1 Wednesday, 8 August 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Good morning, Professor Markovic.

7 THE WITNESS: Good morning.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I hope you're well today. We will now continue the

9 examination by Mr. Zecevic.

10 Mr. Zecevic.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Your Honour, before we

12 start we have been able last night to find the web site of the Ministry of

13 Defence of FRY concerning the Law on Defence which is at tab 63, P984

14 here, and we had the problem about the second paragraph. Now, the

15 document is in Serbian, but out of -- from the web site it clearly shows

16 that there are three paragraphs in this law and we can distribute this to

17 the Judges, to Professor, and to our learned friends from the OTP so maybe

18 Professor can comment, if it pleases the Court.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: It seems sensible to do this, Mr. Hannis, and

20 perhaps give it an IC number and mark it for identification.

21 MR. HANNIS: That's fine, Your Honour, I'll have an argument at

22 some point in time before you consider admitting it into evidence about

23 when that was published on the web site and when it got to be three

24 paragraphs, if it was always that way or only since yesterday --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Hopefully that investigation will be continued by

1 Mr. Zecevic and should be clarified but relevant. But when we've got the

2 Professor here, we should hear the evidence subject to its admissibility

3 being determined in due course. So in a sense -- not just in a sense, it

4 would be a wider reservation than simply marking the document for

5 identification. We will reserve the question of the admissibility of the

6 answers given to questions about this document until the matter is either

7 resolved or in the course of our final deliberations.

8 So have you copies of this for us?

9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I have copies.

10 THE REGISTRAR: That will be IC133, Your Honours.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 Did you say tab 69?

13 MR. ZECEVIC: No, it's at tab -- Your Honour, tab 63, P984,

14 Article 4, second, I think --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, thank you.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, could I have one copy for me.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think even I can see the point just from

18 looking at the document.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, just a brief comment by Professor will do I

20 think.

21 WITNESS: RATKO MARKOVIC [Resumed]

22 [Witness answered through interpreter]

23 Examination by Mr. Zecevic: [Continued]

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's precisely as I assumed

25 yesterday, which means in performing the duties described in paragraph 2

1 which consist of eight items,"The president of the republic shall issue

2 orders, commands, and decisions," this is what I assumed the case was

3 yesterday.

4 It says here: "In performing all of the duties described in

5 paragraph 2," and paragraph 2 has a total of eight items.

6 MR. ZECEVIC:

7 Q. So, Professor, paragraph 2 begins with the following words: "In

8 his command of the army, the president of the republic shall ..." and then

9 follow eight items?

10 A. Yes, "... and in performing all of these eight duties, the

11 president shall issue orders, commands, and decisions."

12 Q. Which is paragraph 3?

13 A. Yes, which is paragraph 3.

14 Q. Thank you.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, do you wish me to pursue this matter

16 any further?

17 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't. I'm satisfied with --

18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- that explanation of the document. What

20 Mr. Hannis has to say about it, we'll consider in due course.

21 MR. ZECEVIC: Of course. The -- just for the record, the web site

22 from which this was taken is on the upper -- upper part of the first page.

23 Thank you.

24 Yesterday Your Honours requested us to provide the constitutional

25 decision to which Professor Markovic was referring to. Now, unfortunately

1 we have been unable to find that particular decision because the

2 registry -- the Official Gazette registry concerning the decisions of the

3 Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia for 1991 has like seven pages. And out

4 of the description we couldn't really decide which document was -- which

5 constitutional decision was actually the one which Professor was referring

6 to. And of course there was no time for us to read through all of them.

7 So what I -- what we are suggesting is that we provide a copy of

8 the registry which we have over here, register -- Official Gazette

9 register for the 1991 concerning the decisions of the Constitutional Court

10 so Professor might be able during the -- one of the breaks to reflect --

11 refresh his memory and give us the particular decision that we have to

12 provide to the -- to the honourable Trial Chamber and to him as well.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: That's an excellent suggestion, Mr. Zecevic.

14 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: If usher could -- we have prepared the copies for

17 our colleagues from the Prosecution and the registry and for Professor.

18 Thank you very much.

19 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, this is the register of decisions.

20 You will be able to take a look at it during one of the breaks, and then

21 perhaps after that you could give us your comment concerning that, or

22 rather, your suggestion as to which one of all of those decisions could be

23 the one that we referred to yesterday.

24 Professor, during Prosecution case a certain number of regulations

25 was admitted into evidence, regulations adopted in the period prior to the

1 1992 constitution, to be more precise, between 1988 and 1992. In

2 paragraph 85 of the indictment, the Prosecution claims that in early 1989

3 the government of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

4 commenced a process which was aimed at taking away or revoking the

5 autonomy of Kosovo. I suppose that this pertains to the Government of

6 Serbia, not SFRY. This must be some kind of a mistake. So to revoke the

7 autonomy that Kosovo had pursuant to the 1974 constitution.

8 So, Professor, could we look at tab 72, 1D125. This is a document

9 which is known as the blue book. The date it was published is 11th of

10 March, 1977. The Presidency of the SFRY set up a working group, a body,

11 which assessed the constitutional and legal position of Serbia in

12 relation --

13 MR. ZECEVIC: I have it -- it is probably me, the -- 5, row 8, the

14 Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, not of SFRY. It's page 5,

15 line 8.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, this is tab 72?

17 MR. ZECEVIC: Tab 72, yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: We don't have a page 5 in English.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, it's transcript page 5, 8 -- row 8,

20 where it says "Presidency of FRY -- of SFRY," and it should

21 read: "Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia." It's page 5, row

22 8 of the transcript, that is what I was referring to.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation].

25 Q. So the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Serbia established

1 a working group which assessed the constitutional and legal position of

2 the Socialist Republic of Serbia and autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and

3 Kosovo, that were within its composition in accordance with the decisions,

4 or rather, in accordance with the solutions adopted in the 1974

5 constitution.

6 Professor, at the very beginning on page 1 of this document, which

7 is also the first paragraph of translation, it says that the Presidency of

8 the Socialist Republic of Serbia at a session held on the 16th of January,

9 1975, put forward an initiative to assess the issues of the constitutional

10 organisation of the republic, particularly focusing on the implementation

11 of functions that are of interest to the republic as a whole.

12 Professor, on the 16th of January, 1975, how much time had elapsed

13 at that time since the 1974 constitution on that date.

14 A. If I remember well, the 1974 constitution was adopted in April,

15 that means that this was less than a year after the constitution entered

16 into force.

17 Q. The reason for such an initiative of the Presidency was based on

18 what, very briefly, please?

19 A. The reason was in a contradictory position of autonomous provinces

20 which existed only within the composition of one out of six republics. So

21 those were the autonomous provinces within the constitutional system of

22 one of the units of the Federation. Autonomous provinces existed within

23 Serbia and were represented in the Federation independently, outside of

24 Serbia, as though provinces were also subjects of the Federation. In

25 addition to that, the level of autonomy of a province was almost identical

1 to the level of autonomy of a republic so that the Republic of Serbia,

2 when it came to its rights and duties within the SFRY, could exercise its

3 rights and duties only outside of the territory of autonomous provinces;

4 that is to say, the territory of Serbia proper, excluding autonomous

5 provinces. This is why an issue of equality was raised of the Republic of

6 Serbia in relation to other republics of the Yugoslav Federation.

7 Q. This material is quite voluminous, and we extracted only certain

8 relevant portions of that material here. I think this is a book numbering

9 about a hundred or so pages, correct, Professor?

10 A. Yes, this is the so-called blue book which was not available to

11 the public for quite a long time, because you can see on page 1 it says

12 "strictly confidential," and in that book, if one looks from this point of

13 view, a critical view of the constitution, both of Serbia and the

14 Federation, it takes a critical view of this issue, to follow-up on your

15 previous question.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you should elicit from the witness an

17 explanation of exactly what the blue book is, then it might put it in --

18 or put what's being said in context for us.

19 MR. ZECEVIC: By all means, Your Honour.

20 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you heard Judge Bonomy's question,

21 didn't you. Can you please explain what in actual fact the blue book was.

22 A. It is a criticism of the constitutional position, a critical

23 analysis of the constitutional position of the Republic of Serbia within

24 the constitutional system after 1974. This critical analysis was

25 conducted by a working group comprising two university professors of

1 political sciences at the time, Professor Najdan Pasic and

2 Professor Radislav Ratkovic. There were a number of state officials

3 involved as well. Specifically, I remember Mr. Veljko Markovic and

4 Mr. Milivoj Draskovic, the then-republican secretary for legislation.

5 Within the framework of this critical analysis, a comprehensive

6 view was provided over dozens of pages in a very documented way of

7 Serbia's constitutional position. Certain conclusions were drawn based on

8 this. One of those, as far as I remember - I'm not sure if it is, in

9 fact, included in your presentation - is that Serbia's constitutional

10 position within a federation, that due to its very nature is an expression

11 of the rights of the Yugoslav peoples to self-determination, jeopardizes

12 the right of the Serbian people to the their own self-determination.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Professor, that's sufficient for present

14 purposes. Let's concentrate now on the questions that Mr. Zecevic has for

15 you. Thank you.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, we have highlighted some of the

18 conclusions here. I'm now looking at page 3 of the document that we have

19 prepared. Specifically I'm talking about paragraph 3 of the relevant

20 translation. In the blue book itself the page number is 89, the page

21 numbers are in the upper right corner of the page. Specifically I'm

22 talking about paragraph 2. It begins: "These unresolved

23 contradictions ..."

24 Could you please comment on the three or four contradictions being

25 specifically referenced on this page and the next page, page 90.

1 A. Specifically it reads here that the constitutional position of the

2 Republic of Serbia resulted in the creation of three different and in

3 congress legal systems within the Republic of Serbia growing further and

4 further apart, drifting further and further apart. There was one legal

5 system in one of the provinces and another in the other province and yet a

6 third system in the Republic of Serbia itself, which was not itself as

7 structured as an autonomous province. But this entire territory is within

8 the Republic of Serbia, where we see three parallel legal systems being

9 established.

10 The next thing is tendencies towards territorial isolation --

11 self-isolation exclusivity, not positioned to free self-managed

12 integration. The provinces enjoyed all the attributes of statehood.

13 Their constitutional executive and judicial authorities. Therefore, they

14 were self-sufficient entities. As a result, within the Republic of Serbia

15 itself, you had two states within a state in manner of speaking. Serbia

16 itself had the status of a state, yet within its own body it had other

17 states that were the autonomous provinces, which resulted in a splintering

18 of Serbia's economy and jeopardised Serbia's internal domestic market.

19 The fact that the provinces had a state-like character led to

20 substantial differences in their respective education systems, exclusivity

21 in media operations, cultural, sporting, and other activities, those were

22 exclusively within the territorial limits of the provinces. The very fact

23 that the autonomous provinces were represented within the Federation as

24 independent units, that is, independent from the Republic of Serbia, and

25 not within Serbia's own representation, cast a shadow on the

1 possibility -- on the ability of Serbia as a republic to express its own

2 positions and interests in the same way that the remaining five republics

3 were able to, the remaining five republics that were members of the

4 Yugoslav Federation. These are the conclusions of this analysis. There

5 is one missing, one which we find at the very end of the blue book.

6 This was a multi-national federation which was an expression of

7 the self-determination of all of Yugoslavia's people, but it was the

8 self-determination of the Serbian people that was at stake here, the

9 Serbian people as one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia as a

10 federation.

11 Q. Professor, briefly, if you could, please, explain why they were

12 set up. What was the reason that the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina

13 and Kosovo were set up within the Republic of Serbia?

14 A. The first reason is historical background, the next reason would

15 be the ethnic context, and the third reason would be the peculiarity of

16 these areas in terms of their economies, their peculiarity in relation to

17 the Republic of Serbia as a whole. When the autonomous provinces were set

18 up, and they were first established in 1945, they were created for these

19 very reasons. From day one they were part of the Republic of Serbia, and

20 out of all the republics of the former Yugoslav Federation, the Republic

21 of Serbia was the only republic to have within its body, as it were, two

22 autonomous provinces.

23 Q. Professor, you talked about the ethnic make-up. How important a

24 factor was that? To what extent did that affect the creation of the

25 autonomous provinces? I'm talking about the ethnic make-up of the

1 autonomous provinces, of course.

2 A. In both these autonomous provinces, there were ethnic minorities,

3 and these were represented to a large degree the Albanian minority in the

4 case of Kosovo and Metohija and the Hungarian minority in the autonomous

5 province of Vojvodina, in addition to which there were other minorities.

6 However, some people back where we come from have an erroneous view of

7 what the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija and is supposed to mean.

8 It is not the Albanians in Kosovo's territory enjoying this

9 autonomy, but rather the entire population of Kosovo and Metohija, which

10 is a mixed bag in terms of its ethnic make-up, if I may put it that way.

11 There is -- there are a number of different ethnic minorities in Kosovo,

12 in addition to which the area is very peculiar in terms of its history.

13 Therefore, the autonomy of Kosovo and Metohija is not something that only

14 involves the Albanian ethnic minority, nor is this supposed to be a

15 solution to their position within Kosovo and Metohija. It is the entirety

16 of these peculiarities that I have now addressed that constitutes the

17 reason for Kosovo and Metohija to enjoy autonomy within the Republic of

18 Serbia itself.

19 Q. Everything you are now saying about Kosovo, needless to say,

20 mutatis mutandis applies to Vojvodina, does it not, regardless of the

21 ethnic make-up of Vojvodina's population, where the Serbian people

22 constitute a majority, right?

23 A. Yes, that's right. But even there we see a number of ethnic

24 minorities. What's more, there are more ethnic minorities in Vojvodina

25 than in Kosovo and Metohija.

1 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I just wanted to have a clarification for my

2 purposes. Now, Yugoslavia had federal units and Serbia also had these

3 autonomous provinces, which according to yourself were quite independent.

4 Now, why couldn't Yugoslavia have these also as independent

5 federal units, having the same status as the rest? Why then have it

6 within Serbia? Could there be any reason for that?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The reason is that back at the time

8 when they were first established, they happened to be in the territory of

9 the Republic of Serbia. Another reason is that the Yugoslav Federation,

10 in its very nature, was an expression of the right of all of Yugoslav's

11 peoples to self-determination, the Serbs, the Croats, the Slovenes, the

12 Montenegrins, the Bosnians, the Macedonians. It wasn't possible for the

13 Serbs to exercise their right to self-determination multiply, that is in

14 Vojvodina or among the Albanians because the Albanians were not a Yugoslav

15 people. This is the reason that the Yugoslav Federation comprised only

16 the republics, or rather, only those federal units that were expressions

17 of the right of all of Yugoslavia's peoples to self-determination.

18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Microphone not activated]

19 I'm sorry.

20 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, all of these ethnicities, in fact, had

21 their own original states, don't they?

22 A. We called them nationalities at the time because the expression

23 "minority" had a number of negative connotations. It goes without saying

24 that they all had their home countries, their home states. The Albanian

25 minority, for example, had Albania, a neighbouring state at the time, a

1 neighbor state of the SFRY, and the same thing applies to the Hungarian

2 ethnic minority. Again, there was a shared border between the

3 then-Federation of the SFRY and Hungary.

4 Q. Thank you very much, Professor.

5 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Might I ask a question?

6 Professor, I'd like to know what factors would determine whether a

7 particular group within Serbia became a constituent people as opposed to a

8 minority group.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Purely ethnic factors were at work

10 and were decisive. What was required was an ethnic group that belonged to

11 the south Slavic group. These groups were joined together in a state

12 federation. At first it was called the FNRY and then later it was called

13 the SFRY, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. It was this

14 ethnic character that provided a bench-mark for the establishment of the

15 Yugoslav Federation. This is unequivocally addressed in a 1943 decision

16 adopted at the 2nd Session of the so-called AVNOJ, the Anti-Fascist League

17 of Yugoslavia's National -- the Anti-Fascist Council of Yugoslavia's

18 National Liberation. This was some sort of a provisional parliament that

19 was established during the war of liberation against fascism. The

20 decision was then taken that once the war was over Yugoslavia would be

21 established in the form of a federation comprising on an equal footings

22 all of the Yugoslav peoples, and then these groups are listed as I have

23 listed them before. These would have republics, and these republics would

24 constitute the federal units of the federation.

