1 Wednesday, 15 November 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: We'll go into closed session while the witness
6 enters the courtroom.
7 [Closed session]
2 [Open session]
3 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Mr. Tanic. We are still with Mr.
5 Fila, and I remind you that the solemn declaration continues to apply to
6 your evidence.
7 Mr. Fila.
8 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]
9 [Witness answered through interpreter]
10 Cross-examination by Mr. Fila: [Continued]
11 Q. [Interpretation] And our agreement not to argue still holds.
12 A. Of course.
13 Q. I'm going to read the last quotation.
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I've cut it short.
15 Q. Mr. Mijatovic writes in his book:
16 "After returning to Belgrade, the minister is saying nothing.
17 Mihajlovic a couple of months prior to that had asked him about his
18 relationship with the SDB, disagreements with the service during the war
19 on aggression. I told him as much as I could. He's an agent of a foreign
20 service. He's also ours. He works for money. He's a bad person, and
21 that I'm going to verify what happened during the war and aggression. I
22 did verify, and I found out that he cheated during wartime. And if
23 somebody cheats during wartime, then scores are settled in a different
24 manner; there was kidnapping, et cetera."
25 Mr. Tanic, you heard the opinion of Mr. Mijatovic, the one who you
1 invoked as the main source of information, and that Jovica Stanisic used
2 him to relay information to you. From what I heard, it transpires that
3 you are just an associate, that you were unreliable, that you cheated,
4 that you worked only for the money, et cetera; and this is -- these are
5 his words. Will you agree with me, therefore, that you were just an
6 ordinary collaborator of the state security, that you were unreliable and
7 regular associates; just give information and never receive information?
8 A. I wouldn't agree with you, but I'd like you to continue reading
9 that paragraph. There are very interesting things concerning my
10 kidnapping, which confirm everything I have already said.
11 Q. It -- I read just a piece because it's not been translated.
12 Everything is going to be translated, and the Bench will read everything.
13 So what I wanted to hear is whether ordinary associate --
14 MR. HANNIS: [Previous translation continues]... That paragraph
15 be read.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
17 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would request that the rest of that
18 paragraph be read. I can bring it up in re-direct, I understand, but it's
19 such a long distance in time that I think it may lose it's essence if
20 there's a day between knew and the time I'm able to address it.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm sure Mr. Fila will read it to accommodate
22 you, as he says, but personally I would not have thought it was necessary.
23 Because it appears to me that there's no dispute, but that Mr. Tanic was
24 working in some capacity with the security service.
25 And there's no dispute, as far as I'm aware at the moment, that he
1 and his wife was subjected to some form of abduction. The real -- and we
2 do waste a lot of time if we spend it on issues like that when the
3 challenge is to his reliability, or the reliability of the material that
4 he has provided.
5 Now, if I'm wrong in assuming that that is the real range of the
6 issue here, then I hope counsel will alert me to it. But that seems to be
7 what the cross-examination is focusing on.
8 MR. HANNIS: I agree with that, Your Honour. The one thing in
9 this -- in the remaining sentences relates to the identity of the
10 perpetrators of the kidnapping, which I think has some importance in --
11 for other reasons.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: All right, Mr. Hannis. Mr. Fila has indicated
13 he'll oblige you.
14 So could you give us the rest of the quotation, Mr. Fila.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] "I established another important thing.
16 He was kidnapped by the members of the JSO. The same as they did when
17 arresting Vlado Nikolic, former chief of analysis of the Belgrade centre."
18 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, I cannot catch up with the
19 overlap. The interpreter's note is that there is overlap.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] "So we are putting the pieces together,
21 a small group of JSO members took part in the Ibar assassination attempt.
22 Extortion, racketing ring. They didn't -- they are not interested in
23 names, in legal grounds. They did what they did in arrest of the Bajic
24 brothers. We've come closer to the murder of Slavko Curuvija and the
25 disappearance of Ivan Stambolic. This task could have been maybe would
1 have been brought to a close sooner, if my dearest minister would not have
2 given so many statements at press conferences."
3 Are you satisfied now, Mr. Tanic. I'm not disputing whether Mr.
4 Tanic has been kidnapped or not or that he hasn't worked with the security
5 service. Why I'm saying this is I want to dispute his ranking within the
6 service. I want to demonstrate that he is not a James Bond type of
7 operative, but a usual, ordinary associate or collaborator.
8 Q. You will agree with me that ordinary associates just give
9 information, never receive, and that they always have a pseudonym. Your
10 pseudonym was Rabin, or rabbi in English. So if you are an ordinary
11 associate, you could only provide information and not receive information
12 from the service. Is that true? Is that correct?
13 A. I'm waiting for the interpretation. This is not correct because I
14 was not an ordinary associate. If you followed closely, I said that over
15 the past couple of years I've had no pseudonym or in the last couple of
16 years in service I did not have a pseudonym. You can ask Mr. Mijatovic,
17 and I have to --
18 Q. [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, your microphone is not on and there is
21 definitely an overlap occurring. You will need to observe the pause until
22 the witness's answer is translated. Thank you.
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Highness, what I'm worried about
24 is time. I read a paragraph from this book, and I wanted to seek and
25 elicit his conclusions. And he is wasting my time.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Do you know the English expression "the more hurry,
2 the less speed." I don't know how that might translate into Serbian, but
3 it is something to bear in mind, Mr. Fila.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Well, we have another proverb that's:
5 "If you take a shortcut, you will get there later."
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I answer this question?
7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Why would -- would an ordinary associate with a pseudonym only
9 provide information or receive from the receive?
10 A. Yes. An ordinary associate just provides information. You know
11 what the head of the Belgrade centre of the State Security Service does
12 not personally pay ordinary associates. Mr. Mijatovic, on the previous
13 page, said that he paid for me for my work. An ordinary associate would
14 not be paid by the head of the service. Ordinary associates never see the
15 head of the service, never sit down with the number two or number three in
16 the service at the same table. Ordinary associates work with operatives,
17 they are run by operatives, and paid by operatives.
18 And the fact that Mr. Mijatovic said that he paid me belies his
19 words. What he said about me being deceitful, then charges would have
20 been brought and not -- I would have not been the kidnapped. And of
21 course -- especially my wife. Parts of the JSO were Milosevic's death
22 squadrons. JSO would be sent to special Milosevic's enemies, singled out
23 as particularly dangerous by Milosevic himself. JSO would not be dealing
24 with just ordinary people. Do you know how much it costs to kidnap me and
25 my wife, to close down a whole block of streets, five to six vehicles, 20
1 people. Do you believe that such an expense would be wasted on an
2 ordinary collaborator?
3 Q. I wanted to elicit your comment on Mr. Mijatovic's words, that
4 Mijatovic -- Mihajlovic was trying to get information who you were. He
5 said that you were unreliable, and you mentioned criminal responsibility,
6 foreign agents are criminally prosecuted. And you were being betraying of
7 your country pursuant to the 1992 Criminal Code.
8 A. Mr. Fila, get a hold on. Mr. Fila, this is a massacre. With the
9 British intelligence service, I did not engage in spying against Serbia,
10 as I stated already. We were working on stymie-ing the belligerent
11 conduct of Milosevic's regime. We were not dealing with espionage. All
12 people who work with intelligence service do not deal with espionage
14 Q. You could not disclose state secrets because you did not possess
15 them. You were just an ordinary agent of the SDB for the money. This is
16 your main ideology; money. Mijatovic accused you of that, and this is the
17 only inference that can be drawn from this. And the Serbian Criminal Code
18 states that whoever works with a foreign intelligence service is a traitor
19 and should be criminally prosecuted, during wartime especially. If you
20 were working for the SDB, I can accept that. But if you work for a
21 foreign intelligence service, then this is a crime.
22 A. Why no criminal charges have been brought against me at any point,
23 and that is an important point in the whole matter?
24 Q. [Microphone not activated]
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel. Microphone for
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
3 Q. [Microphone not activated]
4 A. Do you have my statement? Maybe the usher may help me get a copy
5 of my statement.
6 Q. The first paragraph of your statement, let us orientate what we
7 are going to deal with. You say that your statement is based on three
8 parts. Maybe I should let you read the first paragraph.
9 A. No, no. No, go on, Mr. Fila.
10 Q. You say that there are three bases to your statement. One is your
11 personal experience in conducting discreet negotiations with Albanians,
12 with the approval of Slobodan Milosevic in 1995/1997; your personal
13 experience of -- in the spring of 1999 when I was a liaison officer with
14 the western governments and Serbian government; and talks conducted
15 through Zoran Mijatovic. And since you were deposed in 1999/2000, we are
16 covering a period of 1995 and 2000.
17 A. Yes, yes.
18 Q. [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone for counsel was not on.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
21 Q. I'm not going to deal with the first basis. The second, your
22 claim that you are liaison officer between the western countries and
23 Yugoslav government --
24 THE INTERPRETER: There is lots of overlap, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, please. This can't go on, and there has to
1 be some discipline exercised by both of you. You cannot talk over each
2 other. And when one finishes, there has to be a time lapse before the
3 other starts speaking because translation is not complete. You know that
4 yourself, Mr. Tanic. When things are translated into your language, we
5 have to wait while you hear the interpretations. It works for each
6 language. So please focus the questions, Mr. Fila, perhaps a little more
7 briefly; and please, Mr. Tanic, answer as briefly as you can.
8 Mr. Fila.
9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I've tried to cut it
10 short, but I didn't have sufficient time to ask my question, so the
11 question is based on just what I say.
12 Q. That you were the liaison man on behalf of the Yugoslav
13 government, and I emphasise that. You've never mentioned that over the
14 last few days or, for that matter, in any of your statements. We are
15 after all talking about the Yugoslav government. In which way were you
16 authorised to do anything by the Yugoslav government? That's what I'm
18 A. The interpretation was not there yet. I had to wait for the
19 interpretation to enter.
20 Mr. Fila has failed to read the entire sentence. The Yugoslav
21 government in a bid to find an honourable solution to put a stop to NATO's
22 bombing campaign. So that's that. So that authority or those powers stem
23 from the fact that I was on the way already towards helping find a
24 solution to bring the war to an end.
25 So it says I was the liaison man between the Yugoslav government
1 and the western governments in a bid to find an honourable solution to put
2 a stop to NATO's bombing campaign. That's all to easy to ascertain that I
3 did indeed hold that position at a later stage in this trial. As a lot of
4 things seem to be established about me at a pretty late stage, all I can
5 say is I had the powers.
6 Q. The question is: Who on behalf of the Yugoslav government
7 authorised you? The person you mentioned is someone altogether different.
8 I'm talking about the Yugoslav government; it has a prime minister, deputy
9 prime minister, members of the cabinet, and so on and so forth. Who
10 authorised you on behalf of the Yugoslav government to do anything like
12 A. Among other things I was setting out; I had not been authorised by
13 the service only. It was through Mihajlovic that authorisation had been
14 obtained through Milan Milutinovic, who was a member of the cabinet at the
15 time I believe. He also authorised my journey, and through Mihajlovic he
16 received a report on the peace offer. He made comments. He said that it
17 was identical to the substance of his own talks with the foreign minister
18 of another country, and this is easy enough to check.
19 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, please stop him. I don't
20 have time for that.
21 Q. What will you say if I tell you this: Neither Dusan Mihajlovic
22 nor Milutinovic were cabinet members at the time under consideration?
23 A. I have no comment to make. The Yugoslav government, the very
24 phrase, was used in a way that simply -- what could you possibly say?
25 Between Milosevic's regime, the Yugoslav government, Belgrade, and the
1 west, all these are political phrases that mean next to nothing. The
2 essence of the matter is: I was there. People in power knew that I was
3 on my way there. I came back with a result.
4 I described the result as I described it a while ago. It wasn't
5 there in any book for me to read about. Milosevic and Milutinovic were
6 informed as well as the security service. It wasn't until after two years
7 after my evidence that this book emerged that Lilic has something to do
8 with that as well, and he came back with the same result. This is not a
9 fabrication on my part; that would have been impossible. That's should be
10 easy enough to ascertain. I certainly had not been authorised by, I don't
11 know, somebody like my own aunt or uncle. You see my point.
12 I got the money for that journey. I was authorised to leave by
13 the Crisis Staff, and there you have it. There was a perfectly valid
14 report about that offered, too. The one thing that is slightly improper
15 about that, or not quite correct, I was one of the people liaising between
16 the Yugoslav government and the western countries in order to reach an
17 honourable solution, but I did not know who the others involved were so I
18 do not wish to speculate.
19 Q. All right. So we agree that you were never authorised by the
20 Yugoslav government to do anything, were you?
21 A. We definitely have not agreed on that.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: That's the sort of question that really doesn't
23 help us because the witness has given an answer. We know that his view of
24 what might be government authorisation is not the same as the proposition
25 you're advancing to him. And we will sort that out in due course, but we
1 know that the two of you will never agree on -- in these sort of general
2 propositions. Thanks.
3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
4 Q. You talked about submitting a report. Do you still keep a copy of
5 that report for your own purposes?
6 A. A copy of that report, my god, Mr. Fila. Mr. Mihajlovic has a
7 copy in his files, if I remember correctly; he's the one you should go to.
8 Q. Let's move on to something else. At one point you said that you
9 received your authority for negotiations from three different sources, and
10 the fact was there was no democracy in the government. If there was no
11 democracy in the government, you will agree with me that you no longer had
12 the authority or the powers. Is that true? Or the New Democratic Party,
13 rather, was no longer in the government.
14 A. That's right.
15 Q. [Microphone not activated]
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't hear the question
17 because the microphone was switched off halfway through the question.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, your question has been omitted -- hasn't
19 been picked up by the interpreters because the microphone wasn't turned
21 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
22 Q. In paragraph 4, he says that the authority for the negotiations
23 came from three different sources; one of them being the fact that the New
24 Democracy party was a member of the government. I asked him whether that
25 authority ceased when the New Democratic Party left the government, and
1 the witness's answer was yes.
2 A. Let me just clarify what negotiations we're talking about, with
3 the Albanians or to end the war?
4 Q. [Microphone not activated]
5 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear, physically hear
6 the question.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Again, what you've said has not been heard. It may
8 be to do with the microphone, but you've then had a quick exchange with
9 the witness which hasn't been picked up.
10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Page 12, the fact that New Democracy
11 was no longer in government; page 12, line 8, that's what I'm talking
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Well, we've got that, but something else has
14 been said -- anyway, please move on to your next point.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
16 Q. In paragraph 10, you talk about institutional links. You say you
17 met Zoran Mijatovic once; and during your examination-in-chief on the 10th
18 of October, on page 6275, lines 19 through 24, you say that you met a man
19 whose name was mentioned in closed session and Mijatovic whenever
20 necessary, and it went on like that until October 1998. What do you mean
21 by "institutional links?"
22 A. It says communication between institutions or inter-institutional
23 communication and not links. Now, these are two different things, are
24 they? At least in our language. The concept of inter-institutional
25 communication in the life of an intelligence community implies a series of
1 actions determine -- used to determine the level of a meeting, the degree
2 of urgency involved, the nature of any subjects to be raised; will a
3 meeting be recorded or not, will it just be a verbal meeting, will an
4 associate just simply make a statement, or will they be -- will there be
5 counter-intelligence involved or any possible feedback; will anything be
6 written down, what about the person receiving this information, will they
7 write anything down?
8 This is what I mean when I say communications between
9 institutions. For example, I say there is a problem. It's not a major
10 problem. All right, okay. See you next Sunday. Fine.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... This is a
12 sufficient answer.
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
14 Q. If you look at the next paragraph, you say you drafted written
15 reports together with other persons from the State Security Service.
16 Which other persons are you talking about? Which other persons are you
17 talking about?
18 A. Well, there's reference here to a person we're not supposed to
19 mention, first and foremost. When I say we drafted written reports, you
20 know it's a method we use in the security services. And I suppose I'm
21 allowed to say that in open session. There you put together a report in
22 the form of a journalistic piece or a newspaper article, and that's how
23 you then proceed. I suppose that I'm allowed to say that.
24 Q. The question is: What about these other persons from the State
25 Security Services? Who are these other persons?
1 A. Which paragraph was that?
2 Q. [Microphone not activated]
3 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone was not on.
4 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Let me have a look.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Paragraph 11, and it's the last two sentences.
7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Written analysis, in the course of my task, was produced in
9 cooperation with members of the SDB. Who were these other members, and
10 where did you produce these written analyses?
11 A. There, the counsel is again trying to confuse the Chamber.
12 Mijatovic is not a person that I worked with in drafting these reports,
13 and then it goes on to state other persons. Well, these other persons are
14 persons who have been mentioned before. Operatives mentioned previously
15 in closed session. So these are your other persons. Before, we were
16 speaking about Mijatovic. These reports were normally produced on
17 official premises --
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Please confine the answer. You've answered the
19 question. Now, let's move to the next one.
