1 Tuesday, 25 September 2007

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Before we start on the question of evidence today,

6 I have two matters I wish to raise in relation to expert reports.

7 Mr. Hannis, you expressed concern before about the timing of the

8 disclosure of the report by Radinovic. It is now available. He's

9 scheduled, I think, to give evidence next week. That means that the

10 normal provisions of Rule 94 would have to be modified to enable that to

11 happen.

12 Do you ever a clear position on that or is it something you're

13 still reflecting on?

14 MR. HANNIS: Well, Your Honour, I am still reflecting on it. I

15 can tell you if he is permitted to testify as an expert we do wish to

16 cross-examine him. I can commit to that.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You don't surprise me.

18 MR. HANNIS: And I would indicate that we would propose to file

19 some objections to portions of his reported based on my initial viewing of

20 it that I think may not be relevant, and we also have an argument to make

21 to him similar to our argument that we made regarding Professor Markovic

22 at the beginning of the case that we think he's too close to the Defence

23 side of the case and he's too biased to testify as an expert. I know we

24 failed on our application regarding Professor Markovic, but I think

25 there's grounds to make that argument again and I would propose to do so.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Is it still possible though to have all this done

2 and give evidence next week?

3 MR. HANNIS: Your Honour, I find that very difficult. I just got

4 the report today in English. I just got the updated report today in

5 English which is some 30 pages longer than what we got a couple of days

6 ago. In addition I'm trying to prepare for the possible cross-examination

7 of General Ojdanic if he indeed does testify and during both those things

8 at the same time is extremely burdensome.

9 I don't know if the Court is willing to consider the possibility

10 of having the Defence expert testify later, at some other stage in the

11 case. I know you would like to conclude this accused's portion of the

12 case now or as soon as possible, but I propose that as an alternative.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Visnjic, it is obvious that there

14 are potential difficulties for the Prosecution in meeting a time scale

15 that would enable Radinovic to give evidence next week, so some other

16 option may have to be considered.

17 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I find it hard to take

18 a position now in view of what Mr. Hannis has said.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: One possibility would be to have him testify at the

20 end of the case like other experts which we were told would be the course

21 followed.

22 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] I leave that to the Trial Chamber to

23 decide, but I believe that the other Defence teams should have their say

24 as well.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, let's leave this until tomorrow and have a

1 brief discussion then once everyone has had a chance to think further of

2 it. It will be clearer in our minds.

3 The second issue is also one of expert evidence and that's the

4 report of Branislav Simonovic.

5 Mr. Ivetic, I have been advised of the various discussions you've

6 been having with -- just give me a moment, please. Various discussions

7 you've been having with the CLSS on this subject. They are not likely, as

8 I see it, to bear fruit. On the other hand, the issues that you are

9 discussing are matters which you can clearly make submissions to the Trial

10 Chamber about. The issue has arisen before, and it's one that seems a

11 matter for us to resolve in due course in the light of all the evidence.

12 The witness himself can give evidence about it, and it seems to me that

13 the application you've made is not really going to take the matter any

14 further or advance it at this stage.

15 Now, do you see a particular reason why we should address the

16 issue at this stage?

17 MR. IVETIC: Well, Your Honour, it comes with the culmination of

18 the growing set of headaches we've had recently with translations where we

19 find that what is being translated is not what witnesses are saying and in

20 essence --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's concentrate on this one this is a very

22 specific example in which the position of CLSS is clear.

23 MR. IVETIC: We have proposed that we use the acronym PJP and

24 that's what we'd still like to do to avoid any confusion and for our part

25 we're going to try and use the full Serbian name of the unit when dealing

1 with the expert when he is here to testify. So from our side we are going

2 to try to alleviate any confusion over -- over that -- that issue so that

3 the evidence can be led and that the expert can be satisfied that his

4 expert opinion is being expressed with the words that he -- that he

5 chooses to use to explain the various organs and functioning of the units.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: But bearing in mind that you have every opportunity

7 to make whatever submissions you wish, you -- do you intend to insist on

8 this application?

9 MR. IVETIC: Your Honour, we have so much work that having to make

10 submission on an issue like this could add a hardship. I don't know

11 exactly what kind of submissions are necessary. If the Court is aware of

12 the issue and keeps that in mind when listening to the testimony, I think

13 that serves the purpose of -- of us bringing it to the Court's attention.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I think it would assist greatly if this

15 application were withdrawn. It would make no -- it's going to make no

16 difference to how the matter's dealt with in the end of the day.

17 MR. IVETIC: Okay. I'll check with the counsel and we'll have an

18 answer for you later today or tomorrow.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Tomorrow when we deal with the other issue as well

20 because they're both related to the determination of the date by which any

21 submissions by the Prosecution ought to be made in relation to these two

22 reports.

23 MR. IVETIC: Right.

24 [Trial Chamber confers]

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we'll hear further on both these matters

1 tomorrow.

2 Now, Mr. Visnjic, can we start with the evidence?

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before we move on to

4 the evidence, I would briefly like to address the Trial Chamber. It has

5 to do with the witness who is supposed to testify now. I think we should

6 move into private session, please.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well.

8 [Private session]

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12 [Open session]

13 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Can we have the videolink now.

15 WITNESS: GEZA FARKAS

16 [Witness testified via videolink]

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Good afternoon, Mr. Farkas.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Good afternoon.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Would you make the solemn declaration to speak the

20 truth by reading aloud the document before you.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

22 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Please be seated. You will now be

24 examined by Mr. Visnjic on behalf of Mr. Ojdanic.

25 Mr. Visnjic.

1 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Examination by Mr. Visnjic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, General.

4 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Visnjic.

5 Q. General, can you tell us what position you had in the military

6 hierarchy in 1999?

7 A. In 1999, I was chief of the security administration of the army of

8 Yugoslavia.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note while the witness is speaking

10 could all other microphones please be switched off. We cannot hear him.

11 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. When were you appointed to that position?

13 A. I was appointed to that position on the 24th of March, 1999.

14 Q. Tell me, how did that happen? How did you get appointed to that

15 position as chief of the security administration?

16 A. Before that position, I was assistant minister of defence for

17 Civil Defence and through the cabinet of the federal minister I was

18 invited 10 or 15 days before the aggression started to

19 President Milosevic's office. President Milosevic presented his views and

20 this possibility of appointing me to this particular position.

21 Q. At that time did you talk about the position that

22 General Dimitrijevic would have who is your predecessor as chief of the

23 security administration?

24 A. Yes, I did. I asked him about that.

25 Q. And what were you told then?

1 A. The president said to me then that Mr. Aco Dimitrijevic would be

2 appointed Assistant Federal Minister of Defence to unify the work of the

3 security services at the level of all of the Federal Republic of

4 Yugoslavia. Civilian and military security that is.

5 Q. Thank you. General, when you came to head the security

6 administration did you carry out any major personnel changes?

7 A. I did not carry out any major personnel changes. Only the

8 necessary ones envisaged by our regulations in relation to wartime

9 establishment.

10 Q. Thank you. General Gajic testified before this Tribunal, and he

11 spoke at length about the work of the security administration and what it

12 did. I don't want to go through all of that with you now. I want to ask

13 you about the following, though: General Gajic testified before this

14 Court that at the very outset of the war there was a change in the system

15 of information flow and the system of communications from lower to higher

16 security organs.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Can you tell us why these changes took place?

19 A. Yes. It is only natural that once a war starts a new system of

20 communications is established. There is wartime formation of all units,

21 staffs, and commands. The communications used until then had probably

22 been intercepted and the codes must have been broken. So that is one

23 reason, technical.

24 The second is the speed of information flows through secure lines

25 that existed between the subordinate units, those two -- or, rather,

1 between the units that were subordinated and the Supreme Command Staff.

2 The security organs are integrated in these staffs and these commands, and

3 then along the chain of command they informed their superior commands up

4 the chain up to the Supreme Command Staff.

5 Q. General, what would be the basic document, then, through which

6 reporting was supposed to go during the war in the field of security?

7 A. The basic document was the regular and extraordinary combat report

8 from subordinate units to the Supreme Command Staff.

9 Q. As far as I was able to understand from what General Gajic said,

10 up until the beginning of the war there was direct communication, line of

11 communication. By that I mean frequent or regular communication between

12 the security organs along the security line, but when the war began in

13 accordance with what you said this line of communication went through the

14 commands of the subordinate units and through combat reports. Did I

15 understand you correctly?

16 A. Yes. That's correct. You understood me correctly.

17 Q. Thank you. General, why did you in early May go to Kosovo? Could

18 you please tell us?

19 A. Well, the first reason was that we had a situation there. Some

20 information was not specific enough, especially as regards to security

21 affairs. And then the Chief of the General Staff -- or, rather, of the

22 Supreme Command Staff ordered me to go down to Kosovo and to see where the

23 problem lay, because he suspected that those reports were not reaching him

24 regularly, and he thought that what he was getting was not sufficient for

25 his decision-making.

1 Q. Could you please tell me, once you went down to Kosovo, and let me

2 repeat that was in early May, what did you find there? How long did you

3 spend there, and what information did you gather there?

4 A. I spent a short time there, just two days, and I reported to the

5 commander of the army as per usual procedure. He had known that I would

6 come. And I did learn something about the way that the security organs in

7 the lower organisation and units were functioning. I learned that they

8 were carrying out their tasks properly, in a very good manner, and my

9 knowledge from the level of the brigade and onwards at the regular

10 reporting with their commands and their commanders, this was all made part

11 of those reports and all this information finally reached the Supreme

12 Command Staff of the chain of command through those reports. But I did

13 encounter some problems that were presented there. I did learn that there

14 were some problems in terms of vertical cooperation between the military

15 organs and security organs and the MUP.

16 Q. Thank you. From the reports that you got at the General Staff up

17 until that time and what you learned in this previous period of time, were

18 there any differences in what you had been getting up until that time, up

19 the line that you received those combat reports and what you were able to

20 establish in the field.

21 A. Yes, there were differences, and the difference was that some

22 crimes were committed and some of the measures that had been prescribed

23 had not been complied with. Reports in those units up the level of the

24 brigade were regularly reported to their superior commands, but this

25 information never reached us. So I learned that criminal offences were

1 being committed, crimes, including crimes, in this area.

2 Q. Thank you. When you came back to Belgrade, sir, what -- what did

3 you do in relation to this issue?

4 A. Well, I first met with my collegium, and I informed my collegium

5 about the results and what I had learned down there at Kosovo. After

6 that, immediately after that, I reported orally to the chief of the

7 General Staff about what I had noted.

8 Q. What was his reaction?

9 A. His reaction was a strong one because of these events, and at that

10 time I was unable to give him quite some specific details because I had

11 been there for a very short time, and he wanted all that to be established

12 once again. He wanted all the details, and then he said that he would

13 report to the Supreme Commander.

14 Q. And do you know or can you recall whether General Ojdanic had in

15 fact informed the Supreme Commander, President Milosevic, and what

16 happened after that?

17 A. Yes. He informed Mr. Milosevic immediately about this problem.

18 They discussed it. Milosevic ordered something, and I know, because he

19 told me that, the chief of staff of the Supreme Command told me that

20 Milosevic would convene a meeting on the 17th of May on the topic of the

21 way in which those problems that I noted down in Kosovo could be solved.

22 Q. Thank you. But before this meeting on the 17th of May, you did

23 have a meeting within the army of Yugoslavia on this very same topic.

24 Could you tell us something more about that?

25 A. Well, before this meeting, the chief of staff of the Supreme

1 Command decided to call the commander of the 3rd Army, Mr. Pavkovic, in

2 order to prepare for this meeting.

3 Q. General, could you please describe to us briefly what happened at

4 that meeting on the 16th, if I'm not mistaken. That's based on what

5 General Gajic had told us in his evidence, but I may have gone too far

6 with this question.

7 According to General Gajic's evidence, this meeting was held on

8 the 16th of May.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Could you please tell us briefly what was discussed at that

11 meeting?

12 A. Well, the chief of staff of the Supreme Command asked the 3rd Army

13 commander to report to him on the overall security situation in -- in the

14 area of responsibility of the 3rd Army, area of the focus of the 3rd Army.

15 Q. And what did General Pavkovic report to you at that time?

16 A. As far as I know, because I had not had any contacts, major

17 contacts, with him before that, he told us -- he told you all of us that

18 there were some problems and that crimes had been committed in the area of

19 responsibility of the 3rd Army and that some army of Yugoslavia troops

20 participated in the commission of those crimes. So he gave an overall

21 assessment of the security situation in Kosovo, and he added this

22 information too.

23 Q. General, do you remember who attended this meeting?

24 A. In addition to the chief of the Supreme Command Staff and the 3rd

25 Army commander; I was there, General Vasiljevic my deputy was there; and

1 so was general -- or at that time I think he was still a colonel, Gajic.

2 Q. General, the information that you received from General Pavkovic

3 at that time was something that was relatively new for you. You didn't

4 know any of that with the exception of what you learned during your brief

5 stay in Kosovo.

6 A. We were not aware of the details that he presented to us.

7 Q. Could you please tell us or describe briefly the meeting at the --

8 at President Milosevic's on the 17th of May, 1999. Who was present at

9 that meeting?

10 A. Well, at that meeting, apart from President Milosevic, there was

11 General Ojdanic; Rade Markovic who was the head of the state security

12 there representing the MUP, the Ministry of the Interior; I was there; my

13 deputy Aco Vasiljevic; and General Gajic.

14 Q. Could you please tell us briefly how the meeting progressed?

15 A. The previous day at the meeting with General Pavkovic we agreed on

16 an order in which we would present the problems at this forthcoming

17 meeting, and we agreed that General Pavkovic would make some opening

18 remarks and that he would report to the president about the military,

19 political, and security situation in Kosovo. He was the first one to take

20 the floor.

21 Q. And General Pavkovic, as far as I understood from General Gajic's

22 evidence, he repeated what he had already told you the day before at the

23 meeting on the 16th?

24 A. Yes, that is correct. He repeated all that, and he stressed that

25 at that forum. He stressed this problem. I think that Sainovic was also

1 there at that meeting. I forgot to mention that. Yes, Mr. Sainovic was

2 present at that meeting.

3 General Pavkovic at that meeting put a great emphasis on the

4 problems with the cooperation with the MUP, and he even proposed that a

5 commission be set up, a joint commission, that would deal with all those

6 problems and control all those security problems, problems regarding the

7 crimes, a commission that would control both the army and the MUP. And

8 Mr. Sainovic agreed with this proposal made by General Pavkovic, and he

9 said that that should be a state commission.

10 Q. General, was there any discussion about the resubordination of MUP

11 at that meeting or just the cooperation with the MUP?

12 A. Well, the problem of the resubordination actually led to the

13 problems that occurred down there, because in the military chain of

14 command the order of -- for the resubordination was disseminated to all

15 the military units, and this was not done in the MUP for the

16 resubordination of the MUP organisational units on the ground.