25 The first constitution after the country's liberation, that is,

1 after the Second World War, the constitution of the Federal National

2 Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted in 1946. In terms of both norm and

3 constitutional right, this decision was adopted at the 2nd Session of the

4 AVNOJ, A-V-N-O-J. For as long as the Yugoslav Federation existed, this

5 decision lay at the very foundation of the Federation. This is the

6 founding idea, if you like, of the Yugoslav Federation.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Professor, to go back to the blue book. You have already

11 explained to us what conclusions the working group reached, and if I

12 understand it correctly, the only way for that situation which was

13 established in 1977 over a three-year period, or rather, three years after

14 the 1974 constitution was adopted, for that situation to be brought into

15 line with the situation in the other members of the Federation, the only

16 way to do that was to amend the Constitution of Serbia. Is that correct,

17 Professor?

18 A. Yes, to amend the Constitution of Serbia, and certainly also to

19 amend the Constitution of the Federation. Because in the blue book it was

20 the representation of the autonomous provinces in the Federation bypassing

21 the Republic of Serbia that was criticised. They were represented

22 directly as if they were the subject of the Federation, whereas the 1974

23 constitution contained an express provision, stating that they did not

24 have that property, they were not federal units; and yet they were

25 represented in the Federation as if they were federal units.

1 Q. Professor, the amendments to the constitution of 1974, the federal

2 constitution, that of the SFRY, when were they adopted?

3 A. The amendments to the constitution were adopted in two waves. The

4 first time was when the principle of collective work, decision-making, and

5 responsibility was established, and the second time was in 1988. So the

6 SFRY constitution of 1974 was amended twice. The first time eight

7 amendments were adopted, and on the second occasion there were about a

8 dozen. I don't know the exact number, about a dozen amendments. There

9 were quite a few amendments to the 1974 SFRY constitution.

10 Q. The amendments to the constitution of the SFRY, which were adopted

11 in 1988, in relation to the situation described in the blue book was

12 amended, or rather, the situation was amended, it was changed?

13 A. I don't understand what you mean by this expression.

14 Q. Well, the federal constitution was amended in order for it to be

15 brought into line with the actual situation which was that these two

16 autonomous provinces could not independently --

17 A. The amendments to the constitution of the Federation did not

18 impinge on the constitutional position of the autonomous provinces within

19 the Federation. The position of the autonomous provinces within the

20 Republic of Serbia were changed in the amendments to the Constitution of

21 Serbia in 1989, and these amendments were adopted after the federal

22 constitution had been amended.

23 Q. The amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia in

24 1989 were needed, and if I'm correct that this was recognised already in

25 1977, based on the conclusions in the blue book. Is that correct?

1 A. Yes, the blue book is an official document. It was not available

2 to the public, but as for scholarly circles, scholars criticised these

3 solutions severely from the point in time the amendments of 1971 were

4 adopted to the 1963 SFRY constitution. And throughout the period in which

5 the 1974 constitution was in force, scholars criticised sharply the

6 position of the autonomous provinces in the constitutional system. A

7 number of periodicals issued by the Faculty of Law in Belgrade in 1971

8 were banned because they contained criticism of the 1971 amendments, and

9 these amendments laid down the main ideas on which the constitution of

10 1974 was based.

11 Q. Professor, the amendments to the constitution of Serbia of 1989

12 referred in the same way, in an identical way, to the position of both

13 autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, in the same way. Isn't that

14 correct?

15 A. Yes, because the position of the autonomous provinces had to be

16 dealt with in a uniform manner. They don't have different statuses. They

17 have exactly the same status, both within Serbia and within the

18 Federation.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, before the Constitution of the Republic

20 of Serbia was amended, what changes had to be made to the Constitution of

21 the SFRY?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The changes introduced in 1978 had

23 to do primarily with the economic system, liberalizing the property

24 regime, and they did not impinge on the status of the autonomous provinces

25 within the Federation.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: What I'm interested in was what was -- what changes

2 had to be made to the SFRY constitution before the Constitution of the

3 Republic of Serbia could alter the state -- or could be amended to alter

4 the status of the autonomous provinces?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The Constitution of the Republic of

6 Serbia was changed to alter not just the status, but to redistribute the

7 powers, the competences between the autonomous province and the republic.

8 It did not go into the subject matter of the federal constitution, and the

9 Serbian constitution could do that because it fell within the domain of

10 the constitutional power of the Republic of Serbia. So even after the

11 amendments of 1989, the autonomous provinces had exactly the same status

12 within the Federation. There had only been a redistribution of powers

13 between the provinces and the Republic of Serbia, and the most attention

14 was paid and the greatest amount of criticism was levelled at the

15 amendment which --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: That's a separate matter. Mr. Zecevic started this

17 passage of his examination by putting it to you that what had to happen

18 was that the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia had to be amended, and

19 you corrected him and said that it was the SFRY constitution and the

20 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia that had to be amended. I now

21 understand you to be saying that anything that was done to affect the

22 status of the autonomous provinces was exclusively in this instance within

23 the competence of the Republic of Serbia, which is how he put it

24 initially. Now, have I got that right?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, the Constitution of

1 Serbia cannot regulate the status of the autonomous provinces in the

2 Federation, because that is regulated by the federal constitution. The

3 Constitution of Serbia on the other hand --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: If you just stop there. Prior to 1989 were any

5 amendments made in the Constitution of the Federation that affected the

6 status of the autonomous provinces?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 Mr. Zecevic.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Professor --

12 A. However, in these tabs somewhere you have the conclusions of the

13 Federal Assembly of 1989 commenting on these amendments to the

14 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. So the federal organ, the Federal

15 Assembly, commented on the constitutional changes in Serbia.

16 Q. Professor, I'm just coming to that, so let's go step by step,

17 please.

18 Professor, adopting the amendments to the Constitution of Serbia

19 was first done in both provinces and then in the Assembly of the Republic

20 of Serbia; is that right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Could you now please look at tab 73, 1D751. These are the

23 conclusions of the Federal Assembly of the SFRY of the 3rd of March, 1989,

24 and, Professor, I have to explain, as we don't have a translation into

25 English yet, it hasn't arrived yet, I just have to explain what this is

1 about.

2 A. Let me correct you. The conclusions were made on the 1st of

3 March, and they were published in the Official Gazette on the 3rd of

4 March.

5 Q. Thank you. These conclusions were reached after the Presidency of

6 the SFRY by its decision introduced special measures on the territory of

7 the autonomous province of Kosovo because of the unrest in that province

8 in the course of February 1989. First let me ask you, according to the

9 Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the

10 Presidency was authorised to introduce special measures on the territory

11 of the SFRY. Is that correct?

12 A. Yes, yes. That was its constitutional power.

13 Q. These conclusions of the Assembly of the Socialist Federative

14 Republic of Yugoslavia of the 1st of March, as you indicated, refer

15 precisely to these special measures introduced by a decision of the

16 Presidency. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. In the preamble of this document, it says the following: "For the

19 purpose of protecting the constitutional order, public law and order,

20 personal security and the security of property, and the security and

21 safety of all citizens and socially owned property, and the fastest

22 possible normalising of the deteriorating situation in the socialist

23 autonomous province of Kosovo, the Assembly of the SFRY, pursuant to

24 Article 153, the rules of procedure," and I won't read the rest, "of the

25 1st of March, 1989, hereby adopts the following conclusion.

1 "1. The Assembly of the SFRY supports the special measures,

2 which the Presidency of the SFRY, within the scope of its constitutional

3 competencies has taken, in order to preserve and protect the territorial

4 integrity and constitutional order of the SFRY, to secure public law and

5 order, the freedom to work and live, and to normalise the overall

6 situation in the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo."

7 JUDGE BONOMY: What is your question?

8 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm just wondering, Your Honours, should I read all

9 three paragraphs and then pose the questions or should I maybe ask

10 Professor to comment on the paragraphs? It's just -- I'm just doing --

11 I'm reading this because of the -- we don't have a translation. That's --

12 that is the only reason.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: These don't speak for themselves, they require

14 comment, do they?

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Well, some of them do, yes.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Well, if you can identify the parts

17 that require comment and ask him about them, that would be helpful.

18 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Professor, since we will eventually receive the translation and

20 the Judges will be able to read the conclusions under 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, I

21 would like for you to comment the conclusion under item 10 of this

22 document. 1 and 10, I apologise. So the one I have just read out and

23 conclusion under item 10.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Professor, read conclusion 10, first of all,

25 to us and then give us your comments on both number 1 and number 10.

1 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Maybe I should read, Your Honour, so

2 it's --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: It doesn't matter, but somebody should read 10 so

4 that we know what it says, and then the Professor can comment on both of

5 them.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 [Interpretation] Conclusion under item 10: "The Assembly of the

8 SFRY points out that the amendments to the SFRY constitution that have

9 been carried out were aimed at enabling the implementation of the reforms

10 of the economic and political system and that these amendments made no

11 changes to the basic principles of the 1974 SFRY constitution.

12 The Assembly of the SFRY believes that the adopted amendments to

13 the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the amendments

14 adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, that these

15 amendments provide the necessary unity and common spirit of all socialist

16 self-management forces in Serbia which are in accordance with the

17 positions taken at the 13th Congress of the League of Communists of

18 Yugoslavia. These amendments are important not only for the Socialist

19 Republic of Serbia and socialist autonomous provinces, but also for

20 ensuring the constitutional concept of the Yugoslav Federation and

21 stability of the entire country and do not affect the status of the

22 socialist autonomous provinces established by the Constitution of the

23 SFRY. In order to ensure the necessary unity and common spirit or

24 fellowship in the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the procedure of amending

25 the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia needs to be concluded

1 as soon as possible." End of item 10.

2 Q. Professor, would you please give us a brief comment of item 1 and

3 item 10 of the conclusions of the 1st of March, 1989.

4 A. In item 1, the Assembly of the SFRY supports the special measures

5 introduced by the Presidency of the SFRY, and they say that the Presidency

6 has introduced those measures within its constitutional powers. This

7 conclusion is especially important when one has in mind the nature of the

8 then-existing constitutional system. At the time Yugoslavia was a

9 socialist country. The principle of division of power was not in force

10 there; rather, the unity of power was the principle applied, whereas the

11 Assembly is defined in the constitution as the highest organ of power in

12 accordance with the principle of the unity of power which existed in the

13 then-Soviet Union and other socialist countries. So there is no division

14 of power there, but rather unity of power. So the Assembly is defined as

15 the highest organ of power and self-management.

16 The importance of this support lies in the fact that it stems from

17 the SFRY Assembly, that is to say the highest organ of power. This is

18 what I have to say in relation to item 1.

19 As for item 10, it presents the position of the SFRY Assembly.

20 Once again, in its capacity as the highest organ of power. In its

21 position in relation to the amendments to the SFRY constitution and the

22 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, it says there that the amendments

23 of the SFRY constitution, according to the conclusions taken by the

24 Assembly, enable the implementation of the reforms of the economic and

25 political system and that these reforms, even though fundamental, do not

1 affect the basic principles of the 1974 constitution.

2 And then, speaking of the amendments to the Serbian constitution,

3 and they refer to the amendments to the constitution that we mentioned

4 just a bit earlier, the 1989 amendments, they were passed by the Assembly

5 of the SFRY, and the Assemblies of two autonomous provinces

6 [as interpreted] had to express their agreement with them. If we put

7 aside the ideological element, namely, that they were in line or in

8 accordance with the positions taken at the 13th Congress of the League of

9 Communists of Yugoslavia, what is important from a legal point of view is

10 that the Assembly says that these amendments do not affect the status of

11 the socialist autonomous provinces established by the federal

12 constitution.

13 This means that the SFRY Assembly, as the highest organ of power,

14 believes that the amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic

15 of Serbia of 1989 do not affect, do not change, in any way the position of

16 the socialist autonomous provinces established by the constitution. This

17 is why the SFRY Assembly refers, or rather, urges that the procedure for

18 amending the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia be concluded

19 as soon as possible.

20 What remained to be done is that these -- that the Assemblies of

21 two autonomous provinces expressed their approval of the amendments to the

22 Serbian constitution, because that was the procedure for amending the

23 Serbian constitution as established in its constitution of 1974.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

25 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: In the transcript, line 11 of that page, I think it

2 should be the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.

3 MR. ZECEVIC: I would say Serbia, but we can ask Professor to

4 comment.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, when speaking of the amendments to the

6 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, and you said that they referred to

7 the amendments to the constitution that we mentioned just a bit earlier --

8 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, it is as it should be because they

9 referred to the -- yeah, it should be 1988 amendments --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Well you can't have it all ways, Mr. Zecevic, and

11 it does need to be clarified. The way it reads at the moment is

12 inaccurate.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one moment, Your Honour.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you said: And then when speaking of

15 the amendments to the Serbian constitution referring to the amendments to

16 the constitution that we have explained just a bit earlier, that is to say

17 1989 amendments, they were adopted by the Assembly of the SFRY?

18 A. No. They were adopted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic

19 of Serbia.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. I'm sorry for the

22 confusion.

23 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, when you gave your comment on item ten

24 of the conclusions, could one based on that conclude that in 1989 the

25 amendments to the Constitution of Serbia did not infringe upon the

1 autonomous rights of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Metohija?

2 A. Absolutely, that's correct. That's a very clear conclusion that

3 the Assembly of the SFRY reached. They state that these amendments do not

4 affect, do not change, the position of the socialist autonomous provinces

5 established by the SFRY constitution.

6 Q. Thank you, Professor. That means that neither Kosovo nor

7 Vojvodina were stripped of autonomy, but rather that a redistribution of

8 competencies was done between the organs of autonomous provinces and the

9 Republic of Serbia, correct?

10 A. Yes. And those fell within the jurisdiction of the Republic of

11 Serbia which had an equal status with other federal units within the

12 Federation.

13 Q. Thank you for this explanation, Professor. Could you now look at

14 tab 5, please, P855, which is the Constitution of Serbia of 1990.

15 A. I have found it.

16 Q. Would you please comment Article 47 of the Constitution of Serbia;

17 it deals with citizenship.

18 A. Yes, Article 47 deals with citizenship of the Republic of Serbia.

19 "A citizen of the Republic of Serbia shall have citizenship of

20 the Republic of Serbia. A citizen of the Republic of Serbia may not be

21 deprived of his citizenship, exiled, or extradited."

22 This means that there is a legal relationship between an

23 individual and the state embodied in the citizenship, which grants

24 protection to citizens. Then it follows on to say that: "Citizenship

25 shall be acquired and terminated in the manner established by law," which

1 means that it is not the constitution that regulates how a citizenship can

2 be acquired and terminated. The constitution simply defines what

3 citizenship is and what is the scope of protection granted to a citizen of

4 Serbia.

5 Q. Thank you, Professor. Could we now look at tab 6, please, which

6 is P856, the translation is 1D139. This is the Constitution of the

7 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 17, please.

8 Were you able to find this?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. The Constitution of FRY, Article 17. We saw earlier how the

11 citizenship of the republic is regulated, but there was also the

12 citizenship of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, correct?

13 A. Yes. There is a dual citizenship that normally exists in a

14 federation, that of the federation and of the federal unit. Based on the

15 citizenship of the federal unit, each citizen is normally a citizen of a

16 federation as well.

17 Q. What about paragraph 2?

18 A. Paragraph 2 of Article 17 specifies precisely what I just said.

19 Paragraph 3 indicates the scope of protection that of Yugoslav -- that a

20 Yugoslav citizen enjoys, and we can see that that scope of protection is

21 identical to the one that a citizen of Serbia enjoys. That is to say that

22 a citizen of Yugoslavia cannot be deprived of his citizenship, deported

23 from the country. In Serbia we had the word "exiled," and then a Yugoslav

24 citizen cannot be extradited either. That's also contained in the Serbian

25 constitution.

