Mr. Milovancevic.

17 Any re-examination?

18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] No, no. I meant in relation to

19 this topic, Your Honour. I apologise. I only wish to say that I will not

20 pursue the matter of the Serbian goals any longer. Thank you.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic.

22 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I was just

23 informed that we do have the UN report which is number 65 ter number 813

24 on e-court. This is the report dated 11 December 1991. When I said that

25 we had some technical difficulties, I meant the Defence had technical

Page 993

1 difficulties rather than that we were not offered enough assistance by

2 court officers.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Milovancevic. You are now better

4 understood.

5 MR. BLACK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I don't have any objection to

6 looking at this document but it does raise a procedural point which I

7 think should be addressed now. I have not -- I was not aware that this

8 document was going to be used. It's on our 65 ter list. I don't have any

9 problem with it being used but ordinarily the practice at this Tribunal is

10 at the beginning of cross-examination, we are provided with a documents

11 that the Defence intends to use during cross-examination. They can be

12 released to e-court, in fact is I believe how the process was explained to

13 me. That was not done in this case. It's not a problem with there

14 document but I can imagine at sometimes documents that come up a that I

15 haven't seen and I might have to ask for a delay in order to prepare. I

16 can see no reason beyond simple surprise why these kind of documents

17 couldn't be released or identified to me at the beginning of

18 cross-examination rather than piecemeal as we go through the

19 cross-examination.

20 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, do you have any response?

21 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the practice

22 indicated by my learned colleague from the OTP may prevail before some of

23 the Trial Chambers but I believe that such a burden placed on the Defence

24 would prejudice its cross-examination, on the one side. Only after the

25 Prosecutor completes his examination-in-chief can the Defence decide which

Page 994

1 documents it will use during cross-examination. I don't think that such

2 obligations placed on the Defence can be realised. Besides, this is an

3 exhibit from the Prosecution's 65 ter list. We did experience some

4 technical difficulties. However, since the witness himself stated that it

5 would be good for him to see the document, the Defence did it -- its

6 utmost to make sure that the document was presented both to the witness

7 and the Trial Chamber.

8 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, I'm sorry, one thing just to clarify, I'm

9 certainly not suggesting that if during the course of direct examination

10 or particularly during the course of cross-examination it becomes apparent

11 that Defence counsel needs to refer to some other document that was not on

12 his list, they would certainly be free to do that. I'm not suggesting

13 that their hands be tied by any list that they provide to us. But if this

14 was -- again I'm not objecting to this particular document but all such

15 documents as could reasonably be identified at the beginning of

16 cross-examination should be provided to us. We, of course, provide a list

17 of documents to the Defence before we start our direct examination, and

18 while I'm not suggesting either that they have to do that in advance, as

19 we do, certainly at the beginning of cross seems like the reasonable time,

20 Your Honour. That's my request, going into the future.

21 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Black, do you have any Rule of the Tribunal on

22 which you rely for that position?

23 MR. BLACK: Your Honour, as far as I'm aware, this does not appear

24 in the Rules of Evidence and Procedure. I'm relying on my experience in

25 the Limaj trial which was included last year and also in the Brdjanin

Page 995

1 trial which concluded a couple of years ago. I'm not aware of any case

2 that it was done differently although certainly that may have happened on

3 cases in which I did not participate. I can try to collect jurisprudence,

4 Your Honour, but I don't think there will be any written decisions on this

5 issue.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you, Mr. Black.

7 Mr. Milovancevic, do you have any other documents that you intend

8 using during the cross-examination of this witness that you have not shown

9 to the Prosecution?

10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at this time the

11 Defence does not have a single document before it which does not come from

12 the 65 ter list. This issue has been raised just now. I would not wish

13 to give you an incomplete answer. However, based on the experience so far

14 in cross-examination, we have no such other documents.

15 JUDGE MOLOTO: No such what documents?

16 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] We don't have, for the time

17 being, any plans to introduce or to tender documents that are not

18 contained on the OTP 65 ter list. Therefore, all these are documents

19 contained in the Prosecutor's list. We have not had the obligation to

20 deliver such a list in advance because there was no such decision taken by

21 the Trial Chamber, and there was no such proposal on the part of the

22 Prosecution. If I may, Your Honour, I'd like to address you on another

23 matter.