17 Q. What were the conclusions reached at that meeting?

18 A. Well, many topics were presented there. The crimes were

19 discussed, the crimes that were detected, prosecuted, that were still in

20 some kind of procedure. The president ordered, because the minister of

21 the interior was not present at that meeting, the president ordered that

22 Rade Markovic should meet with the minister as urgently as possible and to

23 resolve those problems including the problem of the para-police forces

24 that were present there on the ground. I had learned about that and

25 General Pavkovic presented that problem at the meeting. And the president

1 ordered that Rade Markovic as soon as possible, that the para-police

2 forces should be removed from Kosovo as soon as possible, that the

3 perpetrators, known perpetrators of crimes from those formations should be

4 investigated, should be brought before a Court and those units should not

5 come to that area again. That was one of the conclusions that the

6 president presented to the MUP.

7 As for us, he told us that because of the fierceness of the

8 airstrikes and the current situation, according to the assessment made by

9 General Pavkovic, he said that the army should take everything it could to

10 prevent even a single square foot of our territory from falling into the

11 enemy hands. He ordered that the defence efforts along the borders with

12 Albania and Macedonia should be increased. And because there were some

13 para-police and paramilitary formations in the territory of Yugoslavia, he

14 ordered that if necessary that the Drim [as interpreted] should be closed

15 off to prevent the incursion of any forces that could commit those crimes

16 that could later be ascribed to the police and the military.

17 Q. General, at 5 -- 15, line 18, you said Drim?

18 A. No, I said Drina, the Drina River. The border along the Drina

19 River facing Republika Srpska.

20 Q. Thank you. What happened after that order -- that meeting? What

21 orders did General Ojdanic issue?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment before you embark on that question.

23 Could I be clear about one thing, Mr. Farkas. You've told us about the

24 meeting of quite a number of people with President Milosevic, including

25 representatives of the military and the Ministry of the Interior. When

1 that meeting came to an end was there a smaller meeting, a smaller group,

2 who stayed behind and discussed matters further with President Milosevic?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know about that. General

4 Ojdanic took us there immediately, and all the representatives of the

5 military accompanied him. And as we -- I don't know how people left the

6 room, in what order. I merely know that we all headed out with General

7 Ojdanic.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: When you say "all," who are you referring to?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm referring to the representatives

10 of the army, myself, General Vasiljevic, and General Gajic.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: And in answering, you've omitted any reference to

12 General Pavkovic.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, General Pavkovic. I apologise.

14 So all the soldiers, all the military officers accompanied General Ojdanic

15 out of the room.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: We've heard some evidence, I think, that General

17 Pavkovic stayed. Are you clear that he left with you?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It seems to me that I'm certain that

19 all of us just stood up and went out, this group of officer around

20 General Ojdanic. It seems to me that all of us generals of the army

21 headed out in a single group.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, it may be I'm mistaken in my recollection of

23 that matter, and I shall check it.

24 Please continue, Mr. Visnjic.

25 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

1 Q. General, what orders were given you immediately after that meeting

2 by General Ojdanic?

3 A. As we were still walking going out of the meeting, while we were

4 still in that group he was issuing orders to build up measures of security

5 facing the border. And to me specifically he said that I should form an

6 extremely strong group of security organs and come with him, inspect the

7 basic units and inspect security organs in the area of Kosovo.

8 Q. General, did you indeed set up that team?

9 A. Yes. I immediately set up that team headed by General Vasiljevic.

10 There was also General Lajic on that team.

11 THE INTERPRETER: Gajic, interpreter's correction.

12 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. From the testimony of General Gajic and General Vasiljevic, we

14 know that they did go to Kosovo. In the course of their stay there, did

15 you have any communication with them?

16 A. Yes, we did communicate.

17 Q. Thank you. We will move on to that in a moment, but I want to ask

18 you, do you know that General Ojdanic perhaps gave orders to other

19 administrations, other organs of the General Staff in connection with that

20 meeting in President Milosevic's office?

21 A. Yes, I know that later, but I can't say exactly when. Maybe that

22 afternoon. There was talk within that group that he should urgently issue

23 orders asking reports from the judiciary on the crimes that had been

24 committed and the measures taken in that regard.

25 Q. Thank you. General, you said a moment ago that you did

1 communicate with General Vasiljevic and General Gajic while they were in

2 Kosovo.

3 May the Defence Exhibit 3D633 be prepared, please.

4 A. Yes. That's a report from the 2nd of June, 1999, at the staff.

5 Q. Thank you. General, you told us that this report took place on

6 the 2nd of June, 1999. Were you present?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. On page 1, both in English and in Serbian, we see that below your

9 name there are certain notes.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. I will be asking you about the part of those notes that begin with

12 the words -- that's line 6 below your name that begins with the

13 words: "Taking measures in connection with the events in Cetinje."

14 Sorry -- correction: "Taking measures to redress the situation in the

15 Pristina Corps."

16 A. Yes, that's what's written.

17 Q. Then two lines below we see: "In Kosovo misdeeds are being --

18 crimes are being committed by our units in Kosovo. Reports on these acts

19 are not going through regular channels or lines of command." The next

20 sentence: "Are serious things happening that the global public is aware

21 of?"

22 There must be a problem on this record here. Did you have any

23 information, any specific information when you made this report?

24 A. At that time, that was towards the end of the war operations, we

25 had certain problems with some units. One part of the 7th Brigade had

1 left their positions even before. There were disruptions. People were

2 losing their nerve have especially among the reservists and there were

3 security problems. That was on the one hand.

4 On the other hand, there was some members of the reserve force

5 that took advantage of the overall situation to commit criminal acts.

6 Q. And when you say that the reports about this were not going

7 through regular channels or lines of command, what did you mean?

8 A. I meant the regular reports that should have gone up the line of

9 command through brigades, corps, armies to the staff of the Supreme

10 Command.

11 Q. Thank you. When you told me that you had certain indications even

12 before you came to Kosovo, before you first went to visit Kosovo in end

13 April, early May, what kind of indications did you have that were not in

14 line with the combat reports?

15 A. It was the time of the most intensive operations, and a large

16 number of reservists were in Kosovo, up to 15.000 men, and the scale of

17 these operations and events posed a problem in itself. These problems

18 were not regularly reported on through the regular channels and up the

19 line of command to the Supreme Command Staff. But apart from these

20 security organs that were parts of units, that were part of the units that

21 were directly subordinated to the commanders that formed an integral part

22 of their staffs and that participated in the drafting of reports, apart

23 from those security organs that took care of the intern security of units

24 there were so-called counter-intelligence groups that were protecting

25 units from outside assaults on the security from outside threats. They

1 were directly subordinated, and it was from them that I learned that some

2 crimes were being committed but also that they are being prosecuted. Some

3 are already before courts. But there was none of that in the regular

4 combat reports.

5 Those were the indications I had that prompted the commander of

6 the Supreme Command Staff to tell me to go there myself.

7 Q. I'd like Exhibit 3D493 to be prepared.

8 General, when did Generals Vasiljevic and Gajic and other members

9 of their team return from Kosovo?

10 A. Sometime around the 7th, if I remember well.

11 Q. And could you tell us, when they returned did they make their

12 reports, and what happened after that?

13 A. They reported verbally to their senior staff meeting outlining

14 their assessment of the operation and work of security organs within basic

15 units, that is brigades, and their assessment was positive saying that

16 within their competencies and to the extent of their abilities they're

17 working well detecting crimes and criminal acts and trying in those

18 difficult wartime conditions to prepare them for prosecution.

19 Q. On the 8th of June, 1999, did you report that to the chief of the

20 Supreme Command Staff?

21 A. Yes, I did.

22 Q. Could you please -- first of all, do you have the Serbian version

23 typewritten, printed, or in longhand?

24 A. I have the printed version.

25 Q. I believe in this exhibit there's another attachment which has the

1 printed B/C/S version.

2 General, here on page 1 we see the beginning of your presentation.

3 It has mainly to do with events in Montenegro.

4 Can we have page 2, please, in B/C/S. That is, could you look at

5 page 2 in B/C/S, especially the passage after the line that says: "There

6 are problems, humanitarian crime." And then the second line says: "A

7 complete analysis has been made, led by the deputy chief of the security

8 administration."

9 You are talking here about the report made to you by

10 Generals Vasiljevic and Gajic?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Now, could you tell us a bit more. What exactly did you say to

13 the Supreme Command Staff?

14 A. Well, based on this evaluation they made, I've already said that

15 the security organs down there, as parts of their respective commands,

16 took part in the work of the commands and reported all their findings.

17 And the inspecting organs that I sent found out that over 90 per cent, 95

18 per cent of these criminal acts were prosecuted. The perpetrators were

19 under investigation or arrest and that some active-duty personnel were

20 among the perpetrators. That is, both soldiers and officers.

21 Q. And you reported that you had issued certain orders to you

22 security organs?

23 A. Yes. I included that because by that time it was already a

24 certainty that we would withdraw from Kosovo. It was the 76th day of the

25 war, and of course I issued orders to our organs. I had sent

1 reinforcement and assistance to the basic units, primarily the Pristina

2 Corps, in order to organise the pull-out of all the forces out of Kosovo

3 in keeping with the Kumanova agreement.

4 Q. General, could we now look at page 4 in B/C/S. And it's page 4 in

5 English.

6 At the top of the page there's a sentence that I don't understand.

7 You uttered it. "There are incidents where pellets are thrown in fields

8 and ignited by heat."

9 What does this refer to?

10 A. This is a reference to the NATO aviation. In addition to bombs

11 and other projectiles, that's before our pull-out from the territory but

12 after the decision had been made, we analysed those pellets that they

13 ejected, caused fire and destroyed farms. Those pellets took fire under

14 the sun. It was self-ignition, self-combustion.

15 Q. Now, tell me, what did General Ojdanic order regarding your

16 presentation, that is, the conclusions and findings of your controller

17 team in Kosovo that --

18 A. He gave them credit.

19 Q. Go ahead, General.

20 A. He gave them credit. He commended the security administration and

21 the team that worked in Kosovo trying to document -- document all that was

22 impermissible under international laws of war as he had ordered himself in

23 his prior orders. So he commended the security organs on all levels

24 because under those difficult wartime circumstances they a good job.

25 Q. Now, General, that we saw your presentation and we know that there

1 were certain problems. Where would you say was the problem in providing

2 information about crimes that were possibly committed?

3 A. Well, the problem was that at certain levels -- the lower levels

4 the job was done well, but at certain levels this information underwent

5 filtering and certain processing before it reached the Supreme Command

6 Staff. The reports were not specific enough, were not clear enough, and

7 they were not comprehensive enough, so they did not enable a good

8 evaluation, a proper evaluation. Because the war was not only in Kosovo.

9 There was war on our entire territory. And some of these phenomena had

10 repercussions and happened in other territories, Montenegro and in other

11 regions. So the people who worked on this did not properly report to the

12 Supreme Command Staff on what they had done.

13 Q. Thank you. Now I'd like to ask you to have a look at 3D487,

14 please.

15 General, you have the document before you, don't you?

16 A. I do.

17 Q. These are tasks that the chief of the Supreme Command Staff set at

18 a meeting held on the 8th of June, 1999.

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Could you please pay attention to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this

21 document, and could you give us your comments regarding paragraphs 1 and

22 3?

23 A. "The military judicial organs shall resolve criminal reports

24 according to the following priorities: First, violations of provisions of

25 international law; second, crime in the Yugoslav army; third, desertion;

1 and four, other crimes, other criminal offences."

2 That is to say that through this paragraph he reacts to everything

3 that was learned and sublimated until then, and he even says in which

4 order organs should take measures and work.

5 And what was the other paragraph you asked about?

6 Q. Paragraph 3, just briefly, please.

7 A. Yes. "Monitor paramilitary organisations in the territory

8 (objective, forces, leadership, locations, and so on) take action falling

9 within your own remit and inform the MUP of the Republic of Serbia about

10 that."

11 A comment in this respect would be that when the decision was made

12 to withdraw the forces the army and the MUP from the territory of Kosovo

13 and Metohija certain problems were created in the area among the army,

14 among the civilian population in terms of carrying this out. The officers

15 were there with their families. They had their marching orders. They

16 were retreating. And the status of their families had not been resolved

17 fully. That moment was taken advantage of by destructive forces that

18 wanted to remain in Kosovo, and also military conscripts on the condition

19 that their weapons were left to them. That situation had to be dealt with

20 and one had to leave the area with one's head high, and all other problems

21 should have been resolved through political and diplomatic channels and

22 means.

23 Q. General, as far as I understood the further course of events this

24 was rather successfully prevented and no military troops remained in

25 Kosovo.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. Among the Serbian population that remained in Kosovo.

3 A. That's right. This task was carried out consistently, in a

4 dignified manner, regardless of these problems that we came across. That

5 is to say the security organs, the army MUP and officers of the military.

6 Q. Thank you, General. One more question. After the end of the war

7 the security administration continued working on uncovering perpetrators

8 of crimes.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you tell us something about that?

11 A. Yes. We continued, because many problems were being dealt with

12 only in its -- in their initial stages. That is to say that it was the

13 pre-investigation stage. However, a great many of these problems we could

14 not resolve because as we withdrew from that territory we had no access to

15 the territory. UNMIK forces came to the area and the paramilitary units

16 of the Kosovo Albanians remained there. They had already organised strong

17 military formations, so we did not --

18 Q. I do apologise. Let it be precise for the transcript. When I

19 asked you on page 25, lines 13, 14, 15, whether you continued to work on

20 finding the perpetrators of crimes, I meant crimes -- or, rather, war

21 crimes. I meant violations of international humanitarian law. Are you

22 giving me answers in that spirit?

23 A. Well, yes, precisely in that spirit. These crimes were being

24 dealt with in an initial stage, but we continued within the framework that

25 we had then, because when peace was proclaimed -- or, rather, when there

1 was no more state of war, military courts were disbanded and then civilian

2 courts took over the jurisdiction for resolving these problem, that is to

3 say the gravest crimes.

4 Q. Thank you. And could you please look at 3D1063.

5 A. Yes. Yes. I see that.

6 Q. General, this is a document, this time of the General Staff of the

7 army of Yugoslavia, the security administration, dated the 13th of August,

8 1999.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Can you tell us briefly what the basic motive was for this

11 document -- or, rather, for this order?

12 A. The basic motive was to deal with crimes, particularly war crimes,

13 committed during the course of the war -- or, rather, investigations and

14 the appropriate procedure to continue. And there was a special group of

15 people for that, especially in the 1st Army, whose territory was the best

16 regulated, and security administrations were duty-bound to set up teams

17 and to continue intensively investigations of all war crimes committed

18 during the course of the war.

19 Q. Thank you. General, just a few more questions.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Before moving -- before moving to another area,

21 Mr. Visnjic, may I ask the general one question?

22 General, can you give us an example of a violation of

23 international humanitarian law that you discovered and were able to report

24 on in the course of this investigation.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During this investigation, well, I

1 could not give specific examples because for the most part this moved to

2 the jurisdiction of civilian courts. That is to say that everything that

3 had started in Kosovo from --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Part of the sentence missing, interpreters note.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As military courts were dissolved,

6 then cases were handed over to certain courts in the field, and I have no

7 further reports.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: You may have misunderstood. During the period from

9 your appointment and the investigation you were carrying out through your

10 staff and on which you ultimately - sorry, just a moment - and on which

11 you ultimately reported to the Chief of the General Staff on the 8th of

12 June, can you give me an example of an alleged violation of international

13 humanitarian law that was unearthed during that period?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, there are drastic examples.