1 Q. Thank you, Professor. Paragraph says that: "Yugoslav citizenship

2 shall be regulated by federal law." Is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Can you now please go to tab 71, 1D226, this is the Law on

5 Yugoslav citizenship, tab 71. Have you got that, Professor?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. This is the Law on Yugoslav Citizenship. We saw the paragraph of

8 the constitution referring to this federal law. Article 1 says: "Yugoslav

9 citizenship may be acquired in the following ways," and then it lists the

10 conditions enshrined in this law?

11 A. Yes, that is very much the same thing that the constitution

12 suggests, how citizenship is acquired and how citizenship may cease and

13 that is regulated by the law.

14 Q. In Article 3 the possibilities are listed how citizenship may

15 cease. Can you comment on that, please?

16 A. There are three textbook situations, if you like, one is release

17 from citizenship, there is also the possibility of renunciation, and the

18 third possibility is by international treaties. The important thing is

19 that citizenship may cease or be revoked only if a person is already a

20 citizen of another country, a foreign country, or at least if there is

21 proof or certain indication that this person will acquire foreign

22 citizenship. A person cannot be left without a home country and without

23 citizenship just because his Yugoslav citizenship ceases.

24 Q. Professor, I want to know about something else. Both release and

25 renunciation imply that the person in question must make an explicit

1 request or statement in order to renounce from Yugoslav citizenship or be

2 released from it. Is that not right?

3 A. Yes, that follows from Article 19 and Article 24 of this law.

4 Citizenship cannot cease, cannot be revoked, without explicit request and

5 without a Yugoslav citizen making this explicit request, submitting this

6 explicit request, to be stripped of citizenship.

7 Q. The third manner in which this may come about -- well, I don't

8 think there is any need to comment on this now. This is by international

9 treaty, right?

10 A. Yes, ratified and confirmed.

11 Q. Professor, bearing in mind what you have now told us, the fact

12 that cessation of citizenship by renunciation or by release must be

13 explicitly, unequivocally requested by the person in question. Well,

14 there is one exception to this rule, paragraph 34 of this law -- Article

15 34. If you would please be so kind as to comment on that, sir.

16 A. It reads: "Release from or renunciation of Yugoslav citizenship

17 shall not be granted during a state of war within that is, a request -- no

18 request shall be granted during a state of war or the imminent threat of

19 war or a state of emergency."

20 So while irregular circumstances prevail within Yugoslavia -- for

21 as long as irregular circumstances prevail, Yugoslav citizenship shall

22 continue in both these cases. We're talking about release and

23 renunciation, and we have realised by now that these are the two basic

24 modes for Yugoslav citizenship to cease.

25 Q. The only third way seems to be by international treaty, right, so

1 there are a total of three ways, aren't there?

2 A. International treaties are not something that this law is supposed

3 to deal with. International treaties are international treaties.

4 Q. Professor, if I understand you correctly, as far as Article 34 is

5 concerned, even if there is an explicit request to renounce on Yugoslav

6 citizenship, a person shall not be -- no person shall be granted this

7 request during any of these three irregular situations, so to speak. Is

8 that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Very well. Professor, information concerning Yugoslav citizenship

11 is kept in citizens' registers, right?

12 A. Yes. These books are public, and they are considered to be public

13 documents.

14 Q. So let's imagine the following situation. A Yugoslav citizen

15 leaves Yugoslav territory, loses their ID papers, their passport, for

16 example, or their passport is seized, let's try to assume that for a

17 second, they do not lose their Yugoslav citizenship just because something

18 like that happens, right?

19 A. No, they do not lose their citizenship. The same applies to an

20 ordinary citizen, a man in the street, who simply loses his ID. He simply

21 gets a new one issued. That's all there is to it. Passports are lost

22 sometimes. Passports are lost all over the world on a daily basis. That

23 doesn't mean that people cease to be citizens of their country.

24 Citizenship can only cease on the conditions established in the relevant

25 law. There are three such situations, as we have seen: Renunciation,

1 release, and international treaty.

2 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Let's now move on to something

3 else, please. Could you please go to tab 9. This is the Constitution of

4 the SFRY, it's the 1974 constitution.

5 A. Fine.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: Just bear with me, Your Honour.

7 [Defence counsel confer]

8 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] This is P1623.

9 Q. One of the values enshrined in the constitution or that the

10 constitution was based on was the idea of associated labour and the right

11 of workers to self-management. Wasn't that crucial, sir?

12 A. Yes, this was one of the essential, crucial, features of the 1974

13 constitution. Its very name betrayed the social system that it stood for,

14 I'm referring to the socialist. The country was called the Socialist

15 Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. One of the essential features, one of

16 the milestones, of this system, this organisation, was precisely the

17 subject of your question.

18 Q. Thank you very much. Professor, if you could please briefly

19 comment on Article 46 of the 1974 constitution. Just a minute, please.

20 Let us try to depict this against a wider backdrop. The concept of

21 property in the then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia placed

22 socially owned property first, right?

23 A. Yes, that was the prevalent form of ownership, some sort of social

24 monopoly, if you like.

25 Q. All right. So through the work of its various bodies, the state

1 protected socially owned property, right?

2 A. Yes. Socially owned property and the right of workers to

3 self-management were essential features of the economy of the

4 then-Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

5 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Can you please now briefly

6 comment on Article 46.

7 A. This article is part of a chapter of the constitution discussing

8 the country's economy, economic set-up, its social and economic structure,

9 if you like. What is at stake here is the preservation of these two

10 fundamental values of the country's social and economic set-up. Article

11 46 is part of this chapter, and it must be interpreted in this context,

12 against this background of specific articles and institutes. There is a

13 mechanism that is described here that is used for the protection of the

14 right of workers to self-management as well as the protection of socially

15 owned property.

16 Q. Can you now please comment on 129 and 139, Articles 129 and 139.

17 These address the protection of socially owned property and the right of

18 workers to self-management. This is, you might say, an elaboration of

19 Article 46 of the constitution, right?

20 A. Yes, that's right. The basic principle of all these institutes is

21 Article 129, paragraph 1 of Article 129 which reads: "The self-management

22 rights of the working people and social property shall enjoy special

23 social protection."

24 Article 130, if you like, operationalises this form of social

25 protection.

1 "Organisations of self-management were the basic form of

2 organisation in this sort of society. If in an organisation of associated

3 labour another self-managing organisation or community self-management

4 relations have become essentially disrupted or if serious harm has been

5 caused to social interests or if an organisation community does not fulfil

6 its statutorily established obligations, the assembly of the community

7 socio-political shall have the right, and this is the Municipal Assembly

8 under the rules, under condition and by procedures specified by Statute to

9 dissolve the Workers' Council, which is the organ of self-management in

10 this case, and call for new elections for the members of this body to

11 dissolve in this organisation of associated labour self-managing

12 organisation or community its executive bodies, and to recall the business

13 boards, the individual business executive and workers holding executive

14 posts nominate provisional bodies having statutorily defined rights and

15 duties" --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- "or temporarily to" --

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, we can all read this when we've got

19 other time to do it. It's your expert views that we're really seeking and

20 just to clarify one thing, you're commenting on Articles 129 and 130 and

21 not as said on line 22 and page 31 twice, Articles 129 and 139. Is that

22 correct?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 130.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

25 Now, have you a question on this, Mr. Zecevic, that you would care

1 to --

2 MR. ZECEVIC: Just one question, Your Honour.

3 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, based on this law there was particular

4 state organ, the ombudsmen for self-management who would initiate

5 proceedings in cases such as the ones we have just been reading about when

6 they occur in a body of associated labour, and this is what Article 131

7 talks about, right?

8 A. Yes, this is about the rights of self-managing workers and about

9 socially owned property. This entire mechanism was established in order

10 to be able to implement a principle from Article 10, which says that the

11 entire economic system of Yugoslavia as a whole must be based on free

12 associated labour and socially owned means of production and on

13 self-management by the working people. So these are the two fundamental

14 components expressing the very essence of how Yugoslavia was organised

15 along economic lines: Socially owned property and self-management. 129,

16 130, and 131, these articles establish the basic mechanism for protecting

17 these two fundamental values inherent to how the country was organised in

18 a purely economic sense.

19 Q. Just very briefly, please, we only have five minutes left, tab 74.

20 P1848, this is the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, the

21 relevant articles are 143 and 144.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what's the question?

23 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, Your Honour, just to confirm that this is a

24 completely the same as the --

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, well that's not clear from what you've -- I

1 assume that was the question --

2 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, but, Your Honour, this is a -- we need to

3 establish because there is a federal level then the republican level, and

4 then the level of --

5 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not the fact that you're going to another

6 constitution I'm concerned about; it's focusing questions on it. It

7 appeared as though you were simply inviting the Professor to read out

8 Articles 143 and 144.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: No, no, no, I was not at all.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: No.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: I was just laying down the foundation.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Professor, 142, 143, and 144, Constitution of the Socialist

15 Republic of Serbia. The title also contains the protection, self-managing

16 protection of socially owned property. This is something that was taken

17 from the federal constitution. There is no need to comment, really,

18 because the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia had to be

19 consistent with the Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of

20 Yugoslavia, right?

21 A. Yes, these solutions were simply taken over from the federal

22 constitution, the solutions from the federal constitution were used.

23 Q. In order for these constitutional solutions to be implemented,

24 there had to be laws envisaging ways to protect socially owned property

25 and the modi and modalities of operationalised protection of socially

1 owned property and the rights of workers to self-management. Is that

2 right?

3 A. Yes, that's precisely what these laws were called.

4 Q. Can we please look at the oldest, or rather, the earliest of these

5 laws? I'm talking about tab 75, 1D130. This is the law on temporary

6 measures for the social protection of self-management rights and socially

7 owned property. It was passed by the Assembly of the socialist autonomous

8 province of Kosovo on the 27th December 1977. It was published in the

9 Official Gazette of the socialist autonomous province of Kosovo on the

10 28th of December, 1977. The relevant articles are 1, 3, 8, and 25.

11 However, Professor, all I am looking to elicit from you now is a very

12 general comment. This law operationalises the constitutional protection

13 of socially owned property and self-management rights of workers in the

14 area of the autonomous province of Kosovo in 1977. Is that right?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you very much.

17 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, it would be a time -- it would be

18 appropriate to have a break now.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: We've reached the time for the break again,

20 Professor, so could you please accompany the usher from the court, and he

21 will again show you where to wait; and we shall resume at 11.15.

22 [The witness stands down]

23 --- Recess taken at 10.44 a.m.

24 --- On resuming at 11.16 a.m.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

1 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, we have looked at tab 75, 1D130. Now

3 please turn to tab 76, that's 1D455. This is the law on amendments to the

4 law on temporary measures to the social protection of the self-management

5 rights and social ownership. The law was adopted by the Assembly of the

6 socialist autonomous province of Kosovo at its session of the 30th of

7 December, 1986, and it was promulgated in the Official Gazette, or rather,

8 it was published in the Official Gazette of the socialist autonomous

9 province of Kosovo, number 52 of the 31st of December, 1986. The articles

10 we will be referring to are 1, 4, 7, 12, 14, and 20. I do not wish to go

11 into the content of these articles. This law amends some provisions from

12 the previous law we have looked at and mostly adds to them. This law was

13 also adopted in order to make operational the protection of the

14 constitutional values of socially owned property and the self-management

15 rights of workers in the territory of Kosovo. Is that correct, Professor?

16 A. Yes, because Kosovo as an autonomous province had its independent

17 legislative power and, just like the republic, it was duty-bound to

18 further develop the institutes contained in the federal constitution.

19 This was therefore done, both in the law and the amendments, these

20 amendments we now see to the law.

21 Q. Professor, both these laws, as we see from the Official Gazettes,

22 were enacted by the Assembly of the socialist autonomous province of

23 Kosovo. Is that correct?

24 A. Yes, because that was the only organ of the province that had

25 legislative power.

1 Q. And both these pieces of legislation were enacted before the

2 amendments to the Constitution of Serbia of 1989. Is that correct?

3 A. Yes, one can see that when one looks at the time-line, the

4 chronology. This law was adopted in 1986 and the amendments were adopted

5 in 1989.

6 Q. But the previous law we were talking about?

7 A. Well, that was enacted as early as 1977, but you're asking me now

8 about the law on amendments. The law on temporary measures for social

9 protection of self-management rights and socially owned property was

10 enacted in 1977, whereas the law on the amendments to that law were

11 enacted in 1986 and in 1989 the Constitution of Serbia was amended.

12 Q. So we may conclude that these two laws, the law of 1977 and the

13 one of 1986, were enacted in accordance with the then-valid procedure

14 which was in force at the time in compliance with the Constitution of the

15 socialist autonomous province of Kosovo, with a view to implementing the

16 provisions of the federal constitution. Is that correct?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Thank you, Professor. Could you now look at tab 78, 1D -- excuse

19 me, please. I do apologise. Tab 76, we should take them in the proper

20 order, 76 -- oh, sorry, we've seen that one. 78 then, 1D133. This is the

21 same law, or rather, it's a law on provisional measures for the social

22 protection of self-management rights and socially owned property of the

23 socialist autonomous province of Vojvodina. It was enacted on the 21st of

24 March, 1990, and published in the Official Gazette of the socialist

25 autonomous province of Vojvodina, number 9, of the 31st of March, 1990.

1 We will be referring to Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, that's it, 2, 5, 6, 7, and

2 8.

3 So I assume this is an identical case. A piece of legislation is

4 being enacted in the Assembly of the province on the protection of

5 institutions and values from the constitutional text, the constitution of

6 federal state. Is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And finally tab 77, 1D458. This is the law on temporary measures

9 for social protection of self-management rights and social ownership of

10 the Republic of Serbia. And it was enacted by the Assembly of the

11 Socialist Republic of Serbia and published in the Official Gazette of the

12 Socialist Republic of Serbia, number 49, of the 28th of October, 1989.

13 And we will be referring to Articles 1, 2, 8, 9, 11.

14 This law was enacted by the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of

15 Serbia now, with a view to implementing the provisions of the Constitution

16 of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia of 1974. Is that

17 correct, Professor?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Professor, in all these laws, including the constitutional basis,

20 the state by means of its organs is protecting social ownership and the

21 self-management rights of workers. Is that correct?

22 A. Yes. And we have explained the reasons, because these were the

23 foundations of the economic order of the whole country.

24 Q. The organ initiating these measures was the social attorney of

25 self-management, and this organ existed at the republican level and

1 likewise at the level of the socialist autonomous provinces?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Professor, in these laws we have seen the measures taken, the

4 measures that you spoke about from the constitutional text implied

5 dismissing the executive organs of companies, of management organs, the

6 bringing of new persons, fresh persons to these positions, and so on?

7 A. Yes. These measures limited self-management because

8 self-management had been violated, or rather, abused, as had socially

9 owned property.

10 Q. All these measures that were enacted, according to the text of the

11 legislation had as their aim protecting the self-management rights of

12 workers and socially owned property which was in the care of the state.

13 Is that correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. The purpose was not to discriminate or to be used as tools of

16 discrimination of anybody; is that correct?

17 A. The only motive for taking these measures, as follows from the

18 constitution and the legislation, is the protection of socially owned

19 property and the self-management rights of workers using means of

20 production which are socially owned.

21 Q. Thank you, Professor. Let's go back to the Constitution of the

22 Republic of Serbia of the 28th of September, 1990, that's tab number 5,

23 P855. At the very start of our conversation I think the day before

24 yesterday, or Monday in any case, we spoke about the significance of the

25 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of the 28th of September, 1990,

1 which signified a break with the postulates of the previous constitution

2 and the foundations of the then-social and economic system. Is that

3 correct, Professor?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. If that constitution of Serbia abolishes self-management, courts

6 of associated labour, the leading role of the League of Communists, and

7 introduces, or rather, puts all forms of ownership on an equal footing,

8 guarantees private ownership, introduces a market economy, introduces a

9 multi-party parliamentary democracy, a free market, the independence of

10 the judiciary, and civil freedoms. I think I've listed everything more or

11 less?

12 A. Yes, that constitution signified a radical break with the previous

13 social and state order, and this was also expressed in the name of the

14 Republic of Serbia. The ideological description of "socialist" was

15 dropped and the state was simply called the "Republic of Serbia."