20 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In paragraph 15, you say that Slobodan Milosevic approved of your
22 work. Based on your statement, I see that these are round-table
23 negotiations in actual fact. When you say negotiations, you mean
24 round-table discussions. You claim that Milosevic approved the results
25 reached by one such round-table discussion, in order for you to
1 participate in another such discussion. Is that what you are suggesting?
2 A. That's not true, Mr. Fila. Again, the Defence is trying to
3 exaggerate and twist the meaning of something. There were NGO groups and
4 there were round-table discussions in order to have the participation of a
5 third party, without the third party necessarily being a country. I
6 provided a very specific definition of that, explanation of that. It
7 wasn't just one single NGO; there were several rounds of round-table
8 discussions, closed and semi-closed.
9 These were used as an opportunity for persons to meet after
10 official meetings and to informally participate. There was Agani
11 participating in this round-table discussion and Mr. Perisic as a
12 representative of the SPS. It was in the Sava centre, where I was back in
13 1995. It was at the time that Mr. Perisic was a high ranking official of
14 the SPS. For example, should they have deemed it necessary, they would
15 have had an opportunity to sit down together and talk for ten or 15
16 minutes in full secrecy. This was merely a smoke-screen, a well-meaning
17 smoke-screen for negotiations to be brought to a successful conclusion. I
18 employed this method just like all the other people involved.
19 Q. I asked you a question and you provided an answer. You said:
20 Yes. Well, that's that.
21 A. Excuse me, but my answer was not yes. If you will please excuse
22 me, my answer was definitely not yes. There were a whole succession of
23 meetings, one third of which were round-table debates, or at least a half.
24 There was a group of intellectuals there, and you know that full well,
25 Fila. I'm not sure why you're asking me that, because you know that all
1 to well.
2 Q. That's because I looked at your statement. You participated in
3 three round-table debates up until 1997. New Democracy was not in
4 government at the time. After that there were no round-table, no
5 institutional links, no inter-institutional communications or meetings
6 with Slobodan Milosevic for that matter after 1997. That's what I'm
8 A. Right. Okay. Well, we have to wait for the interpretation to
9 finish. What shall we do, Mr. Fila.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's Note: The microphone was not on.
11 We didn't hear the question.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer to your question was no.
13 You are simply not right; pure and simple. You should call some experts
14 on politics, and then you will see what the methodology behind this is.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
16 Q. In 22, you said that the Albanians accepted the first stage of
17 negotiations, measures for mutual confidence building, and this was
18 supposed to take two years. Are these the two years that were raised in
19 examination-in-chief and suddenly grew out of proportion and became a
20 15-year period, and when exactly did any Albanians accept that, and which
21 Albanians specifically?
22 A. Ah, all right. This is not the 15 years that were mentioned
23 before. In my statement I was clear. I said this was stage one of
24 confidence building, and the implementation took roughly two years. Agani
25 agreed when we were in Pristina sometime in 1995, possibly 1996. He
1 agreed on principle with these policies to take it step by step. It
2 wasn't just me being there advocating these policies. Mr. Paglia can
3 confirm that for your benefit. He was there on behalf of the contact
4 group, and his information is very similar. We cross-referenced our
5 information in preparation for my question.
6 Q. You say that they accepted to go back to autonomy. When did the
7 Albanians accept that? When?
8 A. It was sometime in 1996. They were facing a severe crisis, a
9 political crisis. All the western countries at the time were backing
10 Belgrade's policies. We were talking about full autonomy, about
11 essential autonomy, not autonomy as defined back in 1986. Since they
12 realised that the western governments or the international community did
13 not back their requests, claims, and since they realised that everybody
14 was backing Belgrade's policy, they withdrew to some extent from their
15 previous position.
16 Q. Listen. I'm trying to answer your question. What I'm asking you
17 is when and which Albanians? Did they agree to this in writing? Is there
18 anything you have to show for this?
19 A. They didn't agree in writing, Mr. Fila. These were secret
20 negotiations. They agreed in principle to not drag their feet, and you
21 can see that if you look at the newer declaration, where it says without
22 prejudicing the eventual solution.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, who were the Albanians who agreed in
24 principle to accept Milosevic's offer of a return to autonomy?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was Fehmi Agani, Rugova's deputy
1 and envoy. In the 1960s, in Pristina, we had two meetings. We had
2 meetings about these confidence-building measures --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Names are all I want at the moment. Apart from
4 Agani, who else was involved in that agreement or acceptance in principle?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Nobody else. Nobody else could
6 possibly have accepted that or refused. Agani was -- you know, Rugova was
7 in power, and Agani was his envoy.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
9 Now, the other matter I want to be clear about is you talk about
10 return to autonomy; and then you now try to expand that concept to
11 something called full autonomy, which I have to say causes confusion in my
12 mind. What is meant by this expression "autonomy"? Does that mean that
13 Kosovo would be a republic, or does it mean something short of that that
14 you can define, or does it mean something nebulous that you can't define?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It doesn't mean a republic, but
16 we used to refer it to the concept as autonomy-plus; less than a full
17 republic, but more than full autonomy. This would have presented problems
18 later for constitutional experts. I was paving the way to a political
19 solution, and I'm no constitutional expert. In the sense of politics, we
20 called it or we thought about it more than autonomy, but less than a
21 republic. Autonomy-plus. I can describe it if you wish.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, if you just describe the "plus" element to
23 me, then that might help.
24 Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, there is some explanation that in
1 paragraph 16 of his statement, which is in evidence. On page 4 about four
2 lines up from the bottom, there's a reference to what the "plus" referred
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Hannis.
5 Mr. Fila.
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] There was no mention of Albanians
7 accepting it; that's the difference.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know what? In 1996, the
9 Albanian side was in a very serious position vis-a-vis Belgrade, and this
10 is the vital part of my testimony, if I may. Milosevic enjoyed the
11 positive spin-offs after the Dayton Agreement, because everyone expected
12 that he would present a constructive factor as he had promised at the
14 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Please, we've already heard this.
16 A. When did you hear this, Mr. Fila? That's the essence of this
17 tragedy of ours. We held the political victory in our hands pertaining to
18 Kosovo, and Milosevic just destroyed it. When did you hear this? He
19 turned the Albanian terrorists into freedom fighters; have you ever heard
20 of that?
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Stop.
22 Mr. Fila, ask another question, please.
23 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
24 Q. In paragraphs 31 and 32, you talk about foreign diplomatic efforts
25 to achieve peace. Did you know that there was a summit in Crete of the
1 countries of the Balkans region, and Fatosh Nano and Milosevic met on that
2 occasion. That was a first meeting of Serbian and Albanian president
3 since 1946. And Fatosh Nano said Kosovo was an internal Serbian affair.
4 I'm interested why the summit was not mentioned; this effort invested by
5 the regime to get peace. There's no mention of it. Did you know that a
6 summit took place?
7 A. Of course I know about it. I've been telling you that Milosevic
8 participated in the negotiations as well, and you didn't believe me. I
9 wasn't there; that's why I didn't mention it. I knew of it, but I also
10 knew that what was arranged there was not implemented. We, on the other
11 hand, met with the Albanians. I met with the Albanian minister of the
12 interior during that meeting. I was not there.
13 Q. You mentioned Predrag Simic and his book wrote to Rambouillet. I
14 believe you've read it?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Do you remember that it was his assessment that the increase in
17 activities of the KLA in Kosovo was a reaction to the Crete agreement.
18 Because the KLA saw it as their last chance to fight and to do away with
19 any peaceful efforts. This is also in the book.
20 [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Fila's microphone was switched off for a
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The assessment is very interesting.
24 I know Mr. Simic very well. He's an intellectual, and I advise you to
25 write -- read the book and what he wrote about me. It is partially
1 correct. I agree. The only problem is that Milosevic, as you can read
2 from Stanisic's statements, would not allow our organs, our bodies to deal
3 with the KLA by way of arrests or simply doing away with the entire
4 organisation. He allowed the KLA to grow, and the problem was that there
5 were conflicts at the time already.
6 And if you look at the table, you will see that the increase of
7 Albanian terrorism began as of that moment when Milosevic started
8 protecting Kosovo. But I agree with the assessment. It is rather
9 important, and it is not contradictory to what I'm saying. Mr. Simic put
10 it rather well. The only problem was that the KLA had already been in
11 existence. You should read what Stanisic said at page 239 of Mijatovic's
12 book, page 239 of Mijatovic's book. Stanisic's opinion of Kosovo in 1998.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... Mr. Tanic,
14 let's move on.
15 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
16 Q. Do you remember that in the same book it is stated that Fehmi
17 Agani did not accept, or rather, gave up on Bertelsmann Foundation's
18 recommendation? This is in the same book and concerns Mr. Agani. Do you
19 remember that? I guess you were there.
20 A. Yes. I was at the meeting. It was nice of you to refresh my
21 memory. It was another situation which I was there with Mr. Agani and
22 western diplomats.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Please answer the question, would you? Do you
24 remember that in the same book it is stated that Agani did not accept, or
25 rather, gave up on Bertelsmann Foundation's recommendations? Do you
1 remember that?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember, since he only gave
3 up partially. He was going from one side to another. He changed
5 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I'll move on.
6 Q. In the same paragraph, paragraph 32, you mention a document, a
7 paper. You state that the Albanians gave up on independence. Did you
8 know that Mr. Rugova, in Belgrade, refused to reject independence? There
9 was no one on the Albanian side at that time or nowadays to give up on the
10 notion of independence. Do you agree with me?
11 A. Well, now there aren't any, but at that time they were ready --
12 they were not ready to give up independence completely. I wanted to say
13 that they were willing to put the issue of independence within a longer
14 historical context, to see what comes out of it. Of course, the final
15 goal was not to give up on it completely, although you can interpret it as
16 such. But if someone says, "Let's drop it for the next ten or 15 years,"
17 then that's it.
18 Q. Paragraph 35, you talk about Milosevic's speech in Pristina on the
19 25th of June, 1997, in negative light. During your cross-examination,
20 Milosevic read parts of the speech to you on page 5081, lines 2 through
21 17, the date 16th of May, 2000. I wasn't going to read this to you to
22 save time, but I wanted to ask you this: Did you in the meantime re-read
23 the speech. Can you tell us where in the speech can we find what you
24 assert? [Microphone not activated]
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone was not on.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] It was in 2002.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I recall, he put it
3 clearly in that speech that Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia. He
4 didn't mention Yugoslavia but Serbia. I can go through the speech again.
5 I may have omitted a thing or two; but as far as I know, this speech was
6 not exactly in keeping with the results of the negotiations until then.
7 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
8 Q. We can see the transcript for ourselves, and should you need to
9 see the entire speech I am willing to give it to you.
10 A. I would be happy to see it. Perhaps later you can give it to me
11 so that I can read it back in my hotel room.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the speech an exhibit?
13 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No. I wanted to use it to see whether
14 his memory is any better than in 2002, whether he re-read it in the
15 meantime. If he didn't, he didn't.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Fila, if there are points to be made about the
18 inaccuracy of the comments in paragraph 35, then these are comments that
19 can be made in submissions if the Chamber had the speech in addition, of
20 course, to the transcript, which we do have.
21 Mr. Hannis.
22 MR. HANNIS: And you do have the transcript, Your Honour, but I
23 would indicate that it appears from the transcript, at page 5081, Mr.
24 Milosevic reads out parts of the speech, but he apparently doesn't read
25 the whole speech because at line 8 he says: "Now I'm going to skip a
1 part," and then it says "thus and so." So it appears the whole speech was
2 not put to the witness at the time.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it would nevertheless make sense for us to
4 have the whole speech, so we can put the comments in context. But we
5 don't need to go over the speech here.
6 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] It will be translated, and you will
7 receive it.
8 Q. In paragraph 28, you state that in September 1997 a document was
9 created by the name of "Joint Recommendations." It is Exhibit P0 --
10 P2481. This is based on the recommendations you made to Milosevic at the
11 meeting you had with him and some other people back in 1995. This
12 document dates back to September 1997. How is it possible that Milosevic
13 in his speech from June 1997 annulled something which was created only
14 three months subsequently, as you state in paragraph 35?
15 A. Again, you're trying to abuse the political processes in order to
16 confuse the Board. You are mentioning Agani, Milosevic, Rugova, this and
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, just answer the question, please.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Milosevic did, as Agani and Rugova
20 and others during the negotiations. Maybe I should have said a signal was
21 given to annul the results of the negotiations, then he went to Crete, and
22 then he changed his mind again. We know what the nature of that regime
23 was; one week one thing, the next week the other thing. Mr. Fila, as if
24 you don't know what the regime was like. In the next six months, well,
25 Milosevic would negotiate, and then he wouldn't.
1 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I just asked him how
2 Milosevic was able to prevent in June something which took place in
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I mean it -- when a witness has difficulty
5 answering a specific question like that, often a witness will resort to
6 aggression rather than simply answering the question. And the Court might
7 form the impression that that's what the witness has just done. When he
8 then concentrates on the question, he gives an answer that's plausible.
9 And we would then have to work our way through it. But situation is
10 complicated for us by the fact that the witness takes this aggressive
11 attitude to your question, which is rather unfortunate.
12 MR. FILA: [No interpretation]
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I perhaps used the wrong words.
14 Perhaps I should have said he gave a negative signal in his speech in
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Okay. Let's drop it. Mr. Tanic, you are talking about the
18 meeting in New York from where Mihajlovic allegedly brought that piece of
19 paper, the one we discussed. I wanted to ask you this, and I would kindly
20 ask for an answer: Did you know that that meeting in New York was
21 actually a gathering of individuals under the auspices of the forum for
22 inter-ethnic relations, where around the round-table the participants
23 exchanged views on current topics? No one was authorised to carry out
24 any negotiations and Vesna Pesic was there on behalf of the Citizens'
25 Council as well as Vuk Draskovic. Isn't that correct?
1 A. Formally, it was a round-table discussion. Agani was there and
2 the representative from Madeleine Albright's cabinet. Just look at list
3 of participants.
4 Q. I asked you this: Was this organised by the forum for
5 inter-ethnic relations and that people were there as individuals? That
6 forum is from Belgrade?
7 A. No, not even formally. The forum was one of the organiser. The
8 other organiser was one of the foundations of the state department, but it
9 was in the form of a round-table discussion.
10 Q. In paragraph 36, you mention an expression of jointly accepted or
11 agreed positions. This is the paper we were referring to, but you never
12 mentioned where you find that Rugova gave up on independence. Where is
13 that? Can you show it to the Bench already?
14 A. Rugova never did it in writing. These were secret negotiations.
15 There was change of positions, negotiations, trying to outplay the other.
16 But I categorically state that Rugova and Agani were prepared to postpone
17 the issue of independence; whereas, on our part, we saw our window of
18 opportunity to join the EU in the meantime. And then the Albanians would
19 be allowed to secede if they wanted to. But at -- you're trying to say
20 that they gave up on it at that time. They never did. The politics is
21 about winning and losing at a particular moment.
22 Q. Did anyone say that orally, that we can check, because in
23 paragraph 36 you say: "Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the Kosovar
24 Albanians, accepted to give up on the notion of independence."
25 A. It says "secession."
1 Q. [Microphone not activated]
2 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Fila's microphone was not on.
3 MR. FILA: [Interpretation].
4 Q. You said he didn't put it in writing. How about using the words
5 where, with whom?
6 A. During the secret negotiations with Monsignor Paglia, he was there
7 on behalf of the contact group. Then he practically said that the issue
8 of secession and independence can be postponed. Well, you know, just
9 concessions are difficult to gain or give. The Albanian side waited on --
10 for Milosevic to make a mistake.
11 Q. Do you agree with me that Rugova never gave up on it, be it in
12 writing or orally, as what may have or may not have taken place in
13 subsequent negotiations, that's another issue?
14 A. I wouldn't --
15 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, may I ask for a clarification about he
16 never gave up on "it," because Mr. Fila's question on page 27, line 13,
17 was, "did Ibrahim Rugova say the Albanians accepted to give up on the
18 notion of independence." In paragraph 36, what is stated in the English
19 is that, "Ibrahim Rugova, the president of the Kosovar Albanians, had
20 agreed to step back from secession." I would say those are two slightly
21 different things, and I think the witness needs to be clear what the
22 question is.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the witness answered the last question by
24 saying that he practically said that the issue of secession and
25 independence can be postponed. So I would assume the witness views these
1 as the same, and Mr. Fila then asked the question: Do you agree with me
2 that Rugova never gave up on it. Is it not just --
3 MR. HANNIS: I'll withdraw that, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: -- a question of two words for the same concept,
6 So please answer the question, Mr. Tanic. The question was: Do
7 you agree with Mr. Fila that Rugova never gave up on secession,
8 independence; whatever you wish to call it?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I disagree.