15 For example, in one unit, I wouldn't know exactly which one it was, a

16 group headed by an officer, as a matter of fact, committed crimes and

17 killed over 10 people, I think, ethnic Albanians, and they threw them into

18 a well, for example. That was the most drastic case that was resolved

19 afterwards, after it was discovered by the security organs and the

20 commands. There were other cases of rape and so on and so forth, but this

21 was a very drastic case, even more so since an officer took part in this,

22 an officer from the army of Yugoslavia.

23 This was dealt with. The prosecution was carried out. It was

24 taken to court.

25 Well, this is a drastic example that I can recall at this moment.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

2 Mr. Visnjic.

3 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, I will try to ask you something in relation to Judge

5 Bonomy's question. When we were preparing for your testimony here and in

6 relation to what you said in the Milosevic case, you had a correction in

7 your evidence given in the Milosevic case in relation to information

8 concerning the crime committed in the village of Izbica. Can you tell us

9 what this correction referred to?

10 A. This correction refers to the following: I made a permutation of

11 the date of that event. This was reported to me after my team came back

12 from Kosovo. I and all of us were quite surprised that this happened

13 sometime in the beginning of the war and that we were finding out about it

14 only then. However, from the briefing, we realised when this was

15 discovered, when these graves were discovered, that the MUP organs came

16 there for an on-site investigation and of the army of Yugoslavia too. An

17 exhumation was carried out and also a post-mortem.

18 I was convinced during my testimony at Mr. Milosevic's trial in

19 view of the date when this happened and in view of what they reported to

20 me on the 7th, these organs of mine, that of course this had to go through

21 the chain of command and reach the Supreme Command Staff. However, later

22 on I realised that this report concerning that incident did not reach the

23 Supreme Command Staff.

24 Q. Actually, during your testimony in the Milosevic trial you said

25 that you learned about that on the basis of a combat report.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But actually, there is no such report. Am I not right? Is that

3 your testimony now?

4 A. That's right. The problem is that the mistake is mine. It is my

5 understanding that when military investigation organs go out that the

6 commands are duty-bound, especially when speaking of a volume of that

7 magnitude that it is only natural that this should arrive through command

8 channels, through regular reporting channels.

9 Q. Thank you, General. Just one more question. Do you know from the

10 moment when you came to the General Staff whether there was some plan on

11 expelling the Albanian population across the border involve -- and that

12 the military and security organs were involved in such a plan?

13 A. No. I know of no such plan. The existence of such a plan, no. I

14 believe --

15 Q. Thank you.

16 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] No further questions of this

17 witness, Your Honours. I believe that I have stuck to my original time

18 schedule.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you're even within it.

20 Mr. Visnjic, can you give us a reference to the Milosevic

21 transcript?

22 MR. VISNJIC: Your Honour, if you give me a few minutes.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: If you can after the break.

24 MR. VISNJIC: Yes, after the break.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: This is a suitable time to break and we will resume

1 at 10 minutes to 4.00. We will break at this time, General, and resume

2 your evidence in 20 minutes' time. Thank you.

3 --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.

4 --- On resuming at 3.52 p.m.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

6 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is in response to

7 your question about the reference where general wanted to modify his

8 evidence in Milosevic trial. That's at page 46457, lines 13 through 17.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 Mr. Farkas, you will now be cross-examined by a number of counsel,

11 the first of those will be Mr. Ackerman.

12 Mr. Ackerman.

13 MR. ACKERMAN: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examination by Mr. Ackerman:

15 Q. General, I'm John Ackerman and I represent General Pavkovic and I

16 have a few questions I want to ask you this afternoon.

17 One of the things that has come up in this trial deals with --

18 there's been a lot of talk about volunteers coming into the military and

19 psychological concerns regarding those people and so forth. The question

20 I want to ask you has, I guess, some relationship to that. I understand

21 that persons were removed from the army due to behavioural or

22 psychological problems. Are you aware of any of those kind of incidents?

23 A. Yes, I am aware of that. During the war --

24 Q. Go ahead. Go ahead.

25 A. During the war, when the influx of volunteers grew in number, the

1 Chief of the General Staff -- or, rather, of the Supreme Command Staff

2 issued a very detailed order regulating all the issues or possible

3 problems related to the volunteers. This was a very complex order that

4 encompassed all those elements, everything that a person who is putting on

5 a uniform should do in order to be responsible for his actions.

6 Q. I want to ask you not about that but about if someone was removed

7 from the army for behavioural problems or psychological problems, were any

8 steps taken to keep that person from coming back into the forces in some

9 way by maybe a different route, through the police or some other way?

10 Were any steps taken to make sure when that person was removed they stayed

11 removed?

12 A. Yes. The chief of the Supreme Command Staff issued yet another

13 order that dealt with those issues. Every soldier and in particular every

14 volunteer has his file that accompanies him, a file that where all the

15 data is entered, the reasons for the discharge, and the military

16 territorial organs were obliged under that order to inform about the

17 reasons why this person was recently discharged, to inform the MUP organs

18 in the territory as for the reasons why this volunteer was turned back, so

19 that any problems that might occur could be dealt with, that the weapons

20 be taken away from this person, and that this person be monitored.

21 Q. All right. Were you aware of any steps taken before March 24th,

22 before the bombing started, to advise and train personnel of the army

23 regarding the international laws of war?

24 A. Yes. Before the bombing started, I was on a different post, but

25 through the Ministry of Defence and through the General Staff courses were

1 organised, courses for officers, and in those courses the officers were

2 told about the international humanitarian law and the laws -- the rules of

3 war.

4 Q. Do you know if any steps were taken to -- to provide that

5 information to each of the soldiers that was actually going out in the

6 field?

7 A. When the war started, the administration for morale pursuant to an

8 order of the Chief of the General Staff brochures were put out. They

9 contained appropriate quotes from the conventions on humanitarian law and

10 law of war. I think there were four pages, pocket size. This was

11 enclosed in plastic and every soldier was given a copy.

12 Q. These were laminated, basically wallet-sized documents that were

13 given to every soldier. Is that -- is that the case?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I want to know if you ever received any information about persons

16 coming across the border from Albania dressed in VJ uniforms, speaking

17 Serbian, who committed several crimes as if they were VJ members.

18 A. We received information about those border incidents, about the

19 crossings, and you have to divide those incidents in two parts. The

20 information of this kind about the incidents that occurred in 1998. I

21 know less about those because I was not in the VJ at the time. I was in

22 the defence ministry. But some information did reach us about those

23 incidents. They did reach me. And afterwards, during the war, that was

24 within my remit and those things did happen. So crimes were committed.

25 Buildings were burnt, set on fire, and some crimes were committed in that

1 territory.

2 Q. And that -- that information that you received, then, about these

3 people you were able to verify through investigations conducted by

4 security personnel or how?

5 A. Well, some of this information was verified, and certain combat

6 activities were launched against those persons. Those persons were being

7 uncovered, but some remained undetected. They were either pushed back

8 from the territory or they dispersed because of those combat activities

9 aimed at them, and some must have been killed in those clashes.

10 Q. All right.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Could you give us a specific example?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as for the pre-war events in

13 1998, I have two examples that I remember. A large group of Albanians who

14 were armed, they even had horses, they were ambushed and a large number

15 were killed. Some of them were captured. And I think that after that

16 there was --

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment. You're being asked about events

18 when Albanians or people from Albania were dressed in VJ uniforms,

19 masquerading as VJ soldiers, and it's about that I would like a specific

20 example.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know. I can't give you an

22 example. But I don't think that these people who were crossing the border

23 with weapons in 1998, that they actually wore uniforms.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ackerman, it sounds as though the witness has

25 misunderstood your question.

1 MR. ACKERMAN:

2 Q. General, I was asking you about some information you gave during

3 the Milosevic trial where you said you had reports that people were coming

4 across the border from Albania, probably Kosovo Albanians, I'm not sure,

5 that those people would dress in VJ uniforms, that they spoke the Serbian

6 language, and that they committed several crimes.

7 What I wondered is if you were ever able to verify any of that

8 information that you told the Court in Milosevic that you had received

9 through your security organs.

10 A. Yes. Such information reached us through the chain of command.

11 The commanders reported on those events in the areas of their

12 responsibility. They took appropriate measures. And the security organs

13 had no special jurisdiction over that because we're talking about combat

14 activities, combat actions.

15 We knew about the existence of some centres from which these

16 people were brought in, where they were train, and through our channels we

17 received information about possible axes of their infiltration, even

18 sometimes the time when that would happen, and then the units in the

19 field, combat units, took appropriate combat action to deal with that

20 ambushes and so on. But to be quite specific, this went or should have

21 gone through the reporting line up the chain of command.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, can you give us a specific example of

23 an occasion when this happened now that you understand the question?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I can't. I would have to go

25 through those combat reports. So I really can't recall that. This

1 happened quite often. I can't recall a specific example now.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

3 Mr. Ackerman.

4 MR. ACKERMAN:

5 Q. General, earlier today when you were being questioned by

6 lawyer Visnjic there were quite a few questions about crimes being

7 committed in Kosovo in 1999 and the reporting system regarding those

8 crimes, and the general impression that -- that I think came from your

9 testimony was that there was a regimen of punishment and prosecution that

10 was working well, but there was a reporting problem so that that

11 information wasn't making its way up to the Supreme Command and up to the

12 commanding general, and that -- I'm curious about that because of some

13 testimony you gave in Milosevic. And now I'm at page 46315 of the

14 Milosevic transcript.

15 What you said in that case was that: "Reports of crimes came up

16 through the chain of command through the security channels, so as soon as

17 we heard of such things measures were taken in order to punish the

18 perpetrators." So apparently those reports actually were coming up

19 through the security channels and you were learning of them as that went

20 on. Is that what you were saying in Milosevic?

21 A. I said that the security organs at certain levels did their work

22 because these crimes were committed in the field and those people, those

23 security organs, they detected that, and then from the brigade up to the

24 corps and army level measures were taken by competent organs to detect

25 those crimes, identify perpetrators and prosecute them.

1 The Supreme Command Staff did not get the information, detailed

2 enough information of an appropriate scope because the actions were going

3 on not only in Kosovo but throughout the whole territory, and the Chief of

4 the General Staff should have been informed about the events, particularly

5 from the area where the fighting was the fiercest.

6 So if I did say that, I did say in that sense the security organs,

7 together with the commands because they were part of the commands and

8 staffs and so on, dealt with that. And they did prosecute many of those

9 cases.

10 I was able to learn that when I went down there during the war,

11 but because of the reporting and taking appropriate measures and in order

12 to bolster the judicial organs and so on, the chief of the Supreme Command

13 Staff was not in a position to take appropriate measures because he did

14 not get enough information.

15 Q. Do you know of any crimes that were reported up through those

16 channels as to which no action was taken against perpetrators that were

17 identified or those crimes were simply ignored? Do you know if that

18 happened?

19 A. Well, I got the information after our visits. Then we would get

20 more detailed documents and information about the judicial proceedings.

21 Those documents existed and cases were being prosecuted, but those

22 events -- information about those events did not reach us. So there was a

23 bottleneck in the flow of information from the level of the army to the

24 Supreme Command Staff. There was an obstruction. They completed their

25 job. They prosecuted their -- those cases, and they felt that this was

1 enough, and they did not report further up the chain of command. That's

2 the impression that I got.

3 Q. Well, that's what we keep hearing, General, and I'd like to

4 explore that just a little bit.

5 You told us that you went to Kosovo to look into these matters in

6 early May. I think you said around the 1st of May. Now, considering the

7 war started on the 24th of March, you started getting that information

8 apparently sometime in April, and that's when General Ojdanic decided that

9 you should go to Kosovo and look into it. Is that correct?

10 A. Yes, that's correct.

11 Q. Were you aware of any meeting that General Ojdanic had had with

12 General Pavkovic, General Lukic and Mr. Milosevic on the 4th of May? Did

13 you ever know anything about that meeting if it happened?

14 A. No, I don't know about that.

15 Q. Do you think --

16 A. I really don't know about the existence of any such meeting.

17 Q. Do you think you went to Kosovo before that date, the 4th of May,

18 or after?

19 A. Well, I think it was after that. I went to Kosovo -- I spent two

20 days there, and I came back on the 7th.

21 Q. All right.

22 A. And I spent only two days there.

23 Q. When you went to Kosovo, when did you first see General Pavkovic?

24 Did you see him when you immediately got there or when you were getting

25 ready to come back? When was it you met with him?

1 A. I couldn't recall at this point in time, but it seems to me that

2 it was when I was getting ready to go back. That's where we met, because

3 he was in the field with his security chief, so that even his security

4 chief was not present. I did not contact him while I was down there. And

5 when he came back, we met very briefly. I was already practically on my

6 way back. I was already heading out.

7 Q. So I take it you informed General Pavkovic of your findings that

8 the crimes were being properly detected and prosecuted but the reporting

9 was not adequate. I assume you told him that.

10 A. It seems to me that we met very briefly. There was very fierce

11 action. At that time I stated the reason for my arrival that I was

12 duty-bound to give him, and I presented to him the problem, that the

13 problem was that we were not getting enough information and crimes were

14 being committed, and I was not sure that they were managing to deal with

15 all of it. I told him that there was this problem and that there was this

16 communication problem.

17 Q. Yes. And I -- the communication problem was -- was what? What --

18 what level was it that was failing to report? Was it the security people

19 that were failing to send reports up through security channels?

20 A. Well, the reporting channels went from one security organ to the

21 other. I said that they were integral parts of the commands. And in all

22 of the reports that were drafted at a certain level to the superior

23 command, they took part in writing the report, and they put what they had

24 learned into this report. So you have of to differentiate between

25 different levels.

1 So they stated that there was an incident. The military police

2 carried out the on-site investigation. The courts then took over. But

3 there were some problems at certain levels causing these reports not to

4 reach us at the Supreme Command Staff.

5 Q. Were you aware that at the beginning the war General Pavkovic

6 ordered the -- the prosecutors and the military courts in the 3rd Army

7 area to provide him with daily reports regarding their activities? Were

8 you aware of that?

9 A. No, I was not aware of those orders of the lower commands.

10 Q. Were you aware that virtually every --

11 A. It is quite possible --

12 Q. You wanted to finish that answer, so please go ahead.

13 A. Well, when the war started war courts were set up, and they were

14 under the jurisdiction of the army command and then in the units lower

15 down. And the judicial organs were in contact with the commands, and

16 whatever the commands uncovered they would do their job. Now, whether it

17 would be the security organs or the command, they would do their job and

18 then they would transfer that to the courts, and they did their job as

19 independent organs.

20 Q. Well, are you aware that virtually every day General Pavkovic in

21 his daily combat report to the General Staff included a paragraph on the

22 activities of the military prosecutor and the military courts? Are you

23 aware that have? Did you see those reports?

24 A. I did not see anything of that kind because I was not there.

25 General Gajic was there, and the daily combat reports, regular or

1 extraordinary, were sent to him. And had he reached -- had he gotten any

2 such reports, he was duty-bound to inform me about those reports, but he

3 never did. That information never reached me.

4 Q. So --

5 A. Well, it's very easy to check that, whether there were really such

6 elements in those daily reports.

7 Q. Well, they'll be seen by the Judges in this case, I can assure you

8 of that.

