

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No: IT-05-87-A

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Liu Daqun (Presiding)
Judge Fausto Pocar
Judge Mehmet GÜney
Judge Andrézia Vaz
Judge Theodor Meron

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

DATE: 7 October 2009

THE PROSECUTOR

V.

NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC
SRETEN LUKIC

PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES

**DEFENSE APPELLANT'S BRIEF
REFILED**

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Paul Rogers

Counsel for Accused Sreten Lukić:

Mr. Branko Lukić and Mr. Dragan Ivetić

Counsel for Co-Accused:

Mr. Toma Fila and Mr. Vladimir Petrović for Mr. Nikola Šainović
Mr. Tomislav Višnjić and Mr. Peter Robinson for Mr. Dragoljub Ojdanić
Mr. John Ackerman and Mr. Aleksandar Aleksić for Mr. Nebojša Pavković
Mr. Mihajlo Bakrač and Mr. Đuro Čepić for Mr. Vladimir Lazarević

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction and General Submissions	1
 A. THE TRIAL CHAMBER ERRED – JOINDER, INADEQUATE TIME/FACILITIES	 3
1. <i>JOINDER WITH OTHER ACCUSED</i>	<i>3</i>
2. <i>LACK OF ADEQUATE TIME/FACILITIES PRIOR TO TRIAL</i>	<i>9</i>
3. <i>LACK OF ADEQUATE/FACILITIES AFTER COMMENCEMENT</i>	<i>11</i>
a. Right to being tried without Delay cannot be to the Prejudice of Accused	11
b. Limitation of Cross-Examination	12
c. Extended Sitting Schedule	15
d. Time Between Cases	17
e. Reduction of Witness List and Time for Witnesses	17
f. Stop-Watch method of Time Reports	18
g. Errors relative to CLSS Translation	19
4. <i>INADEQUATE ABILITY TO GO VISIT THE TERRAIN</i>	<i>20</i>
 B. DENIAL OF CRITICAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE	 21
 D. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE UNRELIABLE AND UNTRUSTWORTHY	 23
1. <i>PERSECUTION OF ALBANIANS BEFORE THE ARMED CONFLICTS</i>	<i>25</i>
2. <i>UNIFORMS AND POLICE INSIGNIA</i>	<i>26</i>
3. <i>PARAMILITARY/VOLUNTEERS WITHIN THE POLICE</i>	<i>29</i>
4. <i>FOREIGNER OBSERVERS</i>	<i>35</i>

5. <i>JOINT COMMAND</i>	38
6. <i>THE NATO BOMBING AND CONFLICTS IN KOSOVO</i>	39
7. <i>CVETIC</i>	40
E. BARE FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS IN THE JUDGMENT	41
F. APPELLANT'S INTERVIEW	42
1. <i>TRANSCRIPT WAS LATE DISCLOSED, REplete WITH GROSS ERRORS</i>	42
2. <i>OUT OF CONTEXT</i>	43
G. PREJUDGMENT BIAS	45
H. "WIDESPREAD" AND "SYSTEMATIC" ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST A "CIVILIAN POPULATION"	48
I. ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THE CRIMES, <i>MENS REA/ACTUS REUS</i>	54
1. <i>KLA</i>	55
2. <i>NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN</i>	57
3. <i>FORCIBLE TRANSFER/DEPORTATION</i>	58
4. <i>DISCRIMINATORY INTENT</i>	62
K. POLICE EXPERT WITNESS	69

N. JOINT COMMAND	71
1. <i>“JOINT COMMAND”—1998</i>	75
2. <i>JOINT COMMAND IN 1999</i>	82
3. <i>COORDINATION IN 1998</i>	87
4. <i>COORDINATION IN 1999</i>	89
5. <i>PREPARATION OF PLANS IN 1999</i>	91
O. EXISTENCE OF A J.C.E.	95
1. <i>INTENT / SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS COMMON PURPOSE</i>	98
a. <i>Forcible Displacement</i>	100
b. <i>Double Standards</i>	102
c. <i>Clear Pattern of Forcible Displacement</i>	103
d. <i>Context of Events In 1998 and 1999</i>	104
e. <i>Conclusions on responsibility of Appellant</i>	105
2. <i>IDENTITY DOCUMENTS</i>	119
3. <i>ARMING/DISARMING OF THE KOSOVO POPULATION</i>	122
a. <i>“Discriminatory” nature of the <u>arming</u></i>	125
b. <i>“Discriminatory” nature of the <u>disarming Kosovo Albanians</u></i>	126

P. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE MUP STAFF	128
1. <i>AUTHORITY OVER UNITS OF THE RJB</i>	128
2. <i>THE ROLE OF THE STAFF IN PLANNING</i>	130
3. <i>MUP STAFF REPORTING</i>	132
4. <i>DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE</i>	133
5. <i>LUKIC'S AUTHORITY AS A "RUKOVODILAC"/MANAGER OF MUP STAFF</i>	136
6. <i>LUKIC'S ATTENDANCE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS</i>	137
7. <i>ASSESSMENT OF LUKIC'S AUTHORITY AND ROLE</i>	139
8. <i>DE-FACTO AUTHORITY AS TO INVESTIGATION/DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS</i>	146
9. <i>DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES/CRIMES OF THE MUP</i>	147
a. <i>Knowledge of crimes in 1998 and 1999</i>	147
b. <i>Knowledge of crimes in 1999</i>	150
c. <i>Lazarević's report of 24.5.1999. (P1458)</i>	155
d. <i>Pavković's report of 255.1999. (P1459)</i>	155
e. <i>Pavković's report of 4.6.1999.</i>	157
 Q. CONSOLIDATED CRIME BASE	
1. <i>IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES AS TO CRIME BASE LOCATIONS</i>	158
2. <i>IMPROPER RELIANCE UPON OMPF LIST OF MISSING PERSONS TO DETERMINE THE DATES AND LOCATION OF DEATH</i>	162
3. <i>DEATH FORENSICALLY UNASCERTAINED</i>	164
4. <i>NO FORENSIC EVIDENCE OF A BODY</i>	166
5. <i>VICTIMS NOT NAMED IN INDICTMENT</i>	169

U. ERRORS RELATING TO PRIZREN MUNICIPALITY	170
1. <i>IMPROPER RELIANCE UPON PROSECUTION EVIDENCE</i>	171
a. As to KLA	171
b. As to NATO	173
2. <i>NO EVIDENCE CRIMES KNOWN/FORESEEABLE</i>	174
GG. ERRORS AS TO GNJILANE MUNICIPALITY	175
1. <i>UNTRUSTWORTHY PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE</i>	176
2. <i>IMPROPER CONCLUSIONS</i>	181
KK. SENTENCING	183
1. <i>MITIGATION</i>	183
2. <i>HEALTH AND PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES</i>	185
3. <i>VOLUNTARY SURRENDER</i>	186
4. <i>SENTENCING PRACTICES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA</i>	187
5. <i>AGGRAVATING FACTORS</i>	187
CONCLUSION	189

**THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Case No: IT-05-87-A

PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES

DEFENSE APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Introduction and General Submissions

1. The Chamber rendered its Judgment in the instant case on 26 February 2009. (“Judgment”).
2. The Judgment adjudged and found Sreten Lukic (“Appellant”) guilty pursuant to Article 7(1) (by way of participation in a JCE) of the Statute of:
 - a) Count 1: Deportation;
 - b) Count 2: Forcible Transfer;
 - c) Count 3: Murder;
 - d) Count 4: Murder;
 - e) Count 5: Persecutions
3. The Judgment issued a sentence of twenty-two (22) years imprisonment against Appellant based on these findings.
4. The Appellant respectfully submits that the Trial Chamber has committed various errors of law and fact, which invalidate the Judgment and/or have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.
5. The Appellant submits that for the reasons set out herein, the Appeals Chamber should: a) reverse the Judgment; b) find the Appellant not guilty on all counts; and b) order Appellant be

immediately released from custody, or in the alternative that the Sentence imposed be reconsidered and lowered.

6. In addition to the grounds of appeal set forth, Appellant expressly and respectfully reserves the right to raise any and all errors of law or fact that may become apparent: a) subsequent to a full and thorough review and analysis of the entire record of the proceedings; and b) subsequent to the Appellant receiving a copy of the Judgment in his own language.

7. Due only to word restrictions Grounds Q-JJ have been consolidated under Ground Q, except for Grounds U&GG. In no event is the Defense withdrawing such Grounds or the relief sought.

8. Additionally, due only to word restrictions, Grounds C,J,L,M have not been dealt with separately and their paragraphs have been distributed to the extent possible among the remaining Grounds. In order to comply with the word limit, discussion of topics has been consolidated under the remaining grounds, causing paragraphs to be displaced among sections. This was necessary in order to assist the Chamber to understand the arguments within the limited length, and professionally and properly present Appellant's arguments.

9. In evaluating this case, respectfully, the Appeals Chamber must take into account the fundamental flaws in the Judgment's evaluation of the Evidence, as set forth herein.

A. THE TRIAL CHAMBER ERRED – JOINDER, INADEQUATE TIME/FACILITIES

1. JOINDER WITH OTHER ACCUSED

10. On 8.7.2005¹ an order joined Prosecutor vs. Milutinovic, Ojdanic and Sainovic(IT-99-37), with 3 years pre-trial and which had been declared ready for trial; and Prosecutor vs. Pavkovic, Lazarevic, and Lukic(IT-03-70), where the accused had just surrendered in the months prior, and did not have fully appointed teams.²

11. Requests for joint-trial could be denied where it is in the interests of justice and for purposes of fairness.³ Indeed, the Kvocka⁴ and Kolundzija⁵ cases had been denied joinder precisely because the Kvocka defendants were ready for trial, Kolundzija only had arrived at the tribunal and was in the early pre-trial phase.⁶ Under the same factual backdrop, when the Meakic and Fustar cases were joined they were at an advanced stage of pre-trial preparation, the accused having spent years years in pre-trial the court thus granted joinder.⁷

12. Appellant objected to joinder in writing⁸ argued, among other things:

- a) Article 21's affirmations would be abridged/infringed upon if joinder was granted and trial forced on short-notice.
- b) There existed an actual conflict of interest as 3 defendants are ready for trial; whereas the 3 Pavkovic defendants required time to adequately prepare.
- c) Citation to the Milosevic bench finding that where the size of a trial was quite large, two trials rather than one would be more efficient and allow the chamber to easily manage

¹ See, *Decision on Prosecution Motion for Joinder*, 8.7.2005

² Appellant surrendered 4.4.2005.

³ Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al. IT-98-30 "Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Joinder" 10.10.1999

⁴ Prosecutor v. Kvocka, et al. IT-98-30

⁵ Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al. IT-95-8

⁶ See. Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al. IT-98-30, and Prosecutor v. Kolundzija, IT-95-8, "Decision on Prosecutor's Motion for Joinder", 19.10.1999

⁷ Prosecutor v. Meakic et al. v. Fustar et al., IT-95-4/IT-95-8/1 [renumbered IT-02-65] "Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Joinder of Accused"; 17.9.2002.

⁸ id

the same even if witnesses repeated.⁹ Appellant argued that trial would last 2 years and be quite complex.

d) Citation to the Kvocka/Kolundzija/Meakic/Fustar decisional authority cited above.

13. In granting joinder, the Chamber committed grave/discernible error. Specifically, despite the circumstances relating to Pavkovic/Lazarevic/Lukic (who had not even had permanent counsel assigned) and the level of preparation and other factors, the pre-trial bench found “that there is no indication that a joint trial could not start in December 2005 to January 2006, the anticipated date for the start of trial in the *Milutinovic et al.* case.”¹⁰

14. Certainly the Chamber’s conclusion ignored that Appellant presented multiple grounds with merit opposing joinder precisely due to the proposed imposition of a early trial date.

15. Subsequent decisions failing to acknowledge significant indications of problems with the proposed joinder and early trial start included:

- a) 7.9.2005 “Decision on Pavkovic Motion to Set Aside Joinder or in the Alternative to Grant Severance” –the Chamber considered “no date has yet been set for trial in the present case and that the Accused will have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense” and denied the Motion.
- b) 2.12.2005 “Decision on Nebojsa Pavkovic’s Motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and grant previous Motion for Severance.” - the Chamber considered that none of the events indicating the impending start of trial have taken place and thus dismissed the Motion as premature.
- c) 28.4.2006 “Second Decision on Motions to Delay Proposed Date for Start of Trial” –the Chamber “ ... is satisfied that the accused will have adequate time and resources to prepare for the trial scheduled to commence on the date proposed in the work plan. Throughout the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, the Chamber has been continuously alert so that unfair prejudice will not be caused to the accused due to the lack of adequate time and resources for the preparation of their defenses, and the Chamber will continue to monitor the progress of the case throughout the remainder of the pre-trial phase. Moreover the Prosecution has offered to assist the defense in relation to some of the issues raised in the motions, and the Chamber encourages the parties to cooperate in this regard.

⁹ See, Prosecutor v. Milosevic IT-99-37/IT-01-50/IT-01-51 “Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for Joinder” (13.12.2001) para.47-48

¹⁰ “Decision on Prosecution Motion for Joinder”, 8.7.2005,

16. The substantive arguments of the defense, were not dealt with or addressed, and instead of an adequate analysis of the interests of due process and fairness to the accused and the interests of justice, an erroneous standard was adopted whereby the rights of the accused are to be preserved with the assistance of the Prosecution, which is contrary to the very notion of a adversarial system.

17. Among the rather serious arguments that had been presented by the Defense were:
- a) The Amended Joinder Indictment increased the complexity of the case by including allegations of events in 1998.¹¹
 - b) The lengthy/unproductive efforts to accomplish disclosure/transfer of material from the Milosevic case, due to the Registry's inability to comply with Judge's order.¹²
 - c) Despite Judge Bonomy's ruling on 25.08.2005 that the defense be provided with all transcripts and exhibits from the Milosevic proceedings, the same was not completed by the Registry as to Appellant until 30.3.2006, just before the proposed trial.¹³
 - d) Appellant received approval from the Registry for 2 investigators long after they were sought.¹⁴
 - e) The Registry's Pre-Trial Legal Aid Policy Handbook which was being applied against Appellant's request for co-counsel, foresaw a level III case would have 22 months of pre-trial preparation from the date of initial appearance – whereas the time period being enforced was a mere 7 months from the initial appearance, and thus would make it impossible for adequate preparation.¹⁵ The Registry's budget/plan required several months beyond the proposed trial date for a **FULLY STAFFED** defense team to become ready.¹⁶ The Registry refused to assign co-counsel except 5 months before commencement of trial, and requests for co-counsel were "premature".
 - f) The repeated failure of the Registry to appoint co-counsel hampered the ability to prepare for trial.¹⁷
 - g) A delay by OLAD in providing off-site access to the JDB prevented access to from November 2005 through the end of March 2006.¹⁸

¹¹ "Addendum to Pavkovic Motion to Set Aside Joinder or in the Alternative to grant Severance" 19.8.2005,(para.4.)

¹² "Sreten Lukic's Response in Support of Pavkovic's Motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and Grant Previous Motion for Severance." 7.11.2005,(para.1-3,5);("November Response") and "Motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and Grant Previous Motion for Severance" 7.11.2005(para.5-19.)

¹³ "Sreten Lukic's Motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Grant a Severance of the Proceedings Against This Accused" 24.4.2006(para.37-41)("April Motion")

¹⁴ November Response(para.26-30).

¹⁵ November Response(para.7-9)

¹⁶ April Motion(para.31-33)

¹⁷ April Motion(para.2,21-25)

¹⁸ April Motion(para.42-50)

- h) The volume of Rule 68 disclosures made it unfeasible to complete review and analysis of the same in time for a 10.7.2006. trial.¹⁹
- i) Lack of access to and obstruction of Serbian authorities as to documents prevented the ability to be adequately prepared for trial.²⁰
- j) Defense faced with over 21,000 pages of Milosevic transcripts, 2,114 Milosevic Exhibits, 6,000 pages of Rule 70 material, 40,000 pages of witness material, 58,726 pages of EDS Rule 68 material, and 41,538 pages of material disclosed on CD/DVD.²¹ Bulk of this material not accessible until March of 2006, just a few months before trial.

18. An admission by Judge Bonomy, was made at the 31.03.2006 status conference when it was stated that due to the death of Slobodan Milosevic “circumstances have changed fairly dramatically” – defense counsel have argued that the earlier start date and speeding up of the trial resulting from Milosevic’s death have the effect of depriving the accused of their right to a fair trial and due process.²²

19. Unfortunately, despite the assurances made earlier by Judge Robinson, the Chamber did not take into account and did not address defense concerns about the joinder and the rush to early trial and the effect it had on defense preparations.

20. New Lead Counsel and co-counsel were appointed 1.05.2006. Trial commenced 10.07.2006.

21. Severe prejudice resulting from joinder was evident as throughout trial evidence was led as to events in 1998. The Judgment illustrates multiple findings relating to events from 1998 of which the defense did not have adequate notice and did not have adequate ability to prepare for cross-examination.²³

22. The Defense was forced to trial without having reviewed all the material that had been disclosed, so as to perform its own investigations and be adequately prepared for cross-examination and presentation of defense witnesses

¹⁹ April Motion(para.51-55)

²⁰ April Motion(para.60-70)

²¹ See, “*Renewal of ans Supplement to 7.11.2005. pavkovic motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and Grant Previous Motion for Severance.*”At para. 7

²² See, “*Renewal of ans Supplement to 7.11.2005 pavkovic motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and Grant Previous Motion for Severance.*”At para. 3.

²³ I/842-951

23. The Chamber concluded that the parties, including the defense were given adequate time and facilities for the presentation of evidence.²⁴ This is a misrepresentation of the pre-trial and trial phase.
24. Appellant proceeded to trial with a few months of preparation compared to those who had over 3 years.
25. During trial allocation of time for cross-examination as well as total hours for presentation of the defense case had to be split among 6 teams.
26. With the time constraints imposed, the defense had to dramatically reduce its witness list.
27. The full record of proceedings, respectfully, demonstrates a serious infringement of the rights of the Appellant and mandates a review of the Judgment/sentence.
28. The gravity of the harm can be viewed by the fact that co-accused Milutinovic/Ojdanic, although superior ranking personnel to Appellant in 1999, with over 3 years of preparation, received lesser sentences, with Milutinovic being acquitted.
29. Another of the examples of error can be seen from the treatment of mitigation and personal circumstances in the Judgment. Had Appellant been tried separately, he would have been able to present more mitigation evidence. If tried alone, that mitigation evidence and personal circumstances would have been considered with appropriate weight being attributed.
30. Although significant mitigation evidence was adduced/accepted by the Chamber²⁵, some mitigating factors were rejected by the Chamber.²⁶ Some of the evidence that was led and recognized in the Judgment as mitigation for Appellant was:
- a) efforts to stamp out organized crime connected to the Milosevic's tenure in office and reform the MUP.
 - b) Apprehending the assassins of Prime Minister Djindjic.
 - c) Establishing multi-ethnic police forces.

²⁴ I/46.

²⁵ III/1202

²⁶ III/1203,1204.

- d) democratic reforms which brought amnesty to hundreds of Kosovo Albanians who had been arrested by the authorities as part of the KLA.
- e) efforts after the war to spearhead uncovering/investigation of crimes from the Kosovo War including the clandestine transport of bodies to Serbia.
- f) Establishing a database of data relevant to Kosovo in 1998/1999 to preserve evidence.
- g) MUP initiating cooperation with the Tribunal before other national organs.

31. The Chamber acknowledged that “on the balance of probabilities Lukic contributed to law and order in a number of cases connected to crimes in the Indictment, and therefore will take this into account in mitigation when determining his sentence.²⁷ However, the rather significant mitigation evidence accepted was afforded no weight whatsoever. Indeed, the Chamber explicitly announced its error of non-application of mitigation evidence when it stated:

[...]although different circumstances apply to each of the Accused, the Chamber does not consider it appropriate in fixing the term of imprisonment to discriminate [...] among the three Accused convicted on the basis of their participation in the joint criminal enterprise.²⁸

32. It has been recognized that the personal circumstances of an accused and the factual backdrop of a particular case ought to be taken into account when figuring what sentence is appropriate. As stated in Celebici, “there are certain features of [Appellant’s] case that must be taken into account in his favour when deciding upon the measure of sentence to be imposed upon him.”²⁹ Having concluded Appellant had proper mitigation evidence (leading directly to crimes in the indictment), the Chamber erred in failing to utilize nor even weigh the same, solely because Appellant was in a joint trial with 5 other accused and because he was categorized by the Chamber with 2 other accused “convicted on the basis of their participation in the joint criminal enterprise.”

33. Respectfully, the jurisprudence requires a Chamber take into account the personal history of an Accused and his good conduct that sets him apart from other accused. In Plavsic the factors recognized in sentencing as substantial mitigating factors were her voluntary surrender to the Tribunal, post-conflict conduct, and age.³⁰ All these same factors apply to Appellant, and the evidence accepted included significant evidence of post-conflict conduct serving the interests of justice and assisting in the uncovering of crimes committed in Kosovo. Other cases have focused

²⁷ III/1202

²⁸ III/1205

²⁹ Prosecutor vs. Delalic, et al. IT-96-21,TJ;16.11.1998,(para.1283).

³⁰ Prosecutor vs.Plavsic,IT-00-39&40/1,SJ;27.2.2003,(para.110). (“Plavsic”)

on the individual circumstances of an Accused and prior positive conduct/good character.³¹ In Plavsic her conduct was mitigating because after cessation of hostilities she had demonstrated considerable support for the 1995 Dayton Agreement and attempted to remove obstructive officials order to promote peace.³² As Plavsic promoted peace in Bosnia, Appellant promoted law/order and the pursuit of justice in Serbia. Thus the Chamber's position treating Appellant differently due to the fact he was convicted alongside other accused is without precedent and inconsistent with the prevailing jurisprudence. While an evaluation of a particular case may legitimately lead to a conclusion that no weight should be afforded to mitigation, this however must be done on a case-by-case basis. For a particular Chamber to routinely/automatically exclude or afford no weight to prior good character, as a matter of policy is not in the spirit of individualized sentencing endorsed by the Tribunal. The fate of an accused should not be dependent and vary depending on the Chamber his case is assigned to. Thus Appellant should be afforded the same rights to have his mitigation evidence and personal circumstances taken into account.

2. LACK OF ADEQUATE TIME/FACILITIES PRIOR TO TRIAL.

34. The Chamber made the assertion that "all parties had adequate time in which to present their respective case."³³ Due to the completion strategy and rulings of the Chamber, trial commenced before adequate preparation, a mis-trial has resulted.

35. It should be recalled the case was sped up upon joinder when it was found that "that there is no indication that a joint trial could not start in December 2005 to January 2006, the anticipated date for the start of trial in the *Milutinovic et al.* case."³⁴

36. This decision ignored several factors that were readily apparent and demonstrated at the pre-trial phase as to the lack of adequate time/facilities to be ready for trial.

37. With regard to Defense staffing, many of the critical points for this ground are in A(1) and are hereby incorporated by reference. However, it is instructive to highlight some of the points in greater detail. The Defense filed its Work Plan with the Registry in December 2005, and citing

³¹ Prosecutor vs. Krojelic, IT-97-25, SJ; 15.3.2002, (para 519); Prosecutor vs. Kupreskic, IT-95-16-A, AJ, 23.10.2001, (para. 459).

³² Plavsic (Para. 85-94)

³³ I/46.

³⁴ "Decision on Prosecution Motion for Joinder", 8.7.2005.

concerns for the pace of the proceedings, requested immediate assignment of co-counsel³⁵ to have a trial-ready team. The Registry's response was that it could not appoint co-counsel due to its policy which only authorized co-counsel within the last 5 months of the pre-trial phase. The Registry's estimation of when the case would be set for trial were dashed when the Chamber accelerated the proceedings. As a result, Appellant was deprived of having a full team until just before commencement of trial. All the foregoing was presented to the Chamber and was ignored.

38. Various problems were experienced in obtaining documents, leading to filing of "Sreten Lukic's Motion, Pursuant to Rule 54 bis for a Binding Order Directed to Serbia-Montenegro for Production of Documents" on 17.5.2006. The record reflects that no fewer than 26 requests for documents were sent by the Defense 10.11.2005-14.4.2006 which Serbian authorities had not complied with, despite in excess of 23 meetings.³⁶ Even with trial scheduled for 10.7.2006, the problems still had not been resolved as evidenced at the hearing held on 6.7.2006. The Chamber's Rule 54bis determination came 2 months after commencement of trial,³⁷ and granted the application in part, with compliance by Serbia not taking place until the following month. Documents continued to be received from Serbia well into the trial, including during the defense phase. Due to the inability to have sufficient pre-trial time to resolve issues and obtain/review these documents, the Defense began trial without essential documents to confront Prosecution witnesses. Later many of the same documents were denied admission due to not having been used with witnesses.

39. The onerous requirements of trial double-sessions hampered efforts to undertake significant discovery. The end result was inability of the defense to confront witnesses with evidence that was only later obtained. An illustrative example includes Rule 70 documents³⁸ which were only obtained from the provider long after the Prosecution case had ended, and could not be used to confront Prosecution witnesses.

40. An inordinate amount of time/energy was expended by the Defense during the Pre-Trial phase to obtain Milosevic documentation, which could not reasonably be obtained even AFTER the Chamber ordered the Registry to do so. Despite Judge Bonomy's ruling on 25.8.2005 that the defense be provided with all transcripts/exhibits from the Milosevic proceedings by the Registry, and two subsequent 65 *ter* conferences in 2005 to effectuate the same, the disclosure order was not

³⁵ Co-Counsel sought was Jovan Simic from Belgrade, who fulfilled the experience and language requirements of Rule 45 and who had previously been Lead Counsel for Dragoljub Prcać and Zeljko Meakic in other proceedings before the Tribunal.

³⁶ "Decision on Sreten Lukic's Amended Rule 54 *bis* Application" 29.9.2006.(para.4)

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ 6D1635,6D1637,6D1638,6D1639,6D1640

completed by the Registry as to Appellant until 30.3.2006, just before trial³⁹. In addition, Prosecution disclosures at the pre-trial phase amounted to over 58,000 pages just on EDS.⁴⁰ By not granting sufficient/reasonable time to the defense to review/analyze the same prior to the commencement of trial, the Chamber abused its discretion and erred.

41. The cumulative effect of the foregoing was that the Defense at start of trial was ill-prepared to face the evidence of the Prosecution and thus fought a continual up-hill battle throughout trial. This denied a fair process and trial.

3. LACK OF ADEQUATE/FACILITIES AFTER COMMENCEMENT

a. Right to being tried without Delay cannot be to the Prejudice of Accused

42. After trial started the Chamber erred further preventing adequate or meaningful time not only for preparations but also to fully confront the Prosecution or fully present a defense case.

43. The Chamber makes the subjective claim that all parties had adequate time in which to present their respective cases.⁴¹ Respectfully, a detailed review will convince otherwise. The entire trial seemed to be preoccupied with time, and the shortening of the trial. While it is true that Article 20 guarantees the right to be “tried with undue delay,”⁴² common-sense logic and the tenets of justice/due process dictate that such a guarantee ought to be for the benefit rather than detriment of the Accused. Other Chambers have even acknowledged that the underlying principles for Art.20(4)(c) are a particular concern for the liberty of an individual and the need to hold this in balance with the need to effectively administer justice by trying those charged with offences and to do so without unreasonable delay.⁴³ Articles 20 and 21 require that a trial be fair, expeditious and conducted in accordance with the Rules and with full respect of the rights of the Accused. Specifically incorporated in the Statute are the rights set out in Article 14 of the International

³⁹ Approximately 1,700 documents of varying length comprising the MFI exhibits from the Milosevic proceedings.

⁴⁰ “Motion to Delay Start of Trial or in the Alternative to Reconsider and Grant Previous Motion for Severance”(Pavkovic),7.11.2005,(para. 28.)

⁴¹ I/46.

⁴² Art.21(4)(c)

⁴³ Prosecutor vs. Dragomir Milosevic, IT-98-29/1-PT “Decision on second defence motion for provisional release”9.2.2006.

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter “ICCPR”), as well as the principle of “equality of arms,” which expressly guarantees all accused a fair and expeditious trial.⁴⁴ With the Chamber being the guardian/guarantor of the procedural and substantive rights of the accused, it follows that evidentiary standards should be heightened and not relaxed or give way to expediency. Article 20(1) provides for the twin requirement of “fairness” and “expediency”. Thus, to admit evidence in the interest of expeditiousness but not fairness would be inconsistent with the Chamber’s obligation. The manner in which time was marshaled during trial makes one question if the completion strategy or other factors of expediency were given weight instead of a concern for the liberty of an individual or the fairness of the proceedings.

44. Upon commencement multiple decisions were made by the Chamber that affected the time available to the parties, and the conduct/abilities of counsel. An example of the Chamber’s pre-occupation with the speed of the proceedings at the sacrifice of the rights of the Accused, was the shortening of the time period proscribed by the Rules for filing of Replies.⁴⁵ This rule was applied against Appellant, to deny admission of reply briefs that were substantive in nature.⁴⁶ By preventing Appellant from preserving rights and making an adequate record, the Chamber erred and abused its discretion. Especially in denying an extension of time (one day/2 days) in the face of the flurry of activity deadlines at the same time. These errors, when viewed under the totality of the evidence, occasioned a mis-trial.

b. Limitation of Cross-Examination

45. The Chamber issued its “Decision on Use of Time,”⁴⁷ which reduced time for the collective defense examination of witnesses, called for increased sitting days. The limits imposed upon the cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses infringe upon rights conferred under the ICCPR, most notably Article 6 of the same. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) interpreting Article 6 affirms that the right of cross-examination is fundamental to a fair trial.⁴⁸ The ECHR has asserted that “[t]he right to a fair trial holds so prominent a place in a democratic society that there can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 of the Convention

⁴⁴ Prosecutor v. Tadic IT-94-1-AR72 “Decision on the Defence motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction” 2.10.1995,(para. 46.)

⁴⁵ See.”Order on procedure and evidence”,11-July-2006

⁴⁶ “Decision on Lukic Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Extension of Time and Leave to File Replies,10.6.2008 ; “Decision on Lukic Defense (1) First, Second, Third, and Fourth Motions for Further Enlargement of Time in Relation to Motions for Admission of Documents from the Bar Table and (2) Motion for Leave to File Replies”,2.6.2008.

⁴⁷ 9.10.2006

⁴⁸ Saidi v. France ECHR,17.EHRR.251[1994]para.44;van Mechelen v. Netherlands,ECHR,25.EHRR.647 [1998]para.51.

restrictively.”⁴⁹ Furthermore the Court has repeatedly stated that the Defense must be given “an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him”⁵⁰ and that Art. 6(1) is “intended above all to secure the interests of the defense and those of the proper administration of justice.”⁵¹

46. The ECHR has held that any measures restricting the rights of defense ought to be only those strictly necessary, such that if a less restrictive method is available it ought to be employed.⁵² The Chamber chose the most restrictive method, essentially employing a “stop-watch” approach to cross-examination. At least one effective, but less restrictive measure that was available was the use of 90(f) of the RPE to intervene only where questioning became irrelevant/repetitious/improper. This method would have been more fair/compliant with the customary international law. It would also have been more compliant with Tribunal jurisprudence, as the Appeals Chamber reversed limitations on evidence that could be led in Oric, stating “But unless the Trial Chamber is prepared to reconsider its Rule 98bis ruling and grant a partial judgment of acquittal, it must give Oric a reasonable opportunity to present reliable evidence on at least these issues.”⁵³ This was a request made by the Appellant several times in response to the stop-watch mentality of the Chamber, which was trying to cut inquiries that were of critical import.⁵⁴ Rigid time constraints placed upon cross-examination necessarily affect the quality of the cross-examination, thus, when rushed, the process loses its effectiveness, which goes to the detriment of Appellant. Likewise, where examination cannot be hurried due to translation, the harm is compounded, as counsel sacrifices tactical advantages inherent to cross-examination to which the Appellant is entitled.

47. It should be recalled that with only the 5th witness of the Defense case, the Chamber attempted to curtail the examination of critical evidence relating to one of the key assertions of the Indictment, namely if Appellant’s position entailed expansive powers set forth in a document naming RDB David Gajic as his deputy. From the exchange in court we can see the Chamber’s characteristic impatience with the evidence, which demonstrates a preoccupation with speed of trial rather than substance:

⁴⁹ Moreira De Azevedo v. Portugal, 11296/84, ECHR, [1991] EHRR.41, para.66; Artico v. Italy (1981); 3.EHRR .1 (The right to Counsel must be “practical and effective”, and not “theoretical and illusory.”); Daud v. Portugal, [1998], EHRLR 684 (that Counsel cannot effectively represent a client if unable to conduct a full and fair cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses.)

⁵⁰ Krasniki v. Czech Republic EMDN-1999-51277, ECHR, [2006] EHRR.51277/99, para.33; Kostovski v. Netherlands ECHR, 11454/85, [1991] EHRR.434, para.41.

⁵¹ Acquaviva v. France 19248/91 [1995] EHRR.48, para.66.

⁵² van Mechelen v. Netherlands ECHR, 25.EHRR.647, [1998] para59

⁵³ Prosecutor v. Oric, IT-03-68-AR73.2 “Interlocutory Decision on Length of Defense Case” 20.7.2005.

⁵⁴ Tr.22563/12-21

Q. And just to be clear, sir, who were the head or manager of the MUP staff and his deputy in 1998 up until the date of this decision that we have before us?

A. I know that the manager was Sreten Lukic and his deputy was Miroslav Mijatovic. Until the 1st of June, 1999, I think.

Q. Thank you.

JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, Judge Kamenova is asking me how is it possible to be asking a question like this at this stage? **This trial is never going to end.** That seems to you to have to be asked yet again.

MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honours, the Office of the Prosecution confronts witness after witness with documents stating that someone else was the deputy head of the MUP staff, so until that question is satisfied and until my client is released from custody a free man, I think I am allowed to ask questions and present -- confront the evidence that the Office of the Prosecution time and time again is presenting before us.

JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, we can live without the drama.

Who is the other deputy suggested?

MR. IVETIC: David Gajic, Your Honours.

JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. And he's the one actually named in the order; is that right, the order in 1998?

MR. IVETIC: In one of the orders in 1998. We're about to go into another order from 19 --

JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much.⁵⁵

48. As to the import of the foregoing evidence, it should be noted that P1505 which was being challenged is relied upon multiple times in the Judgment⁵⁶ and is central to the Chamber's deliberations as to the function of the MUP Staff for Kosovo.⁵⁷ It is plainly evident that at no time did the Chamber acquit Appellant of responsibility arising from P1595, albeit it did conclude that he had no authority over the RDB, but asserted this to have no effect on the ultimate finding of criminal responsibility.⁵⁸ Using P1505 and disregarding other evidence, the Chamber ruled the MUP Staff had a central role in planning/organizing/controlling/directing the work of various MUP units⁵⁹, then relied on its own conclusion to then assert Appellant was de-facto commander over MUP forces deployed in Kosovo,⁶⁰ and that he was part of a JCE.⁶¹

49. Another stark example of the Chamber's constant haste curtailing potentially critical evidence was with Radojko Stefanovic, who during the Indictment period, was Operations head of

⁵⁵ Tr.22563/6-22564/3[emphasis added]

⁵⁶ III/945,949,950,951,952,957,963,964,965,983,1018

⁵⁷ III/947

⁵⁸ III/1015

⁵⁹ III/1012,1018.

⁶⁰ III/1051.

⁶¹ III/1114

the PrK and thus drafted/planned all the joint VJ/MUP operations for which criminal liability under the JCE is asserted.⁶²

50. While the Chamber considered Milan Djakovic(Stefanovic's predecessor) of such great importance so as to subpoena him as a Chamber witness and examine him 3 hours, the Cross-examination for Stefanovic was curtailed by the chamber and attempts to present documents for review were rebuffed.⁶³(Despite Stefanovic being the more critical witness as to 1999) Then, AFTER hurrying the defense, the Chamber later denied admission of critical documentary evidence⁶⁴ solely because it had not been presented to hostile witnesses during cross-examination. Although curtailing the examination of Stefanovic as cross-examination, the Chamber counted the same as direct-examination, stating "Part of the questioning, pursuant to Rule 90(H)(i) was on the basis that the witness could give evidence relevant to the Lukic Defence's case, and part went to matters affecting credibility. It was therefore appropriate for a portion of the time to count toward the total 240 hours that the six Accused have been allotted to present their evidence."⁶⁵ If the Defense was free to utilize its time as it saw fit, it should have been able to use as much of it as it wanted in questioning Stefanovic.

c. Extended Sitting Schedule

51. Another Chamber error was the double/extended sitting sessions which again demonstrate a preoccupation with pace/speed of trial over substance. As highlighted previously, Appellant had minimal time/facilities to prepare before trial. During trial, while doing a lion's share of the cross-examination, the Defense faced the same problems of time/resources/staffing trying to make up for preparation deficiencies prior trial. This was hampered and in effect nullified with decision to order double/extended sessions.⁶⁶ With the constant state of flux caused by the Prosecution's changing of witness order, and last minute disclosure of supplemental information, the extended sitting sessions in court exhausted counsel/staff. It was impossible to foresee/locate all potential documents to be used to effectively cross-examine witnesses on critical points. This was particularly true, for those witnesses had testified in Milosevic,⁶⁷ and thus in addition to written OTP statements, hundreds of pages of transcript had to be reviewed from to prepare minimally for each witness. Compounding this difficulty was the constant pressure from the Chamber due to the time limits imposed upon

⁶² E.g.II/1214

⁶³ Tr. 21733/5 - 21734/3;21739/1-21743/25

⁶⁴ Decision on Lukic Defence Motions for Admission of Documents from Bar table,11-June-2008,paras.78-80,82-87,91

⁶⁵ "Decision on Lukic Defence Objection to February 2008 Report on Use of Time" 16.4.2008,(para. 11).

⁶⁶ "Decision on Use of Time, 9.10.2006

⁶⁷ E.g.Vasiljevic, Ciaglinski,Tanic,Drewienkiewicz,Petritch,Loshi,Kickert,Maisonneuve,Shabani,Krasniqi, Popaj

cross-examination. The totality of circumstances created a situation where the effective assistance of counsel was lessened and thus the integrity/fairness of the proceedings were damaged. The harm caused to the defense by these extended sittings was repeatedly brought to the Chamber's attention.⁶⁸

52. These extended-schedule sittings continued into the Defense case-in-chief. A review of the total record will indicate that a total of 100 trial days with sittings 5 hours or more (incl. of breaks) and 10% of those being 7 hours or more.⁶⁹ Even more indicative of the strain this placed on the defense, a full 37% of the extended sitting sessions occurred during the Prosecution case-in-chief (which lasted almost one year), and 27% of the extended sitting days occurred during Appellant's case-in-chief (which lasted under 3 months). On 11.2.2009 Appellant filed "Sreten Lukic's Motion Objecting to Trial Sitting Schedule and Seeking Amendment of the Same." (hereinafter "11 Feb. 2008 Motion") At that time, to comply with the time constraints and reduced number of hours granted to the Defense, Appellant was preparing lengthy statements with defense witnesses. The burden of doing so, combined with the regular defense obligations of intense preparations and the proposed schedule overwhelmed the Defense.

53. Illustrating the extreme harshness of the Chamber's preoccupation with time, the health of Appellant was endangered when the medical treatment/rehabilitation regime could not be continued (the ambulatory therapy portion) due to the late sitting schedules.⁷⁰ This was the only objection actually conceded by the Chamber and addressed by alternating some of the days.⁷¹

54. Both defense counsels, as the Chamber was aware⁷², suffered health complications exacerbated by delays in treatment due to keeping up with the pace of the trial and had to seek emergent care. As set forth also in the motion, in addition to hampering the preparation of statements and working with witnesses, the extended sittings prevented essential attorney-client meetings at UNDU.⁷³

55. Rather than dealing with the serious concerns raised, the Chamber tried to prevent counsel from making a sufficient record on appeal by pressuring them to withdraw part of the motion.⁷⁴

⁶⁸ See Sreten Lukic's motion Objecting to Trial sitting Schedule and seeking Amendment of the same, 11 February 2008

⁶⁹ See annex "A"

⁷⁰ 11 Feb, 2008 Motion para. 7-10.

⁷¹ Decision on Lukic motion for Alteration of Court Schedule, 20.2.2008, (para. 10).

⁷² 11 Feb. 2008 Motion, (para. 11)

⁷³ 11 Feb, 2008 Motion, (para. 17)

⁷⁴ Decision on Lukic motion for Alteration of Court Schedule, 20.2.2008, (para. 10); Tr. 23666/13-23668/17

That act on the part of the Chamber constituted an abuse of discretion, and perhaps a realization on its part of the impact those its errors had on the trial.

d. Time Between Cases

56. All the defense filed a “Urgent Joint Defense Request to Reschedule the Timetable for the Filing of Rule 65 ter Submissions, the Pre-Defense Conference, and the Commencement of the Defense Case,” on 21.5.2007. Appellant again reiterated that the defense had not had adequate time simultaneously to prepare for cross-examination of Prosecution witnesses, for its Rule 98 bis submissions and for the Defense case.⁷⁵

57. The Chamber only granted the 21.5.2007. Motion in part, altering the date of the commencement of the Defense cases, but not altering the filing deadlines as had been requested.⁷⁶

58. Nevertheless, the Defense was able to identify 109 witnesses and approximately 400 exhibits by the date. However, the defense exhibits were constantly being received and added through the defense case.

e. Reduction of Witness List and Time for Witnesses

59. Appellant’s original witness list sought to address and rebut every facet of the prosecution’s wide-ranging and diffuse case. The list was carefully prepared based upon the persons who had knowledge that was relevant to the case, as well as to cover as much of the Indictment as possible.

60. The Prosecution had a total of 260 hours at their disposal to present their case and used 166 of the same. Rather than having parity Appellant had to share in a lesser total allotment to the defense(240 hours⁷⁷). Appellant’s allocation of time was 80 hours from the 240.⁷⁸ As a result, Appellant drastically cut down the number of witnesses but also the length and scope of their testimony and eventually presented a total of 35.

61. This reduction in the number of witnesses amounted to the Defense presenting less than half its case. The prejudice can best be seen by the fact that the Defense had to remove several former

⁷⁵ 21 May 2007 Motion,(para.6-9)

⁷⁶ “Decision on Joint Defence Motion to Postpone Trial Schedule”,23.5.2007

⁷⁷ Pre-Defense Conference T.12847

⁷⁸ “Decision on Use of Time Remaining for Defence Phase of Case,”21.11.2007.

international observers⁷⁹ from the list because it could not locate/present them within the time allocated. Of note, the Chamber relied heavily on OTP International observers in convicting Appellant.⁸⁰

f. Stop-Watch method of Time Reports

62. The Chamber issued monthly reports with the Registry as to the time utilized'. These reports were filed pursuant to the "Order on Procedure and Evidence" that was issued on 11.7.2006.

63. In February 2008 in the midst of conducting its case within the allotted time, the Defense became aware of the Chamber's erroneous practice of time-keeping. Appellant filed an objection seeking the data behind the report. On 18.3.2008, the Chamber issued its Decision⁸¹ and the Registry thereafter produced the "raw" data for the February 2008 report. The first objection was that Stefanovic, an adverse witness called by another defense had been listed as direct-examination by Appellant, with 1 hour and 19 minutes being deducted from the already preciously low time allocated.⁸² In that manner, the vigorous cross-examination of the witness had been counted against the defense, and it had lost time without prior notice, even before their case began. The Second objection was that time spent by the Chamber in examining a witness was under-reported and rather was also allocated as time to be subtracted from the precious 80 hours of the Defense case.⁸³ Whereas the time report stated that Witness Mijatovic was examined by the defense for 5 hours and 2 minutes in direct and the Chamber only used 14 minutes, the audio/video recording of the session, and transcript revealed that just on the first day the Chamber interventions/questioning amounted to just under half an hour, thus calling into question the time reports.⁸⁴ A full analysis of the time for the witness was not performed because the defense had neither the time nor resources to prepare its own report.

64. The Chamber's decision reacting to the Objection was astonishing. With regard to the recordation of Stevanovic's cross-examination as direct-examination, the Chamber revealed it had indeed done the same previously with other witnesses that were not part of the Defense case-in-chief, deducting over 4 hours in addition to Stefanovic. The Chamber defended its practice and repelled this objection. Likewise, with regard to the complaint of Chamber time being mixed into

⁷⁹ Dietmar Hartwig, John Christopher Clark, Richard Haeslip, Guy Sands and Keith Roland.

⁸⁰ III/1041-1048.

⁸¹ "Decision on Lukic defense Request for Information on February 2008 Report on Use of Time", 18.3.2008.

⁸² "Sreten Lukic's Motion Objecting to the Registry's Record of Time in these Trial Proceedings" 26.3.2008,(para.5).

⁸³ Id,(para.6)

⁸⁴ Id.

the defense allocation of time the Chamber found fault with defendants' math and actually acknowledged that EVEN MORE of its questioning had been included in the time that was charged to the defense, while stating this "evidences the fatuity of taking a second by second approach to these issues," defending their practice and continued to allocate their time into defense examination time.⁸⁵ Thus, immeasurable detriment was caused to Appellant, and the fairness of the proceedings was put in doubt. Having already decided to limit the defense, such that the Appellant had less than 1/3 the time the prosecution had used against him in presenting its case, the Chamber applied time-keeping practices which further reduced this time unfairly, and thus prevented Appellant from having an opportunity to be heard fully and also to have equality of arms with the Prosecution.

g. Errors relative to CLSS Translation

65. Another error adversely affecting the time/facilities of the defense to prepare and mount a case was the constant problems with CLSS that forced hours to be expended by defense personnel and prevented the introduction of critical evidence that could not be translated within the time allotted for trial by the translation resources available at the Tribunal. The Chamber in this regard erred and mis-applied the facts to exacerbate the capacity problems with CLSS, thus preventing the defense a full/fair opportunity to present its evidence. These errors led to documents being refused admission solely due to lack of translation.

66. Because of the volume of defense exhibits that were required, and CLSS capacities, combined with the lack of adequate preparation time, defense documents disclosed by the 65ter deadline were not fully translated. It should be noted the Lukic defense met and communicated multiple times with CLSS who gave priorities to other defense teams over Lukic due to its position as 6th in line. All defense documents on the 65ter list were submitted to CLSS for translation. CLSS raised capacity concerns due to the limited resources afforded by the Tribunal and the Lukic team attempted to mediate with the Registry/CLSS. The Chamber encouraged for CLSS and the defense to reach an agreement. After that agreement was reached, the Lukic team and CLSS agreed that ALL documents be 'withdrawn' so that new requests could be made(after a re-review of priorities), and deadlines could be re-assessed. However, AFTER encouraging the parties to reach a private agreement, the Chamber unilaterally, issued its "Order on timing of Motions Prior to Winter Recess and Presentation of Lukic Defense Case"⁸⁶ ordering that all un-translated documents on the rule 65ter list be submitted to CLSS by 30.11.2007, labeling the Appellant in "breach" for not

⁸⁵ Decision on Lukic Defense Objection to February 2008 Report on use of Time, 16.4.2008.

⁸⁶ 14.11.2007.

already having submitted them, in two subsequent decisions⁸⁷ which was erroneous and prejudicial.

A proper review of the record would have found:

- a) All rule 65 ter documents had already been submitted to CLSS prior to the November order;
- b) CLSS and the Defense, as encouraged by the Chamber, had reached an agreement to re-submit the documents with new requests, upon a review of the priorities for the same to better allow CLSS to provide translations upon new priorities;
- c) This process was underway when CLSS and the defense were surprised by the Chamber's November order that placed an inordinate amount of strain/work on both in terms of complying with the limited time given;
- d) After the Defense scrambled to comply with the Court's order expending countless hours with 3 members (co-counsel and 2 assistants) sending requests around-the-clock, CLSS objected to the same viewing it as a breach of the previous agreement; and
- e) That the said selection could not be properly made due to the Chamber's November order.

67. Thus, all the frustration/anger evident from two decisions⁸⁸ denying critical evidence from being admitted all resulted from the Chamber's November order, not from any breaches by Appellant. The harm occasioned was that adequate time/facilities were not available to translate documents, as the Chamber negated the ability to re-prioritize them, thus compounding the original prejudice/harm caused by the failure of the system to adequately resource CLSS.

4. INADEQUATE ABILITY TO GO VISIT THE TERRAIN

68. Due to the restrictions on the size of this brief we cannot go into detail on this ground of appeal. The Appellant hereby adopts by reference and incorporates as if set forth fully herein the arguments set forth by Co-appellant Ojdanic in his Fifth Ground of Appeal.

⁸⁷ Decision on Lukic Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Extension of Time and Leave to File Replies, 10.6.2008 ; "Decision on Lukic Defense (1) First, Second, Third, and Fourth Motions for Further Enlargement of Time in Relation to Motions for Admission of Documents from the Bar Table and (2) Motion for Leave to File Replies", 2.6.2008.

⁸⁸ Id.

B. DENIAL OF CRITICAL DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

69. During the course of Trial Appellant sought several times to introduce documents, to try and present a full case in spite of the harsh limits on live testimony. Countless times Defense attempts to introduce documents were denied.

70. On 6.5.2008 the defense filed its first bar table motion, seeking introduction of documents that were categorized and arranged in such a way so as to demonstrate their significance. On 12.6.2008 the Chamber issued its decision on the initial bar table motion, granting some but denying others (hereinafter “1st Bar Table Decision”).

71. Rule 89(c) of the RPE permit a Chamber to admit any relevant evidence with probative value.⁸⁹

72. The Defense would like to highlight some critical documents that were not introduced, thus leaving a faulty and incomplete record of evidence.

73. Map Extracts of Anti-Terrorist-Actions⁹⁰: These documents speak for themselves and demonstrate the manner/extent to which the Army prepared maps for MUP units. Thus it is simply not accurate when the Chamber concludes that it has not been illustrated how they relate to an issue in the trial.⁹¹ Indeed, similar maps were introduced through Djakovic and the probative value of these was identical. With the manner in which the defense case was hurried by the Chamber it is inappropriate to deny admission simply because witnesses did not introduce the documents. It should be recalled that the Defense had to cut its witness list from 109 to 35 witnesses. The Chamber alleged a significant role of Appellant in preparing such maps,⁹² which is clearly not the case from even a cursory review of these documents in conjunction with the testimony of army witnesses who denied such documents existed.

⁸⁹ RPE-89(c)

⁹⁰ 6D1622;6D1623;6D1624;6D1625.

⁹¹ Para.103.

⁹² section P

74. Official MUP website lists of persons that were attacked and injured/killed in KLA activities on the territory of Kosovo-Metohia⁹³ and RDB Information on the KLA⁹⁴: These documents are critical as they demonstrate actions of the KLA in areas where the OTP witnesses said there were no KLA. Likewise it should be recalled the Chamber concluded the lack of KLA activity in many alleged crime-base municipalities as the sole reason it discounted the KLA as a reason for persons leaving in 1999⁹⁵. The Chamber erred and prevented the Defense from rebutting a crucial point erroneously relied on to convict the Appellant, despite questioning the veracity of OTP witnesses on the same topic.

75. Documents underlying 6D614 and evidencing disciplinary and criminal charges brought against persons, inclusive of Police for crimes in Kosovo during the indictment period⁹⁶ and Overview of the same(6D614): These documents are of a critical nature. Milutinovic was acquitted for knowing of crimes having been committed, but being advised that appropriate legal actions were underway against perpetrators.⁹⁷ These documents demonstrate the very same situation for Appellant, who only had knowledge that legal actions were taken even against Police for crimes. Thus he could not have had the knowledge or intent to be convicted. The Defense actually sought reconsideration for these very same documents, explaining their significance to the Chamber. Nevertheless they were denied admission.⁹⁸ We had extensive evidence as to how 6D614 was compiled⁹⁹ and thus it was improper to deny admission of the same. It should be noted in this regard, insofar as 6D614 was fully translated, and portions were introduced into evidence by the Chamber, there was no legitimate rationale which could serve the interests of justice in excluding the rest of that document.

76. The applicable law of the Tribunal is embodied in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute of the Tribunal, which guarantee Appellant the right to a fair trial and full equality before the Tribunal. The principle of equality of arms is one of the critical elements of a fair trial. This principle requires that each party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case under conditions that don't place them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent.¹⁰⁰ Great emphasis

⁹³ 6D1109;6D1111;6D1112;6D1115;6D1116;6D1117.

⁹⁴ 6D1468;6D1469.