10 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
11 Q. When did he give up on that, in writing or orally, that he stood
12 up and said, "We are giving up on independence," when and where?
13 A. You know what? This part of the testimony can create further
14 chaos down there in the region and can bring about further dithering and
15 can bring some people in Kosovo into a disadvantaged situation. So I
16 propose that we move into private or closed session with the Court's
18 Q. There's no reason for going into private session.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. That would not be an appropriate reason for
20 us to hear evidence in private session. The -- there are two issues here.
21 You've said that Monsignor Paglia was present when this was indicated.
22 Now, can you be more specific about what indication was given by Rugova of
23 his position?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, he indicated this: Of course,
25 for the Albanian people, the notion of independence remains a permanent
1 political goal. However, because of the objective state of play and the
2 circumstances obtaining and the interest for the Albanians for this matter
3 to be started resolved -- being resolved and by political means, they
4 would accept a step-by-step approach. First, four or five measures to
5 build confidence over two years; and then a temporary status of Kosovo,
6 which would imply a restoration of full autonomy, autonomy-plus. That
7 would be lasting for a longer period of time.
8 Subsequently, at Rambouillet, they cut that short. And asked not
9 only by Monsignor Paglia, but you can verify that with the state
10 department and foreign office. When Rugova was asked: What about
11 independence? A formula agreed by Agani and me in Pristina was applied
12 for the notion of independence to remain a permanent political goal that
13 the Albanians are going to fight for sometime in the future, and then in
14 the meantime we are going to resolve this problem and conclude a political
15 solution. That was the gist of it.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: When you refer to the foreign office, do you mean
17 the United Kingdom foreign office?
18 THE WITNESS: [No verbal response]
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, you have to answer.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you remember where this happened, and roughly
22 when it was?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot pin-point the date, the
24 time, because this was a process where some headway was being made. This
25 is a period between 1995 and 1996, that period, particularly 1996,
1 immediately after the Dayton Accords. Let's put it in 1996. This -- it
2 was a series of talks. This is no secret. I would like to highlight this
3 formulation. It remains their permanent political goal, but --
4 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that.
5 Now, Mr. Fila, bearing in mind that there seem to be no absolutes
6 in this trial, you've perhaps got the answer, the only answer, you're
7 going to get to this question.
8 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] I cannot accept anything more,
9 obviously. I'm going to bring my cross to a close soon.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course, Mr. Fila. If I may
11 describe this. They were sitting back and waiting for Milosevic to make a
12 mistake --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... Yourself and
14 confine yourself to answering questions. Once your answer is complete,
15 leave it at that and we'll move to another question.
16 Mr. Fila.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.
18 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
19 Q. The only thing I'd like to hear more about now is that you
20 mentioned a helicopter that Perisic and Stanisic took to travel to Kosovo.
21 I would like to ask you to explain that why this helicopter is never
22 mentioned in your earlier statements, sir. You haven't mentioned it to
23 the OTP in your additional interview. Now this helicopter springs up
24 here. I put it to you that this helicopter flight never took place, that
25 Sainovic, Perisic, and Stanisic never took together a helicopter to fly
1 there. Think about it. I believe that your memory was much better in
3 A. This was told to me by Perisic. Initially, I did not this take as
4 an important fact; it was just an illustration of theirs that they could
5 not work with Sainovic. It was told to me by Perisic. It's just an
6 illustration. It is not pertinent to the subject matter at hand.
7 Q. Finally, another thing is interesting to me. You said that the
8 main thesis of your book was that Milosevic intentionally provoked the war
9 with NATO. The question I'm interested in is whether you received that
10 5.000 euro from the British intelligence service because of that claim in
11 your future book.
12 A. My main thesis was that Milosevic intentionally provoked the war
13 with Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, and after that with NATO. I did not
14 receive 5.000 euro from the Brits because of this thesis, but to cover my
15 expenses. I had to travel to check and double-check with international
16 factors some of my thesis to see whether I'm in the right or not, and it
17 costs money. My thesis was that Milosevic intentionally provoked war in
18 Kosovo and that he turned Albanian terrorists into freedom fighters.
19 Q. Did the Brits ask you to give the money back, since you did not
20 write the book eventually? [Microphone not activated]
21 THE INTERPRETER: The microphone was off for counsel.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that question appears to have been answered.
23 Unless you have some particular foundation for suggesting that that
24 payment was an advance for a book, then I would not be prepared to allow
25 you to pursue this. But have you a basis for saying that or have I
1 misunderstood the --
2 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] No, no. In a previous statement he
3 said that he proved Serbian victims, and the British service was
4 interested in giving him money for the publication of the book and that he
5 would receive money from them for the purpose of writing the book.
6 Q. And you are going to agree, Witness, to me?
7 MR. HANNIS: [Previous translation continues]...
8 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry?
9 MR. HANNIS: Can we have a reference to where that is?
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, can we?
11 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] Let me find it. Paragraph 2 states
12 about the content of the book. Can we resolve it in a simple manner. Can
13 I ask the witness whether the Brits gave him the money to write the book?
14 I cannot find the place, but there is such a claim.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Please ask that question.
16 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Mr. Tanic, is it true that you received 10.000 German marks on two
18 occasions connected with your writing the book, that was the basis for
19 your receiving the money?
20 A. Yes. In relation to the costs related to the writing of the book,
21 and the Brits were interested in Serb victims, crimes perpetrated by the
22 Haradinaj brothers, and you may ask Mr. Mijatovic about the origins. You
23 know, you will see.
24 Q. So my question: If you did not write this book, did the British
25 secret service ask you to give the money back? I believe that the UK is a
1 wealthy country, but ...
2 A. This is a very difficult question to answer -- well, the book has
3 been written, so don't worry about that. And one day, if I will be in a
4 position to publish it, it will be published.
5 Q. I wanted to ask you another thing, and this is going to conclude
6 my examination. You said that Milosevic had absolute control over the
7 security services, MUP, and the military answering a question by the
9 A. Could you pin-point that part of the statement?
10 Q. 6333, lines 6 to 8.
11 A. This was true particularly after Stanisic and Perisic had been
12 removed. And he had control beforehand; but after Perisic and Stanisic
13 were dismissed, he had absolute control over the security services and the
14 military. And this is why they were removed.
15 Q. If he had such level of control as you claim - I may agree with
16 you - why would he need a parallel line of command or chain of command
17 when you say that everybody was doing their bidding? At some places you
18 allude to orders being given to General Pavkovic?
19 A. Thank you for this beautiful question. He needed a parallel chain
20 of command because he could not secure political control, neither in the
21 federal parliament nor in the republican government, as you know. Federal
22 parliament comprised Serbia and Montenegro, and the Serbian parliament
23 comprised opposition as well.
24 And in Serbia and Montenegro there were many people in parliament
25 and in government who -- well, who knew that a political solution to the
1 Kosovo problem was possible, however lame, so that Milosevic could not
2 secure political control of the republican parliament and government and
3 federal parliament and government. And this is why he established this
4 parallel chain of command, otherwise he would not have done that.
5 Q. [No interpretation]
6 THE INTERPRETER: Can the counsel repeat the question because of
8 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
9 MR. FILA: [Interpretation]
10 Q. So this would go for a political chain of command, not a police or
11 military chain of command over which he usually had control, as you
12 stated, to circumvent the parliament?
13 A. This is not some political control; it goes for constitutional
14 political control through both parliaments and through the republican
15 government and the republican Assembly and other --
16 Q. Thank you.
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] This was my last question.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I understand that, Mr. Fila. I regret, I
19 don't understand the answer to the question.
20 Why would these political grounds require him to have a parallel
21 command structure or chain of command over the MUP, the security service,
22 and the military, if he was effectively in control of all?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see, at that time Milosevic was
24 president of Yugoslavia, let me remind you. So as Yugoslav president, he
25 had very little authority and powers to conduct such affairs. The Serbian
1 president was Milan Milutinovic. And constitutionally, he had much
2 greater powers than Milosevic -- well, on paper, not de facto.
3 And also while he was president of Serbia, Milosevic took the
4 position of Yugoslav and Serb president in turns. He had de facto
5 control, but he could not enact his decisions through parliament or
6 through government, because he could not confine in everybody because then
7 a riot would ensue and this is why he made this parallel chain of command.
8 Had Milosevic, you know --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: The only detailed evidence we've had about a
10 parallel chain of command I think related to the army, if I'm not
11 mistaken, and the army is a federal institution here. Now, why would he
12 in relation to a federal institution need to have a parallel chain of
13 command if he was legally and factually in control?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, to use the military
15 against the civilians in a part of the territory, pursuant to our allow,
16 it is disallowed to use military against civilians. This is possible only
17 in extraordinary circumstances, and for -- to introduce this state in
18 Kosovo Milosevic had to --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: But your whole point is that he did do that. And
20 the only reason, on the face of it, for requiring a parallel structure
21 would be if there were intervening senior commanders in the army who would
22 not implement apparently illegal orders. And the question you're being
23 asked is: Once Perisic had gone, what was the obstruction to simply
24 ordering this through the normal channels? Who was there to prevent
25 Milosevic simply committing criminal acts if he wished through ordering
1 them to be done by the army?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there were, in the military,
3 people who did not want to -- so in political structures in federal and
4 republic governments, who disproved of that. But it is a fact that the
5 parallel chain of command involved both the MUP; security services, after
6 the removal of Jovica Stanisic; and the army. All these institutions were
7 placed under the parallel chain of command through that commission, the
8 federal commission for Kosovo, which changed its title subsequently. But
9 in political structures, there were enough individuals who would oppose
10 that had he used the institutional channel. This is my explanation as a
11 politician. If you need a constitutional expert, you may --
12 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] The only thing I would like to say to
13 intervene with regard to transcript page 31, lines 18, 21, the witness
14 said that maybe this helicopter flight never took place. I would like
15 this to be put on record. Thank you.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. --
17 MR. FILA: [Interpretation] In relation to that flight by Perisic,
18 Stanisic, and Sainovic.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, in relation to the helicopter flight,
20 was one of the comments you made in answer that for all you know it may
21 not have taken place?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was told by Perisic, so I
23 wasn't there myself. I didn't see the helicopter take off. It is just an
24 assumption. Perhaps it did; perhaps it didn't.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. That clarifies the point.
1 Thank you, Mr. Fila.
2 Mr. Ackerman.
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:
5 Q. Mr. Tanic, my name is John Ackerman. I represent General
6 Pavkovic, and I have a number of questions for you. I want to begin by
7 reminding you of an answer you gave yesterday to a question by Mr.
8 O'Sullivan. This is at page 38, line 23 of yesterday's transcript. You
9 said to Mr. O'Sullivan this language:
10 "Not correct. And this attorney-at-law is not qualified and does
11 not have the expertise to interpret complicated political arrangements.
12 It's simply incorrect. I was not going into armed forces technicalities.
13 Could the counsel please be asked not a meddle with high politics and
15 Do you remember saying that?
16 A. Yes. As far as I know, Mr. O'Sullivan failed to introduce himself
17 as someone who is experienced in that sort of thing. And one thing that
18 his questions indicated is that he was entirely untrained in these
20 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Well, let me tell you
21 something right now. I want you to answer my questions and that's it. If
22 you start making a speech, I'm going to stop you because you're doing it
23 to keep me from answering all my questions. I know that's your tack here,
24 and I'm not going to let you do it. I'll ask a question, you give an
25 answer, and that will be it. Now, I will tell you, because you're
1 claiming that Mr. O'Sullivan didn't, I will tell you that I have a degree
2 in international affairs, which you don't; that I served in intelligence
3 of United States army, which you didn't --
4 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I object testify to this. He's
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I think your objection is well founded, Mr. Hannis.
7 Mr. Ackerman, you draw attention to a statement made yesterday
8 which was inappropriate. It's for the Bench to decide just how to deal
9 with these as we go along. Some of them are tackled face-on. Others are
10 allowed just to go unanswered because the situation doesn't demand it. I
11 was tempted at the stage that comment was made yesterday to make the point
12 to the witness that the qualifications of counsel in anything other than
13 the law are entirely irrelevant to the issues in the trial.
14 Counsel is there properly briefed by appropriate experts to ask
15 questions, and it's not for the witness to question the capacity of
16 counsel. I decided not to do so. I didn't realise it was such a big
17 issue. I thought Mr. O'Sullivan was comfortable with the situation. But
18 I hope I've now made it clear to the witness that that is the role counsel
19 plays. And I think with that indication you can proceed with your
21 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Just a few moments ago there was some discussion, Mr. Tanic, about
23 your book. And the Judge even raised some question about that. At page
24 52, line 14, yesterday you were being asked about that. And you said with
25 regard to the amount of money:
1 "I believe that it was 10.000 German marks. Today's counter value
2 of 5.000 euro. For the expenses connected with the preparation of
3 different materials, the book, et cetera."
4 Can you tell me what else besides the book you were being paid for
5 by the British intelligence people. What else were they compensating you
6 for besides your work on this book?
7 A. Well, the book and everything in relation to the book. Travel
8 expenses, I had to travel to Rome to see Mr. Paglia. I had to go to two
9 or three other countries to see diplomats there to check my theories. In
10 answer to your question, I wasn't paid for anything else by the British
11 security services, apart from any expenses incurred during the writing of
12 my book. After my exile, some of my living expenses were covered, but I
13 was not in the pay of the British intelligence services, if that's what
14 you were implying.
15 Q. So you were being paid, you claim now, a fee for writing the book,
16 plus expenses for travel and things of that nature. How much was the fee
17 for writing the book?
18 A. My fee was zero. It was all about expenses that went towards the
19 making of that book, travel expenses --
20 Q. All right, all right --
21 A. -- that sort of thing.
22 Q. Then why did you say yesterday that it was for expenses connected
23 with the preparation of different materials, the book, and so forth? So
24 things other than the book. What other expenses were you being
25 compensated for besides the writing of this book? Were you being paid for
2 A. You say you worked with the US intelligence services. You know
3 that this is not the fee that is normally paid for that sort of
4 information, 100 German mark. It's not like they paid my coffee or
5 anything. Whatever expenses were paid had to do with my book. Don't try
6 to take every single word I say and twist it around to mean something
8 I did not have a fee that was paid to me for any intelligence
9 activity that I carried out. It would have been a much higher fee had
10 there been one to begin with. You say you worked with the US
11 intelligence. If indeed you worked for the US intelligence, you should
12 know better.
13 Q. You were privy to -- you claim you were privy to a great deal of
14 secret information from your government. It's the case, isn't it, that
15 you were providing secret information without the knowledge of your
16 government to western intelligence agencies, and that that's why you were
17 arrested as a possible spy, rather than being kidnapped as you claim.
18 Isn't that true?
19 A. I never submitted any sort of intelligence to any foreign
20 government, intelligence about Serbia or about Yugoslavia. It's true, we
21 did exchange information. I did submit to them information that might
22 have helped them to suppress Milosevic's belligerent behaviour. I was
23 never arrested. I was kidnapped. Please stop these fabrications. If I
24 had been a spy in someone's pay during the war, charges would have been
25 brought against me.
1 I would have been locked up in a prison. I wouldn't have been
2 able to leave the country. Please don't insinuate. The deputy head of
3 the intelligence service confirms for your benefit that indeed I was
4 kidnapped, and now you say I was arrested as a spy. There's no such thing
5 as a special spy. You are either a spy or you are not a spy. Not
6 everyone who is authorised to do their work is a spy.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Tanic. Thank you.
8 Now, we will have to break at this stage for 20 minutes. We'll go
9 into closed session while Mr. Tanic leaves the court, and we'll remain
10 that way until he returns.
11 [Closed session]
21 [Open session]
22 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
24 Mr. Ackerman.
25 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.
1 Q. I've got one maybe final question regarding the book. You told us
2 the first day you testified here that you had not published the book
3 because in the witness protection programme, you're not entitled to
4 publish anything. Is that what you said?
5 A. Yes. I'm not entitled to any form of public life at all,
6 especially not of a political journalistic nature.
7 Q. Well, when you say you're not entitled to publish anything, is
8 there a rule that you can't submit your book for publication? Why does
9 that interfere with anything?
10 A. The witness protection programme implies a change of identity and
11 the removal of anything from one's previous life that might be used to
12 identify this person. Publication of that book in this particular case
13 would be contrary to the provisions of the witness protection programme;
14 that much is certain. There's actually a document you sign when you
15 become part of this programme that you will not be involved in any sort of
16 activity that might be used to reveal your previous real identity.