9 The -- I think what you're now telling us, if General Gajic was

10 getting this information, it was his fault for not telling you about it.

11 Is that what you're saying?

12 A. No, that's not what I meant. Had such information reached

13 General Gajic, he would have informed me, and he would have submitted that

14 to me. So they did not reach him. And you can check that fairly easily

15 through those daily reports that were sent in. That's not a problem. You

16 have everything. You have those daily operational reports, and it is very

17 easy to see, and there's no need for me now to strain and try to remember

18 something that really didn't happen.

19 Q. I totally agree with you, and the Judges -- the Judges will see

20 those reports.

21 Now, you went to Kosovo in early May, returned on the 7th, and I

22 take it immediately told General Ojdanic what it was you had learned while

23 you were there.

24 A. Yes. Yes. I informed him briefly orally.

25 Q. And then tell me the next thing that happened. Was the

1 meetings -- were the meetings on the 16th and 17th with General Pavkovic

2 and Milosevic, were those the next thing that happened or did Vasiljevic

3 and Gajic go to Kosovo before those meetings?

4 A. This involves several question, doesn't it. The first one, a

5 reaction did follow on the part of the chief of the Supreme Command Staff

6 to take measures straight away, to establish what happened, and to see

7 what it was that I had learned. It so happened that in that period the

8 deputy chief of the army department was in Belgrade on some private

9 business, and in that period between the 16th and my return our documents

10 were reviewed and talks were held with Djuric. I think his name was

11 Djuric. Colonel Djuric. And this further amplified this information

12 before the meeting of the 16th. Then the meeting took place on the 16th

13 when General Pavkovic confirmed all of this and added some other elements

14 too. These were things that we had not been aware of before that.

15 Q. So additional information was developed between your return from

16 Kosovo on the 7th and when General Pavkovic came to Belgrade to report on

17 the 16th, and we've already heard a lot about what General Pavkovic's

18 report was about on that date and the meeting the next day with Milosevic

19 where he basically repeated that report. And I'm trying to hurry here,

20 General, because I'm using more time than I said I would. And he repeated

21 that report, and it wouldn't have come then, I take it, as any surprise to

22 you or General Pavkovic if General Pavkovic sent an additional report on

23 the 25th of May saying that there's a problems with crimes being committed

24 here in Kosovo. That wouldn't have been any surprise to anybody because

25 you'd already had several reports about it, hadn't you?

1 A. Well, no, we didn't have any reports in writing. There were no

2 written reports. This came after all the measures taken, then my stay

3 down there, then the meeting on the 16th, then the meeting at Milosevic's.

4 So this came as a product, this particular information. If it exists in

5 writing, I've never seen it. If it does exist, then it came after all of

6 these measures that were ordered by the chief of the Supreme Command

7 Staff.

8 Q. I really don't understand what you're telling us now. Are you

9 saying that the only information you had was what you learned when you did

10 your investigation and what you were told by General Pavkovic, and because

11 none of it was in writing that you didn't any obligation to deal with it

12 in any way?

13 A. Well, as for these problems, it is lower the commands and organs

14 that dealt with them, and this is shown by the fact that they prosecuted

15 many of the cases that they uncovered. The problem is that we did not get

16 anything in writing from the army command, not even in a summarised

17 version or not even information of any other kind until what we did. All

18 of this was happening on the 25th of May. And this is written information

19 coming from the level of the army command. Well, if that existed, I did

20 not see that. If it does exist, then it is a product of all the measures

21 that were taken beforehand.

22 Q. All right. You were shown during your direct testimony 3D493, and

23 you probably still have it there.

24 MR. ACKERMAN: And that, Your Honours, is identical to 3D479,

25 which I indicated that I would use but I might as well use the same one

1 lawyer Visnjic used.

2 Q. You were referred to page 1 in English at the bottom where it has

3 the language: "There are problems involving humanitarian crime."

4 Now, this is a report that you're making to the Supreme Command

5 chief of staff. You talk about this full analysis having been made by

6 ZNUB. You say most of the atrocities have been documented and are

7 currently before the military court's organs, the kinds of crimes, and you

8 say around 95 per cent have been arrested and under investigation.

9 Now, I take it you were being quite honest in your report on that

10 date as to what your investigation had shown; correct?

11 A. It's not my investigation. This investigation was conducted by

12 lower-level commands and units and courts. That is the result of all of

13 those reports that had arrived until that point in time about cases that

14 were prosecuted and cases that were learned about. That is to say that

15 the security organs and commands learned about.

16 As for all of these cases that were learned about, 95 per cent

17 were prosecuted. That is not to say that all crimes and criminal offences

18 that had taken place were uncovered. What is referred to here are those

19 where proceedings were initiated. Some were still in the

20 pre-investigation stage or the investigation stage. And, sir, that is the

21 76th day of the war, that is to say the last days of the war.

22 Q. I just have a couple more questions for you. You discovered these

23 reporting problems between the 6th and 7th of May while you were down

24 there in Kosovo, and I take it those reporting problems ended at that

25 point, that, you know, as a general that you ordered them to report

1 properly and after that point there were no more reporting problems, after

2 the 7th of May, true?

3 A. You didn't understand me correctly. These reports are a command

4 matter. Commanders can issue orders, send these combat reports through

5 regular channels. I just indicated that there was a problem and that it

6 should be resolved, and then the commands and commanders of the corps and

7 armies were duty-bound to overcome this problem and inform the command. I

8 did not have the right to issue orders to units and commands. I just

9 viewed the problem from a professional point of view, and I pointed out

10 the problem, just as an artillery man would, just as an engineering

11 officer would when he toured an area and realised that there were

12 problems.

13 Q. And so when you reported this to General Ojdanic after your

14 return, like on maybe the 8th of May or something, did you see an order

15 that he issued regarding better reports, the requirement of better

16 reports? I'm trying to find out if that problem was solved rather

17 immediately upon your report of it, and if not, why not.

18 A. This problem, if it had been resolved and how it had been

19 resolved, well, it was resolved in some way or it started being resolved

20 only after the 16th, after the direct meeting and the briefing of the

21 chief -- or, rather, the commander of the 3rd Army. In the interim, I

22 don't know. Perhaps General Pavkovic, on the basis of this brief meeting,

23 blitz meeting we had, he collected data in order to compile a report, and

24 that is what he might have used to report to the chief of the Supreme

25 Command Staff and to President Milosevic.

1 Q. This meeting that you had where you made your report to the

2 Supreme Command chief of staff at 3D4693, that was on the 8th of June.

3 That's over a month from the time you came back from Kosovo. And it's

4 also just a couple of days before withdrawal of all forces from Kosovo;

5 correct?

6 A. Well, no. I first reported -- I mean, after my return, sometime

7 around the 7th, I reported to the chief of the Supreme Command Staff, and

8 after that what followed was --

9 Q. I'm talking about this specific document, 3D493. It is dated the

10 8th of June, isn't it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And that was very shortly before the withdrawal of -- of all

13 forces from Kosovo.

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. Okay. The question that I have about that is did UNMIK cooperate

16 with your security forces, your investigators, to continue investigation

17 of these crimes, to allow you into Kosovo to interview witnesses, victims

18 of rape or persons who had seen crimes committed? Were you able to

19 continue your investigation after the forces left Kosovo?

20 A. We were not able to. We had no rights of access. I think that is

21 the case even up to the present day. There is no possibility of

22 reconstructing certain things, investigating, and so on. UNMIK entered,

23 the forces entered, and only the terrorist organisations remained, and

24 within UNMIK later turn into the armed force of that territory. So we had

25 no possibilities. Civilian ones either, I think, but the military had no

1 way of having access and continuing to resolve of the problems that they

2 started dealing with.

3 Q. Do you know of any efforts made to try to get cooperation from

4 UNMIK to assist with these continuing investigations, or was it simply a

5 situation where you were without witnesses basically?

6 A. Attempts were made. I believe that to this day attempts are being

7 made to have these matters resolved. However, to the best of my knowledge

8 we had not had any access.

9 Q. And my last question. You talked about General Pavkovic at the

10 meetings in Belgrade on the 16th and 17th recommending that there be a

11 commission to investigate all of the issues that were raised in these

12 meetings, the subordination issues, the crime issues, all of these issues,

13 and Mr. Sainovic agreed with him that that was a good idea. What I'm

14 wondering is if you know why that didn't happen. Why didn't Mr. Milosevic

15 approve that and set it in motion? Do you know?

16 A. First of all, I wasn't the one who proposed that, the

17 establishment of that commission. It was Mr. Pavkovic who proposed that

18 at that briefing at Milosevic's.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... But my question is do you

20 know why Mr. -- General Pavkovic's proposal was not adopted by Milosevic

21 and put into motion? Why didn't he do that?

22 A. First of all, previously a few things had been said that had to be

23 done. First of all, the president decidedly order that had para-police

24 forces withdraw. Arkan, the Wolves, Boca, et cetera, that the problems be

25 resolved with these para-police units first of all. And once this is

1 dealt with and certain measures are taken, then and meeting should take

2 place between the MUP and the military and then we should raise the

3 question of the right order and way of resolving these problems. That

4 problem was put in very strong terms. The president said that this kind

5 of lack of cooperation and this kind of attitude equalled sabotage. And

6 this was a reprimand to me and Rade Markovic. And he explicitly first

7 gave an order to the MUP that they resolve the question of these

8 para-police forces and then Rade Markovic said that this was underway and

9 that these units would be withdrawn and measures would be taken and only

10 after that this meeting was supposed to take place which did not take

11 place because the sequence of events was a very fast one and very soon

12 there was the withdrawal from that territory, but there was this

13 initiative vis-a-vis the MUP from my side specifically. We did try to

14 schedule that kind of meeting.

15 Q. But you don't -- I take it the answer is you don't know were

16 Milosevic didn't set up this commission that Pavkovic suggested and

17 Sainovic thought was a good idea, do you?

18 A. Well, it's not that Milosevic was supposed to organise that.

19 Milosevic said, first of all, the police should resolve their internal

20 problems with these para-organisations and we should meet and we should

21 set up a commission and then we should find the right way and make

22 proposals to resolve this. However, this did not happen for the

23 above-mentioned reasons.

24 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

25 A. Mr. Sainovic was for the state, and I don't know about that.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Cepic.

2 MR. CEPIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 Cross-examination by Mr. Cepic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. -- Or, rather, General, may I introduce

5 myself. I'm Djuro Cepic, one of the Defence attorneys for

6 General Vladimir Lazarevic and one of the first things I wish to do is to

7 wish you a good day.

8 A. Good day.

9 Q. General, let me ask you a couple of questions to clear some things

10 up. Today in your evidence you said that you were the assistant to the

11 Federal Minister of Defence?

12 A. Yes, that's correct.

13 Q. Now I want to know whether the units of the Civilian Defence and

14 civilian protection in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija and throughout

15 the territory it of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were under the

16 federal defence ministry. They were subordinate to them?

17 A. Yes, in organisational terms they were part of and subordinate to

18 the Federal Ministry of Defence.

19 Q. Thank you. Is it true that the Ministry of Defence pursuant to

20 the constitution and the law on defence and other bylaws provided weapons

21 for all its units of the Civilian Defence?

22 A. Yes, that is correct.

23 Q. Thank you. Now that we're on the topic of the civilian defence,

24 could you please tell me if you remember how many people were in the

25 civilian defence in Kosovo Metohija in that period 1998, beginning of

1 1999.

2 A. Well, according to the establishment that was made and approved

3 for the civilian defence and the civilian protection, the communication

4 units and encryption units that were all within the jurisdiction of the

5 Federal Ministry of Defence in Kosovo there were about 9.000 personnel

6 there. In accordance with the establishment, in accordance with the

7 criteria that were used in order to produce the establishment. Over

8 9.000.

9 Q. Thank you, General. Do you know that there was an administration

10 for the defence of Pristina and that it had its own warning and

11 surveillance centre?

12 A. Yes. That administration, in accordance with systematisation of

13 the civilian structures existed throughout the territory of Yugoslavia as

14 it was then. There were such centres in Vojvodina and so on all over the

15 territory. There were such centres not only as part of those

16 administrations but also in lower organisational units wherever it was

17 deemed that there could be some threat from chemical accidents, adverse

18 weather, natural disasters, and those surveillance and warning centres

19 were set up in such locations and that also applied in the war, during the

20 war.

21 Q. General, let me just follow up. Do you know that those

22 administrations that you just described to us sent their reports using

23 their own reporting channels to the federal defence ministry?

24 A. No, no. There was a hierarchy, just as it existed in the army.

25 So if we're talking about the Pristina administration, they were

1 duty-bound to send their reports up to the branch organ in Serbia which

2 was an organisational unit covering the territory of Serbia.

3 Q. And this republican organ in Serbia would then send -- send this

4 report further up to the federal defence ministry?

5 A. Yes, that is correct. The reports, the documents that it deemed

6 to be necessary for dealing with some problems or that were something that

7 the federal ministry of defence should deal with were sent up to them.

8 Q. Thank you. Could the General please be shown Exhibit P1294.

9 A. Yes, I can see it.

10 Q. General, in this Prosecution exhibit there is your signature.

11 Could you tell us briefly, really very briefly, that the appointment of

12 the commanders of the civilian defence staffs were done by you, that that

13 was not part of the system of the army of Yugoslavia.

14 A. Yes, that is correct. As the assistant for the federal defence

15 minister for civilian defence, it was within my purview to make such

16 appointments, and I was supposed to update all those documents regularly.

17 Q. Thank you. General, you mentioned Izbica. I'm going to ask you

18 one question. Do you know, do you recall, do you have that in your

19 memory, clear in your memory, that the exhumation and all the other

20 investigative actions at the mass grave in Izbica were carried out by

21 civilian investigating organs of the District Court in Kosovska Mitrovica?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters kindly ask for all the microphones

23 to be switched off.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Based on the information that I got

25 from my assistant upon his return from Kosovo on the 7th, I got the

1 information and indeed the impression that they did that together, that

2 military organs and civilian organs were present there while those

3 activities were carried out. I don't know any details. I know that the

4 mass grave was exhumed and that post-mortem examinations of the dead

5 bodies were carried out and that the reports -- I don't have any further

6 knowledge of that.

7 Q. General, am I right if I say that if the military investigative

8 organs took part together with the civilian organs and that they

9 determined -- and determined that the army had not taken part in that

10 incident, would then they have to file a report and whether they had taken

11 appropriate measures in that case by referring the case for further action

12 by the civilian organs?

13 A. Well, I can't really give you a proper answer to that question

14 because I myself am not certain at all about this oral report that

15 General Vasiljevic gave. I can't really be certain that the military

16 organs really had participated in that. That's how it seems to me now.

17 That's how I recall that, that they went there together to that area and

18 that the exhumation was carried out jointly.

19 Now as for the second part of your question about the

20 jurisdiction, I think that it happened at the end of the war, and the

21 judicial organs were supposed to decide on the jurisdiction. The judicial

22 organs, both military and civilians, had to decide about the jurisdiction

23 over those cases.

24 Q. General, do you perhaps mean to say that the military organs took

25 part in the exhumation, because in that team that carried out the

1 exhumation, there was an expert pathologist or forensic medical expert,

2 Dr. Tomasevic, from the Military Medical Academy upon the order of the

3 District Court in Kosovska Mitrovica. That was a civilian court, in other

4 words.