16 Q. Thank you, Professor. Due to this change at the very beginning of

17 our conversation on Monday, we mentioned that certain regulations ceased

18 to be in force. Among the regulations which ceased to be in force are the

19 ones we have just been talking about, those on the protection of social

20 ownership and the self-management rights of workers. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes, for the simple reason that these were no longer categories in

22 the constitution in force.

23 Q. Also the organ of attorney of self-management stopped -- ceased to

24 exist. Is that correct?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. To illustrate this, please look at tab 79, 1D136. This is the law

2 on the cessation of validity of the law on taking temporary measures for

3 the social protection of self-management rights. Provisional measures for

4 the social protection or self-management rights and socially owned

5 property. And it lists, or rather, it states that on the 31st of December

6 these measures and these regulations will no longer be valid, and this

7 includes those of the socialist autonomous provinces of Kosovo and

8 Vojvodina.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: I just need to add something to the transcript, page

10 41, 11, it's 31st of December, 1991, that is the date I was referring to.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

12 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 Q. [Interpretation] So these laws we have been discussing were in

14 force in Kosovo - I'm referring to the laws on the protection of socially

15 owned property and the self-management rights of workers - they were in

16 force from 1977 and then in 1986 they were amended. And as of the 31st of

17 December, 1991, they -- their legal force was terminated?

18 A. Yes, that follows from Article 1.2, referring to Kosovo and

19 Metohija.

20 Q. Thank you. And the same case obtained -- the same thing obtained

21 in the case of the regulations of the socialist autonomous province of

22 Vojvodina in paragraph 3 and also similar legislation in the Republic of

23 Serbia under point 1?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. In Article 2 it says that the provisional measures that had been

1 taken pursuant to these laws shall be in force no longer than the 31st of

2 December, 1991, correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Unless the Assembly revoked them earlier?

5 A. Correct.

6 Q. The same goes for the provisional measures in relation to

7 organisations and communities in the territory where special circumstances

8 emerged. They were to cease to exist on the 31st of December, 1991, as

9 well, correct?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. So the territory where special circumstances arose was the

12 territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo, correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So all of these measures that we have just mentioned and that were

15 discussed by a number of witnesses here ceased to be applicable as of the

16 31st of December, 1991, correct?

17 A. Yes, that stems from Article 3 of this law.

18 Q. Could we now please look at tab 80 --

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Before you do that.

20 Professor, can we take it also that this is an illustration of one

21 of the impacts of the amendment of the constitution of the Republic of

22 Serbia, so that the body now dealing with these measures in all three

23 areas of the republic is the republic that's -- is the Serbian republic

24 itself, and there's no longer jurisdiction in the provincial Assemblies to

25 deal with these matters?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This means that social property

2 no longer enjoys special social protection - that was the reason why the

3 special form of protection was established - but rather, that all types of

4 ownership were put on an equal footing. The other element was that

5 self-management was no longer a category of the 1990 constitution. So

6 these two features of the economic order pursuant to the previous

7 constitution ceased to exist in the 1990 constitution because that

8 constitution introduced economic reforms, free markets, free

9 entrepreneurship, and so on and these old features were no longer

10 contained in the new constitution and they ceased to exist both in Serbia

11 and in autonomous provinces.

12 MR. ZECEVIC: If I may be of assistance Your Honour, because it is

13 obvious that ...

14 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm sorry I didn't hear that.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: I said if I may be of assistance, Your Honour,

16 because it is obvious that Professor didn't understand your question.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah, I understood that throughout the earlier part

18 of this evidence the various laws you referred to were implementing the

19 federal constitution, and now we have a situation where the provinces do

20 not appear to be able to control this aspect of the law, it's a matter for

21 the Republic of Serbia Assembly and not for their Assemblies.

22 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I did that just to save the time

23 because if you remember I was referring to the federal constitution and

24 then immediately after that to the Serbian constitution which had the very

25 same provisions, Articles 142 --

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

2 MR. ZECEVIC: -- 3 and 4.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

4 MR. ZECEVIC: And we didn't went into that. So when they were

5 implementing the federal -- the provisions of the federal constitution,

6 they were automatically implementing the provisions of the Serbian

7 constitution as well.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but --

9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: -- the body which had jurisdiction for the province

11 of Kosovo to make this law, to implement the constitution, was the Kosovo

12 Assembly.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, the --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Now we're seeing that it's the Republic of Serbia

15 Assembly which is recalling these orders so that must be because the

16 constitutional amendment in 1990 removed from the Assembly of Kosovo the

17 power to do this and put that power in the hands of the Assembly of the

18 Republic of Serbia. And I was seeking clarification of that. Now, the

19 witness --

20 MR. ZECEVIC: I understood --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: The witness says that's not the case and perhaps

22 he can explain it further.

23 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Professor, would you please explain this. Have you understood the

25 question?

1 A. Yes, I did understand it this time around. Pursuant to the 1990

2 constitution, the provinces no longer had legislative power. They were

3 able to issue decisions. Their Assemblies were able to issue decisions

4 but no longer legislation, just like they no longer had power to adopt

5 constitutions, they also no longer could adopt statutes as the highest

6 legislative enactments.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Does this satisfy it, Your Honour?

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 Mr. Zecevic.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Professor, tab 80, please, which is 1D137, and this is the Law on

12 the Termination of Work of the Social Attorney for Self-Management, we're

13 interested in Articles 1 and 5. This law terminates the organ that was

14 meant to initiate procedures to protect social ownership and

15 self-management rights of the workers, correct?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And in this particular case in Article 5, it says that this law

18 will apply to the laws of Vojvodina and Kosovo, correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Thank you. And now the last item, tab 81, Professor, which is

21 1D138. This is the law amending, the law invalidating, the law on

22 temporary measures for the social protection of self-management rights and

23 social ownership or socially owned property. This law simply extends the

24 deadline by which these laws were supposed to cease to be applied, so

25 instead of the 31st of December, 1991, these laws that we have mentioned

1 earlier were meant to cease to be applied by the 31st of December, 1992,

2 correct, Professor?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. So definitely after the 31st of December, 1992, there no longer

5 was a possibility to introduce temporary measures in order to protect

6 social ownership and self-management rights of the workers in the entire

7 territory of Serbia, including autonomous provinces of Kosovo and

8 Vojvodina, correct?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Thank you, Professor.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, this has brought us to the end of the

12 expert testimony of Professor Markovic. There is just one issue which

13 Your Honour raised concerning the ministries -- concerning the ministries

14 established in Serbia in 1991, this is at tab 17, 1D456. If I -- if I

15 correctly remember, Your Honour was posing a question about why if,

16 according to Professor, these were just so-called reserve authorities or

17 reserve authorities of Republic of Serbia, why were the ministries, in

18 fact, established in 1991 but ceased to exist by amendments of the Law on

19 Ministries in 1993 after the constitution of the Federal Republic of

20 Yugoslavia was brought up. Now --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That related to the Ministry of Defence, the

22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry for International and

23 economic development.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, exactly. Three ministries which are within the

25 competences of the federal state.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

2 MR. ZECEVIC: Now, I have done a research and maybe I can jog the

3 memory of the Professor, if it pleases the Court, by just stating certain

4 facts which might jog the memory of the Professor, and then he can give

5 the explanation.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour.

8 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, do you remember the question put by

9 His Honour Bonomy concerning the Laws on Ministries of the Republic of

10 Serbia of the 5th of February, 1991, and later amendment to this law when

11 these three ministries ceased to exist in 1993. Do you remember that?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Professor, the Trial Chamber put a question inquiring why these

14 ministries were established in Serbia if such ministries already existed

15 at the level of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a federal

16 state. I would like to ask you now, do you remember when the Republic of

17 Slovenia held its plebiscite and declared its independence and sovereignty

18 as a republic, do you remember that?

19 A. Certainly, I remember that. At the time I was a judge of the

20 Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, and what they did was assessed in

21 terms of its constitutionality by the Constitutional Court.

22 Q. Do you remember the date?

23 A. You're asking too much, in view of my age. I can't remember the

24 exact date, but I remember the event. As I said, I was a member on the

25 Constitutional Court, and I know that we reviewed the constitutionality of

1 this. As for the date, it's a difficult question.

2 Q. Professor, 23rd of December, 1990, does this ring a bell? Could

3 this possibly be the date?

4 A. There was a whole series of enactments adopted by the Republic of

5 Slovenia, and they were followed by enactments of Croatia. And they

6 represented gradual secession from the Yugoslav Federation. All of those

7 enactments were assessed for their constitutionality by the Constitutional

8 Court of Yugoslavia.

9 Q. Thank you, Professor. Do you remember that also in December of

10 1990 Croatia -- the Republic of Croatia adopted its constitution?

11 A. Yes, just as the Republic of Slovenia did in September of 1989,

12 they adopted amendments to their constitution, and in it they established

13 the priority of their constitution and laws in relation to those of the

14 Federation. They said that in the territory of Slovenia the federal

15 constitution and federal laws could be applied only if they were not

16 contrary to the Constitution of Slovenia and laws of Slovenia. So they

17 turned the principle upside down, the basic legal principle that is

18 enshrined in every federation, which is the principle of the primacy of

19 the federal law over the law of a federal unit. Slovenia did something

20 that was quite contrary to that. They established the primacy of their

21 law in relation to the law of the Federation.

22 Q. Professor, at any rate these Slovenian constitutional amendments

23 from 1989 were contrary to the solutions adopted in the SFRY constitution,

24 correct?

25 A. Yes, certainly, and that was established in the decision of the

1 Constitutional Court.

2 Q. Professor --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry --

4 MR. ZECEVIC: Sorry.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: It wasn't clear in all of that what was the date of

6 the adoption of the Slovenian constitution.

7 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Professor, amendments to the Slovenian constitution that you just

9 mentioned, which were in contravention of the federal constitution because

10 they gave primacy to the Constitution of Slovenia over the federal

11 constitution were from 1989?

12 A. Yes, September of 1989. All of the republics, including the

13 Republic of Serbia adopted amendments to their constitutions in 1989

14 because the Federation had amended its constitution in 1988 by way of

15 amendments. So these amendments to the republican constitutions was a

16 consequence of the fact that the federal constitution had been amended.

17 And the republican constitutions had to be brought in compliance with the

18 federal one. Slovenia used this opportunity to start gradual secession

19 from the Federation, which was implemented through a series of enactments

20 adopted by the Republic of Slovenia.

21 Q. So these amendments were adopted Slovenia before the 1990

22 constitution was adopted by Serbia. Is that right?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In December 1990, Croatia too, the Republic of Croatia, adopted

25 its own constitution, right?

1 A. Yes, I remember that.

2 Q. Both after and before on the 5th of October, on the 5th of

3 October, 1990, Croatia passed a law on the structure of its republican

4 administration, which is the equivalent of our Law on Ministries, thereby

5 establishing its foreign office and its defence ministry, Ministry of

6 Defence. Do you remember that, sir?

7 A. Yes, I do.

8 Q. The ministries were set up in Serbia in February, or rather, a law

9 was passed, 1D456, tab 17, the Law on Ministries that was adopted in

10 February 1991 in the Republic of Serbia is a reflection of what occurred

11 in Slovenia in 1989 and in Croatia in October 1990. These republics,

12 likewise, had assumed the federal competences and applied them to their

13 own republican level. They established their own state laws, you might

14 say. Is that right, Professor?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. So what we see here is some form of duality between the republican

17 bodies on the one hand that were still operating in Slovenia and Croatia

18 and afterwards in Serbia, and on the other the federal bodies start --

19 were not functioning but continued to exist and continued to do so until

20 some time around April 1992, right?

21 A. Yes, that's right. There was a danger of secession and total

22 disintegration in Yugoslavia, and the danger continued to exist until 1992

23 for as long as the 1974 constitution was still in power and until such

24 time as the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted

25 in 1992, April 1992.

1 Q. After which, after which these ministries that we have mentioned,

2 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry

3 of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries ceased to exist in Serbia

4 since they were under the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of

5 Yugoslavia. Is that right, Professor?

6 A. Following this, amendments were introduced to the Law on

7 Ministries, establishing that these three ministries should cease to

8 exist.

9 Q. This is tab 18, 1D142, Official Gazette 1993, number 67.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honours, if -- I hope this was sufficiently

11 explained.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you, Mr. Zecevic. We have one comment to

13 make on exhibits so far.

14 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Obviously we'll follow the practice that we've been

16 following throughout the trial, which is to admit exhibits when they are

17 introduced in some form in the trial to the extent that they are relevant

18 to the evidence. And that will apply to any that you have referred to

19 which are not already exhibits in the case.

20 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: However, there are at least two, I think, for which

22 there were not translations. Is that correct?

23 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, it's pending, Your Honour.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. But these will have to be identified at

25 lunchtime today so that you can tell me exactly which they are, and we

1 will specifically provide for them being subject to translation. They

2 will not be admitted until the translation -- Mr. Hannis --

3 MR. ZECEVIC: Your -- definitely, Your Honour, I think I can do

4 that even right now. It is document under the tab 19, 1D750.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: Which is a law on conducting foreign affairs within

7 competencies of the federal administration organs and organisations,

8 Official Gazette 56 of 1981, item 601; and the second one is the document

9 under tab 73, 1D759 [sic] which are the conclusions of the Federal

10 Assembly of SFRY, item 131, published in the Official Gazette of SFRY

11 number 13 for year 1989. Those are the two documents which are -- I

12 said -- it is just for the transcript it's 1D751, not 759, tab 73, 1D751,

13 page 52, line 13 of the transcript says 9.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

15 Mr. Hannis.

16 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I would like to make some submissions

17 concerning some of the documents, but I too have to review my list. There

18 are where I think there are only partial translations, and I may have an

19 issue there. And there are one or two where, I think, where there's a

20 question about provenance because they're not Official Gazettes. They're

21 documents without a signature or a seal. There are more of those that

22 relate to his factual evidence, I think, rather than his expert testimony

23 so that will come, but I wanted to preview that for you.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that's helpful but you can understand why it

25 would have been quite neat to deal with the exhibits so far since we are

1 now on to a different aspect of the evidence. So if it's possible after

2 the break at midday for you to clarify whether any of the documents

3 involved in the expert evidence are subject to what you've said, then we

4 can clear this matter up hopefully. And until then, it's sufficient to

5 mark for identification 1D750 and 751 and we have already done so in

6 relation to IC133.

7 Please continue, Mr. Zecevic.

8 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Just bear with me one

9 moment, please.

10 May I?

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, please.

12 MR. ZECEVIC: May I, Your Honours, if the binders have been

13 distributed.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes.

15 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

16 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, on the 5th of August this year you

17 gave a 92 ter statement, which bears the following number 1D753, this

18 statement is in relation to the facts and documents that you were

19 presented with and listed in annex 1 of the statement. Do you remember

20 that?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. You're familiar with these facts and documents. In your statement

23 you briefly explained each of the documents shown to you. Is that right?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Your statement is truthful and is based on your knowledge and

1 convictions. Were you asked the same questions about these documents

2 again, you would provide identical answers in relation to each and every

3 one of them, right?

4 A. Yes, that's right.

5 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, we would be seeking to ask that

6 Professor's 92 ter statement, 1D751, be admitted, except -- 1D753, I'm

7 sorry, be admitted except for the Politika newspaper documents, which I

8 can list right now, which are -- which we are not seeking admittance of.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: [Microphone not activated]

10 MR. ZECEVIC: It is ...

11 [Defence counsel confer]

12 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I suggest that I follow the list which

13 is in your binders or -- because the list which is attached -- the annex

14 which is attached to the statement is a bit different. Now --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's leave this and do it after lunchtime,

16 if that's a simple way of doing it. You can present a list to the court

17 deputy and we'll --

18 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: -- deal with it that way.

20 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, do your comments that you made a

22 moment or two ago apply to some of the other documents referred to in this

23 statement?

24 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour, and I think what I can do after

25 lunch is advise you of the ones that I have a particular objection to.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, please continue for the moment, Mr. Zecevic,

2 with any questions you have to ask about this document or any other

3 matter, and we'll return to the formalities later.