24 In --

25 JUDGE MOLOTO: Can we finalise this matter first before you

Page 996

1 address me on another matter? My question to you had been: Do you have

2 any other documents, irrespective of where they come from, whether they

3 come from the 65 ter list or from anywhere else, do you have any other

4 documents that you intend tendering into evidence during your

5 cross-examination of this particular witness? If you have them, say yes.

6 If you don't have them, say no. Apart from the one that you --

7 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, yes.

8 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you in a position to indicate to the

9 Prosecution what those documents are?

10 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] If the Trial Chamber should

11 decide that we are duty bound to do so, then we will comply. I wanted to

12 refer you to the cases before the Tribunal, Naletilic, Martinovic,

13 Halilovic case, then the Vukovar case, Blagojevic/Jokic case. In none of

14 these cases was there an obligation in place for the Defence to provide

15 the Prosecution with a list of documents in advance of their examination.

16 JUDGE MOLOTO: Very well, then. Mr. Black has no objection to

17 your tendering this document that you're about to tender. You are

18 referring to cases that you say there was no such obligation. He has

19 referred to cases where he says that such lists were tendered. However,

20 Mr. Black does also say that there is no Rule of the Tribunal that forces

21 you to do so. So I will make no ruling on the issue on this matter,

22 unless somebody makes -- submits a motion for a ruling.

23 You may proceed, Mr. Milovancevic.

24 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I wish

25 to briefly point out that the Defence will do its utmost to proceed

Page 997

1 correctly in this case, and to avoid creating any difficulties for the OTP

2 or informing them of some matters on short notice.

3 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much for that undertaking,

4 Mr. Milovancevic. The Court appreciates that.

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE MOLOTO: You wanted to go to another matter. Can you go to

7 that matter?

8 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the document I

9 requested on the monitor, please?

10 JUDGE MOLOTO: Are you asking the legal -- the Court officials to

11 help, Mr. Milovancevic?

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I requested that the Registry

13 show us the 65 ter Exhibit 813, place on the e-court.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you.

15 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we see the entire first

16 page, please?

17 Q. Mr. Theunens, before you is the document by the Security Council,

18 S-23280, dated 11 December 1991. In the paragraphs 1, 3, and 4, on page

19 1, do you see that the Security Council speaks of a peace operation in

20 Yugoslavia?

21 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours, it's mentioned at the end of paragraph

22 4. It talks about the possible establishment of United Nations

23 peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia.

24 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

25 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we please be shown

Page 998

1 paragraph 25? That's on page 8 of the report, for the Registry.

2 Q. Mr. Theunens, can you please read out paragraph 25?

3 A. Paragraph 25, "A soundly based and effective cease-fire would

4 further open the way for constructive negotiations between the

5 representatives of the republics. In this respect, the conference on

6 Yugoslavia under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington enjoys the full

7 support of the Security Council as reflected in resolution 713 of 1991.

8 The conference has been adjourned since 5 November, although Lord

9 Carrington held an informal stock taking session with the presidents of

10 Yugoslavia's six republics on 9 December. The conference, it will be

11 recalled, is guided by a number of considerations, including those set

12 forth in the declaration issued by the 12 member states of the European

13 Community at Rome on 8 November 1991," then between brackets S/23203,

14 "that declaration stated inter alia that, 'The prospect of recognition of

15 the independence of those republics wishing it can only be envisaged in

16 the framework of an overall settlement.'" End of quotation. "The

17 conference has also, with the agreement of its participants, ruled out any

18 changes in external or internal borders by means of force. I believe that

19 any selective uncoordinated departure from those principles could hold

20 very serious dangers not only for the republics of Yugoslavia but for all

21 of her peoples and indeed for the maintenance of peace and security in" --

22 and I--

23 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. In addition to the report, there is

24 annex 4, in view of the fact that at the end of paragraph 25, UN

25 Secretary-General said that on the 10th of December 1991, he had -- he

Page 999

1 sent a letter to the presiding chairman of the European community, Mr. van

2 den Broek.

3 THE INTERPRETER: Or rather of the European council.

4 Interpreter's correction.

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Could we please be shown annex 4 on the screen?