17 Publishing a book would certainly constitute one such infraction.
18 Q. So if a book were to come out with your name on it, you think that
19 would somehow compromise you in the witness protection programme? And if
20 that's your belief, then how is it you're testifying here under the name
21 Ratomir Tanic doesn't do the same thing? That makes no sense to me, Mr.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ackerman, this is a complex issue that I
24 have to say I don't think exploration here will assist. It seems to me
25 basic common sense that someone in a witness protection scheme should not
1 be involved in the publication of a book, and also basic common sense that
2 a country involved in the scheme would have such a requirement, to ensure
3 that the steps they have to take are not compromised in any way by the
4 publication openly of such material and the interest that might then be
5 shown in the individual as a result.
6 Testifying here can be viewed in a number of ways; and it's, some
7 people might say, an obligation. It's quite different from the
8 publication of a book. Is it reasonable to explore this; and secondly,
9 will it advance a knowledge of matters in Kosovo in 1999?
10 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I think so. And I'm relying totally
11 on memory, but I'm quite certain that mafia guy. Sammy "The Bull" Gravano
12 published a book while he was in the protection programme. I don't think
13 there's any prohibition against it. I think there's another reason for
14 not getting the book published. I think it has to do with libel law.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Different countries no doubt have different rules
16 and different terms that they agree with people and that -- exploring that
17 alone doesn't seem to me to be in the public interest or the interest of
18 the witness. But if you wish to put a specific question about an ulterior
19 motive, then that's perfectly proper..
20 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, one thing I hope I've learned in
21 my career is that when the finders of the fact are not interested in what
22 I'm doing, it's probably something I should not be doing. So I'll go on
23 to something else.
24 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I don't think you should doubt that. With
25 permission, I'll say please do ask. Don't doubt, because this is just as
1 things go on, and we keep understanding each other and appreciating points
2 of views.
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you for that, Your Honour. I will ask one
4 further question.
5 Q. Was there ever a time when your manuscript was submitted to a
7 A. No. At the time the manuscript was completed I was already part
8 of the witness protection programme.
9 Q. All right. I'm going to go on to something else, and this is just
10 an effort to understand your view of your statement, which as -- part of
11 which has been put in evidence in this case. In the Milosevic trial, at
12 page 5108, line 6, you were being asked questions by Mr. Milosevic and he
14 "You say there was a delegation, but here it says that there was
15 you and Dusan Mihajlovic and not a delegation. When were you telling the
16 truth; then or now?"
17 The answer you gave is this:
18 It's unfair. Once again it's a verbal trick to abuse the free
19 interpretation of the working version."
20 Now, first of all, what are you talking about when you're talking
21 about the "working version?"
22 A. First, let me tell you one thing. Whenever you go to a meeting --
23 Q. No, don't tell me one thing. Answer my question. What do you
24 mean when you say "working version?"
25 A. In that case I must tell you, I fail to understand your question.
1 Can you please provide further clarification.
2 Q. I'll ask it again. You said in answer to Mr. Milosevic, who was
3 asking you about your statement:
4 "It's a verbal trick to abuse the free interpretation of the
5 working version; "working version" referring to your statement. What do
6 you mean by "working version?"
7 A. Oh, all right. Now I understand, and thank you for this
8 clarification. The draft version of my statement, since he was using
9 several different versions of my statement. So the draft version was the
10 one that was used to set up a framework for this problem. At a later
11 stage, things are further defined in a way more amenable to the purposes
12 of a Court or the general public, something that you can freely use.
13 In a draft version, sometimes you phrase things more liberally,
14 which I did in relation to this meeting. Because Mihajlovic and I were
15 the only two people briefing him, the important thing is who is doing the
17 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Thank you. We don't need
18 another speech. Now, first of all it's not true that Mr. Milosevic was
19 using several versions of your statement. He had one version of your
20 statement just like we have one version of your statement. If there are
21 other versions of your statement, the Prosecutor has not given them to us,
22 which would be a violation of the Rules. And I know that have not
23 violated the rules in that regard.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
25 MR. HANNIS: That's correct, Your Honour I have no other version
1 of the statement than the one we provided.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
3 MR. ACKERMAN:
4 Q. And the statement we have before us today, right at the very top,
5 says draft statement of witness Tony X. And you told us, in answer to
6 questions by Mr. Hannis, other than the changes you made that were
7 submitted to us in a supplemental information sheet, everything in there
8 was true and correct, didn't you?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And so when you said to Mr. Milosevic that him asking you about
11 that statement was a verbal trick to abuse the free interpretation of the
12 working version, what you were trying to do was say, "Please let me answer
13 your question any way I want to, because my statement really isn't true."
14 And he was tricking you by referring to this statement you've now sworn is
15 true, right?
16 A. Well, what I'm saying is Milosevic employed a verbal ruse, a
17 trick, if you allow me to quote your exact words. He knows that the main
18 participants at that meeting were those doing the meeting and not those
19 simply sitting pretty. When I gave my statement I wasn't being precise
20 enough to be specific about that. There were several people at the
21 meeting, but they weren't the ones briefing Milosevic. Milosevic wasn't
22 talking to them. It was just Mihajlovic and myself, the only two people I
23 specified. I didn't deem it necessary to mention anybody else who was
24 there. This may have been an error on my part, for which I apologise.
25 That changes nothing about the substance of that briefing.
1 Q. I want to go through an exercise now with you that I hope will not
2 be too tedious, and I need your cooperation to try and make it as painless
3 as possible for us to get through this. I think you have a copy of your
4 statement in front of you. I'm going to try to refer very rapidly to a
5 number of paragraphs and ask you just a very simple question. And I'm
6 going to start with paragraph 5. And in paragraph 5 the sentence appears:
7 "I know from my contacts with members of the SDB." With regard to
8 that particular paragraph, who were the contacts that you had that you
9 learned this from? Names, please.
10 A. First of all, I don't see that quote in paragraph 5. If I could
11 please have the same statement that Mr. Ackerman is using. I apologise.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: You have it, Mr. Tanic, and it's the second
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Oh, all right. Yes. That is right
15 after the one that was challenged. I understand. Well, yes, I've named
16 my contacts already, haven't I?
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. If you say so, I accept that. Let's go to paragraph 15.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: I think it's important here to identify any
20 paragraph or any comment made, Mr. Tanic, about an SDB contact, where that
21 contact in fact is a person that you're not prepared to identify. So if
22 in paragraph 5 the reference to "my contacts with members of the SDB"
23 refers to someone you're not prepared to identify, you should tell us
24 that. It may be that in that paragraph it doesn't.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They are identified in paragraph 5;
1 the names are there.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. Well, the names that are there are those with
3 whom you had perhaps the greatest contact. You say "especially," but that
4 presupposes that you had contacts with more than simply the two named.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is true. When I say
6 "especially," that refers to the peculiar relevance of the information
7 shared and not to any technical aspects of that situation. There were
8 several contacts, but we can stay with this first name that was mentioned
9 in closed session. He was an operative who monitored all of this at the
10 intelligence level. Obviously, it wasn't the head of the service who
11 monitored things at an intelligence level.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
13 Well, Mr. Ackerman wants to take you now to paragraph 15.
14 MR. ACKERMAN:
15 Q. Paragraph 15 begins with the language:
16 "Finally, through my contacts in the SDB, I was able to follow
17 Milosevic's reaction to proposals for settling the crisis in Kosovo."
18 Who are the contacts, plural, that you are referring to there?
19 A. The same ones that I mentioned above, in both closed and open
21 Q. You only mentioned one person, I think, in closed session
22 yesterday -- two, two persons in closed session yesterday. You used the
23 plural "contacts" here. Would that be those two persons?
24 A. No. I mean four different persons. Two were mentioned in
25 paragraph 5, and the other two were mentioned in closed session. You mean
1 "mnozina," right? They had their own contacts. So there's a
2 multiplicity of things like these going on within the intelligence
3 community. So the number you end up with is normally higher. It's not
4 "mrdjina." I said "mnozina," which means plural. It says, "mrdjina."
5 Q. You told us yesterday that there were contacts you had in the SDB
6 that you weren't going to reveal to us, and you gave us some reasons for
7 that. And one of the reasons you gave us was that you knew they would
8 simply wash their hands of you and say that you were lying, and that's one
9 of the reasons you didn't want to give us the names. And, of course,
10 that's -- can certainly be taken both ways. It could be that what they're
11 going to do is tell the truth, and you're afraid of that and don't want us
12 to find out their names. So as we go through this paragraph process and
13 we get to a paragraph where there are people involved that you told us
14 yesterday you didn't want to name, I want you to tell me that because I'm
15 going to ask you for those names. Do you understand that?
16 A. I fail to understand your question. Mr. Mijatovic was mentioned.
17 He was the chief of the Belgrade department of the State Security Service,
18 which is the most powerful and biggest department in the whole of Serbia.
19 He was the number two man virtually --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, please, there are a number of questions
21 which you appear not to understand, which I find it difficult myself --
22 where I find it difficult to understand your position. The questions --
23 the point that's being made is perfectly clear. You -- yesterday you
24 refused on a number of occasions to name your source, and Mr. Ackerman
25 just wants to be clear that when we are referring or you're referring in
1 the statement or anything you say here to a source you're not prepared to
2 name, you make that clear. And then he will follow it with a question,
3 which will have to be dealt with when it arises.
4 Just before moving on to that an expression I don't understand has
5 been used in one of your answers and perhaps you can help me "mnozina,"
6 what does that mean?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it was a
8 misinterpretation. It should have been the "plural, a couple of persons."
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: "Mnozina" is the word used
10 by the witness in B/C/S.
11 THE WITNESS: [Microphone not activated]
12 JUDGE BONOMY: So it means "a couple" in the vernacular English,
13 does it?
14 We can move on now, Mr. Ackerman.
15 MR. ACKERMAN:
16 Q. Lied like to go to paragraph 40 now. In paragraph 40 you say
18 "I was present at many meetings or receptions; for example,
19 receptions on state occasions or JUL receptions, where I, because I had
20 SDB approval, I was able to speak to Milosevic directly."
21 Who did you get approval from, from SDB, that would enable you to
22 speak to Milosevic directly? I don't understand how that works.
23 A. I have to explain to the Bench the technique that was used in
24 Serbia, before I met with Milosevic. It goes for any meeting with any
25 person. Whichever person is to attend a political meeting --
1 Q. If the Defence is interested in that, they will ask you to answer
2 it. The questing is very simple: Who in the SDB gave you approval to
3 speak to Milosevic directly? Just tell us that first.
4 A. The person who provided security vetting for my first meeting with
5 Milosevic, and that needs to be checked in the archives.
6 Q. And you don't know who that was?
7 A. I don't know who signed in the archives, but I had a security -
8 what word should I use in Serbian? - well, in any case, before anyone
9 could approach Milosevic, he would ask the security service for
10 information as to whether that person in terms of security is okay or not.
11 Otherwise, you wouldn't be able to approach Milosevic; you couldn't brief
12 him. And Mijatovic, a few months before I met Milosevic told me, "You'll
13 go to see the boss." And I asked him, "How do you know?" And he said,
14 "Well, it's standard procedure. He wanted to have intelligence data on
16 Q. Okay. That's good enough.
17 A. Is it clear?
18 Q. That's good enough. I think you know the name of this person; why
19 won't you tell us?
20 A. Mr. Zoran Mijatovic told me that Mr. Milosevic asked information
21 on me and on other participants. He said they ran their checks and that
22 it was okayed and that I was going to see Milosevic. He told me that, but
23 I don't know who signed it. Maybe it was another person.
24 Q. [Previous translation continues]... All right. You don't know.
25 That's your position. I'm trying to get through this as painlessly as
1 possible --
2 A. This is not my answer. I apologise to the Bench. This is not my
3 answer. "I don't know" was not my answer. I know clearly who told me
4 that I was checked, that I was given the green light to see the president,
5 and this was Zoran Mijatovic.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: What you say you don't know is who actually carried
7 out the vetting.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know who signed it. It may
9 have been Stanisic, Mijatovic, another civil servant. These are routine
10 checks; however, Zoran Mijatovic was the person who told you me, You will
11 go and see the president.
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, thank you.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The information was okayed and so
15 MR. ACKERMAN:
16 Q. Please look at paragraph 48. It contains this language:
17 "According to my sources in the SDB, initially Milosevic accepted
18 this offer of assistance from the west to eliminate the UCK."
19 "Sources in the SDB" as referred to here, just yes or no, are
20 these persons you've already identified or not?
21 A. Yes. These are the persons I've identified publicly.
22 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
23 A. And you should read page 239 of that person's book.
24 Q. I asked you for a yes or no. Please answer my question that way
25 when you can. Paragraph 51:
1 "I know through my SDB contacts that Milosevic also forbid the SDB
2 to execute an international operation against Hashim Thaqi in
4 Are these SDB contacts you've already identified to us or not, yes
5 or no?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Paragraph 62, please. You talk about your knowledge of political
8 agreements and so forth. You say:
9 "I know about this from Tomic, Draskovic, Mihajlovic, and the
11 The SDB information was provided to you by persons you've already
12 identified to us or not, yes or no?
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis, before we move on that question, was
14 there not an issue over privacy in relation to one of these?
15 MR. HANNIS: No. I think that first name is a different person.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Oh, yes, I'm sorry, you're quite right. Thank you.
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. Just yes or no, sir.
19 A. Which paragraph?
20 Q. 62.
21 A. Yes, yes.
22 Q. Paragraph 73, please. After halfway through this paragraph,
23 you're referring to -- to your learning that Milosevic's position was the
24 Albanian civilians were as guilty as the KLA. And you say:
25 "Because" -- about some information. You say: "Because the SDB
1 provided me with this information, they must have provided it to
3 Now, the persons or person in the SDB that provided you with that
4 information, are these persons you've already identified or not, just yes
5 or no, please?
6 A. I can't find the paragraph. 73?
7 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
8 A. It's a rather long paragraph.
9 Q. It is. About halfway down you'll find the language:
10 "Because the SDB provided me with this information." You should
11 be able to see the initials "SDB" fairly quickly.
12 A. Yes, yes. The same publicly named persons.
13 Q. We're now going to paragraph 96. Halfway through paragraph 96:
14 "I know through my SDB contacts that Milosevic did not authorise
15 Stanisic to order SDB personnel in Kosovo to arrest the main Kosovo
16 Albanian terrorists."
17 The same SDB contacts you've already identified, yes or no?
18 A. Yes. And I wish to refer you to the material publicised by that
19 person; namely, page 239 in that person's book. And I believe it was
20 tendered by the Prosecution -- by the Defence.
21 Q. [Previous translation continues]... About that person's book, Mr.
22 Fila asked you a number of questions about the things he said about you
23 and your trustworthiness and your character. And you said all those
24 things were untrue, and yet you ask us to rely on his book when you say
25 you were kidnapped as if all of a sudden he started telling the truth. Is
1 his book untrue or true, and how would we know?
2 A. Part of it is true, part of it is half true, part of it is
3 interpretation, as you could hear for yourselves. And it was not
4 completely correct, as usual in intelligence work. Therefore, significant
5 parts of that book are correct, some are incorrect, some are semi-correct.
6 I don't know whether my answer suffices.
7 Q. I think it does. So your position is that half truths are usual
8 in intelligence work?
9 A. Yes. One often has facts which, when tested, checked against
10 several sources, amount to being 50 or 60 or 30 percent correct. You
11 seldom encounter lies in intelligence work, but it is as seldom as a 100
12 percent correct information. Usually the percentage is between 60 to 90
13 percent, and it is a notorious fact for all intelligence agencies in the
14 world. It is a complicated process. It involves different
15 interpretations, perception. That's why you try to check against sources.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues]... And I take it that since you
17 are yourself an intelligence operative, that we're getting quite a few
18 half truths from you. Is that true?
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Mr. Ackerman, that's an argument you may wish
20 to advance in due course. For the moment, I think that will advance our
21 knowledge of the case.
22 MR. ACKERMAN:
23 Q. Paragraph 98, sir.
24 "I know through my SDB contacts that Milosevic refused to
25 officially support gathering information and evidence on UCK crimes
1 against the Serbs."
2 The SDB contacts mentioned there, are they persons you've already
3 identified, yes or no?
4 A. Yes. But this involves another couple of people and some others I
5 didn't mention. This is already 1999, and the initial two people were not
6 in the service at the time.
7 Q. All right --
8 A. And then one joined the service again.
9 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Tell us who the SDB contacts
10 are that you're talking about in paragraph 98.
11 A. Not all of them are the same people. Two people who had publicly
12 been named in 1999 were not with the service. I --
13 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
14 A. -- see what kind of a trick you're trying to use here. The names
15 were given in closed session.
16 Q. [Previous translation continues]... I want you to give me the
17 names of the people that are your SDB contacts that you referred to in
18 1998. This is not a trick. This is a legitimate question and the Judge
19 will tell you so?