4 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much, I appreciate it, Your Honour.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, you became a member of the cabinet of

6 the Republic of Serbia back in 1994. Is that right?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Can you please look at tab 1, 1D385, the date is the 18th of

9 March, 1994. This is a decision on the appointment of the president and

10 vice-president of the Government of the Republic of Serbia and the

11 republic's ministers. This was a government in which you were deputy

12 prime minister in 1994, I'm talking about item 3, we see your name right

13 there. Is that right, Professor?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Thank you. This was published in the Official Gazette, right?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. This is a decision of the Assembly?

18 A. Yes, that is because we were appointed by the Assembly.

19 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. This document shows that you were

20 deputy prime minister, right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. How many deputy prime ministers were there?

23 A. There were a total of five deputy prime ministers, as you can see

24 by reading this decision.

25 Q. Professor, given the way the government was structured at the

1 time, did each of the deputy prime ministers have special duties and

2 responsibilities, different from those of other deputy prime ministers?

3 A. They weren't ministers pure and proper. They had a direct

4 relationship with the prime minister, and their duties and

5 responsibilities were distributed by the prime minister. For example, I

6 was in charge of legislation and the legal system.

7 Q. So you stuck to that throughout your time in office, that's what

8 Prime Minister Marijanovic had told you to do, and that's what you did

9 from the moment you were appointed deputy prime minister to the

10 termination of your time in office in 2000, right?

11 A. Yes, first up until 1998 when this government was disbanded and

12 then a new cabinet was appointed. Again I became deputy prime minister

13 and again the government was headed by Mr. Marijanovic. I was given the

14 same responsibilities in this new cabinet. I was in charge of legislation

15 and the legal system of the Republic of Serbia.

16 Q. Thank you very much. During the time of this second cabinet in

17 1998, in March 1998 more specifically, you were given a certain

18 responsibility by the prime minister. Can you please explain specifically

19 what this responsibility was about?

20 A. Excuse me, which tab should I be looking at?

21 Q. Well, first of all, try to think back and see if you can remember

22 what the responsibility was.

23 A. Which responsibility and what date?

24 Q. March 1998.

25 A. Yes, back in March 1998 the prime minister, or Serbia's government

1 if you like, gave me the responsibility of involving myself in talks with

2 the leaders of Albanian parties and associations, or rather, I was tasked

3 with heading a government delegation which included the following

4 ministers: Ratomir Vico and Andrija Milosavljevic and Ivan Sedlak.

5 Q. Professor, can you please look at tab 3, 1D078, this is an

6 announcement made by the government on the 11th of March, 1998. It talks

7 about a conclusion that was adopted on its session on the 10th of March.

8 Is this what you have been talking about, sir?

9 A. Yes, this is just it. This is an announcement which made public

10 the substance of these conclusions. I headed this delegation of Serbia's

11 government, the Government of the Republic of Serbia. The delegation

12 comprised another three ministers, those that I've mentioned, and we were

13 supposed to talk to the leaders of the Albanian parties. And this was

14 about resolving certain practical matters concerning the life -- the

15 everyday life of people in Kosovo and Metohija.

16 Q. Professor, back in 1996 do you remember if the government set up a

17 special group to implement the agreement on the return of Albanian pupils

18 and teachers to schools in the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija?

19 A. Yes, I do remember that. The group was set up to have normalise

20 teaching in schools and universities, to help normalise teaching in

21 schools and universities, Ratomir Vico, Goran Percevic and

22 Dobroslav Beletic were ministers who were involved in the work of this

23 group.

24 Q. Professor, please look at tab number 2 1D --, or rather, P714.

25 This is the Official Gazette of the 12th of September, 1996. The document

1 bears the number 933, it's a decision. Is that the decision you were

2 referring to, Professor?

3 A. Yes, it is, and it is precisely these members Ratomir Vico, who

4 was a government minister; Goran Percevic, who was a federal deputy; and

5 Mr. Dobroslav Beletic was a scholar.

6 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, when on the 10th of March you

7 were tasked with, or rather, you were tasked by the prime minister of the

8 Republic of Serbia, the late Mirko Marijanovic, with leading this

9 delegation for negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians that you talked

10 about, had you ever dealt with these issues before that point in time? I

11 mean talks with the Albanian leaders about solving the issues of the

12 continued functioning of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija?

13 A. No, never before that had I been given any tasks connected to

14 Kosovo and Metohija. This was the first time I was given a task in that

15 connection.

16 Q. Professor, at this point in time, are you aware that any kind of

17 negotiations took place between the leaders of the Kosovo Albanians and

18 some members of some political parties in Serbia in the course of 1996 and

19 1997?

20 A. I don't know what talks you mean.

21 Q. At the time when you were appointed to chair that delegation, were

22 you aware that any kind of talks were being conducted with the leaders of

23 the Kosovo Albanians in 1996 and 1997?

24 A. I did not participate in any such talks. As I said, the first

25 time I was given such a task was on the 10th of March, 1998.

1 Q. But had you heard about any such talks?

2 A. Well, probably there were talks of that kind because Kosovo and

3 Metohija was an area which was in political terms very full of unrest,

4 ever since the early 1980s.

5 Q. Professor, do you know a certain person called Mr. Tanic?

6 A. Well, I heard about him in the media. He was very prominent. I

7 think he was the spokesman of a political party, the Civic Alliance and

8 especially New Democracy. I met him only once when we had lunch with the

9 German ambassador, the ambassador of Great Britain was also present at

10 that lunch hosted by the German ambassador. And that was my only physical

11 contact with him. I saw him once in person. Before that I had seen him

12 on television because he was very prominent in the media.

13 Q. Professor, did you ever participate in any negotiations with the

14 Kosovo Albanians together with Mr. Tanic?

15 A. Absolutely not, no, never. He was never given any tasks by the

16 government. He was not a public official, and I repeat I met him

17 physically only once when the German Ambassador, Mr. Gruber, invited us to

18 lunch.

19 Q. Does that mean that you never consulted him about negotiations or

20 anything like that, that you coordinated positions with him?

21 A. No, no, why would I? I never had any kind of contact with him.

22 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, after you were appointed the

23 leader of that delegation on the 10th of March, 1998, what steps did you

24 take? What did that delegation of the Government of the Republic of

25 Serbia do first?

1 A. Well, first that delegation convened a meeting in Pristina, or

2 rather, it scheduled a meeting and it was supposed to meet representatives

3 of the Kosovo Albanians, thus opening the so-called political process and

4 begin solving the issues affecting the daily life of citizens in Kosovo

5 and Metohija. The meeting was scheduled. A public announcement was

6 issued. Invitations were sent out to the private addresses of the leaders

7 of the Albanian political parties, and I think it was supposed to be on

8 the 12th of March, 1998. However, they never showed up at the meeting.

9 Q. Just go slowly. So, Professor, the first meeting you scheduled

10 was on the 12th of March, 1998, in Pristina. You arrived but they did not

11 show up?

12 A. Yes. The delegation arrived, but I have to say that at the time

13 that this delegation was being established, the government called on every

14 party in the National Assembly to give one representative from their group

15 of deputies to participate in these talks, with a view to affirming the

16 unified approach of the National Assembly to the solution of issues in

17 Kosovo and Metohija. The community of Hungarians from Vojvodina

18 responded, and they sent their representative so that this gentleman went

19 there together with the government delegation.

20 Q. Tell me, Professor, the reason for this government communique,

21 which we saw in tab 3, 1D078, of the 11th of March, and the decision of

22 the prime minister to appoint you and your other three colleagues to this

23 delegation was motivated to the best of your knowledge by what?

24 A. Well, in the course of my research I had dealt for a long time

25 with issues of territorial autonomy in the world, and I have published

1 many papers on that topic. I studied especially autonomy in Italy and

2 Spain, the then-USSR, so that probably it was because I had a scholarly

3 interest in the subject matter of territorial autonomy, and I knew the

4 subject. Mr. Andrija Milosavljevic and Ratomir Vico were conversant with

5 the conditions of living in Kosovo and Metohija.

6 Mr. Vico was a minister who had already been tasked with

7 conducting negotiations about normalising teaching in Kosovo and Metohija

8 and Mr. Sedlak who was himself a member of a national minority was the

9 minister in charge of human and minority rights in the Government of the

10 Republic of Serbia. And I'm sure that this was the motive why the prime

11 minister proposed this team to negotiate with the Kosovo Albanians.

12 Q. Well, Professor, thank you for your response, but I wanted to know

13 what the motivation of the cabinet was, of the prime minister.

14 A. You mean for the negotiations themselves, well that was to find a

15 peaceful way through political negotiations, to solve the problems on

16 Kosovo and Metohija, because at that time armed conflict was already

17 escalating in Kosovo and Metohija and this was an offer to solve

18 everything in a civilised, peaceful manner through political negotiations

19 of all the interested subjects. The international community had also

20 appealed to the Republic of Serbia to act in this way.

21 Q. Professor, if I understood you correctly, the government's policy

22 was to take political measures, to engage in negotiations, in order to

23 solve the situation in Kosovo at that time?

24 A. Yes. One can see that from the persistent attempts made by this

25 delegation, even at the cost of physical maltreatment.

1 Q. We'll come to that later.

2 A. Well, we went there dozens of times. We persistently attempted to

3 have the whole matter discussed in a peaceful, political way.

4 Q. Professor, that was the position of the government in March 1998?

5 A. Yes, on the 10th of March, 1998, in the first half of March 1998.

6 Q. You were the deputy prime minister until the year 2000. This

7 political standpoint of the government, was it ever changed in that

8 period?

9 A. No. This position, this standpoint of the government, was not

10 changed. This is also evident from the fact that the government, and

11 later on the National Assembly, agreed to the negotiations in Rambouillet

12 and in Paris and the government appointed a state delegation to negotiate

13 in Rambouillet and Paris. The government always gave priority to

14 political means for the solution of burning issues, issues of daily life

15 in Kosovo and Metohija.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I see the time -- oh, I'm sorry. I'm

17 obviously anxious to ...

18 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, after you went to that meeting on the

19 12th of March where the delegation of the Albanian representatives did not

20 show up, did you go there again on the next day, the 13th of March?

21 A. Yes, we went there on the following day. I looked it up, and

22 those were -- those days were Thursday and Friday of that week. And then

23 on the following week we went on every working day, and we scheduled the

24 meeting in the same place at the same time every day and informed the

25 leaders of the Albanian political parties. This was in Pristina, of

1 course.

2 Q. So you went there on the 12th and the 13th, which were a Thursday

3 and a Friday, and then on the following Monday, the 16th, and from that

4 time on you went there every day?

5 A. Yes, I even recall the address, Vidovdanska 2, because I had gone

6 there so many times, but every time the leaders of the Albanian political

7 parties failed to turn up at those meetings, they failed to show up for

8 them. Later on there were representatives of other ethnic communities who

9 participated in that --

10 Q. Professor, just take it easy, we'll go in chronological order.

11 A. All right.

12 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember the declaration of the

13 President of the Republic of Serbia of the 18th of March, 1998?

14 A. Yes, I do, and that declaration was made in order to encourage

15 political dialogue, to support a peaceful and political solution of the

16 problems in Kosovo and Metohija. So apart from the government calling for

17 negotiations and also the president of the republic called on the

18 representatives of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija to participate in

19 these talks.

20 Q. Professor, please look at tab 5, 1D079.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Is that the declaration you mentioned?

23 A. Yes. And it says in paragraph 2: "I appeal to the leaders of the

24 political parties of the Albanian national minority in Kosovo and Metohija

25 to start a political dialogue without delay and without conditions and as

1 the president of the Republic of Serbia, I'm willing to be the guarantor

2 of such talks on the basis of territorial integrity and sovereignty and

3 Kosovo and Metohija within the framework of Serbia."

4 Q. Thank you. Professor, Professor, how do you understand this

5 willingness of the president to guarantee the talks between your

6 delegation and the representatives of the Albanian minority and the

7 delegation of the Republic of Serbia?

8 MR. ZECEVIC: I was just waiting for the transcript.

9 Q. [Interpretation] Go ahead, Professor.

10 A. Well, I understood it as follows. The president of the republic

11 guaranteed that whatever was agreed would be implemented. And as this

12 declaration is a rather extensive text, it states what the president of

13 the republic expects from these talks. It says that the Federal Republic

14 of Yugoslavia is a European country committed to European values and

15 principles, that he is convinced that the future of the citizens in Kosovo

16 and Metohija is not an ethnic, religious, and cultural division and

17 isolation, but in mutual linking up and living together. So the president

18 expressed the spirit in which these talks should be conducted, and he

19 expressed his willingness to guarantee the implementation of whatever was

20 agreed.

21 Q. Thank you, Professor.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Professor, you told us yesterday about the very

23 limited powers of the president. Under what power would he be able to

24 guarantee the success of the talks?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, this is not really a power.

1 This is a moral position that he took. The president of the republic, who

2 was elected directly by all of the citizens, guaranteed that the agreement

3 would be implemented. He represents the state of Serbia and symbolises

4 its unity, and it is in this capacity that he spoke. Naturally, he did

5 not have any specific powers in relation to this. This is all on the --

6 was said on the moral grounds. The negotiations were of political nature.

7 It was the representatives of government and leaders of Albanian political

8 parties that negotiated. There were no state organs involved.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Professor, upon the return from Pristina on the 20th, on those

12 seven occasions when you went to meetings starting on the 12th, none of

13 the Albanian representatives showed up, correct?

14 A. Only two members of Albanians ethnic community showed up, but they

15 were not leaders, they were not members of the majority political

16 parties. Those were Mr. Faik Jashari and Mr. Sokol Qusha. However, they

17 were not members of these majority political parties who had the support

18 of the majority of Albanian citizens, members of the Albanian ethnic

19 community, rather they were leaders of smaller political parties.

20 Q. When you're referring to leaders of larger political parties, you

21 are primarily referring to the late Dr. Rugova?

22 A. Yes, absolutely. They had the dominant position in the political

23 life in Kosovo at the time. That was the dominant political party.

24 Q. Thank you. Tab 6, 5909 [as interpreted], is the decision that you

25 have already mentioned. This is the second cabinet where you served as

1 deputy prime minister and Mirko Marijanovic once again was the prime

2 minister?

3 A. Yes, and in that government I had the same tasks as in the

4 previous government.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: That's document 1D909.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour, P909, P909.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: It's been recorded as 5909 but it's P.

8 MR. ZECEVIC: P5000.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: No, P909. Thank you.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you. [Interpretation]

11 Q. Professor, on the 31st of March there was a declaration or a

12 statement issued by the government on Kosovo, do you remember that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That's tab 8, 1D082. Could you please comment on this government

15 appeal. As far as I can see, this is again an appeal to Albanian leaders

16 to come to the meetings and negotiations?

17 A. Yes. This is a repeated call issued by the government after a

18 series of unsuccessful trips of the members of its delegation. They're

19 stating here that in the world the declaration of the president of Serbia

20 was welcomed, and once again they issue a public appeal to hold a direct

21 and unconditional dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic

22 minorities. Because other ethnic minorities other than Albanian also

23 asked to be involved in this political process.

24 It says there that an indispensable method of resolving all issues

25 in Kosovo and Metohija was the method of applying political mechanisms in

1 order to achieve European standards on human rights and freedoms but also

2 to respect the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities. And here the

3 government elaborates on its views concerning these talks. This is a

4 somewhat longer statement of the government. If it's been translated into

5 English, there's no need for me to convey the content.

6 Q. Absolutely. Professor, did you start sending out written

7 invitations, written notices, to attend to the Albanian leaders?

8 A. Yes. In order for them not to use a pretext or an excuse that

9 this was a public invitation and not an invitation sent to private

10 residences, then letters were also sent containing invitations to private

11 addresses; namely, to Ibrahim Rugova, Demaqi, Krasniqi, and some others.

12 A number of persons, all of them listed in this statement in the last

13 paragraph.

14 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor --

15 A. I have a correction, by your leave. It says here: "The

16 composition of the delegation." Given that the cabinet had some changes,

17 this is March of 1998 and there were some changes in the cabinet, and they

18 were reflected in the composition of the delegation as well, meaning that

19 Professor Milovan Bojic as a deputy prime minister was included, as was

20 Mr. Tomislav Nikolic, also deputy prime minister. And Mr. Milosavljevic

21 Sedlak and myself were there just like we were previously. As for the

22 president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, he appointed his special

23 representative, and that was deputy prime minister of the federal

24 government, Professor Vladan Kutlesic. So the delegation was expanded

25 significantly, and in addition to the delegation there was also a Special

1 Envoy of the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

2 Q. Just another question, Professor, before we break. Professor

3 Vladan Kutlesic was who, if you can just tell us briefly.

4 A. Professor Vladan Kutlesic at the time was deputy prime minister of

5 the federal government.