5 A. Well, I don't know of those details. I don't know about the

6 jurisdictions at that time.

7 Q. Well, thank you. Thank you very much, General. Let me just ask

8 you for some clarification.

9 At page 41, line 19 of the transcript today, you mentioned the

10 name Colonel Djuric, deputy chief security -- chief of security. General,

11 in that case are we maybe talking about Lieutenant Colonel

12 Stevan Djurovic, the deputy of the security organ in the Pristina Corps,

13 who on the 8th of May, 1999, informed your deputy,

14 General Aleksandar Vasiljevic, about the crimes that had been prosecuted?

15 A. Yes, that's the man I was talking about. I would like to

16 apologise both to you and both to him for my faulty memory, for being

17 unable to give you the correct name. He was there in a private capacity

18 because of some family issues, and this fact was used to get some more

19 details about what I had learned while I was there in Kosovo, but that was

20 done by my deputy.

21 Q. General, thank you very much. I have no further questions.

22 MR. CEPIC: Your Honour, I have no further questions for this

23 witness. Thank you.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.

25 Sorry, you didn't -- was there an indication?

1 MR. IVETIC: We raised our hand and we also sent the information

2 regarding our estimate to the court officer.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, perhaps we should break at this stage before

4 we start.

5 [Trial Chamber confers]

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, we will break at this stage, and that break

7 will be 20 minutes. So we'll resume at 10 minutes past 5.00.

8 --- Recess taken at 4.51 p.m.

9 --- On resuming at 5.12 p.m.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, you will now be cross-examined by

11 Mr. Ivetic on behalf of Mr. Lukic.

12 Mr. Ivetic.

13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour.

14 Cross-examination by Mr. Ivetic:

15 Q. Good day, General. As you've heard I'm one of the lawyers for

16 Mr. Sreten Lukic in this case. Now I'm going to be asking you several

17 questions and I'm going to be going through some documents but I'm using

18 the documents just to be fair to you and to give you all the information

19 upon which my questions are based, so please unless my -- wait for my

20 question to see what if anything you need to review in the documents to

21 refresh your recollection that way we'll move much smoother.

22 Now, my colleague had asked you about the Civilni Zastita, the

23 Civilian Protection Units. I would like to confirm with you sir that in

24 fact these units of the Civilni Zastita wore blue uniforms with a yellow

25 emblem of some sort.

1 A. Yes. That was the uniform worn by the civilian protection in

2 accordance with international regulations.

3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... To the next topic. You

4 mentioned three groups affiliated with the MUP. I believe you called them

5 para-police. I'd like to first start with the group known as the Boca

6 Medic group and the question will be very simple if you just listen all

7 the way through the end without looking at the documents until we get to

8 the actual question.

9 3D1055 is a document that should be there and available for you if

10 you need it. This is the 13 May 1999 information issued by your service

11 regarding this -- in here it's listed a paramilitary today I guess you

12 would call it a para-police based on your testimony group led by Boca

13 Medic, talks of a crime they committed at the end of March in Podujevo and

14 they were driven out of Kosovo by the commander of 354th brigade of the

15 VJ. Now, two other documents that I sent there for you to have if need be

16 are 6D1135 and 4D00371 and these are the Pristina Corps regular combat

17 reports from the 31st of March, 1999, and the 1st of April, 1999

18 respectively it. I will save you the trouble of reading through those

19 since they are lengthy documents. Neither one of those documents

20 references the Podujevo incident involving the Medic group and the conduct

21 of the commander of the 354th brigade of the VJ. Now, the question I have

22 for you, would you expect that such a drastic event would in fact be

23 reflected in the combat reports if it happened in a manner set forth in

24 your is security organ's information, particularly the involvement of the

25 commander of the 354th Brigade of the VJ?

1 A. I don't know how the reporting system functioned in its entirety

2 and these are documents from the Pristina Corps.

3 Q. Pristina Corps?

4 A. Yes, the Pristina Corps to send to the army command. I guess they

5 should be entered or marked, but as for those events of the 17th of March,

6 Mr. Rade Markovic talked about them and he confirmed that those units were

7 there and that they committed crimes, that they were disbanded or expelled

8 out of this area. That's what Mr. Rade Markovic said at the meeting.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

10 A. On the 17th.

11 Q. The May I think?

12 A. Yes, the 17th of May. But regardless of all that, this should

13 being mentioned in those reports but that's not important because he

14 confirmed that those units existed and that they had been.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

16 A. Expelled from those areas.

17 Q. Sorry, sir. I had to pause for the translation and the transcript

18 to catch up with us. We'll get to the 17th May meeting and what I want to

19 draw out of it. What I'm trying to figure out now is to find out the

20 reliability and veracity of the information that your service had at the

21 time.

22 Now, am I correct that had the 354th Brigade of the VJ been

23 involved in the Podujevo incident your security organs in the field would

24 have known about this incident shortly after it occurred on the 31st of

25 March, 1999.

1 A. Every unit, including this brigade that you mentioned, has its

2 security organ, and as I explained the security organ is a part of the

3 command system. Whatever the commanders do at the briefings, whatever

4 they say there, the security organ is aware of that and he takes part in

5 drafting the report that is sent to the superior command. The answer to

6 your question is that the staff or the command of that unit had to know,

7 and that includes the security organ. They had to know about any events.

8 Q. Now, sir, given that the first information from your security

9 organisation came on the 13th of May, almost two months after the incident

10 in question, and given that it came -- strike that.

11 If the organs had to have known of the incident if it involved the

12 commander, how do you explain the fact that this information is written

13 almost two months later, on the 13th of May? Do you have any explanation

14 for that?

15 A. Well, the only explanation is that the information about this

16 incident did not reach the Supreme Command Staff through the regular chain

17 of command and chain of reporting. So they were solving a problem. They

18 solved it the way they did and they failed to report on that. And the

19 information about Boca and so on, this is something that we got in the

20 field.

21 Q. Now, we had Mr. Stoparic, a member of this reserve SAJ unit and a

22 former Scorpion who was there that day testify that in fact it was the

23 police SAJ commanders who ordered his group out of Kosovo. Given the

24 foregoing things that we've gone through, do you concede the possibility

25 that in fact the 13 May information, as presented by your security organ,

1 did not give the complete and full picture, particularly in regards to the

2 participation of the commander of the 354th Brigade of the VJ who in fact

3 is not mentioned by Mr. Stoparic?

4 A. Well, it's possible. I didn't get the reports about the events,

5 but this information from the security administration talks about the

6 existence of this group there, and we are, I think, relaying this

7 information to, I think, MUP too. And later on at that meeting

8 Rade Markovic himself said that such groups existed, that they had been

9 there, they went away, and then they came back. So that's the information

10 that I am aware of. That's what Rade Markovic.

11 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

12 A. Reported to the Supreme Commander.

13 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... The question I want to ask

14 you is isn't it correct that --

15 A. Fine.

16 Q. -- The first date, this May 13th, 1999, that your service finally

17 writes something about the Boca Medic group occurs after the RDB, and

18 specifically the person in Rade Markovic, went to President Milosevic and

19 exposed the Pauk saboteur group going behind your back?

20 [Interpretation] Well, it may be easier to ask the question in

21 Serbian because I see that there is a problem with interpretation.

22 General, is it true that your information related to Boca Medic

23 group of the 13th of May, 1999, that this information happened after, that

24 the RDB of MUP and their leadership, Rade Markovic, went behind your back

25 to report to Milosevic about the existence of Pauk group within the army?

1 A. I don't know. I don't understand the question. What do you mean

2 going behind my back? The existence of Pauk group. I really don't know.

3 What do you mean when you say they went behind my back.

4 Q. [In English] Well, sir, those are the words used by

5 Aleksandar Vasiljevic your subordinate used in this courtroom you'll have

6 to ask him, but if you don't know I'll move on.

7 Now, a question I would have for you regarding this topic is why

8 if according to document 6D998, which should also be there for your

9 review, it's a short document, you could probably read it rather quickly.

10 This is a supplemental information relating to Boca Medic's people that is

11 dated the 16th of May, 1999, wherein it is stated that these -- this group

12 was a lawful MUP organ that in fact had been sent -- ordered to Kosovo by

13 General Rodza of the MUP and General Gajic explained this was

14 General Rodza Djordjevic.

15 If -- and that's 6988, I'm sorry. If as of the 15th of May, 1999,

16 you knew that this group had official status within the MUP, wore MUP

17 uniforms, had documentation showing them to be reservist MUP and had been

18 tasked in the field by the deputy minister of interior Djordjevic, why is

19 it that your organs and your subordinates and even you today even to this

20 date keep referring to them as either paramilitary or para-police? How

21 can that fit your description of paramilitary or para-police?

22 A. Well, I don't know under whose command he was part of, what unit

23 he was. I can repeat only one thing that I know I'm 100 per cent sure.

24 These people who were present there, they were told to us about by

25 Mr. Rade Markovic. I didn't see this document. I don't know what this

1 means. If they were, then they were, but the fact is that they were

2 expelled.

3 Q. Prove [Previous translation continues] ...

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel please not overlap with

5 interpretation.

6 MR. IVETIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Did Rade Markovic say they were not reservists of the MUP on one

8 hand as far as Boca Medic is concerned and the RDB reservists when this

9 comes to Arkan's men?

10 A. Well, that's not what he said. They said that both had committed

11 crimes and Arkan had offered 100 people to him and he accepted 30 people

12 and I really can't see who this Arkan was when he was able to just offer

13 those people like that. The police had its own regular way of mobilising

14 people.

15 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

16 A. And mobilising its reserve force, and it was said at that meeting

17 in fact that both MUP and the RDB, I guess, had regulations in place for

18 that. It was impossible for Arkan to.

19 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

20 A. Just come and say I have 100 people if you want them. Well, fine,

21 yes.

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... If you can just finish up

23 with these Boca Medic group?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Microphone, Mr. Ivetic.

25 MR. IVETIC: Sorry, it keeps going off by itself, maybe, I think.

1 Q. Sir, so we finish off this Boca Medic group, in May of 1999 when

2 you drafted your initial information in -- and then the supplemental

3 information and participated in the 17th May meeting where Rade Markovic

4 was present, at that time did your service know anything about the alleged

5 crimes committed in 1995 in Locina by individuals affiliated with group of

6 Boca Medic the so-called Scorpion video that first aired long after the

7 Kosovo conflict and was made public during the Milosevic trial?

8 THE INTERPRETER: Counsel is kindly asked to slow down.

9 MR. IVETIC:

10 Q. -- In May of 1999?

11 A. Well, at that time I was not in service. At that time I was the

12 assistant defence minister for civilian defence. So I really had no

13 knowledge of that. I didn't get any information in my official capacity

14 or in fact in any other capacity of the existence of this group. That was

15 a long time ago when I was not in service so --

16 Q. [Interpretation] I'm asking you about May 1999, General. Did you

17 at that time, you or your service, have information about this videotape

18 and the crimes committed by those units in Locina area in Bosna?

19 A. No, no, we didn't have that information.

20 Q. [In English] Thank you.

21 A. Apart from what we wrote down here.

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I'm showing you the documents

23 to show you that I'm not running away from anything that's written on

24 paper, sir.

25 Now, with respect to the negative image and reputation of the

1 so-called Scorpions, that really arose after the Scorpion video was shown

2 some time in the 2000s, long after the Kosovo conflict. Isn't that

3 correct?

4 A. Yes. At that time when this information was written and when the

5 meeting was held with Slobodan Milosevic, I did not know that they were

6 called the Scorpions, I think. It may have been mentioned, but in this

7 information we say that allegedly they're called the Scorpions, and the

8 other ones were called the Tigers and so on. So these names did not mean

9 anything to us at the time. However --

10 Q. Okay. Sir, if we can move on to another group that you mentioned

11 and that your colleagues also mentioned, the Wolves of the Drina, "Vokovi

12 Sa Drine." Did anyone mention this unit at the 17 May 1999 meeting with

13 Slobodan Milosevic and, if so, who?

14 A. I think I cannot remember exactly that anyone mentioned this. It

15 was only Boca's group that was being mentioned as such and the Tigers. I

16 did not remember that the Wolves were mentioned by anyone present.

17 Q. Thank you. Now, am I correct that as records these "Vokovi Sa

18 Drine," Wolves of the Drina, your service did not have any information as

19 to where they were based or who sent them to Kosovo Metohija allegedly?

20 A. We did not have any exact information.

21 Q. Would you agree with me that the information you did have was

22 rather scant?

23 A. Well, probably so because we are not in charge of such organs. If

24 some groups appear without being identified, then we cooperate with the

25 MUP. We give them information in order to resolve who they are. We

1 establish that they were not members of the military, Boca's group, that

2 they were not Tigers, and then it was dealt with in the field who was who.

3 They were members of.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

5 A. Boca's for example and Arkan's Tigers and so on and so forth.

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please wait for the interpretation

7 of the witness's answer to finish.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, you will have to wait until the

9 interpretation is complete.

10 MR. IVETIC:

11 Q. Now, I promise you, sir, we're going to work through each one of

12 these groups. So please bear with me and you'll have your say on each of

13 these groups in due turn. To your knowledge did your service issue any

14 written reports or did anyone else in the army mention these Wolves of the

15 Drina in combat reports like we saw for Boca Medic's group?

16 A. No. I'm not aware of any such information coming to the Supreme

17 Command Staff all the way up until my team came, rather, Aco Vasiljevic,

18 who I think was the first one to hear of the names of these groups.

19 Q. Okay. Now, both of your -- your colleagues, General Gajic in

20 particular, reported that the commander of this group, the Wolves the

21 Drina, was a certain individual named Karisek nicknamed Legenda. Karisek

22 nicknamed Legenda. Do you recall from what source you got about this from

23 the commander was it the same source in Bosnia who gave you the initial

24 information about this formation?

25 A. I did not deal with that, with those sources of information.

1 Quite simply they were not within my purview. Generally speaking, I did

2 not deal with them at all. I was just supposed to inform the MUP that we

3 had such knowledge and they should resolve it in the field. So I did not

4 investigate that. It wasn't for the chief of security of the army of

5 Yugoslavia to investigate some units that were down there in that

6 territory and that belonged to the police or the SDB. However, if they

7 commit some crimes and if we find out about that, well, then that would be

8 stated in stronger terms and then we would be duty-bound vis-a-vis the MUP

9 just as they were vis-a-vis us to inform them or they inform us about

10 crimes that were being committed by units in the field.

11 Q. I see. And your obligations and duties were effectuated by

12 informing the MUP two months after it arrested the people and had already

13 processed them about the Boca Medic group existing; is that correct?

14 A. Well, I provided the information. Had I received this

15 information, I would have provided it straight away. We got this

16 information. We informed them, and they said, "We know, and we have

17 completed the job. Thank you for having told us, but we finished this."

18 I don't see anything strange about that. We provide information at the

19 moment we find out about something.

20 Q. Okay. Well, you say that it was not your -- within your purview

21 to deal with such matters, but yet both of your immediate subordinates

22 dealt with these matters almost exclusively. So I want to know whether in

23 fact you know if the source for the information about the Wolves of the

24 Drina and about this Legenda, Nedeljko Karisek, that General Gajic talked

25 about whether the source was considered authentic and reliable.