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm now confused. If you've already given us
21 the names, either openly or in closed session, then the answer to the
22 question would be that you've already identified them. But your initial
23 answer indicated that there were two others not so far identified. And
24 what you're being asked to do is identify them.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry, there seems to be a
1 confusion. In 1999, there were two people whom I'd identified in closed
2 session yesterday. The initial two persons I had named were not named in
3 open session because at that time those two people were not with the
5 MR. ACKERMAN:
6 Q. All right. I think I understand. Let's go then to paragraph 102.
7 Near the beginning, second or third sentence:
8 "In the beginning of 1998, based on my conversations with my SDB
9 contacts," and then it goes on to talk about operations in Prekaz and the
10 Jashari family and so forth.
11 Who were the SDB contacts that you got that information from? If
12 they are people you've already mentioned, just say that they are.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. All right. Let's go to paragraph 109. The first sentence:
15 "Based on my conversation with members of the SDB and with
16 Perisic, Milosevic ordered the army to give only minor resistance and not
17 to engage NATO in serious battles."
18 What members of the SDB gave you that information? Are they
19 people you've already named? Answer yes or no.
20 A. In closed session -- I mean the people identified in closed
21 session who conveyed that information from the top, as they explained.
22 Q. Mr. Tanic, I don't want to waste a bunch of time here. If your
23 answer to the remaining paragraphs that I have to ask you about is going
24 to be, "Yes, I've already identified them," contrary to what you told us
25 yesterday, then I have no need to go through this exercise. Will that be
1 your position?
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, before -- don't answer that question. I
3 don't think yet you have actually identified a passage of evidence in
4 respect of which the witness yesterday refused to identify the source. So
5 I think you do have to go through the exercise until we get to one which
6 coincides with the various ones Mr. Fila put where there was a refusal to
8 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, in agreement with Mr. Fila, I
9 didn't refer to any of the ones that had anything to do with Mr. Sainovic,
10 and I won't today either.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I understand that. But it follows from that
12 that there could be one there where the same issue arises. I don't think
13 it's fair to the witness to say, "Is your answer going to be the same to
14 every one I ask you about?" That would be taxing his memory I think
15 beyond reason.
16 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, that's fine. I'm sorry, I'm
17 struggling to try to finish this cross-examination today, as you would
18 like us to do.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, that was the message conveyed. But I also
20 indicated to you if it has to go into tomorrow, it has to. And I'm very
21 grateful for the efforts that are being made.
22 MR. ACKERMAN: All right.
23 Q. Paragraph 110:
24 "According to my conversations with SDB members, under Milosevic's
25 orders, the army's main strategy was to hide from NATO attacks."
1 Are these SDB members persons you have already identified, yes or
3 A. Yes, in closed session. And I've explained the chain of
4 information through which they received that information.
5 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Let's go to paragraph 113,
6 second sentence:
7 "From my sources in the SDB, I learned that approximately the
8 first week in June 1999, Milosevic ordered troops into the Djakovica
9 region near the Albanian border."
10 The sources in the SDB that you learned that from, have those been
11 identified to us already or not, yes or no?
12 A. Yes, one in closed session. (redacted)
14 Q. Paragraph 118:
15 "I know from my SDB contacts that the SDB provided Milosevic with
16 maximum information about future targets," that's talking about NATO
18 The SDB contacts mentioned there, have they already been
19 identified to us in open or closed session? Answer yes or no.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, Mr. Hannis.
22 MR. HANNIS: Maybe we need to have a redaction at line 7, because
23 that may identify the person who's been named in closed session based on
24 the description.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, since I don't think it's going to cause any
1 great difficulty for anyone trying to follow the evidence, and it would be
2 for the avoidance of any doubt or difficulty, I agree. And we will redact
3 from the word "that's" to "there" in lines 7 and 8 on page 59.
4 MR. HANNIS: Thank you.
5 MR. ACKERMAN:
6 Q. You haven't answered my question about paragraph 118 yet, I don't
7 think. And what is your answer to that?
8 A. The persons identified in closed session, together with their
10 Q. All right. Let's go to paragraph 121.
11 "During the bombing, I was authorised by the SDB and Milosevic to
12 use my foreign contacts to contribute to finding an honourable way to stop
13 the bombing."
14 Who in the SDB authorised you? Is that someone whose name you've
15 already given us; if so, just say yes.
16 A. No. These people were the superiors of those people mentioned in
17 closed session. The persons named in closed session couldn't issue such
18 authorisation, but their superiors did.
19 Q. And you've given us the names of their superiors, have you, that
20 authorised this?
21 A. No, I didn't.
22 Q. Could you do that, please.
23 A. The aforementioned person, the person mentioned in closed session
24 would be able to tell you who was up the chain of command, if he wishes
25 to. I have knowledge about that but then it may be incorrect, since it
1 was wartime and I cannot rely fully on my memory. And there was no time
2 for us to sit down and discuss that. We had only very brief meetings and
3 instructions issued. In any case, the authorisation came from the top via
4 the person who was identified yesterday in closed session. Otherwise, I
5 wouldn't have been able to leave the country.
6 Q. Now, the essence of that big long speech was you didn't know who
7 it was. Is that true?
8 A. No. That was not the essence. I cannot give you an answer of
9 which I can be certain. I can suppose and can speculate, but that's not
10 my duty here.
11 Q. [Previous translation continues]... And I don't want a guess. If
12 you don't know, you don't know. Now I want to go to paragraph --
13 A. I didn't say I didn't know. I said I wasn't sure.
14 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
15 A. That I cannot be sure.
16 Q. If you think you know, then tell us. Who was it?
17 A. These were superiors of the security service at the time. I can
18 try and guess whether he was the person X or Y, but I cannot corroborate
19 that. In any case, they were superior personnel; otherwise, it wouldn't
20 have been possible.
21 Q. Well --
22 A. One cannot leave the country and be given communications equipment
23 and money at wartime. You are being taken across the border, given
24 corrode. You cannot do that without an approval.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... You've got me very confused.
1 Because when I say your answer was you don't know who it was, you quarrel
2 with that and tell us that's not true. Then when I ask you to tell us who
3 it was, you say I would have to guess. Now, that makes no sense, Mr.
4 Tanic. Why don't you pick one of those, and tell us which one is true.
5 Do you know, or would you have to guess?
6 A. Finally, you posed the right question. Yes. I would have to
7 guess. Because at the very top of the SDB, there were two or three people
8 at the time. That's why I wouldn't like to guess.
9 Q. Well, why don't you just give us the two or three names, and we
10 can ask all three of them, then.
11 A. The superiors of the SDB, at the time, it was Rade Markovic,
12 Curcic, Radonjic [Realtime transcript read in error "Markovic"], Suvakovic
13 [Realtime transcript read in error "Sudakovic"] was there as well. Take
14 your pick. I would have to guess.
15 Q. All right. Let's go on now to paragraph 125. You're talking
16 about an agreement --
17 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry. Your Honour, the transcript again 62, 4,
18 the witness said Radonjic, not Markovic. No, no, he said Rade Markovic,
19 Curcic, Radonjic.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic. That's certainly
21 consistent with my recollection.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And not Sudakovic but Suvakovic. He
23 was the ideologue; he wasn't an operative.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Tanic.
25 MR. ACKERMAN:
1 Q. You're talking in 125 about the unilateral Easter cease-fire
2 issue, which you say you found out through the SDB that Milosevic told
3 Draskovic of this agreement. Who in the SDB provided you with this
4 information? If it's someone you identified, just say yes.
5 A. The person was identified in closed session.
6 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 129, please. You refer to some information
7 there regarding General Pavkovic, and you say:
8 "I know this partly from Vasiljevic and partly from the SDB."
9 Who from the SDB did you learn this information? If it's someone
10 you've already named, just say "yes."
11 A. Yes, yes.
12 Q. Paragraph 130, please. You're talking about your knowledge that
13 Milosevic was prepared to wait until the last possible second before NATO
14 troops entered Serbia. You say:
15 "I have knowledge of this through the SDB." Who in the SDB? If
16 it's someone you've already named, just say "yes."
17 A. Yes. The message was conveyed from the top. I don't know who
18 gave that information at the top, but I got that from the person who was
19 within the operative chain.
20 Q. 131, please.
21 "I know through my sources in the SDB that even after the war
22 ended, Milosevic attempted to provoke war between NATO and Russia."
23 Who in the SDB gave you that information? If it's someone you
24 already named, just say "yes."
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Thank you.
2 A. I just wanted to say that --
3 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
4 A. -- the superiors I mentioned were only to -- were given only to
5 assist you. But as to who actually conveyed the messages, well you'll
6 have to ask that to someone else.
7 Q. Your answer was yes, wasn't it?
8 A. My answer stands as it is recorded.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: The transcript of the last answer doesn't look
10 right. You say that,"The superiors I mentioned were only given to assist
11 you. But as to who actually," and it's translated as, "conveyed the
12 messages, you'll have to ask that to someone else."
13 Is that what you said?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. You will have to ask the
15 person identified in closed session, who conveyed the message. Whether it
16 came from one of the three people at the top or from a fourth or a fifth
17 person, that I don't know.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand now. I understand now. Thank you.
19 MR. ACKERMAN:
20 Q. Paragraph 143:
21 "I know through my SDB and military contacts that both the army
22 and the SDB have bad relations with the Republic of Serbia police."
23 Who in the SDB provided you with that information? If it's
24 someone you've already named, just say "yes."
25 A. Persons named in public session. It's a long story, been going on
1 for years.
2 Q. Paragraph 151:
3 "I know through my SDB contacts that Frenki Simatovic is the head
4 of operational units, the so-called Red Berets."
5 What SDB contacts provided you with this information? If you've
6 already named them, just say "yes."
7 A. Yes. The person named in open session.
8 Q. Paragraph 153:
9 "According to my sources in the SDB and some individuals who are
10 acquainted with both Arkan and myself, Milosevic had trouble engaging
11 paramilitary forces in Kosovo."
12 Sources in the SDB, are these persons you've already identified to
13 us? If so, just say "yes."
14 A. The persons named both in closed and in open session, all four of
16 Q. Paragraph 154:
17 "I know through my SDB contacts and Perisic that Milosevic
18 recruited ad hoc irregular special units to conduct operations in Kosovo."
19 The SDB contacts referred to there are people who -- are they
20 people who have already been identified to us? If so, just say "yes."
21 A. They were identified both in the open and closed session, all of
22 these persons.
23 Q. Paragraph 157:
24 "According to some experts within ND, who have connections in the
25 Ministry of Justice, and my sources in the SDB, Milosevic arrested 150 to
1 200 paramilitaries in Kosovo."
2 The sources in the SDB, are these people you already identified to
3 us? And if so, simply say "yes."
4 A. They were named in both open and private session. I am always
5 providing this explanation who was named in close session, who was name in
6 open session, and we are referring to persons who are named in both
7 private and open session. I say so.
8 Q. Paragraph 159, please, talks about the reporting of the numbers of
9 casualties, what was in the newspapers, and what was suppressed. You
10 say: "I received these estimates from the SDB and the military."
11 Who in the SDB provided you with these estimates? If it's someone
12 you've already named, just say "yes."
13 A. Mentioned in private session.
14 Q. Paragraph --
15 A. Assessment of his --
16 Q. Paragraph 167, please:
17 "I know through my former SDB contacts," referring to Mira
18 Markovic,"that he is currently involved in directing SDB activities on a
19 daily basis."
20 The former SDB contacts you're referring to, are these persons
21 you've already named for us in closed or open session? If so, just say
23 A. I don't have this in the transcript at all. It says through my
24 contacts. It doesn't say "former."
25 Q. Well, there's apparently a difference between the English and the
1 B/C/S transcript in that regard. Forget about the word "former." The SDB
2 contacts you're referring to there, are these persons you've already
3 identified to us in closed or open session?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And finally paragraph 170, you talk about the SDB's evaluation of
6 Pavkovic. Who in the SDB gave you this information? Is it somebody
7 you've already named in either closed or open session?
8 A. A person named in public session who wrote the book we mentioned.
9 Q. All right [Previous translation continues]...
10 A. And who conveyed the prevailing opinion, the opinion of the other
12 Q. We've gone through 30 instances, I believe, which are nearly all
13 the mentions you made in your statement about SDB contacts. In page 22 of
14 your testimony, the first day you testified here on direct examination,
15 you named some persons with whom you'd had contact with the SDB. And you
16 said:"But also a lot of other individuals who I would meet in the course
17 of the number of years." And you haven't identified for us today a lot of
18 other individuals. In fact, you haven't identified one other individual.
19 So what did you mean when you said, "but also a lot of other individuals"?
20 A. May I see the entire sentence described to me.
21 Q. I have no way of showing it to you. Let me see if I can do a
22 little better; I probably can.
23 A. Can you read it -- the entire sentence out or maybe give me the
24 context because I did meet many people, you know. I didn't work with all
25 of them. Is there a full stop, comma, what is the context? Does it
1 presume numerous other individuals from the service or not?
2 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
3 JUDGE BONOMY: We got the message, Mr. Tanic, and we're looking
4 for it.
5 MR. ACKERMAN: Now, Your Honour, just -- I don't know. Maybe Mr.
6 Hannis can help me with this a little bit. I want to read out to the
7 witness the first 14 lines on page 22 of the first day's transcript, the
8 10 November transcript. This is the rough version, and this particular
9 testimony was taken in closed session. But the part I want to read out
10 doesn't reveal anything that -- I think doesn't relieve anything that
11 can't be public.
12 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, we're looking, but the transcript I have
13 has the consecutive numbers of 6200 and something, rather than page 22 for
14 that day.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]
16 MR. HANNIS: They don't always run consistently. We're looking.
17 If Mr. Ackerman can indicate to me the subject maybe close or after.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: [Microphone not activated]
19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I think it's page 6277.
21 MR. ACKERMAN: [Microphone not activated]
22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
23 MR. ACKERMAN: 6277, line 2 I think is where it starts.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Bear in mind that part of that's in private
1 MR. ACKERMAN: It all is, Your Honour. It's actually 62 -- starts
2 at 6276 on line 24, and that's the part that I would like to put to the
3 witness down to the end of the -- of private session. I just want to make
4 sure that I don't do that inappropriately. And I'd like Mr. Hannis to
5 perhaps assist.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let me read it to the witness.
7 You named your primary contact, and this is in --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Are we in private or --
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Just -- no, we're in open session, but listen to my
10 question. You named your primary contact and that name was given in
11 private session, so we will not use the name. You then said -- well, you
12 indicated he -- but the question was:
13 "You indicated he was your primary contact. Elsewhere in your
14 statement, you refer to your sources at the SDB. When you used that term
15 'elsewhere in your statement,' what individuals were you referring to?"
16 And you then go on to say: "Well, above all to these two
17 individuals I have in mind," and you give the name, one is Mijatovic, and
18 the other is the name is private session, "but also to a lot of other
19 individuals I would meet in the course of the number of years. I have
20 even forgotten some of their names now."
21 Now, that's the passage that Mr. Ackerman is interested in and he
22 wants to know why you've named so few individuals when you were referring
23 to a lot of other individuals who you would meet in the course of the
24 number of years.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it is very easy to explain. I
1 got in contact with people for one day or half a day. Somebody would
2 drive me somewhere, provide security, does a short operative task, then
3 you exchange opinions,. And you hear for the fifth time something that
4 you had heard from somebody else. In that context, I -- this is what I
5 meant. Of course in operational matters, you get in contact with people
6 that -- whose names you very soon forget or they do not use their real
8 They would approach you and say, My name is that and that. They
9 bring you a passport, drive you to the border. You sit down, light a
10 cigarette, have a coffee, cup of coffee, and you hear from that person
11 what you'd heard from five other people. These are operatives not of the
12 lowest rank and many of them do not use their real name. They do not
13 introduce themselves at all sometimes. So you can't expect all of them to
14 say, Hello, I'm Markovic, et cetera.
15 And even those whose names I do remember, I wouldn't want to
16 entangle them in this. I've helped this Tribunal quite a lot by naming
17 the people from the top. And this has opened and raised a very
18 controversial issue for me and I've taken that risk on my shoulders and I
19 believe named more people than I should have.
20 MR. ACKERMAN:
21 Q. Well, you just said something that really drew my attention. You
22 talked about -- you said this: "I've helped this Tribunal a lot by naming
23 the people from the top." And then you say this: "This has opened and
24 raised a very controversial issue for me." How do you know? Have you
25 been talking to people outside of this court about your testimony?
1 A. No, I have not. But I know what it means to broach the
2 intelligence dimension of political problems. This is tantamount to
3 opening Pandora's box. And the two names I mentioned today, I mentioned
4 in the Milosevic trial four years ago, and this means I probably have
5 discussed this with somebody. Broaching the intelligence dimension means
6 quite a problem for the witness, broaches a series of issues, and means
7 that the witness has to bear quite a large burden.