6 Q. And he's a professor of what?

7 A. Later on he became, and today he's -- actually today he's no

8 longer, but he became professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, and

9 recently he changed his job and now teaches at the Megatrend University.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I see the time now, so again.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Time now for the lunch break, Professor. Could you

12 again please leave the courtroom with the usher, and we will see you in an

13 hour at quarter to 2.00.

14 [The witness stands down]

15 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.46 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 1.46 p.m.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

18 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour, I believe it was the wish of the Trial

19 Chamber to deal with the -- to deal with 1D753, the Rule 92 ter statement

20 of Professor Markovic --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, first -- yeah -- well, Mr. Hannis said he

22 would make certain submissions about this which we can look at, but one

23 thing you said you would do is clear up --

24 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: -- the question of the Politika articles.

1 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, Your Honours. We will not be seeking to tender

2 the paragraph 17 of the statement of Professor Markovic. Paragraph 17 is

3 on the page 12 -- it starts on the page 12 and continues until page 13.

4 And all the Politikas are listed there, except 1D046 which is Politika of

5 19th November, which by mistake is included in this list, but it's already

6 been admitted previously during the Prosecution case through Witness

7 Petritsch. So this document has already been admitted.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: So you don't need to have it admitted again?

9 MR. ZECEVIC: No, definitely not.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Okay. We will use the original --

11 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah. And all others listed under the paragraph 17

12 we will not be seeking to tender these into the exhibits.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you going to be referring at all in the oral

14 examination of Mr. Markovic --

15 MR. ZECEVIC: No, Your Honour --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to any of these?

17 MR. ZECEVIC: No, Your Honour, no.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: And so far as the -- well, I better hear from

19 Mr. Hannis first of all. Thank you.

20 Mr. Hannis.

21 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I -- having gone through the list now, a

22 number of items that I had marked as having some concerns about from the

23 original 65 ter notification are not on the list, so pretty much all of my

24 problem exhibits have gone away. I don't know if we mentioned

25 Exhibit 1D748 which is number 80 on the list of fact exhibits with the red

1 binders, which is still pending translation, that's the only issue I have

2 with that one. And I think we've addressed all the others.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the rule is clear that even if a document is

4 referred to in evidence but has not been translated into English, it will

5 not be admitted unless it's specifically raised, for example, on the basis

6 that enough is translated in the course of the interpretation here for it

7 to be unnecessary for any more translation to be done on it. But in the

8 absence of that sort of determination, it's up to the party presenting it

9 to get it into English before it will be admitted.

10 What exactly is annex A, Mr. Zecevic?

11 MR. ZECEVIC: Annex A is a list of all the documents, Your Honour.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Is this just the index for the binders?

13 MR. ZECEVIC: Yeah, that's just the index for the binders.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: These are the ones being referred to?

15 MR. ZECEVIC: That's right, that's right. And actually, his 92

16 ter statement has 17 paragraphs, and we are not seeking to tender the

17 paragraph 17, which is referred to on page 12 and 13 of his 92 ter

18 statement.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Hannis, what's effectively being done here

20 is the incorporation into the oral evidence of Professor Markovic of all

21 these documents other than those referred to in paragraph 17, all those

22 documents which are mentioned in his 92 ter statement. I take it that on

23 the face of it they look authentic as far as you're concerned, and in the

24 end of the day it's all going to be a question of interpretation.

25 MR. HANNIS: Yes, Your Honour.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 So far as the documents referred to in his evidence as an expert

3 are concerned, there are no others that you have any concern about, apart

4 from the three which had not been translated?

5 MR. HANNIS: I believe that's correct, Your Honour. So I was

6 going through making notes when he testified, and looking at the list I

7 don't think there was anything. There are a couple I have questions

8 about, but I don't have questions about authenticity.

9 MR. ZECEVIC: Your Honour.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: In that situation -- I'm sorry.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry to interrupt you, Your Honour, but there

12 is one other issue I think I should raise with the Trial Chamber or

13 actually inform the Trial Chamber about. It's at tab 63 of the laws and

14 regulations exhibits. It's the Law on VJ, P984, which we have a problem

15 with Article 4 on the paragraphs, is it a paragraph 2 or 3 or 1 and so.

16 And we have produced today the web site.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Yeah.

18 MR. ZECEVIC: Now, I understood the reaction by my learned friend,

19 Mr. Hannis, from the Office of the Prosecutor that he might be having an

20 issue with that. So what we have done in the meantime is we have

21 contacted the legal committee of the National Assembly of Serbia, which is

22 the only body or organ that can provide with the authentic explanation of

23 all the laws which have been brought up in the National Assembly.

24 However, due to vacation issue, they will not be meeting before

25 the 25th of August. So I would assume that after the 25th of August we

1 will have an official explanation on the Law on VJ and the particular

2 Article 4 that we are having here as an issue by the -- or legal committee

3 of the National Assembly of Serbia.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, that IC exhibit will remain marked for

5 identification until you make a joint submission filing --

6 MR. ZECEVIC: Okay. Thank you, Your Honour --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: -- to the Trial Chamber, or in the event of you

8 being unable to make a joint one that you raise it because the onus will

9 be on you to remove it from that status.

10 MR. ZECEVIC: I understand, Your Honour. Thank you very much. I

11 just wanted to inform the Trial Chamber.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: So in these circumstances, the general rule we've

13 applied will apply to all the exhibits that have been referred to in the

14 course of the evidence so far by Professor Markovic. They will be

15 admitted to the extent that they are relevant to issues raised in the

16 evidence.

17 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can we please have the witness back.

19 [The witness takes the stand]

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Zecevic.

21 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

22 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, how are you feeling?

23 A. Tired.

24 Q. I believe you on that one. Professor, about the declaration of

25 the Government of Serbia concerning Kosovo dated the 31st of March, 1998,

1 we spoke about that. Do you remember Resolution 1160 of the Security

2 Council of that date?

3 A. Yes, I do.

4 Q. Would you please look at tab 9, P0455.

5 MR. ZECEVIC: [No interpretation]

6 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, would you please go slowly because we

7 have been asked by the interpreters to wait for the document to appear on

8 the screen before commenting on it.

9 Professor, see on page 1 we have Resolution 1160, which notes the

10 declaration of the president of Serbia, or rather, the declaration of the

11 president of Serbia on the situation in Kosovo. On page 2, the Security

12 Council invites sides, that is to say Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and

13 leadership of the Kosovo Albanians, to do certain things and to undertake

14 certain measures, correct?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Would you please give a brief comment to items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

17 and 8 of the resolution in light of -- in light of what the Government of

18 Serbia did up until the 31st of March when you were appointed a member of

19 that delegation for negotiations, so what the government did before this

20 resolution was issued, just briefly, please.

21 A. In this resolution, the Security Council calls upon the government

22 in Belgrade to offer a true political dialogue to the leadership of Kosovo

23 Albanians. This resolution was adopted on the 31st of March, 1998, and

24 the government in Belgrade had offered a political dialogue to them prior

25 to that, back on the 10th of March. And on the 12th we already travelled

1 to Pristina. It is further stated here that a political solution to the

2 issue of Kosovo through dialogue without an alternative, then they call

3 upon the leadership of the Kosovo Albanians to condemn all terrorist

4 action. Then they welcome the decision to implement the agreement on

5 education. We spoke about that agreement. Back in 1996 the government

6 had established a negotiating team.

7 Then they call upon all countries in order to establish peace and

8 stability in Kosovo to either stop or prevent any shipment of arms to the

9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo and its citizens from

10 their territory. So everything that this resolution mentioned is

11 something that the Government of Serbia had already done. What is also

12 important for me, looking at this resolution, is the qualification given

13 in the preamble, where it says that they condemn all terrorist operations

14 on the part of the KLA. So from the highest international forum there was

15 a message sent about the KLA using terrorist methods.

16 Q. Thank you, Professor. Professor, the text of the resolution and

17 what the resolution invites parties to do and what it requires parties to

18 do is something that the Government of Serbia had already been doing two

19 weeks before the resolution was issued, correct?

20 A. Yes, correct.

21 Q. Professor, following that in April you travelled to Kosovo several

22 times again, attempting to meet with the leadership of Kosovo Albanians,

23 correct?

24 A. Yes, that's how it was.

25 Q. Do you remember, Professor, whether you travelled to Pristina on

1 the 7th of April for talks there?

2 A. Yes, I went on the 7th of April as well.

3 Q. On the 7th of April, was it the entire delegation that travelled

4 or how was it?

5 A. The president of the Republic of Serbia, Mr. Milan Milutinovic,

6 travelled on the 7th as well as the entire delegation established by the

7 Government of Serbia, again with the same objective. We believed that

8 such a strengthened delegation of Serbia would perhaps produce a better

9 response among the leaders of Kosovo Albanians, the leaders of political

10 parties, and that this would give an impetus to political dialogue.

11 Q. Professor, do you remember that on that occasion

12 President Milutinovic gave a statement?

13 A. Yes, I do remember.

14 Q. Would you please look at tab 10, which is 1D083.

15 A. Yes.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation] Can we have that document in

17 e-court, please. 1D83.

18 Q. Professor, is this the statement we have just been talking about?

19 A. Yes, that's the statement issued by President Milutinovic on the

20 7th of April, 1998, in Pristina.

21 Q. Will you please read the last line of the first paragraph, which

22 begins with: "Coming here today ..."

23 A. "Coming here today, I wanted to underline the significance we

24 attach to such talks."

25 Q. Would you please explain what is meant here.

1 A. Well, as I said in the answer to the last question, as the

2 delegation had now been strengthened with the arrival of the president of

3 the Republic of Serbia, it was thought that this would be an impetus, that

4 it would encourage the leaders of the -- the political leaders of the

5 Albanians to respond to the invitation to talks. And the president, who

6 according to the constitution, personifies the republic, embodies state

7 unify, is here underlying the significance attached to these talks,

8 demonstrating that the official state of Serbia seriously wants talks.

9 So not only are representatives of the government present, but

10 also the president of the republic. And this testifies to the fact that

11 Serbia seriously wants talks because it's sending its highest state

12 official to them.

13 Q. Thank you. In his statement the president repeats a wish -- in

14 fact, he repeats his position, saying that the future of Kosovo does not

15 lie in closing up and division, but on the contrary, in openness. And he

16 expresses his dissatisfaction with the fact that the Albanian

17 representatives have again failed to show up. Is that correct, that they

18 failed to show up?

19 A. They did not show up, and in spite of the fact that there was such

20 a strong delegation which had been ignored, the president points out

21 that -- that Serbia remains willing to engage in dialogue, and he is

22 willing to meet them at any time in Belgrade.

23 Q. Thank you --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: What notice was given to the Albanians of the

25 meeting on the 7th of April?

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They were always notified, from the

2 time when they complained that the invitations were not arriving at their

3 home addresses but that they were being invited only through public

4 announcement. From that point in time onwards, they were always invited

5 personally and the invitations were sent out to their home addresses. The

6 list of invitees has just been mentioned. It's a broad circle of Albanian

7 political leaders whom we mentioned before the break, and they received

8 not only this general public invitation, but also personal invitations

9 sent to their home addresses.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Have you any idea when the invitation was made,

11 both publicly and privately?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I couldn't answer that because it's

13 a technical issue I did not deal with, but I believe the invitations were

14 sent out in time. The town is in the same country. It doesn't take so

15 long for the post office to do its job, and probably there was a secure

16 mechanism of delivering these invitations. I know that there had to be

17 signatures, they had to sign receipts that they had received the

18 invitation, especially Mr. Rugova, he had to sign receipts every time, or

19 rather, his Chief of Staff had to sign a receipt.

20 [Trial Chamber confers]

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I take it that you're speculating about how the

22 personal invitations might have been delivered?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm not speculating, because

24 Mr. Veljko Odalovic showed me a receipt signed by the chief of

25 Mr. Rugova's cabinet, Mr. Merovci, a receipt stating that he had received

1 the invitation. Mr. Veljko Odalovic showed me that signed receipt.

2 However, as head of the delegation, I was not in charge of these technical

3 matters. So I don't know what method was used to send out the

4 invitations. It was my job to -- to direct the talks.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Your suggestion is, though, that it was done by the

6 post office, and I wondered whether that was speculation.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What the technology was, I don't

8 know, what the method was used -- what method was used, whether they were

9 sent by post, through the post office, or some other methods, that I don't

10 know.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

12 Mr. Zecevic.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation].

14 Q. Professor, very briefly, I would like to take you back to tab 8,

15 1D82. This is a statement of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on

16 Kosovo and Metohija. Page 2, the last two paragraphs, which I think

17 explain what technical methods were used to send out the invitations.

18 A. Yes. In the statement of the 31st of March, 1998, the

19 representatives of the political parties of the Albanian minority are

20 invited to attend a meeting seven days from today. That was the 7th of

21 April, 1998, in Pristina in Vidovdanska number 2, the building of the

22 republican government at 1200 hours. So seven days before the meeting was

23 scheduled, they knew there was to be a meeting, but in addition to this

24 public invitation the Government of Serbia sent out written invitations to

25 the representatives of the political parties of the Albanian minority and

1 public personalities, and then they list all the people.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. I have your answer.

3 Mr. Zecevic.

4 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Professor, talking about letters, after the 7th of April did you

6 go to Pristina an another occasion in April?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Do you remember the date?

9 A. Not the specific date. I'm afraid I might be wrong if I try to

10 tell you the date, but in April, May, and August we went there to have

11 meetings with Mr. Fehmi Agani who failed to show up yet again.

12 Q. Professor, do you remember whether you went to Pristina on the

13 16th of April, 1998?

14 A. Yes, that's right.

15 Q. And none of the Albanian representatives showed up; although as

16 you said, they had been informed both by public and written invitations

17 about the meeting?

18 A. Well, both public and private, personal, invitations. I signed

19 those invitations. I signed those invitations to all of them.

20 Q. Thank you. Professor --

21 JUDGE CHOWHAN: I'm sorry to intervene. Forgive me for

22 interruption.

23 Now, obviously these were very seriously meetings and were also

24 asquel [phoen] to what the Security Council had stated. Was it enough to

25 send these letters through transmissions by post? Because usually people

1 intervene. There are mediators, there are people who try to bring parties

2 together, and they are put in for purposes of persuasions and calling

3 people for meetings. Is it in your knowledge, sir, that such method was

4 employed or was it just perfunctory sending notices as it was being

5 suggested through the post office only? That is what I thought if you

6 would like to say anything on this. Thank you.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to say once more I'm not sure

8 the post office was used, it's just my assumption. But possibly it was

9 not sent through the post office. Possibly all these invitations were

10 sent through Mr. Veljko Odalovic, and he may have delivered those letters

11 personally to the addressees through his people. I don't know what the

12 methods, physical methods, of delivering the letters were. But if

13 somebody is sent a polite invitation --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Markovic, we know your position on this. What

15 the question relates to is quite a different matter, and that is whether

16 in the context of this important issue, you wouldn't expect some mediator,

17 negotiator, or some intermediary to be acting to arrange the meeting

18 rather than you as the leader of the delegation deciding when the meeting

19 would be, sending out these invitations, and expecting everybody to turn

20 up.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know what

22 intermediaries you mean. These are people who live in the same country.

23 They lived in one and the same country. Pristina is in the Republic of

24 Serbia. Albanians were citizens of the Republic of Serbia. So what sort

25 of intermediaries would be needed? I don't understand. The government

1 and the president of the republic were going there to meet them. They

2 could have proposed a place and a time that suited them, but evidently it

3 was their intention not to talk directly without intermediaries to the

4 Government of the Republic of Serbia and its delegation.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 Mr. Zecevic.