1 A. That is not correct. That is not correct that my deputies were

2 dealing with those problems exclusively. As they were in the field in

3 contact with security organs, they found out about these things and they

4 provided the kind of information they did. We provided this information

5 to the MUP. As for investigations, where they came from and why they

6 came, we didn't deal with that. They said what they said. So it's not

7 that my organs were supposed to deal with that. We did not at all

8 investigate what the MUP was doing with those units. Once we received

9 information, then we would pass it on and clear things up that way.

10 Q. Well surely, sir, your service had a means for determining whether

11 the information it received was credible and came from an authenticated

12 source. Was this information about the Wolves of the Drina that

13 General Gajic testified about vetted so that the source was considered to

14 be reliable and authenticated according to all your resources?

15 A. Well, the checks will be done by those who provided information,

16 but we checked and we realise it did not come from our own ranks. And

17 then we expected that the MUP organs would check where they came from and

18 what they did. So really these questions, I don't understand what you're

19 trying to achieve. These people found out in the field that there were

20 some groups messing about in uniform and immediately they provided

21 information about this as soon as they found out, as soon as I found out,

22 and so on and so forth. Later on they checked. Why would they expel Boca

23 if he was good, and that group?

24 Q. Now, General, General Gajic indicated that the source was from

25 Bosnia, not from the ground in Kosovo for this Wolves of the Drina group.

1 Now the reason I'm asking these questions is very simple and I think the

2 only way to do is to just to present you with the documentation.

3 Now, according to the documents in our possession and I'm go

4 through it with you document by document in a second. Just listen to the

5 beginning portion of the question. According to our information, during

6 the Bosnian conflict the Wolves of the Drina were not a paramilitary but

7 were a specialised unit of the Drina corps and the Zvornik Brigade of the

8 army of Republika Srpska, the VRS, and they were commanded by a

9 professional army officer, Milan Jolovic, nicknamed Legenda. Now, the

10 documents that you should have in front of you, sir, except for the first

11 one which is only available in English that support this and identically

12 refer to both the unit and the commander being this Jolovic, are 601136, a

13 November 6, 1995, news article including an interview with Mr. Jolovic

14 from Vreme; 601138, the statement of facts presented by Dragan Obrenovic

15 and the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal in support -- that's also

16 in English, in support of a guilty plea before the United Nations

17 Tribunal; 6D1137, which should be in front of you in Serbia, a command

18 order of the Drina Corps to the Bratunac Brigade dated 2 June 1995 again

19 references the Wolves of the Drina and their commander Legenda Jolovic;

20 and also two witnesses that are -- that testified under oath in the

21 Popovic case here in recent history at transcript page 8871, lines 6

22 through 8, transcript page 2667, line 23 through transcript page 2668,

23 line 3. All these sources explicitly refer to the Wolves of the Drina as

24 a unit within the army of the Republika Srpska under the command of

25 Captain First Class at that time Milan Jolovic, a professional army

1 officer who by the way in case you don't have that information just

2 retired as commander of the army of Yugoslavia's 72nd Special Brigade a

3 few months ago.

4 Now -- I have to wait for the transcript to catch up with us.

5 First of all -- now, am I correct --

6 A. First of all.

7 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... So please bear with me. I

8 only have two more questions on this point and I'll move on, and we're

9 almost done.

10 First of all, am I correct that elements of the 72nd Special

11 Brigade of the VJ were deployed in Kosovo Metohija in 1999?

12 A. First of all, as for all of these documents that you mentioned, I

13 don't have any of them here. First and foremost.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: General, General, please answer the question you've

15 been asked for now. I hope we're going to come back to the documents in a

16 moment but just answer the question counsel has asked you which has

17 nothing on the face of it to do with the documents.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not aware of that, of any

19 units, entities, and so on in 1999 existing in the territory of Kosovo, in

20 the establishment, in the formations of the army of Yugoslavia.

21 MR. IVETIC:

22 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters could not hear the speaker from

24 counsel.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: I think you've missed the question again. I accept

1 what you're thinking this is a very confusing way of going about it.

2 You've been asked whether it's correct that elements of the 72nd Special

3 Brigade of the VJ were deployed in Kosovo in 1999. Now, you should be

4 able to answer that yes or no.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know about that.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

7 MR. IVETIC: Thank you.

8 Q. Now if we could return to this -- these documents. One thing that

9 is clear from these documents is that they conflict with the information

10 that your service had about the Wolves of the Drina. I do not need you to

11 comment any further on what is contained in these documents, but I would

12 like to ask you, given this information --

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment.

14 Mr. Visnjic.

15 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, first of all I would

16 like the witness to confirm that he has the documents, because in his

17 question Mr. Ivetic says that something is clear in these documents. So

18 for things to be clear to him should have the documents in front of him.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, I for one am not appreciating this

20 approach to cross-examination. I don't even know at the moment what the

21 witness is claiming is his source of information about the Wolves of the

22 Drina and you seem to be making certain assumptions about that.

23 Now, what does he know about the source? I thought he said he

24 didn't know what the source of the information was, but perhaps you'd like

25 to clarify that first.

1 MR. IVETIC: Okay.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: And depending on that answer all of this is

3 argumentative and not appropriate cross-examination but that will become

4 clear once we hear the answer to the first part of it.

5 MR. IVETIC:

6 Q. Sir -- now, sir, the Wolves of the Drina were such an important

7 part of your --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's just ask the question, Mr. Ivetic. No more

9 speeches for the moment. Straight to question.

10 MR. IVETIC:

11 Q. All right. You mentioned the Wolves of the Drina, General. What

12 knowledge do you have of them and the source for that knowledge?

13 A. During the stay of my team headed by Aco Vasiljevic in the

14 territory of Kosovo through our organs of security of the units they heard

15 that a group or formation under that name existed. That is to say these

16 formations were in the field. The information came from the security

17 organs of the army of Yugoslavia in the field. When we heard it from

18 them, we did not check this any further. We informed the MUP, nothing

19 more than that.

20 Q. Then my follow-up, sir, is a question that I asked but I believe

21 you did not answer. Since you do know the source of this information and

22 what information was contained, did you consider the source or sources of

23 this information to be verified and credible?

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic -- just, a moment --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I did not have any need to.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic.

2 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, this takes me back a

3 bit. First of all, Mr. Ivetic asks the witness a few times one and the

4 same question, but let's leave that aside. Then he asks the witness to

5 speculate, and then if the witness speculates then he gives it back to him

6 as a return information. So that's the way they've been dealing with this

7 same topic for three or four times. I don't mind the General answering

8 that, but I don't see that this is taking us anywhere.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Please continue, Mr. Ivetic. There's nothing wrong

10 with your question.

11 The question was, General, did you consider the source or sources

12 of your information to be verified and credible, and you had begun to

13 answer.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not think it was necessary for

15 me to look at the credibility or incredibility of that information

16 received from security organs of the army of Yugoslavia from that terrain,

17 and it is this source information, this original information, that I sent

18 further to the MUP without any further verifications or checks, and I'm

19 not entitled to that. I concluded that it was not from our formation,

20 from our jurisdiction, and as soon as we learned about this we sent this

21 information on to those who were in charge of those units.

22 MR. IVETIC:

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Was the information that was

24 sent to the MUP in written form, and where can that be found?

25 A. Well, if they were in writing, then they can be found in the

1 archives of the security administration. At this moment I don't know. If

2 they got this in the field they could have quite simply asked

3 Aco Vasiljevic and any organ could have come to some MUP commander or the

4 authorised official and say orally, well, look there is something going on

5 here and see what this is all about.

6 If there are written traces of this, official ones, then it could

7 be found in the archives of the security administration.

8 Q. Thank you. Now --

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic, your question is not clear. Are you

10 saying that the MUP don't have this in writing, or are you asking a

11 question about whether it came to the VJ in writing?

12 MR. IVETIC: Well, the question is related to some documents

13 searches that we are in the process of trying to complete and thus far no

14 such documents have been given to us.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Your question relates to whether the MUP actually

16 had this reported to them in writing by the VJ.

17 MR. IVETIC: With respect to the Wolves the Drina; correct.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Now, Mr. Farkas, was that -- was any report made to

19 the MUP that you're aware of about the presence of or activities of the

20 Wolves of the Drina in Kosovo?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot give an accurate answer to

22 that question except for this report that we sent. I really cannot give

23 an accurate answer whether there was anything in writing, a written

24 report, communication between us at that level, that is to say the

25 administration and the Ministry of the Interior.

1 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you mean by "except for this report that we

2 sent"? What are you referring to?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it pertains to some

4 information in relation to Boca Medic, that is, on the 13th of May. That

5 is --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: That's got nothing to do with the Wolves of the

7 Drina, has it?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's why I'm saying that apart

9 from this written information, I can confirm that this exists, but I don't

10 know about others, that there was that kind of communication in relation

11 to the Wolves.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

13 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honour. Think I'll move on to my

14 last is series of questions.

15 Q. Now, General you've been chomping at the bit to talk about the

16 Arkanovci and the Rade Markovic's statements in the May 17th meeting.

17 MR. SEPENUK: Excuse me, Your Honour, I think Mr. Ivetic is being

18 carried away just a bit here. Chomping at the bit. I think it's

19 improper.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivetic.

21 MR. IVETIC: I'm waiting for the translation. I have no problems

22 with that being taken out and we can move forward efficiently.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: That's withdrawn. Please proceed.

24 MR. IVETIC:

25 Q. Now, General, first of all, is it correct that prior to the 17 May

1 1999 meeting where Rade Markovic was with President Milosevic your service

2 had very little, if any, information regarding so-called Arkanovci in

3 Kosovo Metohija?

4 A. I don't know what you consider to be very little, if any. We have

5 information there is a group in Kosovo called the Tigers and that they

6 belong to Arkan's organisation. As far as we knew up until that time and

7 that is what we reported.

8 Q. Okay. And again you say that's what we reported. That's curious.

9 Was it in written form? Because again with the Arkanovci we have thrust

10 to find any written reports from your service giving the details. Where

11 you report it to the MUP.

12 A. I think that there are no written traces of communication between

13 us and the MUP except for this meeting that you have been saying that I

14 could hardly wait to come to that part.

15 Q. All right?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note could all other microphones

17 be switched off while the witness is speaking.

18 MR. IVETIC:

19 Q. [Overlapping speakers] We're getting a note from the interpreters

20 to shut off microphones. I don't know if anyone else's is on apart from

21 mine. I will turn it off when the witness answers just to make sure.

22 Now, General, focusing on the 17th of May meeting, do you recall

23 Rade Markovic mentioning that he had deployed 31 -- or excuse me 30 of 100

24 men offered by Arkan in uniforms of the JSO and that just prior to the

25 meeting two of these individuals had killed an elderly couple and had been

1 arrested and prosecuted?

2 MR. STAMP: It's not my witness but the question is very unclear.

3 I don't know if it could be rephrased. I'm looking at the transcript here

4 and I'm wondering if there might be a clear translation of the question

5 having regard to what is written there.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Seems to me very specific about what was said at

7 the meeting on the 17th of May. Well, it may seem inherently

8 contradictory the question is clear enough.

9 Can you help us with this, General?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, out in the field we received

11 information from that -- or, rather, that some persons from that group had

12 committed certain crimes. This is information from security organs.

13 Later on at this meeting of the 17th it was clarified and Mr.

14 Rade Markovic said what he said. I don't want to repeat all of that.

15 From 100 and then 30 and then this crime was committed and they were

16 arrested. This knowledge about the arrest of those two, that is what I

17 learned on the 17th.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note we cannot hear the speaker via

19 videolink when anybody's microphone is on in the courtroom. Thank you.

20 MR. IVETIC:

21 Q. And this crime committed by two individuals is the only evidence

22 or information that your service had of crimes committed by these

23 so-called Arkan's people. Isn't that correct?

24 A. Yes. That is what I got at that meeting and it was defined that

25 they were to be dealt with by the MUP and it was all supposed to be done

1 in the spirit of President Milosevic's order, what did he say to process

2 things, clear things up, Boca and the Wolves and everybody else, to clear

3 up all these units that are or are not within the composition and how they

4 are within the composition of the MUP, to get rid of them from the area of

5 Kosovo and that they should not appear there. In relation to this, he

6 also said the following: That the border should be closed and if

7 necessary even the border towards the Drina should be closed so that we

8 would not have individuals or units coming from there who would then do

9 evil things in the territory of Serbia.

10 Q. Last question. You said within the composition of the MUP.

11 Focusing on the Arkanovci, was it said that they were under the

12 composition of the RJB or the RDB of the MUP, if you remember?

13 A. Well, this is what was said, that Rade Markovic said that Arkan

14 personally offered to him 100 persons, 100 of his young men, and that from

15 that 100 he accepted 30, and he knew that those 30 committed some crimes,

16 killed a few people there. So he himself said that. I am not inventing

17 who it was that they belonged to.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Can you answer the question? Was it said that they

19 were under the composition of the RJB or the RDB of the MUP? Yes or no?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know what to answer

21 yes or no to. I have to say what -- in what composition they were, what

22 they were part of. According to what Rade Markovic said, they were part

23 of the state security. Since Arkan had offered that to him and he had

24 accepted it, and that leads me to believe that they were units that were

25 part -- that belonged to the state security.

1 MR. IVETIC: Thank you, Your Honours.

2 Thank you, General.

3 I have no further questions for this witness.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Now, Mr. Stamp, where do we stand do

5 you think?

6 MR. STAMP: I think since we have to take a 20-minute break, it

7 will probably go over into tomorrow. I could try, but I don't think it's

8 likely that we'd complete today.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Can the interpreters let me know if they would be

11 willing to resume at quarter past 6.00?

12 THE INTERPRETERS: Yes, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Well, we'll have a shorter than normal

14 break just now and we will resume at 6.15.

15 --- Recess taken at 6.03 p.m.

16 --- On resuming at 6.17 p.m.

17 [Private session]

18 (redacted)

19 (redacted)

20 (redacted)

21 (redacted)

22 (redacted)

23 (redacted)

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 [Open session]

6 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp.

8 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.

9 Cross-examination by Mr. Stamp:

10 Q. Good evening, sir.

11 A. Good evening.

12 Q. You said in evidence that after your visit to Kosovo on the 6th,

13 7th May 1999, you discovered that there were quite a lot of crimes,

14 serious crimes being committed in Kosovo, but that these crimes were not

15 being reported up to the Supreme Command or to the Supreme Command Staff.

16 What I'd like you to tell us is exactly where was the failure of

17 reporting? Who was it who was supposed to report who did not report?

18 A. In the chain of command it is quite clearly defined. The brigade

19 commands, the corps command, the army command, and the competent strategic

20 formations are the army commands that are supposed to report and

21 communicate with the Supreme Command Staff.

22 Q. So can I take it from your answer is that you are saying that it

23 was the 3rd Army command that failed to report up about these crimes that

24 you discovered were being perpetrated in Kosovo?

25 A. Yes. There was a failure there, but they had no failures in terms

1 of prosecuting those responsible, but they had failed to report what they

2 had done.

3 Q. So they failed to report the fact that these crimes were

4 committed, and they failed to report what they had done in respect to

5 these crimes; is that correct?