⁹⁵ II/69;115;147;156;198;230;285;259; 285;728;1156;1175

⁹⁶ 6D2,Tr.25474

⁹⁷ 6D889,6D925

⁹⁸ "Decision on Lukic Motion for Reconsideration of Trial Chamber's Decision on Motion for Admission of Documents from Bar Table and Decision on Defense Request for Extension of Time for Filing of Final Trial Briefs" 2.7.2008; "Corrigendum to Decision on Lukic Defense Motions for Admission of documents from bar table"29.7.2008.

⁹⁹ 6D2,Tr.25473/25475;6D1631,para.114;6D1647

¹⁰⁰ See,Dombo Beheer B.V. v. The Netherlands Judgment(27October1993)Series A, no.274,p.19§33;Ankeri v. Switzerland,Judgment(23.10.1996)Reports of judgments and Decisions 1996-V,pp.1567-68,§38

should be placed on appearances.¹⁰¹ It is thus respectfully submitted that a party must be given the opportunity "to make known any evidence needed for their claims to succeed".¹⁰² Respectfully, in denying documentary evidence, the Chamber infringed on that right.

D. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE UNRELIABLE AND UNTRUSTWORTHY.

77. In I/50, the Chamber noted that it would partially accept witness statements, namely that it would take into account parts found credible, but leave out any parts found untrustworthy. If the defense showed a witness testified untruthfully, the Chamber could still take into account other parts of that testimony. Appellant respectfully submits that this is an erroneous standard, a witness can be deemed credible only if he/she speaks the truth. All statements made by witnesses who have been found untruthful in any of their testimony cannot be used as evidence, especially not as evidence to determine Appellant guilty. The Chamber accepted the position of the Defense in I/51 that it was not possible to examine every point over the course of these proceedings. Therefore, as an illustration, the Defense respectfully submits that all witnesses who claimed that the KLA was not present, contrary to a multitude of other evidence, should not be accepted/relied upon for finding Appellant guilty. All these witnesses were asked about the reasons of their departure, and coincidentally denied it was due to KLA instructions/actions. Having testified untruthfully about KLA presence, it follows they would untruthfully deny KLA actions. As a result of such paradoxical acceptance of evidence by the Chamber it took into account testimony that was not reliable in the least.

78. The Chamber noted¹⁰³, the difficulty was compounded because the Defense was not required to disclose to the Prosecution details of its witnesses/exhibits until the close of the Prosecution case-in-chief. This position/reproach is rather curious bearing in mind that this is stipulated by the Rules, and thus no difficulties in presentation of evidence were compounded by it.

¹⁰¹ See APEH Uldozotteinik Svoversege v. Hungary, Judgment of 5.10.2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-X: Case of Špnisch i., Austria, Judgment of 6 May 1985, Series A no. 92.

¹⁰² See Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland Judgment of 18 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I, p.108, § 24; and Case of Mantonavelli v. France, Judgment of 18.3.1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-TI, p.436, §33.

¹⁰³ I/52

79. The Defense is further reproached when it was not put to Prosecution witnesses that defense witnesses would testify contrary to that testimony, which deprived the Prosecution witnesses of the opportunity to comment on the defense case. The Defense respectfully submits that at the time of the Prosecution case-in-chief, it was not known who the Defense witnesses would be, let alone what they would testify. The Defense believes that this reasoning of the Chamber is unjustified and that it unreasonably put blame on the Defense as if purposefully/unfairly omitting something, which isn't true.

80. The explanation the Chamber provided¹⁰⁴, that it was able discern reliable information even in statements of witnesses who spoke with evident hatred, relates to Prosecution witnesses. Such approach gave undue credibility to witnesses who were shown to have testified untruthfully, or who were "exaggerating the events of which they spoke", as the Chamber put it.¹⁰⁵

81. The Chamber described problems related to Defense witnesses in I/54. However, it is not clear to what this pertains. The Chamber could come to this conclusion only because it was unfamiliar with the law that governed certain institutions. In an attempt to understand how these institutions operated the Chamber found explanations given by witnesses to be to rigid.

82. The Chamber once again confirmed its position by creating the category of a lying witness who occasionally speaks the truth.¹⁰⁶ The Defense respectfully submits that such an approach is not permissible. In spite of such an explanation about the use of documents,¹⁰⁷ it is evident that the Chamber did not take into account the exhibits that clearly show that Appellant did not have the authority to punish, or initiate disciplinary/misdemeanor/criminal proceedings against any policeman, including those who were in Kosovo-Metohija. Otherwise the Chamber would have found that Appellant had no effective control and it would have acquitted him.¹⁰⁸

83. The Chamber noted that it did not discuss all the evidence, but that this did not mean that the evidence that was not specifically discussed in the Judgment was not considered.¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to know what extent the Judgment is based on evidence that was not discussed therein. Or that all evidence was considered correctly.

¹⁰⁴ I/53

¹⁰⁵ I/53

¹⁰⁶ I/64

¹⁰⁷ I/61

¹⁰⁸ 6D464;6D1339;6D1340;6D1343;6D1344;6D1345;6D1346;6D1348;6D1349;6D1357).

¹⁰⁹ I/64

1. PERSECUTION OF ALBANIANS BEFORE THE ARMED CONFLICTS

84. In I/225 the Chamber inference that Albanian children were unable to go to school is impermissible. The fact is that the Albanian secessionists worked towards separation from Serbia and that they boycotted the state institutions. Sadiku testified that he had no problems in attending the state school.¹¹⁰

85. The evidence presented indicates that there was a plan of the secessionists/terrorists, which was, besides training/gathering/arming of terrorists, also reflected in parallel institutions education/MUP/armed forces.¹¹¹ The Chamber failed to take into account evidence which clearly shows that the separatist movements formed “parallel” state bodies in Kosovo-Metohija as early as at the beginning of the nineties, with the main goal to create “the Republic of Kosovo”.¹¹²

86. The Chamber misquoted the evidence given by Damjanac/Pantić by noting that they testified about dismissals of Albanians,¹¹³ whereas these witnesses testified about the subsequent stage of the Albanian boycott. The said witnesses testified that Albanians left under pressure from other Albanians. The Chamber noted that Albanians had to sign a document to indicate their loyalty, suggesting that it was pressure that was the reason of their leaving. Not a single such document was tendered. Conversely, there is evidence that shows that all the Albanians who wanted remained employed without any problems caused by the Serbian side. They had problems only with the Albanians who pressured them to leave their jobs.¹¹⁴ All Albanian doctors continued working until the end of war in 1999. This fact would be impossible if the Serbs dismissed the Albanians from work.

87. Furthermore, Albanians who participated in the work of legitimate bodies of the FRY/Serbia were considered “traitors” by the terrorists. Numerous Albanians left their jobs attracting sympathy of foreign politicians and showing the alleged “terror” of the state.¹¹⁵ As early as September 1990, the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Independent Union of Kosovo called upon Kosovo

¹¹⁰ P2252/para.2,3

¹¹¹ 6D1491/para.11-14,17-21,43

¹¹² 6D1491/para.11,12,13

¹¹³ I/64

¹¹⁴ Joksic-(6D1491/para.12);Mijatovic-(6D1492);Vojnovic-(6D1532/para.25);Debeljkovic-(6D1533/para.7);Pantic-(6D1604/para.4);

¹¹⁵ 6D1603,para.18,19,20,21,38;Krga-(Tr.16824/14-21)

Albanians to leave their posts in the state institutions and the majority of Kosovo Albanians complied with this instruction.¹¹⁶

88. The Chamber once again erroneously/incompletely presented the evidence in I/663. The Chamber neglected the witness' explanation of a complex security situation in Kosovo-Metohija, i.e. the threat of NATO bombing and terrorist actions, after which the competent bodies began general mobilization. Thus all persons registered as reservists were required to keep their weapons with them.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, concerning the difference between the reservists in Kosovo-Metohija and those in the rest of Serbia, this witness mentioned that „the ethnic Albanians did not want to take part in the reserve forces“¹¹⁸. Therefore, this was not the “systematic discrimination” but it represented a boycott of the state. It is because of this fact that the VJ/MUP reserve forces were predominantly comprised of Serbs/Montenegrins. The small number of Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija who would respond to the legal obligation of mobilization were threatened.¹¹⁹ Albanians outside of Kosovo-Metohija responded to the mobilization¹²⁰.

2. UNIFORMS AND POLICE INSIGNIA

89. In I/688, which deals with the equipment used by JSO(RDB), the Chamber relied upon the evidence of Vasiljević. This witness never explained how he knew this information.

90. The Chamber once again impermissibly ascribed more weight to Vasiljević, who was not part of the MUP and cannot be considered a reliable witness, completely ignoring the material evidence – the Rules on weapons carried by authorized personnel/employees engaged in specific tasks,¹²¹ issued by the Minister.

91. One of the indicators that the Prosecution witnesses were instructed to testify as it suited the Prosecution is their testimony about the uniforms and insignia of the Serbian MUP.

¹¹⁶ 6D1491/para.12;Joksic-(6D1491/para.12);Vojnovic-(6D1532/25);Pantic-(6D1604/para.4)

¹¹⁷ K25-(T.4738-9/21)

¹¹⁸ K25-(T.4678-22/25)

¹¹⁹ Kosovac-(T.15795/15796)

¹²⁰ Kosovac-(T.15796/ln.5/7)

¹²¹ 6D989

92. The Chamber failed to note¹²² that the MUP uniforms worn in 1998/1999 were rather distinctive with their fluorescent “*POLICE*” lettering that could be seen at considerable distances, even at night,¹²³ which was important for proper evaluation of evidence and credibility of witnesses in identification of crime perpetrators as members of the MUP forces.

93. The Chamber’s conclusion¹²⁴ that the police uniforms were almost black in color is unbelievable. Police uniforms were not black, but blue-camouflaged, and there is a clear difference between the two colors. The formal blue dress uniform that is depicted as black by the Chamber has a light blue shirt under the jacket.¹²⁵

94. In I/715, it should be noted that Zhuniqui, clearly testified that the police had white ribbons around their arms,¹²⁶ and this precisely is the trap into which the Albanian witnesses fell. Namely, the photographs they were shown during proofing sessions were obviously from 1998, when the police wore white ribbons. Conversely, in 1999, none of the police wore white ribbons, which can be seen from the evidence.¹²⁷

95. K14 incorrectly stated that the police wore blue ribbons on their blue uniforms to distinguish themselves when moving in the open.¹²⁸

96. Shaqiri also claimed that the police wore white ribbons on their sleeves,¹²⁹ which is not true, as shown above. Therefore, all the witnesses who testified to this effect should be excluded as unreliable/untruthful. This is a mere fabrication and a product of witness preparation, and not truthful eyewitness/fact testimony.

97. While true that PJP had two types of uniforms, contrary to the Chamber’s conclusion¹³⁰ they wore exclusively green-camouflage uniforms after the bombing campaign had started. The units from the rest of Serbia that were deployed to Kosovo did not bring with them blue uniforms.

¹²² I/706

¹²³ 6D106,para.8;Ilic-(Tr.24324/12-24352/10);Paunović-(Tr.21854/1-21855/8)

¹²⁴ I/708

¹²⁵ Nikčević-(T.23235)

¹²⁶ Zhuniqui-(T.4126)

¹²⁷ 6D237;6D579;6D667

¹²⁸ K14-(T.10981-10983,closed session)

¹²⁹ Shaqiri-(T.2789)

¹³⁰ I/716

98. II/875 deals with the testimony of K62 and her husband K63. K62 was certain that the men who assaulted her were not policemen¹³¹ and she was very clear about it. Yet, in II/889, the Chamber found that this witness was raped by VJ or MUP personnel.

99. No reasonable Chamber would find the testimony of witness K14¹³² to be trustworthy. Specifically the evidence clearly shows that on the date in question police wore red ribbons,¹³³ not blue, so it cannot be accepted beyond reasonable doubt that this witness identified perpetrators as members of the MUP. Witness Ilić not only confirmed the above in his testimony, but also explained that it was dangerous not to obey the standard prescribed in terms of uniforms.¹³⁴

100. The Chamber discussed/accepted as reliable the testimony by K81 concerning the activities of VJ and residents of Žegra, some of whom allegedly wore police uniforms.¹³⁵ Even if this was the case, it certainly does not mean that policemen participated in these activities. The Chamber found that the villagers wore blue police uniforms taking no notice of the fact that dark blue uniforms were not worn exclusively by policemen. Namely, solid blue uniforms were also worn by members of Civil Protection. It should be noted that K81 certainly did not speak the truth as he claimed that he had entered Macedonia from another part of Serbia, via Preševo, and not from Kosovo, and that his documents were taken from him on that occasion.¹³⁶ No one else mentioned this possibility and it is evident that this witness is also one of the instructed witnesses who did not speak the truth.

101. The testimony by witnesses who claimed that the police wore black/blue-black/blue-white uniforms,¹³⁷ cannot be accepted. In particular, the testimony by witnesses who tried to correct their earlier statements by claiming that they had known that the uniforms were blue, but they called them black, is unacceptable. This entire case has been characterized by numerous Albanian witnesses who often claimed that they were color-blind and that blue color was yellow,¹³⁸ or blue color was green,¹³⁹ and similar nonsense. It is evident that their statements were adjusted to the needs of this case, which is unacceptable and, if nothing else, calls into question their credibility/truthfulness.

¹³¹ K62-(T.2274/23-2275/8;T.2284/4-7)

¹³² II/877;II/878

¹³³ 6D579

¹³⁴ Ilić-(T.24326)

¹³⁵ II/931,II/937,II/946

¹³⁶ K81-(T.7075/25-7076/6);K81-(P2268/page.4/para.4)

¹³⁷ II/965,II/968,II/1089,

¹³⁸ Zhuniqui-(T.4106/7-T.4107/5)

¹³⁹ Popaj-(T.5766/8-9)

102. Hyseni is arbitrary and completely unreliable, not only because he incorrectly identified police uniforms as blue-black, but also for the following inconsistencies found further in his testimony: a) witness Hyseni distinguished reservists from “other police officers” by their age¹⁴⁰ (allegedly, “other police officers” were younger), which suggests that the identification made by this witness is arbitrary; b) concerning the statement in which he claimed that the VJ/MUP jointly armed the Serbs, this witness confirmed that he did not see it in person, but that he learned of it from the “mass media”.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, the Chamber failed to note that Hyseni claimed that the group was commanded by Novica Mijović,¹⁴² who was not a member of the police, but worked at the VJ Club. In addition, Hyseni was a member of the Board for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms associated with the KLA, which also calls into question his credibility/impartiality.

103. It should be noted that the Defense was not able to go to Kosovo, to otherwise test the credibility of witnesses and the question of ribbons worn at the critical time was one of the rare tests which the Defense could apply to these witnesses. Having failed that test, Prosecution witnesses were shown to be untruthful and should not have been relied upon.

3. PARAMILITARY/VOLUNTEERS WITHIN THE POLICE

104. The Chamber misquoted the Defense “concedes that the former members of the Scorpions, a unit that was supposed to no longer exist in 1998 and 1998, were incorporated into the SAJ”.¹⁴³ Namely, the Defense explicitly stated that the Scorpions, as a formation unit, did not exist in 1998/1999, but that individual former members were reservists of the SAJ. The Defense based its claim on the evidence of insider witness Stoparić,¹⁴⁴

105. I/738 discusses the statement by Gajić wherein he mentioned the Scorpions as a paramilitary formation, as well as other groups associated with the JSO/SAJ. This witness testified with the only intention to prove that the VJ was not associated with paramilitary groups. Stoparić, who was at one point a member of the Scorpions, confirmed that in 1999, he and others were in Kosovo as a member of the SAJ, and not the Scorpions.¹⁴⁵ In 1999, all mentioned individuals were SAJ

¹⁴⁰ Hyseni-(T.3092)

¹⁴¹ Hyseni-(T.3093)

¹⁴² P2270/page.3/para.3

¹⁴³ I/737

¹⁴⁴ Stoparić-(T.705/14-17;T.698/1-10)

¹⁴⁵ Stoparić-(T.699);Stoparić-(P2224/para.80)

reservists, and thus could not have been members of paramilitary at the same time. Mijatović, also confirmed that members of the SAJ were present in Podujevo in 1999, not any paramilitary/scorpions.¹⁴⁶

106. I/738 further discusses the testimony by Vasiljević who claimed that a group named “Legija”, which was commanded by Colonel Kovačević, operated in Kosovo. This witness further stated that he received this information from Sergej Perović, his subordinate officer.¹⁴⁷ Conversely, Perović explained that Vasiljević actually tasked him with investigating those allegations, and he informed his superiors after investigation that the allegations were untrue.¹⁴⁸ The evidence of Perović was confirmed by his superior, Stojanović, who stated that Perović indeed informed his investigation found no evidence that a paramilitary group named “Legija” was operated by the MUP in Djakovica.¹⁴⁹ This is yet another proof that Vasiljević’s testimony is unreliable and largely construed.

107. The Chamber refers to certain parts of the testimony given by Gajić and Vasiljević concerning their stay in Kosovo,¹⁵⁰ in which they stated that they gathered significant information about the MUP units, including the information on the presence of paramilitary units.

108. In establishing Appellant’s responsibility, the Chamber relied to a great extent on Vasiljević. On the other hand, in establishing Ojdanić’s responsibility, and it should be noted that Ojdanić sent Vasiljević/Gajić to Kosovo, the Chamber pointed to certain limitations of Vasiljević’s knowledge, stating that “The Chamber notes that, while Vasiljević was generally a reliable witness, he was only brought back into the Security Administration on 27.4.1999. and only reported on what he was told by VJ members in Kosovo during his mission.”¹⁵¹ This is yet another proof the Chamber applied double standards.

109. It is not true that Vasiljević, Gajić and Farkaš jointly toured the area of Kosovo. In III/572 it is correctly noted that Farkaš was in Kosovo on 5/6.5.1999. Vasiljević and Gajić stated that they were in Kosovo from 1-7.6.1999,¹⁵² which implies that the Chamber wrongly presented the facts when it concluded that Farkaš, Vasiljević and Gajić were on a joint mission in Kosovo.

¹⁴⁶ Mijatović-(T.22495/5-19)

¹⁴⁷ Vasiljević-(T.9034/16-T.9035/11)

¹⁴⁸ Perović-(T.21083/10-21084/1).

¹⁴⁹ Stojanović-(T.19833/20-T.19834/11).

¹⁵⁰ I/738

¹⁵¹ III/572

¹⁵² P2594/para.75;Gajic-T.15319/19

110. In the statement referred to by the Chamber Stoparić stated that Arkan's Tigers were dissolved in 1995 and that the group did not exist in 1999.¹⁵³ Vasiljević was retired in 1992, a military pensioner until 27.4.1999. Also, even if the Chamber relied on Vasiljević's statement that Legija was a member of Arkan's Tigers, he could have been a member of this group only until 1995, when this group was dissolved.

111. In contrast, Stojanović, the top VJ Security officer in Kosovo-Metohia, did not confirm the above claims and stated that he had never heard that Arkan's Tigers operated in Kosovo.¹⁵⁴

112. The presence of the Tigers in Kosovo was also contested by Mihajlović, who lived in Kosovo Polje.¹⁵⁵ Mihajlović explained that Kosovo Polje was only six kilometers away from Priština, and that at least some of the two thousand journalists who were based in Priština would have known of the existence of such a group. However, none of these journalists ever reported anything about the existence of this group.¹⁵⁶

113. Contrary to Gajić,¹⁵⁷ Farkaš testified that he had never heard about any report on Wolves of the Drina. In particular, Farkaš stated that he first learned of this group from Vasiljević.¹⁵⁸

114. Lazarević, also testified that he had no information about the Wolves of the Drina.¹⁵⁹

115. Stojanović, the top person in the military security of the Priština Corps, also testified that he had no information about the Wolves of the Drina.¹⁶⁰

116. Joksić, deputy RDB coordinator for Kosovo, testified that it was the members of the SAJ that were present in Kosovo Polje, rather than the Wolves of the Drina.¹⁶¹

117. Filić, testified that it was not possible to conceal the arrival and presence of a group named the Wolves of the Drina in Kosovo Polje. He confirmed that this unit was not present in Kosovo Polje and that, in fact, members of the SAJ were present there.¹⁶²

¹⁵³ P2224/Paragraph.10

¹⁵⁴ Stojanović-(T.19833/8-12)

¹⁵⁵ Mihajlović-(T.24056/9-10)

¹⁵⁶ Mihajlović-(T.24056/18-T.24057/4)

¹⁵⁷ I/740

¹⁵⁸ Farkaš-(T.16345/11-18).

¹⁵⁹ Lazarević-(T.18189/4-12)

¹⁶⁰ Stojanović-(T.19832/14-22)

¹⁶¹ Joksić-(T.21954/6-21)

¹⁶² Filić-(T.23861/1-14)

118. Ilić also denied that the Wolves of the Drina were present in Kosovo. He stated that he knew the alleged Commander of this unit, Milan Jolović, a/k/a “Legenda”. This person was his roommate from the Military Academy. Milan Jolović was a member of the VJ, rather than the MUP.¹⁶³

119. Therefore the information provided by Gajić is incorrect and unreliable, and thus should not have been relied upon by the Chamber.

120. The Chamber noted upon Farkaš’s return from Kosovo, “he reported that there were serious problems with paramilitaries in Kosovo, including rapes, looting, and theft.” The Chamber failed to note that Farkaš did not mention any murders, which clearly shows that Farkaš did not speak of the Scorpions or Arkan’s Tigers, since it was these two groups that had been associated with murders.¹⁶⁴ Farkaš did not speak about the Scorpions¹⁶⁵ which clearly shows that the VJ found out about Medić’s group upon Farkaš’s return from Kosovo.

121. Vasiljević did not speak the truth when he stated that the paramilitary unit named “Scorpions” was discussed at a meeting with Milošević. Farkaš, who was superior to both Vasiljević/Gajić, stated that the term “Scorpions” meant nothing in 1999.¹⁶⁶ Likewise, the diary kept by Vasiljević indicates that the group of Slobodan Medić-Boca was discussed at the meeting held with Milošević on 17.5.1999, without referring to this group as “Scorpions”.¹⁶⁷

122. The document prepared by VJ Security Administration was dealing with the “paramilitary group of Slobodan Medić-Boca”.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, there was talk of “Scorpions” during the war in Kosovo.

123. The Chamber noted that Ojdanić invited Pavković and other members of the VJ to a meeting with Milošević on 16.5.1999.¹⁶⁹ The Chamber also noted that after the meeting with Milošević, which was not attended by Lukić, Ojdanić ordered Farkaš to set up a team to inspect VJ units and security organs within Kosovo, which Farkaš did and sent Vasiljević/Gajić to Kosovo on 1.6.1999.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶³ Ilic-(T.24334/13-T.24336/4

¹⁶⁴ Farkaš-(T.16292-T.16293;T.16303-T.16304).

¹⁶⁵ 3D1055

¹⁶⁶ Farkas-(T.16342/25-T16343/9)

¹⁶⁷ P2592

¹⁶⁸ 3D1055

¹⁶⁹ III/575

¹⁷⁰ III/577

124. The Podujevo crime committed by SAJ reservists, took place at the end of March 1999, and was immediately processed (criminal report was filed by the MUP, all members of the reserve forces were withdrawn etc.), which leads to a logical conclusion that there was no reason to discuss this incident at the meeting with Milošević 50 days after the incident had happened.

125. It is precisely because of this fact that Minister Stojiljković or any other RJB official did not attend this meeting with Milošević, and not because Milošević had *de facto* control over RJB, as the Chamber erroneously concluded.¹⁷¹

126. The Chamber misquoted Vasiljević,¹⁷² that the meeting held with Milošević on 17.5.1999. Vasiljević testified that at the meeting at Ojdanić's office,¹⁷³ not Milošević's office, Pavković reported the number of unidentified bodies in Kosovo. The Chamber confirmed that Vasiljević stated this in relation to the meeting held on 16.5.1999.¹⁷⁴ Appellant was not present on this meeting, but only military personnel.

127. Likewise, in establishing Pavković's individual responsibility,¹⁷⁵ and discussing the meeting held on 17.5.1999, the Chamber noted that "Vasiljević further testified that Ojdanić and Pavković proposed to establish a 'joint state commission' to examine what was occurring in Kosovo, but that Milošević was not interested in creating this commission". Therefore, it was Milošević who did not accept the forming of this commission, not Lukić. The Chamber abused the facts and tailored Vasiljević's testimony to the detriment of Appellant.

128. The Chamber misquoted the contents of the 17.2.1999 meeting, concerning volunteers.¹⁷⁶ The evidence clearly shows that Stojiljković said volunteers could be engaged in the specified manner, only when he and his colleagues from Belgrade (Marković/Đorđević/Stevanović) assessed it was necessary.¹⁷⁷

129. Dispatch from 18.2.1999,¹⁷⁸ with the instructions to carry out the "necessary checks, compile lists, and establish complete control over volunteer and paramilitary units" was sent, to all Serbian SUPs (1-33), rather than only to those in Kosovo.

¹⁷¹ III/350,III/1132

¹⁷² III/576

¹⁷³ P2600;Vasiljevic-(T.8783)

¹⁷⁴ III/349

¹⁷⁵ III/741,

¹⁷⁶ I/742

¹⁷⁷ P1990

¹⁷⁸ 6D269

130. The Chamber should have concluded based on this dispatch that its main goal was to to be on lookout and police potential volunteer/paramilitary groups, which means that they were to be prevented from operating in war circumstances.

131. It was established that there were no paramilitaries/volunteers within the MUP. Even Cvetić himself testified¹⁷⁹ that there were no paramilitaries within the police. Cvetić explained that he referred a volunteer to the military department.¹⁸⁰ Cvetić also denied their existence in the territory of his SUP, except for one case when they were expelled from Kosovo.¹⁸¹ There was one recorded case of a paramilitary unit that showed up in the part of Kosovo adjacent to Serbia-proper, but it fled the area when the police headed towards them.¹⁸²

132. The Chamber noted that Lukić attended the meeting where he “raised the issue of volunteers”, which it based on the testimony by Cvetić,¹⁸³ completely ignoring the testimony of the other two SUP chiefs, Vojnović/Gavranić, who stated that there was no meeting on that day and that they never heard Lukić mention volunteers. The issue of volunteers was already defined/elaborated by Minister Stojiljković on 17.2.1999 in Priština,¹⁸⁴ by RJB Chief in his dispatch of 18.2.1999,¹⁸⁵ and finally again by Stojilkovic in his dispatch of 24.3.1999,¹⁸⁶ which emphasized that all the Serbian SUPs were obliged to be on lookout and police potential volunteer/paramilitary groups.

133. Cvetić’s testimony was also undermined by Mijatović.¹⁸⁷ There is no evidence of a meeting of the MUP Staff held on 17.3.1999. All volunteers were included in the VJ and there is no evidence any volunteer was ever a member of the MUP.¹⁸⁸ This is yet another indicator Cvetić was an unreliable witness and that his testimony should not have been used as a basis of the Judgment.

¹⁷⁹ Cvetić-(T.8065)

¹⁸⁰ Cvetić-(T.8062/3-T.8063/5)

¹⁸¹ Cvetić-(T8063/21-T.8065/21)

¹⁸² Cvetić-(T8063/21-T.8065/21)

¹⁸³ I/743,I/744

¹⁸⁴ P1990

¹⁸⁵ 6D269

¹⁸⁶ 6D238

¹⁸⁷ Mijatovic-(T.22725/6-18)

¹⁸⁸ Joksić-(T.21952/6-16);Mijatović-(T.22275/8-11);Milenković-(T.22945/11-T.22946/4);Damjanac-(T.23760/23-25); Filić-(T.23947/18-20);Vojnović-(T.24154/3-7)Ilić-(T.24327/15-21)

134. The Chamber failed to take into account the fact that the Defense managed to make Cvetić change his testimony during the trial.¹⁸⁹

135. When the Chamber noted in I/745 that Lukić instructed those in attendance to “take rigorous measures towards paramilitary units,” the Chamber should have drawn the logical conclusion that Appellant made efforts to prevent/suppress any paramilitaries and take rigorous measures in case paramilitaries appeared.

4. FOREIGNER OBSERVERS

136. The Defense contests I/844, and submits that the Prosecution failed to prove the crimes in 1998, which cannot be properly charged against any Accused. As an example, the Chamber noted the alleged crimes in Gornje Obrinje, concluding that the crimes were committed by Serbian forces, and that Appellant was aware of them. Appellant respectfully submits that the area in which the alleged crimes were committed was held by the KLA and that it was impossible to carry out any investigation because the terrorists controlled it.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, the material evidence in relation to the alleged crimes has never been found or presented. Marinković and Kickert, confirmed that they tried to investigate the alleged crimes in this area, but were prevented by the KLA, although all of this was happening at the time when the KVM and thousands of journalists were present. This area was also controlled by the KLA in 1999.¹⁹¹

137. It was established that the Chamber would not accept witness statements/testimony not given pursuant to Rules 92 *bis* and 92 *ter*. For this reason, significant evidence tendered by both the Prosecution and the Defense was rejected. The Chamber rejected the documents of HRW and OSCE for the same reason.¹⁹² Therefore, Appellant submits that the Chamber erroneously relied on evidence given by Abrahams, as it did in I/852;904;905;906, since the defense was in no position to confront the witnesses he interviewed in the field.

138. At any rate, the evidence on which the Chamber based its findings in I/865,I/892 and I/894 should also be rejected, bearing in mind that the testimony by Crosland and Drewienkiewicz is self-

¹⁸⁹ I/744

¹⁹⁰ Maissoneuve-(T.11227/1-2);Kickert-(T.11279/10-16);Zivanović-(T.20468/23-25;T.20492/2-9);Mijatović-(T22455/10-24);Marinković-(T.23525/15–T.23528/12);Clark-(6D106/page.7/Paragraph.4);6D197

¹⁹¹ 6D1256/3.Paragraph.5;6D1257/2;6D1635/7;6D1650;6D1669

¹⁹² Decision on Evidence Tendered Through Sandra Mitchell and Frederick Abrahams,1.9.2006.

contradictory in many aspects. These two witnesses were not experts and they could not testify as to the cause of burned houses and the manner in which they were burned. Likewise, Crosland testified that Junik was razed,¹⁹³ while the video recording shown during trial indicated only minor damage caused by rifle bullets on the facades of the buildings.¹⁹⁴ It is clear from the foregoing that the Chamber based its conclusions on unreliable/unacceptable evidence.

139. The Chamber accepted the testimony by Abrahams with regard to recipients of his findings.¹⁹⁵ The evidence is clear Appellant was not named as a recipient.

140. The Chamber referred to a report published by HRW on the events that took place in the last week of September 1998,¹⁹⁶ and further referred to the testimony by Abrahams showing that he was at Gornje Obrinje¹⁹⁷. The Chamber also referred to a report on those events made by Abrahams on 1.2.1999, which was allegedly sent to the FRY officials and the Presidency of Serbia. Abrahams never gathered any information from the VJ/MUP forces that he identified as perpetrators.

141. Abrahams did not contact any of the MUP officials in Kosovo, which clearly confirms the assertion Appellant had no confirmation of the allegations relayed by the media with regard to Gornje Obrinje.

142. I/902 deals with Abrahams's personal observations as to the death of certain individuals in Gornje Obrinje. These allegations are not corroborated by any evidence.

143. I/903 refers to Abrahams refuting the possibility of KLA responsibility for those killings. This not supportable by the evidence and the law on permissible inferences.

144. The Chamber accepts the fact that there were fierce combat activities between the KLA and Serbian forces in this area.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, Abrahams denial of KLA responsibility is irrelevant.

145. In I/910, the Chamber incorrectly quoted Kickert, linking his testimony regarding the attempts made in December with earlier attempts of the state authorities to perform an on-site investigation and exhumation in Gornje Obrinje. Namely, Kickert testified that he was aware of the

¹⁹³ Crosland-(T9807/20-23)

¹⁹⁴ 5D1239

¹⁹⁵ I/900

¹⁹⁶ I/900

¹⁹⁷ I/901

¹⁹⁸ I/904;;I/905;;I/906

fact that the competent bodies tried on several occasions to perform on-site investigation and other investigative activities in Gornje Obrinje, but that they were prevented from doing so by the KLA.¹⁹⁹

146. I/907 and I/909 show that the authorities of Yugoslavia/Serbia reacted to the letters by Abrahams, but that they were unable to verify the allegations. The inability to verify these allegations is also confirmed in I/908 dealing with the testimony by Damjanac, namely that the area in question was under KLA control and therefore impossible to enter. This was further confirmed by Kickert, as noted in I/910, and by Marinković, as noted in I/911. It is obvious the KLA presence prevented investigation of the allegations.

147. The facts not having been established by investigation, it was improper to treat Abrahams testimony as evidence of notice a crime had been proven in Gornje Obrinje in 1998.

148. The Chamber incorrectly interpreted Ciaglinski's "impression" regarding the role of Mijatović as Appellant's deputy, finding that Mijatović was in the chain of command of the MUP.²⁰⁰ It is respectfully submitted an "impression" is not proper proof in a criminal case. The Chamber committed this error multiple times with witnesses who had no knowledge of the MUP. None of the members of the KVM were ever police officers in their own countries, let alone in Serbia.²⁰¹ Members of the KVM mostly had military training.²⁰² None of these foreign representatives were trained specifically for this mission, so they are unsuitable as witnesses on the structure and functioning of police.²⁰³ These military witnesses and those of the VJ testified from the military point of view, which is not applicable to the MUP.

149. The Chamber focused on Appellant's purported defensiveness concerning the complaints of the use of excessive force.²⁰⁴ However, Phillips often confused Lončar with Lukić.²⁰⁵ The Chamber failed to note this and selectively presented the testimony of Phillips, who, when further asked to explain the "defensive attitude", named Šainović and Lončar as the representatives of the authorities, not Appellant.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁹ Kickert-(T.11226/13-T.11227/6)

²⁰⁰ I/926

²⁰¹ Byrnes-(Tr.2202/25-12203/11); Dz (Tr.7965/20-7965/2)

²⁰² Dz-(Tr.7990/9-7921/22)

²⁰³ Ciaglinski-(T.6932/7-T.6933/7)

²⁰⁴ I/944

²⁰⁵ Phillips-(T.11981)

²⁰⁶ Phillips-(T.11846/6-11)

150. The Chamber accepted Phillips where he spoke about his impressions.²⁰⁷ This testimony does not satisfy the test of evidence. Phillips testimony is tainted with speculation and conjecture, which affected I/944, I/946, I/948 and I/949.

151. Characteristically, the witnesses who were members of the KVM came to Serbia to control the number of members of the VJ and MUP in Kosovo, and yet they did not know what was the exact baseline of VJ/MUP that was stipulated by the agreement.²⁰⁸

152. All of such testimony by witnesses who spoke about MUP structures they did not comprehend, or about the agreements pursuant to which they verified unknown to them must be excluded/dismissed as incredible and unreliable. Any different treatment of such evidence denies a fair trial.

5. JOINT COMMAND

153. Prosecution evidence was given more weight than evidence given by defense witnesses. This wholesale approach of the Chamber is reflected in I/1071, where it relied on Cvetić who spoke about the establishment of the Joint Command, although he did not participate in the same.

154. The Chamber critically relied on the speculative testimony Vasiljevic who was not a regular attendant.²⁰⁹ Vasiljević obviously did not know what kind of meeting he attended on 1.7.1999; yet, the Chamber concluded that the meeting in question was a meeting of the Joint Command, or a meeting of a body similar to the Joint Command. There is no evidence in this case that would confirm that such body existed in 1999.

155. The Chamber made conclusions to Appellant's detriment solely on the presumptions offered by Vasiljević,²¹⁰ and contrary to the other evidence. In addition Vasiljević's testimony is internally inconsistent/contradictory, as well as to the testimony by Stojanović and Anđelković, who also attended this meeting. Vasiljević, in his statement did not say that he was present at a Joint

²⁰⁷ I/945

²⁰⁸ Ciaglinski-(T.6942/14-6954/11)

²⁰⁹ I/1145,I/1149

²¹⁰ I/1145,I/1146

Command meeting, as put by the Chamber, but at a meeting held at the Priština Corps Command,²¹¹ which he also wrote in his diary.²¹²

156. The Chamber referred to Vasiljević's evidence²¹³ but fails to note that Vasiljević described Appellant as "the last hole on the flute".²¹⁴ The actual role of Appellant is reflected in III/356, wherein Vasiljević explained that Lukić's role was to give a briefing. Appellant had a role of briefing, not any command role. Vasiljević further emphasized that no orders were issued.²¹⁵

6. THE NATO BOMBING AND CONFLICTS IN KOSOVO

157. Naumann testified that Serbian forces violated the agreement on force reduction in Kosovo.²¹⁶ Contrary to Naumann, numerous witnesses/documents confirmed the fact that this agreement was observed.²¹⁷

158. The Chamber acknowledged one of the most serious shortcomings of these proceedings when it conceded that they dealt only partially with the role of NATO in the war to which this military alliance was a party.²¹⁸ These proceedings were deprived of the NATO documentation, which was unavailable during trial.

159. The Chamber concluded that it was established beyond reasonable doubt that an armed conflict existed in the territory of Kosovo at all times relevant.²¹⁹ This is true, though not conflict with the KLA, which was a terrorist organization, but of NATO, whose role could not be examined at this trial.

160. The Chamber deemed unreliable the testimony given by defense witnesses, who presented their direct knowledge based on conversations with Albanians, that were leaving because of the NATO bombing and the KLA.²²⁰ According to the Chamber, this testimony is unreliable since the

²¹¹ 2D387;para.1

²¹² P2862

²¹³ III/355

²¹⁴ Vasiljevic-(T.9066/8-16)

²¹⁵ Vasiljevic-(P2600/para.81)

²¹⁶ I/1206.

²¹⁷ 6D1650;P683;6D780;Byrnes-(T.12202/13-23);Maissonneuve-(Tr.11166/6-11167/10);Mijatovic-(T.22278/7)

²¹⁸ I/1214

²¹⁹ I/1217

²²⁰ II/1175

witnesses wore uniforms while speaking to those individuals. Instead, the Chamber relied on the testimony given by the Albanians who claimed that they left because of the Serbian/Yugoslav forces, without taking into account that these witnesses denied the existence of the KLA, who now wear the uniform of Kosovo Protection Corps. Only this can explain why they stubbornly refused to admit that a person could be afraid of bombs, or that one would leave home due to close fights between the terrorists and Serbian forces. This is the only connection between the Albanian witnesses, not their victimization, as put by the Chamber.

161. Moreover, on the basis of testimony by Smiljanić that people did not leave Belgrade and other parts of Yugoslavia in the massive numbers which fled Kosovo, the Chamber unacceptably found in II/1176 that the NATO bombing was not the primary reason for the mass displacement of civilians. The Chamber failed to consider the fact that in other parts of Serbia/Yugoslavia there were no KLA present that would force the civilians to leave the country in order to cause artificial humanitarian catastrophe.

7. CVETIC

162. The Chamber failed to accept the evidence that Cvetić was removed from his position due to his inability to properly carry out his duties.²²¹ Nevertheless, the Chamber regarded Cvetić's evidence as reliable and accepted his testimony that he did not "know of any case when a police officer was accused of murder, arson, or persecution of Kosovo Albanians while he was the head of Kosovska Mitrovica SUP". This witness was removed from his position precisely due to the fact that he did not perform his job, i.e. he did not fight crime. Contrary to the finding of the Chamber, the circumstances of Cvetić's removal from the position he held in March-April 1999 do undermine his testimony, since it is not applicable to other SUPs. It is evident from the minutes of the MUP Staff meeting held on 4.4.1999, several days before Cvetić's removal from his position, that Cvetić was the only one who did not report that he discovered any crimes.²²² Therefore, he himself should be blamed for this omission. There is evidence that police officers were prosecuted for crimes in Kosovska Mitrovica municipality.²²³ Bogunović testified to this effect as well.²²⁴ The above clearly

²²¹ II/1178

²²² P1989

²²³ 6D614/11/26-(four murders);;6D614/12/31-(double murder);;6D139-(double murder);;6D298-(felony);;6D301(theft)

²²⁴ 6D1614/Paragraphs,54,94

shows that witnesses Vojnović/Bogunović spoke the whole truth, whereas Cvetić was not a reliable witness.

163. Chamber didn't accept Vojnovic since he stated that he heard about the Berisha killings years later, although he was the Chief of Prizren SUP.²²⁵ To be fair the Chamber had to reject Cvetić's credibility likewise as Cvetić stated that he only heard of Izbica many years later, although he was the Chief of SUP with territorial jurisdiction over Izbica.²²⁶

E. BARE FINDINGS/CONCLUSIONS IN THE JUDGMENT

164. It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment demonstrates discernible error in the manner that the Chamber analyzed the evidence. Better put, there is no analysis and weighing of the evidence evident under the appropriate standard for the bare findings/conclusion asserted. A Chamber must make clear in its judgment that it has considered crucial, exculpatory evidence and explain the weight which it has given to evidence and its reasons. If it does not do so, it can only be presumed that it did not consider the evidence/arguments made with respect to that issue and that it has erred. As a US Court has stated, the failure of a Court to give reasons for its Judgment "is a hallmark of injustice."²²⁷

165. The Appeals Chamber has likewise stated "the right of an accused under Article 23 of the Statute to a reasoned opinion is an aspect of the fair trial requirement embodied in Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute."²²⁸ Further, a Chamber must "indicate its view on all of those relevant factors which a reasonable Trial Chamber would have expected to take into account before coming to a decision."²²⁹ And also in finding error and vacating a conviction that "neither the parties nor the Appeals Chamber can be required to engage in this sort of speculative exercise to discern findings from vague statements by the Chamber."²³⁰

²²⁵ III/960

²²⁶ Cvetić-(8110/25-T.8111/7

²²⁷ US v. Snow, 157 US.App.D.C.331(D.C.Civ.1973)

²²⁸ OTP v. Furundzija Appeals Judgment, para.69.

²²⁹ "Decision Refusing Milutinovic Leave to Appeal" 03.07.2003, para.22.

²³⁰ OTP v. Oric Appeals Judgment, para.56.

F. APPELLANT'S INTERVIEW

1. **TRANSCRIPT WAS LATE DISCLOSED, REplete WITH GROSS ERRORS**

166. P948 is the transcribed interview of Appellant with the Prosecution, taken in 2002, before an indictment was issued, and in the absence of any counsel assisting Appellant. Although 3 days worth of videotape was disclosed, a transcript was not provided until February 2008, just as Appellant was undertaking a very detailed case-in-chief. At that time it was discovered that the initial OTP translator at the interview had made serious errors in translation, which would not have been evident until a merged(BCS-English) transcript was provided.

167. OTP advised Appellant he would receive a transcript at the conclusion so as to review the same before adopting it as his own, including the ability to clarify matters said during it (pages/4;68;157), no such transcript was ever provided, and no feasible means existed to review the video-transcript in advance of the next session so as to correct any deficiencies.

168. Having deprived Appellant of the rights they promised to him, the Prosecution has made it impossible for any meaningful clarifications to be made for what was in the mind of Appellant at the time of the faulty translations.

169. With no English knowledge, Appellant could not be alerted to the flawed translations solely upon the video-tape. The transcript was only produced as Appellant was beginning the defense case, insufficient time and resources were available to both review the same AND conduct the case with the diligence/efficiency required by the Chamber's scheduling.

170. Despite being apprised of the foregoing flawed process, and specific errors of translation, the Chamber admitted P948 into evidence.²³¹

²³¹“Decision on Lukic request for reconsideration of the Trial Chamber admission into evidence of his interview P948”22 May 2008;“Order on admission into evidence of revised version of Lukic interview P948”22 May 2008;”Second decision on Lukic request for reconsideration of the Trial Chamber's admission into evidence of his interview-(ExhibitP948)”2.6.2008.

2. OUT OF CONTEXT

171. P948 is erroneously relied upon throughout the Judgment. The following analysis demonstrates that the Chamber erred in weighing the evidence to establish guilt “beyond reasonable doubt” as is its burden, as set forth in the Celebici Judgment.²³²

172. According to the jurisprudence, the Chamber must be satisfied so that the conclusion reached is the only one which reasonably can be and that it cannot be called into question by another **rational** conclusion.²³³ Accordingly, if a countervailing interpretation or inference under the evidence is available, consistent with the presumption of innocence, the Chamber cannot adopt the conclusion assessing criminal responsibility.

173. One such error is in regard to conclusions as to the position/role of Appellant as head of Staff. In III/941 the Chamber only partially sets forth the evidence presented by the Defense which shows that during 1998/1999 several higher-ranked MUP officers superior to Appellant in position were present in Kosovo-Metohia. In 1998 from July to October both the Assistant Minister/RJB Chief Djordjevic and Asst. Minister/PJP Commander Stevanovic were non-stop on Kosovo-Metohia.²³⁴ Likewise even Minister Stojilkovic would arrive on occasion.

- From November 1998 through 20.3.1999 the aforementioned officials were in Kosovo-Metohia frequently, including the minister. After 20.3.1999, General Stevanovic (Assistant Minister/Chief of the Police Administration/Commander of PJP) was constantly at the location of the MUP Staff, as an MUP official of the highest authority.²³⁵

174. In P948/p228²³⁶ Appellant, on the questioning relating to Stevanovic:

KC: The role he had as commander of the special units. Is that what brought him down to Kosovo?

SL: Both the position of assistant interior minister and this other position.

KC: So it was basically an issue of having a more senior MUP officer in Kosovo during that period than had been before?

SL: That is so.

²³²Prosecutor vs. Delalic, et al., IT-96-21-T, TJ, (paras. 600, 603)

²³³Prosecutor vs. Delalic, et al., IT-96-21-A, AJ, (para. 458)

²³⁴Intervju P948/str. 53; 6D1499/para 20; Mijatović-(T.22328/20-24; 22202/9-16; 22202/18-23); Vučurević-(T.23064/1-13); Adamović-(T.25069/12-22; 25081/1823; 6D 80014-25

²³⁵Mijatović-(22240/13-17; 22428/15-20); P1989; P1996; P1993;; Bogunović-(T.25150/8-15; 2515114-19)

Ilić(T.24405/16-24406/13)

²³⁶P948/p228

175. Had the Chamber properly viewed the evidence in this manner, it would have properly concluded that Appellant was not the highest ranked MUP officer nor one of the highest authority on the territory of Kosovo-Metohia during the NATO war.

176. At III/961 when the Chamber relies upon the Appellant's interview, it states:

[...]Lukić explained that the “task of the Staff was to coordinate the work of [the police] units, and in this part ... the special police units, had practically dual responsibility: to the commander and, at the same time, to ... the Staff itself.”²³⁷ When subsequently asked who gave instructions to the PJP units, Lukić answered that “from mid July until the end of September or beginning of October [1998], the Chief of the Department, Mr Đorđević and Obrad Stevanović, the Assistant Minister and commander of special units, were with [him] constantly in Priština.”²³⁸ He stressed that Đorđević and Stevanović were “by all means above the head of the Staff”.²³⁹

177. With such a response Appellant explicitly amended his prior answer such that there could be no reasonable inference of Dual authority. It should be taken into account that the questions/answers relate to 1998 as is evident from the text. At that time the PJP relations to the Staff was only in reference to informing of police casualties, problems in food/lodging, health issues, lack of technical supplies and similar logistical type concerns. In any event, Appellant in the interview even requests to go into detail to explain the precise position and role of the Staff, but OTP investigators (although promising such an opportunity) did not effectuate that opportunity²⁴⁰ nor did they provide a copy of the transcript of the interview as promised, so as to permit him to make corrections.²⁴¹

178. At another point, although the Chamber concludes Appellant did not have a key role in formulation of plans at the highest level, it nonetheless assumes criminal knowledge/liability because he was present at the meeting(21.07.1998) where the plan was adopted, it neglects to analyse Appellant's interview where he even states there was no discussion of the plan which was presented as a fait accompli.²⁴² Insofar as Milutinovic was also present at that meeting, and the Chamber cleared him of responsibility in part due to his lack of a significant role at that meeting²⁴³

²³⁷P948/p.41.

²³⁸P948/p.41

²³⁹P948/p42

²⁴⁰P948/para.149/154

²⁴¹P948/p153

²⁴²P948/p68-73

²⁴³III/143

it would have been proper for the same analysis to be applied to Appellant's role, as to the same meeting. Particularly since alongside Appellant at the same were 3 superior officers of the MUP, Minister Stojilkovic, Djordjevic, and Stevanovic.

179. In conclusions about the JC the Chamber also mis-interprets Appellant's interview, contrary to logic, and the principles recited above.

180. When giving an overview of defense evidence, the Chamber does so selectively in III/1023, such that the same gains an incorrect meaning/inference. In that way the Chamber relies on the Interview in part, out of context, and not under a totality of its contents as to the JC.

181. In the Interview Appellant clearly/unequivocally states that there was no Joint Command in existence as such (no command body) and that all plans were prepared exclusively by the Pristina Corps.²⁴⁴

182. The foregoing are merely the most illustrative of problems prevalent in the Chamber's analysis of the Interview.

G. PREJUDGMENT BIAS

183. During several instances the Chamber exhibited a personal bias against Appellant, which calls into question the propriety of the Judgment. Such partiality/prejudgment is improper.

184. The European Convention on Human Rights provision that everyone is entitled to a hearing by "an independent and impartial tribunal established by law", has been interpreted by the ECHR as requiring disqualification where there is either a lack of subjective impartiality (the existence of actual bias) or a lack of objective impartiality (the existence of a fear of bias). In the latter case, it is said, the determinant is whether the fear of bias can be held to be objectively justified, or whether the judge has offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in the matter.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴P948/p48,49,54,84,100,101

²⁴⁵Prosecutor vs. Brdjanin, "DECISION ON APPLICATION BY MOMIR TALIC FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION AND WITHDRAWAL OF A JUDGE", 18.5.2000, (para.13)-citing: *Piersac v Belgium*, ECHR, (1.10.1982), Series A, No.53, (para.30); *Hauschildt v Denmark*, (1990)12.EHRR.266, (para.48); *Bulut v Austria*, ECHR, (22.2.1996), Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1996-II 347,356 (paras.31-33).

Article 6 and the ECHR's decisions in relation to it appear to have widely affected the attitude of the domestic courts in Europe in relation to judicial impartiality.²⁴⁶

185. Rule 15(A) in the ICTY deals with the same topic. As was noted by Judge Hunt:

“In some domestic jurisdictions it is considered a Judge is to step down if in all the circumstances, the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he or she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in that case. What is to be considered is not the actual reaction of the particular complainant but the hypothetical reaction of the fair-minded observer with sufficient knowledge of the actual circumstances to make a reasonable judgment.”²⁴⁷

186. It should be recalled that Judge Bonomy previously sat on the Milosevic proceedings, which shared many witnesses and subject-matter with this case. Prior to that, Judge Bonomy was known in Scotland for his work in advocating the speeding of the trial process.²⁴⁸ The basis of the apparent bias is unknown and immaterial but the prejudgment bias is evident from certain comments recorded in the record. Judge Bonomy at various times acted in a very disparaging manner toward the Lukic defense, including, but not limited to (quotations at Annex "D"):

- a) Tr.2090/ln.1-2 [Essentially curtailing vigorous cross-examination by co-counsel for Appellant]
- b) T.21925/ln.11-13 [Essentially curtailing consultations between counsel and Appellant and making a disparaging remark about both during a critical point of the proceedings when the Chamber was considering admission of witness Joksic's statement as to the KLA prior to 1998]²⁴⁹
- c) T.27372/ln.1-7 [Essentially rejecting without consideration the glaring misstatements/misrepresentations of evidence in the Prosecution Final Brief that were too numerous to be unintentional, as if unintentional misrepresentation is not an appropriate matter to bring to the attention of the Court]
- d) T.23630/ln.23–Tr.23631/ln.5 [Essentially preventing Appellant's counsel from attempting to make a record and be heard.]
- e) T.22393/ln.6-7 (*JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Lukic, sit down, please. Mr. Mijatovic can answer questions*) [Essentially preventing Appellant's counsel from attempting to make a record and be heard.]
- f) [Seeking counsel to withdraw a validly raised argument for a motion premised upon the legal rights of the accused afforded under the statute and Rules – thus attempting to prevent a record as to the serious complaints raised about the rush of the trial.]

²⁴⁶ Id.

²⁴⁷ Id., Para.10.