7 JUDGE CHOWHAN: Yes, learned Professor, you had signed the

8 invitations, you had gone there also. And then when they didn't show up,

9 did you thinker of bothering to inquire whether things were served,

10 whether somebody should be sent to them as an emissary? Obviously they

11 were a different group. Within the same countries people negotiate

12 through intermediaries or to emissaries or special messengers or common

13 friends. It's not that people do it only in the international arena, it's

14 also within. Even in the same house, somebody comes in. So I was

15 wondering why this sort of attitude was shown, nobody bothered to check or

16 remind them or persuade them or send somebody to them. After all, this

17 was a very important matter, and what I hear from this declaration, this

18 statement of the president, he was all serious about it. Then somebody

19 had to implement this then. Why wasn't it done and nobody cared whether

20 they were coming or not, who was served, who did not serve, what further

21 steps be taken.

22 Was all this a perfunctory exercise or a meaningful is a question

23 which would arise in our mind, and we shall be grateful if you very kindly

24 throw some light on it because you were the actor, the main participant,

25 and nobody else will be able to tell us this. I'm grateful for your

1 patience.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that there is testimony by

3 Mr. Fehmi Agani that they always received those invitations, but that they

4 deliberately did not want to respond to them. So it was not a matter of

5 the technology of delivery and the physical receipt of the invitations,

6 but rather of a political standpoint that they did not want to attend

7 these meetings because that would amount to an admission that Kosovo and

8 Metohija was a part of the Republic of Serbia. It would be tantamount to

9 a recognition of the Republic of Serbia. Therefore, the issue was not

10 that they had not received the invitations, but that it was their firm

11 standpoint that they would not attend those talks.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, although that doesn't answer the question, I

13 think we should move on.

14 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Professor Markovic, you said you signed

15 invitations and notices. How many days' notice would have been under

16 those invitations and those notices? That's my first question. Can you

17 recall that?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, that can be seen from the

19 government statement. It was done seven days in advance.

20 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: My next question to you is this: In the normal

21 course of things, if you post a correspondence or a letter, such as your

22 notice or invitation, from the destination where these would have been

23 posted, how long would it have taken in the post to get to the varied

24 destinations that the notices were sent out to? That's another question I

25 wanted to know. In the post or via the post.

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, according to my personal

2 experience, you would receive it the next day after it was posted.

3 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: And other than the post, in the system that was

4 being employed for delivery of notices for those that were not -- if they

5 weren't posted, how long would your internal delivery system take to make

6 delivery of correspondence, as a general rule? Is it that it would remain

7 in the system for a few days or would there normally be immediate delivery

8 or how would it be carried out? If you don't know, you can say you do not

9 know.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think I can remember what

11 happened. The chief of the Kosovo district was Mr. Veljko Odalovic. I

12 think that the invitations were sent to him, and he with his team

13 personally organised the delivery of the invitations to the addresses of

14 the invitees. I know that Mr. Odalovic showed me the signature of

15 Mr. Rugova's chief of cabinet, confirming receipt of the invitation, but I

16 don't have it with me of course now. Mr. Odalovic may still have it, I

17 don't know.

18 JUDGE NOSWORTHY: Thank you very much, Professor Markovic.

19 Thank you, Mr. Zecevic.

20 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Professor, you sent these letters to everyone that they were

22 addressed to in the same way, right?

23 A. Yes, in the very same way.

24 Q. If I understand you correctly, some of them turned up. I think

25 you mentioned two specific names of members of some Albanian political

1 parties, but not the key Albanian political parties. So two minor

2 politicians responded to these invitations.

3 A. The best illustration of the fact that the invitations were

4 received was the fact that Mr. Faik Jashari and Mr. Sokol Qausha regularly

5 turned up. The same could be said of the representatives of the Roma

6 national minority and the Egyptian national minority as well as the Turks,

7 Guber Hasabovic [phoen] and Zenel Abedin Kures [phoen]. The same thing

8 applies to the representatives of the Gorani, they all received their

9 invitations and they all turned up for the meeting, which means that there

10 was nothing wrong with the delivery system.

11 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Do you remember if you personally

12 sent a letter in April 1998 to Ibrahim Rugova?

13 A. Indeed, I did send a letter to Ibrahim Rugova and Fehmi Agani.

14 Q. Do you remember the date?

15 A. I'd be hard-put to remember the exact date, but one thing that I

16 do know for certain is I sent letters to those persons.

17 Q. Can you tell us what the letters were about, letters that you sent

18 to Mr. Rugova and Mr. Fehmi Agani?

19 A. Might I be shown the letters before I start commenting? It's very

20 difficult to keep all of these things in mind.

21 Q. This is tab 11, 1D18, 3, 4, and 9, the page in e-court is 349,

22 this is paragraph 6, your letter dated the 26th of April, 1998, do you

23 recognise it sir?

24 A. Yes, I do, it's quite an extensive letter that I sent to

25 Mr. Rugova. I outlined the basic elements for talks, for a dialogue. I

1 restate my conviction, which was that of the state of Serbia as well, that

2 violence is not acceptable for achieving -- is not a viable tool for

3 achieving political aims. I also specify what I believe this dialogue

4 should comprise, the dialogue between the state delegation and the

5 representatives of all national minorities, all ethnic minorities, in

6 Kosovo and Metohija, including, needless to say, the majority Albanian

7 community. There is an English translation; therefore, I will not now

8 recount the substance of this letter.

9 Q. In this letter, Professor, you refer to a meeting that was

10 scheduled for the 28th of April, the 28th of April, 1998. Is that not

11 right, sir?

12 A. Yes. That was precisely what I proposed to Mr. Rugova.

13 Q. Professor, the 28th of April, 1998, in Pristina. What about that

14 meeting, did the representatives of the Albanian party turn up?

15 A. The 28th of April, if memory still serves -- well, I can't

16 remember. There were 16 or 17 such invitations and futile visits to

17 Pristina on our part. It wasn't more than once that we managed to meet

18 representatives of the Albanian political parties. It was in the

19 headquarters of the Kosovo and Metohija literary association, writers'

20 association, and the talks were headed for the Albanians by Fehmi Agani

21 and by myself on behalf of the Serb side. I'm afraid I might get the

22 dates wrong, but we did go 16 or 17 times to meet them. And it wasn't but

23 once that we managed to actually meet them.

24 Q. What about the date of the 22nd of May, the headquarters of the

25 Pristina writers' association, does that ring a bell, sir?

1 A. Yes, yes, it was in May. I do remember that. There were a large

2 number of foreign and domestic journalists from all sorts of media. It

3 was more a ceremonial meeting. These were no substantial talks between

4 the two parties. At the same time, this was the one and only time we ever

5 met during all of these efforts that we made to open a political dialogue

6 to have a proper political dialogue with the representatives of the

7 Albanian community.

8 Q. Professor, you said that the meeting took place on the 22nd of

9 May, was attended by the late Fehmi Agani. Do you remember who else was

10 there on behalf of the Albanian side?

11 A. Mr. Veton Surroi, Blerim Shala, Mahmut Bakalli, Mr. Kelmendi,

12 these are some of the persons I remember as being there, but you must bear

13 in mind the fact that this was all nine years ago.

14 Q. Thank you very much, Professor. Do you remember the meeting

15 between President Milosevic and President Yeltsin in Moscow in June 1998?

16 A. I remember that a declaration, a joint declaration, was announced

17 that resulted from that meeting -- that was reached at that meeting. It

18 was signed in Moscow, and all I remember is what I read about this in the

19 media. I wasn't personally involved in this meeting in any way.

20 Q. Do you remember the substance of the joint declaration signed by

21 President Yeltsin and President Milosevic?

22 A. Yes, I do remember the substance. It reflected the positions of

23 our government. It prioritized a peaceful solution for resolving open

24 issues by political means.

25 Q. This declaration lifted any sort of restriction on diplomatic

1 emissaries of foreign countries in terms of their diplomatic contacts in

2 Kosovo. Isn't that a fact?

3 A. Yes, that was one of the requests that were made in that

4 declaration.

5 Q. Unhindered access was guaranteed to all of Kosovo's different

6 areas to humanitarian organisations, including the International Red

7 Cross. Isn't that right?

8 A. Yes, that's one of the things stated in the declaration. I do

9 remember that clearly.

10 Q. Most importantly, do you remember that the Federal Republic of

11 Yugoslavia expressed its readiness to welcome OSCE to Serbia?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Thank you. Professor, we have now conducted a brief analysis of

14 the substance of this declaration. In essence, did it reflect the

15 position and the policies pursued by Serbia's government at the time?

16 A. It reflected not only the policies and the position of the

17 government, but of all the political players in Serbia at the time. This

18 was a position that had been agreed upon by all in sundry in Serbia.

19 Everyone believed that this was the only way to go about all these open

20 issues in Kosovo.

21 Q. Professor, do you remember that you wrote a letter to Fehmi Agani

22 in August?

23 A. Yes, it was in August that I called on Mr. Fehmi Agani to attend

24 talks, the intention behind this being I wanted to try talking to a

25 specific person. We were colleagues. He was a university professor as

1 well as I was, and I believed that a sense of academic solidarity between

2 the two, especially since I was the one going to Pristina, that would

3 prompt Mr. Agani to respond to my invitation and to have an informal talk.

4 Q. Professor, can you please go to tab 17, 1D061. Is this the letter

5 that you wrote and is this the public announcement that you made

6 subsequently, the letter you wrote to Professor Agani as tab 17?

7 A. Yes, it is. On page 1 you can see exactly what I was asked

8 before, what the channels were for sending in signatures. This was the

9 information stated, the name of the sender, the reference, when the letter

10 was received or an invitation. On the previous page Mr. Fehmi Agani says

11 explicitly: "We received your letter" -- no, I'm just trying to answer

12 the question that I was asked before, when I was unable to state anything

13 with certainty. So the letters were received.

14 Q. [Microphone not activated]

15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Professor, let us please take this one step at a time. There are

18 a number of technical matters that we need to resolve now. This is one of

19 those documents that we have no English translation for. Please try to

20 focus on your letter dated the 17th of August, 1998. Could you please

21 read it and --

22 A. The letter is a simple one. I address him as: "Dear Professor

23 Agani," as a gesture of solidarity.

24 "In relation to your letter dated the 17th of August this year, I

25 am glad to be able to express my satisfaction that you, too, want our

1 talks to resume as soon as possible. Let it be that way.

2 "Therefore, I propose that we meet as soon as tomorrow, Tuesday,

3 the 18th of August, at 1400 hours, in Pristina at Vidovdanska Street

4 number 2. I'm expecting your reply. Sincerely," on behalf of Serbia's

5 government, I signed this.

6 Q. So that's your letter?

7 A. Yes. That's my letter and my signature.

8 Q. If you turn to the next page, there is a public announcement which

9 contains the text of the letter which you have just read back to us,

10 right?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. Professor, you invoke here a letter sent to you by Professor

13 Agani. Can you please go to tab 16, 1D064. We do have a translation for

14 this one.

15 A. I answered this letter that same day.

16 Q. And?

17 A. And I scheduled talks for the next day. I was the one who

18 travelled from Belgrade to Pristina. Mr. Agani was in Pristina already.

19 Q. Professor in his letter -- Professor Agani talks about the

20 mediation of Ambassador Hill, who is in constant contact with both

21 Belgrade and Pristina. That's what Mr. Agani claims in the very last

22 sentence of the letter?

23 A. Yes, that's true.

24 Q. What about your letter written on that same day, what about your

25 agreement to meet him? Does that not indicate that you had absolutely no

1 problem whatsoever with the fact that this meeting should be mediated by

2 ambassador --

3 MR. HANNIS: I would object --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Please, please, it's a very leading question.

5 We're now into matters of fact.

6 MR. ZECEVIC: I'm sorry, Your Honour.

7 Q. [Interpretation] Professor, what was your position regarding this

8 proposal made by Mr. Agani in his letter dated the 17th of August?

9 A. I welcomed his initiative to have talks. I also proposed for us

10 to meet the next day in Pristina.

11 Q. In your letter you made no mention of Ambassador Hill's mediation.

12 What were your feelings about his mediation?

13 A. First of all, Ambassador Hill was not ambassador in the Federal

14 Republic of Yugoslavia. He was ambassador to Macedonia. He had attended

15 talks before. He wasn't seated at the table specifically, but he was

16 there for the Pristina talks when we held talks in the writers'

17 association in Kosovo and Metohija, the meeting that I referred to a while

18 ago. I didn't deem it necessary to refer to Ambassador Hill specifically.

19 I didn't understand why Ambassador Hill of all people should be

20 the one to mediate these talks between Mr. Agani, as a representative of

21 Kosovo and Metohija's Albanians on the one hand, and me as a

22 representative of the Government of the Republic of Serbia on the other.

23 Q. Professor, some moments ago we discussed the meeting that occurred

24 on the 22nd of May, the meeting with Fehmi Agani, Blerim Shala,

25 Veton Surroi, Mahmut Bakalli, Mr. Kelmendi, a meeting that took place in

1 the headquarters of the writers' association of Pristina?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. I asked you who attended the meeting. It's probably only now that

4 you remember Ambassador Hill being there, right?

5 A. Yes, but he wasn't with us at the table. He wasn't a participant

6 in these talks. He was in the same meeting, but not at the same table.

7 Q. Can you explain this a bit further so it doesn't appear that I'm

8 putting leading questions. Would you please explain the role of

9 Ambassador Hill in that meeting held on the 22nd of May, if you know.

10 A. I will tell you, and I'm certain that my recollections are quite

11 accurate. I went with an entire delegation, the second composition of the

12 delegation. And in the hallway Mr. Veton Surroi addressed me and asked me

13 whether I would agree to talk to Mr. Hill in one of the rooms of the

14 writers' club. I refused that and I said that we came to talk with the

15 delegation of Kosovo Albanians, not with Mr. Hill. That was the entire

16 substance of that meeting. So I did not see Mr. Hill on that occasion,

17 but I suppose that he was there, given that Mr. Surroi was offering me to

18 meet with him.

19 Q. Professor, can you tell us what was discussed on the 22nd of May

20 with the Albanian representatives in that meeting, the one that you

21 referred to just now.

22 A. The talks were not particularly meaningful. There were some

23 general platitudes about how a political dialogue was needed, how it was

24 important to resolve daily problems that civilians encountered. So this

25 was more of an overture to future talks rather than talks on specific,

1 concrete matters. There was really nothing to remember from that meeting.

2 There was nothing of substance that took place there.

3 Q. Professor, on that occasion on the 22nd of May, was there any

4 discussion of a new meeting of another date?

5 A. In principle, yes. We did not schedule a particular date, but in

6 principle we both expressed readiness to discuss these issues even though

7 the logistics and modes of these future talks were not discussed.

8 Q. Professor, on the basis of those talks, did the delegation of the

9 Government of Serbia go to Pristina again for talks on the 5th of June?

10 A. The delegation of the Government of Serbia, once again travelled

11 to these talks for the same reasons, counting that there was some progress

12 and that the talks would finally be launched. However, that was not the

13 case. The talks did not take off except for the talks with other ethnic

14 minorities in Kosovo, and the representatives of those two minor Albanian

15 political parties. Only they were the ones who came; the others did not.

16 It was my understanding that the Albanians - and when I say

17 "Albanians," I'm referring to leaders of majority political parties -

18 conceived these talks as exclusively talks between Serbs and Albanians as

19 though there were only Serbs and Albanians living in Kosovo and no other

20 ethnic communities, such as Turks, Gorani, Egyptians, and so on. It was

21 our platform that we should take as a starting point the equal status of

22 all ethnic communities and not accept that position, that there were no

23 other ethnic communities in Kosovo but Albanian and Serbian ones.

24 Q. Thank you. Professor, now let us go back to your correspondence

25 with Professor Agani. He wrote a letter to you, you replied to him, and

1 then on the 18th of June you travelled to Pristina. Did Professor Agani

2 appear then?

3 A. He did not, and I waited for him for an exceptionally long time,

4 for several hours, following which I returned to Belgrade.

5 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember the resolution of the

6 Security Council dated the 23rd of September, 1998, number 1199?

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one thing, Mr. Zecevic. Did you mean the 18th

8 of August?