6 A. Yes. More or less that would be it.

7 Q. Now, the security administration that you headed also had a

8 security section in the 3rd Army that reported directly to you. Did that

9 security sector --

10 A. No, no.

11 Q. Sorry?

12 A. No. They were also part of the command system. So they were to

13 report to the subordinate army commander. They were the section, the

14 chief of the section was a member of the army commander's staff, and all

15 the reports that had come in were supposed to be integrated and security

16 problems were to be flagged in those reports.

17 Q. In March of 1999, who was the head of the security sector in the

18 3rd Army?

19 A. I think it was Stojanovic.

20 Q. Did not -- who was the head of the Pristina Corps security sector?

21 A. Momir Stojanovic.

22 Q. So who was the head the 3rd Corps security sector -- 3rd Army, I

23 beg your pardon, security sector?

24 A. Well, Momir Stojanovic was the head of the security, was the chief

25 of the security in the 3rd Army in March.

1 Q. Anyway, the question is this: Do you not know -- do you not know

2 that Momir Stojanovic sent reports, that is security service reports,

3 directly to the security administration in Belgrade during March or April?

4 A. Some reports were sent directly, and it is quite well-known which

5 reports are to be sent directly, but again with the knowledge of the

6 commander.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Visnjic, sorry. Yes?

8 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it seems to me that the

9 witness is not feeling well. That's why I got to my feet.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, are you able to carry on?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that I will be able to carry

12 on for a little while longer.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you very much. Thank you very much for

14 assisting.

15 Mr. Stamp, please.

16 MR. STAMP:

17 Q. General Farkas, the evidence of General Gajic was that you,

18 shortly after your appointment, you changed the system of reporting and

19 caused both the Pristina Corps security sector and the 3rd Army security

20 sector to report to you or to report to the security administration on a

21 daily basis from March 1999; is that correct?

22 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Cepic?

23 MR. CEPIC: Well, Your Honour, I think that is a completely --

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment. Let the witness answer first of

25 all, then I'm hear from you. Just a moment. Please sit down.

1 Please answer the question, Mr. Farkas.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did change the system but not

3 in the way that you say, that I or, rather, the security administration

4 was to be informed. This was all directly integrated into the system of

5 commands. It was in the chain of command. The brigades report to the

6 corps, the corps reports to the army, and the army reports up the chain of

7 command directly to the Supreme Command Staff and not the security

8 administration.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Just a moment, Mr. Stamp.

10 Riaz, can you switch off the link just to my voice so that the

11 general doesn't hear it.

12 Thank you.

13 Now, the reason, Mr. Cepic, I intervened there was we already have

14 had evidence from the witness that the system changed at the start of the

15 war, and the question wasn't framed in a way that was misleading to the

16 point it would make it difficult for him to answer. He was able to answer

17 and I was anxious that he should not be hearing what his answer should be

18 from you. That is why I intervened and he has now answer the question in

19 a fairly detailed way. That doesn't suggest he was mislead in any way He

20 may have given evidence you don't like, I don't know; but there's nothing

21 there to suggest that he was mislead..

22 MR. CEPIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, but the way

23 the question was framed it was simply wrong. It was misstated by my

24 learned colleague, Mr. Stamp, because at page 1, 5188, lines 1 through 9,

25 General Gajic gave a reply that is consistent with the reply provided by

1 General Farkas and the very point why I stood up, the reason why I did so,

2 is because my learned colleague misquoted the question, and he's referring

3 to something that was not stated, because General Gajic's evidence --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: You don't need to tell me something several times,

5 Mr. Cepic.

6 Mr. Stamp, what do you have to say about the inaccuracy of your

7 question?

8 MR. STAMP: Your Honours, I do not accept that what I represented

9 was an inaccurate reproduction.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We don't need to resolve it at this

11 stage. We'll move on to the next question.

12 Please restore the link.

13 Thank you for your patience, Mr. Farkas. We had to deal with a

14 matter of law just now. We can now proceed with the evidence having dealt

15 with that matter.

16 Mr. Stamp.

17 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honours.

18 Q. I think you can answer this very quickly. So it is your evidence

19 that the 3rd Army security sector did not have a responsibility to report

20 up to the security administration in Belgrade on daily basis?

21 A. No, only in --

22 Q. Very well.

23 A. -- Exceptional circumstances and for everything else --

24 Q. Can I take it that if the bottleneck as you described it once, if

25 the failure of reporting was at the level of the 3rd Army command, it was

1 General Pavkovic who was failing to report to the Supreme Command.

2 A. Yes, at the level of the 3rd Army.

3 Q. Very well.

4 A. And the commander of the 3rd Army was Pavkovic.

5 Q. You were shown a document which I'll summarise just to be speedy.

6 I won't show it to you unless you need to see it. This is 3D493 for the

7 record. And that is a briefing that you had that you were present for at

8 the chief of the Supreme Command Staff, General Ojdanic, dated the 8th of

9 June. And in that document there is again a report by you about the

10 failure of reporting up. That's the 8th of June. Was the problem of

11 General Pavkovic's failure to report up that you discovered from the 5th

12 to the 6th of June not resolved by the 8th of June? I beg your pardon.

13 I'll withdraw the question. Was a problem that you discovered about the

14 failure to report up at about the 5th to the 6th of May not resolved by

15 the 8th of June?

16 A. Well, in a way it was resolved. The reports, regular reports,

17 came in, I guess, but at this briefing, that's the last days of the war,

18 there were technical problems and other problems related to reporting. So

19 General Pavkovic cannot be the only one to blame for that.

20 Q. Is that your explanation as to why it is that this reporting

21 problem arising from General Pavkovic's failure was not resolved after it

22 was discovered after one month, is your last answer your explanation for

23 that?

24 A. Well, after the meeting, yes, it was resolved. And after the

25 meeting with Mr. Milosevic some things were dealt with, some things were

1 ordered, and for a while regular reports came in, but then again the

2 problem cropped up when it came to the withdrawal of the troops from

3 Kosovo, so that I really don't have an idea of the intensity of the

4 reporting from the 3rd Army. I don't have anything very accurate, but I

5 do have information that the information they were receiving were not

6 sufficient.

7 Q. I also refer to you another document that you were shown. This is

8 3D633, dated the 2nd of June, 1999, and this is what you said, this is a

9 quote of you, and I'd like you to focus on the day as well 6th of June,

10 1999: "Crimes are being committed by all units in Kosovo. Reports on

11 these acts are not going through regular channels and lines of command."

12 A. Yes. Yes, I have that document.

13 Q. And at page 3 you also said that: "Very little of what is

14 contained in our combat reports indicates the negative phenomena," and

15 you're talking about criminal activities.

16 How is it that the problems in respect of reporting these crimes

17 persisted up to the 2nd of June, 1999?

18 A. After the meeting of the 17th, all the crimes that were committed

19 and that were detected were dealt with, and then the chief of staff of the

20 Supreme Command issued another order to the judicial organs to -- both to

21 the courts and to the prosecutor's offices to assist and to produce an

22 overview of all the cases that had been prosecuted to date. So that up to

23 that moment everything had been cleared up and it was known what was

24 prosecuted, what was not. That was in the report -- or, rather, I know

25 that this report was made by the courts, but I don't know the details. So

1 up until that date -- or as of that date all those problems were solved.

2 Q. As of which date?

3 A. But then when --

4 Q. As of which date?

5 A. Well, as of the meeting of the 17th, because the order was issued

6 at that day, and I don't know when the courts actually produced this

7 report about --

8 Q. General, how --

9 A. -- The cases that were prosecuted, but there is this order of the

10 chief of the Supreme Command Staff.

11 Q. General, you are saying that it was solved as of the meeting of

12 the 17th of May, which is why I quoted what you said on the 2nd of June.

13 How can you say it was solved on the 17th of May when on the 2nd of June

14 you are reporting to the chief of General Staff the same problem?

15 A. Because a new situation happened because problems occurred once

16 the forces began to pull out from the area --

17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

18 A. And there were problems involving the uncovering --

19 Q. I'm sorry, I interrupted you. You said there were problems

20 involving the uncovering of what?

21 A. Yes, uncovering -- or reporting the uncovering the crimes,

22 producing adequate documents about cases to be prosecuted, and at the same

23 time parallel to that we had problems with the regrouping of the forces,

24 the communication lines, but primarily the problems involved finding

25 evidence and producing appropriate dossiers that the courts could use. We

1 had the problems that we couldn't access those areas even at that time.

2 Q. I'm talking about the 2nd of June. Which areas couldn't you

3 access?

4 A. Yes, that's what we're talking about, the 2nd of June.

5 Q. Which areas couldn't you access then which affected your

6 investigations?

7 A. Because the units were preparing for the pull-out, and they could

8 not produce documents, valid documents, that could be used in court. We

9 were in the territory at that time, but you know that you need certain

10 preliminary investigative measures before an appropriate investigation is

11 launched to produce a proper document.

12 So there was knowledge, but it was impossible to produce

13 appropriate, valid documents.

14 Q. General, did you -- General --

15 A. They started --

16 Q. General, didn't you tell us in your testimony today that at the

17 lower levels, brigade and below, the reporting and investigations were

18 regular and proper, there were no problems with that?

19 A. Yes, that's what I said.

20 Q. Therefore, General, what you're telling us now could not, I submit

21 to you, be an explanation as to why there was still a problem with the

22 reporting up of crimes and what was done in respect to the crimes by the

23 3rd Army command in June.

24 A. Well, there were no regular reports. There were the problems that

25 I described, that valid evidence could not be produced of that.

1 Q. General, that, with respect, sorry, is not an answer to my

2 question, but I'll move on for the sake of time.

3 You mention the meeting on the 17th of June. Can I just ask you

4 quickly -- thank you very much, Counsel. The meeting on the 17th of May.

5 Persons from the -- well, one person from the MUP, Rade Markovic,

6 and persons from the VJ were present, as well as the Supreme Commander,

7 President Milosevic. Mr. Sainovic was also there. What was his role

8 there?

9 A. He was the deputy prime minister. I don't know in what capacity

10 he was there, but in a way he was charged with monitoring the situation in

11 Kosovo as the deputy prime minister. That's the impression that I had on

12 the basis of what he said, what he proposed, what he -- the way he agreed

13 to General Pavkovic's proposal to set up the state commission to deal with

14 all those crimes and problems that occurred in Kosovo.

15 Q. Very well. You're speaking about your impressions, so I'll move

16 from there.

17 General Vasiljevic said that after that meeting you and the

18 remainder of those persons from the VJ left but left Rade Markovic and

19 Mr. Sainovic with Mr. Milosevic. Do you recall that?

20 A. I don't recall who remained there. We, the generals, headed out

21 because as soon as we got up General Ojdanic started issuing tasks to us

22 even as we started walking.

23 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...

24 A. I don't know who stayed behind. I don't know where general and

25 how general was able to see that.

1 Q. And we have a testimony, and I think including yours -- or may I

2 just phrase the question this way: Is it not correct that after

3 General Ojdanic received the reports from the security organs about the

4 crimes in Kosovo, and he began receiving those reports, according to you,

5 from early May 1999, that he made or issued orders as the concrete steps

6 to be taken in investigating and prosecuting those crimes in Kosovo?

7 A. I'm sorry, I don't know what you're asking me.

8 Q. Is it correct, is the evidence of some persons that have come here

9 to testify on behalf of General Ojdanic correct that he issued orders to

10 investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes in Kosovo after he

11 became aware of it in May 1999?

12 A. That's correct. He did issue orders and measures were taken

13 beforehand and all orders were issued in order for those things not to be

14 done, but after that meeting he issued orders to the courts, to the

15 security service, to the military prosecutors' offices and to the commands

16 of the strategic groups in the strictest possible terms that things --

17 measures should be taken to clear up all those crimes fully.

18 Q. You're also saying and I take it, this is the question, that there

19 was no need for further measures, because although you discovered that

20 crimes were being committed in Kosovo, the problem was that they were not

21 being reported up. The 3rd Army was doing all that was necessary in

22 respect of these crimes.

23 If all that was to be done in respect to these crimes was to be

24 done by the 3rd Army what was the need for the measures ordered by General

25 Ojdanic?

1 A. Well, there were problems, because then in addition to these

2 activities there was ongoing mobilisation and demobilisation, and when we

3 had over 13.000 men in that area, I think, new units came in and new

4 commanders as well, this had to be dealt with. One had to put a stop to

5 all of that. At the same time the judiciary and the Prosecution offices

6 were supposed to intensify their work in terms of processing these crimes.

7 So this need existed not only in the 3rd Army but in all armies. These

8 orders and warnings went to all the strategic commands. To Montenegro as

9 well and so on.

10 Q. You sometimes use the term para-police, and I believe at other

11 times the term paramilitaries was used. Can you tell us what you mean by

12 each of these terms? When you use the term para-police what do you mean,

13 and when you use the term paramilitary, what do you mean?

14 A. Well, what I mean is that a group of people get together, they

15 organise themselves, they get police uniforms, and they introduce

16 themselves as members of the police, and they commit crimes and they loot

17 outside the system of the existing system in the police structure. It's a

18 group, renegades if I can put it that way. They get uniforms, they use

19 the name of police, and they do what they do, commit crimes, loot, rape

20 and so on. As for paramilitaries, we said that paramilitary formations

21 did not exist in the army of Yugoslavia except in the territory of Kosovo

22 where it was the KLA that was the main paramilitary force. It was outside

23 any kind of system. It was armed. It fought and committed crimes against

24 their own people and against the JNA. They are a real paramilitary

25 formation. Within the army of Yugoslavia, there could not have been any

1 such formations, because through orders and warnings and instructions

2 issued by the chief of the Supreme Command Staff it was regulated how

3 volunteers should be taken in. They could not have been grouped, and they

4 had gone through this procedure that had already been explained.

5 Q. General, I'm not sure if I understand your last answer. Are you

6 saying that the term "paramilitary," as far as you use it, applies

7 exclusively to the KLA?

8 A. We did not have any other renegade groups. All the others, the

9 military conscripts were within the organised legal army that was based on

10 the constitution and law, whereas these were outside that system. They

11 wore uniforms, and they carried weapons, and they were not internationally

12 recognised either as an armed force, and they were not regulated by law.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note could Mr. Stamp please switch

14 off his microphone.

15 MR. STAMP: Excuse me.

16 Q. Were there not groups of persons wearing uniforms committing

17 crimes in Kosovo that were attached to the MUP of Serbia?

18 A. I tried to explain a few moments ago, and then it was said -- or,

19 rather, we ultimately came to it that they were organically part of the

20 MUP or of state security. According to our first information, we thought

21 that they were not, that they were some kind of para-formations wearing

22 police uniforms, and that is why we -- when we found out informed the MUP

23 about that. The reaction to that was the one that I already described on

24 the part of the MUP.

25 At the moment when we found out about them, we sent information

1 about that. They existed before, and it was defined later that they were

2 a reserve force of the MUP and state security, and then we got that

3 explanation. We gave up. They exist, end of story.

4 Such units did not exist --

5 Q. Well --

6 A. -- As a whole within the army of Yugoslavia.

7 Q. I was asking you generally about these units. Do you know of any

8 order from the Supreme Command -- sorry, from the chief of the command,

9 Supreme Command Staff, that paramilitaries were to be disarmed? Or I

10 think maybe we should have a look at --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Could you look at P1902, please. Very well. I understand that

13 there might be some difficulties with that document. I'll move on

14 quickly.