²⁴⁸ See, Bonomy, Lord Iain, "Improving Practice: 2002 REVIEW OF THE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURE OF THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY" (2002)

²⁴⁹ Judge Bonomy conceded the error of his conduct (T.22014/5-15)

187. The foregoing comments make a clear record of the disparaging treatment of the Appellant by the Presiding Judge. Added to this we have the Chamber in a Decision disparaging the “unsatisfactory manner in which the Lukic Defense has chosen to litigate this matter.”²⁵⁰

188. We have previously highlighted the apparent pre-occupation of the Chamber with the speed of the trial, and the efforts undertaken to deduct time from the defense improperly.²⁵¹ An impartial observer could believe such action, in conjunction with the foregoing, demonstrate a certain animosity towards a defense that diligently and steadfastly asserted the rights of their client, even in the face of mounting pressure to finish the case speedily. When faced with the pressures of the ICTY completion strategy and Judge Bonomy’s prior life work in advocating speeding-up trials in Scotland, it is understandable that a prejudgment/bias might exist against the team that mounted a proper defense which was at odds with the completion strategy.

189. The harm caused by the aforementioned is apparent in certain findings, including a disparate treatment of Appellant. For instance, in its analysis on sentencing the Judgment finds mitigating circumstances were established for Ojdanic²⁵², Lazarevic²⁵³, and Lukic²⁵⁴, yet whereas the first 2 received sentences of 15 years, Lukic received 22 years along with other accused who had **NO** mitigating factors accepted. Similarly, Lazarevic’s voluntary surrender was given weight as a mitigating factor²⁵⁵ whereas for Lukic the voluntary surrender was not regarded as a mitigating factor²⁵⁶ despite the fact these accused surrendered within months of one another.

190. Milutinovic was acquitted of criminal responsibility despite attendance at same meetings where criminal knowledge/liability was asserted against Appellant.²⁵⁷ Milutinovic was acquitted of criminal responsibility despite notice of crimes from Yugoslav/Serb officials who advised him they were being investigated/prosecuted²⁵⁸, whereas Appellant with similar level of knowledge of investigation and prosecution is convicted.²⁵⁹ The disparate treatment was most evidenced in the denial of bar table motions, when the Chamber refused to admit 6D614(demonstrating the cases

²⁵⁰ “Decision on Lukic Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Extension of Time and Leave to File Replies”, 10.6.2008/para 7

²⁵¹ See, section A

²⁵² III/1186,1188

²⁵³ III/1196,1198,1199

²⁵⁴ III/1202

²⁵⁵ III/1200

²⁵⁶ III/1204

²⁵⁷ III/132-143,284

²⁵⁸ III/141;148;255;265

²⁵⁹ III/1095;1097

brought against perpetrators of crimes) because it was not an original record, and then refusing also into evidence the underlying original records on which the overview is based.²⁶⁰

191. Defense witnesses were disregarded almost in totality in the Judgment, making Appellant question whether its defense was even considered.

H. "WIDESPREAD" AND "SYSTEMATIC" ATTACK DIRECTED AGAINST A "CIVILIAN POPULATION"

192. Appellant incorporates by reference the objections raised in Section D²⁶¹, and E²⁶².

193. Appellant contests the Chamber's reliance upon the standard from *Brđanin* discussed in I/99 where it held “in order to hold a member of a joint criminal enterprise responsible for crimes or underlying offences committed by non-members of the enterprise, it has to be shown (a) that the crime or underlying offence can be imputed to one member of the joint criminal enterprise (not necessarily the accused) and (b) that this member—when using a physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator—acted in accordance with the common plan.” The application of the above led to the conclusion that the police members were responsible for actions of the army even though they did not have any control over them, nor did they know and could have known what was happening in the army. The application of such a standard unjustifiably lowered the threshold for criminal responsibility of the Appellant in this case. The Chamber itself found that Lazarević and Ojdanić were not guilty of the acts committed by the police officers since they did not have effective control over the police units²⁶³.

194. Concerning the requirement of proof that there was a JCE, which is discussed in I/101, the Prosecution called witnesses who confirmed that there was no plan to persecute civilians, which is essential for establishing the existence of such JCE²⁶⁴.

²⁶⁰“Decision on Lukic defence motions for admission of documents from bar table,11.06.2008”; “Decision on Lukic motion for reconsideration of trial chamber's decision on motion for admission of documents from bar table and decision on defence request for extension of time for filing of final trial briefs,02.07.2008”

²⁶¹ I/64,I/892,I/894,I/900,I/901,I/902,I/903,I/904,I/905,I/906,I/907,I/908,I/909,I/910,I/911

²⁶² I/146,I/147,I/148,I/820,I/878

²⁶³ III/632;III/932

²⁶⁴ Cvetić-(T:8179/21-8180/3)

195. Immediately before the NATO bombings, the Serbian Parliament discussed the obligation to meet the requirements of the Dayton Accords, which meant providing assistance to civilians to return to their homes in other former Yugoslav Republics²⁶⁵. All these points were the subject of negotiations/agreements. Before the war broke out in Serbia, the majority of refugees had already returned home.

196. However, according to the misconstrued logic of the Judgment, someone then came up with a illogical idea to expel Albanians by first provoking NATO to bomb Yugoslavia and then proceeding with persecution. Such a theory does not have any credibility under the given circumstances. Everything that was happening in Yugoslavia/Serbia was closely observed by the international community and if such a plan had existed, it would have been known.

197. The Defense contests the theory of the JCE discussed I/102. This suggests Appellant need not be aware of the common purpose, but that the Prosecution may, ten years after the events, allege that there was a common purpose, which the Chamber accepts and introduces thus a thinly veiled mode of strict liability that becomes part of one people's history although they were not aware of its existence at the time of the events.

198. As the Chamber explained,²⁶⁶ “the Accused’s acts or omissions ‘must form a link in the chain of causation’.” Appellant respectfully submits that he was not part of any “chain of causation” since not part of any chain of command. No person from the MUP Staff was authorized to make any decision of executive nature or punish anyone who failed to act in accord. It is evident that this necessary element is missing on the part of Appellant.

199. Appellant had no command status, and was not in a position to silently approve/significantly contribute to any occurrence. As it was established, and at one point concluded by Judge Bonomy, the MUP Staff was just a post box for communications²⁶⁷. Appellant was virtually unimportant since the MUP Staff was included only as a parallel-link in the chain of reporting²⁶⁸, which concurrently went from the Kosovo SUPs directly to the MUP Headquarters in Belgrade²⁶⁹. Among the important factors in evaluating the level of an accused’s of participation in JCE the Chamber listed “any efforts made by the accused to impede the efficient functioning of the joint criminal

²⁶⁵ Dayton Accords, Annex 7, *see*. Book of Authorities; 1D32;

²⁶⁶ I/105

²⁶⁷ T.22545/18-21

²⁶⁸ P1044; 6D-2(Tr.25491/13-20); Mijatovic(Tr.22329/2-9), Tr.25526/4-16

²⁶⁹ Mijatovic-(Tr.22224/25-22225/3; 22651/7-13); Gavranic-(Tr.22654/4-12)

enterprise”. Appellant stresses he was only authorized to issue instructions that emphasized the need to abide the law and providing assistance to civilians in the course of police work.²⁷⁰

200. The Chamber erred when it found the KLA was an armed force.²⁷¹ Regardless of its size, the KLA was still a terrorist organization, due to the methods it applied, including murders/abductions/torture of civilians, looting, etc. Moreover, members of the KLA did not wear KLA markings and insignia, but civilian clothes²⁷²; they would throw down their arms and mix with civilians in order to avoid being arrested²⁷³; they would move civilians in order to reach Albania/Macedonia hidden in civilian columns²⁷⁴.

201. Throughout the Judgment, the Chamber attempted to show that the only reason for departure of civilians from Kosovo was the existence of a widespread and systematic attack carried out by the FRY/Serbian security forces. The Chamber erred when it drew such conclusion, and failed to consider the evidence in its totality.

202. Appellant’s Final brief contested the inferences that would be drawn to the detriment of the Appellant, especially in a situation where there were several reasonable explanations for one event²⁷⁵. The principle of *in dubio pro reo* is sacrosanct. It is obvious that the Chamber did not observe this principle, particularly with regard to one of its crucial issues, namely the reason(s) for civilian departure. According to the Chamber, Yugoslavia/Serbia first provoked NATO and the bombings as a cover behind which they carried out the displacement of civilians. . Even the Chamber itself accepted that Yugoslavia was not the only party responsible for the failure in negotiations²⁷⁶. The evidence shows that Yugoslavia was not responsible for the failure of negotiations, but was eager to avoid the bombing and did everything to prevent that scenario.

203. According to the Chamber, the civilians were not afraid of the bombs or clashes between the terrorists and the security forces. According to the Chamber, the KLA was not engaged in mass movement of civilians to such an extent that it comprised a significant factor in the departure of civilians. The evidence presented in this case and the logic itself contradict such a conclusion.

²⁷⁰ 6D666;6D768;6D773; 6D778

²⁷¹ I/791;I/792

²⁷² See. Book of authorities-Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12.8.1949,art.13

²⁷³ Paunovic(Tr.21868/9-19)

²⁷⁴ Gerxhaliiu(Tr.2508/9-23)

²⁷⁵ FTB,para.9

²⁷⁶ I/412

204. The evidence shows that there were several powerful reasons for departure of civilians in 1999 not an attack against civilians by the Yugoslav/Serbian forces.

205. Even some of the Prosecution witnesses, Albanians, testified that they left their homes for reasons other than being evicted by the security forces.²⁷⁷

206. Other witnesses changed statements obviously under pressure of the KLA.²⁷⁸ They had to return to Kosovo, and if they had stated something favorable for the Defense, it could have jeopardized not only their lives, but the lives of their families, too²⁷⁹.

207. The first reason for the departure of civilians was the obvious threat posed by NATO bombings²⁸⁰. Bearing in mind the extent and nature of the NATO bombings, it is very unusual that this fact was completely ignored by the Chamber. The fear of bombing was manifest, as the NATO aircraft bombed civilian targets, which led to civilian casualties.²⁸¹ This was recognized by the Chamber.²⁸² The evidence shows that the method applied by NATO led to devastation that forced civilians to leave their homes.²⁸³ Civilians of all ethnicities left their homes because of the NATO bombing.²⁸⁴ Hyseni testified that his father-in-law and brother-in-law were wounded when their house was hit during the NATO bombing, so they had to leave it.²⁸⁵

208. There was a justified fear among the population that they might be a target of NATO, be it on purpose or inadvertently. Civilians knew that NATO was constantly targeting military/MUP facilities/positions. Due to the size of Kosovo, every settlement had a military or police facility close to it. The NATO bombing forced the army and the police to relocate frequently.²⁸⁶ This relocation was necessary to avoid being destroyed but the relocation process covered a large portion

²⁷⁷ K14(T.10991/14-17);Sadiku(T.1952/17-20);Xhafa(T.2455/15-22);Gerxhaliu(T.2508/17-23);Bucaliu(T.3024/18-3025/7);Krasniqi(T.3082/25);Mazrekaj(T.5836/7-14)

²⁷⁸ Hyseni T.3110/13-18;

²⁷⁹ Fazliji-Tr.25227/1-25228/5

²⁸⁰ Tr.12379/4-7;22701/6-16;22702/16-21;22807/11-22808/4;22865/21-22866/2;22882/14-25;22965/12-23;6D1603,para46;6D1629,para.17

²⁸¹ 4D90;5D1394,para.23-24;6D1251;5D1401,para.60;6D1257;5D1394,para.23-

24;5D1401,para.60;6D604;6D171;6D172;6D174; 6D175; 6D176; 6D177; 6D1532,para.44;6D1631,para.50;6D604;6D604;6D1492,para.42;6D1238;6D1329;6D1243;6D1257;6D1240;6D998;6D1627,para.30,33,38;5D1394,para.14

²⁸² I/1214

²⁸³ Smiljanić(Tr. 15751/1-15752/10);5D692;Lazarević(Tr. 17947/20-17949/5;5D1219; Tr.18129/10-19;18130/25-19;3D524,42338/22-42339/19)

²⁸⁴ 6D1614,para.49-50;Stojanović(T.19731/12-17);Joksić(T.21958/5-

15);Vuković(T.21334/22;21335/12);Bogunović(T.22869/7-12);6D1603,para.56;6D1530,para.36;6D1627,para.38;6D1614,para.47,49-50;6D770;6D323;6D1603,para.67;6D1604,para.28

²⁸⁵ P2270,p.3,11;T.3102/9-18

²⁸⁶ 6D1606,para.33;Gavranić(T.22675/1-25)

of the territory. To accept the orchestrated testimony of Albanians that they did not fear the NATO bombs is illogical and contrary to the facts of this case.

209. The second reason for the departure of civilians was the fear of fighting between the KLA and the state forces.²⁸⁷ Civilians were leaving the areas held by the KLA. It is not probable or logical that there was a plan to displace civilians designed so that the security forces would lose their lives in order to evict civilians, when they could easily evict them from the areas with no KLA.

210. The third reason for the departure of civilians were orders/threats/suggestions by the KLA and its collaborators²⁸⁸. Whenever the state forces would perform a maneuver, the KLA would send false messages to the village population that an operation was being launched against them.²⁸⁹ The evidence shows that the KLA issued leaflets urging the population to flee.²⁹⁰ The KLA instructed the population to flee.²⁹¹ The KLA also caused the movement of civilians²⁹².

211. Non-Serbian/non-Yugoslav media contributed to the movement and departure of civilians. NATO used propaganda to frighten the population²⁹³

212. Abundant evidence showing that KLA caused movement of civilians in order to hide among them and escape from encirclement.²⁹⁴ In order to avoid being arrested, the KLA members would force the civilians to go as far as Albania or Macedonia.

213. The KLA were aware that the movement of civilians would be used against Yugoslavia/Serbia (P929,p.10). It is clear that the KLA largely took advantage of this practice.

214. The fourth reason for the departure of civilians is reflected in the intention to avoid being mobilized by the KLA.²⁹⁵ It was established that in 1999 the KLA turned to forced mobilization. This certainly influenced a number of civilians to leave in order to avoid being mobilized into the KLA.

²⁸⁷ 6D1604,para.42;

²⁸⁸ Tr.7635/20-25;Tr.5993/25-5994/10;Tr.24345/5-16;6D1603,para39

²⁸⁹ 6D1603,para.51

²⁹⁰ 5D1364;Filipović(T.19183/14-19185/25);6D1614,para.65

²⁹¹ 6D1629,para.16;6D1532,para.40

²⁹² P929,pp.8-9

²⁹³ 6D1530,para.36

²⁹⁴ Gerxhaliu(Tr.2508/9-23)

²⁹⁵ 6D1603,para.18,20;6D614-28/13;3D1052;Lazarević(T.17850/5-17851/9);P2068;

215. The fifth reason for the departure of civilians was the fear of retaliation for being loyal citizens. The evidence clearly shows that the KLA controlled a large part of Kosovo and that it committed crimes against the Albanians it considered “traitors”/Serbian collaborators. An overwhelming amount of evidence shows this²⁹⁶. The activities of the KLA, including attacks, mistreatment, abductions, extortion, etc., were carried out in all the areas affected by the KLA, and that these activities were also aimed against the Albanians, which gave rise to the population to flee.²⁹⁷

216. The sixth reason for the departure of civilians was the lack of basic necessities such as electric power and food.²⁹⁸

217. Rule 70 documents from America show that the fear of both Serbs and Albanians in Priština increased when NATO started bombing during daytime; due to the lack of job and resources and the destruction of the electric network by NATO, the town was abandoned by Serbs and Albanians alike.²⁹⁹ Encouraged by power outages, criminals took advantage of the night to increase their illegal activities, which logically caused problems to the civilians and forced them to leave³⁰⁰.

218. The evidence presented at trial shows that men felt safer knowing that their women and children were removed from this situation to safer places.³⁰¹

219. The seventh reason for the departure of civilians was the creation of an artificial humanitarian catastrophe through an agreement by NATO and the KLA.

²⁹⁶ 6D1603(para.21,38);Krga(Tr.16824/14-21)

²⁹⁷ Tr.30760;Tr.16824/14-21;6D1631,para.44,45,37;6D614,30/55

²⁹⁸ 6D1532,para.32;6D1637

²⁹⁹ 6D1637

³⁰⁰ 6D1533,para.42;6D459;6D1604,para.33,39;6D297;6D1614,para.55;6D1627,para.45;6D1631,para.88;6D307;6D320;6D382;6D385;6D386;6D460;6D469;6D472;6D483;6D541;6D555;6D557;6D573;6D638;6D659;6D661;6D868;6D891;6D893;6D896;6D903;6D915;6D991;6D992;6D614/317/804;6D614/332/881;6D614/387/1218;6D614/393/1253;6D949;6D614/329/866;6D614/345/953;6D614/347/963;6D614/363/1067;6D614/363/1068;6D924;6D614/39/102;6D868;6D614/36/88;6D61421/29;6D614/278/588;6D614/278/589;6D614/285/630;6D614/291/665;6D614/292/670;6D614/297/697;6D614/314/786;6D614/278/787;6D614/317/801;6D614/321/823;6D614/321/824;6D614/321/825;6D614/321/826;6D614/324/837;6D614/324/837;6D614332/880;6D1604,para.32;6D1614,para.60;6D1631,para.87,88;6D565;6D614/328/863;6D614/347/966;6D614/288/659;6D614/291/666;6D614/292/671;6D614/295/687;6D614/295/690;6D614/299/709;6D614/301/722;6D614/310/767;6D614/312/780;6D614/359/1036;6D614/363/1066;6D614/369/1107;6D614/376/1147;6D614/355/1019;6D614/376/1147;6D614/277/7;6D614/31/62;6D614/10/23;6D614/34/80;6D614/38/96;6D614/33/72;6D614/278/588;6D614/278/589;6D614/285/630;6D614/291/665;6D614/292/670;6D614/295/689;6D614/297/697;6D614/314/786;6D614/278/787;6D614/317/801;6D614/318/808;6D614/321/826;6D614/321/824;6D614/321/825;6D614/321/824;6D614/321/825;6D614/321/826;6D614/324/837;6D614/332/880;6D1604,para32,33;6D1614,para60;

³⁰¹ Odalović(T.14442/6-14444/7)

220. The Chamber failed to take into account that the evidence shows that the VJ/MUP officials tried to convince the population to stay or return to their homes.³⁰² Moreover, the security forces were ordered not to expose civilians to danger even when terrorists were among them.³⁰³

221. When the evidence is considered realistically, it is obvious that no reasonable trier of fact would have ignored these factors as the principal reason for the departure of civilians.

I. ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR THE CRIMES, *MENS REA* ACTUS REUS

222. Respectfully *mens rea* and *actus reus* elements of the crimes charged were erroneously applied.

223. Respectfully the *actus reus* and *mens rea* elements cannot be satisfied if what is planned/ordered is a legal operation.

224. The Appeals Chamber made clear in articulating the *mens rea* requirement that knowledge of a risk that a consequence will occur is not sufficient for the imposition of criminal responsibility for serious violations of IHL.³⁰⁴ If that were so, then “any military commander who issues an order would be criminally responsible, because there is always a possibility that violations could occur.”³⁰⁵ Instead, Blaskic set a higher standard: to avoid the unacceptable result of too broad a criminal liability, insisting that “an awareness of a higher likelihood of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard.”³⁰⁶ In Kordic the Appeal Chamber extended this holding to liability for planning.³⁰⁷

³⁰² 6D1631,para.50;6D1604,para.34,36;6D1606,para.39

³⁰³ 6D1606,para.19,20,38;6D778;6D1492,para.43

³⁰⁴ Blaskic Appeal Judgment para. 34-42.

³⁰⁵ Id.,para.41.

³⁰⁶ Id.

³⁰⁷ Kordic Appeal Judgment para.29-32.

1. KLA

225. The Chamber erred holding the KLA as an organized armed force that fought by legally acceptable means that complied with the laws or customs of war,³⁰⁸ which occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

226. The KLA were terrorists, who did not employ acceptable methods. In the heart of the KLA General Staff there was a private prison for torturing/butchering civilians.³⁰⁹ The Chamber's finding that the KLA instituted the use of a distinctive emblem is contradictory to an overwhelming amount of evidence that clearly shows that most of the KLA members had weapons and wore no uniforms.³¹⁰ That was, indeed, one of the problems faced by the security forces, they often had to resort to gunpowder residue tests in order to determine which individuals recently used firearms.

227. The Chamber barely addressed the actual/perceived threat the KLA posed to the State/civilians, let alone found the risk of crimes being committed under the circumstances was unjustifiable or unreasonable.

228. The Chamber disregarded the fact that during 1998/1999, KLA were controlling 70% of Kosovo and that their terrorist tactics included constant abuse of civilians, including:

a) "Two Villages"³¹¹, the terrorists would barricade themselves in a village that is farther from the security forces and would force the civilians to a second village as a shield/logistic support, between them and the security forces.³¹² Then the terrorists would open fire at the security forces³¹³. The army/police would pass through the nearer village pursuing the terrorists, and all the witnesses who were brought to testify could then truthfully state that there were no terrorists in their village and that it was the army/police that opened fire, but that would not reflect the true assessment³¹⁴.

³⁰⁸ I/812,813,814,815,819,821,827,840,841

³⁰⁹ P3063-(T.9291/1-5;;3D168/page.107;;2D54/page.3;;

³¹⁰ 3D182,p.132;P673,p.4;3D386,p.11;6D1606,para.19;P407,p.308;P2676,p.3;P3113,p.10;Tr.2070(Kabashi);Tr.4179(Hoti);Tr.4643(Dashi);Tr.5343(K72);Tr.6323(Zyrapi);Tr.7835(Drewienkiewicz);Tr.9602(K79)

³¹¹ Tr.18290(Lazarevic);Tr.18916(Jelic);Tr.19280(Delic)

³¹² Tr.18290(Lazarevic)

³¹³ Tr.19280(Delic)

³¹⁴ Lazarevic(Tr.17754/7-17);Delic(Tr.19279/16-19280/12);4D2;4D6;4D13/2005;4D25/3594;6D87/6708;P2234/8093;P2240/4584;P2247/7140;P2263/2;P2264/1527;P2269/2;P2270/11;P2271/2;P2281/7497;P2287/2062;P2324/3697;P233

- b) Mis-using MUP uniforms and forcible eviction of civilians for propaganda purposes³¹⁵;
- c) Shedding uniforms or wearing civilian clothing and blending with civilians or using civilians for purposes of smuggling, or to escape³¹⁶;
- d) Putting civilians at risk of harm by utilizing them as “human shields” in the course of combat operations frequently throughout Kosovo-Metohia³¹⁷.

229. In light of the above-mentioned, “the presence of a large number of soldiers or combatants within that population may, under certain circumstances, deprive the population of its civilian character”³¹⁸.

230. The laws of war provide a presumption of civilian status so that a person shall not be made the object of attack when it is not reasonable to believe in the circumstances of the person contemplating the attack, including the information available to the latter, that a potential target is a combatant³¹⁹.

231. The burden of proof as to whether the alleged victims were civilians rests on the Prosecution and no such presumption may apply in that context³²⁰.

232. The Defense challenges the position of the Chamber that it is not limited by the definition of “civilian” in IHL. The Defense believes that definitions such determining who has civilian status must be observed. Otherwise, it would lead to an improper expansion of the definition of a civilian and comprise an impermissible attempt to include therein the members of the KLA who engaged in combat wearing civilian clothes³²¹. As the Chamber in Mrksic stated (relying on the Blaskic Appeal

2/6445;P2337/3563;P2338/2;P2353/6540;P2378/2;P2382/3653;P2514/9;P2522/2;P2523/915;P2597/8148;P2649/2555;P2670/43

³¹⁵ 6D1629/para.17

³¹⁶ Paunovic-(T.21868/1-25;;T.21689/10-23);Loshi-(T.5374/4-11;5379/3-13);Simic-(T.15631/9-25);K25-(T.4745/8-13);Mitchel-(T.622/8-17);;DZ(T.7835/14-22);Byrnes-(T.12229/2-10)

³¹⁷ Delic-(T.19279/16-19280/3);Dikovic-(T.199983/12-19984/3);Mandic-(Tr.20897/24-25);5D973;6D1614/para.39;P641;P2448;Loncar-(T.7617/7-9);Marinkovic-(T.20329/1-18)Mandic-(T.20898/14-20);Stefanovic-(T.21775/2-14).

³¹⁸ *Blaskic*, AJ/Para-115

³¹⁹ Galic, TJ/para-50

³²⁰ *Blaskic* Appeal Judgment/para 111

³²¹ Loshi(Tr.5374/4-11;5379/3-13);Simic(Tr.15631/9-25);K25(Tr.4745/8-13),Mitchel(Tr.622/8-17), Zyrapi(Tr.6232/16-20);K14(Tr.10969/8-13);Dashi(Tr.4642/25-4643/7);Zhuniqi(Tr.4179/6-17);Mitchel(Tr.662/2-8)

Judgment) “the term “civilian” in Article 5 of the Statute has to be interpreted in accordance with Article 50 of Additional Protocol I and therefore does not include combatants or fighters *hors de combat*.”³²²

233. For the purposes of defining a civilian in the present case, it should be noted that the members of the KLA in most cases mixed with the civilians, retaining or dropping their arms,³²³ and incited movement of civilians and formed civilian columns which they infiltrated in order to leave the encirclement of the security forces³²⁴. The terrorists frequently opened fire from the civilian columns³²⁵. Civilians were used for reconnaissance and relay of information³²⁶. Civilians were laying mines and explosive devices on the roads, in buildings, at police stations, etc³²⁷. The entire logistic service of the KLA was comprised of civilians³²⁸. Members of their logistic service were in towns and villages alike, in the entire territory of Kosovo³²⁹. There were no conflicts with the KLA in the areas where there were no attacks against the security forces, nor were there civilians leaving and civilian casualties in such areas³³⁰.

2. NATO BOMBING CAMPAIGN

234. In I/1214, the Chamber noted that it was not “charged with reaching conclusions about the responsibility of NATO.” However, the Chamber should have considered the role of NATO in detail, as it was necessary for understanding the conflict that occurred and reaching an adequate decision.

235. It is impossible to reach adequate conclusions as to the departure of civilians from Kosovo without considering the manner and scope of the bombing campaign. The bombing campaign cannot be dealt with “in relation to the individual municipalities”, as suggested by the Chamber in I/1214. Conversely, the bombing campaign should have been considered as a whole taking into

³²² *OTP v. Mrksic, et al.* Trial Judgment, para.461.

³²³ T.3380/15-20;T.12229/2-10;18291/1-9;22958/17-25;23014/11-20;3D524;3D1116/196-197;3D524-41842; 3D1116 / 14;

³²⁴ 3D1084;

³²⁵ P641; Tr.6903/5-9;T.7618/7-9;Tr.18792/11-15;Tr.19280/1;Tr.19983/25-19984/1;Tr.20329/3-5;Tr.20897/24-25; T.21775/10-11

³²⁶ Paunovic-Tr.21868/20-24

³²⁷ Gerxhalitu-Tr.2553;Kadriu-Tr.5098;Zyrapi-Tr.6193;Crosland-Tr.9898;3D168/p.10

³²⁸ T.2553/24-25;T.5098;T.6193;T.9898; 3D168/page.10

³²⁹ 3D168;3D375;3D386/page.4;P2466

³³⁰ Tr.2276;Gavranic-Tr.22757

account not only its scale, but duration. Bombing of a town can make civilians of a neighboring town leave their homes. It is not necessary that one's house is bombed before one decides to move away, and this is precisely what the Chamber is trying to suggest.

236. The position of the FRY/Serbian forces has to be considered in light of an enormous number of aircraft sorties and large scale bombing.

237. The fact the Prosecution did not prosecute NATO was a political decision. The Chamber's finding in I/1211 has no legal validity in determining the truth in this case. The Chamber refused to establish the number of aircraft sorties and bombs dropped even though Smiljanić testified about this. This aspect of the conflicts is extremely important for understanding the conflicts that occurred in Kosovo at the time relevant for the Indictment. In this way the Chamber invalidated its findings relating to the aggression of NATO.³³¹

238. As a result of the improper consideration and assessment of the role of NATO bombing campaign, the Chamber erroneously found in II/1175-6 that NATO bombing was not the main reason for the departure of civilians.

239. The explanation provided in II/1177 was that even though the conflict existed in 1998, there was no "massive flood of people across the borders." The counter-argument would be that the security forces were present in 1998 as well, which brings us back to NATO. NATO is the only new actor that appeared in 1999. The conflict between security forces and the KLA existed in both 1998 and 1999. There was no massive departure of civilians. Civilians started leaving in large numbers only when the bombing began, and the Chamber found that the KLA did not contribute to their departure even though the KLA was present during 1998/1999.

3. FORCIBLE TRANSFER/DEPORTATION

240. With respect to forcible transfer/deportation,³³² the Chamber ignored several alternative/legitimate/equally reasonable explanations for the migration of civilians from their

³³¹ I/1209;I/212;3D800-3D875

³³² I/165

homes, besides “shelling of civilian objects, the burning of civilian property, and the commission of or the threat to commit other crimes”³³³.

241. The Chamber found those civilians were forced to leave by the forces of Yugoslavia/Serbia.³³⁴ This finding is based on the testimony given by certain Albanian witnesses. No conclusions can be made based on the testimony of these witnesses, because they denied the existence of the KLA despite significant evidence, which proved otherwise. The Chamber found that such denials of Kosovo Albanian witnesses border upon the irrational.³³⁵ The Chamber erroneously relied on the testimony by Albanian witnesses in establishing the reason for civilian departures, as these witnesses obviously lied that the civilian departures were not caused by the KLA. Despite the defense raising this issue the Chamber disregarded the fact that the civilians left the areas in which the KLA was most active.

242. Prosecution witnesses testified that they voluntarily left for reasons other than being ordered/forced out by government forces, such as NATO/KLA.³³⁶ Other witnesses kept changing their explanation, so prompting by the KLA to lie under oath cannot be excluded either.³³⁷

243. There was ample evidence ignored by the Chamber, that civilians were leaving their homes for several alternative, legitimate and equally reasonable reasons:

- a) KLA ordered to civilians to vacate their homes and villages for a variety of purposes³³⁸;
- b) to avoid forced recruitment into the KLA.³³⁹;
- c) from fear of retribution by KLA for being considered to be “traitors” or Serb collaborators,³⁴⁰ (also, the Chamber failed to take into account that terrorist activities, attacks, cruelty, kidnapping, extraction of mandatory tax payments, etc. continued throughout areas the KLA operated in, and

³³³ I/165

³³⁴ II/1178

³³⁵ I/55

³³⁶ K14-(T.10991/14-17);Sadiku-(T.1952/17-20);Xhafa-(T.2455/15-22);Gerxhaliu-(T.2508/17-23);Bucaliu-(T.3024/18-3025/7);Krasnici-(T.3082/25);Mazrekaj-(T.5836/7-14)

³³⁷ Hyseni(T.3110/13-18;311/18).

³³⁸ 6D76

³³⁹ 6D1603,para.18,20;;6D614,28/13;3D1052;Lazarevic-(T.17850/5-17851/9);P2068

³⁴⁰ 6D1603,para.21,38;;Krga-(T.16824/14-21);

with the targeting of ethnic Albanians this gave a reason for people to leave to try and remove themselves from this situation ³⁴¹);

d) to avoid clashes between KLA and Government forces³⁴²;

e) terrorist tactics and propaganda - among other, terrorist have used every opportunity to reinforce people's fear of government forces, and if government forces made any maneuver, they would send messages to the people in villages saying it was the start of an operation against them,³⁴³ distribution of leaflets/flyers urging people to leave, to create a humanitarian catastrophe that could be used as propaganda.³⁴⁴ Likewise, there is evidence of KLA telling people to leave.³⁴⁵ On the other hand, NATO propaganda repeatedly warned that the Serbs were preparing "Operation Horseshoe," which scared people into leaving.³⁴⁶ It also cannot be ignored that NATO had warned Albanian leaders that a vicious bombing campaign was going to commence³⁴⁷ and that if bombing dragged out longer than the few days forecast, the prospects of a bloody and protracted conflict with a ground invasion became more likely.

e) fear from NATO bombing campaign in general, given the extent and nature of the NATO bombing campaign (the fact is that NATO hit civilian targets and caused civilian casualties, with examples such as: Meja Refugee Convoy³⁴⁸; Maja Refugee Camp-Djakovica³⁴⁹; Korisa³⁵⁰; Nogovac³⁵¹; Pristina Town Center-PTT Telecom II Building³⁵²; Nis-Express passenger bus³⁵³; and Djakovica Old City center³⁵⁴, including others³⁵⁵) with such a manner that led to devastation and forced civilians to flee³⁵⁶, without regard to their ethnicity.³⁵⁷ There was evidence that men felt

³⁴¹ Krga-(T.16824/14-21);;6D1631,para.44,45,37;;6D614,30/55;;6D1606,para.38;;6D1603,para.65-66.

³⁴² 6D1604,para.42

³⁴³ 6D1603,para.51

³⁴⁴ 5D1364;;Filipovic-(T.19183/14-19185/25);;6D1614,para.65

³⁴⁵ 6D1629,para.16;;6D1532,para.40

³⁴⁶ 6D1530,para.36

³⁴⁷ Merovci-(Tr.8524/9-8527/15);;P2588.

³⁴⁸4D90;;5D1394,para.23-24;;6D1251;;5D1401,para.60.

³⁴⁹ 6D1257;;5D1394,para.23-24;;5D1401,para.60.

³⁵⁰ 6D604;;6D171;;6D172;;6D174;;6D175;;6D176;;6D177;;6D1532,para.44;;6D1631,para.50;;6D604; 6D1492,para.42.

³⁵¹ 6D1238;;6D1329.

³⁵² 6D1243;;6D1257;6D1240.

³⁵³ 6D998

³⁵⁴ 6D1627,para.30,33,38;;5D1394,para.14.

³⁵⁵ 5D1158;;5D1374;;6D1603,para.68;;6D1532,para.36,38-39;;Delic-(Tr19321/13-17)

³⁵⁶ Smiljavic-(T.15751/1-15752/10);;5D692;;Lazarevic-(Tr.17947/20-17949/5);;5D1219;Tr.18129/10-19;18130/25-19;;3D524,42338/22-423339/19).

³⁵⁷ 6D1614,para.49-50;;Stojanovic-(T.19731/12-17);;Joksic-(T.21958/5-15);;Vukovic-(Tr.21334/22;21335 ln.12);;Bogunovic-(Tr.22869/7-12);;6D1603,para.56;6D1530,para.36;6D1627,para.38;6D1614,para.47,49-50;;6D770;;6D323;;6D1603,para.67;;6D1604, para.28

more at ease knowing that their wives/children were removed from the situation to safety.³⁵⁸ There is evidence that both Albanians and non-Albanians feared for their safety as a result of bombings and left areas they felt were at risk.³⁵⁹ Hyseni confirmed that both his father-in-law and brother-in-law were injured when a NATO strike hit their house, and they had to leave to seek treatment.³⁶⁰

f) Fear from the bombing campaign due to knowledge that NATO was targeting Army/Police structures such that it was reasonably resumed that any VJ/MUP equipment or personnel posed a potential, legitimate target for the NATO.³⁶¹ The bombing forced VJ/MUP to relocate frequently.³⁶²

g) Due to NATO bombings electricity, utilities and supplies were cut off, making normal life difficult for people, leading to departures.³⁶³ The Rule 70 documents from the United States show that Serbs/Albanians in Pristina were more afraid when NATO started bombing during the day, and due to lack of work/pay, and electricity being knocked out by NATO, both Serbs/Albanians were leaving the city.³⁶⁴

244. The Chamber further ignored the evidence that due to NATO bombings even VJ/MUP were deserting and trying to leave Kosovo.³⁶⁵

245. Additionally, the Chamber ignored evidence that VJ/MUP authorities tried to persuade people to stay/return to their homes,³⁶⁶ as well as the fact Serb forces were ordered to take care not to cause harm to civilians, even if terrorists were mingled within them.³⁶⁷

246. Inferences consistent guilt can only be drawn where they are “the only reasonable inference available on the evidence.”³⁶⁸ If a reasonable inference consistent with innocence can be drawn, then innocence must be presumed.³⁶⁹

³⁵⁸ Odalovic-(T.14442/6-14444/7)

³⁵⁹ 6D1530,para.36;;6D1627,para.38;;6D1614,para.47,49-50;;6D770;;6D323;;6D1603,para.67;;6D1604, para.28

³⁶⁰ P2270,p.3,11;;Tr.3102/9-18.

³⁶¹ 6D1603,para.54;;6D1532,para.33;;6D1604,para.38

³⁶² 6D1606,para.33;Gavranic-(Tr.22675/1-25).

³⁶³ 6D1532,para.32;;6D1637.

³⁶⁴ 6D1637

³⁶⁵ 3D180;3D496,para.50-52;;3D996;;3D1053;;4D123;;4D238;;6D1638

³⁶⁶ 6D1631,para.50;;6D1604,para.34,36;;6D1606,para.39.

³⁶⁷ 6D1606,para.19,20,38;;6D778;;6D1492,para.43.

³⁶⁸ See, *Vasiljevic*, IT-98-32 (29.11.2002), para.69; *Kronjelic* Trial Judgment, para.83 (citing *Brdjanin and Tadic*, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment, para.26). (emphasis added). See also *Kronjelic* Appeal Judgment Summary, paras.45,52 (drawing inferences when it is the “only reasonable inference” to be drawn from the factual findings entered by the Trial Chamber).

³⁶⁹ Statute. Art.21(3)

4. DISCRIMINATORY INTENT

247. The Chamber reached³⁷⁰ impermissible conclusions with respect to *mens rea* of persecution. According to it Appellant need not possess discriminatory intent to be held liable for persecution, so long as it is proved that physical perpetrator possessed discriminatory intent. This view cannot be acceptable. Persecutory *mens rea* is the distinctive feature of the crime of persecution³⁷¹, and such state of mind may never be presumed, not even where the acts take place in the context of discriminatory attack on a given civilian population. Persecution can only be committed with proven intent, the same *mens rea* as the individual who is found guilty of that crime. One cannot plan/order/instigate the commission of the crime by the perpetrator without having discriminatory intent himself. In order to establish liability, the discriminatory intent of the accused must relate to his acts and conduct, not to the attack of which those acts are a part, and it is not sufficient for those acts and conduct to be part of discriminatory attack, where established, to infer that the accused possessed the requisite *mens rea*³⁷². It is not sufficient for the accused to be “aware” that he is in fact acting in a discriminatory manner, nor would recklessness on his part suffice; he must consciously intend to do so³⁷³.

248. The Chamber erred³⁷⁴ finding that the influence of Milosevic over the organs/institutions was based exclusively on his charisma. The Chamber ignored the normative and legal system and drew erroneous inferences without any reliance on factual evidence presented.³⁷⁵

249. The Chamber misperceived³⁷⁶ the powers of Milosevic and accorded him the competences as if he had been Serbian rather than Yugoslav President. In 1998/1999, Milosevic was not in the position to promote MUP officers; such promotions were effected by Milutinovic, for whom these conclusions should refer to³⁷⁷. There is no evidence that would suggest Milosevic had such power over the MUP. Even Professor Markovic referred to the Serbian National Assembly as opposed to

³⁷⁰ I/181

³⁷¹ *Kordic and Cerkez* TJ, 212; *Naletilic and Martinovic* TJ, 638;

³⁷² *Krnjelac*, TJ 436; *Vasiljevic*, TJ, 249, *Krnjelac*, AJ, 235

³⁷³ *Krnjelac*, AJ, 435, *Vasiljevic*, TJ 248; *Kordic and Cerkez* TJ, 217

³⁷⁴ I/284,I/285,I/286

³⁷⁵ 3D1067/para.37;P1623/Article222;P2594,para.15;P985,Article8;1D139

³⁷⁶ I/284;I/285;I/286.

³⁷⁷ 1D680

the Yugoslav Parliament.³⁷⁸ The Chamber failed to comprehend the evidence and organizational structure referred to by Markovic.

250. The Chamber erred³⁷⁹ on the competencies of the Federal/Republican MUPs. The fact that the Serbian MUP had more powers is a consequence of the constitutional/legal provisions.³⁸⁰ The same powers were vested in the Montenegrin MUP.³⁸¹

251. The Chamber analyzed evidence³⁸² on disciplinary/criminal proceedings against members of the MUP. The Chamber ignored the plethora of evidence which clearly proved that Appellant/MUP Staff had no role/authority in initiating disciplinary/criminal proceedings against MUP members. A superior/commander may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others if, *inter alia*, “failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof”, and the “effective control” means “the material liability to prevent offences or punish the principal offenders”³⁸³. The *effective control* test applies to all superiors, weather *de jure* or *de facto*, military or civilian³⁸⁴. Considering previously stated, no reasonable Chamber would reach conclusions on Appellant’s authority over MUP units.

252. In any event the MUP did initiate proceedings and undertook measures to punish all offences that were known of, irrespective of the identity of the perpetrators. The evidence demonstrates that crimes against life/property in 1998-1999 in Kosovo-Metohija committed by persons who were policeman against Albanians/non-Albanians that were known of/reported to the MUP were documented, processed and punished in accord with the applicable law.³⁸⁵

³⁷⁸ Tr.12942;Tr.12944;Tr.12902

³⁷⁹ I/294

³⁸⁰ 1D139;P1021

³⁸¹ 1D139;P1829

³⁸² I/719,I/720,I/723,

³⁸³ *Krnojelac*TJ,93;*Celebici* AJ,196-198, 256;*Blaskic*,TJ,300-302

³⁸⁴ *Aleksovski*, AJ,76

³⁸⁵ 6D140;6D467;6D905;6D942;6D943;6D946;6D947;6D949;6D1614,para.54,55;6D298;6D139;6D301;6D1325;6D1533,para.35,40,55;6D950;6D1604,para.29-30;6D928;6D-2 Tr.25497-25498/8;6D614/11/26;6D614/12/31;6D614/54/73;6D614/141/61;6D614/145/83;6D614/10/23;6D614/10/24;6D614/13/32;6D614/142/65;6D614/142/66;6D614/143/73;6D614/148/99;6D880;6D881;6D882;6D882;6D883;6D884;6D885;6D886;6D355;6D890;6D897;6D898;6D899;6D901;6D902;6D904;6D906;6D907;6D908;6D909;6D910;6D914;6D916;6D918;6D919;6D921;6D922;6D923;6D928;6D929;6D930;6D934;6D935;6D937;6D938;6D948;6D951;6D952;6D953;6D957;6D958;6D614/146/89;6D614/137/45;6D614/138/46;6D614/138/49;6D614/140/55;6D614/140/58;6D614/140/59;6D614/141/63;6D614/146/89;6D614/143/72;6D614/144/78;6D614/143/70;6D614/143/71;6D614/147/92;6D614/5/1-6D614/13/33

253. The Chamber accepted the conjectured testimony of Cvetic, that “he knew of no police officers being charged” for murder/arson/expulsion of Kosovo Albanians. He was the only Chief of SUP in Kosovo who was not fulfilling his legal duties. From the minutes dated 4.4.1999, it could be easily established that Cvetic is the only Chief who took no measures with respect to any criminal offences³⁸⁶, and the evidence of Bogunovic(Cvetic’s deputy) and Vojnovic who testified show that Cvetic was removed due to his inability to carry out his duties. Ilic testified that 8,75% of members of 122nd Intervention PJP Brigade faced disciplinary/criminal proceedings in the course of 1998-1999 for offences committed against civilians. The fact that Ilic could not recollect that any of the Brigade members was not charged for maltreatment of civilians does not affect the arguments above mentioned, since *there obviously was no discriminatory manner in performing the police duties and punishing offenders*. Police disciplinary organs functioned properly.

254. The Chamber made several errors about the SAJ.³⁸⁷ In I/730, the Chamber cited a document from the 3rd Army, not any document by the MUP Staff, simply because despite 4,000 exhibits there is no such evidence that the MUP Staff had anything whatsoever with deployment/engagement/operations conducted by SAJ.

255. The Chamber erroneously concluded³⁸⁸ that the group known as the “Scorpions”, was incorporated into SAJ and sent to Kosovo. This is not supported by evidence and Stoparic’s testimony. Stoparic testified that the former “Scorpions” that were sent to Kosovo were police reservists within SAJ.³⁸⁹ The record is clear that Stoparic was in fact, a reserve policeman³⁹⁰. Stoparic confirmed the “Scorpions” were no longer in existence in 1998/1999, having been disbanded previously³⁹¹.

256. The crucial facts ignored by the Chamber, are:

- a) the perpetrators of the Podojevo killing, albeit SAJ reservists, decided on their own, absent any orders, to carry out said crime. Stoparic further confirmed that the tragic crime in Podujevo was not ordered by police superiors, whom he said never ordered anything of that nature³⁹², and never ordered him to kill civilians³⁹³;

³⁸⁶ P1989

³⁸⁷ I/730;I/731

³⁸⁸ I/731

³⁸⁹ Stoparic-(T.705/14 – 17)

³⁹⁰ Stoparic-(T.726/19-23) (Tr.771/4-22)

³⁹¹ Stoparic-(T.698/1-10)

³⁹² Stoparic-(T.744/24-745/7)

³⁹³ Stoparic-(T.727/3-6)

- b) Stoparic testified that police superiors were very irate at the Podujevo shooting, and immediately sent the “Scorpions” out of Kosovo-Metohija and prevented any future killings³⁹⁴;
- c) MUP personnel offered assistance to those wounded at Podujevo; The OUP and nearby PJP operated to assist victims, an on-site investigation was performed³⁹⁵ and the MUP did all it could under the Law;
- d) The perpetrators of the Podujevo shooting, were arrested and tried for this crime, some even convicted³⁹⁶;
- e) There is no evidence of any crimes being committed by this SAJ reserve component made up of former “Scorpions” after they were deployed a second time to Kosovo-Metohija, from Stoparic or otherwise³⁹⁷.

257. What the Chamber failed to take into account is what was or could reasonably been known about “Scorpions” in 1999. Instead the Chamber wants to impute knowledge/intent from what is known 10 years later, after the Srebrenica killing video was shown at the Milosevic trial, and after the “Scorpions” have been written about in newspapers. Chief of VJ Security Intelligence Farkas confirmed “Scorprions” negative image/reputation only became known after 2000³⁹⁸. Mijatovic, testified the first time he ever heard about “Scorpions” was on TV, after the Kosovo war³⁹⁹.

258. With respect to I/892, the Chamber relied upon Crosland while describing the activity of MUP and VJ units in Drenica to establish knowledge/notice from 1998 to be imputed to Appellant.

259. In assessing Crosland the Chamber overlooked his gross exaggeration, particularly with respect to events in mid-1998, in Junik/Prilep/Rznic/Glodjane. Crosland remained firm in claiming that Junik and most of the surrounding villages were “razed” in spring 1998⁴⁰⁰. On the other hand,

³⁹⁴ Stoparic-(Tr.724/23-725/8;Tr.749/15-21;750/1-752/4);;6D7

³⁹⁵ 6D1606,para.37;;Mijatovic-(Tr.22495/1-11);;Gajic(Tr.15347/19-15348/2);;Kostic(Tr.24102/9-24103/14)

³⁹⁶ P951;;6D5;;6D7;;Mijatovic-(Tr.22495/1-11)

³⁹⁷ Vasiljevic-(Tr.9005/6-12)

³⁹⁸ Farkas-(Tr.16342/25-16343/9)

³⁹⁹ Mijatovic-(Tr.22258/14-16;22495/3-4)

⁴⁰⁰ Crosland-(T.9920/16-21)

material evidence showed completely different picture. Video footage⁴⁰¹ presented to several witnesses(Milosavljevic⁴⁰²/Odalovic/Filic), and their testimony totally disproved Crosland's assertions. Considering this, no reasonable Chamber would have accepted testimony of Crosland without any reserve.

260. There is no evidence that Appellant issued any orders, drafted any plans/maps with respect to anti-terrorist actions mentioned⁴⁰³, nor that it has been conducted with any notice, knowledge and approval of Appellant. Furthermore, the attack is directed against the civilian population only if the objective of the accused is to attack civilians. If it is a military operation with the aim to attack soldiers and/or military installations then the motive or intent is different and not forbidden by international law.

261. The Chamber erred in respect to Gornje Obrinje.⁴⁰⁴ This does not fulfill notice/intent. From the evidence adduced it has not been shown a crime occurred that ought have been punished. What has been established and was known at the time is that area of Gornje Obrinje had been under control of KLA, that fighting against KLA occurred there, and that there has been efforts to conduct an on/site investigation. From Pavkovic's/Appellant's statements on meeting held on 26.9.1998 it only can be seen that there had been clashes between legitimate forces/terrorists, but with no information on any crime against civilians. It has not been established that the Appellant in his mind has picture that any action which has been undertaken is an attack on the civilian population. His actions cannot be interpreted as a part of a systematic attack on civilians

262. In order to convict Appellant for a crime committed with intent and with the aim to bring about a particular consequence, the Prosecutor had to establish:

- (i) that Appellant had influence on these crimes and
- (ii) that he could have prevented them, and
- (iii) that he either knew or had reason to know of them.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ 5D1239

⁴⁰² Milosavljevic-(T.14314/18-T.14315/1;;Odalovic-(T.14431/14-T.14432/13;;Filic-(T.23906/17-23907/12

⁴⁰³ I/892

⁴⁰⁴ I/900-I/912

⁴⁰⁵ Cerkez Appelants Brief pp.31

263. Therefore, the existence of a state of mind and knowledge of an act must be proved in every particular case. Presumption of guilt is not allowed in a Criminal Law.

264. Nothing Appellant could have done would have prevented the consequences, because Appellant had no knowledge of any crimes that were about to be committed. Even if he knew of the alleged crimes, he had no power as the Head of MUP Staff to issue orders preventing the committing of crimes or punishing the perpetrators who were not under his command. All evidence, leads to only reasonable conclusion the MUP Staff, either conveyed instructions and orders previously issued by HQ in Belgrade (or from the MUP officials on senior positions), or advised and reminded MUP organs in Kosovo on their duties already prescribed by Law, without any effective control over the MUP units on the ground.

265. The Chamber erred in III/1117, namely, that “Lukić shared the intent to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over Kosovo through the crimes of forcible displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population”. It must be noted that the Chamber ignored evidence against the existence of any criminal plan, even those presented by Prosecution, which goes in clear favor of the Appellant, such as:

- a) General DZ said no plan existed among the Yugoslav/Serbian forces at any time to expel the Albanian citizenry⁴⁰⁶, refuting the claims of his deputy Ciaglinski had said the plan was called “Horseshoe”⁴⁰⁷ allegedly advised by Kotur⁴⁰⁸. Kotur himself refuted these allegations⁴⁰⁹.
- b) General Naumann said that NATO did not feel the existence of a “Horseshoe” plan was corroborated⁴¹⁰.
- c) Abrahams conceded that there was credence to the claims “Operation Horseshoe” was a fake, a hoax cooked up by German Intelligence to try and bolster positive support for the air strikes⁴¹¹.

⁴⁰⁶ P2508/para.174

⁴⁰⁷ T.6994/11-20

⁴⁰⁸ T.6831/7-6835/2;P248

⁴⁰⁹ T.2078/8-2079/13.

⁴¹⁰ P2561

⁴¹¹ T.2078/8-2079/13

- d) VJ insider Vasiljevic emphatically stated that there absolutely never was any such plan in existence⁴¹²;
- e) Cvetic, crucial “insider” from MUP, testified that no such plan existed⁴¹³;
- f) K25, also a police “insider” testified not only that no such orders to commit crimes were issued by MUP superiors, but that Police were tasked with defending the civilian population from the KLA⁴¹⁴;
- g) Loncar not only denied the existence of such a plan, he excluded even the possibility of such a plan⁴¹⁵;

266. Defense witnesses at all levels/structures dismissed the existence of such a plan⁴¹⁶. The Chamber also ignored evidence that Serb authorities were trying to assist Albanians and urge them back to their homes rather than forcing them out of the country⁴¹⁷.

267. The Chamber erred⁴¹⁸ by reaching several impermissible conclusions with respect to *mens rea*. From the context it could be erroneously concluded that the motive of this meeting held on 4.5.1999 was the letter from Arbour⁴¹⁹ dated 26.3.1999, (more than a month before the meeting) which is completely irrational and unfounded in any evidence. There is clear contradiction to findings in III/140 and III/1005 which don't mention this letter at all, but find that “the security situation in Kosovo” and “the current situation and plans for the defence of the country, and the “fight against terrorism”, were discussed on this meeting. It should be mentioned that besides Milosevic/Milutinovic/Sainovic/Ojdanic, Lukic was not a recipient of this letter.