7 THE WITNESS: Your Honours? If you allow me, when I was asked

8 earlier questions about the risks, recognition or premature recognition

9 would entail, I asked to see the report. And when we see now the

10 paragraph 24, it mentions not only the risks of premature recognition as a

11 potential factor for -- cause for trouble in the future but also the

12 changes into internal or external borders. So I think we need to be

13 complete when we address these issues. In this paragraph 24, the

14 Secretary-General talks about two principles that need to be respected,

15 the principle of non-premature recognition and the principle of

16 inchangeability of the borders, internal and external.

17 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Theunens, can you tell us, did the Republic of Croatia change

19 the state borders of Yugoslavia by using armed force?

20 A. Your Honours, I would -- I mean, again this is a question which is

21 outside my qualifications. I can only refer to the report we have been

22 looking at now that says in paragraph 24 that one of the two principles

23 that need to be respected is the principle of the inviolability of

24 internal and external borders.

25 Q. Mr. Theunens, would you please read out the last sentence of

Page 1000

1 paragraph 25? The last sentence of paragraph 25.

2 A. "I addressed a letter to the current president of the council of

3 ministers of the European Community, foreign minister van den Broek of the

4 Kingdom of the Netherlands, the text of which is reproduced as annex 4 to

5 the present report."

6 Q. Does this mean that despite these warnings, there was a de facto

7 recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in January of 1992?

8 A. Your Honours, I don't think I have the required background to be

9 able to make an authoritative statement on the fact whether it was a de

10 facto or any other recognition.

11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens.

12 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] I tender this document into

13 evidence, Your Honours, as Defence exhibit.

14 JUDGE MOLOTO: The document may be -- admitted into evidence. May

15 it please be given an exhibit number.

16 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Exhibit number 104, Your Honours.

17 JUDGE MOLOTO: Thank you very much.

18 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Mr. Theunens, we will now turn to another section of your expert

20 report. This is the topic known as the TO of the SAO Krajina. It starts

21 on page 84 of your expert report.

22 In paragraph 1, which is an introduction, you say that already

23 prior to the eruption of hostilities in Croatia, the police and TO of the

24 Republic of Croatia were divided into Croatian and Serb structures. Can

25 you tell us who implemented this division or split?

Page 1001

1 A. Your Honours, it may be a translation issue but I didn't phrase

2 the -- that paragraph exactly as it has been put here. What I wrote, and

3 I will read it out, is that "already prior to the eruption of hostilities

4 in Croatia, the police and TO of the Republic of Croatia gradually split

5 into Croatian and local Serb structures." So I want to emphasise it was a

6 gradual process. Based on the documents I reviewed, there are several

7 situations in, on one hand, you can see that on the local level, in

8 particular in areas with a Serb majority or a significant minority, local

9 Serbs create their own structure. But I've also seen that the

10 documents -- the issue I'm discussing now, these documents are not

11 included in the report, that in some cases the Croats say that they don't

12 want to be part of the TO any more or don't want to be part of the police

13 any more and they create their own structures. There are also examples

14 where from the Knin level, from the SAO Krajina level, instructions are

15 given to create local Serb TO forces in a number of areas with a

16 significant Serb minority or a Serb majority and the latter is also

17 happening with assistance of the JNA or as we have seen in -- as is

18 visible in a number of examples the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of

19 Serbia. And this is a process that takes place more or less between

20 January and December 1991 but becomes more intensified after summer 1991.

21 And that's what I've attempted to describe in this section from the

22 report.

23 Q. You speak about gradual division of the police and Territorial

24 Defence into Serbian and Croatian component. Did these two processes

25 evolve simultaneously or did one start before the other? Can you tell us

Page 1002

1 something about that?

2 A. Your Honours, I apologise, I didn't look at the process that

3 resulted in the Croatian -- of local Serb police forces so I can't really

4 say whether the TO was created prior to the police or the police prior to

5 the TO. From a document we discussed during examination, that spoke about

6 the situation in Benkovac, and that was 65 ter number 1851, there it

7 appears, at least in the Benkovac area that the local Serb police started

8 to be organised at an earlier stage than the local Serb TO, and as a

9 result was better equipped and better organised.

10 And 1851 is mentioned on the top of page 86.

11 Q. Continuing this sentence in paragraph 1, you say that the areas

12 where local Serbs had a majority or a significant minority were the areas

13 where they took over existing structures, and that they remained loyal to

14 what remained of the SFRY and Serbia. Is that true, Mr. Theunens?