15 In an area where -- in Kosovo in particular, in Kosovo where the

16 VJ was undertaking combat tasks and there might be civilians in the

17 neighbourhood, was it incumbent on the VJ commanders in those areas to

18 disarm and, if necessary, arrest armed paramilitary formations or members

19 of armed paramilitary formations?

20 A. Yes. Yes, the chief of the Supreme Command Staff ordered that by

21 way of one of his orders that in the zones the army and all units should

22 check their respective areas, and if they find any paramilitary

23 formations, that is to say such organisations or groups of people armed,

24 in uniform, those who do not belong to their organic structure, they

25 should disarm them, arrest them, and initiate the appropriate procedure.

1 This kind of order does exist and it pertains to these possible

2 paramilitaries. And also there was a deadline involved in terms of when

3 there should be reporting back, and I think you should have a document

4 about that.

5 THE INTERPRETER: There was an interruption in the tone,

6 interpreters note.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In the area of responsibility, well,

8 now we're talking about the 3rd Army there was no such thing this. The

9 commander of the battalion checks his own zone, and then the brigade, and

10 so on; and they did not come across people who wore the uniform of the

11 army of Yugoslavia without belonging to any organised unit according to

12 establishment.

13 MR. STAMP:

14 Q. How about other armed formations in the zone of operations of a

15 military unit? Was the responsibility of the command of that unit to

16 disarm these formations in their zone of operations when combat activity

17 was to be undertaken?

18 A. Well, absolutely. That was regulated precisely through that

19 order, that they search their own area and that they should control their

20 zone of responsibility, that they are responsible for, to check that there

21 were no such groups outside their own units. That was the core of that

22 order. And I think that there was feedback information that in the zones

23 of responsibility of their units there were no armed paramilitary

24 organisations except for these KLA units, and they could not disarm them.

25 They allowed for this possibility --

1 Q. General --

2 A. -- But you know what it's like.

3 Q. General, we've had evidence before the Court of many crimes being

4 committed against Kosovo Albanians by armed paramilitary or members of

5 armed paramilitary formations in the presence of VJ units and during

6 operations that VJ units were conducting. Did the security sector receive

7 information about these crimes?

8 A. All the information that was received was processed further, all

9 the information that was received: Commands, security organs, the

10 judiciary. As for these crimes that were committed, they were prosecuted.

11 Q. You were asked to give an example of -- of persons prosecuted for

12 crimes against international humanitarian law or war crimes, and you

13 mentioned one case of an officer who went along with a group of soldiers

14 was involved in the killing of approximately 10 civilians, some of whom

15 were thrown in a well. Can you recall whether or not the name of that

16 officer was Stojisic, Colonel Stojisic?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Are you aware, General, that the case in respect to

19 Colonel Stojisic was dismissed?

20 A. General Stojisic. I don't know.

21 Q. It's Colonel Stojisic.

22 A. I don't know. At the moment when -- at the moment when a certain

23 case goes before the judiciary, we have no further jurisdiction over these

24 cases unless the prosecutor's office and the investigation organs of the

25 courts do not ask us for additional investigations and additional

1 information regarding such cases.

2 Q. But General --

3 A. The outcome of all of these cases is in the court archives, and

4 the court can give specific answers to this question -- or, rather, the

5 military judiciary can give concrete answer. I don't want to speculate.

6 Q. General, you referred to that case as --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- As a drastic case. Are you saying that you would not recall

9 the outcome of a case --

10 A. One of the drastic cases.

11 Q. Are you saying that you would not recall the outcome of a case in

12 which a colonel of the VJ is alleged to have killed 10 people, 10

13 civilians?

14 A. I cannot. I really cannot go into that. There are entire lists

15 as to what was done in accordance with General Ojdanic's orders, and you

16 have all these cases listed specifically and their outcomes. It's a long

17 list, and you will probably have an opportunity to hear about this when

18 the court organs testify, because we were not in a position to see how the

19 courts finished their job. We were out there to prevent crimes and --

20 Q. Very well.

21 A. -- And to deal with any if committed. You will get specific

22 information without any speculation on my part.

23 Q. What I'm asking is this: Do you know how many officers of the VJ

24 or how many cases against officers of the VJ were presented by the

25 security organs to the military courts for crimes committed against

1 Kosovar Albanian citizens in 1999?

2 A. The security service compiled that within their commands because

3 these crimes happen out in the field in units, so that is how they

4 participate in that --

5 Q. But you were --

6 A. As for this number of crimes --

7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters could not hear the rest of the

8 answer.

9 MR. STAMP: Sorry.

10 Q. You were the head of the security services or security

11 administration for the army so you can answer whether you know or not how

12 many officers of the VJ were prosecuted or how many cases were presented

13 against officers by the security administration of the VJ in 1999.

14 A. We did not keep such records. Such records were kept by the court

15 and the prosecutor's office. I'm saying again that we did not follow the

16 outcome of these trials unless they gave us additional tasks.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Farkas, that's not the question you're being

18 asked. How many cases did your administration present to the military

19 prosecution authorities which involved officers of the VJ allegedly

20 committing crimes against Kosovo Albanians? Now surely you have records

21 of that.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, my administration did not

23 because this was happening out in the field. I already explained that

24 these criminal reports were filed in the units where this actually

25 happened. My administration did not have such crimes committed within it.

1 It is the commands and the security organs of the units concerned that

2 provided this information. It is the courts that had the numbers and

3 everything that happened. The security administration is an institution.

4 It doesn't even have any soldiers. It has drivers and --

5 THE INTERPRETER: There was an interruption again, interpreters

6 note.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So all of this was happening down

8 there in the units and they were in charge of doing that.

9 MR. STAMP:

10 Q. Yes. But, General, according to you General Ojdanic issued orders

11 where these types of crimes were dealt with as a matter of priority. The

12 security organs in the field, in the brigade, in the battalions reported

13 up to your administration. You're saying that you do not know how many

14 cases they prepared against VJ officers in 1999, and that question you can

15 answer yes or no, that you know or you do not know.

16 A. Well, it's a simple question but it went up the chain of command

17 and that's where the problem was. The security organs integrated into

18 brigade commands and then through the commander's signature this went up

19 the chain of command, this security aspect too, that is to say involving

20 these crimes. We've already explained that there was this bottleneck and

21 that there were these problems and that that did not come up to the chief

22 of General Staff. You have to understand that there is no direct

23 communication between the chief, between me, and the organ down there in

24 the brigade and the battalion.

25 Q. General, I'm not asking you about a report that crimes were being

1 committed now. I'm asking you about a report upwards that people, VJ

2 members, were being prosecuted. You're saying that you did not get those

3 reports upwards even after the orders of General Ojdanic?

4 A. That's not what I'm saying. I didn't put it that way. Again

5 there were problems regarding this reporting up until that moment. After

6 that, things started developing normally again, but just before the war

7 was over new problems cropped up in relation to these units and so on, and

8 the military conscripts who were in Kosovo with their families and now the

9 army was supposed to withdraw and the families were supposed to stay

10 behind and so on and so forth. There were other problems that came to the

11 fore then and then certain crimes were committed and they prevented us

12 from intensively working on clearing this up.

13 From the 17th of May onwards, up until some date --

14 Q. General, General --

15 A. -- You probably have it in the court reports up until what time

16 this was being cleared up, processed --

17 Q. General, you're not answering my question?

18 A. -- And punishment meted out and I cannot talk about --

19 Q. Okay. General, I'll move on. Time is very limited.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, how long will you be?

21 MR. STAMP: I think maybe I could perhaps stop now because there

22 might be re-examination, and he has indicated that.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask the interpreters first of all how much

24 slack we have for this evening?

25 THE INTERPRETER: Fifteen minutes. Would that be okay?

1 JUDGE BONOMY: That's certainly very generous. If the lights go

2 out, we'll -- I don't see any howls or hear any howls of protest from any

3 other quarter. Your re-examination will be how long, Mr. Visnjic?

4 MR. VISNJIC: [Interpretation] Nothing in re-examination for the

5 time being, Your Honour.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, can you do it in 10 minutes, Mr. Stamp?

7 MR. STAMP: Yes, Your Honour.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

9 MR. STAMP:

10 Q. We have had evidence -- and I'm moving on to something else.

11 We've had evidence that civilians in Kosovo were armed by the VJ in 1998.

12 Indeed we have evidence that General Samardzic said at --

13 A. That a question?

14 Q. I'm coming to the question, sir. General Samardzic said that

15 47.000 weapons had been issued in Kosovo to civilians in 1998, to Serb

16 civilians. Did the Ministry of Defence play a role in the issuing of

17 these weapons?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Very well.

20 A. At that time that you're talking about, I was the assistant

21 minister for civilian defence, and I don't know anything about the

22 distribution of the weapons. I know about the number that was on the

23 basis of my order and the establishment that had been signed was

24 distributed to the civilian structures of the society, the civilian

25 protection unit, the encryption protection unit, the civilian defence, and

1 a little over 6.500 weapons were issued, although the establishment

2 envisaged that there should be about 9.000 people. But we didn't have

3 enough personnel to fill all those posts. This was not just handed out to

4 people. It was placed in depots, and according to my order the weapons

5 were to be distributed in accordance with the achieved degree of

6 mobilisation. As a unit was mobilised weapons were issues. This is all I

7 know about this issue.

8 Q. Very well. During the conflict, after the 24th of March, there is

9 evidence indicating that what were described in orders as armed non-Siptar

10 population were deployed for operations in conjunction with VJ forces or

11 in support of operations by VJ forces. Do you know about that?

12 A. Well, the army couldn't distribute, at least not on the basis of

13 the existing establishment. They may have called up the reserve force and

14 then distributed weapons to them, but it is possible that the weapons that

15 you're talking about were distributed to some Civil Protection Units that

16 had been mobilised - I don't know the number now - or the civilian defence

17 units, but in accordance with the establishment constitution and the

18 law --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters doesn't hear the rest of the

20 witness.

21 MR. STAMP:

22 Q. General, I moved on from the distribution of weapons. What I'm

23 asking is this: When armed civilians are deployed for action in support

24 of the VJ as we have had evidence that there were in 1999, during the

25 conflict, do they not come under the jurisdiction of the VJ if any of

1 their members commit crimes?

2 A. Well, according to this logic they should. The moment they get

3 into the ranks, the moment they line up, if there are not enough uniforms

4 they bear insignia indicating that as of that moment on they belong to an

5 army unit and that they should act or conduct themselves as the army --

6 JUDGE BONOMY: General, you've answered the question.

7 Mr. Stamp, please.

8 MR. STAMP:

9 Q. Where armed civilians are deployed for operations in support of

10 the VJ and individual members of those armed civilians commit crimes

11 during those operations, was it not the responsibility of the organs of

12 the security sector to arrest them?

13 A. Well, the role of the security organs is to arrest anyone who is

14 found in the commission of the crime, and these civilians were part of

15 organised units of the army even if they didn't wear uniforms, and they

16 absolutely were subject to the same --

17 Q. Thank you.

18 A. -- Sanctions as the other soldiers.

19 Q. When -- and I'm moving on to something else now, General, quickly.

20 When you were -- you were reassigned from the ministry of -- of defence to

21 the staff of the Supreme Command, or to become the head of the security

22 administration, wouldn't you agree with me that you were being placed in a

23 position that gave you more responsibility for decision-making at a

24 tactical and strategic level of the VJ than you were before when you were

25 in the Ministry of Defence?

1 A. No. This function in terms of its size and structure is lower

2 than the one that I held before. I was the assistant defence minister

3 covering a whole large sector, the whole system. I was in charge of

4 producing the defence plan for the country, and here I was responsible

5 only for a part of that system, only for the military.

6 Q. I had a series of questions in respect of this but I'll just ask

7 you one. We have had evidence that on many occasions bodies were

8 transported from various places in Kosovo to Batajnica and other places in

9 Serbia during the conflict, what is numbering to over 800. When did it

10 first come to your attention as head of the VJ security administration

11 that upwards of 800 bodies of Kosovo Albanians were transferred to Serbia

12 during the time when you occupied that post?

13 A. I don't know the number. I wasn't aware of the number, but that's

14 something that I heard after the war. I heard after the war that

15 something had happened there and that this was within the purview of the

16 MUP and that some investigations were being carried out, but the military

17 had nothing to do with this. It had no jurisdiction, no tasks to do, and

18 it had no problem with it.

19 Q. Batajnica where most of the bodies were found is a VJ compound on

20 which the MUP had a range. You're saying that you did not receive any

21 information, or you did not know about bodies being buried on this VJ

22 compound?

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Protest from Mr. Cepic.

24 MR. CEPIC: Again, Your Honour, if you allow me to say again the

25 question which Mr. Stamp asked the witness, it is not VJ compound. We

1 never heard before that this compound is VJ compound. So the base -- the

2 base for this question I don't know really where my learned friend found.

3 We never heard in this case.

4 MR. STAMP: I think the evidence was that -- I think the evidence

5 was that this is a VJ compound on which the MUP had a firing range. You

6 had to pass your VJ check-point then a MUP check-point to get there.

7 In any case, the witness has said that he --

8 JUDGE BONOMY: My -- my recollection's similar to Mr. Stamp's, but

9 I wouldn't be prepared to buy on it solidly, so we shall allow you to ask

10 the question without reference to the layout, Mr. Stamp. If you want the

11 witness to clarify whether he has heard nothing about this, then obviously

12 you would be able to make submissions if in fact the basis that you've

13 originally stated is shown to be correct.

14 MR. STAMP: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Q. So, Witness, when you heard -- or I choose to ask you this: Did

16 you not know -- or did you know, did you know, that the area at Batajnica

17 where these bodies were found was part of a VJ compound?

18 A. That was not part of a VJ facility. It was quite clearly

19 delineated. There was a high fence. There were two gates, entrance

20 gates. So there were two separate facilities, one next to the other. The

21 military had no jurisdiction over the facility that was used by the MUP.

22 As you said, there were two check-points where you could get into one or

23 the other facility. One was under the jurisdiction of the military and

24 the other was under the jurisdiction of the MUP. The only thing they had

25 in common was the fact that they were next to each other. They were

1 adjacent.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Stamp, we --

3 MR. STAMP: Yes I thank you for your indulgence.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: If you want more time then you have to ask for us

5 to continue tomorrow.

6 MR. STAMP: I am finished. Thank you very much, Your Honours.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you. Mr. Visnjic.

8 MR. VISNJIC: No questions, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

10 Mr. Farkas, that completes your evidence. You will not be

11 required to return tomorrow. You are free to leave as soon as we adjourn,

12 and the link will now be disconnected.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The Trial Chamber would like to express its

15 gratitude to the audiovisual staff, the interpreters, transcribers,

16 security officers, court staff, for all your cooperation this evening in

17 assisting us to complete the evidence of this -- of this witness.

18 Another day, Mr. Ackerman, perhaps.

19 We will be sitting unusual hours tomorrow to sit around about the

20 Plenary meeting of Judges at noon. We hope to be able to adhere to the

21 schedule announced, which means we will resume tomorrow at 9.00.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.27 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 26th day

24 of September, 2007, at 9.00 a.m.

25