268. In III/141 the Chamber is satisfied that “mention was made of structures put in place to help “all citizens to return to their homes” once the hostilities ceased“ and “while engaged in fierce fighting with the KLA, the security forces of the VJ had also dealt with numerous cases of

⁴¹² T.8840/5-21

⁴¹³ T.8179/21-8180/3

⁴¹⁴ T.4733/4-4738/8

⁴¹⁵ T.7687/9-16

⁴¹⁶ 6D1213,para.48;;6D1631,para.49;;6D1533,para.45;;Bulatovic-(T.13856/24-13857/4); Cucak-(T.14857/3-8;14898/18-25);;Gajic-(Tr.15318/4-12;15329/2-10);;Smiljanic-(T.15760/23-25);;Andjelkovic-(T.16404/12-18;;16435/13-16436/2);;Krga-(T.16940/12-18);;Curcin-(T.16975/12-17);;Obradovic-(T.15145/11-25);;P2166;;Vintar-(T.21044/8-15);;Vucurevic-(Tr.23129/18-21);;Dujkovic-(T.23311/23-23312/12);;Djakovic-(T.26497/2-13)

⁴¹⁷ Andjelkovic-(T.14675/17-25;;6D778;;Adamovic-(T.24958/18-24959/12);;6D269;

Vucurevic-(Tr.23076/2-21);;Milenkovic-(Tr.23101;5-11)

⁴¹⁸ III/1201

⁴¹⁹ III/270

violence/murder/looting, and other crimes, and had arrested several hundred perpetrators whose crimes were a great danger to the civilian population. It was concluded at the meeting that the work of the military courts had made the future occurrences of such crime “impossible”. This kind of conclusion does not indicate that any of the requirement for the Appellant’s *mens rea* were satisfied, quite the opposite.

269. While in III/1201 the Chamber erroneously concludes that Lukic “after the Tribunal Prosecutor Arbour sent a letter of warning to Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, and Ojdanić continued to instruct the MUP to engage in joint operations with the VJ in Kosovo, despite his knowledge of crimes being committed against Kosovo Albanians during previous joint operations” it does not offer even a single reason as to what test the *mens rea* of Appellant was submitted. The position of Lukic with respect to this meeting was no different from Milutinovic, but nevertheless, the Chamber finds⁴²⁰ that it was presented with no evidence that Milutinović knew this information to be incorrect. The Chamber cited no evidence Lukic knew, or could have known differently than Milutinovic, namely, that information with respect to military courts cited in III/142 could have been incorrect.

K. POLICE EXPERT WITNESS

270. The Chamber rejected⁴²¹ the findings of the only police expert who testified, namely Professor Simonović. The Prosecution and Chamber focused on whether Simonović ever dealt with police in Kosovo.⁴²² The MUP in Serbia was systematized normatively across the whole state, and thus it is not a matter of focusing on only one part of this system, which Simonović himself explained.⁴²³ Simonović is the more familiar with the MUP than any other witness. Instead the Chamber permitted lay witnesses to opine about the work of the Serbian MUP, even though they neither had any expert knowledge nor formal training, and were speculating as to how it functioned. This primarily refers to foreign witnesses⁴²⁴, none of whom had any police experience or training as

⁴²⁰ III/142

⁴²¹ I/658

⁴²² T.25597/8-T.25598/16

⁴²³ Simonovic-(25597/8-20

⁴²⁴ Drewienkiewicz-(T.7963/21-23);;Maissoneuve-(1116510-14);;Abrahams-(T.996/1-4);;Ciaglinski-(T6932/7-T.6933/7) Byrnes-(T12203/1-11)

to the MUP, as well as to the witnesses who were members of the VJ,⁴²⁵ who speculated the MUP worked like the Army.

271. The testimony of this expert was rejected as it contradicted the Chamber's improper, untrained preconceptions of the functioning of the MUP. It is inconceivable where the functioning of the MUP and Appellant's place within the same is of central importance that conclusions of guilt are made without the support of an expert. Without the assistance of a police expert the Chamber cannot understand how the MUP functions in Serbia. By rejecting the testimony of Simonovic, the Chamber infringed upon the rights of Appellant, abused its discretion and erred in law in all segments of the Judgment dealing with the organizational aspects and functioning of the Serbian MUP. The expert's opinions are essential for determining whether Appellant can be a command-superior. It should be recalled that material ability to punish/control subordinates is the threshold/minimum requirement in establishing such a relationship.⁴²⁶ The expert was the only qualified witness to opine on this topic, and established Appellant had no ability to punish or control.⁴²⁷ The importance of avoiding misconceptions about the Police is evident from the jurisprudence, which even states "a police officer may be able to 'prevent and punish' crimes under his jurisdiction, but this would not as such make him a superior (in the sense of Article 7(3) of the Statute) vis-à-vis any perpetrator within that jurisdiction."⁴²⁸ Respectfully the only evidence assisting the Chamber to analyze Appellant's true role was ignored out of hand when Simonovic was dismissed without cause.

272. The Chamber did not have any conflicting Expert on this topic. Simonovic was un rebutted despite being subjected to a fair adversarial proceeding.

273. The Chamber itself gave credibility to this expert by relying on him in the Judgment.⁴²⁹ It is thus without proper basis that the conclusions of Simonovic were ignored by the Chamber, who insisted on supplanting his work with their own, misguided and speculative assessments of the functioning of the MUP.

⁴²⁵ Djakovic-(T.26514/7-16)

⁴²⁶ Halilovic, AJ para.59.

⁴²⁷ Simonovic-(T.25588/5-T.25590/18)

⁴²⁸ Halilovic, AJ para.59.

⁴²⁹ III/166;III/172;III/924;III/952

N. JOINT COMMAND

274. In the Judgment,⁴³⁰ the Chamber constantly used the term “Joint Command,” which leaves one with the impression that there, indeed, was a body that commanded both the army and police units. This is contrary to other findings made by the Chamber⁴³¹.

275. The Chamber referred to orders by the JC⁴³², although it accepted elsewhere⁴³³ that the source of all the 16 orders, which bore the heading of the JC, was in fact the PrK. Likewise, The Chamber found that the VJ/MUP combat operations were not commanded by any Joint Command, but that their respective chains of command remained separate and intact.⁴³⁴ However, the Chamber presented the facts in an ambiguous manner and implied that the JC issued orders,⁴³⁵ which is not true.

276. It is obvious that such meetings amounted to exchange of information.⁴³⁶

277. The Chamber noted that no one who attended the meetings referred to it as the “Joint Command.”⁴³⁷ Djakovic explained that the term was used internally between him and Pavković, and that other persons present at those meetings were not aware of that term⁴³⁸. As the meetings in question served for exchange of information, they cannot be characterized as having any “significant influence” having in mind that the information exchanged thereat concerned the events that had already occurred, rather than having anything to do with actions to be carried out in the future. It should be emphasized in this regard that the participants in those meetings in 1998 did not convene at all in 1999.

278. With regard to the notes of these meetings,⁴³⁹ The Chamber itself accepted that these notes were selective and did not represent a complete picture⁴⁴⁰. The Chamber drew a series of conclusions that have no support in this document. The Chamber failed to adequately assess the

⁴³⁰ I/909,

⁴³¹ I/1135,I/1144

⁴³² I/785

⁴³³ I/1135

⁴³⁴ I/1144

⁴³⁵ I/1135,

⁴³⁶ I/889,I/905,I/1003,

⁴³⁷ I/1057

⁴³⁸ P2943,para33,Tr.26380/25-26381/21,26444/24-26445/5

⁴³⁹ P1468

⁴⁴⁰ I/1062

importance of these notes, bearing in mind the manner in which the author recorded what was stated by others. The Chamber heard Đaković state the following:

- I tended to translate it into military-speak⁴⁴¹
- I was rather selective except when it came to the data that was obtained from the state security. [when] I tried to get as much information as I could [...];⁴⁴²
- I already got a kind of a picture as to what I should jot down, what I should record, and what would be of interest to me.⁴⁴³
- he was unfamiliar with the MUP and that he was incompetent to make adequate notes beyond the scope of the army⁴⁴⁴.

279. These Notes were not official minutes and the contents thereof were not verified by participants to which words were ascribed, nor were the Notes adopted by the attendants at the meeting.

280. The Chamber noted that Appellant was often “the only representative from the MUP, showing that he had a senior and central role in co-ordinating the actions of the MUP and the VJ”.⁴⁴⁵ The Chamber assumed the above, without asking Đaković to describe the manner in which he recorded the presence of participants. The Chamber erred in fact if it drew conclusions about the presence of individuals based on their participation in the discussion at a meeting.

281. A telling example of unreliability/inaccuracy of the Notes is 10.9.1998, wherein it was noted that Stevanović was absent, while at the same time his discussion was recorded. Đaković himself testified that the MUP personnel who attended the meetings of the Joint Command were Đorđević/Stevanović/Mijatović, “Say, five or six people [...] from the Ministry of Interior.”⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴¹ Djakovic-(T.26374/22-26375/5)

⁴⁴² T.26375/6-14

⁴⁴³ (T.26374/1-11).

⁴⁴⁴ Tr.26514/4-16

⁴⁴⁵ III/1032

⁴⁴⁶ T.26386/15-21

282. The Chamber erroneously listed Stevanović as an occasional attendant. Stevanović was present at 42 of 69 meetings. Lukić was not the only MUP representative at any single such meeting.⁴⁴⁷ Besides Lukić, Đorđević was present at virtually all meetings(55).

283. According to Đaković, no one outside the Army ever saw the notes prepared by him at such meetings in 1998⁴⁴⁸.

284. The Chamber noted that little documentary evidence was presented at trial showing that the MUP organs issued orders for the execution of the various actions to be implemented during joint operations.⁴⁴⁹ The Chamber further considered that the MUP also issued orders in some form. In fact the trial record contains no evidence whatsoever that the MUP planned any actions and issued any orders, because the MUP, indeed, did not do so. The Judgment further dealt with this hypothesis as if it were an established fact. Đaković testified to the contrary when presented with the maps that the army delivered to the police units in the field.⁴⁵⁰

285. The Chamber referred to his explanation of the character/purpose of these meetings as follows: “Đaković’s explanation of these meetings was that they were primarily for the exchange of information, with a view to co-ordinating activities of the MUP and the VJ”.⁴⁵¹ This description of the character of the meetings, is in line with all evidence. The finding that these notes were records of meetings of a body called the Joint Command, whose role was to coordinate the actions carried out by the MUP and VJ is utterly incorrect. Đaković’s description corresponds to the testimony by Adamović and Mijatović⁴⁵², whereas it is contradictory to Cvetic’s testimony from this same Paragraph.

286. Nowhere in these notes is it implied that anyone issued orders during meetings. The fact that there were suggestions made does not allow the Chamber to conclude that “there is no doubt that [...] participating politicians stated what was to be done by the VJ and MUP”. Such a conclusion contradicts the finding that “However, some evidence indicates that the proposals discussed at JC meetings were contingent upon prior approval from VJ organs, and that requests made during JC meetings were to be authorised by the VJ afterwards”⁴⁵³. This Paragraph clearly shows that

⁴⁴⁷ P1468

⁴⁴⁸ Tr.26377/17-22

⁴⁴⁹ I/1042

⁴⁵⁰ Djakovic, Tr.26523/26524;6D1618;6D1619;6D1620;6D1621;

⁴⁵¹ I/1067

⁴⁵² I/1071

⁴⁵³ I/1080

meetings of a group the army referred to as the JC were not meetings at which decisions were made.⁴⁵⁴

287. All of the above is confirmed by Chamber⁴⁵⁵. The Chamber correctly noted that “a significant amount of evidence suggests that the formal command structures, as well as the reporting systems, of the VJ and MUP remained intact during the period of operation of the Joint Command”. Therefore, it is clear that no decisions were made at those meetings.

288. This position is enforced by the Chamber’s discussion contained wherein it accepted the testimony by Đaković that “[...] no decisions were taken regarding the use of forces during combat operations at the Joint Command meetings. [...] the decisions referred to during these meetings ‘had already been made at General Samardžić’s [level]’”.⁴⁵⁶ Therefore, the meetings of the so-called Joint Command dealt with the issues that had already been decided/ordered on other levels. The Chamber considered that Đaković minimized the role of the so-called Joint Command⁴⁵⁷. Such a position of the Chamber is unsupported.

289. The Chamber resorted to intellectual gymnastics in order to justify and accept the testimony by Cvetić.⁴⁵⁸ It should be noted he himself testified that he never attended any of the meetings in question christened by Djakovic. No one present at these meetings was aware Djakovic’s term, nor did they believe that it was a command of any sort. Had this group been a command, witness Đaković, being a soldier, would certainly have recognized that fact and entered orders into his notes, or he would have referred to any other matters that would show that this body had command prerogatives.

290. The Chamber shifted the burden of proof upon the Defense, where it noted that witnesses Stojanović or Đaković failed to address or explain certain issues.⁴⁵⁹

291. It is obvious from I/1077 that the term JC was also used when a document was issued by the army without any participation of the MUP. As even the Chamber noted the issuance of a military

⁴⁵⁴ Mladenovic-(T.17602-17620)

⁴⁵⁵ I/1881

⁴⁵⁶ I/1087

⁴⁵⁷ I/1087

⁴⁵⁸ I/1071

⁴⁵⁹ I/1076

document was filed in the military logbook, under a military log number and without any reference to the police.⁴⁶⁰

292. Command over the units is also described elsewhere⁴⁶¹, and the Chamber correctly accepted that “the VJ command structure continued to operate during the operations conducted in 1998 and that regular combat reports were sent from subordinate units to the PrK, and not the Joint Command”.⁴⁶² The Chamber also correctly found that: “The Chamber accepts that the VJ command structure continued to operate during the operations conducted in 1998 and that regular combat reports were sent from subordinate units to the PrK, and not the Joint Command”.⁴⁶³ This conclusion by the Chamber clearly indicates that it accepted that the units reported to their commands, which further indicates that the so-called Joint Command had no influence over the execution of actions or coordination thereof, as otherwise it would have received reports on such actions.

1. “JOINT COMMAND”-- 1998

293. Although, the Chamber stated “Rather than solving the KLA problem through the democratic and effective use of the police and the judicial system [...]”⁴⁶⁴ it completely ignored the following evidence showing that the MUP was obliged to engage in Kosovo without any special decisions:

The Law on Ministries;⁴⁶⁵

The Law on Internal Affairs;⁴⁶⁶

The Law on Criminal Procedure;⁴⁶⁷

The Criminal Code;⁴⁶⁸

The Rules on Internal Organization of the MUP;⁴⁶⁹

Evidence given by General Naumann, who testified that NATO treated the KLA as a terrorist organization,⁴⁷⁰ confirming that the police was obliged to react

⁴⁶⁰ I/1077

⁴⁶¹ I/1091,I/1093

⁴⁶² I/1095

⁴⁶³ I/1096

⁴⁶⁴ III/92

⁴⁶⁵ P1821(Art.7)

⁴⁶⁶ P1737(Art.1)

⁴⁶⁷ P1824(Art.151)

⁴⁶⁸ P1736(Art.125,137)

⁴⁶⁹ 6D1305(Art.2)

Expert Report,⁴⁷¹

294. MUP as an organ of state administration was obliged to cooperate with other state organs⁴⁷²

295. Moreover, the Chamber was in the position to learn that the obligation of the MUP to cooperate/coordinate their measures with the VJ stemmed from certain orders sent from the MUP seat in Belgrade. For instance, Deputy Minister Stevanović, issued specific orders on 1.7.1998, and requested that “In performing these tasks, a better and direct cooperation and coordination shall be established with the relevant state organs (VJ, market inspection, financial police, customs, etc.)⁴⁷³ This exhibit clearly shows that it was specifically addressed and sent to all the SUPs in Kosovo-Metohija, whereby it is clear that each of them was obliged to secure such cooperation/coordination in its territory. Therefore, it is obvious that such horizontal coordination/cooperation was secured at all organizational levels of the MUP. Similar orders were sent from the MUP seat in 1999.

296. The Chamber did not in any manner indicate or conclude that the command and control system in the MUP was disturbed, or that the regular chain of command was somehow bypassed, or, for that matter, that the MUP failed to abide by the provisions of the Law on Internal Affairs, the Rules of Internal Organization of the RDB⁴⁷⁴, the Rules of Internal Organization of the RJB⁴⁷⁵, or the Decision on the Establishment of Separate Police Units⁴⁷⁶, the Decision on Establishing the 124th PJP Brigade,⁴⁷⁷ the provisions of the Rules on Establishing the SAJ⁴⁷⁸, the Decision on Establishing the SAJ⁴⁷⁹, and the Rules on Internal Organization, Systematization of Employment Posts and Salaries of the Personnel Employed in the SAJ.⁴⁸⁰

297. In light of the above, the Chamber should logically conclude that the MUP was directed solely by the Minister in accordance with the Law on the Ministries.⁴⁸¹

298. Cvetić testified that the system of command and control remained unchanged when the Joint Command had been created.⁴⁸² The above was corroborated by the evidence given by witness

⁴⁷⁰ Naumann, Tr. 8264/20-25; 8265; 8270/25-8271/10

⁴⁷¹ 6D668(p.87,88)

⁴⁷² P1823(Art.64,para.2;Art.65).

⁴⁷³ 6D266

⁴⁷⁴ 6D1320

⁴⁷⁵ P1192

⁴⁷⁶ P1507

⁴⁷⁷ 6D5667

⁴⁷⁸ 6D1355

⁴⁷⁹ 6D1355

⁴⁸⁰ 6D1421

⁴⁸¹ P1821(Art.28)

Mijatović, the then Deputy Head of the MUP Staff⁴⁸³; witness Adamović, Assistant to the Head of the MUP Staff⁴⁸⁴, Vučurević⁴⁸⁵; and Bogunović.⁴⁸⁶

299. When drawing numerous conclusions with regard to an entity called the Joint Command in combined engagement of the VJ/MUP in suppressing terrorism in Kosovo in 1998, the Chamber failed to consider the facts related to the chronology and to establish which documents provided the basis for execution of anti-terrorist actions (“ATA”). Specifically, ample evidence shows that the Decision on engagement of the VJ in suppressing terrorism was passed by the SDC on 9.6.1998,⁴⁸⁷. This fact is corroborated by other evidence.⁴⁸⁸ Đaković stated on the record that “after the Decision by SDC, I was given the task of making preparations for the production of the Plan.”⁴⁸⁹ He also testified that the PrK was tasked by the 3rd Army to prepare the Plan⁴⁹⁰, and that the Plan for Combating Terrorism, with accompanying maps, was delivered 15.7.1998. to Smiljanić of the General Staff.⁴⁹¹ In addition to the VJ, the Plan included the police units.⁴⁹² No one from the Serbian MUP, took any part in the preparation/conceptual design of the Plan, in defining the tasks to be carried out by the VJ/MUP, in designating the units or in defining individual stages and tasks within these stages for the VJ/MUP. No individuals from the MUP Staff or the seat of the MUP in Belgrade were informed that such a plan is being prepared, regardless of the fact that the duties of police units were defined by that plan. This was confirmed by witnesses Adamović,⁴⁹³ Mijatović,⁴⁹⁴ and accepted by the Chamber⁴⁹⁵-“The Chamber accepts that Lukić was not involved in the actual formulation of the Plan [...]”⁴⁹⁶

300. The Chamber noted⁴⁹⁷ that on 21.7.1998 a meeting called by Milošević and was attended by Milutinović, Šainović, Dimitrijević, Matković, Samardžić, Perišić, Pavković. At this meeting Pavković presented a Plan. On that occasion Milošević stated that the Plan was adopted and did not ask the participants to vote on it.⁴⁹⁸ Among the MUP officials present were Minister Stojiljković,

⁴⁸² T.8118/12-18;.8119/8-12;T.8123/6-12

⁴⁸³ T.22235/11-19

⁴⁸⁴ Tr.25061/24-25062/16

⁴⁸⁵ Tr.23209/14-24;Tr.23131/13-17

⁴⁸⁶ T.25118/24-T.25119/11

⁴⁸⁷ P1547;1D760,(p.10)

⁴⁸⁸ P2166(29.10.1998); Dimitrijevic-(T.26600)

⁴⁸⁹ T.26543/7-9

⁴⁹⁰ T. 26409/4-24

⁴⁹¹ 4D101

⁴⁹² T. 26523/19-23;4D100;4D101;T. 26524/7-9(Djakovic)

⁴⁹³ 6D1613/para17

⁴⁹⁴ Mijatovic, Tr.22184

⁴⁹⁵ III/1021

⁴⁹⁶ Id

⁴⁹⁷ I/995

⁴⁹⁸ T.14637(Matković)

Đorđević, Stevanović, and Lukić.⁴⁹⁹ Thus, the meeting at which the five-stage Plan for Suppression of Terrorism that envisaged combined actions of the VJ/MUP was adopted⁵⁰⁰ was attended by Minister Stojiljković as the Head the MUP, the Head of RJB (Đorđević), and the Head of Police Administration and Commander of all PJP (Stevanović). Notwithstanding that the meeting was attended by Lukic; Đorđević and Stevanović arrived in Priština on 22.7.1998 and held a meeting with the heads of the SUPs, PJP commanders and the members of the Staff, whereat the tasks on the realization of the Plan were defined.⁵⁰¹ This fact caused the Chamber to erroneously conclude⁵⁰² that the Joint Command allowed the MUP commanders to “‘save face’. Stojiljković authorized the VJ to plan the combined anti-terrorist actions of the VJ/MUP in implementing separate stages of the Plan and carrying out individual actions. This Plan defined combined activities of the VJ/MUP, and the individual anti-terrorist actions were precisely defined in orders and decisions of the PrK and entrusted to brigade commanders and combat group commanders of the VJ.⁵⁰³

301. The Chamber concluded⁵⁰⁴ that the Joint Command had influence in the implementation of the various stages of the Plan.⁵⁰⁵ The Chamber noted⁵⁰⁶ that the decision to proceed with the third stage of the Plan for Combating Terrorism was not made at the meeting of the Joint Command held on 31.7.1998, although Pavković referred to a decision made at that meeting in the document he sent to the 3rd Army’s Forward Command Post (IKM)⁵⁰⁷. Nevertheless the Chamber in I/891 referred to this document, The Chamber also noted Pavković’s request was rejected by Samardžić that same day, with the explanation Samardžić did not allow the use of the forces until the Plan was approved at the meeting with the FRY President, scheduled for 3.8.1998.⁵⁰⁸

302. The document addressed to Samardžić,⁵⁰⁹ wherein Pavković stated, “as stipulated by the plan to smash the DTS, when the DTS was smashed by MUP and VJ forces, rapid intervention forces were to be formed...as ordered by the President”. This document clearly shows that the decision to form such forces was passed along with the Plan on 21.7.1998. The record reflects that there was no mention of these forces at the meeting held on 19.9.1998, the next day Šainović

⁴⁹⁹ P948, page 68

⁵⁰⁰ Djakovic-Tr.26446/7-23

⁵⁰¹ 6D798

⁵⁰² I/1111

⁵⁰³ P1429,P1431,P1101,6D696,6D697,6D700,6D701,6D731,P1434

⁵⁰⁴ I/1110

⁵⁰⁵ I/1085-1086.

⁵⁰⁶ I/1086

⁵⁰⁷ P1419

⁵⁰⁸ 4D125

⁵⁰⁹ P1439/item2,(5.10.1998)

recalled that the rapid intervention units should be prepared and trained, demonstrating the decision on forming these forces was adopted earlier⁵¹⁰.

303. The Chamber noted⁵¹¹ that during the period between 25.7-29.10.1998, joint operations were conducted in Kosovo pursuant to the Plan. It further noted that the orders during this period contained references to the “Joint Command”. The Chamber primarily relied on the evidence related to the Slup and Vokša actions. Specifically, the Chamber analyzed two orders, (14.8.1998/18.8.1998). The Chamber failed to note that at least eight other orders contained no reference to the Joint Command.

304. The Chamber noted⁵¹² that some evidence suggested a significant role for the JC during implementation of joint operations, and as the basis it referred to orders/decisions of the PrK of 10.8.1998⁵¹³ and 14.8.1998.⁵¹⁴ However, for the Decision of 14.8.1998⁵¹⁵ the Chamber concluded⁵¹⁶ that the “Slup and Vokša operation was under the control of the PrK Command from the Forward Command Post and that the function of the Joint Command order in relation to the operation was that of coordination”. The Decision ordering the Slup and Vokša operation was signed by Lazarević, and in assessing his criminal responsibility the Chamber noted that it “has already established that this operation was discussed during a Joint Command meeting on 13 August 1998 and that its plan was prepared by the PrK Command in advance of this Joint Command meeting”.⁵¹⁷ This finding confirms that the operation was prepared before it was discussed at the Joint Command meeting of 13.08.1998; that the decision was prepared by the PrK Command; and the above conclusion⁵¹⁸ confirms that the operation was under the control of the PrK Command. Thus, the question is what kind of role the JC had. According to the Chamber this role would imply that it was supposed to go in the field and coordinate execution of each individual anti-terrorist action. Obviously, the conclusion drawn by the Chamber is illogical and unreasonable. Such a conclusion is contradictory to I/1091, wherein the Chamber noted the role of the Joint Command was significant. The Chamber’s conclusion that the JC’s function was to coordinate was not supported by any documentary or testimonial evidence. Quite the contrary, the evidence indicates that the role of the JC was not even that of coordination. Thus, for instance Decision of

⁵¹⁰ P1468/pages121-123

⁵¹¹ I/1004

⁵¹² I/1091

⁵¹³ P1427

⁵¹⁴ P1428

⁵¹⁵ P1428

⁵¹⁶ I/1092

⁵¹⁷ III/802

⁵¹⁸ I/1092

15th Armored Brigade Commander⁵¹⁹ made pursuant do the Decision of Lazarević with regard to the Slup and Vokša operation reads (item 7) that the Commander of 15th Armored Brigade ordered the following: “All the forces [...] are under the command and direction of the PrK IKM”. Lazarević confirmed he monitored this action from the IKM.⁵²⁰

305. The Chamber found⁵²¹ that the combat operations were to be “commanded by the Joint Command for Kosovo and Metohija”. However, the Chamber quoted only a segment of this clause, which in its entirety reads: “the combat operations are to be commanded by the Joint Command for KiM from the PrK Forward Command Post in Đakovica.”⁵²² Despite these entries specifying that this Joint Command would command, the Chamber concluded⁵²³ that the Slup and Vokša action was under the control of the PrK Command from the IKM and that the role of the Joint Command was to coordinate.

306. The above addressed error regarding the coordination role of the Joint Command after the PrK issued the Order on implementing the joint anti-terrorist action of the VJ and MUP, which was based on the two previously discussed, is best demonstrated false by a series of Decisions of the PrK Command, which contain no references to the Joint Command whatsoever. Appellant hereby points to 8 such orders of the PrK Command (“PrK”), which were simply ignored by the Chamber:

1. Lipovica, 29.8.1998,⁵²⁴
2. deblocking the road communication, 30.8.1998,⁵²⁵
3. Ratiš, 5.9.1998,⁵²⁶
4. Lug, 9.9.1998,⁵²⁷
5. Bajgora, 13.9.1998,⁵²⁸
6. Kosmač, 24.9.1998,⁵²⁹
7. Jezerce, 25.9.1998,⁵³⁰
8. Ćićavica, 19.9.1998.⁵³¹

⁵¹⁹ 6D731

⁵²⁰ T.18297

⁵²¹ I/1032

⁵²² P1427;P1428(item.6)

⁵²³ I/1092

⁵²⁴ 6D697

⁵²⁵ 6D696

⁵²⁶ P1101

⁵²⁷ P1429

⁵²⁸ P1431

⁵²⁹ 6D700

⁵³⁰ 6D701

⁵³¹ P1434

307. Had the Chamber thoroughly and consistently analyzed this relevant evidence, it would have drawn the only reasonable conclusion namely that the entity referred to as the Joint Command had neither command nor coordination role in the implementation of anti-terrorist actions of the VJ/MUP. This is substantiated by the finding of the Chamber that "although the order of the 125th Motorised Brigade referred to 'the approval of the Joint Command', in reality it required that the Priština Corps and the MUP Commands approve the operations, not the Joint Command."⁵³²

308. Had the Chamber thoroughly and consistently analyzed and assessed all the evidence available in this case, it would have concluded as follows:

- 1) Production of the Plan for Combating Terrorism (the five-stage plan) ensued after the SDC session on on 9.6.1998, and this task was entrusted solely to the VJ, without participation the MUP;
- 2) The Plan, was adopted on 21.7.1998 in Belgrade, by the FRY President who was the only person authorized by the Constitution to command the VJ in peacetime and war. By way of his presence at the above session, MUP Minister Stojiljković agreed with such engagement of the MUP, whereby he authorized the VJ to continue with planning individual anti-terrorist actions stemming from the Plan for both VJ/MUP;
- 3) Implementation of joint anti-terrorist actions was carried out exclusively on the orders and decisions of the PrK, in accordance with the individual stages of the Plan;
- 4) Commanding of the VJ/police units in carrying out joint anti-terrorist actions was carried out through their regular chains of command.
- 5) The intensity of the KLA terrorist activities and the measures taken by the state in establishing peace/order in Kosovo-Metohija required daily exchange of information between all relevant structures, which was realized through joint meetings of the representatives of VJ, MUP (RJB and RDB), and civilian authorities at the state and federal levels;
- 6) The above mentioned meetings at which information was exchanged in no manner derogated the regular chains of command of the VJ and the organizational units of the MUP, regardless of the fact that they were referred to as meetings of the Joint Command.

⁵³² I/1096

7) In analyzing the actions carried out by the VJ/MUP in suppressing terrorism in Kosovo in 1998, the Chamber never found that measures implemented in any of the stages were aimed at committing crimes.

2. JOINT COMMAND IN 1999

309. The Chamber noted⁵³³ that “even though the Priština Corps Command was the source of the 16 orders issued in 1999, a heading ‘Joint Command’ was added to them. In the view of the Chamber, the references to the ‘Joint Command’ constituted an important factor during the planning and implementation of joint operations between the VJ and the MUP, as they evoked the authority of the entity referred to in 1998 as the ‘Joint Command.’”

310. Concerning the Chamber’s reference that adding “Joint Command” as a heading of the orders in order to ensure their acceptance by the MUP chain of command⁵³⁴, there is no evidence, more specifically no order for joint operations, that shows such a heading in 1998.⁵³⁵

311. Conversely, all the orders for joint operations, in 1998, were issued by the PrK with the heading “PrK Command”. Besides the above referred series of orders, there is one specific Order of 27.08.1998, with the MUP heading, which however indicated at the end “Commander, Lieutenant General Nebojša Pavković”, along with his personal signature and stamp of the PrK.⁵³⁶ Taking account that the joint operations were carried out according to the orders containing the PrK heading,⁵³⁷ including the specific order, Appellant respectfully submits the Chamber drew an erroneous conclusion based on Đaković’s false testimony. Namely, the above evidence clearly shows that the orders for joint antiterrorist operations did not contain the heading “Joint Command”, but the PrK Command heading.

312. Likewise, the Chamber drew an erroneous conclusion⁵³⁸ by noting that “While little documentary evidence has been presented at trial showing that MUP organs issued orders for the execution of the various actions to be implemented during joint operations, the Chamber considers

⁵³³ I/1151

⁵³⁴ I/1028

⁵³⁵ P1427,P1428,P1101,P1329,P1431,P1434,6D696,6D697,6D700,6D701.

⁵³⁶ P1613

⁵³⁷ 3D697

⁵³⁸ I/1042

that, as in 1998, the MUP also issued orders in some form.” There is not a single piece of evidence presented at trial whose author was the MUP Staff or any other part of the MUP, which contained orders “for the execution of the various joint actions.”

313. Taking into account that the orders with the Joint Command heading contained only tasks for the VJ units, it is clear that these orders were sent to VJ units, rather than MUP units.⁵³⁹ Several map excerpts were presented during trial, which were prepared/provided by the PrK, based on which the senior police officers would carry out actions on the ground together with the VJ commander, as previously organized/prepared by the respective VJ unit commander.⁵⁴⁰

314. To substantiate its finding in I/1042, the Chamber referred to 5D1418. However, 5D1418 is not an order, but rather provides assistance to a senior police officer who requested it in relation to taking care of civilians. Therefore, this in no way relates to combat operations, which was also confirmed by Adamović⁵⁴¹. Furthermore, the Chamber failed to note that joint operation of the VJ/MUP⁵⁴² was carried out based on the order of the PrK Command, which clearly and imperatively specified the tasks for both VJ and MUP units, ordering in item 14 that “[t]he 211th Armoured Brigade command, which [was] responsible for planning, organizing and conducting the combat activities, [was to] organise combined action between the elements of combat disposition during the planning, organisation, preparation and conduct of combat operations in the Palatna village sector.”⁵⁴³. This operation was not carried out based on the order of the Joint Command, but based on the order of the PrK Command signed by Lazarević, that was sent to the MUP in that form.

315. Likewise, all the orders for carrying out joint actions issued after 20.4.1999, i.e. after the Resubordination Order, had the PrK Command heading and were signed by the PrK Commander Lazarević.⁵⁴⁴ This further invalidates the Chamber’s finding.⁵⁴⁵

316. The first such order was issued on 24.4.1999⁵⁴⁶ whose implementation was confirmed in the Combat Report of 29.4.1999⁵⁴⁷). The order of 24.4.1999 issued by the PrK Commander, as well as

⁵³⁹ Mijatovic, Tr.22290; Adamovic, Tr.25062; 6D1606, para41; Gavranic, Tr.22723; Vojnovic, Tr.24189;

⁵⁴⁰ 6D1618, 6D1610, 6D1620, 6D1621

⁵⁴¹ Adamovic-(T.25037/4-6); 6D1613, para18

⁵⁴² I/1198

⁵⁴³ 6D709(item.5/14, 22.05.1999)

⁵⁴⁴ 6D136(24.04.1999); 6D704(4.05.1999); 6D705(7.05.1999); 6D709(22.05.1999); 6D710(24.05.1999); 6D712(28.05.1999); P2011(20.05.1999); P2014(25.05.1999); P1503(27.05.1999).

⁵⁴⁵ I/1042

⁵⁴⁶ 6D136

other orders that were subsequently issued⁵⁴⁸, clearly show that after the resubordination the PrK Command issued orders to MUP units also.

317. The Chamber found the following⁵⁴⁹:

- a) “In 1999 the co-ordination system continued to function. It had become standard practice for MUP and VJ representatives to hold co-ordination meetings before finalising plans for and conducting joint operations.”

Conversely, the orders containing the Joint Command heading clearly show that there were no such coordination meetings, or the orders would have also contained complete information about MUP units. Importantly, the Chamber itself did not identify any role of the Joint Command.

- b) “The Chamber [...] finds that [...] the Priština Corps Command was the source of the 16 orders issued in 1999” with the Joint Command heading.

Therefore, these orders were not issued by the Joint Command, but by the PrK Command.

- c) The Chamber found⁵⁵⁰ that Lazarević took responsibility for the issuance of these orders. The Chamber further found in this same Paragraph that the VJ planned joint operations in cooperation with the MUP. However, these two conclusions don't indicate any role of the Joint Command. (The extent the MUP participated in the planning will be discussed later.)

- d) The Chamber concluded the following: “Once the co-ordination phase was completed, the actions remained to be planned at the tactical level.”

Likewise, the Chamber did not mention any role of the Joint Command

- e) Further the Chamber noted⁵⁵¹ that “the VJ and MUP chains of command remained separate and intact and the VJ and MUP units were commanded by their respective commands. At most their separate commands might have been based in a common command post.”

The Chamber also did not identify any role of the Joint Command in this very important segment that relates to the commanding of units.

⁵⁴⁷ 5D796

⁵⁴⁸ 6D704;6D705;6D709;6D710;6D712;P2011;P2014;P1503

⁵⁴⁹ I/1151

⁵⁵⁰ III/827

⁵⁵¹ I/1144

- f) In its analysis⁵⁵² concerning a specific operation carried out pursuant to an order issued with the Joint Command heading (P3049) and the evidence relating to the preparation of that operation, the Chamber noted that “It explained that the planning process had been conducted ‘in accordance with [the 3rd Army Command’s] general idea and particular plans.’”

The Chamber noted that the Corps Command “had organized ‘a specific coordinated action’ with the MUP for this joint operation.” The Chamber did not identify any role of the Joint Command in this analysis either.

- g) As to the Bajgora action⁵⁵³ (P1975), the Chamber noted that “That evidence demonstrates that, before the Joint Command orders were issued in mid-April 1999, the VJ and the MUP co-ordinated the actions that were to be carried out by their units during the joint operation.” The Chamber did not identify any role of the Joint Command. However, the Chamber erroneously concluded that the VJ and MUP coordinated actions. Namely, if they did coordinate the actions, the above referred order would have indicated specific MUP units in the same manner as it specified the VJ units.

- h) In regard to P1990, and pointing to “a template order” prepared by Đaković, which had a MUP Command heading, but contained no number/signature/stamp, the Chamber noted⁵⁵⁴ that this evidence (probably referring to the “template order”) suggested that “plans for actions involving VJ and MUP units were prepared within the VJ and MUP.” The Chamber also noted: “Before specific joint operations were carried out, the VJ and the MUP met during co-ordination meetings to ensure co-ordination between their respective plans.”

Such conclusion shows the Chamber did not identify any role of the Joint Command. Furthermore, the Chamber erroneously noted the “template order”⁵⁵⁵ had a MUP Staff heading, even though it states MUP Command. Certainly, the author of this “template order”, Đaković, did not refer to the MUP Staff when he prepared it. The Chamber drew an erroneous conclusion when it referred to the “template order” as the MUP plan.

The Chamber was able to examine one such order from 1998 with identical heading, which was in contrast signed by the PrK Commander(Pavkovic). Having this in mind, it can be concluded that the template order was a preparatory order of the PrK Command which

⁵⁵² I/1037

⁵⁵³ I/1040

⁵⁵⁴ I/1039

⁵⁵⁵ 6D716

would be finalized at a later stage (signed/stamped by the PrK Command) in the same manner as the order from 1998.⁵⁵⁶

318. The Chamber erred by identifying “combined action” with the term “coordination”. Namely item 13 of the 16 orders with the Joint Command heading reads as follows: “Organize combined action with the MUP forces concerning the preparation of combat operations before and during execution of combat operations.” In particular, the Chamber heard from military expert Radinović⁵⁵⁷, that the term *sadejstvo* (synergy, collaboration, combined or correlated action) implied a relationship in which the entity that implemented it was its main protagonist, ie. that VJ was the agent of the preparations before and during combat activities.

319. In a state of war, the VJ and MUP, as well as all other state organs were obliged to secure intense and uninterrupted cooperation and coordination. Each form of combined activities of the VJ and MUP was connected by the Chamber with the entity referred to as the Joint Command, although it had at its disposal sources that regulated the relationship between VJ and MUP in a state of war, before all the Law on Defense.⁵⁵⁸

320. Regardless of the Chamber itself having found that there is no sufficient evidence to prove the existence of Joint Command in 1999⁵⁵⁹, the Chamber endeavored to categorize any form of coordination between the VJ/MUP as the work of the Joint Command.

321. Its analysis of individual orders⁵⁶⁰, stating, *inter alia*, the following:

- “The Chamber notes that each of the 16 Joint Command orders in evidence, in setting out the assigned tasks of the relevant units, uses the phrase ‘I have decided as follows’, rather than a reference to a joint decision.”⁵⁶¹
- “... the Chamber finds that, although the 16 orders contained a clause stipulating that the combat operations were to “be commanded by the Joint Command”, the VJ and MUP chains of command remained separate and intact and the VJ and MUP units were commanded by

⁵⁵⁶ P1613

⁵⁵⁷ Radinovic-(T.17036;17141/17142)

⁵⁵⁸ P985/Art.16

⁵⁵⁹ I/1112

⁵⁶⁰ I/1123,I/1144

⁵⁶¹ I/1132

their respective commands. At most their separate commands might have been based in a common command post.”⁵⁶²

322. The above shows that the Chamber established no role of the Joint Command whatsoever.

323. Analyzing the meeting of 1.6.1999, the Chamber concluded “[...]this meeting [...] attended by, *inter alios*, Stojanović, Anđelković, Đorđević, Stevanović, Lukić, Pavković, Lazarević, and Šainović was a meeting similar to the Joint Command meetings held in 1998.”⁵⁶³

324. The Chamber impermissibly relied on Vasiljević’s statement that he had the “impression that the meetings were a daily occurrence”. To enter a conviction on, *inter alia*, the findings such as “similar” and “had the impression” is below any standard of proof in criminal proceedings⁵⁶⁴.

325. Finally, the Chamber in no manner implied that what was said or concluded at this meeting comprised or caused a crime of any kind. Was the Chamber’s intention to imply that every meeting held in 1998, including this one from 1999, was criminal in nature and that all the attendants bear criminal responsibility? Nevertheless, the Chamber applied selective approach with regard to participation at this meeting, and found in III/843 that Lazarević was apparently surprised and not as culpable as others. But found in III/356, Lukić was also surprised with regard to the withdrawal of units, but simply ignored that fact and did not ascribe it the same weight to as it did in Lazarević’s case; thus, the mere presence of Lukić at the meeting made him guilty in the eyes of the Chamber, and it used this fact as proof that Lukić was a member of the Joint Command in 1999.

3. COORDINATION IN 1998

326. The Chamber’s finding at I/1026, that Adamović took part in drafting plans for joint operations, is incorrect. All that Adamović submitted to Đaković was information about the location of MUP forces⁵⁶⁵.

⁵⁶² I/1144

⁵⁶³ I/1149

⁵⁶⁴ P2594, para. 81

⁵⁶⁵ Adamovic-6D1613, paras. 17, 18, Tr. 24968/21-24969/9, 24981/10-22; Mijatovic-Tr. 22190/25-22191/7; Zivaljevic-6D 1606, para. 24, Tr. 24820/7-24821/15

327. The Chamber noted “Adamović’s testimony that, before operations were conducted, meetings were held at the MUP Staff during which the VJ and the MUP discussed the plan for carrying out ‘anti-terrorist’ actions. Quite the contrary, Adamović explicitly explained that no joint actions of the army and police were planned at the MUP Staff, and that the MUP Staff did not participate in any manner in the preparation of the relevant plans⁵⁶⁶.”

328. The Chamber further noted that Obrad Stevanović took part in planning activities⁵⁶⁷. Stevanović was the Commander of the PJP and was located on the ground in Kosovo. He was not a member of the MUP Staff.

329. The fact that all further planning for both VJ/MUP units was carried out by the VJ commanders is reflected in the Order by the 15th Armored Brigade Commander, who made all additional planning for the tasks to be carried out by his Combat Group and the 8th PJP Detachment/Company from Đakovica⁵⁶⁸. This Order stemmed from the Priština Corps Decision/Order of 14.08.1998⁵⁶⁹.

330. As stated in 6D731, the 15th Armored Brigade Commander prepared details and the manner in which this joint action was to be carried out, and ordered the 15/3 Combat Group Commander to organize joint activities with the 8th PJP Detachment organs during the preparation and execution of combat actions. 6D731 explicitly stated that “All units carrying out the combat activities shall be commanded and directed by the Priština Corps Command IKM.”

331. The Chamber accepted⁵⁷⁰ that the MUP Staff did not plan these MUP actions, but that it was done by the PJP Command.⁵⁷¹ This should have been taken into consideration in determining the role of the MUP Staff and Appellant. Since Appellant was not a part of the PJP Command, he was not able to participate in the planning of PJP actions.

⁵⁶⁶ 6D1613,para18

⁵⁶⁷ I/1027

⁵⁶⁸ 6D731

⁵⁶⁹ P1428

⁵⁷⁰ I/1032

⁵⁷¹ P1427

4. COORDINATION IN 1999

332. A soldier is not competent to testify as to the work/structure of the police. This is reflected in I/1035, where the Chamber referred to Stefanović's testimony of the manner in which the MUP acted upon receiving maps from the army. He explained the process from his military point of view, and stated with regard to the MUP that "they should..." Thus, he was not familiar with the functioning of the MUP. The witness did not testify about something he knew, but something he presumed. At this point in Judgment, the Chamber again accepted presumptions as evidence, instead of relying on knowledgeable witnesses who explicitly testified about the facts related to these issues.⁵⁷²

333. The Chamber fully accepted Stefanović's conjectures as facts in I/1041. The Chamber added something that was not even stated by Stefanović, or anyone. It found that, "depending on the operation, either the MUP plan or the VJ plan prevailed". Instead of making this unsubstantiated finding, the Chamber should have relied on the statement given by Adamović, who was a member of the MUP Staff until 29.03.1999. In his written statement⁵⁷³, in Paragraphs 28, 31, 32, 33 and 34, Adamović clearly explained the role of MUP representatives in the planning of joint actions with the VJ.

334. Stefanović's evidence is illogical. He stated that he had contacts with Arsenijević, (Arsenijević came to the MUP Staff on 1.4.1999⁵⁷⁴). He further stated that he had contacts with Stevanović, and towards the end, with Braković.⁵⁷⁵ Stefanović did not mention Adamović as a person with whom he had contacts. If this is viewed in connection with the statement by Adamović that he was in Kosovo until 29.3.1999, then it is clear that all orders issued from January through 29.3.1999.⁵⁷⁶, were in fact issued without prior coordination with any MUP representative.

335. The Chamber noted in I/1037 that "The Chamber received into evidence 16 orders headed 'Joint Command'. One of these orders [...] ⁵⁷⁷ demonstrates that this operation was planned by the Priština Corps Command in accordance with the orders from the 3rd Army Command. It also

⁵⁷² 6D1613,para.17,32;6D1614,para12.,Mijatovic(Tr22240/19-22);Adamovic(Tr.24968/21-24969/1)

⁵⁷³ 6D1613

⁵⁷⁴ P1888

⁵⁷⁵ T.21684-21689(Stefanović)

⁵⁷⁶ P1966,P1967,P3049,P1968, P1969,P2015,P2031,6D1416,5D273,5D276

⁵⁷⁷ P3049

demonstrates that the planning process of this operation included co-ordination with the MUP. [...] the Priština Corps Command suggested to the 3rd Army Commander its ‘idea for conducting an operation [...]’ It explained that the planning process had been conducted ‘in accordance with the 3rd Army Command’s general idea and particular plans’ and indicated that the Priština Corps Command had organized a ‘specific co-ordinated action’ with the MUP [...]”.

336. However, the 3rd Army Order⁵⁷⁸ doesn’t indicate that cooperation with the MUP was established before the planning process. Had a MUP representative participated in the planning, the MUP units would have been listed in accordance with the formation structure to which they belonged, rather than in the general manner presented. Unlike the MUP units, the VJ units were listed precisely, along with concrete tasks related to them.

337. In I/1039, the Chamber relied on Lazarević, who claimed that the PrK Command documents of 18. and 19.3.1999 “indicate that the MUP conducted its own planning for the operations that were to be conducted at the end of March 1999 and that, before orders for the execution of these operations were issued, the VJ and the MUP conducted ‘specific co-ordination’”. This part of Lazarević’s testimony is in contradiction with the above-mentioned Order,⁵⁷⁹ in which Lazarević, addressing Pavković, stated that “At the Corps Command, the planning and preparation of the commands and units and the MUP forces for executing the action ... was conducted”

338. Here the Chamber again misquoted the minutes of the meeting held on 17.2.1999, by transforming it to read “the MUP Staff plan[ned]...”. Besides, the Chamber quoted Lazarević’s testimony wherein he implied that the “MUP planned [actions] in parallel [and] independently from the 3rd Army Command and the Corps Command”. At the meeting of 17.2.1999, Lukić informed the Minister about future actions that the Priština Corps Commander had planned in his Order of 16.2.1999, in which Lazarević precisely listed the MUP units and defined their tasks.

339. The Chamber erred when it failed to note that Stefanović stated that orders were prepared first, then the decision would be entered on a map, upon which excerpts of such maps would be submitted to individual units⁵⁸⁰. Đaković confirmed that excerpts of decisions entered on maps were submitted to MUP units both in 1998 and 1999.⁵⁸¹ These documents show that the first contact

⁵⁷⁸ 6D1416

⁵⁷⁹ 6D1416

⁵⁸⁰ Stefanović T.21646/19-21647/14

⁵⁸¹ 6D1618;6D1619;6D1620;6D1621

between the MUP and VJ representatives regarding the planning of joint anti-terrorist actions occurred in the final stage of entering the decision on the map. Adamović himself confirmed this.

5. PREPARATION OF PLANS IN 1999

340. In I/1012 the Chamber erroneously analysed, the *Grom 3* and *Grom 4* plans, prepared within the VJ, to show “the VJ ‘enemy’ at that time was NATO rather than the ‘terrorist’ forces”. Specifically, paragraph 3 of *Grom 3* directive,⁵⁸² to which the Chamber referred⁵⁸³ reads that the objectives of the first stage were to “close the routes used for bringing in the terrorist from Albania, to protect the forces and facilities from the terrorists, and, together with the MUP forces, block the terrorists and prevent them from acting in unison with NATO. Stage two envisages prevention of terrorist engagement from the territory of Albania and destruction of the terrorist forces in the area of Kosovo.” Thus, the Chamber again misquoted the evidence.

341. Pursuant to this order Lazarević issued a decision/order on preventing insertion of terrorists, and breaking and destroying the NATO and KLA brigades in Kosovo(5D249), which ordered the implementation of the same activities⁵⁸⁴.

342. Pursuant to the Order of 1.2.1999,⁵⁸⁵ Lazarević issued an Order for the elimination of Albanian terrorist forces in the sectors of Malo Kosovo, Drenica and Mališevo, dated 16.2.1999.⁵⁸⁶ The Chamber erred in fact when it identified this Order as the *Grom 3* Order, since the latter was issued on 7.2.1999.⁵⁸⁷

343. With regard to the PrK Order of 16.2.1999, the Chamber referred to Lazarević and noted that “... when the 16 February order was prepared within the Priština Corps Command, the operative organs of the Corps Command achieved co-ordination with the people dealing with planning in the MUP in order to have co-ordination and co-ordinated action”. However, Lazarević confirmed that the PrK Command had first prepared this Order and only then did they coordinate

⁵⁸² 3D690

⁵⁸³ I/1012

⁵⁸⁴ Tr.17901/5-20

⁵⁸⁵ 5D249;;I/1014

⁵⁸⁶ I/1015

⁵⁸⁷ T.17905(Lazarevic)

with the MUP.⁵⁸⁸ Likewise, Stefanović of the Priština Corps stated “I prepared this Order”⁵⁸⁹. Stefanović further emphasized that⁵⁹⁰ this Order came as the result of the 3rd Army Order⁵⁹¹, which read in Item 5 that the Priština Corps was designated as the main agent of production of this Plan.

344. The Chamber failed to consider that, in Item 2 of this Order, which contained the tasks for the Priština Corps Command issued by the higher command, the following was determined in advance:

- conceptual base of the plan;
- locations at which the actions would be carried out;
- the main agent of the activities ;
- the structures that were to participate in the implementation of the task;
- relationship between the forces;
- readiness to execute the actions;
- the sector of the command post.

345. Thus, no MUP representatives participated in key elements of planning.

346. From this example of the manner in which the orders were prepared, the Chamber was able to establish the real possibilities and role of the MUP in planning combined actions. The role of the MUP was that of providing information to the PrK Command about availability of MUP units. Hence, this role was exactly as described by Adamović⁵⁹². Such role of the MUP was to a significant extent confirmed by Đaković.⁵⁹³

347. On 17.2.1999, a meeting was held at the MUP Staff, which was attended by Minister Stojiljković and his three assistants(Đorđević/Stevanović/Marković), as well as by the Staff members and other officers⁵⁹⁴. Informing the MUP officials about the security situation in Kosovo, Lukić notified them about the measures that would be taken against terrorists at a later stage, when ordered. The notes produced were not a result of official shorthand minutes, they represent a personal account of their author. The Chamber erroneously/inconsistently quoted these notes. The

⁵⁸⁸ Tr.17905/9-17907/18

⁵⁸⁹ Tr.21654/19-21655/10

⁵⁹⁰ Tr.21654/19-21655/10

⁵⁹¹ 5D249

⁵⁹² 6D1613,para27;Tr.25070/7-25071/16

⁵⁹³ Djakovic-Tr.26397/3-14

⁵⁹⁴ P1990

Chamber quite blatantly misquoted a passage from the notes when it noted that Lukić announced “that the MUP Staff ‘plan[ned]’ ... to carry out three mopping up operations”.

348. The notes, in fact, read “the MUP Staff planned, when ordered to do so, to carry out three action of clearing the terrain from the terrorists ...” Everything that Lukić said with regard to the future three actions was based on the facts contained in the orders by the PrK.

349. The Chamber failed to differentiate between the joint anti-terrorist actions carried out by VJ/MUP units, the plans for which were prepared by the PrK, and MUP police law-enforcement activities. Thus, the Chamber referred⁵⁹⁵ to a meeting held on 21.12.1998, whereat Obrad Stevanović, stated that the MUP Staff should plan “broader actions towards terrorist bases”. The Chamber further noted that “He stressed, however, that the initiative was to be with the SUPs, who were to ‘make preparations and compile recommendations of the Activity Plan’”. It was stated at this meeting that “All these plans are to be based on the principles of police action”. Therefore, it is clear that the actions in question were not joint actions of the VJ/MUP.