8 It's very complicated subject matter connected with very specific
9 areas of life that may be subject by -- to abuse by the Defence, may be
10 subject to a misunderstanding on the part of the public. So to broach an
11 intelligence dimension of a political problem such as Kosovo is tantamount
12 to a very large burden on me. I was less than willing to do so, but I did
13 in the interest of justice to get to the truth. And, Mr. Ackerman knows
14 quite well what kind of burden I undertook by doing so, and now you are
15 being -- you are forcing me to name more names.
16 Since from 1994 and 2001, I've got into contact with at least 30
17 to 50 members of that service. Somebody drove me to the border. Some
18 beat me up. Some lauded me, and some beat up my wife. This is a very
19 complex and -- relations with SDB of Serbia ranging from love to open
20 disagreement. And now you're trying to exploit this dimension. I've
21 never discussed this with anybody. I'm perfectly aware of being steeped
22 in that job for 25 years at various levels. I'm a politician. Apart from
23 that, I have a master's degree in politics. I know what it means to
24 introduce an intelligence dimension into a political problem, such as
25 Kosovo is. And this is opening a Pandora's box both for the witness and
1 the Defence. And it is not that for the Defence because you may
2 manipulate at will --
3 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... You've said
4 all that. Thank you.
5 Mr. Ackerman.
6 MR. ACKERMAN:
7 Q. Mr. Tanic, we're going elsewhere now. We got through the process.
8 In being fair with you, because you're always accusing us, Defence
9 counsel, of abusing you in some way - maybe you abuse us by doing that.
10 But in any event, I want you to know that my thesis regarding your
11 testimony is that you just make up answers which you think will sound good
12 at the time. And I'm going to demonstrate that in the questions I'm
13 getting ready to ask you.
14 Now, yesterday during your testimony - and I'm at pages 23 and 24
15 starting I believe at line 19 on page 23 - you were answering a question
16 and Judge Bonomy said to you:
17 "Mr. Tanic, please get real. You are being asked for your
18 recollection of events. You're not being asked for other people's
19 recollections. You're not being asked to name any other individuals who
20 were present on this occasion at this stage. You are simply being asked
21 to explain accurately what happened. And you're persisting in refusing to
22 address the apparent contradictions in the various explanations you've
23 given. That leaves the Court -- remember, we're not politicians, we're
24 not newspapers, we're not gossips in the street. We are a Court and
25 Courts operate on facts. And if you won't assist us by giving the facts,
1 then we will not be able to do justice."
2 Mr. O'Sullivan then started to ask you another question and you
3 interrupted and you said this: "Your Honours, may -- it is now clear my
4 position. Can I try to help the Court finally to resolve this
6 And you're talking about the conversation with Milosevic. "There
7 was a conversation over the telephone and tete-a-tete, both occurred."
8 Do you remember saying that?
9 A. Yes, but I don't understand why you're asking me this. I've
10 already explained to the Court that, yes, of course when describing
11 circumstances there are in my testimony things which may sound
12 contradictory because there were so many events, and my memory doesn't
13 serve me perfectly well.
14 Q. [Previous translation continues]... And I'm going to explain --
15 A. But --
16 Q. -- and you're going to find out why I'm asking that question right
17 now. So just be patient. What was happening there was you were being
18 challenged on a statement that you had had with Milosevic, when all you
19 had done was overhear a telephone conversation. And you explained that to
20 the Court with this answer, saying: "Both telephone and a tete-a-tete
21 conversation with Milosevic." That's what you said.
22 Now, I want to refer you to your testimony in Milosevic in that
23 case, and that's where Milosevic was talking to you about whether or not
24 you'd had any personal meetings with him. And you said: "Do you mean eye
25 to eye, a tete-a-tete, just you and me" --
1 MR. HANNIS: Can I have a page reference, please?
2 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, I'm going to try and find it. I'm having a
3 little problem here with that.
4 [Microphone not activated]
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, I'm content you ask the question as
7 long as the reference is going to be found in due course within this
8 session. So please go on with the question while someone else finds the
9 particular reference for you.
10 MR. ACKERMAN: If nothing else, I'll find it during the break.
11 Q. Let me start over. Milosevic says this: "As far as I'm able to
12 interpret this, you never had a personal meeting with me, did you?"
13 And you said: "You mean eye to eye, a tete-a-tete, just you and
15 And then he said: "Any meeting."
16 And then you said: "I'm waiting for the interpretation. Each of
17 these times there was a meeting you and meet, never a tete-a-tete. There
18 was always other people present. It was always a group of some kind."
19 So when I say you made up answers just because you think they are
20 going to sound good, that's what you did yesterday when you told Judge
21 Bonomy that it wasn't just a telephone conversation, but a tete-a-tete
22 meeting between you and Milosevic. You just made that up, didn't you?
23 A. What is the question there? So this is a lengthy tirade which
24 accuses me of being a liar. Of course, you are bound to do that because
25 you don't want to admit that because I'm in the right. Can you specify
1 your question from all this.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I'm surprised that you don't understand the
3 question, Mr. Tanic. But the question is inviting you to explain the
4 apparent inconsistency between telling Milosevic that you never had a
5 tete-a-tete with him and telling us yesterday that you did. And what we
6 would like to know is the explanation for that.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know what? If there are several
8 people somewhere and then you take a couple of steps with the president
9 aside, could you describe this as an eye to eye or a meeting with other
10 people present? There were occasions when other people attended. And you
11 know you take somebody to the side or you are taken to one side for five,
12 seven, ten minutes, this is a tete-a-tete meeting, but in a -- in the
13 context of other people being present.
14 And nobody else would know what transpired between us. And you
15 cannot name all of these people because some meetings were controversial,
16 secret, and some people would deny having attended.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that --
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And apart from that. Sorry, I
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's a perfectly understandable
21 explanation. Can you then explain your answer in Milosevic, which was
22 each of these times there was a meeting you and me, never a tete-a-tete,
23 there was always a group present of some kind?
24 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, this is why I've asked for the page
25 reference, because I think there was a somewhat similar explanation about
1 that answer in Milosevic as he's just given related to the answer and I
2 need to find the reference.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Of course --
4 MR. ACKERMAN: 5016, 19 through 25.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: And you'll be able to deal with it, Mr. Hannis, in
6 due course.
7 But bearing that explanation you've just given in mind, can you
8 explain the answer you gave in Milosevic?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You know what? I could not provide
10 any explanation for my answer to Milosevic for the simple reason that you
11 may follow what kind of proceedings that was. It was an argument between
12 the two of us, and that was all it was. And finally, I gave up from
13 testifying against Milosevic - and this is perfectly clear from the
14 transcript - he negated everything. He denied that he ever set eyes on
15 me, that we ever worked together.
16 He denied everything; and in such a situation I just said, Okay, I
17 will stick to verifiable things and this is what I said. And I did not
18 mention the things that could not be verified. And this trial is much
19 more regular. Milosevic really attacked me as a beast, if you monitored
20 that trial, and at this trial I can collect my thoughts, et cetera.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you for your answer.
22 Mr. Ackerman.
23 MR. ACKERMAN:
24 Q. Mr. Tanic, I know in the Milosevic case that before you testified
25 you swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
1 And I know in this case before you testified you swore to tell the truth,
2 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Now, when you say in
3 Milosevic you never had a tete-a-tete meeting with him, and when you say
4 in this case that you did have a tete-a-tete meeting with him, one of
5 those is not true. And telling things that are not true, under oath, is
6 an offence in this Tribunal called perjury, are you aware of that, for
7 which you can receive a pretty serious sentence and fine?
8 A. Of course I am aware of that. But simply in the Milosevic trial,
9 I simply told the Court that given the circumstances obtaining, I will
10 testify to facts that could be proven or verified. There were people at
11 our meetings. If you do not say everything, this is not lying. You
12 simply did not say everything.
13 I would have then been testifying for 20 days if I were to tell
14 everything. In that case, I chose examples which could be verified to
15 avoid further argument. If you omit saying something which happened,
16 doesn't mean that you are lying.
17 Q. Well, you didn't omit anything. You said exactly what you said.
18 And now are you saying to us that you lied in Milosevic just because you
19 gave up and he was treating you like a beast? Is that what you're saying?
20 Because let me tell you, it's perjury either way.
21 A. Please, it is stated in the transcript that I informed the Bench
22 that I would be testifying to things that can be verified by two or three
23 sources. The Bench was not happy with that, but that was my testimony at
24 that point in time. I thought it would be in the best interests of the
25 justice and the Court, and subsequently I was borne out by certain
2 Now I can testify about many more events because in the meantime
3 events borne out my testimony in the Milosevic trial. And they were not
4 known to be correct at the time of the Milosevic trial. In the meantime,
5 they've been verified as true, and now I can testify in a much more
6 relaxed atmosphere.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: I've used this button I have here to cut off a
8 witness here for the first time in this trial because I'm not satisfied
9 you're trying to answer the question. No Court will tolerate a witness
10 coming in and answering only questions he chooses to answer. And the
11 Milosevic Tribunal certainly did not tolerate that as an approach that was
13 So going down a side-road into a discussion of that is simply a
14 smoke-screen to avoid answering the question. You're being asked to
15 explain why you said in Milosevic that you did not have a tete-a-tete
16 meeting with him at any stage, and we would like a straightforward answer
17 to that question. Can you give us it?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said, first of all, because I was
19 under a great deal of emotional strain and stress; secondly, because I had
20 been subjected to extreme propaganda from Belgrade during his trial,
21 things that I was shown; and thirdly, because there was no way for me to
22 prove that. The principal reason being the emotional strain and the
23 extreme propaganda launched against me that was shown me during the actual
25 I was sadly affected by the fact that my party seemed to have
1 washed their hands of me as well as some of my friends. They could have
2 said things like, "All right, we don't agree with you testifying. We
3 don't approve of it," that sort of thing. But what they did really
4 affected me in a very sad way. My emotional state during my testimony in
5 the Milosevic case was a complex one, must have been a slip of the tongue
6 during that particular altercation and what I eventually said must have
7 been a result of my condition at the time.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
9 MR. ACKERMAN:
10 Q. You know, Mr. Tanic, I think you've probably been pretty
11 successful in your life dancing around the truth and getting away with it.
12 I assure you you're not going to get away with it in this court. And I
13 suggest to you that what you told us yesterday is your attitude about
14 whether or not you need to be truthful in this court.
15 Page 20 of yesterday's transcript Judge Bonomy stopped you and
16 said: "Are you now refusing to answer the question? It's not for you to
17 decide whether you'll answer on matters that can be corroborated. It's
18 your job to answer every question that's put to you. Now I ask you,
19 please answer the question."
20 And then you said this: "But what was the question? Whether I
21 had two meetings with him," meaning Milosevic, "one conversation with him,
22 direct conversation," meaning Milosevic. And then you said this: "I can
23 say whatever I wish because that man is no longer alive, so he can't
24 challenge anything I say so I'll just make stuff up." That's what you
25 were saying, wasn't it?
1 A. Well, yes, I really must say. I didn't understand. I still fail
2 to understand why I'm being asked questions about Milosevic. He's no
3 longer alive; case closed. I just said this to show that my intentions
4 were honourable and that I did not intend to be telling the Court all
5 kinds of things. It's a simple misunderstanding, truly. This man died.
6 And this is not a subject on the agenda of this trial as far as I
7 understand, which is the reason I fail to understand the original
9 I can say all sorts of things, well, yes. But that is not what I
10 was doing. I tried to stick to the very substance. When it comes to
11 substance, I try to be very consistent, that's at least my impression. It
12 is true that some of the circumstances are quite confusing. My personal
13 destiny is a sad one. It has been and still is. Every time I give
14 evidence this presents an emotional problem.
15 Q. Well, let's stop dancing and start dealing with the questions.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, I certainly consider there's a
17 context to that particular answer that you've identified which relates to
18 the question of giving evidence only about things that can be
19 corroborated. I think it's only right to take it in its proper context.
20 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, that's certainly one context it could be in,
21 Your Honour, but it could be otherwise also.
22 Q. I want to move to another matter. I'm going to go to paragraph 4
23 of your statement now. In paragraph 4 of your statement you tell us this:
24 "I was chosen to conduct discreet negotiations with the Kosovo
25 Albanians. I received this authorisation directly from Milosevic in a
1 meeting that I and Dusan Mihajlovic held with him in approximately 1995."
2 Now, it wouldn't be a mistake for one reading that to get the
3 impression that there was a private meeting between you and Milosevic and
4 Mihajlovic where he said, "Ratomir Tanic, because of all your training and
5 skill and wonderful contacts, I'm choosing you to conduct discreet
6 negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians." That would be a logical
7 conclusion one could draw from reading that, isn't it?
8 A. I'm sorry, but that's not the conclusion. You will say again that
9 I'm dancing the truth. First of all, Milosevic said I had good contacts
10 with the Kosovo Albanians. He asked for me to be vetted, as I explained
11 before. He knew this from before and so did Dusan Mihajlovic. You simply
12 can't understand that Mr. Milosevic told me, "There you are, Mr. Tanic,
13 you have wonderful contacts. Here's your authorisation." He was the
14 president after all. I was very specific when I described that scene.
15 It wasn't a private meeting. It was an official meeting between
16 the delegation of our party, Milosevic, and two of his associates, if I
17 remember correctly, who were -- that were sometimes there. Dusan
18 Mihajlovic and I were the only two people doing the briefing; that's why I
19 mentioned those two names. We put this plan to him. Milosevic said,
20 "This is fine. You can go ahead with that." That's what authorisation
21 means in purely political terms. He certainly didn't tell me what his
22 opinion of me was. If that opinion had been a poor one, he probably
23 wouldn't have come to that meeting to begin with. He would have said, "I
24 don't want to see that person."
25 Had he not known I had good contact with the Albanians and I had
1 worked on that he probably would have said, "Oh, god, where did you get
2 this idea." I don't think Milosevic would have enlisted my assistance.
3 If you start twisting my words like that and quoting them out of context,
4 the impression can be a grotesque one. You're telling me that I'm dancing
5 a dance around the truth. I apologise to the Court every time I was wrong
6 when I said something. My situation is a very difficult one while giving
7 evidence and what you're trying to do is --
8 Q. Is it your position that if I quote from your statement I'm
9 twisting your words, or is that your twist that's in your statement?
10 MR. HANNIS: Well, in that last question, he didn't quote from his
12 MR. ACKERMAN: I did.
13 MR. HANNIS: He referred to it as a private meeting and he
14 flowered it up with all kinds of terms of why he was selected. That's not
15 in his statement.
16 MR. ACKERMAN: "I was chosen to conduct discreet negotiations" --
17 I read it absolutely word for word, Your Honour. I'm prepared to go to my
18 next question.
19 JUDGE BONOMY: No. I don't see anything inappropriate in how that
20 was presented. The statement was quoted and then a gloss was put on it as
21 an impression that can be gleaned from it, and the witness was asked to
22 say if that is fair or not. And instead of dealing directly with it and
23 giving us the exact circumstances in which there was a delegation of more
24 than the two of them from the one side and Milosevic had two with him,
25 instead of giving us that straightforward explanation which it would be
1 pretty simple to give, we go into a suggestion that this is somehow or
2 other misleading.
3 MR. HANNIS: I guess my objection is, Your Honour, when he phrases
4 it: Would it be from that quote that I just gave you unfair to assume the
5 following? Well, it would be possible to assume a thousand things from
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it might be, Mr. Hannis, but it's perfectly
8 reasonable to assume that there were only three of them at the meeting,
9 and it's equally appropriate for the witness then to explain that that was
10 not the case. If we could nail the facts in that simple way, we would
11 make far better progress towards justice in this case. It's time for
12 another break and that may be merciful.
13 We must go into closed session while Mr. Tanic leaves the court,
14 and we'll remain that way until he returns.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 [Closed session]
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
2 MR. ACKERMAN:
3 Q. Mr. Tanic, do you remember testifying in the Milosevic case that
4 you only met with Mr. Milosevic either five or seven times -- five to
5 seven times?
6 A. Yes. What I meant was the important meetings, the ones where
7 relevant issues were discussed; that was the context. I did meet him many
8 times, as I said at the time, but some of the meetings were simply
9 irrelevant. I said exactly how many times I met certain persons just to
10 tell you about the pace of our political life, and I think I was pretty
11 specific at the time.
12 Q. That's fine. I want to go to paragraph 6 of your statement now.
13 "In my capacity as negotiator, on several occasions I presented my
14 work to Milosevic directly. I met with Milosevic directly in relation to
15 Kosovo and international issues approximately six to ten times."
16 Now, the truth is what we learned earlier today, and that is that
17 you never had a tete-a-tete meeting with Mr. Milosevic, but you were
18 always in some kind of a group, weren't you?