15 A. Your Honour, maybe again it's a translation issue but the phrase

16 that was put was in areas where the Serbs had a majority or significant

17 minority they took over existing structures. At least in my understanding

18 this sentence does not suggest that in all areas where local Serbs had a

19 majority or significant minority they took over existing structures or

20 created their own TOs. Otherwise, Mr. Milovancevic is correct in what he

21 mentioned.

22 Q. You said that this process commenced in 1991, roughly in January

23 1991. What is this concept of what remained of Yugoslavia that you are

24 talking about then, when Slovenia and Croatia did not secede until much

25 later, end of June 1991?

Page 1003

1 A. Your Honour, in the subtitle "historical background" on page 84,

2 it has the heading, A, which is under the heading 4, SAO Krajina TO, it

3 says January to December 1991. So the text that follows below is, of

4 course, a reflection or applies to the entire time period between January

5 and December 1991. So it also includes the latter half of 1991.

6 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. What do you say about the conduct of

7 non-Serbs in that period of time, which is the next sentence after the one

8 talking about Serbs taking over existing structures? What can you tell us

9 about the conduct of non-Serbs?

10 A. Your Honours, based on the documents I looked at, the documents I

11 looked at to try to understand and then describe the creation of a local

12 Serb SAO Krajina TO, it appeared that non-Serbs in some areas, they left,

13 or they were encouraged to leave, or they didn't recognise the SFRY any

14 more and they ceased their cooperation with the JNA. It's hard for me now

15 to come up with specific documents on specific situations that I related

16 to specific areas but when you look at these various documents and they

17 will follow when -- also on page 85 I discuss the evolution, these things

18 I have mentioned on the actions undertaken by the non-Serbs are visible.

19 Q. Based on what you wrote in the first paragraph that we just

20 quoted, Mr. Theunens, could we say that in that period of time, gradually,

21 police and Territorial Defence in Croatia split into the Croatian and Serb

22 component and that the Serb component remained loyal to the SFRY, whereas

23 the Croatian component refused to comply?

24 A. Your Honours, I don't think that that reflects what this paragraph

25 says. What I say in this paragraph goes beyond the fact that, of

Page 1004

1 course --

2 Q. Mr. Theunens, I apologise for interrupting you. I didn't say that

3 this is what you wrote in your paragraph. My question was could we say,

4 based on everything you testified about, that the situation was as I have

5 described it? You can certainly answer on the basis of the sources that

6 you are familiar with. So I'm not asking you about the meaning of the

7 text that you wrote here. I'm simply asking you whether such a conclusion

8 can be drawn.

9 A. Your Honours, I wish that my reply reflects my report, which is

10 then based on sources I reviewed. I don't think I put it the way as

11 Mr. Milovancevic puts it. I don't think I wrote it that way in my report,

12 because, as we know, Territorial Defence was a republican organisation and

13 they were answerable for a number of issues, combat readiness, training,

14 and related issues, to the republican authorities. It is correct that

15 they were subordinated to the SFRY Supreme Command. Now, the Territorial

16 Defence in the Republic of Croatia was a republican structure which

17 covered the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia and we see that,

18 as I tried to describe, a gradual split occurs whereby local Serb

19 structures are set up in areas with a significant Serb presence. Now,

20 these local Serb structures, they see that the goals they are pursuing are

21 also being pursued by the JNA, so it's quite logical that these local Serb

22 structures remained loyal to the SFRY and that Croatian structures

23 preferred to be loyal to the government of the Republic of Croatia. So I

24 don't think it is correct to state, as Mr. Milovancevic stated, that the

25 Croatian structures were not complying with SFRY structures -- with SFRY

Page 1005

1 leadership any more.

2 JUDGE MOLOTO: Mr. Milovancevic, I don't mean to interrupt you.

3 I'll ask that we stop at quarter to because of other engagements that the

4 Chamber has to do, to attend to. We are left with about half a minute.

5 MR. MILOVANCEVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I was

6 about to propose that we adjourn for the day. We will continue tomorrow.

7 JUDGE MOLOTO: The Chamber is very grateful to you for that.

8 The matter then stands postponed to the 3rd of February at 9.00 in

9 the morning in Courtroom II. Court adjourned.

10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,

11 to be reconvened on Friday, the 3rd day of February

12 2006, at 9.00 a.m.