350. The Chamber incorrectly quoted the minutes of the MUP Staff meeting of 17.2.1999, noting that “‘tasks and activities’ relating to anti-terrorist actions had been determined at the ‘annual meetings’”. In fact, the minutes read that such annual meetings “dealt with the work and engagement in the previous year, and established further tasks and activities of the service”. The above misquotation led to an erroneous conclusion that the MUP also prepared the plans of “anti-terrorist” activities in early 1999.

351. The Chamber noted⁵⁹⁶ that the period between January and March 1999 was devoted to planning major joint VJ/MUP operations that were conducted from the latter part of March 1999, referring to VJ orders, none of which date from the period before March 1999, the earliest one being dated 9.3.1999.⁵⁹⁷

352. There is no evidence that proves that the period from January to March 1999 was devoted to planning. All of the orders issuing tasks to police were made by the army.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹⁵ I/1016

⁵⁹⁶ I/1017

⁵⁹⁷ P2067

⁵⁹⁸ P2067,P2808,4D147,4D332,5D243,5D245

353. There is no evidence in this case that shows that the MUP Staff participated in any manner in the planning and carrying out of the above joint actions⁵⁹⁹.

354. In I/1012-I/1022, the Chamber was able to see that engagement of the VJ/MUP units in 1999 was based on and envisaged by the directives of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, and realized through orders of VJ commanders. This is particularly reflected in various orders.⁶⁰⁰

355. Moreover, the Chamber failed to note that the PrK Commander ordered his brigade commanders to establish contact with heads of the SUPs and carry out the planning and implementation of actions upon approval of PrK Command.⁶⁰¹

356. Following this order, the PrK Command issued nine orders for joint actions in exactly those locations.⁶⁰²

357. The Chamber found the following with respect to these orders⁶⁰³: “These joint operations appear to have been conducted in furtherance of the plans elaborated by the MUP and the VJ at the beginning of April 1999”. The use of term “appear” shows that the Chamber had no evidence to substantiate this finding. The record indeed contains no plan prepared by the MUP.

358. The Chamber accepted⁶⁰⁴ the fact that orders within the police were issued by Stevanović, rather than Appellant. This is a correct conclusion, bearing in mind that orders to the PJP units could only be issued by their commander in the field. In this line is testimony of Djakovic, who says that non-members of PJP could not command PJP,⁶⁰⁵ which is logical. Appellant was not a member of PJP.⁶⁰⁶ The SUP plans in question were the plans discussed earlier in this Brief, which dealt with the activities of arresting terrorists. These plans were not combat plans. This Paragraph of the Judgment shows that the MUP Staff did not engage in any planning⁶⁰⁷. Likewise I/1022 indicates that the MUP Staff did not engage in planning any actions.

⁵⁹⁹ P2808

⁶⁰⁰ 3D690;4D332;5D249;P2808;P2072;6D1465;6D1465;P1483;5D175;
P1966;P2031;P1967;P2015;P1968;P3049;P1969;P2003;P19970;P1971;P1972;P1973;P1974;P1975;P1976;P1977;
6D136;6D704;6D705;6D709;6D710;6D712;P2011;P2014;P1503;T.17905(Lazarevic)

⁶⁰¹ 5D476

⁶⁰² Bajgora,(P1970);Žegovac,(P1971);Drenica,(P1972);Orlane-
Zlaš,(P1973);Ćićavica,(P1974);Jezerce,(P1976);Rugovo,(P1878);Bajgora-Bare,(P1975);Zatrić(P1977).

⁶⁰³ I/1022

⁶⁰⁴ I/1021

⁶⁰⁵ Djakovic-(T.26522/21-24)

⁶⁰⁶ 6D1647;

⁶⁰⁷ Mijatovic-(Tr.22204/13-22205/3);Gavranic-(Tr.22654/5-12);Vucurevic-(Tr.23052/2-6);Filic-(Tr.23923/9-14)

O. EXISTENCE OF A J.C.E.

359. The Chamber noted⁶⁰⁸ that “[...] the requirement of proof that there was a common plan, design, or purpose to commit a crime or underlying offence is fulfilled where the Prosecution proves that the accused and at least one other person, who may or may not be the physical perpetrator or intermediary perpetrator, came to an express or implied agreement that a particular crime or underlying offence would be committed”. No insider witnesses confirmed any such plan, nor did any document prove the existence of such plan. Conversely, insider witnesses testified that there was no such plan, as was the case with Cvetić, whom the Chamber found to be credible and frequently cited.⁶⁰⁹

360. Likewise, there is ample documentary evidence that shows that there was no such plan, and that return of refugees was discussed at the relevant time.⁶¹⁰

361. With regard to the mental elements required, it is clear Appellant did not voluntarily agree to any common purpose. Quite the contrary, the totality of the evidence shows that Appellant did everything in his power to prevent commission of crimes, bearing in mind that, due to his position, he did not have power to discipline/issue orders to any policeman. Appellant did not share any intent to commit crimes.

362. In stating the elements of forcible displacement as an underlying offence, the Chamber committed an error as it started from the premise that there was no other factor in the departure of civilians other than the acts of the FRY/Serbian security forces.

363. Contrary to this position, there is abundant evidence as to the existence of various other reasons for departure of civilians. As discussed in more detail in Section H, these reasons include the following:

- NATO bombing
- fear of combat activities between the KLA and the state forces
- orders/threats/suggestion of the KLA and its allies

⁶⁰⁸ I/101

⁶⁰⁹ III/317

⁶¹⁰ 1D32,2D16,2D182,2D217

- persons fleeing to escape mobilization by the KLA
- fear of retribution from the KLA
- lack of basic necessities like electricity/food
- artificial humanitarian catastrophe by NATO/KLA.

364. The prosecution witnesses did not truthfully explain their departures, in that they stated that they were not afraid of bombs or clashes between forces, and that the KLA was not present in their areas. While the first two could be described as a natural psychological reaction of any person in such circumstances, the last one is of objective nature, and the Chamber found that these witnesses did not speak the truth in that regard.⁶¹¹

365. The Chamber found⁶¹² that an essential element was the departure of civilians from a territory “with no hope of return”. This could not have been the objective of Serbian/FRY forces taking into account actions of these forces were actually aimed at the return of civilians during the conflict.⁶¹³

366. Civilians also left their homes in 1998 due to combat, but almost all of them returned to their homes. Why would anyone assume that they would not return in 1999? Taking into account all the circumstances on the ground and considering the evidence as a whole, it can be concluded that there was no intention to make the civilian population leave “with no hope of return”.

367. The Chamber erroneously accepted the Prosecution’s argument that Appellant implemented the objectives of the JCE through members of the forces of the FRY/Serbia, whom they controlled.⁶¹⁴ Appellant must be shown to have exercised authority/control over members of the forces. One of the basic requirements of control over a subordinate person is that his superior is able to issue him an order or instruction, or to punish/discipline him. The record clearly shows that Appellant was neither able to order, nor discipline/punish any MUP/Army personnel.

368. Appellant emphasizes that based on the above standard, it is unreasonable to hold a policeman responsible for the acts committed by soldiers.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹¹ I/55

⁶¹² I/165

⁶¹³ 6D770

⁶¹⁴ III/11

⁶¹⁵ III/132

369. Prosecution evidence contradicts the Chamber's finding that there was a JCE designed to permanently expel the Albanians from the territory of Kosovo.

370. General DZ confirmed that such general plan of the FRY/Serbian forces to expel Kosovo Albanians never existed.⁶¹⁶

371. Lončar also denied any possibility of the existence of such a plan.⁶¹⁷

372. Vasiljević, whose testimony was referred to by the Chamber throughout the Judgment, explicitly stated that such a plan never existed.⁶¹⁸

373. Likewise, Cvetić, quoted throughout the Judgment, confirmed that there was no such plan.⁶¹⁹

374. Insider K25 testified that there were no orders issued by the MUP senior officers to commit crimes, and that the police was tasked with protecting civilians from the KLA.⁶²⁰

375. Numerous Defense witnesses from various levels/structures denied any possibility of the existence of such plan.⁶²¹

376. Likewise, documentary evidence adduced invalidates the Chamber's finding as to the existence of such a criminal plan.⁶²²

377. To the contrary of a JCE, there is plenty of evidence which shows that Serbian authorities were trying to help the Albanians and called on them to return to their homes, rather than expelling them from the country.⁶²³

378. There is evidence that the Albanians left Kosovo-Metohija voluntarily and in accordance with KLA plans. Šaban Fazliu confirmed this when he stated that families of the KLA members

⁶¹⁶ P2508(Para.174)

⁶¹⁷ Loncar-(T.7687/9-16)

⁶¹⁸ Vasiljevic-(T.8840/5-21)

⁶¹⁹ Cvetic-(T.8179/21-8180/3)

⁶²⁰ K25-(T.4733/4-4738/8)

⁶²¹ 6D1213,para.48;6D1631,para.49;6D1533,para.45;T.13856/24(Bulatović)

⁶²² 6D90;P2561

⁶²³ (Anđelković)T.4675/17-25;6D778;(Adamović)T.24958/18-24959/12;6D269;(Vučurević)T.23076/2-21;(Milenković)T.23101/5-11

were the first to leave.⁶²⁴ At the beginning of the NATO bombing, KLA issued an order instructing Albanian civilians to leave.⁶²⁵

379. Joksić presented lists of Serbian/Albanian villages abandoned under pressure exerted by the KLA.⁶²⁶

380. Despite stating the requisite “intent that the victims be displaced permanently”⁶²⁷ the Chamber applied a lesser standard that Serbs intended to establish continued control over Kosovo.⁶²⁸ Thus the Chamber erred.

1. INTENT / SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS COMMON PURPOSE.

381. The Chamber found⁶²⁹ that the common purpose of the JCE was to ensure continued control by the FRY/Serbian authorities over Kosovo, to be achieved by criminal means. The Chamber made the same finding in addressing the mental element, concluding Lukić shared the intent to ensure continued control over Kosovo through the crimes of forcible displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population.⁶³⁰

382. Why would FRY/Serbian organs try to do such a thing if the territorial integrity of Serbia has been guaranteed principally by the Constitution of 1974⁶³¹, as well as the present Constitution?⁶³²

383. Likewise, all the resolutions of the Security Council dealing with the issue of Kosovo guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY/Serbia⁶³³ as well as other international groups as

⁶²⁴ 6D1629/Para.16-17

⁶²⁵ 6D76;;Gerxhaliu-(T.2508/9-23);;Kadriu-(T.5125/19-22);;Zyrapi-(T.6245/2-14);;Loncar-(T.7635/20-25);;K14-(T.10975/16-18);;Ciagliniski-(T.6965/13-22);;P680;;Deretic-(T.22751/10-T.22752/25)

⁶²⁶ 6D1491/Para. 52-53;6D775;6D776

⁶²⁷ I/167

⁶²⁸ III/95

⁶²⁹ III/95

⁶³⁰ III/1117;III/1130,

⁶³¹ P1848(Art.1);P1623

⁶³² P855(Art.5);P856

⁶³³ I/318;P456;P433

follows: Contact Group,⁶³⁴Principles of the Contact Group,⁶³⁵Milošević–Yeltsin Agreement;⁶³⁶Gelbard’s statement;⁶³⁷Holbrooke–Milošević Agreement;⁶³⁸Jovanović–Geremek Agreement;⁶³⁹Perišić–Clark Agreement;⁶⁴⁰Kumanovo Agreement.⁶⁴¹

384. All the above guaranteed the territorial integrity of the FRY/Serbia inclusive of Kosovo-in 1998/1999. Therefore, there is no basis for the Chamber’s finding working to ensure territorial integrity was part of a JCE.

385. Based on the foregoing, Appellant could only logically understand, in line with his official duties, that his actions, and those of others, were aimed at enforcing law/order and the Constitutional obligation to defend his country in the state of war. Appellant carried out his professional duties as envisaged by the Law on Criminal Procedure, Law on Ministries⁶⁴² and the Law on Internal Affairs⁶⁴³.

386. In finding⁶⁴⁴ that “the members of the JCE were aware that it was unrealistic to expect to be able to displace each and every Kosovo Albanian from Kosovo, so the common purpose was to displace a number of them sufficient to tip the demographic balance more toward ethnic equality”, the Chamber did not indicate that number which would be “sufficient to tip the demographic balance”. Moreover, the Chamber failed to note the number of Albanians that were allegedly forcibly displaced by the FRY/Serbian forces, and who actually left because of the KLA combat activities and NATO bombs. The Chamber noted that these were also the reasons for the departure of civilians from Kosovo. The Chamber disregarded its finding that Albanians constituted more than 90% of the population,⁶⁴⁵ as well as Mitchell’s testimony of 2,000,000 Albanians and about 300,000 non-Albanians in Kosovo, and that the departure of about 700,000 Albanians meant that there were still 4.3 times more Albanians populationwise.

⁶³⁴ I/314

⁶³⁵ I/354

⁶³⁶ 2D371

⁶³⁷ 6D1491

⁶³⁸ 1D204

⁶³⁹ I/334;P432

⁶⁴⁰ I/334;P454

⁶⁴¹ I/192;6D611

⁶⁴² 1D456

⁶⁴³ P1737

⁶⁴⁴ III/95

⁶⁴⁵ III/92

387. Numerous witnesses confirmed that non-Albanians also left Kosovo.⁶⁴⁶ Mitchell confirmed that half of the Serbs left Kosovo.⁶⁴⁷ According to the Chamber, 1/3 of the Albanians left Kosovo, which ultimately means that the demographic balance was actually tipped to the detriment of Serbs, invalidating the Chamber's finding as to the existence of the common purpose to achieve "ethnic equality".

388. There were both Serbs and Albanians who left Kosovo and went to Central Serbia, which can be seen from the example of the "Niš express" bus that was bombed on its way from Priština to Niš in May 1999.⁶⁴⁸

a. Forcible Displacement

389. The Chamber incorrectly found⁶⁴⁹ that the FRY/Serbian delegation, "along with the other interlocutors," contributed to the failure of negotiations. Namely, these negotiations failed after the American representative, without consulting the other members of the Contact Group, changed the terms, which were unacceptable to the Serbian delegation, as well as a Contact Group member.⁶⁵⁰

390. Here the Chamber once again insisted that the Serbs were actually waiting for the NATO bombing in order to implement their criminal plan. No reasonable trier of fact would have made such an inference.

391. By finding⁶⁵¹ that "some orders may have been issued directing the police to prevent the departure of civilians from Kosovo [...] these orders do not create doubt as to the existence of the common purpose", the Chamber disregarded the evidence which showed that such orders were implemented in practice. Both Prosecution⁶⁵² and Defense⁶⁵³ witnesses testified about the return of civilians and the care that was provided for them.

⁶⁴⁶ Mihajlović-(T.24048/25;T.24049/1-14);Odalović-(T.14441/25;T.14442/1-14);Mitchell-(T.565/24-25;T.566/1-7)

⁶⁴⁷ T.566/8-20

⁶⁴⁸ P2888/pg.132

⁶⁴⁹ III/92

⁶⁵⁰ T.12368/14-20

⁶⁵¹ III/92

⁶⁵² Malaj-(T.1352/13-25;T.1353/21-25;T1354/13-25);Sadiku-(P2252/p.4/Para.4)

⁶⁵³ Živaljević-(6D1606/Paras.38,5D1418),(T.24863/15-17;24864/10-13);Joksić-(6D666),(T.22051/15-25;T.22052/11-14);Ilić-(T.2431/17-25;2432/20-25;2433/1-14);Mihajlović-(6D1530/Paras.36,37);Vojnović(6D1532/Paras.40,43,44,45;6D604);Debeljković-(6D1533/Paras.44,45,46);Paponjak-(6D1603/Paras.54,55,56,88,90,91);Pantić-(6D1604/Paras.35,36,37,38);Adamović-(6D1613/Paras.47,48);Bogunović-

392. The Chamber did not show in any manner that the MUP Staff/Appellant were informed that the police forces were forcibly displacing Albanian civilians.

393. At III/1054 the Chamber erroneously states the the Daily Overviews from 2.4.1999 onward give the data as to persons leaving Kosovo through official border crossings, that is not true, as a review of the same shows that data on the departure of citizens from FRY was present in the February/March overviews.⁶⁵⁴ This data also rebuts the conclusion that departures were due to attacks launched by Serb after NATO attacked, as these departures predate the NATO attack. The only inference proper is that persons left out of fear of impending NATO strikes or KLA.

394. Had it properly assessed testimony by KLA commander Zyrapi, the Chamber would have concluded that the Albanians were displaced by the KLA.

395. The Chamber noted⁶⁵⁵ “that witnesses who testified that there was no plan (a) had a motive to lie [...] were not in a position to know about it; or (c) were merely speculating based upon inadequate information,” without referring to any document or other evidence that would support its finding. Specifically, the Chamber failed to consider all the available evidence in the same manner it did in III/110, where the Chamber considered the decisions of the SDC as to “whether there was anything criminal or sinister in them.”

396. In contrast to III/92 where the Chamber concluded “orders” directing the police to prevent the departure of Albanians from Kosovo were systematically violated, in III/173 dealing with Milutinović’s individual responsibility, the Chamber put these instructions into a positive context. Such reasoning shows a double standard.

(6D1614/Paras.68,69,70,85,86,87);Zlatković–(6D1627/Paras.38,46);Fazliju–(6D1629/Paras.16,17,18,21);6D2–(6D1631/Paras.49,55,56,58,63);Filić–(T.24012/17-25);Bogosavljević–(T.23935/1-15);Damjanac–(T.23755/12-20;23756/1-14;23757/1-2)

⁶⁵⁴ 6D1208(24.2.1999)6D1211(3.3.1999),6D1232(24.3.1999),P1099(28.3.1999).

⁶⁵⁵ III/93

b. Double Standards

397. The Chamber's assessment⁶⁵⁶ Lazarević's order issued to prevent the departure of civilians, represents a clear example of the double standards. The Chamber correctly found⁶⁵⁷ was not proven that Lazarević "shared the intent of the joint criminal enterprise members to maintain control over Kosovo through the forcible displacement of Kosovo Albanians." In contrast, in reaching conclusions as to Appellant⁶⁵⁸ the Chamber did not apply the same reasoning it applied to Lazarević and drew improper conclusions against Appellant.

398. In establishing Lazarević's responsibility, the Chamber found that "In 1999, he did not participate in the meetings held in Belgrade on 4, 16, or 17 May between inter alia Milošević, Milutinović, Pavković, Ojdanić, and Lukić." ⁶⁵⁹

399. In the relevant footnote, the Chamber noted that Lazarević did not attend the meetings of 16-17.5.1999, but that he attended the meeting of 4.5.1999.

400. The Chamber thus concluded that Lazarevic was distanced from the policy-makers in Belgrade and that thus he was not part of any JCE.

401. The Chamber would have reached the same conclusion with respect to Appellant if it had not erroneously noted his participation in two important meetings with Milošević. The Appeals Chamber should therefore based on the same principle applied to Lazarević, establish that the Appellant was not a member of the JCE.

⁶⁵⁶ III/918

⁶⁵⁷ III/918

⁶⁵⁸ III/936–1140

⁶⁵⁹ III/918

c. Clear Pattern of Forcible Displacement

402. The Chamber's finding⁶⁶⁰ that the direct testimony of witnesses "demonstrates that the Kosovo Albanian population was fleeing from the actions of the forces of the FRY/Serbia, rather than the NATO bombing" is evidently based on the testimony of witnesses who denied that the KLA was present where they resided. Thus, those witnesses could not admit that they left due to clashes between the KLA and the security forces. This inconsistency in the testimony of Albanian witnesses is noted by the Chamber in I/55. Therefore, the Chamber erred in all instances in which it based its findings on such testimony.

403. The Chamber itself noted in II/74 that K90 changed his evidence by stating that they were never ordered to expel civilians⁶⁶¹, which is contradictory to III/43. The situation in Đakovica should also be taken into account, where there were constant clashes where the KLA was attacking from Albania, managed to seize a part of the territory and kept it under control continuously trying to penetrate deeper. Therefore, it was reasonable to temporarily remove civilians from such territories.

404. In III/44, the Chamber accepted the testimony of an ordinary soldier who testified about matters allegedly decided at the command level. K90 could only speculate about the decisions made at the command level.

405. The Chamber reaffirmed its finding⁶⁶² that "the NATO bombing and the activities of the KLA were factors in the complicated situation on the ground." No reasonable trier of fact could thus conclude they had no effect on population movements.

⁶⁶⁰ III/42

⁶⁶¹ T.9273/6-21

⁶⁶² III/45,III/46

d. Context of Events In 1998 and 1999

406. The Chamber noted⁶⁶³ that security forces fought against the terrorists in a ruthless manner. On the contrary, terrorists were arrested/processed through regular court procedures.⁶⁶⁴ Displaced people returned to their homes as soon as the clashes.

407. The Chamber based its finding⁶⁶⁵ as to the modus operandi of the VJ/MUP on an army document which was never seen by any members of the police, let alone drafted by the MUP. Nothing contained in this document could be “[...] indicative of the approach of the [...] MUP” towards the problem of either armed or unarmed Albanians.

408. In discussing Ojdanić’s knowledge of the alleged crimes committed by MUP and paramilitaries, the Chamber found⁶⁶⁶ “[...] Ojdanić received information indicating criminal activities by MUP forces in Kosovo in 1999. [...] Gajić reported to the Supreme Command Staff that there had been problems with paramilitary groups operating with the MUP in Kosovo.” The Chamber referred to two Briefings.⁶⁶⁷

409. The Chamber misquoted these documents/Gajic. Neither shows “that there had been problems with paramilitary groups operating with the MUP in Kosovo”.

410. In 3D721, Gajić reported that “there are problems with paramilitary formation with regard to that territory” and went on to state that “there is information as to the presence of volunteers [...] which is the reserve formation of the MUP”.

411. In 3D587, Gajić reported on the situation in Montenegro and problems in the relations between the VJ/(Montenegrin)MUP.

412. The Chamber incorrectly found that there were paramilitary groups within the MUP in Kosovo. The above-mentioned evidence contains no data on criminal activities of the Serbian MUP.

⁶⁶³ III/90

⁶⁶⁴ 6D2035;6D20648;6D2586

⁶⁶⁵ III/570,III/542,III/543,III/544,III/557,III/575,III/576,III/579,III/581,III/582,III/583,III/585,III/591, III/592,III/593,III/594

⁶⁶⁶ III/579,III/580,III/581

⁶⁶⁷ 3D721;3D587

413. The Chamber found⁶⁶⁸ that “Six days after Gajić’s first report, the issue of paramilitaries re-rose at the briefing of 22.4.1999, where he stated that data was being collected regarding adherence to the laws of war by VJ members, and that paramilitary groups were becoming more active in Kosovo.”

414. 3D592, to which the Chamber referred, reads that Gajić reported that the “Security situation in the territory of Montenegro is becoming more complex [...]”. Therefore, the above finding of the Chamber does not correspond with the contents of Gajić’s briefing.

415. The Chamber noted⁶⁶⁹ “Upon receiving further reports of criminal activity by paramilitaries in Kosovo [...], Ojdanić issued another order, requiring that the commanders of the armies ensure that paramilitaries operating in Kosovo were disarmed and legal measures take against them.” None of the documents referenced in support show that they referred to criminal activities by paramilitaries in Kosovo.

416. The same objection applies to Paragraphs⁶⁷⁰ contained in Volume III.

e. Conclusions on responsibility of Appellant

417. In III/1115 the Chamber stated “For Lukić’s liability to arise pursuant to the first category of the JCE, the evidence must show that he participated in at least one aspect of the common purpose to ensure continued control by the FRY and Serbian authorities over Kosovo, through crimes of forcible displacement, which the Chamber has already found existed.” This formulation shows that in establishing criminal responsibility of Appellant the Chamber started from erroneous postulates, which inevitably led to erroneous conclusions.

418. The Chamber further noted that “As for the necessary mental element, it must be proved that Lukić participated voluntarily [...] and that he shared the intent with other members [...] to commit

⁶⁶⁸ 3D721;3D587

⁶⁶⁹ III/581

⁶⁷⁰ III/609,III/611,III/615,III/616,III/623,III/624,III/625,III/626,(Ojdanić);II/718,III/719,III/735,III/765,III/766,III/772,II/773,III/774,III/775,III/778,III/779,III/780,III/781,III/782,III/783,III/784,III/785,III/786,III/788,(Pavković);III/808,I/815,III/838,III/848,III/853,III/854,III/855,III/856,III/859,III/885,III/922,III/923,III/924,III/925,III/928,III/932,(Lazarevic

the crime or underlying offence [...]” In this regard, the Chamber has not established which act or conduct of Appellant proves that he voluntarily:

- went to Kosovo;
- identified and/or accepted the authority and tasks that clearly comprised a common criminal purpose to forcibly displace Albanians.

419. Appellant was obliged by law to comply with the decision of the RJB Chief/Minister and go to Kosovo as the Head of Staff. The decision deploying Appellant to Kosovo, as other such decisions contains the clause that deployment was pursuant to Article 72 of the Law on Internal Affairs, which provided for deployment of a MUP employee without his/her consent.

420. With regard to the appointment of high-level officials in Kosovo, the Chamber concluded that there was evidence that high-level officials were carefully positioned as the crisis in Kosovo escalated, though it further found that Appellant did not fit that pattern⁶⁷¹. The Chamber erred when it concluded that Lukić participated in the JCE.

421. Moreover, the Chamber has not found that the decisions contained any elements of preparation or commission of criminal offences. Therefore, there was nothing illegal in his deployment to Kosovo.

422. The Chamber erred when it transformed Appellant’s engagement as the Head of MUP Staff into his participation in a JCE. The Chamber was able to learn that the acts and activities of the KLA were of a terrorist nature, and that the KLA was considered a terrorist organization by NATO.⁶⁷² Furthermore, the activities of the KLA comprised criminal conduct under law. Thus, it was legitimate for a professional policeman to be so deployed.

423. The Chamber stated⁶⁷³ that it provided specific references in relation to issues addressed and noted that it based its findings on all the relevant evidence. Conversely, all the evidence if properly assessed, shows that Appellant in no manner participated in any criminal plan.

424. The Chamber’s conclusion “Lukić worked closely with the leadership of the VJ, in particular with the Commander of the Priština Corps, and then of the 3rd Army, Nebojša Pavković,

⁶⁷¹ III/85

⁶⁷² Naumann-(T.6996/14-22)

⁶⁷³ III/1116

co-ordinating various joint VJ and MUP ‘anti-terrorist’ actions” is contradictory to the evidence, and even to the conclusions made by this same Chamber.

425. Firstly, the above conclusion is inconsistent with the Chamber’s conclusion regarding Pavkovic’s responsibility,⁶⁷⁴ where it, *inter alia*, stated Pavković, “[a]s a member of the Joint Command in 1998, [...] worked closely with the MUP leadership, in particular Sreten Lukić.” In this conclusion the Chamber clearly limited the relevant period to 1998, when Pavković was the PrK Commander. This shows that the contact with Appellant was established at the level of PrK Commander, rather than the level of 3rd Army Commander, as otherwise, as suggested by the conclusion of the Chamber, Appellant would also have closely cooperated with Samardžić in 1998, since Samardžić was the 3rd Army Commander at that time.

426. Moreover, the Chamber found that Lazarević was the PrK Commander in 1999, and that communication between the MUP and the VJ, was carried out with the PrK organs, not the 3rd Army organs, which means that Appellant’s communication with the VJ, if any, was directly with Lazarević.

427. The Chamber’s finding that Appellant coordinated various joint anti-terrorist actions with Pavković in 1999 is contradictory to its numerous findings that this coordination was carried out between the PrK Command and the MUP Staff.

428. Thus, in determining Lazarević’s responsibility⁶⁷⁵ with respect to the issue of planning/carrying out joint anti-terrorist actions in 1999, the Chamber concluded:

- the PrK Command was the source of Joint Command Orders;
- Lazarević took responsibility for the issuance of these orders;
- Lazarević and the PrK Command significantly participated in planning/execution of the joint operations conducted from March-June 1999;
- the PrK Command coordinated these operations with the MUP.

429. As seen from the above, the Chamber itself considered the PrK Command the principal agent of these activities, including Lazarević’s responsibility for the issuance of orders bearing the heading of “Joint Command”, which clearly negates the conclusion that in 1999 Appellant closely cooperated with Pavković.

⁶⁷⁴ III/773

⁶⁷⁵ III/825,III/826,III/827,III/828

430. When discussing Appellant's participation in his official capacity at several high-level meetings with FRY/Serbian authorities, whereat the Plan for Combating Terrorism was addressed, the Chamber ignored its own conclusions that he was not involved in the actual formulation of the Plan based on which anti-terrorist actions were conducted in 1998⁶⁷⁶, as well as that at the meeting during which the results of this Plan were analyzed⁶⁷⁷, following Pavković's presentation about the successful execution of the Plan, "Lukić briefed the participants about the positioning of MUP forces in Kosovo, in light of the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement". The Chamber itself denied that Lukic's role at this meeting was significant.⁶⁷⁸

431. The above clearly shows that Appellant played no role in preparation and production of the Plan.

432. The Chamber was presented with ample evidence showing that Appellant did not have either *de jure* or *de facto* authority over the MUP units in Kosovo. Briefly put, Appellant:

- was not in the position to decide which unit would come to Kosovo, and where/when;
- was not in the position to appoint anyone;
- was not in the position to relieve anyone of duty, or punish any MUP member;
- was not in the position to order that a criminal/disciplinary action be instituted.

433. The Chamber concluded: "The information received by Lukić before and during the NATO air campaign is vital evidence for the determination of his responsibility, because knowledge of the commission of crimes by MUP subordinates and VJ members from mid-1998 until the end of the NATO campaign in 1999, combined with his continuing work to ensure co-operation of the joint MUP/VJ operations despite the knowledge of such crimes, is indicative of his intent that those crimes occur."⁶⁷⁹

434. This categorized all information received by Lukić as information on crimes, which does not correspond with the truth.

435. Moreover, the Chamber failed to consider that along with being informed on the occurrence of a registered crime, Appellant was informed about the measures taken by the competent law-

⁶⁷⁶ III/1021

⁶⁷⁷ P2166

⁶⁷⁸ III/1021

⁶⁷⁹ III/1119

enforcement authorities; measures were clearly defined by the laws/regulations and implementation thereof was entrusted to the competent bodies (prosecutor's offices, investigative judges, etc.). Appellant was also informed on the measures taken to verify alleged crimes reported by journalists/representatives of various organizations. An example of the above is Gornje Obrinje.⁶⁸⁰

436. Notwithstanding his limited authority, Lukić urged police to energetically fight all forms of crime no matter perpetrator identity.⁶⁸¹ The record reflects evidence indicating that the information received was often unreliable/unverified, and that quite often such information was propaganda.

437. The Chamber applied double standards when drawing conclusions on responsibility of different accused.

438. Thus, discussing Milutinović, "In addition, the evidence outlined above relating to Milutinović having notice of crimes, while at the same time being told by those with official responsibilities therefor that the allegations were either propaganda or were being dealt with, does not [...] convince the Chamber to infer that he had the intent to displace Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo."⁶⁸²

439. The Chamber failed to apply the same approach in assessing Appellant's responsibility ignoring he was informed that all legally required measures had been undertaken by the competent authorities, or that certain incidents were not deemed criminal offences by prosecutors/judges, or that adequate criminal actions had been instituted against perpetrators, or that incidents were identified as propaganda.

440. Instead, the Chamber concluded Appellant was criminally responsible and intended crimes to occur, Despite finding Appellant issued orders demanding that crimes be prevented and perpetrators punished.⁶⁸³

441. It concluded⁶⁸⁴ "Lukić, despite his knowledge of the events on the ground, nevertheless continued to order the MUP to engage in joint operations with the VJ shows that his orders were not genuine, and thus do not create any doubt as to his intent to further the objectives of the joint criminal enterprise."

⁶⁸⁰ P1468(pg.134)

⁶⁸¹ 6D765;6D769

⁶⁸² III/276

⁶⁸³ 6D765;6D769

⁶⁸⁴ III/1129

442. However, on the same topic it concluded “Lazarević also took a number of steps in relation to the criminal offences of members of the VJ/MUP in Kosovo, including in some cases issuing written orders to prevent the civilian population from being displaced and requiring that misconduct towards civilians be severely punished. These orders suggest that, although he knew that the VJ was involved in the widespread movement of the Kosovo Albanian population, he took some steps to ameliorate the circumstances in which this occurred”.⁶⁸⁵ This disparate treatment depending on the accused, is improper.

443. Finding⁶⁸⁶ “Lukić was aware that crimes were committed in 1998 by various forces, including the PJP and the SAJ, which were under his control while deployed in Kosovo”, the Chamber referred to the following evidence: Adamović’s statement⁶⁸⁷; Minutes of the MUP Staff meeting held on 4.4.1999.⁶⁸⁸; and memorandum by the MUP Staff.⁶⁸⁹ Although this finding related to 1998, the Chamber referenced evidence dating from 1999 that does not substantiate the conclusions.

444. Moreover, the Chamber itself noted⁶⁹⁰ that 6D874 was signed by Dragan Ilić, rather than Appellant. The Chamber’s position is untenable, as it would require that Appellant was able to control dispatches by any MUP officer from a building he was not based in.

445. As regards the Chamber’s reference to the meeting held on 4.4.1999,⁶⁹¹ neither this document nor Appellant’s words recorded therein mention/imply any crimes committed in 1998.

446. Finally, the paragraph of Adamović’s statement referenced by the Chamber makes no mention of crimes committed in 1998.

447. The Chamber further concluded that Appellant continued to fulfill his tasks as the MUP Staff Head, which included, planning “anti-terrorist” actions in cooperation with the VJ and issuing corresponding instructions and orders to the SUPs/PJP/SAJ. In support of this conclusion the minutes of meetings held at the MUP Staff are referenced.⁶⁹²

⁶⁸⁵ III/918

⁶⁸⁶ III/1120

⁶⁸⁷ 6D1613,para.50

⁶⁸⁸ P1989,p.4

⁶⁸⁹ 6D874

⁶⁹⁰ III/1005

⁶⁹¹ P1989

⁶⁹² P3130,P3122,P1991

448. This is yet another instance of misquotation of evidence. None of the above minutes show that the MUP Staff planned any anti-terrorist actions.

449. The Chamber concluded⁶⁹³ that in 1998 Appellant was actively involved in the secret process of arming of the non-Albanian population, under the auspices of the RPOs, and the disarming of the Kosovo Albanians despite his awareness of the commission of crimes. In support of this conclusion, the Chamber referenced the minutes of the MUP Staff meeting⁶⁹⁴ and document P2804.

450. Neither of the referenced indicates any crime committed by the RPOs. Furthermore, neither shows that Lukić participated in the secret process of arming of the non-Albanian population. It should be noted that the Chamber did not conclude that such arming was illegal.⁶⁹⁵

451. As to disarming of Albanians, this process involved “voluntary” surrender of weapons illegally possessed by Albanians forced by the KLA to keep them. Such voluntary surrender of weapons entailed amnesty from criminal prosecution. This process was monitored and approved of by the international community at the time it was undertaken, and by way of example, Sean Byrnes, Head of USKDOM sought a list of villages that had surrendered weapons.⁶⁹⁶

452. The Chamber misrepresented facts when it noted the secret arming of the non-Albanian population was conducted under the auspices of RPOs. The Chamber was presented with ample evidence showing that RPOs were “formed” by the reserve formation of VJ, military territorial detachments and the reserves of the Ministry of Defense, as well as of the reserves of the MUP that were issued weapons as per their wartime posting within the MUP units.

453. Likewise, there is no evidence that Appellant took part in any secret process of arming of the reserve police. The issuance of weapons was conducted by SUPs in accordance with regular procedures and pursuant to the Instruction issued by Minister Stojilkovic.⁶⁹⁷

454. The Chamber’s conclusion⁶⁹⁸ that “[...]Lukić directed the participants at a meeting in the MUP Staff to retain volunteers, is based only on Cvetić. This error is discussed in section D herein.

⁶⁹³ III/1121

⁶⁹⁴ P1989,p.3

⁶⁹⁵ III/56

⁶⁹⁶ P1468/p.43

⁶⁹⁷ Cvetić–(T.8169/21-8170/4)

455. When concluding⁶⁹⁹ “[...]Lukić continued to receive information that crimes were being committed by the MUP and VJ members against Kosovo Albanian civilians in Kosovo”, the Chamber failed to note that Appellant was also being informed about the measures taken by competent authorities with regard to such crimes, and none were crimes alleged in the Indictment.

456. Noting that “these reports” contained information on criminal offences, the Chamber misrepresented the facts, as the summaries reflected the measures taken by the police/judiciary in accordance with relevant laws. Again, Milutinovic was acquitted based under the same extent of knowledge standard.

457. Police took measures against persons of all ethnicities suspected of committing crimes. As regards VJ/MUP members against whom police measures were taken, the only conclusion available to Lukić based on the above-mentioned summaries/overviews was that the police was apprehending every crime suspects, regardless of whether the individual was policeman/soldier/civilian, and regardless of ethnicity.

458. Through such summaries/overviews, Appellant was informed that the police in Kosovo apprehended a large number of individuals who committed criminal offences against Kosovo Albanians, i.e. that the police was acting as required by law.⁷⁰⁰

459. Moreover, the Chamber noted that members of RPOs were among perpetrators, which is not reflected in the evidence referred to in support.

460. The Chamber abused the fact Appellant was aware of the discovery of bodies in Izbica/Pusto Selo, as it implied those had at that time been qualified as a crime by the prosecutor/investigative judge. This is particularly relevant to Pusto Selo, where the competent authorities concluded that the the persons been killed in combat. Thus this could not be considered knowledge of a crime.

461. As regards Izbica, Appellant was informed that all legally prescribed measures had been taken in this case upon the order of the investigative judge. Appellant was informed that the VJ had undertaken all necessary measures to discover the perpetrators. Due to his limited authority

⁶⁹⁸ III/1122

⁶⁹⁹ III/1123

⁷⁰⁰ 6D1631/84;;6D614/10/23;;6D614/10/24;;6D614/143/73;;6D1542;;

Appellant was not in the position to take any further steps with regard to Izbica, especially since the matter was within the competence of military/civil investigative judges/prosecutors.

462. The Chamber concluded⁷⁰¹ that “Lukić knew that large numbers of civilians were leaving Kosovo in 1999, and that some PJP commanders were ‘tolerating massive-scale departures of civilian population’”. In support of this conclusion, the Chamber referenced 10 summaries/. None of these reflect that civilians were leaving Kosovo because the PJP commanders tolerated massive-scale departures. As these summaries/overviews don't provide the reason for massive-scale departures of civilian population, the above conclusion of the Chamber is incorrect and does not correspond with the evidence.

463. When concluding that the PJP commanders were “tolerating” massive-scale departures, the Chamber misinterpreted 6D778. This dispatch does not indicate that PJP commanders “were tolerating” anything, nor does it reflect that there was “forcible displacement of civilians”. The document stressed the need to prevent massive-scale departures of civilian population regardless of the reasons behind such departures. It further reflects that the measure included all civilians, not only Kosovo Albanians. The Chamber heard the evidence that Serbs were also departing.⁷⁰²

464. The Chamber noted⁷⁰³ the issue of serious crimes being committed by VJ/MUP members was also discussed at a meeting with the FRY/Serbian leadership on 4.5.1999, which Lukić attended. This is discussed more in Section P.

465. It is incorrect that the exhibit⁷⁰⁴ reads “information was presented that the security forces of the MUP and the VJ had dealt with numerous cases [...]”, as MUP is not mentioned in this context.

466. With regard to the measures taken by the military judicial organs, Appellant was informed at this meeting that these organs undertook all necessary measures against the perpetrators of crimes. Appellant was not in position to verify this information. Again the Chamber did not impose upon Milutinovic any such duty to verify, acquitting him under the same circumstances.

467. The Chamber incorrectly noted⁷⁰⁵ that a meeting held on 7.5.1999 was the meeting of the MUP Staff. P1996 only shows that “the meeting was held at the MUP Staff”. The fact that it was

⁷⁰¹ III/1124

⁷⁰² Mitchell-(T.566/8-20)

⁷⁰³ III/1125

⁷⁰⁴ P1696

not a MUP Staff meeting, but a meeting held at the premises of the Staff is also reflected by the attendants, which included Assistant Minister, Stevanović; the Chief of Criminalistic Police Administration, Dragan Ilić; Vladimir Aleksić; Siniša Španović. None of these officials were members of the Staff.

468. The Chamber erroneously concluded that “[...] measures for the prevention of crimes and means to protect the civilian population were addressed once again” at this meeting. The minutes of this meeting reflect that several issues were addressed thereat, including defense of the country against aggression/anti-terrorist activities/establishing general security, etc., but not the above measures mentioned by the Chamber.

469. Šainović’s exposé was a political speech. Once the senior officers addressed by Šainović discovered crimes and undertook measures against perpetrators, they were supposed to notify Appellant of such measures. The Chamber could clearly see from the above that Appellant’s role was only to receive information.

470. Regarding the Chamber’s finding that “Lukić demonstrated knowledge of the situation on the ground, by stating that the number of 27 murder investigations was ‘not realistic’ and that there was information available that a greater number of criminal investigations had been conducted and that the number of criminal reports was greater”, it should be noted that Appellant had heard about the number of 27 murder investigations from the discussions by the SUP Chiefs, which why he pointed out the statistical discrepancies.

471. At this meeting, Chief of Criminalistic Police Ilić notified the heads of the SUPs about further tasks within the competence of the criminalistic police (criminal investigations/terrain restoration/criminal reports). Ilic stated he had prepared a plan for terrain restoration, which was distributed to all criminalistic police departments of the Kosovo SUPs.⁷⁰⁶

472. The above clearly shows Appellant did not represent any “bridge” between the SUP Chiefs in Kosovo and the policy/plans set in Belgrade, because only three days earlier Appellant had been at a meeting in Belgrade. If it had been the case that he was the “bridge”, he would have relayed the above-mentioned tasks, rather than Ilic.

⁷⁰⁵ III/1126

⁷⁰⁶ P1996(p.18-19)

473. The Chamber noted⁷⁰⁷ that “On 11 May 1999 an additional meeting was held at the MUP Staff, only this time the attendees were the commanders of the MUP forces in Kosovo.” However, fails to note that the meeting was also attended by Lieutenant-General Obrad Stevanović. The tasks concerning a number of issues were issues by Stevanović himself, including the order that “Departures of civilians should be prevented to the greatest extent possible”⁷⁰⁸Lukić only repeated what the Assistant Minister ordered.

474. Stefanović testified others, not Appellant, were involved in determining which MUP units would take part in a joint action.⁷⁰⁹

475. Police units which took part in joint operations with the VJ were tasked by RJB Chief Đorđević, or, on his behalf, by Stevanović.

476. Even the Chamber⁷¹⁰ concedes Appellant was not a person in charge of approving the engagement of MUP forces.

477. The Chamber has not referred to any evidence proving “Lukić had the intent to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian population”, as inferred by it⁷¹¹. This inference is not substantiated by any evidence presented.

478. Furthermore, the Chamber concluded that Appellant shared intent with Milošević/Pavković/Šainović. However, it did not refer to any evidence that would confirm, or even “suggest” that Appellant had knowledge that Milošević/Pavković/Šainović shared such intent, if any.

479. The Chamber concluded⁷¹² that “[...] it is plain from the preceding paragraphs that he [Lukić] did contribute [to the joint criminal enterprise] and that that contribution was significant.” This conclusion has no support in the evidence and should therefore be rejected as unsubstantiated.

480. The Chamber further concluded⁷¹³ “Lukić was the *de facto* commander over MUP forces deployed in Kosovo [...]”. This clearly shows the extent to which the Chamber failed to

⁷⁰⁷ III/1127

⁷⁰⁸ P1993(p.6.item3)

⁷⁰⁹ T.21803/10-14

⁷¹⁰ III/1051

⁷¹¹ III/1130

⁷¹² III/1131

comprehend the organizational structure of the Serbian MUP. No evidence presented in this case implies the existence of a *de jure* or *de facto* “commander over MUP forces in Kosovo”.

481. Nonetheless, the above is in contradiction with the conclusion⁷¹⁴ “As the Head of the MUP Staff for Kosovo, Lukić had *de jure* powers over the Kosovo SUPs, OUPs, regular police stations, as well as over the RJB units participating in combat activities, such as the PJP and the SAJ”.

482. Thus, without referring to any additional evidence, the Chamber converted its conclusion regarding the powers of Appellant into a conclusion that he was a “commander”.

483. Such a conclusion is clearly contradictory to the findings “Lukić did not replace Stevanović, Đorđević, or Ilić, the heads of the SUPs, or the commanders of PJP or SAJ units, [...]”⁷¹⁵ and “At all times relevant to the Indictment the Head of the RJB was Lieutenant General Vlastimir Đorđević.”⁷¹⁶ Further, that “Lieutenant General Obrad Stevanović served as the overall head of the PJP”⁷¹⁷, and “During the time relevant to the Indictment the SAJ commander was Živko Trajković, and the deputy commander was Zoran Simovic (a.k.a. Tutinac)”.⁷¹⁸ Furthermore, “The Republic of Serbia, including Kosovo, was divided into geographical areas, each with its own Secretariat of the Interior (“SUP”) managed by a “chief of secretariat”.”⁷¹⁹

484. The Chamber has presented 3 contradictory theories of Appellant’s role.

485. When concluding that Appellant was the bridge between individuals that prepared plans for the police, such as Milošević/Stojiljković/Đorđević, and the police in Kosovo, the Chamber ignored ample evidence showing that in 1998/1999 the police in Kosovo carried out anti-terrorist actions exclusively pursuant to the plans prepared by the PrK. Thus, there was no need for a “bridge” of any kind.

486. In 1999, there was no plan executing joint actions of the VJ/MUP that had been prepared and adopted in Belgrade. All joint actions were carried out pursuant to the Directive issued by Ojdanić; the role of the police in these actions was defined through the 3rd Army Commander and

⁷¹³ III/1131

⁷¹⁴ III/1118

⁷¹⁵ III/1051

⁷¹⁶ I/659

⁷¹⁷ I/666

⁷¹⁸ I/675

⁷¹⁹ I/660

PrK Commander, the latter being the one who prepared specific orders for each joint anti-terrorist action of the VJ/MUP.

487. The Chamber concluded⁷²⁰ that Appellant “[...] was directly involved in the planning process and in ensuring that day-to-day operations were conducted by the various MUP forces in accordance with those plans.” This conclusion is not supported by evidence.

488. Neither Lazarević, nor Đaković(1998)/Stefanovic(1999) as the main PrK officer in charge of planning anti-terrorist actions, identified Appellant as a participant in the planning of actions.

489. None of the MUP witnesses named Appellant as a person who participated in approving operations carried out by various MUP forces.

490. Therefore, the conclusion that “Lukić was an important member of this JCE” is without basis.

491. Testimony was heard that there were two Assistant MUP Ministers in Kosovo, Đorđević and Stevanović, who were superior to Appellant.⁷²¹

492. Mijatović testified after the KVM’s departure(20.3.1999), the Assistant Minister(PJP-Commander) Stevanović, arrived in Kosovo and stayed there until the end of war. This fact was confirmed by Lukić in his interview, as well as by Ilić.⁷²²

493. Again in III/1132, the Chamber concluded that “Lukić was Pavković’s counterpart with respect to the VJ [...]”. This conclusion is absolutely incorrect, as discussed throughout this brief.

494. The extent to which it was inappropriate to equate the role of Pavković as the 3rd Army Commander and Appellant is reflected in the statement given by Đaković, who claimed with respect to Pavković that “He also travelled to other parts of the 3rd Army zone of responsibility, where there were 180,000 people under the command of Pavković”.⁷²³ On the other hand, Appellant was directly in charge of the MUP Staff that numbered 8 individuals, whereas the total number of MUP personnel in Kosovo amounted to about 15,000, including administrative/clerical personnel.

⁷²⁰ III/1131

⁷²¹ III/917

⁷²² T.2441/12-25

⁷²³ P2943(para.3)

495. The Chamber had more reason to compare Pavković with Stevanović or Đorđević, since it found⁷²⁴ that “Pavković [...] attended a meeting there with Stevanović and Đorđević from the MUP [...]”.

496. The fact that Appellant was not present at that meeting clearly speaks of his minimal authority and importance.

497. The Chamber found with respect to Appellant that he was not promoted as rapidly as individuals who were close to Milošević⁷²⁵. It was only after the fall of Milošević and the establishment of democratic government in 2001 that Appellant was positioned as Assistant Minister/RJB Chief.

498. The Chamber did not explain how it came to the conclusion⁷²⁶ crimes of both the VJ/MUP were imputable to Appellant (ie. no effective control for VJ personnel). What is more, there is no evidence showing that Appellant knew members of the VJ committed Indictment crimes. The conclusion by the Chamber that murders committed by PrK members are imputable to Lukić is absurd, since the Chamber correctly found Lazarević as the PrK Commander was not responsible for these murders.⁷²⁷

499. The Chamber noted⁷²⁸ that “[...] Lukić’s detailed knowledge of events on the ground in Kosovo in 1998/1999 put him on notice that murders would be committed by the VJMUP as a result of the displacements taking place in 1999” and in support of this conclusion it referred to the incident at Gornje Obrinje in 1998 and a memorandum of 6.5.1999 sent by Mijatović, not Lukić, as a letter accompanying the *Politika* article dealing with the public announcement on the meeting with Milošević.

⁷²⁴ III/775

⁷²⁵ III/85

⁷²⁶ I/1132

⁷²⁷ III/928

⁷²⁸ III/1134

500. As regards Gornje Obrinje, Kickert confirmed that the competent authorities tried on several occasions to conduct an on-site investigation, but were prevented from doing so by the KLA. The above was also confirmed by Investigative Judge Marinković.⁷²⁹

501. As regards the memorandum of 6.5.1999, this cannot be associated with any count of the Indictment, as the *Politika* article does not imply that the killings were committed by members of the VJ participating in joint anti-terrorist actions with MUP units. This neither shows that Lukić was put on notice that any murders would occur, nor that he willingly took the risk that they would be committed.

502. Appellant certainly couldn't have known/willingly accepted the risk FRY/Serbian forces would destroy four of several thousand mosques in Kosovo.⁷³⁰ Such incidents could not be foreseeable, especially if one takes into account the fact that when Lukić received information about destruction of any religious/cultural monuments, he was notified that such destruction was a result of the NATO bombing.⁷³¹

503. Application of double standards on the part of the Chamber is reflected in the destruction of the Celina mosque, which the Chamber concluded was foreseeable to Appellant, whereas it correctly found that Lazarević could not foresee this incident even though Lazarević issued the order for conducting the relevant joint anti-terrorist action. The same is true of the mosque in Vlačica, where there were no police at all.

2. IDENTITY DOCUMENTS

504. The Chamber concluded⁷³² that “the confiscation and destruction of identity documents is some of the strongest evidence in the case going to show that the events of spring 1999 in Kosovo were part of a common purpose.” However, it did not point to any ultimate consequence for any Kosovo Albanian. Arguendo if the documents had been confiscated, Kosovo Albanians would not have suffered any consequences as a result. Indeed, the Chamber itself drew the same conclusion⁷³³

⁷²⁹ Maissonneuve-(T.11227/1-2);Kickert-(T.11279/10-16);Zivanović-(T.20468/23-25;T.20492/2-9);Mijatović-(T22455/10-24);Marinković-(T.23525/15–T.23528/12);Clark-(6D106/page.7/Paragraph.4);6D197

⁷³⁰ III/1136

⁷³¹ 6D1249(p.2)

⁷³² III/40

⁷³³ III/172

“the Chamber is satisfied that the Kosovo Albanian citizens of the FRY whose identity documents were seized did not lose their citizenship as a result.” And had no “evidence of Kosovo Albanians encountering problems on their return to Kosovo because of the loss of the identity documents.”

505. The Chamber’s conclusion that the majority of witnesses testified that identity documents were confiscated at the border⁷³⁴ and that “this was a common practice, carried out primarily by members of police”⁷³⁵ is not supportable.

506. An ID card is a document which proves the identity of a person within the state.⁷³⁶ A lost/destroyed ID card could be easily re-issued.⁷³⁷ Everyone was aware of this. Hence, the Chamber’s conclusion that the confiscation of identity documents was part of a common criminal purpose is illogical.