19 A. I don't know what people might take this to mean. If we're
20 together with other people and we go to one side, is that something you
21 define as a tete-a-tete meeting, or is that a meeting within a group?
22 Someone might call that a tete-a-tete. We're talking about something that
23 no one else can hear. Someone else might tell you this is a meeting
24 within a group.
25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... We don't need to have it
1 again, and I understand what you're saying. You talk in that paragraph I
2 just read to you, you used the words "in my capacity as a negotiator,"
4 A. Yes, I was one of the negotiators. I was one of them.
5 Q. I'm just curious --
6 A. On first that day --
7 Q. That's good enough. I am just curious about something. In the
8 Milosevic case - I'm on page 5104 - Judge Robinson intercedes and asks you
9 this: "Mr. Tanic, what you're saying is that you were one of the driving
10 forces in the negotiations, not the principle negotiator." And then you
11 said to Judge Robinson this: "That's right. From a formal and legal
12 point of view, I was not a negotiator."
13 So is that the case? You really weren't a negotiator in legal and
14 formal terms?
15 A. No. That should have read: "I was not the main negotiator." In
16 a formal sense, I was not the chief negotiator. But I was the driving
17 force behind the negotiations, and I think my evidence was consistent at
18 the previous trial and the present one.
19 Q. So your response to that is that that's a mistake in the
20 transcript, that you didn't say that? Is that what you have to say about
22 A. It's possible. You should go back to the audio-tape. There was
23 an altercation and perhaps there wasn't time for me to interject and say I
24 wasn't the chief negotiator.
25 Q. The final question I want to ask you about that is: What are the
1 legal and formal terms that one would use to describe a negotiator, since
2 you say that you were not the such in legal and formal terms? What formal
3 and legal terms are you talking about?
4 A. I'm talking about the president's decision. Under the law, as far
5 as I know, he has the power to issue instructions and orders that are as
6 good as a law. He, for example, comes up to Mr. Ratko Markovic and
7 says,"You're the chief negotiator," then Ratko Markovic is the chief
8 negotiator, which is what I've been saying.
9 He was the chief negotiator in these discreet negotiations. I was
10 never told my Milosevic that I was the chief negotiator. So that's what I
11 had in mind. He was after all the president of Serbia, and it was down to
12 him to say who was the chief negotiator or otherwise.
13 Q. All right -- [Previous translation continues]...
14 A. I think that was as good as a law, his word, I mean.
15 Q. I would like to go to paragraph 11. In paragraph 11 you say this:
16 "I am certain that members of the SDB, Milutinovic and Mihajlovic,
17 presented my work on these negotiations to Milosevic and that Milosevic
18 received reports on my progress on a daily basis."
19 So you know, do you, that every day someone from SDB or
20 Milutinovic or Mihajlovic went to Milosevic to report what you had
21 accomplished that day, every day; true?
22 A. Yes. I said that I was convinced, but I didn't say that it was
23 like that. As far as the -- I was aware of the way Milosevic's government
24 worked. He would always start every day with a briefing in the morning, a
25 security briefing. That happened every day. Whether Stanisic briefed him
1 directly every morning or sent a report to him in view of a briefing, I
2 don't know.
3 I don't suppose that he was briefed every day, but I know that
4 Milosevic's day always began with a security briefing. After all, when we
5 talked about a variety of issues, he told me that I was always to read
6 these security reports every day that there were negotiations, but not
7 every day when there were no negotiations in progress.
8 Q. I didn't ask you if he got a security briefing every day. I asked
9 you if you are certain, like you say, that he was briefed on a daily basis
10 about your work in the negotiations, because that's what you said. Now,
11 do you really want to tell this Chamber that that's true, that every day
12 somebody said to Milosevic, "Okay, here's what Tanic did today." Is that
13 your position?
14 A. If there were negotiations in progress that had already gone on
15 for five or six days, then this would be a daily thing. When there were
16 no negotiations in progress, he certainly wouldn't go around saying things
17 such as, "Tanic did this or did that." So I place this clearly in the
18 context of negotiations, when negotiations were in progress.
19 That's what I'm saying. It wasn't the case every day, but when
20 negotiations were in progress, he was briefed on a daily basis. Based on
21 the information I received from Mr. Mijatovic, within an hour and an hour
22 and a half, he would have a report on his table on everything that was
23 going on, because that went directly through Stanisic's office and would
24 normally reach Milosevic.
25 If Mijatovic misinformed me, then I simply was told something that
1 wasn't accurate. I didn't walk up to Milosevic to ask him if he had been
2 receiving daily reports. But when negotiations were in reports, I am
3 certain that reports were a daily thing because I didn't need to have
4 feedback after all, did I?
5 Later on, the whole thing was explained. There was an entire
6 paragraph explaining the methodology.
7 Q. Okay. I want you to explain something to us. This is in
8 paragraph 38. Now, you were -- even though you've now backed off of it,
9 you did say in some statements that you were the principal negotiator.
10 You certainly contend that you were the most successful negotiator, and
11 the driving force behind these negotiations.
12 Paragraph 38 you say this in the middle of the paragraph: "At the
13 end of 1997, I asked a couple of people what was going on with the
14 negotiations." Now, if you're the driving force and the most successful
15 negotiator and the main power behind this negotiation process, why on
16 earth are you asking other people what's going on in the negotiations?
17 A. There's talk here of implementation of the education agreement. I
18 wasn't involved with that simply because this was implementation pure and
19 simple, nothing more. Ratomir Vico was in charge of implementing that
20 agreement, not Ratko Markovic. The negotiations had to do with
21 confidence-building measures. Once a certain measure had been agreed,
22 we'd move on to the next set of measures. And Milosevic would set up a
23 special commission to deal with education-related issues. When I asked
24 about those negotiations, those were the negotiations that I had in mind,
25 the negotiations regarding the education system.
1 I don't see any particular discrepancy there, which of course is
2 for the Chamber to judge, but negotiations were about the entire process.
3 Whenever we were successful in something, we would have that particular
4 settlement implemented one way or another, and then we would just move on.
5 We had massive amounts of issues that were tabled and negotiated.
6 Q. Paragraph 52, please. You're talking about one your conversations
7 with Perisic, and this has been referred to more than once in your
8 testimony. You say: Perisic stated that in February or March of 1998,
9 the SDB and the VJ began cooperating and organised a state fact-finding
10 mission to Kosovo. The purpose of this fact-finding mission was to get an
11 accurate picture of what was happening in Kosovo, what was the extent of
12 the threat of terrorism, and what measures to use with the threat."
13 The first question I want to ask you about is: In February and
14 March of 1998, what position did Perisic hold?
15 A. I think he was the chief of the General Staff at that time.
16 Q. [Microphone not activated]
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for counsel, please.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: Microphone. Come on, mike man.
19 Q. Is it your position that the Chief of the General Staff, in
20 February and March of 1998, didn't know what was going on in Kosovo; and
21 thus had to send a fact-finding mission there to find out what was going
22 on? Is that your position?
23 A. No. That doesn't follow from this paragraph. Please. The
24 context is altogether different. I explained, didn't I, that Perisic and
25 Stanisic had started working together. They joined forces, and along with
1 a number of other politicians, tried to change Milosevic's mind. You have
2 Stanisic's evidence about that and you have Perisic's evidence about
3 that --
4 Q. I just want to ask you a question. I don't think you understood
5 my question because it doesn't sound like you're answering it. My
6 question was: Is it really your position that the Chief of the General
7 Staff didn't know what was going on in Kosovo; and thus had to send a
8 fact-finding mission, be part of one, down there to find out what was
9 happening? Now, is that your position? And if you will answer that
10 question, yes or no, then maybe we can go on. I don't need a further
11 explanation right now.
12 A. Well, he wasn't entirely certain, at least that's what he told me.
13 I told you about the conversations with Perisic. He said that he did not
14 have that kind of perspective in terms of intelligence. There were
15 problems as to who would be controlling the border, who would be providing
16 the equipment for electronic surveillance of the border.
17 He wanted to have the intelligence perspective. He had the
18 military perspective, his own perspective, but he needed to have an
19 intelligence in on this situation. This was a synergy of efforts.
20 Everyone has their own perspective. I have a political perspective and
21 not a military perspective, and the same thing applies to him.
22 Q. So, now you have answered that. Now, I want to ask you something
23 else about that. You're talking about this fact-finding mission, where
24 there was this helicopter flight that you claim Perisic told you about,
1 A. Yes. If what he said wasn't true, then I was misinformed. All of
2 my information relating to General Perisic stems from what he said, or
3 rather, from our conversation back in 1999. I hadn't known Mr. Perisic
4 previously, and I did not interfere with military issues.
5 Q. In addition, it's your position that your information from
6 Operation Horseshoe came from General Perisic, your information about this
7 helicopter flight. Those are two pieces of information that he was the
8 source for; correct?
9 A. I think I was crystal clear about this.
10 Q. Thank you. I just wanted to make sure we were all on the next
11 page before I ask you the next question --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that there was a question in line 10
13 in which you're quoting as saying, "I have a military perspective and not
14 the political one, and the same thing applies to him," and I suspect you
15 said the opposite of that.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. I have a political
18 JUDGE BONOMY: It's just to clarify it. Thank you.
19 Mr. Ackerman.
20 MR. ACKERMAN: All right.
21 Q. After you testified in Milosevic, General Perisic was interviewed
22 by the Office of the Prosecutor for eight days; the 6th, the 7th, and the
23 8th of December, 2003, and the 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of January, 2004.
24 Now, would it surprise you to know that General Perisic never mentioned
25 your name, never mentioned the helicopter incident, and never mentioned
1 Operation Horseshoe?
2 A. Of course, that would greatly surprise me. In that case, you
3 should call General Perisic, since our conversations did take place. And
4 I think they were even recorded, because I think there must have been some
5 eavesdropping going on in Perisic's house at the time. The house must
6 have been bugged. I can't be certain about that, but I think you should
7 call General Perisic.
8 I would be comfortable confronting him or anyone else to
9 contradict my statement. There's no problem at all about that. I have no
10 vested interest in lying to anyone or deluding anyone. My position is
11 what it is. Very often you get people saying one thing in a court of law,
12 writing something else in their books, and saying yet a third thing
13 privately. I heard at least four kinds of information about myself; one
14 in court, another thing in the book, and a yet third thing was said in the
16 People say things about me that were out of what I testified to in
17 court, 95 percent was true. They send a book to the Court and yet they
18 claim not to know me. I can hardly be expected to know about everything
19 going on. As far as I know, Mr. Perisic confirmed that he knew he at a
20 trial in The Hague and also in a newspaper interview. You can go and ask
21 him again perhaps because, to say the least, I would be somewhat
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we've had an awful long answer to a very
24 simple question. Again, please restrict your answers to what's necessary
25 to answer the question, Mr. Tanic.
1 Mr. Ackerman, are you privy to the questions that were asked in
2 the course of the interview, or do you simply have a record of what
3 answers were given?
4 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, we have the entire transcripts of
5 those interviews.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: And were questions asked about his knowledge of the
7 helicopter incident or the name Tanic or Operation Horseshoe?
8 MR. ACKERMAN: I would have to conduct an additional search of the
9 transcript before I would be comfortable in my answer.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
11 MR. ACKERMAN: I am told that there was specific question about
12 there being some kind of a plan which could have triggered, I suppose, the
13 horseshoe issue. He never spoke about horseshoe, and I believe he said
14 there wasn't any plan that he knew of either. But I don't want to be
15 quoted with regard to that without consulting it further, Your Honour, and
16 doing a more further search into it.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: I only tried to find out if Mr. Tanic's name was
19 mentioned, if the horseshoe issue were mentioned, and if the helicopter
20 incident were mentioned; and none of them were I don't think.
21 Q. At paragraph 67, Mr. Tanic, the issue you're talking about there
22 is whether a foreign military presence would be allowed in Kosovo ...
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 MR. ACKERMAN:
25 Q. The issue was whether a foreign military presence would be allowed
1 in Kosovo. And what you said there was: "I had discussions on this
2 matter with ambassadors and diplomats of the EU countries." First, give
3 me the names of the ambassadors that you had discussions with about
4 foreign military presence in Kosovo.
5 A. The British ambassador, I think his name was Donald; and the
6 Italian ambassador, Baskoni, Francesko Baskoni; after that there was
7 Ricardo Sosa; the Hungarian ambassador, whose name escapes me right now;
8 the German ambassador, Mr. Gruber; an American envoy; and their closest
9 associates, the embassy's sector, that sort of thing.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: There's a name been recorded as Donald, but you've
11 previously referred to this name as Donnelly. Is that correct?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Donnelly. I think his name is
14 MR. ACKERMAN:
15 Q. And how about the American envoy, what's that name?
16 A. The charge d'affaire, I forget who it was at the time. The name
17 escapes me. They didn't have an envoy, but they didn't have an ambassador
18 either, so it was a charge d'affaire who was there.
19 Q. And then you talk about having conversations about this with
20 diplomats of the EU countries. Can you give me the names of any these
21 diplomats who you had these discussions with.
22 A. Well, these are at the same time diplomats of the EU, their
23 closest associates. I would have to check my notes for secretaries of
24 embassies, but these are EU member country diplomats. Ambassadors are
25 diplomats of those countries. We discussed with the European Union itself
1 about these matters. I believe that at the time Mr. Stefano Sannino was
2 one of the diplomats of the European Union itself, with whom we discussed
3 these matters. But really, I would have to go through my archives. Many
4 people were involved. I believe I've named enough of them.
5 Q. Do you have notes and archives, do you?
6 A. No, I don't have anything, Mr. Ackerman. You know that very well.
7 We had books and everything else stolen from us. I don't have any
8 documents, no photo archives. My political party does not want to access
9 to them, and this is why at times it is very difficult for me during
10 testimony to remember certain things.
11 All documents, all books have been stolen from us, and this is
12 verifiable. And now I can produce to the Court a list of cover letters or
13 invitations for certain meetings. It accidentally was left in one of my
14 photo albums and one photograph with Milosevic, but it was -- it is now
15 currently in the country that I'm residing in. I haven't brought them
16 with me.
17 Q. Do you remember a little earlier when we talked about dancing
18 around the truth. And your answer starting at line 7 just now, page 93,
19 you said: "I'd have to check my notes." And then a little further down
20 you said: "I'd have to go through my archives."
21 And then I say: "Oh, you have notes and archives, do you?" And
22 you say: "No, I don't have anything." Now, that just doesn't wash.
23 That's you dancing around the truth, isn't it?
24 A. This is not dancing about the truth. There is a notebook, and
25 this is everything that I kept, Mr. Ackerman. The Court may verify how
1 many meetings I held. These are material facts. The core diplomatic in
2 Belgrade knew me. And we had, through Mr. Sannino we had access to
3 certain -- please, what do you want me to say that I never anybody? And
4 do you want me to claim like Milosevic did that I never lived? This is
5 why this is an emotional issue for me.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Please hold on, Mr. Ackerman.
7 Mr. Tanic, do you still have a notebook?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, one small notebook. Because I
9 took it with me to Hungary when I fled the country, and it is now kept in
10 the country where I live in right now. There are telephone numbers and
11 notes. But when it comes to archives, my party has the archives and the
12 notes, and they can be consulted.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
14 MR. ACKERMAN:
15 Q. So when you said: "I'd have to check my notes," and "I'd have to
16 go through my archives," you're referring to one little notebook that you
17 had in the archives of your party, and you really weren't trying to
18 mislead this Chamber. Is that your position now?
19 A. No, no. I want to verify some telephone numbers of some people in
20 the US or names, if it's necessary for the purpose of this trial. It's a
21 small notebook. Only -- the only document that may refresh some names in
22 my memory, but I had many meetings with diplomats in Belgrade where we
23 discussed these issues. And these are EU diplomats because the countries
24 named are member countries. And sometimes I meant the Russians --
25 Q. Stop. You don't want to answer my question and I understand that,
1 so you can stop. And I'll ask you something else?
2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, don't assume that I for one from drawn from
3 you the same inference as you seek to draw from the answers given, Mr.
4 Ackerman. You have to take all that's been said by the witness together,
5 before concluding what this is all about. The comments can be made in
6 submissions in due course.
7 MR. ACKERMAN:
8 Q. In that same paragraph, 67, of your statement, where you talk
9 about meeting with all these ambassadors and diplomats; you used both
10 terms, "ambassadors" and "diplomats," did these meetings all take place in
12 A. No, there were some meetings abroad; and ambassadors at the same
13 time diplomats really --
14 Q. And when you say "I had discussions on this matter," you use the
15 word "I," "I had discussions on this matter." Do you really mean to tell
16 us that you had discussions face-to-face with these ambassadors and
17 diplomats that you have named; with each one of them, you, face-to-face
18 discussions? Is that your evidence?