9 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes, I'm sorry, it was my mistake.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: That's in 93, line 8.

11 MR. ZECEVIC: Yes.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: Thank you very much.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Perhaps you should ask the witness again then,

15 since you may have been thinking --

16 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Professor, I misspoke when I asked you about the meeting with

18 Professor Agani. I referred to the 18th of June, but since you exchanged

19 those letters on the 17th of August, as you have already testified, you

20 scheduled a meeting with him for the 18th of August, correct?

21 A. Yes, and I travelled on the 18th of August. I realised that you

22 made a mistake, but I also realised that that was a slip of the tongue.

23 Q. Thank you. Professor, my question centred on the UN Resolution

24 1199, which is tab 18 here, P0456. Are you familiar with the content of

25 this resolution, are you not?

1 A. Certainly I am. I was still an unsuccessful head of the

2 delegation for negotiations with Kosovo Albanians at the time, so

3 naturally I followed all of these events.

4 Q. Professor, please look at page 2 of the resolution, last

5 paragraph, where the Security Council calls upon the authorities and the

6 Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter into dialogue. The delegation that

7 you headed and the government, were they ready to enter the dialogue with

8 the Kosovo Albanians as the Security Council Resolution requested you to

9 do?

10 A. Yes, absolutely. The government was ready and it based its

11 position on the part of the resolution which says that the Security

12 Council once again confirms the commitment of all member states to the

13 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of

14 Yugoslavia. That means that it was precisely that position of the

15 Security Council that we used as a basis for insisting on these talks. In

16 this resolution, the Security Council once again calls upon the

17 authorities of FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to enter immediately

18 into meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with international

19 involvement, and to a clear timetable leading to an end of the crisis and

20 to negotiate a political solution to the issue of Kosovo.

21 Therefore, in this resolution they guarantee the sovereignty and

22 territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was a

23 very strong encouragement for the Government of Serbia to persevere in

24 their insistence to hold negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians.

25 Q. If I understood you correctly, the text of this resolution, item 3

1 on the second page, the last paragraph, was quite acceptable to the

2 Government of the Republic of Serbia and the delegation led by you?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Professor, I see that you highlighted or emphasised the part of

5 the resolution that speaks of the commitment of all member states to the

6 sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of

7 Yugoslavia. That's on the previous page.

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Would you please explain why you emphasised this, why you referred

10 to this.

11 A. Well, I did that because as early as its first statement, its

12 first announcement on the 10th of March, 1998, the government as well as

13 the president of the Republic of Serbia in his declaration on the 18th of

14 March, 1998, they both showed willingness to solve the issue of Kosovo and

15 Metohija within the framework of the Republic of Serbia in compliance with

16 the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of

17 Serbia. So in all of those appeals, that was the interpretation of the

18 political dialogue. That is to say we were not considering the change of

19 status of Kosovo and Metohija. And it was not supposed to become an

20 independent state, rather the talks were aimed at establishing what scope

21 of autonomy Kosovo wanted; that needed to be established.

22 Q. Based on your experience and based on those infrequent contacts

23 that you had with the representatives of Kosovo Albanians, tell us what

24 was their position on that issue?

25 A. Well, you have to distinguish between the Kosovo Albanians who

1 came to talk with our delegation who had the same aims, who had the same

2 intentions, as representatives of all other ethnic communities. So in the

3 talks that we had with them they expressed the same efforts, the same

4 convictions. And I suppose that the leaders of the majority political

5 parties of Kosovo Albanians wanted something quite different.

6 Later on we -- it became evident in Rambouillet. They did not

7 want to sign the ten basic principles of the Contact Groups, precisely

8 because one of those principles insisted on territorial integrity and

9 sovereignty of Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Thank you, Professor.

11 Professor, in September the National Assembly of the Republic of

12 Serbia adopted a decision on the temporary Executive Council of the

13 province of Kosovo. Do you remember that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. That's tab 19, P907. Would you please explain this to us, since

16 this was proposed by the government, and you were the deputy prime

17 minister of the government.

18 A. Well, yes, this decision of the government was an expression of

19 the willingness to organise a cabinet in order to solve the daily -- the

20 problems relating to the daily life in Kosovo and Metohija. So this

21 temporary Executive Council of the province of Kosovo and Metohija was

22 precisely a reflection of such intentions on the part of the Republic of

23 Serbia; namely, efforts aimed at solving daily problems encountered by the

24 population of Kosovo and Metohija regardless of their ethnic background.

25 Q. So if I understood you well, that was the reason why the

1 government proposed to the National Assembly to pass a decision forming

2 the provisional Executive Council of the autonomous province of Kosovo and

3 Metohija?

4 A. Yes, that's correct.

5 Q. Thank you. Professor, in 1998 did you meet with Ambassador Hill?

6 A. Yes, I did. I met with Mr. Hill as well as Mr. O'Brien, who was a

7 legal expert. Mr. Hill was not a lawyer. I met with them concerning the

8 drafting of an agreement or perhaps a plan, perhaps I should call it a

9 plan for self rule, in Kosovo and Metohija. Mr. Vladan Kutlesic was

10 always a participant in such talks on our side. At the time he was deputy

11 prime minister of the federal government. Both of us are constitutional

12 lawyers.

13 Q. Would you please explain the process to us. This was the draft

14 proposal or plan for self rule in Kosovo. Would you tell us how this

15 transpired, how frequent these meetings were, over what period of time,

16 and so on.

17 A. Well, these meetings took place all the way up until 1999, if I

18 remember well. The composition of delegations was always the same. In

19 those meetings, Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien, or rather, to those meetings

20 Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien would bring in their proposals for this plan or

21 agreement on self-administration of Kosovo, we would give our comments,

22 and then they would go with our comments to Kosovo and Metohija and then

23 come back to us to convey to us whether the Kosovo Albanians accepted or

24 not the suggestions given by us.

25 There were -- I can't tell you how many versions of this plan for

1 self-administration in Kosovo and Metohija. There were a lot of them. I

2 know that I wrote an article for Politika concerning one of the last

3 versions of this agreement, and as I was able to establish later, many of

4 those ideas or solutions were later integrated into the draft agreement in

5 Rambouillet, especially annex 1 or chapter 1 which was entitled

6 "Constitution for Kosovo and Metohija."

7 Q. Professor, was President Milutinovic involved in the talks with

8 Chris Hill?

9 A. Yes, President Milutinovic was involved in those talks as well,

10 quite actively so. However, the wording of the provisions was something

11 that Mr. Kutlesic and I mostly dealt with it on our side, and it was

12 Mr. O'Brien who did that on the US side.

13 Q. This contact with Mr. Hill and Mr. O'Brien and the exchange of

14 drafts which, as you say, were taken to Kosovo in order to be discussed

15 with the representatives of the majority political parties of Albanians,

16 was that the kind of mediation that we discussed a bit earlier? Is that

17 what you saw under this mediation role?

18 A. Yes, that's what I understood under their mediation role. This is

19 what the mediation boiled down to, namely, that the draft plan which was

20 most likely produced by Mr. O'Brien would be given to us to comment upon

21 them, and then they would take our comments to Pristina, obtain the

22 opinion of Kosovo Albanians concerning them, and then convey that to us.

23 So they were facilitators, they were mediators in these

24 non-existing contacts between Mr. Milutinovic, Mr. Kutlesic, and myself on

25 one side and Kosovo Albanians on the other side.

1 Q. Professor, you did not have any contact with the representatives

2 of the majority Albanian parties in Kosovo, as I understood, because of

3 their refusal to show up for talks; is that correct?

4 A. Apart from the date you mentioned, the 22nd of May, 1998, I think

5 we never had any other contact with them. This includes the meetings in

6 Rambouillet and Paris. In Rambouillet there was one instance of physical

7 contact, but it was not a dialogue. It was a monologue by each side in

8 the presence of Madeleine Albright.

9 Q. Professor, regardless of the mediating mission of Mr. Hill and

10 Mr. O'Brien, as the delegation of the Serbian Assembly, you continued

11 making attempts to invite the representatives of the majority Albanian

12 parties for talks, did you not?

13 A. Yes, we did, because throughout this time we felt that direct

14 contacts and direct talks were the most fruitful way to find a solution

15 rather than talking through mediators who, let it be said, knew very

16 little about the history of the problem, all the manifestations of the

17 problem in the present, and who were not familiar with the spirit of our

18 legal system either because these were people coming from a completely

19 different legal system. The legal terminology was quite different. These

20 were the reasons for the misunderstandings we had in our contacts.

21 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember that you sent a letter to

22 Mr. Agani in early October 1998?

23 A. Yes, I do.

24 Q. Would you please look at tab 22, 1D063. Is that your letter?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Could you please briefly comment on this letter because -- well,

2 especially on the last paragraph of this letter.

3 A. Well, in the letter for the umpteenth time, the conviction is

4 expressed of the advantages of dialogue and solving all outstanding issues

5 by political means in the interest of all the citizens and national or

6 ethnic communities living in Kosovo and Metohija, and in the passage

7 before the last it says that I'm asking Mr. Agani to consider this an open

8 invitation, and I say that I hope we will soon have an opportunity to

9 agree on a time for the continuation of the talks. In other words, to

10 determine the date ourselves. However, this also remains simply a voice

11 calling in the desert, crying out in the desert, without any response.

12 Q. When you said that you asked Professor Agani to consider this an

13 open invitation, an open-ended call, does that mean that you were willing

14 to meet him and talk to him at any time, anywhere?

15 A. Yes, the second sentence states that and clarifies it.

16 Q. Thank you. Professor, you remember a conversation -- well, you

17 were aware that President Milosevic had talks with Mr. Holbrooke in early

18 October 1998, and these led to an agreement. Do you remember that?

19 A. Yes, I know about that.

20 Q. The Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement was presented to the cabinet.

21 Do you remember that?

22 A. Yes, it was. The president of the republic, Milan Milutinovic,

23 informed the cabinet of the content of those talks and that agreement.

24 Q. And did the cabinet accept the agreement achieved between

25 President Milosevic and Richard Holbrooke?

1 A. Yes, it did and it established 11 points for the solution of the

2 unresolved issue of Kosovo and Metohija.

3 Q. Thank you. Professor, are you aware that this fact was something

4 that Yugoslavia informed the Security Council about?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. Would you please look at tab 27, 1D204. Our then charge d'affaire

7 in the mission to the United Nations in New York, Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic,

8 signed the letter; do you see that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. This letter contains the 11 points you mentioned which the

11 Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted, does it not?

12 A. Yes, they are set out in order.

13 Q. And it also contains a certain timetable or schedule containing

14 the dates by which certain agreements were to be achieved and some sort of

15 preparatory documents prepared, does it not?

16 A. Yes. Dates are mentioned. You see, it's all in English. There's

17 no need for me to explain it.

18 Q. Professor, that schedule mentioned here, of which the Security

19 Council was notified, was also adopted by the government, was it not, on

20 the same date?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Thank you. Professor, tell me, to the best of your knowledge did

23 the government implement this agreement, or rather, these 11 points which

24 it adopted in October 1998?

25 A. I don't understand what you mean by "implement." What do you

1 imply by that?

2 Q. Well, carry out.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Thank you. Professor, even after all of this you continued going

5 to Kosovo, yes or no?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Were you in Kosovo with President Milutinovic on the 5th of

8 November, 1998?

9 A. Yes, I was. That was the second time President Milutinovic was

10 going to Kosovo and Metohija with the delegation.

11 Q. Will you please look at tab 31, 1D40 --

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 1D045.

13 MR. ZECEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Do you remember the communique and the statement made for the

15 public by President Milutinovic at the time?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Is it the one you have before you?

18 A. Yes, precisely so.

19 Q. In paragraph 2, as we see, President Milutinovic is still

20 referring to a firm agreement for the solution of all issues by political

21 means.

22 A. Yes. He expressed the standpoint in the declaration of the 18th

23 of March of 1998.

24 Q. Now that you've said this, Professor, do you know whether

25 President Milutinovic ever changed this standpoint?

1 A. No, never.

2 Q. Thank you. On page 2 President Milutinovic in the passage before

3 the last of his statement explains how the authorities and all of the

4 Republic of Serbia sees the OSCE mission. Can you comment on this and was

5 this the way you saw it also and was this is the position of the

6 government, the cabinet?

7 A. Yes, that was the reason why the OSCE mission was accepted, in the

8 interest of finding out the truth about the events in Kosovo and Metohija

9 and to deal with and get rid of media harangues, as is stated here, to

10 present the truth to the world, eliminate rumours, speculation, and

11 organise media incitement and the like.

12 Q. Thank you, Professor. You said at the very outset that this was

13 the second time that President Milutinovic went to Kosovo together with a

14 delegation. Do you remember how many times in total President Milutinovic

15 went to Kosovo with a delegation?

16 A. As far as I can remember on one more occasion and that had to do

17 with the signing of the so-called Pristina declaration.

18 Q. Professor, tell me, what in your view was the reason why

19 President Milutinovic went to Kosovo with the delegation for the meetings

20 with the representatives of the majority Albanian parties?

21 A. The reason was the one I've already mentioned. The high state

22 official, the head of state, directly elected by the citizens, even though

23 he had no strong effective constitutional power, wished by his presence to

24 indicate the significance attached by the state to those talks to

25 encourage and motivate the representatives of the majority Albanian

1 parties for political dialogue and by presenting his ideas on what

2 starting principles to adopt for the talks to contribute to the beginning

3 of a dialogue. And these efforts are all evident in the president's

4 declaration, his statement which sets out all these ideas, saying that

5 closing themselves into a cultural and ethnic ghetto was not a solution.

6 Q. You mentioned the third occasion on which President Milutinovic

7 went to Kosovo. Please take a look at tab 33, 1D622, and this is his

8 introductory statement at the talks with the representatives of national

9 communities in Kosovo and Metohija, Pristina, 18th of November, 1998. Do

10 you remember that meeting?

11 A. Yes, I do.

12 Q. Do you remember the president's keynote speech?

13 A. Yes. In his keynote speech the president again expressed his

14 basic ideas, which were, so to speak, the red thread, a constant in his

15 views on the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija.

16 Q. In any case, this boiled down to the need for a political solution

17 which was indispensable?

18 A. Yes, precisely so. That was the starting point in President

19 Milutinovic's ideas.

20 Q. Please look at 1D623, these are the concluding remarks by the

21 president. Do you remember his concluding remarks at that same meeting?

22 A. Yes, I do.

23 Q. Thank you. Professor, do you remember that President Milutinovic

24 too sent letters to the Albanian leaders, in a bid to in a way encourage

25 them, stimulate them, to attend meetings with the delegation, do you

1 remember that?

2 A. Yes, I do.

3 Q. Do you remember who he sent those letters to, the political

4 leaders or also prominent members of the Albanian community in Kosovo?

5 A. He sent letters to both, he sent letters to the political leaders,

6 the political leaders of the Albanian ethnic community, Mr. Qausha,

7 Hyseni, Demaqi.

8 Q. Therefore, both the government and the president did their best.

9 How can we understand this? An attempt was made to talk to the Albanian

10 leaders at all costs, or perhaps there's a different interpretation that

11 you would suggest?

12 A. This was an effort that was made to encourage those most prominent

13 among Kosovo's Albanians. For example, Mr. Qausha has an academic

14 reputation, not merely a political one. An attempt, as I said, to talk,

15 to use their authority, to use their reputation in order to contribute to

16 political talks and in order to stop armed clashes throughout Kosovo.

17 Q. Can you please look at tab 36, Professor, 1D066, are these the

18 letters that we have been mentioning, the letters to Qausha, to Demaqi, to

19 Hyseni?

20 A. Yes, these are the very letters. Their substance is identical.

21 They were just sent to different persons, and I explained why these very

22 persons. These are important persons in the Albanian ethnic community.

23 These are not just politicians. Their importance is not solely political.

24 MR. ZECEVIC: I think it's time, Your Honours, for a break. I

25 definitely need one I can tell you -- I can assure you that and Professor

1 too, I believe.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, Professor, that's it for today. The usher

3 will escort you from the court, and we'll continue tomorrow at 9.00.

4 [The witness stands down].

5 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 3.30 p.m.,

6 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 9th day of

7 August, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

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