507. The Chamber noted⁷³⁸ that “twenty-six Kosovo Albanian witnesses gave evidence of identity document confiscation along the Kosovo-Albanian border or as part of a convoy to the border.” The Appellant emphasized that a total of 62 Kosovo Albanians testified in this case, including three only by statements. This clearly shows that even if the documents had been seized, a common criminal purpose cannot be implied.

508. One of the witnesses(Sadiku) stated that her documents were taken at the border. The evidence from the Government of Serbia⁷³⁹ was that this witness was not issued any passport. which implies that her documents could not have been seized in 1999.

509. It has been shown that, nine years after the state authorities had withdrawn from Kosovo, this person was still registered in the birth records, which means that the records kept by Serbian authorities about citizens of Serbia/Yugoslavia were properly updated. Furthermore, it clearly shows that the loss of documents did not in any way imply loss of the data about a citizen.

510. None of the witnesses at Đeneral Janković/Globočica border-crossings stated that his/her documents were confiscated. Nazlie Bala was the only witness who stated that, even though her

⁷³⁴ III/32

⁷³⁵ III/38

⁷³⁶ P1832(Art.1);6D668(p.74)

⁷³⁷ 1D776

⁷³⁸ III/32

⁷³⁹ 6D1324;(T.23355/18-25;T.23356/1-12)

documents were not seized, she allegedly saw that documents were taken from male Kosovo Albanians.

511. Appellant reiterates that evidence⁷⁴⁰ shows that a total of 174,473 persons left the country through the above border-crossings. It is possible that the documents issued by the KLA were confiscated, as these documents were invalid.⁷⁴¹ This evidence shows that in 1998 the KLA destroyed documents issued by the state, and issued its own/illegal documents.

512. The fact that none of the Albanian witnesses stated that they were searched by police members in cases when they said they did not have documents further confirms that confiscation/destruction of identity documents were not a part of any plan.⁷⁴²

513. ID cards are not used as documents for crossing the state border, and therefore their confiscation makes no sense. Passport⁷⁴³ is the only document used for crossing the state border.⁷⁴⁴ All citizens could return to the country even without having passports,⁷⁴⁵ and certainly without ID card.⁷⁴⁶

514. The Chamber failed to consider the Law on Yugoslav Citizenship,⁷⁴⁷ which in Article 3 stipulates that Yugoslav citizenship ceases by release, renunciation and international agreements. Thus, any confiscation/destruction of documents would not result in the loss Yugoslav citizenship.

515. In contrast, the Chamber noted⁷⁴⁸ “at the Vrbnica(Morina) border crossing, witnesses reported the burning of Kosovo Albanian identity documents after their confiscation by the forces of the FRY and Serbia,” misinterpreting witness statement by Fondaj⁷⁴⁹, in which she stated how her group was treated by the police: “They felt sorry for us and said goodbye. Police officers asked if it was necessary to search us and if we had ID cards with us. The tractor driver Fondaj said that everything was all right, and a police officer said that he felt sorry for us and let us go.” The Chamber misinterpreted this witness by concluding that her documents were confiscated/burned.

⁷⁴⁰ P1693

⁷⁴¹ 6D665

⁷⁴² Hoxha-(T.1563/17-1564/9)

⁷⁴³ P1833/Article-2;6D668/p.73

⁷⁴⁴ Dujkovic-(T.23366/1-12);Vucurevic-(T.23110/7-19);Ognjenovic-(T.22896/10-20)

⁷⁴⁵ P1833/Paragraph-3

⁷⁴⁶ 6D808

⁷⁴⁷ 1D226

⁷⁴⁸ III/35

⁷⁴⁹ P2283(p.5)

516. The Chamber concluded⁷⁵⁰ that the majority of witnesses testified that their identity documents were confiscated at the border by the FRY/Serbian forces. The Chamber further concluded⁷⁵¹ that the Appellant, had no control over border police stations. The question arises how Appellant could thus provide significant contribution to the JCE through the confiscation/destruction of documents, which the Chamber found to be “some of the strongest evidence” of the existence of a common purpose.⁷⁵²

517. It should be noted that there is no evidence Appellant ever issued any order/instruction/recommendation or expressed support to the confiscation/destruction of documents.

518. On the contrary, as the Chief of the Administration for Border Crossing Affairs, in the period after July 1999, Appellant made efforts to ensure that all Kosovo Albanians were issued identity documents in Priština, as well as in other places in Serbia.⁷⁵³

3. ARMING/DISARMING OF THE KOSOVO POPULATION

519. The Chamber noted⁷⁵⁴ that it was “unable to conclude whether such arming in general was illegal *per se*, but considers that the primary issue in relation to process of arming/disarming is whether it was done upon ethnic lines.”

520. The KLA attacked/killed policemen/soldiers/civilians⁷⁵⁵, but also Kosovo Albanians that were loyal to the state.⁷⁵⁶ The Police was entitled to call upon its reserves to meet this threat. Likewise the State was entitled to call up its reserves to face the threat of war

521. Indeed, the KLA was increasing the intensity of its terrorism (murders,abductions,inflicting of physical injuries), at the time when the issuance of arms was conducted,(i.e.1.1.1998-7.7.1998).

⁷⁵⁰ III/32

⁷⁵¹ III/1075

⁷⁵² III/40

⁷⁵³ 6D1603/para.100;;Dujkovic-(T.23366/13-T.23368/4)

⁷⁵⁴ III/56

⁷⁵⁵ 3D588;3D345

⁷⁵⁶ 3D102;3D586

During this period there were 387 recorded attacks against civilians⁷⁵⁷ and 255 against policemen⁷⁵⁸.

522. As a result of these attacks, 52 civilians were killed, 30 of them Albanians – loyal citizens of Serbia.⁷⁵⁹ Besides, 105 civilians were abducted – including 27 Albanians(16 women, 5 minors).⁷⁶⁰

523. In view of NATO's threat, it was decided at the sessions of the SDC that the possible attack must be met with resistance⁷⁶¹

524. The Ministry of Defense took the necessary measures through the order of 21.5.1998⁷⁶², whereby it ordered the preparation of lists for arming the portion of population without existing wartime posting in the VJ, military territorial departments, MUP, and units of the Ministry of Defense “due to increased frequency of Šiptar terrorist attacks against local authorities, Serbs, Montenegrins and citizens of other ethnicities who are loyal to the RS and FRY.”

525. The number of about 6,000 armed non-Albanians⁷⁶³ without wartime assignments at the beginning of war in 1999 represented the local population referred to in Article 61 of P985, who were organized into guards/conducted patrols/secured facilities. They were commanded by the organ responsible for civil defense and protection, i.e. the organ of the Ministry of Defense(“MoD”).⁷⁶⁴ In addition the civil defense and protection units, which comprised 6,000 members, were also subordinated to the MoD.⁷⁶⁵

526. VJ also took similar measures in June and organized the issuance of arms to military conscripts (reservists).⁷⁶⁶

527. Faced with an increasing KLA threat, the MUP additionally engaged members of the reserve force in accordance with the Law on Defense,⁷⁶⁷ the Law on Internal Affairs,⁷⁶⁸ instruction

⁷⁵⁷ 1D726

⁷⁵⁸ 1D725

⁷⁵⁹ 1D721

⁷⁶⁰ 1D708

⁷⁶¹ P1574;P1575/p.1;P1575/p.9

⁷⁶² P1259/Items:1,2,3,4,5,6

⁷⁶³ I/788

⁷⁶⁴ P985(Art.63/para.1)

⁷⁶⁵ I/763

⁷⁶⁶ P 1415

⁷⁶⁷ P985(Art.18/Para.1)

⁷⁶⁸ P1737(Art.28)

of Minister Stojilkovic in June 1998.⁷⁶⁹ The engagement of the reserve force was also done before 1998. The engagement of the reserve force is done pursuant to order issued by the Minister.⁷⁷⁰

528. In assigning wartime posts to military conscripts within the MUP, the Priština Military District, which was in charge of keeping records, would sometimes leave this task to the MUP organs.⁷⁷¹ This document makes no mention of RPOs, nor does the Military District Commander refer to any transgression of powers on the part of Appellant. Based on this misinterpretation of facts, the Chamber drew an erroneous conclusion in I/779.

529. The MoD took measures with regard to organizing protection of civilian population⁷⁷² since 21.5.1998, while in late June, General Samardžić ordered the PrK Command to also organize defense of inhabited areas by engaging military conscripts.⁷⁷³

530. Both structures, including a certain number of MUP reservists engaged pursuant to the Plan for Combating Terrorism, were colloquially referred to as reserve police squads/detachments (“RPOs”).⁷⁷⁴

531. Therefore, all members, whether engaged by the MoD/VJ/MUP were basically organized in order to protect themselves from KLA attacks based on their residence. The Chamber erroneously identified all these structures as “armed Serbs”, and found⁷⁷⁵ that they numbered approximately 60,000. As reflected in P2803, there was no differentiation between the VJ and MoD; this can also be seen from P1114, which refers only to MUP members and VJ reservists.

532. In 1998 and 1999, there were 1463 inhabited places in Kosovo and Metohija. The evidence shows that there were 255 RPO.⁷⁷⁶ These facts explicitly undermine the Chamber’s conclusion that the citizens who were organized to defend their places of residence were organized to commit crimes against Albanians.

⁷⁶⁹ Cvetić– (.8169/21-8170/4)

⁷⁷⁰ P1737/Article28

⁷⁷¹ 4D521

⁷⁷² P1259

⁷⁷³ P1415;P931

⁷⁷⁴ P2166;P1114;P2804

⁷⁷⁵ I/764

⁷⁷⁶ P2803

533. It should also be noted that a significant number of RPO comprised no more than five members⁷⁷⁷. There is no evidence that any RPO member committed any crime.⁷⁷⁸

534. By March 1999, members of the RPOs responded to the mobilization and ceased to exist. In the meeting held on 11.5.1999,⁷⁷⁹ Appellant warned the attendants to prevent abuse of military/police uniforms by former RPOs mobilised in VJ/MUP units. Specifically, these former RPO were the 6,000 men who were without wartime assignments and who were under the responsibility of the MoD (Article 63 of the Law on Defense).

535. RPOs had never been a part of the MUP or under MUP command, which the Chamber confirmed.⁷⁸⁰

536. The Chamber noted⁷⁸¹ that it would approach the issue of arming non-Albanians and disarming Kosovo Albanians in three stages:

- “(a) the process of the arming of the ethnic Serb and Montenegrin population;
- (b) the legality of the arming of the ethnic Serb and Montenegrin population in their villages;
- (c) the discriminatory nature of the arming and disarming of the population.”

a. “Discriminatory” nature of the arming

537. The Kosovo Albanians willingly detached themselves from the state and refused to go to the army under the pressure of a separatist movement since the beginning of the nineties.⁷⁸²

538. The Kosovo Albanians who continued working in the state services or organs were denounced by KLA.⁷⁸³

⁷⁷⁷ P1114

⁷⁷⁸ P2803

⁷⁷⁹ P1993

⁷⁸⁰ I/788

⁷⁸¹ III/51

⁷⁸² Joksić,(6D1491/Para.12);Mijatović,(6D1492/Para.3);

Debeljković,(6D1533/Para.7);Pantić,(6D1604/Para.4,5,6);Fazliu,(6D1629/Para.3,6);Mihajlović,(6D1530/Para.4)

⁷⁸³ 6D1491/Para.32,6D1629/Para.6

539. The Albanians' attitude towards their fellow-citizens who continued working in the state bodies, as well as their attitude towards those who observed the laws of the state and acted in accordance with these laws, was beligerant, and many such citizens were killed.⁷⁸⁴

540. The intensity of the KLA attacks against Kosovo Albanians can also be seen from 1D707 which shows that between 1.1.1998-1.2.1999, 110 Albanians were killed, 88 injured, 104 abducted. The KLA seized legally owned weapons. 1D726 shows that in the period from 1.1.1998-7.7.1998, 97 rifles and 52 guns were forcibly taken from their owners.

541. Terrorist attacks against civilians and confiscation of weapons continued in 1999 as well.⁷⁸⁵

542. The above evidence shows that every Albanian who cooperated with the state, responded to conscription/call-up and took weapons, basically was condemned by the KLA.

543. Local security was a genuine attempt to include Kosovo Albanians in security affairs. Local security was established in about 80 Albanian villages in Đakovica,⁷⁸⁶ 10 Albanian villages in Kosovska Mitrovica/Kaçanik⁷⁸⁷ The implementation of this project was confirmed by Ambassador Petritsch.⁷⁸⁸ However, KLA targeted local security.⁷⁸⁹

b. "Discriminatory" nature of the disarming Kosovo Albanians

544. The Chamber found that the process of disarming Kosovo Albanians was an illegal process even though the confiscation of illegal weapons is proper under the law.

545. SUP's regular tasks included measures against smuggling of weapons, as well as seizing illegally owned weapons.⁷⁹⁰

⁷⁸⁴ Zyrapci-(T.6050/24-T.6051/17;Naumann-(T.8294/19-21);Kickert-(T.11244/15-T.11245/1);Shabani-(T.2732/17-T.2733/7)

⁷⁸⁵ 6D1221;6D1222,6D614/557/515,6D614/574/24);6D614/575/28;6D614/615/213;6D614/677/491;6D614/68/514

⁷⁸⁶ 6D448

⁷⁸⁷ 6D972,6D484,6D1154/p.2/Para.1

⁷⁸⁸ P557/Para.2/Item5

⁷⁸⁹ 6D1154

⁷⁹⁰ P1074/p.14,Para.3

546. SUPs would seize weapons irrespective of ethnicity, pursuant to Article 33 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, and file criminal reports with Prosecutors. Weapons were also seized from Serbs.⁷⁹¹

547. There were instances in which the KLA would force Kosovo Albanian civilians to accept illegal weapons.⁷⁹²

548. Individuals or villages would voluntarily surrender weapons through their representatives and were not held criminally responsible.⁷⁹³

549. The Chamber noted⁷⁹⁴ that “the Joint Command operations reports do not mention that the weapons were being collected because they were illegally obtained and owned.” Certainly, if the weapons were smuggled from another state, it is clear that such weapons were illegal. This was confirmed by Odalović⁷⁹⁵, and it is stipulated by the Law.

550. Fazliu stated that there were significant quantities of weapons in Kosovo⁷⁹⁶, which implies that the Chamber improperly found that Kosovo Albanian population was unprotected except for 17,000 or 18,000 KLA members.

551. Likewise, the Chamber erroneously concluded⁷⁹⁷ “the large majority of Kosovo Albanians remained outside of the KLA throughout 1998 and 1999,” which is contrary to P2453/p.5, showing that one of the officers present at the KLA meeting, whose pseudonym was “Smailj”, stated as follows: “in order to help each other in the future we must arm all people who are over 16 years of age.” Smailj was later appointed Commander of the KLA and his real name is Ramuš Haradinaj.

⁷⁹¹ 6D1151/Item4/Para.2,3;6D1153/Item4/Para3;6D1154/Item4/Para1,2;6D1154/Item/Para.6;6D1155/Item4/Para.4;6D1156/Item4/Para2,3;6D1240/p.6/Para.3;6D1242/p.4/Para.4,6;6D1249/p.4/Para.4

⁷⁹² P88;P2091;3D181;6D618;6D1629/Para.14;6D770/Item3/Para.2

⁷⁹³ 6D1156/p.4;6D1151/Item6/Para.5;P1203/ChapterIII;P1197/p.3;P2623/p.4/Para.2;6D770/Item3/Para2

⁷⁹⁴ III/70

⁷⁹⁵ 6D770/Item3/Para.2;6D755;6D12

⁷⁹⁶ T.2016/13-18;T.2024/2-7

⁷⁹⁷ III/72(d)

P. STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE MUP STAFF

1. AUTHORITY OVER UNITS OF THE RJB

552. The Chamber incorrectly interpreted Appellant's career.⁷⁹⁸ He was degraded to the Belgrade SUP after dismissal from Republican MUP, which proves that he was not among the privileged⁷⁹⁹. He was not "reassigned", but sent to Kosovo on 11.06.1998⁸⁰⁰. It was only after Milosevic's fall, that the new democratic Government appointed him as Assistant Minister/RJB Chief⁸⁰¹.

553. During the NATO bombing Obrad Stevanovic, was constantly present in Kosovo⁸⁰².

554. July-October 1998 in addition to Stevanovic, Vlastimir Djordjevic⁸⁰³ also was in Kosovo. P1468 proves their presence unless their absence was specifically noted. Two of them were within the MUP hierarchy individuals right below the MUP Minister and thus were the highest ranking police officers in Kosovo. Lukic explained during interview that the PJP tasks were issued by Djordjevic/Stevanovic, hierarchically above him⁸⁰⁴.

555. The fact that Lukić was not the most senior officer in Kosovo is also confirmed by Mijatović⁸⁰⁵ and Adamović.⁸⁰⁶ Asked by Judge Bonomy what was his understanding of the role of the MUP Staff, Đaković testified that "the Minister of Interior sent part of the officers from the MUP down there to reinforce the team [...] and directly influence the overall situation in Kosovo in

⁷⁹⁸ III/936;;III/937

⁷⁹⁹ P948/page.10,11;;6D1613/par.51

⁸⁰⁰ P1252

⁸⁰¹ P948/page17

⁸⁰² Mijatovic-(Tr.22202/9-11);;P1989;;P1993;;P1996;;Lazarevic-(Tr.18260);;P948/page228

⁸⁰³ P1468

⁸⁰⁴ P948/page.41,42

⁸⁰⁵ Mijatovic-(6D1492)

⁸⁰⁶ Adamovic-(6D1613)

relation to the tasks and obligations of the police. [...] I am referring to General Đorđević and General Obrad Stevanović.”⁸⁰⁷

556. The same was confirmed by Lukić in his interview⁸⁰⁸ and reflected in the minutes of the meeting held at the MUP Staff on 22.7.1998.⁸⁰⁹

557. The Chamber noted⁸¹⁰ that “Đaković identified Lukić as the person in command of the MUP forces in Kosovo”. The Chamber incompletely and inaccurately quoted Đaković. He stated that Obrad Stevanović “[...] had specific authority to deploy and engage the PJP units”.⁸¹¹ Asked what was his understanding of the role of the Staff, Đaković confirmed that he was not familiar with its role, He further stated that he dealt with Stevanović with regard to the PJP.⁸¹²

558. Chamber indicates⁸¹³ that the Prosecution supported its arguments regarding Staff’s mandate with Decisions of 16.06.1998.⁸¹⁴, 31.05.1999.⁸¹⁵ and Cvetic’s statement⁸¹⁶. Prosecution never presented Cvetic with the actual Decision of 16.06.1998. Therefore, Cvetic’s statement cannot refer to the period of 16.06.1998, or thereafter⁸¹⁷. Further, Cvetic wasn’t a Staff member and his knowledge is limited/incorrect. Cvetic was not a professional police officer, but a person trained and employed by the Ministry of Defense.⁸¹⁸

559. The Chamber incompletely analyzed evidence regarding Staff’s mandate,⁸¹⁹ especially those that Staff did not have the nature of a MUP organizational unit, due to which it couldn’t administrate/command other MUP units, as explained in detail by the Expert⁸²⁰.

560. The Staff didn’t have authority on:

- PJP deployment to Kosovo(Djordjevic/Stevanovic did)⁸²¹;
- dismissal/appointment Chief of SUPs⁸²²

⁸⁰⁷ Djakovic-(T.23534/4–23535/7)

⁸⁰⁸ P948

⁸⁰⁹ 6D798

⁸¹⁰ III/1024

⁸¹¹ Djakovic-(T.26518/10-16)

⁸¹² Djakovic-(T.26534/4–26535/7)

⁸¹³ III/949

⁸¹⁴ P1505

⁸¹⁵ P1811

⁸¹⁶ III/950

⁸¹⁷ Cvetic-(T.8067),

⁸¹⁸ Cvetic-(T.8183/24-T.8184/9)

⁸¹⁹ III/951-to-III/958

⁸²⁰ 6D668/page.150

⁸²¹ 6D683;6D684;6D685;6D686;6D687;6D291

- allocation/promotion of policemen⁸²³;
- disciplinary procedures against policemen⁸²⁴;
- misdemeanor/criminal prosecution of policemen⁸²⁵.

561. Chamber disregarded that Trajkovic wasn't a Staff member.⁸²⁶ This was confirmed by Vucurevic⁸²⁷/Adamovic⁸²⁸, both members of the Staff.

562. Analyzing parts of Lukic's interview,⁸²⁹ Chamber omits to point out that he was explaining the Staff's role in 1998, disregarding that Stevanovic, during the war, in 1999, was constantly present in Pristina⁸³⁰ Chamber failed to consider that Zivaljevic, PJP Commander, confirmed no one was between him and Stevanovic, within chain-of-command⁸³¹.

563. While citing K25(traffic-policeman)⁸³², Chamber ignored⁸³³ that witness dissociated from claims that "it was "common knowledge" that "[a]ll MUP units in Kosovo were commanded by the MUP HQ in Priština", and that Lukić was the commander of all the MUP forces in Kosovo", by stating "I don't know how specifically I became aware of it"⁸³⁴.

2. THE ROLE OF THE STAFF IN PLANNING

564. Based on Cvetic's conjecture, rebutted by Djakovic/Mijatovic/Adamovic, Chamber concluded that Staff had "a central role in planning how particular MUP units were to be deployed in Kosovo in the implementation of the overall "anti-terrorism" plan, once decisions were taken in Belgrade".⁸³⁵

⁸²² P1884;P1886;P11885

⁸²³ 6D1344;6D1348

⁸²⁴ 6D1340;6D1613/para.41

⁸²⁵ 6D464;6D1339;6D1613/para.42,43

⁸²⁶ III/960

⁸²⁷ Vucurevic-(T.23056/16-18)

⁸²⁸ 6D1613/par.6,7

⁸²⁹ III/961

⁸³⁰ Vucurevic-(T.23064/10-13;T.23074/17-21);Mijatovic-(T.22202/9-23);Filic-(Tr.24011/18-23)

⁸³¹ Zivaljevic-(T.24930)

⁸³² P2439/p.20

⁸³³ III/962

⁸³⁴ P2439/page.20

⁸³⁵ III/970

565. However, the Chamber ignores the contradictory evidence from Cvetic, that such plans were made by Joint Command both for VJ/MUP⁸³⁶. This demonstrates Cvetic is just wrongly speculating.

566. However, the 5-phase anti-terrorism plan(existing only in 1998) was solely contemplated/elaborated in PrK Command, without MUP members participation⁸³⁷.

567. Reliance on Djakovic's assertions of planning by the MUP Staff⁸³⁸ is erroneously placed, since the Chamber fails to take into account admissions on cross-examination, namely: a) that PrK organs prepared/drafted maps for MUP units⁸³⁹; b) The military commander had had to approve plans⁸⁴⁰; c) he never saw a single MUP Staff order⁸⁴¹; d) his admission he really did not know the function of the Staff at all⁸⁴²; e) his disclaimer that all his testimony was according to military rules and he had no idea about the MUP rules⁸⁴³; and f) he never reviewed a single MUP rule/regulation⁸⁴⁴.

568. The Chamber presented parts of Adamovic's testimony out of its context.⁸⁴⁵ Adamovic never testified that meetings were held before each ATA. In-fact, what he testified about was that there were one/two meetings in July 1998⁸⁴⁶ when Djordjevic/Stevanovic, together with military officers, presented the plan in whole for the first time, before operations began.⁸⁴⁷ Indeed this is corroborated 100% by Mijatovic.⁸⁴⁸ The Chamber impermissibly extends the role of the Staff beyond the evidence. Adamovic clearly stated the maps received from Prk would be handed over to the Commander or courier without any cover-letters or additional explanation⁸⁴⁹.

⁸³⁶ Cvetic-(T.8075/23-24)

⁸³⁷ Đakovic-(T.26536/18-26538/11)

⁸³⁸ III/973-974.

⁸³⁹ T.26523/15-25528/23

⁸⁴⁰ T.26518/10-16.

⁸⁴¹ T.26522/14-16

⁸⁴² T.26527/4-6

⁸⁴³ T.26526/22-26527/1

⁸⁴⁴ T.26514/7-16

⁸⁴⁵ III/975

⁸⁴⁶ 6D1613/para.17

⁸⁴⁷ T.24976-24977

⁸⁴⁸ T.22197-22198

⁸⁴⁹ 6D1613/par.31,32,33,34

3. MUP STAFF REPORTING

569. The Chamber erroneously took evidence out of context.⁸⁵⁰ All witnesses cited by the chamber actually testified SUPS regularly reported to the MUP in Belgrade, and copied the Staff, pursuant to the order of RJB Chief⁸⁵¹ and compliant with Rulebook on reporting. It should be recalled when Mijatovic was named Liason with the KVM, he sent out an additional methodology to fulfill requirements of daily contact with KVM, not an „order“ as mis-characterized by the Chamber.⁸⁵²

570. Chamber incorrectly interprets Appellant’s interview and wrongly promotes Cvetic’s untrained conjecture.⁸⁵³ Lukic’s description of PJP sending reports to the Staff must be read alongside evidence that PJP Commander Stevanovic was present at/used the Staff premises in 1999⁸⁵⁴ Not a single of the reports speculated by Cvetic was introduced/exists. The Chamber forgot to analyze Zivaljevic’s testimony, that he composed an overall report on activity performed, and submitted the same to MUP Police Administration in Belgrade directly⁸⁵⁵. Zivaljevic further testified that he did not report to anyone except in cases of medical assistance or killed policemen⁸⁵⁶. Rather than listen to Zivaljevic(Commander of 122nd PJP Brigade), the Chamber inexplicably relied on Cvetic, who had no knowledge/experience of PJP

571. Adamovic likewise confirmed the security-related events reporting method (death or policeman wounding etc.) used in the MUP– not on “combat reporting” as suggested by the Chamber⁸⁵⁷. This is another example of the “military perception” of police adopted by the Chamber.

⁸⁵⁰ III.976

⁸⁵¹ P1044

⁸⁵² P2528

⁸⁵³ III/981

⁸⁵⁴ 6D1499/20;6D1122;6D475;P1989;P1991;P1993;P1996

⁸⁵⁵ Zivaljevic-(T.24843)

⁸⁵⁶ Zivaljevic-(T.24877-24878)

⁸⁵⁷ Adamovic-(T25078)

4. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

(A) 1998

572. The Chamber erroneously concluded the Staff's role was to plan/organize/manage RJB units.⁸⁵⁸ However in the same paragraph is the opposite conclusion that chains of reporting and command remained intact. No evidence exists that the Staff made Plans or performed "command-control" over MUP units.

573. In discussing the 22.7.1998 meeting,⁸⁵⁹ the Chamber ignored the fact that Djordjevic/Stevanovic were considerably higher positioned than Appellant, and that although P1505⁸⁶⁰ listed them as deputies of Lukic, Gajic (RDB), Lukovic (JSO Commander), Trajkovic (SAJ Commander) are not present.⁸⁶¹ Their absence is more indicative bearing in mind the importance of subject – "[d]efin[e] tasks in the implementation of the Global Plan", an apparent reference to the Plan on Combating Terrorism. This demonstrates the Staff was not functioning in accordance to P1505, neither in terms of tasks, nor personnel. The Chamber ignored minutes from the next day's meeting, from which it could be seen that Mijatovic was Lukic's Deputy, not Gajic, and that neither Trajkovic nor Lukovic were present, which depicts Staff's real role – providing logistical support⁸⁶².

574. Chamber erroneously interprets⁸⁶³ the 28.7.1998. meeting-it's not true that Lukic "chaired a meeting". Markovic was not RDB Chief at the time. It's not true that all 7 SUP Chiefs in Kosovo were present- only 3 were(Pristina/Mitrovica/Urosevac). None of the PJP, SAJ or JSO Commanders were present. These errors call into question the Chamber's appreciation of the evidence.

575. Chamber incorrectly concludes the Staff issued an "order".⁸⁶⁴ Dispatch 6D768, shows Staff has only passed along the opinion from MUP HQ. Staff's only activity was to acquaint MUP members with conclusions from Belgrade. Chamber further erroneously concluded that Lukic "directed" the heads of Kosovo SUPs, to *inter alia* interview Kosovo Albanians. Staff only passed

⁸⁵⁸ III/983

⁸⁵⁹ III/985

⁸⁶⁰ P1505

⁸⁶¹ 6D798/page.1

⁸⁶² P3120

⁸⁶³ III/986

⁸⁶⁴ III/987

along information that “a number of people of Albanian ethnic minority” have destroyed official IDs and are, using false ones issued by the KLA.

576. At III/989 the Chamber ignored⁸⁶⁵ that measures in regard to armored vehicles/large-caliber weapons were envisaged in a)Byrnes-Djordjevic agreement⁸⁶⁶; b)conclusions from meeting held by Stevanovic⁸⁶⁷; c)measures in reporting from RJB instruction⁸⁶⁸ and d)Mijatovic's note⁸⁶⁹. All conclusions related to the consistent implementation of October agreement. Further, Lukic reminded about Stevanovic’s instructions from meeting, at which Lukic wasn’t even present⁸⁷⁰, and instructions from RJB Chief⁸⁷¹, and did not “chair” the meeting as suggested.

577. The Chamber made errors with respect to meeting 2.12.1998.⁸⁷² From the minutes of that meeting⁸⁷³ purpose was to acquaint those who were present with obligations formulated by Minister at the meeting in Belgrade on 27.11.1998(as stated in par. III/990). The Chamber ignored the full context of these meetings, which is police activity and compliance of October agreement. When Lukic asked for submission of Plan for combating terrorism⁸⁷⁴, Chamber ignored the essence of this plan which is classically preventive, and not any offensive operation Plan, which could be seen from minutes.

578. The Chamber ignored⁸⁷⁵ the presence of Stojilkovic, Stevanovic and Ilic on 21.12.1998⁸⁷⁶. The Chamber failed to give significance to Stojilkovic’s words: “Today General Obrad Stevanovic will convey to you my orders regarding the methods of how to act in the future considering new circumstances”, nor that Stevanovic's instructions match to measures Lukic mentioned on 2.12.1998. From Stevanovic's instructions: “All plans should be based on the principles of a police operation.” Chamber failed to establish that Stevanovic was issuing tasks to SUP Chiefs and PJP Commander, directly, without Lukic’s presence.

⁸⁶⁵ III/989

⁸⁶⁶ P394

⁸⁶⁷ 6D800

⁸⁶⁸ 6D267

⁸⁶⁹ P2528

⁸⁷⁰ 6D800

⁸⁷¹ 6D267

⁸⁷² III/990

⁸⁷³ P3122

⁸⁷⁴ P3122/ p.8

⁸⁷⁵ III/994

⁸⁷⁶ P1991

579. Chamber's conclusion that Staff had a role in information exchange between RJB-RDB is wrong. Cvetic's complaint⁸⁷⁷ that RDB Chief in Mitrovica doesn't submit information, clearly shows exchange of information on level SUP-CRDB.

(B)1999

580. Lukic hasn't "directed" the SUPs and PJP to "ensure" correct behavior towards KVM, as described in III/996, but reminded of measures already determined by MUP in Belgrade⁸⁷⁸. Chamber itself states that on 23.2.1999 Lukic repeated/reiterated this instruction. Chamber failed to consider that NRJB Djordjevic attended meeting on 17.2.1999. Lukic stated: "A plan of the RJB has been worked out..." - the plan obviously drafted by RJB, not Staff or Lukic. Chamber interprets Lukic in impermissible manner: "The Staff plans, when it is ordered, to carry out three mopping up operations...", since minutes containing phrase "cleaning the territory from terrorists".

581. Although Chamber was quoting Lazarevic's, it has indicated⁸⁷⁹ that Stefanovic testifies that "he personally did not see an order from the MUP Staff⁸⁸⁰" allegedly issued to SUPs. The Chamber failed to consider that Stefanovic himself was someone Lazarevic called upon as "main operational man"⁸⁸¹.

582. This is more contradictory since SUPs haven't planned specific ATA, as Chamber concludes in III/972.

583. It wasn't Lukic who sent a copy of "Politika" article on 6.5.1999, as found in III/1005, but Mijatovic.⁸⁸² Lukic didn't direct the SUP chiefs and PJP and SAJ commanders to take "all the measures in the forthcoming period to prevent paramilitary formations and individuals from committing acts of violence", since it has been written in original document "and" in the future period undertake...". The essence of word and is that these measures were already undertaken, and need to be continued with. To be fair the Chamber relied on a false translation by CLSS in its error.

⁸⁷⁷ P3122,p.4

⁸⁷⁸ 6D267

⁸⁷⁹ III/1002;;III/1003

⁸⁸⁰ Stefanovic-(T.21770)

⁸⁸¹ Lazarevic-(T.18215)

⁸⁸² 5D1289

584. Chamber mis-cited 6D874. Correct interpretation would be: “Secretariat chiefs are responsible for the realization of the envisaged activities and OKP are tasked with their direct realization”, not Staff/ Lukic, and their “overall directions” as Chamber incorrectly presents.

585. In relations to Stevanovic’s discussion that “the plan must be approved by the Staff”, Chamber totally disregarded Mijatovic’s statement that Stevanovic was person who would approve the plan, with an address at the Staff⁸⁸³.

586. The Chamber misquoted Zivaljevic’s telegram dated 26.5.1999 in order to report on “achieved lines”. The essence of this dispatch is informing about unit losses and seeking help in treatment of civilians, in which there are about 150 “fighters”. Furthermore, answer sent from Staff⁸⁸⁴ wasn’t sent by Lukic.⁸⁸⁵

5. LUKIC'S AUTHORITY AS A “RUKOVODILAC”/MANAGER OF MUP STAFF

587. Conclusions regarding the Staff’s role⁸⁸⁶ are incorrect and a product of erroneous/incomplete/incorrect/selective analysis of documents/evidence. The Chamber ignored practice upon which, documents under the Staff’s heading or Lukic’s typed name, were drafted and sent by other MUP officials who weren’t Staff’s members⁸⁸⁷. Stevanovic also sent a report under the Staff’s firm⁸⁸⁸.

588. The Chamber erred that “the precise title of Lukić’s position, and its translation into English, is immaterial”.⁸⁸⁹ It reached improper conclusions based on military witnesses, especially foreigners/VJ without even basic knowledge of MUP functioning/organization. All organizational units (which status gives managing powers) are managed by Chief (RJB, Administration, SUP) or Commanders and commanders (PJP, PS), and working body (MUP Staff) was managed by manager, since Staff was not an organizational unit. Many witnesses, who had military education or were from VJ, due to this name, had a perception of Staff Manager as the Commander or Chief, incorrectly identifying him with “Military Commander”. Chamber improperly applied “military

⁸⁸³ Mijatovic-(T.22303)

⁸⁸⁴ 5D1418

⁸⁸⁵ III/1011

⁸⁸⁶ III/1012

⁸⁸⁷ III/1005

⁸⁸⁸ 6D1122

⁸⁸⁹ III/1018

terms” onto police, using terminology such as “order”, “command”, “commanding”, “subordinate”, “report”.

6. LUKIC'S ATTENDANCE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS

589. Lukic didn't attend a meeting with Milosevic's on 30.5.1998. It should be recalled that P1252 shows he was not appointed to staff until June.

590. It's not true that “a plan for fighting terrorism” was discussed on 30.5.1998. The Chamber concluded that a “plan for combating terrorism” has been approved on 21.7.1998.⁸⁹⁰ Dimitrijevic testified that the meetings were held in July/August, without mentioning 30.05.1998. Chamber doesn't rely upon first-hand witness Dimitrijevic, but upon Djakovic, who allegedly heard second-hand from Pavkovic.

591. The Chamber's error is evident in that it accepted that Lukic wasn't involved in the formulation on Plan for combating terrorism, adopted on 21.7.1998. but found liability because “Lukic was involved in the meeting at which it was adopted...”.⁸⁹¹ In regards to Milutinovic's attendance in this and other meetings, Chamber concluded: “However, the above mentioned evidence don't indicate that Milutinovic had an important role in those meetings⁸⁹²”. This disparate treatment by the Chamber is error.

592. Its not true that Lukic's Defense claims that “Joint Command represented legitimate effort of MUP and VJ to exchange information”,⁸⁹³ rather meetings of representatives of VJ/MUP and representatives of federal/republican governments were an effort to exchange information and no one called this Joint Command. Lukic in his interview, never explicitly called those meetings “Joint Command”⁸⁹⁴.

593. Adamovic never “confirmed” Lukic's role as the key member of Joint Command, involved in ensuring implementation of its directives in a co-ordinated manner between VJ/MUP forces...⁸⁹⁵ in his testimony. Adamovic testified that Lukic assigned him to submit maps to the units regarding joint MUP/VJ operations, and this has no relation to Joint Command. Conclusions based on

⁸⁹⁰ III/1021

⁸⁹¹ III/1021

⁸⁹² III/143

⁸⁹³ III/1023

⁸⁹⁴ P948/page-34;;V000-3910ET

⁸⁹⁵ III/1033

Djakovic's testimony for planning ATA in 1999, should be disregarded as he was replaced by Stefanovic. Adamovic was no longer in Kosovo after 28/29.3.1999, having been injured by NATO's bombing.⁸⁹⁶

594. The Chamber failed to give appropriate weight to attendance and participation of Stoiljkovic, Djordjevic, Stevanovic and Markovic in a meeting on 29.10.1998, as MUP officials, with higher positions than Lukic.⁸⁹⁷ Lukic only briefed in light of of the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement⁸⁹⁸.

595. Chamber made incorrect findings that the meeting in Belgrade on 27.11.1998,⁸⁹⁹: "examined the situation in Kosovo and discussed the further engagement of MUP forces in "anti-terrorist actions". From the minutes⁹⁰⁰, the meeting was dedicated to implementing the October agreement and increased terrorist activity, which brought Sainovic, being head of the Commission for implementation of the Agreement. The meeting was called/led by Stoiljkovic, also a Commission member.

596. The Chamber misinterpreted/abused what Lukic said in his interview, deliberately interpreting that Lukic was at multiple meetings with Milosevic. Lukic clearly stated "I think there was only this one meeting at which I was present"⁹⁰¹.

597. There's no valid evidence, contrary to the Chambers finding,⁹⁰² that meeting of "JC" was held on 1.6.1999. Vasiljevic has written in his notes that he attended a meeting of the Pristina Corps.⁹⁰³ The Chamber does not give appropriate weight to the fact that Djordjevic and Stevanovic were present.

⁸⁹⁶ Adamovic-(T.25015/24-25016/10)

⁸⁹⁷ III/1035

⁸⁹⁸ III/1035

⁸⁹⁹ III/1037

⁹⁰⁰ P3122

⁹⁰¹ P948/p.142-143

⁹⁰² III/1040

⁹⁰³ 2D387

7. ASSESSMENT OF LUKIĆ'S AUTHORITY AND ROLE

Sreten Lukić's role in reporting to the MUP

598. The Chamber's conclusion "Much of the evidence [...] in relation to the powers and functions of the MUP Staff also reveals the extent of Lukić's involvement [...]"⁹⁰⁴ is incorrect. The Chamber often based its conclusion on errors, particularly documents. As the most important evidence of Lukić's authority the Chamber noted that he "chaired" most of the meetings held at the MUP Staff in the presence of Milutinović, Stojiljković and the Chiefs of RJB/RDB, referring, *inter alia*, to exhibits 6D789 and P3121. This evidence itself shows the untenability of such a conclusion. Nowhere in the referenced evidence is it mentioned that Appellant "chaired" the meetings. At the meeting of 22.7.1998, which was attended by Đorđević, and Stevanović, Lukić "proposed" the agenda, whereas he would have "communicated" the agenda if he had been the "chairman". The meeting attended by Milutinović⁹⁰⁵ most realistically reflects the role of "chairing", since Lukić had a protocol role and the aim of the meeting was Milutinović's address.

599. The Chamber's conclusion that Lukić issued "numerous" dispatches containing tasks for SUPs/PJP/SAJ,⁹⁰⁶ does not correspond with the facts. The Chamber based this conclusion on incorrect interpretation of the dispatches in question. The Chamber erroneously ascribed certain documents to Appellant even though they were neither "dispatches" nor signed by him. This is obvious from each such "dispatch".⁹⁰⁷

600. Certain exhibits were "promoted" by the Chamber into orders/commands/tasks/instructions, etc. In fact, the documents in question were merely reminders prompting and emphasizing the need for compliance with the law.

601. The Chamber's conclusion of central role of the MUP Staff in planning/organizing/controlling/directing the work of MUP units was unsupported. There is no evidence that would corroborate the conclusion that the MUP played a central role in coordinating/planning joint operations with the VJ.

⁹⁰⁴ III/1050

⁹⁰⁵ P2805

⁹⁰⁶ III/1051

⁹⁰⁷ III/1005;5D1289;6D690;P2528;6D237;6D874;6D876;5D1418

602. The Chamber's conclusion is solely based on Lukic's position as Head of Staff. But it is untenable to call him "*de facto* commander of the MUP forces". This finding further proves the Chamber's lack of knowledge of the police organization and its inability escape a "military perception" of the police.

603. The Chamber ought to have accepted police-expert, Professor Simonović, as well as the testimony by the witnesses who were long-time professional policemen.

604. The Chamber's conclusion of a command-role contradictory to where it stated "Lukić did not replace Stevanović, Đorđević or Ilić, the heads of the SUPs, or the commanders of PJP or SAJ units [...]".

605. Such conclusions of the Chambers are even more illogical in light of the fact that it concluded as follows:

- Minister of Interior was Stojiljković⁹⁰⁸
- RJB Chief was Đorđević,⁹⁰⁹
- Assistant Minister/Police Administration/Chief and PJP Commander was Stevanović⁹¹⁰
- Crime Police Administration Chief was Ilić⁹¹¹
- SAJ Commander was Trajković⁹¹² and
- Each of 33 SUPs had their respective Chiefs.⁹¹³

606. The conclusion Appellant was *de facto* commander is further invalidated by the Chamber's finding he "[...] was the bridge between those commanders and the policy and plans set in Belgrade, [...]". Thus, the Chamber gave up the "*de facto* commander" and assigned a role of a "bridge". When viewed together with the Chamber's conclusion that "The MUP Staff did not replace the day-to-day command structure within the MUP."⁹¹⁴ The finding of a *de facto* commander is neither logical nor legally founded on proper facts/evidence.

607. The conclusion of the Chamber⁹¹⁵ that the difference between the organization/structure of the MUP and of the VJ is the reason why "there are no combat orders in evidence giving specific

⁹⁰⁸ I/658

⁹⁰⁹ I/659

⁹¹⁰ I/666

⁹¹¹ I/700

⁹¹² I/675

⁹¹³ I/660

⁹¹⁴ III/1012

⁹¹⁵ III/1051

deployment tasking to MUP units” is an unprecedented legal conclusion. The only reason why there are no police orders in evidence is that no such orders were ever issued.

608. The evidence concerning a promotion letter Stojiljković sent to Milutinović⁹¹⁶, proposing a “regular” promotion of Lukić showed this was pro-forma rather than substantive, and that authors of such documents were clerks who adhered to pre-established formulaic language.⁹¹⁷ Thus, it is not justified to take this letter as evidence of “Lukić’s central role” or his being “a *de facto* commander over MUP forces”.

609. The conclusion that Appellant was the “bridge” between the commanders and Belgrade is factually untenable. Each order/directive/instruction coming from the MUP was individually addressed to the SUPs(PJP being attached thereto), and then copied to the Staff. Besides the direct “top-to-bottom” relationship in place, the “bottom-to-top” relationship functioned on the same principles. It is illogical for Lukić to be that “bridge” when the Minister had sent two Assistant Ministers(Đorđević/Stevanović) to Kosovo.

610. Appellant was not at any Belgrade meetings that weren’t also attended by Stojiljković/Đorđević/Stevanović. The same is true of the meetings with Milošević. Thus, it is clear that Lukić was not the “bridge” between Belgrade--PJP commanders because the foregoing meetings were attended by PJP Commander Stevanović.

611. The fact Appellant’s role at Belgrade meetings was neither central nor a “bridge” is indicated by the finding that “[...] Lukić was not involved in the actual formulation of the Plan at the highest level [...]”.⁹¹⁸ This finding relates to the Plan for Combating Terrorism of 1998, and the meeting in question was attended by Stojiljković, Đorđević and Stevanović.⁹¹⁹ The next day, Đorđević/Stevanović came to Priština and held a meeting with the SUP heads/PJP commanders, whereat the implementation of the Plan was discussed.⁹²⁰

612. During 1999, no plans were prepared/adopted in Belgrade. A meeting held on 4.5.1999. did not involve preparation of plans. The Chamber itself denied that Lukić’s role at meetings in Belgrade was central when it analyzed his role in the meeting held on 29.10.1998⁹²¹ and found that

⁹¹⁶ 1D680

⁹¹⁷ I/159;T.22471/22472;T.25591/25592

⁹¹⁸ III/1021

⁹¹⁹ III/1021

⁹²⁰ 6D798

⁹²¹ P2166

“Lukić briefed participants about positioning of MUP forces in Kosovo, in light of the Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement.”⁹²²

613. Appellant was not “directly involved in the planning process”. Witnesses from PrK who were involved in the planning of operations of the VJ/MUP (Đaković/Stefanović) expressly stated that Lukić did not participate in the planning of actions.⁹²³

614. The Chamber misquoted the Decision to establish the MUP Staff(P1505). This does not correspond with the contents of the Decision, which reads: “For his work, the work of the Staff and the aspects of the security situation under the remit of the Staff, the Head of Staff is responsible to the Minister and shall inform him about the following:

- security-related developments,
- measures taken and the effects of those measures.”⁹²⁴

615. The Chamber drew incorrect conclusions on Lukić’s role in the reporting process within the MUP. The reporting was conducted according to a uniformly prescribed procedure which Lukić could not change.

616. Reporting within the Serbian MUP was conducted pursuant to the Instruction on Reporting and Informing, adopted by the MUP Minister in 1994 and effective during the relevant period. The Chamber should have acknowledged the reporting process reflected in the Expert Report.⁹²⁵ The same area was regulated by the MUP Minister’s Circular,⁹²⁶ which envisaged that the SUPs in Kosovo “shall send dispatches concurrently to the Ministry and the MUP Staff in Priština.”

617. The above Instruction and the Circular were the backbone and the only basis for the reporting process.⁹²⁷

618. The Chamber did not analyze the evidence properly, particularly the Expert Report, which shows that the above-mentioned Instruction regulated the obligation of the MUP organizational

⁹²² III/1035

⁹²³ T.21803/10-14;T.21804/14-18;26380/1-10

⁹²⁴ P1505/Item-III

⁹²⁵ 6D668, p.86,87

⁹²⁶ P1044/p.3.Item.5

⁹²⁷ Mijatovic-(6D1492/para.57;;T.22223/5–22227/7;;Adamović-(6D1613/para.22,38,37,39;; Petrović-(6D1631/para.12,20,27;;Vojnović-(6D1532/para.14,15,16,17,18;;Gavranić-(T.22636/18–22637/2)

units to ensure urgent/daily/periodical reporting and informing on security-related developments and events.

619. The Instruction observed the hierarchy of organizational units reflected in the Rules of Internal Organization, so the OUP Commanders (“bottom-to-top”) reported to and informed the SUPs, and the SUPs Chiefs reported to the Ministry. Additionally, the heads of the Kosovo SUPs were, according to P1044, obliged to inform the MUP Staff. This included daily reporting/informing, but not periodical reporting/informing (monthly/annual).

620. The Chamber received ample evidence showing that SUPs acted in compliance with the Instruction on Reporting and Informing when they informed the MUP Ministry and, at the same time, the MUP Staff.⁹²⁸ Ignoring the totality of evidence, the Chamber drew superficial conclusions based on assumptions, as in III/1057, where it noted “normally the reports were prepared based on the information obtained from the various SUPs”.

621. The Ministry in Belgrade was the principal addressee of the information. The Kosovo SUPs sent their dispatches to Belgrade, stating concrete organizational units such as the Crime Police Administration, the Police Administration, the Analytics Administration, and at all times, the MUP Operations Center. Below the headings of dispatches, the SUPs included the MUP Staff.⁹²⁹

622. The MUP Staff merely compiled the information received from the SUPs, based on which the MUP Staff analytics officer prepared an “Overview of important security-related events, phenomena, and insights”.

623. The MUP Staff did not produce reports, but overviews. Such overviews contained only summarized information received from the SUPs, and the MUP Staff could not alter the data thus received. The overviews did not contain any information on concrete events authored by the MUP Staff members. Bearing in mind the above evidence and the established MUP procedures, it is clear that the SUPs first submitted their information to the Ministry, and then, or concurrently, to the MUP Staff. There could be no situation that the MUP Staff received information which had not been first, or concurrently, submitted to the Ministry.⁹³⁰

⁹²⁸ T.22635/21-22636/4;T.22639/21-22641/16;6D1532,par.14,15,16,17,18

⁹²⁹ 6D44;;6D197;;6D323;;6D401;;6D409;;6D128;;6D661;;6D663

⁹³⁰ Adamovic-(6D1613/para.22,37,38,39,50

624. A report is a document of authorship, containing the ideas of and results of the actions of the author. An overview does not contain anything that is a result of the actions of the individual preparing it; it is merely a compilation of received reports.

625. The MUP Staff didn't prepare periodical (monthly/annual) information/reports.⁹³¹

626. The Chamber incorrectly noted that all "reports" contained Lukić's typewritten name and signature.⁹³² None of the numerous Overviews were signed by Lukić.⁹³³

627. The Chamber noted that from 2.4.1999 the "reports" "began addressing the numbers of 'persons from the Albanian and other national communities who fled' Kosovo", which followed a 1.4.1999 "order" by Lukić to the SUPs "that the number of Albanians leaving Kosovo through their border crossings should be tracked".⁹³⁴ Thus, the Chamber misquoted the evidence, as other overviews show that the information on the departure of Albanians were also recorded in February and March.⁹³⁵

628. The Priština MUP Building, was bombed 28/29.3.1999.⁹³⁶ Four members of the Staff were injured(including the analytics officer).⁹³⁷ This is the reason why the Overview of 29.3.1999 was incomplete and did not contain the number of individuals who had left FRY, while the Overviews of 30, 31 March and 1.4.1999. were not prepared at all. All of this evidence disproves the finding that the information on numbers of Albanians who left FRY "followed a 1.4.1999 order by Lukić".⁹³⁸

629. Mijatović explained that the memorandum in question further regulated the manner and form of submitting information, in order to facilitate analytical processing thereof and ensure a uniform layout.⁹³⁹

⁹³¹ 6D1492/para.57

⁹³² III/1053

⁹³³ P1228(Adamović);P1093(Zdravković);P1100,P1099(Blagojević)

⁹³⁴ III/1054

⁹³⁵ 6D1208/7;6D1211/6;6D1232/7; P1099/7

⁹³⁶ T.8148/17-19;T.24158/4-16

⁹³⁷ T.23119/19-23120/7

⁹³⁸ 6D808

⁹³⁹ 6D1492/para.50

630. The Chamber failed to thoroughly analyze 6D1238/6D1239/6D1240.⁹⁴⁰ All of the examples referred to by the Chamber were qualified as terrorism, and were as such supposed to be reported in accordance with the Instruction, as explained by Expert Report.⁹⁴¹

631. The Chamber erroneously found that “Most of the reports [Overviews] do not indicate on what basis the MUP Staff prepared them.”⁹⁴² These overviews were prepared exclusively on the basis of relevant SUP reports.⁹⁴³

632. In interpreting the meeting held 28.7.1998.⁹⁴⁴ and concluding Lukić “had an instrumental position in co-ordinating information exchange between the MUP forces in Kosovo and the MUP headquarters in Belgrade”, the Chamber mis-identified the manner of presenting information at this meeting, which was held in Priština rather than in Belgrade, with the overviews sent to different addressees within the MUP headquarters in Belgrade. If Stojiljković had not arrived in Priština, the information regarding the Plan for Combating Terrorism would not have been sent as part of the Staff’s daily reporting to the MUP headquarters(Belgrade).

633. The Chamber ignored that SUP Chiefs at this meeting shared their information/evaluations/conclusions on equal footing with Lukić. SUP Chiefs directly reported to the Minister, and Appellant’s role in this process was not to mediate/coordinate.

634. The information Lukić presented before the Minister, on 27.7.1998, was comprised of the data which he had previously learned from Đorđević/Pavković.⁹⁴⁵

635. All of the above-mentioned including the evidence showing that the informing/reporting process was performed pursuant to the Instruction on Reporting and Informing, indicates that the MUP Staff did not have and could not have a role of mediator/coordinator in the exchange of information. The existence of the Staff did not affect the process of reporting, since the reporting process functioned uniformly in the entire territory of Serbia.