19 A. Oh, yes.
20 Q. All right.
21 A. Of course and with --
22 Q. [Previous translation continues]...
23 A. Yes, yes. May I supplement my answer which is: Yes. I'm not
24 changing it. Relatively, often I emphasise, I would have meetings with
25 political directors at ministries of foreign affairs abroad. They were
1 usually engaged with us. If I may, I can refresh my memory. Maybe I may
2 invoke Mr. Martin Lutz. He was one of such people who was involved quite
3 a great deal in this process, and I hope he has ample archive material.
4 It would be more useful to us to call him, rather than to bother
5 Mr. Talja.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Tanic.
7 Mr. Ackerman.
8 MR. ACKERMAN: --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Paglia.
10 MR. ACKERMAN:
11 Q. I want to ask you about some meetings with other people that you
12 have not mentioned in your statements and ask you if you actually --
13 whether or not you had meetings with any of these people or talked with
14 them. Did you ever have any meetings or talk with President Clinton of
15 the United States?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. And how about Prime Minister Blair of the United Kingdom?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Madeleine Albright, the Secretary of State, heavily involved in
20 the Kosovo matter, did you ever talk with her?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Richard Holbrooke of the United States, heavily involved in Kosovo
23 negotiations, did you ever talk with him or negotiate with him?
24 A. I did not negotiate. I believe that once, very briefly, we
25 exchanged opinions at a reception. But I spoke to all associates of the
1 people you mentioned, close associates of Mr. Blair, Madeleine Albright --
2 Q. Christopher Hill, how many meetings did you have with Christopher
3 Hill? He was the principle negotiator for the United States with regard
4 to Kosovo. Now, you, as a major negotiator for Yugoslavia, you must have
5 met with Christopher Hill on many occasions?
6 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, that misstates his evidence, and I
7 object to the relevance --
8 JUDGE BONOMY: Misstates whose evidence?
9 MR. HANNIS: Mr. Tanic's, Your Honour. He indicated he was
10 involved in discreet negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians; not with the
11 Americans about Kosovo, but with the Kosovo Albanians.
12 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, he says over and over that he
13 met with ambassadors and diplomats and envoys and all these people about
15 JUDGE BONOMY: In a set of negotiations, Mr. Ackerman?
16 MR. ACKERMAN: Yes. He said he was negotiating with
17 representatives of all these various countries.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Was I ever -- was I ever -- did I
19 ever say --
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, when this sort of thing happens, you
21 remain silent until the thing is resolved.
22 I see nothing wrong with the question. Continue, please, Mr.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: I don't even insist on the word "negotiations." I
25 just want to know how many meetings he had with the principal American
1 negotiator regarding Kosovo, Mr. Christopher Hill.
2 Q. How many?
3 A. Christopher Hill was not chief negotiator for the Serbian Albanian
4 political dialogue concerning Kosovo, neither did he meddle with it. His
5 associate in the US embassy was included on an information reception
6 level. He was the envoy for the problem of Kosovo on behalf of the US,
7 Mr. Hill. And he was the envoy at the time when his brother also worked
8 in the US embassy in Belgrade, with whom I would occasionally meet.
9 And as far as Christopher Hill himself was concerned, he operated
10 in the time when New Democracy and Milosevic took separate views with
11 regard to Kosovo. And he was involved when our negotiations with Kosovo,
12 together with international intermediaries, were side-tracked. I used to
13 meet his brother on several occasions. He most probably knows what his
14 brother was talking about with me, I presume.
15 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Personal envoy regarding the
16 KLA was Lawrence [sic] Gelbard. How many times did you meet with Lawrence
18 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, can we have a time-frame for these,
19 because this witness has testified that he was involved in negotiations
20 with the Kosovo Albanians from 1995 to 1997. Now, if these questions are
21 regarding people who had positions in 1998 and 1999, then I object to the
22 relevance of this line of questioning.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman.
24 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, he claims to have been meeting with
25 various representatives, foreign governments, almost right up until the
1 time he left Belgrade. So he talks about negotiations that he conducted
2 and meetings that he had after the bombing started; and certainly before
3 the bombing started, Mr. Gelbard and Mr. Hill were both very active in
4 dealing with Kosovo.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: The relevant period is from 1995, Mr. Hannis, and
6 therefore if -- the question will be read in that light.
7 And the question is whether you met Mr. Gelbard, Mr. Tanic.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I spoke with him, but this could not
9 be described as a meeting. Mihajlovic and I spoke to him briefly at a
11 MR. ACKERMAN:
12 Q. Now, because of your importance as the most successful and -- I
13 can't remember your other word right now --
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's not ask provocative questions; let's try and
15 encourage answers that help us by directing them to -- by directing us to
16 the facts.
17 MR. ACKERMAN:
18 Q. A number of people have written books about this period of time in
19 Serbia and Kosovo. Tim Judah wrote a book called "Kosovo: War and
20 Revenge." Do you find it strange that you're not mentioned in that book?
21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I object to that. The author who writes
22 a book, whether he puts a person in or not, is not necessarily a
23 reflection of what role this witness played.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: In other contexts I might have agreed with you, Mr.
25 Hannis, but not on this one. I will allow the question.
1 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, without some foundation of what the
2 particular focus of Mr. Judah's book is, I maintain this is irrelevant.
3 If he's focusing on the combat, that's one thing; but we don't have a
4 foundation for what Mr. Judah's focus was in his book.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, are you familiar with this book?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When it was published -- when it was
7 published, this is an important piece of information.
8 JUDGE BONOMY: So you're not familiar with it?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is -- this book is not known to
10 me. I know Tim Judah; I spoke to him on several occasions. This is why
11 I'm asking you: When was this book published? Was it published --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't matter when it was published to
13 establish whether or not you are familiar with it. Could you answer that
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It's not known to me.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
17 Well, I think Mr. Hannis's second intervention does have some
18 foundation in it, Mr. Ackerman. Can you elaborate a little on a basis for
19 a foundation for the question that you ask?
20 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, Mr. Judah's book is an effort of
21 him, as near as I can tell, to give a very comprehensive background of the
22 conflict and the war itself, and the various efforts that were made to
23 settle it, keep it from happening, things of that nature. And that's my
24 recollection of the book that I read some time ago.
25 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. But you see the answer the witness has
1 given that he's not familiar with the book means that the question is
2 pointless, isn't it?
3 MR. ACKERMAN: I don't think it's not pointless. I don't think
4 whether or not he appears in that book has anything to do with his
5 familiarity with it, but with Mr. Judah's familiarity with him as this
6 high-powered negotiator --
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, that's like saying to me there's a
8 book written called "Little Women," are you surprised you're mentioned in
9 it? My immediate reaction might be: Yes. But without having read it and
10 knowing the whole subject matter, I couldn't give you a meaningful answer
11 to the question. So as presently framed, I consider that this is not a
12 question this witness could answer in a way that would be meaningful for
13 us, so please move to something else.
14 MR. ACKERMAN: [Microphone not activated]
15 A better analogy might be if a book was written about outstanding
16 jurist of Scotland in the 20th century, clearly, your name would be in it
17 if there was such a book.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, bearing in mind we're now in the 21st
19 century, Mr. Ackerman --
20 MR. ACKERMAN: [Indiscernible]
21 JUDGE BONOMY: -- there may be no surprise at all about that. So
22 let's move to something else.
23 MR. ACKERMAN:
24 Q. Are you familiar with General Clark's book, "Waging Modern War"
25 about NATO and Kosovo?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Did you ever have any meetings with or discussions with General
4 A. Absolutely no. At that time I did not speak to him. Excuse me,
5 when did I claim that I was chief negotiator, that I was very important --
6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Tanic, just, please, again restrain yourself.
7 I think we are reaching the point of diminishing returns, Mr. Ackerman.
8 MR. ACKERMAN: I'll go elsewhere, Your Honour. I'm finished with
9 that anyhow.
10 Q. Paragraph 77 you say this: "Perisic told me, in the conversation
11 that I had with him while preparing my book, that he gave a written order
12 in late spring 1998 to local commanders not to undertake any operations
13 that were not signed by him."
14 Now, a very simple question: Have you seen that order?
15 A. No. I said that I was told by him -- I did not say "showed to
17 Q. I only want to know if you've seen the order. Now, you also claim
18 that actions went on anyhow, in spite of this order. And you say this:
19 "The military actions that took place anyway were undertaken on
20 Milosevic's order through General Nebojsa Pavkovic, then the commander of
21 the 3rd Army, now the VJ Chief of Staff."
22 Now, these actions you talk about, these were actions that were
23 taking place in the spring and summer of 1998, weren't they?
24 A. Yes. But it follows from the context of my talks with Perisic in
25 its entirety. Please.
1 Q. All I'm trying to nail down with you right now is the date. The
2 date when these -- when Perisic issued this order that you're talking
3 about and when these actions went on, anyway, had to be spring and summer
4 of 1998, didn't they?
5 A. He said that he had issued this order at the end of spring, so
6 it's summer 1998 --
7 Q. Yes --
8 A. -- beginning of 1999.
9 Q. And you know by the end of 1988, that General Perisic was no
10 longer in the position of Chief of Staff of the army -- 1998, right?
11 A. I think that from October or November ceased to be Chief of
12 General Staff and not from summer. After the agreement with Holbrooke, he
13 was displaced from that position.
14 Q. And so what you are claiming here, or at least what you claim
15 Perisic told you, is that he issued this order in the spring of 1998; and
16 that in spite of that in the spring and summer of 1998, Milosevic issued
17 orders that went straight to General Pavkovic, who was commanding the 3rd
18 Army at that point, bypassing General Perisic. That's what your claim is,
19 isn't it?
20 A. Yes. This is the content of the information received from General
21 Perisic, and it was complimentary to information that were relayed through
22 intelligence channels. And the main source of that statement was General
23 Perisic; I believe it's perfectly clear from the context. I never claimed
24 anything. I relayed the content of our conversation, and you are claiming
25 that I'm claiming something.
1 Q. I think -- I take it you relayed that conversation as accurately
2 as you possibly could. You didn't make any of that up, did you?
3 A. No. And, as I said, it is complimentary to all other information
4 received through intelligence channels. And in this context, I found that
5 information to be trustful, because it was similar to what was reaching me
6 from the top of the security service.
7 Q. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Let's take a look --
8 A. Similar opinions --
9 Q. Let's look at an exhibit and see about this. Let's look at
10 Exhibit 4D35.
11 Now, do you see that exhibit over there on the B/C/S version of
12 it? Do you see that?
13 A. Yes. Yes, I can see it.
14 Q. And that says that Pavkovic was appointed 3rd Army commander in
15 December of 1998, doesn't it?
16 A. Yes.
17 MR. ACKERMAN: Let's go to 4D36 now, please.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says also that from the position
19 of the commander of the Pristina Corps.
20 MR. ACKERMAN:
21 Q. Yeah, that's what it says. But let's look at 4D36 now. Now, I
22 think if you look at this document you'll find that General Pavkovic
23 didn't take up his duties as 3rd Army commander until 13 January of 1999;
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. So the question that I have for you is when you say in paragraph
2 77 that Milosevic was issuing orders through Pavkovic, commander of the
3 3rd Army, in the spring and summer of 1998, are you the one that made that
4 up or does that -- or did Perisic get that wrong?
5 A. You mean I invented that Mr. Pavkovic was replaced or moved, or
6 that Perisic was not that -- he was commander of the Pristina Corps and
7 then he was moved to the -- what is the question?
8 Q. Mr. Tanic, you know exactly what I mean. You say in your
9 statement that Pavkovic was the commander of the 3rd Army in the spring
10 and summer of 1998; and now you know that's wrong. Now, where did that
11 come from? Did you make that up, or did Perisic tell you that? Now,
12 that's a simple question; just answer it.
13 A. No. Perisic did not say this, and neither did I invent that.
14 It's just -- lacks precision. The Pristina Corps had to be inserted.
15 Q. Well, it lacks precision in a statement that you have sworn is the
16 truth. Are we back to this is just a working document that you really
17 don't adopt?
18 A. No. No, I'm not going back to that. God forbid --
19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Hannis.
20 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, he indicated when he adopted his
21 statement that was true to the best of his information and belief. He's
22 indicated in his early testimony today that he's a political guy not a
23 military guy.
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, these are all arguments to be weighed in due
1 Mr. Ackerman, we're going to have to stop now. An outside
2 observer might feel you've had a fair crack at the whip.
3 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Judge, it has gone a lot more slowly than I
4 anticipated. I figured I'd be done well ahead of this, but we get very
5 long answers. And I still have a significant amount to deal with. I'd
6 say I've got another hour.
7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I don't think we can allow that, I'm afraid,
8 because there's got to be a starting point for controlling the length of
9 cross-examination; otherwise, we're dealing with an endless trial. It
10 cannot be that way. I've asked you all in the past to prioritise and that
11 was working pretty well.
12 And it has to work even with witnesses of the significance that
13 you place on this witness. And I feel that the Chamber has plenty to go
14 on so far as questions of general credibility and reliability are
15 concerned, and that questions ought to be much more pointedly dealing with
16 particular facts, as the last ones have been. But it may be that with
17 that guidance you can tailor it to some extent.
18 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I certainly will undertake to do that,
19 but I must say, for the record, that there's not been a witness that
20 covers as much of the indictment as this witness. He covers paragraphs 17
21 through 69, paragraphs 77, paragraphs 79 to 101 --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I say, Mr. Ackerman, I'm well aware of that.
23 But I have to also take account of the evidence of witnesses yet to come,
24 the significance that their evidence will have, that this may just be the
25 first of many who -- for whom similar arguments could be advanced. And we
1 do have to have some measure of control. So I'm asking you to look again
2 at what has to be done in the remaining time. We also have another issue
3 tomorrow that special interpretation arrangements will be in place for the
4 next witness, and it's important to get started on him fairly early
6 MR. ACKERMAN: Well, Your Honour, and I'm telling you that I will
7 do that. But you know that prior to this trial I tried very hard to get a
8 severance because I knew this was going to happen to me. You let counsel
9 for the other accused in this case so far cross-examine as long as they
10 wanted to. Now when it comes to Mr. Pavkovic you're telling me that I
11 can't cross-examine as long as I want to and I can't ask the questions
12 that I think are necessary for his Defence --
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Ackerman, you know I haven't said that.
14 And you know that to take the line that you're taking at the moment sounds
15 like an attempt to establish a position in relation to possible future
16 proceedings here. I will always allow questions that you can justify as
17 necessary. But you know, as well as everyone else in the courtroom, that
18 in a case of this nature we have to prioritise. There will be things
19 which significant -- which though significant are of marginal
21 Now, with witnesses of this range, you and many others with
22 experience and ability would be able to cross-examine for many, many
23 hours. But in the real world, it's not possible. So I'm not stopping you
24 raising issues of significance. I'm asking you to reflect on how much it
25 is necessary for you to ask. As I said earlier today, if the
1 cross-examination has to go on a bit longer, it has to go on a bit longer,
2 but I'm relying on your professional experience to try to specify me to
3 exercise adequate control over the case.
4 MR. ACKERMAN: Your Honour, I have to say one more thing just for
5 the record if nothing else. I really do appreciate what you just said to
6 me and I agree with that. But when you say to me that you'll allow
7 questions if I can justify their necessity, I must reflect back to the
8 first two accused who asked questions in this case and were never asked to
9 justify their questions.
10 So the time pressure when it comes, comes when us down toward the
11 end of this indictment get up to start doing cross-examination. And I
12 would just think -- I would just hope that you, Your Honour, and your
13 colleagues would be somewhat sensitive to that. And that's all I can ask
14 and that's I do ask.
15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think it ought to be said also that it was
16 plain to me in the cross-examination of both Mr. O'Sullivan and Mr. Fila
17 that they did not cross-examine anything like as exhaustively as would
18 have been open to them. And they also have used -- I don't have an exact
19 calculation, but I suspect they've used less time individually than you
20 have. Now, the one thing I don't want to get down to is that sort of
21 detailed assessment of the situation and the time that's been used.
22 I also am taking cognisance of the fact that earlier in the case,
23 they have not asked very many questions. And I put that down to a fact
24 that as a group of counsel working together, you have you have agreed on
25 who would take the lead, who was perhaps most affected, albeit you may all
1 be affected by the evidence of particular witnesses. So I would certainly
2 not accept that what has happened in the cross-examination of this witness
3 is in any way unfair to you.
4 So we will leave the matter there until tomorrow morning at 9.00.
5 Mr. Tanic, I'm afraid you have to return again tomorrow. Be back
6 ready to resume at 9.00. Meanwhile, please, no discussion with anyone
7 about your evidence. Would you now leave the -- oh, sorry, we'll go into
8 closed session while you leave.
9 [Closed session]
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.51 p.m.,
16 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day of
17 November, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.