⁹⁴⁰ III/1055

⁹⁴¹ 6D668/pp.151,152,153

⁹⁴² III/1057

⁹⁴³ Adamovic-(6D1613/para.37)

⁹⁴⁴ P3121

⁹⁴⁵ P1468

8. DE-FACTO AUTHORITY AS TO INVESTIGATION/DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

636. The Chamber accepted Appellant wasn't able to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and concluded "that disciplinary proceedings were generally initiated by a person's immediate supervisor and were dealt with by the relevant SUPs."⁹⁴⁶

637. Before initiating criminal/other proceedings, the SUPs would request an approval from the MUP headquarters(Belgrade), without having any obligation to copy the Staff/Lukić in any manner.⁹⁴⁷

638. During the wartime, when the provisions concerning disciplinary responsibility were changed, the Staff/Lukić were not even informed by Djordjevic or Zeković, who issued the appropriate instructions directly to all SUPs.⁹⁴⁸

639. Decisions concerning replacement/appointment of SUP Chiefs were made exclusively by the RJB Chief, without any involvement of the Staff/Lukić.⁹⁴⁹

640. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Chamber concluded that Lukić had *de facto* authority to require the SUP Chiefs to conduct investigations into crimes, even if not the person who actually initiated proceedings. The Chamber referred to 6D768 and 6D872. Firstly, the dispatches referred to in III/987&III/996 were "information" about the assessment made by the leadership in Belgrade concerning the engagement of the police in Kosovo⁹⁵⁰ and the "reminder" of the measures envisaged by law. These were certainly not orders.

⁹⁴⁶ III/1049

⁹⁴⁷ 6D464;;6D1339;;6D1613/Para.42,43;;6D1340;;6D1613/Para.41;;6D1344;;6D1348;;Cvetić-(T.8152-8153)

⁹⁴⁸ 6D133;6D1342

⁹⁴⁹ P1884;P1886;P1885

⁹⁵⁰ 6D768

9. DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES/CRIMES OF THE MUP

a. Knowledge of crimes in 1998 and 1999

641. The Chamber improperly interpreted Lukić's presence at the so-called "Joint Command" meetings by concluding that all these meetings dealt with joint VJ/MUP operations, the refugee crisis, and the need to discipline the FRY/Serbian forces.⁹⁵¹

642. The Chamber based its generalized/improper conclusion on a total of six JC meetings⁹⁵², which it used to show Lukić's knowledge of the existence of crimes. All the information discussed in these meetings were actually unverified information from various sources whose accuracy was to be confirmed and, based on that, a legal qualification thereof was to be established in consultation with the competent Prosecutor. Even this unverified information was followed up.⁹⁵³

643. The Chamber disregarded the legal system of the country and ignored its regulations and the authority granted to various organs (Prosecution/courts/police/military police). The Chamber *a priori* attributed all the crimes to the FRY/Serbian forces, ignoring criminals/terrorists.⁹⁵⁴

644. The Chamber noted that Lukić regularly met with representatives of international organizations "who provided him with information about potential criminal activity by the MUP." Although the Chamber itself noted that the information provided was unverified, it treated it as verified in determining guilt.

645. According to the Chamber, "the Notes [...] indicated that acts of arson committed by forces of the FRY and Serbia were often discussed," referring to the meetings of 7. and 12.8.1998, and 1. and 7.9.1998.⁹⁵⁵ A closer analysis taking into account the contents of previous/subsequent meetings, shows that the discussions dealt with arson committed by criminals and not FRY/Serbian

⁹⁵¹ III/1079

⁹⁵² III/1080-III/1081

⁹⁵³ P948, p.159; 6D612; 6D613; 6D1631, par.27,28,29,30,31,60,93

⁹⁵⁴ I/801, I/802, III/1029; III/1031; III/1086; III/1091; III/1092; III/1097

⁹⁵⁵ III/1080

forces. Đorđević's remark at the meeting of 7.8.1998 that measures must be taken "against persons who subsequently set houses on fire" supports the above.

646. The knowledge about the alleged crime in Gornje Obrinje was based solely on Albanian newspapers, until a more reliable piece of information was provided by the American diplomats, according to which this crime was committed by Albanians.⁹⁵⁶ Kickert testified that the competent authorities (primarily an investigative judge) tried to go to the crime scene but were prevented by the KLA.⁹⁵⁷

647. The Chamber failed to note⁹⁵⁸ that when asked whether the VJ participated in the actions with the police, Byrnes gave a negative answer. Therefore, Byrnes either had no information about the situation he was monitoring or he failed to tell the truth.

648. Byrnes's testimony had serious inconsistencies. Namely, Byrnes claimed that Lukić was in charge of Serbian police in Kosovo,⁹⁵⁹ but also that Lukić reported to Stevanović and that Đorđević was Stevanović's and Lukić's superior.⁹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Byrnes testified that Lukić replaced Stevanović, for which there is simply no evidence whatsoever.

649. The Chamber noted Byrnes's testimony about a village south of Kijevo he saw in flames and PJP he saw leaving the village. However, when asked if he knew who set the houses on fire, Byrnes's stated: "I did not see a single PJP officer pull a trigger. I did not see a PJP officer light a house on fire by whatever means."⁹⁶¹

650. The Chamber noted the following: "However, the evidence that PJP units stood by while homes in deserted villages burned was not undermined by cross examination." Byrnes did not state that the PJP units had stood by, but that he saw them leaving the village. Criminal responsibility cannot be based on the presence of units in the area without knowing who and under what circumstance caused the fire. Paunović, a participant in anti-terrorist actions in 1998, stated that the KLA members themselves caused fires, burned harvests, etc., on numerous occasions, in order to prevent the advancement of the state forces.⁹⁶²

⁹⁵⁶ P1468,p.135,para.3

⁹⁵⁷ Kickert-(T.11279/10-11280/21;6D197;Damjanac-(T.23813/5-23816/20)

⁹⁵⁸ III/1082

⁹⁵⁹ T.12151/10-20

⁹⁶⁰ T.12145/25-12146/9

⁹⁶¹ Byrnes-(T.12148/6-24)

⁹⁶² Paunović-(T.21872/22-21873/3)

651. The Chamber noted that Byrnes photographed the event near Peć.⁹⁶³ However, Byrnes stated that he was not present himself, but that he was informed by his teams.⁹⁶⁴ Concerning Byrnes's testimony, the evidence shows that a joint anti-terrorist action took place in that area. In fact, the Chamber itself concluded in I/881 that this area "was the site of significant combat operations" and that the terrorists, not civilians, were the only target.

652. Based on the above, the Chamber had sufficient basis to dismiss Byrnes's testimony. The evidence referred to in I/874, clearly contradicts Byrnes.

653. Pursuant to P1429, the PrK Command planned a joint anti-terrorist action in the area of Lug. The Chamber could see that the action was carried out pursuant to the PrK Decision from the so-called "Joint Command Notes" of 10.9.1998, where Pavković is recorded to have informed the attendants about the action. At this same meeting, Stevanović reported that an ICRC member prevented the civilians from returning to their homes. The Chamber ignored this evidence.

654. The measures taken for the civilian population to return to their homes show that these activities did not ensue because of the international media reports, as incorrectly claimed by Byrnes.

655. The notes of the meeting of 10.9.1998 reflect that Lukić was able to relay to Byrnes only the information he gathered from the reporting by Stevanović, who was in charge of the activities related to return of civilians.

656. The Chamber noted that Drewienkiewicz informed Lukić about "unconfirmed" reports that MUP was using excessive force in the area of Kosovo Polje.⁹⁶⁵ The Chamber did not analyze the issue of excessive force in this concrete instance, i.e. it did not establish the limits of an adequate use of force. The Chamber relied on Drewienkiewicz's notes reading that he called upon Lukić to take the appropriate steps with regard to a breach of the cease-fire in Podujevo and that Lukić allegedly took no steps to that effect. In I/931 to I/936, the Chamber did not in any manner establish that the side breaching the cease-fire was the MUP, so it unjustifiably interpreted the above breach, and particularly its finding on the breaches of the agreements by the VJ, against Appellant.

⁹⁶³ III/1083

⁹⁶⁴ T.12228/4-10

⁹⁶⁵ III/1084

657. The Chamber ignored all the evidence showing that Lukić was not in the position to decide on or potentially recall the joint activities of the VJ and the MUP, even if he had knowledge of the alleged crimes. Moreover, the Chamber failed to discuss the reliability of information that was presented even before the UN Security Council.

658. The Chamber's finding that "Lukić was aware that there were serious allegations of criminal activity by MUP forces in Kosovo in mid/late 1998, directed against the Kosovo Albanian civilian population,"⁹⁶⁶ does not correspond with the established facts. The Chamber failed to assess the totality of evidence and drew arbitrary conclusions based, *inter alia*, on unverified newspaper articles published in the *Koha Ditore*.

659. The Chamber did not ask Đaković to explain certain entries. The Chamber failed to clarify the essence of entries that it subsequently used in support of Appellant's conviction. For instance, in III/1931, the Chamber noted that at the meeting of 1.10.1998 Lukić mentioned, "Allegedly, there is a mass grave in the region of Jablanica." What the Appellant meant by this entry is that in Jablanica, one of the largest strongholds of the KLA,⁹⁶⁷ there was a mass grave containing individuals killed by the KLA.⁹⁶⁸ This would certainly have been confirmed by Đaković, too. Therefore, Appellant did not anticipate the need to cross examine the witness regarding this entry. However, without putting the Appellant on notice, the Chamber associated the above entry with the Appellant's criminal responsibility by suggesting that the mass grave was a site where individuals had been killed by the security forces.

b. Knowledge of crimes in 1999

660. When referring to Cvetic's testimony that the MUP Staff received information from the SUPs and various PJP/SAJ, the Chamber did not note that Cvetic had no knowledge of the incident in Izbica, which was in the area of his SUP. Clearly, Cvetic did not inform the MUP Staff about this incident.

661. None of the indictment crimes was known to Lukić at the relevant time, nor was it then reasonably suspected that crimes such as Izbica were committed by MUP. When there were indicia

⁹⁶⁶ III/1086

⁹⁶⁷ I/801;I/802

⁹⁶⁸ 4D140;;5D1307

of the existence of a mass grave, the competent authorities took the measures envisaged by the law, the PrK initiated an investigation, as did the competent Prosecutor and judge of the Kosovska Mitrovica District Court.

662. When noting that the arguments advanced by the Defense are contrary to the testimony of Adamović/Cvetić, the Chamber did not differentiate between the “combat reports” which, were not submitted to the MUP Staff, and reports on the security-related events that fall into the category of the knowledge of crimes. The Chamber created this confusion by incorrectly identifying the way in which MUP functioned with that of the VJ. This is a result of the Chamber’s lack of understanding of the laws regulating the functioning of these two entities.

663. The Rules of Internal Organization, as amended in 1996⁹⁶⁹ were incorrectly found to be a “reporting alternative”. These Rules were not any kind of alternative, but represented the only basis of reporting that needed to be communicated through dispatches. The basic document pursuant to which the process of reporting and informing was carried out was the Instruction on Reporting and Informing.⁹⁷⁰

664. The Chamber further noted that Lukić instructed the chiefs of the Kosovo SUPs to send urgent daily reports, containing information about ‘terrorist actions’.⁹⁷¹ This was a lawful instruction. Concerning the document referenced by the Chamber, Mijatović said “this document was produced in accordance with the obligation of the MUP to inform the KVM on incidents and potential actions and movement of the police.”⁹⁷² This obligation stemmed from the signed agreements.⁹⁷³

665. With regard to P1092, the Chamber committed a series of factual errors, as shown below:

- This was not an “order” but “information”, as reflected in the document;
- this information was not sent to shift leaders at police stations throughout Kosovo, but only to those of the Priština SUP;

The Chamber misrepresented this evidence—the shift leaders at the police stations subordinate to the Priština SUP were supposed to inform the shift leader of the Priština SUP so that he would report to

⁹⁶⁹ P1044

⁹⁷⁰ Adamović-(6D1613/para.38);6D2-(6D1631/para.12,27);Vojnović-(6D1532/para.14);Gavranić-(T.22645/14-22646/9)

⁹⁷¹ P2528;6D808

⁹⁷² 6D1492/para.11

⁹⁷³ P395/item 8;P492;Byrnes-(T.12206/4-13)

the MUP in Belgrade in accordance to the Instruction on Reporting and Informing. 6D-2 sent this information to his subordinates in order to ensure a more effective daily reporting process.

666. The principal user of the information thus conveyed was the MUP headquarters(Belgrade), not the Staff.

667. The Chamber misquoted the Minister's dispatch⁹⁷⁴ by noting that the MUP Staff was to be informed first, and then the MUP in Belgrade. Item 9 of this document reads as follows: "IMMEDIATELY report to the Operations Center and the Work Lines at the MUP headquarters, and the organizational units from Kosovo-Metohija are also to report to the MUP Staff in Priština." The Minister differentiated between the organizational units and the Staff, since the latter was not one. Therefore, the MUP Staff was the last to be reported to.

668. According to the Chamber, on 10.4.1999 the MUP Staff sent a "report" signed by Lukić to the Ministry of Interior. The document in question was not a "report" but an overview. Moreover, this document was not signed by Lukić.⁹⁷⁵

669. Daily overviews were not normally compiled based on the information sent from the SUPs from the MUP Staff. Rather, they were exclusively compiled on such information.⁹⁷⁶ These daily overviews did not relate to any incidents alleged in the Indictment.

670. The Chamber failed to establish in what manner Lukić was informed about incidents, and did not reference that Lukić was aware of any indicted crimes. As regards certain incidents registered in the daily overviews, the Chamber could not draw any conclusions as to whether they occurred as a result of crimes.

671. The Chamber noted that Lukić sent a report to the MUP in Belgrade on 3.4.1999, referring primarily to the items related to the discovery of bodies at three locations.⁹⁷⁷ This document was not a report but an overview, which confirms that it only contained a summary of reports written elsewhere.

⁹⁷⁴ 6D238

⁹⁷⁵ 6D1246

⁹⁷⁶ Adamović-(6D1613, para.25,37)

⁹⁷⁷ III/1091; III/1056

672. There is no evidence showing that the bodies were related to crimes and there is no evidence as to who was responsible for the deaths. Lukić's obligation ended upon reporting on the incident, and the incident came into the remit of the competent prosecutor and judge. The bodies were found in the zone of terrorist activities, which indicates that the victims were either killed by terrorists or were terrorists themselves.

673. The Chamber ascribed to Lukić something he did not say in his interview.⁹⁷⁸ Thus, the part of the interview pertaining to Pusto Selo was interpreted to relate to Izbica. When asked by the Prosecutor about, "the Investigation in both of these cases, in Pusto Selo and Izbica...", Lukić replied: "When we speak about Pusto Selo..." which clearly implies that Lukić spoke about Pusto Selo. As regards Izbica, Lukić was not even able to talk about the types of injuries, as the post-mortem report was submitted to the investigative judge only in 2003.⁹⁷⁹

674. Concerning the dispatch of 28.5.1999, as Gagić explained, the MUP Staff was used as an address to which he sent the dispatch on behalf of the Crime Police Administration to Crime Police Departments (OKPs) on the ground.⁹⁸⁰ The Chamber's reference to the indictment of Milošević/Stojiljković is not clear as this fact is not mentioned in this dispatch and its attachment.

675. The Chamber misinterpreted document 6D666 of 3.4.1999, by noting that Lukić "instructed" heads of Kosovo SUPs and commanders of PJP detachments "to prevent any forcible eviction of the Kosovo Albanian population." The exhibit itself and 6D-2⁹⁸¹ clearly show that Lukić actually prepared an official note of the "order relayed" to the SUPs, but not to the commanders of PJP detachments, as erroneously noted by the Chamber.

676. Lukić prepared this note in order to show that he relayed the above-mentioned order. The order was transmitted on 5.4.1999. and not on 3.4.1999, as indicated in the document admitted into evidence. This is confirmed by the dispatch of 15.4.1999,⁹⁸² which actually refers to the order relayed on 5.4.1999. Furthermore, 6D-2 confirmed that Lukic conveyed order from MUP on 3.4.1999⁹⁸³. Joksic also confirmed that he received such an order from Head of RDB⁹⁸⁴.

⁹⁷⁸ III/1092

⁹⁷⁹ Tomašević-(T.7034/21-7036/2)

⁹⁸⁰ T.24477-24478/4; 24526/17-24527/6

⁹⁸¹ T.25347/1-18

⁹⁸² 6D778

⁹⁸³ 6D2-(T.25347)

⁹⁸⁴ Joksic-(T.22052)

677. The Chamber concluded that the mass departure continued even after 5.4.1999., noting that “from 5 to 30.4.1999, a total number of 101,628 more” citizens had left Kosovo. It is a period of twenty-five days, while in the first eleven days of the bombing about 600,000 citizens had left Kosovo. This proves that the relayed order actually produced appropriate results, and that it was mostly obeyed. This is also confirmed by the fact indicated in the dispatch of 15.4.1999. that “certain senior officers tolerate mass departure of civilian population.” Certain, but not the majority senior officers did tolerate the departure, but attempts were made to prevent it. The above statistical data also show that the greatest mass departure of civilians was a consequence of a shock that ensued after the bombing had started.

678. In I/541 the Chamber did not associate this meeting with the letter sent by Arbour. Likewise, in III/140 and III/141, in analyzing Milutinović’s responsibility, the Chamber did not note the same. Although the Chamber referred to the interview with Lukić in order to corroborate its conclusion that the meeting was indeed held,⁹⁸⁵ the Chamber failed to note that Lukić did not mention that the letter from the Prosecutor was the reason for this meeting, but rather it was a routine reporting exercise under bombing conditions.⁹⁸⁶ Arbour sent her letter on 26.3.1999, i.e. 39 days before this meeting, and therefore, the Chamber improperly concluded that this letter was the reason for this meeting.

679. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss “the tasks in the defense of the country, anti-terrorist combat [...]”⁹⁸⁷

680. The Chamber itself noted that “the security forces of the VJ had dealt with numerous cases of violence,” while there is no mention of any crimes committed by members of the MUP. Specifically, if there had been any crimes committed by members of the MUP, the VJ security organs would have reported them and they would have been discussed at this meeting.

681. The Chamber’s conclusion in III/141 is contrary: “The Chamber is satisfied that during the [...] meeting the security situation in Kosovo was discussed, a mention was made of structures put in place to help ‘all citizens to return to their homes’ once the hostilities ceased, [...] the security forces of the VJ had also dealt with numerous cases of violence, murder, looting, and other crimes, and had arrested several hundred perpetrators [...]”

⁹⁸⁵ III/1095

⁹⁸⁶ P948,p.142,143,144

⁹⁸⁷ 5D1289

682. Although Lukić heard of crimes at this meeting, he also heard that competent organs(VJ security organs) took all measures envisaged by the law against perpetrators. The Chamber itself drew the same conclusion in III/141: “The Chamber was presented with no evidence that Milutinović knew this information to be incorrect.” The Chamber had to draw the same conclusion with regard to Lukić. No evidence was presented that Lukić knew that this information was incorrect. The Chamber assessed the same fact differently with regard to different Accused.

683. In discussing Lukić’s statement at the meeting of 11.5.1999,⁹⁸⁸ the Chamber failed to note the key sentence,⁹⁸⁹ that “the mass departure of civilians must be prevented immediately,” and that, in such context, measures and treatment of civilians should be foreseen in the zone of operations. It is clear that civilians were to be protected/secured in order to remain in their places of residence.

c. Lazarević’s report of 24.5.1999. (P1458)

684. Concerning Lazarević’s report of 24.5.1999, the Chamber failed to consider⁹⁹⁰ evidence that calls into question when this document was prepared. The PrK Operational Logbook⁹⁹¹, kept track of all written documents prepared by the Priština Corps under number “455”. However, the Operational Logbook does not contain any reference to the above report.⁹⁹² None of the VJ witnesses provided any explanation as to how it was possible that this report was not registered in the Logbook.

685. The Chamber noted that “it appears from Stefanović’s testimony that Lazarević’s report was based on a report that the former had previously sent to the Priština Corps Command.”⁹⁹³ No such report was presented at trial.

d. Pavković’s report of 25.5.1999. (P1459)

686. Concerning Pavković’s report, Appellant emphasizes that all VJ witnesses confirmed that they never saw the above report, or had any knowledge about the alleged crimes of the MUP

⁹⁸⁸ P1993

⁹⁸⁹ III/1096

⁹⁹⁰ I/1182;III/847

⁹⁹¹ 6D1486

⁹⁹² Id.

⁹⁹³ III/848

indicated therein. Đaković confirmed that the 3rd Army Logbook was kept in the archives of the 3rd Army, as it was under his control, and that it was not clear to him how it disappeared⁹⁹⁴. Serbian authorities provided evidence that this Logbook had disappeared.⁹⁹⁵

687. In Pavković's response to the allegations made by Arbour,⁹⁹⁶ Pavković did not mention the issue of alleged crimes committed by police members, even though this was an excellent opportunity to mention these crimes bearing in mind the topic of the report.⁹⁹⁷

688. The Chamber relied⁹⁹⁸ on P1459 and P1458, though other evidence adduced showed that these exhibits cannot be considered trustworthy. The evidence questions the authenticity of these two documents to such an extent that the Chamber couldn't have based any inferences on them. Specifically, the Chamber failed to adequately consider the following:

- a) Based on the PrK Operational logbook, it can be concluded that the documents bearing number "455" were not sent during the war.⁹⁹⁹
- b) Simić who assumed his function in Priština immediately after the date on which these documents were allegedly sent had no information that would confirm the existence/accuracy of the allegations contained in these letters.¹⁰⁰⁰
- c) Several witnesses from the VJ/MUP structures testified that they had never seen the above letters and denied the contents thereof.¹⁰⁰¹
- d) In performing his function of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Pavković ordered in 2001 that the original documents kept in the VJ archives be replaced with "authentic" and "legible" copies thereof, and that the originals be kept in Pavković's office.¹⁰⁰²

⁹⁹⁴ Tr.26532/8-26533/16

⁹⁹⁵ 6D1665

⁹⁹⁶ 3D790

⁹⁹⁷ III/757

⁹⁹⁸ I/1182,I/1183

⁹⁹⁹ 6D1486

¹⁰⁰⁰ Simić(Tr.15760/22-15761/22;15673,/21-15676/4;15717/19-22)

¹⁰⁰¹ 6D1614,para.90;6D1631,para.86;Stojanović(Tr.19815/12-20);Stefanović(Tr. 21715/9-24);

Živaljević(Tr.24837/17-24838/19)

¹⁰⁰² Jevtović, Tr. 20379/8 – 20380/8

e) General Ojdanić never received P1459 (also, the document does not have a stamp indicating that it was received by the Supreme Command Staff).¹⁰⁰³ The Chamber was presented with evidence that this document had never been in the VJ archives.¹⁰⁰⁴

f) Both documents contain initials “BB”, which indicates that these documents were typed/sent by the same staff-person. Moreover, Mladenovski,¹⁰⁰⁵ as well as graphology expert Aleksić, provided sufficient arguments for any reasonable trier of fact to conclude that these documents were recorded “subsequently”, and that, taking into account the foregoing, they cannot be considered reliable evidence.

689. Simić/Terzić who performed the inspection of the PrK, both stated that neither Lazarević, nor Pavković informed them about the problems/contents of the reports during the meeting of 26.5.1999, which was organized as the final meeting following the inspection of the work of the PrK Command and its units, and nothing like that is contained in the Report post-inspection.¹⁰⁰⁶ This meeting was an opportunity to inform the members of the Supreme Command Staff about the problems/information concerning the alleged crimes committed by police members, so that they could proceed with investigation of those crimes in Belgrade. Both confirmed that after the inspection had been completed, Pavković did not inform them about this.

690. Based on the foregoing, the Chamber should have reasonably concluded that the above mentioned reports were not prepared during the relevant time, but at a later stage, most probably at the time when Lukic established a working group to investigate mass graves in Serbia.

e. Pavković’s report of 4.6.1999.

691. The Chamber erroneously and without any factual basis associated Pavković’s report of 4.6.1999 with document P1725 , since this report refers to the report of the Supreme Command Staff in relation to the inspection of the PrK.¹⁰⁰⁷ The contents of this report is not even remotely as detailed as Lazarević’s and Pavković’s reports of 24 and 25.5.1999, which indicate murders at check points, killing of civilians in convoys, etc. The information contained in the report of

¹⁰⁰³Gajić(Tr.15428/3-15431/2);Curcin(Tr.16964/19-16965/2;17020/17-17021/8);Vlajkovic(Tr.16072/22-16703/6)

¹⁰⁰⁴ 3D1077;3D1078;Radoičić(Tr.16127/9-16130/4)

¹⁰⁰⁵ 3D1130;3D1135,para.7-13;Tr.25762/12-24;25768/11-25775/15

¹⁰⁰⁶3D692

¹⁰⁰⁷ 3D692

4.6.1999 is taken over from the report prepared by a team of the Supreme Command Staff based on the inspection of a brigade in Podujevo¹⁰⁰⁸ If Lazarević's and Pavković's reports of 24 and 25.5.1999 had been prepared at that time, Pavković would have certainly referred to these reports as they contain far more serious problems than indicated in the report of 4.6.1999.

Q. CONSOLIDATED CRIME BASE

1. IMPERMISSIBLE INFERENCES AS TO CRIME BASE LOCATIONS

692. The discovery of mortal remains of persons from Djakovica (as an example) does not in and of itself provide automatic affirmation that a crime has occurred, or that Appellant had knowledge of the same, so as to be found criminally liable for these deaths.

693. Again, with respect to a majority of the 287 deaths in the Djakovica surroundings, the Chamber's reasoning is more conjecture than solid evidence.

694. The Chamber found "it is established that this process of exhuming and moving bodies was carried out in order to cover up the results of a joint VJ/MUP operation, and the fact the MUP was responsible for the cover up provides strong evidence of its forces' involvement in the commission of crimes."¹⁰⁰⁹

695. However, strong evidence does not mean only evidence, and considerable evidence was given of combat having taken place and Police organs, including Zlatkovic, engaging in the legitimate/legal police function of investigating/documenting the bodies.¹⁰¹⁰ This evidence of dead persons being terrorists/combatants resulting from legitimate combat was confirmed in VJ combat reports.¹⁰¹¹

696. The equally reasonable inference that some of these combatant bodies were transported to Serbia and part of the "deaths" now being asserted in the 287 cannot be rebutted, but was not even considered by the Chamber.

¹⁰⁰⁸ 5D436

¹⁰⁰⁹ II/ 237.

¹⁰¹⁰ 6D1627, paras.39-42;Zlatkovic-Tr.25281/25-25285/14

¹⁰¹¹ 6D1468

697. The Chamber erred in that it found the KLA presence in the Djakovica area (Reka/Caragojs) was not significant on 27 and 28.4.1999, and thus the Reka operation was primarily directed against the civilian population.

698. This is unsupported by the evidence. The Chamber had access to Rule 70 documents that demonstrated intel/factual reports received by the United States that indeed the entire region surrounding Djakovica(including the Reka/Carragoj valley) was in the hands of strong KLA forces that held even a significant portion of Djakovica Town.¹⁰¹²

699. This evidence was corroborated by various witnesses,¹⁰¹³ including OTP witnesses¹⁰¹⁴ who affirmed the presence of the KLA precisely in this area.

700. The totality of the evidence demonstrates precisely what type of information was available to Appellant. There was no evidence adduced that he was present in Djakovica 27 or 28.4.1999. so as to know personally of the deaths being now charged against him, and no first-hand reason to know of any such deaths “concealed” as deaths of terrorists when in fact civilian.

701. What was adduced at trial was the method by which daily reports were sent to the Staff, which Appellant then re-submitted to the MUP headquarters in Belgrade.¹⁰¹⁵

702. Albeit translation capacity concerns denied the defense from presenting all Daily overviews prepared by the Staff, a significant number were admitted into evidence, and in particular, relating to dates after the alleged deaths, are devoid of any information of these deaths having occurred.¹⁰¹⁶

703. Zlatkovic testified that the on-site investigations that were conducted by the MUP after the operation were destroyed in the SUP when NATO bombed the same.¹⁰¹⁷ The VJ reports speak of dead terrorists.¹⁰¹⁸ Thus it is perfectly legitimate/reasonable for someone based on that information to have the impression that terrorists perished in combat, and that investigative steps were being taken by the law enforcement authorities to investigate and document each death before taking any

¹⁰¹² 6D1637;6D1638;6D1639

¹⁰¹³ Zivanovic(Tr.20440/13-18,20495/15-20496/10);Zlatkovic-Tr.25274/7-16

¹⁰¹⁴ Zyrapi-Tr.6264/23-6265/7;K73-Tr.3395/25-3396/4

¹⁰¹⁵ Mijatovic-Tr.22222/13-22223/4;Vucurevic-Tr.23052/20-23053/12

¹⁰¹⁶ 6D1232-6D1252,6D1254-6D1257,6D1259-6D1261,P1693

¹⁰¹⁷ Zlatkovic-Tr.25304/24-25305/12

¹⁰¹⁸ 6D1468

action against unjustified homicides in Djakovica municipality. In essence, Appellant had no knowledge of any unjustifiable homicides that had been reported after investigation, and at most could have had knowledge of homicides being investigated legitimately and properly by the local authorities. This is precisely the same circumstances under which the Chamber acquitted Milutinovic, in finding “even when put on notice regarding the displacement and possible crimes, mostly by international representatives, he was the same time told by the FRY/Serbian authorities with official responsibilities therefore that they were being dealt with or that they were caused by KLA and NATO. Thus the Chamber cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the only inference to be drawn from the evidence relating to notice is that Milutinovic knew of the physical or intermediary perpetrators’ intent to commit crimes of displacement.”¹⁰¹⁹

704. Moreover, the Chamber’s linkage of the exhumation/reburial process to criminal participation and liability of MUP forces cannot be properly inferred to Appellant. On the basis of ALL the evidence before it, the Chamber has acquitted Appellant of involvement in the exhumation/reburial of these bodies.¹⁰²⁰

705. Having already acquitted Appellant of involvement in “concealment” of bodies (the same bodies that constitute a vast majority of the 287 victims alleged for Djakovica), it is improper/illogical to hold Appellant criminally responsible and satisfying his knowledge/participation in the crime by using the very same “concealment”.

706. Respectfully, the findings of the Chamber are in direct contradiction to one another. Having already acquitted President Milutinovic for having even more knowledge than that of Appellant, an acquittal of Appellant is warranted.

707. Due to the restrictions imposed on the length of the Appeals brief, we have presented Djakovica as the leading example of this specific ground of error which applies to all municipalities. We will also highlight Prizren to demonstrate the same errors at play. We will treat Gnjilane separately because of its unique position in the trial.

708. As to NATO air-strikes significant evidence was adduced as to the municipalities of Pec,¹⁰²¹ Decane,¹⁰²² Orahovac,¹⁰²³ Suva Reka,¹⁰²⁴ Srbica,¹⁰²⁵ Kosovska Mitrovica¹⁰²⁶, Pristina,¹⁰²⁷

¹⁰¹⁹ III/281

¹⁰²⁰ III/1113.

¹⁰²¹ 6D323,6D1557,6D1558,6D1559

¹⁰²² P2616

¹⁰²³ 6D1631 para.103;6D1401,para.30

Urosevac,¹⁰²⁸Kacanik,¹⁰²⁹ that simply was not considered as an alternative reason reasonable under the evidence.

709. Likewise, there was considerable evidence presented that was omitted from the Chamber's findings, relative to the presence/activity of the KLA in Pec,¹⁰³⁰Decane,¹⁰³¹Orahovac,¹⁰³²Suva Reka,¹⁰³³Srbica,¹⁰³⁴Kosovska Mitrovica¹⁰³⁵,Pristina,¹⁰³⁶ Urosevac,¹⁰³⁷Kacanik.¹⁰³⁸

710. Just as in Djakovica, the Daily Bulletins introduced into evidence don't indicate that Appellant had knowledge of any crimes relative to the Indictment sites, nor any crimes that were condoned by or failed to be investigated by the relevant authorities for all the above municipalities.¹⁰³⁹

711. If the Appellant had no notice of these events in such a manner so as to put him on notice of a criminal plan in which he could be considered a participant, then he could not have the intent necessary to be convicted of direct/indirect participation in the crimes themselves or the aftermath.

¹⁰²⁴ 5D885

¹⁰²⁵ 5D1023;5D1033

¹⁰²⁶ 6D1614,para95

¹⁰²⁷ Anđelković,T.14673-14676,14678;Marinković,T.23457,23462–23463;P2443,para.22;Kabashi,P2250,p.6,P2251,T.4016–4017;Bogosavljević,T.23856;6D1606,para.33; Bogosavljević,T.23856;Filić,T.23970,24035–24036;Mijatović,T.22176–22177;Deretić,T.22577–22578,22585;Filipović,T.19174–19176,19192–19193;5D1242.

¹⁰²⁸ Jelić,T.18945;

¹⁰²⁹ P3115,T.37904

¹⁰³⁰ 6D1603,paras.16,34,35;Paponjak-T.24539,24547–24548; Nikčević-T.23242–23243; 6D1606,paras.11,14, ; Joksić-T.21977–21978;Crosland-T.9919,3D510,para. 63,Annex B; ;4D141;6D698

¹⁰³¹ 6D96;6D490;6D491; 6D1014

¹⁰³² Zyrapi- T.5967,T.5991,T.6258–6259,T.6264/23-6265/7;P2447;P2469;P2808;3D1048;6D1013;Delić-T.19438;IC152

¹⁰³³ Zyrapi-Tr.6264/23-6265/7;K83,T.3978–3979;Vojnović,T.24172;6D1532,paras.27–28;6D787; ZyrapiT.5934,5967,6258;P2469;P2465;P2447;P2468;P2459;Maisonneuve,-T.11133;P2772,para.15, attachment MM2/B;6D1008,p.1;Joksić,6D1491,para.62; 6D1010;6D1635e-court-p.8.

¹⁰³⁴ Damjanac-T.23738;Zyrapi,T.5934,5967,5991,6242-6244,6258;P2469;P2447;IC105

¹⁰³⁵ 6D1614,paras.25-35,37-39,43

¹⁰³⁶ Zyrapi-T.5934,5967,6018,6258;P2469;Gërzhaliu-T.2529–2530;Byrnes,T.12232;6D1016; Filipović,T.19165;Kabashi,T.2083,2086–2087,2114;P2251,T.4048, Kabashi,T.2084–2085;6D1017;Phillips,T.12016–12017;Filić,T.23951–23953;Filipović,T.19164;6D1495,paras.28–30;6D1523;6D1524;6D1525;P407,p.820

¹⁰³⁷ Zyrapi,T.5932,5934,5967,5987–5989,6209,6259;P2469;P2453,p.2;Kotur,T.20647;6D1,T.25671–25672,(closed session);Debeljković,6D1533,paras.57,66;6D412;6D614,p.667,para.448., Hyseni,T.3131–3132.

¹⁰³⁸ Zyrapi,T.5967,6046–6047,6259;P2469;Drewienkiewicz,P2508,para.191;P2469;Loku,T.3185,P2296,p.2; Dashi,T.4628–4629;5D8,p.2,P680,p.4.,Jelić,T.18839–18840,18845,Lazarević,T.17869–17870;5D253,p.1.

¹⁰³⁹ 6D1232-6D1252,6D1254-6D1257,6D1259-6D1261,P1693

2. IMPROPER RELIANCE UPON OMPF LIST OF MISSING PERSONS TO DETERMINE THE DATES AND LOCATION OF DEATH

712. The Chamber erred in its reliance upon Prosecution Evidence that lacks indicia of credibility.

713. For a vast majority of the 287 named murder victims in Djakovica that are attributed to the MUP/VJ forces, very little or no direct OTP witness testimony was adduced at trial.

714. Respectfully, as to a vast majority of the named victims, the sole evidence relied upon by the Judgment for conviction is the list of missing persons prepared by the OMPF (“Office of Missing Persons and Forensics”¹⁰⁴⁰)

715. The OMPF list(P2454), respectfully, is insufficient to meet the burden of proof of death that can be relied upon for a criminal conviction.

716. The OMPF list does not identify the basis of the assertion, which is erroneously relied upon by the Chamber, that the victim was part of a group of people last seen in Meja on 27.4.1999.

717. Specifically, P2454 does not provide ANY indication of where/when the deceased met their demise, and does not differentiate as to wounds received in combat or otherwise. As such, this evidence cannot meet the burden of proof necessary to establish the death of an individual that may be attributed to Appellant.

718. P2798, is merely a spreadsheet from OMPF, with an unexplained entry “date event” and “location event” upon which the Judgment is relying in concluding that these fatalities occurred during the Reka operation in the Carragojs valley of Djakovica. There is no further information, most importantly any explanation of the source of this hearsay information. There is no correlation of this information to any evidence that was led at trial to conclude that the deaths are chargeable against the Appellant.

¹⁰⁴⁰ IV/Annex C

719. Indeed, the source for any such assertion was not subjected to cross-examination and thus the Defense was deprived of an essential right to confront the evidence, that, unbeknownst to the defense, was to become the crux/lynchpin of judgment convicting Appellant.

720. These findings violate the principle of *in dubio pro reo*, as well as Rules 92bis and 92ter that relate to written statements that can be admitted without the declarant being subjected to cross-examination. The Chamber also violated its own ruling in regards to “AS SEEN AS TOLD” and “UNDER ORDERS” where similar evidence was barred.¹⁰⁴¹

721. These assertions as to names of individuals whose remains were transferred to OMPF from Batajnica or other secondary graves by no means can be reasonably considered to establish that in addition to being seen in Meja 27.4.1999(although as stated even that cannot be taken as proven under the appropriate standard) these individuals met their mortal end at that location as a direct/proximate result of criminal acts by the VJ/MUP that Appellant had reason to know of.

722. Indeed, the recovery of remains from a secondary grave does not determine the precise manner/location of death, and does not establish whether death was as a combatant or as a civilian, so as to cause criminal liability to attach thereto.

723. Indeed, the Prosecution brought witness testimony to explain the demise of only a handful of the alleged victims.¹⁰⁴²

724. As a true indication of the unreliable nature of OTP witnesses, the Chamber concluded it had “unconvincing” evidence as to the killing of Kole Dushmani, and was not satisfied that his death was done by the forces of the FRY and Serbia.¹⁰⁴³ Likewise, despite OTP testimony that Skender Pjetri was also killed at the Markaj compound, the Judgment rightly declines to find criminal responsibility due to the lack of any body.¹⁰⁴⁴

725. For a large number of “victims” from Srbica/Izbica the OMPF list and one compiled by KLA Commander Loshi are the sole evidence of a person having been killed in Izbica by Serb MUP on 28.3.1999,¹⁰⁴⁵ even though many of the OMPF “victims”(50-42,3%) have a different date

¹⁰⁴¹ 1.9.2006

¹⁰⁴² II/233

¹⁰⁴³ II/235

¹⁰⁴⁴ II/233

¹⁰⁴⁵ IV/649,651,652,654,655,656,657,758,659,660,661,662,663,665,666,668,669,670,671,679,680,681,682,683,684,686,687,688,689,691,691,692,693,694,695,696,697,698,699,700,701,702,703,704,705,706,707,708,709,710,711,712,713,7

for disappearance AFTER 28.3.1999.¹⁰⁴⁶ It is discernible error to assert persons who disappeared days later perished days earlier, as this is illogical. The Prosecution eyewitness testimony brought does not link these deaths to the incident Accordingly, the imposition of criminal liability is not proper, because the standard of proof has not been met. In at least one instance, the OMPF information does not even record the person as having gone missing in Izbica.¹⁰⁴⁷ The error is compounded by the fact that “while the chamber has found that approximately 93 people were killed, it is unable to state exactly which of the remaining victims named in Schedule F were part of that number although obviously most were” then referring to volume IV where the questioned lists are the sole evidence.¹⁰⁴⁸ We cannot rely solely on a list to determine the burden of proof has been met.

726. The OMPF list again plays a role in Suva Reka. However in that instance, OMPF was only relied upon to determine when/where death occurred in the cases when accompanied with direct witnesses as to the circumstances of death.¹⁰⁴⁹ It is critical to note that, where OMPF listed an individual as missing and there was no direct eye-witness, “The Chamber is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that these two persons were killed in Suva Reka on 26.3.1999.”¹⁰⁵⁰ This is proper application of the standard of proof, and the same reasoning/rationale ought to have been employed in the case of Djakovica/Izbica.

3. DEATH FORENSICALLY UNASCERTAINED

727. It is difficult to discern if the proper forensic conclusions have been made as to method and manner of death, by the Chamber. The Indictment listed only names, and only an approximate age.

728. The Chamber erred in its reasoning that discrepancies between names of charged victims and mortal remains that were identified was minor and did not affect the ability to identify “victims”.¹⁰⁵¹

14,715,716,717,718,720,721,722,723,724,725,726,727,729,733,734,735,736,737,738,739,742,746,748,750,751,752,753,754,755,756,757,759,760,762,763,765.

¹⁰⁴⁶ IV/649-767

¹⁰⁴⁷ IV/680

¹⁰⁴⁸ II/250

¹⁰⁴⁹ II/537-543

¹⁰⁵⁰ II/544;IV/633

¹⁰⁵¹ IV/22;IV/649;IV/934

729. As was demonstrated, many Kosovo Albanians had similar/same names. Without proper biographical information, it becomes impossible for the defense to have actual knowledge of victims for whom criminal liability is asserted, and to challenge the same.

730. Likewise, it is respectfully submitted that by lowering the standard so drastically, where not a single live/documentary witness was called to testify as to the existence, identity and demise stated victims puts the credibility of the Tribunal in jeopardy. This is especially true where scant lists are the sole basis of determining liability of Appellant.

731. In regards to mortal remains alleged to be evidence of victims relative to Djakovica, there are several forensic discrepancies which call into question the factual allegations of the indictment, which were largely unsupported. Among these are the following.

732. PJETER ABAZI – where the Chamber noted the autopsy findings on the remains demonstrate a conclusion “which is not consistent with the approximate age of the indictment.”¹⁰⁵² It should be noted that the concern of the Chamber over a critical inconsistency did lead the Chamber to refrain from adjudicating that Mr. Abazi from the indictment died as a result of a crime and that Appellant is responsible.¹⁰⁵³ The multiple other persons for whom the Chamber did not find the death criminally caused should best illustrate the flaws apparent in the method of relying on OTP OMPF lists as your sole evidence.¹⁰⁵⁴

733. A significant number of remains are said to have the cause of death unascertained.¹⁰⁵⁵ Shockingly, of 287 victims with remains for whom criminal liability is adjudged, no fewer than 84 are remains where no forensic manner of death was ascertained. It is shocking that almost 30% of the victims for whom liability is adjudged don't have any evidence their death was unnatural/criminal. Where no direct evidence was led as to the nature of the death for a vast preponderance of these “victims”, this is insufficient for criminal liability for murder.

¹⁰⁵² IV/26.

¹⁰⁵³ II/329

¹⁰⁵⁴ id

¹⁰⁵⁵ IV/27,IV/29,IV/34,IV/35,IV/41,IV/42,IV/43,IV/48,IV/55,IV/58,IV/59,IV/64,IV/65,IV/71,IV/72,IV/73,IV/75,IV/76,IV/77,IV/78,IV/79,IV/86,IV/87,IV/90,IV/96,IV/97,IV/126,IV/132,IV/140,IV/145,IV/157,IV/175,IV/178,IV/180,IV/183,IV/184,IV/186,IV/189,IV/206,IV/109,IV/210,IV/211,IV/218,IV/219,IV/220,IV/221,IV/227,IV/238,IV/247,IV/248,IV/250,IV/251,IV/264,IV/277,IV/280,IV/282,IV/283,IV/285,IV/301,IV/304,IV/305,IV/306,IV/308,IV/309,IV/312,IV/322,IV/330,IV/331,IV/333,IV/338,IV/345,IV/349,IV/351,IV/352,IV/371,IV/373,IV/375,IV/379,IV/387,IV/396,IV/399,IV/401,IV/404.

734. In regards to several alleged victims arising out of Srbica(Izbica), there are several forensic discrepancies which call into question the findings, which were largely unsupported by any evidence.

- a) a significant number of victims (100/116;86.2%)have no proof of death or violent mode of death ascertained by forensics so as to allow it to be attributed to a war-crime chargeable against Appellant.¹⁰⁵⁶ Where no direct evidence was led as to the nature of the death by the Prosecution at trial for a vast preponderance of these “victims”, this is insufficient to establish murder.
- b) IV/658 – the only OTP evidence confirms NOT killed at Izbica;
- c) The persons at IV/676/685/728/749 have no evidence submitted whatsoever.
- d) IV/686 has no evidence linking to Izbica.
- e) IV/683 the Chamber is unsure how the OTP linked the name to a victim.

735. The Chamber’s free disposition to conjecture the cause of death where it is not able to be done so by forensic professionals ought to cause concern for the manner in which the other evidence was viewed.

4. NO FORENSIC EVIDENCE OF A BODY

736. It is respectfully submitted that the Chamber erred, in finding that deaths occurred in Mala Krusa and/or Srbica for which Appellant bears criminal responsibility.

737. The Judgment erroneously found that 111 individuals in schedule C of the Indictment were killed by MUP forces on 26.3.1999 in Mala Krusa¹⁰⁵⁷, 59 persons were killed by MUP in Bela Crkva¹⁰⁵⁸ and 93 individuals from Schedule F were killed by MUP/PJP in Srbica/Izbica.¹⁰⁵⁹

¹⁰⁵⁶IV/649/650/651/652/654/656/657/660/662/666/669/670/671/673/675/679/691/695/697/699/701/702/703/708/709/710/711/716/717/720/722/724/726/727/729/731/733/734/735/736/739/743/744/745/746/750/751/752/754/755/759/760/766

¹⁰⁵⁷ II/433

¹⁰⁵⁸ II/381-382

¹⁰⁵⁹ II/679-687

738. In reaching these conclusions the Judgment based its findings in whole on evidence that suffered defects in credibility, lacked sufficient qualities to meet the burden of proof, and that were rebutted by defense evidence as to alternative causes which must be given priority under *in dubio pro reo*.

739. It should be noted that, where charges of murder are concerned, the evidentiary burden to be met includes proof beyond any reasonable doubt that:

- a) the victim is dead;
- b) the death was caused by an act or omission of the perpetrator; and
- c) the act or omission was done with intention to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm, or to inflict serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that such act or omission was likely to cause death.¹⁰⁶⁰

740. The *actus reus* consists in the action/omission of the accused resulting in the death of the victim, and therefore the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct contributed substantially to the death of the victim.¹⁰⁶¹

741. In the Stakic case the Chamber concluded the Prosecution has only met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an individual is deceased when the victim is either:

- (i) *exhumed and identified*, (ii) *identified by an eye-witness as being killed or by a witness as still missing or dead*, or (iii) *named in a death certificate issued by a local court*,¹⁰⁶²

742. Where the Prosecution intends or seeks to discharge its burden with circumstantial evidence rather than production of a body, the ONLY reasonable inference under the evidence must be that the victim is dead as a result of the acts/omissions of the accused.¹⁰⁶³ A review of the findings and evidence does not support this inference.

743. With regard to Mala Krusa not a single one of the 111 named victims had a body recovered and yet criminal responsibility for Murder was entered. It should be noted that even the Chamber

¹⁰⁶⁰ *Prosecutor v. Vasiljević*, IT-98-32,(Trial Judgment)29.11.2002,para.205(“*Vasiljević* TJ”)

¹⁰⁶¹ *Prosecutor v. Brdjanin* IT-99-36 (Trial Judgment) 4.1.2004,para.382(“*Brdjanin* TJ”),

¹⁰⁶² *Prosecutor v. Stakic*,IT-97-24-T(Trial Judgment),31.7.2003,para.939

¹⁰⁶³ *Brdjanin* TJ,para.385 (“*Brdjanin* TJ”),*citing Prosecutor vs. Krnojelac* IT- 97-25,(Trial Judgment) 15.3.2002,para 326-327.

acknowledged that there was no forensic evidence.¹⁰⁶⁴ Respectfully, with no forensic evidence it is simply impossible for there ONLY to be an inference of a murder, as it is equally available under the evidence that the event never happened. Indeed, the 2 Prosecution witnesses were found to be unreliable and contradictory to several other persons for whom the Chamber declined to assert liability.¹⁰⁶⁵ Thus their evidence cannot dispel reasonable doubt nor the presumption of innocence.

744. In Bela Crkva, the Chamber relied on two Prosecution witnesses- but for 7 out of the 59(12%)victims¹⁰⁶⁶ Forensic teams did not identify any remains belonging to the persons stated by the witnesses to have been killed. Such a discrepancy calls into account whether the witnesses can be relied upon for their description of how the deaths occurred and who was involved.

745. With regard to Srbica/Izbica, of a total of 116 scheduled victims, 48 total(41.38%)¹⁰⁶⁷of the victims never had a body recovered/offered as proof of death. The *Actus Reus* is thus not satisfied.

746. The Chamber's approach to other municipalities, rightly could not deem a chargeable death occurred and did not assert liability where there was no body recovered.¹⁰⁶⁸ The only explanation for this disparate treatment by the Chamber is that they committed error as to these three sites(Mala Krusa/Bela Crkva/Izbica).

747. Respectfully, the Judgment does not offer an analysis under prevailing jurisprudence to satisfy this burden finding that 111 persons from Mala Krusa and 59 persons from Bela Crkva and 93 from Srbica/Izbica were killed by the MUP, nor that criminal liability properly attaches to Appellant as a result of his actions/omissions. These findings¹⁰⁶⁹ should be vacated, and the sentence reconsidered, or new trial ordered.

¹⁰⁶⁴ II/430-431

¹⁰⁶⁵ II/434

¹⁰⁶⁶ IV/412,415,418,423,427,467,477.

¹⁰⁶⁷ 649 650 653 655 658 659 661 663 664 668 672 674 676 677 680 681 685 686 687 690 693 694 696 698 700 704 705 706 715 719 721 723 728 730 737 738 740 741 742 747 748 749 756 757 758 761 764 765.

¹⁰⁶⁸ e.g.II/239;IV/99(Djakovica)

¹⁰⁶⁹ II/15,II/18,II/19,II/20,II/21,II/23,II/24,II/25,II/26,II/27,II/28,II/29,II/30,II/32,II/33,II/34,II/35,II/36,II/38,II/39,II/48,I I/52,II/53,II/57,II/58,II/59,II/60,II/61,II/62,II/63,II/64,II/65,II/66,II/67,II/68,II/69, II/74, II/75, II/76,II/77,II/78,II/79,II/80,II/81,II/82,II/83,II/84,II/85,II/86,II/87,II/88,II/89,II/90,II/91,II/92,II/139,II/140,II/141,II/144, II/145,II/147,II/148,II/149,II/238,II/244,II/298,II/304,II/310,II/311,II/312,II/313,II/315,II/320,II/321,II/322,II/323,II/324,II/325,II/326,II/327,II/328,II/329,II/330,II/331,II/332,II/333,II/334,II/335,II/340,II/341,II/342,II/343,II/344,II/345,II/346,II/347,II/348,II/349,II/350,II/351,II/352,II/353,II/354,II/355,II/356,II/357,II/358,II/359,II/360,II/367,II/368,II/369,II/370,II/371,II/372,II/373,II/374,II/375,II/380,II/381,II/382,II/383,II/384,II/385,II/397,II/400,II/402,II/403,II/404,II/405,I I/406,II/407,II/408,II/409,II/410,II/411,II/412,II/413,II/414,II/415,II/416,II/417,II/418,II/419,II/420,II/421,II/422,II/423, II/424,II/425,II/426,II/427,II/432,II/433,II/460,II/611,II/612,II/616,II/616,II/619,II/621,II/735,II/742,II/743,II/746,II/759,II/760,II/761,II/762,II/764,II/768,II/769,II/770,II/771,II/774,II/775,II/777,II/778,II/779,II/781,II/782,II/783,II/784,II/785,II/790,II/794,II/795,II/796,II/799,II/800,II/805,II/806,II/808,II/811,II/812,II/814,II/816,II/817,II/818,II/820,II/822,II/823,II/825,II/826,II/827,II/828,II/829,II/830,II/831,II/832,II/833,II/836,II/837,II/839,II/840,II/841,II/842,II/843,II/844,I

5. VICTIMS NOT NAMED IN INDICTMENT

748. Criminal liability was asserted for victims who were not previously in the Indictment. This is true for the judicial findings in regards to Suva Reka/Vucitrn/Srbica.¹⁰⁷⁰ The error is of such a magnitude, that a significant number of deaths in Izbica fall in this category.

I/845,II/846,II/848,II/849,II/850,II/851,II/852,II/853,II/854,II/855,II/856,II/857,II/858,II/859,II/860,II/861,II/863,II/869,II/873,II/874,II/875,II/876,II/877,II/878,II/880,II/881,II/885,II/886,II/887,II/888,II/894,II/897,II/912,II/915,II/918,II/921,II/926,II/927,II/928,II/929,II/931,II/934,II/936,II/937,II/942,II/944,II/946,II/948,II/955,II/960,II/965,II/968,II/973,II/974,II/975,II/983,II/990,II/997,II/998,II/999,II/1003,II/1009,II/1010,II/1011,II/1024,II/1025,II/1026,II/1067,II/1089,II/1091,II/1095,II/1099,II/1103,II/1104,II/1140,II/1141,II/1142,II/1143,II/1144,II/1148,II/1149,II/1151,II/1156,II/1157,II/99,II/897,II/1175,II/1176,II/1177,II/1178,II/1180,II/1181,II/1182,II/1182,II/1183,II/1184,II/1185,II/1186,II/1187,II/1188,II/1189,II/1190,II/1191,II/1192,II/1193,II/1194,II/1195,II/1196,II/1197,II/1198,II/1199,II/1200,II/1201,II/1202,II/1203,II/1206,II/1207,II/1208,II/1209,II/1210,II/1211,II/1212,II/1213,II/1214,II/1215,II/1216,II/1217,II/1218,II/1219,II/1220,II/1221,II/1222,II/1223,II/1224,II/1225,II/1226,II/1227,II/1228,II/1229,II/1230,II/1231,II/1232,II/1233,II/1234,II/1235,II/1237,II/1238,II/1239,II/1240,II/1241,II/1242,II/1243,II/1244,II/1246,II/1247,II/1248,II/1249,II/1250,II/1251,II/1252,II/1253,II/1254,II/1255,II/1256,II/1257,II/1259,II/1260,II/1261,II/1262,IV/95,IV/97,IV/100,IV/175,IV/177,IV/179,IV/212,IV/214,IV/224,IV/226,IV/233,IV/235,IV/237,IV/285,IV/221,IV/23,IV/25,IV/27,IV/28,IV/29,IV/30,IV/31,IV/32,IV/33,IV/34,IV/35,IV/37,IV/38,IV/39,IV/40,IV/41,IV/42,IV/43,IV/45,IV/46,IV/48,IV/49,IV/51,IV/53,IV/55,IV/56,IV/57,IV/58,IV/59,IV/60,IV/61,IV/62,IV/63,IV/64,IV/65,IV/66,IV/67,IV/68,IV/69,IV/70,IV/71,IV/72,IV/73,IV/75,IV/76,IV/77,IV/78,IV/79,IV/80,IV/81,IV/82,IV/83,IV/85,IV/86,IV/87,IV/89,IV/90,IV/91,IV/92,IV/96,IV/98,IV/101,IV/102,IV/103,IV/104,IV/105,IV/106,IV/107,IV/108,IV/109,IV/110,IV/111,IV/112,IV/113,IV/114,IV/115,IV/116,IV/117,IV/118,IV/119,IV/120,IV/121,IV/122,IV/123,IV/124,IV/126,IV/128,IV/129,IV/131,IV/132,IV/133,IV/134,IV/135,IV/136,IV/137,IV/138,IV/139,IV/140,IV/141,IV/142,IV/143,IV/145,IV/146,IV/149,IV/150,IV/152,IV/153,IV/154,IV/155,IV/156,IV/157,IV/158,IV/159,IV/161,IV/162,IV/163,IV/164,IV/165,IV/166,IV/168,IV/170,IV/171,IV/172,IV/173,IV/174,IV/176,IV/178,IV/180,IV/183,IV/184,IV/185,IV/186,IV/187,IV/188,IV/189,IV/190,IV/191,IV/192,IV/193,IV/194,IV/195,IV/196,IV/198,IV/199,IV/200,IV/201,IV/202,IV/204,IV/205,IV/206,IV/207,IV/209,IV/210,IV/211,IV/213,IV/215,IV/217,IV/218,IV/219,IV/220,IV/221,IV/223,IV/225,IV/227,IV/228,IV/229,IV/230,IV/232,IV/234,IV/236,IV/238,IV/239,IV/240,IV/241,IV/242,IV/243,IV/244,IV/246,IV/247,IV/248,IV/249,IV/250,IV/251,IV/252,IV/253,IV/254,IV/255,IV/256,IV/257,IV/259,IV/260,IV/263,IV/264,IV/265,IV/266,IV/268,IV/270,IV/272,IV/274,IV/275,IV/276,IV/277,IV/278,IV/279,IV/280,IV/282,IV/283,IV/284,IV/286,IV/287,IV/288,IV/289,IV/290,IV/291,IV/292,IV/293,IV/300,IV/301,IV/303,IV/304,IV/305,IV/306,IV/307,IV/308,IV/309,IV/310,IV/311,IV/312,IV/313,IV/314,IV/315,IV/316,IV/317,IV/318,IV/319,IV/320,IV/321,IV/322,IV/324,IV/325,IV/326,IV/327,IV/328,IV/329,IV/330,IV/331,IV/332,IV/333,IV/334,IV/335,IV/338,IV/339,IV/341,IV/342,IV/343,IV/344,IV/345,IV/346,IV/349,IV/350,IV/351,IV/352,IV/353,IV/354,IV/355,IV/356,IV/357,IV/358,IV/359,IV/360,IV/361,IV/364,IV/365,IV/367,IV/368,IV/369,IV/370,IV/371,IV/372,IV/373,IV/374,IV/375,IV/376,IV/377,IV/378,IV/379,380,IV/381,IV/382,IV/385,IV/387,IV/388,IV/390,IV/392,IV/393,IV/394,IV/396,IV/397,IV/398,IV/399,IV/400,IV/401,IV/402,IV/403,IV/404,IV/405,IV/406,IV/407,IV/408,IV/412,IV/413,IV/414,IV/415,IV/416,IV/417,IV/418,IV/419,IV/420,IV/421,IV/422,IV/423,IV/424,IV/425,IV/426,IV/427,IV/428,IV/429,IV/430,IV/431,IV/432,IV/433,IV/434,IV/435,IV/436,IV/437,IV/438,IV/439,IV/440,IV/441,IV/442,IV/443,IV/444,IV/445,IV/446,IV/447,IV/448,IV/449,IV/450,IV/451,IV/452,IV/453,IV/454,IV/455,IV/456,IV/457,IV/458,IV/459,IV/460,IV/461,IV/462,IV/473,IV/464,IV/465,IV/466,IV/467,IV/468,IV/469,IV/470,IV/471,IV/472,IV/473,IV/474,IV/475,IV/476,IV/477,IV/601-632,IV/634,IV/635,IV/636,IV/638-647,IV/649,IV/651,IV/652,IV/654,IV/655,IV/656,IV/657,IV/658,IV/659,IV/660,IV/661,IV/662,IV/663,IV/666,IV/667,IV/668,IV/669,IV/670,IV/671,IV/672,IV/673,IV/674,IV/675,IV/677,IV/678,IV/679,IV/680,IV/681,IV/682,IV/683,IV/684,IV/686,IV/687,IV/688,IV/689,IV/691,IV/692,IV/693,IV/694,IV/695,IV/696,IV/697,IV/698,IV/699,IV/700,IV/701,IV/702,IV/703,IV/704,IV/705,IV/706,IV/707,IV/708,IV/709,IV/710,IV/711,IV/712,IV/713,IV/714,IV/715,IV/716,IV/717,IV/718,IV/720,IV/721,IV/722,IV/723,IV/724,IV/725,IV/726,IV/727,IV/729,IV/730,IV/731,IV/732,IV/733,IV/734,IV/735,IV/736,IV/737,IV/739,IV/740,IV/741,IV/742,IV/743,IV/744,IV/745,IV/746,IV/748,IV/750,IV/751,IV/752,IV/753,IV/754,IV/755,IV/756,IV/757,IV/758,IV/759,IV/760,IV/762,IV/763,IV/765,IV/766,IV/767

¹⁰⁷⁰ IV/646-647(SuvaReka);II,799,IV/872(Vucitrn);II/611,II/612,II/616,II/616,II/619,II/621,IV/649,IV/651,IV/652,IV/654,IV/655,IV/656,IV/657,IV/658,IV/659,IV/660,IV/661,IV/662,IV/663,IV/666,IV/667,IV/668,IV/669,IV/670,IV/671,IV/672,IV/673,IV/674,IV/675,IV/677,IV/678,IV/679,IV/680,IV/681,IV/682,IV/683,IV/684,IV/686,IV/687,I

749. The Appeals Chamber has held that the Prosecution must particularize the criminal episodes it seeks to prove at trial in a manner which is consistent with the Defense's right to be informed promptly of the nature and cause of the charges against them.¹⁰⁷¹

750. Surely the right to be informed cannot arise at the time of Judgment being rendered as in the instant matter, particularly where for other municipalities, the failure of the prosecution to link a body to a schedule was determinative in excluding criminal responsibility.

751. In the instant case there has been ample time for the Prosecution to Apply to amend the indictment and they have not done so. With the serious restrictions and limitations in terms of time for cross-examining OTP witnesses and presenting the defense case, it would be unjust and wrong to allow liability to attach for non-indicted deaths, particularly when logic would dictate those deaths would not be crossed or rebutted to save time and resources for the indicted charges.

752. In asserting liability for non-indicted, non-scheduled murders the Chamber has committed discernible error that has caused prejudice and harm to the Appellant.

U. ERRORS RELATING TO PRIZREN MUNICIPALITY

753. It is respectfully submitted that the Chamber erred as to the findings of criminal conduct/responsibility as to Prizren.

754. This error includes making impermissible inferences of guilt when equally reasonable/valid inferences of innocence were available under the evidence.

755. Prosecution witnesses who were of questionable credibility and whose evidence had been rebutted were relied upon.

V/688,IV/689,IV/691,IV/692,IV/693,IV/694,IV/695,IV/696,IV/697,IV/698,IV/699,IV/700,IV/701,IV/702,IV/703,IV/704,IV/705,IV/706,IV/707,IV/708,IV/709,IV/710,IV/711,IV/712,IV/713,IV/714,IV/715,IV/716,IV/717,IV/718,IV/720,IV/721,IV/722,IV/723,IV/724
725,IV/726,IV/727,IV/729,IV/730,IV/731,IV/732,IV/733,IV/734,IV/735,IV/736,IV/737,IV/739,IV/740,IV/741,IV/742,IV/743,IV/744,IV/745,IV/746,IV/748,IV/750,IV/751,IV/752,IV/753,IV/754,IV/755,IV/756,IV/757,IV/758,IV/759,IV/760,IV/762,IV/763,IV/765,IV/766,IV/767(Izbica).

¹⁰⁷¹ *Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana* ICTR-96-10-A /ICTR-96-17-A,AJ,(13.12.2004),paras.77-79

1. IMPROPER RELIANCE UPON PROSECUTION EVIDENCE

756. The Chamber erred that there was no satisfactory alternative reasons for persons to leave their homes and displace towards the border.

757. Specifically, the Chamber stated that the “assertion that these people departed Kosovo due to the NATO bombings and conflicts between the FRY/Serbian forces and the KLA is not supported by the testimony of those who themselves left the town, the evidence relating to the targets hit by NATO in the area, or the lack of evidence of KLA activity.”¹⁰⁷²

a. As to KLA

758. The Prosecution witnesses that were presented almost uniformly denied the presence/existence of the KLA. Even the Chamber noted Prosecution witnesses as a whole denied the existence of the KLA which was viewed with great skepticism.¹⁰⁷³

759. The Chamber interestingly found specifically to Prizren that one of the key OTP witnesses, Rahim Latifi, was unreliable as to his evidence regarding the KLA presence in the area.¹⁰⁷⁴

760. Having already found Latifi unreliable it is astonishing/erroneous, for the Chamber to proceed to make findings that the KLA was not active/present, or to rely further on Latifi in regards to his other testimony.

761. In doing so, the Chamber had to overlook a multitude of evidence that demonstrated the widespread presence of the KLA in Prizren, inclusive of Dusanovo.

762. Ognjenovic, Delic and Gloncak, testified as to the KLA in Prizren.¹⁰⁷⁵ Notably, KLA Commander Zyrapi confirmed the KLA presence Prizren.¹⁰⁷⁶ The Chamber’s findings are contradictory and cannot be harmonized with prior reliance on Zyrapi over Latifi, in finding that indeed there was a KLA presence in and around Pirane at the commencement of the NATO

¹⁰⁷² II/285

¹⁰⁷³ I/55

¹⁰⁷⁴ II/244

¹⁰⁷⁵ 3D97;3D98;3D100;T.24223/2-16;T.24254/10-21

¹⁰⁷⁶ Tr.19373;Tr.5934;Tr.5967;T.r6285;Tr.21107-21139

bombings.¹⁰⁷⁷ KVM Section-Chief Masonneuve testified as to the presence/activities of the KLA during the cease fire period.¹⁰⁷⁸

763. Further, there was no mention of Prizren SUP Chief, Vojnovic, who testified as follows:

- a) Dragobilje and a number of settlements in that area of Prizren had a “great many of Siptar terrorists were there, and of course they didn’t stay put, they committed crimes.”¹⁰⁷⁹
- b) About a Kosovo Albanian camp for training terrorists existed in Jeskovo, that was also moving residents out of Albanian villages.¹⁰⁸⁰
- c) The tense security situation in Dragas, Suva Reka, Orahovac and Prizren with many terrorist attacks against the army, police, and civilians.¹⁰⁸¹
- d) In 1999 the KLA took over territory including the main roadways and frequently attacked civilians traveling there.¹⁰⁸²

764. The testimony relating to KLA at Jeskovo was confirmed by Delic.¹⁰⁸³

765. In the face of such significant evidence of KLA activity in Prizren on the one hand, and with the discredited denials of Latifi/Kryzlieu on the other hand, no reasonable chamber could conclude that the KLA was inactive and thus discount its influence upon the movement of civilians from Prizren in 1999.

766. Kryzlieu’s credibility was directly called into question when Ognjenovic revealed that his neighbor, Haki Cuni from Dusanovo, was in fact alive, and not dead as Kryzlieu had claimed.¹⁰⁸⁴

767. As to Dusanovo, contrary to the assertion in the Judgment that no such evidence was led, there was evidence of fighting undertaken by the KLA in May of 1999, including Krylieu’s own family.¹⁰⁸⁵

¹⁰⁷⁷ II/250.

¹⁰⁷⁸ T.11180/17-24

¹⁰⁷⁹ TR.24155/22-24156/2.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Tr.24175/2-12.

¹⁰⁸¹ 6D1532(para.27);6D787

¹⁰⁸² 6D1532(para. 31).

¹⁰⁸³ Tr.19336/17-22;Tr.19337/16-19;P2067.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Tr.22875/21-22880/15.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Tr.22881/3-20.[private session]

768. Lastly as to the KLA, the Judgment is in contradiction with itself, despite finding no KLA activity, the Chamber also stated it “heard evidence that in 1998 and early 1999 the boarder area between Prizren and Albania was the site of **significant** KLA movement and activity and combat actions undertaken by MUP/VJ forces in response.¹⁰⁸⁶ The Chamber cites to a multitude of evidence that it relied on in making such a finding of significant activity.¹⁰⁸⁷ The Chamber erred in concluding that such activity could be discounted as a cause for movement of civilians.

b. As to NATO

769. As to the Chamber’s conclusion that no targeting of civilians was shown such as to warrant consideration of the possibility Albanians were fleeing NATO, this ignores the substantial evidence that was presented as to the horrific NATO bombing of Albanian civilians at Korisa.¹⁰⁸⁸

770. Likewise there was significant evidence of other NATO attacks that would have been known to the civilian population in Prizren and influenced their decision to leave the municipality in 1999.

771. Vojnovic, testified that NATO bombed Prizren every day.¹⁰⁸⁹ Most importantly, on 25.3.1999, the NATO forces bombed the very center of Prizren town.¹⁰⁹⁰ Likewise Vojnovic testified as to his personal knowledge of Albanians in buses having been struck by NATO¹⁰⁹¹ and also attacks on refugee convoys by NATO.¹⁰⁹²

772. The incident at Korisa does not even figure in the Judgment, but is huge in terms of an alternate reason for people to leave. The incident is significant because Albanian civilians were struck by NATO, civilians in the process of being convinced to return to their homes by the Serbian Police. Such would be a reasonably compelling reason for persons to leave their homes in Prizren municipality.

¹⁰⁸⁶ II/245

¹⁰⁸⁷ P2772(paras.12–13);3D134-/para.163);3D136(p.1);3D137;3D138;T.10008;T.19275-19276,19558-19561;Mitić-(5D1390,paras.50–51);Vojnović-(T.24172);6D1013;3D179;Zyrapi-(T.6043);4D87;3D139;P2071;P2072;P1999;3D1051;P1998

¹⁰⁸⁸ 6D604

¹⁰⁸⁹ Tr.24184/9-20.

¹⁰⁹⁰ 6D1532/para.36

¹⁰⁹¹ 6D1532/para.37

¹⁰⁹² 6D1532/para.38

773. It is apparent that in reaching its conclusions the Chamber did not adequately consider the foregoing, and thus wrongly concluded that there was no other reasonable alternative conclusion for the civilians leaving Prizren Municipality.

2. NO EVIDENCE CRIMES KNOWN/FORESEEABLE

774. Thus the Chamber erred in reaching conclusions as to the lack of KLA activity/NATO bombings as a possible reasonable cause of the displacement of civilians, in violation of the principle of *in dubio pro reo*. The same is true with respect to the aspect of knowledge of Appellant as to crimes.

775. Specifically there was ample evidence that the MUP Staff in Pristina did not have the ability during the war to communicate with the field.¹⁰⁹³

776. The evidence showed that the method of reporting involved the SUPs sending information to the MUP HQ in Belgrade, and also to the MUP Staff, which during the time of war took place by courier.¹⁰⁹⁴

777. A review of the Daily Bulletins prepared by Appellant based upon information received from the Prizren SUP indicates no reporting nor knowledge of any of the criminal acts in Prizren for which responsibility is asserted.

778. Vojnovic, when asked about the indictment crimes alleged for Prizren, expressly denied having had any knowledge of the same during 1999.¹⁰⁹⁵ As such, Appellant could only have had the same/less knowledge, insofar as his knowledge would have come from the SUP in the first place.

779. Among the crimes alleged in Prizren it is alleged that mistreatment and taking of identity documents took place at the Vrbnica Border crossing.

¹⁰⁹³ Deretic-(T.22582/7-22586/7)

¹⁰⁹⁴ Deretic-(T.22585/13-24)

¹⁰⁹⁵ Tr.24182/12-24184/5.

780. Ognjenovic, commander of the Border Police station at the Vrbnica crossing soundly contradicted/rejected those claims.¹⁰⁹⁶

781. In any event, Ognjenovic stated¹⁰⁹⁷ and the Chamber concluded,¹⁰⁹⁸ the Border Police stations did not come under the purview and jurisdiction of Appellant as head of the MUP Staff, and thus they did not report to him. Having found so, it is illogical for the chamber to attribute to Appellant any knowledge of the situation at the Border Police Station Vrbnica, irrespective of the rebuttal testimony offered by Ognjenovic.

782. No reasonable trier of fact could conclude on the base of foregoing that Appellant could have had actual/constructive knowledge of the crimes alleged.

GG. ERRORS AS TO GNJILANE MUNICIPALITY

783. The Chamber erred in fact/law with regard to Gnjilane.

784. The Chamber completely ignored evidence and at the same time based its conclusions on unreliable/incredible/instructed testimony of OTP witnesses contrary to common-sense/logic.

785. The Chamber erred when it determined Appellant criminally liable for the departure of civilians from Gnjilane. This is particularly true given its finding as to Nosalje that insufficient evidence existed of forcible displacement.¹⁰⁹⁹

786. The Chamber further erred when it found Appellant criminally liable for the burning of the Vlastica Mosque.

787. This error was compounded when the Chamber found Appellant liable for the taking of identity documents.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Tr.22917/15-22;Tr.22918/1-5

¹⁰⁹⁷ Tr.22910/13-21

¹⁰⁹⁸ III/1073/1074/1075

¹⁰⁹⁹ II/947

1. UNTRUSTWORTHY PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE

788. The Prosecution evidence that was relied upon by the Chamber in making its findings was demonstrated to be unreliable/inaccurate in many respects.

789. The Chamber demonstrated in II/894 a complete bias and inappropriate standard in analysis of evidence. The Chamber's mis-characterization that there were difficulties in the way the Prosecution led K81 indicates a double-standard. The Chamber accepted Prosecution evidence *a priori* despite serious problems in consistency, while defense witnesses/evidence were simply disregarded totally with all inferences against Appellant.

790. The Chamber has misrepresented an order as being issued by the JC, when it obviously originates from PrK, ¹¹⁰⁰ ignoring the testimony of Lazarevic who unambiguously identified this and others¹¹⁰¹ as orders of PrK¹¹⁰².

791. At II/912 the Chamber concludes the **border police Chief** 'forced the villagers to leave their vehicles at a field...'. Shaqiri actually, testified this was a member of the customs police¹¹⁰³, unrelated to border police¹¹⁰⁴. Arguendo, even if the Border Police were at issue, said structure was found outside Appellant's authority. Appellant had no way of receiving notice of anything happening at the border crossing, as the reporting went straight to Belgrade and bypassed the Staff. Thus Appellant cannot be found liable for said activities, even if they were proved, which in fact they were not.

792. The Chamber accepted the testimony of Shaqiri¹¹⁰⁵ denying the Prilepnica locals were afraid of NATO bombing. This is illogical.

793. The Chamber, once again showed bias in finding a lack of evidence about NATO bombing of this area ignoring evidence and its own finding¹¹⁰⁶ from which it is seen that the NATO bombing was frequent¹¹⁰⁷

¹¹⁰⁰ II/897

¹¹⁰¹ P1977;P1974;P1972;P1973;P1878;P1975;P1976;P1970

¹¹⁰² Lazarević-(T.18638/8-22)

¹¹⁰³ Shaqiri-(T.2955/10-15)

¹¹⁰⁴ Shaqiri-(T.2821/6-9)

¹¹⁰⁵ II/915

¹¹⁰⁶ II/941

794. When it interprets the testimony of Smiljanic¹¹⁰⁸, the Chamber omits that he confirmed around 40% of NATO targets were civilian, that during the bombing cluster bombs were used, so-called carpet bombs and munitions with deplete uranium¹¹⁰⁹. Gnjlane Municipality was not exempt from NATO action.

795. Gavranic's testimony that civilians departed for fear of NATO bombings due to the proximity of the VJ¹¹¹⁰ is a) un rebutted; and b) supported by tangible evidence which the Chamber acknowledged.¹¹¹¹ K81 decided to leave the country because there were nearby VJ forces¹¹¹² consistent with Gavranic's testimony. The Chamber leaves out the evidence which shows that the police was told by the Prilepnica locals that they left when the NATO bombing intensified.¹¹¹³

796. Gavranic's testimony stands un rebutted, and pursuant to *in dubio pro reo*, thus it must be given prevalence over any conclusion tending to show criminal liability.

797. The Chamber states that Shabani 'confirmed' the testimony of K81, that two- three weeks before the beginning of NATO attacks Serbian military/police came to Zegra.¹¹¹⁴ However K81 testified that VJ and armed men in civilian clothing came to Zegra, under VJ command'.¹¹¹⁵

798. The Chamber states that on 29.3.1999 additional troops arrived in Zegra, including the 'paramilitary' which 'acted together with the police'.¹¹¹⁶ Here again the Chamber incompletely analyses the evidence, in other words constructs the same and arbitrarily interprets it against Appellant. Shabani¹¹¹⁷ at no time mentioned the police in his statement.¹¹¹⁸

799. It is important to note he first mentioned the police presence at trial, despite his written statement and Milosevic testimony to the contrary¹¹¹⁹. The Chamber erroneously accepted his contradictory evidence that by 'military' he means regular military, regular police, reserve police

¹¹⁰⁷ Gavranic-(T.22715);;4D123;Gavranic-(T.22680;T.22700-22702;22739-22740; 5D1100;5D1101;P1099

¹¹⁰⁸ II/942

¹¹⁰⁹ Smiljanic-(T.15749-15752

¹¹¹⁰ Gavranic-(T.22700/7-22701/16)

¹¹¹¹ II/941

¹¹¹² II/930

¹¹¹³ Gavranic-(T.22702/24-22705/21)

¹¹¹⁴ II/918

¹¹¹⁵ II/917

¹¹¹⁶ II/921

¹¹¹⁷ II/921

¹¹¹⁸ P 2263

¹¹¹⁹ P2264;T.1529

and the members of the reserve army.¹¹²⁰ Rather than giving the witness instruction he was under oath to tell the truth the Chamber assisted his changed testimony.

800. The evidence shows the VJ came into Zegra and made a control point. All previous acts in regards to Zegra, which were explained by Shabani¹¹²¹ related to paramilitary members/VJ, and **not the police**. The Chamber itself states that the soldiers¹¹²² started to expel people whereas in II/925 ‘paramilitary forces’ and ‘Serbian military forces’ are mentioned. The Chamber ignores in full the material evidence/testimony of Prosecution witness Vasiljevic that those members of the paramilitary were in fact VJ volunteers/reservists¹¹²³.

801. Shabani describes the murder of the Uksini couple and of Miljazim Idrizij, Cazim Haziri and his wife Camila Haziri¹¹²⁴. As to these murders¹¹²⁵ the Chamber completely ignores evidence exculpatory of Appellant. Namely, SUP Gnjilane members arrested seven VJ reservists/volunteers, for these crimes. The Gnjilane SUP detained the Zegra perpetrators in custody, submitted a criminal complaint to the investigating judge, who handed them over to the military investigators for further processing.¹¹²⁶

802. The foregoing illustrates the impropriety of the Chamber’s mis-construction in regards to MUP activities. Perpetrators were arrested/detained, criminal complaints filed, all measures required by law followed, perpetrators delivered to appropriate military justice organs and a judgment issued.¹¹²⁷ There is no basis for Appellant’s liability thereunder

803. The Chamber analyses Shabani in regards to Donja Stubla.¹¹²⁸ Shabani points out that 30.03.1999, he went to Donja Stubina staying there five weeks¹¹²⁹. He stated neither VJ nor police entered the village, even though thought he saw the police coming towards Gornja Stubla¹¹³⁰, which indicates the absence of any intent to deport.

¹¹²⁰ II/921

¹¹²¹ II/918,II/920,II/921,II/925

¹¹²² II/922

¹¹²³ 6D69;Vasiljevic-(T.9107/5-17

¹¹²⁴ P2263;P2280/para.7,12,13

¹¹²⁵ P228/para.16;6D334

¹¹²⁶ 6D69;Gavranić-(T.22690-22691)

¹¹²⁷ 6D1231;Gavranic-(T.22701/6-16;;22703/23-22704/4)

¹¹²⁸ II/926;II/927

¹¹²⁹ P2263

¹¹³⁰ P2263

804. According to the Chamber, due ‘to constant fear of being killed from Serbian forces’, ‘people organized into groups and left towards the Macedonian border’ from Donja Stubla. However Shabani stated after 10 days 1500 persons returned to their villages of Ribnik and Djelekara.¹¹³¹¹¹³² The same witness explained that some persons due to lack of food, on their own initiative made way for Macedonia¹¹³³ while the witness himself left by his own words ‘ because we have wasted food reserves and *we did not feel safe*.¹¹³⁴ The Chamber disregards this voluntary leaving, which is much more rational an explanation than its mis-construction that this has been done due to ‘the fear of Serbian forces’. K81 stated that after two weeks food was running short, and that he decided to go to Pristina,¹¹³⁵ All of this demonstrates the magnitude of the Chamber’s errors.

805. Shabani stated that 16 persons were killed in other villages and named five people¹¹³⁶. In regards to these people, the Gnjilane police upon hearing that in Donja Stubla 6 graves existed, took measures to confirm and informed the investigative judge, who ordered an exhumation. An identification of the exhumed bodies was done and, and on the basis of testimony of Sadiku Zuljfen, it was concluded that VJ perpetrators killed them. SUP Gnjilane upon authorization of the public prosecutor, handed over the complete file to the Military Prosecutor in Pristina for further actions in accordance with their jurisdiction.¹¹³⁷ Again, what possible basis for Appellant’s liability arises therefrom?

806. Shabani stated upon his return to Zegra all Albanian house were burned. K81 alleges the same.¹¹³⁸ However, it is fully clear that Gnjilane SUP in every known case, undertook all appropriate measures under the law against the perpetrators. Gavranic stated that in Prilepnica persons were arrested by the Gnjilane SUP that were caught looting.¹¹³⁹ Again, no liability for Appellant arises therefrom.

807. As to Vladovo place¹¹⁴⁰ the perpetrators were not described as MUP thus it is unclear how the Chamber can find Appellant guilty for the same.

¹¹³¹ P2263

¹¹³² II/926

¹¹³³ P2263

¹¹³⁴ P2263

¹¹³⁵ II/934

¹¹³⁶ P2280/para.16

¹¹³⁷ 6D334

¹¹³⁸ II/929

¹¹³⁹ Gavranic-(T.22795-22796)

¹¹⁴⁰ II/931;;II/934

808. The Chamber further found that police in Presevo searched the people and took all identification documents/passports.¹¹⁴¹ Presevo is not in Kosovo, to hold Appellant responsible for acts of police beyond Kosovo is illogical.

809. As to Vlastica/Zegra,¹¹⁴² again perpetrators were not identified as police. The Chamber failed to evaluate the evidence that the police acted on information of damage to the mosque in Vlastica, conducted an on-site investigation, and prepared a criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators, in accord with the law.¹¹⁴³ Additionally, the proper and good-faith conduct of the police is demonstrated in that they engaged heavy digging machinery, based on the Albanian source's belief his parents were trapped in the rubble.¹¹⁴⁴ In II/946 the Chamber finds it 'proven that the mosques in Vlastica were burned by VJ members and armed locals, from which some wore dark blue police uniforms.' The Chamber in regards to Zegra concludes 'that the VJ and MUP, together with the irregular forces expatriate the Kosovo Albanians from the village.'¹¹⁴⁵ Respectfully, under the evidence set forth above, no reasonable trier of fact could reasonably infer of Police criminal responsibility for these events.

810. The Chamber on the bases of Shaqirij/Sabani concludes 'that the Kosovo Albanians from this municipally have been tortured by VJ members at control-points in front of the Macedonian border', and that 'on the Macedonian border the Serbian police search and take their personal documents and passports'.¹¹⁴⁶ The Chamber ignores the evidence. Shaqiri, from Prilepnica, described the way in which they left the village 06.04.1999 toward Bujanovac., a city in Serbia-proper. He testified this in no way was prompted by police.¹¹⁴⁷ He testified the Serbian Police sent them back to their home village.¹¹⁴⁸ He testified the police provided a sentry-watch at Prilepnica for the safety of the Albanian citizenry.¹¹⁴⁹ Gavranic testified that as Gnjilane SUP Chief he undertook all possible measures to convince these locals to stay, that the police will provide protection, and even reached an agreement with them to establish security patrols near the approach to the village.¹¹⁵⁰ Shaqiri testified to a second departure, again not related to any police orders/threat, and that he requested of the SUP a police escort, which was granted.¹¹⁵¹

¹¹⁴¹ II/936

¹¹⁴² II/937

¹¹⁴³ Gavranic-(T.22795-22796)

¹¹⁴⁴ Gavranic,(Tr. 22795-22796)

¹¹⁴⁵ II/944

¹¹⁴⁶ II/948

¹¹⁴⁷ Shaqiri-(T.2774/11-2777/12)

¹¹⁴⁸ Shaqiri-(T.2794/19-2796/17)

¹¹⁴⁹ Shaqiri-(T.2798/14-2796/17)

¹¹⁵⁰ Gavranic-(T.22703/1-22705/13)

¹¹⁵¹ Shaqiri-(T.2803/3-24)

811. Village locals told SUP personnel that they must leave because NATO has began bombing VJ locations near the village.¹¹⁵² This is a logical position, and pursuant to *in dubio pro reo* must be considered. The instruction to the police patrol was to protect the column, and to provide them with a safe-way to their destination of choice.¹¹⁵³ From the testimony of both Shaqiri, and Gavranic, the police patrol professionally fulfilled the request of the Albanian civilians all the way to the border. To mis-characterize the foregoing as police commission of deportation is an abuse of discretion/discernible error.

812. Likewise, as to Shabani's claims of theft at the border, the MUP arrested/jailed 4 VJ soldiers for robbing persons who were crossing the border and handed them over to VJ security bodies to the treatment of their competence for further prosecution and punishment.¹¹⁵⁴

813. At no time in did the Chamber confirm any conduct of the Police in Gnjilane that could be construed to support a finding of deportation which deprived 'the right of a victim to stay in his/hers home or community, or the right not to be disabled from their property by means of forceful movement to another place.'¹¹⁵⁵

2. IMPROPER CONCLUSIONS

814. It is important to note that the only negative findings with respect to Gnjilane were:

- A) that members of the VJ ordered residents of Prelipnica to leave their homes and were escorted to the Border.¹¹⁵⁶
- B) That the VJ/MUP reinforced by armed civilians drove Albanians from their homes in Zegra and left for Macedonia.¹¹⁵⁷
- C) The Mosque in Vlastica was burned down by VJ solders.¹¹⁵⁸
- D) Serbian Police took their identity documents at the border.¹¹⁵⁹

¹¹⁵² Gavranic-(Tr.22704/3-22705/13)

¹¹⁵³ Gavranic-(Tr.22702/24-22705/21)

¹¹⁵⁴ 6D614/15/3;6D 1533,(para. 3)

¹¹⁵⁵ See, *Simic*, TJ, para.130;*Krnojelac*, AJ,para.218

¹¹⁵⁶ II/943

¹¹⁵⁷ II944

¹¹⁵⁸ II946.

¹¹⁵⁹ II/948

815. These findings are error, insofar as the evidence does not support the conclusion that Appellant would have had any notice that would impute criminal liability to him.

816. Appellant had no access to VJ reports. Multiple witnesses confirmed that any police official would have no ability to order VJ troops in any regard.¹¹⁶⁰ As such he could not have had any notice of or ability to interfere as to Prelipnica, or that he would know about the Mosque in Vlastica.

817. Appellant only had the same knowledge known to the SUP Chief in Gnjilane. We had testimony from Gavranic, that in fact the reasons stated by the Prilepnica group was different, and involved their fear of being struck by NATO, and that a police escort was requested by these Kosovo Albanians.¹¹⁶¹ As such, given the regular and accepted reporting practices of the MUP, the only information that would have been conveyed to Appellant would be innocuous and would not raise his knowledge or suspicion that criminal activity was underway.

818. With regard to Zegra, the information available was that criminal elements (VJ reservists) committed crimes, were arrested by the MUP, and turned over to VJ security organs to be prosecuted for their crimes.¹¹⁶² The Chamber earlier, when dealing with President Milutinovic, found that such knowledge was insufficient of determining guilt, and acquitted Milutinovic.¹¹⁶³ Thus, a grave and discernible error was committed when the Chamber departed from its ruling as to Milutinovic, and instead issued a contrary ruling as to Appellant, finding him guilty.

819. There was no evidence led that Kosovo Albanians crossing the Djeneral Jankovic crossing had their own personal identity documents taken away.¹¹⁶⁴ As such the conclusions of the chamber are without basis.

820. Respectfully, even IF such activity had been proved at the Border Crossing, it must be taken into account that these stations were not under Appellant's jurisdiction¹¹⁶⁵. Thus Appellant would not have had information, nor authority to intervene.

¹¹⁶⁰ Radinovic, Tr.17105/7-17105/18; 5D1391, para44;

¹¹⁶¹ Gavranic, Tr.22703/22705

¹¹⁶² Gavranic, Tr.22689/22690;22729

¹¹⁶³ Judgment, III/261;284

¹¹⁶⁴ P2298pg.5, para.3

¹¹⁶⁵ III/1075

821. Having already found Appellant not responsible for the Border Police Stations, the Chamber made a discernible error by trying to assert responsibility upon him for their purported acts and conduct.

KK. SENTENCING

822. Rule 101 sets out the factors which a Chamber is mandated to take into consideration when determining a sentence. The list of factors enumerated is not exhaustive. One factor that is expressly provided for as mitigation is substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor before/after conviction.¹¹⁶⁶ The Chamber erred by failing to take into account the substantial cooperation of Appellant.

823. The decisional authority has developed other mitigating grounds. The Simic Chamber viewed, among other things, voluntary surrender, lack of prior criminal record, and comportment in the Detention Unit and as circumstances proven to be mitigating. The Chamber erred by failing to take into account the evidence led on these factors and others, as they relate to Appellant. As set forth hereinabove, in Plavsic mitigating factors were her voluntary surrender to the Tribunal, post-conflict conduct, and age.¹¹⁶⁷ Other cases have looked at good character.¹¹⁶⁸ The Chamber erred by failing to adequately assess evidence of the foregoing relating to Appellant.

824. The standard of proof to be applied for mitigating factors is that they need not be established beyond any reasonable doubt, but rather need only be established by the balance of the probabilities.¹¹⁶⁹

1. MITIGATION

825. The Chamber committed discernible error that resulted in a manifestly excessive sentence which does not reflect mitigation evidence.¹¹⁷⁰ It is submitted Appellant is entitled to a significant

¹¹⁶⁶ RPE101(B)(ii)

¹¹⁶⁷ Prosecutor vs. Plavsic, IT-00-39&40/1, SJ,27.222003,(para.110).

¹¹⁶⁸ See, Prosecutor vs. Krnojelac IT-97-25, SJ,15.3.2002,(para.519);Prosecutor vs. Kupreskic,IT-95-16-A, AJ,23.10.2001,(para.459).

¹¹⁶⁹ Prosecutor vs. Obrenovic,IT-02-60/2-S,SJ,10.12.2003,(para. 91).

¹¹⁷⁰ III/1202

reduction in sentence, especially in the particular context of the wider mandate of the International Tribunal to support peace/reconciliation.

826. Both Article 24 of the Statute and Rule 101 contain general guidelines for a Chamber that amount to an obligation to take into account the following factors in sentencing: the gravity of the offense or totality of the culpable conduct, the individual circumstances of the convicted person, the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of former Yugoslavia, and aggravating/mitigating circumstances.¹¹⁷¹ The Appeals Chamber had further held that:

Trial Chambers are vested with broad discretion, although not unlimited, in determining an appropriate sentence, due to their obligation to individualize penalties to fit the circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime. As a general rule, the Appeals Chamber will not revise a sentence unless the Trial Chamber has committed a “discernible error” in exercising its discretion or has failed to follow the applicable law. [...] For instance, a Trial Chamber’s decision may be disturbed on appeal if the Appellant shows that the Trial Chamber abused its discretion either by taking into account what it out not to have or by failing to take into account what it ought to have taken into account in the weighing process involved in the exercise of its discretion.¹¹⁷²

827. The Chamber was bound, to take into account all matters/factors that were relevant to sentencing, including those properly regarded as mitigating, and the failure to do so invalidates the Judgment.

828. The Chamber failed to consider/apply several facts that properly constitute mitigation evidence, both individually and cumulatively, which it had in fact already acknowledged and treated as having been established. These are summarized as follows:

- a) The Chamber’s acknowledgement that Lukic was acting in the midst of a complicated situation, including the defense of the country against NATO and the KLA.¹¹⁷³
- b) The Chamber’s acknowledgement that Lukic contributed to law and order in a number of cases connected to the crimes in the Indictment, which would be taken into account in mitigation for sentencing.

829. Having already found Appellant had proper mitigation evidence leading directly to crimes in the indictment, the Chamber erred and abused its discretion in failing to then utilize that evidence nor even weigh the same, solely because he was in a joint trial with 5 other accused and because he

¹¹⁷¹ Prosecutor v. Deronjic, IT-02-61, AJ(20/7/2005) para.6

¹¹⁷² Id. para.8

¹¹⁷³ III/1201.

was categorized by the Chamber with 2 other accused “convicted on the basis of their participation in the joint criminal enterprise.” Indeed there was significant evidence that Appellant undertook to spearhead efforts after the war to stamp out organized crime¹¹⁷⁴; reform the Serbian MUP¹¹⁷⁵; investigate crimes/war-crimes dating from the Kosovo war¹¹⁷⁶ and promoted/facilitated cooperation between the Serbian MUP and ICTY as to ongoing investigations¹¹⁷⁷. Multiple witnesses(Defense/Prosecution) talked of his integral part in post-conflict efforts to uncover events related to crimes in Kosovo and promote justice, including cooperation with the ICTY.¹¹⁷⁸ The Chamber’s negation of such explicitly recognized mitigating factors is improper. It also sends the wrong signal, which would stifle efforts of others contemplating personal sacrifice in the interests of justice/law and order.

830. Likewise, it must be recalled that the “harsh environment” of the armed conflict as a whole must be considered as mitigation and weighed in the sentence.¹¹⁷⁹ Such an approach recognizes that when considering an appropriate sentence for an individual there must be greater condemnation for the individual who with the luxury of peace and security and time for consideration sets a careful plot to initiate/execute rather than one who acts/reacts in extreme circumstances, in a climate of fear and uncertainty. It is both artificial and unjust to exclude this entirely from consideration in arriving at an appropriate sentence.

2. HEALTH AND PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

831. At III/1205 the Chamber erred in finding that it could not utilize personal circumstances to render differing sentences against the various accused from each of the 2 groups defined therein.

832. Respectfully that is a clear and explicit departure from the jurisprudence. The Appeals Chamber previously agreed that while “it is to be expected that two accused convicted of similar crimes in similar circumstances should not in practice receive very different sentences, often the differences are more significant than the similarities, and the **mitigating and aggravating factors**

¹¹⁷⁴ FTB,para.1453-1457

¹¹⁷⁵ FTB,para.1458-1463

¹¹⁷⁶ FTB,para.1464-1485.

¹¹⁷⁷ FTB,para.1486-1507.

¹¹⁷⁸ K84,6D2,Zivkovic,Kostic,Furdulovic.

¹¹⁷⁹ Prosecutor v. Delalic, et al. TJ,(para.1283)

dictate different results.”¹¹⁸⁰ [emphasis added] Accordingly, it is the individual facts and circumstances pertaining to a particular Accused that must be given a fair analysis in arriving at a sentence.

833. Several matters established the state of health of Appellant, and accordingly are incorporated as Annex B(confidential) of the Appeal. For purposes of brevity and confidentiality they are not repeated herein.

834. The deteriorated health of an accused may be considered a factor in mitigation for purposes of sentencing.

835. The Judgment erroneously cites to two provisional release decisions from 2008, and fails to analyze Appellant’s medical condition as a whole, including the original medical records filed when he surrendered. By overlooking the most detailed of accounts as to Appellant’s health, the Chamber made a decision to exclude evidence from its consideration without having reviewed the lion’s share.

3. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

836. At III/1204 the Chamber disregarded the voluntary surrender of Appellant as a mitigating factor. As support for this stance, the Chamber drew from a decision on provisional release from earlier that it had made itself. We respectfully submit that in doing so the Chamber erred by ignoring the decisional authority regarding voluntary surrender as a mitigating factor.

837. In the Milan Simic, Plavsic, and multiple other cases it has been recognized that voluntary surrender is a factor of mitigation for sentencing. The only remaining appraisal is the weight to be afforded.

838. The Chamber acknowledged the voluntary surrender of Appellant. Accordingly, this factor should have been attributed some weight as a mitigating factor. Accordingly the sentence should be lowered in line with his voluntary surrender.

¹¹⁸⁰ *Celebici* AJ,(para. 19);*Furundzija* AJ,(para. 250);*Jelusic* AJ,(para.101).

4. SENTENCING PRACTICES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

839. An aspect of *nullem crimen sine lege* was violated by the imposition of a Sentence that was not foreseeable in 1999 when it is alleged that the criminal conduct took place. It should be noted that the record is replete with evidence that the maximum sentence foreseeable under law in 1999 was 20 years imprisonment.¹¹⁸¹

840. The European Convention on Human Rights¹¹⁸² as well as the Rome Charter have enshrined the principle of *nullem crimen sine lege*. While the Tribunal has not followed suit, it has enshrined that, as far as sentencing is concerned, that the sentencing practices of the Former Yugoslavia for the relevant crimes are considered. Even taking into account that the Appeals Chamber has previously stated "...the International Tribunal may, if the interests of justice so merit, impose a greater or lesser sentence than would have been applicable under the relevant law in the former Yugoslavia,"¹¹⁸³ it is respectfully submitted that the Chamber did not take into account the sentencing principles at all in setting a sentence of 22 years. The sentence imposed is in excess of the MAXIMUM sentence available in 1999 for any crimes, it is unduly severe and Appellant couldn't have had notice of it so as to have voluntarily undertaken exposure to it. For this reason the sentence should be dramatically reduced.

5. AGGRAVATING FACTORS

841. The Chamber also erred in finding certain factors aggravating. The Chamber identifies as an aggravating factor that "This conduct, which was undertaken by Lukic in his official capacity as the Head of the MUP Staff, constitutes an abuse of his superior position and thus aggravates his sentence."¹¹⁸⁴ This stance erroneously uses as an aggravating factor the very same determination for which Appellant was found to have participated in the JCE, namely by way of his alleged superior position.

¹¹⁸¹ Tr.21276/19-24;16743/10-15;16651/3-25

¹¹⁸² Art.7(1)

¹¹⁸³ Prosecutor vs. Simic, IT-95-9-A, AJ(28/11/2006), para264, citing Blaskic and Krstic

¹¹⁸⁴ III/1201.

842. It is discussed earlier in this brief how the evidence clearly establishes that Appellant could not have been a command superior at the time of the indictment, as to either MUP or VJ forces, and thus under those same arguments the inclusion of his “superior position” as an aggravating factor is improper. Among other things, the Chamber acknowledged the evidence that was presented that Appellant did not have *de jure* powers to punish/discipline.¹¹⁸⁵ This is an essential minimum requirement of Superior.¹¹⁸⁶ Aggravating circumstances must be directly related to the commission of the offence,¹¹⁸⁷ and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.¹¹⁸⁸ These standards were not properly met in determining this aggravating factor, insofar as a *de jure* superior position was not established under the evidence. Accordingly the sentence need be reduced.

¹¹⁸⁵ III/1049

¹¹⁸⁶ *Halilovic*, AJ, (para.59)

¹¹⁸⁷ *Blaskic*, AJ, (par.686-696)

¹¹⁸⁸ *Celebici*, AJ, (para.777;780); *Blaskic* AJ, (para.685).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectfully requests that the Appeals Chamber reverse the Judgment and quash the Appellant's conviction on all counts, entering a judgment of NOT GUILTY.


Further and alternatively, if the Appeals Chamber considers that any of the convictions against Appellant should stand, the sentence should be reduced accordingly, and

Further and alternatively, Appellant respectfully requests a re-trial.

In The Hague, on the 6th of October 2009



Branko Lukic
Lead Counsel for Sreten Lukic



Dragan Ivetic
Co-Counsel for Sreten Lukic

WORD COUNT(incl. Annex B): 59,998

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Case No: IT-05-87-A

IN THE APPEALS CHAMBER

Before: Judge Liu Daqun (Presiding)
Judge Fausto Pocar
Judge Mehmet GÜney
Judge Andréia Vaz
Judge Theodor Meron

Registrar: Mr. John Hocking

DATE: 7 October 2009

THE PROSECUTOR

V.

NIKOLA SAINOVIC
DRAGOLJUB OJDANIC
NEBOJSA PAVKOVIC
VLADIMIR LAZAREVIC
SRETEN LUKIC

ANNEX A OF THE DEFENSE APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The Office of the Prosecutor:

Mr. Paul Rogers

Counsel for Accused Sreten Lukić:

Mr. Branko Lukić and Mr. Dragan Ivetić

Counsel for Co-Accused:

Mr. Toma Fila and Mr. Vladimir Petrović for Mr. Nikola Šainović
Mr. Tomislav Višnjić and Mr. Peter Robinson for Mr. Dragoljub Ojdanić
Mr. John Ackerman and Mr. Aleksandar Aleksić for Mr. Nebojša Pavković
Mr. Mihajlo Bakrač and Mr. Đuro Čepić for Mr. Vladimir Lazarević

LIST OF EXTENDED SESSIONS IN MILUTINOVIC ET AL TRIAL		
Number	Date	Time
1.	10 July 2006	09:00-17:00
2.	7 August 2006	09:00-17:30
3.	8 August 2006	09:00-17:30
4.	9 August 2006	09:00-17:30
5.	10 August 2006	09:00-17:00
6.	11 August 2006	09:00-17:15
7.	25 September 2006	09:00-17:30
8.	26 September 2006	09:00-17:40
9.	27 September 2006	09:00-17:30
10.	28 September 2006	09:00-17:30
11.	29 September 2006	09:00-15:50
12.	27 November 2006	09:00-15:20
13.	29 November 2006	09:00-15:00
14.	30 November 2006	09:00-15:30
15.	4 December 2006	09:00-15:30
16.	22 January 2007	09:00-15:30
17.	23 January 2007	09:00-16:00
18.	24 January 2007	09:00-16:00
19.	25 January 2007	09:00-15:30
20.	7 February 2007	09:00-15:30
21.	8 February 2007	09:00-15:30
22.	9 February 2007	09:00-14:30
23.	19 February 2007	09:00-15:30
24.	20 February 2007	09:00-15:30
25.	21 February 2007	09:00-15:30
26.	22 February 2007	09:00-15:30
27.	2 March 2007	09:00-16:20
28.	6 March 2007	09:00-15:30
29.	7 March 2007	09:00-15:30
30.	8 March 2007	09:00-15:30
31.	9 March 2007	09:00-15:30
32.	12 March 2007	09:00-15:30
33.	13 March 2007	09:00-15:30
34.	19 March 2007	09:00-15:30
35.	1 May 2007	09:00-15:30
36.	3 May 2007	09:00-15:00
37.	4 May 2007	09:00-15:30
38.	6 August 2007	09:00-15:30
39.	7 August 2007	09:00-15:30
40.	8 August 2007	09:00-15:30
41.	9 August 2007	09:00-15:30
42.	10 August 2007	09:00-15:30
43.	13 August 2007	09:00-15:30
44.	14 August 2007	09:00-15:30
45.	15 August 2007	09:00-15:30
46.	16 August 2007	09:00-15:30

47.	17 August 2007	09:00-15:30
48.	20 August 2007	09:00-15:30
49.	29 August 2007	09:00-15:30
50.	31 August 2007	09:00-15:30
51.	4 September 2007	09:00-15:30
52.	5 September 2007	09:00-15:30
53.	6 September 2007	09:00-15:30
54.	7 September 2007	09:00-15:30
55.	14 September 2007	11:00-17:30
56.	26 October 2007	09:00-15:30
57.	9 November 2007	11:00-17:30
58.	23 November 2007	09:00-15:30
59.	26 November 2007	09:00-15:30
60.	27 November 2007	09:00-15:30
61.	29 November 2007	09:00-15:30
62.	4 December 2007	09:00-15:30
63.	5 December 2007	09:00-15:30
64.	6 December 2007	09:00-15:30
65.	7 December 2007	09:00-15:30
66.	10 December 2007	09:00-15:30
67.	14 December 2007	09:00-15:30
68.	18 January 2008	09:00-15:30
69.	21 January 2008	09:00-15:30
70.	24 January 2008	09:00-15:30
71.	25 January 2008	09:00-15:30
72.	28 January 2008	09:00-15:30
73.	1 February 2008	09:00-15:30
74.	7 February 2008	09:00-16:00
75.	8 February 2008	09:00-15:30
76.	11 February 2008	09:00-15:30
77.	12 February 2008	09:00-15:30
78.	13 February 2008	09:00-15:30
79.	15 February 2008	09:00-15:30
80.	18 February 2008	09:00-15:30
81.	19 February 2008	09:00-15:30
82.	21 February 2008	09:00-15:30
83.	22 February 2008	09:00-15:30
84.	28 February 2008	09:00-16:00
85.	4 March 2008	09:00-15:30
86.	6 March 2008	09:00-15:30
87.	10 March 2008	09:00-15:30
88.	19 March 2008	09:00-15:30
89.	3 April 2008	09:00-15:30
90.	14 April 2008	09:00-15:30
91.	15 April 2008	09:00-15:30
92.	16 April 2008	09:00-15:30
93.	17 April 2008	09:00-15:30
94.	21 April 2008	09:00-15:30

95.	16 May 2008	09:00-15:30
96.	19 August 2008	09:00-15:30
97.	20 August 2008	09:00-15:30
98.	21 August 2008	09:00-15:30
99.	22 August 2008	09:00-15:30
100.	27 August 2008	10:45-16:40